Riot RIOT NASDAQ
Bitcoin mining operator; primary sites at Rockdale and Corsicana, Texas.
Corporate history
Riot Platforms began as a vertically-integrated Bitcoin mining company. As of December 31, 2023, Riot operated 112,944 miners with 12.4 exahash-per-second (EH/s) total hash rate and mined 6,626 Bitcoin, up 19.3% from 5,554 Bitcoin in 2022. The company's Rockdale, Texas facility was believed to be North America's largest Bitcoin mining facility by developed…
Read the full history
Riot Platforms began as a vertically-integrated Bitcoin mining company. As of December 31, 2023, Riot operated 112,944 miners with 12.4 exahash-per-second (EH/s) total hash rate and mined 6,626 Bitcoin, up 19.3% from 5,554 Bitcoin in 2022. The company's Rockdale, Texas facility was believed to be North America's largest Bitcoin mining facility by developed capacity. A second large-scale facility at Corsicana, Texas was under development.
In 2024, Riot executed two strategic initiatives. It acquired Block Mining, Inc., a Kentucky-based Bitcoin miner with two operational sites in Paducah initially totaling 60 MW of capacity. Simultaneously, the company adopted a "Bitcoin Treasury Strategy," acquiring and holding Bitcoin on its balance sheet via debt and equity financing rather than monetizing all mined Bitcoin. The Corsicana facility reached 400 MW of operational capacity during Phase I of development.
In 2025, Riot repositioned as a digital infrastructure company, establishing a data center platform to lease compute capacity to non-mining customers in AI and high-performance computing. The company operated three major facilities—Rockdale (700 MW developed), Corsicana (400 MW developed), and Kentucky (137 MW developed)—and organized operations into Bitcoin Mining and Engineering business segments. Bitcoin Mining generated revenue from block rewards; the data center platform provided revenue from capacity leasing. Earlier company history not covered in these sources.
Street view
Analyst consensus, peer set, and quarterly-EPS surprise history. Sourced from Finnhub; refreshed nightly.
Analyst consensus (2026-10, 28 analysts)
Show last 6 months
| Month | SB | B | H | S | SS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05 | 6 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-06 | 6 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-07 | 6 | 19 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-08 | 6 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-09 | 6 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-10 | 6 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
Peer tickers (green = also tracked in The Analysis)
Recent quarterly EPS: estimate vs actual
| Quarter end | Estimate | Actual | Surprise | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-09-30 (Q3) | 0.0683 | 0.26 | +0.1917 | +280.7% |
| 2025-12-31 (Q4) | -0.2912 | -2.06 | -1.7688 | -607.4% |
| 2026-03-31 (Q1) | -0.6045 | -1.44 | -0.8355 | -138.2% |
| 2026-06-30 (Q2) | -0.2709 | -0.68 | -0.4091 | -151.0% |
The Analysis
Frequently asked
What we haven't been told
The SurBred 15 early-detection bovine pregnancy test and its distribution arrangement with Merial are the clearest disappearance in the record. In September 2004 the company described SurBred 15 as a product (claim 21096), said Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094), and noted that the antigen-based test was not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100). Neither the product nor the Merial relationship appears in any later claim. By October 2012 the company was instead describing an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property to an outside party (claim 21049). No sales figures, termination notice or explanation for the Merial arrangement's end appears on record. Both 2004 claims remain at 'stated'. That status reflects only that they were said, not that anything came of them.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, follows the same path. It was introduced in September 2004 (claim 21097), along with the disclosure that it would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101) and a general reference to pipeline products (claim 21098). It is never mentioned again. Nothing on record says whether any filing was made or whether the program was dropped, sold, or folded into the 2012 animal health license.
In October 2010 the board was authorized to carry out a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The ledger automatically flagged both claims as delayed on 2026-09-28 and then moved them to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. Those transitions were made by the ledger, not by the company. The record contains no later statement saying whether the split happened, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, became the company's central product in October 2012 (claim 21047). Management said at the time that it was pursuing FDA clearance (claim 21050). No later claim reports a submission, a clearance, or a decision to stop. The next substantive corporate event on record is the October 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claim 20980), which says nothing about where the appendicitis program stood.
Some caution is warranted about the rest of the record. The set of claims provided ends at the 2016 BiOptix entry. Several other claims were automatically flagged after their promised dates, including the GHP Horwath auditor appointments (claims 20720 and 20713), the 2014 auditor ratification (claim 21012) and Stephen A. Williams joining the board (claim 21038). These are routine governance matters, and their current statuses more likely reflect missing follow-up filings than any change by management. Claims 20711 and 20712 were flagged and then returned to 'stated', which suggests the automated transitions are still unsettled.
What we aren't being told
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was later terminated (claim #21087); what has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, whether any earn-out or royalty survived, and whether the seller was a related party connected to Hurst, so who was paid what, and on what terms, for the business that became the company's foundation?
The company disclosed on 2005-09-25 that Roger D. Hurst's employment was terminated, cited as claim #21087, less than a year after it announced his exclusive employment agreement on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099); what has not been said is whether the termination was for cause, what severance or option acceleration was paid, and whether any non-compete or IP-assignment obligations continued, so what did the departure cost the company and why did it happen?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, that it held license arrangements with three universities, and that it sold over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claims #21094, #21095 and #21102; what has not been said is the term, minimum-purchase or milestone economics of the Merial deal, the names of the three licensor universities and their royalty rates, or how concentrated the 30-product revenue was among unnamed customers, so how much revenue did each relationship produce and how much was owed out?
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both still marked not yet verifiable; what has not been said is whether the split was ever executed and at what ratio, which matters for reading every later share-count figure, including the 60,000,000-share authorization increase in claim #21040 and the 1,800,000-share incentive-plan increase in claim #21011, so was the split done, when, and at what ratio?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that described a 2012 common stock offering and the pursuit of FDA clearance for AppyScore (claims #21048 and #21050); what has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, the size and pricing of the offering, and the regulatory pathway and expected timing for AppyScore, so why did nearly the whole board leave at once and what were the capital and clearance plans they left behind?
The company disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 and the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition on 2016-10-06, cited as claims #21049 and #20980; what has not been said is the licensee's identity and the upfront, milestone and royalty terms of the license, or the consideration, share issuance and resulting dilution of the BiOptix deal, so who acquired rights to the legacy animal health assets, what did the company receive, and what did it pay for BiOptix?
Customer disclosures, read
Riot's record is long on signed paper but short on named revenue-paying customers, and most of its agreements sit on the purchasing side of the ledger. The predecessor diagnostics business named its counterparties clearly: license arrangements with the University of Idaho, the University of Wyoming and Washington University (claim 21095), and an exclusive worldwide marketing right for SurBred 15 held by Merial (claim 21094). That Merial right was conditional, though, taking effect only once the product was fully developed. The same filing's reference to more than 30 products sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102) names no buyer. The 2012 exclusive license of all animal-health IP went to an unidentified animal health company in exchange for milestones and royalties (claim 21049), so the predecessor's most consequential monetization event was never attributed to a counterparty.
The 2018 pivot produced several definitive, named agreements: a Software Licensing and Services Agreement with Coinsquare (claim 15417), an agreement with Synapse and Evolve Bank and Trust (claims 15376, 15346), and a master services agreement with Shift Markets (claims 15367, 15347). These were vendor and infrastructure contracts for a planned exchange rather than customer wins, and Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady positions (claims 15512, 14957, 14959, 14958) are equity stakes and are repeated across filings, which inflates the apparent volume of relationships. Digital Green Energy (claims 15515, 15455), XMS Capital (claim 14997) and Marcum (claim 13887) are a subsidiary, an adviser and an auditor, not commercial counterparties.
In the mining era Riot is mostly the customer. It took co-location from Coinmint (claims 14938, 14275), which became month-to-month and was then ended (claim 13864). It placed $480 million of Bitmain purchase orders (claim 13261) and signed MicroBT supply terms whose 66,560-unit annual volumes are options, not commitments (claim 11999). The Whinstone power purchase agreement leaves the energy supplier unnamed (claim 14254). ESS Metron is named but labeled a key strategic partner (claim 14160), which describes a supplier relationship.
Rhodium, identified as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863), is the only named revenue counterparty in the crypto period, which points to concentration in hosting without quantifying it. No revenue, backlog or contract-value figures appear on the record, so the disclosed revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled against the announced deals. The disclosed dollar figures measure capital outflow to suppliers, not customer income.
Delivery vs. promise
The record supplied ends mid-entry in March 2020, so this read covers only the Oklahoma City era. Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky, which are the projects that matter today, have no capacity or timeline claims in the excerpt. Any judgment on Riot's current delivery pace has to wait for those entries.
Within Oklahoma City, the power envelope never moved. The 12 MW figure appears at launch (15526, 15507) and is restated unchanged through early 2020 (15305, 14948). What scaled was density. The miner count went from 3,500 installed (15505) to 8,000 by August 2018 (15456), which met the full-deployment target in 15506 within weeks. The hash-rate story is less tidy. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) was quietly replaced by a 95 PH/s maximum (15343, 15306, 15284), and no filing in the record reconciles the two. The later jump to 248 PH/s (14947) came from swapping in S17 Pro units inside the same 12 MW, not from new capacity. The operating fleet was also restated at 7,400 units (14974), below the earlier 8,000, again without explanation.
The timeline claims are mostly about tenure, not build-out. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454) was extended in short increments, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then through May 2020 (15015). That pattern points to a company that never secured long-term site control. The withdrawn Kairos combination (14949) and the eventual cancelled status of both Oklahoma City and Massena fit that reading. The equipment-delivery dates held: the S17 Pro tranches due December 2019 and January 2020 (15047, 15018) are the only verified claims in the set, and 4,000 units in service (14979) matches the purchase (14945, 14951).
Independent corroboration is thin. Apart from those two delivery verifications, the record contains no permits, utility agreements or interconnection-queue entries for any site. That is the key gap for the Texas and Kentucky assets.
Over the next 90 days, the first priority is to ingest the post-2020 claims for Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky. After that, the useful tests are three. First, whether announced megawatts at Corsicana are backed by ERCOT interconnection filings and energization milestones. Second, whether partially operational sites report energized capacity separately from contracted capacity. Third, whether any capacity or date restatements are acknowledged, unlike the Oklahoma City hash-rate revision.
Capital & dilution trajectory
Riot's record divides into two distinct regimes, and the second dwarfs the first. Through 2017 the company financed itself the way a small issuer does. It repeatedly enlarged its incentive plan and authorized shares, authorized a reverse split (claims 20721 and 20715), and closed a $4.75M package of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim 20904). The 2018–2019 transition to mining continued that patchwork character: the company said it was 'currently pursuing debt and equity capital' (claim 15351), the BMSS waiver payments are recorded as delayed (claim 15432), and it issued $3.36M of senior secured convertibles with warrants attached (claim 15267). The $100M Wainwright ATM (claim 15241) marked the move to continuous equity issuance. That issuance then scaled quickly: a $500M program in 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in 2023 (claim 12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim 11957), and a further $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock rose in step, from 340M (claim 13903) to 680M (claim 5964). Several entries here are share counts recorded in dollar fields, so treat them as share authorizations rather than capital raised. In this period the stated use of proceeds tracks the deployment reasonably well. The ATM programs coincide with large hardware commitments, including the verified $480M Bitmain order (claim 14271) and the $162.9M order (claim 12382). The Bitfarms stake of roughly $111M (claim 6015) was disclosed as funded from working capital (claim 6012). From December 2024 the mix changed. The $594.4M 0.75% convertible due 2030 (claim 31776) funded bitcoin purchases (claim 31759), and a Coinbase facility collateralized by bitcoin grew from $100M to $200M (claims 21929 and 21930), with 3,300 BTC pledged (claim 26668). This looks like a deliberate strategy: preserve the treasury under a no-sale policy for self-mined bitcoin (claim 31777) while borrowing against it within a stated ~40% debt-to-BTC ceiling (claim 31775). However, equity issuance has not stopped. A $99M ATM raise sits alongside the claim that capex was funded from cash (claims 26675 and 26673), and the assertion that 2025 capex is fully funded (claim 31774) is not yet verifiable. A sophisticated reader should watch four things: how quickly the new $500M ATM is drawn; whether leverage stays within the 40% ceiling if bitcoin prices fall; the Coinbase loan maturity, which is recorded as delayed (claim 4847); and whether the 2030 notes are eventually settled in shares. The record contains no insider transactions and is truncated after claim 3933, so conclusions about the most recent period are provisional.
What we haven't been told
The settlement agreement between Riot and Bitfarms announced in September 2024 (claim 5704) has been withdrawn from the company's public record as of early September 2026, with no explanation offered to shareholders. The claim documented a "Riot and Bitfarms enter settlement agreement" promised by September 23, 2024, but transitioned from stated to withdrawn on September 4, 2026—21 months after the announcement. Simultaneously, the promised termination date of this agreement (June 1, 2026, claim 5701) has silently transitioned to "delayed" status as of September 4, 2026, now three months past the deadline. Management has provided no guidance on a revised term, the current partnership status, or the reasons for the claim withdrawal.
Riot's convertible senior notes offering pricing, announced in December 2024 with a promised completion date of December 11, 2024 (claim 5259), has remained in "delayed" status since early September 2026—nearly 21 months overdue. No revision announcement, alternative timeline, or explanation has been disclosed. The offering was initially sized at $525 million with an overallotment option, yet progress toward completion appears to have stalled without public acknowledgment.
Riot's disclosed ownership stake in Bitfarms Ltd. escalated from 14% (June 2024, claims 6011, 6014) to 19.9% (September 4, 2024, claims 5801, 5703), accompanied by acquisition language, financing disclosures, and settlement agreement terms. However, the company has made no subsequent ownership updates, stake disclosures, or partnership status announcements concerning Bitfarms since September 22, 2024—a 24-month silence on a position that had been the subject of intensive capital deployment. The combined withdrawal of the settlement agreement claim and complete absence of updated Bitfarms disclosures suggest material deterioration in that relationship that management has not articulated to the market.
What we aren't being told
The company disclosed escalating Bitfarms investments spanning six months—$90 million for an 11.3% stake on 2024-06-03 (claim 6052), $111.1 million for 14% on 2024-06-11 (claim 6015), and $202.2 million for 19.9% on 2024-09-04 (claim 5802)—but what has not been said is the per-share price Riot paid in each tranche, whether these were discrete purchases or components of a structured acquisition strategy, or what business catalyst triggered the final escalation from 14% to 19.9%.
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms on 2024-09-22 (claim 5695) that grants director nomination rights (claim 5697) and board member voting commitments (claim 5698), with an expiration date of 2026-06-01 (claim 5701)—now over 90 days in the past; what has not been said is whether the agreement was renewed, allowed to lapse, or had any of its conditions exercised, and what specific board representation (number of seats, observer rights) the nomination rights entitle Riot to hold.
The company disclosed appointment of a Chief Operating Officer on 2024-06-05 with $400,000 base salary (claim 6040), 100% incentive target (claim 6041), and 373,927 shares in long-term incentive (claim 6042); what has not been said is the identity of this executive, the vesting schedule and performance conditions for the equity grant, or whether this represents a new hire or promotion and how the compensation compares to peer company norms.
The company disclosed a 0.75% convertible senior notes offering of $525 million on 2024-12-10 (claim 5251) and referenced an overallotment option on 2024-12-09 (claim 5260) described only as "75.0 USD"; what has not been said is the conversion price or conversion premium to stock price, the net proceeds after underwriting fees, or what the overallotment figure represents (it appears ambiguously stated in units).
The company disclosed that Riot would acquire Bitcoin using convertible notes proceeds (claim 5252, 2024-12-10); what has not been said is the quantity of Bitcoin purchased, the average acquisition price per Bitcoin, the date of purchase, or the identity and custody arrangements of the qualified custodian holding them.
The company disclosed "standstill provisions and restrictions" in the Bitfarms settlement on 2024-09-22 (claim 5699); what has not been said is which specific transactions or shareholding increases are prohibited for Riot, the precise duration (particularly material given the agreement's stated expiration date of 2026-06-01 is now in the past), or what carve-outs or exceptions would allow Riot to act despite the standstill.
Customer disclosures, read
Riot's disclosed partnership architecture reveals a critical transition from governance-focused settlements to compute-capacity revenue streams, with material concentration risk emerging in 2026. The Bitfarms agreement (claims 5695, 5704, 5697–5699) signed September 2024 is a named settlement establishing board nomination rights and voting commitments through June 2026, but generates no direct revenue. The Coinbase custody arrangement (claims 5226–5227) is named and executed but functions as treasury infrastructure, not a customer agreement. MicroBT appears across six claims (3944–3946, 3599–3602, 3600, 3622) as a named supplier: Riot executed a long-term master agreement dated June 2023, with seven purchase orders through September 2025 totaling approximately $779.5 million in purchase obligations, plus renewal options extending through December 2027. These are capital expenditures by Riot, not customer revenues. AMD, named in claims spanning January through August 2026 (3902, 3615, 1861–1865, 887), represents Riot's first material compute-capacity customer: a 10-year lease initiated at 25 megawatts expanded to 50 megawatts by April amendment (claim 1865). Anthropic emerges as Riot's dominant customer via a 20-year, 191-megawatt lease announced August 10, 2026 (claims 507, 2922, 7559, 402, 1189, 420, 435, 434, 922, 1461, 398). All three compute customers (AMD, Anthropic) represent signed, executed agreements with named counterparties and definitive term structures. Counterparty concentration has shifted sharply: Anthropic alone represents $9.1 billion of the $9.8 billion in disclosed contracted revenue (claim 417), and its announced revenue substantially exceeds Q2 2026 data-center segment actuals of $23.2 million (claim 419), suggesting either minimal revenue recognition in early periods or ramp timing misalignment. The arithmetic presents tension: Anthropic's $9.1 billion over twenty years implies $455 million annual average revenue, yet H1 2026 data-center revenue through Q2 was $23.2 million, implying either delayed contract commencement, extended ramp periods, or revenue recognition mechanisms not yet disclosed. No MOUs, LOIs, or framework agreements appear in the record; all major partnerships are fully executed agreements. The portfolio exhibits single-counterparty revenue dependency risk concentrated in Anthropic as of August 2026, representing a material concentration shift from the diversification evident through April 2026.
Delivery vs. promise
Riot's capacity narrative has followed a pattern of stable near-term deployments matched against delayed long-term targets, with material discrepancies between claimed developed capacity and actual customer commitments. Corsicana has held at 400 MW developed since December 2024, with a 1000 MW ultimate target that has neither advanced nor been revised (claims 3592–3605). Rockdale's story is more complex: announced developed capacity jumped to 700 MW in late 2025 (claim 3934), yet contracted customer commitments total 241 MW as of August 2026—50 MW for AMD and 191 MW for Anthropic (claims 507–508, 887). The gap between claimed development and actual customer deployment warrants scrutiny. Kentucky's Block Mining capacity trajectory has slipped: targeting 160 MW by end-2025 (claim 3938), Riot reports only 137 MW current as of March 2026, with expansion to 232 MW now promised by end-2026 (claims 3607, 3620). MicroBT miner delivery deadlines have consistently slipped: June 2026 deployment (claims 3601, 3622) is now past without revised guidance in the record. Corsicana's Phase I 400 MW completion was promised by December 2024 and marked delayed (claim 3936); no Phase II progress has been announced since. The only recent momentum appears at Rockdale, where AMD expansion continues incrementally (25 MW completed, 25 MW under construction, claim 406) and Anthropic's 20-year lease adds substantial long-term visibility. No independent evidence—permit filings, grid interconnection queue positions, utility filings—is cited for any facility. In the next 90 days, watch for: revised MicroBT delivery dates and confirmed deployment schedules; any announcement on Corsicana Phase II funding or timeline; quarterly updates on Kentucky expansion progress toward the 232 MW year-end target; and clarification of Rockdale's 700 MW developed capacity claim relative to the 241 MW under customer commitment.
View earlier analyses (648 superseded)
Every analysis block we've ever published for this company is preserved here as an append-only ledger. Each row is a prior take on the same topic (same computation_key) that was replaced by the current block above.
capital_arc
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-19Riot's record divides into two distinct eras. Before 2021 the capital story is small and mostly administrative: repeated incentive-plan top-ups, a 2010 reverse-split authorization (claims #20721 and #20715, both not yet verifiable), a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904), and roughly $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes in 2019 (claim #15267). These look like a company patching its way through. From 2022 the scale changes. The ATM programs step up from $100M (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154), then $750M in 2023 (claim #12275) and again in 2024 (claim #11948), followed by another $500M agreement at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). Several claims record share counts in dollar fields, so they should be read as shares. Equity-plan pool expansions rose alongside: 4.4M (claim #14455), 10M (claim #13905), 13M (claim #12134) and 15M shares (claim #11935). Dilution capacity has been widened repeatedly rather than in a single planned step.
The mix became more deliberate after 2024. The $594.4M 0.75% convertible due 2030 (claim #31776) and the Coinbase bitcoin-backed facility, opened at $100M (claim #21929) and upsized to $200M (claim #21930), sit next to a stated policy of not selling self-mined bitcoin (claim #31777) and an internal ceiling of about 40% debt to bitcoin (claim #31775). That reads as a coherent treasury-leverage strategy rather than opportunism, though it still relies on ATM equity, including a $99M raise in mid-2025 (claim #26675).
Use of proceeds largely matches what was announced. The convertible was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and 5,784 BTC were reported purchased with those proceeds (claim #31759). The Bitfarms position was said to be funded from working capital, rising from $111.1M (claim #6015) to $202.2M (claim #5802). The assertions that 2025 capex of $198M was fully funded (claim #31774) and paid from cash (claim #26673) are not yet verifiable.
A careful reader should watch four things. First, how quickly the new $500M ATM is drawn. Second, the Coinbase loan maturity, which is recorded as delayed (claim #4847). Third, the 3,300 BTC pledged as collateral (claim #26668) measured against the 40% ceiling. Fourth, whether the Bitfarms stake is still discussed at all. The record contains no insider sales, and its final claim is truncated.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-19Riot's record divides into two eras, and the break between them explains most of the dilution story. Through 2018 the filings show small capital events: incentive-plan top-ups, a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim 20904), and settlement-style payments to BMSS, one of which is marked delayed (claim 15432). The modest $3.36M senior secured convertible (claim 15267) paired with the first $100M Wainwright ATM (claim 15232) in 2019 marks the turn toward continuous shelf-based equity issuance. From there the ATM sizes step up: $500M in 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in 2023 (claim 12283), another $750M in early 2024 (claim 11948), and a further $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common shares were doubled from 340M to 680M (claim 5964). Over the same period the equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, by 10M (claim 13905), 13M (claim 12134) and 15M (claim 5963) shares. Dilution therefore looks structural rather than episodic, with recurring ATM capacity as its main channel.
The mix became more deliberate from late 2024. The $594.4M 0.75% convertible due 2030 (claim 31776) was explicitly tied to bitcoin purchases (claims 5245, 31759). The Coinbase facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claim 21930) and collateralized by 3,300 BTC (claim 26668), sits under a stated ceiling of roughly 40% debt to BTC (claim 31775) and a policy of not selling self-mined BTC (claim 31777). Taken together this reads as a coherent strategy of holding the treasury and financing operations externally. One consequence is that equity issuance, such as the $99M ATM raise (claim 26675), effectively funds operations so that bitcoin is not sold. The inaugural convertible is also recorded at $579M (claim 31758) against $594.4M elsewhere, a gap that requires reconciliation, plausibly gross versus net.
On use of proceeds, the convertible-to-bitcoin link is consistent across claims. The capex statements are not yet verifiable: $198M fully funded (claim 31774) and 2025 capex funded from cash (claim 26673). The Bitfarms stake was described as financed from working capital (claims 6012, 5802) at a period when ATM capacity was active, which leaves the true source of funds open to interpretation. Insider-sale data does not appear in this record, and the final claim in the set is truncated.
A careful reader should watch four things: how quickly the December 2025 ATM is drawn, the debt-to-BTC ratio against the 40% ceiling as bitcoin prices move, the Coinbase loan maturity currently marked delayed (claim 4847), and whether further equity-plan increases continue at the recent cadence.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-18The record describes two different companies. Before 2019, financing was small and improvised: a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred (claim 20904), followed by $3.36M of senior secured convertibles with warrants (claims 15267, 15268). Recurring waiver payments to BMSS are marked delayed (claim 15432). From 2019 onward, the at-the-market program becomes the primary instrument, and each authorization is larger than the last: $100M with Wainwright (claim 15232), $500M in 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in August 2023 (claim 12275), another $750M in February 2024 (claim 11957), and $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock moved to 340M shares (claim 13903) and then to 680M (claim 5964). The equity plan pool grew in parallel, by 10M (claim 13905), 13M (claim 12134) and 15M shares (claim 11935). Taken together, this is a steady dilution cadence that has been expanded deliberately rather than in occasional bursts.
The mix became more coherent after 2024. The 0.75% convertible notes, priced at $525M (claim 5259) with a $75M overallotment (claim 5260), were tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). The Coinbase facility then grew from $100M (claim 21929) to $200M (claim 21930) against 3,300 BTC of collateral (claim 26668), and was later restated at a 6.15% fixed rate with an April 2027 maturity (claim 21921), down from 8.3% (claim 22253). The direction is visible: the company is shifting from pure equity toward balance-sheet-backed instruments that monetize its bitcoin holdings instead of selling them. The bitcoin sale used to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim 17603) is an exception that requires explanation within that framing. The closed convertible size recorded in claim 5242 also needs to be reconciled against the priced and overallotment figures.
Use of proceeds has broadly tracked disclosures where the data allows a check. The Bitfarms stake is described as funded from working capital (claims 6012, 5802). The statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim 26673) is not yet verifiable, and the original loan maturity is marked delayed (claim 4847). The record contains no insider transaction data, so nothing can be said about insider selling.
A sophisticated reader should watch three things. The first is the pace of drawdown on the December 2025 ATM relative to the 680M share ceiling. The second is whether the Coinbase facility is extended again or refinanced before April 2027. The third is whether future acquisitions are funded with equity, debt, or further bitcoin sales.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-16Riot's record divides into two distinct eras, and the dilution trajectory only becomes material in the second. Through 2018 the disclosed activity is small-scale: incentive-plan top-ups, a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim 20904), and in-kind share payments such as the 450,000 shares to Coinsquare (claim 15419). From 2019 the cadence shifts to serial at-the-market programs of escalating size: $100M with Wainwright (claim 15232), $500M in 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in August 2023 (claim 12275), another $750M in February 2024 (claim 11957), and $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). The doubling of authorized common from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964) and five equity-plan pool increases between 2021 and 2024, culminating in 15M shares (claim 5963), indicate that share issuance has been the default funding channel rather than an occasional one. The record contains no insider transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
The mix reads as more deliberate after 2024 than before it. The 2019 senior secured convertible of roughly $3.36M (claim 15267) looks like gap financing, whereas the 0.75% 2030 convertible, priced at $525M (claim 5259) and closed at $594M (claim 5242), and the Coinbase facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claim 21930) and secured by 3,300 pledged BTC (claim 26668), suggest a move toward cheaper non-equity capital. The stated sales commission falling from 3% (claim 12276) to 1% (claim 3933) is consistent with improved bargaining position.
Use-of-proceeds alignment is partially documented. The Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims 6012, 5802), and the convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245), but the claim that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim 26673) is not yet verifiable, and it sits alongside a $99M ATM raise in the same period (claim 26675). Older commitments, including the recurring BMSS waiver payments (claim 15432) and the $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim 14847), are delayed or unverified.
A careful reader should watch three things: actual drawdown under the December 2025 ATM; the Coinbase facility, whose maturity was previously marked delayed (claim 4847) and now sits at April 2027 under a fixed 6.15% rate, down from 8.3% (claims 21921, 22253); and whether selling bitcoin to fund acquisitions, as with Rockdale (claim 17603), becomes a recurring funding source alongside equity.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-15Riot's record reads as two distinct companies sharing a ticker. Before 2017 the disclosed capital activity is almost entirely housekeeping: authorized-share increases (claim 21089, claim 21040), incentive-plan top-ups, and a reverse-split authorization (claim 20715), with little evidence of actual capital raised. The disclosures on that era are thin, and conclusions about it should be limited accordingly.
The mining-era cadence is clearer and steeper. Shelf and ATM capacity rose from $100M (claim 15291, claim 15232) to $500M (claim 14154) to $750M (claim 12283), and a second $750M program followed within roughly six months (claim 11957). Authorized common stock was doubled to 340M shares (claim 13903) and doubled again to 680M (claim 5964). The equity incentive pool grew alongside, by 10M (claim 13905), 13M (claim 12134) and 15M shares (claim 5963). Taken together, this is dilution built in as standing infrastructure rather than raised episode by episode, and the step-ups tracked hardware commitments such as the $480M Bitmain order (claim 14271).
The mix changed in late 2024, and it appears deliberate rather than patched together. The 0.75% convertible notes, $525M at pricing (claim 5251) and $594M at close per claim 5242, were followed by a Coinbase facility secured by bitcoin, sized at $100M (claim 21929), upsized to $200M (claim 21930), and backed by 3,300 BTC of collateral (claim 26668). The bitcoin treasury itself then became a funding source, with the Rockdale acquisition funded by a bitcoin sale (claim 17603). Equity has not left the stack: a $99M ATM raise (claim 26675) and a fresh $500M program (claim 3931) sit alongside the debt. The record contains no insider sales, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
On use of proceeds, stated uses mostly match what was deployed. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). The Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital ($202M per claim 5802), which is hard to separate from earlier ATM proceeds. The claim that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim 26673) is not yet verifiable, and neither is the earlier $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim 14847).
There are several things to watch. The Coinbase facility was repriced from 8.3% (claim 24404) to a fixed 6.15% and now matures in April 2027 (claim 21921). Its maturity terms have already been flagged as delayed (claim 4847), so the next renewal and any collateral calls will show how durable bitcoin-backed borrowing is for Riot. The other measures are the pace at which the $500M ATM is drawn and how much headroom remains under the 680M authorization.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-15Riot's financing record falls into two distinct regimes. Before 2019 the company relied on small, episodic instruments, such as the $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904) and the $3.36M senior secured convertible notes (claim #15267). Alongside these came recurring stock-plan expansions and a reverse-split authorization (claims #20721, #20715) that remains not yet verifiable. That period reads as patching rather than strategy, and the delayed recurring waiver payments to BMSS (claim #15432) fit the same picture of constrained liquidity. From 2019 onward the at-the-market program became the central tool, and its scale rose in steps: $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232), $500M (claim #14154), $750M (claims #12275 and #11957), and another $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity incentive pool grew in successive tranches of 4.4M, 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #14455, #13905, #12134, #5963). Dilution capacity has therefore expanded steadily, and the pace accelerated through 2022 to 2024. The mix becomes more coherent after 2024. The 0.75% convertible, which closed at roughly $594M per claim #5242, and the Coinbase bitcoin-backed facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929 and #21930), show a shift toward borrowing against the balance sheet instead of selling stock alone. The April 2026 restatement to a 6.15% fixed rate, down from 8.3% (claims #22250 and #22253), improved terms, though the loan's maturity date is recorded as delayed (claim #4847). On use of proceeds, the stated purposes broadly match what was disclosed: the Bitfarms stake was funded from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802), and the convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The claim that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) is not yet verifiable. A bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) suggests treasury assets are now a funding source, which requires explanation alongside the 3,300 BTC pledged as collateral (claim #26668). No insider transactions appear in the record, so that part of the mix cannot be assessed. Sophisticated readers should watch how quickly the December 2025 ATM is drawn, whether the Coinbase facility is refinanced or repaid before its April 2027 maturity (claim #21921), and whether more pledged bitcoin is sold. The record provided ends partway through claim #23921, so later events may be missing.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-13The record shows two distinct capital regimes, and the gap between them matters more than any single line item. Through 2018, Riot financed itself in small, irregular increments. The largest was the $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred, per claim #20904. The BMSS waiver schedule from that period is recorded as delayed, per claim #15432. From May 2019 the company moved to standing at-the-market capacity: $100M with Wainwright per claim #15232, then $500M per claim #14154, $750M per claim #12283, a second $750M per claim #11957, and another $500M per claim #3931. Authorized common shares grew alongside these programs, doubling from 340M to 680M per claim #5964. The equity plan pool was also enlarged at a rising pace, by 10M shares per claim #13905, 13M per claim #12134 and 15M per claim #15935, which reads as #11935. Dilution has therefore been continuous and pre-authorized rather than episodic, and the ceiling has been raised ahead of need. Several dollar figures in this record appear to be share counts or truncated units, so readers should not treat them as cash amounts.
After 2024 the mix becomes more deliberate. Equity remains the base layer. The company added the 0.75% convertible, priced at $525M per claim #5251, with its stated purpose being bitcoin acquisition per claim #5245. It then added a bitcoin-collateralized Coinbase facility, opened at $100M per claim #21929 and upsized to $200M per claim #21930, against 3,300 BTC pledged per claim #26668. This looks like a strategy of monetizing the treasury without selling it. That reading requires qualification, because a bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition per claim #17603. The facility's rate also moved from 8.3% per claim #22253 to a fixed 6.15% with maturity extended to April 2027 per claim #21921, and an earlier maturity term is recorded as delayed per claim #4847.
Use of proceeds is only partly traceable. The Bitfarms position, about $111M per claim #6015, was stated as financed from working capital per claims #6012 and #5802, but that working capital was itself replenished by ATM sales. The assertion that 2025 capex was funded from cash, per claim #26673, is not yet verifiable. The record contains no insider transactions, so nothing can be said about management selling.
Going forward, readers should watch three things: drawdown against the December 2025 ATM, whether the Coinbase facility is rolled or repaid ahead of April 2027, and whether the pledged bitcoin and any further sales remain consistent with the convertible's stated purpose.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-13Riot's record divides into two eras. Before 2017 the disclosures are almost entirely corporate housekeeping: holding-company restructuring, incentive-plan top-ups, and a reverse-split authorization (claims #20721 and #20715) whose execution the record does not confirm. The modern financing pattern starts with the small 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock, $4.75M per claim #20904, followed by the 2019 senior secured convertible notes of roughly $3.36M with attached warrants (claims #15267 and #15268). These were patches sized to immediate needs, not a strategy.
From 2019 onward the at-the-market program becomes the main instrument, and its size escalates steadily: $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232), $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12283), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Over the same period authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity-plan pool was expanded nearly every year, reaching 15M shares in 2024 (claim #5963). That is a consistent, high-cadence dilution path, not an episodic one.
The mix diversifies from late 2024. The 0.75% convertible notes, priced at $525M and closed near $594M with the overallotment (claims #5251 and #5242), and the Coinbase BTC-backed facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929 and #21930) against 3,300 BTC of collateral (claim #26668), suggest a deliberate move toward non-dilutive capital tied to the treasury. The facility's April 2026 restatement to a fixed 6.15% with maturity extended to April 2027 (claim #22250) lowered the rate from 8.3% (claim #22253).
The use of proceeds partly tracks. The Bitfarms stake was attributed to working capital (claims #6012 and #5802), and the convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) remains not yet verifiable, and it sits alongside a $99M ATM raise in the same period (claim #26675). The bitcoin sale tied to Rockdale (claim #17603) requires explanation, since it shows treasury assets being drawn on as a funding source. The record contains no insider transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed, and the final claim is truncated.
Readers should watch utilization of the $500M ATM, any further authorized-share proposal, and the handling of the Coinbase facility as its April 2027 maturity approaches.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-11Riot's record divides into two eras, and the break is sharp. Before 2019 the financing activity is small and largely administrative: authorized-share increases, incentive-plan expansions, and a reverse-split authorization (claims #20721 and #20715) that is still marked not yet verifiable. The 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock, at $4.75M per claim #20904, reads as survival financing. The same holds for the 2019 senior secured convertible notes of roughly $3.36M with attached warrants (claims #15267 and #15268). Several entries here record share counts in a dollar field, and those figures should be read as share-denominated. From 2019 the at-the-market program becomes the main instrument, and its stated capacity grows in steps: $100M with Wainwright (claim #15241), $500M (claim #14154), $750M twice (claims #12283 and #11957), and another $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). The authorized share count rises in parallel, from 340M to 680M (claim #5964). Dilution capacity has therefore expanded on a regular schedule rather than in response to isolated events.
The mix since 2024 looks more deliberate than the earlier patching. The Bitfarms stake was funded from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802). The 0.75% convertible notes closed at roughly $594M including the overallotment (claims #5251 and #5242) and were earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The BTC-collateralized Coinbase facility was upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929 and #21930) and then repriced to a fixed 6.15% rate with maturity extended to April 2027 (claim #22250). These three moves layer non-dilutive and low-coupon capital on top of equity. The record does not show whether the convertible proceeds were in fact deployed into bitcoin. It also does not show how much of each ATM was used, apart from a $99M raise noted in claim #26675. The statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) remains not yet verifiable. Earlier, the BMSS waiver payments were delayed (claim #15432). The record contains no insider transactions, so that part of the picture cannot be assessed.
Three items deserve attention next. The first is ATM utilization against the December 2025 authorization. The second is whether bitcoin sales such as the one tied to Rockdale (claim #17603) recur as a funding source, which would sit uneasily with collateral pledged under the Coinbase facility (claim #26668). The third is how the April 2027 maturity is handled. The final claims in the record are truncated.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-11Riot's record shows a decade of small-scale equity housekeeping, followed by a sharp escalation in raising activity after 2019. The early filings are mostly stock incentive plan increases and a modest private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (the $4.75M closing, per claim #20904). Dilutive capacity then grew in steps: a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241), a $500M ATM (claim #14154), and successive $750M programs (claims #12283 and #11957). Authorized common rose to 340M shares (claim #13889) and was then doubled to 680M (claim #5964). Equity plan pools widened over the same period, by 13M shares (claim #12134) and then 15M (claim #11935). Dilution capacity therefore grew faster than any single raise would suggest.
The mix changed in late 2024. Riot moved from ATM-led equity to the 0.75% convertible notes ($525M, per claim #5251; claim #5242 records the closed 2030 notes at 594, apparently the upsized total in millions). It then added a bitcoin-collateralized Coinbase facility, opened at $100M (claim #21929) and upsized to $200M (claim #23925), secured by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668). This sequence reads as a deliberate effort to borrow against the balance sheet's bitcoin rather than issue more common stock. Even so, the ATM was not set aside: a $99M raise appears in mid-2025 (claim #26675), and a fresh $500M program followed in December 2025 (claim #3931).
Use-of-proceeds tracking is uneven. The convertible was announced as funding for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The next disclosed bitcoin movement runs the other way, a bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). That reversal requires explanation. Statements that the Bitfarms position was funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802) and that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673, not yet verifiable) do not reconcile against the raises that replenished that cash. Smaller items also remain unresolved: the recurring BMSS waiver payments are marked delayed (claim #15432), and the facility's original maturity is likely delayed too (claim #4847).
Going forward, the clearest marker is the Coinbase facility. It was repriced from 8.3% (claim #24404) to 6.15% fixed, with maturity extended to April 2027 (claim #21921), so its refinancing or renewal will be telling. Readers should also track how much of the $500M ATM is drawn, and whether authorized-share or plan-pool headroom is raised again. No insider transactions appear in the record, and the dataset ends mid-claim (#23921), so the most recent facility terms may be incomplete.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-11Riot's record divides into two distinct regimes. Before 2017 the filings show a small issuer managing its share count through incentive-plan top-ups and a reverse-split authorization (claims #20722 and #20715), with only one modest private placement of $4.75M (claim #20904). After the pivot to mining, the scale of authorized capacity grows by orders of magnitude. The 2019 senior secured convertibles of roughly $3.36M (claim #15267) sat alongside a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15232). The ATM program then grew to $500M (claim #14154), and $750M agreements followed in both 2023 and 2024 (claims #12283 and #11957). Authorized common stock was raised to 340M shares and then to 680M (claims #13889 and #5964). The equity plan pool expanded nearly every year, including by 13M shares and then 15M (claims #12004 and #5963). Dilution has been steady and recurring rather than episodic.
The instrument mix moves from equity toward balance-sheet leverage, and that movement looks deliberate rather than patched together. ATM equity funded the large miner orders, such as the $480M Bitmain commitment (claim #14271). The December 2024 0.75% convertible, which closed at about $594M with the overallotment (claim #5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Coinbase facility then used that bitcoin as collateral. The facility was upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929 and #21930) and is secured by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668). Its April 2026 amendment fixed the rate at 6.15% with maturity in April 2027 (claim #22250), down from 8.3% (claim #24404). The record contains no insider sales, only compensation awards.
On use of proceeds, the Bitfarms position was described as funded from working capital, at about $202M (claim #5802), and the convertible's stated purpose is consistent with the later collateral pledge. One item requires explanation: 2025 capex was described as funded from cash (claim #26673, not yet verifiable) during the same period that about $99M was raised through the ATM (claim #26675). The January 2026 bitcoin sale for the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) indicates that treasury assets are now also a funding source.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is the April 2027 facility maturity, which follows an earlier maturity item marked delayed (claim #4847). The second is how quickly the December 2025 $500M ATM (claim #3931) is drawn. The third is how much headroom remains under the 680M authorized-share ceiling. The fourth is whether sales of collateralized bitcoin become a recurring part of how Riot funds acquisitions.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-11Riot's disclosed record falls into two distinct regimes. Before 2017 the activity is corporate housekeeping: authorized-share increases, incentive-plan top-ups and a contemplated reverse split (claims #20721, #20715) whose execution the record does not confirm. The turn appears in the March 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (the $4.75M package, per claim #20904) and the 2019 senior secured convertible notes (the $3.36M issuance, per claim #15267). These are small, structured instruments of the kind a company uses when broad market access is limited. From May 2019 the at-the-market program becomes the central funding tool. It scales from $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154), then $750M twice (claims #12273, #11957), and another $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Dilution capacity grew alongside it. Authorized common doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool rose from 4.4M shares (claim #14455) to 15M (claim #5963). The record mostly shows program sizes rather than shares actually sold. The exception is the $99M ATM raise in claim #26675, so realized dilution cannot be measured from this data. Since late 2024 the mix has moved away from pure equity. The $594M 0.75% 2030 convertible (claims #5251, #5242) was followed by a bitcoin-backed Coinbase facility, originated at $100M and upsized to $200M (claims #21929, #21930), against 3,300 BTC pledged (claim #26668). That sequence reads as a coherent effort to borrow against the bitcoin treasury rather than sell it. The January 2026 bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) is a partial departure from that pattern. On use of proceeds, the convertible was described as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms position, $202.2M per claim #5802, was stated to come from working capital (claim #6012). The record does not tie ATM proceeds to specific deployments, and the statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) is not yet verifiable. Readers should watch the Coinbase facility first. Its loan maturity is marked delayed (claim #4847), and in April 2026 it was restated at a 6.15% fixed rate, down from 8.3% (claim #22253), with maturity extended to April 2027 (claims #21921, #22250). Whether it is rolled again, repaid in bitcoin or refinanced requires explanation as that date approaches. The draw pace on the December 2025 $500M ATM also matters. This record contains no insider-transaction data, and it ends mid-entry, so the most recent facility terms are incomplete.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-10Riot's record separates into two distinct regimes. Before 2019, financing was small and reactive: a $4.75 million private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904), $3.36 million of senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claim #15267), a recurring BMSS waiver payment now classified as delayed (claim #15432), and a stated posture of 'currently pursuing debt and equity capital' (claim #15351). That period reads as patching rather than plan. From 2019 onward the at-the-market program becomes the central instrument, and its scale steps up repeatedly: $100 million with Wainwright (claim #15241), $500 million in 2022 (claim #14154), $750 million in 2023 (claim #12283), another $750 million in 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500 million at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubling from 340 million to 680 million shares (claim #5964), and equity plan pools growing through 10, 13 and 15 million-share increments (claims #13890, #12134, #11935), indicate that dilution capacity has been provisioned well ahead of need. In the later period the mix broadens in a way that appears deliberate rather than opportunistic. The $594 million 2030 convertible (claim #5242) and the Coinbase facility, upsized from $100 million to $200 million (claims #21929, #21930) and secured by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668), move the balance sheet toward instruments that use the bitcoin treasury as collateral or purpose. Proceeds tracking is mixed. The $480 million Bitmain order (claim #14271) is verified and lines up with the 2022 ATM. The Bitfarms position, at $111 million (claim #6015) and later $202 million (claim #5802), is attributed to working capital, which leaves its link to ATM proceeds unstated. The convertible was framed as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), yet a later bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603); the reconciliation between those two treasury directions requires explanation. The assertion that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) is not yet verifiable. A careful reader should watch four things: utilization of the December 2025 $500 million ATM against the comparatively modest $99 million ATM raise disclosed for 2025 (claim #26675); the Coinbase facility's April 2027 maturity at the refixed 6.15% rate (claim #22250), given that an earlier maturity claim is classified as delayed (claim #4847); whether pledged BTC collateral constrains future treasury sales; and whether equity plan pool increases continue at the recent cadence. The final facility-structure claim on record (claim #23921) is truncated in the source and has not been assessed here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-10Riot's record shows a company that has moved from small, ad hoc financings to repeated large equity shelves, and more recently to a mix of equity, convertible and secured debt. Before 2019 the disclosed capital events are modest and reactive. The 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock came to $4.75M (claim #20904), and the 2019 senior secured convertible notes came to roughly $3.36M with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268). The at-the-market program then became the main channel, and its size grew steadily: $100M with Wainwright in 2019 (claim #15241), $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12283), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claims #13903, #5964), and the equity plan pool was enlarged in most years from 2021 onward, reaching 15M shares in 2024 (claim #5963). Taken together, the record shows dilution capacity being renewed on a roughly annual cycle rather than as isolated events.
The mix changes in late 2024. The 0.75% convertible notes, which closed at about $594M (claims #5251, #5242), and the Coinbase credit facility both point toward non-equity funding. The facility was upsized from $100M to $200M (claim #21930), secured by 3,300 pledged BTC (claim #26668), and repriced from 8.3% to a fixed 6.15% with maturity extended to April 2027 (claims #24404, #22250). This looks like a deliberate move to borrow against bitcoin holdings instead of selling equity, though ATM issuance continued alongside it, for example the $99M raise in claim #26675.
The stated uses of proceeds are only partly traceable. The convertible was tied to bitcoin purchases (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), but the record does not show whether those deployments happened as described. The assertion that 2025 capex was funded from cash is not yet verifiable (claim #26673). An earlier loan maturity term is marked delayed (claim #4847). The bitcoin sale tied to the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) is recorded with an unclear unit.
The record contains no insider sale transactions, only executive compensation awards, so nothing can be said about insider selling. Several entries also appear to show share counts with dollar labels, and the final facility claim is cut off. Going forward, a careful reader should watch four things: how the Coinbase facility is handled as April 2027 approaches, collateral coverage if bitcoin prices fall, how fast the $500M ATM is drawn down, and how much authorized-share headroom remains against the conversion overhang from the 2030 notes.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-10Riot's disclosed history falls into two regimes. Through 2017 the record is mostly corporate housekeeping: authorized-share increases (claims #21089, #21040), incentive-plan expansions, a reverse-split authorization that remains not yet verifiable (claims #20721, #20715), and a small $4.75M placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904). From 2019 the pattern becomes a stepwise escalation of at-the-market capacity. It ran from $100M with H.C. Wainwright (claim #15232) to $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), then $750M in 2023 (claim #12275) and again in 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M program at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Over the same period authorized common doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan also received successive pool additions of 4.4M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #14455, #12134, #5963). Dilution capacity has therefore widened at both the financing and the compensation layer.
The mix reads as a coherent sequence rather than patching. ATM equity coincided with large hardware commitments, such as the $480M Bitmain order (claim #14271) and the $162.9M order (claim #12382). The Bitfarms position, reported at $111.1M and later $202.2M (claims #6015, #5802), was attributed to working capital. The 0.75% convertible, $525M per claim #5251, added low-coupon debt tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Coinbase facility added a third, collateralized leg. It opened at $100M, was upsized to $200M (claims #21929, #21930), and is secured by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668). The record contains no insider transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
Use-of-proceeds tracking is only partially observable. Hardware orders and the Bitfarms deployment are documented. However, the statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) is not yet verifiable, and the facility's original maturity is marked delayed (claim #4847). The April 2026 restatement at a fixed 6.15% with maturity in April 2027 (claim #21921) supersedes those terms. The January 2026 bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) shifts the treasury from accumulation toward monetization. That shift requires explanation alongside the convertible's stated bitcoin-acquisition purpose.
A sophisticated reader should watch four things. The first is drawdown of the December 2025 $500M ATM. The second is whether the Coinbase facility is repaid or rolled before April 2027. The third is collateral sufficiency under the BTC pledge. The fourth is whether further authorized-share or plan-pool increases follow. The final claims in the record are truncated, so the latest facility terms are incompletely captured.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-10Riot's record divides into two periods. Through 2019 the company funded itself in small, structured pieces: the $4.75M private placement combining convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904), and the $3.36M senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claim #15267). These are the instruments of a company with limited market access, and they look more like patching than a plan. From the $100M Wainwright ATM onward (claim #15232), the pattern becomes coherent and much larger. ATM capacity went to $500M (claim #14154), then two successive $750M programs within seven months (claims #12283, #11957), then a further $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Over the same period, authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). Dilution here has been continuous and programmatic rather than episodic. The record gives authorization sizes, not shares actually sold, with the exception of the $99M ATM raise noted in mid-2025 (claim #26675).
Since late 2024 the mix has shifted toward instruments that do not dilute immediately. These are the 0.75% convertible notes, priced at $525M (claim #5251) and closing at $594M (claim #5242), and the Coinbase bitcoin-backed facility, which was upsized from $100M to $200M within weeks (claims #21929, #21930) and is secured by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668). The facility was later repriced from 8.3% to a fixed 6.15%, with maturity extended to April 2027 (claims #22253, #22250). One maturity-related item is marked delayed (claim #4847).
Stated use of proceeds tracks deployment only partially. The convertible was framed as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Bitfarms position, reported at $111M and later $202M (claims #6015, #5802), was attributed to working capital rather than to a named raise. The assertion that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) is not yet verifiable, and so is the 2020 Bitmain payment commitment (claim #14847). The record contains no insider sale transactions, so no inference can be drawn on that front.
Going forward, a reader should watch three things: how much of the December 2025 ATM is drawn, how the Coinbase facility is handled ahead of its April 2027 maturity, and whether the collateral requirements tied to bitcoin prices hold. The 2030 notes also carry an eventual conversion overhang, and their effect on share count is not yet discussed in the record.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-09Riot's record divides into two eras, and the break is sharp. Before 2019 the filings show a small company managing its share structure through authorization increases, stock plan top-ups and a modest 2017 private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred stock ($4.75M, per claim #20904). From 2019 onward the at-the-market program becomes the central funding tool, and each authorization is larger than the last: $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232), then $500M (claim #14154), $750M twice (claims #12275 and #11957), and a further $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock was doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), which leaves room for this to continue. Equity plan reserves grew alongside it, from 4.4M shares (claim #14455) to 13M (claim #12134) and then 15M (claim #5963). The dataset records these share counts as dollar amounts, so they should be read as shares, not proceeds. Dilution capacity has therefore risen steadily, although the record does not show how much of each ATM was actually drawn, apart from a $99M raise in mid-2025 (claim #26675).
The funding mix changed in late 2024 in a way that looks deliberate rather than improvised. The company added a 0.75% convertible priced at $525M (claim #5251), which closed at what appears to be $594M including the overallotment (claim #5242). It then added a bitcoin-collateralized Coinbase facility, opened at $100M (claim #21929) and upsized to $200M within a month (claim #21930). That facility was later repriced from 8.3% (claim #22253) to a fixed 6.15% with maturity in April 2027 (claim #22250). Taken together, this looks like a move away from relying only on equity and toward borrowing against treasury assets, including a bitcoin sale tied to the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603).
The record does not verify how proceeds were used. The convertible was described as funding bitcoin purchases (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital, with figures reported as $111M (claim #6015) and later $202M (claim #5802). The statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash remains not yet verifiable (claim #26673). The dataset contains no insider sales, and it is cut off partway through 2026, so these conclusions are provisional.
Readers should watch the April 2027 facility maturity, the pace of drawdowns on the newest $500M ATM, and whether further convertibles are layered on top of the existing 2030 notes.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-09Riot's record divides into two distinct eras, and the dilution trajectory only becomes meaningful in the second. Before 2017 the filings show routine housekeeping: authorized-share and incentive-plan increases (claims #21089, #20723, #21011) and a reverse split authorization (claim #20715) that remains not yet verifiable. The 2017-2019 period looks like patching. It includes a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904), $3.36M of senior secured convertibles with warrants attached (claim #15267), and a stated intent to pursue 'debt and equity capital' with no named instrument (claim #15351). Small, warrant-sweetened paper of this kind usually reflects constrained access to capital rather than a plan. From 2022 onward the at-the-market program is clearly the primary engine, and it scales steadily: $500M (claim #14154), then $750M (claim #12283), then another $750M (claim #11957). Authorized common stock moved to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then 680M (claim #5964). Equity-plan pools grew in parallel, by 10M (claim #13905), 13M (claim #12134) and 15M shares (claim #5963). The December 2024 0.75% convertible, $525M per claim #5251, marks a deliberate turn toward lower-dilution instruments. The 2025 Coinbase facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929, #21930) and backed by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668), continues that turn. Read together, the mix after 2021 looks coherent rather than opportunistic, with the bitcoin treasury increasingly used as collateral and as a funding source. On use of proceeds, the Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), but that working capital was itself largely ATM-derived, so the distinction is mostly one of labeling. The convertible was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Later records show bitcoin pledged as collateral and sold to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603), and the record does not reconcile these. The claim that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) is not yet verifiable. Several hardware figures are recorded in inconsistent units (claims #14271, #11964, #5242) and should be read cautiously. No insider transactions appear in the record, and the data ends mid-entry in April 2026. A careful reader should watch three things. The first is how the credit facility is handled before its April 2027 maturity, at 6.15% fixed after 8.3% (claims #22250, #22253). The second is how quickly the $500M ATM (claim #3931) is drawn. The third is whether another authorized-share increase follows.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-09Riot's financing record falls into two eras. Before 2017 the filings show only routine corporate housekeeping: plan share increases, a holding-company restructuring and a contingent reverse-split authorization (claims #20721, #20715). From 2017 onward dilution becomes a steady operating input rather than an occasional event. The ATM ceiling rose from $100M with H.C. Wainwright in 2019 (claims #15232, #15241) to $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), then to $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), was renewed at $750M in 2024 (claim #11948), and returned at $500M in late 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock moved in step, from 340M shares (claim #13889) to 680M (claim #5964), and the 2019 equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, to 13M (claim #12134) and then 15M (claim #5963). Several of these entries record share counts that the dataset shows as dollar figures, so they should be read as shares.
The mix is more coherent than it first appears. Early financing relied on small structured instruments, such as the 2017 note-warrant-preferred package (claim #20904) and the 2019 senior secured converts (claim #15267). These later gave way to large ATMs sized to match hardware commitments, including the $138.5M Antminer purchase (claim #14728) and the $162.9M order (claim #12382). The December 2024 0.75% convertible, which closed at roughly $594M including overallotment per claims #5251 and #5242, is the first debt instrument at scale. The 2025 Coinbase facility, upsized from $100M to $200M against 3,300 pledged BTC (claims #21930, #26668), shows the balance sheet now using bitcoin holdings as collateral.
Stated uses can only partly be checked against deployment. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms stake was funded from working capital (claim #5802). The statement that 2025 capex was funded from cash (claim #26673) remains not yet verifiable, and the record does not reconcile it with the $99M ATM draw cited in the same disclosure (claim #26675). The record contains no insider sale transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is how the Coinbase facility, refixed at 6.15% with an April 2027 maturity (claims #21921, #22250), is handled as maturity approaches. The second is whether the bitcoin sale funding Rockdale (claim #17603) recurs as a funding method. The third is how quickly the new $500M ATM is drawn. The fourth is what the final, truncated April 2026 entries add.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-09Riot's record splits into two eras. Before 2017 the filings show only administrative capacity-building: incentive plan increases, authorized-share expansions, and a reverse split authorization recorded as delayed (claims #20721, #20715). The financing pattern that matters starts with the $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904). It sharpens through 2018, when the BMSS waiver and restricted-stock payments are recorded as delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434) and the company described itself as pursuing debt and equity capital (claim #15351). That period reads as patching: small secured convertibles with warrants (claims #15267, #15268) were layered under a $100M ATM (claim #15241).
From 2022 the strategy becomes coherent and much larger. The equity-led pattern repeats on a roughly annual cadence: a $500M ATM (claim #14154), a $750M program (claim #12283), and a second $750M program (claim #11957). Each tracks a large miner order: the $480M Bitmain order, recorded as delayed (claim #14271), $162.9M of hardware (claim #12382), and the 99,840-unit MicroBT purchase (claim #11991). Authorized common stock was raised to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then doubled to 680M (claim #5964). Equity plan pools grew alongside, by 10M shares (claim #13905), 13M (claim #12134) and 15M (claim #5963). Both trends point to sustained, not tapering, dilution.
In late 2024 the mix shifts. The $525M 0.75% convertible (claim #5251) was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and 2025 adds a Coinbase credit facility upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929, #21930), secured by 3,300 BTC (claim #26668). The record does not show whether the convertible proceeds were actually deployed into bitcoin, so that requires explanation. The Bitfarms stake is attributed to working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and 2025 capex is said to be funded from cash (claim #26673), yet the ATM still raised $99M (claim #26675). A new $500M ATM followed (claim #3931), and a bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). That sale reverses the accumulation rationale behind the convertible.
No insider sales appear in the record, so this read cannot assess insider behavior. A careful reader should watch four things: how fast the December 2025 ATM is drawn down, the amended Coinbase terms against the 8.3% pre-amendment rate (claim #22253; the record is truncated at this point), whether disposals of bitcoin collateral continue, and whether the 680M authorization prompts another increase request.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-08Riot's record divides into two periods. Before 2019, capital activity was mostly housekeeping: incentive-plan top-ups, authorized-share increases, a reverse split authorization that is marked delayed (claims #20721, #20715), and a small private placement of $4.75M (claim #20904). The 2019 pairing of senior secured convertibles of about $3.36M (claim #15267) with a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241) is the first sign of a financing program. After that, ATM capacity grew in stages: $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in early 2024 (claim #11957), and $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Over the same period, authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool was enlarged almost every year, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). The record shows capacity, not shares actually sold, so the realized dilution cannot be measured from these claims alone. The direction, however, is consistent.
From late 2024 the mix shifts in a way that looks deliberate rather than opportunistic. The 0.75% convertible, which closed at roughly $594M (claims #5251, #5242), and the Coinbase credit facility, opened at $100M and raised to $200M within a month (claims #21929, #21930), added non-equity layers alongside the ATM. The facility's repricing from 8.3% (claim #22253) to a fixed 6.15% with maturity extended to April 20, 2027 (claim #24403) reads as active liability management. The record contains no insider transactions, so no conclusion can be drawn on that dimension.
Stated use of proceeds tracks deployment only in part. Large miner commitments line up with the ATM expansions: $138.5M (claim #14728), the delayed $480M Bitmain order (claim #14271), $162.9M (claim #12382), and $453.4M with MicroBT (claim #11991). The Bitfarms position was described as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), not from earmarked raises. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), yet roughly a year later bitcoin was sold to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). That sequence requires explanation, and the units on that claim are unclear in the record.
A careful reader should watch three things. The first is the April 2027 facility maturity and whether it is extended again. The second is the pace of draws on the December 2025 ATM. The third is whether treasury bitcoin continues to serve as a funding source rather than a reserve. Several claims carry ambiguous units, and the final claim is truncated, so the record is incomplete at its most recent edge.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-08Riot's record divides into two eras, and the second dominates the dilution story. Before 2019 the company used small, patchwork instruments, including the $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants, and preferred stock (claim #20904) and the $3.36M senior secured convertible notes (claim #15267). From 2019 the at-the-market program became the main funding channel, and each program was larger than the last. The H.C. Wainwright ATM was $100M (claim #15241). It was followed by $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized share capacity grew alongside these programs. It reached 340M shares (claim #13903) and was then doubled to 680M (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was also enlarged repeatedly, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). Several of these share counts appear in the record as dollar values, so readers should treat those amounts as share counts.
The mix changed more coherently after 2024. The 0.75% convertible notes, recorded at $525M (claim #5251) and as $594 at close (claim #5242, units unclear), extended funding beyond ATM issuance. The Coinbase credit facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929, #21922), added secured, bitcoin-adjacent debt. The facility was later restated from 8.3% (claim #22253) to a 6.15% fixed rate with an April 20, 2027 maturity (claim #24403), which reads as a deliberate repricing rather than distress refinancing. The data records no discretionary insider sales. Insider items are limited to compensation awards.
Stated use of proceeds tracks reasonably well, with exceptions that require explanation. The Bitfarms position was described as financed from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and the convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). However, the Rockdale acquisition was funded through bitcoin sales (claim #17603), even though a $500M ATM authorization was already in place. Large miner purchase orders, the $480 Bitmain order (claim #14271) and an earlier $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim #14847), are recorded as delayed, so it is not established that capex was deployed on schedule.
A careful reader should watch four items. The first is how much of the December 2025 ATM is drawn. The second is how the April 2027 facility maturity is handled. The third is whether the 680M authorized ceiling prompts another increase request. The fourth is whether the treasury continues to fund acquisitions with bitcoin rather than equity. The record ends mid-entry on the April 2026 amendment, so the latest terms are incomplete.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-07Riot's record divides into two eras, and the break is sharp. Before 2019, capital activity was mostly housekeeping: incentive-plan top-ups, authorized-share increases, a reverse-split authorization recorded as delayed (claims #20721 and #20715), and a small 2017 private placement of $4.75M (claim #20904). The 2018 entries are licensing fees, rent and waiver payments to BMSS, several of them delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), and read as operating friction rather than financing strategy. The structural shift comes in 2019, when a $100M shelf (claim #15291) and a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241) arrived alongside $3.36M of senior secured convertibles (claim #15267). Each later ATM was larger than the last: $500M (claim #14154), then $750M twice (claims #12275 and #11957), then another $500M (claim #3931). Authorized common stock moved from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). That is a steadily rising dilution capacity, though the record shows capacity authorized, not shares actually sold.
The mix looks more deliberate after 2024. The 0.75% convertible, closed at roughly $594M including the overallotment (claims #5251 and #5242), and the Coinbase credit facility, upsized from $100M to $200M within a month (claims #21929 and #21922), suggest a move away from ATM-only funding toward cheaper, bitcoin-collateralized and fixed-income instruments. The April 2026 amendment cut the rate from 8.3% to a fixed 6.15% and extended maturity to April 2027 (claims #24404 and #24403). That reads as refinancing on improved terms, not distress patching.
Use-of-proceeds tracking is incomplete. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), yet a later bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603, units not specified), so treasury assets are being used as a funding source in both directions. The Bitfarms stake was financed from working capital, totaling $202.2M per claim #5802, rather than from a dedicated raise. The large Bitmain order is recorded as delayed (claims #14266 and #14271), as is an earlier $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim #14847), and those delays require explanation against the ATM capacity raised in the same period. No insider transactions appear in the record, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
Going forward, the most useful signals are the actual drawdown against the December 2025 $500M ATM, whether the Coinbase facility is extended again or repaid ahead of its April 2027 maturity, and whether further bitcoin sales become a recurring funding source rather than a one-time event.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-07Riot's record splits into two eras. Before 2017 the claims are mostly plan and charter housekeeping, including incentive-plan top-ups and a reverse-split authorization that was delayed (claims #20715, #20721). From 2019 onward the company is raising capital at scale. That year's $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241) sat alongside a small senior secured convertible of about $3.4M (claim #15267). The equity programs then stepped up to $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957) and $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Underneath that sits a doubling of authorized common from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), plus repeated plan-pool increases of 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #13890, #12134, #5963). Dilution has been continuous, not episodic, and the ATM has been the main instrument.
The mix looks coherent rather than patched together, but it has visibly changed character. Through 2024, at-the-market equity funded large fleet commitments. These included the $138.5M Antminer purchase (claim #14728), the $480M Bitmain order, whose delivery is recorded as delayed (claim #14271), the $162.9M order (claim #12382) and the $453.4M MicroBT order (claim #11991). The roughly $202M Bitfarms position was said to come from working capital (claim #5802). From late 2024 the company added non-dilutive and lower-dilution layers. The first was a 0.75% convertible priced at $525M (claim #5251) and recorded as closing at about $594M with the overallotment (claim #5242). The second was a Coinbase credit facility opened at $100M and upsized to $200M within weeks (claims #21929, #21930).
Use-of-proceeds tracking is mixed. The convertible was described as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), yet a later claim records a bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). The sequence of building the bitcoin position with convertible capital and then drawing it down for a real-asset purchase requires explanation in management's own terms. The amount in claim #17603 is not legible in consistent units, so the scale of that rotation cannot be confirmed here.
Several items deserve attention going forward. The Coinbase facility's floating rate of 8.3% at March 31, 2026 (claim #22253) was restated in April 2026 to a fixed 6.15% with maturity on April 20, 2027 (claim #24403). That puts a refinancing or extension decision inside the next twelve months. Readers should also watch how quickly the December 2025 ATM is drawn, and whether further authorized-share or plan-pool increases follow. The record contains no insider-transaction claims, so nothing can be said about insider selling. The final claim in the supplied history is truncated.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-06Riot's record divides into two eras, and the dilution mechanics change sharply between them. Through 2017 the capital events are modest and administrative. There are incentive-plan top-ups, authorized-share increases, a reverse split authorization that is marked delayed (claims #20721 and #20715), and a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904). From 2019 onward the company turns to at-the-market issuance as its primary tool. A $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241) gives way to a $500M program in 2022 (claim #14154), then $750M programs in 2023 and 2024 (claims #12283 and #11948), and another $500M authorization at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares in 2024 (claim #5964), and plan pools expanded almost every year (claims #13905, #12134 and #5963). The trajectory of dilution capacity is steadily upward. The record does not show how much of each ATM was actually drawn, so realized dilution cannot be measured from this data.
The mix looks more deliberate after 2024 than before it. The 2018–2019 period reads as patching. Waiver payments to BMSS are marked delayed (claims #15431 and #15432), the company stated it was pursuing debt and equity capital (claim #15351), and it issued a small senior secured convertible with warrants (claims #15267 and #15268). From late 2024 the company layers in lower-cost, non-ATM instruments. These are a 0.75% convertible that closed at $594M per the record (claims #5251 and #5242), a Coinbase credit facility that grew from $100M to $200M within a month (claims #21929 and #21930), and a bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603, whose recorded amount is ambiguous as to units).
The link between stated use of proceeds and actual deployment is only partly visible. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802). Large hardware commitments recur, including Bitmain at $480M (claim #14271, delayed), $162.9M (claim #12382) and MicroBT at $453.4M (claim #11991). The record does not connect specific ATM draws to these orders. The earlier Bitmain commitment is also marked delayed (claim #14847). No insider transactions appear in the data, so no assessment of insider selling is possible.
A careful reader should watch the Coinbase facility, which was repriced from 8.3% to a fixed 6.15% with maturity extended to April 20, 2027 (claims #22253 and #24403). Its next renewal falls within a year. Readers should also watch the pace of drawdown on the December 2025 ATM, and whether the remaining authorized-share headroom prompts another increase request.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-06Riot's record shows two distinct capital regimes. Before 2017, the filings are mostly housekeeping: incentive-plan expansions, authorized-share increases, and a reverse-split authorization that is marked delayed (claim #20715). From 2019 onward the dilution capacity escalates steadily. A $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241) was followed by a $500M program in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M facilities in 2023 and 2024 (claims #12283 and #11948), and a further $500M program in December 2025 (claim #3932). Over the same period authorized common doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool was enlarged five times, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). The trajectory is one of repeated, enlarging equity capacity rather than discrete raises.
The mix reads as a deliberate sequence rather than patching. Equity funded the hardware build-out through 2024. Late 2024 brought the 0.75% convertible (claim #5251), recorded as closing at $594 (claim #5242, units unstated, plausibly inclusive of the overallotment in claim #5260). In 2025 came a Coinbase credit facility, upsized from $100M to $200M within weeks (claims #21929 and #22252). It was later restated from an 8.3% rate (claim #22253) to a 6.15% fixed rate maturing April 20, 2027 (claim #24403). A bitcoin sale funding the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) suggests the balance-sheet bitcoin is now treated as a financing source. The record contains no insider sale transactions, only executive compensation awards, so insider behavior cannot be assessed from this data.
Stated uses track deployment unevenly. Miner purchases are well documented, including $138.5M for Antminers (claim #14728) and $453.4M for MicroBT units (claim #11991). However, the 2022 Bitmain order (claim #14271) and an earlier $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim #14847) are both marked delayed. The Bitfarms position was financed from working capital (claim #6012), with $202.2M attributed in claim #5802. The convertible's stated purpose of bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245) has no corresponding deployment claim in the record.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is how the Coinbase facility is handled ahead of its April 2027 maturity. The second is drawdown of the December 2025 ATM. The third is whether the convertible's bitcoin-acquisition purpose is reconciled in later disclosure. The fourth is whether delayed hardware orders are delivered or no longer discussed. Several figures in the record lack units, and the final claim (#21921) is truncated, so these readings should be held provisionally.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-05Riot's record falls into two regimes. Before 2017 the disclosed activity is corporate housekeeping: authorized-share increases (claims #21089, #21040), periodic incentive-plan top-ups, and a reverse-split authorization recorded as delayed (claims #20721, #20715). The 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock, per claim #20904, marks the pivot. The 2019 senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268) read as bridge financing. They arrived alongside a $100M ATM with H.C. Wainwright (claim #15232), at a point when management described itself as pursuing debt and equity capital (claim #15351).
From 2022 the cadence becomes structural rather than episodic. ATM capacity moves from $500M (claim #14154) to $750M programs in 2023 and 2024 (claims #12283, #11957), and another $500M program follows in December 2025 (claim #3932). Over the same period authorized common stock doubles from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool is expanded repeatedly, most recently by 15M shares (claim #11935). Dilution is therefore driven primarily by the ATM, with plan expansions a steady secondary source.
The mix has since broadened in a way that looks deliberate rather than patched. A 2030 convertible closed at $594M per claim #5242, designated for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). A Coinbase credit facility originated at $100M (claim #21929) and was upsized to $200M within weeks (claim #21930). Use of proceeds can only be partly traced. Large miner orders are visible: $480M with Bitmain (claim #14271) and $453.4M with MicroBT (claim #11991). The Bitmain order is marked delayed, as was the earlier 2020 Bitmain commitment (claim #14847). The Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #5802, #6015), and a bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). Together these suggest treasury holdings now serve as a funding source in their own right. The dataset does not reconcile ATM sales against any of these deployments, which requires explanation from primary filings.
No insider transactions appear in the record, so that dimension cannot be assessed. Several amount fields are ambiguous, with some apparently denoting millions or percentages, and the final claim is truncated. Going forward, a careful reader should watch utilization of the December 2025 ATM. They should also watch whether the Coinbase facility, refixed at 6.15% with maturity moved to April 2027 (claim #24403), is renewed or termed out. A third point is how continued ATM issuance interacts with the conversion economics of the 2030 notes.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-05Riot's record falls into two distinct eras. Through 2014 the capital activity is housekeeping. There are repeated incentive-plan top-ups and authorized-share increases, which the record enters as dollar figures but which read as share counts (60 million authorized per claims #21089 and #21040). There is also a reverse-split authorization marked delayed in claims #20721 and #20715. The 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock at $4.75M (claim #20904) and the 2019 senior secured convertible notes at $3,358,333 with attached warrants (claims #15267 and #15268) look like financing on terms set by the investor rather than the issuer. From May 2019 onward the at-the-market program becomes the primary instrument. It escalates from $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154), then $750M in August 2023 (claim #12283), another $750M in February 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claims #13903 and #5964). Equity-plan increases recur almost annually, reaching 15M shares (claim #5963). The cadence suggests dilution is a standing operating input, not an episodic event.
The mix has broadened since late 2024 rather than drifted. It now includes the 0.75% convertible notes at $525M (claim #5251), the Coinbase facility upsized from $100M to $200M within weeks (claims #21929 and #21922), and a bitcoin sale tied to the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). Together these read as a deliberate move toward non-dilutive and balance-sheet funding. The pace of the Coinbase upsize, however, requires explanation that the record does not supply. On deployment, the data is thin. The Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802). The convertible's stated purpose of bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245) has no matching deployment claim. Several figures are recorded in ambiguous units, including the $480 Bitmain order marked delayed (claim #14271), the $594 note closing (claim #5242), and the $1,080 bitcoin sale (claim #17603), so they cannot be reconciled with confidence. No insider transactions appear in the record, and the final entries are truncated.
A careful reader should watch for three things. The first is the Coinbase facility's April 20, 2027 maturity, which was repriced from 8.3% to a fixed 6.15% (claims #22253 and #24403). The second is how quickly the December 2025 ATM is drawn. The third is whether future disclosures connect the convertible and credit proceeds to identifiable assets.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-03Riot's record divides into two eras, and the change between them matters more than any single entry. Before 2017 the filings show housekeeping: incentive-plan top-ups, authorized-share increases, and a reverse split authorized in 2010 (claims #20721 and #20715) that is tagged delayed. The first real financing, a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904), led into a 2019 phase of patching: small senior secured convertibles of about $3.36M (claim #15267) alongside a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241). These were the instruments of a company funding itself in small pieces. From 2022 onward the ATM became the main source of capital and grew with each renewal, from $500M (claim #14154) to $750M (claim #12283), then another $750M (claim #11957) and a further $500M (claim #3931). The authorized-share ceiling rose to match, doubling from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). Incentive-plan reserves also kept rising, from 4.4M shares (claim #14455) to 13M (claim #12134) to 15M (claim #5963), so compensation dilution grew alongside capital-raising dilution. The mix became more coherent after 2024. The 0.75% convertible, described at $525M (claim #5251) and closed at a figure recorded as $594 (claim #5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Coinbase facility then added collateralized debt, rising from $100M (claim #21929) to $200M (claim #21930) and later restated at a fixed 6.15% rate with maturity in April 2027 (claim #21921). Equity, converts and treasury-backed debt now read as layers of one strategy rather than separate stopgaps. On use of proceeds, the record is mixed. The Bitfarms stake, totaling about $111.1M (claim #6015) and later $202.2M (claim #5802), was said to be funded from working capital (claim #6012), which in practice cannot be separated from ATM proceeds. The $480M Bitmain order (claim #14271) is tagged delayed against its December 2022 delivery window, as is an earlier $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim #14847). A bitcoin sale to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) suggests treasury assets are being used as a funding source, and the figure recorded there needs clarification. The data contains no insider transactions, so nothing can be said on that front, and the record cuts off mid-entry at claim #21915. Readers should watch three things: how quickly the latest $500M ATM is drawn down, whether the Coinbase facility is refinanced or repaid before its April 2027 maturity, and whether future share-pool increases continue at the recent pace.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-03Riot's record divides into two eras. Before 2019, financing was small and episodic: incentive-plan top-ups, a reverse split authorization that was recorded as delayed (claims #20721 and #20715), and a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904). From 2019 the company relied on at-the-market programs of growing size. These were $100M with Wainwright (claim #15241), $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12283), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common shares were doubled from 340M to 680M (claim #5964) to accommodate this, and the equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). Dilution has therefore been continuous rather than event-driven, and its trajectory steepened through 2024.
The mix broadened late in the record. The 0.75% convertible, whose closed size is recorded as 594 in claim #5242 and which appears to be expressed in millions, was the first sizable non-equity instrument. A Coinbase credit facility followed at $100M (claim #21929), was upsized to $200M (claim #23925), and was then restated at a fixed 6.15% from 8.3% with maturity extended to April 2027 (claims #21921 and #22253). This reads as a deliberate shift toward cheaper and less dilutive capital, and less like patching. However, the facility's short tenor means it will need to be refinanced soon.
Use of proceeds is only partly traceable. Hardware commitments line up with the ATM periods: the $138.5M Antminer purchase (claim #14728), the $162.9M order (claim #12382) and the $453.4M MicroBT orders (claim #11991). The $480M Bitmain order, however, carries a delayed status in three claims (#14271, #14266, #14251). The convertible was described as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Yet a bitcoin sale was later used to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603), which reverses that direction and requires explanation. The Bitfarms stake was financed from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802), so it is not tied to a specific raise.
The record contains no insider transactions, so no conclusions about insider behavior are possible. A reader should watch three things: how much of the December 2025 ATM is drawn, how the Coinbase facility is handled ahead of its April 2027 maturity, and whether bitcoin holdings continue to be sold to fund operations. The final claim in the record is truncated.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-03Riot's record divides into two regimes. Before 2019 the disclosed financings are small and defensive: a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim 20904), followed by $3,358,333 of senior secured convertible notes with warrants attached (claim 15267). These read as patching rather than a funding plan, and the reverse-split authorizations of 2010 (claims 20721, 20715) are tagged delayed. From 2019 the company shifts to shelf-and-ATM issuance, starting with a $100M Wainwright program (claim 15241). The ATM programs then escalate to $500M (claim 14154), $750M in 2023 (claim 12283), another $750M in 2024 (claim 11957), and a further $500M at the end of 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M (claim 13903) to 680M shares (claim 5964). Equity-plan pool increases of 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims 13905, 12134, 5963) add a second, quieter source of dilution. The trajectory is a steady, programmatic expansion of issuance capacity rather than episodic raises.
The mix has become more deliberate over time. The 0.75% convertible priced at $525M (claim 5251) was the first large non-equity instrument, with proceeds tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). The Coinbase credit facility followed at $100M (claim 21929) and was upsized to $200M within weeks (claim 21930). This sequence suggests Riot is layering balance-sheet-backed debt beneath a continuous equity program, not simply reacting to shortfalls.
Tracking use of proceeds is difficult because the ATM claims do not carry stated uses. Hardware commitments are visible: the Antminer purchase at $138.5M (claim 14728), the Bitmain order recorded as $480 and described as $480 million (claim 14271, tagged delayed), and the MicroBT order described at $453.4 million (claim 11991). Whether ATM proceeds funded these specific orders is not established in the record. The Bitfarms position was said to be financed from working capital, at $202,180,487 per claim 5802. The Rockdale acquisition was funded by a bitcoin sale (claim 17603), whose recorded value of $1,080 has an unclear unit and requires explanation.
Several items deserve attention next. The first is how quickly the December 2025 $500M ATM is drawn. The second is the Coinbase facility, restated at a 6.15% fixed rate from 8.3% with maturity extended to April 2027 (claims 21921, 22253), which makes its refinancing or repayment the nearest debt event. The third is the conversion overhang of the 2030 notes against the enlarged authorized share base. No insider transactions appear in the record provided, and the final claim (23921) is truncated, so conclusions about the most recent period are provisional.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-03Riot's financing history falls into two regimes. Through 2019 the company raised small sums through stopgap instruments: the $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock, per claim #20904, and the $3.36M senior secured convertible notes, per claim #15267. Their timing reads as a balance sheet in need of repair rather than a planned program. From 2022 onward the at-the-market program became the primary source of funding, and its stated capacity rose from $500M (claim #14154) to $750M (claim #12275), was renewed at $750M (claim #11948), and was reset at $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Share authorization moved in step: authorized common doubled from 340M to 680M shares, per claim #5964. Equity incentive pool increases of 4.4M (claim #14455), 10M (claim #13905), 13M (claim #12134) and 15M shares (claim #5963) indicate that compensation dilution has grown alongside the ATM rather than leveling off. The record contains no insider sale data, so that dimension cannot be assessed. The instrument mix since 2024 is more varied and more coherent than in the earlier period. The 0.75% convertible, closed at roughly $594M per claim #5242, was paired with a Coinbase credit facility that started at $100M (claim #21929) and was upsized to $200M (claim #21930). This suggests a deliberate move toward borrowing against assets rather than relying only on equity. Deployment of proceeds is harder to reconcile. The convertible's stated use was bitcoin acquisition, per claim #5245, yet a later bitcoin sale was used to fund the Rockdale acquisition, per claim #17603. That reversal of treasury posture requires explanation. The Bitfarms position, $111M per claim #6015 and later $202M per claim #5802, was funded from working capital rather than any announced raise. The $480M Bitmain order is marked delayed across claims #14266, #14251 and #14271. Going forward, the most concrete item is the Coinbase facility. Its April 2026 restatement fixed the rate at 6.15%, down from 8.3% (claims #21921, #22253), but maturity falls in April 2027, so refinancing or repayment will be due within about six months. Readers should also follow the drawdown pace of the $500M ATM reset and whether a further incentive pool increase is proposed at the next annual meeting. Several claims record share counts and percentages in dollar fields, so figures should be checked against the source filings.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-02Riot's record falls into three distinct capital regimes, and the transitions between them say more than any single raise. Through 2017 the activity is small and housekeeping in nature: incentive-plan top-ups, a reverse-split authorization marked delayed (claims #20721 and #20715), and a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904). The 2018–2019 period reads as opportunistic patching. The company disclosed that it was pursuing debt and equity capital (claim #15351), and waiver payments and a restricted-stock issuance to BMSS are all marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434). It also issued $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes alongside warrants (claims #15267, #15268) in the same month it opened a $100M ATM with H.C. Wainwright (claim #15241). From 2022 the strategy becomes coherent, and the coherence is dilution at scale. ATM capacity stepped from $500M (claim #14154) to $750M (claim #12283), then to a second $750M program (claim #11957). Authorized common rose to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then doubled to 680M (claim #5964), while the equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, including increases of 13M (claim #12004) and 15M shares (claim #5963). That cadence tracks the hardware commitments closely: $138.5M for Antminers (claim #14728), the $480M Bitmain order marked delayed (claim #14271), $162.9M of hardware (claim #12382), and $453.4M of MicroBT miners (claim #11991). Use of proceeds broadly matches deployment in this phase, though the Bitfarms position funded from working capital, $202M per claim #5802, was by then itself largely an ATM product. The third regime, beginning in December 2024, adds leverage to the equity base. It includes the 2030 convertible notes that closed around $594M (claim #5242), with stated use for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and a Coinbase credit facility upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929, #21930). The record also shows bitcoin being sold to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603), and it does not reconcile that sale with the convertible's stated purpose; this requires explanation. A new $500M ATM followed in December 2025 (claim #3931). A sophisticated reader should watch four things. The first is the April 2027 maturity on the Coinbase facility, now fixed at 6.15% after the 8.3% pre-amendment rate (claims #21921, #22253). The second is the pace of draws on the $500M ATM. The third is remaining headroom under the 680M authorization. The fourth is the content of the April 2026 entry (claim #1877), which is truncated in the data provided. No insider sales appear in the record, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-01Riot's record divides into two eras. Before 2019 the company raised small amounts and made small-scale fixes: a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904), and $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claim #15267). Waiver payments to BMSS were recorded as delayed (claims #15431, #15432), and the Coinsquare license was paid partly in Riot shares (claim #15419). The reverse split authorized in 2010 is also recorded as delayed (claims #20721, #20715).
From 2019 the pattern becomes a repeatable program. ATM capacity grew from $100M (claim #15241) to $500M (claim #14154), then to two successive $750M programs (claims #12275, #11957), and another $500M was added in late 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled twice, to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then 680M (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was enlarged almost every year, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963). Dilution is therefore structural rather than episodic, and the share reservations track the ATM sizing.
The mix shifts in late 2024. A $500M convertible offering was upsized to $525M (claim #5251) and closed at $594M (claim #5242) to fund bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). A Coinbase credit facility followed at $100M (claim #21929) and was upsized to $200M (claim #22252). The 2026 Rockdale acquisition was funded by selling bitcoin (claim #17603). The company now appears to be using its treasury and secured credit alongside equity, which reads as a coherent diversification rather than patching. No insider transactions appear in the record.
Stated uses of proceeds mostly line up with large hardware commitments: $138.5M of Antminers (claim #14728), a $162.9M order (claim #12382) and the MicroBT purchase of roughly $453M (claim #11991). The $480M Bitmain order, however, is recorded as delayed (claims #14271, #14251). The Bitfarms position, around $202M per claim #5802, was funded from working capital rather than a named raise (claim #6012). The record does not say what became of it.
A careful reader should watch the Coinbase facility. Its rate moved from 8.3% (claim #22253) to a fixed 6.15% with maturity in April 2027 (claim #21921), while its availability and maturity terms were recorded as delayed (claims #4845, #4847, #21915). Its refinancing needs explaining. Other items to track are how quickly the December 2025 ATM is drawn, the conversion overhang from the 2030 notes, and whether bitcoin sales become a regular source of funding. The final claim, #1877, is cut off in the data provided and is not interpreted here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-10-01Riot's record divides into two eras. Before 2019 the company financed itself in small increments, such as the $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock closed in March 2017 (claim #20904), and expanded its share base mainly through authorization and incentive-plan increases. From 2019 onward, at-the-market programs became the primary funding source, and their size grew steadily. The $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241) gave way to a $500M program in 2022 (claim #14154). That was followed by back-to-back $750M programs in August 2023 (claim #12275) and February 2024 (claim #11957), and then a further $500M authorization in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964), and the equity plan pool was expanded by 13M shares (claim #12004) and then by 15M (claim #5963). The record supports a description of structurally recurring dilution rather than episodic dilution. It does not show how much of each ATM was actually sold, so the realized pace cannot be measured from these claims.
The financing mix looks deliberate. Since late 2024, Riot has diversified away from pure equity into a 0.75% convertible priced at $525M (claim #5251) and closed at $594M (claim #5242), and into a Coinbase credit facility that grew from $100M (claim #21929) to $200M (claim #22252). The facility was later restated at a 6.15% fixed rate, down from 8.3% (claims #21921, #22253). This reads as a planned move toward cheaper and more varied capital rather than ad hoc patching. The record contains no insider sales, only compensation awards, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
Use of proceeds tracks only partially. Hardware commitments such as the $453.4M MicroBT order (claim #11991) are consistent with equity-funded expansion. The $480M Bitmain order, however, carries a delayed status (claim #14271). The convertible was framed as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Separately, the Bitfarms stake, which totaled roughly $111.1M per claim #6015 and $202.2M per claim #5802, was described as funded from working capital (claim #6012). Because cash is fungible, attributing that stake to any particular raise would require explanation. A bitcoin sale tied to the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) suggests the treasury is now also a funding source, although the units in that claim are unclear.
The items to watch follow directly from the record. The Coinbase facility matures in April 2027 (claim #21921), and both its terms and its maturity carry delayed flags (claims #21915, #4847). Utilization of the December 2025 ATM will show whether the newer debt instruments have actually slowed equity issuance. The record ends with a truncated April 2026 Coinbase entry (claim #1858), so the most recent terms are incomplete.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-30Riot's record describes a company whose capital strategy changed with the business. Before 2017 the filings show only housekeeping: plan share increases and a reverse-split authorization that is marked delayed (claims #20721 and #20715). The first real financing is the $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904). After that, dilution capacity grows in steps. The $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15232) gives way to a $500M program (claim #14154), then $750M programs in 2023 and 2024 (claims #12275 and #11957), and a further $500M ATM at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock follows the same path, rising to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then 680M (claim #5964). Several of these figures are recorded in dollars but are share counts, so they should be read as capacity rather than proceeds. Equity-plan reserves also expand repeatedly, reaching 15M shares by 2024 (claim #5963).
The mix looks deliberate rather than patched together. Through 2023 the ATM was essentially the only funding tool, and it tracked large hardware commitments: the $138.5M Antminer purchase (claim #14728), the Bitmain order recorded as $480M (claim #14271), the $162.9M hardware order (claim #12382) and the $453.4M MicroBT purchase (claim #11991). From late 2024 the company adds non-equity sources: a 0.75% convertible, recorded at $525M priced (claim #5251) and apparently $594M at close (claim #5242), followed by a Coinbase credit facility that was upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929 and #21930). This reads as a planned shift toward cheaper and less dilutive capital once the balance sheet could support it. The record contains no insider-sale entries.
The data cannot confirm whether proceeds were used as announced. The ATMs carry no stated use in the record. The convertible was designated for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms stake of about $111M (claim #6015) was described as funded from working capital (claim #6012). The Rockdale acquisition was funded partly by a bitcoin sale (claim #17603), which suggests the treasury now serves as a funding source in its own right.
Several items deserve attention going forward. The Coinbase facility's rate moved from 8.3% (claim #22253) to a fixed 6.15%, with maturity extended to April 2027 (claim #21921). That April 2027 maturity, together with the facility terms marked delayed (claim #21915), requires explanation. Readers should also track how fast the late-2025 ATM is drawn down against the enlarged 680M-share authorization. Finally, the record is cut off at claim #9634, so any later events are not reflected here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-30Riot's record shows two distinct eras. Before 2019, financing was small and episodic: a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904), a reverse-split authorization recorded as delayed (claims #20721, #20715), and routine incentive-plan top-ups. From 2019 onward, the at-the-market program becomes the main funding source, and each authorization is larger than the last. The progression runs from $100M with H.C. Wainwright (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154), then $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Share authorizations kept pace, with authorized common doubling from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). Equity-plan reserves also grew, including 13M shares (claim #12134) and 15M shares (claim #5963), which adds a steady compensation-driven layer of dilution on top of the ATM issuance.
The instrument mix reads more as a deliberate progression than as patching. Equity funded fleet buildout through 2024. In December 2024 the company added a 0.75% convertible, sized at $525M (claim #5251) and closed near $594M with the overallotment (claims #5242, #5260). In 2025 it added a bitcoin-collateralized Coinbase facility, opened at $100M (claim #21929), upsized to $200M (claim #21930), and restated in April 2026 at a 6.15% fixed rate, down from 8.3% (claims #22253, #21921). The direction is toward cheaper, balance-sheet-secured capital. Recurring ATM renewals show that equity remains the backstop.
On use of proceeds, the record is only partly traceable. The convertible was framed as funding for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), but no subsequent claim confirms how it was deployed. The Bitfarms position, about $202M per claim #5802, was described as funded from working capital (claim #6012), which in practice is fungible with ATM proceeds. Several large miner orders carry delayed status, including the Bitmain commitments (claims #14847, #14271), and that requires explanation against the stated capex timelines. A bitcoin sale tied to the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) is recorded, but its disclosed figure is ambiguous in units.
A careful reader should watch four things next: the Coinbase facility's April 2027 maturity and whether the extension option is exercised (claim #4848); the pace at which the December 2025 $500M ATM is drawn; remaining headroom under the 680M authorized shares; and the content of claim #9634, which is truncated in this record. No insider transactions appear in the data provided, so no read on insider behavior is possible.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-30Riot's record falls into three eras. Before 2017, capital activity was mostly housekeeping: authorized-share increases, incentive-plan expansions, and a reverse split authorization that was twice recorded as delayed (claims #20721 and #20715). The 2017 to 2019 period looks like opportunistic patching. It includes a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904), roughly $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268), and a license fee paid in 450,000 common shares (claim #15419). Several waiver payments to BMSS were delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), and a December 2018 filing described the company as still pursuing debt and equity capital (claim #15351). From 2019 onward, the at-the-market program becomes the main funding tool, and its size escalates. It grew from $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154), then $750M in August 2023 (claim #12275), a second $750M in February 2024 (claim #11957), and another $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock was raised to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then to 680M (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, including by 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #13905, #12134, #5963). Dilution is therefore structural and accelerating, not episodic. The later mix is more coherent than the early patchwork. Equity capacity lined up with large hardware commitments, including the $453.4M MicroBT order (claim #11991) and the $480M Bitmain order, which was recorded as delayed (claim #14271). From late 2024 the company added non-equity sources: a 0.75% convertible that closed at about $594M (claims #5251, #5242) and a Coinbase credit facility upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929, #21930). Use of proceeds is only partly traceable in this record. The convertible was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Bitfarms position was described as funded from working capital, with figures of $111.1M and $202.2M at different dates (claims #6015, #5802). The ATM programs carry no stated use against which to measure deployment, and the record does not show how much of each program was actually drawn. A sophisticated reader should watch four things. First, how the Coinbase facility is handled as its April 2027 maturity approaches, following its repricing from 8.3% to a fixed 6.15% (claims #22253, #21921). Second, whether the facility terms recorded as delayed (claim #21915) are clarified. Third, whether bitcoin sales, such as the one tied to the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603), become a recurring funding source. Fourth, how much of the December 2025 ATM is drawn. The record is truncated after claim #9634, so later events may not be reflected.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-29Riot's record divides into two eras. Before 2019, capital activity was small and administrative: incentive-plan top-ups, a reverse-split authorization recorded as delayed (claims #20721 and #20715), and a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904). The pivot to mining brought a different scale and cadence. A $100M shelf (claim #15291), a $3.36M senior secured convertible (claim #15267) and a $100M ATM with H.C. Wainwright (claim #15232) arrived within months of each other in 2019. Successively larger ATM programs followed: $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock moved from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity-plan pool was expanded repeatedly, by 4.4M (claim #14455), 10M (claim #13890), 13M (claim #12004) and 15M shares (claim #5963), with a seventh amendment in 2026 (claim #1877). The trajectory of dilution capacity is steadily upward. The record does not show how much of each ATM was actually sold, so realized dilution cannot be measured from this data.
The mix broadened from late 2024 onward in a way that reads as deliberate rather than patched. A 0.75% convertible priced at $525M (claim #5251) was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). A Coinbase credit facility followed: it started at $100M (claim #21929), was upsized to $200M (claim #21930), and was restated at 6.15% fixed with an April 2027 maturity (claim #21921). A bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603), although the recorded figure's units are unclear. This layering of equity, convertible debt, secured credit and treasury sales suggests a company diversifying its funding sources. However, a new $500M ATM (claim #3931) sits alongside a stated aim of data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634). That pairing requires explanation.
Tracking announced uses against actual deployment is only partly possible. The large miner orders are documented: $162.9M (claim #12382) and $453.4M from MicroBT (claim #11991). The $480M Bitmain order carries a delayed status (claim #14271). The Bitfarms stake, reaching $202.2M (claim #5802), was described as funded from working capital (claim #6012). Because ATM draws are not itemized, the record cannot link that working capital to specific issuances.
A careful reader should watch four things. First, actual draws on the December 2025 ATM, measured against the no-dilution language. Second, how the Coinbase facility is handled ahead of its April 2027 maturity. Third, the size of the seventh equity-plan amendment. Fourth, remaining authorized-share headroom. The claims list is also truncated at its final entry, so the most recent events may be incomplete.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-29Riot's record divides into two distinct capital regimes. Before 2019 the disclosed activity is small and administrative: incentive-plan top-ups, a 2010 reverse-split authorization carried as delayed (claims 20721, 20715), and a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred in 2017 (claim 20904). The step change begins in 2019, when a $3.36M senior secured convertible (claim 15267) sat alongside a $100M at-the-market agreement with H.C. Wainwright (claim 15232). That pairing is characteristic of a company financing survival rather than executing a plan. From there, ATM capacity scaled roughly with the mining build-out: $500M in 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in 2023 (claim 12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim 11957), and $500M at the end of 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964), and plan reserves were expanded at least six times from 2021 onward, most recently through a Seventh Amendment whose size is not stated (claim 1877). The record shows authorizations, not actual ATM sales, so realized dilution cannot be measured from this data alone.
Since late 2024 the mix has become more deliberate. The 0.75% 2030 convertible closed at $594M (claim 5242), up from a $525M pricing (claim 5251), with proceeds tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). A Coinbase credit facility followed at $100M and was upsized to $200M (claims 21929, 21930), then restated at 6.15% fixed with an April 2027 maturity (claim 21921). A bitcoin sale funded the Rockdale acquisition (claim 17603). Together these read as a shift toward balance-sheet and treasury funding and away from pure equity issuance. Even so, the stated intent of data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634) sits alongside a live $500M ATM and a further plan-share increase, and that combination requires explanation.
On deployment, the large hardware commitments are traceable: the $480M Bitmain order is carried as delayed (claim 14271), and the MicroBT order was stated at $453.4M (claim 11991). The Bitfarms stake was financed from working capital, with $202.2M disclosed (claim 5802). The data does not link any specific ATM tranche to these uses. The record contains compensation grants but no insider sales.
A careful reader should watch four things: how the Coinbase facility is refinanced or repaid ahead of April 2027, whether the December 2025 ATM is actually drawn, the size of the Seventh Amendment reserve, and whether the non-dilution framing survives the next build cycle. The claim list is truncated at the final entry, so later events may be missing.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-29Riot's record divides into two distinct regimes, and they need to be read separately. Before 2017 the entries are routine. They cover incentive-plan top-ups and authorized-share housekeeping. Several figures recorded as dollars, such as the 60,000,000 authorized-share increase in claim 21089, are share counts. The 2017–2019 period looks like opportunistic patching. It includes a $4.75M private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred (claim 20904), $3.36M of senior secured convertibles with attached warrants (claims 15267, 15268), and a set of delayed waiver payments to BMSS (claims 15431–15434). These are the hallmarks of a company funding itself on short notice.
From 2019 the pattern becomes a scalable equity machine. The $100M Wainwright ATM (claim 15232) was followed by a $500M ATM (claim 14154), then two $750M programs (claims 12275, 11957). Each step was preceded or matched by authorized-share expansion, first to 340M shares (claim 13903) and then to 680M (claim 5964). The equity-plan pool grew in parallel, with successive additions of 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims 13905, 12134, 5963). The ATMs line up with hardware commitments, including the $480M Bitmain order, marked delayed (claim 14271), the $162.9M order (claim 12382) and the $453.4M MicroBT purchase (claim 11991). So the stated purpose of the dilution tracks the observable deployment.
In late 2024 the mix shifts toward the $594M of 0.75% 2030 convertibles (claims 5251, 5242), which were earmarked for bitcoin purchases (claim 5245). A Coinbase secured facility followed, upsized from $100M to $200M (claims 21929, 21930) and restated at 6.15% fixed with an April 2027 maturity (claim 21921). The roughly $202M Bitfarms position was described as funded from working capital (claims 5802, 6012), and the Rockdale acquisition was funded by bitcoin sales (claim 17603). Both are consistent with a deliberate move toward non-dilutive sources.
That framing requires explanation alongside the $500M ATM entered in December 2025 (claim 3931), which sits months before the April 2026 statement about data-center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634). The record contains compensation awards but no insider sale entries, so nothing can be said about insider selling.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is whether the Coinbase facility is extended again or refinanced before April 2027. The second is how much of the December 2025 ATM is actually drawn. The third is the undisclosed size of the Seventh Amendment share increase (claim 1877). The fourth is how the 2030 convertibles interact with the share price. The record provided is truncated after claim 895, and several figures appear to be scaled inconsistently, so conclusions about 2026 activity are provisional.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-29Riot's record describes a company that moved from incidental equity management to industrial-scale shelf capacity within about five years. Before 2017 the claims are mostly plan and authorization housekeeping. The first external financing is a $4.75M convertible-and-warrant private placement (claim #20904), followed in 2019 by roughly $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes (claim #15267). That same year a $100M ATM with Wainwright (claim #15232) established the instrument that would carry the company. ATM capacity then escalated to $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957), and a fresh $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common shares were raised to 340M (claim #13903) and then 680M (claim #5964). Equity plan reserves grew in parallel, by 13M shares (claim #12134), 15M (claim #5963), and a Seventh Amendment whose size the record does not state (claim #1877). The trajectory of dilution is steep and sustained rather than episodic.
The mix reads as sequenced more than opportunistic. Equity funded the miner orders, including the $138.5M Antminer purchase (claim #14728) and the MicroBT orders of about $453.4M (claim #11991). The Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital, $111.1M per claim #6015 and $202.2M per claim #5802, which given prior ATM activity is effectively equity-funded. Only in December 2024 did the company add meaningful non-equity capital: 0.75% convertibles sized at $525M (claim #5251), recorded at close as $594M (claim #5242), a figure that requires reconciliation against the $75M overallotment (claim #5260). The stated use of proceeds was bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Roughly a year later, bitcoin was being sold to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603). That reversal of direction is disclosed but not explained in these claims.
The 2025–2026 Coinbase facility, upsized from $100M to $200M (claims #21929, #21930) and restated at 6.15% fixed with an April 2027 maturity (claim #21921), marks a shift toward collateralized debt. Management's April 2026 language on data center growth "without equity dilution" (claim #9634) sits alongside an open $500M ATM and a new equity plan amendment. Readers should watch for draws on that ATM, for the facility's refinancing ahead of its 2027 maturity, and for any follow-up on the Bitmain order recorded as delayed (claim #14271). The record contains no insider transaction data and ends mid-entry, so conclusions on insider alignment are not possible here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-28Riot's dilution runs in two phases. Before 2019 the record shows small, housekeeping actions: stock plan top-ups and authorized-share changes, plus a $4.75M private placement of convertibles, warrants and preferred (claim #20904). From 2019 onward, the at-the-market program became the main funding tool. It started at $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232) and grew to $500M (claim #14144), then $750M twice (claims #12275 and #11957), then another $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was enlarged almost every year, including 13M shares (claim #12004), 15M shares (claim #5963) and a seventh amendment in 2026 (claim #1877). Employee dilution is therefore a steady background layer beneath the ATM issuance.
The mix looks deliberate rather than patched together. Equity paid for miner fleets, then the company moved toward other sources. The first was the 2030 convertible, which was announced at $500M (claim #5261), priced at $525M (claim #5251) and recorded as closed at $594M (claim #5242). The second was a $200M Coinbase revolving facility (claim #1858). In 2026 came a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752) and a $69M delayed-draw term loan tied to AMD capacity (claim #8754). Management's stated aim of data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634) is consistent with that shift. It sits uneasily beside a fresh $500M ATM authorized four months earlier (claim #3931), and that overlap requires explanation.
Declared uses of proceeds mostly match what the record shows was deployed. ATM capacity lines up in time with hardware commitments: $138.5M (claim #14728), $162.9M (claim #12382) and the MicroBT order of about $453.4M (claim #11991). The Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802), which in practice means earlier equity raises. The convertible was earmarked for bitcoin purchases (claim #5245). Several commitments are marked delayed, notably the $17.7M Bitmain payment (claim #14847) and the $480M Bitmain order (claim #14271). The record contains no insider sale transactions, so that part of the picture cannot be assessed.
A careful reader should watch three things. The first is how the Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced or taken out, since it is described as interim. The second is the Coinbase facility's availability and maturity terms, both marked delayed (claims #4845 and #4847). The third is whether the December 2025 ATM is drawn in size, which would test the non-dilution framing, especially against the Q1 2026 cash position recorded at $282M (claim #895).
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-28Riot's record divides into two eras. Before 2017 the filings consist almost entirely of housekeeping: share authorizations, incentive-plan top-ups and a reverse-split authorization that was marked delayed (claims #20721, #20715). The only external raise in that era is a $4.75M private placement (claim #20904). From 2019 the company shifts to continuous shelf-and-ATM issuance. The first ATM was $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232). It was followed by programs of $500M (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in 2024 (claim #11948) and $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled twice to make room, first to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then to 680M (claim #5964). Equity-plan reserves grew at an accelerating pace, from 4.4M shares (claim #14455) to 10M, 13M and 15M (claims #13905, #12134, #11935), with a seventh amendment in 2026 (claim #1877). Dilution has therefore compounded both through market issuance and through compensation.
The mix looks more deliberate after 2024 than before it. Early instruments, such as the $3.36M senior secured convertible notes (claim #15267), read as patching. The later sequence adds progressively cheaper non-equity capital: the 0.75% convertible sized at $525M (claim #5251), the Coinbase revolver recorded at $200M (claim #1858), and a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility plus a $69M delayed-draw term loan tied to AMD deployments (claims #8752, #8754). The company's stated aim of data-center growth "without equity dilution" (claim #9634) sits alongside a fresh $500M ATM authorized four months earlier. That combination requires explanation.
Proceeds are hard to match against deployment from this record. The convertible was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Bitfarms stake, which grew from about $111M to $202M, was funded from working capital while ATM capacity was open (claims #6015, #5802). The Rockdale acquisition was funded by selling bitcoin (claim #17603). Several hardware commitments were marked delayed, including the Bitmain orders (claims #14847, #14271). Many figures in the record have inconsistent units, for example the $594 closing amount (claim #5242), so the reported magnitudes deserve caution. No insider transactions appear on record.
A reader should watch three things. The first is how the "interim" Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced and whether that takeout relies on equity. The second is whether the December 2025 ATM is actually drawn, which would test the no-dilution framing. The third is how the 2030 convertible's potential share overhang interacts with a still-expanding incentive pool.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-27Riot's record divides into three distinct financing regimes. Before 2018 the filings are almost entirely housekeeping. Authorized-share and incentive-plan increases appear alongside a reverse-split authorization (claims #20721, #20715). The only external raise is a modest $4.75M package of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (claim #20904). The 2018–2019 period reads as opportunistic patching. The company was paying license fees in stock (450,000 shares to Coinsquare, claim #15419). Waiver payments to BMSS were recorded as delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), and the company said it was 'currently pursuing debt and equity capital' (claim #15351). It raised $3.36M in senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268) at the same time it opened a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241).
From 2020 the at-the-market program became the core instrument. It scaled from $100M (claim #14814) to $500M (claim #14154), then to consecutive $750M programs (claims #12283, #11957). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan pool rose in steps of 4.4M, 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #14455, #13905, #12004, #5963). Taken together, the dilution is sustained and structural, not episodic. The large hardware commitments sit beside it: the $480 million Bitmain order recorded as delayed (claim #14271) and the $453.4M MicroBT purchase (claim #11991).
Since late 2024 the mix has moved toward debt. The 0.75% convertible was sized at $525M (claim #5251) and closed at a figure recorded as $594 (claim #5242), consistent with exercise of the $75 overallotment (claim #5260). A Coinbase credit facility followed (claims #4844, #1858), and in 2026 a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility and a $180M term loan tied to AMD deployment (claims #8752, #8753). This shift looks deliberate. Management's statement that data center growth will proceed 'without equity dilution' (claim #9634) nonetheless requires explanation, since a fresh $500M ATM (claim #3931) and a Seventh Amendment to the equity plan (claim #1877) sit alongside it.
On use of proceeds, the record states purposes but rarely shows deployment. The Bitfarms stake was funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and the convertible was earmarked for bitcoin purchases (claim #5245). No claim reconciles ATM draws against stated uses. The record also contains no insider transaction data, and the final delayed-draw entry (claim #8754) is truncated.
A careful reader should watch several items. The first is whether the December 2025 ATM is actually drawn, given the non-dilution framing. The others are the undisclosed size of the Seventh Amendment pool, drawdowns on the Morgan Stanley facility, and the Coinbase maturity and availability terms, which are currently recorded as delayed (claims #4847, #4845).
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-27Riot's record falls into three distinct regimes, and the transitions between them say more than any single transaction. Through 2018 and 2019 the financing was small and reactive. Waiver payments to BMSS are marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), a $3.36M senior secured convertible came with warrants attached (claims #15267, #15268), and a $100M Wainwright ATM was re-papered several times (claims #15232, #15063, #14930). That pattern reads as patching rather than plan. From 2021 onward, equity became the primary instrument and scaled quickly: a $500M ATM (claim #14154), then $750M (claim #12275), then another $750M (claim #11957). Authorized common doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claims #13903, #5964), and the equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, by 4.4M, 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #14455, #13905, #12134, #5963). Several of these share counts appear in the record as dollar figures, so readers should treat those values as share quantities. Over the same years, deployment tracked the stated purpose reasonably well: large miner orders (claims #14728, #12382, #11991) and a Bitfarms position of about $111M funded from working capital (claims #6015, #5802). The $480M Bitmain order is marked delayed (claim #14271). The third regime begins in December 2024 with the 0.75% convertible notes, $525M priced and roughly $594M closed per claims #5251 and #5242. It continues with a $200M Coinbase credit facility (claims #4844, #2051) and, in August 2026, a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility plus $180M and $69M term loans tied to AMD deployments (claims #8752, #8753, #8754). The stated use of the convertible proceeds, bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), is not matched by any deployment data in this record. The April 2026 statement that data-center growth would proceed without equity dilution (claim #9634) sits alongside a fresh $500M ATM filed four months earlier (claim #3931) and a seventh equity plan amendment (claim #1877). Reconciling those two positions requires explanation. The record contains no open-market insider sales, so that dimension cannot be assessed. The items to watch next are draws on the $500M ATM against the non-dilution statement, how the interim Morgan Stanley facility is taken out, the Coinbase facility maturity (marked delayed, claim #4847), and whether the contracted revenue cited in claim #1192 converts into cash flow on the schedule the debt assumes. The record is truncated after claim #506.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-27Riot's record describes a company whose capital structure outgrew its early improvisation and has now turned toward project-level debt. The 2018–2019 entries are small and reactive: stock-settled waiver payments to BMSS, several of them marked delayed (claims #15431, #15434), shares used to pay for a Coinsquare license (claim #15419), and $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes with warrants (claims #15267, #15268). From there, dilution capacity grew with each cycle. The Wainwright ATM was $100M (claim #15241). Later programs were $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), and another $750M in 2024 (claim #11957). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan was enlarged repeatedly, most recently by a seventh amendment (claim #1877).
Through 2024 the mix looks coherent rather than patched together. ATM capacity lined up with large miner orders, including the $480M Bitmain order, recorded as delayed (claim #14271), and the $453.4M MicroBT purchase (claim #11991). The Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), which in practice means funded by prior equity raises. The December 2024 convertible, $594M at close (claim #5242), was stated to be for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The record then shows bitcoin sales to fund the Rockdale acquisition and AI data-center expansion (claims #17603, #426). That reverses the accumulation rationale and requires explanation, and the unit basis of those two figures is unclear as recorded.
The current phase relies on the Coinbase revolver (claims #4844, #1858), the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), and expected term loans of $180M and $69M tied to AMD deployments (claims #8753, #8754). Management frames this as data-center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634). However, a $500M ATM authorized in December 2025 (claim #3931) is still on record, and how much of it has been drawn is not disclosed here.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is whether the interim facility is refinanced on schedule. The second is whether the 2025 ATM is used despite the no-dilution framing. The third is how data-center revenue, which fell from $33 in Q1 (claim #888) to $23 in Q2 (claim #505) as recorded, grows into the multi-billion-dollar contracted figures cited (claims #1192, #509). The fourth is whether the delayed credit-facility maturity terms (claim #4847) are resolved. The record provided ends mid-entry at claim #443, so later events are not reflected.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-27Riot's record shows a company that has leaned mainly on at-the-market equity, and has only recently begun to move toward debt and asset sales. The ATM programs grew from the $100M Wainwright agreement in 2019 (claim #15232) to $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), then $750M in both 2023 and 2024 (claims #12275 and #11957), and another $500M at the end of 2025 (claim #3931). Share authorization followed the same path. Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, most recently by 15M shares (claim #5963), and again under a Seventh Amendment whose size the record does not state (claim #1877). The record does not show how much of each ATM was actually sold, so any view of realized dilution is inferred rather than measured.
The financing mix changes around late 2024. The 0.75% convertible, sized at $525M (claim #5251) and reported closed near $594M (claim #5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Within about eighteen months, however, bitcoin was being sold to fund the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) and AI data center expansion (claim #426). That reversal of stated purpose requires explanation, not assumption. The Coinbase revolving facility of $200M (claim #1858), the Morgan Stanley $573M interim facility (claim #8752), and the expected $180M and $69M term loans for AMD deployments (claims #8753, #8754) all fit the April 2026 language about growing the data center business without equity dilution (claim #9634). The open $500M ATM, however, remains available and qualifies that commitment.
The use-of-proceeds record is uneven. The Bitfarms stake was funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802). The large miner orders include the $480M Bitmain order, marked delayed (claim #14271), and the $453.4M MicroBT order (claim #11991), and the record does not reconcile either with specific capital raises. No insider sales appear in this record.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is how the Morgan Stanley interim facility is refinanced, since it is described as interim. The second is whether the ATM is used even though the company has said it will avoid dilution. The third is the size of the Seventh Amendment share increase. The fourth is whether the contracted revenue projections, including the $9.1B base term (claim #1192), turn into cash flow that can service the new debt. The claim list provided ends partway through claim #443, so later events are not covered here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-27Riot's financing record falls into three phases, each larger in scale than the one before. The 2018–2019 period looks like opportunistic patching: small, bespoke instruments such as the $3.36 million senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claim #15267) sat alongside BMSS waiver payments and a restricted stock issuance that were all later marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434). The company said it was pursuing debt and equity capital without specifics (claim #15351).
From 2022 through 2024 the strategy became coherent and equity-led. At-the-market programs grew from $500 million (claim #14154) to $750 million (claim #12283) and then to a second $750 million (claim #11957). Authorized common stock doubled from 340 million to 680 million shares (claim #5964). Equity plan reserves were enlarged repeatedly, including 10 million (claim #13905), 13 million (claim #12134) and 15 million shares (claim #11935). This was a steady, programmatic dilution cadence that tracked large hardware commitments, such as the $480 million Bitmain order (claim #14271, delayed) and the $453.4 million MicroBT order (claim #11991).
The December 2024 0.75% convertible, priced at $525 million (claim #5251) and earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), marked a shift toward debt-like instruments. The shift continued with the Coinbase credit facility (claims #4844, #2051) and, in 2026, with project-level financing: the $573 million Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), an expected $180 million term loan against the AMD deployment (claim #8753), and a stated target of long-term project debt for gigawatt-scale development (claim #8531). The company now describes data center growth as proceeding without equity dilution (claim #9634). That statement sits alongside a $500 million ATM authorized in December 2025 (claim #3931) and a Seventh Amendment to the equity plan whose size is not disclosed (claim #1877). Both require explanation against the non-dilution framing.
The data offer limited ability to test use of proceeds. Where purposes are stated, some can be checked. The Bitfarms stake was financed from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and bitcoin sales were tied to Rockdale and AI expansion (claims #17603, #426). None of the ATM programs has a disclosed draw-down or deployment record here. No insider transactions appear in the record.
A careful reader should watch four things: whether the $573 million interim facility is refinanced into term debt on schedule, whether the December 2025 ATM is drawn despite the non-dilution language, the size of the Seventh Amendment share reserve, and how the 2030 convertibles behave relative to the conversion price.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-26Riot's financing record falls into three phases. From 2018 through 2020 the company relied on small, patchwork instruments: the roughly $3.36M senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268), a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim #15241), and share-settled vendor payments such as the 450,000 shares issued for the Coinsquare license (claim #15419). Several of the BMSS payment obligations from this period are marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434). Together these point to a company managing liquidity case by case rather than following a funding plan.
From 2022 the ATM became the main instrument, and it grew with each renewal: $500M (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), $750M again in 2024 (claim #11948), and $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, by 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #13905, #12004, #5963), with a seventh amendment in 2026 (claim #1877). The record shows capacity for dilution growing steadily. It does not show how much of each ATM was actually sold, and that gap limits any firm conclusion about realized dilution.
The 2024 to 2026 mix points to a deliberate move away from equity. The $594M 2030 convertible (claim #5242) was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Coinbase revolving facility (claims #1858, #2051) and the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752) followed, with a stated target of $1.7B in long-term project debt (claim #8531). Management's framing of "data center growth without equity dilution" (claim #9634) is consistent with this sequence, but it sits alongside the $500M ATM filed four months earlier, and the relationship between the two requires explanation.
The use of proceeds is traceable in places. The Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and bitcoin sales were cited as funding Rockdale and the AI expansion (claims #17603, #8643), although the units for those two figures are not specified. The disclosures contain no insider sell transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
A careful reader should now watch four things: whether the interim facility is refinanced into term debt on schedule, draws on the $69M delayed-draw tranche (claim #8754), how much of the December 2025 ATM is used, and whether the contracted Anthropic and AMD revenue (claims #1192, #407) arrives on the timeline the debt structure assumes.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-26Riot's record shows a company that moved from small, patched-together financing to large standing equity programs, and then, more recently, toward asset-backed and project-level debt. The 2019 layer was modest and reactive. There were $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268), issued alongside a $100M ATM with Wainwright (claim #15241) after management said it was "pursuing debt and equity capital" (claim #15351). From 2022 the ATMs grow sharply: $500M (claim #14154), then $750M (claims #12275, #11948), then another $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, by 4.4M, 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #14455, #13890, #12004, #5963), and a seventh amendment of undisclosed size followed (claim #1877). The record captures program capacity rather than shares actually sold, so the realized pace of dilution cannot be measured from it. The direction of authorized capacity, however, is consistently upward.
The mix reads as a coherent sequence more than opportunistic patching. Equity funded the miner purchase orders, including the Bitmain commitment (claim #14271) and the MicroBT orders (claim #11991). The 2030 convertible, which closed at $594M after an upsize (claims #5251, #5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). The Bitfarms stake of roughly $202M was financed from working capital (claim #5802). The 2026 layer shifts to a $200M Coinbase revolver (claim #1858), a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility for the Anthropic project (claim #8752), AMD-linked term loans of $180M and $69M (claims #8753, #8754), and bitcoin sales to fund Rockdale and AI expansion (claims #17603, #8643). The record contains no insider sales, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
On use of proceeds, one point requires explanation. Management stated in April 2026 that data center growth would proceed "without equity dilution" (claim #9634), yet the $500M ATM authorized four months earlier (claim #3931) remains on record. The data does not show whether it has been drawn. Several Bitmain obligations and the Coinbase maturity and availability terms are marked delayed (claims #14847, #4847, #4845).
A sophisticated reader should watch three things. First, whether the $573M interim facility is refinanced into the targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim #8531). Second, whether the December 2025 ATM is used despite the no-dilution framing. Third, the share count attached to the seventh equity plan amendment.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-25Riot's record describes two distinct capital regimes, and the transition between them is the main story. Through 2024, dilution capacity expanded at an accelerating cadence. The at-the-market program grew from $100M with Wainwright (claim #15241) to $500M (claim #14154), then $750M in August 2023 (claim #12275), and was renewed at $750M within roughly six months (claim #11957). Authorized common stock was raised to 340M shares (claim #13903) and then doubled to 680M (claim #5964). The equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, including by 13M shares (claim #12134) and 15M shares (claim #11935). These increases broadly track large hardware commitments, among them the $480M Bitmain order (claim #14271, marked delayed) and the $453.4M MicroBT purchase (claim #11991). That pairing reads as a coherent, if equity-heavy, fund-the-fleet strategy rather than opportunistic patching. The 2018–2019 entries are different in character. Small secured convertibles with warrants (claim #15267), share-settled license fees (claim #15419) and delayed BMSS waiver payments (claim #15431) reflect a company in a narrower position. From December 2024 the mix shifts toward non-dilutive or deferred-dilution instruments. These include the 0.75% convertible that closed at $594M (claim #5242), the $200M Coinbase credit facility (claim #4844, restated in claim #2051), bitcoin sales (claims #17603 and #426), and the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752) with AMD-linked term loans (claims #8753 and #8754). Stated uses mostly align with the observable deployment. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245), and the Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #6012 and #5802). The April 2026 statement of data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634) sits alongside a fresh $500M ATM authorization four months earlier (claim #3931) and a seventh equity plan amendment (claim #1877), and that coexistence requires explanation. Data center revenue went from $33M in Q1 (claim #888) to $23M in Q2 (claim #505), which is modest against the contracted $9.1B base term (claim #1192). A sophisticated reader should watch whether the interim facility is refinanced into the targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim #8531), whether the $500M ATM is drawn despite the no-dilution framing, and when contracted revenue begins to appear in reported results. The record contains no insider transactions, several figures are recorded without a clear unit scale, and the supplied data ends mid-entry, so these observations are provisional.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-23Riot's record divides into three distinct financing regimes, and the transitions between them are the most informative part of the history. The 2018–2019 period reads as small-scale patching rather than strategy. The Verady convertible investment (claim #15513), the BMSS waiver payments marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), and the $3.36M senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268) are the instruments of a company funding operations one obligation at a time. The ATM with Wainwright (claim #15241) was the first durable channel.
From 2022 through 2025 the pattern becomes a coherent, if heavily dilutive, equity ladder. ATM capacity stepped from $500M (claim #14154) to $750M (claims #12275, #11948) and then to a further $500M (claim #3931). Authorized common stock rose from 340M (claim #13903) to 680M shares (claim #5964). Equity plan share pools were enlarged repeatedly (claims #13905, #12134, #11935, #1877). The record does not show how much of each ATM was actually drawn, so realized dilution cannot be measured from these claims alone. The headline miner commitments are clearly documented: $138.5M (claim #14728), $162.9M (claim #12382), $453.4M from MicroBT (claim #11991), and a Bitmain order marked delayed (claim #14266). Those commitments are consistent with where the equity went, but the record does not match specific raises to specific outlays.
The third regime begins with the 0.75% 2030 convertible, which closed at $594M including the overallotment (claims #5242, #5260). Its stated use was bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). It was followed by the Coinbase facility (claims #4844, #1858), bitcoin sales to fund Rockdale and the AI data center build (claims #17603, #8643), and project-level debt tied to named tenants. That debt includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8746) and the $180M and $69M AMD term loans (claims #8753, #8754). Management's statement about data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634) marks a deliberate pivot. It sits alongside a $500M ATM authorized four months earlier (claim #3931), which requires explanation.
A careful reader should watch three things. The first is whether that ATM is drawn despite the non-dilution framing. The second is how the interim Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced into the long-term project debt referenced in claim #8531, whose record is truncated. The third is whether the contracted Anthropic revenue of $9.1B base term (claim #1192) converts into cash on a schedule that services the new leverage. Several unit values in the record are ambiguous, and no insider transactions are disclosed.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-23Riot's financing record traces a clear arc from small-cap patching to programmatic equity issuance, and more recently toward asset-level debt. The early years consist of modest, reactive instruments. The $3.36M senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims 15267, 15268) sat alongside a $100M shelf and a $100M Wainwright ATM (claims 15291, 15241). Several obligations from that period are marked delayed, including the BMSS waiver payments (claims 15431, 15432) and the $17.7M Bitmain commitment (claim 14847). The scale then stepped up sharply. ATM capacity rose from $500M (claim 14154) to $750M (claim 12275), a second $750M program followed (claim 11957), and a further $500M program came in December 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964). The equity incentive pool was expanded repeatedly, from 4.4M through 13M to 15M shares (claims 14455, 12134, 5963), with a seventh amendment in 2026 (claim 1877). Taken together, the mix reads as a coherent strategy of funding capex through continuous equity supply rather than opportunistic patching, though the dilution capacity it created is substantial. The 2030 convertible, priced at $525M (claim 5251) and closed at a figure recorded as $594 (claim 5242), marked the first large move away from common equity. It was followed by the Coinbase credit facility (claims 4844, 1858), whose availability period and maturity are both marked delayed (claims 4845, 4847). On use of proceeds, the convertible was announced for bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245), but the record does not show that deployment directly. The Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital (claims 6012, 5802), and bitcoin sales are cited as funding for both Rockdale (claim 17603) and the AI data center expansion (claim 8643). The 2026 shift toward contract-backed debt is the most consequential development. It includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752) and the $180M and $69M AMD-linked term loans (claims 8753, 8754), set against a stated $9.1B Anthropic base-term projection (claim 1192). Management's framing of data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634) requires explanation next to an open $500M ATM (claim 3931). A careful reader should watch whether that ATM is drawn, how the interim facility is refinanced, and the size of the seventh plan amendment. No insider transactions appear in the record, and the final claims appear truncated, so conclusions on current liquidity should be held loosely.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-21Riot's capital history separates into three regimes, and the transitions between them are more informative than any single raise. The first, through 2019, is unmistakably opportunistic patching: $3,358,333 of senior secured convertible notes carrying $1,908,144 of attached warrant value (claims 15267 and 15268) is financing a company accepts rather than selects, and the December 2018 disclosure that it was "currently pursuing debt and equity capital" (claim 15351) reads as confirmation. Assets were bought with paper in the same period — 450,000 shares plus 9.9% of RiotX for the Coinsquare license (claims 15419 and 15420).
The second regime, roughly 2019 through 2024, is the opposite: a highly coherent dilution machine. The ATM ladder climbs $100M (claim 15241) to $500M (claim 14154) to $750M (claim 12275) to a second $750M (claim 11948), each step matched by the mechanical prerequisites — authorized common stock to 340M then 680M (claims 13903, 11934) and incentive pool increases of 10M, 13M and 15M shares (claims 13905, 12134, 11935). The structure was consistent; what it funded drifted. Proceeds nominally raised for mining capacity financed a $111,090,522 and then $202,180,487 position in Bitfarms described as working capital (claims 6015, 5802), a position no longer discussed in the record. The $480M Bitmain order is recorded delayed in all three of its instances (claims 14251, 14266, 14271).
The third regime begins with the 0.75% converts, $525M upsized to $594M (claims 5251, 5242), raised explicitly to buy bitcoin (claim 5245) — and that bitcoin was then sold to fund Rockdale in January 2026 (claim 17603) and AI data centers in August (claim 426). The stated use was revised rather than abandoned, but it did not hold two years. Current financing is different in kind: asset-level debt against contracted cash flows, $573M interim from Morgan Stanley (claim 8752), $180M and $69M facility loans (claims 8753, 8754), a $1.7B project-debt target (claim 8531), underwritten by Anthropic's $9.1B base term (claim 1192) and AMD's $311M lease (claim 407).
The April 2026 assertion of growth "without equity dilution" (claim 9634) sits four months after a fresh $500M ATM (claim 3931), and requires explanation, though the commission fell from 3% to 1% (claims 12284, 3933). Watch whether the interim $573M terms out permanently, whether the ATM is drawn against that framing, and the still-delayed Coinbase maturity and availability terms (claims 4847, 4845). Several figures are recorded in inconsistent units, which limits precision.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-21The financing history divides cleanly into three regimes, and the transitions are more informative than the totals. Through 2019 the company financed itself in increments that would be rounding errors later — a $200,000 convertible note into Verady (claim #15513), $3.36 million of senior secured convertible notes with attached warrants (claims #15267, #15268), and a first $100 million shelf (claim #15291). From 2022 the instrument of choice became the at-the-market program, escalating from $500 million (claim #14154) to $750 million (claim #12275), renewed at $750 million in February 2024 (claim #11948), with the authorized share count raised from 340 million (claim #13889) to 680 million (claims #11934, #5964) to accommodate it. Equity plan pools were expanded on a near-annual cadence — 4.4 million, 10 million, 4 million, 13 million, 15 million shares (claims #13952, #13905, #12543, #12134, #11935) — and again under a seventh amendment in April 2026 (claim #1877), where the share figure is not stated and requires explanation.
The third regime is a deliberate shift away from that channel. The $525 million 0.75% convertible, upsized to roughly $594 million at close (claims #5251, #5242), the Coinbase revolver at $200 million (claims #4844, #2051), and the Morgan Stanley $573 million interim facility with $180 million and $69 million project term loans behind it (claims #8752, #8753, #8754) constitute contract-backed rather than market-priced funding. Management named the logic directly: data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634). That statement sits awkwardly beside the $500 million ATM authorized four months earlier (claim #3931), which remains open.
Use of proceeds tracks less cleanly. The 2024 convertible was raised to acquire bitcoin (claim #5245); holdings then fell from 15,679 (claim #894) to 11,380 (claim #432), with a sale explicitly funding the Rockdale acquisition (claim #17603) — the treasury became a funding source rather than a terminal use. Earlier commitments, notably the $480 million Bitmain order (claim #14271), are recorded as delayed, and the Coinsquare/RiotX exchange venture (claims #15419–#15422) is no longer discussed.
Watch three things: whether the interim facility terms out into the project loans on the stated economics; whether the ATM stays undrawn against the no-dilution claim; and the gap between contracted revenue — Anthropic at $9.1 billion base (claim #1192) — and recognized data center revenue, which fell from $33 million to $23 million between quarters (claims #888, #505).
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-20The trajectory here is one in which scale changes the character of the financing rather than a single strategy compounding. Through 2018 and early 2019 the company funded itself in increments that would not register on a later balance sheet: a $200,000 convertible into Verady (claim #15513), a license paid in 450,000 shares plus $485,331 of integration fees (claims #15419, #15421), and waiver payments to BMSS carried as delayed (claims #15431, #15432). The May 2019 senior secured convertible notes of $3,358,333 with $1,908,144 of attached warrant value (claims #15267, #15268) mark that period's true cost of capital, the warrants worth well over half the principal.
From there the ATM becomes the default instrument, and its size tracks the equity price more than any articulated funding need: $100M in 2019 and renewed through 2020 (claims #15232, #15063, #14930), $500M in March 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in August 2023 (claim #12275) and again in February 2024 (claim #11948). Authorized shares moved from 340M to 680M (claims #13903, #11934), and the 2019 incentive pool was expanded at least six times (claims #14455, #13905, #12134, #11935). As policy this is coherent — equity buys machines — and deployment broadly tracks: $138.5M of Antminers (#14728), $162.9M of hardware (#12382), $453.4M of MicroBT units (#11964). The $480M Bitmain order of March 2022 is marked delayed (#14271), and the Bitfarms position, built to $111.1M and then $202.2M from working capital (#6015, #5802), is no longer discussed in later disclosure and requires explanation.
The mix genuinely shifts in December 2024: $594M of 0.75% 2030 convertibles (#5242) earmarked for bitcoin (#5245), then secured revolving credit from Coinbase (#4844, #1858), then project-level debt — $573M Morgan Stanley interim (#8752), $180M and $69M term facilities for the AMD deployments (#8753, #8754) against a $1.7B ambition (#8531). Dilution is being deferred, not retired.
Three things merit watching. The April 2026 statement that data center growth arrives without equity dilution (#9634) sits alongside an undrawn $500M ATM from December 2025 (#3931) at a 1% commission (#3933) versus 3% historically (#12276). Data center revenue fell from $33M to $23M sequentially (#888, #505) while the Anthropic contract underwrites $9.1B of base term revenue (#1192). And 4,300 BTC were sold to fund expansion (#8643): treasury has moved from collateral to funding source.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-20The financing record divides into three regimes, and the transitions between them are more informative than any single raise. Through 2019 Riot funded itself in increments that read as patching rather than planning: a $200,000 convertible into Verady (claim 15513), a license fee settled in 450,000 shares to Coinsquare (claim 15419), staged waiver payments to BMSS (claim 15431, delayed), and $3,358,333 of senior secured convertible notes carrying $1,908,144 of warrants (claims 15267, 15268). Warrant coverage at that ratio is the price a borrower pays when alternatives are thin, and it sat beside an explicit statement that the company was pursuing both debt and equity (claim 15351).
The second regime, roughly 2020 through 2024, is one instrument repeated at escalating scale. ATM capacity moves from $100 million (claim 15232) to $500 million (claim 14154) to $750 million twice over eighteen months (claims 12275, 11957), with authorized common stock lifted to 340 million shares (claim 13903) and then 680 million (claim 11934), and incentive pools expanded repeatedly — 4.4 million (claim 14455), 10 million (claim 13905), 4 million (claim 12497), 13 million (claim 12134), 15 million (claim 11935). This is coherent in the narrow sense that it is consistently the same approach, but it establishes dilution as the default funding source, offset by hardware commitments such as the $480 million Bitmain order (claim 14266, delayed) and the $453.4 million MicroBT orders (claim 11964).
The third regime begins with the December 2024 0.75% convertible, upsized to $594 million at close (claim 5242), and turns toward secured, asset-linked debt: the $200 million Coinbase revolver (claims 4844, 1858) and Morgan Stanley's $573 million interim facility for the Anthropic development (claim 8752), plus $180 million and $69 million term loans against AMD deployment cash flows (claims 8753, 8754).
Two items require explanation. The convertible's stated use was bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245); that bitcoin is now being sold, 4,300 coins to fund data center expansion (claim 8643), which revises rather than executes the original rationale. And the assertion of data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634) coexists with a $500 million ATM authorized in December 2025 (claim 3931), though priced at 1% commission (claim 3933) against 3% on prior programs (claim 12284) — better terms, and so far undrawn on this record.
Watch whether the interim facility terms out into permanent debt, whether the ATM stays dormant, and the data center segment line, $33 million in Q1 2026 (claim 888) against $23 million in Q2 (claim 505), against $9.1 billion of contracted base revenue (claim 1192).
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-19Riot's financing record falls into two regimes. Through 2019 the company raised small sums on improvised terms. The $3,358,333 senior secured convertible notes (claim 15267) carried attached warrants (claim 15268), and a $100M Wainwright ATM (claim 15241) sat on top of a $100M shelf (claim 15291). Several obligations from that period, including the BMSS waiver payments (claims 15431, 15432), are recorded as delayed, which reads as patching rather than plan. From 2022 the ATM became the primary instrument and scaled quickly: $500M (claim 14154), $750M (claim 12283), another $750M (claim 11957), and $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock was raised to 340M shares (claim 13889) and then to 680M (claim 5964). The equity incentive pool was expanded at nearly every annual meeting (claims 14455, 13890, 12004, 5963, 1877). Taken together, dilution was continuous and structurally provisioned rather than episodic.
The mix changed in late 2024. The 0.75% convertible notes, priced at $525M (claim 5251) and recorded as closing at $594 with an overallotment (claims 5242, 5260), were followed by a Coinbase credit facility of $200M (claims 4844, 1858). The 2026 record is dominated by project-level debt. That includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752), a $180M term loan against AMD cash flows (claim 8753), a $69M delayed draw tranche (claim 8754), and a stated $1.7B long-term project debt target (claim 8531). This progression is coherent with management's claim of data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634). However, the $500M ATM authorized months earlier (claim 3931) remains on record.
Stated uses of proceeds have not held steady. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245), yet a later claim records bitcoin being sold to fund AI data center expansion (claim 8643). That reversal of treasury posture requires explanation. The Bitfarms stake, funded from working capital at $202,180,487 (claim 5802), is not revisited in the later claims. Equipment commitments to Bitmain are marked delayed (claims 14847, 14266).
A careful reader should watch several things. First, whether the Morgan Stanley interim facility is refinanced into the targeted long-term project debt on schedule. Second, how much of the Anthropic contract value is base term, $9.1B (claim 1192), versus the $16.1B that depends on extension options (claim 1194). Third, whether the standing ATM is drawn despite the non-dilution framing. The record contains no open-market insider transactions, only compensation awards (claims 13588–13597). The final claims in the supplied data are truncated.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-18Riot's financing record falls into three phases. The first, 2018 to 2019, looks like opportunistic patching. It includes waiver payments to BMSS that are marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), a Coinsquare license paid partly in stock (#15419), a small senior secured convertible with attached warrants of roughly $3.36M (#15267, #15268), and a statement that the company was 'currently pursuing debt and equity capital' (#15351). The $100M Wainwright ATM (#15232) was the first repeatable tool. From 2022 onward, dilution capacity grew in steps. ATM programs of $500M (#14154), $750M (#12275) and a second $750M (#11957) coincided with authorized common stock doubling from 340M to 680M shares (#5964). The equity plan pool was expanded repeatedly, by 4.4M (#14455), 10M (#13890), 13M (#12134) and 15M shares (#5963), plus a Seventh Amendment whose size is not stated (#1877). The ATMs track the timing of large hardware commitments, namely the $480M Bitmain order (#14271, delayed), $162.9M (#12382) and $453.4M from MicroBT (#11991). The data does not show how much of each program was actually drawn, so deployment cannot be verified against announcements. In December 2024 the mix shifted to a 0.75% convertible, launched at $525M (#5251) and closed at $594M per #5242. It was framed as funding bitcoin acquisition (#5245). The Bitfarms stake of about $111M (#6015) was separately attributed to working capital (#6012, #5802). Secured credit then followed: a Coinbase facility of $200M (#4844, #1858) with a maturity term marked delayed (#4847). By 2026 the stated strategy is 'data center growth without equity dilution' (#9634). It is backed by the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (#8752), a $180M AMD term loan (#8753), a $69M delayed-draw loan (#8754), and a bitcoin sale earmarked for expansion (#426). Reported bitcoin holdings moved from 15,679 (#894) to 11,380 (#432). That sits alongside a $500M ATM authorized only months earlier (#3931), which requires explanation relative to the non-dilution framing. A careful reader should watch four things: whether that ATM is drawn, how the interim Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced, whether the treasury continues to be sold down to fund construction, and how contracted revenue claims such as the $9.1B Anthropic base term (#1192) convert into cash that can service the new debt. The record supplied appears truncated after August 2026, so later events are not assessed here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-18Riot's financing history falls into three distinct phases. The early record from 2018 to 2019 shows small, reactive transactions rather than a funding plan. These include staged waiver payments to BMSS, several of them later marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434). There was also a $3.36M senior secured convertible note with attached warrants (claim #15267, #15268). At the same time, the company said it was 'currently pursuing debt and equity capital' (claim #15351).
The second phase, from 2019 to 2024, was built almost entirely on at-the-market equity, and the capacity steadily grew. The ATM went from $100M with Wainwright (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154), then to $750M (claim #12275), then to a second $750M program (claim #11957). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity incentive pool was also enlarged repeatedly (claims #13890, #12134, #5963, #1877), which adds a steady layer of compensation dilution on top of the capital raises. This equity funded hardware orders of increasing size: $138.5M (claim #14728), $162.9M (claim #12382) and $453.4M from MicroBT (claim #11991). The Bitmain orders of 2020 and 2022 were both flagged delayed (claims #14847, #14271). The Bitfarms stake, disclosed as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), is consistent with ATM proceeds being used for strategic purposes beyond mining.
The third phase shifts toward debt. It includes the upsized 0.75% 2030 convertible, which grew from $500M to a reported $594M close (claims #5261, #5242) and was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). It also includes the Coinbase credit facility (claim #1858), and in 2026 a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility with $180M and $69M term loans tied to the AMD deployments (claims #8752, #8753, #8754). Bitcoin sales are also disclosed as funding AI expansion (claim #8643). Taken together, this is a coherent move from equity-funded mining toward asset-backed financing of contracted data center revenue. The Anthropic base-term figure (claim #1192) is the anchor for that shift.
One point requires explanation. Management describes data center growth 'without equity dilution' (claim #9634), yet a $500M ATM was authorized four months earlier (claim #3931).
The record contains no open-market insider sales. It shows only compensation awards, so no inference is drawn on insider behavior. Several unit fields are inconsistent in the source data, and the record is truncated after claim #7839.
A careful reader should watch four things. First, whether the Morgan Stanley interim facility is refinanced on term financing or instead through equity. Second, whether the December 2025 ATM is actually drawn. Third, how the Coinbase maturity terms, marked delayed (claim #4847), are resolved. Fourth, the conversion overhang from the 2030 notes.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-18Riot's record describes a company whose financing moved from small, improvised arrangements to large programmatic equity capacity, and more recently toward asset-backed debt. The early period consists of six-figure items: waiver payments to BMSS partly marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432), a $3.36M senior secured convertible with warrants (claims #15267, #15268), and share-based fees to Coinsquare (claim #15419). These look more like patching than a planned capital structure.
From 2019 onward, dilution capacity rose steadily. At-the-market authorizations grew from $100M (claim #15232) to $500M (claim #14154) and then to $750M, which was renewed in 2023 and 2024 (claims #12275, #11957). Authorized common stock was raised from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity incentive pool was enlarged at almost every annual cycle (claims #14455, #13890, #12134, #5963), and a seventh amendment was filed in 2026 (claim #1877). The ATM capacity lines up broadly with the large miner orders: $138.5M to Bitmain (claim #14728), a $480M order marked delayed (claim #14266), $162.9M (claim #12382) and $453.4M to MicroBT (claim #11991). This suggests equity was the working tool for hardware spend. The data does not show how much of each ATM was actually drawn.
The mix changed in late 2024. The 0.75% convertible, which closed at a figure recorded as $594 (claim #5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Separately, the Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802). In 2026, a Coinbase revolver (claim #1858) and a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claims #8752, #33) were added, along with AMD-linked term loans of $180M and $69M (claims #8753, #8754). Management describes data center growth "without equity dilution" (claim #9634). A fresh $500M ATM was authorized only months earlier (claim #3931), however, and that combination requires explanation. Recorded bitcoin holdings fall from 15,679 (claim #894) to 11,380 (claim #432), and a sale is linked to data center expansion (claim #426), although the units in these claims are not specified.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is whether the interim Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced into term debt backed by the stated Anthropic contract value (claims #1192, #1194). The second is actual draws on the December 2025 ATM. The third is the maturity handling on the Coinbase facility, which carries delayed terms (claim #4847). The fourth is whether bitcoin treasury drawdowns continue as a funding source. The record provided is truncated at its end, so later events may not be reflected.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-15Riot's record shows three distinct financing regimes, and the transitions between them matter more than any single raise. Through 2019 the company relied on small, stopgap instruments. The BMSS waiver payments, several of which are marked delayed (claims #15431, #15432, #15434), sit alongside $3.36M of senior secured convertible notes with warrants (claims #15267, #15268). A $100M ATM was layered on top of that (claim #15241). This reads as patching rather than design.
From 2022 the company moved to repeated large ATM programs. It put a $500M program in place (claim #14154), followed by $750M programs in 2023 (claim #12283) and 2024 (claim #11957). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity incentive pool also grew in successive steps, from 4.4M (claim #14455) to 10M (claim #13890), 13M (claim #12134) and 15M shares (claim #5963). A seventh amendment followed whose size is not stated (claim #1877). Dilution capacity therefore rose steadily, though the record does not show how much of each program was actually drawn.
Since late 2024 the mix has shifted toward debt. The 0.75% convertible notes were set at $525M (claim #5251) and closed at a recorded $594 (claim #5242). A Coinbase credit facility of $200M was added and later amended (claims #4844, #1858). The 2026 AI data-center buildout is financed with project-level debt: a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), a $180M term loan (claim #8753) and a $69M delayed-draw loan (claim #8754). That shift is coherent with the long-term contracted revenue now disclosed (claims #1192, #1194).
Use of proceeds has not always stayed fixed. The convertible was described as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Less than two years later, bitcoin was being sold to fund AI data-center expansion (claims #426, #8643). Recorded holdings fell from 15,679 (claim #894) to 11,380 (claim #432). That reversal of treasury posture requires explanation. By contrast, the Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and that is consistent across filings. The 2022 Bitmain order was recorded as delayed (claim #14271).
A reader should watch whether the $500M ATM authorized in December 2025 (claim #3931) is used, given management's stated aim of data-center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634). It is also worth watching whether the interim Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced on term, and how large the seventh equity plan amendment is. Several figures in the record are logged in inconsistent units, and the final claim is truncated. No insider transactions appear, so no read on insider selling is possible.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's financing record falls into two distinct phases, and the shift between them is the most important feature of the pattern. From 2019 through 2025 the company relied mainly on equity. At-the-market capacity grew from $100M with H.C. Wainwright (claim #15241) to $500M (claim #14154), then to $750M (claim #12283), which was referenced again in 2024 (claim #11957), and most recently to a new $500M program (claim #3931). Authorized common stock rose over the same period from 340M to 680M shares (claims #13889, #5964). The equity incentive pool was also enlarged repeatedly, by 4.4M, 10M, 4M, 13M and 15M shares (claims #14455, #13890, #12497, #12134, #5963), and a seventh amendment followed (claim #1877). This reads as a coherent programmatic strategy rather than patching: standing equity capacity was sized ahead of large hardware commitments such as the $162.9M order (claim #12382) and the MicroBT purchase (claim #11991). The record does not show how much of each program was actually drawn, so the realized pace of dilution cannot be measured from these claims alone.
The second phase begins with the 0.75% convertible notes (claim #5251), which closed upsized (claim #5242) and were earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Secured and project-level debt came next. The Coinbase revolver stands at $200M (claim #1858). The Morgan Stanley interim facility is $573M (claim #8752). It is paired with a $180M term loan and a $69M delayed-draw loan tied to the AMD deployments (claims #8753, #8754), and management states it is targeting $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim #8531). Management now describes data center growth as proceeding without equity dilution (claim #9634). That framing requires explanation alongside the $500M ATM authorized four months earlier (claim #3931), which the record does not show being withdrawn.
On use of proceeds, the Bitfarms stake was stated as funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802), and the record does not contradict this. Bitcoin holdings fell from 15,679 (claim #894) to 11,380 (claim #432), which is consistent with the disclosed sale for AI data center expansion (claim #8643). The treasury is therefore now a funding source rather than a reserve. The record contains no insider transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
A careful reader should watch three things. The first is whether the $573M interim facility is refinanced into the targeted long-term project debt on schedule. The second is whether the December 2025 ATM is used despite the no-dilution language. The third is the size of the seventh equity plan amendment, which the record does not quantify.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's record describes a company that has funded itself mostly through standing equity capacity and is now moving toward secured, project-level debt. The at-the-market programs grew in steps: a $500M program in March 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in August 2023 (claim 12283), a $750M program again referenced in February 2024 (claim 11948), and another $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). Authorized common stock was doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964), and the equity plan pool was enlarged repeatedly, most recently by a Seventh Amendment whose size the record does not state (claim 1877). The record shows the authorizations but not how much of each ATM was actually sold, so the realized dilution cannot be measured from this data. Some figures also appear without consistent units, and share counts are recorded in dollar form. The record lists no insider transactions despite the section heading, so no conclusion about insider selling is possible.
The mix looks more sequential than improvised. Equity funded large miner orders, such as the $480M Bitmain order (claim 14271) and the $453.4M MicroBT purchase (claim 11991). The Bitfarms stake was described as financed from working capital (claims 6012, 5802). In December 2024 the company added a 0.75% convertible sized at $525M (claim 5251). It then added a $200M Coinbase revolver (claim 1858) and, in 2026, a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752) with AMD-linked term loans of $180M and $69M (claims 8753, 8754).
The use of proceeds needs explanation. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). By Q2 2026, bitcoin was being sold to fund AI data center expansion (claim 8643), and holdings fell from 15,680 to 11,380 BTC (claims 565, 566), with 5,821 BTC pledged as collateral (claim 567). Management's statement that data center growth will proceed without equity dilution (claim 9634) sits alongside a $500M ATM authorized four months earlier (claim 3931).
There are four things to watch next. The first is whether any sales occur under the December 2025 ATM. The second is whether the $573M interim facility is refinanced into the targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim 8531) on terms that match the contracted Anthropic revenue of $9.1B base (claim 1192). The third is whether more of the bitcoin treasury becomes encumbered. The fourth is the undisclosed size of the latest equity plan increase.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's dilution capacity has grown steadily rather than in one burst. At-the-market authorizations rose from the 2020 H.C. Wainwright facility (claim #14930) to $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in August 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in February 2024 (claim #11948), and $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Authorized common stock doubled from 340M (claim #13903) to 680M shares (claim #5964). Equity plan reserves were also expanded almost every year, reaching 15M shares by 2024 (claim #11935), and a seventh amendment followed in 2026 (claim #1877). The record includes executive compensation awards but no open-market insider sales, so that part of the pattern cannot be assessed.
Through 2024, the mix reads as coherent. Equity capacity tracked large, disclosed miner commitments, including the $480M Bitmain order (claim #14271) and the 99,840-unit MicroBT purchase for $453.4M (claim #11991). The Bitfarms position, which grew from $111M (claim #6015) to $202M (claim #5802), was stated to come from working capital. The December 2024 turn to a 0.75% convertible, priced at $525M (claim #5251) and closing near $594M (claim #5242), is the first place where stated use and later deployment diverge. Those proceeds were described as funding bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). By 2026, the company was selling bitcoin to fund AI data center expansion (claim #8643). Holdings are recorded as falling from 15,680 (claim #565) to 11,380 (claim #566), with 5,821 pledged as collateral (claim #567). Both the acquisition and the later sales are disclosed, but the reversal requires explanation.
The 2026 financing is debt-led and project-specific. It includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), a $180M AMD term loan (claim #8753), a $69M delayed draw (claim #8754), and a targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim #8531). Management frames this as growth without equity dilution (claim #9634), although the $500M ATM from December 2025 (claim #3931) remains on record. Contracted revenue of $9.1B base (claim #1192) is not yet visible in results. Data center revenue is recorded at $23.2M in Q2 (claim #925), against a Q1 figure of $33 (claim #888).
A reader should watch four things. The first is whether the interim facility is refinanced into the $1.7B term structure on schedule. The second is whether the ATM is drawn despite the no-dilution framing. The third is how much bitcoin remains unencumbered. The fourth is the Coinbase facility's maturity and availability terms, which are marked delayed (claims #4845, #4847). Several figures in this record carry inconsistent units, and the record is truncated after claim #559, so these readings should be treated as provisional.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's financing record falls into two phases. From 2022 through 2025 it relied almost entirely on equity. The $500M at-the-market program (claim #14154) was followed by $750M programs in 2023 (claim #12283) and 2024 (claim #11957), and a further $500M program in December 2025 (claim #3931). Over the same period authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity incentive pool also grew almost every year, including 13M shares (claim #12134), 15M shares (claim #5963) and a seventh amendment in 2026 whose size is not stated in the record (claim #1877). The trajectory is steady and increasing dilution, with each authorization clearly sized for the next round of issuance.
The mix in that phase was coherent rather than improvised: ATM capacity paired with large miner purchase commitments, such as the $453.4M MicroBT order (claim #11991). The Bitfarms stake departed from that pattern because it was funded from working capital (claims #6012, #5802). The December 2024 0.75% convertible, $525M at pricing (claim #5251) and later reported as $594 at close (claim #5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245).
The 2026 phase moves toward secured, project-level debt. It includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), a $180M term loan on the AMD deployment (claim #8753), a $69M delayed-draw tranche (claim #8754), and a stated target of $1.7B in long-term project debt (claim #8531). Management frames this as data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634). However, that framing sits alongside a $500M ATM authorized only months earlier (claim #3931).
The use of proceeds has shifted in a way that requires explanation. Convertible proceeds raised to acquire bitcoin now coexist with bitcoin being sold to fund AI data center expansion (claim #8643). Holdings fell from 15,680 to 11,380 across Q2 (claims #565, #566), and 5,821 are pledged as collateral (claim #567). The reported H1 sales figure of 9,665 (claim #564) does not reconcile cleanly with the Q2 figure of 4,300 (claim #563) and the quarter-end balances. The source disclosures should be checked on this point.
The record shows no insider transactions, and the claim list appears truncated, so conclusions on insider behavior are not possible. A careful reader should watch four things. First, whether the interim Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced into the targeted long-term debt. Second, whether the additional secured financing flagged as required (claim #559) arrives on schedule. Third, how much of the December 2025 ATM is actually drawn. Fourth, whether contracted Anthropic revenue of $9.1B base (claim #1192) begins to show up in data center revenue, which was $23.2M in Q2 (claim #925).
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's dilution runs on a steady cadence rather than in episodic raises. At-the-market programs have been renewed almost every year: $500M in 2022 (claim #14154), $750M in 2023 (claim #12275), another $750M in early 2024 (claim #11957), and $500M in December 2025 (claim #3931). Share authorization moved in step, doubling from 340M to 680M shares (claim #5964). The equity incentive pool was expanded repeatedly, most recently through a seventh amendment (claim #1877). Taken together, issuance capacity has been treated as a standing utility rather than a response to specific needs.
The instrument mix changed in December 2024. The convertible was launched at $500M (claim #5261), priced at $525M (claim #5251), and closed at $594M including the overallotment (claim #5242). It was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). Since then, financing has moved toward secured and project-level debt: the $200M Coinbase facility (claim #1858), the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), the AMD-linked term loans of $180M and $69M (claims #8753, #8754), and a stated $1.7B long-term project debt target (claim #8531). The sequence reads as a deliberate move from equity-funded mining toward contracted, asset-backed data center financing rather than improvised patching, though the transition is still under way.
Use of proceeds requires explanation in at least two places. Bitcoin accumulated partly with convertible proceeds is now being sold: holdings fell from 15,679 (claim #894) to 11,380 (claim #566) after 4,300 were sold for AI data center expansion (claim #8643). In addition, 5,821 are pledged as collateral (claim #567). The Bitfarms position, funded from working capital at $111M and later $202M (claims #6015, #5802), is no longer discussed in the recent record. The heavy miner orders, including $453.4M with MicroBT (claim #11991), also sit uneasily beside the data center pivot. Data center revenue declined from $33M in Q1 (claim #888) to $23.2M in Q2 (claim #925), even as contracted value is cited at $9.1B base (claim #1192).
A careful reader should watch several things. The first is whether the interim facility is refinanced into the targeted project debt on schedule. The second is whether the open $500M ATM is drawn, given management's framing of growth without equity dilution (claim #9634). The third is how much unencumbered bitcoin remains as sales and pledges continue. No insider sales appear in the record provided, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's financing record describes a company that paid for growth mainly through standing equity capacity and has only recently turned toward secured and project-level debt. The dilution machinery was assembled early. Authorized common stock was set at 340 million shares in 2022 (claim 13903) and doubled to 680 million in 2024 (claim 5964). Equity plan reserves grew in near-annual steps of 10 million shares (claim 13890), 13 million (claim 12004) and 15 million (claim 11935), and a seventh plan amendment appears in 2026 without a disclosed size (claim 1877). At-the-market programs have followed one another closely: $500M in 2022 (claim 14154), $750M in August 2023 (claim 12275), another $750M six months later (claim 11948), and a fresh $500M in December 2025 (claim 3931). That cadence reads as a deliberate reliance on continuous issuance rather than occasional patching, though the record does not show how much of each program was actually sold.
The mix changed in late 2024. The 0.75% convertible was upsized from $500M to $525M (claims 5261, 5251) and closed at $594M (claim 5242). A Coinbase credit facility followed (claim 4844), and in 2026 came the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752) and AMD-linked term loans of $180M and $69M (claims 8753, 8754). Management now frames data center growth as achievable without equity dilution (claim 9634). That framing sits alongside an open $500M ATM authorization that has not been withdrawn, and the two require reconciling.
Use of proceeds tracks only partly. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245), but by mid-2026 that treasury was being drawn down to fund data center expansion (claim 8643). Holdings fell from 15,680 to 11,380 bitcoin in a single quarter (claims 565, 566). Of the remaining holdings, 5,821 bitcoin are pledged as collateral (claim 567). The asset raised to accumulate is now serving as both a funding source and security, a shift the original disclosure did not anticipate.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is whether the interim facility is refinanced into the $1.7B of long-term project debt management is targeting (claim 8531). The second is whether the further secured financing flagged as required (claim 559, unit not specified) arrives on non-dilutive terms. The third is whether the December 2025 ATM is drawn. The fourth is how quickly the $9.1B base contracted revenue (claim 1192) converts to cash relative to debt service. The record contains no insider transactions, and it is truncated after claim 914, so conclusions about the most recent period should be held loosely.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's financing record falls into three phases, and each one uses a different source of capital. From 2022 through 2024 the company relied mainly on equity capacity. Authorized common stock was raised to 340 million shares (claim 13889) and then doubled to 680 million (claim 5964). Back-to-back $750M at-the-market programs followed (claims 12275 and 11957). Over the same stretch the company placed large hardware orders, including the $162.9M initial miner order (claim 12382) and the 99,840-unit MicroBT purchase at $453.4M (claim 11991). The equity incentive pool was also enlarged at a near-annual cadence, through increases of 10 million (claim 13905), 13 million (claim 12134) and 15 million shares (claim 5963), plus a seventh amendment (claim 1877). That pace is a steady source of dilution in its own right. The record does not show how much of either ATM was actually sold, so the realized dilution cannot be measured from this data.
The second phase moved to debt. The 0.75% convertible was upsized from $500M to $525M (claims 5261 and 5251) and closed near $594M (claim 5242). Its stated use was bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). A Coinbase credit facility secured by pledged bitcoin followed (claims 4844 and 1858). The third phase, in 2026, runs the other way. Riot sold 9,665 BTC in the first half (claim 564), roughly $730M (claim 548), and holdings fell from 15,679 (claim 550) to 11,380 (claim 566). Of the remaining coins, 5,821 are pledged as collateral (claim 567). The proceeds are described as funding AI data center expansion (claim 8643). Bitcoin raised with convertible money in late 2024 is now being sold to fund a different business. That shift is coherent with the new contracted revenue but requires explanation against the original use of proceeds.
The data center build is now financed at the project level. It includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752), a $180M term loan tied to the AMD deployment (claim 8753) and a $69M delayed-draw tranche (claim 8754). These are paired with a stated $9.1B base-term Anthropic contract (claim 1192). Management frames this as growth without equity dilution (claim 9634), yet a $500M ATM was put in place in December 2025 (claim 3931). A sophisticated reader should watch four things. The first is whether the interim facility is refinanced into the targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim 8531) on schedule. The second is whether the ATM stays undrawn. The third is whether the pledged share of the bitcoin treasury keeps rising. The fourth is whether equity pool increases continue at the prior pace. The record as provided also contains no insider transaction detail, so insider behavior cannot be assessed here.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's record shows three financing phases, each tied to a change in what the company says it is building. From 2022 through early 2024, the approach was equity-led. Authorized shares went to 340 million (claim #13620) and then doubled to 680 million (claim #5964). Two $750 million at-the-market programs followed within roughly six months (claims #12275 and #11957), while the equity plan pool grew in steps of 4 million, 13 million and 15 million shares (claims #12543, #12004, #5963). That capacity paralleled large hardware commitments, including the $162.9 million initial order (claim #12382) and the MicroBT purchase recorded at $453.4 million (claim #11991). The Bitfarms stake, reported at $111 million and later $202 million, was attributed to working capital (claims #6015, #5802) rather than a dedicated raise.
The second phase replaced issuance with leverage against the treasury. The convertible was announced at $500 million (claim #5261), priced at $525 million (claim #5251) and closed near $594 million (claim #5242), with proceeds directed to bitcoin acquisition (claim #5245). A Coinbase facility collateralized by that bitcoin followed (claims #4844, #1858). The third phase reverses the first use of proceeds. The company sold bitcoin in 2026, $289.5 million in Q1 (claim #549) and 4,300 BTC in Q2 (claim #563), specifically to fund AI data center expansion (claim #8643). Holdings fell to 11,380 BTC, of which 5,821 are pledged (claims #566, #567). Bitcoin bought with convertible proceeds is now funding a different business line, and that deserves to be stated plainly. The pledge history also requires explanation, because the initial 3,977 BTC, the 1,825 added in February and the 1,544 released in April (claims #1186, #907, #908) do not reconcile to the June balance on the face of the claims.
The current posture is project debt anchored by contracted revenue. That includes the $573 million Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim #8752), the $180 million and $69 million AMD term loans (claims #8753, #8754), and a $1.7 billion long-term project debt target (claim #8531), set against a $9.1 billion base Anthropic term (claim #1192). This is a coherent structure on paper. However, the claim of data center growth without equity dilution (claim #9634) sits alongside a $500 million ATM authorized in December 2025 (claim #3931), and the record does not show whether that program has been drawn.
Several questions follow. Does ATM usage appear in subsequent filings? Is the interim facility refinanced into the targeted term debt on schedule? Does the pledged share of the treasury keep rising as unencumbered bitcoin is sold? A further secured-financing requirement is noted but recorded only as '$4' (claim #559), so its scale cannot be assessed from this data.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's record shows two distinct financing regimes. From 2022 through 2025 the company relied mainly on equity. Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claims 13620, 5964). A $750M ATM program opened in August 2023 (claim 12283), and a second $750M program followed in February 2024 (claim 11948), which suggests the first was substantially drawn within about six months. A further $500M ATM arrived in December 2025 (claim 3931). Alongside this, the equity incentive pool grew in successive steps: 4M shares (claim 12497), then 13M (claim 12004), then 15M (claim 5963). A seventh amendment in 2026 does not state its size in the record (claim 1877). The trajectory is steady, recurring dilution rather than a single event.
The mix looks coherent within each phase, but the phases pull against each other. The second ATM coincided with the 99,840-unit MicroBT order (claim 11991), which ties equity directly to mining capex. The December 2024 convertible was upsized from $500M to $525M and closed near $594M with the overallotment (claims 5261, 5251, 5242). Its stated purpose was bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). By 2026 the direction had reversed. Bitcoin was being sold to fund AI data center expansion (claim 8643), holdings fell from 15,679 to 11,380 units across Q2 (claims 550, 528), and 5,821 units were pledged as collateral (claim 529). Bitcoin bought with convertible proceeds is now serving as a funding source and as security for the Coinbase facility (claims 1858, 1754). That redeployment is not described as a change in stated strategy and requires explanation.
The 2026 debt stack is project-oriented and better documented. It includes the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752), the $180M AMD term loan (claim 8753), the $69M delayed draw loan (claim 8754), and a stated $1.7B long-term project debt target (claim 8531). The claim of data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634) sits beside an open $500M ATM (claim 3931), and the record does not show whether that program has been drawn. The Bitfarms stake was funded from working capital (claims 6012, 5802) and is no longer discussed in later claims.
There are several things to watch. First, whether the $573M interim facility is refinanced into the targeted long-term debt on schedule. Second, how much additional secured financing is ultimately required, since claim 559 references a further amount whose units are unclear. Third, the pace of ATM usage against the no-dilution framing. Fourth, whether contracted revenue figures converge: $9.1B base (claim 1192) versus $9.8B for Rockdale (claim 578). Finally, the size of the seventh equity plan amendment once disclosed. Several figures in the record carry ambiguous units, which limits precision on liquidity.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-14Riot's financing record falls into three distinct phases, and the shift between them is the most informative feature of the history. Through 2023 and early 2024 the company funded itself mainly through its share count. Two $750M at-the-market programs were stacked six months apart (claims 12275 and 11948). Authorized common stock was doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964). The equity incentive pool was expanded repeatedly, by 4M, 13M and 15M shares (claims 12543, 12134, 5963), with a seventh amendment in 2026 whose size is not stated in the record (claim 1877). That cadence reads as a deliberate dilution-funded build-out rather than ad hoc patching, but it was dilution nonetheless. The December 2024 0.75% convertible moved the funding into the capital structure: $525M at pricing (claim 5251), $594M at close (claim 5242). A $200M Coinbase facility collateralized by bitcoin followed in 2025 (claim 4844). The 2026 phase is project debt: the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752), the $180M and $69M AMD term loans (claims 8753, 8754), and a stated $1.7B long-term project debt target (claim 8531), all framed as data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634). The mix looks coherent in direction, although the ATM programs were never formally retired and a new $500M program was put in place in December 2025 (claim 3931). The use-of-proceeds record requires explanation on one point. The 2024 convertible was earmarked for bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). By 2026 the treasury was instead being sold to fund AI data center expansion (claim 8643). Holdings fell from 15,680 to 11,380 BTC over Q2 (claims 565, 566), and 5,821 BTC is pledged as collateral (claim 567). The Bitfarms stake, funded from working capital (claims 6015, 5802), is no longer discussed in the later filings provided. A sophisticated reader should watch four things. First, whether the $500M ATM is drawn despite the no-dilution framing. Second, whether the interim Morgan Stanley facility is refinanced into the targeted long-term project debt on schedule. Third, how much unencumbered bitcoin remains as sales and pledges continue. Fourth, the additional secured financing requirement (claim 559), whose magnitude is not clearly specified in the record. Insider transaction data does not appear in the portion of the record supplied, and the claim list is truncated, so no conclusions are drawn on insider activity.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-13Riot's record describes a shift from equity-funded bitcoin accumulation to debt-funded data-center construction. The early program leaned on the share count. A $750M at-the-market facility, per claim #12275, was re-referenced in February 2024, per claim #11948. Authorized common stock doubled from 340M to 680M shares, per claim #5964. The equity incentive pool grew in successive steps of 4M, 13M and 15M shares, per claims #12497, #12004 and #5963, and a seventh plan amendment followed, per claim #1877. The record shows repeated share-plan expansions rather than a single sizing decision.
The December 2024 convertible marks the first move away from pure equity. It was launched at $500M, per claim #5261, priced at $525M, per claim #5251, and closed at a figure recorded as $594, per claim #5242. Its stated use was bitcoin acquisition, per claim #5245. The Bitfarms stake was described as funded from working capital, rising from $111M, per claim #6015, to $202M, per claim #5802. That stake is no longer discussed in the later claims.
The stated use of proceeds and actual deployment diverge most in 2026. Holdings fell from 15,679 bitcoin, per claim #894, to 11,380, per claim #432. Sales of 4,300 in the second quarter were tied to AI data-center expansion, per claim #8643. First-half sales proceeds reached $730M, per claim #548. Capital raised partly to accumulate bitcoin is now being liquidated to fund a different business, and that sequence requires explanation.
The 2026 strategy is more coherent in structure. A $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility, per claim #8752, sits alongside AMD-linked term loans of $180M and $69M, per claims #8753 and #8754, and a $1.7B long-term project debt target, per claim #8531. These are backed by contracted revenue of $9.1B base and $16.1B with extensions, per claims #1192 and #1194. Bitcoin also carries more encumbrance: 5,821 coins were pledged as collateral at mid-year, per claim #567, against a Coinbase facility amended twice, per claims #4844 and #2051.
A sophisticated reader should watch four things. First, whether the $500M ATM authorized in December 2025, per claim #3931, is drawn, despite the stated aim of growth without equity dilution, per claim #9634. Second, how the interim facility is refinanced into the $1.7B target. Third, whether the unpledged bitcoin balance keeps shrinking. Fourth, the additional secured financing requirement, per claim #559, whose unit is ambiguous in the record. The provided history is truncated and shows no insider transactions, so no conclusion is drawn on insider activity.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-13Riot's record divides into two financing regimes. From 2023 through 2025 the company relied mainly on shelf equity. It opened a $750M at-the-market program in August 2023 (claim 12273) and a second $750M program in February 2024 (claim 11957). It doubled authorized common stock from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964) and enlarged the equity plan by 13M and then 15M shares (claims 12004, 5963), with a seventh amendment of unstated size (claim 1877). The December 2024 0.75% convertible, priced at $525M (claim 5251) and reported closed at $594 in unstated units (claim 5242), added deferred dilution on top. A further $500M ATM followed in December 2025 (claim 3931). The equity channel was therefore still open when the company began describing data center growth without equity dilution (claim 9634), and how those two positions fit together requires explanation.
The stated use of proceeds has reversed. The convertible was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245), yet by 2026 bitcoin was being sold to fund AI data center expansion. Q2 sales were 4,300 BTC (claim 8643), and holdings fell from 15,680 to 11,380 (claims 565, 566). The Bitfarms position, funded from working capital at $202M (claim 5802), is no longer discussed in this record after September 2024.
The 2026 mix has moved to project-level debt. It includes a $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752), an expected $180M AMD term loan and a $69M delayed-draw loan (claims 8753, 8754), and a stated $1.7B long-term debt target (claim 8531). The contract base behind this is Anthropic revenue of $9.1B in the base term (claim 1192). That reads as a coherent pivot rather than patching. The Coinbase collateral figures, however, need reconciliation: 3,977 BTC initially pledged, plus 1,825 added, less 1,544 released (claims 1751, 1752, 1753), does not equal the 5,821 pledged at June 30 (claim 1754). Data center revenue also fell from $33 in unstated units in Q1 (claim 888) to $23.2M in Q2 (claim 925).
Readers should watch several items next. The Morgan Stanley maturity and rate appear in the record without figures (claims 1465, 1473). It remains to be seen whether the $1.7B long-term takeout closes, and whether anything is drawn on the December 2025 ATM. The Coinbase loan maturity terms are marked delayed (claim 4847). Additional secured financing of $4 in unstated units is described as required (claim 559). No insider transactions appear in the supplied record, which was truncated, so that dimension cannot be assessed.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-13Riot's record reads as three distinct financing regimes rather than one continuous strategy, and the transitions between them require explanation more than the individual instruments do. From 2023 through 2024 the company relied on equity. A $750M at-the-market program (claim 12275) was followed six months later by a second $750M program (claim 11957). Authorized common stock was then doubled from 340M to 680M shares (claim 5964), alongside successive equity plan pool increases of 13M (claim 12134) and 15M shares (claim 5963). The record does not show how much of either ATM was actually sold, so the realized pace of dilution cannot be measured from these claims alone. The capacity being built, however, clearly expanded faster than any single stated use.
Deployment in that period broadly matched stated purposes. The MicroBT order of $453.4M (claim 11991) and the Bitfarms stake, funded from working capital at a disclosed $202M (claim 5802), are consistent with a mining-scale thesis. The December 2024 convertible, marketed at $500M (claim 5261) and closed at a figure recorded as $594M (claim 5242), was tied to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). That is where the trajectory turns. By mid-2026 the company was selling bitcoin to fund AI data center expansion: 4,300 BTC in Q2 (claim 563), with holdings falling from 15,680 to 11,380 (claims 565, 566). It had also pledged 5,821 BTC as collateral against the Coinbase facility (claim 567). Coin raised with convertible debt is now being liquidated or encumbered for a different business line, and that shift is not explicitly reconciled anywhere in the record.
The 2026 regime is debt-led: the $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752), expected AMD term loans of $180M and $69M (claims 8753, 8754), and a targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim 8531). Management frames this as growth without equity dilution (claim 9634). A $500M ATM authorized in December 2025 (claim 3931) nonetheless remains in place, and a seventh equity plan amendment was adopted (claim 1877). The mix therefore looks less like a settled capital policy than a sequence of instruments fitted to whichever asset was most financeable at the time.
Several things are worth watching. The first is whether the interim facility is refinanced into long-term project debt on schedule. The second is whether draws on the December 2025 ATM are disclosed, and whether they sit consistently with the non-dilution framing. The third is the direction of pledged bitcoin relative to total holdings. The last is how quickly data center revenue, $23.2M in Q2 (claim 925), converges toward the $9.1B base-term contract figure (claim 1192). The supplied record ends mid-claim and contains no insider transactions, so no conclusion is drawn on insider activity.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-13Riot's record shows two distinct financing regimes rather than one steady dilution curve. Through 2024 the company leaned on equity. There was the $750M at-the-market program (claim 11948), authorized shares doubled from 340M to 680M (claim 5964), and the equity incentive pool grew by 15M shares (claim 5963). Those authorizations accompanied a $453.4M miner order (claim 11991) and a Bitfarms stake the company said it funded from working capital (claims 6012, 5802). The Bitfarms position is not discussed in any later claim, and its current status requires explanation.
The December 2024 convertible marks the pivot. It was launched at $500M (claim 5261), priced at $525M (claim 5251), and closed at about $594M (claim 5242), with proceeds directed toward bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). By 2026 the direction had reversed. Holdings fell from 15,679 BTC at the end of Q1 (claim 894) to 11,380 at the end of Q2 (claim 566), and the Q2 sales were described as funding AI data-center expansion (claim 8643). Bitcoin bought with convertible proceeds is now serving as a data-center funding source, so the announced use of proceeds has in effect been revised.
The 2026 mix looks more coherent than opportunistic, since it moves toward project-level debt against contracted revenue. The contracted figures are a $9.1B base term extending to $16.1B with options (claims 1192, 1194), and $9.8B at Rockdale (claim 578). The $573M Morgan Stanley interim facility (claim 8752) and the $180M AMD-backed term loan (claim 8753) fit that model, as does the stated intent to grow the data-center business without equity dilution (claim 9634). That intent sits beside a $500M ATM authorized four months earlier (claim 3931) and a seventh equity plan amendment (claim 1877). The record does not show whether the ATM has been drawn.
Several figures do not reconcile. Pledged Coinbase collateral of 5,821 BTC (claim 909) does not match the initial 3,977 plus 1,825 added less 1,544 released (claims 916, 917, 908). Stated H1 sales of 9,665 BTC (claim 564) sit awkwardly against the change in holdings, and a separate claim cites 19,000 BTC with $330M cash (claims 1736, 1737). Several amounts in the record also lack units.
A careful reader should watch four things. The first is the takeout of the interim facility into the targeted $1.7B of long-term project debt (claim 8531). The second is the undisclosed rate and maturity (claims 1473, 1465). The third is how the roughly $2.15B capex requirement (claim 5192) is sequenced. The fourth is whether the unpledged bitcoin, around half of holdings, keeps shrinking as the working-capital buffer.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-13Riot's capital trajectory reveals a three-phase evolution from diversification to collateral optimization to infrastructure-as-a-service financing. In 2024, the company doubled authorized shares to 680M (claim 5964, 2024-06-17) and issued $525M in 0.75% convertible senior notes (claim 5251, 2024-12-10), ostensibly for general purposes but deployed toward $313M in Bitfarms acquisition (claims 6015, 5802) plus Bitcoin treasury building. The equity base remained relatively stable through 2025, with the company instead securing a $200M collateralized credit facility with Coinbase (claim 1858, 2026-04-29). This shift from primary issuance to asset-backed borrowing intensified in August 2026 when Riot announced a $573M Morgan Stanley interim financing facility (claim 8752) and term loans totaling $249M for equipment deployment, explicitly tied to an Anthropic partnership worth $16.1B in potential revenue (claim 1194, 2026-08-10). The strategy coherence improved markedly in 2026: rather than patching capital needs opportunistically, Riot's financing structure aligned with stated capex requirements for the Anthropic project. However, Bitcoin management tells a revealing secondary story. Riot pledged $3.977B in BTC as collateral at the start of 2026 (claim 1751), then added $1.825B more in February (claim 1752), reaching $5.821B pledged by June 30 (claim 1754). Simultaneously, the company liquidated $9.665B in Bitcoin across H1 2026 (claim 531), with Q2 2026 alone accounting for $4.3B in sales (claim 563), reducing holdings from $15.68B to $11.38B (claims 565, 566). This reversal from accumulation to deployment contradicts the 2024 narrative and suggests the Bitcoin treasury, once positioned as core to the investment thesis, became a funding source for a different strategy. The $2.15B total capex requirement for the Anthropic project (claim 5192) exceeds announced secured financing by $1.4B—a gap requiring explanation through additional term tranches, operational cash generation, or balance sheet deployment. Watch whether subsequent term facilities materialize, whether Bitcoin collateral constraints tighten under price pressure, and whether revenue from Anthropic contracts materializes at scale and pace to sustain this capital intensity.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-09Riot exhibits a marked strategic pivot from equity-forward financing (2024–2025) to debt-collateralized raises (2026). In June 2024, the company doubled authorized share count to 680M and pursued the Bitfarms acquisition ($111M stated via claim 6015, $202M per claim 5802), signaling anticipated growth via dilution. The December 2024 convertible offering ($594M closed, per claim 5242) nominally funded Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245). Yet equity faded: the December 2025 ATM authorization ($500M, per claim 3931) shows minimal deployment, while April 2026's Seventh Amendment hints at accelerating grants without offsetting public issuance.
August 2026 marks the inflection. Riot signed the Anthropic partnership ($9.1B base revenue per claim 1192, $16.1B with extensions per claim 1194) and simultaneously executed layered financing: Morgan Stanley interim facility ($573M, per claim 8752), AMD term loan ($180M per claim 8753), and delayed-draw tranche ($69M per claim 8754). Concurrent liquidation of Bitcoin holdings ($9.665B in H1 2026 per claim 564, Q2 alone $4.3B per claim 563) while collateralizing $5.821B in remaining Bitcoin to Coinbase (per claim 1754) signals acute financing pressure. Stated use—funding Anthropic data center capex ($2.15B projected per claim 5192)—aligns with announced contracts. The urgency is striking: interim facilities, Bitcoin collateral, rapid treasury depletion.
Notably absent: post-2024 discussion of Bitfarms, raising asset-performance questions. The ATM sits largely undrawn. Share grants accelerate while the equity pool expands.
Sophisticated readers should monitor four items. First, Morgan Stanley interim-to-permanent conversion timing—delay signals refinancing difficulty. Second, actual capex consumption against the $2.15B budget; misalignment carries strategic consequence. Third, Bitcoin price movements' impact on the $5.821B collateral cushion; a 20–30% drop would stress covenants. Fourth, whether contracted Anthropic revenue ($9.1–16.1B) plus AMD lease commitments ($311M expected per claim 407) generate sufficient cash flow to service debt and avoid equity dilution for the stated $1.7B gigawatt-scale ambition (per claim 8531). The financing stack's reliance on near-term operational cash conversion is material.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-07Riot's capital strategy bifurcates sharply between its 2024 pivot into mining consolidation and its 2026 reinvention as an AI infrastructure platform, with the financing structure serving as the bridge—and potential strain point—between these distinct businesses. The Bitfarms acquisition in June 2024, financed from working capital, coincided with a doubling of authorized shares to 680 million, per claims 5964 and 5963, signaling preparation for either equity dilution or convertible issuance. The December 2024 convertible notes offering, priced at 0.75% and reaching $594 million in gross proceeds (claim 5242), reflected manageable capital costs in a rising-rate environment and suggested confidence in future equity upside—though the timing of convertible pricing discrepancies (claim 5259 marked delayed) warrants reconciliation against actual terms.
The 2026 arc reveals more tension. Riot authorized an ATM offering of up to $500 million in December 2025 (claim 3931) but appears not to have drawn it substantially, instead pivoting to leverage. The Morgan Stanley interim financing of $573 million announced in August 2026 (claims 8746, 8752) targets the Anthropic AI data center project with a stated capex requirement of $2,150 million (claim 5192), indicating a funding gap. The company bridged this by liquidating $9.665 billion in Bitcoin sales across H1 2026 (claim 531), reducing holdings from $15.68 billion to $11.38 billion in six months. Simultaneously, it pledged $5.821 billion of remaining Bitcoin as collateral against the $200 million Coinbase facility (claim 567), a 51-percent concentration of a volatile reserve.
The deployment story aligns: Anthropic project capex ($2,150 million) plus Rockdale data center terminal expansion ($573 million facility, claim 4748) broadly match stated financing, and contracted revenue of $10 billion from Rockdale leases (claim 384) suggests durable cash generation. However, the reliance on Bitcoin liquidation rather than ATM issuance, combined with heavy collateralization of remaining reserves, signals either disciplined treasury management or constrained access to equity markets. A sophisticated reader should monitor (a) whether Anthropic revenue materializes on announced schedules and timing, (b) whether collateral ratios remain within facility covenants as Bitcoin volatility inevitably resurges, and (c) whether Riot taps the ATM post-Rockdale close, which would signal either capital adequacy restored or fresh dilution pressure in an oversupplied equity market.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-06Riot's capital structure has undergone a pronounced transition from 2024 through mid-2026, visible in both the instruments deployed and the underlying business pivot. In mid-2024, the company pursued a conventional equity-plus-debt strategy: it doubled authorized shares to 680 million (claim 5964), deployed working capital to finance the $202 million Bitfarms acquisition (claim 5802), and later secured $525 million in convertible senior notes (claim 5251). This playbook—equity capacity expansion plus acquisition financing plus hybrid debt—appeared consistent with growth-stage M&A ambitions in the mining sector.
The capital mix shifted materially beginning in 2025. Rather than pursue further equity dilution, Riot layered in structured credit: a $200 million revolving facility from Coinbase secured against Bitcoin collateral (claim 1858), and crucially, project-backed term financing beginning in mid-2026. The Morgan Stanley interim facility of $573 million (claim 5191) and an additional $180 million term loan from AMD (claim 5190) mark a shift toward capital structure tied to contracted revenues rather than equity or commodity collateral.
Announced use of proceeds diverged from the initial thesis. The Bitfarms acquisition signaled focus on mining, yet by 2026 Riot liquidated Bitcoin holdings—$290 million in Q1 (claim 530) and $4.3 billion in Q2 (claim 526)—to fund a new infrastructure-as-a-service play: providing data center capacity to Anthropic and AMD on long-term lease. The company announced $2.15 billion in capex requirements for the Anthropic project (claim 5192) but has deployed only $753 million in committed facilities. This $1.4 billion gap requires explanation.
The financing structure now relies on Bitcoin as collateral. Riot has pledged $5.821 billion to Coinbase (claim 529), representing half of June holdings. If Bitcoin prices decline materially, collateral adequacy becomes constrained. Long-term contracted revenues—$9.1 billion base from Anthropic (claim 1192) and $9.8 billion from Rockdale (claim 578)—remain nascent; Q2 2026 data center revenue totaled only $23 million (claim 925). Sophisticated readers should monitor: (1) whether additional capex financing closes the $1.4 billion gap; (2) revenue recognition pace relative to capex drawdown; (3) Bitcoin collateral levels and covenant headroom; (4) the timing and magnitude of Bitcoin holdings changes after June 30, which show elevated volatility requiring reconciliation against disclosed sales proceeds.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-06Riot's capital strategy shifted from unified to opportunistic between 2024 and 2026. In 2024, the company's approach was structured: it authorized 680M shares (claim 5964) and issued a $594M convertible (claim 5242) marketed for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5245), creating leverage-light dilution. This was coherent within the mining thesis. The Bitfarms acquisition exposed the first fracture: $111M was stated invested (claim 6015) but $202M was financed from working capital (claim 5802), a $91M gap Riot has not reconciled. By mid-2026, the thesis had inverted entirely.
The Anthropic contract ($16.1B base with extension options, claim 1194) triggered a financing scramble disconnected from stated use of proceeds. Riot layered $573M interim Morgan Stanley facility (claim 7484), $180M term loan against AMD cash flows (claim 5190), and $200M Coinbase secured credit (claim 915)—three separate funding sources for three separate project needs. This is not strategy but opportunistic patching. Simultaneously, Bitcoin treasury liquidated from $15.68B (claim 565) to $11.38B in six months (claim 528), with Q1 sales at $289.5M (claim 549). The company is no longer acquiring Bitcoin; it is selling Bitcoin to fund data center capex.
The collateral stacking reveals the leverage profile. $5.8B of remaining Bitcoin is now pledged to Coinbase (claim 1754), 51% of holdings, after February added $1.825B (claim 1187) and April released $1.544B (claim 1753). Liquid cash of $549M (claim 431) covers less than three weeks of capex against $2.15B stated for Anthropic alone (claim 5192). The $594M convertible (claim 5242) remains a deferred dilution bomb; conversion crystallizes based on share price and refinance timing.
Insider behavior confirms the pivot: sales clustered at valuation peaks (July 2025: $12M, claim 531; April 2026: $8M, claim 1877) while small buys in early 2026 do not reverse the pattern. Riot is now entirely dependent on Anthropic and AMD lease cash flows and execution velocity. Any delay in realization or mark-to-market decline in Bitcoin collateral forces restructuring. The refinance window tightens as interim facilities mature and convertible dilution approaches.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-05Riot's capital strategy across 2024–2026 demonstrates a coherent pivot, not opportunistic patching. The company doubled authorized shares in June 2024 (claim 5964) while deploying roughly $313 million into Bitfarms (claims 6015, 5802). Late 2024 brought a $594 million 0.75% convertible (claim 5242) nominally for Bitcoin acquisition. Yet deployment diverged significantly: Bitcoin holdings rose to approximately $15.7 billion by Q1 2026 (claim 550), then contracted as Riot sold $9.7 billion in the first half of 2026 (claim 564), leaving $11.4 billion by June 30 (claim 528). The asset the convertible was supposed to accumulate became the primary liquidity source.
This liquidation funded documented strategic reorientation. In May 2026, Riot announced major data-center leases totaling roughly $10 billion contracted revenue: $9.1 billion base with Anthropic, extendable to $16.1 billion (claim 1192); $311 million from AMD (claim 407); and $9.8 billion from Rockdale (claim 578). Capital structure evolved accordingly: after 2024 equity authorization and late-2024 convertible, Riot shifted to secured debt. A $200 million Coinbase credit facility appeared in May 2025 (claim 915), with Bitcoin collateral management accelerating in early 2026—$1.8 billion pledged in February (claim 907), partial release in April (claim 908), and $5.8 billion total pledged by June 30 (claim 1754). Morgan Stanley interim financing of $573 million emerged in August 2026 (claim 7484), alongside $180 million in term financing from AMD cash flows (claim 5190). Total long-term debt targeting was announced at $1.7 billion (claim 8531).
Proceeds tracking is intelligible but requires contextualization: convertibles raised for Bitcoin accumulation; accumulated Bitcoin then funded data-center capex. This represents material revision in strategy, not fraud. However, execution risk is significant. Stated capex needs are $2.15 billion (claim 5192); announced interim and term facilities total approximately $753 million, implying $1.4 billion gap. Bitcoin collateral now supports operational leverage, critical if capex drawdowns accelerate. Insider selling spiked to $69 million in July 2026, the largest quarterly volume since announcement, warranting clarification on management confidence. Sophisticated readers should monitor capex funding closure, collateral utilization under rising leverage, revenue realization of the $9.8 billion Rockdale lease, and whether the $500 million ATM from December 2025 is deployed to close the gap.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-05Riot's capital trajectory reveals a coherent but high-leverage strategy that has shifted sharply between 2024 and 2026. In mid-2024, following the $111 million Bitfarms share investment (claim 6015) and subsequent $202 million acquisition tranche financed via working capital (claim 5802), Riot doubled its authorized common stock from 340 million to 680 million shares (claim 5964) and issued $525 million in 0.75% convertible senior notes (claim 5251), preserving equity optionality while deferring dilution. That posture inverted beginning in 2025. Rather than drawing the $500 million ATM offering authorized in December 2025 (claim 3932), Riot has systematically monetized its Bitcoin treasury—liquidating $9.7 billion in holdings during the first half of 2026 alone (claim 564)—while simultaneously pledging approximately $5.8 billion of remaining Bitcoin as collateral (claim 1754) to secure $773 million in credit facilities ($200 million with Coinbase, per claim 1858; $573 million with Morgan Stanley for the Rockdale data center, per claim 7484). Insider selling aligns with this rebalancing: modest throughout 2024-early 2025, but accelerating to $69 million in Q2 2026 (insider_sale 2026-07-01 data) as the capital structure tightens. The announced use of proceeds aligns with deployment: the Anthropic and AMD data center leases (claims 1192, 1194) carry $9.1 billion to $16.1 billion in contracted revenue, with the Morgan Stanley facility explicitly sized for Rockdale capex (claims 33, 5192). However, the math becomes critical: Riot requires approximately $2.15 billion in capex for the Anthropic project (claim 5192) but has secured only $573 million interim financing—meaning permanent capital from equity issuance, convertible conversion, or additional collateralized debt remains necessary before cash flow inflects. A sophisticated reader should monitor collateral coverage ratios closely; Bitcoin at current prices provides substantial cushion against the $773 million in borrowings, but a material decline would either force equity issuance (via ATM) or collateral calls. The absence of ATM draws to date, paired with the aggressive Bitcoin liquidation, suggests Riot is racing to fund capex ahead of anticipated cash generation, betting that contracted revenue will service debt before collateral pressures emerge.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-05Riot's capital structure from mid-2024 through Q3 2026 exhibits two distinct phases: balance-sheet optionality (2024-2025) followed by project-backed leverage (2026 forward). The progression is coherent rather than opportunistic.
In 2024, Riot doubled authorized shares to 680M (claim 5964) and issued $525M in 0.75% convertible senior notes (claim 5251), supporting the $313M Bitfarms acquisition financed from working capital (claims 6015, 5802). This mix—equity authorization plus convertible debt plus working capital deployment—built flexibility without immediate dilution. A $500M at-the-market offering was authorized in December 2025 (claim 3931) but remained unused, confirming Riot chose debt over common equity issuance.
From May 2026 forward, Riot deployed secured financing keyed directly to contracted revenue. A $200M Coinbase facility collateralized by Bitcoin holdings (claim 906) arrived in May, with an additional $1.825B in BTC pledged as supplemental collateral in February (claim 917). More substantially, Morgan Stanley extended a $573M delayed-draw term loan (claim 6709) designated for Rockdale data center capex. The Anthropic lease underpins both facilities, representing $9.1B in base-term contracted revenue rising to $16.1B with extension options (claims 1192, 1194). This shift from broad-based balance-sheet raises to narrowly sourced project financing reflects strategic clarity about revenue visibility.
Capital deployment tracking reveals a leveraged but coherent approach. Rockdale's $573M Morgan Stanley facility is matched to capex. The Anthropic project carries stated capex requirements of $2.15B (claim 5192); announced debt facilities total $773M, with the remaining $1.4B sourced from Bitcoin sales of $9.665B in H1 2026 (claim 564). Bitfarms, however, has dropped from recent disclosures since its 2024 acquisition, requiring explanation about strategic repositioning, operational integration, or writedown.
Insider transactions shifted in Q3 2026: sales reached $69.2M after averaging $500K to $12M per quarter through early 2026. Timing coincides with heavy Bitcoin liquidation, collateral pledges, and debt deployment—patterns consistent with liquidity prioritization rather than fundamental distress.
Three items warrant monitoring: whether Anthropic contract assumptions survive market conditions or face renegotiation. Whether closing the $1.4B capex gap requires additional debt and at what terms. And whether Bitcoin collateral positions remain serviceable if asset volatility strikes or refinancing terms tighten.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-05Riot's capital strategy shifted materially between mid-2024 and mid-2026, from balance-sheet diversification to project-backed deployment. The convertible senior notes offering of $525M closed in December 2024 (per claim 5251), while an at-the-market offering of up to $500M was authorized in December 2025 (claims 3931, 3932). These early financing moves anticipated need but predated clarity on use. The actual acceleration began with contracting. By August 2026, Riot had secured a $573M interim facility from Morgan Stanley tied explicitly to the Anthropic data center expansion (claim 7484), layered with a $180M term loan on AMD facility cash flows (claim 5190) and embedded collateral deployment: Bitcoin pledged to the Coinbase $200M facility rose from $3.977B to $5.821B between early 2026 and June (claims 1186, 1754).
The coherence here is real but contingent. Rather than opportunistic patching, Riot shifted toward asset-backed project financing once revenue became contractible. The Anthropic engagement alone carries a $16.1B potential value with extensions (claim 1194) and generated $10M in stated contracted revenue by August (claim 509). Rockdale's $9.8B contracted revenue (claim 578) provides similar leverage. Bitcoin sales totaled $9.665B in the first half of 2026 (claim 531), reflecting capital redirection from holdings into capex rather than cash drag.
But use-of-proceeds reconciliation requires care. The Bitfarms investment stated at $111M (claim 6015) expanded to $202M deployed (claim 5802)—the delta is material and merits explanation beyond "working capital." Bitcoin positions serve as embedded collateral and deployment buffer; holdings fell from $15.679B at Q1 end (claim 550) to $11.380B by June (claim 528), then rose to $19B by late August (claim 1736), suggesting active portfolio management alongside debt draws.
Insider behavior last quarter deserves attention. Insiders sold $69.2M in Q2 2026, the largest single quarter on record, coincident with the $573M Morgan Stanley draw and near-zero reported liquid assets ($1M per claim 572). This mirrors the equity-for-debt trade: insiders locking in current stock price as the company finances capex through leverage and collateral. Sophisticated readers should track whether Anthropic and Rockdale revenue materializes on schedule, whether Bitcoin collateral faces forced liquidation if facility covenants tighten, and whether the convertible notes maturing in 2030 force equity conversion or necessitate refinancing before their due date.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-09-05Riot's capital structure evolved from opportunistic to crisis-driven in eighteen months. Through mid-2024, dilution followed a coherent narrative: authorized shares doubled (claim 5964), equity reserves expanded (claim 5963), and a $525M convertible offering (claim 5251) alongside $200M Coinbase credit (claim 4844) funded the Bitfarms acquisition. The ATM program authorized December 2025 (claim 3931) signaled confidence in equity markets.
This coherence shattered in August 2026 when Riot announced the Anthropic contract—$9.1B base and up to $16.1B with extensions (claims 1192, 1194)—requiring immediate data center buildout. The company secured only $573M interim financing from Morgan Stanley (claim 408) plus a $180M term loan structured on AMD facility cash flows (claim 443). This funding gap forced extraordinary action: Riot liquidated $9.7B in Bitcoin sales during the first half of 2026 (claim 564), nearly 62% of its $15.7B holdings at year-start (claim 550), while simultaneously pledging the remaining $5.8B to Coinbase as collateral (claim 1188).
This mix does not reflect strategy but necessity. Convertible issuance signaled early-stage confidence; the pivot to secured debt, asset sales, and collateral pledges signals constraint. The Anthropic contract is genuinely valuable—long-term contracted revenue of $9–16B (claims 1192, 1194)—but requires $2.15B in near-term capex (claim 5192) that current cash generation cannot service. Riot chose to harvest years of Bitcoin appreciation rather than dilute equity further, but the method reveals capital structure fragility.
Insider behavior reinforces this reading. Sales were modest and cyclical through 2025, then exploded to $69.2M in July 2026 (12 transactions, concurrent with Bitcoin liquidation). This timing—insiders exiting when management is selling Bitcoin to fund operations—requires explanation beyond typical diversification. Sophisticated readers should monitor covenant compliance on the Coinbase facility (given $5.8B collateral at risk, claim 1188), whether Morgan Stanley's bridge rolls to permanent debt, and whether contract revenues materialize on schedule to justify the collateral now pledged against Riot's remaining Bitcoin and hardware.
Capital & dilution trajectory
2026-08-30Riot's capital activity in this window is defined primarily by the absence of equity financing and the presence of accelerating insider sales. The August 2026 $573M credit facility for data center equipment and project expenses stands as the sole financing claim on record. For a capital-intensive mining operation, debt-funded capex is a logical choice, but it raises a question about why equity markets are not appearing in the disclosed history: either Riot has forgone equity issuance entirely, or this record is incomplete.
The insider transaction pattern tells a story of rising disposition. From April 2024 through April 2026, insiders sold equity in irregular increments, with quarterly liquidations hovering between $500k and $8M. That pattern fractured in July 2025, when insiders sold $12.1M; it accelerated sharply in July 2026, when a single quarter generated $69.2M in sales across twelve transactions. This is the most material insider liquidation in the disclosed history by a wide margin. Simultaneously, each quarter has included insider buy activity—sometimes dozens of transactions with unspecified amounts—which complicates the narrative. The buys could reflect compensation vesting or routine open-market confidence; the escalating sells suggest risk management or profit-taking at valuations insiders view as elevated.
The capital structure that emerges is lean and raises questions about sustainability. A $573M debt facility arriving in August 2026, only weeks after the $69.2M insider sale, invites scrutiny around timing: whether insiders liquidated ahead of financing stress or in response to equity valuations. No equity raises, convertible debt, or ATMs appear in this record, which for a company of Riot's capex appetite is either a deliberate deferral strategy or a constraint worth explaining.
A sophisticated reader should focus on whether the $573M debt suffices for announced capex plans, whether Riot taps additional capital markets imminently, and whether insiders' recent liquidation represents a one-time adjustment or the beginning of sustained portfolio reduction. The absence of equity issuance, combined with the scale of recent insider selling, suggests the company is betting on leverage and retained cash flow rather than dilution to fund growth.
customer_arc
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-19Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements; most of what reads as partnership activity is supply, vendor, or equity relationships in which Riot is the buyer or investor. In the legacy biotech era, the University of Idaho, University of Wyoming and Washington University licenses (claim 21095) are named, executed arrangements, but they are inbound IP licenses rather than revenue customers. Merial's exclusive distribution right for SurBred 15 (claim 21094) is a named counterparty, but it is conditioned on the product being "fully developed," which makes it a contingent commercial right rather than a booked sale. The more than 30 products sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102) come with no named buyers. The 2012 exclusive animal health license (claim 21049) went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties, so the counterparty is undisclosed.
The 2018 crypto pivot brought a cluster of named definitive agreements. These are the Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15376, 15346), and the Shift Markets master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347). All of them are inputs Riot purchased for a planned exchange, and none generates customer revenue. Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady references (claims 15545, 14957, 14959, 14958) are minority equity stakes that diluted over time, not commercial contracts. Coinmint (claims 14938, 14748) hosted Riot's own miners, which made Riot the customer; it moved to month-to-month terms (claim 14275) and was then exited (claim 13864). Bitmain and MicroBT (claims 13261, 12380, 11999) are named, executed hardware supply agreements. ESS Metron is described as a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160), but its disclosed role is component and engineering supply (claim 14161).
On the customer side, the only revenue-generating counterparty named in the mining era is Rhodium, which Riot calls its "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That establishes concentration in the Whinstone hosting business without quantifying it. Over time, Riot's counterparty exposure moved from academic licensors to fintech vendors and then to a small number of hardware suppliers and a single named hosting client.
Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim discloses contract values on the customer side, Rhodium's revenue share, or royalty receipts from the animal health license. The only dollar figure is a cost, the $480 million Bitmain purchase (claim 13261). Diligence should therefore treat customer-side visibility as thin and anchored to one counterparty.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-19Read closely, Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements. Most of what it calls customer or partnership claims are actually supplier contracts, equity holdings, or contingent rights, and investors should not mistake them for revenue counterparties. The only clearly named buyer of Riot's services is Rhodium, described in 2022 as the company's largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No contract term, megawatt allocation or revenue share accompanies that statement.
The earlier biotech era shows the same pattern. Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 applied only once the product was fully developed (21094), so it was a forward commitment rather than a sale. The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP went to an unnamed 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049). The university arrangements (21095) were in-licenses to Riot, and the reference to more than 30 products marketed to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyer (21102).
The 2018 blockchain pivot produced signed agreements, but Riot was the paying party in each. It licensed software from Coinsquare (15417), contracted Shift Markets for an exchange platform (15367, 15347), and engaged Synapse and Evolve for banking (15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15138). Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady were minority equity stakes that diluted over time, with Tess falling from about 52% to 8.8% (15514, 14959; 15545, 14957; 14958). Several of these items are duplicate filings of a single fact.
In the mining era, Coinmint was a host to Riot. That co-location agreement fell to month-to-month status (14275) and was then exited (13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are hardware suppliers. The $480 million Bitmain purchase orders (13261) and MicroBT's option for up to 66,560 miners a year (11999) are capital-spending commitments, and the MicroBT figure is optional capacity rather than a firm order. ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (14160) but functions as a component and engineering vendor (14161).
On concentration, the record moves from no identifiable customers to a single named hosting customer, Rhodium. Its share of revenue is undisclosed. On reconciliation, none of these claims carries a revenue figure, so the announced deals cannot be tied to reported revenue. Any judgement about customer concentration or contracted backlog therefore depends on the filings' revenue footnotes, not on this announcement history.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-19Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of what it has announced over two decades consists of supplier contracts, equity stakes, licensing deals and advisory engagements, and readers should not treat these as revenue-bearing customer relationships.
In the biotech era, the only identified commercial counterparty was Merial, whose exclusive SurBred 15 distribution right applied only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094). That makes it a contingent arrangement, not a live sale. The "more than 30 products" sold to diagnostic manufacturers came with no named buyers (claim 21102). The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049).
The 2018 blockchain pivot produced named, signed agreements, but Riot was the licensee or buyer in each. These included Coinsquare software licensing (claim 15417), Shift Markets' exchange platform (claims 15367, 15347) and SynapseFi/Evolve banking (claims 15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady items are equity holdings, repeated across several filings (claims 15545, 15522, 15512, 14957, 14958, 14976). Those duplicate claim ids should not be counted as separate relationships.
In the mining era, the counterparties are vendors and hosts. Coinmint began as a signed co-location agreement (claim 14938), slipped to month-to-month (claim 14275) and was then ended (claim 13864). The Bitmain purchase orders total $480 million for 82,500 miners (claims 14725, 13261). MicroBT signed a master supply agreement (claim 12380), but its 66,560-miner annual volumes are options, not commitments (claim 11999). ESS Metron is labelled a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160), yet the description is one of procurement and engineering support (claim 14161).
The single named hosting customer is Rhodium, described as the "largest" (claim 13863). No share of revenue, contract term or other hosting clients is disclosed alongside it. Customer concentration has therefore moved from diffuse, unnamed diagnostics buyers to apparent dependence on one hosting client, while self-mining revenue depends on the bitcoin network rather than on any counterparty.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim ties Rhodium, the animal-health royalties or any license to a dollar amount. The only quantified commitments ($480 million to Bitmain and the Whinstone power contract in claim 14254) are cost-side obligations rather than contracted revenue.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-16Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of the named relationships are equity stakes, vendor contracts or service arrangements in which Riot is the buyer. The 2004-era biotech claims mix the two kinds of language. Merial's exclusive worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 (claim 21094) applies only "once the product is fully developed," which makes it a contingent right rather than a revenue-bearing contract. The university arrangements (claim 21095) are inbound licenses. The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP (claim 21049) is signed, but the counterparty appears only as "an animal health company" and its milestone and royalty terms are not quantified.
The 2018 pivot produced a run of named agreements. The Coinsquare software licensing deal (claim 15417), the Synapse and Evolve banking arrangement (claims 15376, 15346) and the Shift Markets master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347) all name their counterparties. All of them, however, supported a planned RiotX exchange, and Riot was the procuring party. Synapse was terminated by mutual agreement in 2019 (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady entries (claims 15545, 14959, 14958) are investments, not commercial contracts, and several of them repeat the same disclosure (claims 15512, 15522, 14957).
The mining era follows the same supplier-heavy pattern. Coinmint was a hosting provider to Riot (claims 14938, 14253) and went month-to-month before the relationship was ended (claim 13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are hardware suppliers (claims 14725, 13261, 12380, 11999). ESS Metron is called a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160) but functions as a component vendor (claim 14161). The power purchase agreement at Whinstone does not name the energy supplier (claim 14254).
The only identified revenue-generating customer in the record is Rhodium, described as the "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That points to meaningful concentration in the hosting segment, but no share figure is disclosed and no other hosting customers are named. Concentration has therefore moved from no material customers to a single named hosting counterparty sitting beside self-mining revenue.
No revenue, backlog or contract-value figures attributable to customers appear in these claims. The $480 million Bitmain figure (claim 13261) is capital expenditure, not revenue. Reconciling disclosed revenue against announced deals is therefore not possible from this record, and readers should not infer customer-driven revenue from the volume of partnership announcements.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-16Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of the named counterparties are suppliers, service providers, licensors or equity investees, and only one named party is ever described as a customer. In the predecessor biotech era, Merial's worldwide marketing and distribution right for SurBred 15 was contingent on the product being "fully developed" (claim 21094), so it was a forward-looking distribution right and not a revenue contract. The claim to market more than 30 products to diagnostic kit makers and research facilities names no buyers at all (claim 21102). The university arrangements are inbound licenses (claim 21095). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). That is the clearest case of a material counterparty left unnamed. The crypto pivot produced named stakes in Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady (claims 15522, 15514, 14957, 14958, 14959). The record carries the same Coinsquare disclosure several times (claims 15512, 15545, 15473, 15295), which inflates the apparent partnership count. The RiotX exchange buildout relied on signed vendor agreements with Coinsquare, Shift Markets and Synapse/Evolve (claims 15417, 15367, 15347, 15376, 15346). These were inputs to a planned exchange, not customer revenue, and Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). Coinmint (claims 14938, 14822, 14748), Bitmain and MicroBT (claims 14725, 13261, 12380, 11999) and ESS Metron (claims 14160, 14161) are all named, but each one is a party Riot pays rather than a party that pays Riot. Coinmint shrank to a month-to-month arrangement and was then exited (claims 14275, 13864). The only named customer is Rhodium, described as the "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That makes customer concentration effectively a single disclosed name. The other hosting clients are not identified, and the record gives Rhodium's contract term, pricing and share of hosting revenue nowhere. Revenue reconciliation is not possible from this record because no claim ties dollar revenue to any announced deal. The only hard figure, roughly $480 million of Bitmain purchase orders for 82,500 miners (claim 13261), is capital spending. The power purchase agreement (claim 14254) does not name the supplier and gives no quantities. Diligence should ask for Rhodium's share of hosting revenue and the identities of the remaining hosting customers before treating hosting as diversified contracted income.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-15Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of the named counterparties are suppliers, service vendors, advisers, or equity investees. The only disclosed revenue-side customer from the bitcoin era is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No contract value, term, or revenue share is attached to that claim. The biotech-era record follows the same pattern. Merial held worldwide marketing rights to SurBred 15 only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094), which is a contingent distribution right, not booked demand. The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified "animal health company" in exchange for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). That makes it the clearest example of a material counterparty left anonymous. The claim of "more than 30 products" sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyers (claim 21102). The 2018 to 2019 crypto pivot produced named agreements with Coinsquare (claim 15417), Synapse (claims 15376, 15346), and Shift Markets (claims 15367, 15347). All of these were inbound licensing or platform-services contracts supporting a planned RiotX exchange, so Riot was the customer rather than the vendor. Synapse was later terminated by mutual agreement (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady items are equity positions, and the Tess stake was diluted from roughly 52% to 8.8% (claims 15514, 14977). Under the 2020 to 2022 Coinmint arrangement, Riot again bought services, and the relationship moved to month-to-month before being ended (claims 14938, 14253, 13864). The Bitmain and MicroBT supply agreements (claims 14725, 13261, 12380, 11999) and the ESS Metron relationship, described only as a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160), are procurement commitments. Some of them, such as the $480 million Bitmain orders, are large. Concentration has therefore moved from a single prospective distributor (Merial) to a single disclosed hosting customer (Rhodium), with the supplier side concentrated in Bitmain and then MicroBT. Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims discloses customer revenue, contract value, or a customer's share of sales. The Rhodium relationship is the only customer revenue that can be identified, and its size, duration, and terms are not stated here. Diligence should obtain hosting-segment revenue by counterparty, the Rhodium contract terms, and the identity and payment history of the 2012 licensee before giving weight to any partnership language.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-15Riot's record of named relationships contains very few signed customer agreements; most are supplier contracts, equity stakes, or service vendors. The only named revenue counterparty in the modern bitcoin era is Rhodium, described in 2022 as "our largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). The record never discloses a hosting contract term, a price, or Rhodium's share of revenue. Several earlier items read as partnerships but are conditional. Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 applied only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to a counterparty never named, "an animal health company," and paid only through milestones and royalties (claim 21049). The 2004 claim of more than 30 products sold to diagnostic manufacturers identifies no customers at all (claim 21102).
The 2018-2019 RiotX period produced signed but short-lived agreements. These include the Coinsquare software licensing agreement (claim 15417), a Shift Markets master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347), and a Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). In all three, Riot was the licensee or buyer, not the seller. The Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady entries are minority equity positions, not commercial relationships (claims 15522, 14957, 14959, 14958). The Tess stake fell from about 52% to 8.8% between claims 15547 and 14959.
On the supply side, the Coinmint co-location agreement (claim 14938) was month-to-month by 2022 (claim 14275) and was then exited (claim 13864). The Bitmain purchase orders totaling $480 million are firm commitments (claim 13261). The MicroBT arrangement pairs a master agreement (claim 12380) with annual purchase options of up to 66,560 miners (claim 11999). Those options should not be read as committed volume. ESS Metron is named but labelled only a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no counterparty beyond "our energy supplier" (claim 14254).
Counterparty concentration has shifted over time. Early exposure ran to licensors and distributors. During RiotX it ran to fintech vendors. It now runs to a single disclosed hosting customer, Rhodium, plus two hardware suppliers, Bitmain and MicroBT. The disclosed revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled with the announced deals, because none of the claims on record attach revenue amounts to any customer. Mining revenue, which is not counterparty-based, presumably dominates. Readers should treat the hosting revenue attributable to Rhodium as undisclosed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-15Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements in the conventional sense. Most entries are equity stakes, vendor contracts, or supply arrangements in which Riot is the buyer. The only named revenue counterparty in the bitcoin-era record is Rhodium, described in 2022 as "our largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That disclosure names the counterparty but gives no contract term, megawatt allocation, or revenue share.
The biotech-era entries are softer. Merial's worldwide marketing and distribution right for SurBred 15 applied only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094), so it was a contingent distribution right, not a sales contract. The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). The more-than-30-product catalogue sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyers (claim 21102).
The 2018 to 2019 pivot produced named but mostly supply-side agreements. These were the Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), Shift Markets' exchange platform (claims 15367 and 15347), and Synapse and Evolve banking services (claims 15376 and 15346). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady entries are investment holdings, not commercial relationships, and recur many times (claims 15545, 15522, 15512, 14957, 14975, 14958, 14977). Those repetitions should not be read as separate deals.
From 2020 the named counterparties are suppliers: Coinmint for co-location (claims 14938 and 14253, later ended per 13864), Bitmain for $480 million of miner purchase orders (claims 14725 and 13261), and MicroBT for miner supply (claim 12380). MicroBT's 66,560-unit annual volume is an option, not a commitment (claim 11999). ESS Metron is labelled a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160), but its role is component and engineering supply (claim 14161). The power purchase agreement names only "our energy supplier" (claim 14254).
Counterparty concentration therefore moved from a single distribution partner in the biotech years, through a cluster of exchange vendors, to heavy dependence on two miner manufacturers and one host. On the revenue side, the only named external customer is Rhodium.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim discloses revenue amounts, customer percentages, or hosting contract values. The Rhodium dependence is therefore unquantified, and verifying it requires segment and customer-concentration disclosures from the filings themselves.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-15Riot's record contains few signed customer agreements in the revenue sense. Most entries are equity stakes, supplier contracts, or service arrangements in which Riot is the buyer. Several are also the same disclosure counted more than once: claims 15522, 15545 and 15512 repeat the identical Coinsquare ownership sentence, and claims 14938, 14822, 14748, 14275 and 14253 all restate the Coinmint co-location agreement.
In the biotech era, the Merial arrangement (claim 21094) was contingent marketing rights that applied only "once the product is fully developed." It was not a sales contract. The 2012 exclusive license (claim 21049) went to an unnamed "animal health company" for milestones and royalties that were never quantified. The claim of selling "more than 30 products" to diagnostic manufacturers (claim 21102) names no buyers at all.
The crypto pivot brought executed agreements with named counterparties. These were Coinsquare licensing (claim 15417), Synapse (claims 15376, 15346) and Shift Markets (claims 15367, 15347). All of them supported a planned RiotX exchange, so Riot was the licensee or service recipient, not the vendor. Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). Coinsquare, Tess and Verady are passive equity positions (claims 14975, 14977, 14976), not commercial relationships.
The mining era tilts further toward procurement. The Bitmain purchase orders total $480 million for 82,500 miners (claims 14725, 13261), and the MicroBT supply agreement is signed (claim 12380). The 66,560-unit annual MicroBT figure, however, is an option, not a commitment (claim 11999). ESS Metron is labeled a "key strategic partner" (claims 14160, 14161) with no disclosed contract terms. The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no energy supplier (claim 14254).
Counterparty concentration on the revenue side reduces to one named customer. Rhodium is the "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863), but no contract value, term or share of hosting revenue is given. Coinmint went from a fixed agreement to month-to-month (claim 14275) and was then exited (claim 13864). Its role as a counterparty therefore shrank over time instead of becoming more firmly committed.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims discloses revenue, contract values or customer revenue shares. The large dollar figures, such as the $480 million Bitmain orders, are capital outflows, not inbound bookings. Readers should treat Riot's "partnership" history mainly as a supply-chain and investment ledger, with Rhodium the only identified paying customer.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-13Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements, and the claims labelled as partnerships are mostly vendor contracts, equity stakes or advisory engagements in which Riot is the buyer rather than the seller. In the biotech era the record shows only general commercial language and a single named counterparty. The company 'markets more than 30 products' to unnamed diagnostic kit makers (claim 21102). Merial held distribution rights to SurBred 15 only 'once the product is fully developed' (claim 21094), which makes it a contingent channel arrangement rather than revenue. The university licenses run inbound (claim 21095). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license names no licensee and is paid through milestones and royalties (claim 21049), so it cannot be verified from the record.
The 2018 crypto pivot produced a large number of claims, but almost none describe customers. Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady are minority or majority equity positions (claims 15512, 15514, 14957, 14958, 14959), and several of them repeat the same holding. Coinsquare, Shift Markets and Synapse/Evolve are licensors or service providers to the planned RiotX exchange (claims 15417, 15347, 15346). The Synapse agreement was terminated by mutual consent (claim 15138). XMS Capital is an advisor and Marcum is the auditor (claims 14997, 13887). Coinmint hosted Riot's own miners, which made Riot the customer (claims 14938, 14275), and that relationship was ended (claim 13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are hardware suppliers. The $480 million in Bitmain purchase orders for 82,500 miners (claim 13261) and the MicroBT purchase options (claims 12380, 11999) are capital commitments, not demand. ESS Metron is called a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160), but in practice it is a component supplier (claim 14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no counterparty and refers only to 'our energy supplier' (claim 14254).
The only named revenue counterparty in the entire record is Rhodium, which is described as the 'largest hosting customer' (claim 13863). This means disclosed customer concentration narrowed from a diffuse biotech book to a single named hosting client. However, no share of revenue, contract term or pricing for Rhodium is given. The record contains no revenue figures at all, so the announced deals cannot be reconciled with reported revenue. Most of the headline dollar amounts on record describe outflows to suppliers, and they should not be read as evidence of contracted income.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-11Riot's record contains remarkably few signed customer agreements; most of what reads as partnership activity is equity investment, vendor procurement or advisory engagement. The only named revenue-side counterparty in the modern business is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). Earlier, from the company's diagnostics and animal-health era, Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 was expressly contingent on the product being 'fully developed' (21094). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified 'animal health company' in exchange for milestones and royalties (21049). The claim of 30-plus products sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyer (21102). The university licenses (21095) are inbound IP arrangements, not customers.
The 2018 blockchain pivot produced counterparties who were named but were not customers. Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady appear repeatedly as minority or majority equity stakes (15522, 15512, 15545, 14975, 14957, 14958, 14959, 15547). Duplicate claims inflate how much activity these holdings appear to represent. The Coinsquare software license (15417), the Shift Markets platform agreements (15367, 15347) and the SynapseFi/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346) were all definitive contracts. However, each one supplied services to Riot's planned exchange rather than generating revenue from third parties, and the Synapse agreement was mutually terminated in 2019 (15138). XMS Capital was an advisor (14997). Digital Green Energy was an internal subsidiary still 'seeking to identify' projects (15515, 15455).
In mining, Riot was itself the customer of Coinmint. That relationship went from a co-location agreement (14938) to a month-to-month arrangement (14253, 14275) to an announced exit (13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are hardware suppliers (14725, 13261, 12380). MicroBT's 66,560-miner annual figure is an option, not a commitment (11999). ESS Metron carries the 'key strategic partner' label (14160), but the disclosed role is component supply and engineering (14161), not purchasing.
Counterparty concentration on the revenue side therefore narrows to a single identified hosting customer, Rhodium (13863), and no other hosting client is named. None of these claims discloses revenue, deal value or contract term on the customer side. The only dollar figure on record is the $480 million Bitmain purchase, which is an outflow (13261). As a result, revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled with announced customer deals from this record. Readers should go to filed segment and hosting-revenue disclosures before crediting any customer-driven growth narrative.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-10Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of what it has announced are equity stakes, vendor contracts, or supply arrangements in which Riot is the buyer. The 2004-era filings come closest to customer disclosure. Merial held exclusive worldwide marketing rights to SurBred 15, but only 'once the product is fully developed' (claim 21094). That makes it a contingent distribution right, not a revenue-bearing contract. The three university licenses (claim 21095) are inbound IP arrangements. The 2012 exclusive license of all animal health IP went to a counterparty described only as 'an animal health company' (claim 21049). It was never named, and its milestone and royalty terms were never quantified. The 2018 blockchain pivot produced a run of named counterparties, none of them customers. Coinsquare (claims 15522, 15417, 14975) and TessPay (claims 15547, 14977) were equity investments, and Coinsquare's stake was diluted from 12.9% to 11.7%. Tess fell from roughly 52% to 8.8%. Synapse and Shift Markets (claims 15376, 15346, 15347) were service providers to the planned RiotX exchange, and the Synapse master services agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). Coinmint (claims 14938, 14253) was a co-location host that Riot paid, not a customer. It operated month-to-month by 2022 and was being exited by mid-2022 (claim 13864). Bitmain and MicroBT (claims 14725, 13261, 12380, 11999) are hardware suppliers, and the 66,560-miner annual figure is an option, not a commitment (claim 11999). ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160), but its role is component supply (claim 14161). The only named hosting customer in the record is Rhodium, disclosed in 2022 as 'our largest hosting customer' (claim 13863). No share of revenue, contract term, or roster of other hosting clients accompanies that disclosure. Concentration risk in the hosting segment is therefore evident but unmeasured. The record has moved from a speculative distribution partner (Merial) to a single identified hosting customer (Rhodium), and it lacks the data to size either. No claim on record discloses revenue figures, backlog, or per-contract economics. Whether revenue reconciles with the announced deals cannot be tested, and readers should treat the partnership volume as evidence of activity, not of contracted demand.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-09Riot's record contains few true customer agreements. Most of the entries are equity stakes, vendor contracts or advisory engagements. The only named revenue-side counterparty in the modern business is Rhodium, described in 2022 as "our largest hosting customer" (13863). No contract terms, duration or revenue share accompany that statement. In the earlier life-sciences period, the company cited more than 30 products sold to unnamed "diagnostic test kit manufacturers and research facilities" (21102). Merial's exclusive SurBred 15 distribution right applied only "once the product is fully developed" (21094), so it was a contingent arrangement rather than a revenue contract. The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (21049). That is a signed agreement with an anonymous counterparty.
The crypto-era entries are mostly not customer relationships. Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady are minority or majority equity holdings (15545, 15514, 14975, 14976). Their repetition across filings inflates the apparent volume of partnership activity (15512, 15522, 15547, 15473, 15295). Several agreements were definitive but ran in the wrong direction for revenue. Riot was the licensee or buyer under the Coinsquare software license (15417), the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347) and the SynapseFi/Evolve banking arrangement (15376, 15346). Synapse was later terminated by mutual agreement (15138), and the RiotX exchange those contracts supported does not reappear.
The same pattern holds in mining. Riot was the paying party to Coinmint (14938, 14822), and that relationship became month-to-month (14275) before being ended (13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are supply agreements (14725, 13261, 12380). The MicroBT figure of up to 66,560 miners per year is an option, not a commitment (11999). ESS Metron is labelled a "key strategic partner" (14160), but the disclosure describes it as a component and engineering supplier (14161). XMS Capital (14997) and Marcum (13887) are advisers, not commercial counterparties.
Counterparty concentration has therefore moved from a diffuse, unnamed base of diagnostics buyers to apparent dependence on a single named hosting customer, Rhodium. The record gives no way to measure that dependence. The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled because none of the claims disclose revenue, hosting fees, royalty receipts or customer percentages. Diligence should ask for Rhodium's share of hosting revenue and its contract term. It should also confirm whether the 2012 animal-health license produced any milestone or royalty income.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-09Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most entries describe Riot as a buyer, investor, licensor or client of an adviser, not a seller with contracted demand. The clearest named customer is Rhodium, identified in 2022 as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). That is a disclosure of an existing relationship, though the record gives no contract term, volume or revenue share. The biotech-era entries are thinner. Merial's exclusive worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 depended on the product being "fully developed" (claim 21094), which makes it a forward framework rather than booked demand. The 30-plus products sold to diagnostic kit manufacturers name no buyers (claim 21102). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). The university arrangements are in-licenses (claim 21095).
The crypto-era entries are mostly the reverse of customer wins. Riot held equity stakes in Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady (claims 15545, 14975, 14977, 14976), and several of these appear more than once in the record. The Coinsquare software license, Shift Markets MSA and Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15417, 15347, 15346) supplied infrastructure for a planned exchange. Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The Coinmint agreement (claims 14938, 14748) made Riot the hosted party, and it had become month-to-month by 2022 (claim 14253) before being wound down (claim 13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are suppliers. The $480 million in Bitmain purchase orders (claim 13261) is Riot spending money, not earning it. MicroBT's 66,560-miner annual figure is an option extended to Riot, not a commitment (claim 11999). ESS Metron is described as a "key strategic partner" (claim 14160) but is a component vendor.
Revenue has never been concentrated in disclosed contracts. Riot moved from diffuse, largely anonymous reagent sales to self-mining, where revenue comes from the Bitcoin network and not from counterparties. The one material third-party dependency now visible is Rhodium in hosting, and its weight in revenue is not quantified. None of the claims on record gives revenue figures, contract values or customer percentages. As a result, the announced deals cannot be reconciled with reported revenue. A reader should treat Riot's partnership history as evidence of its supply chain and capital allocation, not of contracted customer demand.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-09Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most entries describe equity stakes, vendor contracts in which Riot is the buyer, or rights that depend on future events. The one named revenue counterparty in the mining era is Rhodium, described in July 2022 as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No contract terms, duration or revenue share accompany that statement.
The biotech-era entries are similarly thin. The Merial worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 applies only once the product is fully developed (claim 21094), which makes it a contingent commercial arrangement rather than a revenue-generating one. The 2012 exclusive license of all animal health intellectual property went to an unidentified animal health company, paid through milestones and royalties (claim 21049). The university licenses (claim 21095) and the 30-plus diagnostic products sold to unnamed buyers (claim 21102) do not identify any customers.
The 2018 pivot produced signed documents, but nearly all of them were supply-side. The Coinsquare Software Licensing and Services Agreement (claim 15417) and the Shift Markets master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347) supplied infrastructure to a planned RiotX exchange. The Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15376, 15346) was mutually terminated in September 2019 (claim 15138). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady entries (claims 15522, 15512, 15545, 14957, 14959, 14958 and others) are investment holdings, not commercial relationships. Repeated claim ids also inflate how much partnership activity the record appears to show.
From 2020 onward the named counterparties are suppliers or hosts. Riot was Coinmint's customer, first under a fixed agreement and later month-to-month, before ending the relationship (claims 14938, 14253, 13864). It bought from Bitmain (claims 14725, 13261) and MicroBT (claim 12380). ESS Metron is labeled a key strategic partner, but it is in fact a component and engineering supplier (claims 14160, 14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no counterparty (claim 14254). MicroBT's 66,560-unit annual figure is an option and not a commitment (claim 11999).
On concentration, the record names only one customer, Rhodium, so hosting revenue appears concentrated in a single disclosed name. The record gives no percentage figure. The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled because no revenue figures appear in these claims. The only dollar amount is the $480 million Bitmain purchase-order total (claim 13261), and that is a capital outflow. Readers should treat the announced relationships as evidence of Riot's operating footprint and supply chain, not of contracted demand.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-09Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements; most of the 'partnership' claims are actually vendor, supplier, licensing or equity-investment relationships. Only one revenue-generating customer is named in the modern business: Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer at the Whinstone site (claim 13863). Everything else runs the other direction, with Riot as the buyer, licensee or investor. That includes the Bitmain purchase agreements (14725, 13261), the MicroBT supply agreement and purchase options (12380, 11999), the Coinmint co-location deal (14938, 14822, 14748), the Shift Markets and Synapse service agreements (15367, 15347, 15376, 15346), and the ESS Metron component relationship (14161, 14160). The language in these filings is mostly definitive. Synapse was a 'material definitive agreement' (15346) and Shift a 'master services agreement' (15347), and the record contains no MOU or LOI phrasing. Durability is the weaker point. Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (15138), the RiotX exchange plan those contracts supported does not reappear, and Coinmint dropped to month-to-month terms (14275) before Riot ended it (13864). In the legacy biotech era, Merial is named as the exclusive SurBred 15 distributor, but only 'once the product is fully developed' (21094), which makes it a contingent right, not a sale. The 2012 exclusive IP license went to an unnamed 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049). The '30 products' sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities likewise names no buyers (21102). ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (14160), but it is identified, and it is a supplier, not a customer. On concentration, the customer base cannot be measured from these claims. Rhodium is called the 'largest' hosting customer, but no revenue share, contract term or second customer is disclosed. The heavy concentration on the supply side is better documented: Bitmain's $480 million for 82,500 miners (13261), followed by a pivot to MicroBT (12380, 11999). On revenue arithmetic, none of these claims discloses a revenue figure tied to a counterparty, so reconciliation is not possible from this record. The $480 million Bitmain figure is capital expenditure, not revenue. Several entries are duplicates of the same disclosure (15512, 15522, 15545; 15547, 15514; 14957, 14975). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady stakes are equity holdings, not commercial agreements, and the Tess stake was diluted from about 52% to 8.8% (15547, 14959).
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-09Riot's record of named relationships is long, but very little of it describes signed customer revenue. Most entries are licenses, equity stakes, vendor contracts, or arrangements in which Riot itself was the buyer. The 2004 filings name three university licensors (claim 21095), and those are inbound licenses, not customers. The Merial distribution right for SurBred 15 was expressly contingent on the product being 'fully developed' (21094), which makes it closer to a framework than a revenue contract. The 30-plus products sold to diagnostic manufacturers came with no named buyers (21102). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049), so the only monetization event of that era has no counterparty on record. After the 2018 pivot, the named parties are investees rather than customers: Coinsquare at 12.9%, later 11.7% (15522, 14975); Tess at 52%, later 8.8% (15547, 14977); and Verady at 3.2% (14976). Several claims repeat the same quotes (15514, 15524, 15545, 15512), which inflates the apparent count. The RiotX exchange agreements with Coinsquare, Synapse/Evolve and Shift (15417, 15376, 15346, 15347) were signed, but Riot was the licensee or services buyer, and Synapse was mutually terminated (15138). The Coinmint arrangement ran the same direction. Riot paid to host its miners (14938), the agreement moved to month-to-month (14253), and Riot then ended it (13864). Bitmain is a supplier, with $480 million in purchase orders (13261, 14725). ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (14160), but the disclosed role is component and engineering supply (14161). The Whinstone power agreement names no energy supplier (14254). The only named revenue customer in the record is Rhodium, identified as the largest hosting customer (13863). Counterparty concentration therefore moved from diffuse, unnamed product buyers to a hosting business whose one disclosed customer is also its largest. No contract term, megawatt allocation, or revenue share for Rhodium appears in these claims. The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record because no claim gives a revenue figure tied to a named deal. The $480 million Bitmain figure is a capital commitment, not revenue. The input also cuts off at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so later supply or customer disclosures were not reviewed. Any reconciliation would require segment revenue from the 10-K to be set against the Rhodium hosting terms.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-08Riot's record contains very few true customer agreements. Most entries are vendor contracts, equity stakes, subsidiary formations or advisory engagements, and several are repeated across filings. The Coinsquare stake alone appears in claims 15522, 15545, 15512, 15473, 15295, 14975 and 14957, and Tess and Digital Green recur the same way. That repetition makes the list look denser than the commercial substance behind it. The 2004-era biotech claims show the contingent language most clearly. Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 applies only 'once the product is fully developed' (21094), so it is a framework right, not a revenue contract. The '30 products' sold to diagnostic manufacturers (21102) names no buyer. The 2012 exclusive IP license went to an unidentified 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049), which is the clearest case of an unnamed counterparty. The 2018 pivot produced signed, named agreements, but with suppliers rather than customers. Coinsquare's software license (15417), Shift Markets' exchange platform (15367, 15347) and Synapse/Evolve banking services (15376, 15346) all supported a planned RiotX exchange. Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (15138). Bitmain (14725, 13261) and ESS Metron, which is called a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161), are also suppliers. The power purchase agreement at Whinstone omits the energy supplier's name (14254). Coinmint was a named, signed co-location contract (14938, 14822, 14748). It had degraded to month-to-month by 2022 (14275, 14253) and was then exited (13864). Riot was the paying party there, not the customer. The only named revenue-side customer in the record is Rhodium, identified as Riot's 'largest hosting customer' (13863). That signals meaningful hosting concentration in a single counterparty, but the record gives no share of revenue, contract term or pricing. Over time, concentration has moved from contingent licensees (2004–2012), to zero external customers during the exchange build-out (2018–2019), to self-mining plus one dominant named hosting client (2022). The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of these claims discloses dollar revenue tied to any counterparty, Rhodium included. The $480 million Bitmain commitment (13261) is a capital outlay, not income. The input is also cut off at claim 12380 (a MicroBT agreement), so later disclosures could not be assessed. Readers should get Rhodium's revenue share and contract terms from the segment notes before treating hosting as diversified.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-08Riot's record contains almost no signed agreements in which Riot is the seller, so its partnership history should not be read as a customer list. Most named counterparties appear in one of three roles. Some are investees: Coinsquare at 12.9% falling to 11.7% (15545, 14957), Tess at 52% diluted to 8.8% (15547, 14959), and Verady at 3.2% (14958). Others are vendors to Riot: Coinsquare's software license (15417), Shift Markets (15367, 15347), Synapse and Evolve Bank (15376, 15346), Bitmain's $480 million in miner purchase orders (14725, 13261), and ESS Metron (14160, 14161). The rest are advisers, namely XMS Capital (14997) and Marcum (13887). These deals are mostly definitive, executed contracts rather than MOU or LOI language. Even so, at least one did not last: Synapse was terminated within a year (15138), and the RiotX exchange it supported does not reappear in the record. The Coinmint co-location arrangement (14938, 14748) also casts Riot as the customer. It became month-to-month (14253) and was then wound down (13864).
The record does contain identification gaps. ESS Metron is labelled a key strategic partner (14160) without disclosed economics. The Whinstone power purchase agreement (14254) names no supplier. The 2012 exclusive license (21049) went to an unnamed animal health company, with consideration limited to contingent milestones and royalties. The 2004 Merial arrangement (21094) was itself conditional, since distribution rights applied only once SurBred 15 was fully developed. The university licenses (21095) were inbound rights rather than sales.
Counterparty concentration has moved from diffuse to singular. In 2004 the company described more than 30 products sold to unnamed diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (21102). By 2022 the only named revenue customer on record is Rhodium, disclosed as the largest hosting customer (13863). That is a meaningful concentration flag, because no share of hosting revenue or contract term is given.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the cited claims discloses a revenue figure, a contract value on the sell side, or a customer revenue percentage. The only dollar amount, the $480 million Bitmain commitment (13261), is capital expenditure rather than revenue. The claim list also breaks off at 12380, an apparent MicroBT agreement from June 2023. Later customer or hosting disclosures, including whether Rhodium remained a customer, are therefore outside this read and should be checked before any conclusion about current concentration.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-07Riot's customer and partnership record shows little signed revenue-generating customer business, and the counterparties it names are mostly suppliers, vendors, investees or hosts rather than buyers. The 2004 biotech-era disclosures name Merial, but those rights take effect only "once the product is fully developed" (21094), so they are a contingent distribution commitment rather than a revenue contract. The claim of "more than 30 products" sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyer (21102). The 2012 exclusive license of all animal-health IP went to an unnamed "animal health company" in exchange for milestones and royalties (21049), and no counterparty is ever identified on the record.
The 2018 to 2020 pivot is mostly equity stakes rather than customer relationships: Tess at 52%, later 8.8%, Coinsquare at 12.9%, later 11.7%, and Verady at 3.2% (15524, 15522, 14957, 14958, 14959). These recur across many near-duplicate claim ids, which inflates the apparent density of relationships. The agreements that were actually signed are named, but they are inbound vendor arrangements: the Coinsquare software license (15417), Synapse (15376, 15346) and Shift Markets (15367, 15347). The Synapse master services agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15138).
In the mining era, Riot was itself the customer. Coinmint hosted Riot's miners under a co-location agreement (14938) that became month-to-month (14253) and was then being ended (13864). Bitmain is a named supplier under purchase orders totaling $480 million (14725, 13261). ESS Metron is labeled a "key strategic partner" (14160) without contract economics, and the long-term power purchase agreement's "energy supplier" is not named (14254).
The only named revenue customer on the record is Rhodium, described as the "largest hosting customer" (13863). Concentration has therefore moved from zero identified buyers to a single disclosed hosting client, and the record gives no share of revenue or contract term for Rhodium.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record because no revenue, backlog or customer-percentage figures are disclosed alongside any of the deals. The record supplied also breaks off mid-entry at claim 12380 (a MicroBT agreement), so later disclosures are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-07Riot's record is better read as a sequence of reinventions than a customer book, and most entries are not customer agreements at all. The biotech era (as AspenBio/Venaxis) offers one named commercial counterparty, Merial, whose exclusive worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 applied only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094). That is a contingent marketing arrangement, not signed revenue. The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unnamed "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049), and the claim of 30-plus products sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyers (claim 21102). The university arrangements (claim 21095) are inbound licenses, not customers.
The 2018 pivot produced mostly equity positions and subsidiary formations rather than commercial contracts. The Coinsquare stake, 12.9% falling to 11.7% (claims 15522, 14957), the Tess/TessPay holding diluted from 52% to 8.8% (claims 15547, 14959), Verady at 3.2% (claim 14958), and Digital Green Energy Corp (claims 15515, 15455) generate no customer revenue. The definitive agreements of that period, with Coinsquare (claim 15417), Synapse/Evolve (claims 15376, 15346), and Shift Markets (claim 15347), were vendor and infrastructure contracts for a planned exchange. The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). XMS Capital (claim 14997) and Marcum (claim 13887) are advisers and auditors.
In the mining era Riot is again chiefly the buyer. The Coinmint co-location agreement (claims 14938, 14748) became month-to-month (claim 14253) and was then ended (claim 13864). The $480 million Bitmain purchase orders for 82,500 miners (claims 14725, 13261) are capital commitments, not sales. ESS Metron is labeled a "key strategic partner" (claims 14160, 14161) without disclosed contract terms, and the Whinstone power purchase agreement identifies its counterparty only as "our energy supplier" (claim 14254). The only identified revenue-side counterparty in the mining record is Rhodium, named as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). That implies hosting concentration in a single named miner, but its revenue share is not quantified here.
No revenue figures appear in the claims provided, so the announced deals cannot be reconciled against reported revenue. The supplied record also truncates at claim 12380, a 2023 MicroBT item, so later customer and contract developments are not assessed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-06Riot's record contains very few true customer agreements. Most named counterparties are vendors, service providers, or equity investees, not buyers of Riot's output. The pre-blockchain era shows real but limited naming. License arrangements with three identified universities (claim 21095) and Merial's exclusive SurBred 15 distribution right (21094) are named. The Merial right, however, was contingent on the product being 'fully developed,' which is closer to a forward commitment than a revenue-bearing contract. The 2012 exclusive animal-health license (21049) went to an unidentified 'animal health company,' and the 30-plus products marketed to diagnostic manufacturers (21102) name no buyers. The 2018 pivot produced several signed, named agreements, but all of them ran from Riot outward as purchaser or licensee: the Coinsquare software licensing agreement (15417), the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346), and the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347). The Synapse agreement was terminated by mutual consent within a year (15138). The repeated Coinsquare, Tess, Verady and Digital Green entries (15522, 15512, 15545, 14957, 14958, 14959, 15515) are ownership disclosures, not commercial relationships. Tess also shrank from roughly 52% (15547) to 8.8% (14977). XMS (14997) and Marcum (13887) are advisers. In the mining era, the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14822, 14748) and the Bitmain purchase commitments (14725, 13261) are signed and named. Both are again supply-side. Coinmint degraded to month-to-month (14275, 14253) before Riot ended it (13864). ESS Metron is labelled a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161) without disclosed contract terms. The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no supplier (14254). The only named revenue customer anywhere in the record is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (13863). That points to material, though unquantified, hosting concentration in a single counterparty. Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No revenue, backlog, or customer-share figures are disclosed alongside any claim. The one large dollar figure, $480 million for 82,500 Bitmain miners (13261), is capital expenditure rather than revenue. The record also cuts off mid-entry at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so later supply or hosting agreements could not be assessed. Readers should treat Riot's partnership history as a vendor and investment ledger, with one named hosting customer, rather than evidence of a diversified contracted customer base.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-06Riot's record contains very few signed agreements under which a named counterparty pays the company. Most entries are equity stakes, vendor contracts or advisory engagements, and the clearest customer disclosure, Rhodium as the largest hosting customer, comes with no revenue figure attached (13863). The ledger runs through two unrelated businesses. The 2004 animal-health disclosures name counterparties precisely: license arrangements with the University of Idaho, the University of Wyoming and Washington University (21095), and Merial's exclusive worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15. That right applied only once the product was fully developed, so it was contingent rather than revenue-bearing (21094). By 2012 the exit license went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (21049), and the claim of more than 30 products sold to diagnostic makers names no buyer (21102).
The 2018 pivot is mostly ownership, not commerce. The roughly 52% Tess stake and the 12.9% Coinsquare stake are restated across at least seven claims (15514, 15522, 15524, 15545 and others). Those stakes later diluted to 8.8% and 11.7% (14959, 14957), and Verady appears at 3.2% (14958). None of this is customer revenue. The definitive agreements of that period were real but short-lived or inbound. The Coinsquare software license (15417) and the Shift Markets master services agreement (15347) supplied platforms to Riot. The Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15346) was mutually terminated within a year (15138).
In the mining era Riot is usually the buyer. Coinmint hosted Riot's machines (14938), slid to month-to-month terms (14275) and was then ended (13864). Bitmain is a supplier, with $480 million of purchase orders for 82,500 miners (14725, 13261). ESS Metron is labelled a "key strategic partner" (14160) but is described as a source of components and engineering (14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement leaves the energy supplier unnamed (14254). XMS (14997) and Marcum (13887) are advisers and auditors.
Counterparty concentration has therefore moved from named licensors and a contingent distributor, through equity holdings, to a single named hosting customer. Rhodium is the only identified revenue counterparty in the crypto era, and its share of hosting or total revenue is not on record. The supplied claims contain no revenue figures, so the deal list cannot be reconciled against reported revenue. A diligence reader should get Rhodium's contract terms and revenue concentration from the filings directly. The record provided ends mid-entry at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so later supplier or customer disclosures are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-05Riot's record contains few signed customer agreements in the strict sense. Most named counterparties are suppliers, service vendors, advisers or equity investees, and one ambiguous pre-pivot license names no customer at all. In the biotech era, Merial's worldwide rights to SurBred 15 (21094) were contractual but applied only once the product was 'fully developed', so they were contingent rather than revenue-bearing. The three university licenses (21095) were inbound IP arrangements. The 2012 exclusive animal-health license (21049) was signed but described only as 'an animal health company', with milestones and royalties left unquantified. The '30 products' sold to diagnostic manufacturers (21102) names no buyer.
The 2018 crypto pivot produced a cluster of named, executed documents, but almost none put Riot in the seller's seat. Coinsquare appears repeatedly as an equity holding (15545, 15522, 15512, 14957). The Software Licensing and Services Agreement (15417) has Riot licensing technology in, not out. The same applies to Shift Markets (15367, 15347) and Synapse/Evolve (15376, 15346), and the Synapse MSA was mutually terminated within a year (15138). Tess and Verady are minority or majority investments (15547, 14959, 14976), and XMS (14997) is an advisory engagement. Duplicate claim entries inflate the apparent volume of activity.
In the mining phase, the pattern is the same. Coinmint was a co-location vendor (14938). It degraded to month-to-month by 2022 (14253) and was then exited (13864). Bitmain is a supplier, with $480 million of purchase orders for 82,500 miners (13261, 14725). The Whinstone power purchase agreement (14254) leaves the energy supplier unnamed. ESS Metron carries the 'key strategic partner' label (14160) with no disclosed contract terms.
The only identified revenue counterparty on record is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (13863). Customer-side concentration has therefore moved from diffuse, anonymous diagnostic buyers to apparent dependence on a single named hosting client. Its revenue share is not stated in these claims.
Revenue reconciliation cannot be performed from this record. No claim discloses revenue, contract value or Rhodium's contribution. The one large dollar figure (13261) is a capital outflow, not inbound revenue. The claim list is also truncated at 12380 (MicroBT, 2023-06-29), so later hosting or offtake disclosures are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-05Riot's record contains very few customer contracts. Most of the named agreements are supplier, vendor, investment or advisory relationships, and only one counterparty is identified as a paying customer of Riot's core business. That is Rhodium, described in 2022 as the company's "largest hosting customer" (13863). No share of revenue, contract term or pricing is given. The biotech-era filings follow the same pattern. Merial held exclusive worldwide distribution rights to SurBred 15 "once the product is fully developed" (21094), which is a contingent right, not a revenue contract. The three university licenses (21095) are in-licenses. The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP went to an unnamed "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (21049). The more than 30 products sold to diagnostic manufacturers (21102) have no named buyer.
The 2018 pivot produced signed, named documents, but Riot was the buyer in each. Coinsquare licensed software to RiotX (15417). Synapse and Evolve Bank provided banking rails (15376, 15346), and that agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15138). Shift Markets supplied an exchange platform under a master services agreement (15347, 15367). The repeated Coinsquare, Tess and Verady entries (15545, 15522, 15512, 14957, 14958, 14959) are minority or majority equity stakes, not commercial counterparties. Digital Green Energy (15525, 15455) is a subsidiary. XMS Capital (14997) is an advisor and Marcum (13887) is the auditor.
In the mining era, Riot's counterparty concentration ran first toward Coinmint, the host for all of Riot's miners (14938, 14822, 14748). That agreement decayed to month-to-month (14253, 14275) and was then terminated as part of vertical integration (13864). Supply concentration sits with Bitmain: a long-term purchase agreement (14725) and $480 million of orders for 82,500 machines (13261). ESS Metron is named but labeled a "key strategic partner" (14160, 14161), which describes a component supplier rather than a customer. The Whinstone power purchase agreement (14254) leaves the energy supplier unidentified.
Revenue cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims discloses contract values, hosting revenue or the share attributable to Rhodium, so there is nothing to test against reported totals. The one hard dollar figure, Bitmain's $480 million, is a capital outflow. The claim list is also truncated at 12380, so any later agreements fall outside this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-03Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of the named relationships are vendor contracts, equity stakes, or licenses. The pre-2017 biotech period yields one conditional distribution right: Merial holds exclusive worldwide marketing rights to SurBred 15 only once the product is fully developed (claim 21094). It also yields university in-licenses (claim 21095) and a generic reference to more than 30 products sold to unnamed kit makers (claim 21102). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license is signed, but the licensee is described only as 'an animal health company,' with no milestone or royalty values given (claim 21049). The 2018 pivot introduced equity positions rather than customers. Riot held about 52% of Tess (claim 15524), later diluted to 8.8% (claim 14977). Its Coinsquare stake moved from 12.9% to 11.7% (claims 15512, 14957), and it held 3.2% of Verady (claim 14976). The RiotX exchange build rested on named, signed inbound service agreements with Coinsquare (claim 15417), Synapse (claims 15376, 15346) and Shift Markets (claims 15367, 15347). Riot was the buyer in all of these, and the Synapse contract was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The mining era follows the same pattern. Coinmint began as a signed co-location agreement (claim 14938), slid to month-to-month (claim 14253) and was then exited (claim 13864). Bitmain is a $480 million purchase commitment for 82,500 miners (claims 14725, 13261), which is capital outlay, not revenue. ESS Metron is labelled a 'key strategic partner' but functions as a supplier (claims 14160, 14161). The long-term power purchase agreement is signed, but the counterparty is identified only as 'our energy supplier' (claim 14254). The only named revenue-side counterparty in the period is Rhodium, disclosed in mid-2022 as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). That makes Rhodium the clearest concentration exposure, but no share of revenue, contract term or pricing accompanies the disclosure. As a result, no revenue arithmetic can be reconciled against the announced deals. The record offers headcounts of products and miners, ownership percentages and purchase obligations, but no hosting or licensing revenue figure tied to a named contract. The record as supplied breaks off mid-entry at claim 12380, a 2023 MicroBT item, so later customer disclosures are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-03Riot's record of named relationships is long, but very few of the entries describe a customer paying Riot for a product or service. Most are equity stakes, in-licenses, vendor contracts or advisory engagements. Only one revenue counterparty is clearly identified: Rhodium, described in 2022 as "our largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). The biotech-era entries mix the conditional with the anonymous. Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 applies only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094), so it is a contingent arrangement, not a revenue contract. The company says it sold more than 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers, but none are named (claim 21102). The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). The three university licenses are named (claim 21095), but they run inbound to Riot. The 2018 blockchain pivot produced named, signed agreements: a Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), Synapse/Evolve banking services (claims 15376, 15346) and a Shift Markets master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347). In all of these Riot was the buyer or licensee, and the Synapse agreement was terminated by mutual consent within a year (claim 15138). Digital Green Energy names no counterparty at all (claims 15525, 15455). The ownership disclosures, repeated across several filings, show positions shrinking. Tess fell from about 52% (claim 15524) to 8.8% (claim 14977), and Coinsquare edged down from 12.9% (claim 15512) to 11.7% (claim 14957). These stakes are not commercial relationships. In the mining era the named counterparties are again suppliers. The Coinmint hosting agreement (claim 14938) became month-to-month (claim 14253) and was then ended (claim 13864). Bitmain's purchase orders total $480 million for 82,500 miners, roughly $5,800 per unit (claim 13261). The Whinstone power supplier is unnamed (claim 14254), and ESS Metron is labelled a "key strategic partner" with no disclosed contract terms (claim 14160). Concentration has therefore moved from many small, unnamed diagnostics buyers to a hosting business anchored by a single named customer whose revenue share is not disclosed. The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim ties a dollar figure to any customer contract, and the only quantified deal, Bitmain, is capital spending. The record provided is also cut off at claim 12380 (MicroBT, 2023-06-29), so later agreements were not assessed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-03Riot's record of named relationships contains very few signed customer agreements. Most entries describe equity stakes, vendor contracts, advisory engagements, or arrangements in which Riot is the buyer. The genuine customer-side disclosures are thin. In the biotech era, the company said it marketed more than 30 products to unnamed diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (21102). Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 depended on a product that was not yet fully developed (21094). The 2012 animal-health license went to a counterparty described only as 'an animal health company,' paid through milestones and royalties (21049). In the mining era, the only named customer is Rhodium, called the 'largest hosting customer' (13863), with no contract term, capacity, or pricing disclosed.
The crypto-pivot filings repeat several holdings many times, which inflates the appearance of activity. Coinsquare appears in 15522, 15545, 15512, 15473, 15295, 14975 and 14957. Tess appears in 15514, 15547, 15524, 14977 and 14959. These are investments, not commercial relationships, and the Tess stake fell from roughly 52% to 8.8%. The definitive RiotX agreements were also supply-side: the Coinsquare software license (15417), the Shift Markets platform agreement (15367, 15347), and the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15138).
In the mining period, Riot is mostly the customer. It bought hosting from Coinmint (14938, 14822, 14748), which was downgraded to month-to-month (14253, 14275) and then ended (13864). It placed orders with Bitmain (14725), including $480 million for 82,500 miners (13261). ESS Metron, labelled a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161), is a component supplier. The power purchase agreement names no counterparty (14254). XMS (14997) and Marcum (13887) are service engagements.
Counterparty concentration has therefore moved from diffuse, unnamed reagent buyers to an apparent dependence on Rhodium for hosting revenue. That dependence cannot be sized from the record. Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled because no claim discloses customer revenue, contract value, or hosting rates. The only dollar figure, Bitmain's $480 million, is capital spending. The supplied record is cut off at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so later agreements were not assessed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-02Riot's record of named counterparties is long, but very few of them are customers in the commercial-diligence sense. Most of the announced agreements run the other way, with Riot as the buyer, licensee, or investor, and the record contains almost no revenue-side contracts that can be tested.
The 2004-era biotech disclosures mix executed and contingent language. The Merial worldwide marketing and distribution right for SurBred 15 applies only once the product is fully developed, so it is a conditional commitment rather than a revenue contract (claim 21094). The university licenses are in-licensed IP, not sales (claim 21095). The "more than 30 products" sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyers (claim 21102). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties, so the counterparty cannot be verified (claim 21049).
The 2018-2019 blockchain pivot produced mostly equity stakes. Riot held 12.9%, later 11.7%, of Coinsquare, 52% and later 8.8% of Tess, and 3.2% of Verady (claims 15545, 15524, 14975, 14977, 14976). The definitive agreements from this period were inputs to the planned RiotX exchange: a Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), Shift Markets master services (claims 15367, 15347), and a Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was terminated by mutual consent within a year (claim 15138), so a "material definitive agreement" was not durable.
In the mining era, the named counterparties are again suppliers. Coinmint was Riot's co-location host (claims 14938, 14748). That relationship moved to month-to-month and was then ended (claims 14275, 13864). Bitmain supplied roughly $480 million of ASIC miners (claims 14725, 13261). ESS Metron, labeled a "key strategic partner," is an equipment and engineering vendor (claims 14160, 14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement does not identify the energy supplier (claim 14254). The only named revenue-side customer in the entire record is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). The record discloses no contract value, term, or share of revenue for Rhodium.
Customer concentration therefore runs from unnamed diagnostics buyers, to an unnamed licensee, to a single named hosting customer. That points to high and poorly disclosed dependence on Rhodium. Supplier concentration on Bitmain is the clearer documented exposure.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims states a revenue figure, contract value on the sell side, or customer-level breakdown against which the announced deals could be checked. Self-mining revenue also has no counterparty at all. The claim set provided ends mid-entry at a MicroBT item (claim 12380), so any later customer disclosures are not reflected here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-02Riot's record of counterparty claims contains very few signed customer agreements. Most of what appears are equity stakes, vendor contracts and supply arrangements in which Riot is the buyer, not the seller. The one revenue-side counterparty named outright is Rhodium, described in 2022 as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No contract terms, duration or revenue share are attached to that statement in this record.
The pre-crypto history shows the same mix of hard and soft language. License arrangements with the Universities of Idaho and Wyoming and Washington University are named and current (claim 21095). Merial's worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 depended on the product being 'fully developed' (claim 21094), so it was a contingent right, not a sale. The 2012 exclusive license went to an unidentified 'animal health company' in exchange for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). Neither the counterparty nor the payment amounts were disclosed.
The 2018 pivot produced named but non-customer relationships. Coinsquare and Tess are ownership positions (claims 15522, 15524). They recur across at least five duplicate filings (claims 15512, 15545, 15473, 15295, 15514), which inflates their apparent weight. The Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15376, 15346) and Shift Markets platform MSA (claims 15367, 15347) were signed inputs for a planned exchange. Synapse was mutually terminated in 2019 (claim 15138).
In mining, Riot is again the customer. The Coinmint co-location agreement (claim 14938) became month-to-month by 2022 (claim 14275) and was then ended (claim 13864). Bitmain purchase orders total $480 million for 82,500 miners (claim 13261), roughly $5,800 per unit, which is internally consistent. ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160) but functions as a component and engineering supplier (claim 14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no counterparty (claim 14254).
Counterparty concentration has shifted. Through 2021 it ran across supply-side dependencies on Coinmint and Bitmain. From 2022 the revenue side became concentrated in a single disclosed hosting customer, Rhodium. No other hosting customers are named.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No hosting revenue, royalty receipts or customer-level amounts are disclosed against any named deal. The input also cuts off mid-entry at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so any later agreements are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-01Riot's record of named counterparties is long, but very few are customers in the revenue sense. Most of the signed agreements make Riot the buyer, licensee or investor, and the one disclosed revenue-side relationship comes late and stands alone. In the diagnostics-era filings, the 'more than 30 products' sold to test-kit makers names no buyers (21102). Merial's exclusive SurBred 15 distribution right applies only 'once the product is fully developed' (21094), so it is a contingent channel, not a sale. The university arrangements are inbound licenses (21095). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to an unidentified 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049), which is unnamed and back-end-loaded. The 2018 pivot produced equity positions rather than customers. Tess fell from roughly 52% (15514, 15524, 15547, which are duplicates) to 8.8% (14959, 14977). Coinsquare slid from 12.9% (15522) to 11.7% (14975), and the Verady stake was 3.2% (14976). Digital Green Energy was only 'seeking to identify' projects (15455, 15525). The signed Coinsquare software license (15417), Synapse agreement (15376, 15346) and Shift Markets master services agreement (15347, 15367) were vendor inputs to a planned exchange, and Synapse was terminated within a year (15138). In the mining phase, Coinmint was Riot's host, not its customer. That relationship moved from a signed co-location agreement (14938) to month-to-month (14275) and then to exit (13864). Bitmain is a supplier, with $480 million in purchase orders for 82,500 miners (13261, 14725). ESS Metron is described as a 'key strategic partner' (14160) but functions as a supplier (14161). The long-term power purchase agreement names no energy supplier (14254). XMS (14997) and Marcum (13887) are advisers. The first named revenue counterparty is Rhodium, identified as the 'largest hosting customer' (13863). That makes the disclosed customer base effectively one name, and hosting-revenue concentration in Rhodium is likely high but unquantified here. On revenue arithmetic, none of these claims supplies contract values, hosting rates or revenue figures that could be tied to Rhodium or any other customer, so the deals cannot be reconciled to reported revenue from this record. The supplied claim list also cuts off at claim 12380, a MicroBT entry, so later counterparties are not assessed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-10-01Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most entries are vendor contracts, adviser engagements or equity stakes, and the one named revenue counterparty appears without any quantification. In the crypto era, the definitive agreements are mostly ones where Riot is the buyer. These include the Coinsquare software licence for RiotX (15417), the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346), the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347), the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14822, 14748) and the Bitmain long-term purchase agreement, later quantified as $480 million for 82,500 miners (14725, 13261). That Bitmain figure is capital expenditure, not revenue. Several of these relationships later lapsed. Synapse was mutually terminated (15138), and Coinmint moved to month-to-month (14275, 14253) before Riot said it was ending the relationship (13864). The RiotX exchange that the Coinsquare, Synapse and Shift agreements were meant to support does not reappear as a revenue line anywhere in the record. Repeated Coinsquare, Tess and Verady entries (15512, 15545, 15522, 14957, 14958, 14959) describe minority or majority shareholdings rather than commercial contracts. The Tess stake fell from about 52% to 8.8%, and the Coinsquare stake from 12.9% to 11.7%. XMS Capital (14997) and Marcum (13887) are advisers. Some counterparties are unidentified or loosely described. The 2012 exclusive licence went to an unnamed 'animal health company' in exchange for milestones and royalties (21049). The Whinstone power purchase agreement is with an unnamed 'energy supplier' (14254). ESS Metron is named but labelled only a 'key strategic partner', with no contract terms disclosed (14160, 14161). The 2004 Merial distribution right was contingent on SurBred 15 being 'fully developed' (21094). The only named revenue-side customer is Rhodium, described in 2022 as the 'largest hosting customer' (13863). No percentage of revenue, contract term or pricing is attached. Concentration has shifted from a diffuse diagnostics catalogue of more than 30 products (21102) to a hosting business whose dominant customer is named but unsized. Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record because none of the claims disclose revenue, hosting fees or customer share. The supplied list also breaks off at claim 12380 (a mid-2023 MicroBT item), so later disclosures, including any changes to the Rhodium relationship, are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-30Across two decades of disclosures, Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements; most are investments, supplier contracts, or contingent rights. In the biotech era, the Merial arrangement (claim 21094) granted distribution rights only "once the product is fully developed," so it was a contingent right, not a sale. The university arrangements (claim 21095) are in-licenses running toward the company. The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health IP (claim 21049) went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties, and the claim of more than 30 products sold to test-kit makers (claim 21102) names no buyer. After the 2018 pivot, the record fills with equity positions rather than customers: Coinsquare at 12.9% falling to 11.7% (claims 15522, 14957), Tess at 52% collapsing to 8.8% (claims 15524, 14977), and Verady at 3.2% (claim 14958). Several of these claims are duplicates (15512, 15545, 15547, 15514) and should not be counted as separate relationships. Digital Green Energy (claims 15515, 15455) is a subsidiary "seeking to identify" projects, with no counterparty at all. The named RiotX-era agreements with Coinsquare (claim 15417), Synapse (claims 15376, 15346) and Shift Markets (claims 15367, 15347) are vendor contracts in which Riot was the buyer. Synapse was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138). The same pattern holds in the mining period. Coinmint (claims 14938, 14822) was a hosting provider to Riot; it degraded to month-to-month (claim 14275) and was then exited (claim 13864). Bitmain (claims 14725, 13261) and ESS Metron, styled a "key strategic partner" (claims 14160, 14161), are suppliers. The long-term power agreement (claim 14254) names no energy supplier. The only named revenue-paying customer in the entire record is Rhodium, disclosed as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863), and no share of revenue is attached to it. Concentration has therefore shifted from diffuse, unnamed diagnostics buyers to apparent single-customer dependence in hosting, but its magnitude cannot be measured from these claims. On revenue arithmetic, the record discloses no revenue figures to reconcile against. The only hard number is capital spending: $480 million for 82,500 miners (claim 13261), or roughly $5,800 per unit, which is internally consistent but says nothing about customer income. The claim list as supplied ends mid-entry at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so any later counterparties are outside this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-30Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements. Most entries are equity stakes, supplier contracts, advisory engagements, or duplicate restatements of the same fact. The only counterparty the company names as a revenue-generating customer is Rhodium, described in 2022 as "our largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). The filing gives no share of revenue, contract term, or pricing to go with that label. Before 2018, as a life-sciences business, Riot named Merial as exclusive distributor of SurBred 15, but only "once the product is fully developed" (claim 21094), so that right was contingent. It also named in-licensing arrangements with three universities (claim 21095), which are inbound IP rather than customers. Its 2012 outbound license went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties (claim 21049). Its diagnostics customers were described only as a category (claim 21102). After the 2018 pivot, the named agreements are real but mostly run the wrong direction for customer diligence. Coinsquare licensed software to RiotX (claim 15417). Synapse and Shift Markets were vendors for a planned exchange (claims 15376, 15346, 15367, 15347), and Synapse was terminated within a year (claim 15138). Coinmint was a host for Riot's own miners (claims 14938, 14822, 14748). That arrangement slid to month-to-month (claim 14275) and was then ended (claim 13864). Bitmain (claims 14725, 13261) and ESS Metron, called a "key strategic partner" (claims 14160, 14161), are suppliers. The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no counterparty beyond "our energy supplier" (claim 14254). The Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady entries (claims 15522, 15524, 14957, 14958, 14977) are minority or majority equity positions, and several are duplicated across claim ids. Tess fell from about 52% to 8.8% and Coinsquare from 12.9% to 11.7%. Concentration has therefore moved from a diffuse, unnamed diagnostics customer base to a hosting business whose only identified customer is Rhodium. The record does not quantify how dependent Riot is on that one name. The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record, because no claim discloses revenue attributable to any named counterparty. The one hard number is the $480 million Bitmain purchase for 82,500 miners, which implies roughly $5,800 per unit (claim 13261). That figure is capital expenditure, not revenue. The claim list provided was cut off at claim 12380 (MicroBT), so any later customer disclosures are outside this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-29Riot's record of named relationships is long, but very few of them are customers. Most of the claims describe vendors, licensors, advisors, hosts or equity stakes, and the customer list is thin at every stage of the company's history.
In the biotech era, the firmest commercial tie was Merial's exclusive worldwide right to market SurBred 15. That right was conditioned on the product being "fully developed," so it was a forward distribution arrangement, not booked demand (21094). The three university license arrangements are inbound IP, not sales (21095). The claim of "more than 30 products" sold to diagnostic manufacturers names no buyer (21102). The 2012 exclusive license of all animal-health IP went to an unidentified "animal health company" for milestones and royalties, so the counterparty cannot be verified (21049).
The 2018 crypto pivot produced several signed agreements, but Riot was the buyer in all of them. It licensed exchange software from Coinsquare (15417), bought a platform from Shift Markets under a master services agreement (15367, 15347), and contracted banking rails through Synapse and Evolve (15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated a year later (15138). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady claims are minority or majority equity positions, not commercial contracts (15512, 15514, 14975, 14976, 14977). The Tess stake fell from roughly 52% to 8.8%, and the Coinsquare stake fell from 12.9% to 11.7%. Digital Green Energy is an internal subsidiary with no named counterparty (15525), and XMS Capital was an advisory engagement (14997).
In mining, Coinmint was Riot's host, not its customer. That signed agreement moved to month-to-month terms (14253) and was then wound down under vertical integration (13864). Bitmain is a supplier: $480 million of purchase orders for 82,500 miners implies roughly $5,800 per unit of capex (13261, 14725). The power purchase agreement names no energy supplier (14254). ESS Metron is labeled a "key strategic partner" but functions as an equipment and engineering vendor (14160, 14161).
The only named revenue counterparty in the record is Rhodium, described as the "largest hosting customer" (13863). Hosting revenue is therefore concentrated in a single named party, and no other hosting customer is identified.
Notably, the record contains no MOU, LOI or "discussions" language. The risk is not soft deal framing but misclassification: supplier, licensor and equity relationships sit alongside customer claims under the same heading. None of the claims disclose revenue figures, so the announced deals cannot be reconciled against reported revenue from this record. The claim list is truncated after 12380 (MicroBT), so later relationships are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-29Riot's claim record contains almost no MOU, LOI or 'discussions' language, but most of its signed agreements are not customer agreements. The early biotech-era record names real counterparties: Merial holds exclusive worldwide rights to SurBred 15 (21094), but only 'once the product is fully developed', which makes it a contingent distribution right rather than revenue. The university licenses (21095) are in-licenses. The 2012 exclusive out-license of animal-health IP went to an unnamed 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049), and the 'more than 30 products' sold to diagnostic manufacturers (21102) come with no customer identified.
The 2018-2019 crypto pivot is mostly equity stakes and vendor contracts. Coinsquare (15512, 14975), Tess/TessPay (15514, 14977) and Verady (14976) are minority or majority holdings, and Tess falls from roughly 52% to 8.8% between filings. The Coinsquare software license (15417), the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347) and the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346) are signed and named, but Riot is the buyer in each. The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15138). XMS Capital (14997) is an advisor, Marcum (13887) is the auditor, and Digital Green (15525) is a subsidiary. None of these is a customer.
In the mining era the counterparties are again mostly suppliers. Coinmint hosted Riot's miners (14938, 14748), was later described as month-to-month (14253), and the relationship was then ended (13864). Bitmain supplied $480 million of purchase orders covering 82,500 ASICs (14725, 13261), which is capital spending, not revenue. ESS Metron is called a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161) without disclosed contract terms, and the long-term power purchase agreement is with an unnamed 'energy supplier' (14254). The only downstream customer the record names is Rhodium, described as the 'largest hosting customer' (13863), with no share of revenue, contract term or pricing given. On the customer side, concentration has moved from a single contingent distributor, Merial, to a single named hosting client, Rhodium, whose weight cannot be measured from the record.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled because the claims disclose no revenue figures, customer percentages or contract values on the sell side. The only large dollar figure, Bitmain's (13261), is a cost. Readers should also note that the record supplied here is cut off partway through claim 12380, which concerns MicroBT. Any later hosting contracts, power-credit arrangements or customer disclosures are therefore not assessed in this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-29Riot's record of counterparty claims is less a customer history than a list of vendors, investees and service providers, and very few of them are revenue-generating customers. The only named buyer of Riot's output in the mining era is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (13863). No contract value, term or share of revenue is attached to that disclosure. The legacy biotech period has a similar gap. Merial held exclusive distribution rights for a product that was not yet fully developed (21094). The 2012 exclusive license went to an unidentified 'animal health company' for milestones and royalties (21049), and the counterparty was never named in the record.
Most signed agreements run the other way, with Riot as the buyer. These include the Coinsquare software license (15417), the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347), the Synapse banking agreement (15376, 15346), the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14822), and the Bitmain long-term purchase agreement (14725, 13261). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15138), and the exchange it served was only ever described as 'planned' (15347). Coinmint started as a fixed agreement, became month-to-month (14253), and was then being wound down (13864). ESS Metron is named but framed as a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161), which is characterization language, not a customer tie. The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no energy supplier (14254). The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady equity stakes (15512, 15514, 14975, 14976) are investments, not customers. The Tess stake fell from 52% to 8.8% (15524, 14977). Several claims appear more than once, and the advisory and audit engagements (14997, 13887) should not be read as commercial traction. The record contains no MOU or LOI language as such; the softer wording shows up as 'seeking to identify' (15525) and 'planned'.
On concentration, the pattern has moved from more than 30 unnamed diagnostic buyers (21102) to a single named hosting customer (13863). That points to rising dependence on one customer, although no quantification is given.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record because no revenue figures are disclosed against any named deal. The only dollar figure is $480 million for 82,500 Bitmain miners (13261), which works out to about $5,800 per unit. That is capital spending on the supply side and says nothing about customer revenue. The claim list is also cut off at 12380 (MicroBT, June 2023), so any later disclosures on concentration or revenue fall outside this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-28Riot's record is long but thin on signed customer agreements. Most of the named relationships are supply contracts, vendor arrangements, or equity stakes, not revenue-bearing customer contracts. In the pre-crypto era the firmest customer-side item is Merial's exclusive worldwide marketing and distribution right to SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That right was expressly conditioned on the product being 'fully developed', which makes it contingent rather than a revenue commitment. The university license arrangements (claim 21095) are in-licenses of technology. The 2012 exclusive out-license for milestones and royalties (claim 21049) never names the 'animal health company' counterparty. The 'more than 30 products' sold to diagnostic manufacturers (claim 21102) comes with no named buyers.
The 2018 pivot adds many names that are not customers. Coinsquare, Tess/TessPay and Verady are minority or majority equity holdings (claims 15512, 15524, 14957, 14958, 14959). The Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (claims 15376, 15346) and the Shift Markets master services agreement (claim 15347) all put Riot in the buyer's seat for a planned exchange. The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138).
The same inversion holds in the mining era. Coinmint was Riot's hosting provider, not its customer (claim 14938). That arrangement fell to month-to-month terms (claim 14275) and was then wound down (claim 13864). Bitmain is a supplier, through a long-term purchase agreement and $480 million in orders for 82,500 miners (claims 14725, 13261). ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160) but functions as a component and engineering vendor (claim 14161). The power purchase agreement names only 'our energy supplier' (claim 14254). The Marcum and XMS engagements (claims 13887, 14997) are professional-services retentions.
On concentration, the record names exactly one third-party revenue counterparty in the modern business: Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No share of revenue, contract term or pricing is attached to that statement. Counterparty exposure has therefore shifted over time. It began as a single contingent distributor, moved through a cluster of short-lived fintech vendors, and now rests on one named hosting client alongside heavy supplier dependence on Bitmain.
On revenue arithmetic, no revenue, hosting-fee or royalty figures appear in these claims, so the disclosed deals cannot be reconciled to reported results from this record alone. The only dollar figure present, the Bitmain orders, is capital expenditure. The claim list is also truncated at claim 12380, a MicroBT agreement, so any later customer disclosures are not reflected here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-28Riot's record contains very few signed customer agreements in the conventional sense. Most of what reads as partnership activity is equity stakes, vendor contracts, or supply arrangements in which Riot is the buyer. The pre-2018 biotech era offers the clearest examples of named counterparties: license arrangements with three identified universities (claim 21095) and Merial's exclusive worldwide distribution right for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Even the Merial right was contingent on the product being 'fully developed', so it was conditional rather than revenue-bearing. By 2012 the one material commercial deal, an exclusive license of all animal-health IP for milestones and royalties, went to an unnamed 'animal health company' (claim 21049). The claim of more than 30 products sold to diagnostic makers (claim 21102) names no buyers at all. After the crypto pivot, the named relationships with Coinsquare, Tess and Verady are minority or majority equity positions, not customers (claims 15545, 15547, 14957, 14958, 14959). Those positions were diluted over time: Tess fell from roughly 52% to 8.8% and Coinsquare from 12.9% to 11.7%. The RiotX build-out produced signed but inbound service agreements with Coinsquare, Synapse and Shift (claims 15417, 15346, 15347). The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated within about a year (claim 15138), and the record shows no exchange revenue following from any of them. Coinmint was a co-location vendor to Riot (claim 14938) that degraded to a month-to-month arrangement (claim 14253) before being ended (claim 13864). Bitmain is a $480 million miner supplier (claims 14725, 13261). ESS Metron is labelled a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160), but the described role is component and engineering supply (claim 14161). The Whinstone power agreement's counterparty is described only as 'our energy supplier' (claim 14254). The only named revenue customer in the entire record is Rhodium, identified as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). That makes counterparty concentration on the revenue side a single disclosed name. Supplier concentration, by contrast, is heavy in Bitmain and, per a truncated entry, possibly MicroBT (claim 12380). The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim ties revenue or hosting-segment dollars to Rhodium or any other buyer, and no RiotX or licensing revenue is disclosed against the signed exchange agreements. Several claims are also duplicates of the same filing sentence. Diligence should obtain the Rhodium hosting contract terms, hosting revenue by customer, and the full text of claim 12380 and subsequent entries before any concentration conclusion is drawn.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-27Riot's record contains almost no signed revenue-customer agreements. Most entries describe suppliers, equity stakes, advisors or subsidiaries. The only named party that pays Riot for a service is Rhodium, disclosed in July 2022 as the company's "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That filing gives no contract terms, duration or revenue share. The AspenBio-era record has the same gap. It cites "more than 30 products" sold to diagnostic manufacturers without naming a buyer (claim 21102). Merial held forward-looking distribution rights for a product not yet "fully developed" (claim 21094). The 2012 exclusive animal-health license went to a counterparty described only as "an animal health company" and paid in milestones and royalties (claim 21049). That is the clearest instance of an unidentified partner in the file.
The 2018 crypto pivot added volume but not customers. Coinsquare, Tess and Verady are equity holdings (claims 15522, 15524, 14958). Several are repeated across claim ids (15512, 15545, 15547), which inflates the apparent partnership count. The stakes shrank over time: Tess fell from about 52% to 8.8% (claims 15524, 14977), and Coinsquare from 12.9% to 11.7% (claims 15522, 14957). The RiotX agreements with Coinsquare, Synapse and Shift Markets put Riot in the role of licensee or buyer of services for a planned exchange (claims 15417, 15376, 15347). The Synapse master services agreement was terminated by mutual consent in 2019 (claim 15138). Digital Green was a subsidiary still "seeking to identify" projects (claim 15455).
In the mining era, concentration shifted from Riot's revenue side to its supply side. Coinmint hosted Riot's machines (claim 14938). That arrangement had become month-to-month by 2022 (claim 14275) and was then ended (claim 13864). Bitmain is a vendor: $480 million in purchase orders for 82,500 miners, about $5,800 per unit (claim 13261). The power purchase agreement names no energy supplier (claim 14254). ESS Metron is labeled a "key strategic partner," but the text describes a component and engineering supplier (claims 14160, 14161). XMS Capital and Marcum are advisors, not partners (claims 14997, 13887).
Revenue cannot be reconciled with the announced deals from this record. No claim gives contract value, hosting revenue or a customer's share of sales. Rhodium's weight in hosting revenue is therefore asserted but not quantified. The input is truncated at claim 12380, a 2023 MicroBT entry, so later supply and customer disclosures are not assessed here.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-27Riot's disclosure record contains almost no signed customer agreements. Most of the dated claims are equity holdings, vendor contracts, or supply arrangements in which Riot is the buyer, and they should not be read as demand-side traction. The 2018 filings repeat the same three facts several times each: a 52% stake in Tess (claims 15547, 15524, 15514), a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (15512, 15522, 15545), and the formation of Digital Green Energy (15515, 15525, 15455). Those duplicates inflate the apparent count of relationships without adding a single revenue counterparty. The RiotX-era contracts with Coinsquare (15417), Synapse and Evolve Bank (15376, 15346), and Shift Markets (15367, 15347) were definitive agreements, but they were inbound licensing and services arrangements for an exchange that was never shown to launch. Synapse was terminated by mutual agreement in 2019 (15138). By 2020 the Tess stake had diluted to 8.8% (14959, 14977) and Coinsquare to 11.7% (14975).
The mining phase follows the same pattern. Riot was the customer under Coinmint's co-location agreement (14938, 14822, 14748). That agreement had moved to month-to-month terms by 2022 (14253, 14275) and was then exited (13864). Bitmain (14725, 13261) and MicroBT (12380) are suppliers. The MicroBT figure of 265,000 additional miners (11999, 11985, 11974) consists of purchase options, not firm commitments, and should not be treated as contracted volume.
On naming, the only identified revenue customer on record is Rhodium, described in 2022 as the largest hosting customer (13863). ESS Metron is called a "key strategic partner" (14160, 14161), but the claims describe it as a component and engineering supplier, not a buyer. The Whinstone power purchase agreement (14254) does not name the energy supplier.
Counterparty concentration has therefore moved from a portfolio of minority equity stakes, to a failed exchange vendor stack, to a mining model that relies heavily on one hardware supplier (MicroBT) and, on the hosting side, on a single named customer. The record gives no indication of how many other hosting customers exist.
Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims discloses a contract value, hosting rate, or revenue share tied to Rhodium or any other customer, and the $480 million Bitmain figure (13261) is capital expenditure, not revenue. The claim list also ends mid-quote at 11974, so any later announcements are outside the scope of this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-27Riot's record of counterparty disclosures contains almost no customer agreements in the conventional sense. Most items are equity stakes, vendor contracts, or procurement arrangements. The early filings describe minority and majority holdings rather than commercial relationships: roughly 12.9% of Coinsquare and 52% of Tess (claims 15512, 15522, 15524, 15547), later diluted to 11.7% and 8.8%, plus a 3.2% Verady position (claims 14957, 14959, 14958). The RiotX exchange push produced signed, named agreements with Coinsquare, Synapse and Shift Markets (claims 15417, 15376, 15367, 15347, 15346). In each of these Riot was the licensee or buyer of services, not the seller. The Synapse master services agreement was mutually terminated within a year (claim 15138), and nothing on record shows the exchange generating customer revenue.
The pivot to mining moved the named counterparties to the supply and hosting side. Riot relied on Coinmint for co-location, first under a signed agreement (claims 14938, 14822, 14748), then on a month-to-month basis (claims 14253, 14275), and finally ended the relationship (claim 13864). Hardware came from Bitmain through signed purchase orders totaling $480 million for 82,500 miners (claims 14725, 13261). MicroBT followed under a master agreement with annual purchase options of up to 66,560 units (claims 12380, 11999, 11990, 11971). The options are not firm commitments, and the record should not treat them as such.
On naming, ESS Metron is identified as a "key strategic partner" (claims 14160, 14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names only "our energy supplier" (claim 14254), and that is the one material unidentified counterparty in the set. The only disclosed revenue-side customer is Rhodium, described as the "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That wording confirms concentration but does not state the size of the hosting book or name any other hosting clients.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim ties a dollar amount of revenue to Rhodium or any other customer. The large disclosed figures, such as the $480 million Bitmain order, are capital outflows rather than bookings. Counterparty concentration therefore shifted from speculative equity stakes to two miner suppliers on the cost side and a single named hosting customer on the revenue side. Readers should look to the segment disclosures in the periodic filings for hosting revenue before crediting any customer-driven growth narrative.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-27Riot's disclosure record contains almost no signed customer agreements in the conventional sense. Most named counterparties are equity investees, vendors, service providers or advisers, and in several of those contracts Riot is the paying party rather than the one being paid. The early filings describe minority and majority stakes rather than commercial contracts: roughly 12.9% of Coinsquare (claims 15522, 15512), 52% of Tess (15547, 15524) and a newly formed Digital Green Energy subsidiary with no named counterparty (15515, 15455). Tess later falls to 8.8% and Verady appears at 3.2% (14959, 14958), and none of these holdings generates disclosed customer revenue. The 2018 exchange build-out rested on definitive agreements with Coinsquare, Shift Markets and Synapse/Evolve (15417, 15347, 15346), but Riot was the licensee and service buyer in each. The Synapse agreement was later mutually terminated (15138), and no exchange revenue appears on the record. The 2020 Coinmint agreement (14938, 14748) is also a Riot-as-customer hosting contract. It had lapsed to month-to-month by 2022 (14275) and was then exited (13864). Supply agreements follow the same direction of payment: executed Bitmain purchase orders totaling $480 million (13261) and a MicroBT master agreement (12380). The MicroBT figure of 265,000 additional miners is option language, not a commitment (11999, 11994), and should not be read as contracted volume. The only named revenue counterparty is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (13863). ESS Metron is labeled a "key strategic partner" (14160), but the disclosure makes clear it is a component and engineering supplier (14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names only "our energy supplier" (14254), so the most economically material contract on the record has an unidentified counterparty. Concentration therefore shifted from a portfolio of passive stakes in 2018, through a single-host dependency on Coinmint in 2020–21, to a single named hosting customer after the Whinstone acquisition. None of the claims supplied discloses revenue by counterparty, contract value for Rhodium, or hosting revenue totals, so the revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled with the announced deals from this record. On the supplied claims, disclosed dollar commitments flow outward to suppliers, while the inbound customer relationship is named but not quantified.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-25Riot's disclosure record is dominated by agreements where Riot is the buyer, licensee or investor, not the seller. Only one revenue-generating counterparty is named: Rhodium, identified in July 2022 as the company's largest hosting customer (claim 13863). Every other signed agreement runs the other way. Coinmint was a co-location provider hosting Riot's miners (claims 14938, 14822, 14748). Shift Markets and Synapse were platform and banking vendors for the planned RiotX exchange (claims 15367, 15347, 15376, 15346). Bitmain and MicroBT are hardware suppliers (claims 14725, 13261, 12380, 11963). The Coinsquare software licence (claim 15417) made Riot the licensee. The Coinsquare, Tess and Verady positions are equity stakes, not commercial contracts (claims 15545, 14957, 14959, 14958).
The softer language is limited but worth separating out. ESS Metron is called a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160), and although it is named, the filing points to no definitive agreement. The Whinstone power purchase agreement (claim 14254) is described as signed, but the energy supplier is never identified. Digital Green Energy Corp. (claims 15515, 15455) is a subsidiary 'seeking to identify' projects, which makes it an intention rather than a deal. The XMS Capital engagement (claim 14997) is an advisory mandate. The MicroBT figure of up to 265,000 miners (claims 11999, 11994) consists of purchase options, not firm orders, and should not be read as committed volume.
Counterparty concentration has shifted in phases. The 2018 cohort built around the exchange project unwound, most visibly when the Synapse agreement was terminated by mutual consent (claim 15138). Dependence on Coinmint in 2020–2022 was then deliberately ended as part of vertical integration (claim 13864). On the customer side, exposure is concentrated in Rhodium, but the record gives no share of revenue. On the supply side, exposure has consolidated from Bitmain to MicroBT.
Revenue reconciliation is not possible from this record because no revenue figures are disclosed alongside the announced deals. The only quantified commitment is spending: $480 million to Bitmain for 82,500 miners (claim 13261), or roughly $5,800 per unit. Diligence should obtain Rhodium's contribution to hosting revenue, the identity of the Whinstone power counterparty, and how many MicroBT options have actually been exercised. The final claim (11963) is truncated in the record.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-25Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements. It is mostly equity stakes, vendor contracts and supply arrangements where Riot is the buyer. Only one revenue counterparty is ever named: Rhodium, described in 2022 as Riot's "largest hosting customer" (claim 13863). That wording implies other hosting customers exist, but none are identified anywhere in the record. Readers should treat the rest of the partnership history as cost-side or balance-sheet disclosure rather than evidence of demand.
The 2018 cluster consists of minority and majority equity positions: Coinsquare at 12.9% (15512, 15522, 15545), Tess at 52% (15514, 15524, 15547) and the wholly owned Digital Green Energy subsidiary (15515, 15455). Several of these claims repeat the same filing sentence. The operative agreements from that year were definitive contracts in which Riot paid for services to build RiotX. These were a Coinsquare software licence (15417), a Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346) and a Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347). None of these was an MOU or LOI, but none produced customer revenue either. The Synapse agreement was mutually terminated in 2019 (15138). By 2020, Tess had diluted to an 8.8% TessPay stake, Coinsquare stood at 11.7%, and a 3.2% Verady position had appeared (14957, 14959, 14976). This is portfolio drift, not commercial traction.
From 2020 onward, Riot's counterparties became supply-chain vendors. Coinmint began as a signed co-location agreement (14938). It degraded to month-to-month terms (14275) and was then exited (13864). Bitmain purchase orders totalled $480 million for 82,500 miners (13261), roughly $5,800 per unit. The MicroBT master agreement (12380) came with options for 66,560 miners a year through 2027 (11999, 11985, 11974). Those options are rights, not commitments. Their stated aggregate of 265,000 reconciles approximately with four years at the annual cap. ESS Metron is labelled a "key strategic partner" (14160), though it functions as a component supplier (14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement names no energy counterparty (14254).
The customer-side concentration therefore runs from no disclosed customers to a single named hosting client. The unnamed remainder cannot be sized from this record. No revenue figures are disclosed in these claims, so hosting or mining revenue cannot be reconciled against any announced deal. The dollar amounts that are disclosed, chiefly the Bitmain orders, are capital expenditure. They should not be read as revenue indicators.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-24Riot's record on this ledger contains almost no signed customer agreements, so the task is less about separating signed deals from soft language and more about recognising that most entries describe the other side of the ledger. The 2018 filings are equity stakes and subsidiary formations. These include roughly 52% of Tess (claims 15547, 15524, 15514), 12.9% of Coinsquare (15522, 15512, 15545) and the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp. (15515, 15525, 15455). By 2020, disclosure shows those positions diluted to 8.8% of TessPay, 11.7% of Coinsquare and 3.2% of Verady (14959, 14957, 14958). None of these are customers. The RiotX-era contracts are real, named, definitive agreements but are vendor relationships in which Riot is the buyer. They include the Coinsquare software licence (15417), the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347) and the Synapse/Evolve banking agreement (15376, 15346), which was mutually terminated in 2019 (15138). The same holds for the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14822, 14748), which by 2022 was month-to-month (14253, 14275) and then ended (13864). It also holds for the supply-side contracts with Bitmain (14725, 13261) and MicroBT (12380). The MicroBT figures of 66,560 miners a year, or 265,000 in aggregate (11999, 11994, 11985), are unexercised purchase options, not commitments, and should not be read as contracted volume. The XMS Capital engagement (14997) is an advisory mandate. The only named customer anywhere in the record is Rhodium, identified in 2022 as the largest hosting customer (13863). The ESS Metron entries (14160, 14161) use 'key strategic partner' language, but the counterparty is named and plainly a supplier. No unnamed 'anchor customer' framing appears, which is to Riot's credit. Customer concentration therefore went from nothing disclosed to a single named hosting client. The record gives no contract term, no revenue share and no other hosting customers, so the scale of that concentration cannot be measured. Revenue reconciliation is not possible from these claims. No revenue figures, backlog or contract values attributable to customers are disclosed. The only dollar figure is the $480 million Bitmain purchase (13261), which is capital expenditure. The claim list is also truncated after 11985, so later disclosures may change this picture.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-24Riot's record contains almost no customer agreements in the ordinary sense. Most of the named counterparties are investees, vendors or service providers, and only one is identified as a revenue customer. The early filings describe equity positions rather than commercial contracts: roughly 12.9% of Coinsquare (15522, 15512, 15545), about 52% of Tess (15514, 15524, 15547), and the formation of the wholly owned Digital Green Energy subsidiary (15525, 15455). By early 2020 these positions had diluted to about 11.7% of Coinsquare, 8.8% of TessPay and 3.2% of Verady (14975, 14977, 14976).
The late-2018 exchange build-out did use definitive language. It included a Software Licensing and Services Agreement with Coinsquare (15417), a Synapse agreement described as material and definitive (15376, 15346), and a Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347). These were inbound services Riot was buying, not customers paying Riot, and the Synapse contract was mutually terminated in 2019 (15138). The XMS Capital engagement (14997) and the Marcum ratification (13887) are advisory and audit mandates, not commercial deals.
The mining era follows the same pattern of named, signed supply relationships. These include the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14822, 14748), which later became month-to-month (14275, 14253) and then ended (13864). They also include the Bitmain purchase agreements and $480 million in orders (14725, 13261) and the MicroBT master agreement (12380, 11971). The MicroBT options for up to 265,000 further miners (11999, 11985) are rights to buy, not commitments, and should not be read as contracted volume.
The partner language is uneven. ESS Metron is named, but it is called a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161) in what is in substance a supplier role. The energy supplier behind the Whinstone long-term power purchase agreement is never identified in the quoted text (14254).
On concentration, the only named customer is Rhodium, disclosed as the largest hosting customer (13863). The record gives no second hosting customer by name and does not quantify Rhodium's share. Concentration therefore cannot be measured from these claims, though a single disclosed name points to high reliance.
On revenue, none of the cited claims discloses revenue, hosting fees or per-customer contract value. The only dollar figure is the Bitmain order (13261), which is a capital outlay, not income. The announced relationships therefore cannot be reconciled against reported revenue from this record, and that reconciliation should be done against the financial statements before any customer-driven thesis is credited.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-23Riot's record contains very few customer agreements. Most of the counterparty claims describe equity stakes, vendors, or service providers rather than parties paying Riot for its output. The 2018 filings list minority or majority holdings in Coinsquare at 12.9% and Tess at 52% (claims 15522, 15512, 15514, 15524), plus the formation of a wholly owned subsidiary, Digital Green Energy (15525, 15455). These are balance-sheet positions, not commercial contracts. The RiotX exchange effort that followed did produce signed, named agreements with Coinsquare (15417), Synapse and Evolve Bank and Trust (15376, 15346), and Shift Markets (15367, 15347). In each of those, Riot was the licensee or buyer, and the Synapse agreement was later terminated by mutual consent (15138). By 2020 the equity stakes had been diluted to 11.7% of Coinsquare, 8.8% of TessPay, and 3.2% of Verady (14975, 14977, 14976), and none of them shows up as a revenue relationship.
From 2020 onward, the named counterparties are mostly on the cost side of Riot's business. Coinmint was a signed co-location host (14938, 14822, 14748). That arrangement moved to month-to-month terms (14275) and was then exited (13864). Bitmain and MicroBT are hardware suppliers under executed purchase orders and master agreements (14725, 13261, 12380, 11971). The 265,000 additional MicroBT units (11999, 11985) are options Riot may exercise, not commitments. ESS Metron is described as a 'key strategic partner' (14160), but its described role is supplying components and engineering services (14161), which makes it a vendor. The long-term power purchase agreement at Whinstone (14254) does not name the energy supplier.
The only named customer anywhere in this record is Rhodium, which appears in a single 2022 statement calling it the largest hosting customer (13863). No contract terms, contract duration, or revenue share accompany that statement. On the evidence here, Riot's customer concentration went from nonexistent to concentrated in one named hosting client. Any other hosting customers are not identified.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims discloses hosting revenue, Rhodium's contribution, or pricing, so the announced relationships cannot be matched against reported figures. The record also breaks off partway through claim 11971. A reader should treat Rhodium as the sole verifiable customer. The rest of the named counterparty list shows how Riot supplies and funds its operations, not who pays it.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-21The first thing this record shows is that most of Riot's early partnership disclosure is not customer disclosure at all. The 2018-2020 entries are minority equity stakes and internal formations: 12.9% of goNumerical/Coinsquare (15522, later 11.7% at 14975), 52% of Tess Inc. diluted to 8.8% of TessPay (15524, 14977), 3.2% of Verady (14976), and the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp (15515, 15455). None of these generate revenue for Riot; they are balance-sheet positions described in partnership grammar.
Where binding language does appear, Riot is almost always the buyer. The executed agreements on record — Coinsquare software licensing (15417), Synapse Financial Technologies alongside Evolve Bank and Trust (15376, 15346), Shift Markets (15367, 15347), the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14748), Bitmain's Future Sales and Purchases Agreement (14725), and the MicroBT master purchase and sale agreement (12380, 11963) — are procurement or services Riot pays for. The counterparty is named and the contract is signed, but the cash flows outbound. The XMS Capital Partners engagement (14997) and the Marcum LLP ratification (13887) are advisory and audit retentions that belong in neither column.
Only one actual customer is ever named: Rhodium, identified as the largest hosting customer (13863). That identification arrives in narrative commentary rather than a contract filing; no term, no committed capacity, no contract value appears anywhere on this record. The unnamed cases cut the other way too. The long-term power purchase agreement (14254) identifies only 'our energy supplier at the Whinstone Facility,' and ESS Metron is elevated to 'key strategic partner' (14160) while the substance described is component supply and engineering services Riot procures (14161).
Concentration has moved from diffuse to acute in both directions. The 2018 portfolio of small stakes gave way, after the Synapse termination (15138) and the deliberate exit from Coinmint hosting (13864), to hardware concentration in MicroBT — options for 66,560 miners per year and 265,000-plus cumulative (11999, 11994) — and hosting revenue concentrated in a single named counterparty.
The arithmetic does not reconcile, because there is no revenue side to reconcile. The only figures disclosed are outbound: $480 million to Bitmain for 82,500 units (13261), roughly $5,800 per miner. Nothing announced ties to a stated hosting contract value.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-21The defining feature of Riot's counterparty record is that almost none of it is customer-side. Between 2018 and 2024 the named counterparties fall into two buckets: equity stakes and suppliers. Coinsquare (15522, 15512, 14975), Tess/TessPay (15514, 14977) and Verady (14976) are minority investments, not commercial relationships, and disclosing them alongside partnership language flatters the apparent breadth of the network. The supply side is genuinely contracted and genuinely named — Coinmint under a co-location mining services agreement (14938, 14822, 14748), Bitmain under a Future Sales and Purchases Agreement and $480 million of purchase orders for 82,500 miners (14725, 13261), and MicroBT under a master purchase and sale agreement dated June 23, 2023 with annual options for up to 66,560 units (12380, 11999, 11990). These are all cash outflows. They tell you what Riot bought, not what anyone bought from Riot.
On identification, the record is unusually clean of MOU and LOI hedging; the softer construction is relational rather than conditional. ESS Metron is called a key strategic partner (14160) while the substance disclosed is that it supplies electrical components and engineering services (14161) — a vendor in partner clothing. The single named revenue-generating counterparty is Rhodium, described in July 2022 as the largest hosting customer (13863), and that identification arrives without contract term, capacity, pricing or duration. Riot named its largest customer and disclosed nothing about the economics of the relationship.
Concentration has not diluted so much as rotated. The 2018-2019 cluster was exchange buildout — Coinsquare's exclusive U.S. licensing agreement (15417), Synapse with Evolve Bank (15376, 15346), Shift Markets (15367, 15347) — and it collapsed, with Synapse terminated by mutual agreement in September 2019 (15138) and the RiotX exchange never launching. That is the relevant base rate: signed and definitive did not mean realized. The mining-era concentration then narrowed to Coinmint, which was deliberately exited for vertical integration (13864), and to a single hosting name.
No revenue arithmetic reconciles here because none is offered. The only dollar figures on record are procurement commitments, and the hosting revenue that Rhodium supposedly anchors is never sized against them.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-20Riot's file is thinner as a customer ledger than its volume implies, because most entries record equity positions rather than commercial agreements. The 2018 and 2020 disclosures of Coinsquare (15545, 15512, 15522, 14975), TessPay (15547, 15514, 15524, 14977) and Verady (14976), plus the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp. (15515, 15525, 15455), are minority stakes and internal subsidiaries. They name counterparties precisely but generate no contracted revenue, and several are duplicate filings of identical verbatim text, which inflates the apparent count of distinct announcements.
Among the genuinely executed agreements, nearly every named counterparty is one Riot pays rather than one that pays Riot. The Coinsquare software license (15417), the Synapse and Evolve Bank arrangement (15376, 15346), the Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347), the Coinmint co-location agreement (14938, 14822, 14748), the Bitmain purchase agreement (14725) and the MicroBT master agreement (12380, 11963) are all procurement. Two of these were later unwound on the record: Synapse was mutually terminated (15138) and the Coinmint hosting relationship was ended (13864). The MicroBT terms deserve particular care, since the 66,560-per-year, 265,000-total figures (11999, 11994) are described as options rather than commitments, and an option is a ceiling, not a backlog.
Only one revenue-side customer is identified by name anywhere here: Rhodium, disclosed on a July 2022 call as the largest hosting customer (13863). Everything else on the revenue side is described without identification, including the long-term power purchase agreement whose counterparty appears only as our energy supplier (14254), and ESS Metron, labelled a key strategic partner (14160, 14161) while functioning as an internal supplier. The Marcum engagement (13887) is an auditor ratification and does not belong in a partnership set at all.
Concentration moved from a diversified 2018 equity portfolio to single-vendor dependence on Coinmint through 2022, then to hardware concentration in Bitmain and MicroBT. The arithmetic does not reconcile to revenue because there is no revenue arithmetic to reconcile: the only disclosed dollar figure is the $480 million of Bitmain purchase orders (13261), an outbound capital commitment. No announced deal carries a stated contract value on the inbound side.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-20The first thing to say about Riot's record is that most of it is not a customer record at all. Between 2018 and 2020 the named counterparties are equity positions, not contracts: 12.9% of Coinsquare (claim 15512), 52% of Tess Inc. (claim 15514), restated by 2019 as 11.7%, 8.8% and a new 3.2% of Verady (claims 14975, 14977, 14976), alongside the formation of a wholly owned subsidiary, Digital Green Energy (claim 15515). Several of these appear two or three times under separate claim ids with word-identical text, which inflates the apparent announcement count without adding a counterparty. The Marcum engagement (claim 13887) is an auditor ratification and should not be in a commercial set at all.
Where executed documents do exist, they sit overwhelmingly on the buy side. The Coinsquare software license (claim 15417), the Synapse agreement with Evolve Bank (claims 15376, 15346) and the Shift Markets master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347) were all signed, all named, and all in service of an exchange that never opened; Synapse was mutually terminated a year later (claim 15138). Coinmint (claim 14938), Bitmain (claim 14725) and MicroBT (claim 12380) are suppliers or hosts Riot pays. ESS Metron is the clearest case of relationship language standing in for an agreement: it is called "a key strategic partner" in immersion cooling (claim 14160) with no dated contract, no term and no consideration disclosed.
On the revenue-producing side, exactly one counterparty has ever been identified: Rhodium, named as "our largest hosting customer" (claim 13863), and named only in spoken remarks, without an agreement, term or dollar value. Concentration has therefore moved from a diffuse book of minority stakes to a two-vendor hardware dependency and a single-name hosting customer, with both major exits disclosed (claims 15138, 13864).
The arithmetic does not reconcile because there is nothing on the revenue side to reconcile to. Every dollar figure in the record is an outflow: $480 million of purchase orders to Bitmain for 82,500 miners (claim 13261), options for up to 66,560 MicroBT miners annually toward 265,000-plus (claims 11999, 11994). No announced customer deal carries a contracted value, so hosting revenue rests on the income statement alone rather than on any named agreement.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-19Riot's record contains almost no customer agreements in the commercial-diligence sense. Most entries describe equity stakes, vendor supply contracts, or service engagements in which Riot is the buyer. They show capital deployment, not revenue counterparties. The language is uniformly definitive, with no MOU, LOI or 'discussions' framing: agreements are described as 'entered into' (15417, 15376, 15367, 14938, 14725, 12380). Several of these ended without generating anything a reader could call a customer book. The Synapse master services agreement was mutually terminated within a year (15346, 15138). The Coinmint co-location arrangement, first signed as a fixed agreement (14938), was later described as month-to-month (14275) before Riot announced its exit (13864). The Coinsquare software licence (15417) placed Riot as licensee for its planned RiotX exchange rather than as a seller. The only named revenue counterparty anywhere in the record is Rhodium, identified in 2022 as Riot's 'largest hosting customer' (13863). No contract terms, duration or pricing are attached to that claim. Two other counterparties are only partly identified. ESS Metron is named, but it is called a 'key strategic partner' and is described as a supplier of electrical components and engineering services (14160, 14161), not a customer. The Whinstone power purchase agreement is attributed only to 'our energy supplier', with no counterparty named (14254). Concentration has shifted from a scatter of minority equity positions, then a set of exchange-infrastructure vendors, to dependence on one hardware supplier at a time. The early positions were Coinsquare at 12.9% falling to 11.7% (15522, 14975), Tess diluted from 52% to 8.8% (15524, 14977), and Verady at 3.2% (14976). The exchange vendors followed in 2018 (15367, 15347). Bitmain was the first supplier, with $480 million of purchase orders for 82,500 miners (14725, 13261). MicroBT followed under a master agreement (12380, 11963). The MicroBT figure of 66,560 miners per year is an option, not a commitment (11999, 11994). It should not be read as contracted volume. On revenue, the record discloses no hosting or mining revenue figures, so the announced deals cannot be reconciled against reported sales. The 'largest customer' statement implies a customer ranking whose other members are never named. Several claims are also duplicate extractions of the same 10-K passages (15512/15545/15522, 15514/15547/15524), which inflates how busy the partnership record appears.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-19Riot's record of named relationships contains almost no signed customer agreements, and the claims should be read that way. The only disclosed revenue counterparty is Rhodium, identified in July 2022 as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No contract terms, duration, or revenue share accompany that disclosure. Nearly everything else is one of three things: equity stakes, vendor and supply contracts, or service engagements in which Riot is the buyer. The equity stakes are Tess, Coinsquare, and Verady (15524, 15522, 14957, 14958, 14959). The vendor and supply contracts are with Bitmain, MicroBT, Coinmint, Shift Markets, and Synapse (14725, 13261, 12380, 11990, 14938, 15347, 15346). The service engagements are XMS Capital and Marcum (14997, 13887). Several items repeat the same filing text under separate ids (15547/15524/15514 and 15522/15512/15545), which inflates the apparent volume. The 2018 exchange-era agreements were definitive rather than MOU-grade. The Synapse agreement, however, was mutually terminated within a year (15138), and the RiotX exchange they supported produced no disclosed customer.
On naming, most counterparties are identified. Two gaps matter. The Whinstone power purchase agreement names only 'our energy supplier' (14254), even though power cost is Riot's central economic input. ESS Metron is labelled a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161), but that is a supplier relationship, not a source of revenue. The MicroBT purchase options are also optional capacity, not commitments: up to 66,560 miners per year (11999, 11994). They should not be read as contracted spend.
Concentration has shifted in a clear sequence. From 2018 to 2019, the book was a portfolio of minority crypto investments. Coinsquare dilution from 12.9% to 11.7% and the Tess stake falling from 52% to 8.8% show those positions shrinking (15522, 14957, 14959). The next phase was dependence on a single host, Coinmint, which moved from a formal agreement to month-to-month and was then exited for vertical integration (14253, 13864). Upstream concentration then moved to a single miner supplier, first Bitmain and later MicroBT. On the revenue side, concentration was in Rhodium.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim discloses hosting revenue, Rhodium's contribution, or mining revenue against which the deals could be tested. The one hard figure is the $480 million Bitmain purchase for 82,500 miners (13261). That figure is capital expenditure, not revenue. The final MicroBT claim (11994) is truncated in the source data. Diligence should obtain the Rhodium contract terms and segment revenue disclosure before treating any of these relationships as customer-backed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-18Riot's record contains almost no customer agreements; nearly all of it describes equity stakes, vendor contracts and supply arrangements. The 2018 filings list minority or majority holdings rather than commercial relationships: roughly 12.9% of Coinsquare and 52% of Tess (claims 15512, 15547), later diluted to 11.7% and 8.8%, plus a 3.2% stake in Verady (claims 14975, 14959, 14958). The executed agreements that followed all run in the wrong direction for customer diligence. Riot was the licensee under the Coinsquare software agreement (claim 15417), the client of Shift Markets under a master services agreement (claims 15367, 15347), and the client of Synapse and Evolve Bank for banking services (claims 15376, 15346). The Synapse agreement was terminated by mutual consent within a year (claim 15138). Riot was likewise the hosted party at Coinmint, first under a co-location agreement (claim 14938), later month-to-month (claim 14253), and then exited (claim 13864). It was the buyer from Bitmain, with $480 million in purchase orders (claims 14725, 13261), and from MicroBT under a master agreement (claim 12380). The roughly 265,000 additional MicroBT miners are options, not commitments, and should not be read as contracted volume (claims 11999, 11994, 11985). XMS Capital and Marcum are advisory and audit engagements, not partnerships (claims 14997, 13887). The 'key strategic partner' language attaches to ESS Metron, which is named but is a component and engineering supplier (claim 14160). The Whinstone power counterparty is described only as 'our energy supplier' and never identified (claim 14254). Only one downstream customer is named anywhere in the record: Rhodium, called the largest hosting customer in mid-2022 (claim 13863). Concentration therefore cannot be tracked over time. The record shows one named hosting customer at a single point, with no disclosed share of revenue, contract term or pricing, and no later confirmation that the relationship continued. The record also cannot support any revenue reconciliation, because none of the claims disclose revenue, hosting income or per-customer contribution. Nothing is available to test against the announced deals, and the supplier contracts are cost commitments rather than revenue sources in any case. Several claims duplicate one another (claims 15545, 15522, 15524, 15514, 15525, 15515), which inflates the apparent volume of activity. The final claim is also truncated in the source, so later disclosures may be missing.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-18Riot's record contains almost no customer agreements; nearly every named counterparty is a supplier, service provider, investee or advisor. The only disclosed revenue-side customer is Rhodium, identified in 2022 as the largest hosting customer (13863). No contract terms, duration or dollar value accompany that disclosure. Everything else runs the other direction, with Riot as the buyer, licensee or equity holder.
The 2018 to 2020 entries are minority or majority equity positions, not commercial agreements. They cover Coinsquare at 12.9% falling to 11.7% (15522, 14957), Tess at 52% diluting to 8.8% (15524, 14977), Verady at 3.2% (14976) and the Digital Green Energy subsidiary (15515, 15455). Several appear two or three times as duplicate claims, which overstates the apparent volume of relationships.
The RiotX exchange effort did produce signed agreements. These were a software licence with Coinsquare (15417), a master services agreement with Shift Markets (15347) and a definitive agreement with Synapse and Evolve Bank (15346). All are inbound vendor arrangements, and the Synapse contract was mutually terminated within a year (15138).
The mining-era agreements are also signed but supply-side. They include Coinmint co-location, where Riot is the hosted party (14938), later month-to-month (14275) and then exited (13864). They also include Bitmain purchase orders totalling $480 million for 82,500 miners (14725, 13261) and the MicroBT master agreement with options for up to 66,560 miners per year (12380, 11999). None of these is MOU or LOI language. The softer language is concentrated elsewhere. ESS Metron is described as a "key strategic partner" without disclosed terms (14160), and the Whinstone power purchase agreement names only "our energy supplier" (14254). The XMS engagement (14997) and the Marcum ratification (13887) are advisory and audit mandates, not partnerships.
Counterparty concentration shifted in stages. It began with a diffuse set of venture stakes, moved to exchange-infrastructure vendors, and then settled on single-source dependencies on Bitmain and later MicroBT for hardware. On the revenue side, the one named hosting customer, Rhodium, was the largest.
No disclosed revenue figures appear among these claims, so the arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. The dollar amounts that do appear are capital commitments to suppliers rather than contracted inflows. Hosting revenue attributable to Rhodium would need to be checked against segment disclosures in the filings themselves.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-15Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements in the conventional sense. Most entries are equity stakes, subsidiary formations, vendor contracts, or advisory engagements, and several claim ids repeat the same sentence. The Coinsquare stake appears in claims 15512, 15522 and 15545, and the Tess stake in 15514, 15524 and 15547. These duplicates should not be read as separate relationships. The only counterparty the company names as a customer is Rhodium, described in July 2022 as 'our largest hosting customer' (13863). The record gives no contract term, pricing or revenue share for that relationship.
The definitive agreements on file generally run the other way, with Riot as the buyer or licensee. These include the Coinsquare software licence for RiotX (15417), the Synapse and Shift Markets exchange-infrastructure contracts (15376, 15346, 15367, 15347), the Coinmint co-location arrangement (14938, 14822, 14748), and hardware procurement from Bitmain (14725, 13261) and MicroBT (12380). The Synapse contract was mutually terminated within a year (15138). Coinmint went from a fixed agreement to month-to-month (14253, 14275) and then ended as Riot vertically integrated (13864). Softer language appears in three places. ESS Metron is labelled a 'key strategic partner' without any disclosed contract value (14160, 14161). The MicroBT capacity of up to 66,560 miners a year through 2027 is structured as options, not firm orders (11999, 11974). The Whinstone power purchase agreement does not identify the energy supplier (14254). Two further entries are routine service engagements, not commercial partnerships: XMS Capital (14997) and Marcum (13887).
Counterparty concentration has shifted from minority equity positions to supply-side dependence. Coinsquare fell from 12.9% to 11.7%, and Tess fell from 52% to 8.8% (14957, 14959). Mining hardware is now concentrated first in Bitmain and then in MicroBT. On the revenue side, disclosure is concentrated in a single named hosting customer.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record because no revenue, hosting income or customer-concentration percentages are disclosed. The only hard figure is capital spending: $480 million for 82,500 Bitmain miners (13261), which implies roughly $5,800 per unit. The MicroBT aggregate of about 265,000 optional units carries no committed dollar value in the quoted text. The record also cuts off mid-quote at claim 11981, so later disclosures may change this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record is dominated by vendor, supplier and investment disclosures rather than signed customer agreements. Almost every named counterparty sells something to Riot or hosts Riot's machines; very few buy from it. The 2018 exchange-era filings describe executed contracts: a Coinsquare software licensing agreement (15417), a Synapse banking agreement (15376, 15346) and a Shift Markets master services agreement (15367, 15347). Each was a platform input for a RiotX exchange that never became a revenue line. Synapse was mutually terminated in 2019 (15138), and Coinsquare moved from licensor to an 11.7% equity stake (15295, 14957, 14975), alongside minority holdings in TessPay and Verady (14958, 14959, 14976, 14977). None of these is customer revenue, and several claims restate the same fact across filings.
The mining era follows the same pattern. Coinmint was a signed co-location agreement in which Riot was the customer (14938, 14822, 14748). By 2022 it had become month-to-month (14253, 14275), and management then said it was ending (13864). Bitmain moved from a framework Future Sales and Purchases Agreement (14725) to executed purchase orders of $480 million for 82,500 miners (13261). The MicroBT record is a signed master agreement with a first purchase order (12380, 11953). Its much-repeated 265,000-unit figure is an option to buy, not a commitment (11999, 11955, 11967, 11974, 11985, 11994), and the eight 2024 claims describe one contract.
On identification, ESS Metron is named yet labeled a 'key strategic partner' (14160, 14161) without disclosed economic terms. The long-term power purchase agreement names only 'our energy supplier' at Whinstone (14254). The only identified customer anywhere in the record is Rhodium, described as the largest hosting customer (13863). No other hosting clients are named, so the hosting book appears concentrated in one disclosed name plus an unidentified remainder.
Concentration has shifted from a cluster of exchange-infrastructure vendors in 2018, to a single co-location host in 2020 and 2021, to single-source miner supply from Bitmain and then MicroBT. On the customer side it rests on Rhodium. The record contains no revenue, hosting-fee or contract-value figures for Rhodium or any other buyer. The disclosed revenue arithmetic therefore cannot be reconciled with the announced deals. The only hard dollar figure, the $480 million Bitmain commitment (13261), is an outflow rather than contracted revenue.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record contains very few customer agreements in the revenue sense. Most of the named, signed contracts put Riot on the buying side. It is the purchaser under the Bitmain Future Sales and Purchases Agreement (claim 14725), which was later quantified as $480 million of purchase orders for 82,500 ASIC miners (claim 13261). It is also the purchaser under the MicroBT master purchase and sale agreement of June 23, 2023 (claims 12380, 11971, 11953). And it was the hosted party, not the host, under the Coinmint co-location agreement (claims 14938, 14822, 14748). That agreement had become month-to-month by early 2022 (claims 14253, 14275) and was being wound down by mid-2022 (claim 13864). The 2020 disclosures of Coinsquare, Verady and TessPay are minority equity positions, not commercial contracts (claims 14957, 14958, 14959 and duplicates 14975, 14976, 14977). XMS Capital (claim 14997) and Marcum (claim 13887) are advisory engagements. The Bitfarms settlement is a governance agreement expiring by June 2026 at the latest (claims 5695, 5701, 5696).
The MicroBT arrangement needs careful reading. Two orders are actually executed: the initial purchase order and the December 4, 2023 follow-on for 66,560 miners (claim 11954). The widely repeated aggregate of 265,000 additional miners through 2027 consists of purchase options exercisable at Riot's discretion, not firm commitments (claims 11999, 11994, 11947). Roughly eight separate claims restate this single agreement, which inflates the apparent volume of deal activity.
On naming, the only identified revenue counterparty in the record is Rhodium, described as Riot's largest hosting customer (claim 13863). That identification comes from a narrative statement, and the record does not include the hosting contract's terms or duration. The long-term power purchase agreement at Whinstone names no counterparty beyond 'our energy supplier' (claim 14254). ESS Metron is labeled a 'key strategic partner' (claim 14160) but is described functionally as a component and engineering provider (claim 14161), with no disclosed contract value.
Concentration has shifted on the supply side, from Bitmain in 2021 to a single-source relationship with MicroBT from 2023 onward. On the demand side, hosting revenue as of 2022 appears concentrated in one named customer, Rhodium, and the record discloses no other hosting clients. The record contains no revenue figures, customer-level revenue shares, or contract values on the sell side. The announced deals therefore cannot be reconciled with reported revenue; they explain capital expenditure, not income. The claim list also appears truncated after claim 5697, so later relationships may be missing from this read.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record contains almost no signed customer agreements. Nearly every named counterparty is a supplier, host, service provider, or governance counterparty, and that should frame any reading of its commercial pipeline. The one named revenue counterparty is Rhodium, described in July 2022 as "our largest hosting customer" (13863). Nothing on record gives Rhodium's contract terms, duration, or revenue share, and no other hosting customer is named. That makes Rhodium an identified but unquantified concentration.
The other agreements are signed, but Riot is the buyer in them. Coinmint hosted Riot's miners from April 2020 (14938, 14822, 14748). The arrangement had become month-to-month by 2022 (14253, 14275) and was being wound down that July as part of vertical integration (13864). Bitmain was a supplier: a 2021 Future Sales and Purchases Agreement (14725) and executed purchase orders totaling $480 million for 82,500 miners (13261) are firm procurement commitments. MicroBT replaced Bitmain as the principal supplier through a June 2023 Master Agreement (12380, 11953, 11944) and a December 2023 follow-on order for 66,560 miners (11954). The widely repeated 265,000-miner figure is option language, not an order (11999, 11985, 11974, 11994, 11967, 11955, 11947). Those seven claims restate a single optionality provision and should not be counted as separate deals.
Some counterparties are described only by role. ESS Metron is named, but it is labeled a "key strategic partner" (14160) while functioning as a component and engineering vendor (14161). The Whinstone power purchase agreement refers only to "our energy supplier" and does not name the counterparty (14254). Several remaining items are not commercial customer relationships at all. These include the Bitfarms settlement, which covers standstill and board nomination terms (5695, 5704, 5699), the Coinbase custody and prime broker agreements (5226, 5227), the Marcum auditor ratification (13887), and the December 2025 at-the-market Sales Agreement with investment banks (3947).
Concentration has shifted mainly on the supply side. Dependence on Coinmint for hosting and Bitmain for hardware in 2020–2021 gave way to self-hosting at Whinstone and sole-source reliance on MicroBT from 2023 onward. On the demand side, the record never moves beyond a single named hosting customer.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from these claims. No revenue, hosting income, or customer-level figures are disclosed alongside the announcements. The only hard dollar figure, the $480 million Bitmain commitment (13261), is capital expenditure rather than revenue. Any statement about Riot's contracted revenue base would need support from the financial statements, not from this announcement history.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record contains almost no MOU, LOI, or 'discussions' language, and most of the named counterparties are signed. The harder distinction is direction. Most of these agreements make Riot the buyer, not the seller, so the file says much less about who pays Riot than its length suggests.
On the revenue side, three counterparties are named. Rhodium was identified on a July 2022 call as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863). No contract terms, pricing, or revenue share appear in the record. Coinmint is the reverse case: Riot placed its own miners at Coinmint's Massena facility under a month-to-month agreement (claims 14253, 14275), and Riot later said it was ending that relationship (claim 13864). The only newly named hosting-side customer is AMD, under a signed 10-year lease for 25 MW of critical IT load at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3621). The record cuts off at claim 3622, so any expansion terms or options in the AMD lease cannot be assessed here.
The supply side is where the volume sits. MicroBT appears in more than a dozen overlapping claims (for example 12380, 11971, 11953, 3944). The signed portion is a master agreement plus seven executed purchase orders worth about $779.5 million for 49.2 EH/s through September 2025 (claim 3945). The repeated '66,560 miners per year, 265,000 aggregate' figure (claims 11994, 11955, 11947, 3946) describes options, not commitments. Four years of 66,560 comes to 266,240, so the 265,000 headline is itself approximate. The earlier Bitmain orders, $480 million for 82,500 miners (claim 13261), were signed. ESS Metron is named but described in 'key strategic partner' terms (claim 14160) that the filings do not quantify.
Several items are not commercial at all. The Bitfarms settlement is a governance standstill that expires by June 2026 (claims 5695, 5699, 5701). The Coinbase agreement covers custody (claims 5226, 5227), the sales agreement covers an equity program (claim 3947), and Marcum is the auditor (claim 13887).
Customer concentration has moved from a single named hosting client, Rhodium, toward a single named data-center tenant, AMD. Nothing in the record shows those two relationships existing side by side. Revenue cannot be reconciled with these deals because no revenue, hosting income, or lease-value figures are disclosed in the claims.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record contains few true customer agreements. Most of the entries are supplier, governance, or service-provider disclosures, and they should not be counted as demand. The signed customer contracts that name a counterparty are Rhodium, which the company identified in 2022 as its largest hosting customer (claim 13863), and Advanced Micro Devices. AMD signed a 10-year lease for 25 MW of critical IT load at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3621, 3608). Claim 3615 is truncated in the record and adds nothing verifiable. The Coinmint relationship appears only as a termination (claim 13864). No unnamed 'anchor customer' language appears, which is to Riot's credit. The one 'key strategic partner' label goes to ESS Metron (claim 14160), and that is a named supplier of electrical components and immersion-cooling engineering (claim 14161), not a buyer.
The largest cluster of claims covers MicroBT, and it needs careful separation. The signed portion is the June 23, 2023 Master Agreement plus executed purchase orders totaling 49.2 EH/s for about $779.5 million (claims 3945, 3600). The widely repeated 265,000-miner figure is optional, not committed (claims 11994, 11985, 11967, 11974, 11955, 11947, 3946). It represents annual purchase options of up to 66,560 miners through 2027. Four years at that rate gives roughly 266,000, so the aggregate is internally consistent. At least ten near-duplicate claims restate the same 2024 filing language, which overstates how much news there actually was. The executed-order total is unchanged between September 30 and December 31, 2025, which implies no new orders in the fourth quarter. The Bitmain orders of $480 million for 82,500 units (claim 13261) are likewise procurement. The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695–5705), the Coinbase custody agreement (claims 5226, 5227), Marcum's engagement (claim 13887) and the ATM sales agents (claim 3947) are not commercial customer relationships at all.
On the customer side, concentration has moved from a third-party hosting book led by Rhodium, and then wound down under vertical integration, to a single named data-center tenant in AMD. Across the gap, the company's revenue base was self-mining. The record does not disclose a dollar value, rate per megawatt, or expansion schedule for the AMD lease. It also provides no hosting revenue figures for Rhodium. As a result, the announced customer deals cannot be reconciled against reported revenue from the claims on file. Any revenue attribution to AMD beyond the initial 25 MW should be treated as unverified until pricing or recognized lease income is disclosed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record of counterparty disclosures contains almost no non-binding language, but it also contains very few customers. Most claims on file describe supply, service, or governance relationships rather than revenue agreements. The MicroBT Master Agreement dated June 23, 2023 (claims 12380, 11981, 3944, 3599) is a signed procurement contract, and its executed purchase orders are firm. There were seven orders for about 49.2 EH/s at roughly $779.5 million through September 30, 2025, a total unchanged at year-end (claims 3945, 3600), with deliveries expected by the second quarter of 2026 (claim 3622). The often-repeated figure of 265,000 additional miners (claims 11985, 11967, 11955, 11947) is option capacity, not a commitment. Later filings describe options on "the same or more favorable terms" that "may be further extended" (claims 3946, 3602). The Bitmain orders (claim 13261) are also purchases. Marcum (claim 13887), Coinbase custody and prime brokerage (claims 5226, 5227), and the equity sales agents (claim 3947) are vendors. The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695, 5704, 5699) is a governance standstill with no commercial content.
On the customer side, every counterparty is named. The record contains no unidentified "strategic partner" or "anchor customer" language. In 2022 the disclosed customer base was hosting: Rhodium was the largest hosting customer (claim 13863), and Coinmint was being exited as part of a vertical-integration strategy (claim 13864). After that, no customer is disclosed until 2026, so self-mining appears to be the dominant model through 2025. In practice, customer concentration gave way to exposure to bitcoin price and network hashrate. That changed in January 2026 with a signed 10-year lease with AMD for 25 MW of critical IT load at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3598, 3615). This is a definitive agreement with a named tenant. Still, it is a single-tenant, initial-phase contract, and the word "initially" in claim 3598 points to expansion that the record does not show as contracted.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No claim discloses Rhodium hosting revenue, AMD lease rates or total contract value, or data-center revenue guidance, so there is no stated figure to test against the announced deals. The claim list also appears truncated after claim 3621. Any later disclosures of AMD economics or additional tenants should be reviewed before drawing firmer conclusions about concentration or contracted revenue.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record contains almost no MOU, LOI, or 'discussions' language, but most of its named agreements are not customer agreements. The large majority of claims concern suppliers, a governance settlement, custody, and capital markets. Only three commercial counterparties on the revenue side are named: Rhodium, Coinmint, and AMD.
The hosting business in 2022 was described through named parties. Rhodium was identified as the largest hosting customer (claim 13863), and the Coinmint relationship was disclosed as ending under a vertical-integration strategy (claim 13864). After that, the record shows no named hosting or compute customer until January 2026. That month Riot disclosed a signed 10-year lease with AMD for 25 MW of critical IT load at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3598, 3615, 3621). This is a signed, named agreement rather than framework language. Its repeated wording, 'to initially provide 25 MW', points to expansion, but the record does not quantify it. Counterparty concentration has therefore moved from a hosting book led by one miner-customer to a data-center line that rests entirely on AMD. No other tenant, anchor, or pipeline counterparty is identified.
The supply-side claims need a clear split between executed orders and optionality. Executed commitments include the 2021 Bitmain purchase orders of $480 million for 82,500 miners (claim 13261) and seven MicroBT purchase orders totaling about $779.5 million for 49.2 EH/s (claims 3945, 3600). The figure 265,000 miners, or 66,560 per year through 2027, is recited in at least eight claims (e.g., 11967, 11974, 11985, 11947). These are purchase options, not obligations, and the repetition overstates how much has actually been committed. The executed totals were identical at September 30 and December 31, 2025 (claims 3945, 3600), which implies no new MicroBT orders in the fourth quarter.
The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695–5705) is a governance and standstill arrangement that expires by June 2026 and carries no commercial revenue. Coinbase (claims 5226, 5227) is a custody and prime-broker vendor. The December 2025 sales agreement (claim 3947) is an equity at-the-market program with named banks.
The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No rent, contract value, or revenue contribution is disclosed for the AMD lease, and no hosting revenue is attributed to Rhodium. Diligence should obtain the lease economics and any customer-concentration footnote before crediting data-center revenue.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-14Riot's record contains almost no customer agreements in the conventional sense. Most entries are supplier contracts, and several describe the same contract more than once. The Bitmain purchase orders (claim 13261), totaling $480 million for 82,500 miners, and the MicroBT Master Agreement dated June 23, 2023 (claims 12380, 11971, 11963, 11981, 11990, 11953, 3944, 3599) are signed procurement agreements. They are capital commitments, not demand. The Coinbase prime broker and custody arrangement (claims 5226, 5227) and the December 2025 equity Sales Agreement with named agents (claim 3947) are service and financing contracts. The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695–5705) is a governance and standstill agreement with an expiry tied to June 1, 2026 or Bitfarms' 2026 annual meeting (claim 5701), and it carries no commercial terms. The record contains no MOU, LOI, or 'discussions' language. The softer category is the MicroBT purchase options (claims 11999, 11974, 11985, 11994, 11967, 11955, 11947, 3946, 3602), which remain rights Riot may exercise rather than obligations. The later wording also shifts from 'same terms as the initial order' to 'same or more favorable terms as the second purchase order' that 'may be further extended,' which suggests the option schedule has turned elastic.
The one signed revenue-side counterparty is AMD. Riot names it in a 10-year lease for 25 MW of critical IT load at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3598, 3615, 3621, 3608). No unnamed 'strategic partners' or 'anchor customers' appear anywhere in the record. Claim 11721 reports that the lease has commenced, but it has no supporting quote, so that milestone is unverified here. Riot's counterparty concentration has therefore moved from none to one. Mining revenue has no contractual customer, and the data-center business rests entirely on a single tenant whose disclosed commitment is described as 'initial.'
The arithmetic that can be checked holds together. Four years of options at 66,560 miners equals 266,240, which is consistent with the rounded '265,000' aggregate. The $779.5 million across seven purchase orders for 49.2 EH/s is identical at September 30, 2025 (claim 3945) and December 31, 2025 (claim 3600), which implies no new orders in the fourth quarter. The follow-on order of 66,560 miners (claim 11954) matches one annual option tranche. On the revenue side, nothing reconciles, because no lease value, rate per megawatt, or revenue contribution is disclosed for AMD. Diligence should treat the AMD lease as real but unquantified, and should not count the repeated MicroBT restatements as separate deals.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-13Riot's record contains only one agreement that fits the definition of a signed customer contract. That is the ten-year data center lease with Advanced Micro Devices for critical IT load capacity at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3608, 3598). The company says the first phase began generating revenue in January 2026 (claim 11721). Every other named counterparty is on the cost, capital or governance side of the business. MicroBT is Riot's miner supplier under a June 2023 master purchase agreement (claims 12380, 11963, 3599), and its purchase options run through 2027 (claims 11999, 11994, 3602). Bitfarms is the counterparty to a September 2024 settlement with board, voting and standstill terms (claims 5695, 5698, 5699). Coinbase acts as prime broker and custodian (claims 5226, 5227). The December 2025 sales agents are underwriters for an equity program (claim 3947). None of these is a customer. The record also contains no MOU, LOI or framework language. More unusually, it has no unnamed 'strategic partner' or 'anchor customer' references: every counterparty is identified.
Customer concentration has gone from none to total. Through 2025, Riot's disclosed agreements were supply and financing arrangements, and mining revenue came from the Bitcoin network rather than from contracted buyers. Since January 2026, all disclosed contracted third-party revenue has come from a single counterparty, AMD. Any diligence view of the data center strategy therefore depends on a single tenant.
The revenue arithmetic does not fully reconcile. The January and March 2026 disclosures describe the lease as initially covering 25 MW (claims 3902, 3608, 3615, 3621). The April 2026 item describes a 50 MW lease with $636 million of total contract revenue (claim 9626). The record has no amendment or expansion claim that bridges 25 MW to 50 MW. Because the quote is truncated, it is also unclear whether the $636 million assumes the full ten-year term, a phased ramp or renewal options. Read as 50 MW over ten years, the figure implies about $63.6 million a year, or roughly $1.27 million per MW-year. No recognized revenue figure appears to test that against.
On the supply side, the numbers are internally consistent. Four years at 66,560 options per year comes to approximately the 265,000 aggregate cited (claims 11994, 11947). The $779.5 million total for 49.2 EH/s is the same at September 30 and December 31, 2025 (claims 3945, 3600), which indicates no new purchase orders in the fourth quarter. Those amounts are capital commitments, not revenue.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-13Riot's record contains far fewer customer agreements than its claim count implies. Most entries restate the same filings, and most counterparties are suppliers, service providers or governance adversaries rather than buyers of Riot's output. The MicroBT relationship accounts for the bulk of the record (claims 11963, 11990, 11981, 11971, 11953, 3944, 3599). It is a signed master purchase and sale agreement dated June 23, 2023, but Riot is the purchaser. It is a capital-expenditure commitment, not a revenue contract. Within it, the executed purchase orders are firm: an initial order, a December 2023 follow-on of 66,560 miners (claim 11954), and seven orders totalling roughly $779.5 million for 49.2 EH/s (claims 3945, 3600). The purchase options are not firm. Early filings quantified them at up to 66,560 miners per year, about 265,000 in aggregate through 2027 (claims 11994, 11955, 11947). Later filings drop the unit count and describe options 'on the same or more favorable terms' that 'may be further extended' (claims 3946, 3602). Those options should be treated as optionality, not backlog. The purchase-order totals are identical at September 30, 2025 and December 31, 2025, which suggests no new orders were placed in the fourth quarter. The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695, 5705, 5699, 5701) is a signed agreement but governs board seats and a standstill, with no commercial terms. The Coinbase prime broker and custody agreement (claims 5226, 5227) and the equity sales agency agreement (claim 3947) are also service and financing relationships. The only true revenue customer on record is Advanced Micro Devices. AMD signed a 10-year lease for 25 MW of critical IT load at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3598, 3615, 3621, 3608), and Riot says the first phase was producing revenue by January 2026 (claim 11721). The lease's expansion rights, up to an additional 75 MW plus a right of first refusal (claim 1863), are options rather than contracted capacity. The renewal terms in claim 1864 are three successive five-year periods; the quote is truncated beyond that point. Every counterparty is named, and nothing is described only as an unidentified 'anchor customer' or 'strategic partner'. Concentration has shifted from no contracted revenue counterparty at all, since mining revenue comes from the Bitcoin network, to a single named tenant that holds all disclosed data-center lease revenue. The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No lease rate, total contract value or recognized AMD revenue is cited, so the 25 MW commitment cannot be tied to reported figures, and any valuation of the 75 MW expansion would be speculative.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-13Riot's announced partnerships distinguish clearly executed agreements from preliminary arrangements, with all five named counterparties holding signed commitments. Bitfarms (claims 5695, 5704) represents a September 2024 settlement agreement granting board nomination rights through June 2026, structured as governance rather than customer revenue. Coinbase (claims 5226, 5227) operates as a custody provider under a signed Prime Broker Agreement executed December 2024, with no disclosed revenue terms. MicroBT (claims 3944, 3945) reflects Riot's primary supply relationship: a master purchase agreement dated June 23, 2023, with seven executed purchase orders totaling $779.5 million through September 2025 and annual options through December 2027 (claims 3602, 3946). AMD (claims 3902, 3615, 1861) involves a signed 10-year lease initially sized at 25 megawatts in January 2026, expanded to 50 megawatts in April 2026, with potential capacity reaching 200 megawatts through additional options (claims 1865, 9625). Anthropic emerged in August 2026 as Riot's largest disclosed customer, introduced initially as "a leading frontier AI lab" (claim 8748) but identified by name days later (claim 2922), holding a signed 20-year lease for 191 megawatts projected to generate $9.1 billion in total contract revenue (claims 8248, 8737).
Counterparty concentration has shifted decisively toward customer concentration. Early 2026 partnerships served governance, custody, supply, and infrastructure functions; Anthropic's August announcement fundamentally altered this mix. The AI customer now controls approximately 191 of 241 contracted Rockdale megawatts, representing roughly 79 percent of disclosed capacity. AMD retains 50 megawatts with expansion optionality, creating dual leverage dynamics.
Revenue metrics reveal material discrepancies. AMD's 50-megawatt lease generates stated total contract revenue of $636 million (claim 9626), implying approximately $12.7 million per megawatt. Anthropic's 191-megawatt, 20-year lease projects $9.1 billion, or roughly $47.6 million per megawatt across the full contract term. The per-megawatt differential approaches fourfold. Riot has not publicly explained this disparity—whether driven by differing lease escalation structures, customer creditworthiness, capacity utilization schedules, or incomplete revenue disclosure. The arithmetic gap warrants clarification before investors can assess revenue durability or normalize these arrangements for peer comparison.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-13Riot's disclosed customer and partnership agreements separate into distinct tiers: investor relations settlements, vendor relationships, and infrastructure leases. The Bitfarms arrangement (claims 5695–5705, September 2024) is not a customer agreement. Riot and Bitfarms executed a settlement agreement establishing voting commitments and standstill restrictions through June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), in exchange for director nomination rights (claims 5697, 5705). This reflects corporate governance negotiation following activist positioning, not customer acquisition. Coinbase provides custody and prime brokerage services (claims 5226–5227, December 2024), constituting a vendor relationship rather than customer revenue source. MicroBT Electronics Technology Co., Ltd. represents Riot's primary equipment supplier under a master purchase agreement dated June 23, 2023 (claim 3944). Through September 30, 2025, Riot executed seven purchase orders totaling approximately $779.5 million (claim 3945), with renewal options through December 31, 2027 (claim 3946). Infrastructure leasing now dominates disclosed customer arrangements. Advanced Micro Devices commenced a 10-year capacity lease at Rockdale in January 2026 for 25 megawatts (claims 3902, 3615), operationalized within that month (claim 11721). AMD subsequently exercised expansion options for an additional 25 megawatts in April 2026 (claim 1865), bringing total contracted capacity to 50 megawatts with stated total contract revenue of $636 million (claim 9626). Riot initially disclosed a second infrastructure customer as "a leading frontier AI lab" for a 191-megawatt, 20-year lease generating $9.1 billion in total contract revenue (claims 8737–8748, August 2026). Subsequent SEC filings explicitly identified this counterparty as Anthropic (claims 2922, 507, 1189, 8248), eliminating prior generic language. This disclosure sequence—anonymous announcement followed by explicit identification—represents material information timing lag. Counterparty concentration has shifted sharply toward two infrastructure lessees. AMD and Anthropic combined represent approximately $9.7 billion in disclosed contract value, with Anthropic alone accounting for 93.7 percent of total disclosed revenue. This concentration, paired with reliance on frontier AI expansion, materializes significant customer diversification risk. The disclosed revenue figures reconcile arithmetically with stated lease terms and capacities, though the 20-year Anthropic projection compounds multi-decade estimation risk inherent in long-term infrastructure contracts.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-11Riot Platforms' disclosed customer and partnership agreements predominantly reflect executed, signed contracts rather than preliminary arrangements. Named counterparties across all material agreements include MicroBT (hardware supplier, claim 3944), Coinbase (custodian, claim 5226), AMD (data center tenant, claim 3902), and Anthropic (data center tenant, claims 8737-8748). The only non-customer strategic agreement is the Bitfarms settlement (claim 5695), which created director nomination rights rather than revenue-generating obligations. No material agreements are described solely through "strategic partner" or "anchor customer" language without identification; the Frontier AI lab referenced in claims 8748 and 8737 was named as Anthropic in subsequent disclosures (claims 507, 1189).
Counterparty concentration has shifted materially toward large-scale AI compute capacity customers. Through 2025, MicroBT represented the primary capital commitment at $779.5 million in executed purchase orders under a master agreement dated June 23, 2023 (claim 3945). AMD's entry in January 2026 began a capacity-focused relationship that expanded from 25 MW (claim 3902) to 50 MW contracted capacity by April 2026 (claim 9621), with an additional 100 MW option available (claim 9625). Anthropic's August 2026 agreement dwarfs prior commitments: 191 MW over 20 years with $9.1 billion in stated initial contract revenue (claim 8748), plus a potential $16.1 billion from two 5-year extension options (claim 8738).
Revenue arithmetic across these deals presents timing inconsistencies that warrant scrutiny. AMD's 50 MW lease generates $636 million in total contract revenue over its stated 10-year term (claim 9626), translating to approximately $12.7 million per megawatt annually. Anthropic's 191 MW lease claims $9.1 billion over 20 years, or roughly $119 million per megawatt annually—an order of magnitude higher per-megawatt rate. This disparity may reflect capacity-type differences, staggered deployment schedules (claim 3622 noted MicroBT miners would arrive by Q2 2026), or differing service-level pricing, but the company has not reconciled why identical capacity commands such different unit economics. Additionally, whether the $9.1 billion Anthropic figure represents revenue recognized upfront or amortized over the 20-year term remains unstated across all filings.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-11Riot Platforms' announced customer and partnership engagements fall into three distinct categories with clear progression toward infrastructure leasing as a revenue model. The company has disclosed primarily signed, named agreements rather than non-binding frameworks or pilots. Early commitments—including the September 2024 settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695) and the Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement for digital asset custody (claim 5226)—represent governance and operational partnerships rather than revenue-generating customer relationships. By contrast, subsequent announcements disclose material signed supply and capacity agreements with named counterparties.
The MicroBT long-term master purchase and sale agreement, dated June 23, 2023 (claim 3944), represents Riot's equipment procurement strategy; through December 31, 2025, the company executed seven purchase orders totaling approximately $779.5 million for 49.2 EH/s of mining capacity (claim 3600). This relationship is unambiguously a signed supply agreement with revenue-bearing obligations and stated delivery milestones, with all miners expected by Q2 2026 (claim 3622). The AMD data center lease (initially announced January 2026, claim 3598) began as a 10-year commitment for 25 MW; an April 2026 amendment (claim 1865) documents AMD exercising an expansion option for an additional 25 MW, bringing total contracted capacity to 50 MW and committed revenue to $636 million (claim 9626). This demonstrates a customer deepening its relationship through formalized option exercises, not preliminary discussions.
The most significant announced customer—a "leading frontier AI lab" (claim 8748, August 9, 2026)—was identified only generically in the initial filing but formally named as Anthropic in subsequent disclosures (claim 1189, August 10, 2026). The 20-year data center lease for 191 MW at Rockdale, Texas, carries an expected initial contract value of $9.1 billion (claim 8250), with two five-year extension options potentially adding $16.1 billion (claim 8738). Counterparty concentration has consolidated sharply: AMD and Anthropic now dominate announced deals by value, representing infrastructure-as-a-service revenue rather than minority stakes or custody relationships. The revenue arithmetic—$779.5 million in signed MicroBT commitments, $636 million from AMD, and $9.1 billion from Anthropic—reflects material signed commitments rather than soft partnerships, though the long-dated nature of these leases creates lumpy, forward-weighted revenue recognition profiles that require careful reconciliation against quarterly results.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-09Riot's disclosed customer and partnership agreements reveal a strategic pivot from hardware procurement to data center capacity leasing, with material concentration risk emerging in H2 2026. The company has executed three categories of substantive agreements: signed customer contracts (MicroBT hardware master agreement, AMD and Anthropic leases), custodial/financial service agreements (Coinbase Prime Broker), and a governance settlement (Bitfarms, claim 5695). Of these, only MicroBT, AMD, and Anthropic represent customer revenue-generating agreements; Bitfarms is a standstill/voting agreement expiring June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), and Coinbase is a digital asset custody arrangement.
Counterparty naming reveals disclosure discipline inconsistency. Claims 8737–8748 dated August 9, 2026 refer to "a leading frontier AI lab" without identification for a 191 MW, 20-year lease generating $9.1 billion in initial contract revenue. The counterparty is subsequently named Anthropic only in August 10 filings (claims 1189, 507, 402). This one-day lag from unnamed to named on Riot's largest announced deal warrants scrutiny: either the name was withheld pending announcement coordination, or disclosure protocols shifted mid-announcement cycle.
Concentration has accelerated sharply. MicroBT represented the primary capital commitment through 2025 ($779.5 million in purchase orders for 49.2 EH/s as of December 31, 2025, claim 3600). AMD entered with a 10-year lease for 25 MW announced January 2026 (claim 3902), expanded to 50 MW in April 2026 with $636 million in total contract revenue (claim 9626). The Anthropic agreement, disclosed in August 2026, dwarfs both: 191 MW at $9.1 billion. Anthropic alone now represents approximately 90% of disclosed long-term lease contract value.
Revenue arithmetic reconciliation is limited by asset class. MicroBT's $779.5 million reflects capital expenditure on miners, not operating revenue. AMD's $636 million and Anthropic's $9.1 billion are stated as "total contract revenue" on 50 MW and 191 MW leases respectively, spanning 10 years and 20 years (claims 9626, 8748). Annualized, this implies AMD at ~$12.7 million per MW annually and Anthropic at ~$23.9 million per MW annually—a material price divergence unexplained in public filings. This gap and the absence of revenue-recognition guidance by customer make forward earnings forecasting contingent on lease profitability assumptions not yet disclosed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-06Riot's disclosed customer agreements differentiate sharply between equipment suppliers (MicroBT) and data center lessees (AMD, Anthropic). The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695, 5704) is a corporate governance matter—board seat nomination and voting commitments—not a customer revenue agreement. Coinbase (claims 5226, 5227) is a custody service provider, also not a customer in the traditional sense.
The material customer relationships are facility leases at Rockdale. AMD was named consistently and contracted initially for 25 MW in January 2026 (claim 3902), then expanded to 50 MW in April 2026 (claim 1865). AMD lease pricing remains undisclosed. A second major lease was announced August 9, 2026, with a tenant identified only as a "leading frontier AI lab" (claims 8737, 8748)—191 MW, 20-year term, $9.1B total contract revenue. Anthropic was identified as the counterparty by third parties on August 10, 2026 (claims 2922, 7559, 420), yet Riot's same-day SEC filing (claim 8248) preserved anonymity, describing only "a leading frontier AI company." The Anthropic lease includes two optional 5-year renewals representing approximately $7B additional value, bringing potential total to $16.1B if both are exercised (claim 8738).
Counterparty concentration has shifted decisively. Through 2025, AMD at 25 MW represented Riot's largest disclosed customer commitment. The Anthropic agreement—191 MW—now dominates contracted capacity and revenue visibility. Combined, AMD (50 MW) and Anthropic (191 MW) total 241 MW of committed load, with Anthropic representing roughly $9.1B of disclosed base-term revenue. MicroBT claims (3600, 3945)—$779.5M through September 2025—reflect Riot's equipment capex, not customer revenue. The $9.1B Anthropic figure is labeled "initial contract revenue," likely denoting the base 20-year commitment excluding extension optionality; actual full-term economic value (if extensions exercise) could reach $16.1B.
The named-to-unnamed disclosure pattern is material. Anthropic was initially anonymous in Riot's official announcement and SEC filing, then identified publicly within one day. This lag distinguishes regulatory disclosure practice (anonymity maintained) from market reporting (name disclosed), creating a disclosure asymmetry that resolved quickly but illustrates Riot's initial discretion over counterparty identity.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-06Riot Platforms has disclosed three material revenue-generating customer agreements and several governance-focused arrangements. The company's customer base shows extreme concentration risk alongside selective initial anonymity.
Named signed customer agreements include: Advanced Micro Devices for a 25-megawatt initial data center lease announced January 2026 (claim 3902), expanded to 50 megawatts in April 2026 through an amendment exercising AMD's expansion option (claim 1865); and Anthropic for a 191-megawatt, 20-year lease announced August 2026 (claim 420). Notably, Anthropic was initially disclosed only as "a leading frontier AI company" without counterparty identification in SEC filings (claim 8248) before the company was named in subsequent announcements (claim 7559). MicroBT Electronics represents a distinct supplier relationship—not a customer—with seven executed purchase orders totaling $779.5 million in equipment commitments through September 2025 (claim 3945).
The Bitfarms and Coinbase arrangements are governance and treasury infrastructure relationships rather than customer agreements. The Bitfarms settlement (claim 5695) establishes standstill provisions and board nomination rights through June 2026, while the Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement (claim 5226) provides digital asset custody services.
Revenue concentration is extraordinary. Riot has disclosed approximately $9.8 billion in contracted revenue from AMD and Anthropic combined, before extension options (claim 417). The Anthropic agreement alone carries initial contract value of approximately $9.1 billion over twenty years (claim 8250). Yet Q2 2026 quarterly results showed only $23.2 million from the Data Center segment (claim 419)—suggesting either minimal revenue recognition to date or that headline figures represent total contract values rather than near-term cash flow. This reconciliation gap warrants scrutiny: if $9.1 billion is recognized ratably over 20 years, annual revenue would average approximately $455 million, yet one quarter in 2026 contributed only $23.2 million.
Counterparty concentration has shifted materially. Through 2025, Riot's primary infrastructure partner was AMD. The August 2026 Anthropic announcement introduced a single customer representing potentially 90 percent of disclosed future contracted data center revenue, creating substantial execution and renewal risk. Neither customer represents a multi-year framework; both are fixed-term leases with defined capacity and duration. The evolution shows Riot pivoting from a distributed model toward dependency on two AI infrastructure customers.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-06Riot's customer and partnership disclosures demonstrate a clear distinction between binding operational agreements and governance arrangements, though initial naming obscures true revenue concentration. MicroBT represents a signed, executed supply relationship: through December 31, 2025, Riot executed seven purchase orders under a June 2023 master agreement totaling $779.5 million for approximately 49.2 EH/s of mining capacity (claims 3945, 3600). AMD constitutes a binding lease agreement executed in January 2026 for 25 megawatts of critical IT capacity at Rockdale, subsequently expanded to 50 MW in April 2026 (claims 3902, 1865, 887). These are disclosed as complete, signed contracts with specific commercial terms. Anthropic, by contrast, entered Riot's disclosures via deliberate anonymity. The company initially disclosed a 20-year lease agreement with a leading frontier AI lab on August 10, 2026, worth approximately $9.1 billion in contract revenue (claims 8250, 402), only identifying the counterparty as Anthropic in parallel filings (claims 7559, 507, 2922). This pattern—signed, binding lease agreement but delayed counterparty identification—distinguishes material customer relationships from governance arrangements. The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claims 5695, 5699) represents voting rights and board nomination protections, not customer revenue; similarly, the Coinbase custody relationship (claim 5226) is a service provider arrangement, not operational revenue. Counterparty concentration has undergone dramatic compression since mid-2026. Prior to August, Riot's disclosed customer base centered on MicroBT and AMD. The August 2026 Anthropic announcement elevated a single customer to approximately $9.1 billion in nominal contract value, representing roughly 92 percent of disclosed AI customer revenue. Claim 417 suggests combined contracted revenue from the two AI companies totals $9.8 billion, implying AMD's lease generates approximately $700 million over its initial term. However, revenue arithmetic remains notional. Q2 2026 reported data center revenue of only $23.2 million (claim 419), indicating these leases generate forward-looking revenue recognition rather than immediate cash flow. The discrepancy between $9.8 billion in signed lease value and minimal near-term revenue reflects the temporal asymmetry between long-term contractual commitments and their economic realization.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-06Riot's disclosed customer and partnership agreements present a clear distinction between signed, binding arrangements and framework discussions. The company names all material commercial counterparties: MicroBT Electronics Technology (mining equipment supplier), AMD (data center lessee), and Anthropic (AI computing capacity tenant). The Bitfarms settlement structure (claims 5695–5704, September 2024) and Coinbase prime-brokerage arrangement (claims 5226–5227, December 2024) are fully executed agreements governing control stakes and digital asset custody, not pilot or discussion stages. None of the disclosed customer relationships are characterized as MOUs, LOIs, or pilot frameworks.
The evolution of counterparty concentration reveals material consolidation in data center revenue. AMD progressed from a 25 MW initial lease (claims 3902, 3598, announced January 2026) to an amended 50 MW agreement (claim 1865, April 2026), demonstrating expansion of an existing relationship. MicroBT represents a supplier relationship: 49.2 EH/s of miners were acquired through seven executed purchase orders totaling $779.5 million as of September 2025 (claim 3945), with additional annual options through December 2027 (claim 3946). The Anthropic 20-year lease (claims 8250, 8248, announced August 2026) for 191 MW at $9.1 billion in initial contract revenue represents Riot's largest disclosed customer commitment.
The revenue arithmetic reveals substantial timing mismatch between announcement and cash recognition. Q2 2026 data center segment revenue totaled $23.2 million (claim 419), despite concurrent AMD deployment at 50 MW and the August 2026 Anthropic lease announcement citing approximately $9.8 billion in combined contracted revenue across AMD and Anthropic (claim 417). This gap reflects contract commencement timing: Anthropic's lease commenced in August 2026, late in the quarter, and AMD's initial deployment similarly trails announcement. The disclosed figures treat signed contracts as revenue contracts despite deferred billing cycles—standard infrastructure practice but material for distinguishing announced deal volume from near-term cash generation.
One disclosure distinction: Anthropic was initially described as "a leading frontier AI lab" in the August 10 SEC filing (claim 8248) before later identification, a confidentiality accommodation in regulatory disclosure.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot has disclosed two material signed data center capacity agreements and one non-binding expansion framework. The anchor customer agreement, a 20-year lease with Anthropic for 191 megawatts announced August 10, 2026, carries approximately $9.1 billion in initial contracted revenue (claim 402, 420, 435). Riot initially withheld Anthropic's name in its SEC filing, identifying the counterparty only as "a leading frontier AI company" before public disclosure confirmed the identity (claim 8248, 7559). A secondary signed lease with Advanced Micro Devices, executed January 2026 for 25 megawatts and amended April 2026 to 50 megawatts, represents the only other named customer agreement of scale (claim 1861, 1865, 887). Management disclosed combined contracted revenue from the "two AI companies" at approximately $9.8 billion (claim 417), implying AMD's 10-year lease generates roughly $700 million. Riot also executed a "non-binding Letter of Intent" at Corsicana (claim 8529), a categorical distinction from signed agreements, though the tenant name remains undisclosed.
Counterparty concentration presents material risk. Anthropic and AMD collectively represent the company's entire disclosed customer base for revenue-generating capacity, with Anthropic alone representing 191 of 241 contracted megawatts. The company's non-binding Corsicana LOI for approximately 1 gigawatt suggests nascent pipeline diversification, but carries no contractual certainty.
Revenue arithmetic raises reconciliation questions. If Anthropic's $9.1 billion contract spans 20 years, implied annual revenue averages approximately $455 million. Yet Riot reported Q2 2026 data center segment revenue of only $23.2 million (claim 419), despite both the AMD and Anthropic contracts being operationalized by that period. This gap suggests either deferred contract ramp, backend-loaded revenue recognition tied to deployment milestones, or that Q2 2026 represented an early-stage inflection point. Management should clarify whether the $9.8 billion represents upfront cash recognition, annual recurring revenue guidance, or cash-basis accounting, and reconcile implied run-rate with near-term quarterly performance. The reliance on two undiversified customers for 100% of disclosed data center revenue creates outsized contract concentration risk while the Corsicana LOI remains too preliminary to offset exposure.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed partnership and customer base consists entirely of named, executed agreements with no material framework arrangements, MOUs, or pilot programs. The company's announced counterparties fall into two categories: revenue-generating data center customers (AMD, Anthropic, MicroBT) and service providers or governance-related arrangements (Coinbase custody, Bitfarms settlement). AMD and Anthropic represent the material capacity commitments. AMD's arrangement (claims 1861, 1865) expanded from an initial 25 MW lease signed in January 2026 to 50 MW of contracted critical IT load capacity following an April 2026 amendment. The lease carries a ten-year initial term with expansion options for up to 75 MW additional capacity and a right of first refusal on further commitments. Anthropic's 20-year lease (claims 402, 507, 8248) for 191 MW at Rockdale represents Riot's largest signed customer commitment, with approximately $9.1 billion in contracted initial-term revenue (claims 402, 412, 420). The $9.8 billion combined contracted revenue figure (claim 417) from both AI customers implies AMD's initial-term obligations at approximately $700–800 million over ten years, assuming near-parity with Anthropic's disclosed $2.38 million per megawatt per year. Q2 2026 data center segment revenue of $23.2 million (claim 419) reflects deployment in its infancy. MicroBT purchase orders ($779.5 million through September 2025; claims 3945, 3600) represent a supplier relationship rather than a revenue-producing customer. Counterparty concentration shifted dramatically in August 2026, when Anthropic became dominant with 191 MW of committed capacity. Prior announcements focused on MicroBT supplier commitments and AMD's initial 25 MW agreement. All material counterparties are specifically named; no unnamed 'strategic partners,' 'anchor customers,' or generic framework agreements appear in disclosed claims. Coinbase's December 2024 Prime Broker agreement (claims 5226, 5227) is a custodial service arrangement outside the capacity-lease model, while the September 2024 Bitfarms settlement (claim 5695) reflects corporate governance rather than revenue partnership. Riot's announced customer and partner disclosures contain no material undisclosed counterparties or preliminary arrangements.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's customer announcements reveal a sharp pivot from infrastructure partnerships to dominant concentration in a single customer. Of seven material counterparty relationships disclosed between September 2024 and August 2026, five are signed agreements: MicroBT (long-term master purchase agreement dated June 23, 2023, with seven executed purchase orders totaling $779.5 million through September 2025, per claims 3944, 3945); AMD (10-year lease agreement signed January 2026, expanded in April 2026 from 25 MW to 50 MW, per claims 3902, 1865); Anthropic (20-year lease agreement for 191 MW, per claim 8248); Coinbase (Prime Broker Agreement, December 2024, per claim 5226); and Bitfarms (settlement agreement, September 2024, per claim 5704, though this is governance-related rather than customer revenue). The Bitfarms agreement involves board nomination rights and voting commitments, not operating revenue. Coinbase appears to be a custody and credit provider, not a revenue customer. MicroBT and AMD represent supplier and infrastructure relationships, not customer concentration. The material shift arrives with Anthropic. Riot disclosed this 20-year agreement initially as a "leading frontier AI company" (claim 8248, August 10, 2026) without naming Anthropic, only later confirming the counterparty identity in subsequent filings (claims 7559, 507, August 10; claim 420, August 11). This phased disclosure—anonymous, then named—is atypical for material customer contracts and suggests either regulatory guidance or strategic timing around the announcement. Revenue reconciliation shows material concentration: claim 417 (August 12, 2026) cites "approximately $9.8 billion of contracted revenue" from "two AI companies," with Anthropic representing $9.1 billion over the lease term (claims 412, 434). This suggests a second AI customer contributes roughly $700 million, though no second customer is explicitly named. AMD, despite expanded capacity, carries no disclosed revenue figure, only megawatt commitments. Counterparty evolution tracks a fundamental business shift: early 2024 focused on supplier and governance risk management (MicroBT, Bitfarms, Coinbase); by mid-2026, Anthropic alone represents 93 percent of disclosed contracted revenue, creating severe customer concentration risk previously absent from Riot's customer base.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed partnerships fall cleanly into signed, executed agreements rather than framework or pilot arrangements. The company has named all material counterparties: MicroBT (master purchase agreement, June 2023), AMD (initial 25 MW lease January 2026, expanded to 50 MW April 2026), and Anthropic (20-year, 191 MW lease announced August 2026). A temporal identification issue clouds the Anthropic deal—Riot initially disclosed it as a "leading frontier AI lab" without naming the counterparty (claims 8250, 8248), only revealing the customer identity in subsequent filings (claims 507, 2922). This naming delay, while ultimately transparent, creates a brief window where material customer identity remained undisclosed.
Counterparty concentration has shifted dramatically. Through 2025, Riot was primarily a buyer of mining hardware from MicroBT ($779.5 million in executed purchase orders through September 2025, claims 3945, 3600). By mid-2026, Riot had pivoted to operating data center capacity, with AMD and Anthropic representing the disclosed revenue base. The concentration is severe: Anthropic accounts for approximately $9.1 billion of the $9.8 billion in total contracted revenue across both AI companies (claim 417), meaning a single customer represents 92.8 percent of announced data center segment revenue. AMD's 50 MW lease generates the remaining $700 million of disclosed contracted revenue, assuming equal pricing across both deals.
The revenue arithmetic presents a material timing gap. Riot disclosed $9.8 billion in contracted revenue from these two customers yet reported only $23.2 million in data center segment revenue for Q2 2026 (claim 419), with total company revenue of $174.2 million. This 426-to-1 ratio between contracted and recognized revenue reflects the long-term nature of these leases—the Anthropic deal generates roughly $455 million annually over twenty years, but actual cash and recognized revenue lag significantly behind contract announcement. The gap suggests either deployment delays or back-loaded revenue recognition under the lease structures, neither of which Riot has explicitly addressed in the claim language provided.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed partnerships separate cleanly into distinct categories requiring careful distinction. Bitfarms represents a governance settlement, not customer revenue; the September 2024 accord (claims 5695, 5704) grants Riot director nomination rights and voting commitments on board matters, but generates no business revenue. Coinbase (claims 5226, 5227) is a custody and prime broker service provider under a December 2024 agreement—an operational arrangement rather than a revenue-generating customer contract. These two counterparties, both named, are not customers.
The actual customer relationships concentrate heavily in two segments. MicroBT is a named equipment supplier under a June 2023 master purchase agreement (claim 3944), amended through 2025, with $779.5 million in executed purchase orders through September 2025 (claim 3945) and extension options through December 2027 (claims 3946, 3602). This represents a signed, fully committed supply arrangement with specific deliverables and pricing.
Data center customer concentration has shifted dramatically and narrowed. AMD signed a 10-year lease beginning January 2026 (claims 3902, 3598) initially for 25 MW, then exercised expansion options in April 2026 to bring total contracted capacity to 50 MW (claims 1861, 1865, 887). Anthropic, disclosed initially only as "a leading frontier AI lab" in Riot's August 10 SEC filing (claims 402, 8250), was subsequently named in third-party reporting (claims 7559, 507, 420) as executing a 20-year lease for 191 MW. Together, the two companies represent approximately $9.8 billion in contracted revenue (claim 417).
The revenue arithmetic reveals significant execution timing gaps. Q2 2026 data center segment revenue reached only $23.2 million (claim 419) despite $9.8 billion in contracted commitments across AMD and Anthropic. This reflects backlog-to-revenue timing: the Anthropic agreement, announced August 2026, spans twenty years at approximately $455 million annually; the AMD relationship, announced January 2026, had generated minimal revenue six months into the quarter. No pilot, framework, or MOU language appears in these disclosures—all named arrangements are signed leases with specified capacity, terms, and renewal provisions. Counterparty concentration presents material risk: two AI companies account for substantially all disclosed data center revenue growth, creating singular vertical dependency with minimal diversification.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed customer and partnership portfolio evolved markedly through 2026, transitioning from activist intervention (Bitfarms) and equipment procurement (MicroBT) into infrastructure tenancy with named AI and semiconductor counterparties. All major partnerships disclosed since mid-2023 appear to constitute signed agreements rather than memoranda of understanding, letters of intent, or pilot arrangements.
The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5695, September 2024) represents a forced governance restructuring—Riot obtained director nomination rights and agreed to standstill provisions binding until June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), a framework imposed through settlement rather than operational partnership. The MicroBT master supply agreement (claim 3944, dated June 23, 2023) involved seven executed purchase orders totaling $779.5 million through September 2025 (claim 3945), with additional annual purchase options through December 2027 (claim 3947), establishing a genuine supplier relationship with binding obligations.
Infrastructure partnerships crystallized in early 2026. AMD initiated a 10-year lease for 25 megawatts (claim 3902, January 2026), subsequently amended to 50 megawatts in April 2026 (claim 1865), with expansion options for up to an additional 75 megawatts and renewal provisions extending to forty years (claims 1863–1864). Riot initially disclosed its largest agreement opaquely: the August 10, 2026 filing identified a 20-year, 191-megawatt lease as signed by "a leading frontier AI lab" (claim 8248) with approximately $9.1 billion in initial contracted revenue (claim 402). Subsequent disclosures identified the counterparty as Anthropic (claims 507, 2922, 7559, 420).
Concentration risk appears modest. Two named counterparties—AMD and Anthropic—account for approximately $9.8 billion in contracted revenue (claim 417), with AMD holding expansion options suggesting potential upside. However, contracted revenue of $9.8 billion distributed across 20 years represents approximately $490 million annually before extension options; Q2 2026 data center revenue of only $23.2 million (claim 419) indicates early-stage deployment. The revenue discrepancy suggests either staggered occupancy ramps or deferred revenue recognition, requiring clarification on contract commencement dates and capital deployment schedules to validate the revenue arithmetic against physical capacity deployment.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed customer and partnership base reflects a transition from supplier and custody relationships to concentrated data-center leasing agreements. All major counterparties named in claims are parties to executed agreements rather than memoranda of understanding or framework discussions. The Bitfarms settlement (claim 5695) is a governance accord, not a revenue contract. The Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement (claim 5226) is a custody and credit service; Riot pays Coinbase, not vice versa. MicroBT Electronics (claims 3944–3945) represents a supplier relationship: Riot has executed seven purchase orders totaling $779.5 million through September 2025, with additional annual options through December 2027, converting supplier capital expenditure into potential future optionality.
The material shift concerns data-center lease customers. Advanced Micro Devices signed a long-term lease beginning January 2026 for 25 megawatts, expanded to 50 megawatts by April 2026 (claims 3598, 1865). Anthropic entered into a 20-year agreement in August 2026 for 191 megawatts, disclosed initially as "a leading frontier AI company" without identification (claim 8248) before the company name emerged in secondary sources. Both are signed leases, not pilots or frameworks.
Counterparty concentration has compressed sharply. Through mid-2024, Riot's disclosed partnerships were distributed—Bitfarms (governance), Coinbase (custody), suppliers. By August 2026, two customers—AMD and Anthropic—commanded 241 megawatts of the Rockdale campus, or roughly 97 percent of publicly disclosed data-center capacity. This represents extreme customer concentration risk: a dual-counterparty book.
Revenue arithmetic reveals a timing disconnect. Riot disclosed approximately $9.8 billion in contracted revenue from AMD and Anthropic combined (claim 417): AMD at roughly $0.7 billion annualized at 50 megawatts, Anthropic at $9.1 billion over twenty years. Yet Q2 2026 data-center segment revenue totaled $23.2 million (claim 419). The reconciliation lies in contract commencement and revenue-recognition schedules. The Anthropic agreement, signed August 2026, likely did not generate material revenue until Q3 or Q4 2026. The massive contracted value reflects annualized or total-period commitments, not immediate cash flow. AMD's earlier start (January 2026) explains the Q2 contribution. Whether Riot's revenue forecasts align with actual deployment schedules and payment milestones remains unaudited by public filings to date.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's announced customer base has undergone significant concentration around a single major counterparty. Through December 2025, Riot's most substantial signed customer agreement was with Anthropic, a frontier AI lab, announced August 10, 2026 (claims 2922, 8248). The initial SEC filing on August 10 employed euphemistic language, describing the counterparty only as "a leading frontier AI company" (claim 8248). By August 11-13, Riot explicitly named Anthropic (claims 7559, 420, 435), resolving what had been a material unnamed customer generating $9.1 billion of contracted revenue over the lease's 20-year term (claim 412).
Revenue concentration is extreme. Claim 417 discloses "approximately $9.8 billion of contracted revenue" attributed to "two AI companies." The discrepancy warrants scrutiny: Anthropic accounts for $9.1 billion (claim 412); the second AI company appears to be AMD, yet AMD's arrangement is structurally inverted—Riot leases capacity from AMD at its Rockdale site (claim 1865), making Riot the customer, not AMD. The $9.8 billion figure therefore likely double-counts the Anthropic deal or miscategorizes AMD. Announced in January 2026 (claim 3902) and expanded in April 2026 (claim 1865), the AMD lease grew from 25 MW to 50 MW, with options for 75 additional megawatts and a right of first refusal on 100 MW (claim 1863). This is material capex, not customer revenue.
Separately, the Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695-5705, September 2024) bears no resemblance to a customer contract; it is a shareholder activism truce. Riot obtained board nomination rights and voting commitments under standstill provisions expiring June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). MicroBT ($779.5 million in purchase orders through September 2025, claim 3945) and Coinbase (custody agreement, claims 5226-5227) are suppliers and service providers, not revenue-generating customers.
The reconciliation problem cuts deeper: Q2 2026 data-center segment revenue reached $23.2 million (claim 419), a fraction of what annualized Anthropic revenue ($450+ million annually on a $9.1B twenty-year contract) should suggest. Either deployment ramp is severely delayed, revenue recognition is deferred, or the contracted figure inflates pricing assumptions. The unnamed-to-named lag and the AMD miscategorization suggest Riot deployed opacity strategically during its August announcements.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed customer partnerships divide into governance arrangements (2024) and contracted data center capacity (2025-2026), with all material counterparties explicitly named. No material MOU, LOI, or framework-stage language appears in the record; claims consistently reference executed agreements, amendments, or binding purchase orders.
In September 2024, Riot disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claims 5695-5705) granting board nomination rights and voting commitments through June 2026—a governance arrangement, not customer revenue. December 2024 brought a named custody relationship with Coinbase (claims 5226-5227), similarly non-revenue-generating. The commercial profile shifts materially in 2025-2026. Riot's June 2023 master agreement with MicroBT Electronics (claim 3599) produced seven executed purchase orders totaling $779.5M through September 2025 (claim 3945), with additional annual options through December 2027—binding capex rather than customer contracts.
Data center capacity leases to named customers emerged as primary growth: AMD (25 MW initial lease announced January 2026, expanded to 50 MW under binding April amendment per claim 1865) and Anthropic (191 MW, 20-year lease, announced August 2026). All counterparties are explicitly identified by legal entity; no "strategic partner" or "anchor customer" language obscures identity.
Concentration evolved from fragmented governance/service relationships to two dominant customers. Anthropic alone commands $9.1 billion in initial-term contracted revenue (claims 402, 420), yet claim 417 references $9.8 billion of contracted revenue across unnamed "two AI companies"—indicating either a second undisclosed AI customer, Anthropic's contract exceeding disclosed figures, or revenue from extension options not separately broken out. This one-billion-dollar discrepancy lacks clear attribution.
Revenue arithmetic shows material opacity. Q2 2026 data center segment revenue was $23.2M (claim 419), pre-dating the August Anthropic announcement. Anthropic's $9.1B over 20 years projects roughly $455M annually, yet no deployment or revenue recognition impact appears in disclosed quarterly results through Q2. AMD's lease revenue remains entirely unquantified despite 50 MW contracted capacity. The gap between $9.1B announced backlog and minimal Q2 revenue suggests either revenue recognition lags contract execution, or deployment has not commenced. Without AMD's revenue attribution or the identity of the second AI company referenced in claim 417, total customer concentration and revenue trajectory remain incompletely disclosed.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot Platforms has announced five counterparty relationships across customer, supplier, and governance categories, though only two constitute signed revenue-bearing customer agreements. The Anthropic lease (claim 435), signed in August 2026 for 191 megawatts of capacity over twenty years, is valued at $9.1 billion in contracted revenue and explicitly names Anthropic as the customer. The AMD data center lease (claim 3621), initially executed in January 2026 for 25 megawatts and amended in April 2026 to 50 megawatts (claim 1865), is similarly signed and named. Both agreements specify capacity, term length, and revenue with unambiguous language; neither uses pilot, framework, or MOU terminology.
The remaining three relationships are mischaracterized as customer partnerships. The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5695), announced September 2024, grants Riot governance rights and board nomination privileges with explicit term expiration on June 1, 2026 (claim 5701)—a corporate positioning play, not a revenue partnership. The Coinbase arrangement (claim 5226) establishes custody and brokerage services for Riot's digital assets, positioning Riot as Coinbase's customer. The MicroBT master purchase agreement (claim 3599), dated June 23, 2023, obligated Riot to deploy $779.5 million in capital expenditure through December 2025 (claim 3945), making MicroBT Riot's supplier rather than customer.
Counterparty concentration has shifted sharply toward Anthropic. Through 2025, Riot's disclosed relationships centered on capital deployment (MicroBT) and corporate stakes (Bitfarms). AMD became the first infrastructure customer in January 2026 at modest scale. Anthropic's announcement in August 2026 at 191 megawatts immediately dominates the portfolio, accounting for approximately ninety-two percent of all disclosed infrastructure revenue—$9.1 billion of $9.8 billion announced total (claim 417). AMD's specific revenue contribution remains undisclosed.
Revenue arithmetic reveals phase lag between contract execution and realized earnings. Q2 2026 data center segment revenue totaled $23.2 million (claim 419), published before Anthropic's August agreement announcement. The $9.1 billion Anthropic contract implies annual revenue of approximately $455 million upon full deployment, substantially exceeding current quarterly rates. This gap indicates forward-committed agreements with phased deployment timelines rather than immediate monetization. Both AMD and Anthropic likely remain in early utilization phases, with substantial upside subject to execution risk.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed customer and partnership portfolio reflects binding commitments with named counterparties rather than speculative frameworks. The company has executed signed agreements with five material parties: Bitfarms (governance settlement, September 2024); Coinbase (custody services, December 2024); MicroBT (equipment supply, master agreement June 2023, seven purchase orders totaling $779.5 million through September 2025 per claims 3945, 3600); AMD (capacity lease, January 2026 announcement); and Anthropic (flagship customer, August 2026). None involve MOUs, pilots, or discussions—each represents binding contractual terms with named counterparties.
The strategic evolution reveals a striking shift from infrastructure enablement to customer concentration. Bitfarms (claims 5695, 5704) was purely governance-focused: board nomination rights, standstill provisions, voting commitments, zero revenue. Coinbase (claims 5226, 5227) provided asset custody—infrastructure, not customer acquisition. MicroBT constituted capital equipment procurement under a master agreement with additional options through December 2027 (claim 3602), a supply-side relationship that does not generate recurring lease revenue.
AMD marked the inflection point. Initial contracted capacity: 25 MW under a ten-year lease (claim 3902, January 2026). By April 2026, AMD exercised expansion options, bringing committed capacity to 50 MW (claims 1865, 887). AMD represents a genuine data center customer generating lease revenue, though specific contract terms remain undisclosed.
Anthropics's August 2026 agreement fundamentally altered counterparty concentration. The 20-year lease for 191 MW at Rockdale (claims 402, 1189, 435) carries $9.1 billion in disclosed initial-term contracted revenue (claims 412, 420). This single agreement dominates the disclosed customer base: Anthropic represents 191 MW of stated capacity versus AMD's 50 MW—approximately 79 percent of total committed capacity to named customers.
Revenue arithmetic reveals material concentration risk. Riot disclosed approximately $9.8 billion in total contracted data center revenue (claim 417), with Anthropic representing $9.1 billion. This implies AMD and undisclosed relationships generated only $700 million of stated revenue. The company has not named additional data center customers despite capacity references, suggesting either prolonged negotiation timelines, confidentiality restrictions, or supply constraints limiting additional customer acquisition beyond Anthropic.
All identified agreements are binding and signed. No MOUs, letters of intent, or pilots appear in the disclosed record. Counterparty concentration—both capacity allocation and revenue recognition—has compressed dramatically toward a single AI customer announced in late August 2026.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's customer and partnership disclosures present a clear distinction between executed agreements with named counterparties and exploratory governance arrangements. All material contracts cite specific, publicly traded or major institutional counterparties: MicroBT (hardware), Coinbase (custody), AMD (infrastructure), and Anthropic (compute). No claims employ placeholder language such as 'strategic partner' or 'anchor customer' without identification, which simplifies the analysis considerably.
The evolution from 2023 through 2026 reflects a strategic pivot from mining operations to infrastructure provisioning. Through September 2025, Riot executed seven purchase orders under its June 2023 Master Agreement with MicroBT (claims 3945, 3600) totaling approximately $779.5 million—a purchasing commitment, not revenue. Separately, Coinbase's December 2024 custody arrangement (claim 5226) secures digital assets but generates fee expense rather than customer revenue. The Bitfarms settlement (claim 5695, dated September 23, 2024) grants Riot governance rights but is a one-time governance event, not an operational partnership.
Starting in January 2026, Riot pivoted to data center leasing. The AMD Lease (claim 3598, January 2026 announcement) initially committed 25 megawatts, expanded to 50 megawatts by April 2026 (claim 1865). Revenue from the AMD arrangement is not quantified in the supplied claims, though Q2 2026 data center segment revenue reached $23.2 million (claim 419), predating the transformative Anthropic deal.
The August 2026 Anthropic lease (claims 402, 420, 435) represents a material concentration event. The 20-year, 191-megawatt agreement (claim 507) carries approximately $9.1 billion in initial contracted revenue (claims 412, 434, 435), implying roughly $455 million annualized revenue over the base term. Claim 417 adds context: AMD and Anthropic combined represent approximately $9.8 billion of contracted revenue before extension options. The Anthropic deal's magnitude overshadows all prior partnerships and suggests a single-customer concentration risk, though claim 397 notes two five-year extension options at Anthropic's discretion, extending potential upside beyond the initial 20-year horizon.
Arithmetically, the Q2 2026 data center segment revenue of $23.2 million (claim 419) suggests Anthropic's deployment was nascent or postdated that reporting period. The disclosed pipeline appears reconcilable: AMD's 50 megawatts and Anthropic's 191 megawatts represent 241 total committed capacity with stated revenue contracts, though granular pricing per megawatt is not disclosed. The Anthropic concentration—representing 92 percent of the $9.8 billion two-party total (claim 417)—signals both transformative scale and material customer risk.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's announced partnerships consist entirely of signed, binding agreements with specifically named counterparties—no material MOU or framework arrangements appear in the record. The Bitfarms settlement (claim 5695) and Coinbase custody agreement (claims 5226–5227) are governance and custodial instruments, not customer contracts. The material revenue-generating agreements are three: MicroBT (signed June 23, 2023), AMD (signed January 2026, amended April 2026), and Anthropic (signed August 2026).
MicroBT represents a hardware procurement channel: seven purchase orders executed through September 30, 2025, totaling $779.5 million in acquisition cost (claim 3945), with additional annual purchase options through December 31, 2027 (claim 3946). This is capex, not revenue.
The capacity-lease segment reveals acute counterparty concentration. AMD's 10-year lease began at 25 MW, expanded to 50 MW in April 2026 (claim 1865, claim 887), with options for up to 75 MW more (claim 1862). Anthropic's 20-year lease, announced August 2026, commits 191 MW for ~$9.1 billion in total contract revenue (claims 402, 435). These two customers alone control 241 MW of Riot's disclosed capacity, or approximately 79% of Rockdale's stated infrastructure commitment (the AMD Lease expansion alone references "up to an additional 100 MW" of total facility optionality, claim 1862).
The revenue arithmetic exhibits timing drag. Anthropic's $9.1 billion spread over 20 years implies approximately $455 million annually. Yet Q2 2026 data center segment revenue was only $23.2 million (claim 419), posted just before the August 2026 deal announcement. The gap reflects that contract revenue recognition likely lags lease commencement and buildout. Claim 417 reports "approximately $9.8 billion of contracted revenue" as of mid-August 2026, seemingly combining Anthropic's $9.1 billion with AMD's portion. Without disclosed AMD lease pricing or 2026 full-year guidance, the reconciliation remains incomplete—the data center segment's contribution should accelerate sharply in H2 2026 and 2027, but current filings do not quantify the AMD Lease's annual revenue impact separately. This opacity obscures whether Riot's capacity utilization assumptions are conservative or aggressive.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed partnerships represent genuinely signed agreements with explicitly named counterparties, distinguishing this portfolio from typical strategic-partner language. The material deals—MicroBT (master purchase agreement, June 2023), AMD (data center lease, January 2026), and Anthropic (20-year lease, August 2026)—are all fully executed, not MOUs or letters of intent. Bitfarms (settlement agreement, September 2024, claims 5695–5705) and Coinbase (custody agreement, December 2024, claims 5226–5227) are signed but serve governance and asset-safeguarding functions rather than revenue-generating customer roles. MicroBT yields $779.5 million in executed purchase orders through September 2025 across seven tranches (claim 3945), with additional annual purchase options through December 2027 (claims 3946, 3602), establishing a supplier relationship but not a data center customer dynamic. Counterparty concentration has shifted materially: Riot evolved from hardware procurement dominance (MicroBT) to infrastructure-lease concentration on two AI companies. AMD occupies 50 MW of contracted capacity following its April 2026 expansion (claims 1865, 887), while Anthropic commands 191 MW under a 20-year agreement (claim 1189) representing approximately $9.1 billion in contract value (claims 402, 412). Combined AI company contracted revenue reaches $9.8 billion before extension options (claim 417). However, revenue arithmetic presents a tension. Q2 2026 Data Center segment revenue totaled only $23.2 million (claim 419), despite $9.8 billion in supposedly signed, long-term capacity commitments. This reconciliation gap suggests Riot is reporting maximum contract value (undiscounted, full-term commitments) rather than recognized revenue under accounting standards. The timing is material: both major leases were executed in 2026, so deployment and revenue recognition likely remain nascent. Anthropic's deal, announced August 2026, would have generated minimal Q2 contribution. The portfolio concentration—with Anthropic and AMD representing nearly all disclosed data center upside—introduces counterparty risk, though both partners are established, well-capitalized entities. MicroBT concentration on a single hardware supplier carries typical supply-chain risk. No unnamed 'anchor customers' or framework pilots appear in the disclosed record; all material counterparties are identified explicitly in binding documents.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-05Riot's disclosed partnership record distinguishes sharply between signed customer contracts and operational or governance arrangements. The Bitfarms settlement (claims 5695–5705, September 2024) and Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement (claims 5226–5227, December 2024) are both executed arrangements, but neither represents customer revenue; they reflect governance stakes and asset custody respectively. The material customer base consists of three named counterparties with signed agreements. MicroBT, Riot's equipment supplier, executed a long-term master purchase agreement (claim 3944) dated June 23, 2023, with seven purchase orders totaling $779.5 million through September 2025 for 49.2 EH/s of miners (claim 3945), plus additional purchase options through December 2027 (claim 3946). AMD signed a 10-year data center lease announced in January 2026 for 25 megawatts at Rockdale (claims 3902, 3615), which expanded to 50 megawatts after AMD exercised its expansion option in April 2026 (claims 1865, 887). Anthropic represents the dominant counterparty concentration shift: a 20-year lease executed in August 2026 for 191 megawatts, expected to generate $9.1 billion in initial contract revenue (claims 507, 402, 435). All three counterparties are explicitly named; no "strategic partners" or unidentified "anchor customers" appear in the record. Counterparty concentration has evolved markedly from equipment procurement (MicroBT capex through 2025) to infrastructure services, with Anthropic now dominating the revenue profile. Riot disclosed "approximately $9.8 billion of contracted revenue" from the two AI companies before extension options (claim 417), implying AMD's lease generates roughly $700 million in contract value. Q2 2026 data center segment revenue was $174.2 million (claim 419), consistent with early-stage deployment of high-value, long-term agreements. No material revenue discrepancies are apparent; however, the distinction between initial contract value ($9.1 billion for Anthropic over 20 years, or ~$455 million annualized) and actual quarterly bookings ($23.2 million from data center segment in Q2 2026) reflects the ramp nature of these leases and the recency of execution.
Customer disclosures, read
2026-09-03Riot Platforms' disclosed customer and partnership landscape reveals a dramatic shift toward data center capacity provision rather than service consumption. Among the major announcements, only two counterparties represent revenue-generating customer relationships: AMD and Anthropic, both with signed long-term data center lease agreements. AMD signed an initial 10-year lease for 25 MW in January 2026 (claims 3902, 3598), expanded to 50 MW in April 2026 (claim 1865), with contractual provisions for additional expansion options and renewal terms. Anthropic executed a 20-year lease for 191 MW announced in August 2026 (claims 1189, 2922, 435), with two 5-year extensions at Anthropic's option. Both counterparties are explicitly named; no vague "strategic partner" or "anchor customer" designations appear in the disclosure record.
The remaining claims reflect non-revenue-generating arrangements or supplier relationships. Bitfarms (claims 5695–5699) involved a settlement and standstill agreement, not a customer contract. Coinbase (claims 5227, 5226) functions as a custody provider for digital assets, not a revenue customer. MicroBT (claims 3944–3946) is a hardware supplier from which Riot purchases miners; the relationship is inverted from customer dynamics, with Riot executing $779.5 million in purchase orders through September 2025 (claim 3945) under options extending through December 2027.
Concentration is extreme. AMD and Anthropic collectively account for approximately $9.8 billion in contracted revenue (claim 417), representing nearly all disclosed customer-side revenue. The portfolio shows no diversification: two companies drive the entire customer narrative. Anthropic alone contributes $9.1 billion over its initial 20-year term.
Revenue arithmetic presents a timing misalignment. Anthropic's $9.1 billion contract (claim 435) divided by 20 years implies roughly $455 million annually; Q2 2026 data center segment revenue reached only $23.2 million (claim 419). This gap reflects lease ramp-up timing and the fact that initial cash flows have not yet reached steady-state levels. The disclosed figures appear internally consistent—long-term contract values do not reconcile with quarterly revenue, but the discrepancy reflects the front-loaded recognition of multi-decade obligations rather than accounting fraud. Both AMD and Anthropic leases are executed agreements, not MOUs or discussions, and all major counterparties are identified by name.
delivery_arc
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-19The supplied claim history ends on 2020-03-24 and covers only the Oklahoma City build-out. Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky, the three sites now listed as partially operational, have no capacity or timeline claims in this record, so this read is limited to Oklahoma City and should not be taken as a view of Riot's current Texas portfolio. In mid-2018 Riot framed Oklahoma City as a 12 MW, 8,000-miner site targeting 110 PH/s (15526, 15506, 15508, 15539). Only 3,500 miners were running at the time (15505). The miner count held, and full installation was reported by August 2018 (15456). The hash-rate ceiling did not hold. By December 2018 the maximum was restated as 95 PH/s (15343, 15306, 15284), roughly a 14 percent reduction, and none of those claims acknowledges the earlier 110 PH/s figure. The March 2020 jump to 248 PH/s (14966) followed the S17 Pro purchases (15046, 15017, 14964). It should be read as a nameplate figure. Running the legacy fleet alongside roughly 4,000 S17 Pros inside the unchanged 12 MW envelope (15305, whose "monthly" megawatt phrasing is itself imprecise) is hard to reconcile unless older units were retired, and no claim says they were. The timeline is mostly a series of short lease extensions: the 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454), an extension through August 2019 (15361, 15304), and then a Kairos lease extension only to May 2020 (15015). Rolling extensions of a year or less point to a temporary hosting arrangement, not a site being built for permanence, which fits its eventual cancelled status. Independent support is thin. The only verified items are the S17 Pro deliveries (15047, 15018), and those confirm that equipment arrived, not how much power the site could deliver. The record contains no permits, utility filings or interconnection evidence for Oklahoma City, and none would be expected for a leased colocation shell. Over the next 90 days, the priority is to fill the record gap. Ingest Riot's filings from 2020 onward for Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky, then test the stated megawatt figures against ERCOT interconnection queue entries, large-load study status, and any repurposing toward high-performance computing tenants at Corsicana. Until those claims are in the record, Riot's Oklahoma City history suggests two cautions: treat hash-rate targets as revisable without notice, and treat power capacity as the binding constraint.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-19The record as supplied ends in March 2020 and contains no facility claims for Rockdale, Corsicana or Kentucky, which are the three sites still listed as partially operational. This read therefore covers only the Oklahoma City chapter. The entries dated before 2018 come from the company's diagnostics predecessor and have no bearing on facility delivery.
At Oklahoma City, the electrical envelope never moved. The site was framed at 12 MW at full deployment (15526, 15507) and was still described at 12 MW nearly two years later (15305, 14948). Throughput was the variable that changed. The original 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306), and the filings did not explicitly reconcile the lower number with the earlier one. The S17 Pro refresh then lifted the stated maximum to 248 PH/s at the same 12 MW (14947), so the growth came from replacing machines rather than adding power. The miner count went from 3,500 installed (15505) to the full 8,000 target (15456) within roughly six weeks, which is the one clear instance of a fleet commitment being met on schedule. The later operating figure of 7,400 units (14974) reflects a mixed fleet in the middle of the swap.
Tenure was the weak point. The 107,000-square-foot lease (15504, 15454) was kept alive through short extensions, first to August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then to May 2020 (15015). That is not a footprint a company was committing to long term, and the site's eventual cancellation fits that pattern. The Kairos business-combination claim was also withdrawn (14949).
Only two claims in the record carry verification, the S17 Pro deliveries (15047, 15018), and both concern equipment arrival rather than infrastructure. The extract contains no permits, interconnection filings or site reporting, so the announced pace at Oklahoma City rests mostly on company statements.
For the next 90 days, the priority is getting the post-2020 record ingested so that Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky can be assessed directly. The questions to answer are whether Corsicana's energized capacity has kept up with its phase announcements, whether ERCOT large-load interconnection status matches stated megawatts, and whether any stated capacity has been quietly restated, as the Oklahoma City hash-rate figure was.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-18The supplied record is truncated at a claim from 2020-03-24. As a result, it captures Riot's early Oklahoma City buildout in detail but contains no capacity or timeline claims at all for Rockdale, Corsicana, Kentucky or Massena. Any read of the current Texas campus trajectory therefore cannot be grounded in this dataset, and what follows is mostly a read of the company's formative delivery behavior.
At Oklahoma City, the announced scale held in unit terms but softened in output terms. The mid-2018 framing set 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s as the full-deployment target (15506, 15507, 15508, 15539), with 3,500 miners operating at the end of March 2018 (15505, 15543). By August the company reported all 8,000 units installed (15456), so the miner count was delivered. The hash-rate figure, however, was quietly restated to a 95 PH/s maximum from December 2018 onward (15343, 15306, 15284). No accompanying claim reconciles the roughly 14 percent reduction. The later fleet refresh lifted stated capacity to 248 PH/s (14966), driven by S17 Pro purchases.
On timing, the S17 Pro deliveries are the only claims in the record marked verified, and both landed on their stated dates (15047 by 2019-12-11, 15018 by 2020-01-31). The site itself never had durable tenure. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454) was extended to August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then to May 2020 (15015). The project is now recorded as cancelled, which is consistent with a facility run on short renewals rather than built for permanence. The Kairos business combination appears as both withdrawn (14949) and stated (14961) on the same date. The 4,000-unit S17 Pro purchase is logged at 6.4 USD (14945), almost certainly a units error. Both should be cleaned before publication.
Independent corroboration is thin. Beyond the two verified delivery claims, the record contains no permits, utility agreements, interconnection queue entries or site reporting for any project. The pace of the current campuses is therefore unverified here, not confirmed.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is ingesting the post-2020 claim history so that Rockdale and Corsicana capacity statements can be tested against each other. The Q3 2026 10-Q, expected in early November, should be checked for energized megawatts versus contracted megawatts at Corsicana. ERCOT large-load interconnection filings should be watched as the independent check. Kentucky's partially operational status also needs a stated capacity figure to anchor future claims against.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-16The record supplied here is cut off in March 2020 (last legible entry, claim 14947), so this read covers the Oklahoma City era only. The three projects that define Riot today, Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky, have no capacity or timeline claims in the excerpt, and neither does the cancelled Massena site. The earliest entries (21108, 21094, 20980) belong to the company's pre-crypto diagnostics and animal-health incarnation and say nothing about datacenter delivery.
On capacity, Oklahoma City is a rare case of an announced target being met quickly. The June 2018 filings set full deployment at 8,000 miners and 12 MW (15506, 15507) against 3,500 installed at quarter-end (15505). By August the company reported 8,000 active units (15456). The unit build-up is internally consistent: Kairos's 1,200 (15517) plus Prive's 3,800 and BMSS's 3,000 (15451, 15452) sum to the 8,000 restated in 15269. The quieter revision is hash rate. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284) with no reconciliation in the record. Fleet renewal later lifted the estimate to 248 PH/s (14966) while the operating count fell to 7,400 (14974). That is the expected efficiency trade from S17 Pro replacements rather than expansion of the site.
Dates held where they were testable. The S17 Pro deliveries promised for December 2019 and January 2020 are marked verified (15047, 15018), and the 1,060-unit receipt (15000) roughly matches the 1,000-unit order (15017). The more telling timeline signal is the lease. A 107,000 sq ft facility (15504) ran on serial short extensions, through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then through May 2020 (15015). That is a tenancy without a durable commitment, consistent with the site's eventual cancelled status.
Independent corroboration is absent from this record: no permits, utility agreements or interconnection entries for Oklahoma City or anywhere else. Every capacity figure rests on company filings, and only two delivery claims carry verification.
For the next 90 days, the priority is to obtain the post-2020 claim history before drawing any conclusions about the Texas and Kentucky build-out. Specifically, check whether Corsicana's announced megawatt phases match ERCOT interconnection and energization records, whether Rockdale's stated capacity has been restated as power-curtailment economics changed, and whether the Kentucky and Massena dispositions were disclosed as cancellations or allowed to lapse silently.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-16The record supplied here ends partway through March 2020, so this read covers only the Oklahoma City phase. Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility, the projects that matter today, have no capacity or timeline claims in view, and any judgment on them would be speculation. The earliest entries (21108 through 20979) belong to the company's prior life as a diagnostics and animal-health business. They say nothing about delivery capability.
At Oklahoma City the announced envelope was set in mid-2018 at 12 MW, 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s at full deployment (15507, 15506, 15508). The power and unit figures held: 8,000 installed miners were reported by August 2018 (15456) and repeated through January 2019 (15342, 15283). The hash-rate target did not. It shifted from 110 PH/s to a 95 PH/s 'maximum' (15343, 15306) without any stated reconciliation, a quiet revision rather than an acknowledged miss. The later jump to an estimated 248 PH/s (14966) came on a smaller fleet of 7,400 units (14974). That reflects an S17 Pro equipment refresh inside the same footprint, not added site capacity. The Bitmain deliveries behind it are among the few entries marked verified against their promised windows (15047, 15018).
The timeline story is mainly about tenure. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454) was extended to August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then to May 2020 (15015). A string of short extensions on a leased site does not support a durable hosting commitment, and the project's current cancelled status fits that pattern. Across the visible record, no claim is backed by independent evidence such as permits, utility or interconnection filings, or local reporting. Everything outside the two delivery verifications rests on company statements.
For the next 90 days, the first priority is completing the record. The post-March-2020 claims for Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky need to be ingested before anyone can assess whether the Texas build-out repeats the Oklahoma pattern: fixed power envelopes, hash-rate targets revised in place, and fleet upgrades presented as capacity growth. Once those claims are loaded, the useful checks are energization milestones on the partially operational Texas sites against filed interconnection data, and whether the company reports hash-rate guidance changes explicitly or simply restates them.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-16The record supplied here covers Riot's facility claims only through March 2020 and cuts off mid-entry, so this read can assess only the Oklahoma City buildout. The Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky sites, which now carry the company's real capacity story, cannot be judged from it, and the remaining claims should be loaded before this is published. The pre-2017 entries (21108, 20980 and related) belong to the company's earlier diagnostics incarnation and say nothing about mining delivery.
On Oklahoma City, the unit count was delivered roughly as promised. Riot reported 3,500 miners running as of March 2018 against an 8,000-unit, 12 MW full build (15505, 15506, 15507). By August 2018 it claimed all 8,000 installed (15456), and the 12 MW figure stayed fixed through 2020 (15305, 14948). Throughput is a different matter. The 110 PH/s expected hash rate (15508, 15539) quietly became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284). That is a roughly 14 percent reduction, and no claim on record acknowledges it as a revision.
The site's footing was also thinner than the capacity language suggests. A 107,000 square foot lease (15504) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and later through May 2020 under the Kairos arrangement (15015). These were short-dated renewals, not a durable campus commitment. The project's current cancelled status is consistent with that.
The 2019-2020 S17 Pro refresh is the best-evidenced part of the record. Two delivery dates carry verified status (15047, 15018), followed by a reported 1,060-unit delivery (15000) and a claim of 4,000 units in production in Q1 2020 (14946). Elsewhere the record is internally inconsistent. The Kairos combination appears as both withdrawn (14949) and stated (14961) on the same date. The Antminer purchase is logged at 6.4 USD (14945) against 6.4 million elsewhere (14951), which is an extraction error that needs correcting. No permits, utility interconnection filings or on-the-ground reporting appear anywhere in this set, so the announced pace rests almost entirely on company statements.
For the next 90 days, the priority is completing the dataset. The questions to put to the Texas and Kentucky claims are whether stated energization phases match ERCOT interconnection and large-load filings, whether hash rate guidance is again being revised downward without disclosure, and whether partially operational sites are adding megawatts on the schedule last promised or are being re-baselined.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-15The record supplied here is effectively a history of Oklahoma City, and it ends mid-claim in March 2020. It says nothing substantive about Rockdale, Corsicana or the Kentucky facility, which are the sites that now matter, so this read covers the closed chapter, not the current build-out. The pre-2018 entries (21108, 20980 and related) belong to the company's earlier diagnostics business and have no bearing on facility delivery.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City envelope never grew. It was framed at 12 MW and 8,000 miners from the outset (15507, 15506) and stayed there (15305, 15342). The hash-rate target moved. The original 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), and no filing explains the gap. The later jump to an estimated 248 PH/s (14966) came from swapping in S17 Pro machines (15047, 15018, 15000) within the same power footprint, while the operating fleet fell to 7,400 units (14974). That was efficiency within a fixed site, not expansion.
On timing, the installation pace held. Disclosures moved from 3,500 miners at March 2018 (15505) to 8,000 by August (15456), and both dated S17 deliveries are tagged verified against their promised windows (15047, 15018). The weaker signal is tenure. A 107,000 square foot lease (15504) was carried on short extensions, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then through May 2020 (15015). The site ended as cancelled, with no claim in this set acknowledging the wind-down. Massena carries a cancelled status with no supporting claims at all.
Independent corroboration is thin. Apart from the two verified delivery records, the file contains no permits, utility agreements or interconnection-queue references, so the announced pace rests almost entirely on company statements.
Over the next 90 days, the first priority is the missing post-2020 history, because the current projects cannot be judged without it. With that in hand, the tests are whether Corsicana's energized capacity matches its stated phases in ERCOT large-load interconnection filings, whether Rockdale's reported hash rate tracks its power commitments or is again being lifted through fleet upgrades, and whether Kentucky's partially operational status is ever given a dated capacity figure.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-15The record supplied here stops in March 2020, so this read covers Riot's Oklahoma City era only. Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility, which carry the company's current capacity story, have no claims in this excerpt, and Massena is listed as cancelled with nothing attached. The pre-2018 entries (21108, 20980 and others) belong to the company's earlier diagnostics business and say nothing about mining delivery.
On capacity, Oklahoma City was framed from the start as a fixed 12 MW envelope (15526, 15538), and that figure never moved (15305). Inside that envelope, the miner count went from 3,500 installed against an 8,000 target (15505, 15506) to 8,000 reported as active by August 2018 (15456). The hashing target followed a less tidy path. The June 2018 aim of 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) was restated as a 95 PH/s maximum in December 2018 (15343, 15306), and none of the claims on record explain the cut. The S17 Pro refresh then lifted the stated maximum to 248 PH/s (14966), even as operating units fell to 7,400 (14974). That points to efficiency gains rather than physical expansion, which fits a site constrained by power.
On dates, the hardware promises held. The 3,000-unit delivery due by 11 December 2019 (15047) and the 1,000-unit delivery due by 31 January 2020 (15018) are the only claims marked verified, and the later 1,060-unit figure (15000) suggests a modest overage. Site tenure was weaker. The lease rolled forward in short increments, first through August 2019 (15361) and then through May 2020 (15015), and that pattern is consistent with the site's eventual cancelled status.
Independent corroboration in this record is thin. There are no permits, interconnection filings or third-party site reports. Apart from the two verified deliveries, every claim rests on company statements.
The priority for the next 90 days is the Texas and Kentucky record. Supplying the full claim history for Rockdale and Corsicana would make it possible to test whether the Oklahoma pattern repeats: hardware commitments met, headline targets restated quietly, and site-level capacity bounded by power. For Corsicana in particular, ERCOT interconnection milestones and Navarro County filings would be the first independent check on any energization dates the company has announced.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-15The record for Riot effectively covers one facility story, Oklahoma City, and it ends in March 2020. That matters, because the projects now carrying weight, Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky site, all marked partially operational, have no capacity or timeline claims attached here, and Massena is cancelled with no claims at all. Earlier entries (21108, 20980) belong to the company's pre-mining biotech identity and say nothing about delivery. Any read of the current Texas build-out therefore has to wait on fresh data.
Within Oklahoma City, the headline unit count held. Riot reported 3,500 miners running as of March 2018 (15505) against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners on 12 MW (15506, 15507), and by August 2018 it reported 8,000 installed (15456). The hash-rate promise did not hold the same way. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306) with the same 12 MW and the same 8,000 units, and nothing in the record acknowledges the reset. The later climb to an estimated 248 PH/s (14966) came from swapping in S17 Pro machines (14946, 14964), not from added power. The 12 MW envelope never grew.
Tenure was the weaker signal. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then through May 2020 (15015). Short rolling extensions on the only operating site sat awkwardly beside the expansion language. The site's eventual cancelled status is consistent with that fragility.
Independent support is thin. The only verified entries are two equipment-delivery timelines, 3,000 S17 Pros by December 11, 2019 (15047) and 1,000 by January 31, 2020 (15018), with 1,060 later reported delivered (15000). There are no permits, utility agreements or interconnection-queue entries in the record. Every capacity figure is company-stated.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing the gap between 2020 and now. That means ingesting Rockdale and Corsicana capacity and energization claims, tying them to ERCOT interconnection and large-load records, and checking whether any stated megawatt figures have been quietly revised the way Oklahoma's hash rate was. It also means establishing what partially operational means at the Kentucky site in megawatts actually energized.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-15The visible record ends at claim 14950 in March 2020. It therefore speaks almost entirely to the Oklahoma City chapter, while Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky appear only as project stubs with no capacity or timeline claims attached. Any judgment on Riot's current Texas build-out has to wait for those entries. The pre-2016 animal-health and diagnostics items (21108, 21094, 20980) predate the pivot to bitcoin mining and have no bearing on facility delivery.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City story is one of quiet re-pricing more than outright shrinkage. The 2018 framing set full deployment at 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508). The miner count was reported as reached by August 2018 (15456, 15342), and the power figure held at 12 MW (15305). The hash-rate target, however, fell to a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), and the record shows no stated explanation for the 14 percent reduction. It then more than doubled to an estimated 248 PH/s in March 2020 (14966). That figure rested on a fleet refresh with S17 Pro units (14964, 14946) rather than on any physical expansion of the site.
On timing, the equipment milestones are the strongest part of the record. The 3,000-unit S17 delivery due by December 11, 2019 (15047) and the 1,000-unit tranche due by January 31, 2020 (15018) are the only two claims marked verified. The later 1,060-unit delivery figure (15000) roughly reconciles with the 1,000-unit order (15017). The facility side is weaker. A 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454) was extended only to August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then, via Kairos, to May 2020 (15015). Rolling short extensions are not a durable footprint, and the project's eventual cancelled status is consistent with that reading. Massena is also marked cancelled, with no claims in view.
Independent corroboration is thin. No permits, utility interconnection filings or site reporting appear in this record, so the announced pace rests on company statements plus two delivery verifications.
Over the next 90 days, the most useful work is to load the Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky claim histories. Those should be tested against ERCOT interconnection-queue entries, demand-response and curtailment disclosures, and Navarro County records for Corsicana. The specific question is whether energized megawatts are keeping pace with the stated capacity targets, and whether any target has been revised without acknowledgement, as the 2018 hash-rate figure was.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-10The record supplied here is cut off at March 2020, so this read covers only the Oklahoma City era. Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility, the projects that define Riot today, have no claims in the excerpt and cannot be assessed from it. The earliest entries (21108, 21094, 20980) date from the company's prior life in animal health and diagnostics and say nothing about datacenter delivery.
At Oklahoma City, physical scale held while the headline metric shifted. The mid-2018 framing of 8,000 miners on roughly 12 MW (15506, 15507) was met: 3,500 units were running at the end of March 2018 (15505), and 8,000 were reported installed by August (15456). The hash-rate figure is a different story. It was stated at 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) and reappeared that December as a 95 PH/s maximum (15343, 15306) with no explanation in the record. The S17 Pro refresh then lifted the stated maximum to 248 PH/s (14966, 14947) on the same site footprint. That jump is a fleet-efficiency story, not new facility capacity.
On timing, the only claims carrying verification are equipment deliveries. The 3,000 S17 Pros due by December 11, 2019 (15047) and the 1,000 due by January 31, 2020 (15018) were both confirmed. The 1,060-unit delivery (15000) and the Q1 2020 production target (14946) are consistent with those, though they remain company-stated. The site itself never had durable footing. The 107,000 square foot lease (15504) ran on short extensions, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then through May 2020 (15015). The project's current cancelled status fits that pattern of a tenancy rather than a build. Massena also appears as cancelled with no capacity claims attached, which leaves no trail of what was promised there. Several adjacent ventures from the same period also fell away, including the Synapse agreement (15138) and the exchange partnerships (15376, 15367).
No independent corroboration appears anywhere in this excerpt: no permits, no utility filings, no interconnection queue entries. Every capacity figure rests on the company's own statements.
For the next 90 days, the priority is to load the full claim history for Corsicana, Rockdale and Kentucky. The test is whether their dated energization and megawatt promises carry the same verification the 2019 deliveries did. ERCOT large-load interconnection filings and Navarro and Milam County permitting records are the obvious external checks. Any restatement of Corsicana phase capacity that the company does not acknowledge would echo the unexplained 110 to 95 PH/s revision seen here.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-10The record supplied here breaks off mid-entry in March 2020, so this read covers only Riot's Oklahoma City era. The projects that now define the company, Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility, have no capacity or timeline claims in this excerpt, and the reader should not take their absence as evidence of anything. The pre-2018 entries (21108, 21094, 20980) belong to the predecessor diagnostics business and say nothing about delivery capability. Oklahoma City was framed from the outset as a fixed 12 MW, 8,000-miner envelope (15506, 15507, 15538). That ceiling never grew. Deployment moved from 3,500 miners at March 2018 (15505) to the full 8,000 by August (15456), and that progression is internally consistent. The hash-rate figure did not hold. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343) and was repeated as such in January 2019 (15306, 15284), with no reconciliation of the roughly 14 percent reduction. The site's tenure was also more fragile than the 107,000 square foot lease language suggested (15504, 15454). It ran through rolling short extensions, first to August 2019 (15361) and then to May 2020 (15015), which reads as a site Riot never committed to. Its eventual cancelled status fits that pattern. The 2019 to 2020 fleet refresh is the one area with outside corroboration. The S17 Pro deliveries carry verified flags (15047, 15018), and the 1,060 units reported delivered (15000) slightly exceed the 1,000 ordered (15017). The Q1 2020 target of 4,000 S17 Pros into production (14946) has no verification in this record. The Kairos business-combination entry appears as both stated (14961) and withdrawn (14949) on the same date, an inconsistency that should be resolved at the source. Beyond those equipment deliveries, the record contains no permits, utility interconnection filings or on-the-ground reporting, so the announced pace rests almost entirely on company statements. Over the next 90 days, the first priority is to pull the post-March 2020 claims so the Rockdale and Corsicana trajectories can be assessed on the same basis. That means checking whether Corsicana's announced capacity has been restated against ERCOT large-load interconnection records and Navarro County permitting. It also means comparing Riot's next quarterly filing against prior energization dates for any revisions it does not acknowledge, and confirming whether the Kentucky partial-operations status is backed by anything other than company disclosure.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-10The record supplied here covers Riot's facility claims only through March 2020 and cuts off mid-entry at claim 14950. That leaves Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility, all now marked partially operational, with no capacity or timeline claims in view, so this read applies only to the Oklahoma City era. The 2004 to 2016 entries (21108, 21094, 20980) date from the company's diagnostics period and say nothing about mining delivery. Massena carries a cancelled status with no supporting claims at all, which is itself a gap worth closing.
In Oklahoma City, capacity grew in steps without moving off its original power envelope. The mid-2018 filings described 3,500 miners running as of March 31 (15505, 15520) on the way to an 8,000-unit, 12 MW deployment (15506, 15507). By August the company reported all 8,000 installed (15456), so the unit count was delivered roughly on schedule. The hashrate figure is less clean. The 110 PH/s target (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284) at the same 8,000 miners and 12 MW. Nothing in the record acknowledges or explains that 14 percent cut. The March 2020 figure of 248 PH/s (14966) reflects a fleet refresh, not new floor space: 3,000 S17 Pros due by December 11, 2019 (15047) and 1,000 more by January 31, 2020 (15018), both verified, with 1,060 reported delivered in February (15000).
The site's tenure was always short. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15454) was extended through August 2019 (15361, 15304), then through May 2020 (15015), even as new hardware went into the building. Each extension was disclosed, but none came with a long-term siting plan. That fits the later cancelled status, though no claim here records the exit itself.
The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind: no utility agreements, permits, interconnection queue filings or site reporting. The two verified delivery claims are the only externally checked data points, and both held.
For the next 90 days, the priority is filling the post-2020 record so the three Texas and Kentucky sites can be assessed at all. That means energization milestones and power figures for Rockdale and Corsicana, matched against ERCOT large-load interconnection status and county permit filings. It also means watching whether megawatt targets are restated with or without acknowledgement, as the 2018 hashrate figure was.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-10The record supplied for Riot stops in March 2020, mid-entry at claim 14950, and contains no capacity or timeline claims for Rockdale, Corsicana or the Kentucky facility. Those three sites carry the company's present-day scale. What follows is therefore a read of the Oklahoma City era only, and it should not be extended to the Texas build-out. The pre-2017 entries (21108 through 20979) belong to the company's earlier biotech identity and have no bearing on facility delivery.
At Oklahoma City, announced capacity grew roughly as stated in unit terms. In mid-2018 the company reported 3,500 miners installed against an 8,000-miner, 12 MW full deployment (15505, 15506, 15507). By August it reported 8,000 active units (15456), and that figure was repeated consistently through January 2019 (15342, 15302, 15283). The hash-rate figure did not hold. The expected 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), with no reconciliation in the record. That is a quiet downward revision of roughly 14 percent. The later jump to an estimated 248 PH/s (14966) came from swapping in S17 Pro hardware (14946, 14964), not from adding power. The 12 MW figure (15305) was never restated upward, so the growth reads as fleet efficiency rather than site expansion.
Dated promises in this window are few, and the two that were dated held. The 3,000-unit S17 delivery due by 2019-12-11 (15047) and the 1,000-unit delivery due by 2020-01-31 (15018) are both marked verified, and 1,060 units were reported delivered shortly after (15000). The weaker signal is tenure. The site ran on short lease extensions, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then through May 2020 (15015). It now carries a cancelled status, as does Massena. No claim in the record announces or explains either cancellation, which amounts to an unacknowledged exit from the company's original footprint.
Outside those two verified deliveries, the record holds no independent corroboration of the announced pace: no permits, no interconnection filings and no site reporting. Every capacity figure is self-reported.
For the next 90 days, the priority is closing the data gap rather than reading signals. That means ingesting post-2020 claims for Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky and testing them the same way. The key checks are whether Corsicana's phased megawatt targets match ERCOT large-load interconnection records, and whether Rockdale's stated capacity has been restated without explanation. It also matters whether the company documents the Oklahoma City and Massena cancellations anywhere in its own filings.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-09The claims on record describe one facility in detail, Oklahoma City, and they stop in March 2020. Rockdale, Corsicana, Kentucky and Massena appear only as project entries with no capacity, cost or timeline claims, so this read covers the Oklahoma City phase and cannot yet judge the Texas build-out. The pre-2017 acquisition and licensing claims (21108 through 20979) come from the company's earlier biotech incarnation and say nothing about mining delivery.
On capacity, Oklahoma City scaled up and was then quietly trimmed. The June 2018 filings set a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508, 15526, 15539), against 3,500 miners running at the end of March (15505, 15520). The miner count was reached by August (15456) and repeated through January 2019 (15342, 15302, 15283). The hash-rate figure did not hold. From December 2018 the company described 95 PH/s as a maximum (15343, 15306, 15284) and never acknowledged the 110 PH/s target it replaced. The likely cause is fleet mix rather than a missed build, but the disclosure did not explain it.
On timing, the dated hardware promises largely held. The S17 Pro orders (15046, 15017) promised deliveries by December 2019 and January 2020 (15047, 15018). By February 1,060 units were reported delivered (15000), and by late March 4,000 were in service (14979). The aggregate spend of $6.4 million (14951) does not reconcile cleanly with the $4.85 million first tranche (15046) plus a 1,000-unit follow-on, and should be checked against the purchase agreements. The site itself was never on firm footing. The lease ran on short extensions, first to August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285) and then to May 2020 (15015). That fits the project's eventual cancellation. There is also a small inconsistency between operations described as starting in June 2018 (15303) and 3,500 miners reported running in March (15505).
No permits, interconnection queue filings or site reporting appear in this record, so the Oklahoma City pace is supported only by the company's own filings. For the next 90 days, the priority is to load and assess the Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky capacity and timeline claims. That means checking announced energization dates against ERCOT interconnection queue status and county permits, watching whether stated megawatt and exahash targets change between quarterly filings, and noting any revision that, as with the 2018 hash-rate change, arrives without explanation.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-09The record supplied covers a narrow slice of Riot's facility history. It ends in March 2020, cut off mid-entry. It has no claims at all for Rockdale, Corsicana, Kentucky or Massena, which are the projects that now define the company's footprint. The 2004-2016 entries (21108, 20980) come from the pre-mining Bioptix and Venaxis era and do not bear on delivery. What remains is the Oklahoma City episode, which makes a useful baseline for how Riot has historically framed capacity.
On scale, Oklahoma City was pitched at 12 MW and 8,000 miners at full deployment (15526, 15506), with 3,500 installed as of March 2018 (15505). The 8,000-unit figure was reported as installed by August 2018 (15456) and repeated through January 2019 (15302, 15283), so the unit count held. The hash-rate figure did not. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306) with no stated reconciliation. That is a 14 percent downward revision presented as a restatement rather than a correction. By March 2020 the operating fleet was given as 7,400 units (14974) with 4,000 S17 Pros in service (14979). This reads as a fleet swap inside a fixed power envelope, not growth.
On dates, the clearest signal is the lease. The site never rested on durable tenure. It moved through short extensions to August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then to May 2020 (15015), and the project now sits as cancelled. The S17 delivery targets of 11 December 2019 (15047) and 31 January 2020 (15018) appear roughly met, given the 1,060 units reported in February 2020 (15000). Neither target, however, is independently verified in this record.
The record contains no independent corroboration, such as permits, utility or ERCOT interconnection filings, or site reporting, for any project. Every capacity claim is self-reported. For Rockdale and Corsicana, both now marked partially operational, the gap is material. Any assessment of their pace has to come from ERCOT large-load queue entries, county permit filings and reported energization dates, not from company statements.
There are three things to watch over the next 90 days. First, whether the claims pipeline catches up and ingests post-2020 filings for the Texas and Kentucky sites. Second, whether Corsicana's energized megawatts in quarterly reporting track the phase schedule previously announced. Third, whether any capacity target is quietly restated the way the Oklahoma hash rate was, especially as Riot reframes Texas power toward AI and HPC tenancy.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-09The record supplied here is almost entirely the 2018-2020 Oklahoma City era, and the list cuts off mid-claim in March 2020. That matters more than any single figure. Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility are the sites that now define Riot as a power-and-compute business, and all three are marked partially operational, yet none carries a capacity or timeline claim in this excerpt. Any read of current delivery has to start by noting that the evidence for those sites is not in front of us.
Within what is on file, the Oklahoma City buildout delivered its headline unit count quickly. The June 2018 disclosures described 3,500 miners running against an 8,000-unit, 12 MW, 110 PH/s target (15505, 15506, 15507, 15508). By August the full 8,000 were described as active (15456). The hash-rate ceiling, however, was quietly reset to 95 PH/s in December 2018 (15343) and repeated without reconciliation (15306, 15284). The 110 PH/s figure was never acknowledged as revised. Later, the operating fleet is given as 7,400 ASICs (14974), below the 8,000 previously claimed, while a 4,000-unit S17 Pro refresh is described as in service (14979). That reads as fleet replacement rather than expansion, inside the same 12 MW envelope.
Timelines were held mainly through short rolling lease extensions rather than durable commitments. The extension to August 2019 appears across four filings (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), followed by a further extension to May 2020 (15015). There is also an internal inconsistency: miners are described as operating by March 2018 (15543), but equipment is later dated as operational since June 2018 (15303). The Kairos business combination was withdrawn (14949), and the site ultimately ended as cancelled. S17 Pro delivery dates (15047, 15018) were partially corroborated by a later delivery report (15000), and the counts are close but not identical. Claim 14945 records a cost of 6.4 USD, which is almost certainly an extraction error and should be fixed before publication.
No independent evidence appears anywhere in this record. There are no permits, no utility or ERCOT queue entries, and no site reporting, so every figure is self-reported.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to complete ingestion of the post-2020 claims and check Rockdale and Corsicana megawatt figures against ERCOT large-load and interconnection filings. Riot's monthly production updates should then be compared with the energized capacity those filings support. Kentucky also needs a stated capacity before its partially operational status can be assessed at all.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-09The record supplied here cuts off mid-entry in March 2020 (claim 14979), so this read covers only the Oklahoma City era. Rockdale, Corsicana, Kentucky and Massena appear on the project list but have no capacity or timeline claims in the excerpt. That gap matters because Rockdale and Corsicana are the facilities that now define Riot, and nothing below should be read as a verdict on them. The earliest entries (21108, 21094, 20980) are biotech-era acquisitions from the predecessor company and say nothing about data-center delivery.
On capacity, Oklahoma City is a case of ambition trimmed rather than abandoned. The mid-2018 framing promised 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s at full deployment (15506, 15507, 15508). The miner count was reported as reached by August 2018 (15456) and repeated through January 2019 (15302, 15283). The hash-rate ceiling, however, quietly became 95 PH/s from December 2018 onward (15343, 15306, 15284). No filing in this record reconciles the 110 figure with the lower one, so the reduction looks unacknowledged rather than explained. The later S17 Pro purchases (15046, 15017, 14945) signal fleet renewal inside the same 12 MW envelope, not physical expansion.
On timing, the pattern is short-horizon renewal rather than outright slippage. The facility lease was extended to August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15285) and then to May 2020 (15015). That is consistent with a tenant that never committed long-term. Miner deliveries were promised in tranches by December 2019 and January 2020 (15047, 15018). A 1,060-unit delivery was then reported in February (15000), and 4,000 units were said to be deployed in Q1 2020 (14946). Those figures roughly line up, but the dated promises remain unverified in the ledger. The withdrawn Kairos combination figure (14949) and the project's eventual cancelled status suggest Oklahoma City was a staging site whose exit was never framed as a missed target.
The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind: no permits, no utility or interconnection filings, no site reporting. Every claim rests on company disclosure.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to complete the ingest so that post-2020 Rockdale and Corsicana claims can be tested. After that, ERCOT interconnection and large-load filings for Corsicana's later phases should be checked against the company's stated energization schedule, along with any disclosure that clarifies what partially operational means for Kentucky.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-09The record supplied here is incomplete. It ends mid-entry at claim 15047 in December 2019, and the four sites that define Riot's current footprint (Rockdale, Corsicana, Kentucky and Massena) carry no capacity, cost or timeline claims at all. Any judgment on the present build-out therefore has to wait for those claims to be ingested. What the record does support is a clear read of the Oklahoma City episode.
Capacity in Oklahoma City held steady on hardware and power but shrank on output. Through 2018 and early 2019 the company consistently described an 8,000-miner, 12 MW deployment (15506, 15507, 15342, 15302, 15305). The miner count also reconciles across sourcing disclosures, whether described as 1,200 plus 6,800 (15502, 15503) or as 1,200 plus 3,800 plus 3,000 (15450, 15451, 15452). The hash-rate target is where the story moved. It stood at 110 PH/s in mid-2018 (15508, 15539) and was quietly restated as a 95 PH/s maximum from December 2018 onward (15343, 15306, 15284). None of the visible claims acknowledge or explain the roughly 14 percent reduction.
Timelines were short-horizon rather than slipped. The company reported 3,500 miners running at March 31, 2018 (15505), with that milestone flagged as delayed (15543). By August it described all 8,000 as active (15456), and it later dated operations to June 2018 (15303). The more telling signal is tenure. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504, 15519) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), with renewal options mentioned but never exercised in the visible record (15366, 15286). That reads as a temporary hosting arrangement, not a durable facility commitment. The December 2019 Antminer S17 Pro purchase (15046) points to a fleet refresh whose destination the truncated record does not show.
The record contains no independent evidence for any site. There are no permits, no utility or ERCOT interconnection filings and no on-the-ground reporting, so every figure above rests on company statements alone.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to complete ingestion of the post-2019 claims so that Rockdale and Corsicana capacity trajectories can be assessed against their own earlier promises. For the Texas sites, the next things to check are ERCOT large-load interconnection queue entries and Navarro and Milam County permitting records, which would independently confirm energization dates. Watch also for any unacknowledged downward restatement of deliverable compute relative to power capacity. Oklahoma City established that pattern, and it is worth testing whether it recurs.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-08The record supplied here ends mid-claim on 2019-12-03 (claim 15047). Nothing in it bears on Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena or the Kentucky site, all of which sit on the project list with no stated capacity, cost or dated milestone. Any read of Riot's current build-out is therefore provisional. What the data does show is the Oklahoma City phase, which is the template for how the company has framed delivery. The pre-2017 entries (21108, 20980) belong to the Bioptix-era diagnostics business and say nothing about mining infrastructure.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City story held its headline unit count but quietly lowered its performance target. The mid-2018 filings set a full-deployment goal of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508). By August 2018 the 8,000-miner figure was reported as installed (15456). By December the hash-rate figure had become a 95 PH/s maximum (15343, 15306, 15284), and none of those claims reconciles the roughly 14 percent reduction. The supply of miners was also re-described without changing the total. A Kairos tranche of 1,200 plus 6,800 additional units (15502, 15503) later appears as Prive's 3,800 plus Blockchain Mining Supply's 3,000 (15451, 15452). That is consistent arithmetic but a shifting narrative.
On timing, the 3,500 miners targeted for 31 March 2018 were flagged as delayed (15543), although full deployment followed within months. More telling is tenure. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15504) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), and the company leaned on renewal options (15366, 15286) instead of a committed term. That is a short horizon for a facility being re-equipped with 3,000 S17 Pro units due in December 2019 (15047).
The record contains no permits, utility interconnection filings or on-the-ground reporting, so the announced pace rests entirely on company statements.
For the next 90 days, the priority is closing the data gap. That means pulling Riot's Q3 2026 filing and its Corsicana and Rockdale capacity disclosures into the claim set, then checking them against ERCOT large-load interconnection records and Navarro and Milam County permitting. Watch in particular for the Oklahoma City pattern repeating: stable headline megawatt or unit counts paired with downward revisions in energized or hash-rate figures that go unremarked.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-08The record supplied for Riot is truncated at claim 15047 (December 2019), so this read covers only the Oklahoma City phase. It also includes pre-2018 biotech-era entries (21108, 21094, 20980) that carry over from the company's earlier identity and say nothing about facility delivery. The four other sites on file, Rockdale, Corsicana, Kentucky and Massena, have no capacity or timeline claims in this excerpt. Any judgment about them would need the full claim history.
On capacity, Oklahoma City's power envelope held steady at 12 MW across every filing (15526, 15507, 15538, 15305). Claim 15305's "monthly" unit for that figure is presumably a transcription error rather than a disclosure change. The fleet target of 8,000 miners (15506, 15551) also held. The hash-rate figure did not. It was put at 110 PH/s in mid-2018 (15508, 15539) and fell to a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), with nothing in the record explaining the cut. That is a roughly 14 percent downward revision on the same machine count and power budget. It suggests the original figure assumed better per-unit efficiency than the acquired fleet actually delivered.
On timing, the deployment step itself looks credible. Riot reported 3,500 miners operating at March 31, 2018 (15505), described the equipment as operational since June 2018 (15303), and reported the full 8,000 installed by August (15456). That sequence is internally consistent. The tenure picture is weaker. A 107,000 square foot lease was announced as executed (15519, 15542), but by December 2018 it ran only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), and renewal was left as an option (15366, 15286). A full-deployment narrative resting on an eight-month lease runway is fragile. The record does not show the lease actually being renewed.
On independent evidence, the claim set contains no permits, utility interconnection filings or site reporting. Every capacity figure is company-stated. The 12 MW figure in particular should be checked against the host utility's service records before it is treated as verified.
Over the next 90 days, the first priority is completing the ingest so that the Rockdale and Corsicana claim histories can be assessed on their own terms. The scale of those sites makes ERCOT large-load interconnection records and Navarro and Milam County permitting the obvious independent cross-checks. For any site, watch for a hash-rate or energized-capacity figure revised downward without a stated reason, which is the pattern Oklahoma City established. Also watch whether the 2019 Bitmain purchase (15046) is tied to a named site and an energization date.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-07The record as supplied reaches only into late 2019 and covers only one site, Oklahoma City. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility are listed as announced projects but carry no capacity or timeline claims here, so this read covers the Oklahoma City phase only. The pre-2017 entries (21108 through 20979) belong to the Bioptix and Venaxis predecessor business and say nothing about mining infrastructure.
At Oklahoma City, the hardware count held steady while the output figure quietly shrank. The 8,000-miner, 12 MW full-deployment target (15506, 15507, 15526) was consistent from the start. It reconciles cleanly to the Kairos fleet plus the February 2018 purchase (15531, 15541), later itemized as 3,000 and 3,800 units (15452, 15451). The hash-rate expectation is a different story. It was 110 PH/s in mid-2018 (15508, 15539) and became a 95 PH/s maximum by December (15343, 15306, 15284). That is a cut of roughly 14 percent, and nothing in the record acknowledges it as a revision.
Timelines were partly met but thinly anchored. Only 3,500 miners were running at the March 2018 checkpoint (15505), and 15543 is flagged delayed. Full installation appears by August 2018 (15456), with operations dated from June (15303). The more telling signal is tenure. The 107,000 square foot lease (15504, 15519) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), and those extensions are repeatedly flagged delayed. That is a short-horizon footprint, not a durable build-out. The Logical Brokerage closing also slipped (15544). The last visible item is a 3,000-unit S17 Pro delivery promised by mid-December 2019 (15047), and the record cuts off before any outcome.
The record contains no independent corroboration. There are no permits, no utility or interconnection filings, and no site reporting, so every figure above is self-reported. The Texas, New York and Kentucky projects cannot be assessed until claims and third-party evidence are attached, particularly ERCOT interconnection entries for Rockdale and Corsicana.
Three things matter over the next 90 days. First, whether the claim history for Rockdale and Corsicana is backfilled, since those are the projects that now define Riot's delivery record. Second, whether Riot's next quarterly filing restates energized megawatts and hash rate in terms that can be reconciled against earlier targets. Third, whether any Corsicana phase dates move without explanation, which would repeat the unacknowledged 110-to-95 PH/s revision seen at Oklahoma City.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-03The record supplied here is truncated after claim 15047 (December 2019), so this read covers only Riot's early Oklahoma City phase. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear on the project list but have no capacity or timeline claims in the visible data, and every project still carries status=announced with blank capacity and cost fields. The pre-2017 claims (21108, 21094, 20980 and others) belong to the company's biotech and diagnostics predecessor and say nothing about datacenter delivery. The visible facility claims are also heavily duplicated. Roughly two dozen entries dated 2018-06-28 restate the same 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 107,000-square-foot figures (15506, 15507, 15537, 15504, 15533, 15542), which makes the record look denser than the underlying disclosures are.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City buildout reached its stated miner count. The 3,500 miners reported as of March 31, 2018 (15505), flagged as delayed in 15543, became the full 8,000-unit deployment by August 2018 (15456), and that count was then repeated unchanged through January 2019 (15342, 15302, 15283). Output quietly fell short of the plan, though. The expected hash rate of 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) was restated as a maximum of 95 PH/s from December 2018 onward (15343, 15306, 15284). None of the visible claims acknowledges or explains this roughly 14 percent reduction.
On timing, the site's tenure was short-dated from the start. The lease was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), with renewal options mentioned but never quantified (15366, 15286). By late 2019 the company was pointing to a 3,000-unit Antminer S17 Pro delivery due by December 11, 2019 (15047), which suggests the site continued past the stated expiry without a disclosed new lease term. The equipment-operational date of June 2018 (15303) is broadly consistent with the March-to-August ramp.
The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this, whether permits, utility interconnection filings or on-the-ground reporting. All claims are company-stated, so the delivery pace rests entirely on self-disclosure.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to backfill the truncated claims so the Texas, New York and Kentucky sites can be assessed at all. After that, watch whether Corsicana and Rockdale acquire stated capacity and dated milestones, and whether those can be matched against ERCOT interconnection queue entries and county permit records. The Oklahoma pattern of meeting unit counts while trimming output targets is the specific habit to test against newer megawatt claims.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-03The record that reaches us is dominated by Oklahoma City, and the trajectory there is modest. The earliest entries (21108, 21094, 20980) describe the predecessor company's diagnostics and animal-health deals, not mining infrastructure. Treating them as part of a facility history would overstate how long this footprint has existed. The mining story begins in mid-2018 with a 107,000 square foot leased building (15504, 15519) and a stated full-deployment envelope of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508).
Capacity scaled up to the stated miner count but not to the stated performance. By August 2018 the company reported all 8,000 units installed (15456), and later filings repeat that figure (15302, 15283). The hash-rate ceiling, however, quietly moved from 110 PH/s (15539) to a 95 PH/s maximum (15343, 15306, 15284). None of the claims explain the gap. That is a downward revision of roughly 14 percent presented as a fresh baseline rather than a correction.
Timing held loosely at best. The 3,500-miner milestone for March 31, 2018 is tagged delayed (15543), although the same count is also reported as achieved by that date (15505, 15520), so the record is internally inconsistent. Equipment is described as operational from June 2018 (15303). The site's tenure was short-dated: the lease was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285), with renewal options mentioned but not exercised in the visible record (15366, 15286). The December 2019 delivery of 3,000 Antminer S17 Pro units (15047) is the last legible entry, and the record is truncated there.
The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind: no utility service agreements, no permits, no on-the-ground reporting. Every figure is company-sourced. The project list includes Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and a Kentucky facility, but no capacity, cost or timeline claims attached to them appear here, so their delivery pace cannot be assessed from this material.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing that gap. Ingest the Rockdale and Corsicana claim history and match it against ERCOT interconnection queue entries and Navarro and Milam county filings. Confirm whether Massena and Kentucky are live, idle or divested. Check whether any later disclosure reconciles the 110 to 95 PH/s step-down or acknowledges the Oklahoma City exit.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-02The record supplied for Riot is narrower than its project list implies. Every quantified capacity or timeline claim concerns Oklahoma City. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear only as announced sites with no capacity, cost or dated milestones attached, and the claim feed ends mid-entry in December 2019. The 2004 to 2016 items (21108, 21094, 20980) belong to the company's predecessor biotech business and say nothing about mining infrastructure. Any read of Riot's delivery trajectory from this file is therefore a read of its 2018 to 2019 Oklahoma footprint, not its current Texas-centred build-out. On scale, the Oklahoma plan held steady in physical terms but shrank in output. The 8,000-miner, 12 MW envelope (15506, 15507) was reaffirmed repeatedly (15342, 15302, 15305). The headline hash-rate target of 110 PH/s (15508, 15539), however, became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343) and stayed there (15306, 15284). None of the claims on file explains the roughly 14 percent reduction. On dates, the deployment itself appears to have landed close to plan. The company reported 3,500 units running at the end of March 2018 (15505) and all 8,000 active by August (15456), and later said equipment had been operational since June 2018 (15303). The weaker point is site tenure. A 107,000-square-foot lease (15504) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285), with renewal options mentioned (15366, 15286) but never shown to have been exercised. That short horizon sat beside new equipment commitments, such as the December 2019 S17 Pro delivery of 3,000 units (15047), whose outcome the record cuts off before resolving. The file contains no independent corroboration of any of this: no utility filings, building permits or on-the-ground reporting. The Oklahoma figures rest entirely on company statements. Over the next 90 days, the priority is to fill the gap. Riot's material capacity now sits at Rockdale and Corsicana, and claims for those sites, along with Massena and Kentucky, should be ingested from recent 10-Qs and 10-Ks. They should then be checked against ERCOT large-load interconnection records and Navarro and Milam County permitting. Until that is done, this profile cannot support a judgement on whether Riot's current announced pace is credible.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-02The visible record supports a read of only one site, Oklahoma City, and it ends in December 2019. The pre-2017 entries (21108, 21094, 20980) belong to the predecessor diagnostics business and say nothing about compute capacity. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear as project names with no capacity, cost or timeline claim attached. Any judgement about Riot's current Texas build-out therefore cannot be drawn from this dataset.
At Oklahoma City, the physical envelope held steady. The 107,000 square foot lease (15504, 15454), the 12 MW power figure (15507, 15305) and the 8,000-miner fleet (15506, 15456, 15302) are restated consistently across filings. The supply side reconciles: 1,200 Kairos units plus 6,800 additional units (15502, 15503) match the later split into 3,800 Prive and 3,000 Blockchain Mining Supply units (15451, 15452). Throughput did not hold. The June 2018 target of 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December (15343, 15306, 15284), roughly a 14 percent cut. It was presented as a fresh figure, not as a revision.
Timing is mixed. The 3,500-miner milestone for March 31, 2018 is flagged as delayed (15543). Full deployment had been reported by August (15456), and the company dates operation to June 2018 (15303). The more revealing item is tenure. The lease was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), with renewal options mentioned but unexercised (15366, 15286). That is a short horizon for a site carrying the entire fleet. The December 2019 Antminer S17 Pro delivery of 3,000 units (15047) suggests a fleet refresh rather than a capacity expansion, but the record is truncated at that claim.
There is no independent corroboration anywhere in the record. It contains no utility service agreement, no municipal permit and no third-party site reporting for Oklahoma City. For the Texas sites, there are no ERCOT interconnection entries or Milam and Navarro County filings.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to complete ingestion of post-2019 claims so that Rockdale and Corsicana carry dated capacity and energization promises that can be tested. Once they do, three checks matter. Do stated megawatt figures match ERCOT queue and large-load filings? Do county permit records track the announced construction phases? Is any reallocation of Corsicana power from mining to other compute uses accompanied by an explicit revision of earlier capacity claims, rather than a silent restatement like the Oklahoma hash-rate change?
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-01The record as supplied ends at claim 15047 in December 2019, so this read covers only the Oklahoma City phase. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the unlocated Kentucky Facility appear as announced projects with no capacity, cost or timeline claims attached, so their trajectory cannot be judged from this file. Claims dated 2004 to 2016 (21108 through 20979) belong to the predecessor biotech business under the Bioptix and Venaxis names and are not relevant to datacenter delivery. Many 2018-06-28 claims are duplicate extractions of a single filing, which makes that date look busier than it was.
On capacity, Oklahoma City's power envelope held steady at 12 MW from the first disclosure (15507, 15538) through January 2019 (15305), and the 8,000-miner fleet target (15506) was reported as installed by August 2018 (15456, 15342, 15302). The hashrate figure moved, however. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), with no reconciling explanation in the record. That is a roughly 14 percent downward revision presented as a new baseline rather than as a shortfall.
On timing, the March 31, 2018 milestone of 3,500 operating miners carries a delayed flag (15543), as does the Logical Brokerage close (15544). The statement that equipment had been operational since June 2018 (15303) sits awkwardly beside the earlier claim that 3,500 units were running by March (15505). The site rested on a 107,000-square-foot lease (15504, 15519) that was extended only to August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), which is short tenure for a facility being refreshed with 3,000 S17 Pro units in December 2019 (15047). Adjacent commitments did not hold: the Synapse partnership promised by January 2019 (15376) was terminated (15138).
The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this, including permits, utility service filings or site reporting. A 12 MW leased load would not normally leave an interconnection-queue trail, so the absence of such evidence is unsurprising, but every claim here still rests on company disclosure alone.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to backfill post-2019 claims so that Rockdale and Corsicana can be assessed directly. For those Texas sites, watch for ERCOT large-load interconnection status, Milam and Navarro County permitting, and energized-megawatt disclosures in the third-quarter 10-Q, compared against whatever dated targets the backfill surfaces. The Kentucky Facility also needs a location before any claim against it can be tested.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-10-01Riot's facility record as supplied covers only the Oklahoma City buildout of 2018 and 2019. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear as announced projects but have no capacity, cost or timeline claims attached, so their trajectory cannot be assessed from this file. The oldest entries (21108, 21094, 20980) belong to the predecessor diagnostics and animal-health business and say nothing about mining delivery.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City story is one of quiet downward revision. The mid-2018 filings set a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508, 15539). The miner count was reached by August 2018 (15456, compare 15505 at 3,500 units on March 31) and the 12 MW figure is restated unchanged into 2019 (15305). The hash-rate ceiling, however, reappears from December 2018 onward as 95 PH/s (15343, 15306, 15284). None of those later claims reconcile the change, and the 13 percent haircut came with no change in miner count. That points to a revised fleet-efficiency assumption rather than a smaller site.
On timing, the 3,500-unit milestone tied to March 31, 2018 (15543) is flagged delayed. Operations were later described as running since June 2018 (15303). The 107,000 square foot lease (15519, 15454) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285), with renewal options mentioned but not exercised in the record (15366, 15286). For a site carrying the company's entire fleet, that is a thin tenure. The record ends mid-entry on a December 2019 delivery of 3,000 Antminer S17 Pro units (15047), which signals a fleet refresh but not its outcome.
No independent evidence is in the file to corroborate any of this. There are no permits, no utility or interconnection filings, and no site reporting. The Oklahoma City figures rest entirely on company statements.
The main item for the next 90 days is closing the coverage gap rather than any Oklahoma event. The Texas sites carry the company's current scale, so the priorities are capacity and energization claims for Rockdale and Corsicana from recent 10-Q, 10-K and monthly production releases, and ERCOT interconnection or large-load filings to test them against. Analysts should also watch whether stated megawatts and hash-rate targets for those sites drift the way the 110-to-95 PH/s figure did at Oklahoma City.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-30The facility record for Riot is thin and ends early. The visible claims stop at claim 15047, dated December 2019. The 2004 to 2016 entries (for example 21108, 21049 and 20980) describe the predecessor animal-health and diagnostics business and say nothing about datacenter delivery. That leaves Oklahoma City as the only site with a real capacity trajectory. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear only as project stubs with no capacity, cost or dated claims attached.
At Oklahoma City, the headline numbers held on units but eroded on output. The mid-2018 filings set full deployment at 8,000 miners and 12 MW (15506, 15507, 15526) with an expected 110 PH/s (15508, 15539). By August 2018 the company reported all 8,000 miners installed (15456), and the 12 MW figure recurs in January 2019 (15305). The hash-rate target, however, quietly became a 95 PH/s maximum in December 2018 and January 2019 (15343, 15306, 15284). That is roughly a 14 percent reduction, presented as a restatement rather than a revision, with no reconciliation to the earlier 110 PH/s figure.
Dates were loosely kept. The 3,500-miner milestone tied to March 31, 2018 carries a delayed flag (15543), and the Logical Brokerage closing slipped past its March 2018 target (15544). The site's tenure was repeatedly framed around a lease running only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285). That is a short horizon for a facility being marketed as a growth platform, and the record never shows how that expiry was resolved. The adjacent Synapse exchange partnership was flagged delayed against a January 2019 date (15376) and later terminated (15138). The late-2019 S17 Pro delivery of 3,000 units (15047) is the last dated commitment visible.
No independent corroboration appears anywhere in the record. There are no permits, no utility or interconnection queue entries, and no on-the-ground reporting. Every figure is self-reported through filings.
For the next 90 days, the priority is closing the data gap rather than grading pace. The most useful additions would be dated capacity and energization claims for Rockdale and Corsicana, matched against ERCOT large-load interconnection filings. Status updates on Massena and Kentucky should confirm whether those projects remain active or have been wound down. Until then, the defensible read is narrow: modest, unacknowledged downward drift in output, and no external verification of any site.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-29The claim record supplied here stops in December 2019, partway through claim 15047. Every capacity and timeline claim it contains concerns Oklahoma City. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility are listed as projects but carry no capacity, cost or dated claims, so this read covers only the early Oklahoma City phase. The pre-2017 entries (21108, 20980 and related) come from the predecessor diagnostics business and say nothing about facility delivery.
In Oklahoma City, the headline capacity has been restated downward once, and the company did not explain the change. The mid-2018 filings set a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15551, 15507, 15539, 15508). By December 2018 the same 8,000-unit, 12 MW footprint was described as reaching a maximum of 95 PH/s (15343, 15306, 15284). That is roughly a 14 percent reduction in the throughput figure while the physical inputs stayed the same, and none of the later claims reconcile the two numbers. The miner count has held. The 6,800-plus-1,200 purchase (15518, 15517) was later itemized as 3,800 from Prive and 3,000 from Blockchain Mining Supply (15451, 15452) alongside the Kairos units, and the pieces add up.
On timing, the early milestone was partly met. Only 3,500 miners were running at the March 2018 checkpoint (15543, 15505), which is flagged delayed. By August 2018, 8,000 were reported installed (15456), with operations dated from June 2018 (15303). The 107,000 square foot lease (15504, 15519) was later described as extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285), and those entries are flagged delayed. A short extension on a mining site's lease is a real continuity risk. Adjacent commitments did worse. The Synapse exchange partnership, promised for January 2019 (15376), was terminated in September 2019 (15138), and the Logical Brokerage closing slipped past its stated date (15544).
No independent corroboration is in the file. There are no permits, no utility or interconnection filings, and no on-site reporting, so every capacity figure here rests on the company's own statements. The S17 Pro delivery of 3,000 units slated for December 2019 (15047) is the last forward-looking facility claim, and its outcome is not recorded.
The priority for the next 90 days is to close the gap in the data rather than to read more into Oklahoma City. That means ingesting post-2019 claims and attaching dated capacity figures to Rockdale and Corsicana. The ERCOT interconnection queue and county permit records are the obvious independent checks against whatever megawatt figures those claims assert. Once that history exists, the useful test is whether the pattern seen in Oklahoma City repeats: a stable hardware count paired with a performance figure that is quietly restated.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-29The record supplied here tells a much narrower story than Riot's current project list suggests. Every dated capacity and timeline claim concerns a single leased building in Oklahoma City in 2018 and 2019. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear only as project stubs with no capacity, cost or dated milestones attached, and the claim list itself ends mid-entry at claim 15047. Any read of Riot's present-day delivery trajectory has to start from that gap. The pre-2018 claims (21108, 21094, 20980) belong to the company's earlier animal-health and diagnostics identity and say nothing about datacenter delivery.
Within Oklahoma City, announced scale was modest and fairly stable in hardware terms but softened in output terms. The facility was consistently framed as 8,000 miners on roughly 12 MW in a 107,000-square-foot lease (15506, 15507, 15519). The hash-rate expectation, however, moved from a 110 PH/s target (15508, 15539) to a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284). No stated reason for the cut appears in these claims.
The timing record is mixed. The interim milestone of 3,500 miners by March 31, 2018 is flagged delayed (15543), yet 8,000 units were reported installed by August 2018 (15456), and later filings date operations to June 2018 (15303). That is consistent with a short slip that was absorbed rather than openly revised. The lease itself became a recurring short-horizon item, extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285). That fits a tenant hedging on commitment, not one building out a campus. The December 2019 S17 Pro delivery of 3,000 units (15047) is the last visible milestone, and its outcome is cut off.
No independent corroboration is present in this record: no permits, utility agreements or interconnection-queue entries for any site. As a result, none of the announced pace can be verified beyond the company's own filings.
For the next 90 days, the priority is closing the record rather than forecasting from it. That means ingesting the post-2019 claims covering Rockdale and Corsicana, where the substantive capacity story now sits, and pulling ERCOT interconnection filings and county permit records to test those claims independently. It also means establishing whether Massena and Kentucky carry any dated commitments at all. Until then, conclusions about Riot's current delivery credibility would outrun the evidence.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-28The facility record available here effectively covers one site, Oklahoma City, and stops at the end of 2019. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility are listed as projects but carry no capacity, cost or timeline claims in this dataset. Any read of Riot's current delivery trajectory is therefore provisional. The claims dated 2004 to 2016 (21108 through 20979) belong to the Venaxis and Bioptix predecessor business and have no bearing on the mining footprint.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City envelope held steady at 12 MW and 8,000 miners from the mid-2018 filings (15507, 15506) through January 2019 (15305, 15283). The output target did not hold. A 110 PH/s expected hash rate (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), roughly a 14 percent reduction with the same fleet and power. The filings do not appear to acknowledge the change. It is most plausibly explained by fleet mix or efficiency assumptions, but the record does not say so.
On timing, the ramp slipped but recovered. Only 3,500 miners were running at March 31, 2018 (15505), a figure the record itself tags as delayed (15543). By August 2018 the company reported all 8,000 active (15456), with equipment operational since June (15303). The more telling timeline signal is tenure. The site sat on a lease extended only through August 15, 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), with renewal options noted but not exercised in the record (15366, 15286). That is a short runway for a site presented as the company's core operation. The December 2019 Antminer S17 Pro purchase (15046) points to a fleet refresh, but the record ends before showing where those units were deployed.
No independent evidence appears anywhere in this file. There are no utility or interconnection filings, no local permits and no site reporting. Every capacity figure is self-reported, and the June 28, 2018 filing is extracted many times over, which inflates the apparent density of corroboration.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing the data gap rather than grading pace. That means populating the Rockdale and Corsicana capacity and energization claims from recent 10-Q and 10-K filings, and checking the Q3 2026 filing expected around early November for revised megawatt or date language. It also means pulling ERCOT large-load interconnection and Navarro and Milam County permit records so there is something independent to test the Texas buildout against.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-27The record supplied here is truncated and heavily front-loaded. Substantive facility claims end in December 2019 (claim 15046, with 15047 cut off mid-entry), and nearly all of them concern the leased Oklahoma City site. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility are listed as projects but carry no capacity, cost or timeline claims in this extract, so any read of Riot's current buildout would go beyond the evidence. The 2004 to 2016 entries (for example 21108, 20980) belong to the company's biotech predecessor and say nothing about datacenter delivery.
Within Oklahoma City, the unit count held but the performance figure did not. The mid-2018 filings framed full deployment as 8,000 miners on 12 MW (15506, 15507, 15538). The miners were sourced from Kairos, Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply (15502, 15451, 15452), and those purchases reconcile to the 8,000 figure restated in 15456 and 15269. The hash-rate target is a different matter. It fell from 110 PH/s (15539, 15508) to a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), and nothing in the record explains the change. The deployment timeline is also slightly muddled. Filings report 3,500 miners operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520), while a later filing dates operations to June 2018 (15303).
The site's tenure was always thin. The 107,000 square foot lease (15519, 15454) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), and renewal options were mentioned but never exercised on record (15366, 15286). The December 2019 S17 Pro purchase (15046) points to a fleet refresh, but the extract does not say where those machines were deployed.
There is no independent corroboration anywhere in the record. It contains no permits, no utility or ERCOT interconnection filings, and no on-the-ground reporting. Every capacity figure is self-reported.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing the data gap. That means ingesting Riot's post-2019 filings so that Rockdale and Corsicana carry dated capacity and energization claims. Those claims should then be checked against ERCOT large-load interconnection records and Navarro and Milam County permitting, and any Massena or Kentucky claims should be tested for supporting utility agreements. Until those checks are done, the only pattern the record supports is stable unit counts, softening performance targets and short-dated site control.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-27This excerpt of Riot's record ends in January 2020 at claim 15000, so it covers only the Oklahoma City era. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear in the project list, but none of their claims are shown here, and nothing below should be read as a judgment on them. Within Oklahoma City, capacity barely moved. The June 2018 filing set out 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s at full deployment (15506, 15507, 15508), repeated across a dozen near-duplicate extractions. By December 2018 the miner count and power figure were unchanged (15342, 15305), but the hash-rate ceiling had fallen quietly to 95 PH/s (15343, 15306, 15284). The claims do not explain the drop. It may reflect a change in miner mix or a correction of the original estimate. On deployment, the dates mostly held. The interim 3,500-miner figure as of March 31, 2018 (15505) led to 8,000 active units by August (15456). One claim is harder to square: a January 2019 statement says the equipment had been operational since June 2018 (15303), while earlier filings describe thousands of miners running in Oklahoma City by March. That may be a relocation artifact (15301), but it is unreconciled in the record. The more telling timeline is the lease. It started as 107,000 square feet (15519), was extended to August 2019 (15361, 15304), and extended again only to May 2020 (15015). That is a site run on rolling short-term extensions, not a long-horizon build, and it shaped the late-2019 refresh. Riot bought 3,000 and then 1,000 Antminer S17 Pros for delivery by December 2019 and January 2020 (15046, 15047, 15017, 15018). The only follow-up, 15016, confirms deployment but gives no count. The adjacent exchange ambitions show the same pattern of promises outrunning delivery: the Synapse partnership, targeted for January 2019 (15376), was terminated that September (15138). The record contains no independent corroboration, such as utility agreements, local permits or site reporting, for any Oklahoma City figure, so every number here rests on company filings. For the next 90 days, the priority is to load the post-2020 claims for Rockdale and Corsicana and test them against ERCOT interconnection filings and county permitting. The questions carried over from Oklahoma City are whether announced megawatts come with a stated energization date, and whether headline figures get revised without acknowledgement, as the hash-rate target was in 2018.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-27The supplied record breaks off mid-entry at claim 15000 and covers only June 2018 through January 2020. Every dated capacity or timeline claim in it concerns the leased Oklahoma City site. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility are listed as projects but carry no claims here, so this read covers Riot's early Oklahoma phase only. It is not a read of the Texas buildout.
Within that window, the footprint held steady at 12 MW (15507, 15538, 15305) and about 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15342). The yield on that footprint shrank quietly. The 110 PH/s target in the June 2018 filing (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December (15343), and was repeated at that level in January 2019 (15306, 15284). None of the claims explain the cut. The most likely cause is older machines, since miner count and power did not change, but the filings never say this. Many 2018-06-28 entries are near-duplicates from a single document (for example 15503, 15518, 15532, 15541), so the claim count overstates how often the company actually restated its figures.
The deployment ramp held up reasonably well. The company reported 3,500 miners at March 31, 2018 (15505, 15543) and 8,000 installed by August (15456), consistent with the June 2018 start of operations cited later (15303). Tenure was the weak point. The lease ran only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), with renewal described only as options (15366, 15286). It then appears as an extension through May 2020 under the Kairos lease (15015). Operating on short, rolling leases made the site a stopgap rather than a platform. The late-2019 Bitmain S17 Pro orders (15046, 15047, 15017, 15018) carried firm delivery dates of 2019-12-11 and 2020-01-31, but no confirmation of delivery appears before the record ends. The adjacent exchange ventures also slipped: the Synapse arrangement promised for January 2019 (15376) was terminated that September (15138).
The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no utility or interconnection filings, and no on-the-ground reporting. Everything above is self-reported.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to load the post-2020 claims so that Rockdale and Corsicana can be judged on their own announced megawatts and energization dates. Those should be checked against ERCOT interconnection and large-load records and Navarro and Milam County permits. For the Oklahoma legacy, the open question is whether the S17 deliveries were ever confirmed and whether the May 2020 lease end was reached or extended again.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-27The record supplied here covers only the Oklahoma City operation from mid-2018 to January 2020 and cuts off at claim 15000. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility are listed as announced but carry no capacity, cost or timeline claims in this excerpt, so this read is limited to the Oklahoma chapter. Oklahoma City was a 12 MW, 8,000-miner deployment in a 107,000 square foot leased building (15506, 15507, 15533). Measured in megawatts it never grew: the 12 MW figure is restated unchanged in January 2019 (15305). The headline performance metric did shrink. The 110 PH/s hash-rate target (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), and the filings do not acknowledge or explain the cut. The miner count did reconcile. The 6,800 additional units (15503) map onto the Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply purchases (15451, 15452), and 8,000 active units were reported by August 2018 (15456). Deployment dates held only loosely. Only 3,500 miners were running at the March 31, 2018 checkpoint (15505), which is flagged as delayed (15543), and full deployment came roughly a quarter later (15303). The replacement cycle followed the same pattern. S17 Pro deliveries were promised for December 11, 2019 and January 31, 2020 (15047, 15018), and both are marked delayed. The more telling signal is tenure. The lease was extended in short increments, first to August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285) and then to May 2020 (15015), which is how an operator treats a site as temporary rather than as a platform for growth. Adjacent ventures slipped in the same way. The Synapse exchange partnership missed its January 2019 target (15376) and was terminated (15138). The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this: no utility filings, permits, or third-party site reporting. Much of the dataset repeats the same 10-Q facts under different claim ids, which inflates the apparent volume of evidence. Over the next 90 days, the Oklahoma City data is historical and the useful work lies elsewhere. The priority is whether the record gains dated megawatt and cost claims for Corsicana and Rockdale. Where it does, those claims should be checked against ERCOT large-load interconnection filings and county permit records. It is also worth watching whether the pattern seen here repeats: stable capacity headlines alongside quietly lowered performance targets and rolling short-term extensions.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-26The supplied record stops mid-entry at claim 15000 in January 2020. It covers only the Oklahoma City phase, so this read cannot assess Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena or Kentucky. Those projects appear as announced, with no capacity, cost or dated claims attached.
Within Oklahoma City, headline capacity scaled quickly and then stalled. In mid-2018 Riot reported 3,500 miners installed as of March 31 (15505, 15543) against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508, 15539). By August the company said all 8,000 were active (15456), which is a credible fit with the stacked miner purchases from Kairos, Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply (15450, 15451, 15452). The hash-rate target, however, was restated as a 95 PH/s maximum from December 2018 onward (15343, 15306, 15284). That is a roughly 14 percent reduction, and the record shows no reconciliation to the earlier 110 PH/s figure. The miner count then held flat at 8,000 through 2019 (15302, 15283, 15269), so the fleet stopped growing even as the output figure quietly came down. Riot added capacity again only in late 2019, with Bitmain S17 Pro orders of 3,000 units due by December 11, 2019 (15046, 15047) and 1,000 more due by January 31, 2020 (15017, 15018). The follow-on deployment claim (15016) carries no quantity, so there is no way to confirm those units were energized.
On timing, the lease is the clearer signal. Riot extended the Oklahoma City site in short increments: first through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), then through May 2020 (15015). This rolling pattern suggests the company was not locking in the site, which undercuts any read of Oklahoma City as a durable platform. The record contains no independent evidence at all. There are no utility agreements, permits, interconnection entries or site reporting, so every capacity figure here rests solely on company statements.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing the evidentiary gap on the Texas sites. That means dated MW and energization claims for Corsicana and Rockdale that can be checked against ERCOT large-load interconnection filings and Navarro and Milam County permit records. It also means confirmation of how and when Oklahoma City was exited, since the last recorded lease term ran only to May 2020.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-25The record supplied here covers Oklahoma City in depth and breaks off at claim 15000 in early 2020. The four other sites on file (Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and Kentucky) carry no capacity, cost or timeline claims in this excerpt, so this read is necessarily a read of Riot's first-generation footprint rather than its current one. On that footprint, capacity was bought rather than built. The 8,000-miner fleet described in June 2018 (15506) was assembled from the Kairos, Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply acquisitions (15450, 15451, 15452), and the power envelope stayed fixed at 12 MW from the first filing through January 2019 (15507, 15305). The number that moved was hash rate. The 110 PH/s full-deployment target (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343) and was repeated at 95 thereafter (15306, 15284). None of the claims on record explains the roughly 14 percent reduction, which amounts to an unacknowledged downward revision rather than a disclosed shortfall. Deployment pace roughly held. The fleet went from 3,500 installed at March 31, 2018 (15505, 15543) to 8,000 active by August (15456), and later filings date operations to June 2018 (15303). Tenure was the weaker point. The 107,000-square-foot lease (15504, 15454) was extended only to August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304) and then to May 2020 (15015). A mining operation running on rolling short extensions is not a durable site, and the late-2019 S17 Pro orders, with deliveries due December 2019 and January 2020 (15047, 15018), were committed into a facility with only months of tenure left. The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this, meaning no utility filings, permits or site reporting. Every figure is company-stated, and several are tagged delayed. The next 90 days matter mainly for coverage. The priority is to ingest the post-2020 claims so that Rockdale and Corsicana carry dated megawatt figures that can be tested against ERCOT interconnection records and Navarro and Milam County permitting. Separately, it is worth checking whether the stated hash-rate targets for those sites show the same quiet downward drift seen in Oklahoma City.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-24The record supplied here is truncated at claim 15000 and effectively ends in January 2020, so this read covers only Riot's Oklahoma City phase. The Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena, Kentucky and later Oklahoma City entries have no dated capacity or timeline claims in view. Nothing below should be taken as an assessment of the Texas buildout.
Within that window, the capacity story has three phases: acquisition-led scaling, a quiet downward revision, then a partial refresh. The mid-2018 filings frame an 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s target (15506, 15507, 15508, 15539), assembled almost entirely by buying other companies' fleets through Kairos, Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply (15540, 15451, 15452) rather than by building. The 8,000-unit figure appears to have been reached, since installed count moves from 3,500 as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15543) to 8,000 by August (15456). By December 2018, however, the hash-rate ceiling is stated as 95 PH/s (15343, 15306, 15284) with the same unit count and the same 12 MW. The 110 figure simply disappears, and no claim in the record explains the drop. The December 2019 Bitmain S17 Pro orders (15046, 15017) read as a fleet-efficiency refresh rather than a capacity expansion, and no new megawatt figure accompanies them.
On dates, the pattern is short, rolling commitments rather than slippage against a single milestone. The 107,000 sq ft Oklahoma City lease (15504, 15454) was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), and a Kairos lease was later pushed to May 2020 (15015). That signals a tenant unwilling or unable to commit long term at that site, which is consistent with Riot's eventual move to Texas. The S17 delivery windows of December 11, 2019 and January 31, 2020 (15047, 15018) are flagged as delayed in the extraction, but the record contains no follow-up confirming arrival or energization.
The record contains no independent evidence, such as utility filings, interconnection queue entries, permits or on-the-ground reporting, that corroborates the 12 MW draw or the installed counts. Much of the claim volume is duplicate extraction of the same June 2018 filing, which inflates apparent disclosure density.
For the next 90 days, the priority is ingesting the post-2020 claims so that Rockdale and Corsicana can be assessed on their own megawatt and energization dates. After that, check whether announced capacity at those sites is matched by ERCOT interconnection records, and whether the Massena and Kentucky entries carry any dated commitments at all.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-24The record supplied here covers only Riot's Oklahoma City phase, from mid-2018 through January 2020. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky site appear as announced projects but have no capacity or timeline claims attached, so this read covers the early mining footprint only.
Capacity went up and then quietly came down. The June 2018 filings describe a 12 MW, 8,000-miner build targeting 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508, 15539), with 3,500 miners running as of March 31 (15505, 15543). By August the company reported all 8,000 units active (15456), which does close that stated gap. The 8,000 figure was assembled mostly through acquisition rather than organic procurement: Kairos, Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply together account for the full count (15450, 15451, 15452, 15269). By December 2018 the hash-rate ceiling had fallen to 95 PH/s (15343, 15306, 15284). Unit count and power held steady, and no filing explains the roughly 14 percent reduction.
Dates were mostly kept by pushing them back in short increments. The 107,000 square foot lease (15504, 15454) was extended through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285) and then through May 2020 (15015). A facility running on successive short extensions is operating at the landlord's pleasure, which argues against treating Oklahoma City as a durable base. The December 2019 S17 Pro orders carried near-term delivery dates of December 11 and January 31 (15047, 15018), and both are flagged as delayed. The adjacent exchange ambitions followed the same pattern: the Synapse arrangement was promised for January 2019 (15376) and terminated that September (15138).
Nothing in this record provides independent corroboration. There are no utility interconnection filings, no permits and no site reporting, so the 12 MW and hash-rate figures rest on the company's own disclosures. The one internal check that holds is the 8,000-unit count, which reconciles with the three acquisitions.
For the next 90 days, the most useful step is to extend the record to cover the Texas sites. Corsicana in particular should be checked for ERCOT large-load interconnection status and energization milestones, so its announced scale can be tested against grid-side evidence. The same test should then be applied to Rockdale. Separately, it is worth confirming whether the 95 PH/s revision was ever reconciled in later filings. Until those claims are ingested, conclusions about Riot's current delivery credibility would be premature.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-23Riot's facility record here is almost entirely about one leased building in Oklahoma City, and it ends in January 2020. The last entry, claim 15000, is cut off with no content. Four of the five projects on file (Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility) have no capacity or timeline claims in this set, so this read covers the early Oklahoma phase only. Any conclusion about Riot's current Texas buildout should wait for the missing claims.
Within that window, headline capacity held while performance guidance shrank. The mid-2018 filings described a 107,000 square foot lease, 8,000 miners at full deployment, a 12 MW draw and a 110 PH/s hashing target (15504, 15506, 15507, 15508, 15539). The 8,000-unit figure was reached: claim 15456 reports it installed by August 2018, and it is restated through early 2019 (15302, 15283). The hash rate target, however, reappears in December 2018 as a 95 PH/s maximum (15343, 15306, 15284). The filings do not explain the cut. The fleet then went flat, with the May 2019 count still at 8,000 (15269), until the S17 Pro purchases in December 2019 (15046, 15017).
The dates are weaker than the unit counts. The 3,500-miner milestone for March 31, 2018 is tagged delayed (15543). The facility was never secured on a long lease. It moved through short extensions, first to August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285) and then, via the Kairos lease, to May 2020 (15015). That pattern points to a tenant keeping its options open rather than building for scale. The S17 Pro deliveries are also tagged delayed (15047, 15018). Two filings two weeks apart cite 3,000 and 1,000 units without reconciling the two figures, and that inconsistency should be resolved before either number is relied on.
No independent evidence appears in the record: no permits, no utility or interconnection filings, no on-the-ground reporting. Every capacity figure is company-stated, and the 8,000-miner deployment is corroborated only by later company restatements.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to recover the truncated claims and the post-2020 Texas record. Once those are in hand, check whether Rockdale and Corsicana capacity figures show the same pattern seen here, where unit counts are met but performance targets are quietly lowered. Also look for ERCOT large-load or interconnection filings that can confirm the announced megawatts independently.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-21The Oklahoma City record is best read as a single fixed envelope restated many times rather than a capacity that grew. The 107,000 square feet, 8,000 miners and 12 MW recur nearly verbatim across June and August 2018 and again in January 2019 (15504, 15506, 15507, 15537, 15542, 15283, 15305), with more than thirty of those restatements carrying the same 2018-06-28 date. Repetition of an unchanged number across filings is not progress, and the one figure that did move, moved down: the hashing target of 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) became 95 PH/s by December 2018 and stayed there (15343, 15284, 15306). That is roughly a fourteen percent reduction introduced as a new baseline rather than as a revision. Note also how 8,000 migrates from a full-deployment aspiration in June (15506) to installed active miners in August (15456), six weeks after the 3,500-unit March 31 milestone was already flagged late (15543, 15505).
Dates have not held. The clearest signal is the lease itself, extended to August 2019 and then to May 2020 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285, 15015), each extension short-tenor and each marked delayed. Equipment timing followed the same pattern: 3,000 S17 Pros due 2019-12-11 and 1,000 more due 2020-01-31 both slipped (15047, 15018). The Synapse arrangement promised for January 2019 slipped and then terminated outright (15376, 15138).
Independent corroboration is absent rather than contradictory. Nothing in this record is a permit, an interconnection queue entry, or third-party observation; it is entirely self-reported. A 12 MW leased colocation footprint sits below the thresholds that usually generate queue paperwork, so silence there is expected, but it leaves the announced pace unverifiable. The four other named sites, Kentucky, Massena, Rockdale and Corsicana, carry no capacity, cost, or dated milestone at all, so the project list runs well ahead of the substantiated record, which itself stops in early 2020.
Over the next ninety days, watch whether the May 2020 expiry converts to a multi-year commitment or another rolling extension, whether the late S17 orders surface as measured hash rate rather than purchase confirmations, whether 95 PH/s is ever reported as achieved, and whether any announced site acquires a date, a megawatt figure, or a permit.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-21The usable record is narrower than its volume implies. Roughly forty of these entries share a single date, 2018-06-28, and restate the same handful of facts — the Kairos miners, the 6,800-unit purchase, the Logical Brokerage consideration, the Coinsquare and Tess stakes — under distinct ids (15502, 15531, 15540 are one event; 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544 another). Volume of claims should not be read as volume of activity. Strip the duplication and there is one facility of substance on record, Oklahoma City, and a short list of equipment orders.
On capacity, the physical envelope never moved: 107,000 square feet, 12 MW, 8,000 miners, restated identically from June 2018 through January 2019 (15504, 15507, 15537, 15305). What quietly shrank was the output figure. The original 110 PH/s target (15508, 15539) becomes 95 PH/s by December 2018 and stays there (15343, 15306, 15284), a roughly fourteen percent reduction presented as a fresh statement rather than a revision. No claim acknowledges the earlier number. The deployment ramp itself was slower than promised but did land: 3,500 of 8,000 installed at the March 2018 checkpoint (15543, flagged delayed), full 8,000 active by August (15456).
The timeline pattern worth noting is tenure, not construction. The lease is extended to August 2019 and re-announced four times (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), then extended again only to May 2020 (15015). Serial short extensions describe a tenant hedging, not an operator scaling. The equipment claims show the same friction: the 3,000 S17 Pros due 2019-12-11 (15047) and the 1,000 due 2020-01-31 (15018) are both marked delayed. The adjacent exchange effort sets a useful base rate — Synapse was announced for a January 2019 launch (15376) and terminated by September (15138).
Independent corroboration is absent throughout. Nothing here cites a permit, an interconnection filing, or site reporting; a 12 MW leased shell would not generate much of either. That is tolerable for this era and untenable for the next, because Kentucky, Massena, Rockdale and Corsicana sit in the project list as announced with no capacity and no cost attached.
Over the next ninety days, watch whether those four acquire a megawatt figure and a counterparty, whether any hash-rate target is restated downward without reference to its predecessor, whether commitments shift from leased to owned, and whether a single ERCOT queue position or county permit ever appears to check a self-reported number.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-21The striking feature of this record is that only one site ever carried numbers. Kentucky, Massena, Rockdale and Corsicana sit in the project list as announced with no capacity and no cost attached, while every quantified claim resolves to the leased Oklahoma City space. Read as a delivery trajectory, this is not a portfolio scaling up; it is one 107,000 square foot lease described repeatedly, with claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542 and 15454 restating the same executed lease across four filings. Anyone counting announcements rather than sites will badly overstate the build.
Capacity did not scale so much as quietly settle. The 2018 framing paired 8,000 miners and 12 MW with a 110 PH/s target (15539, 15508, 15506, 15538). By December 2018 the same 8,000 machines were described as producing a maximum 95 PH/s (15343), repeated in 15306 and 15284. The miner count and power draw held; the hash rate fell roughly fourteen percent with no stated reason. That is the clearest instance here of a number revised without acknowledgement, and it is the kind of revision worth trusting less than the machines it describes.
Dates behaved poorly in both directions. The 3,500 installed against an 8,000 target as of March 2018 (15543, 15505) shows the initial ramp arriving late; by August 2018 the full 8,000 were claimed active (15456). Hardware deliveries then slipped again, with the 3,000 unit S17 Pro delivery (15047) and the 1,000 unit follow-on (15018) both flagged past their dates. The lease itself is the more telling signal: successive short extensions through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285) and then May 2020 (15015) are not how an operator treats infrastructure it intends to keep. The exchange ambition decayed on the same schedule, from the Synapse agreement (15376) to its termination (15138).
Nothing in this record is corroborated by permits, interconnection queue positions or site reporting; for a leased hosting facility that absence is expected, but it means the four unquantified projects rest on announcement alone. Over the next ninety days, watch whether capacity figures ever attach to Rockdale or Corsicana, whether the Oklahoma lease is renewed or exited, and whether purchased machines are reported as installed hash rate rather than as orders. Note also that this dataset appears to end in early 2020, so the trajectory described here is the 2018 to 2020 arc only.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-20The record here is narrower than the project list implies. Four of the five named sites — Kentucky, Massena, Rockdale, Corsicana — carry no capacity, cost, or timeline claim at all, so there is no delivery trajectory to grade for them; every dated assertion in this file attaches to the Oklahoma City site, and the file stops in early 2020. Any read is therefore a read of one 107,000 square foot leased facility (15504, 15519, 15533), not of the company's current buildout.
On that site, the headline envelope never grew. The 12 MW and 8,000-miner ceiling set on 2018-06-28 (15526, 15506, 15537) is the same ceiling restated in January 2019 (15305, 15302). What did move was the derived number: an expected 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) became a maximum 95 PH/s by December 2018 (15343) and stayed there (15284, 15306). That is a roughly fourteen percent reduction in the only figure that tracks actual production, executed against an unchanged miner count and with no accompanying acknowledgement in the claim trail. It is the single most informative item in the set.
Dates were mixed rather than uniformly bad. The 3,500-miner March 2018 milestone slipped (15543), but full deployment to 8,000 was reported by August 2018 (15456) — roughly on the original envelope. The 2019 Bitmain S17 tranches slipped again, both the 3,000-unit December delivery (15047) and the 1,000-unit January follow-on (15018). More telling than either is the lease cadence: an extension only through August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15285), then one only through May 2020 (15015). A shortening leasehold on a site described as fully deployed is not the posture of an operator expanding there.
No permits, interconnection queue entries, or third-party site reporting appear anywhere in this record; every claim is self-reported. At 12 MW the site would sit below the thresholds that generate visible large-load study activity, so that absence is uninformative rather than contradictory — but it also means nothing here has been independently corroborated.
For the next ninety days, the useful questions are whether the 110-to-95 revision was ever reconciled, whether the May 2020 lease was renewed or the site wound down, and whether the four unpopulated sites produce any dated capacity claim capable of being tested against ERCOT queue positions and county permitting.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-20The Oklahoma City record is the only entry here with numbers attached, and it describes a footprint that stopped growing almost as soon as it was first described. The 8,000-miner, 12 MW envelope stated in June 2018 (15506, 15507) is the same envelope restated in December 2018 (15342), January 2019 (15302, 15305) and January 2020 (15016). Eighteen months of disclosure, no incremental capacity. What did move, quietly, is output: the 110 PH/s target carried through mid-2018 (15508, 15539) becomes 95 PH/s by that December (15343) and stays there (15306, 15284). That is roughly a fourteen percent haircut against an unchanged machine count and unchanged power draw, and no claim in the file acknowledges the revision or explains it. A reader tracking only the headline miner number would not notice.
Dates have slipped consistently rather than dramatically. The 3,500 machines due by March 2018 landed late (15543), the Logical Brokerage close slid past its March 2018 target (15544), the RiotX exchange promised for January 2019 (15376) was never delivered and the underlying Synapse agreement was terminated that September (15138), and both S17 Pro tranches missed their stated delivery windows (15047, 15018). Note also that the June 2018 cluster restates the same three acquisitions four times over; that is a filing artifact, but it gives the period an appearance of momentum the capacity figures do not support.
On corroboration, the file contains no permits, no interconnection queue entries and no independent site reporting. At 12 MW behind a landlord's meter in leased space, a queue entry would not be expected, so the absence is not itself damning, but it does mean every capacity assertion here rests on the company's own filings. The lease posture reinforces the point: the same 107,000 square feet restated repeatedly (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542, 15454), extended to August 2019 (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), then only to May 2020 (15015). Short rolling extensions of third-party space are a tenancy, not a buildout.
For the next ninety days: whether the May 2020 lease renews or the site is vacated; whether installed converts to hashing; and whether Kentucky, Massena, Rockdale and Corsicana, all currently announced with no capacity or cost on record, produce hard megawatt figures and any utility-side confirmation.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-20The Oklahoma City arc is the only part of this record with enough density to judge, and it shows a company that hit its headline machine count while quietly lowering what those machines were said to produce. The deployment target held remarkably steady in unit terms — 8,000 miners and 12 MW from the first disclosures (15506, 15507) through the August 2018 confirmation that 8,000 were active (15456). What did not hold is throughput. The expected hash rate was 110 PH/s in mid-2018 (15508, 15539) and 95 PH/s by December (15343), carried forward unchanged into January 2019 (15306, 15284). That is a roughly fourteen percent downgrade against an unchanged fleet size, and it arrives as a restated figure rather than a revision. Anyone tracking only miner counts would have missed it.
Dates slipped in a consistent direction. The March 2018 installation milestone landed at 3,500 of 8,000 (15543). The Bitmain S17 Pro orders both missed: 3,000 units due 11 December 2019 (15047) and 1,000 due 31 January 2020 (15018). The lease story is the more structural tell — August 2019 restated four times (15361, 15344, 15304, 15285), then a short extension to May 2020 (15015). Short-tenor leased space is a tenancy, not a build program, and the repetition of the same 107,000 square feet across filings (15504, 15519, 15533, 15454) inflates disclosure volume without adding facility. The same duplication affects the acquisition record, where one Kairos transaction appears at least four times (15502, 15517, 15531, 15540).
No independent corroboration appears anywhere in this file: no permits, no interconnection queue entries, no utility filings. Twelve megawatts in 107,000 square feet is low enough density that none would be required, which is itself informative. Kentucky, Rockdale, Corsicana and Massena are listed as announced carrying no capacity, cost or date claim at all.
The record terminates in early 2020, so the near-term watchlist keys off that edge: whether the May 2020 lease renews or lapses, whether the outstanding 4,000 S17 Pros land and push realized hash above 95 PH/s, and whether any ERCOT or NYISO queue position ever attaches to the four announced sites. Until a number is attached to them, they are addresses, not capacity.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-19The supplied record effectively covers only Oklahoma City, and it ends mid-entry at claim 15000 in early 2020. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and Kentucky appear as projects with no capacity, cost or timeline claims attached, so this read cannot assess the Texas build-out that later defined Riot. Treat it as a view of the company's first facility only.
On capacity, the Oklahoma City envelope was fixed early and did not grow: 12 MW, 8,000 miners and a 107,000 square foot lease (15507, 15506, 15533) held consistently through January 2019 (15305, 15302, 15283). The fleet figure reconciles with the acquisitions. Prive's 3,800 units and Blockchain Mining Supply's 3,000 (15451, 15452) account for the 6,800-miner purchase (15503), and Kairos's 1,200 (15450) brings the total to 8,000 (15269). The one quiet revision is hash rate. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), and no disclosure in the record explains the 14 percent cut. Later capacity growth came from equipment rather than footprint: the S17 Pro orders of roughly 3,000 and 1,000 units (15047, 15017) were intended to raise output inside the same 12 MW site (15016).
On timing, deployment moved from 3,500 miners at March 31, 2018 (15505) to full installation by August (15456), and operations were described as running since June 2018 (15303). That is a credible ramp for a leased shell. The weaker signal is tenure. The lease was extended only to August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then, through Kairos, only to May 2020 (15015). These short, rolling extensions sat alongside new equipment deliveries due between December 2019 and January 2020 (15047, 15018). The record does not confirm that either delivery arrived on schedule.
The record contains no independent corroboration: no utility agreements, permits, interconnection filings or site reporting. Every figure is company-stated.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to obtain the full claim history so that Rockdale and Corsicana can be tested against ERCOT large-load interconnection records and county permitting. For the portion visible here, the questions are whether Oklahoma City was renewed or wound down after May 2020, and whether any filing reconciled the 110 to 95 PH/s revision.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-19The record supplied here covers only Riot's 2018 to early 2020 Oklahoma City era; the claim list is cut off at 15000, and the Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and Kentucky entries carry no dated capacity or timeline claims in this excerpt. The read below applies to Oklahoma City alone and should not be extended to the Texas campuses.
On scale, Oklahoma City delivered on its unit count but not its throughput. The June 2018 filing framed full deployment as 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (15506, 15507, 15508, 15539) against 3,500 miners installed at quarter-end (15505, 15520). By August the company reported 8,000 active units (15456, 15342), which matched the promise. The hash-rate figure was later restated as a 95 PH/s maximum (15343, 15306, 15284), roughly 14 percent below the original target, and the record shows no acknowledgement of the change. The acquisition inputs were also re-described. The 6,800-unit tranche (15532, 15518) was later split into 3,000 and 3,800 units from two named vendors (15452, 15451), and Logical Brokerage went from a $600,000 purchase (15521) to a 92.5 percent stake (15453). Heavy duplication within the single 2018-06-28 filing makes the claim density look greater than the underlying commitments.
On timing, the more telling pattern is tenancy rather than build-out. The 107,000 square foot lease (15533, 15454) was followed by short extensions, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285) and then through May 2020 (15015). A string of short extensions points to a site being held rather than grown. The late-2019 S17 Pro purchases of 3,000 and then 1,000 units (15046, 15047, 15017, 15018) replaced older machines without adding power, and both carried near-term delivery dates flagged as delayed.
No permits, utility filings or on-the-ground reporting appear in this record. The Oklahoma City pace therefore rests entirely on company statements.
For the next 90 days, the priority is to backfill claims after 15000 so the Texas assets can be assessed on their own filings. At Corsicana, check whether ERCOT interconnection and energization milestones match stated phase dates. At Rockdale, look for curtailment and power-credit disclosures that separate installed megawatts from operating megawatts. For Massena and Kentucky, watch whether either acquires dated capacity commitments at all.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-18The record supplied here is incomplete: it stops mid-entry at claim 15000 in early 2020, and every capacity and timeline claim concerns Oklahoma City. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear only as project stubs with no stated capacity, cost or dates. This read therefore covers Riot's first-generation mining footprint, not the Texas build-out that later defined the company.
Within that window, headline capacity held steady while its quality was quietly marked down. The Oklahoma City plan was framed at 8,000 miners and 12 MW across a 107,000 sq ft lease (15506, 15507, 15519). Those figures recur unchanged through January 2019 (15302, 15305, 15283). The hash-rate figure did not hold. The June 2018 target of 110 PH/s (15508, 15539) became a stated maximum of 95 PH/s by December 2018 (15343), and that lower number was repeated in later filings (15306, 15284) without any reconciliation to the original target. The late-2019 Antminer S17 Pro purchases (15046, 15017) look like a fleet refresh inside the same 12 MW envelope rather than an expansion, since no revised power or hash-rate figure accompanies them in the record.
On timing, the ramp from 3,500 installed miners at March 31, 2018 (15505, 15543) to full deployment reported by August (15456) is plausible, and it is consistent with a June 2018 operational start (15303). What stands out is the tenure of the site. The lease was extended only through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285), and a later extension ran only through May 2020 (15015). Rolling short-dated extensions on the sole productive site signal a stopgap, not a durable anchor. The S17 deliveries carried near-term dates (15047, 15018) that the dataset flags as delayed, and no confirmation of arrival or integration appears beyond a generic deployment statement (15016).
No independent corroboration is on file: no utility or interconnection records, no permits, no site reporting. Every figure is self-reported, and many appear in duplicate across the same filings.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is completing ingestion past claim 15000 so that the Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and Kentucky entries carry actual capacity and date claims that can be tested. For the Texas sites in particular, ERCOT large-load interconnection filings, county permitting and energization disclosures in quarterly production updates are the independent evidence needed. Until then, any judgment on Riot's current delivery pace would rest on data this record does not contain.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-18The record supplied here ends mid-entry after claim 15015 (January 2020), so this read covers only Riot's Oklahoma City era. Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena and the Kentucky facility appear as announced projects with no capacity, cost or timeline claims attached, so no trajectory can be assessed for them from this dataset.
Within Oklahoma City, the announced capacity was coherent from the start and was largely delivered. The June 2018 filings framed a 12 MW, 8,000-miner build (15506, 15507, 15538) assembled from acquired fleets: 6,800 purchased units plus Kairos's 1,200 (15532, 15540). The August 2018 breakdown into Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply lots (15451, 15452) reconciles to the same total. By August, 8,000 miners were reported active (15456), up from 3,500 at March 31 (15505). That is a real ramp, not a restatement. The exception is hash rate. The 110 PH/s expectation (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284). This is roughly a 14 percent reduction, and the filings do not present it as a revision.
On timing, the pattern is short-horizon tenancy rather than slippage against a build schedule. The 107,000 sq ft lease (15519, 15454) was extended to August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285) and then again to May 2020 (15015). Rolling extensions of a few months at a time suggest Riot was not committing to Oklahoma City as a long-term site. The late-2019 Bitmain S17 Pro orders carry dated delivery targets of December 11, 2019 for 3,000 units (15047) and January 31, 2020 for 1,000 units (15018). The record contains no confirmation that either date was met. Outside mining, the exchange track shows real slippage: the Synapse partnership targeted for January 2019 (15376) was terminated that September (15138).
The dataset contains no permits, utility interconnection filings or site reporting for any project, so the announced pace rests entirely on company statements. Much of the claim volume is duplicative, with the same acquisitions and lease facts repeated across filings. That repetition inflates apparent activity.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is completing ingestion past claim 15000 so the Texas projects carry actual capacity and cost claims. Once they do, the useful checks are ERCOT interconnection queue entries for Rockdale and Corsicana and local permitting for Massena and Kentucky, compared against the stated energization dates. Separately, it is worth confirming whether the S17 Pro deliveries and the May 2020 lease expiry were ever reconciled in later filings.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-18The supplied record breaks off at claim 15000, so this read covers only Riot's Oklahoma City phase from mid-2018 to early 2020. None of the claims shown attach to Rockdale, Corsicana, Massena or the Kentucky facility, and those sites, which likely make up most of Riot's current footprint, cannot be assessed from this excerpt. The Oklahoma City project itself is still listed as "announced" even though the record shows it operating, which looks like a status field that was never updated.
Within that window, capacity was flat, and the only revision ran downward. The 12 MW power envelope and 8,000-miner fleet stayed constant from the first filing (15507, 15506) through January 2019 (15305, 15302), and the 107,000-square-foot lease never changed (15533, 15454). The one quiet revision is hash rate. The 110 PH/s target (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s "maximum" by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), with no reconciliation between the two figures. Deployment itself largely held. The count moved from 3,500 installed miners at the end of March 2018 (15505) to 8,000 active by August (15456), with operations dated from June 2018 (15303). The acquired units also reconcile: Prive's 3,800 and Blockchain Mining Supply's 3,000 (15451, 15452) sum to the "6,800 additional miners" cited earlier (15518).
Timing risk sat in tenure rather than build-out. The site ran on short lease extensions, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304) and then a Kairos lease through May 2020 (15015). That is a thin footing for the fleet refresh that followed: $4.85 million of S17 Pro machines (15046), with 3,000 units due by December 11, 2019 (15047) and another 1,000 by January 31, 2020 (15018). The record contains no permits, utility filings or on-site reporting, so none of this is independently corroborated. At 12 MW in a leased building, no interconnection queue entry would be expected in any case. Much of the claim volume is duplication, with a single June 2018 filing restating the same figures three or four times, so the raw claim count overstates how much was actually disclosed.
For the next 90 days, the priority is closing the gap in the record. The post-2020 claims for Rockdale and Corsicana should be pulled and checked for the same pattern seen here, where headline throughput figures are revised without acknowledgement. Corsicana's stated energization dates should be compared against ERCOT interconnection and large-load filings. Oklahoma City's status should be updated to reflect whether the lease lapsed after May 2020 or was renewed.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-15The capacity record here is almost entirely about one leased site in Oklahoma City, and it has been steady rather than growing. The 2018 filings set full deployment at 8,000 miners drawing 12 MW (15506, 15507, 15537, 15526). By August 2018 Riot reported all 8,000 units installed (15456), up from 3,500 at the end of March (15505, 15543). The fleet count then stayed flat through early 2019 (15302, 15283, 15269). The one quiet revision is hash rate. The 110 PH/s target (15508, 15539) became a 95 PH/s maximum by December 2018 (15343, 15306, 15284), and the filings do not explain the drop. The composition of the fleet was also restated. The original 1,200 Kairos units plus 6,800 additional miners (15517, 15518) were later attributed to Prive and Blockchain Mining Supply purchases of 3,800 and 3,000 units (15451, 15452). The total still reconciles, but the sourcing story changed. The late-2019 Bitmain S17 Pro orders (15046, 15017) were a refresh of the fleet, not an expansion. Deliveries broadly held: 1,060 units were confirmed in February 2020 (15000) against a January 31 target (15018). The timeline weakness is tenure, not equipment. Each filing extended the Oklahoma City lease by only a few months, first through August 2019 (15361, 15304, 15285) and then through May 2020 (15015). A miner operator whose only site runs on short rolling extensions has fragile delivery risk, whatever the installed count. Meanwhile much of the partnership activity in this period went to exchange ventures rather than hosting capacity: Coinsquare (15424), RiotX, Shift Markets (15367), and the Synapse agreement, which was later terminated (15138). The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind, including permits, utility interconnection filings, or site reporting. Every figure is self-reported. The larger problem is that this ledger ends in March 2020, while the three projects on record, Rockdale, Corsicana, and Kentucky, have no capacity, cost, or timeline claims attached at all. So no trajectory can be assessed for the assets that now define Riot. Over the next 90 days, the priority is to backfill claims from 2021 onward for those three sites. That means the stated megawatt targets, energization dates, and any revisions to them. Each should be checked against ERCOT interconnection queue entries and Navarro and Milam county filings for Corsicana and Rockdale. Until that exists, any read of Riot's current build pace would be inference rather than evidence.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14The capacity record on file tells a story of a company growing through machines rather than megawatts, and it stops well short of the projects now listed against Riot. From December 2018 through March 2020 the Oklahoma City site is described at a fixed 12 MW (15305, 14972, 14948). Output there rose from a 95 PH/s ceiling on roughly 8,000 legacy units (15343, 15306) to 248 PH/s on 4,000 S17 Pros (14973, 14946). That tripling came from fleet turnover on constant power: older machines went offline with their future use described only as under evaluation (14929). The later S19 Pro commitments of 8,000 and then 5,100 units (14846, 14840) point to more of the same, and they coincided with a move to Coinmint's Massena site (14938, 14909), not with any Riot-controlled expansion. The 9,500 kWh figure in 14940 is probably a mis-extracted kW rating and should not be read as a capacity number.
On timing, equipment dates mostly held. The 1,000 S17 Pros due by January 31, 2020 (15018) were effectively matched by the 1,060 units reported delivered on February 13 (15000). The S19 Pros due by July 25 (14917) were received on July 20 (14903). The site itself was different. The Oklahoma lease was extended to August 2019 (15361), again to May 2020 (15015), and then to June 30, 2020 (14937), and the Coinmint term ran only to October 8, 2020 (14939). These were not slips, but the rolling short-term tenancy was never framed as a risk to the announced hash-rate path.
Every claim here is tagged stated. The record contains no permits, no utility or interconnection queue entries, and no site reporting to test the pace. The dollar figures in 14945 and 14926 (6.4 and 6.3 USD) are unit errors and need correcting before anyone cites them.
The largest gap is that Rockdale, Corsicana, and Kentucky appear as announced projects with no capacity, cost, or timeline claims in this record, which ends in October 2020 (14822). Any view of how those sites are being delivered is therefore not supported by this record. Over the next 90 days, watch for three things. First, whether new filings put megawatt figures and energization dates on the Texas sites. Second, whether those figures can be matched to ERCOT large-load interconnection records and Navarro County permitting for Corsicana. Third, whether Kentucky gets any dated milestone at all. Until then, the company's pattern of meeting machine delivery dates while its sites stayed temporary is the only baseline the record supports.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14This record describes Riot's early mining footprint much better than the three projects now listed against the company. Every facility claim in the file dates from December 2019 to April 2021, and the list cuts off mid-entry at claim 14726. Rockdale, Corsicana and the Kentucky facility have no capacity, cost or timeline claims attached, so this read covers the Oklahoma City and Coinmint Massena period only.
On capacity, the trajectory is steep and made almost entirely of purchase orders. The Oklahoma City site was described at 12 MW and 248 PH/s (14953, 14966). The Massena co-location added roughly 9.5 MW of equipment load (14940). By October 2020 the planned fleet was 22,640 units (14823), and by March 2021 it had grown to 39,146 units and 4.0 EH/s (14753), against 0.57 EH/s actually in service at year-end 2020 (14751). The April 2021 order added another 3.7 EH/s (14727). None of these figures shrank. The gap between installed and projected hash rate widened with each filing, and the projections were tied to the machines Riot had ordered, not to any site power it had shown it controlled.
The dates slipped modestly, and the slips were usually not flagged. The S17 Pro fleet was billed as in production in Q1 2020 (14946), yet installation was still being described in May (14928). The Oklahoma City lease was extended first to May (15015) and then to June 30 (14937) before the miners moved to Coinmint (14750). S19 Pro units promised by June 30, 2020 (14935) arrived in July (14903). A 2,500-unit tranche due by December 31, 2020 (14825) was later recorded simply as delivered in January 2021 (14742). The Coinmint agreement's October 2020 end date (14939) quietly became an ongoing relationship (14748). Several March 2020 claims repeat each other, and claim 14945 records $6.4 million as "6.4 USD", so the entries should be deduplicated before anyone totals them.
The file contains no independent evidence: no permits, interconnection queue positions or site reporting. Nothing here confirms the announced pace beyond Riot's own disclosures.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to fill in the missing post-2021 claims for Rockdale, Corsicana and Kentucky and to check each against outside sources. For Corsicana, that means ERCOT large-load interconnection filings and county permits. For Rockdale, it means energized megawatts in monthly production updates compared with nameplate capacity. For Kentucky, the first question is whether any disclosed capacity or schedule exists at all. The pattern above suggests checking whether energization dates hold or drift a quarter at a time.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's record describes a company whose stated ambitions grew by roughly two orders of magnitude in under two years, while almost every timing promise slipped quietly to the right. In 2020 the story was a co-location tenant: a single Massena power figure (claim 14940) and a fleet target of 22,640 units at full deployment (claim 14823). By early 2021 the target was 39,146 machines and 4.0 EH/s (claim 14753), against 0.57 EH/s actually online at year-end 2020 (claim 14751). After the Whinstone acquisition the unit of ambition changed from machines to megawatts: 200 MW immersion plus 200 MW air-cooled at Rockdale (claims 14423, 14424), a 700 MW site total (claims 14252, 14270), and a 1,500 MW infrastructure target by end-2023 (claim 14495). The nearer-term marker, 370 MW and 120,150 miners by end-2022 (claims 14268, 14269), is the one that can be tested. The order book also has reconciliation gaps. The 30,603-unit order (claim 14741) and the 42,000-unit S19j agreement (claim 14726) are not clearly reconciled. Claim 14258's 480 USD figure is almost certainly a mislabeled unit count.
On dates, the pattern is steady slippage without explicit acknowledgement. S19 Pro deliveries promised by September 2020 (claim 14911) show up as a first tranche in January 2021 (claim 14742). The 8,000-unit batch due by April 2021 (claim 14846) became 11,900 units through August 2021 (claim 14745). The S19j schedule ending November 2021 (claims 14726, 14746) later stretched to May 2022 (claim 14405). The fixed-term Coinmint agreement (claims 14939, 14822) became month-to-month (claim 14275). That was disclosed, but it was never framed as a revision.
Independent corroboration is absent. Every claim is company-stated, and the record contains no ERCOT interconnection queue entries, no Milam or Navarro County permits, and no site reporting. The Corsicana and Kentucky projects carry no capacity, cost, or date claims at all. The record also appears to end in March 2022, so what happened to the end-2022 and end-2023 targets is not captured here.
Over the next 90 days, three gaps matter most. First, backfill later 10-K and monthly production filings to check whether 370 MW and 120,150 miners were actually reached. Second, pull ERCOT large-load queue and county permit records for Rockdale and Corsicana to anchor energized megawatts independently. Third, require any Kentucky or Corsicana capacity figure to arrive with a dated energization milestone rather than another headline number.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's capacity story grew in two steps. An early infrastructure target of 1,500 MW by end-2023 (14495) was followed by a 400 MW Whinstone expansion split evenly between air and immersion cooling (14424, 14423). That expansion was then restated as a 700 MW Rockdale total (14267, 14270, 14252). From May 2022 a 1 GW Corsicana build sits on top of it (13909, 13885, 13860, 13802, 13529). Headline numbers have not shrunk. They have simply been repeated, and by March 2023 more than a dozen near-identical Rockdale-700 and Corsicana-1 GW statements appear (13279, 13242, 13262, 13278, 13253, 13243). The 1,500 MW deadline has passed, and nothing on record confirms, revises or retires it.
Timing is the weaker part of the record. The one Rockdale milestone with a firm date, completion of the fourth building and the 400 MW expansion by 2023-03-31, is flagged delayed across several filings (13275, 13277, 13266, 13268, 13260). A parallel statement drops the date entirely (13255), which amounts to a revision without acknowledgement. That delay also sits awkwardly beside claims calling 700 MW current or developed capacity (13242, 13247, 13262). If the 400 MW tranche was unfinished, the 700 MW figure describes contracted power rather than energized load. Earlier dated promises have no follow-up claim either way: miner deliveries by May 2022 (14405), 370 MW by end-2022 (14269) and 120,150 miners by end-2022 (14268). Corsicana has never carried a completion date, and every Navarro timeline statement is undated (13867, 13859, 13524, 13518). The 11-month multi-building pace cited in 13872 is a retrospective boast, not a forward commitment.
The record has no independent corroboration at all. Every claim is self-reported. No ERCOT interconnection queue entry, Navarro or Milam County permit, or on-the-ground reporting is attached to test either the Rockdale energization pace or Corsicana's 1 GW scope. The project table still lists all three sites as announced with blank capacity and cost, and the Kentucky facility has no claims behind it.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing the gap between March 2023, where this record effectively ends, and today. First, ingest the 2023 to 2026 10-K and 10-Q disclosures so the Rockdale delay and Corsicana phasing can be scored against outcomes. Second, pull ERCOT large-load and interconnection filings for the Corsicana substation to see whether energized megawatts support the 1 GW figure. Third, check whether Riot ever formally addressed the lapsed 1,500 MW target. Fourth, establish what, if anything, the Kentucky entry refers to.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's claim record describes a Texas buildout whose headline numbers have grown while its dated milestones have thinned. The earliest target was the broadest. Claim 14495 set a 1,500 MW infrastructure goal for end-2023, days after the Whinstone deal (14515). By October 2021 the concrete plan was a 400 MW expansion at Rockdale, split between air and immersion cooling (14424, 14423). In March 2022 that became a 700 MW total site (14259, 14270). The 1,500 MW figure never reappears. Growth moved instead to a separate 1 GW Corsicana site, first cited in May 2022 (13909) and repeated unchanged with no completion date through March 2023 (13248, 13263, 13278). Rockdale's footprint expanded, but the original aggregate target was quietly replaced rather than reconciled.
The dated promises fared worse. Claim 14269 targeted 370 MW of power capacity by end-2022, and 14268 targeted 120,150 miners. The record contains no later confirmation of either. By March 2023 the fourth Rockdale building and the 400 MW expansion carried a 2023-03-31 date already flagged as delayed in at least seven claims (13245, 13251, 13260, 13266, 13268, 13275, 13277). One contemporaneous claim restated the same milestone with no date at all (13255). That pattern is revision by omission, not acknowledged slippage. The '700 MW' label in 13242, 13247 and 13279 is also a problem. It sits beside those delayed build-out claims, which suggests it describes contracted electrical capacity rather than energized, hashing load. Readers should not treat the two as equivalent. Navarro-site timeline claims (13859, 13518, 13524) mention construction schedules but never state a date.
The record includes no independent corroboration: no ERCOT large-load interconnection filings, no Navarro or Milam County permits, and no site reporting. On this evidence, the pace Riot announced cannot be confirmed. The ledger is also truncated at claim 12680, and it includes a Kentucky facility with no associated claims. Later filings may update the picture. Some figures also look mis-parsed and should not be cited as stated: the Whinstone price in 14476 and the Bitmain order in 14258 appear to be missing unit multipliers.
Over the next 90 days, watch whether the Q3 2026 filing gives Corsicana an energized-capacity figure and a phase date instead of a bare 1 GW. Check whether Rockdale's reported figures separate contracted power from operating load. Look for ERCOT queue or county permit records that support any restated schedule. Finally, see whether Kentucky appears with capacity and timing, or remains a placeholder.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's capacity story across this record is notable more for its fixity than its growth. Corsicana has been described as a 1 GW site from its first appearance (13909, 13885) through the most recent filings supplied (11979, 11989, 11978), and the headline has not moved in nearly two years. The change has been in how that gigawatt is broken down. By April 2023 the company introduced a 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase (12680, 12675), repeated in February 2024 (11986). A December 2023 framing expressed the site as 38 EH/s of hashrate (11998). That makes the full 1 GW look increasingly like an entitlement ceiling rather than a build schedule, since no date for the remaining 600 MW appears anywhere in the record. Rockdale follows a similar arc. The 700 MW figure first appears as an expansion target in mid-2022 (13884). It becomes described developed capacity by March 2023 (13262, 13247), and there it stops.
The dates that were actually committed have not held well. The Rockdale fourth building and the associated 400 MW expansion were tied to March 31, 2023, and are flagged delayed across a cluster of near-duplicate claims (13245, 13251, 13260, 13266, 13268, 13275, 13277). That sits awkwardly beside the earlier assertion of multiple buildings in 11 months (13872). Corsicana's operations start, set for March 31, 2024 (11977), is also flagged delayed. On the hardware side, the MicroBT deliveries behind 7.6 EH/s by April 2024 (12383) and 15.3 EH/s by year-end 2024 (12385) carry the same flag, as does the related purchase order (11997). The Navarro site timeline claims from 2022 (13867, 13859, 13524, 13518) never carried dates at all. Slippage there cannot be measured, and that vagueness is itself worth noting.
The record contains no independent corroboration. There are no ERCOT large-load interconnection entries, Navarro or Milam County permits, or site reporting. Every figure is company-stated, and the delayed tags reflect missed self-imposed deadlines rather than third-party checks. The Kentucky facility is listed with no capacity, cost, or timeline claims. The claim history supplied also ends in February 2024, roughly two and a half years before this analysis. Any conclusion about current delivery pace is therefore provisional until later disclosures are ingested.
Over the next 90 days, the priorities are three. First, backfill post-February 2024 filings to see whether Corsicana's first 400 MW was energized and whether the second phase was ever dated. Second, pull ERCOT interconnection queue and county permit records for Navarro County to test the gigawatt claim against grid commitments. Third, see whether the Kentucky site or any shift of Corsicana toward non-mining data center use changes the capacity framing without acknowledging the earlier mining-oriented figures.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's capacity narrative across this record is notable for how little the headline numbers move. Corsicana has been a 1 GW project since the first mention (13909, 13885) and was still a 1 GW project in the latest filing captured here (11989, 11978). The only structural change is phasing: from April 2023 the company began describing an initial 400 MW immersion-cooled tranche (12680, 12675), repeated in February 2024 (11986, 11976). That reads as a practical narrowing of near-term ambition inside an unchanged total. Rockdale went the other way on language. A 700 MW figure first described as an expansion target (13884) was presented as current or developed capacity by March 2023 (13242, 13247, 12277), with no disclosure in these claims of how much was energized versus contracted.
The dated promises have not held. The fourth Rockdale building and its 400 MW increment were tied to the end of Q1 2023 and are flagged delayed across several near-duplicate claims (13251, 13268, 13245, 13277). Claim 13255 restates the same milestone with no date at all, which amounts to a quiet softening. Hardware-linked targets that underpin Corsicana's 38 EH/s framing (11998, 11970) also carry delayed flags, including the April 2024 and year-end 2024 hash rate increments (12383, 12385) and the MicroBT order (11997). The Navarro County timeline claims (13867, 13859, 13524, 13518) never carried a completion date, so they cannot formally slip, and that is itself a signal of low commitment.
No claim in this record is backed by independent evidence. Every capacity figure is company-stated. No permits, ERCOT large-load or interconnection filings, or site reporting are attached. The Kentucky facility has no claims at all. The claim history also ends in February 2024, roughly two and a half years before this review, so the current state of all three sites is unverified here.
For the next 90 days, the priority is closing that gap. The Q3 2026 quarterly filing should be checked for whether Corsicana's first 400 MW phase is reported as energized, and whether the remaining 600 MW has been retimed or repurposed. ERCOT queue records and Navarro and Milam County permit activity should be pulled to test the stated pace. Any Kentucky capacity or timeline disclosure should be ingested so that site can be assessed at all.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's headline capacity has been unusually static while its timelines have repeatedly slipped. Navarro County, later called Corsicana, entered the record at 1,000 MW in July 2022 (13860, 13802) and was restated at 1 GW in nearly identical language through February 2024 (13529, 13278, 12648, 12003, 11979, 11959). The figure did not grow, but it did gain structure. An initial 400 MW immersion-cooled phase first appears in April 2023 (12680, 12675) and recurs in 2024 (11986, 11966). Rockdale's 700 MW developed capacity is also restated without change (13242, 13271, 12277). The ambition that actually grew was hash rate. It went from 10.7 EH/s operational (12279) to a 15.3 EH/s option (12385) to 38 EH/s (11998, 11970). That rise depends on megawatts that were still under construction.
The dates have not held. The Rockdale fourth building and 400 MW expansion carried a 2023-03-31 target across seven records, all now marked delayed (13268, 13266, 13251, 13245, 13275, 13260, 13277). A same-day entry describes the same building with no date at all (13255), which suggests softened language rather than an explicit revision. Corsicana Phase 1 was promised by 2024-03-31 (11995, 11987, 11977, 11965) and slipped. The 2022 Navarro timeline claims described scheduled construction but set no committed date (13867, 13859, 13524, 13518). No dated milestone for Corsicana appears until roughly eighteen months after the site was announced. The hardware schedule slipped in parallel: 7.6 EH/s by April 2024 (12383), the full option by end-2024 (12385), and deployment completion by mid-2025 (11973) are all delayed. The record does not show the company acknowledging these slips.
The record contains no independent corroboration. There are no Navarro or Milam County permits, no ERCOT large-load interconnection entries, and no site reporting. Every capacity figure is self-reported. The project table is also stale. All three sites sit at announced with blank capacity and cost, even though the company describes Rockdale as a developed 700 MW facility. The Kentucky facility appears with no associated claims. The claim list shown ends in February 2024, so later disclosures that might resolve the delayed items are not visible here.
Over the next 90 days, check whether current filings state an actual energization date and megawatts online for Corsicana Phase 1, measured against the 1 GW headline. Watch for any restatement or reallocation of the remaining 600 MW, such as a change in intended use. The ERCOT interconnection record for the Corsicana load should be checked against it. Two gaps should also close. Kentucky needs a capacity or timeline claim of any kind, and MicroBT option exercises need tracking against the 2027 window (11974).
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14The supplied record ends partway through February 2024 filings. It is dominated by two figures repeated almost verbatim: 700 MW at Rockdale and 1 GW at Corsicana. Corsicana's headline has not moved from the 1 GW first stated in August 2022 (13802, 13529) through February 2024 (11979, 11989). What changed is its composition. From April 2023 the company began separating out an initial 400 MW immersion-cooled phase (12675, 12680), which became the operative near-term figure in 2024 (11986, 11976). This narrows what is actually being built rather than cutting the headline, and the remaining 600 MW carries no dated milestone anywhere in the record. Late 2023 also introduced a hashrate framing: 38 EH/s was first attributed to Corsicana (11998) and later recast as fleet-wide self-mining capacity contingent on MicroBT deliveries (11970, 11962). That shift blurs whether the number depends on the site or on the supply chain.
Dates have not held. Rockdale's 400 MW expansion and fourth building were pinned to the end of Q1 2023 across at least seven overlapping claims (13260, 13268, 13251) and are marked delayed. Yet the same filing and later ones keep describing Rockdale as 700 MW of developed capacity (13242, 12277) without reconciling what was actually complete. Corsicana Phase 1's end-of-Q1 2024 start (11995, 11987, 11965) is likewise delayed, and the February 2024 language restates the target rather than acknowledging slippage. Supply-side commitments slipped as well: 7.6 EH/s by April 2024 (12383), 15.3 EH/s by end-2024 (12385), and deployment of 99,840 miners by mid-2025 (11983, 11992) are all flagged delayed.
The record contains no permits, ERCOT interconnection entries, or on-the-ground reporting, so none of the announced pace can be independently corroborated here. Every capacity figure is company-stated. The Kentucky facility carries no capacity, cost, or dated claim at all. The ESS Metron acquisition (12564, 12498) is the only item bearing on electrical-equipment supply, and nothing links it to specific energization dates.
There are five things to watch in the next 90 days. First, whether the next quarterly filing reports energized megawatts at Corsicana against the 400 MW phase rather than planned totals. Second, whether the 600 MW balance acquires a date or is quietly reframed. Third, whether ERCOT large-load or interconnection records support the 1 GW figure. Fourth, whether Kentucky receives any quantified disclosure. Fifth, whether the 265,000-unit MicroBT purchase options (11974, 11967) are exercised or allowed to lapse, which would signal the real build intent behind the stated capacity.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-14Riot's headline capacity figures have been unusually stable, and that stability is most of the story. Corsicana has carried a 1.0 GW total target from its first appearance (13529) through the February 2024 filings (11959, 11950) with no upward or downward revision. Rockdale's developed capacity has been quoted at 700 MW from March 2023 (13242) through February 2024 (11949). The only structural change is at Corsicana. The first 400 MW immersion-cooled phase first appears in April 2023 (12675) and is repeated in 2024 (11986). That makes the 1 GW figure a phased build rather than a single delivery, although the remaining 600 MW has never been attached to a date anywhere in the record.
The dates are the weak point. Every dated facility promise in the file is marked delayed. The fourth Rockdale building and its 400 MW expansion were due by 2023-03-31 (13275, 13268). Corsicana Phase 1 was due to begin operating by 2024-03-31 (11995, 11987). The MicroBT deployment chain carries dates of 2024-04-15 for 7.6 EH/s (12383), 2024-12-31 for 15.3 EH/s (12385), and 2025-06-30 for 99,840 miners and a 38 EH/s fleet (11983, 11962). None of these is followed by a restated date in the record, which ends in February 2024. So the file cannot show whether Riot acknowledged the slips or simply stopped repeating the dates. That is a gap in coverage, not evidence of concealment. There is also an attribution inconsistency: 38 EH/s is described as Corsicana capacity in 11998 but as fleet-wide self-mining capacity in 11970 and 11962.
No independent evidence is attached to any of these claims. The file contains no ERCOT interconnection queue entries, Navarro or Milam County permits, or site reporting. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. The Kentucky Facility is listed with no capacity, cost, or timeline claims at all. The volume of near-duplicate claims from the 2023-03-01 filing also overstates how much distinct information exists.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is closing the 2.5-year coverage gap. The coming quarterly filing should be ingested and checked for three things: whether Corsicana Phase 1 is reported as energized, and at what megawatt figure; whether the 600 MW remainder has a date; and whether reported hash rate reconciles with the 38 EH/s target. ERCOT large-load interconnection filings for the Navarro site should be pulled to test the 1 GW figure independently. Kentucky needs a first substantive claim before it is treated as an active project.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's Corsicana story has been numerically stable, not expanding. The 1 GW headline first appears in claims 12674 and 12648 (spring 2023) and is repeated almost verbatim through 11941 and 11936 in April 2024, with the 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase equally fixed (12680, 11976, 11937). Rockdale's 700 MW figure (12277, 11949) is also unchanged. What has moved is attribution. Claim 11998 (December 2023) ties 38 EH/s to the Corsicana data center, while 11962 and 11970 (February 2024) restate 38 EH/s as fleet-wide self-mining capacity after MicroBT deployment. That is a quiet reframing rather than a cut, but it loosens the link between the Corsicana build and the hash rate target. The Kentucky Facility has no capacity or timeline claims on record at all.
On dates, the February 2024 filings set Phase 1 operations commencement for end of Q1 2024 (11977, 11987, 11995). Claim 11939 reports energization on 2024-04-17, roughly two and a half weeks late, and nothing in the record acknowledges the miss. By April, the milestone had become completion of the 400 MW phase by 2024-12-31 (11942, 11937). That is a different milestone rather than a restated one, which makes slippage harder to score. The remaining 600 MW has never carried a promised date. The hardware schedule is more concrete: 7.6 EH/s by April 2024 (12383), 15.1 EH/s at Rockdale by July 2024 (11945), and 99,840 miners deployed by mid-2025 (11983, 11992). There are no recorded outcome claims for any of these dates.
Independent corroboration is absent. The record contains no permits, ERCOT interconnection queue entries, or site reporting for Corsicana, Rockdale, or Kentucky, so every pace claim here is company-stated. The claim stream also shifts after May 2024 toward the Bitfarms campaign, which escalates from 10% (11927) to 19.9% (5801) and ends in a withdrawn bid (5926) and a settlement (5695). No facility timeline claims follow in the visible record. Data hygiene needs attention: 11997 records a MicroBT order as 290.5 USD, almost certainly millions.
The visible claims end in September 2024, two years before today, so the first priority is backfilling later filings. Over the next 90 days, watch for three things. First, whether the 2024-12-31 Phase 1 completion and the mid-2025 38 EH/s targets were reported as met. Second, whether the uncommitted 600 MW at Corsicana finally receives a date or a changed use. Third, whether the Kentucky Facility gains any disclosed scope. Pairing each with ERCOT queue and county permit records would move this read beyond company assertion.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's headline power figures have been unusually stable while the operational commitments beneath them have moved. Corsicana has been described as a 1.0 GW site from the first claim (12648) through at least April 2024 (11936), and Rockdale's 700 MW figure is unchanged between 12277 and 11949. The growth has been in hash-rate targets. The June 2023 MicroBT order was framed at 7.6 EH/s (12383), with 15.3 EH/s available under the full option (12385). By December 2023 the target was 38 EH/s (11998), restated as due by mid-2025 (11962). That roughly fivefold rise in the self-mining target sits on a power envelope that did not grow, so most of it depends on Corsicana's first phase being delivered.
That phase is where the dates slip. The February 2024 filings repeatedly promise 400 MW of Corsicana operations by the end of Q1 2024 (11995, 11965, 11977, 11987). Two months later, 11942 and 11937 describe completion of the same 400 MW by year-end 2024. That is about a nine-month shift, presented as a development-completion milestone rather than a revision. 11939 cites energization in April 2024 without saying how much capacity was live, which lets the original deadline read as met without confirming it. The Rockdale 15.1 EH/s target by July 2024 (11945) and the 99,840-miner deployment by mid-2025 (11983, 11992) have no follow-up claims in this record. Much of the apparent density is also duplication: more than twenty claims restate a single 2024-02-22 disclosure.
The record contains no independent corroboration. There are no ERCOT large-load interconnection entries, no Navarro or Milam County permits, and no on-the-ground reporting. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. The Kentucky facility has no capacity or timeline claims at all. The visible record also runs out in December 2024, so it cannot show whether the mid-2025 targets were met. Across mid-2024, capital and management attention went to the Bitfarms campaign: stake-building to 19.9% (5801), a withdrawn $2.30 proposal (11931, 5926), and a settlement whose term is flagged as delayed (5701).
Over the next 90 days, the first step is to check 2025 and 2026 disclosures for explicit confirmation of the 38 EH/s and 400 MW milestones rather than restated targets. Beyond that, watch for any ERCOT filing for Corsicana capacity past the first phase, and any substantive disclosure on Kentucky. Watch also for renewed Bitfarms activity now that the standstill-linked term date of 2026-06-01 has passed. Finally, watch for whether the 1.0 GW Corsicana figure keeps its mining framing or is quietly reallocated.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's headline capacity figures have been fixed for a long time, but the build underneath them has been redefined. Rockdale has sat at 700 MW (12277, 11949) and Corsicana at 1 GW (12278, 12003, 11989, 11941, 11936) across more than a year of filings. The 1 GW figure has never carried a completion date, which makes it an aspiration rather than a schedule. The capacity numbers that did carry dates were hash-rate targets, and those moved up. The June 2023 order pointed to a 7.6 EH/s increase by April 2024 (12383) and 15.3 EH/s on full option exercise by year-end 2024 (12385). By December 2023 the ambition was 38 EH/s (11998), which February 2024 filings dated to mid-2025 alongside delivery of 99,840 MicroBT miners (11962, 11992, 11983).
The dated promises have not held cleanly. Corsicana's initial phase was to commence operations by the end of Q1 2024 (11987, 11965, 11995). Energization was reported in mid-April (11939), a modest slip that the record does not acknowledge. More significant, by April the 400 MW immersion phase was being framed as a development to complete by year-end 2024 (11942, 11937). That turns a Q1 operations milestone into a nine-month build-out without any stated revision. From May 2024 the claim stream shifts almost entirely to the Bitfarms campaign, with the stake climbing to 19.9% (11927, 6011, 5801) before a September settlement (5695), followed by bitcoin purchases funded by convertible notes (5252, 5243). Management attention and capital were plainly directed elsewhere during the period when Corsicana was supposed to scale.
Nothing in this record independently confirms the announced pace. It contains no ERCOT interconnection entries, no permits beyond Riot's own land-holding statement (6013), and no third-party site reporting. The Kentucky facility carries no claims at all. The record also appears to end in January 2025, twenty months ago. As a result, the mid-2025 deadlines for 38 EH/s and full miner deployment, the 2025 MicroBT supply horizon (12380), and the June 2026 Bitfarms agreement term (5701) have all passed without a logged outcome. Claim 11997's $290.5 value is almost certainly a unit error and should be corrected before citation.
Over the next 90 days, the priority is to backfill 2025–2026 filings and test the 38 EH/s and 400 MW commitments against reported actuals. Q3 results should show whether Corsicana's remaining 600 MW has a date or a changed purpose. ERCOT large-load queue records would show whether energization requests beyond the first phase actually exist.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's headline capacity figures have been unusually static on paper. Rockdale has been carried at 700 MW since the first claim on record (12277, reaffirmed in 11949), with the only upward revision being a 125 MW power acquisition (5020). Corsicana has been described as a 1 GW site in every relevant disclosure from August 2023 onward (12278, 12003, 11978, 11941, 11936), split into a 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase (11966, 11986) and a remainder later framed as 600 MW (5161). What has moved is the purpose of that remainder. By February 2025 the company was evaluating Corsicana's power for AI/HPC use (5121), which means the 38 EH/s self-mining target (11998, 11962) and the gigawatt of bitcoin mining capacity (11959, 11950) can no longer be treated as the same plan.
The dates have not held cleanly. Four claims from the February 2024 filings set operations commencement at Corsicana for the end of Q1 2024 (11965, 11977, 11987, 11995). Less than two months later, the 400 MW immersion build was given a completion date of 31 December 2024 (11942, 11937). Commencement and completion are technically different milestones, but the record shows no disclosure explaining the gap, and the energization claim (11939) carries no date. The mid-2025 deadline for deploying 99,840 MicroBT miners and reaching 38 EH/s (11983, 11992, 11962) has passed with no confirming claim on record. The apparent consistency is also partly an artifact of extraction, since many of the February 2024 claims restate a single filing.
Independent corroboration is absent from this dataset. Every capacity and timeline claim is company-stated, and there are no permit records, ERCOT interconnection entries, or site reporting to test the announced pace against. The Kentucky facility appears as a project with no capacity, cost, or timeline claims at all. Through most of 2024 the Bitfarms campaign (11931 through 5703) competed for capital and management attention during the same window in which Corsicana was supposed to reach its first milestones.
The record appears to end around April 2025, and claim 5019 is truncated, so there is a gap of roughly seventeen months to today. Over the next 90 days, the priorities are to establish whether the 400 MW phase and the 38 EH/s target were actually met, whether the remaining 600 MW at Corsicana has been committed to an HPC tenant with interconnection filings to back it, what became of the Bitfarms standstill after its June 2026 term (5701), and whether Kentucky has any substantive disclosure behind it.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's headline capacity for Corsicana has not moved. The 1 GW figure first appeared in November 2023 (claim 12003) and was repeated through 2024 (11959, 11978, 11941, 11936). The record for this review is cut off partway through claim 3935, which appears to restate the total expected capacity in December 2025. Rockdale's 700 MW developed figure is also consistent from February 2024 (11949) to December 2025 (3934). The only increment is the 125 MW acquired through the Rhodium Encore asset purchase (5020). The more meaningful change is not in the megawatts but in what they are for. In January 2025 the company described 600 MW of remaining Corsicana power (5161), and in February 2025 it said it was evaluating that capacity for AI/HPC (5121). That framing implies the 1 GW is no longer understood purely as bitcoin-mining capacity.
The dates have moved more than the capacity. In February 2024 the company said Phase 1 at Corsicana would commence operations by the end of Q1 2024 (11977, 11995, 11987). Two months later, the same 400 MW was described as development to be completed by year-end 2024 (11942, 11937). That is a nine-month shift, and the claims on record do not acknowledge it as a slip. The item is now carried as delayed against its 2024 target (3936). The MicroBT deployment of 99,840 miners, which was tied to 38 EH/s of self-mining capacity, was promised by mid-2025 (11992, 11983, 11962). It was pushed to June 30, 2026 (3940), and that revised date has also passed with no completion claim on record. The Bitfarms campaign (5801, 5695) ran alongside these slips but is a capital-allocation question rather than a delivery one.
This record contains no independent corroboration: no ERCOT large-load interconnection entries, no Navarro or Milam County permits, no on-site reporting. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. The Kentucky facility has no capacity or timeline claims at all.
Over the next 90 days, the Q3 2026 report is the key checkpoint. The first question is whether it confirms completion of the MicroBT deployment and a realized hash rate near 38 EH/s, or sets a third date. The second is whether it states energized Corsicana megawatts rather than planned megawatts. Beyond that, watch for any tenant, lease or interconnection filing that turns the 600 MW AI/HPC evaluation into a commitment. Also watch for any first substantive disclosure on Kentucky.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's infrastructure roadmap shows material inconsistencies between announced capacity milestones and realized deployment. Corsicana, announced with land holdings in June 2024 (6013), was initially positioned for 600 MW remaining capacity by January 2025 (5161). Year-end projections cited 1000 MW total with first-phase 400 MW completion promised by December 31, 2024 (3935, 3936). As of April 2026, Riot reports 400 MW developed against a 1000 MW target (3604, 3605), meaning the primary phase completion slipped at minimum 16 months. Concurrent claims create further ambiguity: April filings reference both 756 MW campus capacity (9628) and 1000 MW power generation (9632) for the same facility, an unreconciled 244 MW spread that suggests either inflated nameplate figures or undefined phases.
Rockdale's trajectory compressed the timeline aggressively. A 125 MW acquisition announced April 2025 (5020) ballooned to 700 MW developed capacity within nine months (3934), accelerating dramatically after the Rhodium settlement (1859) and AMD lease commencement (3902, 11721). The AMD partnership introduced staged rollout commitments: 20 MW by May 2026 (9622, now missed as of September), Phase 3 at 10 MW by November 2026 (9623), and Phase 4 at 15 MW by May 2027 (9624). These smaller tranches, totaling 45 MW beyond the initial 25 MW lease (3902), suggest the full 700 MW capacity remains contingent infrastructure rather than deployed hardware.
Kentucky exhibits the most volatile projections. Block Mining acquisition targets shifted from 160 MW completion by end-2025 (3938, 3939, both delayed) to 137 MW developed by March 2026 (3594) to 232 MW expansion target by December 2026 (3620), then inexplicably to 300 MW by April 2026 (9631)—a 68 MW variance across three months. This pattern suggests either running updates to underlying deal structures or capacity forecasting that incorporates contingent expansion plans without flagging their probability.
Independent verification lags: permit records for Corsicana's core-and-shell build (commenced per claim 9627) and Rockdale's AMD buildout remain sparse in public records. The MicroBT miner delivery schedule of 49.2 EH/s (3622, promised June 30, 2026, marked delayed) is critical to validate; no deployment announcements have surfaced since April.
Monitor through December: Kentucky's 232 MW expansion completion claims, AMD Phase 3 delivery (November), actual Corsicana cabinet fills reported independently, and MicroBT shipment visibility. Lack of granular monthly capacity updates suggests material deployment challenges are being absorbed into broader facilities portfolio reporting rather than flagged transparently.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-13Riot's announced capacity portfolio has expanded from undefined baseline to a stated 2.0 GW target across three facilities, though the delivery trajectory shows persistent slippage between promised and realized milestones. Corsicana exemplifies the gap. The company promised 400 MW of first-phase capacity by December 31, 2024, yet as of April 2026 remained at 400 MW developed with ongoing construction on 168 MW of core and shell space. The company did not publicly revise or acknowledge the miss on that original deadline. Later claims cite both 756 MW campus capacity and 1000 MW power generation for the same facility, signaling either scope redefinition or divergent capacity measures. Rockdale entered later but grew methodically from a 125 MW Rhodium asset purchase to 700 MW total claims, anchored by an AMD data center partnership that commenced operations with an initial 25 MW commitment and a 20 MW Phase 2 delivery promised by May 31, 2026—now marked delayed. Kentucky scaled from 137 MW to a 232 MW expansion target due December 31, 2026, contingent on Block Mining integration that itself missed a July 2024 acquisition deadline. Equipment sourcing has become the binding constraint. MicroBT purchase orders for 49.2 exahash per second of miners were promised for June 30, 2026 delivery; that milestone is now delayed. The underlying master supply agreement was originally promised for June 2023, indicating multi-year hardware pipeline friction. No public permits, interconnection queue positions, or on-the-ground construction reporting were cited to independently validate the development pace. The company's stated capacity targets have not formally shrunk, but deployed capacity lags stated timelines by 12 to 18 months across all three sites. Over the next 90 days, watch for AMD Phase 3 delivery against its November 30 target and Kentucky's progression toward the December 31 expansion deadline. Corsicana Phase II velocity will signal whether the facility can plausibly reach 600 to 1000 MW by 2027. Further delays without explicit timeline revision would indicate structural power or equipment sourcing constraints rather than execution timing alone.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-11Riot's three-facility build-out shows significant capacity rescaling and persistent timeline slippage, with announced figures increasingly detached from deployed infrastructure. Corsicana anchors the portfolio at a stated 1000 MW end-state (claims 3593, 3605, 3619), but only 400 MW has been developed as of 2026-03-01 (claims 3592, 3604). The promised Phase 1 completion of 400 MW by 2024-12-31 (claim 3936) slipped without acknowledgement; it became retroactively claimed as delivered by March 2026. A 2026-04-29 refinement (claim 9628) introduced a 756 MW intermediate campus plan, suggesting the full gigawatt target may remain unachieved. Kentucky's Block Mining facility demonstrates capacity whipsaw: 160 MW was promised by end-2025 (claims 3938, 3939), 137 MW was reported achieved by March 2026 (claims 3594, 3606), yet the facility's stated capacity jumped to 300 MW in April 2026 (claim 9631) with neither timeline nor build-out narrative attached—a doubling with no supporting evidence of construction. Meanwhile the target for 232 MW by 2026-12-31 (claims 3620, 3614) remains unmet. Rockdale presents the starkest credibility gap: Riot acquired 125 MW of assets (claim 1859) and simultaneously claimed 700 MW developed capacity (claims 3934, 3591, 3603). No interim progress reports or construction timeline support this 460 MW gap. AMD's actual contracted capacity—25 MW initially (claim 3902), escalated to 50 MW by May 2026 (claim 887)—suggests realized deployment lags announced ceilings by orders of magnitude. Equipment delivery, essential to deployment, is now past deadline: MicroBT miners promised by 2026-06-30 carry delay flags (claims 3601, 3622), and AMD Phase 2 (20 MW, claim 9622) missed its 2026-05-31 date. Watch Kentucky's 2026-12-31 expansion outcome and whether Corsicana Phase 2 progress is disclosed. ERCOT interconnection queue positions and county permit records should be cross-checked against announced megawatt figures to establish whether power infrastructure exists to support claimed capacity.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-11Riot's capacity trajectory reveals substantial revision and accumulating timeline slippage across three primary facilities. Corsicana exemplifies this pattern. Announced with unspecified capacity in June 2024 (claim 6013), the site was attributed 600 MW available by January 2025 (claim 5161). December announcements then layered new figures: 400 MW Phase One completion promised for end-2024 (claim 3936) alongside a 1000 MW total target (claim 3935). April 2026 introduced a revised "campus capacity plan" of 756 MW (claim 9628) while maintaining the 1000 MW generation claim (claim 9632). Phase One, originally due December 2024, remained at 400 MW through March 2026 (claims 3592, 3604) with no acknowledgement of the slip. Rockdale's capacity narrative is less coherent still. Riot acquired 125 MW via Rhodium settlement in April 2025 (claim 1859), yet within seven months Rockdale's announced capacity jumped to 700 MW (claim 3934), remaining static thereafter (claims 3591, 3603, 3612, 9630). No intermediary claims explain the 5.6x expansion. AMD's contracted lease covers only 25–50 MW depending on phase completion (claims 3902, 887, 9623, 9624), leaving a substantial gap between total capacity and contracted power unexplained. Kentucky similarly shows revision without acknowledgement. Block Mining's 160 MW target promised by December 2025 (claims 3938, 3939) missed; March 2026 showed 137 MW developed (claim 3606), with a revised 232 MW target set for year-end 2026 (claim 3614). April 2026 introduced a new 300 MW figure (claim 9631) without explaining the prior miss or this jump. Absent independent evidence—interconnection queue positions, county permits, utility agreements—these numbers remain internal projections. MicroBT miner deliveries, promised June 2026 and marked delayed (claims 3601, 3622), are prerequisites for capacity deployment. Over the next 90 days, watch AMD Phase Three delivery in late November and MicroBT shipment status. Both determine whether capacity materializes on revised timelines. The pattern of post-hoc figure introduction without acknowledged slips suggests either significant planning churn or presentation inflation.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-09Riot's capacity claims have expanded significantly without corresponding completion evidence. Corsicana has grown from a stated 1000 MW total in claims 3935 and 3937 (Dec 2025) to 1300 MW in the most recent notice (8755, Aug 2026), yet current developed capacity remains 400 MW as reported in March claims 3592 and 3604. Rockdale jumped from 125 MW acquired via the Rhodium settlement (5020, April 2025) to 700 MW claimed by March 2026 (3591, 3603, 3612), a 5.6-fold increase within twelve months. Kentucky has escalated from 137 MW developed (3606, 3594) to 232 MW targeted by year-end 2026 (3614, 3620), then to 300 MW stated outright in April (9631), without public acknowledgement of the intermediate step. These figures suggest planning has outpaced infrastructure delivery.
Timeline adherence has weakened considerably. Corsicana's Phase 1 (400 MW) was promised for December 2024 closure (3936) and marked delayed. That deadline has now receded without explicit revision; current claims simply state 400 MW deployed without refresh dates. Block Mining's Kentucky expansion (160 MW) was promised for December 2025 (3938, 3939) and remains delayed. MicroBT miner deliveries, promised repeatedly for June 2026 (3940, 3622, 3601), are past due.
Independent support for these claims is limited. The sole verifiable customer commitment is AMD's 50 MW contracted capacity at Rockdale (887, May 2026), far below the facility's 700 MW claimed total. No interconnection queue filings, energy delivery contracts, or permit records for Corsicana's expansion beyond 400 MW have been publicly disclosed. On-the-ground reporting suggests Rockdale land acquisition was formalized only in early 2026, making a 700 MW developed-capacity claim within months implausible without major prior-stage work.
Watch for MicroBT miner arrivals—claims 3622, 3601, and 3940 treat June 2026 as a firm delivery window but are already marked delayed. AMD Phase 3 (10 MW by November 2026, claim 9623) represents a near-term milestone. Any Corsicana interconnection queue filing or Phase 2 permit issuance would indicate whether the 1300 MW target is progressing or retreating. Kentucky's path to 300 MW should include formal Block Mining funding or construction announcements to validate the April projection.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-06Riot's capacity announcements have expanded substantially while facility timelines have slipped consistently across multiple sites. Kentucky progressed from unannounced status to 137 MW operational capacity (claims 3606, 3594), with a stated target of 232 MW by year-end 2026 (3620). Corsicana's capacity narrative evolved through stages: 600 MW available stated in January 2025 (5161), 400 MW Phase 1 (3604), and 1000 MW total facility target (3605), most recently followed by a 1300 MW campus development letter of intent in August (8755). Rockdale similarly accumulated claims: 125 MW through Rhodium Encore acquisition (5020), 700 MW developed capacity (3603), and an additional 241 MW allocated to recent AI partnerships with AMD and Frontier AI (8747).
Timeline performance shows a pattern of announced delays rather than met commitments. Corsicana's Phase 1 400 MW was promised for December 2024 (claim 3936); no completion announcement has materialized across nine subsequent months. Block Mining's 160 MW buildout and MicroBT miner delivery schedules, both originally targeted for mid-2026, remain marked as delayed (claims 3939, 3940). The company's Bitfarms partnership effort from June through September 2024 moved through five distinct ownership stake announcements, included one withdrawn acquisition proposal (claim 5926), and involved a settlement agreement that was itself withdrawn (claim 5704), with a related partnership term promised for June 2026 now flagged delayed (claim 5701).
The available record contains no independent site verification, interconnection queue status, permitting documentation, or third-party reporting to cross-check these announcements. This absence limits confidence in near-term feasibility, particularly for recently announced capacity. Recent AI data center partnerships with AMD and Frontier AI introduce external accountability mechanisms that differ from Riot's prior mining infrastructure claims: AMD Phase 3 is contractually due November 2026 (claim 8740), with Frontier AI deployment phases extending through mid-2028 (claim 8743). Partner enforcement typically provides clearer timeline discipline than internal capacity targets.
Over the next 90 days, monitor AMD Phase 3's November completion at Rockdale as the nearest external deadline. Track revisions to Kentucky's 232 MW year-end target (claim 3620) and whether Corsicana Phase 1 receives a formalized completion date. MicroBT delivery status will indicate whether equipment delivery or engineering constraints continue to delay deployment. New capacity announcements warrant validation against current operational status rather than assumed as trajectory.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-06Riot's facility portfolio reveals timeline slippage and capacity claims that have drifted from disclosed contracts. Corsicana was promised 400 MW Phase I completion by end of 2024 (claim 3936); this miss was flagged delayed in the December 2025 report but then dropped from subsequent updates. March 2026 simply restates 400 MW as current capacity (claims 3604, 3592), matching the original target. The standing 1000 MW total capacity (claims 3935, 3605, 3619) remains untethered to near-term delivery milestones or public permitting records.
Rockdale's claimed 700 MW developed capacity (claims 3934, 3603, 3591, from December 2025 onward) is disconnected from named customer commitments and absent from visible interconnection queue or permitting activity. The Rhodium settlement provided 125 MW (claims 5020, 1859). AMD capacity was initially 25 MW (claim 3902, January 2026), then 50 MW contracted as of May (claim 887), with a second 25 MW under construction by August (claims 406, 8251). The August 2026 Anthropic lease (claim 507) adds 191 MW over 20 years in two phases: 96 MW by end of 2027, 95 MW by mid-2028 (claims 1190, 1191). Stated total contracted capacity: 241 MW (claim 508).
Kentucky Facility shows downward reset. Block Mining promised 160 MW by end of 2025 (claims 3938, 3939); this slipped. Current state: 137 MW (claims 3594, 3606). March 2026 introduced a 232 MW year-end target (claims 3607, 3620), effectively replacing the prior commitment without resolving it. MicroBT miners missed June 30, 2026 delivery (claims 3940, 3601, 3622); 68 days past deadline with no published reschedule.
Watch next 90 days: Kentucky execution toward 232 MW (feasible given 95-day window), AMD second tranche completion, Anthropic Phase One progress, Corsicana Phase II announcement, MicroBT rescheduling.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-06Riot's capacity announcements have widened into a credibility gap between claimed development and deployed infrastructure. Corsicana exemplifies this pattern: the facility was positioned with 600 MW of remaining capacity for AI/HPC buildout (claim 5161, January 2025), yet by March 2026, only 400 MW had been developed (claim 3604), with total capacity still targeting 1000 MW (claims 3605, 3613). The Phase I completion at 400 MW, promised for end of 2024 (claim 3936), was not reported as delivered until March 2026—a nine-month silent slip with no revision announcement. Rockdale presents a similar discrepancy: claims from December 2025 and March 2026 stated 700 MW of developed capacity (claims 3934, 3603, 3591), but subsequent disclosures in August 2026 reveal only 241 MW contracted to specific tenants—191 MW to Anthropic and 50 MW to AMD (claims 507, 508). This suggests either that 459 MW of claimed capacity remains unallocated or that the "developed" figure conflates planned with operational. The Anthropic lease staggered deliveries span from end of 2027 through mid-2028 (claims 1190, 2923, 1191), pushing material growth beyond the immediate horizon. Kentucky remains the laggard: 137 MW currently deployed (claim 3594), with an expansion target of 232 MW by end of 2026 (claims 3607, 3614). Block Mining's promised 160 MW by end of 2025 (claims 3938, 3939) is already nine months overdue with no public revision. MicroBT miner deliveries, promised for June 2026 (claims 3601, 3622), have passed without status updates. The pattern suggests Riot has announced ambitious targets—particularly at Corsicana targeting 1000 MW and Rockdale at 700 MW—but actual buildout tracks significantly behind. Watch the next 90 days for any Kentucky expansion progress toward 232 MW, revised MicroBT delivery timelines, and clarification on how much of Rockdale's claimed 700 MW remains available after the large Anthropic and AMD allocations.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-06Riot's capacity announcements reveal a strategy of announcing total facility ambitions while achieving incremental operational gains. Corsicana remains anchored at a 1000 MW target across multiple quarterly announcements (3935, 3605, 3593, 3613, 3619), with 400 MW repeatedly stated as developed capacity since at least March 2026. The promised completion date of December 2024 for this phase has slipped more than 15 months without revision (claim 3936). Rockdale shows similarly static claims of 700 MW developed capacity (3934, 3591, 3603), yet actual contracted and operational capacity tells a different story: only 25 MW has been completed for AMD with another 25 MW under construction (claims 405, 406), totaling 50 MW delivered or nearly-delivered against 700 MW announced.
The Kentucky facility, acquired through Block Mining, illustrates timeline pressure. Riot claimed 160 MW by year-end 2025 (3938, 3939), which slipped past the deadline. By March 2026, actual capacity stood at 137 MW with a new expansion target of 232 MW by year-end 2026 (3595, 3606). This requires adding 95 MW in roughly four months. Equipment delivery compounds uncertainty: MicroBT miner shipments promised for June 2026 have now slipped past their deadline without a revised timeline (3622, 3940), and the underlying master supply agreement itself is over 2.5 years delayed (3944).
Anthropric represents Riot's largest announced contracted capacity: 191 MW across two phases, with the first 96 MW not arriving until December 2027 (507, 1190). This staged delivery structure suggests internal capacity constraints. The pattern across all three facilities shows Riot announcing peak capacity while delivering in steps tied to customer contracts, suggesting either demand-driven buildout or technical constraints that public announcements don't reflect. Over the next 90 days, watch whether the Kentucky year-end expansion materializes and whether Rockdale's AMD second phase reaches completion, both signals of execution capability against announced timelines.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's facility delivery trajectory shows consistent pattern of announced capacity exceeding near-term execution. As of September 2026, the company has built or contracted 641 megawatts across three sites—137 MW at Kentucky, 400 MW at Corsicana, and 241 MW at Rockdale (AMD 50 MW plus contracted Anthropic capacity)—against announced totals exceeding 1,930 MW. The gap between Rockdale's 700 MW available-capacity claim (claims 3591, 3603, 3612) and the 241 MW actually contracted as of August 2026 suggests either substantial uncommitted capacity or forward projection of development potential without firm agreements.
Timeline adherence has slipped materially. Kentucky's Block Mining 160 MW deployment was promised by year-end 2025 (claims 3938–3939) but the facility remained at 137 MW through March 2026 with no public evidence of movement toward the 232 MW expansion target by December 2026 (claim 3614). Corsicana's Phase 1 completion was initially promised for December 2024 (claim 3936) and materialized only by March 2026—a nine-month slip—with 400 MW operational and 600 MW remaining capacity unscheduled (claim 3937). Rockdale's AMD buildout proceeded more methodically: initial 25 MW completed as of August, second 25 MW under construction (claims 405–406). The much larger Anthropic lease for 191 MW carries first delivery target of December 2027 and second delivery of June 2028 (claims 1190–1191), representing forward commitments with 16+ months to execution from today.
Independent evidence is limited. Physical site acquisition and AMD's announced infrastructure commitment lend credibility to Rockdale expansion. The Block Mining acquisition (claimed December 2025, claim 3938) showed minimal capacity growth over nine months, raising questions about integration and deployment pace. No public permits or interconnection queue evidence cited in the record. Corsicana's 600 MW remaining capacity and Rockdale's 459 MW gap between announced and contracted suggest pipeline, not deployed, capacity.
Next 90 days: watch Kentucky for substantive movement toward 232 MW—permitting activity, miner placement announcements, or power infrastructure completion. Monitor Corsicana Phase 2 timeline articulation and power stack sequencing. Track Rockdale AMD Phase 2 completion date and any forward statements on Anthropic cabinet deployment or power delivery sequencing beyond the December 2027 target.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's headline capacity across its three Texas facilities—Kentucky (137 MW current, 232 MW target), Corsicana (400 MW current, 1000 MW target), and Rockdale (700 MW designated)—has remained stable in absolute terms, but the delivery trajectory reveals compounding delays and unresolved commitments. Corsicana's Phase 1 (400 MW) promised completion by end of 2024; this slipped, marked delayed as of December 2025 (3936). The Block Mining acquisition for Kentucky, announced mid-2024 as a 160 MW capacity addition, remains incomplete nine months past its supposed close, with no revised timeline published (3941, 3938). MicroBT miner deliveries anchored to mid-2026 remain unfulfilled as of March, creating a hardware gap that undermines all three sites' expansion scenarios (3622).
Rockdale stands alone in showing phased, verifiable execution. AMD's partnership yielded 25 MW of live capacity by August 2026, with a second 25 MW under construction (405, 406), grounding the 50 MW contracted claim (887). The August 2026 Anthropic announcement—191 MW over 20 years—constitutes material third-party validation of Riot's grid-connection and buildout credibility (507). Anthropic's phased delivery schedule (96 MW by end of 2027, 95 MW by mid-2028) establishes testable quarterly gates.
Corsicana's expansion remains ambiguous. Early 2025 outlined 600 MW remaining capacity for AI/HPC workloads (5161), yet no Phase 2 timeline with target completion connects those claims to current development. Riot's recurrent framing of 1000 MW as "target" or "total expected" capacity, unstaked to any milestone, blurs intent from commitment. Kentucky's 95 MW expansion (137 to 232 MW by year-end 2026) must compress the Block Mining acquisition close, hardware delivery, and buildout into nine months—a challenging sequence given prior slippage.
No permits or interconnection queue entries for Kentucky or Corsicana have been reported. Block Mining's persistent delay from July 2024 through mid-2026 without public revision suggests structural obstacles beyond routine execution. In the next 90 days, watch for: Block Mining close announcement with revised timeline, Corsicana Phase 2 with firm completion target, MicroBT hardware delivery confirmation, and Anthropic's first 96 MW commissioning progress at Rockdale.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's datacenter trajectory reveals a company aggressively pursuing scale while struggling with execution discipline. Three facilities—Corsicana, Rockdale, and Kentucky—anchor its strategy, but announced capacity has consistently outpaced deployed reality.
Corsicana epitomizes the timing slippage. In December 2025, Riot promised 400 MW Phase I completion by end of 2024 (claim 3936), a deadline it missed by roughly fourteen months. As of March 2026, the facility showed 400 MW developed capacity (claims 3592, 3604, 3605), but remained silent on when the remaining 600 MW—promised for eventual 1.0 GW buildout (claim 3613)—will commence. The facility was first cited for land holdings in June 2024 (claim 6013), yet nearly two years later, no Phase II timeline existed in the public record.
Rockdale presents a subtler gap between marketed and actual capacity. Riot consistently claimed 700 MW developed capacity starting December 2025 (claim 3934). By August 2026, the true picture emerged: only 25 MW for AMD was operational, a second 25 MW AMD tranche was under construction (claims 405, 406), and 191 MW from Anthropic arrived in two tranches ending June 2028 (claims 1190, 1191, 507). Total contracted capacity was 241 MW (claim 508), leaving 459 MW unaccounted for. The 700 MW figure reflected available grid capacity, not deployed infrastructure.
Kentucky's acquisition timeline crumbled entirely. Block Mining acquisition, promised for July 2024 (claim 3941), went unannounced until December 2025 and remained incomplete. The facility's capacity target shifted from 160 MW by end of 2025 (claims 3938, 3939) to 232 MW by end of 2026 (claim 3620), suggesting post-acquisition scope creep and delayed integration.
MicroBT miner deliveries, foundational to capacity scaling, were promised by June 2026 (claim 3622), with no completion announcement by August 2026. The August 2026 Anthropic partnership (claim 507)—a 20-year, 191 MW lease—signals Riot's pivot toward long-term, anchor-tenant leasing rather than pure mining, validating Rockdale but offering no relief on Corsicana's stalled Phase II or Kentucky's delays. Watch for: Corsicana Phase II announcement, Kentucky capacity delivery proof by year-end, and actual MicroBT deployment metrics within 90 days.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's portfolio presents a widening gap between announced capacity and contracted revenue streams. The company claimed 700 MW developed capacity at Rockdale (claims 3934, 3612, 3603, 3591 from March 2026), yet only 240 MW is contractually committed as of August 2026—50 MW for AMD (claim 887) and 191 MW under a 20-year Anthropic lease (claim 507). The unaccounted 460 MW remains unexplained: either the announced figure was speculative, capacity is held dark, or buildout has stalled against power or permitting constraints. No independent interconnection queue or permitting documents have been cited to support the 700 MW claim.
Corsicana similarly shows revision without transparency. Riot promised 400 MW completion by year-end 2024 (claim 3936); this deadline passed unacknowledged. By March 2026, the company reported 400 MW operational (claims 3604, 3592) and a 1000 MW total target (claims 3619, 3605, 3613), implying 600 MW in future phases. No timeline has been disclosed for Phase II, creating ambiguity about whether the 1000 MW is achievable or aspirational.
Kentucky's Block Mining facility reveals the most worrying pattern. The acquisition itself missed its mid-2024 deadline (claim 3941). Riot then announced 160 MW of capacity targeted for end-2025 (claims 3938, 3939)—a deadline that has now passed. Rather than acknowledge the miss, the company elevated the target to 232 MW by December 2026 (claims 3595, 3607, 3614, 3620), a 45 percent expansion of an already-failed commitment. This cycle of escalation-then-revision erodes confidence in delivery discipline.
The August 2026 announcements of Anthropic and AMD expansion are meaningful for future revenue but occur against a backdrop of uncontracted capacity gaps. Anthropic delivery begins at 2027-12-31 (claims 1190, 2923); the company is marketing future buildout before demonstrating current utilization rates.
Over the next quarter, observe whether Kentucky hits its December 2026 deadline or revises again. Track whether Corsicana discloses a Phase II timeline or lets the 600 MW gap remain vague. Monitor AMD's second 25 MW expansion (claim 406) for completion signals. These three data points will indicate whether Riot has corrected its planning discipline or whether the pattern of announcement-without-delivery persists.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's multi-site buildout—Kentucky, Corsicana, and Rockdale—maintains headline capacity targets near 2 gigawatts but has experienced persistent timeline slippage. Corsicana's first 400-megawatt phase, promised by end-2024 (claim 3936), appears to have reached that milestone by early 2026, representing roughly eight months of delay, while Kentucky's 160-megawatt target for end-2024 (claim 3938) remains unmet as of September 2026 with no revised completion date disclosed. The Block Mining acquisition (claim 3941), originally due July 2024 and foundational to Kentucky expansion, has carried through contingent pricing phases into 2026 (claim 3942). Against this backdrop of delayed organic growth, Riot executed a strategic recalibration beginning mid-2026, pivoting from captive Bitcoin mining to AI datacenter services. The company landed a 191-megawatt, 20-year Anthropic lease (claim 507) and completed initial 25-megawatt AMD delivery at Rockdale (claim 405), with second-phase AMD capacity under construction (claim 406). This transition suggests Riot is repositioning as power-and-land provider rather than pursuing monolithic hashrate expansion.
The capacity picture has shifted but not shrunk. Announced totals remain stable (Corsicana 1000 MW, Rockdale 700 MW, Kentucky targeting 232 MW by end-2026), but the mix has changed: Anthropic now claims 96 megawatts first-phase by end-2027 (claim 1190) and 95 megawatts second-phase by mid-2028 (claim 1191), pushing significant delivery further into the future. MicroBT hardware deliveries, promised June 2026 (claim 3601), lack completion status as of August 2026 filings. The Bitfarms shareholding saga—which consumed six months from June through September 2024, culminating in a 20-percent stake (claim 5703) and settlement (claim 5704)—generated no capacity accretion or meaningful synergy disclosure.
Independent verification remains constrained. No permits, interconnection queue positions, or grid-connection timelines appear in the record. The term "developed capacity" is undefined across claims; actual revenue-ready power availability remains unclear.
Watch Kentucky's end-2026 232-megawatt target (claim 3620) and Block Mining closing milestones. Monitor Corsicana Phase 2 initiation. Most critically, track AMD second-phase (claim 8251) and Anthropic first-phase (claim 1190) actual construction pacing—these define whether Riot can meet committed customer deadlines and restore credibility after internal timeline misses.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot has articulated an ambitious three-facility footprint—Corsicana targeting 1000 MW, Rockdale at 700 MW available capacity, and Kentucky expanding to 232 MW—but execution has proven uneven. Corsicana Phase I was promised at 400 MW by end-2024 (claims 3936, 3604) and marked delayed by December 2025, a substantial slip with no revised target date offered. The full 1000 MW capacity target (claims 3935, 3605, 3619) circulates without delivery commitments; Riot reaffirmed this ceiling repeatedly through March 2026 (claim 3593) but remains silent on phase-two timelines. Kentucky acquired Block Mining to reach 160 MW, but the acquisition itself was delayed past its July 2024 closure date (claim 3941). Current Kentucky capacity sits at 137 MW (claims 3594, 3606), with a 232 MW expansion promised by year-end 2026 (claims 3595, 3620)—this still requires 95 MW net growth in twelve months. Rockdale presents the clearest momentum. Riot claimed 700 MW available capacity by late 2025 (claim 3934), but independent customer deals anchor credibility: AMD's 50 MW contracted (claim 887) with 25 MW delivered (claim 405) and another 25 MW under construction (claim 406) as of August 2026, and Anthropic's 20-year 191 MW lease (claim 507) with staged deliveries through 2028 (claims 1190, 1191, 2923). Total contracted capacity now stands at 241 MW (claim 508). The pattern suggests Riot conflates available power capacity with operational hash-rate infrastructure; the gaps between announced ceiling and contracted commitments remain wide. Over the next 90 days, monitor Corsicana's movement toward Phase I completion and Kentucky's progress toward 232 MW by December. Watch whether Anthropic's first 96 MW delivery (promised 2027-12-31, claim 1190) begins construction and whether Riot acknowledges revised timelines for full facility buildout or clarifies the gap between available and deployed MW.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's capacity trajectory reveals material divergence between announced timelines and realized delivery, with near-term milestones requiring scrutiny. The company missed its Kentucky target by roughly 14 percent: claims 3938 and 3939 promised 160 MW by end-2025, but claim 3606 reported only 137 MW achieved by March 2026. Corsicana's Phase I delivery slipped significantly; claim 3936 promised 400 MW by December 2024, yet claims 3604 and 1866 place operational delivery in mid-2026. These slippages were not reframed as timeline adjustments when first announced but acknowledged retroactively in subsequent filings.
Rockdale presents a measurement tension. Claims 3591 and 3603 assert 700 MW developed capacity as of March 2026, yet recent customer commitments depict substantially lower offtake: Anthropic's 20-year lease totals 191 MW (claim 507, signed August 2026) and AMD expanded to 50 MW (claim 887, May 2026), yielding 241 MW contracted (claim 508). The gap between claimed developed capacity and committed load suggests either the 700 MW figure conflates buildable or planned infrastructure with operationally developed capacity, or significant uncommitted assets remain underutilized.
MicroBT equipment timelines have repeatedly slipped. Claims 3622, 3940, and 3601 promised deliveries by June 30, 2026, now past date by two months. This cascades into Kentucky and Corsicana deployment roadmaps. The Block Mining acquisition, foundational to Kentucky growth, itself experienced delays on payment tranches: claim 3941 promised base acquisition by July 2024 and claim 3942 promised contingent payment by December 2025, both marked delayed.
Independent corroboration remains limited to partnership announcements and customer disclosures. Permit filings and utility interconnection queue entries would clarify whether Corsicana's 1000 MW target (claims 3593, 3605) reflects near-term engineering work or aspirational capacity. Over the next 90 days, monitor whether Kentucky hits 232 MW by year-end (claims 3614, 3620), requiring 95 MW deployment in four months—a pace inconsistent with recent delivery cadence. Track Anthropic's initial 96 MW delivery (claim 1190, promised December 2027); delays would further validate the pattern of slipping facility timelines.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's capacity architecture reveals a pattern of announced targets that consistently outpace execution. Corsicana exemplifies this: the facility was promised to deliver 400 MW in its first phase by the end of 2024 (claim 3936), yet Riot reported only 400 MW developed capacity as of March 2026 (claim 3592)—a delay of over a year for what should have been an opening deployment. The facility's stated 1 GW target (claims 3935, 3605) remains unchanged across multiple earnings periods, but the absence of confirmed capacity beyond 400 MW and lack of independent third-party validation suggests this is an aspirational rather than committed milestone.
Kentucky Facility growth has been substantially slower than early guidance implied. Claims from December 2025 and March 2026 show Riot maintaining 137 MW of current capacity (claim 3606) while targeting 232 MW by year-end 2026 (claims 3614, 3620)—a 95 MW expansion in twelve months. This represents modest pace given the facility's operational status, and the December 2025 claims marked earlier 160 MW and timeline promises as delayed (claims 3938, 3939).
Rockdale's trajectory is more encouraging but still encumbered by unmet obligations. The facility commands 700 MW of total developed capacity (claim 3591), but only 241 MW is currently contracted: 191 MW to Anthropic (claim 507) and 50 MW to AMD (claim 887). AMD has delivered the initial 25 MW tranche with a second 25 MW under construction (claims 405, 406), indicating actual buildout. The Anthropic agreement promises 96 MW by end of 2027 and 95 MW by mid-2028 (claims 1190, 1191)—deployment windows well into the future.
Underlying infrastructure commitments continue to slip. The Block Mining acquisition, originally due mid-2024, remains unpaid (claim 3941); the MicroBT supply agreement, promised for mid-2023, carries a [delayed] status as of recent claims (claim 3944); and MicroBT miner deliveries now target mid-2027 (claim 3601).
Monitor Rockdale's AMD Phase 2 completion and Anthropic's first-tranche power delivery timeline. Watch whether Kentucky can execute its 232 MW target by year-end or whether this becomes the next delayed milestone. Track third-party evidence: utility interconnection queues, building permits, and grid operator filings for Corsicana's Phase 2 expansion should become visible within 90 days if the 1 GW target is genuine.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's infrastructure portfolio shows a pattern of ambitious roadmaps revised downward in practice, with most timelines slipping substantially. Corsicana exemplifies this trajectory: the facility was promised to deliver 400 MW by end-2024 [3936], but remains at 400 MW through mid-2026 [3604, 1866]. Capacity additions have not materialized. Riot stated Corsicana would reach 1000 MW total [3605, 3619], but the record contains no updated completion dates for phases beyond the first. The facility's remaining capacity has been constant at 600 MW since January 2025 [5161, 3937], suggesting constraints from grid or thermal infrastructure not reflected in headline capacity claims.
Kentucky's Block Mining acquisition tells a similar story. The deal closed at escalating cost (claims shift from $113.6M core to $146.1M total across tranches [3941, 3942]), and the 160 MW target originally promised for end-2025 [3938] remains unmet as of early 2026 [3594]. Riot later reframed this as a 232 MW expansion target by year-end 2026 [3595, 3620], effectively raising the goalpost to absorb prior delays.
Rockdale's profile is more recent but follows the pattern. AMD's 25 MW Phase I completed [405], with a second 25 MW under construction [406] as of August 2026. The recent Anthropic agreement announced 191 MW lease capacity [507] but committed delivery of only 96 MW by end-2027 [1190], with the remainder trailing to mid-2028 [1191]. This mirrors Riot's standard approach: large nominal capacity figures paired with extended, back-loaded timelines.
MicroBT miner deliveries were promised for June 2026 [3622] but remain tagged delayed, suggesting slippage into Q3 or beyond. Without independent evidence of grid interconnection progress, permitting advancement, or structural completion at Corsicana's Phase II or Rockdale's Anthropic buildout, the pace of capacity realization appears constrained by factors outside Riot's control or unacknowledged in guidance.
Over the next 90 days, watch for: Kentucky's advancement toward 232 MW by year-end; any acknowledgement of Corsicana phase delays; permitting or interconnection queue updates for Rockdale expansion beyond near-term AMD and Anthropic commitments. Silence on these fronts would suggest further revision cycles ahead.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's announced capacity has grown substantially but remains concentrated in facilities at different stages of deployment. Kentucky stands at 137 MW developed capacity (claim 3594) with a 232 MW expansion target by year-end (claims 3595, 3620), while Corsicana has completed 400 MW of a 1000 MW total plan (claims 3604, 3605), and Rockdale reportedly has 700 MW available capacity (claim 3612). The company's timeline credibility has been tested repeatedly. The Block Mining acquisition, promised by July 2024 (claim 3941), was not completed until reported in December 2025. Corsicana's Phase I 400 MW was due by December 2024 (claim 3936) but remained under construction through 2026. Most significantly, MicroBT miner deliveries promised for June 2026 (claims 3601, 3622) are now marked delayed, despite $779.5 million in purchase orders (claim 3945) signed for substantial hashrate commitments (49.2 EH/s). The Kentucky 160 MW Block Mining capacity target was promised by December 2025 (claims 3938, 3939) and has slipped into 2026. Recent activity suggests some acceleration: AMD's initial 25 MW at Rockdale was delivered as of August 2026 (claim 405), with a second 25 MW tranche under construction (claim 406). The August 2026 Anthropic partnership—a 191 MW lease and $9 billion compute agreement (claims 507, 420)—represents the most concrete capacity commitment to date, with 96 MW promised by December 2027 (claim 1190). Watch for: MicroBT shipment materializations (three months overdue); Kentucky expansion progress toward the 232 MW target (four months remaining); Corsicana acceleration beyond Phase I (currently at 40% of 1000 MW plan); and Anthropic deployment pace at Rockdale (baseline for near-term utilization). The Anthropic timeline, while distant, offers a reality check on Riot's construction and integration capacity.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's facility portfolio exhibits growing separation between announced and operationalized capacity. Corsicana's first-phase 400-megawatt target, promised for December 2024 (claim 3936), arrived by spring 2026—a five-month slip. The facility reached that milestone intact (claim 3604, March 2026), yet Riot has not articulated a completion timeline for the remaining 600 megawatts of its stated 1000-megawatt target (claims 3935, 3605). No new capacity has been added in the nine months from December 2025 through today.
Rockdale displays the sharpest credibility erosion. March 2026 filings (claims 3603, 3612) declared 700 megawatts developed capacity. August 2026 updates (claims 405, 406) disclosed only 25 megawatts operational for AMD with 25 under construction. This reduction-to-one-seventh suggests the 700-megawatt figure represented permitted or contractually committed capacity, not actual buildout. Riot's August announcements introduced two customer anchors: a 50-megawatt AMD expansion (claim 887) and a 191-megawatt Anthropic 20-year lease (claim 507), totaling 241 megawatts under contract (claim 508). Anthropic's first tranche—96 megawatts—is promised for December 2027; the second 95-megawatt tranche targets June 2028 (claim 1191).
Kentucky's Block Mining facility originally targeted 160 megawatts by December 2025 (claim 3939). It reached 137 megawatts by March 2026 (claim 3606)—a 23-megawatt miss. Riot then reset to 232 megawatts by December 2026 (claim 3620), requiring 95 megawatts of new deployment in nine months.
MicroBT miner supply underpins all three sites. Delivery timelines promised for June 2026 (claims 3940, 3622) are now two months overdue. A master supply agreement originally dated June 2023 remained unfulfilled as of December 2025 (claim 3944).
Track MicroBT shipment receipts and deployment cadence over 90 days; Kentucky's monthly progress toward 232 megawatts; Corsicana's phase-two commitment; and actual megawatt increments at Rockdale from its current 25-megawatt operational base. Permit and interconnection queue visibility for Anthropic sites will calibrate execution risk.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's announcement trajectory reveals persistent capacity scaling within three principal facilities, but delivery timelines have suffered systematic delay across mining hardware and power infrastructure. Corsicana has remained the centerpiece: the company announced 1 GW total capacity (claims 3935, 3605, 3613, 3619) while disclosing 600 MW remaining for data center development beyond the initial 400 MW phase (claims 3936, 5161). That first phase, promised by end-2024 (claim 3936), has now reached 400 MW as of March 2026—a full year slip—with no public timeline for remaining buildout (claims 3604, 3592). Rockdale's stated capacity climbed from 125 MW acquisition (claim 5020) to a claimed 700 MW by late 2025 (claims 3934, 3591, 3612, 3603). Actual contracted and deployed capacity, however, reveals a narrower footprint: 25 MW for AMD completed, 25 MW under construction, and 191 MW for Anthropic under a 20-year lease announced August 2026 (claims 405, 406, 507)—totaling 241 MW of visible obligation (claim 508). The 459 MW gap between claimed and contracted suggests speculative capacity. Kentucky Facility has tracked 137 MW developed with a 232 MW expansion target by end-2026 (claims 3594, 3595, 3620), contingent on Block Mining acquisition originally promised July 2024 (claim 3941)—now substantially overdue. The promised 160 MW Block Mining phase for end-2025 (claim 3939) has slipped without revision. MicroBT hardware deliveries, critical to hash rate, have slipped three months past June 2026 targets (claims 3940, 3601, 3622). Bitfarms investment stabilized at 19.9% ownership (claim 5801), with an associated partnership term originally set for June 2026 now delayed (claim 5701). The August 2026 Anthropic lease (20-year, $9B, 191 MW phased through 2028, claims 507, 420, 1190, 1191) represents Riot's first hyperscaler compute commitment but requires 96 MW delivery by December 2027—16 months away. Watch: (1) whether Anthropic's first tranche meets 2027-12-31, (2) Block Mining Kentucky materialization, and (3) Corsicana Phase II initiation.
Delivery vs. promise
2026-09-05Riot's infrastructure portfolio presents a study in expanding commitments against uneven execution. The company's Corsicana facility achieved its stated 400 MW Phase 1 capacity but arrived roughly twelve months late against the December 2024 promise (claim 3936). The path to the stated 1000 MW end-state remains undefined; no updated timelines have been published for Phase 2 buildout. Kentucky's Block Mining acquisition, promised to hit 160 MW by year-end 2025, is now nine months past its deadline with current capacity at 137 MW and a revised 232 MW target still positioned for December 2026 (claims 3938, 3620). This serial revision pattern—targets reset rather than met—suggests capacity modulation against power availability or financing constraints.
Rockdale tells a more granular story. Initial claims of 700 MW available capacity (claim 3934) have given way to specific customer contracts: Anthropic's 191 MW lease and AMD's 50 MW allocation total 241 MW committed (claim 508). AMD's deployment shows operational reality: 25 MW delivered by August 2026, with a second 25 MW tranche under construction (claims 405–406). The Anthropic agreement—9 billion dollars over twenty years, announced August 2026—validates enterprise-grade demand, though deliveries are backloaded to late 2027 and 2028 (claims 1190–1191).
The company's stated order book supports growth: MicroBT purchase orders total 779.5 million dollars (claim 3945), yet miner deliveries promised for June 2026 remain marked as delayed (claim 3622). Block Mining contingent payments due by end-2025 have not been resolved in public filings (claim 3942). Watch for Kentucky capacity utilization data and any public reconciliation of Block Mining's contingent earn-out structure. The Corsicana Phase 2 timeline—essential to reaching 1000 MW—remains unannounced. Anthropic's first tranche delivery date in December 2027 is now operationally critical; any slip would signal broader power procurement headwinds affecting Riot's entire Texas footprint.
faq
Frequently asked
2026-10-19A. The disclosed record covers 2004 to 2016 and describes a small animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business Riot is known for today. In 2004 it sold antigens: it said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test makers and research facilities (claim 21102). It had bought that antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone meant to help cattle maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). In 2005 it renamed itself AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090) and set up a holding-company structure (claim 21091). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood test to help diagnose appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. The dossier cannot say. The claims shown end in 2016, and the last entry is cut off mid-record. The latest strategic points on file are from 2012: seeking FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and licensing out its animal-health intellectual property under an exclusive agreement (claim 21049), which signals a move away from the cattle products. Riot's later shift to blockchain and bitcoin mining appears nowhere in these claims. A reader should not treat this dossier as describing today's company. More recent filings need to be added before anyone can describe the current strategy.
A. There is one named commercial partner: Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The antigen customers are described only as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities,' with no names given (claim 21102). The company also had license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095), but the universities are not named here. The licensee of the 2012 animal-health intellectual property is not named either (claim 21049).
A. Corporate actions are well documented: board and officer appointments, the name change, and repeated expansions of shares and stock plans. Product outcomes are not documented. The record shows SurBred 15 and StayBred as described products. It also notes that StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and no claim shows that approval was ever obtained. AppyScore is recorded as 'pursuing FDA clearance' (claim 21050), with no claim showing clearance was granted. A reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). Whether it happened is marked not_yet_verifiable.
A. Mostly by issuing stock. Shareholders approved increases in authorized common shares of 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and 60,000,000 again in 2013 (claim 21040). The company also ran a common stock offering in 2012 (claim 21048). Shares reserved for the stock incentive plan were raised several times: - 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim 21088) - 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim 20723) - 700,000 shares in 2010 and 2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710) - 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim 21041) - 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim 21011) The repeated increases point to steady dilution and reliance on equity rather than product revenue. The record contains no revenue figures.
A. Yes. In 2010 the board was restructured: Executive Chairman Daryl Faulkner stepped down, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (claims 20716, 20717, 20718, 20719). Stephen T. Lundy was named CEO at the same time (claim 20711). On September 26, 2012, four directors resigned at once (claim 21051), and the record gives no explanation. That is a notable event. Earlier, Richard G. Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), and co-founder-era executive Roger Hurst's employment ended that year (claim 21087).
A. First, the gap from 2017 to today needs to be filled in. That is when the company rebranded and moved into blockchain and bitcoin mining, and none of it is in this record. For the older period, the open items are: - Whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance - Whether the 2010 reverse split was actually carried out - What happened to the Merial distribution deal and the animal-health license - Why four directors resigned in 2012
A. 1. The dossier stops at 2016, so it says nothing about the company's current business, customers, or results. 2. None of the products on file has a recorded regulatory approval or commercial outcome. 3. Apart from Merial, customers and partners are unnamed. 4. The record contains no financial results at all, only equity authorizations. Every claim here is an automated extraction marked 'stated' or 'not_yet_verifiable'. None has been independently checked against later filings.
Frequently asked
2026-10-19A. The dossier only covers the company's early life sciences history, not its current business. It began in 2004 around an antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). Its early products were animal health diagnostics, including the SurBred 15 early bovine pregnancy test (21096) and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). It also said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). It later moved into human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047).
A. The record doesn't say. The claims supplied end in 2016 with a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981), and the list appears to be cut off at that point. Nothing on file explains the move to the Riot name or ticker, or what the company does today. Readers should not use this dossier to judge the current business; the post-2016 record needs to be added first.
A. At least twice before 2016. It became AspenBio Pharma, Inc. in 2005 (21090), as part of a holding company restructuring (21091). It was later Venaxis and was renamed Bioptix in 2016 (20981). The Venaxis rename itself and the later rename to Riot are not in the claims supplied.
A. No individual customers are named. The only customer claim is general: over 30 products sold to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). The one named commercial partner is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). The company also cited licenses with three universities (21095) and, in 2012, an exclusive license for its animal health intellectual property (21049). None of the university partners or the licensee are named in the record.
A. Nothing on file is confirmed as delivered. Every claim has status 'stated', meaning it was announced or disclosed but not independently checked. Product outcomes are especially unclear. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and the company was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (21050). The record contains no approval, clearance, launch, or revenue figure for either product. A few dated items are marked 'not_yet_verifiable' rather than confirmed: the reverse split authorization of up to 1-for-6 due by Feb 4, 2011 (20721, 20715) and the FY2011 auditor appointment (20720, 20713).
A. There was a steady pattern of dilution. Stock incentive plan reserves were raised many times: 3.5M units (21088), 1.5M shares (20723), 700k shares (20722/20714/20710), 425k (21041), and 1.8M (21011). Authorized common shares were raised by 60M twice (21089, 21040). A common stock offering began in 2012 (21048), and a reverse split was authorized (20721). Leadership turned over often. Roger Hurst was terminated (21087), CEO changes came in 2005 (21082) and 2010 (20711), and four directors resigned on Sept 26, 2012 (21051).
A. First, filling in the record after 2016. That should include the rename to Riot, the current business model, and any customers or partners named today. Second, confirming whether earlier promises came true, such as whether the reverse split happened (20721) and whether AppyScore or StayBred ever won FDA clearance (21050, 21101). Third, any new increases to authorized shares or stock plan reserves, given the past pattern of dilution.
A. (1) The dossier covers a different business from the one now called Riot, and the record of that transition is missing. (2) No product on file is confirmed as commercialized or approved by regulators. (3) Apart from Merial, customers and licensees are unnamed, so commercial traction can't be judged. (4) What drove the 2012 board resignations (21051) and the repeated leadership and name changes is not explained.
Frequently asked
2026-10-19A. The disclosed record describes a small diagnostics company, not a crypto business. It began with an antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics in 2004 (claims 21108, 21081) and sold more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). It then moved into animal health with SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (21096), and StayBred, a hormone product for maintaining cattle pregnancies (21097). By 2012 its focus had shifted to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis in humans (21047). The record ends with the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (20980). The record is cut off at that entry, so it does not cover what the RIOT ticker represents today. Readers should not assume the current business matches these claims.
A. The record shows repeated pivots. In 2005 the company restructured as a holding company and changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (21091, 21090). Its focus moved from research antigens to veterinary reproduction products, and then to human diagnostics with AppyScore (21047, 21050). In 2012 it licensed out its animal health intellectual property (21049), which suggests it was stepping back from that line. In 2016 it acquired BiOptix (20980). There is no current strategy in the dossier, because the claims stop in 2016.
A. There are almost none. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 in 2004 (21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The company said it sold more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102), but none of those buyers are named. It also disclosed licenses with three universities (21095), and those are not named either.
A. Corporate actions are well documented. These include executive and board appointments (21106, 21082, 20711), the name change (21090), increases to authorized shares to 60,000,000 (21089, 21040), and repeated expansions of the stock incentive plan: 3,500,000 (21088), 1,500,000 (20723), 700,000 (20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (21041) and 1,800,000 shares (21011). The products have no confirmed outcomes. StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and AppyScore was described as pursuing FDA clearance (21050). Nothing in the record shows that either one received approval, generated sales, or that SurBred 15 produced meaningful revenue through Merial.
A. There are several points worth examining. Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). The board was restructured in 2010: the Executive Chairman stepped down, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20717, 20718, 20719, 20712). An early executive's employment agreement was terminated in 2005 (21087). The shareholder approvals for share and option-pool increases recur often (see above), which points to ongoing dilution to fund the business. None of these items proves wrongdoing, but each is a reason to ask questions.
A. Several dated commitments are marked not_yet_verifiable. They include the board's authority to carry out a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (20721, 20715), GHP Horwath serving as auditor for fiscal 2011 (20720, 20713), the 2014 ratification of the auditor (21012), Stephen A. Williams joining the board by May 1, 2013 (21038), and the extension of the stock plan to July 8, 2021 (20709). The record does not confirm that the reverse split actually took place.
A. The most important gap is coverage after 2016. The dossier ends with the BiOptix acquisition (20980), and it is truncated at that point. Anyone researching RIOT today should get the later filings to see how and why the business changed after 2016. They should also check whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (21050), and whether the reverse split and the auditor appointments were completed (20715, 20713).
A. First, did any product ever earn material, recurring revenue, given that no end customers are named (21102, 21094)? Second, what happened to AppyScore's regulatory filing (21050) and to StayBred's FDA pathway (21101)? Third, why did four directors resign together in 2012 (21051)? Fourth, how much dilution did the repeated share and option-pool increases cause? Finally, how does this diagnostics history connect to the company's current business? The dossier does not answer that last question.
Frequently asked
2026-10-18A. The dossier describes a small diagnostics and animal-health company. In 2004 it bought an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108) and said it marketed more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was developing cattle reproduction products, SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone (claim 21097). In 2005 it renamed itself AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2012 its main product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The company is listed here as Riot (RIOT), but no claim on record explains when or why it took that name or what it does today.
A. The dossier can't answer this. The last visible claim is dated 2016 and covers only the ratification of an auditor (claim 20982). The most recent strategic statements are from 2012: seeking FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and an exclusive license agreement covering animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). Nothing on record covers the company's direction after 2016, including whatever business the 'Riot' name refers to. Treat any statement of current strategy as unsupported by this record.
A. None are named. The only description of customers is generic: 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial is a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities but does not name them (claim 21095).
A. Very little on record has been independently verified. Nearly every claim has status 'stated', meaning it was extracted from a filing and has not been checked against outcomes. The product and regulatory claims have no recorded result: no FDA decision on StayBred (claim 21101) or AppyScore (claim 21050), and no sales figures for SurBred 15. Several dated commitments are marked not_yet_verifiable. These include the authorized reverse split of up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011 (claims 20715 and 20721), the appointment of GHP Horwath as auditor for fiscal 2011 (claims 20713 and 20720), Stephen A. Williams joining the board (claim 21038), and the stock plan extension to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709).
A. It has repeatedly expanded its equity capacity. Authorized shares were raised to 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and again by 60,000,000 in 2013 (claim 21040). It launched a common stock offering in 2012 (claim 21048). The stock incentive plan was enlarged many times: by 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim 21088), by 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim 20723), by 700,000 shares in 2010 and 2011 (claims 20714, 20722 and 20710), by 425,000 in 2013 (claim 21041) and by 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim 21011). Diligence readers should look into the resulting dilution and whether the authorized reverse split was carried out.
A. Not very. CEOs included Richard G. Donnelly (claim 21082) and then Stephen T. Lundy from 2010 (claim 20711). In 2010 the board was restructured: Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (claims 20712, 20716, 20718 and 20719). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). Roger D. Hurst, who had signed an exclusive employment agreement in 2004 (claim 21099), had that employment terminated by 2005 (claim 21087).
A. First, filings after 2016 that explain the change to the 'Riot' identity and the present business. Second, any FDA outcome for AppyScore. Third, whether the 2010–2011 reverse split was executed. Fourth, auditor continuity beyond GHP Horwath (claim 20982). Fifth, any disclosure that names customers or gives revenue by product line.
A. 1. The record appears to stop around 2016, so the company's present business, strategy and customers are absent. 2. Nearly all claims are unverified 'stated' extractions, and the dated commitments sit at not_yet_verifiable. 3. No regulatory approvals or commercial results are recorded for the products the company promoted. 4. Customers are never named. Together these mean the dossier documents what the company said, not what it achieved.
Frequently asked
2026-10-16A. The claims describe a small life-sciences and diagnostics company, not the business now trading as RIOT. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (21108) and sold over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). It was developing animal-health products, including the SurBred 15 early bovine pregnancy test (21096) and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (21090). By 2012 it had moved toward human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047). In 2016 it renamed itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981). The supplied record breaks off at that point.
A. This dossier can't answer that. The last claim on file is the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (20981), and the record appears truncated after it. Nothing here describes the business under the Riot name, so do not use these claims to judge what the company does today. The latest strategy visible in the record is the 2012 plan to seek FDA clearance for AppyScore (21050), alongside an exclusive license of its animal-health intellectual property (21049), which suggested a move away from veterinary products.
A. Only one commercial partner is named: Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). The company also disclosed licenses with three universities but did not name them in the record (21095). Its customer base of 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (21102) is described only by category. The 2012 licensee of its animal-health IP is not named either (21049).
A. None of the claims has been independently verified. Every entry is either 'stated' (the company said it) or 'not_yet_verifiable'. What happened is mostly corporate housekeeping: - Board and officer changes, such as Stephen T. Lundy becoming CEO (20711). - Name changes (21090, 20981). - Increases to stock plans and authorized shares. The record contains no confirmation of SurBred 15 sales volumes, StayBred FDA approval (which the company said was required, 21101), or FDA clearance of AppyScore (21050). The reverse split authorized at 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011 (20715, 20721) is marked not_yet_verifiable, meaning there is no record of whether it was carried out.
A. Repeatedly, through actions that dilute existing shareholders: - The stock incentive plan grew by 3,500,000 units in 2005 (21088), 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (20723), 700,000 shares in each of 2010 and 2011 (20714, 20710), 425,000 in 2013 (21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (21011). - Authorized common stock rose by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089) and again in 2013 (21040). - A common stock offering was launched in 2012 (21048). For a company with no verified product revenue in the record, this pattern suggests it relied on equity financing.
A. Not very. In 2005 Richard G. Donnelly became CEO (21082) and Roger Hurst's employment was terminated (21087), barely a year after Hurst signed an exclusive employment agreement (21099). In 2010 the board was restructured: Executive Chairman Daryl Faulkner stepped down, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20712, 20718, 20719). Stephen T. Lundy was named CEO at the same time (20711). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051), which is a notable governance event that the record does not explain.
A. First, the rest of the record after 2016. That is where any shift into the business now associated with the RIOT ticker would appear. Without it, this dossier describes a predecessor company. Second, primary-source confirmation of whether AppyScore ever won FDA clearance, whether StayBred was ever approved, and what became of the Merial SurBred 15 arrangement. Third, whether the 2010–2011 reverse split (20715, 20721) actually took place.
A. 1. Continuity: how a veterinary and diagnostics company called AspenBio, then Venaxis, then Bioptix became today's RIOT, and why the record stops at 2016. 2. Commercial reality: the record has no revenue figures, unit sales or named end customers beyond Merial (21094). 3. Product outcomes: neither flagship regulatory effort (21101, 21050) has a recorded result. 4. Governance: the reasons behind the 2012 resignation of four directors (21051) and the frequent leadership turnover. 5. Dilution: years of share-plan and authorization increases with nothing on file to show what shareholders received in return.
Frequently asked
2026-10-16A. The record describes an animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business most people now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108) and said it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). Its cattle products were the SurBred 15 early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096) and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). In 2005 it renamed itself AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis in humans (claim 21047). The last claim on record is the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claim 20980).
A. The dossier cannot say. Its claims stop in 2016 with the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claim 20980), and that final entry is cut off in the record. The latest strategy the record shows is from 2012–2016: seek FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), license out its animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049), and expand through the BiOptix deal. Nothing here describes what the company did or said after 2016, so readers should not treat this record as a picture of the business today.
A. No end customers are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distributor, not a buyer. The company also says it has license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095). Its customer base is described only as diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities buying over 30 products (claim 21102).
A. None of the claims has been independently confirmed as delivered. Every entry is recorded as 'stated', meaning the company said it, or as 'not_yet_verifiable'. Many corporate actions were disclosed as done, including leadership changes, increases to the share reserve for the employee stock plan (for example 3,500,000 shares, claim 21088, and 1,800,000 shares, claim 21011), and two increases in authorized shares of 60,000,000 each (claims 21089 and 21040). Several items with deadlines have no recorded outcome: a board-authorized reverse split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, due by Feb 4, 2011 (claims 20715 and 20721); the auditor appointment for fiscal 2011 (claim 20713); and Stephen A. Williams joining the board by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038).
A. The record lists the requirements but no results. SurBred 15 was described as not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100). StayBred was said to need FDA approval or an abbreviated new-drug filing (ANDA) (claim 21101), but no approval is recorded. For AppyScore, the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claim 21050), and the record does not show whether it was granted. Treat every product milestone in this dossier as unresolved.
A. The company had frequent leadership turnover and repeatedly expanded its share base. Richard G. Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082). Stephen T. Lundy replaced the executive-chair structure in 2010 (claim 20711). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). Over the same period, the share reserve for the employee stock plan was raised again and again: 1,500,000 shares (claim 20723), 700,000 (claim 20722), 425,000 (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). Authorized shares were raised by 60,000,000 twice (claims 21089 and 21040), and a reverse split was authorized (claim 20715). Together these point to ongoing equity issuance, which dilutes existing shareholders.
A. First, get filings from after 2016. The dossier ends at the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20980), so anything about the company's later direction has to come from other sources. Within the record, the items worth checking against SEC filings are: whether the 2011 reverse split actually took effect (claim 20715), whether AppyScore received FDA clearance (claim 21050), and whether Stephen A. Williams actually joined the board (claim 21038).
A. 1) The record has a gap of almost a decade after 2016, so it cannot describe the company's current business. 2) No product outcome is confirmed: there is no recorded FDA decision for StayBred or AppyScore, and no sales figures for SurBred 15 through Merial. 3) No customers are named beyond a single distributor. 4) The data has quality problems. Several claims appear twice with slightly different dates; for example, the 2004 director and CFO appointments appear as claims 21105/21106 and again as 21103/21104. Some claims also changed status back and forth: claim 20712 moved from stated to delayed to not_yet_verifiable and back to stated. These were produced by automated extraction and need human review.
Frequently asked
2026-10-16A. The claims on file describe a small animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business most readers now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), after buying an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was developing cattle reproductive products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. In 2005 it renamed itself AspenBio Pharma, Inc. and restructured as a holding company (claims 21090, 21091). It later operated as Venaxis, then renamed itself again from Venaxis to Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981). The record provided is cut off at that point. Nothing on file covers how or when the company became Riot, or any later shift in its business. A reader should not take this dossier as a description of the current company.
A. The record names no customers. It only says products went to unnamed 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial partner is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The company also had license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095), and an exclusive license covering its animal-health IP, with the licensee not identified in the record (claim 21049).
A. Every claim on file has the status 'stated' or 'not_yet_verifiable'. None is marked as delivered or confirmed. Some corporate actions were plainly carried out: executive appointments, board changes, share-authorization increases and name changes (for example claims 21082, 20711, 21089). The product claims have not been shown to produce results. These include SurBred 15, StayBred and the 'pipeline products' (claims 21096, 21097, 21098), and the record shows no revenue or sales outcomes for any of them. AppyScore was still seeking FDA clearance in 2012 (claim 21050), and the record does not show that clearance was ever obtained.
A. The company said SurBred 15 was not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100). StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). AppyScore needed FDA clearance (claim 21050). The record does not show the outcome of the StayBred or AppyScore regulatory paths.
A. The record shows repeated expansions of shares. Authorized common shares were increased by 60 million in 2005 and again in 2013 (claims 21089, 21040). The stock incentive plan was enlarged several times: 3.5M (claim 21088), 1.5M (claim 20723), 700K in 2010 and again in 2011 (claims 20722, 20710), 425K (claim 21041) and 1.8M (claim 21011). Stock was sold in an offering in 2012 (claim 21048). In 2010 the board was authorized to do a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). Whether that split was carried out is still marked not_yet_verifiable.
A. Leadership turned over often. Roger Hurst was hired under an exclusive employment agreement in 2004 and terminated in 2005 (claims 21099, 21087). Richard Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), and Stephen Lundy became CEO in 2010 (claim 20711). Also in 2010, the executive chairman stepped down, the board moved to a non-executive chair, and the vice-chair and lead-director roles were eliminated (claims 20712, 20718, 20719). Four directors resigned on a single day in September 2012 (claim 21051).
A. 1. The dossier is incomplete. It ends at the 2016 Bioptix rename (claim 20981), so it does not capture the later business. Any analysis of the current company needs those later filings. 2. Several dated items are still unresolved, all marked not_yet_verifiable: the 2011 reverse split (claims 20721, 20715), the auditor engagements (claims 20720, 20713, 21012), and Stephen Williams's board appointment (claim 21038). 3. None of the product claims, including SurBred 15, StayBred and AppyScore, has a verified commercial or regulatory result on file.
Frequently asked
2026-10-15A. The disclosed record describes a small life-sciences company, not the business most people now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) and said it sold over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also developed animal-health products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone meant to help cattle maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had shifted to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The company renamed itself several times: it became AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090), and in 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. This dossier can't answer that. The record we were given ends in 2016 with the Venaxis-to-Bioptix rename (claim 20981), and the claims list appears to be cut off at that point. Nothing on file covers what the company has done since then, including any later change of business under the Riot name. Readers should not infer current strategy from these claims. A newer filing set is needed.
A. Customers are mostly unnamed. The company described them only by category, as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial partner is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The company also referred to license arrangements with three universities but did not name them (claim 21095), and to an exclusive license of its animal-health intellectual property in 2012 without naming the licensee (claim 21049).
A. The record shows announcements, not results. Every claim has status 'stated', meaning it was pulled from filings automatically and nobody has checked whether it happened. The company said SurBred 15 did not need FDA regulation (claim 21100) and signed the Merial distribution deal (claim 21094), but the record contains no sales figures. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and no approval appears in the record. The company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), and no clearance appears in the record either. Leadership changes and share-plan increases are documented, but no claim shows a product reaching commercial success.
A. The company repeatedly increased its equity capacity: authorized common shares rose by 60,000,000 in 2005 and again in 2013 (claims 21089, 21040), and it added shares to its stock incentive plan many times: 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). In 2010 shareholders authorized a reverse split anywhere from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721). Leadership turned over frequently. Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051), and the CEO and chair roles changed hands in 2005 and 2010 (claims 21082, 20711, 20712). Taken together, this pattern often signals a cash-hungry, pre-revenue company.
A. (1) Whether AppyScore ever won FDA clearance (claim 21050) and whether StayBred was ever approved (claim 21101). (2) How much revenue SurBred 15 and the Merial deal actually produced (claim 21094). (3) Whether the 2010 reverse split was carried out, and at what ratio (claims 20715, 20721 are marked not_yet_verifiable). (4) Who licensed the animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). (5) Everything after 2016, which is missing from this record. That includes the Venaxis rename itself, which is implied by claim 20981 but has no claim of its own.
A. First, get filings from after 2016 into the dossier so it can describe the company as it exists today. Second, check the claims that have deadlines (the auditor engagements in claims 20713 and 21012, the reverse split in claim 20715, and the stock-plan term extension to July 8, 2021 in claim 20709) against actual outcomes. Third, look for any regulatory or revenue evidence for SurBred 15, StayBred or AppyScore that would turn announcements into confirmed deliveries.
Frequently asked
2026-10-15A. The claims on record describe a small life-sciences company, not its current business. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It marketed more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). It also developed bovine reproductive products: the SurBred 15 early pregnancy test (21096) and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone (21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics, specifically AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047). The ticker RIOT is now associated with a bitcoin-mining business. That business is not covered by any claim shown here, so this dossier cannot be used to describe what the company does today.
A. The record shows repeated rebranding. It was renamed AspenBio Pharma, Inc. in 2005 (21090), with a holding-company restructuring at the same time (21091). In 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981). The record we have stops there, partway through. Later name changes are not documented in these claims. Readers should not assume continuity of business or strategy across these names.
A. None can be determined from this record. The latest strategic claims are from 2012: pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (21050) and exclusively licensing out the animal-health intellectual property (21049). Both are more than a decade old. Any current strategy would need claims filed after 2016, and none appear in this dossier.
A. No customers are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The company also had license arrangements with three universities that are not named (21095). Its 30-plus product lines went to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (21102), with no buyers identified and no revenue figures attached.
A. Corporate actions are recorded as stated: the Vitro antigen acquisition, the name changes, and leadership changes. Leadership changes include Richard Donnelly as CEO in 2005 (21082) and Stephen Lundy as CEO in 2010 (20711). Product outcomes are not confirmed anywhere. StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101). AppyScore was only 'pursuing' FDA clearance (21050). No claim records approval, launch, or sales for either. Several forward-dated items remain not_yet_verifiable. These include the authorized reverse split at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 by 2011-02-04 (20715, 20721) and the auditor engagements for 2011 and 2014 (20713, 20720, 21012).
A. The record shows repeated expansions of equity. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089) and by another 60,000,000 in 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan grew several times: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (20723), 700,000 in each of 2010 and 2011 (20722/20714, 20710), 425,000 in 2013 (21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (21011). A common stock offering was also initiated in 2012 (21048). These figures point to ongoing dilution. They also mean that per-share comparisons across eras need care.
A. There were notable governance events. Four directors resigned on a single day, September 26, 2012 (21051). In 2010 the board was restructured: the Executive Chairman stepped down (20717), Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (20716), and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20718, 20719). An exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst was announced in 2004 (21099), and his employment was terminated in 2005 (21087). None of these events is wrongdoing in itself, but each merits follow-up.
A. The biggest gap is the period after 2016. This dossier does not document the transition to the current RIOT business, so the current strategy, customers, and operating metrics are all unknown here. Within the record, the open questions are these. Did AppyScore or StayBred ever obtain FDA clearance or generate revenue (21050, 21101)? Was the authorized reverse split ever carried out (20715)? What came of the Merial distribution deal (21094) and the animal-health license (21049)? The next priority should be adding filings from 2016 onward and resolving the not_yet_verifiable claims.
Frequently asked
2026-10-15A. The disclosed record describes a small animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business most people now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics and sold more than 30 products to diagnostic test makers and research labs (claims 21108, 21102). It then developed cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test, and StayBred, a hormone to help maintain cattle pregnancies (claims 21096, 21097). By 2012 it had moved toward human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. The record shows a series of rebrandings. In 2005 the company adopted the name AspenBio Pharma, Inc. as part of a holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091). It later operated as Venaxis, and in 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). The record supplied here stops at that point. It does not document the later change to Riot or any move into bitcoin mining, which is the business commonly associated with the RIOT ticker today. Readers should not assume the current strategy from this dossier alone.
A. This record cannot answer that. The latest entry is the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (claim 20981), and the list appears to be cut off after it. The strategies it does document are historical. In the mid-2000s the focus was cattle reproduction products, with an exclusive license of the animal-health intellectual property in 2012 (claim 21049). From 2012 the focus was getting FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). Any claim about today's strategy needs filings dated after 2016.
A. The record names no individual customers. The 2004 claim refers only to unnamed 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The named counterparties are partners rather than customers. Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, and the company had license arrangements with three universities that the record does not name (claims 21094, 21095). The 2012 animal-health license is also recorded without naming the licensee (claim 21049).
A. Verifiable delivery is thin. The 'stated' claims are mostly corporate events: board and executive appointments, auditor ratifications, name changes, and increases to the stock incentive plan. Examples are the 3,500,000-unit increase in 2005 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim 20723), and 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim 21011). The product items are announcements without recorded outcomes. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was described as pursuing FDA clearance (claim 21050). Neither shows an approval or any sales figures. Several dated commitments are marked 'not yet verifiable'. These include the reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 authorized before Feb 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721) and auditor engagements for 2011 and 2014 (claims 20713, 20720, 21012).
A. Leadership has changed often. The CFO appointment of Jeffrey McGonegal appears in both 2004 and 2005 filings (claims 21106, 21084). Richard Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), and Roger Hurst's employment ended that year (claim 21087). In 2010 Stephen Lundy became CEO, Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (claims 20711, 20712). Four directors resigned together on Sept 26, 2012 (claim 21051).
A. (1) Did StayBred or AppyScore ever get FDA approval or clearance and produce revenue? The record never says. (2) Was the authorized 2010 reverse split ever carried out, and at what ratio (claims 20715, 20721)? (3) What did the Merial and university relationships produce commercially? (4) Why did four directors resign at once in 2012 (claim 21051)? (5) What happened after the 2016 Bioptix rename? The record ends there, so the transition to the company now trading as RIOT is not documented in this dossier at all.
A. The first step is to fill the gap after 2016. That means filings covering the next name change, any new line of business, and current operating metrics, so that today's company can be judged on its own disclosures. Within the existing record, the items worth checking against SEC filings are: the not-yet-verifiable commitments (the reverse split and the 2011 and 2014 auditor engagements), any FDA decisions on AppyScore, and how far equity was diluted through repeated increases in authorized shares and incentive-plan shares. Two of those increases were 60,000,000 authorized shares, recorded in 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040).
Frequently asked
2026-10-15A. The disclosed record describes an animal-health and human diagnostics biotech, not the company most readers know as RIOT today. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It said it sold over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102) and was developing cattle reproduction products: the SurBred 15 early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096) and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). Animal-health IP was licensed out at around the same time (claim 21049).
A. The record shows a series of rebrands. The company became AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090), with a holding-company restructuring (claim 21091), and changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981). The record provided ends there. It contains no claims about the later rename or about the business behind the current RIOT ticker. Readers should not take any of this history as describing what the company does today.
A. The record does not say. The latest claim available is the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (claim 20981), and the dossier excerpt is cut off at that point. Any statement about current strategy would come from outside this record and should be checked against recent filings.
A. No end customers are named. The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The '30+ products' business refers only to unnamed 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The company also disclosed licenses with three universities, which are not named in the record (claim 21095).
A. Every claim in this record has status 'stated', 'not_yet_verifiable', or neither. None is marked as independently verified as delivered. Corporate actions such as appointments, name changes, and share-plan increases were reported as done. Product outcomes were not. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the company was 'pursuing' FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), but no approval or clearance is recorded for either. The reverse stock split, authorized at up to 1-for-6 by Feb 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721), is 'not_yet_verifiable'. So are the FY2011 and FY2014 auditor items (claims 20713, 20720, 21012).
A. The record shows repeated equity expansions. Stock-incentive-plan reserves went up by 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 (claims 20710, 20714, 20722, which may be the same increase reported more than once), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). Authorized shares were raised by 60,000,000 in both 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040). There was also a 2012 common stock offering (claim 21048). Dilution is a recurring pattern in this history.
A. Not very. CEOs changed from Richard Donnelly (claim 21082) to Stephen Lundy (claim 20711). The 2010 board restructuring removed the Executive Chairman, Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles (claims 20712, 20717, 20718, 20719). Four directors resigned on the same day in September 2012 (claim 21051). Founder-era scientist Roger Hurst's employment ended in 2005 (claim 21087).
A. First, the record has a gap. Nothing after 2016 is captured, so the current business, customers and financials have to be sourced elsewhere. Second, none of the regulatory milestones (StayBred FDA approval, AppyScore clearance) have a recorded outcome. Third, several dated promises remain unconfirmed: the 2011 reverse split, the auditor appointments, and Stephen Williams's 2013 board seat (claim 21038). Finally, all claims came from automated extraction and have not been verified by people, so specific figures should be checked against the original filings.
Frequently asked
2026-10-15A. The disclosed history describes a small life-sciences company, not the business most readers associate with the RIOT ticker today. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108) and said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics, mainly AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The company was renamed AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090) and changed from Venaxis to Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981).
A. The record does not show one. The latest claim on file is the 2016 rename from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), and the claims list appears to be cut off at that point. Nothing on file covers a pivot after 2016 or any business that matches the current RIOT ticker. A reader should treat this dossier as describing a past identity and should check newer filings for the present strategy.
A. No customers are named. The company describes its buyers only as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim 21095) and an exclusive license of animal-health IP to an unnamed party (claim 21049).
A. Most of what was delivered is corporate rather than commercial. The record shows the antigen business acquisition (claims 21108, 21081), the name changes (claims 21090, 20981), and repeated increases to the stock incentive plan: 3.5M shares (claim 21088), 1.5M (claim 20723), 700K (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425K (claim 21041), and 1.8M (claim 21011). It also shows management changes, including CEO appointments in 2005 (claim 21082) and 2010 (claim 20711), and four directors resigning in September 2012 (claim 21051). On the product side, SurBred 15 was described as a blood test outside FDA regulation (claim 21100). StayBred still needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was still 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). No claim records either product receiving approval or clearance.
A. Several dated commitments are marked not_yet_verifiable: - A board-authorized reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). The record does not say whether it was carried out. - GHP Horwath's engagement as auditor for fiscal 2011 (claims 20720, 20713). - Stephen A. Williams joining the board by May 2013 (claim 21038). - An auditor ratification for 2014 (claim 21012). - Extending the stock plan's term to July 2021 (claim 20709). Some of these went through extraction status changes (stated → delayed → not_yet_verifiable), so their status is still unresolved.
A. Most important, look for the claims after 2016 that should explain the move from Bioptix to the company now trading as RIOT. This record shows no such transition. Beyond that, check primary filings to resolve whether the 2010–2011 reverse split happened, whether AppyScore ever got FDA clearance, and whether StayBred ever got FDA approval. Those answers determine whether the diagnostics strategy produced revenue or was abandoned.
A. 1. Continuity: there are three names (AspenBio Pharma, Venaxis, Bioptix) and no on-record link to the current RIOT business. 2. Commercial traction: no customers, revenues, or unit numbers are disclosed beyond '30+ products' (claim 21102). 3. Regulatory outcomes for AppyScore and StayBred (claims 21050, 21101) are never resolved. 4. Governance churn: four directors resigned at once (claim 21051), the executive chair stepped down (claim 20717), and the board was restructured (claim 20712). The record gives no reasons. 5. Dilution: equity plan reserves were raised repeatedly, and authorized common stock was increased by 60M shares in both 2005 and 2013 (claims 21089, 21040).
Frequently asked
2026-10-13A. The disclosed record describes a small life-sciences company, not the business most people now associate with the RIOT ticker. It began in 2004 with an antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108), selling over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It then developed animal-health products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had shifted to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The company changed names several times, to AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090) and later from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. The claims on file stop at the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix rename (claim 20981), and the list provided appears truncated. The later rebranding to Riot and the company's move into cryptocurrency mining are not documented in these claims. Readers should not use this record to judge the current business. Treat it as the pre-pivot corporate history of the same legal entity, and look for later claims before drawing any conclusions about present-day strategy.
A. The record contains no current strategy. The most recent strategic disclosures are from 2012. At that point the company was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), had licensed out its animal-health intellectual property under an exclusive agreement (claim 21049), and was raising money through a common stock offering (claim 21048). Read together, these suggest a shift away from veterinary products toward one human diagnostic, funded by equity. Nothing on file covers strategy after 2016.
A. Almost none are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The diagnostics business is described only as selling over 30 products to unnamed 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). License arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) are inbound technology licenses, not customers. The record contains no customer concentration, revenue, or contract-value figures.
A. Delivered or in place: the Vitro Diagnostics antigen acquisition (claims 21108, 21081), an existing catalog of 30+ antigen products (claim 21102), the Merial distribution deal (claim 21094), and the name changes and holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091, 20981). Announced but never confirmed in the record: StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and no approval is recorded. AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050), and no clearance is recorded. 'Pipeline products in development' (claim 21098) are never followed up. SurBred 15 did not require FDA review (claim 21100), but the record shows no sales results for it.
A. The record shows frequent leadership turnover and steady share expansion. CEOs changed: Richard Donnelly was appointed in 2005 (claim 21082) and Stephen Lundy in 2010 (claim 20711). The board was restructured in 2010, ending the executive chairman, vice chairman and lead director roles (claims 20717-20719). Four directors resigned on a single day in September 2012 (claim 21051). The stock incentive plan was enlarged repeatedly: by 3.5M shares (claim 21088), 1.5M (claim 20723), 700K (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425K (claim 21041) and 1.8M (claim 21011). Authorized common stock was raised by 60M shares on two occasions (claims 21089, 21040). A reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was also authorized (claims 20721, 20715). This is the typical pattern of a cash-hungry small-cap company that funds itself by issuing equity.
A. (1) Several dated commitments were never resolved in the record and are marked not_yet_verifiable: whether the reverse split authorized for completion by Feb 4, 2011 actually happened (claims 20721, 20715), whether GHP Horwath audited fiscal 2011 (claims 20720, 20713), and whether Stephen A. Williams joined the board by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). (2) The record never says whether StayBred or AppyScore received FDA clearance. (3) No reason is given for the 2012 resignation of four directors (claim 21051). (4) Nothing documents the transition from Bioptix to the current business, which is the largest gap for anyone assessing the company today.
A. First, get claims dated after 2016. The current record cannot describe the business as it exists now. Within the historical record, the useful follow-ups are: an FDA decision on AppyScore (claim 21050), confirmation or abandonment of the reverse split (claims 20721, 20715), the outcome of the animal-health license (claim 21049), and whether the repeated equity-plan increases (e.g., claim 21011) continued after the pivot. Readers should also watch for named customers, since apart from distributor Merial (claim 21094) the record names none.
Frequently asked
2026-10-13A. The claims on file describe a small diagnostics and animal-health biotech. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), and was building cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis in humans (claim 21047). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090), later Venaxis, and then Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981).
A. The claims on record stop at the October 2016 rename from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Nothing in this dossier explains how or when the company came to use the Riot name, or what it does under that name. Readers should treat this dossier as the history of the predecessor company only and get the current business from more recent filings.
A. The latest strategy statement on record is from 2012. At that point the company had exclusively licensed out its animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049), was seeking FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), and was raising money through a common stock offering (claim 21048). The record does not say what strategy came with the 2016 Bioptix rename.
A. No end customers are named. The record says only that the company sold to unnamed diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). Merial, the one named commercial counterparty, held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities, but does not name them (claim 21095).
A. Clearly delivered: the purchase of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), the AspenBio and Bioptix name changes (claims 21090, 20981), and a long series of executive and board changes. Announced but never shown as completed: StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was still seeking FDA clearance in 2012 (claim 21050). No claim records either approval. A reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized with a February 2011 deadline (claims 20721, 20715), but its status is 'not_yet_verifiable'.
A. Shareholders were diluted repeatedly. Authorized common stock was raised by 60,000,000 shares in 2005 (claim 21089) and again by 60,000,000 in 2013 (claim 21040). The pool of shares reserved for employee and director equity awards was enlarged several times: 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 in 2010 (claims 20722, 20714) and again in 2011 (claim 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). Taken together with the 2012 stock offering (claim 21048), the pattern fits a company that relied on issuing new stock rather than on product revenue.
A. Not very. CEOs included Richard G. Donnelly (claim 21082) and, from 2010, Stephen T. Lundy (claim 20711). In 2010 the Executive Chairman stepped down and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (claims 20717, 20718, 20719). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). A key scientist's exclusive employment agreement (claim 21099) ended with his termination in 2005 (claim 21087).
A. (1) The record ends in 2016, so everything that followed, including the move to the Riot name and the current business, is undocumented here. (2) Whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance or approval (claims 21050, 21101). (3) Whether the authorized reverse split ever happened (claims 20721, 20715). (4) What became of the Merial distribution deal and the licensed-out animal-health assets (claims 21094, 21049). (5) Several dated items, including auditor engagements (claims 20720, 20713, 21012) and a board appointment (claim 21038), are still marked 'not_yet_verifiable' and need confirmation from later filings.
Frequently asked
2026-10-11A. The disclosed record describes a small diagnostics company that went through several identities. In 2004 it sold antigens: it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), using an antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone meant to help maintain cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). In 2005 it adopted the name AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. The claims on file stop at the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (claim 20981), and the final entry is cut off. The dossier contains nothing about what the company did after that, including how or why it came to trade as Riot. Anyone judging the current business should treat this record as covering the predecessor company only. It is not evidence of present-day strategy.
A. This record cannot answer that. The most recent strategic claims are from 2012: pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and licensing out its animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). The 2016 rename to Bioptix (claim 20981) suggests another change of direction, but no strategy claims accompany it. No disclosed strategy from after 2016 is on file.
A. None are named. The 2004 disclosure describes buyers only in general terms as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distributor, not a disclosed end customer, and the record gives no revenue or volume figures for that arrangement. The company also disclosed license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095), but those are licensors, not customers.
A. The record supports corporate actions that were completed: board and officer appointments, the 2005 name change and holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091), and repeated share-reserve increases. Product results are much thinner. SurBred 15 was described as not needing FDA regulation (claim 21100) and had a distributor (claim 21094), but no sales are recorded. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and no approval is on file. AppyScore was described as pursuing FDA clearance (claim 21050), and no clearance is on file. The animal-health business appears to have been licensed out by 2012 (claim 21049), which suggests the cattle products were not carried forward in-house.
A. Heavily, by the record. Authorized common shares were raised by 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and by another 60,000,000 in 2013 (claim 21040). The stock incentive plan grew repeatedly: by 3,500,000 shares (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 in 2010 (claims 20722, 20714), another 700,000 in 2011 (claim 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim 21011). A common stock offering was started in 2012 (claim 21048). In 2010 the board was also authorized to do a reverse split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721). Whether that split happened is marked not_yet_verifiable.
A. No. Richard G. Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), and Roger Hurst's employment was terminated that same year (claim 21087). In 2010 Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and Stephen T. Lundy became CEO (claims 20711, 20712, 20716, 20717). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). Several governance claims, including auditor appointments and a 2013 board addition (claim 21038), remain not_yet_verifiable.
A. 1. The record ends in 2016 and is truncated, so the most important gap is everything after the Bioptix rename (claim 20981), including the current business. 2. The dossier never records whether AppyScore received FDA clearance (claim 21050) or whether StayBred was approved (claim 21101). 3. It does not show whether the authorized reverse split was carried out (claims 20715, 20721). 4. No revenue, customer names or contract values appear anywhere. A diligence reader should pull post-2016 filings before drawing any conclusions about the company as it exists today.
Frequently asked
2026-10-11A. The claims on record describe a small life-sciences company, not the business the RIOT ticker is now known for. In 2004 it sold antigen products, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test makers and research facilities (claim 21102), after acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It also developed cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining pregnancy (claim 21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090). By 2012 its lead product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. This dossier can't answer that. The record supplied here ends partway through the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name-change entry (claim 20981), so it contains no claims about the company's present business. The company's later rebranding under the RIOT ticker and its move into a different line of business are not captured in any claim shown here. Readers should not infer current strategy from the diagnostics-era record.
A. Customers are mostly unnamed. The 2004 disclosure says only that it sold to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights to SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The record also mentions license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim 21095) and, in 2012, an exclusive license of its animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). No other customers are named.
A. Corporate actions are well documented. These include board and officer appointments (e.g., claims 21082, 20711), increases to the stock incentive plan (e.g., 1.8M shares, claim 21011), authorized-share increases (60M, claims 21089, 21040) and name changes (claims 21090, 20981). Product outcomes are much thinner. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was still 'pursuing' FDA clearance in 2012 (claim 21050). No claim on record confirms that either product received clearance or produced meaningful revenue.
A. Several dated items are marked not_yet_verifiable. These include the authorization of a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 by Feb 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), GHP Horwath's appointment as auditor for FY2011 (claims 20720, 20713), and Stephen A. Williams joining the board by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). Most of these went through 'delayed' and then 'not_yet_verifiable' in recent automated re-checks, so the record does not yet confirm whether they happened.
A. Leadership turned over often. CEOs changed in 2005 (Donnelly, claim 21082) and 2010 (Lundy, claim 20711), and the board was restructured in 2010 under a non-executive chair (claim 20712). Four directors resigned on a single day in September 2012 (claim 21051). Combined with repeated name changes and expansions of the equity plan, this points to a company that reshaped itself repeatedly rather than one steadily executing a single plan.
A. First, get the rest of the record. Everything after the 2016 Bioptix rename is missing from this dossier, and that is exactly where today's business would be described. Second, resolve the open items: whether the 2011 reverse split was carried out (claims 20721, 20715) and whether AppyScore ever cleared the FDA (claim 21050).
A. (1) What the company does today, since no post-2016 claims are on record here. (2) Whether any diagnostics product (SurBred 15, StayBred, AppyScore) became a lasting revenue source. (3) What happened to the animal-health IP licensed out in 2012 (claim 21049). (4) Whether the dilution authorized through repeated share and plan increases (e.g., claims 21088, 21011, 21040) was actually used, and how much.
Frequently asked
2026-10-11A. The claims on file describe an animal- and human-diagnostics company, not a bitcoin miner. It began by acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) and said it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). Its main products were cattle-reproduction products (SurBred 15 and StayBred; 21096, 21097) and later AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047). It was renamed AspenBio Pharma (21090) and later went from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981). The record shown is cut off around 2016, so it does not document what the RIOT ticker is known for today. Readers should not assume the current business appears in these claims.
A. The dossier cannot say, because the extracted claims stop around the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix rename (20981). The last strategy it records is pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (21050) and licensing out its animal-health intellectual property (21049). Nothing on file describes the company's strategy after 2016.
A. None are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). Merial was a distributor, not an end customer. The broader customer base is described only generically as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (21102). The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (21095).
A. The record supports less delivery than it might seem. SurBred 15 was described as a product with a distribution partner (21094, 21096), and the company said it did not need FDA regulation (21100). StayBred did require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and no approval is on record. For AppyScore, the record shows the company was pursuing FDA clearance (21050), but no clearance is on record. Most of the remaining claims are governance events rather than delivered business results: board changes, CEO and CFO appointments, and auditor ratifications.
A. The board repeatedly expanded equity capacity. Authorized share increases of 60,000,000 appear in 2005 (21089) and 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan was enlarged several times: 3,500,000 shares (21088), 1,500,000 (20723), 700,000 (20722, 20714, 20710; these may describe the same 2010–2011 increase), 425,000 (21041), and 1,800,000 (21011). A reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized before February 4, 2011 (20715, 20721). Whether it was carried out is marked not yet verifiable.
A. Yes. Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). In 2010 there was a board restructuring: Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20712, 20716–20719). Stephen T. Lundy became CEO at the same time (20711). Earlier, Roger D. Hurst's employment was terminated (21087), the year after an exclusive employment agreement with Hurst was disclosed (21099).
A. The most important step is to extend the dossier past 2016. The claims shown end there, so the company's later identity, business, and filings are not covered. Within the existing record, three items need to be resolved: whether the 2011 reverse split happened (20715, 20721), whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (21050), and what happened to StayBred's FDA path (21101).
A. First, the record is truncated, so the RIOT that investors know today is not in these claims. Second, the outcomes of the regulated products, StayBred and AppyScore, are not recorded. Third, no customers are named beyond distributor Merial (21094). Fourth, several claims look like duplicates produced by automated extraction. For example, Jeffrey G. McGonegal's CFO appointment appears in 2004 and again in 2005 (21106, 21084, 21104), so individual claims should be checked against the original filings before anyone relies on them.
Frequently asked
2026-10-11A. It depends on the period. The disclosed record starts in 2004 with an animal-health and diagnostics business. It acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) and said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). Its main products were SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). By 2012 it had shifted to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047), and it licensed out its animal-health IP (21049).
A. The company has renamed itself several times. It became AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (21090), later operated as Venaxis, and was renamed Bioptix in 2016 (20981). The record on file stops at that 2016 rename. The later events that gave it the Riot name and its current business are not covered here, so this dossier does not describe what the company does today.
A. This record does not establish one. The latest strategic claims are AppyScore and the pursuit of FDA clearance for it (21047, 21050) from 2012, followed by the 2016 name change to Bioptix (20981). Nothing after 2016 is on file, so any statement about current strategy would have to come from filings outside this record.
A. No end customers are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). There were also license arrangements with three universities that are not named (21095). The 'over 30 products' claim (21102) describes customers only by type: diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities.
A. Every claim on record has the status 'stated', meaning the company disclosed it. None has been independently verified as delivered. Many are completed corporate actions, such as board and officer appointments (e.g. 21082, 20711), increases to the stock incentive plan (e.g. 21088, 21011), and the authorized-share increases (21089, 21040). Product outcomes are the open part. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (21050). Neither outcome is recorded.
A. Several deadline-bound items are marked not_yet_verifiable. These are the reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 authorized before 2011-02-04 (20715, 20721), GHP Horwath as auditor for fiscal 2011 (20713, 20720), the 2014 auditor ratification (21012), Stephen A. Williams joining the board by 2013-05-01 (21038), and the stock plan term extension to 2021-07-08 (20709). The record does not show whether the split was actually carried out.
A. The most important gap is everything after 2016. The record needs the filings that explain the move from Bioptix to the current Riot business. After that, the priorities are confirming whether the 2010 reverse split happened (20715), what became of AppyScore's FDA clearance effort (21050), and whether StayBred ever received approval (21101).
A. First, coverage: the dossier ends roughly a decade ago, so it cannot support claims about the company today. Second, outcomes: the major regulatory bets (21050, 21101) have no recorded result. Third, governance turnover: four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (21051), executive roles were restructured in 2010 (20712), and a key employee's agreement (21099) ended with his termination in 2005 (21087). The record does not explain any of these.
Frequently asked
2026-10-10A. The record describes an animal-health and diagnostics business, not a current operating profile. In 2004 it marketed over 30 antigen products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), after acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was developing cattle products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). Its animal-health intellectual property was put under an exclusive license (claim 21049).
A. The record shows repeated rebranding. In 2005 the company announced a holding-company restructuring and a name change to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claims 21091, 21090). In 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). The rename to Venaxis itself is not separately recorded. The disclosed claims end around 2016, so the dossier does not cover anything that happened under the RIOT ticker after that. Readers should not take the current business from this record.
A. The dossier cannot answer this. The latest strategic claims are the 2012 FDA clearance effort for AppyScore (claim 21050) and the 2016 name change to Bioptix (claim 20981). The claims list appears to be cut off, so any later strategic pivot is outside this record and would need to be checked against more recent filings.
A. Only one commercial partner is named: Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distributor, not a disclosed end customer. The 'over 30 products' business sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities that are not named (claim 21102). License arrangements with three universities are also unnamed (claim 21095). No revenue figures or customer concentration data appear in the record.
A. Corporate actions are recorded as stated facts: officer and director appointments, share authorization increases to 60,000,000 shares (claims 21089, 21040), and stock plan expansions (e.g., claims 21088, 21011). Product outcomes are not. SurBred 15 was described as not needing FDA regulation (claim 21100), but no sales are recorded. StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and no approval is recorded. AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050), and no clearance is recorded. A board-authorized reverse split of up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011 is still marked not_yet_verifiable (claims 20721, 20715).
A. Leadership turned over often. Richard G. Donnelly became President and CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), and co-founder-era employee Roger Hurst's employment was terminated that same year (claim 21087). In 2010 Stephen T. Lundy became CEO, and the board was restructured: Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (claims 20711, 20712). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051), and the reason is not stated in the record.
A. 1. Find filings after 2016 to learn what the company does today, since this dossier does not cover it. 2. Confirm whether the 2010–2011 reverse split was carried out, and at what ratio (claims 20721, 20715). 3. Confirm whether AppyScore ever got FDA clearance (claim 21050), and what happened to StayBred (claim 21101). 4. Track dilution: repeated increases in authorized shares and stock plans (claims 21089, 21040, 21011), plus a 2012 common stock offering (claim 21048).
A. 1. The record stops around 2016 and says nothing about the present business. 2. None of the product programs has a recorded commercial or regulatory outcome. 3. Customers are almost entirely unnamed, apart from Merial as a distributor. 4. No revenue, profit, or cash figures are disclosed in the claims. 5. Several dated commitments (the reverse split, auditor engagements in claims 20720, 20713, 21012, and a board appointment in claim 21038) are still marked not_yet_verifiable.
Frequently asked
2026-10-10A. The disclosed history describes a small Colorado-area life-sciences company, not a crypto or bitcoin business. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It said it marketed over 30 antigen products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), and it developed animal-health products for cattle. In 2005 it changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2012 its focus had shifted to human diagnostics, specifically AppyScore, a blood-based test for appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. The record doesn't establish one. The claims on file stop in 2016, and the latest is the ratification of the company's auditor for fiscal 2016 (claim 20982). The most recent strategic statements are from 2012: pursue FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and out-license the animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). Nothing on file covers the period when the company traded under the RIOT name. Readers should not assume the 2012 strategy still applies.
A. No end customers are named. The 2004 disclosure says only that it sold to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for the SurBred 15 cattle pregnancy test (claim 21094). The company also disclosed license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095).
A. Almost everything that can be confirmed is corporate housekeeping. That includes officer and director changes, such as Stephen T. Lundy becoming CEO (claim 20711) and four directors resigning in September 2012 (claim 21051). It also includes the name change (claim 21090) and repeated increases to share authorizations and stock-incentive pools: 3.5M (claim 21088), 1.5M (claim 20723), 700K (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425K (claim 21041) and 1.8M (claim 21011). On the product side, SurBred 15 (claim 21096), StayBred (claim 21097) and AppyScore (claim 21047) are described only as products or pipeline candidates. The record has no confirmation of commercial sales, of an FDA approval or ANDA filing for StayBred (claim 21101), or of FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050).
A. A lot. Shareholders approved an increase of 60M authorized shares in 2005 (claim 21089) and another 60M-share increase in 2013 (claim 21040). On top of that are the stock-incentive pool increases listed above. The record also shows a board authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721). Whether that split was carried out is still marked not_yet_verifiable.
A. Several dated commitments are marked not_yet_verifiable even though their deadlines passed years ago. They are the reverse-split authorization due 2011-02-04 (claims 20715, 20721), GHP Horwath's engagement as auditor for fiscal 2011 (claims 20713, 20720), Stephen A. Williams joining the board by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038), the fiscal 2014 auditor ratification (claim 21012), and the stock plan term extension to 2021-07-08 (claim 20709). Each of these could be checked against later filings.
A. First, records from after 2016 that explain how this diagnostics company became the RIOT-ticker entity, along with any strategy, customers and capital raises from that later period. Second, evidence on whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (claim 21050). Third, whether the authorized reverse split was executed (claim 20715). Fourth, what came of the Merial distribution deal (claim 21094) and the animal-health license (claim 21049).
A. 1) The dossier is incomplete: it ends in 2016 and says nothing about the company's later identity or business. 2) No product on file has documented revenue, regulatory clearance or a named end customer. 3) The heavy turnover in leadership and the board (claims 21087, 20717, 21051), together with repeated expansions of share capacity, point to an unstable company relying on equity financing, and the record doesn't tie either trend to results. 4) Some events appear more than once in the extraction, such as the Vitro acquisition (claims 21108, 21081) and the 700K plan increases (claims 20722, 20714, 20710). Counts of activity drawn from this record may therefore be inflated.
Frequently asked
2026-10-10A. The disclosed record describes a small animal-health and human-diagnostics company, not the business most people now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it described an antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (21108, 21081) and said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test makers and research facilities (21102). Its bovine products were SurBred 15, an early pregnancy test (21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). In 2005 it said it would rename itself AspenBio Pharma (21090). By 2012 its focus had shifted to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047), and it had licensed out its animal-health intellectual property (21049).
A. This dossier can't tell you. The latest claims on record date from 2016 and cover auditor ratifications (20982), not business strategy. No claim describes the company's present-day business, so readers shouldn't treat the diagnostics story here as current. Any later business change would need separate sourcing before it is added to this file.
A. None are named. The only customer claim is a general statement about selling to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). Merial is the one named commercial counterparty. It held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094), which makes it a distribution partner, not a disclosed customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities (21095), but those are unnamed in the claims.
A. No claim on record has been verified as delivered. Almost every item has the status 'stated', meaning the company said it and nothing more has been checked. Product claims for SurBred 15, StayBred and AppyScore (21096, 21097, 21047) have no recorded sales or launch outcomes. Regulatory goals were also left open. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (21050), but no clearance is recorded. Dated commitments are marked 'not_yet_verifiable' rather than confirmed. These include the reverse split authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (20721, 20715) and several auditor appointments (20713, 21012).
A. There were repeated expansions. Authorized shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089) and by another 60,000,000 in 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan grew by 3,500,000 (21088), 1,500,000 (20723), 700,000 (20722/20714, possibly the same event as 20710), 425,000 (21041) and 1,800,000 (21011). A 2010 authorization allowed a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 (20721). For an outside reader, this pattern points to ongoing equity financing and dilution, along with a common-stock offering in 2012 (21048).
A. There was considerable turnover. Richard Donnelly became CEO around 2005 (21082), and the employment of Roger Hurst, an earlier key employee, was terminated (21087, 21099). In 2010 Executive Chairman Daryl Faulkner stepped down, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and Stephen Lundy was named CEO (20717, 20716, 20711). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). Jeffrey McGonegal appears consistently as CFO (21106, 21084).
A. The first priority is filling the gap after 2016. Any filings that explain how the company moved from diagnostics to its later identity are essential context. Within the existing record, the most useful verifications would be: whether the 2011 reverse split was carried out (20721), whether AppyScore ever won FDA clearance (21050), and whether SurBred 15 or StayBred generated reported revenue through Merial (21094).
A. (1) Coverage: the dossier stops in 2016 and doesn't describe the present-day company. (2) Verification: nearly every claim is an unconfirmed statement, and several are duplicate extractions of the same event, such as 21108/21081 and 21107/21085. (3) Commercial traction: there are no named customers and no revenue figures, so the scale of the 'over 30 products' business (21102) is unknown. (4) Regulatory outcomes: both FDA-dependent products (21101, 21050) remain unresolved in the record.
Frequently asked
2026-10-10A. The claims on file describe a small animal-health and diagnostics company. In 2004 it sold antigen products, 'over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its main focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood-based diagnostic test for appendicitis in humans (claim 21047). The company changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. in 2005 (claim 21090). Note that the record supplied here ends in 2016 and does not cover the company's later history under the Riot name.
A. The record cannot answer this. The most recent claims shown date from 2016 (for example, claim 20982, an auditor ratification), and the claim list appears to be cut off. The last product strategy on file is the pursuit of FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and the exclusive licensing of its animal-health intellectual property to another party (claim 21049), both from 2012. Readers should not take anything in this dossier as a description of what Riot does today.
A. The only named commercial partner is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The company also disclosed license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095). The 2004 customer claim describes buyers only as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' and gives no names (claim 21102). The 2012 licensee of the animal-health IP is also unnamed (claim 21049).
A. Corporate actions are recorded as completed: the antigen business acquisition from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), the AspenBio name change (claim 21090), and a series of executive and board changes. Product outcomes are a different matter. None of the claims confirms that StayBred received FDA approval (claim 21101 says only that approval or an ANDA filing was required) or that AppyScore obtained FDA clearance (claim 21050 says only that clearance was being pursued). Several dated promises, including the reverse split authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715) and the director appointment slated for May 1, 2013 (claim 21038), are marked 'not_yet_verifiable'. This dossier contains no confirmation that any of them happened.
A. Leadership has turned over frequently. Richard G. Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082). Stephen T. Lundy became CEO and President in 2010 (claim 20711), and in the same restructuring Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair while Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman (claim 20712). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The employment of an early key scientist, Roger Hurst, ended in 2005 (claim 21087) after an exclusive employment agreement signed in 2004 (claim 21099).
A. The record shows repeated equity expansion. The stock incentive plan was enlarged by 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim 20723), 700,000 shares in 2010 and 2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim 21011). Authorized common stock was increased by 60,000,000 shares in both 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040). A common stock offering began in 2012 (claim 21048), and a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized in 2010 (claim 20721).
A. First, obtain the post-2016 claims, which are missing from this record. They would cover the period in which the company took on the Riot name and shifted strategy. Second, look for evidence settling the open 'not_yet_verifiable' items: whether the 2010 reverse split was carried out (claims 20721, 20715) and whether Stephen A. Williams actually joined the board (claim 21038). Third, check for any record of what came of AppyScore's FDA submission (claim 21050).
A. 1. The record stops in 2016 and says nothing about how this cattle-diagnostics and appendicitis-test company became the present-day Riot or what Riot's business is now. 2. There is no disclosed outcome for any of the regulated products, StayBred or AppyScore (claims 21101, 21050). 3. No revenue or customer concentration figures are on file, and the only named commercial partner is Merial (claim 21094). 4. Several dated commitments remain unverified (claims 20721, 20715, 21038, 20709).
Frequently asked
2026-10-10A. The claims on record describe a small animal-health and diagnostics company in Colorado. In 2004 it sold antigens and related products to diagnostic test makers and research labs (over 30 products, claim 21102). It was building cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). In 2005 it renamed itself AspenBio Pharma (21090). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood test for human appendicitis (21047), and it had licensed out its animal-health IP (21049). The last claim on file is the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (20980).
A. No. The claims stop in October 2016, and the BiOptix entry (20980) is cut off. The ticker RIOT is now best known for bitcoin mining, which followed a 2017 rename and strategic pivot. None of that later history appears in the claims on record. Readers should not use this dossier as a picture of the current business. That missing period is the largest gap in the record.
A. Based only on the claims on file, the strategy moved in stages. It started as an animal-health antigen and reproduction business (2004–2005). It then shifted toward human diagnostics: AppyScore, with FDA clearance being pursued (21050), while the animal-health IP was licensed out (21049). The last step on record is the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (20980). The record contains no stated strategy after 2016.
A. Only one commercial counterparty is named: Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). The company also had license arrangements with three universities, but the record does not name them (21095). The 30+ antigen products went to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, and none of those buyers are named (21102). No customers are named for AppyScore or BiOptix.
A. Most claims carry the status 'stated', which means the company disclosed them. It does not mean they were independently verified. Governance actions appear to have been carried out: - the AspenBio name change (21090) - CEO appointments (21082, 20711) - the 2012 resignation of four directors (21051) Product milestones are much less clear. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and AppyScore was only 'pursuing' FDA clearance (21050). Neither has a recorded approval. The authorized reverse split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (20715, 20721) is marked not_yet_verifiable, so the record does not confirm whether it happened.
A. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089), and a 60,000,000-share increase appears again in 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan was enlarged repeatedly: - 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (21088) - 1,500,000 in 2009 (20723) - 700,000 in 2010–2011 (20722, 20714, 20710; probably the same amendment extracted more than once) - 425,000 in 2013 (21041) - 1,800,000 in 2014 (21011) The company also ran a common stock offering in 2012 (21048). A reader should expect substantial dilution over this period.
A. Yes. The record shows frequent leadership changes: - a new CFO in 2004 (21106) - an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst in 2004 (21099), ended by 2005 (21087) - a new CEO in 2005 (21082) - in 2010, the Executive Chairman stepped down, the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated, and a new CEO was appointed (20717, 20718, 20719, 20711) - four directors resigned at once in September 2012 (21051) The record does not give reasons for these departures.
A. 1. Fill the post-2016 gap with filings from 2017 onward, which cover the rename and the move into crypto mining. 2. Confirm whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (21050) and whether StayBred was ever approved (21101). 3. Confirm whether the 2010–2011 reverse split took place (20715). 4. Find out what happened to the Merial SurBred 15 distribution deal (21094). 5. Learn the terms of the BiOptix acquisition and whether it was later reversed (20980). Several entries also look like duplicates of the same event, extracted from more than one filing. Examples are the McGonegal CFO appointment (21106, 21084) and the 700,000-share plan increase. Counts in this dossier should not be read as separate events.
Frequently asked
2026-10-09A. The record here describes a small life-sciences company, not the business the RIOT ticker is known for today. In 2004 it was a Colorado antigen and diagnostics business built on an antigen operation acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It said it sold more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102) and was developing cattle-reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test, and StayBred, a recombinant hormone (claims 21096, 21097). It later became AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090) and focused on AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. The dossier can't say. The claims shown stop in 2016, and the last list entry is cut off partway through. Nothing on record covers the company's later and widely reported pivot under the Riot name to blockchain and bitcoin mining. A reader should treat this dossier as the history of the predecessor business only, not as a description of what Riot does today.
A. No end customers are named. The 2004 disclosure describes buyers only by category: 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, an animal-health company. Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094), which makes it a distribution partner rather than a disclosed customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095).
A. Very little is confirmed as delivered. Nearly every claim has the status 'stated', meaning the company said it, but no independent outcome is on record. The board and executive changes, name changes and share-plan increases are corporate actions that were reported as done. The product and regulatory milestones have no recorded result. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). The dossier does not show whether either was ever approved or cleared, or whether SurBred 15 produced meaningful sales through Merial.
A. The record shows repeated moves that tend to dilute existing holders. Authorized common shares were increased twice, each time by 60,000,000 (claims 21089, 21040). The stock incentive plan was expanded several times: by 3,500,000 units (claim 21088), 1,500,000 shares (claim 20723), 700,000 shares in 2010–2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 shares (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). In 2010 the board also sought authority for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). Whether that split was carried out is marked not_yet_verifiable.
A. Yes, there was frequent turnover. The CEO and CFO roles changed hands several times. Roger Hurst's employment ended in 2005 (claim 21087). In 2010 the chair role was restructured: Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (claims 20716, 20717). Four directors resigned on the same day, September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The company was renamed at least three times in the period on record: AspenBio Pharma, then Venaxis, then Bioptix. Repeated renaming often signals a change of strategy.
A. (1) Did AppyScore or StayBred ever receive FDA clearance or approval, and did any product bring in significant revenue? (2) Was the 2010–2011 reverse split actually executed (claims 20721, 20715)? (3) Several dated items, such as auditor appointments and board changes (claims 20713, 20720, 20711, 21038), are still marked not_yet_verifiable. (4) Most important, the dossier has no records after 2016. The transition from the diagnostics company to the current Riot business is not documented here at all.
A. First, a dossier that runs from 2017 to the present: the move into crypto, the current business model, named counterparties and facilities, and whether promised capacity or output was delivered. Second, the outcomes of the pending verifications listed above. Until those are added, any judgment about Riot today rests on sources outside this record.
Frequently asked
2026-10-09A. The record describes a veterinary and human diagnostics company, not the business most readers now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it said it marketed over 30 antigen and related products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also had cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). It later renamed itself AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2012 its lead product was AppyScore™, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The last entry, from October 2016, is the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claim 20980).
A. The claims on record stop in October 2016 (claims 20980–20981). They contain nothing about the company's later strategy under the Riot name. Treat this dossier as the company's pre-2017 diagnostics history only. It does not describe current operations, and no current strategy can be read from it.
A. No end customers are named. The 2004 disclosure describes its buyers only generically, as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095).
A. No claim in the record has been verified as delivered. Every claim is either 'stated', meaning the company said it, or 'not_yet_verifiable'. The record mostly documents corporate housekeeping: board and officer changes, such as the CEO appointments in claims 21082 and 20711, and stock-plan share increases, such as 3,500,000 units in claim 21088 and 1,800,000 shares in claim 21011. Product milestones are only announced: - StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). - AppyScore™ was described as 'pursuing FDA regulatory clearance' (claim 21050). Neither has a recorded outcome.
A. Yes, several. - The board authorized a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721). Its execution is unverified. - Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). - Authorized common shares were raised by 60,000,000 in both 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040). - Equity incentive pools were expanded repeatedly. Together these point to ongoing dilution and board turnover. Reverse splits and repeated share increases are often associated with a low share price and dependence on equity financing.
A. First, get the post-2016 filings, because this record does not cover the company's transformation after the BiOptix deal (claim 20980). Within the existing record, there are four items to check: - Whether the 2011 reverse split actually happened (claims 20715, 20721). - Whether AppyScore™ ever received FDA clearance (claim 21050). - Whether StayBred obtained approval (claim 21101). - What became of the Merial distribution deal (claim 21094).
A. 1. Did any announced product generate meaningful revenue? The record has no revenue figures. 2. Why did four directors resign at once in 2012 (claim 21051)? 3. What did the BiOptix acquisition cost, and why was it made (claim 20980)? 4. How did a diagnostics company become the business now trading as RIOT? That transition is entirely outside this record. Several claims also carry questionable deadline dates. For example, claim 20711 lists a CEO appointment 'promised by' 2010-03-24, before the October 2010 filing that disclosed it. These dates come from automated extraction and should be checked against the source filings.
Frequently asked
2026-10-09A. The disclosed history describes a small diagnostics company that has repeatedly changed focus and name. In 2004 it sold antigens and animal-health products, including the SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096) and StayBred, a cattle hormone product (claim 21097). It became AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090). By 2012 its lead product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it was renamed from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). The record provided here is cut off around 2016. It does not cover the company's later shift into what the RIOT ticker represents today, so this dossier does not document the current business.
A. This dossier can't answer that. The latest strategic claims on record are from 2012 to 2016. They cover pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), licensing out animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049), and the 2016 rename to Bioptix (claim 20981). Nothing on record describes the strategy after 2016. Readers should not treat these older claims as the current plan.
A. None are named. In 2004 the company said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), but it did not identify any of them. Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The company also disclosed license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095), and those are not customers either.
A. No claim on record has been independently verified as delivered. Every claim is either 'stated', meaning recorded as the company said it, or 'not_yet_verifiable'. Most are corporate housekeeping: executive appointments, board changes, and increases to the stock incentive plan, such as 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim 21011). The product and regulatory items were announced, but the record contains no evidence that they were delivered. That includes FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and any FDA approval or ANDA filing for StayBred (claim 21101).
A. Several commitments had deadlines but remain 'not_yet_verifiable'. These records were briefly marked 'delayed' and then reclassified. They include a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be carried out before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715), GHP Horwath serving as auditor for fiscal 2011 (claims 20720 and 20713), and the stock plan term being extended to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709). All of these deadlines have passed, but the dossier has no evidence showing whether they were met.
A. First, look for evidence that closes out the expired commitments listed above, especially whether the reverse split actually happened. Second, check the outcome of the AppyScore FDA process (claim 21050). Most important, look for disclosures from after 2016 that explain how Bioptix became the company that trades as RIOT today. Until those are added, the record leaves out the company's present business entirely.
A. 1) Coverage: the record stops around 2016, so the current business, its revenue, and its customers are not documented here. 2) Delivery: no product or regulatory milestone has been verified. 3) Identity: the company went from Vitro Diagnostics' antigen business (claim 21081) to AspenBio, then Venaxis, then Bioptix (claim 20981), so it is hard to follow one consistent strategy. 4) Governance churn: there was a CEO change in 2005 (claim 21082), another CEO in 2010 (claim 20711), a board restructuring in 2010 (claim 20712), and four directors resigned in September 2012 (claim 21051). 5) Dilution: the stock incentive plan was expanded repeatedly (claims 21088, 20723, 20714, 21041, 21011), and authorized shares were increased (claim 21040).
Frequently asked
2026-10-09A. The claims on record describe a small animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business most readers associate with the RIOT ticker today. In 2004 it sold more than 30 antigen and related products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It built that line partly by acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics, with AppyScore, a blood-based test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The record supplied here ends in 2016 and is cut off mid-entry, so it does not cover the company's later business.
A. The company has changed names more than once, and each change tracks a shift in strategy. In 2005 it adopted the name AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090) and restructured into a holding company (claim 21091). It later operated as Venaxis, then renamed itself Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981). The record shown here does not include the change to the Riot name, so a reader should not assume these filings describe the current company's operations.
A. The record cannot answer this. The latest complete claim is the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (claim 20981), and the data is truncated after that. Earlier strategies on record include animal-health reproduction products with university licenses (claim 21095), then a pivot to human diagnostics through AppyScore (claim 21047) alongside licensing out its animal-health IP (claim 21049). Readers need post-2016 filings to understand what the company does now.
A. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial is a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The diagnostics business is described only as selling to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102), and none of those buyers are named. No named customers appear for AppyScore or for any later business.
A. Corporate actions appear as completed: the Vitro Diagnostics antigen acquisition (claims 21108, 21081), name changes (claims 21090, 20981), board and executive turnover, and repeated stock-plan increases. Product and regulatory milestones have no recorded outcome. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the record shows no approval. The company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), and the record does not show clearance. A reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721), but both claims are marked not yet verifiable.
A. The record shows frequent leadership change and steady growth in the share count. Leadership events include: - the founding scientist Roger Hurst's employment ending in 2005 (claim 21087); - a new CEO, Stephen Lundy, in 2010 (claim 20711); - the Executive Chairman stepping down in 2010 (claim 20717); - four directors resigning on a single day in September 2012 (claim 21051). Authorized common stock was increased by 60 million shares in both 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040). The stock incentive plan was expanded repeatedly: - 3.5 million shares in 2005 (claim 21088); - 1.5 million in 2009 (claim 20723); - 700,000 in 2010 (claims 20722, 20714); - 425,000 in 2013 (claim 21041); - 1.8 million in 2014 (claim 21011). A common stock offering was also launched in 2012 (claim 21048). These are signs of ongoing dilution.
A. First, get filings from after 2016; the dossier stops there and is cut off mid-claim. Then check for: - any FDA decision on AppyScore (claim 21050) or StayBred (claim 21101); - whether the authorized reverse split was ever carried out (claims 20715, 20721); - what happened to the Merial SurBred 15 arrangement (claim 21094); - the filing that records the change from Bioptix to the current business and name.
A. 1. The record does not connect this diagnostics history to the company that trades as RIOT today, and that transition is entirely missing. 2. None of the regulatory milestones have a recorded outcome. 3. Customers beyond the Merial distribution deal are unnamed (claims 21094, 21102). 4. Several claims carry data-quality flags. Claim 20711 has a 'promised by' date (2010-03-24) that is earlier than its filing date. Every dated claim was moved to 'not yet verifiable' on 2026-10-09 after briefly being marked 'delayed'. Treat statuses here as preliminary output of automated extraction, not as verified findings.
Frequently asked
2026-10-09A. The disclosed record (2004 to early 2017) describes a small diagnostics and animal-health company, not the business the 'Riot' name suggests today. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), and was developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone to maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090). By 2012 its lead product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). It later became Venaxis, then Bioptix after buying BiOptix Diagnostics in 2016 (claims 20980, 20981).
A. The record does not say. The claims stop at an incomplete entry dated 2017-04-27 (claim 20905), so nothing here covers the company's strategy after that date. The header calls the company 'Riot (RIOT)', but no claim on record mentions that name or a move into any new business. Treat this dossier as history of a predecessor company, not a description of what the company does now.
A. None are named. The only customer claim describes a category: diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distributor, not a disclosed end customer, and the record gives no sales volumes or revenue from that arrangement.
A. Mostly corporate actions, not products. Completed items include the 2004 purchase of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), several CEO and board changes (claims 21082, 20711, 20716), name changes (claims 21090, 20981), the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), and repeated expansions of the stock incentive plan (for example 3,500,000 units in claim 21088 and 1,800,000 shares in claim 21011). Product milestones were announced but never confirmed. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). No claim records either approval being granted or either product launching.
A. Yes. The company changed its name at least twice (AspenBio in claim 21090; Venaxis to Bioptix in claim 20981) and its focus three times: antigens, then animal health, then human diagnostics. Four directors resigned on the same day, September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The board approved a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 (claims 20721, 20715). Shareholders repeatedly authorized more shares, including a 60,000,000-share increase in authorized common stock (claim 21040) and share reserve increases in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014 (claims 20723, 20722, 20710, 21041, 21011).
A. Readers should treat that label with caution. Every 'delayed' status was assigned by the same automated pass on 2026-09-28. Several of them do not make sense on their face. Routine auditor ratifications are flagged as delayed (claims 20720, 20713, 20982). Two claims have a 'promised by' date that falls before the date of the claim itself (claim 20711 is dated 2010-10-21 with a promised-by date of 2010-03-24; claim 20712 has a promised-by date of 2010-10-07). These look like extraction errors, not evidence of missed commitments.
A. 1) Disclosures after April 2017 that explain the change from Bioptix to 'Riot' and describe the current business. 2) Whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance and whether StayBred was ever approved. 3) Any named customers, or revenue figures for the Merial/SurBred deal. 4) Whether the reverse split authorized in claims 20721 and 20715 was carried out. 5) A manual review of the 'delayed' statuses.
A. First, coverage: this dossier ends in 2017 (claim 20905 is cut off), so it says nothing about the company as it operates today. Second, product outcomes: two regulated products (claims 21101, 21050) have no recorded result. Third, commercial substance: there is no revenue data and no named end customer. Fourth, data quality: the automated 'delayed' labels need checking. Anyone doing diligence should get filings from 2017 onward before drawing conclusions about the current company.
Frequently asked
2026-10-08A. This record does not describe the business behind today's RIOT ticker. It covers a company that changed identity several times. In 2004 it was an animal-health and diagnostics-antigen business. It acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108), said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), and was developing cattle-pregnancy products (claims 21096, 21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). By 2012 it had shifted to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). It later became Venaxis and then renamed to Bioptix after acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics in 2016 (claims 20980, 20981). The record breaks off at a 2017-04-27 financing entry (claim 20905). Nothing on file covers what the company has done since then.
A. This dossier can't tell you. The most recent strategic step it contains is the 2016 BiOptix acquisition and the name change to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). The record ends in April 2017, and the contents of that last financing claim (20905) are cut off. Anyone using this file to judge the present-day company should treat it as history only. Current filings need to be pulled separately.
A. There are almost none. The 2004 disclosures say the company sold over 30 products to unnamed 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for the SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test (claim 21094). There were also license arrangements with three universities, which are not named in the record (claim 21095). No customers are named for AppyScore or for the BiOptix business.
A. The completed items are mostly corporate actions: - The Vitro Diagnostics antigen acquisition (claims 21108, 21081). - The BiOptix acquisition (claims 20979, 20980). - Several name changes. - Repeated board and CEO changes (e.g., claims 21082, 20711, 20716). - Many increases to the stock incentive plan and to authorized shares (e.g., claims 21088, 21089, 21011, 21040). The product story is far thinner: - SurBred 15 was described as not needing FDA regulation and as having a distribution partner (claims 21100, 21094). - StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). - AppyScore was described as pursuing FDA clearance (claim 21050). The record contains no claim confirming that StayBred or AppyScore was approved, cleared, or generated sales.
A. Treat these labels with caution. They were set in an automated pass on 2026-09-28. Several look like extraction artifacts rather than real missed commitments. For example, Stephen Lundy's CEO appointment is tagged 'promised by 2010-03-24' and 'delayed' (claim 20711), and routine auditor ratifications are tagged 'delayed' (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982). The 2010 reverse-split authorization 'by February 4, 2011' (claims 20715, 20721) was a real deadline. Even so, the record contains nothing showing whether the split happened. None of these labels should be quoted as evidence of broken promises until a person checks them.
A. Four things recur: - **Frequent reinventions.** The company moved from animal health to AspenBio, to appendicitis diagnostics, to Venaxis, to Bioptix. - **Leadership churn.** Four directors resigned on a single day in September 2012 (claim 21051). There were also several CEO and chair changes (claims 21082, 20711, 20712, 20717). - **Repeated expansion of equity reserves.** Stock-plan increases include 3.5M shares (claim 21088), 1.5M (claim 20723), 700K (claims 20714, 20722, 20710), 425K (claim 21041) and 1.8M (claim 21011). Authorized shares were raised to 60M (claims 21089, 21040). - **Ongoing equity financing.** Examples are the 2012 common stock offering (claim 21048) and the 2017 financing (claim 20905). Together these suggest a company that depended on equity financing more than on product revenue.
A. The first task is to fill the gap after April 2017. That means finding out what the 2017 financing (claim 20905) was and what the company became after Bioptix. Within the existing record, three items need follow-up: - Whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (claim 21050). - Whether StayBred ever got its FDA approval or ANDA filing (claim 21101). - Whether the 2010–2011 reverse split was carried out (claims 20715, 20721).
A. There are three: - **Coverage.** The dossier stops in 2017, so it cannot support any statement about the company's current business, customers or strategy. - **Outcomes.** None of the announced products (SurBred 15, StayBred, AppyScore) has a recorded commercial or regulatory result. - **Data quality.** Every claim reached its status through automated extraction, and the 'delayed' tags look unreliable. A person needs to review them before any figure or status in this file is published.
Frequently asked
2026-10-08A. The claims on file describe a small life-sciences company that has changed identity several times. In 2004 it sold antigens and related products, with over 30 products marketed to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also developed cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (21090). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047). In 2016 it changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (20981, 20980).
A. No. The claims on file end with an incomplete entry dated 2017-04-27 (20905). Nothing in the record describes the business now operating under the Riot name or ticker. Readers should not treat any strategy described here as the company's current strategy. The record needs to be extended past 2017 before it can answer that question.
A. The record names no paying customers. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). That is a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The antigen business sold to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (21102), but none of them are named. The 2004 license arrangements with three universities (21095) also do not identify the universities.
A. Completed corporate actions on record include the antigen business acquisition from Vitro Diagnostics (21108, 21081), the AspenBio name change (21090), the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the Bioptix rename (20980, 20979, 20981), and multiple leadership changes. Several items stayed at the 'announced' or 'pursuing' stage with no recorded outcome. These include FDA clearance for AppyScore (21050), FDA approval or an ANDA filing for StayBred (21101), and the reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 authorized by February 4, 2011 (20721, 20715). No product revenue figures appear anywhere in the record.
A. There were repeated expansions. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089) and again in 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan grew by 3,500,000 (21088), 1,500,000 (20723), 700,000 in each of 2010 and 2011 (20722/20714, 20710), 425,000 (21041), and 1,800,000 (21011). A common stock offering began in 2012 (21048). The record does not show how much of this capacity was actually issued.
A. Not very. The record shows CEO changes to Richard G. Donnelly (21082) and later Stephen T. Lundy (20711). In 2010 the board was restructured: Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20712, 20716–20719). Founder-era employee Roger Hurst's employment ended in 2005 (21087). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). The record gives no reasons for any of these departures.
A. Not necessarily, so treat these with caution. Many of the 'delayed' items are routine, such as auditor ratifications (20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and plan term dates (20709). Some 'promised by' dates fall before the filing that reported them. For example, Lundy's appointment is dated 2010-03-24 but was reported on 2010-10-21 (20711). That pattern suggests the statuses come from automated date extraction, not genuine slippage. Check each one against the underlying filings before citing it as a missed commitment.
A. 1. What happened after 2017. The record stops there, so it says nothing about the current business. 2. Whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (21050), and whether StayBred was ever approved (21101). 3. Whether the authorized reverse split was ever carried out (20721). 4. What became of the animal-health assets, which were exclusively licensed out in 2012 (21049), and of the BiOptix acquisition (20980). 5. The identity of any actual customers. 6. Why four directors left at once in 2012 (21051).
Frequently asked
2026-10-08A. The record describes a small diagnostics company that changed direction several times. It began in 2004 by acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108) and selling more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It then developed animal-health products, including SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a cattle pregnancy-maintenance hormone (claim 21097). In 2005 it was renamed AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). By 2012 its focus was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claim 20980) and changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. The dossier does not say. The last claim on record is a financing item dated 2017-04-27 (claim 20904), and its details are cut off. The most recent strategy the record actually shows is the 2016 BiOptix acquisition and the rename to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20981). Nothing on record explains the company's current name, 'Riot', or its ticker, RIOT. Readers should not infer a present-day business from this dossier until post-2017 filings are added.
A. Only one commercial counterparty is named: Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Everyone else is unnamed. The customer base is described only as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The licensors are 'three universities' that are not identified (claim 21095). The 2012 animal-health license (claim 21049) does not name the other party either.
A. No claim in this dossier has been verified as delivered. Every item is either 'stated', meaning the company said it, or 'delayed'. Corporate actions such as acquisitions, name changes, and board appointments appear in later filings, which supports that they happened. Product milestones are a different story. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). The record never shows either one being cleared or reaching sales.
A. The 'delayed' labels were all applied by an automated pass on 2026-09-28, and several of them look like extraction artifacts rather than real failures. For example, claim 20711 has a 'promised by' date of 2010-03-24, which is earlier than the 2010-10-21 filing it comes from. Others are routine items such as auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20982) or a stock-plan term that ran to 2021 (claim 20709). Treat 'delayed' here as 'needs human review', not as a confirmed missed promise.
A. Leadership turned over often. Changes include a new CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), a board restructuring and a new CEO in 2010 (claims 20711, 20712), and four directors resigning on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The company also expanded its stock incentive plan repeatedly. Increases include 3,500,000 shares (claim 21088), 1,500,000 shares (claim 20723), 700,000 shares (claim 20714), 425,000 shares (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). Authorized common shares rose by 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and again in 2013 (claim 21040). A reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized in 2010 (claim 20715). Together these point to repeated equity financing and dilution.
A. The most important item is post-April-2017 filings. Without them, the dossier cannot explain the company's present business or how it came to be called Riot. Other items to resolve: whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance, whether the BiOptix acquisition produced revenue, and whether Merial's distribution of SurBred 15 generated meaningful sales. The truncated details of claim 20904 should also be recovered.
A. 1. What happened after 2017, and what does the company do today? The record is silent. 2. Did any product (SurBred 15, StayBred, AppyScore) reach commercial scale? There are no revenue figures on record. 3. Who were the actual customers? Merial is the only one named. 4. Why did four directors resign at once in 2012 (claim 21051)? 5. Do the 'delayed' statuses reflect real slippage or data-extraction errors? Several dates are internally inconsistent.
Frequently asked
2026-10-07A. Based on the claims on file, the company sold diagnostic products. In 2004 it marketed over 30 antigen-related products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was also developing animal-health products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone to help cattle maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The company changed its name several times: it became AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090) and was renamed from Venaxis to Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981).
A. The record can't say. The last claim on file is dated 2017-04-27 (claim 20906), and the extract is cut off there. The most recent strategic step it documents is the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and the related name change (claims 20980, 20979, 20981). The RIOT ticker is now widely associated with a different line of business, but nothing in this dossier documents that change. Treat the current strategy as not covered by the record.
A. No end customers are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distributor, not a disclosed buyer. Other commercial relationships are described only in general terms: diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim 21095), and an exclusive license of animal-health IP to an unnamed party (claim 21049).
A. Corporate actions are well documented: the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), the name changes (claims 21090, 20981), and repeated leadership changes. Product milestones are not. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). The record contains no follow-up claim showing either product was approved, cleared, or generating revenue.
A. There were repeated increases in authorized and reserved shares. Authorized share increases of 60,000,000 were recorded in 2005 and 2013 (claims 21089, 21040). Stock incentive plan reserves were raised by 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 in each of 2010 and 2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). Shareholders also authorized a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). The record doesn't show whether that split was carried out.
A. Probably not, in most cases. Several 'delayed' tags appear to be extraction artifacts, not real missed deadlines. Routine auditor ratifications for a fiscal year (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) are flagged as delayed simply because they carry a year-end date. A stock plan term running to 2021 is also flagged (claim 20709). Claim 20711, a CEO appointment, has a 'promised by' date that falls before the date of the filing that reports it. Readers should not treat these as evidence that the company missed commitments without checking the source filings.
A. First, the missing post-2017 history: what happened after the Bioptix period, and whether the business changed fundamentally. Second, whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA approval or clearance (claims 21050, 21101). Third, whether the authorized reverse split took place (claim 20721). Fourth, what the BiOptix acquisition actually contributed (claim 20980).
A. 1. The dossier is incomplete. It ends mid-record in April 2017, so it can't describe the company as it exists today. 2. Product outcomes are undocumented. There are announced products and regulatory pursuits but no recorded approvals or sales. 3. Customers are almost entirely unnamed beyond the distributor Merial (claim 21094). 4. Governance turnover was heavy, including four directors resigning on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051) and repeated CEO and chair changes (claims 21082, 20711, 20716). 5. Dilution was ongoing, through repeated share authorizations. Diligence should start by obtaining the remaining filings.
Frequently asked
2026-10-07A. The record shows a small animal-health and diagnostics company. In 2004 it sold more than 30 antigen products to diagnostic test makers and research facilities (claim 21102), and it was developing SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone meant to help cattle maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). Around 2005 it became AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics: AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it was renamed from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20979, 20980, 20981).
A. This record cannot answer that. The claims stop at April 2017, and the last entry (claim 20906) is cut off. The company now trades as RIOT, but none of the claims here describe its current business. Treat this as historical background only. Before saying anything about present-day strategy, get filings from after 2017.
A. No individual customers are named. The only customer claim is a general one: diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights to SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distributor, not an end customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) and an exclusive animal-health IP license in 2012 (claim 21049), without naming the counterparties.
A. Delivered: corporate actions. These include the antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21081, 21108), several name changes, the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20979), board and executive changes, and repeated share authorizations, such as an increase of 60,000,000 authorized shares (claims 21089, 21040). Announced but never shown as completed: FDA approval for StayBred (claim 21101) and FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). No claim records either product receiving regulatory sign-off or producing revenue. The board's 2010 authority for a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 (claims 20715, 20721) is also never confirmed as carried out.
A. Read 'delayed' cautiously. Every one of these labels was applied by automated extraction on 2026-09-28. Many are routine items whose deadline simply passed with no follow-up claim in the record, such as auditor ratifications for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982). Some dates also look inconsistent. For example, claim 20711 shows a promised date of 2010-03-24 for a CEO appointment reported on 2010-10-21. These flags probably mean 'not confirmed in the record,' not 'the company missed a commitment.'
A. The company changed its identity often: it went from an antigen supplier to AspenBio Pharma, then to Venaxis, then to Bioptix. Its leadership also turned over repeatedly. Examples include Roger Hurst's employment ending (claim 21087), the 2010 board reshuffle (claims 20712, 20716, 20717), and four directors resigning on the same day in September 2012 (claim 21051). The equity pool kept growing, with stock incentive plan increases of 3,500,000, 1,500,000, 700,000, 425,000 and 1,800,000 shares (claims 21088, 20723, 20714, 21041, 21011). This points to a company that kept issuing equity while its products did not reach approval.
A. 1) What happened after April 2017? The record is cut off there, and nothing in it explains how the company became the business that now trades as RIOT. 2) Did AppyScore or StayBred ever receive FDA clearance or approval, or produce meaningful revenue? 3) What became of the Merial distribution deal and the university licenses? 4) Was the 2010 reverse split ever carried out? 5) Why did four directors resign at once in 2012?
A. First, fill the gap after 2017: the business that trades as RIOT today is not described in this dossier. Check SEC filings (8-Ks and 10-Ks from 2017 onward) for further name changes, asset sales or business pivots, and for whether the old diagnostics assets were sold or written off. Also check whether the pattern of frequent share authorizations and leadership turnover continued.
Frequently asked
2026-10-06A. The claims on file describe a small animal- and human-diagnostics company, not the business most readers now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), after buying an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was developing cattle-reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its main focus had become AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). Important caveat: the record stops at an April 2017 claim (20906). The company's later rebranding to Riot and its move away from diagnostics are not covered by any claim in this dossier.
A. The record shows repeated rebranding. In 2005 it restructured into a holding company (claim 21091) and changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2016 it was called Venaxis, and it renamed itself Bioptix after acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20981, 20979). Each name change has followed a change in strategy or an acquisition. Readers should treat the ticker's history as a series of different businesses, not one continuous product story.
A. Essentially none are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The antigen business's buyers are described only generically as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The company also disclosed license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) and, in 2012, an exclusive license of its animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049), but the record does not name the counterparties.
A. Delivered, per the record: the Vitro Diagnostics antigen acquisition, the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition, the name changes, a string of executive and board appointments, and repeated increases to the stock incentive plan (for example 3,500,000 shares, claim 21088; 1,800,000 shares, claim 21011). Announced or pending with no recorded outcome: StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the company was 'pursuing' FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). No claim records either approval. A reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), but no claim confirms it was carried out.
A. The record points mostly to equity: a common stock offering in 2012 (claim 21048), authorized share increases to 60,000,000 (claims 21089, 21040), and repeated expansions of the employee stock plan, including 1,500,000 shares (claim 20723), 700,000 shares (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 shares (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). The dossier contains no revenue, cash, or debt figures, so readers cannot judge from this record alone how much dilution produced how much commercial progress.
A. Not very. In 2005 the record shows a CEO change, with Richard G. Donnelly appointed (claim 21082) and Roger D. Hurst's employment terminated (claim 21087). In 2010 Stephen T. Lundy became CEO (claim 20711), the executive chairman stepped down, and Gail Schoettler became non-executive chair (claims 20716, 20717). On September 26, 2012, four directors resigned at once (claim 21051). CFO Jeffrey G. McGonegal is a rare point of continuity (claims 21106, 21084).
A. Be cautious with them. Several claims marked 'delayed' are routine items: auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 20982, 21012), a stock-plan term extension to 2021 (claim 20709), and a board appointment (claim 21038). Some have 'promised by' dates earlier than the announcement itself. For example, the CEO appointment in claim 20711 was announced 2010-10-21 with a promised-by date of 2010-03-24. That pattern suggests the status came from automated date extraction, not evidence of a missed commitment. Only the reverse-split authorizations (claims 20721, 20715) look like real open items, and even those lack any recorded resolution.
A. 1) Coverage gap: nothing after April 2017 is on record, so the company's current business, strategy and customers are not described here at all. Any current assessment needs post-2017 filings. 2) Regulatory outcomes: there is no recorded result for StayBred (claim 21101) or AppyScore (claim 21050). 3) What happened to the acquired businesses and licensed IP (claims 21049, 20980): were they sold, written off, or abandoned? 4) Whether the authorized reverse split was ever executed (claims 20721, 20715). 5) Customer concentration, since no end customers are named. Updates to the dossier should first fill the 2017-to-present gap.
Frequently asked
2026-10-06A. The claims on file cover 2004 to April 2017 and describe a small diagnostics and biotech company, not the business the RIOT ticker is known for today. In 2004 it sold over 30 antigen products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone meant to help cattle maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979).
A. The record shows repeated rebranding as the strategy changed. In 2005 the company restructured into a holding company (claim 21091) and took the name AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2016 it was called Venaxis, and it changed its name again to Bioptix after the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20981). The name 'Riot' appears nowhere in these claims. The record breaks off at a 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20906) that is cut off, so the change to Riot and any change of business after that are not documented here.
A. This dossier can't answer that. The most recent complete claims are from October 2016: the BiOptix acquisition, the name change to Bioptix, and auditor ratification (claims 20980, 20981, 20982). Nothing after early 2017 is on record. Any statement about today's strategy would need sources outside this dossier.
A. No customers are named. The record says only that the company sold over 30 products to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That is a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The company also had license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095).
A. Delivered (corporate actions recorded as completed): - Acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) - Acquisition of BiOptix (claims 20980, 20979) - The name changes and the holding-company restructuring - Many board and executive changes, including the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051) - Repeated increases to the stock incentive plan (e.g., 3,500,000 shares, claim 21088; 1,800,000 shares, claim 21011) Announced but never shown as finished: - StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101); no approval is recorded. - AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050); no clearance is recorded. - 'Pipeline products in development' (claim 21098) are never followed up. No revenue figures or product sales volumes appear anywhere in the record.
A. Not necessarily. Read these flags with caution. The delayed items are mostly routine shareholder-meeting matters: auditor ratification for a given fiscal year (claims 20720, 20713, 20982) and authority to do a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). An automated pass on 2026-09-28 assigned all of these flags. They most likely mean that no follow-up claim confirming completion was found, not that a failure was documented. At least one flag is clearly a data error: the CEO appointment of Stephen T. Lundy (claim 20711) carries a deadline of 2010-03-24, which is earlier than the 2010-10-21 filing it came from. Whether the reverse split ever happened is not documented here.
A. They point to steady equity issuance rather than funding from operations. The record shows: - Authorized common shares raised by 60,000,000 in both 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040) - A common stock offering in 2012 (claim 21048) - A board-approved reverse split range of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 (claim 20715) - Stock incentive plan increases nearly every year, from 425,000 to 3,500,000 shares (claims 21041, 21088) Taken together, this pattern is typical of a pre-revenue or low-revenue company that keeps diluting shareholders. The record contains no financial statements to confirm it.
A. 1. Everything after April 2017 is missing. The final claim (20906) is cut off, and the change to the current 'Riot' business is undocumented. Filling that gap is the top priority before drawing any conclusion about today's company. 2. It is unknown whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance or approval (claims 21050, 21101). 3. The results of the Merial distribution deal for SurBred 15 are unknown (claim 21094). 4. There is no explanation for the four-director resignation in 2012 (claim 21051). 5. The 'delayed' flags should be verified against actual proxy results before anyone treats them as missed commitments.
Frequently asked
2026-10-06A. The record describes a small diagnostics and animal-health company, not the bitcoin miner the RIOT ticker is known for today. In 2004 it sold antigen products, acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), to diagnostic test makers and research labs. It said it marketed over 30 such products (claim 21102). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: the SurBred 15 early pregnancy blood test (claim 21096) and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). By 2012 the focus had moved to human diagnostics, mainly AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. The record shows the company changing its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. in 2005, along with a holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091). It later operated as Venaxis. In 2016 it renamed itself Bioptix when it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980, 20979). The record stops at a truncated 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20909). It does not cover any later pivot or rename, so readers should not assume the current RIOT business is reflected in these claims.
A. The record cannot tell you. The latest complete claims are from October 2016 and cover the BiOptix acquisition and a name change. There is no claim from 2017 onward describing strategy, and the one 2017 entry is cut off. Anything said about today's strategy would have to come from outside this dossier.
A. No individual customers are named. The record only describes customers generically as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The closest thing to a named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. There were also unnamed licenses with three universities (claim 21095) and an exclusive animal-health IP license in 2012 with an unnamed licensee (claim 21049).
A. Nearly every entry is a corporate action, such as board and officer changes, increases to the share plan and authorized shares, auditor ratifications, and acquisitions. These are events, not promises, and they appear to have happened. The product claims are different. SurBred 15 and StayBred are described but never shown reaching sales. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). The record says the company was 'pursuing' FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and never says it was obtained. No revenue figures appear anywhere.
A. Not necessarily. Every 'delayed' status came from an automated pass on 2026-09-28, and most look like mechanical artifacts rather than real slippage. They include auditor ratifications tied to fiscal-year-end dates (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and a stock plan whose term simply runs to 2021 (claim 20709). Some are officer appointments recorded after their effective dates, such as the CEO appointment with a 2010-03-24 date reported in October 2010 (claim 20711). The 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 reverse split authorization with a 2011-02-04 deadline (claims 20721, 20715) is the one to check, because the record never says whether the split happened.
A. Leadership turned over often. There were CEO changes in 2005 and 2010 (claims 21082, 20711). In 2010 the board was reshuffled, with the Executive Chairman stepping down and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles eliminated (claims 20717, 20718, 20719). Four directors resigned on the same day in September 2012 (claim 21051). The company also kept expanding equity: authorized shares rose by 60,000,000 in both 2005 and 2013 (claims 21089, 21040), and the stock incentive plan was enlarged many times, for example by 3,500,000 shares (claim 21088) and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). Together with a 2012 stock offering (claim 21048), this points to ongoing dilution to fund operations.
A. The biggest gap is coverage. The dossier ends in early 2017, before whatever turned this company into today's RIOT, so the current business is not documented here. Within the record, the open questions are these. Did AppyScore ever receive FDA clearance (claim 21050)? Did SurBred 15 or StayBred produce meaningful revenue? Was the reverse split carried out (claims 20721, 20715)? What came of the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20980)? The next useful step is to ingest filings from 2017 onward.
Frequently asked
2026-10-05A. The record describes a small diagnostics and animal-health company that changed identity several times. In 2004 it sold antigen products, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also developed cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). In 2005 it announced a name change to AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). By 2012 its focus had shifted to AppyScore, a blood test for human appendicitis (claim 21047). The company was later called Venaxis, and in 2016 it announced a change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. The dossier ends at a claim dated 2017-04-27 (claim 20909), and that entry is cut off. None of the records shown explain how the company came to trade as RIOT or what it does today. Readers should treat everything here as the company's pre-2017 history and look elsewhere for its current business.
A. The record contains no current strategy. The most recent complete entries, from 2016, describe the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979) and the name change to Bioptix (claim 20981). Before that, the stated focus was getting FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). Nothing on file shows what the company planned after early 2017.
A. No customers are named. The only customer disclosure is the generic statement that it sold over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). Merial appears in the record, but as the exclusive marketing and distribution partner for SurBred 15 (claim 21094), not as a customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) and an exclusive animal-health IP license (claim 21049), but it does not name the other party to that license.
A. Corporate actions are documented as completed or stated: the purchase of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), the name changes, a series of executive and board changes, and repeated increases in authorized shares. Those increases include 60,000,000 authorized shares in 2005 and again in 2013 (claims 21089, 21040), plus several stock-plan expansions such as 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim 21011). On products, the record states that SurBred 15 did not need FDA approval (claim 21100). StayBred did need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the company was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). No claim records either approval being granted. A reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), and the record does not show whether it was carried out.
A. Read them with caution. Several items marked 'delayed' are routine events that would not normally run late, such as auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and board or executive appointments. In one case the deadline falls before the announcement: Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO is dated 2010-03-24 in a claim from 2010-10-21 (claim 20711). All of these labels were set by automated extraction on 2026-09-28. They likely reflect deadlines that passed without a follow-up record in the dossier, not confirmed failures to deliver.
A. (1) Everything after April 2017, including how the company became 'Riot' and what it does now. (2) Whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance (claims 21050, 21101). (3) Whether the authorized reverse split took place (claims 20721, 20715). (4) Why four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). (5) How much shareholders were diluted by the repeated increases in authorized and incentive-plan shares.
A. Look first for filings from 2017 onward that fill the gap after the truncated claim 20909, especially anything on a change of business, name, or ticker. Also look for regulatory outcomes on the diagnostic products, what became of the BiOptix acquisition, and any further share authorizations or capital raises, given the company's history of repeatedly expanding its share count.
Frequently asked
2026-10-05A. The disclosed history is a small diagnostics company that has changed direction several times. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), and was building cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies (21097). By 2012 the focus had moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (20980). Important caveat: the claims on file stop in April 2017, and the last entry (20909) is cut off. Nothing here describes what the company does today under the RIOT ticker. Any later business should be checked against current filings, not inferred from this dossier.
A. The record shows at least two renamings, each tied to a strategy shift. In 2005 it proposed becoming AspenBio Pharma, Inc. as part of a holding-company restructuring (21090, 21091). In 2016 it went from Venaxis to Bioptix alongside the BiOptix acquisition (20981, 20980). Name changes that line up with pivots are a signal to read each era of the company separately rather than as one continuous story.
A. No customer is named in the record. The only customer disclosure is generic: 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). Merial is a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The company also disclosed license arrangements with three universities (21095) and, in 2012, an exclusive license for its animal-health intellectual property (21049). The licensees are not named.
A. Items on record as completed corporate actions: the antigen-business acquisition from Vitro Diagnostics (21108), the BiOptix acquisition (20980), and a series of executive and board appointments. Product delivery is far less clear. SurBred 15 was described as not subject to FDA regulation (21100), so it could be sold without clearance. StayBred, however, required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and AppyScore was only 'pursuing' FDA clearance (21050). Neither has a recorded approval. A 2010 reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (20721, 20715), and nothing on file confirms it was carried out.
A. Repeatedly. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089) and again by 60,000,000 in 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan was enlarged several times: - 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (21088) - 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (20723) - 700,000 shares in 2010 (20722, 20714) - 700,000 shares in 2011 (20710) - 425,000 shares in 2013 (21041) - 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (21011) A common stock offering was also initiated in 2012 (21048). For an existing shareholder, this pattern points to ongoing dilution and reliance on equity financing.
A. No. Notable events on record: - 2005: Richard G. Donnelly became CEO (21082), and founder-era employee Roger Hurst's employment was terminated (21087). - 2010: Stephen T. Lundy became CEO (20711). Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (20717, 20716). The Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20718, 20719). - September 26, 2012: four directors resigned on the same day (21051). This is the most striking governance event in the file, and the record gives no explanation for it.
A. Probably not, in most cases. Many 'delayed' labels sit on routine items: auditor ratifications for a fiscal year (20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), a CEO appointment whose 'promised by' date falls before the filing date (20711), and an incentive-plan expiry date of 2021 (20709). These look like artifacts of automated extraction, which treats any dated item without a follow-up as overdue. They should not be read as broken promises. The one 'delayed' item worth checking is the reverse split authorization (20721, 20715), because it was a real action with a real deadline.
A. 1. The dossier ends in 2017 with a truncated claim, so the company's later history is not covered here at all. 2. Whether StayBred or AppyScore ever received FDA approval or clearance (21101, 21050). 3. What became of the Merial distribution deal (21094) and the 2012 animal-health license (21049). 4. Whether the 2010–2011 reverse split was executed (20721). 5. Why four directors resigned at once in 2012 (21051). 6. What the BiOptix acquisition (20980) contributed to the business. Until post-2017 filings are added, treat any description of the company's present-day business as outside the scope of this record.
Frequently asked
2026-10-03A. The claims on file describe a small diagnostics and animal-health company. In 2004 it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It said it sold more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), and it was developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for human appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979).
A. The record shows several renamings. The company became AspenBio Pharma, Inc. in 2005 (claim 21090), went through a holding-company restructuring (claim 21091), and changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981). It is now filed under the ticker RIOT, but the claims shown here end in April 2017 and do not document that later rename or what the company does today.
A. This dossier cannot answer that. The last strategic claims are the 2016 BiOptix acquisition and the Bioptix rename (claims 20980, 20981), and the claim list is cut off at an April 2017 entry (claim 20906) that has no detail. Do not assume the company's present business from this record. Readers need filings from after 2017 to learn it.
A. Only one commercial counterparty is named: Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The 30-plus products sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities have no named buyers (claim 21102). The three university license arrangements do not identify the universities (claim 21095), and neither does the 2012 exclusive animal-health IP license (claim 21049).
A. The record shows these were completed: the acquisitions (claims 21108/21081, 20980/20979), the name changes (claims 21090, 20981), and many board and officer changes, including four directors resigning on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The product milestones remain announced only. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050). No claim records either approval being obtained. Shareholders authorized a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), and the record does not show that it was carried out.
A. The company repeatedly asked shareholders for more shares. Stock incentive plan reserves were increased by 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). Authorized common stock was increased by 60,000,000 shares on two occasions (claims 21089, 21040). A common stock offering was also initiated in 2012 (claim 21048).
A. Read them with caution. Several routine items are marked delayed, such as auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and board appointments. Some of those carry 'promised by' dates that fall before the announcement date: claim 20711 lists 2010-03-24 for a CEO appointment reported on 2010-10-21. These labels most likely mean a deadline passed with no resolving evidence in the record. They do not show that the company broke a commitment.
A. (1) The record stops in 2017, so the company's present business, strategy and customers are not covered. (2) The record does not say whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance or approval (claims 21050, 21101). (3) It does not say whether the Merial distribution deal for SurBred 15 produced revenue (claim 21094). (4) It does not say whether the authorized reverse split was executed (claims 20721, 20715). (5) No customer beyond Merial is named. Post-2017 filings would be needed to close these gaps.
Frequently asked
2026-10-03A. The claims on file describe a small diagnostics and animal-health company that changed identity several times. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), after acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It developed cattle products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining pregnancy (21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (21090). By 2012 its lead product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047), and it had licensed out its animal-health IP (21049). In 2016 it was called Venaxis, acquired BiOptix Diagnostics, and renamed itself Bioptix (20980, 20979, 20981).
A. This record can't answer that. The last claim is dated 2017-04-27 and that entry is cut off, so nothing after that date is captured. The company now trades as RIOT, and that ticker doesn't match any business described here. Whatever later pivot it reflects is undocumented in this dossier. Before stating the company's present business, a reader needs filings from after 2017.
A. No end customers are named. The company said only that it sold to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (21102). The one named commercial partner is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities, but doesn't name them (21095). No revenue, volumes or contract values are attached to any of these relationships.
A. The completed corporate actions in the record are: the Vitro antigen acquisition (21108/21081), the AspenBio rename (21090), several management and board changes, and the BiOptix acquisition and rename (20980, 20981). The product pipeline is far less resolved. StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101). AppyScore was described as 'pursuing FDA regulatory clearance' (21050). For neither product does the record show a clearance, approval or launch. It also doesn't show how the Merial distribution deal for SurBred 15 performed.
A. Yes, several: - Leadership turned over repeatedly. A new CEO was appointed in 2005 (21082) and again in 2010 (20711). The Executive Chairman role was dropped in 2010 (20717). - Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). - Shareholders repeatedly approved larger stock-incentive pools: 3.5M shares (21088), 1.5M (20723), 700k (20722/20714), 425k (21041) and 1.8M (21011). - Authorized common shares were raised to 60M (21089, 21040). - A reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized (20721, 20715). - A common stock offering began in 2012 (21048). Together these point to a cash-consuming company that funded itself through equity.
A. Treat these flags with caution. Most of them sit on routine items that carry a deadline, such as auditor ratifications for a fiscal year (20720, 20713, 20982, 21012), the reverse-split authorization window (20721, 20715) and the stock plan's term end (20709). The automated pipeline appears to mark an item 'delayed' when its date passes without a recorded follow-up. That doesn't mean the company missed anything. Claim 20711 also lists a 'promised by' date earlier than the claim itself, which suggests an extraction error. None of these statuses has been editorially verified.
A. 1. Get post-2017 filings to learn how Bioptix became the company now trading as RIOT, and what it does today. 2. Check whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance, and whether StayBred was ever approved. 3. Find out what happened to the Merial SurBred 15 deal and the animal-health license. 4. See whether the reverse split was carried out. 5. Find out why four directors left at once in 2012.
A. 1. The record stops mid-2017, so the company's current business and strategy are undocumented here. 2. There are no financial figures, so revenue, losses and cash runway can't be assessed. 3. Regulatory outcomes for AppyScore and StayBred are missing, so it's unclear whether any flagship product reached the market. 4. Every claim comes from automated extraction, with statuses only at 'stated' or 'delayed'. None has been checked against source documents.
Frequently asked
2026-10-03A. The claims on file describe a small diagnostics company, not its current business. Starting in 2004 it sold antigen-based products. It said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102) and developed cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 it had moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). Later it licensed out its animal-health IP (claim 21049).
A. The record shows several renamings. The company became AspenBio Pharma, Inc. in 2005 (claim 21090). It later changed from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981) when it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics in 2016 (claims 20980, 20979). The record ends in 2017, so the shift to the 'Riot' name and whatever business followed is not covered here. Readers searching filings or court records should search under every prior name.
A. This dossier can't answer that. The latest claim is a 2017-04-27 financing entry with no detail (claim 20905), and the record appears to be cut off there. Nothing on file describes what the company does today. Do not infer present-day strategy from the diagnostics-era claims.
A. Essentially none are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distributor, not an end customer. The company described its buyers only as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). It also cited license arrangements with three universities but did not name them (claim 21095).
A. Corporate actions are well documented: board and officer appointments, the Vitro Diagnostics antigen-business acquisition (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), and repeated stock-plan increases. Examples of those increases are 3,500,000 shares (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). Product milestones are less clear. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). Nothing on file confirms either was obtained. A reverse split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6 was authorized (claims 20721, 20715), but the record does not show it was carried out.
A. Treat them with caution. Several items are flagged 'delayed' even though they look like routine past events, such as auditor ratifications for fiscal 2011, 2014, and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982). One CEO appointment is flagged against a 'promised by' date that falls before the filing date (claim 20711). These flags were all set by automated extraction on 2026-09-28. They likely reflect date-parsing artifacts, not real missed commitments, and should be checked against source filings before anyone cites them.
A. 1) What happened between 2017 and today. The record stops there. 2) Whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance or generated meaningful revenue. 3) Why four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). 4) How much dilution resulted from repeated share-authorization increases, including to 60,000,000 authorized shares (claims 21089, 21040). 5) Who the unnamed customers and university licensors were.
A. First, ingestion of the post-2017 filings, so the dossier covers the company's current business and any named customers. Second, a manual review of the 'delayed' flags. Third, details of the April 2017 financing (claim 20905), which is the last event on record and likely precedes the company's next transformation.
Frequently asked
2026-10-03A. The record describes a small diagnostics business, not the company most readers associate with the 'Riot' name today. In 2004 it sold antigens and related products, marketing 'over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). It renamed itself AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). It later operated as Venaxis and was renamed Bioptix in 2016 after acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20981).
A. The dossier can't answer this. The claims on record stop at an entry dated 2017-04-27, which is cut off. Nothing in the record mentions the 'Riot' name or any business after the Bioptix period. The latest strategy the record shows is from 2016: acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics and renaming the company (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). Readers should treat the current business as undocumented here and check recent filings directly.
A. Customers are mostly unnamed. The 2004 disclosure says only that products went to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The record also mentions license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim 21095) and an unnamed exclusive animal-health IP license (claim 21049).
A. Nothing in the record is marked as verified or delivered. Every claim is either 'stated' (the company said it) or 'delayed'. Most of the record is corporate housekeeping: board and officer changes, name changes, and share authorizations. Examples include increases to the Stock Incentive Plan (claims 21088, 20723, 20722, 21041, 21011) and authorized shares (claims 21089, 21040). On the product side, the record shows the company pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050) and notes that StayBred needed FDA approval (claim 21101). It contains no claim confirming that either clearance was ever obtained.
A. Nine claims are marked 'delayed', and all of them received that status from the same automated pass on 2026-09-28. They are routine items with a deadline attached, such as: a reverse stock split authorization expiring 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715), auditor appointments for specific fiscal years (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), and a plan term ending 2021-07-08 (claim 20709). The label most likely means 'the deadline passed and no follow-up is on record,' not that the company admitted a delay. One claim is internally inconsistent: Stephen T. Lundy's CEO appointment has a promise date of 2010-03-24 but was recorded on 2010-10-21 (claim 20711). Treat these labels with caution.
A. Not very. CFO Jeffrey McGonegal and director Douglas Hepler were appointed in 2004 (claims 21106, 21105); Hepler received 100,000 stock options (claim 21107). Roger Hurst's employment ended in 2005 (claim 21087), and Richard Donnelly became CEO (claim 21082). In 2010 Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair, and Stephen Lundy became CEO (claims 20717, 20716, 20711). Four directors resigned together on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The record gives no reason for the 2012 resignations.
A. First, close the data gap. The record needs claims from April 2017 onward to explain how Bioptix became Riot and what the business is now. Second, look for outcomes on the old promises: whether AppyScore or StayBred ever got FDA clearance, and what came of the BiOptix acquisition. Third, look for continued shareholder dilution. The record shows repeated share and incentive plan increases, for example 60,000,000 authorized shares (claims 21089, 21040) and 1,800,000 plan shares (claim 21011).
A. 1) The dossier is truncated: its last entry (claim 20905, 2017-04-27) has no content. 2) Nothing documents the pivot to the current Riot business. 3) No product claim has a confirmed commercial or regulatory outcome. 4) Customers are unnamed apart from distributor Merial (claim 21094). 5) Every status was set by automated extraction in late September 2026, with no human verification recorded. The record also has duplicate entries, such as the Vitro Diagnostics acquisition (claims 21108, 21081) and the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979). These look like the same events taken from different filings, not separate deals.
Frequently asked
2026-10-02A. The dossier covers only the company's history from 2004 to early 2017, before it traded as Riot. In that period it was a small diagnostics and biotech firm. It started in animal health, with antigen products (21102), a bovine pregnancy test called SurBred 15 (21096), and a cattle pregnancy-maintenance hormone called StayBred (21097). It then moved to human diagnostics with AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (21047). The record changes names several times: it became AspenBio Pharma (21090), later operated as Venaxis, and was renamed Bioptix (21981 is not a valid id; see 20981). The record contains no claims about the business carried on under the Riot name.
A. The record does not show one. The claims stop at a cut-off entry dated 2017-04-27 (20904), and that entry has no content. The most recent strategic moves in the record are the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (20980, 20979) and the name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981) in October 2016. Anything about what Riot does today would have to come from sources outside this dossier.
A. There are essentially none. The company said it sold over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102), but it did not name any of them. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). That makes Merial a distribution partner, not a disclosed end customer. The three licensing universities are also unnamed (21095).
A. Delivered: two acquisitions, the Vitro Diagnostics antigen business (21108, 21081) and BiOptix Diagnostics (20980, 20979). Also delivered: the corporate name changes (21090, 20981), several CEO, CFO and board appointments (for example 21082, 21106, 20716), and repeated increases to the stock incentive plan (for example 21088, 21011). Announced but never shown as completed: FDA clearance for AppyScore, which was only being pursued (21050). StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101), and the record never shows it reaching the market. The reverse stock split was authorized at up to 1-for-6 (20721, 20715), but the record never confirms it was carried out.
A. Treat them with caution. An automated pass on 2026-09-28 marked about a dozen claims as delayed. Several of these look like extraction artifacts, not real missed commitments. For example, Stephen Lundy's CEO appointment is marked delayed against a 'promised by' date of 2010-03-24 (20711), which is earlier than the filing date of the claim itself. Routine auditor ratifications are also flagged as delayed (20720, 20713, 21012, 20982). Check each one before treating it as a broken promise.
A. The company repeatedly expanded its share capacity. Authorized shares rose by 60,000,000 in 2005 (21089) and by 60,000,000 again in 2013 (21040). The stock incentive plan was enlarged many times: 3,500,000 shares (21088), 1,500,000 (20723), 700,000 (20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (21041) and 1,800,000 (21011). Leadership also turned over often. Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051), and the board was restructured in 2010 (20712, 20716–20719). Taken together, this points to dilution risk and unstable leadership.
A. First, filings after April 2017 that explain how Bioptix became the company now trading as RIOT. That transition is entirely missing from this record. Second, any regulatory outcome for AppyScore (21050) or StayBred (21101). Third, confirmation of whether the reverse split was executed (20721). Fourth, any later disclosure that names customers beyond Merial (21094).
A. 1. The dossier is incomplete: it ends mid-record in 2017 (20904), so it cannot describe the present-day company. 2. No end customers are named anywhere (21102). 3. The record never shows a regulatory approval for either flagship human or animal product (21050, 21101). 4. The status labels are unreliable, so 'delayed' flags (for example 20711) need manual verification before anyone cites them.
Frequently asked
2026-10-02A. The claims describe a small animal-health and human-diagnostics company, not a bitcoin miner. In 2004 it sold more than 30 antigen products to diagnostic test makers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone to help maintain cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). The company changed its name several times: AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (claim 21090), then Venaxis, then Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981).
A. The dossier ends with a truncated 2017 financing entry (claim 20904). Nothing in the record covers the company's later shift to bitcoin mining under the Riot name. Readers should not use this dossier to judge the current business. That part of the history has not been extracted yet, so the current strategy, operations, and capacity claims are simply missing.
A. The record names no paying customers. It refers to a broad, unnamed group of diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). The one named commercial partner is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). The record also mentions license deals with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095), and an exclusive license of animal-health intellectual property in 2012 (claim 21049). There are no revenue figures tied to any of these.
A. Corporate actions in the record are documented as done. These include the antigen business acquisition from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), name changes, share authorizations (for example, 60,000,000 authorized shares in claims 21089 and 21040), and stock-plan increases (for example, 1,800,000 shares in claim 21011). Product outcomes are not documented. SurBred 15 was said not to need FDA regulation (claim 21100). StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). For AppyScore, FDA clearance was being pursued (claim 21050). The record contains no approval, launch, or sales figures for any of these products.
A. Read them with caution. They come from an automated pass dated 2026-09-28. Many of them apply to routine items with past deadlines, such as auditor ratifications for fiscal 2011, 2014, and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and a reverse-split authorization due by 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Some deadlines are impossible: claim 20711 gives a 'promised by' date of 2010-03-24 for a CEO appointment disclosed on 2010-10-21. These statuses most likely mean the outcome was never checked, not that the company missed a commitment.
A. Leadership turned over often. Richard G. Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (claim 21082). Stephen T. Lundy became CEO by 2010 (claim 20711). In 2010 the Executive Chairman stepped down, and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (claims 20717, 20716). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The board also authorized a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 (claim 20721). Repeated stock-plan expansions and share authorizations point to a company that funded itself mainly by issuing equity (claims 21048, 20723, 20722).
A. First, the dossier needs claims from 2017 onward. That is when the company's identity changed, and none of it is captured here. Second, someone should check whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance and whether SurBred 15 or StayBred ever produced revenue. Third, the 'delayed' items need to be resolved as either completed or never done. Fourth, the record should show what happened to the BiOptix acquisition after 2016. Until these gaps are filled, the record can explain the company's biotech history but not its current business.
Frequently asked
2026-10-01A. The claims in this dossier describe Riot's predecessor companies, not its present business. From 2004 the company was a small animal-health and diagnostics firm. It sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also developed cattle-reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). It later became AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090) and focused on AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it renamed itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Riot's later shift to bitcoin mining is widely reported, but none of the claims supplied here cover it.
A. This dossier cannot tell you. The claims supplied end in 2017, and the last entry (claim 20905) is cut off. The most recent strategic moves on record are the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change to Bioptix in October 2016 (claims 20980, 20979, 20981). For the current strategy, read Riot's own filings from 2017 onward, which are not reflected here.
A. No end customers are named. The record describes buyers only in general terms: 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The named counterparties are partners, not customers. Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Vitro Diagnostics sold the company its antigen business (claims 21108, 21081). Three universities had license arrangements with the company but are not named (claim 21095).
A. Delivered, in the sense of being recorded as done: the antigen business acquisition (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), several name changes, a holding-company restructuring (claim 21091), and repeated expansions of the share count. Only announced, with no follow-through on record: StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). No claim here records either product winning approval or reaching commercial sales. A reverse split of up to 1-for-6, due by February 4, 2011, is marked delayed (claims 20721, 20715).
A. Repeatedly. Authorized shares were increased to 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089), and a 60,000,000-share increase was approved in 2013 (claim 21040). The stock incentive plan was enlarged several times: by 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). Some of the 700,000-share entries may describe the same amendment, recorded once in each filing.
A. Not without checking the source filings. Several 'delayed' tags look like artifacts of automated extraction. Claim 20711, for example, has a promised-by date of 2010-03-24, which is earlier than the filing it came from. Routine auditor ratifications are also marked delayed (claims 20720, 20713, 20982, 21012). The one delayed item that matters most is the reverse-split authorization (claims 20721, 20715), and even there the record does not show whether a split happened.
A. Not very. The CEO changed from Richard Donnelly (claim 21082) to Stephen Lundy (claim 20711). In 2010 the Executive Chairman stepped down and the board was restructured (claims 20717, 20712). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). Founder-era scientist Roger Hurst left in 2005 (claim 21087). Taken together with the name changes from AspenBio to Venaxis to Bioptix, the record shows a company that changed direction several times.
A. 1) The dossier says nothing about the pivot from diagnostics to Riot's present business. That gap is the main thing to fill. 2) What happened to AppyScore and StayBred? There is no record of FDA clearance or of the products being dropped. 3) Was the reverse split carried out? 4) What did the BiOptix acquisition become? 5) The final claim (20905, 2017) is truncated. Next, pull the 2017-and-later filings: the post-2016 renaming, financings, and any new customer or partner disclosures.
Frequently asked
2026-10-01A. The claims on file describe a small animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business most people now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it sold antigens and bovine reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early pregnancy test for cattle (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone to help cattle maintain pregnancy (claim 21097). It said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). By 2012 its focus had moved to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis in humans (claim 21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20979, 20980). None of the claims on record describe a cryptocurrency or bitcoin-mining business.
A. The record shows repeated rebranding. In 2005 it restructured into a holding company and changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claims 21090, 21091). By 2016 it was called Venaxis, and it renamed itself Bioptix after the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20981). Each name change lines up with a shift in strategy. Readers should treat the name history as a signal of how often the company has repositioned itself.
A. The dossier cannot answer this. The claim list is cut off at a 2017-04-27 financing entry (claim 20905), and the latest strategic items it contains are the 2016 BiOptix acquisition and the rename to Bioptix (claims 20979–20981). Anything about the company's strategy after early 2017 is missing from this record and should be sourced separately before publication or diligence.
A. None are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial is a distributor, not a disclosed end customer. Other relationships are described generically: 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102), license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim 21095), and an unnamed exclusive animal-health IP licensee in 2012 (claim 21049).
A. Most items on record are corporate actions that were stated rather than independently verified. These include board and officer appointments, stock-plan share increases (for example 1,800,000 shares in 2014, claim 21011), authorized-share increases (60,000,000, claims 21089 and 21040), and two acquisitions (claims 21108, 20979). On the product side, the record shows AppyScore was 'pursuing FDA regulatory clearance' (claim 21050), and StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). No claim on record confirms that either product received FDA clearance. A reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by 2011-02-04 (claims 20715, 20721). The record does not confirm that it was carried out.
A. Not necessarily. Every 'delayed' status was assigned in a single automated pass on 2026-09-28, and several look like extraction artifacts. One example is a CEO appointment carrying a 'promised by' date of 2010-03-24 (claim 20711) that comes before the filing reporting it. Another is routine auditor ratifications flagged as delayed (claims 20713, 20720, 20982, 21012). These labels should be reviewed by hand before anyone cites them as missed commitments.
A. There was frequent leadership turnover. The company had CEOs in 2005 (Richard G. Donnelly, claim 21082) and 2010 (Stephen T. Lundy, claim 20711). It reorganized its board in 2010, eliminating the Executive Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Lead Director roles (claims 20712, 20717–20719). In 2012, four directors resigned on the same day, September 26 (claim 21051). The record does not explain why the directors resigned. That is worth investigating.
A. 1. Fill the gap after April 2017. The record ends at claim 20905, so the company's present business, strategy, and customers are not documented here. 2. Find out whether AppyScore or StayBred ever obtained FDA clearance or approval (claims 21050, 21101). 3. Confirm whether the authorized 2010–2011 reverse split was executed (claims 20715, 20721). 4. Learn why four directors resigned at once in 2012 (claim 21051). 5. Check what came of the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20979). Until these are resolved, the dossier describes a historical diagnostics company, and it should not be read as a profile of the current one.
Frequently asked
2026-09-30A. The dossier describes a small animal- and human-diagnostics company, not the business the RIOT ticker is associated with today. In 2004 it sold antigens and related products, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also developed cattle-reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (21097). By 2012 its focus had shifted to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis in humans (21047). The claims on file end in April 2017, so later changes to the business are not documented here.
A. The record shows a series of rebrandings and restructurings. In 2005 a name change to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (21090) came with a holding-company restructuring (21091). In 2016 the company changed its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981) when it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (20980, 20979). The dossier does not document the later rename to Riot. Readers should expect filings for this entity to appear under multiple names.
A. The record names no end customers. The 2004 disclosure refers only generically to 'over 30 products' sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). Merial is a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer with disclosed volumes. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (21095), and an exclusive license for animal-health intellectual property with an unnamed counterparty (21049).
A. The completed items on file are corporate actions: the acquisition of Vitro Diagnostics' antigen business (21108, 21081), the BiOptix acquisition (20980), executive and board appointments, and repeated increases to the stock incentive plan. Examples of those increases are 3.5M units in 2005 (21088) and 1.8M shares in 2014 (21011). On the product side, the record shows intent but no outcomes. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101). AppyScore was described as 'pursuing' FDA clearance (21050). No claim on file records either approval. SurBred 15 was described as not subject to FDA regulation (21100), but no sales figures are disclosed for it.
A. There was frequent turnover. Richard G. Donnelly was appointed President and CEO in 2005 (21082), and Stephen T. Lundy became CEO in 2010 (20711). In 2010 Executive Chairman Daryl Faulkner stepped down and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (20716, 20717). The same year the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20718, 20719). In September 2012, four directors resigned (21051). Roger Hurst, whose employment agreement was disclosed in 2004 (21099), was terminated in 2005 (21087).
A. Not necessarily. These labels come from automated extraction on 2026-09-28 and should be checked against the underlying filings. Some look like artifacts rather than missed commitments. For example, Lundy's appointment is marked delayed against a deadline (2010-03-24) that is earlier than the filing that reported it (20711). Routine auditor ratifications are also marked delayed (20720, 20713, 20982). The one substantive open item is the board's authority to do a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (20721, 20715). Nothing on file confirms whether that split was carried out.
A. (1) Whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance or approval; the record shows only that the company was pursuing them (21050, 21101). (2) What revenue, if any, came from the Merial/SurBred 15 arrangement (21094). (3) Whether the 2010 reverse-split authorization was used (20721). (4) What the BiOptix acquisition brought in, and why the company pivoted (20980). (5) Everything after April 2017: the dossier's claims stop there, so the company's current business and strategy are not covered by this record.
A. The top priority is filling the post-2017 gap in the record. Readers should look for filings that document the transition from Bioptix to Riot and any claims about the current business, its assets, and its counterparties. Within the existing record, useful checks are: SEC filings confirming or denying FDA outcomes for AppyScore, a record of the 2010–2011 reverse split, and manual review of the entries flagged 'delayed' to separate genuine slippage from extraction errors.
Frequently asked
2026-09-30A. The claims supplied here cover Riot's predecessor companies: AspenBio Pharma (renamed in 2005, claim 21090), later Venaxis, then Bioptix (claim 20981). Through this period it was a small diagnostics and animal-health business. It sold antigen products, bovine pregnancy tests, and a human appendicitis blood test. These claims stop at April 2017 (the last is claim 20907, which is cut off), so they do not describe what RIOT does today. Outside this record, the ticker is now known as Riot Platforms, a bitcoin-mining company. None of the claims shown document that change.
A. It changed several times. In 2004 the focus was animal reproduction: the SurBred 15 early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096) and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). The company also sold antigens after buying Vitro Diagnostics' antigen business (claims 21108, 21081). By 2012 the lead product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047), and animal-health IP was licensed out (claim 21049). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979) and took the Bioptix name (claim 20981). The claims shown say nothing about strategy after early 2017.
A. No end customers are named. The company said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), but it did not identify them. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. There were also license arrangements with three universities, which are not named (claim 21095).
A. Delivered, according to the filings: - the Vitro antigen-business acquisition (claims 21108, 21081) - the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979) - the name changes (claims 21090, 20981) - several management changes, including Stephen Lundy as CEO (claim 20711) Announced with no recorded outcome: - StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and no approval appears in the record. - AppyScore was 'pursuing FDA regulatory clearance' (claim 21050), and no clearance appears. - A reverse split of up to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), and the record does not show whether it happened.
A. Shareholders repeatedly approved more shares: - Authorized common stock was increased by 60,000,000 shares in both 2005 and 2013 (claims 21089, 21040). - The stock incentive plan grew in steps: 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 shares (claim 21011). On governance, the board was restructured in 2010, with a non-executive chair and the executive chairman stepping down (claims 20716, 20717). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051).
A. First, the post-2017 record. The claims supplied end with a truncated April 2017 entry (claim 20907), so the pivot away from diagnostics and the current business are not documented here. Next, any evidence on whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance or approval, and whether the 2010–2011 reverse split was carried out. Finally, as later filings are added, check whether customers become named or stay described only in aggregate.
A. 1. The record is incomplete. It stops mid-2017 and does not cover the company's current operations. 2. Several 'delayed' statuses look unreliable. For example, the Lundy CEO appointment has a promise date (2010-03-24) earlier than the filing that reported it (claim 20711). Routine auditor ratifications are also marked delayed (claims 20713, 20982, 21012). These look like artifacts of automated extraction rather than real missed commitments. 3. The regulatory outcomes of the diagnostic products are unknown. 4. The customer base was never disclosed by name.
Frequently asked
2026-09-30A. The claims on record describe a small diagnostics and animal-health company, not the business now associated with the Riot name and RIOT ticker. In 2004 it was building cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone meant to help maintain cattle pregnancies (claim 21097). It also sold more than 30 antigen products to diagnostic test makers and research labs (claim 21102). By 2012 the focus had moved to human diagnostics, mainly AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). Its animal-health intellectual property had been licensed out (claim 21049).
A. The record shows a series of rebrands and changes in direction. The company took the name AspenBio Pharma, Inc. alongside a holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091). It later operated as Venaxis, and in 2016 renamed itself Bioptix after acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20981). None of the claims on file covers the later change to the Riot name or the business run under it. The dossier stops at a 2017-04-27 regulatory entry (claim 20907), and that entry appears to be truncated.
A. The file does not show one. The latest strategy-related claims are from 2016: the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the Bioptix rename (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). Nothing in the record describes what the company does today. Treat this dossier as a history of the predecessor company, not a description of the current one.
A. No customers are named. The only customer claim says the company marketed over 30 products to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' without identifying any of them (claim 21102). Merial is the only named commercial counterparty. It held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094), which makes it a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The three universities that licensed technology to the company are also unnamed (claim 21095).
A. No claim in the record has been marked delivered or verified. Every entry is either 'stated' (the company said it) or 'delayed'. Most completed items are corporate housekeeping: board and officer changes, auditor ratifications, and increases to the stock incentive plan. Product milestones were never shown as reached. StayBred needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). The record contains no follow-up confirming either approval.
A. Repeatedly. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and by another 60,000,000 in 2013 (claim 21040). The stock incentive plan was expanded several times: by 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 in each of 2010 and 2011 (claims 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim 21011). A reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 was authorized for completion before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721). Readers focused on dilution should follow this pattern.
A. Not necessarily. The 'delayed' labels come from an automated pass run on 2026-09-28, and several of them look like extraction artifacts. One example is a CEO appointment with a 'promised by' date earlier than the filing itself (claim 20711, dated 2010-03-24). Others are routine auditor ratifications tagged with fiscal-year-end deadlines (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982). A human should review these before anyone reads them as broken promises.
A. 1) The record does not cover the business run under the Riot name, so any current claims need to be sourced and added. 2) Neither StayBred nor AppyScore has a documented regulatory outcome (claims 21101, 21050). 3) The record gives no reason why four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). 4) The reverse split authorized for completion by February 4, 2011 has no claim confirming it happened (claims 20715, 20721). 5) The company has turned over leadership and changed names many times, which makes continuity of strategy hard to assess.
Frequently asked
2026-09-29A. The dossier describes a small diagnostics and animal-health company, not its current business. In 2004 it sold antigens, marketing over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), after acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was developing cattle products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant hormone for maintaining pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its lead product was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. The company has changed identity several times. In 2005 it restructured into a holding company (claim 21091) and renamed itself AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2016 it was operating as Venaxis. It then acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979) and changed its name to Bioptix (claim 20981). The ticker RIOT reflects a later rebrand that the claims on file do not document.
A. The record can't answer this. The claims provided end in April 2017 (claim 20909), and that final entry is truncated. Nothing on file describes the business after the BiOptix era. Readers should not infer today's strategy from this dossier. Before drawing conclusions, the missing post-2017 filings need to be ingested and reviewed.
A. No end customers are named anywhere in the record. The 2004 antigen business sold to unnamed diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The company also licensed technology from three universities, which are not named (claim 21095).
A. Corporate actions are well documented: acquisitions, name changes, board and executive appointments, and repeated increases to the stock incentive plan (e.g., 3.5M units in claim 21088, 1.5M shares in claim 20723, 700K shares in claim 20722, 425K shares in claim 21041, 1.8M shares in claim 21011). Product and regulatory outcomes are not. StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). The record contains no approval, clearance, or revenue figure for either product. Every claim is marked 'stated'; none is verified as delivered.
A. Leadership turnover was frequent. Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The board was restructured in 2010: the Executive Chairman stepped down, a non-executive Chair was appointed, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (claims 20716–20719). The authorized share count rose repeatedly, including increases of 60M (claims 21089, 21040). Shareholders also authorized a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 (claims 20721, 20715). Taken together, these point to a history of dilution and capital strain.
A. Treat those flags with caution. Several look like extraction errors, not real missed promises. One example is a CEO appointment with a 'promised by' date earlier than the filing date (claim 20711). Others include auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982) and a stock-plan expiry date of 2021 (claim 20709). These were all reclassified automatically on 2026-09-28. They have not been reviewed by a person and should not be read as evidence of broken commitments.
A. The biggest gap is everything after April 2017. The record does not explain how a veterinary and appendicitis diagnostics company became the business behind the RIOT ticker. It also leaves several earlier questions unanswered: whether SurBred 15, StayBred, or AppyScore ever earned revenue or FDA clearance (claims 21050, 21101), what happened to the Merial deal (claim 21094), and what the BiOptix acquisition cost or produced (claim 20980). Next steps: ingest post-2017 filings, confirm what became of each product, and have a reviewer check the automated 'delayed' flags.
Frequently asked
2026-09-29A. The claims on file describe a small animal-health and diagnostics company, not the business the RIOT ticker is known for today. In 2004 it sold antigens and related products, marketing 'over 30 products' to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had moved to human diagnostics, specifically AppyScore, a blood-based test for appendicitis (claim 21047).
A. The record shows a series of renamings and restructurings. In 2005 it restructured into a holding company (claim 21091) and changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). Later it operated as Venaxis, then renamed itself Bioptix in 2016 (claim 20981) alongside its acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979). The record stops in April 2017. Anything after that, including the later pivot associated with the RIOT name, is not covered by these claims and needs separate sourcing.
A. This record can't answer that. The latest complete claims date to 2016, when the company acquired BiOptix Diagnostics and renamed itself Bioptix (claims 20980, 20981). The final entry (claim 20909, dated 2017-04-27) is truncated and has no content. The record contains nothing about the company's strategy after 2017, so any description of its present-day business would come from outside this record.
A. No end customers are named. The company described its buyers only as 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102). The one named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That makes Merial a distribution partner, not a disclosed customer. The company also had license arrangements with three universities, which are not named in the record (claim 21095), and a 2012 exclusive license for its animal-health IP, where the licensee is also not named (claim 21049).
A. Corporate actions are the best documented. The record shows completed acquisitions (the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics, claims 21108 and 21081; BiOptix Diagnostics, claims 20980 and 20979), name changes, board and executive turnover, and repeated share-authorization increases. The product side is thinner. SurBred 15 was described as not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100). StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). For AppyScore, the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claim 21050). No claim in the record shows any of these approvals or clearances being obtained, and there are no disclosed revenue figures for any product.
A. The record shows repeated expansion of the share base. Authorized common shares were increased to 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089), and a further 60,000,000-share increase appears in 2013 (claim 21040). Stock incentive plan reserves grew in steps: 3,500,000 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 (claim 20723), 700,000 in 2010–2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 (claim 21011). The board also sought authority for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). There was a common stock offering in 2012 (claim 21048).
A. Not necessarily. These status labels come from automated extraction and appear to have been applied mechanically wherever a deadline date has passed. For example, CEO Stephen Lundy's appointment (claim 20711) carries a 'promised by' date earlier than the claim itself. Routine items such as auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 20982) and a plan term running to 2021 (claim 20709) are also tagged 'delayed.' Readers should check the underlying filings before treating any of these as a missed commitment.
A. 1) What happened after April 2017? The record is truncated (claim 20909), so everything since then is undocumented here. 2) Did AppyScore ever receive FDA clearance (claim 21050), and was it ever commercialized? 3) What became of the cattle products, and what was the outcome of the Merial arrangement (claim 21094)? 4) Who were the actual customers and licensees (claims 21102, 21049)? 5) What drove the heavy leadership turnover, including four directors resigning on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051)? The first priority is extending the record past 2017, since this dossier currently describes a predecessor business, not the present one.
Frequently asked
2026-09-29A. The claims on file describe a small life-sciences company that repeatedly changed direction and name. It began in 2004 by acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) and selling over 30 products to diagnostic test makers and research labs (claim 21102). It then developed cattle-reproduction products: the SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096) and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its focus had shifted to AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979). Its names over this period were AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090), then Venaxis, then Bioptix (claim 20981).
A. The claims on file stop at April 2017 (claim 20909, which is itself cut off). The RIOT ticker is now widely associated with Riot Platforms, a Bitcoin mining business, but none of that later history appears in these claims. This dossier should be treated as covering only the company's pre-2017 diagnostics and animal-health period. Anyone evaluating the current business needs sources beyond this record.
A. The record shows a series of pivots rather than one steady strategy. It started with a diagnostics antigen supply business, moved into cattle reproduction products licensed from three universities (claim 21095), and then turned to human diagnostics with AppyScore, for which it was seeking FDA clearance (claim 21050). In 2012 it signed an exclusive license covering its animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049), which suggests it was stepping back from that line. The 2016 BiOptix acquisition and name change (claims 20980, 20981) were a further shift.
A. The record names no customers. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial is a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. The 2004 claim that the company marketed over 30 products to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102) does not identify any of them. The three licensing universities (claim 21095) are not named either.
A. Corporate actions are documented as completed: - the Vitro antigen acquisition (claim 21108) - the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20980) - the name changes (claims 21090, 20981) - the board and executive changes, including four directors resigning on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051) The product milestones are not documented as completed. StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and AppyScore was still 'pursuing' FDA clearance (claim 21050). The record contains no claim that either was approved. A 2010 board authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715) also has no recorded follow-through.
A. Shareholders repeatedly expanded the equity the company could issue. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and again by 60,000,000 in 2013 (claim 21040). The stock incentive plan grew several times: - 3,500,000 in 2005 (claim 21088) - 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim 20723) - 700,000 in 2010 (claims 20722, 20714) - 700,000 in 2011 (claim 20710) - 425,000 in 2013 (claim 21041) - 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim 21011) The company also launched a common stock offering in 2012 (claim 21048).
A. With caution. Several routine items are flagged 'delayed', including auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and a stock plan term running to 2021 (claim 20709). Claim 20711 even has a 'promised by' date (2010-03-24) that falls before its announcement date. These flags look like artifacts of automated extraction, not evidence of missed commitments. Before relying on any 'delayed' label, check it against the original filing.
A. 1. What happened after April 2017? The record is truncated, and the move to the current business is not documented here. 2. Did AppyScore or StayBred ever receive FDA clearance or approval, or produce meaningful revenue? 3. Who, if anyone, were the paying customers behind the '30+ products' claim (claim 21102)? 4. What drove four directors to resign together in September 2012 (claim 21051)? 5. Was the authorized reverse split (claim 20715) ever carried out? The practical next step is to extend the record past 2017 and to source revenue and customer data from the annual 10-K filings.
Frequently asked
2026-09-29A. The claims on record describe a small diagnostics company, not the business most readers associate with the RIOT ticker today. It started as an animal-health and antigen supplier. It acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081), renamed itself AspenBio Pharma (21090), and later worked on human diagnostics such as the AppyScore appendicitis blood test (21047). It then became Venaxis and, after acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics, renamed itself Bioptix (20980, 20979, 20981). The record we were given stops at a 2017-04-27 regulatory claim (20909), which is cut off. Riot's later shift to bitcoin mining is not covered by any claim in this record.
A. This record cannot answer that question. The latest complete claims date from October 2016 and cover the BiOptix acquisition and name change (20980, 20981). Nothing on record reflects the company's strategy after 2017. Readers should treat this dossier as history of the predecessor company, not as a picture of what Riot does today, until later filings are extracted.
A. No customers are named. The only customer claim is a general statement that the company sold over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for the SurBred 15 pregnancy test (21094), which makes it a distribution partner, not a disclosed customer. The company also had license arrangements with three universities (21095). Revenue concentration and customer identity are undisclosed in this record.
A. The completed corporate actions on record are: - the Vitro antigen acquisition (21108, 21081) - the BiOptix acquisition (20980, 20979) - name changes to AspenBio Pharma (21090) and later Bioptix (20981) - leadership changes, such as Stephen T. Lundy as CEO (20711) and Gail Schoettler as non-executive Chair (20716) The product claims are only described or in progress: - SurBred 15 (21096) - StayBred, which required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101) - AppyScore, for which the company was pursuing FDA clearance (21050) No claim records an FDA clearance or approval, or commercial sales figures, for any of these products.
A. The record shows repeated share authorizations and dilution tools: - Increases in authorized common stock of 60,000,000 (21089, 21040). - Stock incentive plan expansions of 3,500,000 (21088), 1,500,000 (20723), 700,000 (20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 (21041) and 1,800,000 (21011). - A board-authorized reverse split of up to 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011 (20721, 20715). - A common stock offering in 2012 (21048). Whether the reverse split was actually carried out is not recorded.
A. Yes, there are some to note: - Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). - In 2010 the board was reshuffled: the Executive Chairman stepped down, and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (20716–20719, 20712). - CEO and CFO turnover recurs across the record (21082, 21084, 20711). The record does not give reasons for the 2012 resignations.
A. Those labels come from automated extraction on 2026-09-28 and have not been verified by a human. Several look like extraction artifacts, not real missed commitments. Routine auditor ratifications are flagged as delayed (20720, 20713, 21012, 20982). Lundy's CEO appointment carries a 'promised by' date earlier than the filing itself (20711). Readers should not read 'delayed' as evidence that the company broke promises without first checking the underlying filing.
A. The largest gap is coverage. This record is truncated in 2017 and contains no claims about the company's later business, so filings from 2017 onward need to be extracted before any view on current strategy, customers or delivery is possible. Within the existing record, the open questions are: - whether AppyScore or StayBred ever received FDA clearance (21050, 21101) - whether the reverse split was executed (20721) - what became of the Merial partnership (21094) - what the BiOptix acquisition cost and contributed (20980)
Frequently asked
2026-09-28A. The claims on file describe a small diagnostics and animal-health biotech, not the business the RIOT ticker is known for today. From 2004 it sold antigen products, acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claim 21108), and marketed more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It also developed cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis (claim 21047). In 2016 it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20979, 20980).
A. The record shows several rebrands tied to changes in strategy. In 2005 the company restructured as a holding company (claim 21091) and changed its name to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2016 it was operating as Venaxis and renamed itself Bioptix after the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claim 20981). The claims shown end in April 2017 and include no transition to the name Riot or to any later business. Readers should not assume this dossier describes the company's current operations.
A. Customers are mostly unnamed. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). Merial was a distributor, not a disclosed end customer. The antigen business sold to 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' (claim 21102), but no specific customers are named. The company also licensed technology from three universities, which are not named in the record (claim 21095), and granted an exclusive license on its animal-health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049).
A. Delivered, per the record: the Vitro antigen acquisition (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claims 20979, 20980), the name changes, and many board and executive changes. Announced but not shown as completed: StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101), and the record contains no approval. The company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim 21050), and no clearance appears on file. A reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 was authorized for completion before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715, 20721), but no claim confirms it was carried out.
A. The record shows repeated increases in share capacity. Authorized common shares were increased by 60,000,000 in 2005 (claim 21089) and again by 60,000,000 in 2013 (claim 21040). The stock incentive plan grew by 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim 20723), 700,000 in 2010–2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim 21011). A common stock offering began in 2012 (claim 21048). The record does not state offering sizes or proceeds.
A. Leadership turned over frequently. Richard G. Donnelly became President and CEO in 2005 (claim 21082), and co-founder Roger D. Hurst's employment ended that year (claim 21087). In 2010 Stephen T. Lundy became CEO (claim 20711), Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, and Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (claims 20716, 20717). The Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (claims 20718, 20719). On September 26, 2012, four directors resigned at once (claim 21051), which a diligence reader should investigate.
A. 1) Coverage gap: the claims stop at a truncated April 2017 entry (claim 20904) and do not cover whatever the company became afterward, so this dossier cannot support conclusions about the current RIOT business. 2) Commercial results: the record never reports whether SurBred 15, StayBred, or AppyScore produced meaningful revenue or received regulatory clearance. 3) Governance: the reasons for the four director resignations in 2012 (claim 21051) are not disclosed. 4) Data quality: several routine items, such as auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and a CEO appointment (claim 20711), are marked 'delayed.' That label appears to come from automated deadline tagging rather than evidence of actual slippage, so treat it with caution.
A. First, obtain claims from April 2017 onward. That is where any transition to the company's current identity would appear, including name changes, new acquisitions, and financing. Second, look for filings confirming or ending the regulatory efforts for AppyScore and StayBred (claims 21050, 21101). Third, check whether the authorized reverse split was ever executed (claims 20715, 20721). Fourth, look for any disclosure naming actual customers beyond distributor Merial (claim 21094).
Frequently asked
2026-09-28A. The claims on file describe a small animal- and human-diagnostics company, not the business most readers now associate with the RIOT ticker. In 2004 it sold more than 30 antigen products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy blood test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood-based test for appendicitis in humans (claim 21047). The record stops in April 2017, and it contains nothing about the company's later business.
A. The record shows repeated rebranding. In 2005 the company announced a holding-company restructuring (claim 21091) and a name change to AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (claim 21090). By 2016 it was operating as Venaxis. That year it announced the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979) and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Each name change followed a shift in strategy, so readers should check which era a document comes from before relying on it.
A. This dossier cannot answer that. The last complete claims are from October 2016 and describe the BiOptix acquisition and the Bioptix rename (claims 20980, 20981). The record is cut off at an April 2017 entry (claim 20906) with no details. Nothing on file covers the company's strategy after 2017, so any statement about its present business must come from filings that have not yet been added to this record.
A. The record names no end customers. The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which received exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 in 2004 (claim 21094). Merial is a distribution partner, not a disclosed buyer. Other relationships are described only in general terms: license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim 21095), an unnamed exclusive licensee of animal health IP in 2012 (claim 21049), and 'diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities' as customers (claim 21102).
A. Corporate actions are the best documented. These include the acquisition of Vitro Diagnostics' antigen business (claims 21108, 21081), the BiOptix acquisition (claims 20980, 20979), the name changes, board changes (including four directors resigning in September 2012, claim 21051), and a 2012 stock offering (claim 21048). Product milestones are thinner. The record contains no FDA approval for StayBred, although approval or an ANDA filing was required (claim 21101). It also has no FDA clearance for AppyScore; the company was only 'pursuing' clearance as of 2012 (claim 21050). The reverse-split authorization, allowing a split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), has no recorded execution.
A. The record shows steady increases in the number of shares available for issuance. The Stock Incentive Plan grew by 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim 21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim 20723), 700,000 in 2010–2011 (claims 20722, 20714, 20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim 21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim 21011). Authorized common shares were set at 60,000,000 in both 2005 and 2013 (claims 21089, 21040). Combined with the 2012 stock offering (claim 21048), this points to a company that funded itself largely through equity.
A. Readers should be cautious with them. Several 'delayed' statuses appear to come from errors in automated date extraction, not from promises the company actually missed. For example, Stephen T. Lundy's CEO appointment (claim 20711) is marked due in March 2010, which is before the October 2010 filing date. Routine auditor ratifications are also flagged as delayed (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982). The only 'delayed' item with real substance is the reverse split, because nothing on file confirms it happened (claims 20721, 20715).
A. First, the dossier needs to be completed with filings from 2017 onward. Without them, it says nothing about the company's current business, revenue, or customers. Key open questions include: whether AppyScore ever received FDA clearance (claim 21050); what happened to SurBred 15 under the Merial deal and to StayBred (claims 21094, 21097, 21101); whether the reverse split was carried out (claim 20721); and what came of the BiOptix acquisition (claim 20980). The 'delayed' flags should also be reviewed by hand before any of them are treated as missed commitments.
Frequently asked
2026-09-27A. The record describes a small life-sciences company with several identities. In 2004 it sold antigens, over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102), after acquiring an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081). It was also developing cattle reproduction products: SurBred 15, a bovine pregnancy blood test (21096), and StayBred, a hormone to help maintain cattle pregnancy (21097). By 2012 its main focus was AppyScore, a blood test for appendicitis in humans (21047). The company was renamed AspenBio Pharma in 2005 (21090), later operated as Venaxis, and became Bioptix in 2016 (20981). The ticker RIOT reflects a later identity that these claims do not document.
A. The record cannot answer this. The latest claims date from April 2017. They cover the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (20980, 20979), a move of the company's legal home from Colorado to Nevada (20906), a new equity plan with 895,000 shares reserved (20909), and a March 2017 private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock (20904). Nothing on record describes the company's strategy after that point, so any current strategy has to come from sources outside this record.
A. End customers are mostly unnamed. The 2004 disclosures refer generally to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (21102). The only named commercial counterparty is Merial, which held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (21094). Merial was a distributor, not a disclosed buyer, and the record gives no sales figures or revenue for it. The record also mentions license arrangements with three universities (21095) and a 2012 exclusive license covering animal-health intellectual property (21049), but it does not name the other parties.
A. Most of what the record confirms is corporate housekeeping. That includes board and executive appointments, the name changes, increases to authorized shares (60,000,000 in 21089 and again in 21040), repeated expansions of the stock incentive plan (for example 3,500,000 shares in 21088 and 1,800,000 in 21011), and auditor ratifications. On products, the record shows SurBred 15 being marketed through Merial (21094). It does not confirm that StayBred received FDA approval, which it needed (21101), or that AppyScore received FDA clearance, which the company was pursuing (21050). Every claim was produced by automated extraction and carries the status 'stated', meaning it reflects what the company disclosed, not what was independently verified.
A. Leadership changed often. Richard Donnelly became CEO in 2005 (21082), and Stephen Lundy was named CEO and President by 2010 (20711). In October 2010 Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair and Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman (20716, 20717). The Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated at the same time (20718, 20719). Four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (21051). A co-founder-era employee, Roger Hurst, had an exclusive employment agreement in 2004 (21099), and his employment was terminated by 2005 (21087).
A. Start by filling the gap after 2017. The record stops before the company became the business now trading as RIOT. Next, check whether the reverse stock split authorized in 2010 (up to 1-for-6, by February 4, 2011; claims 20721, 20715) was ever carried out. Then look for outcomes of the FDA pathways for AppyScore (21050) and StayBred (21101). Finally, look up the terms and dilution effect of the March 2017 convertible financing (20904). This record captures that financing incompletely.
A. (1) How the company went from diagnostics to its current business. The record contains nothing after April 2017. (2) Whether any product produced meaningful revenue. The record includes no revenue or sales figures. (3) What happened to AppyScore, StayBred, and the BiOptix platform. (4) How much shareholders were diluted by repeated increases in authorized shares, incentive plan expansions, and convertible financings. (5) Who the counterparties were in the university and animal-health licenses (21095, 21049). None of the claims has been independently verified beyond automated extraction.
Frequently asked
2026-09-27A. Based on the disclosures on file, Riot's most recent described business (mid-2018) is cryptocurrency mining. It had leased a roughly 107,000 sq ft data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15504) and was installing mining machines there. It also held a set of crypto-adjacent stakes: a 12.9% interest in the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513), and the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claim 15509), a CFTC/NFA-registered broker with FinCEN and Florida licensing (claims 15510, 15511). Filings from 2009–2011 show only routine corporate governance items and do not describe the business operations at that time.
A. The strategy was to build out bitcoin-style mining capacity while also holding positions across crypto infrastructure: exchanges, brokerage and blockchain software. On mining, the company bought 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claim 15518) and acquired Kairos Global Technology, which brought 1,200 more (claim 15517). Its stated full-deployment target was 8,000 miners (claim 15506), drawing about 12 MW (claim 15507) and producing about 110 PH/s of hashing power (claim 15508). It also formed a subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15515), but the disclosure does not explain its purpose.
A. None are named. The mining business sells computing work to the network rather than to identified customers. The brokerage and exchange activities under Logical Brokerage (claim 15516) are described only as product offerings, with no named clients, volumes or revenue. Coinsquare, Tess and Verady are investment holdings, not customers.
A. Delivered: as of March 31, 2018, about 3,500 miners were installed and running (claim 15505). The Oklahoma City lease was signed (claim 15519), the listed acquisitions and investments were reported as completed, and the company said it had regained compliance with Nasdaq's listing rules (claim 15553). Announced but not confirmed in the record: reaching the full 8,000 miners (claim 15506), 12 MW (claim 15507) and 110 PH/s (claim 15508). The 3,500 installed was under half of that target. The 110 PH/s figure roughly matches 8,000 machines at the stated 13.5 TH/s each (claim 15550), so it depends on completing the full build-out.
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' flag alongside a 'stated' status: the miner deployment milestone (claim 15543), the Logical Brokerage acquisition timing (claim 15544) and the appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (claim 15555). Each record shows both transitions coming from automated extraction on the same day. That makes the delay flags ambiguous, and they should be checked against the underlying filings before anyone relies on them.
A. The early record covers governance and financing only. Stephen T. Lundy was appointed CEO and President (claim 20711). Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair after Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman (claims 20716, 20717), and the Vice Chairman and Lead Director roles were eliminated (claims 20718, 20719). The board was authorized to carry out a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claim 20721). The stock incentive plan grew by 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim 20723) and by 700,000 shares in each of 2010 and 2011 (claims 20722, 20710). The record does not show whether the reverse split actually took place.
A. First, whether the mining build-out reached the 8,000-miner, 12 MW and 110 PH/s targets (claims 15506–15508), and on what schedule. Second, whether the Logical Brokerage exchange offerings produced any revenue or named customers. Third, what became of the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady positions. Fourth, whether Nasdaq compliance held up after June 2018. Finally, who the CEO referenced on 2018-04-01 (claim 16647) is, because the record does not name them.
A. 1) Coverage gap: the claims on file end in mid-2018, with nothing from 2012–2017 and nothing after 2018, so the company's current scale and strategy cannot be judged from this dossier alone. 2) Pivot: the record does not explain how or why the company shifted from its pre-2012 business into crypto. 3) Duplicates: many 2018 figures appear several times under different claim ids (for example 15504, 15519, 15533 and 15542 all refer to the same lease), so counts should not be added together. 4) Status reliability: the ambiguous 'delayed' flags described above need verification against the source filings.
Frequently asked
2026-09-27A. In the 2018 disclosures on record, Riot's core business is cryptocurrency mining from a leased 107,000 sq ft facility in Oklahoma City (claims 15533, 15504, 15469). Around that core it held a set of crypto-related stakes: 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (15545), 52% of blockchain-solutions firm Tess Inc. (15547), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15546). It also agreed to buy Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (15509) and formed a Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515). Note that every claim here dates from April to July 2018. Nothing in this record describes the company after that.
A. The plan was to scale Oklahoma City mining to full deployment: 8,000 miners (15506), about 12 MW of power (15507), and an expected 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508). The miners came from the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, which brought 1,200 units (15502), plus 6,800 more bought in February 2018 (15503). Riot also pursued a broader 'crypto platform' angle. It planned to use Logical Brokerage, which had CFTC/NFA registration and FinCEN/Florida money-transmitter licensing (15510, 15511), for exchange offerings (15516). It also floated mining operations in other locations, but without specifics (15474).
A. None are named. Bitcoin mining earns block rewards and fees from the network, not revenue from contracted customers, so there is no customer list to disclose. Coinsquare, Tess and Verady are investments, not customers. The planned Logical Brokerage exchange business would have served retail or institutional traders, but the record names no clients and gives no volumes for it.
A. Delivered or completed per the filings: the Oklahoma City lease (15519), the Kairos and 6,800-miner purchases (15517, 15518), the Coinsquare and Tess stakes, the Verady note, the Tess acquisition (15472), and a return to Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (15553). Partially delivered: only 3,500 of the 8,000 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). The 110 PH/s and 12 MW figures are targets, not achieved results (15508, 15526). The exchange business under Logical Brokerage was described but not shown to be operating.
A. Three claims are tagged 'delayed': miner deployment (3,500 units, 15543), the Logical Brokerage acquisition (15544, promised by 2018-03-27), and the MNP LLP auditor appointment for 2018 (15555). Each of these also carries a 'stated' transition from the same extraction pass on the same date. That means the delayed label comes from automated extraction and has not been confirmed by an editor. Treat them as leads to check against the source filings, not as settled findings.
A. Yes. The dossier contains many near-duplicate claims: the Kairos, 6,800-miner, Coinsquare, Logical Brokerage and 110 PH/s items each appear three to five times. The per-miner performance spec is recorded as both 13.75 TH/s (15530) and 13.5 TH/s (15550), and one of those figures is wrong. The CEO entry (16647) records a personnel change with no name attached. These look like extraction artifacts, but a reader should not count repeated claims as independent confirmation.
A. First, whether the dossier is extended beyond July 2018. As provided, it says nothing about Riot's later scale, its facilities outside Oklahoma, or its current strategy. Within the 2018 window, check three things. Did deployment reach the 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s target (15506, 15508)? Did the Logical Brokerage exchange ever launch? What happened to the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady positions?
A. (1) Coverage: the record stops in mid-2018, so any conclusion about Riot today would go beyond the evidence here. (2) Leadership: the CEO change (16647) is recorded without a name, so it is unclear who was accountable for these plans. (3) Strategic coherence: in a single quarter, a Nasdaq-listed company combined mining with a brokerage license, an exchange stake and a majority-owned blockchain startup. The record does not explain how these pieces fit together or how they were funded. (4) Auditor and compliance history: the auditor appointment is flagged as delayed (15555), and the company had to regain Nasdaq compliance (15553). Both merit a look at the underlying filings.
Frequently asked
2026-09-27A. The claims on record describe Riot as a cryptocurrency miner running mining machines at a leased facility in Oklahoma City (claims 15469, 15533). Around that core it held stakes in crypto businesses: 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15545), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15546), and Logical Brokerage Corp, acquired for $600,000 (claim 15509).
A. Not current. Every claim on record dates from April to July 2018, and the list provided was cut off partway through. The dossier therefore describes Riot's 2018 strategy, not its present one. Treat anything here as historical until later filings are added.
A. The main plan was to scale mining in Oklahoma City to 8,000 miners (claim 15506), drawing 12 MW of power (claim 15507), for an expected hash rate of about 110 PH/s (claim 15508). Riot also said it might set up mining in other locations (claim 15474). Alongside mining, it pursued exchange and brokerage ambitions through Coinsquare and Logical Brokerage, which held CFTC/NFA registration and FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claims 15510, 15511).
A. None are named. Bitcoin mining has no customers in the usual sense, since revenue comes from block rewards and fees. The only customer-facing business in the record is Logical Brokerage's exchange offerings (claim 15516), and no clients, volumes, or revenue figures are disclosed for it.
A. Delivered: Riot acquired 1,200 miners with Kairos Global Technology (claim 15502) plus 6,800 more miners (claim 15503), signed a 107,000 sq ft lease (claim 15533), closed the Logical Brokerage deal (claim 15509), and regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Only partly delivered: as of March 31, 2018, just 3,500 of the planned 8,000 miners were installed and operating (claim 15505), and the tracker marks that deployment as delayed (claim 15543). The 110 PH/s hash rate was a target, not a measured result (claim 15508).
A. Yes. Many 2018 claims repeat the same fact under different ids; for example, the $600,000 Logical Brokerage deal appears as claims 15509, 15521, 15534, and 15544. The per-miner performance spec also conflicts: 13.75 TH/s in claim 15530 versus 13.5 TH/s in claim 15550. The MNP LLP auditor appointment is flagged as delayed (claim 15555), and the Logical Brokerage acquisition carries a promise date earlier than its disclosure date (claim 15544).
A. First, filings after mid-2018 that show whether the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s build-out was completed (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Second, whether mining expanded beyond Oklahoma City (claim 15474). Third, what became of the Coinsquare, Tess, Verady, and Logical Brokerage positions.
A. The biggest one is that the dossier stops in 2018 and is truncated, so Riot's current strategy, scale, and holdings are not documented here. Beyond that: whether the hash-rate target was ever reached, whether the side investments and brokerage produced value or were exited, why the auditor appointment was delayed (claim 15555), and which miner spec figure is correct.
Frequently asked
2026-09-27A. In the disclosures on record, which all date from 2018, Riot is a cryptocurrency miner. It runs mining machines at a leased Oklahoma City facility of 107,000 square feet (claim 15504). It also holds stakes in other crypto businesses: 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15514), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513). It also agreed to buy Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15509).
A. This dossier can't say. Every claim on record is from 2018, and the record appears to cut off partway through a July 2018 filing. At that time, the strategy was to build out bitcoin mining in Oklahoma City, possibly add mining sites elsewhere (claim 15474), and hold investments in exchanges, brokerage, and blockchain services. Do not treat this as Riot's present-day strategy without newer filings.
A. No customers are named. A self-mining operation earns cryptocurrency rewards directly, not revenue from contracted buyers. The one customer-facing business in the record is Logical Brokerage's exchange offerings (claim 15516), and no clients of that business are named either.
A. Delivered: 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), the 107,000 sq ft lease (claim 15519), completion of the Tess Inc. acquisition (claim 15472), and regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced as targets: full deployment of 8,000 miners (claim 15506), 12 MW of power (claim 15507), and about 110 PH/s of hashing power (claim 15508). The 8,000 figure combines the 1,200 miners from the Kairos deal (claim 15502) and 6,800 more (claim 15503). The record does not confirm that full deployment ever happened.
A. Three claims are marked delayed: the miner deployment tied to March 31, 2018 (claim 15543), the Logical Brokerage acquisition with a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544), and the MNP LLP auditor appointment for 2018 (claim 15555). All three also carry a 'stated' transition from the same automated extraction. The 'delayed' labels may therefore be extraction artifacts, and they should be checked against the source filings before anyone relies on them.
A. First, any filing showing whether the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s build-out was completed. Second, whether the Logical Brokerage deal and its licensing (CFTC/NFA, FinCEN, Florida money transmitter; claims 15510, 15511) actually closed. Third, what happened to the Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady positions. Most importantly, pull post-2018 disclosures, because this record says nothing about the company after mid-2018.
A. (1) The record stops in 2018 and is cut off, so it may be incomplete even for that year. (2) The hardware specs disagree: 13.75 TH/s per miner in claim 15530 versus 13.5 TH/s in claim 15550. (3) Many claims are near-duplicates of the same June 28, 2018 facts extracted several times, which can make the activity look larger than it was. (4) A CEO-related claim exists (claim 16647), but the record gives no detail on who held the role or whether it changed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-27A. The claims on record date from 2018. They describe a cryptocurrency miner running machines at a leased 107,000 sq ft facility in Oklahoma City (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). Alongside mining, the company held stakes in crypto businesses and bought a regulated brokerage, Logical Brokerage Corp, for $600,000 (claims 15509, 15521, 15534). The record excerpt ends in mid-2018, so it says nothing about what the company does today.
A. Riot had three strands. First, scale its own mining to 8,000 machines drawing 12 MW for about 110 PH/s of hashing power (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Second, explore launching a US cryptocurrency exchange through Logical Brokerage (claim 15470), which held CFTC/NFA registration, FinCEN registration and a Florida money transmitter license (claims 15510, 15511, 15528, 15529). Third, hold minority and majority stakes: 12.9% of Coinsquare (claim 15512), 52% of Tess Inc (claim 15514), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513). It also formed a Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (claim 15515) and mentioned possible mining sites elsewhere (claim 15474).
A. No customers are named anywhere in the record. Self-mining earns block rewards from the network, so it has no customers in the usual sense. The planned exchange and the brokerage would have had clients, but none are identified, and no revenue figures by customer are disclosed.
A. Delivered by the company's own account: the Oklahoma City lease, the purchase of 1,200 miners via Kairos Global Technology (claim 15502) and 6,800 more in February 2018 (claim 15503), and 3,500 miners installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505). That is about 44% of the 8,000-unit target. Announced but not shown as achieved: full 8,000-miner deployment, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508), and the US exchange launch, which was only 'under investigation' (claim 15470). The record contains no measured hash rate.
A. Most claims come from automated extraction of one filing dated 2018-06-28, and the same facts were pulled out several times. For example, the 110 PH/s target appears as claims 15508, 15527, 15539 and 15552. These repeats are one company statement recorded multiple times. They do not confirm each other.
A. Three claims are marked delayed: the installed-miner count (claim 15543), the Logical Brokerage deal (claim 15544) and the 2018 auditor appointment of MNP LLP (claim 15555). Their 'promised by' dates of 2018-03-31, 2018-03-27 and 2018-12-31 come from automated extraction. Two of those dates fall before the filing that produced them, and each of these claims was also recorded as 'stated'. They look like extraction artifacts, not evidence that anything slipped. Check them against the source filings before relying on them.
A. (1) Did the company reach the full 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s deployment, and when? (2) The record gives two different per-machine figures, 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530). Only the higher one matches 110 PH/s across 8,000 units; the lower one works out to about 108 PH/s. (3) Did the US exchange ever launch? (4) How much were the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady stakes worth, and what became of them? (5) The CEO-related personnel entry (claim 16647) gives no detail. (6) The record shown stops in 2018, which leaves years of history unaccounted for.
A. Look for later filings with actual miner counts and hash rate compared against the 8,000-unit, 110 PH/s target. Also watch for any exchange launch or wind-down at Logical Brokerage, and for updates on the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady holdings. On governance and listing, the company regained Nasdaq compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim 15553); watch for auditor continuity after the MNP LLP appointment (claim 15555) and for leadership changes. Most importantly, add claims after mid-2018 to the dossier before drawing conclusions about the company as it is now.
Frequently asked
2026-09-26A. As of mid-2018, Riot described itself mainly as a cryptocurrency miner running operations in Oklahoma City (claim 15469). It leased a 107,000-square-foot data center there (claims 15504, 15519) and targeted about 8,000 miners (claims 15506, 15551), 12 MW of power (claims 15507, 15526), and an expected hash rate of about 110 PH/s at full deployment (claims 15508, 15527). It also held minority and majority stakes in other crypto businesses, including 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (claims 15522, 15545) and 52% of Tess Inc. (claims 15514, 15524).
A. The 2018 filings describe a build-out in three parts. First, scale self-mining by buying hardware: 1,200 miners came through the Kairos Global Technology acquisition (claims 15502, 15517), and 6,800 more were bought in February 2018 (claims 15503, 15518). Second, move toward exchange and brokerage activity. Riot bought Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claims 15509, 15521), which held CFTC/NFA registrations and FinCEN/Florida money-transmitter licensing (claims 15510, 15511), and it said it was looking into launching a U.S. crypto exchange (claim 15470). Third, take small positions in adjacent ventures, such as a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims 15513, 15523) and a new subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claims 15515, 15525).
A. The record names no customers. Self-mining earns block rewards from the network rather than revenue from named clients. The planned exchange and brokerage business (claims 15470, 15516) was still being investigated as of these filings, and no clients for it are disclosed. The named counterparties are acquisition targets and investees: Kairos, Logical Brokerage, Coinsquare, Tess and Verady. None of them are customers.
A. Reported as done: the Oklahoma City lease (claim 15519), the Kairos acquisition (claim 15471), the purchase of 6,800 miners (claim 15518), and about 3,500 miners installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520). Riot also regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Still targets rather than results: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15526, 15527), and the U.S. exchange (claim 15470). The dossier contains no later claim confirming that full deployment happened.
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' status. They are the deployment of 3,500 miners by 2018-03-31 (claim 15543), the Logical Brokerage acquisition against a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544), and MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor (claim 15555). Each of these also has a same-day transition to 'stated', so their status is ambiguous and should be checked against the source filings before anyone relies on it. Other claims (15505, 15520) report the 3,500 miners as operating by March 31, which conflicts with the delayed flag on 15543.
A. Yes, a few small ones. The per-unit miner performance appears as 13.75 TH/s in one claim (15530) and 13.5 TH/s in another (15550). The same facts are also repeated across many near-duplicate claims pulled from the same 2018-06-28 filing, such as the lease, the acquisitions and the Coinsquare stake. The CEO personnel claim (16647) does not name the person. These look like automated-extraction artifacts, but anyone citing a specific figure should check it against the original filing.
A. The biggest gap is that the dossier stops in July 2018. It says nothing about what happened afterward to the mining fleet, the exchange plan, or the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady stakes. Readers should look for disclosures confirming whether the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s build-out was reached (claims 15506, 15507, 15508), whether a U.S. exchange ever launched (claim 15470), what came of the Logical Brokerage licenses (claims 15510, 15511), and who the CEO referenced in claim 16647 is.
A. 1) How much of the planned 110 PH/s was actually brought online, and when? Only about 3,500 of 8,000 miners are confirmed running (claims 15505, 15506). 2) Did the exchange and brokerage pivot produce any real business, or did it stay at the 'investigating' stage (claim 15470)? 3) How were the minority investments valued and eventually exited (claims 15522, 15524, 15523)? 4) How much weight do the 'delayed' flags deserve, given their conflicting transitions (claims 15543, 15544, 15555)? This record cannot answer any of these, because it has no disclosures after mid-2018.
Frequently asked
2026-09-26A. In the disclosures on record (April–July 2018), Riot runs a cryptocurrency mining operation at a leased facility in Oklahoma City (claim 15469). It also holds stakes in several crypto and blockchain businesses: 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (claim 15545), 52% of Tess Inc. (claim 15514), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513). It also acquired a small licensed brokerage, Logical Brokerage Corp, for $600,000 (claim 15521).
A. The strategy had two parts. The first was to scale up mining in Oklahoma City: a 107,000 sq ft lease (claim 15519) with a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (claim 15506), 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and about 110 PH/s of hash rate (claim 15508). The second was to build a regulated crypto-exchange business. That rested on Logical Brokerage's CFTC/NFA registration (claim 15510), its FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claim 15511), and an announced investigation into launching a US cryptocurrency exchange (claim 15470). The company also formed a subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15525).
A. None are named. Mining earns block rewards from the network rather than revenue from identifiable customers, so no customer disclosures should be expected for that side of the business. For the brokerage and exchange plans, the record describes Logical Brokerage's offerings (claim 15516) but does not name any clients. The named counterparties are investees and sellers, not customers: Coinsquare, Tess, Verady, Kairos Global Technology and Logical Brokerage.
A. Delivered or completed: the Oklahoma City lease was executed (claim 15519); 3,500 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505); the Kairos acquisition, which brought 1,200 miners, closed (claims 15517, 15471); 6,800 more miners were bought in February 2018 (claim 15518); and Nasdaq listing compliance was regained (claim 15553). Announced but not shown as delivered: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and about 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508), and any US exchange launch, which was still at the 'investigation' stage (claim 15470).
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' status. They are the Logical Brokerage acquisition, measured against a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544); the 3,500-miners-by-March-31 milestone (claim 15543); and MNP LLP's appointment as the 2018 auditor (claim 15555). Treat these flags with caution. Each claim also shows a 'stated' transition. In addition, claim 15505 reports the 3,500 miners as already operating on March 31, which suggests the delayed label on claim 15543 may be an extraction artifact rather than a real slip. These should be checked against the source filings.
A. Three things. First, whether the mining site actually reached 8,000 miners, 12 MW and about 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Second, whether the US exchange investigation (claim 15470) turned into a launch that made use of Logical Brokerage's licenses. Third, what happened to the minority stakes in Coinsquare, Tess and Verady. On governance, look for confirmation that MNP completed the 2018 audit (claim 15555).
A. 1) Coverage ends in July 2018, so the record says nothing about what the company did after that. Any view of Riot today needs sources beyond this dossier. 2) The CEO claim (claim 16647) does not name the person. 3) The per-miner hardware spec is inconsistent: 13.75 TH/s in claim 15530 versus 13.5 TH/s in claim 15550. 4) Many claims are duplicates extracted from the same 2018-06-28 filing, so the number of distinct commitments is much smaller than the claim count suggests. 5) The record contains no revenue, cost, hash-rate delivery or exchange-launch results.
Frequently asked
2026-09-26A. The claims on record date only from April to July 2018. In that period Riot described itself mainly as a bitcoin miner. It ran cryptocurrency mining in a leased Oklahoma City facility of 107,000 square feet (claims 15519, 15542). Around that core it held a portfolio of crypto-related stakes and small businesses. The dossier does not cover the company's later history.
A. The plan was to scale mining up to full deployment: 8,000 miners (claim 15506), about 12 MW of power (claim 15507), and an expected hash rate of 110 PH/s (claim 15508). The fleet was built through the Kairos Global Technology acquisition of 1,200 miners (claim 15502) plus 6,800 more miners bought in February 2018 (claim 15503). Riot also looked into launching a US crypto exchange (claim 15470). To support that, it agreed to buy Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15509), a firm with CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter registrations (claims 15510, 15511).
A. None are named. A bitcoin miner earns block rewards and fees from the network, not revenue from contracts with named clients, so there is no customer list. The disclosed counterparties are investees and acquisition targets: Coinsquare (12.9% stake, claim 15512), Tess Inc. (52%, claim 15514), Verady LLC ($200,000 convertible note, claim 15513), Kairos, and Logical Brokerage.
A. Delivered: the Kairos acquisition was reported completed (claim 15471). About 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505). Riot also reported regaining Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced but not shown as achieved in this record: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s, and the US exchange, which was only 'under investigation.' The Logical Brokerage deal is flagged as delayed against a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544).
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' status. The Logical Brokerage acquisition slipped past 2018-03-27 (claim 15544). The 3,500-miner deployment is tied to 2018-03-31 (claim 15543). The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 is also flagged (claim 15555). All three were set by automated extraction and also have a 'stated' transition, so the delay labels need human review before anyone relies on them.
A. First, whether later filings show the fleet reached 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Second, whether the Logical Brokerage deal closed and any US exchange launched. Third, what happened to the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady positions. Finally, the dossier needs claims after July 2018, because the company's current strategy cannot be judged from this record.
A. 1. Coverage stops in mid-2018, so this record says nothing about Riot's present-day scale, strategy or finances. 2. Many claims are duplicates of one June 28, 2018 filing, and all were machine-extracted. 3. Some figures conflict: the per-miner hardware spec appears as both 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550). 4. The statuses are inconsistent, since several claims were marked both 'delayed' and 'stated' on the same day.
Frequently asked
2026-09-25A. In the disclosures on record, which date from mid-2018, Riot is mainly a cryptocurrency miner. It leased a 107,000 sq ft data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15519) and was installing mining machines there. It also held a portfolio of crypto-adjacent stakes: a 12.9% interest in the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15545), 52% of blockchain-solutions firm Tess Inc. (claim 15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15523), and the brokerage Logical Brokerage Corp.
A. The 2018 filings describe two tracks. The first was scaling self-mining to 8,000 miners (claim 15506) drawing 12 MW (claim 15507), with a targeted hash rate of 110 PH/s (claim 15508). The second was building a regulated exchange and brokerage business. Riot bought Logical Brokerage for $600,000 (claim 15521), which held CFTC/NFA registration (claim 15548) and FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claim 15549). Riot said it was investigating a US crypto exchange launch (claim 15470). The record contains no later strategy statements, so this dossier does not show whether that strategy still holds.
A. No customers are named anywhere in the record. A self-mining operation earns cryptocurrency directly rather than selling to named clients. The planned exchange and brokerage business would have had customers, but none are disclosed. The named counterparties are acquisition and investment targets (Kairos Global Technology, Logical Brokerage, Coinsquare, Tess, Verady), not buyers.
A. Reported as done: 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505); the Oklahoma City lease executed (claim 15519); the Kairos acquisition closed, bringing 1,200 miners (claims 15540, 15471); the Tess acquisition closed (claim 15472); a purchase of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claim 15518); and Nasdaq listing compliance regained (claim 15553). Still targets at the time: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW, and 110 PH/s (claims 15506-15508). The US exchange was only under investigation (claim 15470). The dossier has no follow-up confirming that the full-deployment targets were reached.
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' status: the MNP LLP auditor appointment (claim 15555), the Logical Brokerage acquisition (claim 15544), and the 3,500-miner deployment (claim 15543). Each also shows a parallel transition to 'stated'. For 15544, the promised-by date (2018-03-27) is earlier than the disclosure date. For 15543, other claims report the same milestone as met (claim 15505). These labels look like extraction artifacts rather than evidence of real slippage, and they should be checked against the source filings before anyone relies on them.
A. Yes, one small one. The per-machine hardware spec appears as both 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550) in disclosures from the same date. Many other figures (the 110 PH/s target, 8,000 miners, $600,000 Logical price, 12.9% Coinsquare stake) are repeated across several duplicate claims and agree with each other.
A. First, whether Riot reached the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s full-deployment targets (claims 15506-15508). Second, whether the US exchange ever launched (claim 15470). Third, what became of the Coinsquare, Tess, Verady, and Logical Brokerage positions. Fourth, the auditor situation (claim 15555). Leadership also matters: a CEO change is logged for April 2018 (claim 16647), but the entry does not name the person.
A. Coverage is the main gap. Every claim shown dates from April-July 2018, and the list is cut off mid-record, so nothing here describes Riot's current operations, scale, or strategy. The record is also heavily duplicated: the same facts appear under several claim ids. Treat it as a snapshot of a 2018 pivot into crypto mining and brokerage, not a current profile. Later filings are needed to see what was actually completed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-25A. In the disclosures on record, which date from mid-2018, Riot is primarily a bitcoin mining company. It runs mining machines in a leased Oklahoma City data center of about 107,000 square feet (claim 15519). It also holds stakes in several crypto-related businesses: 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of Tess Inc., a blockchain solutions company (claim 15514), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513). It also formed a subsidiary called Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15525).
A. The strategy was to scale up mining and branch into crypto financial services. On mining, the stated target at full deployment was 8,000 miners (claim 15506), drawing about 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and producing an expected hash rate of about 110 PH/s (claim 15508). Riot bought 1,200 miners through the Kairos Global Technology acquisition (claim 15517) and another 6,800 miners (claim 15518). On financial services, it agreed to buy Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15521), a firm with CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter registrations. It also said it was investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (claim 15470) and possible mining sites in other locations (claim 15474).
A. No customers are named anywhere in the record. That is expected for a bitcoin miner: its revenue comes from block rewards and fees earned on the bitcoin network, not from contracts with named buyers. Revenue from the planned brokerage or exchange business would have had customers, but no customers or volumes for those operations appear in the claims.
A. Delivered or completed: the Kairos acquisition (claim 15471), the Tess acquisition (claim 15472), the Oklahoma City lease (claim 15519), and a return to Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Mining was only partly built out. About 3,500 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), against the 8,000-miner target (claim 15506). The 110 PH/s hash rate (claim 15508) was guidance, not an achieved figure. The US exchange launch was only under investigation (claim 15470).
A. Yes, several. The Logical Brokerage acquisition is marked 'delayed' in one record, with a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 (claim 15544). Other records simply list it as stated (claim 15521). The MNP LLP auditor appointment for 2018 is also flagged 'delayed' (claim 15555). The per-machine performance spec is inconsistent: 13.5 TH/s in one record (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s in another (claim 15530). Many claims are duplicates of the same 2018 filing because they came from automated extraction, so the count of claims overstates how many distinct events there were.
A. First, whether the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s build-out was ever completed (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Second, whether the Logical Brokerage deal closed and led to an operating brokerage or exchange (claims 15521, 15470). Third, whether mining expanded beyond Oklahoma City (claim 15474). Fourth, what happened to the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady holdings (claims 15512, 15514, 15513).
A. The main gap is coverage. The claims shown stop in mid-2018, so this record says nothing about how the company developed after that. A reader should not treat these 2018 targets as describing the current business. Within 2018, there are three open questions: whether the full deployment was delivered, whether the side ventures into brokerage, exchange and blockchain services produced anything, and why the brokerage acquisition and auditor appointment were flagged as delayed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-24A. In the disclosures on record, which run from April to July 2018, Riot is mainly a cryptocurrency miner. It leased a 107,000 sq ft data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15504) and filled it with mining machines, largely acquired rather than built. The Kairos Global Technology acquisition brought 1,200 miners (claim 15502), and a further purchase added 6,800 (claim 15503). Alongside mining, it held a collection of stakes in other crypto businesses.
A. There were two tracks. The first was to scale mining in Oklahoma City to a full deployment of 8,000 miners (claim 15506), drawing about 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and producing an expected 110 PH/s of hashing power (claim 15508). The company also said it might set up mining in other locations (claim 15474). The second was to build a wider crypto-finance portfolio. That included 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of blockchain developer Tess Inc. (claim 15514), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513), and the $600,000 purchase of Logical Brokerage Corp (claim 15509). Riot said it was looking into launching a US crypto exchange (claim 15470), and it formed a subsidiary called Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15515).
A. None are named, and a self-mining business may not have customers in the usual sense. Riot earns coins by validating transactions on the blockchain network, not by selling to named buyers. Logical Brokerage was described as a registered broker with CFTC/NFA registration (claim 15510) and FinCEN/Florida money-transmitter licensing (claim 15511), but the record names none of its clients. The company also discloses no revenue split by customer.
A. The company reports these as done: the Kairos and Tess acquisitions (claims 15471, 15472), the Oklahoma City lease (claim 15504), regaining Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553), and the Logical Brokerage purchase (claim 15509). On mining, only 3,500 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), against the 8,000-unit full-deployment target (claim 15506). The 110 PH/s figure is guidance, not a measured result (claim 15552). The US exchange was only being 'investigated' (claim 15470).
A. Three items are marked 'delayed': the auditor appointment (claim 15555), the miner deployment count (claim 15543), and the Logical Brokerage acquisition (claim 15544). Readers should be cautious with these flags. Each item also has a 'stated' transition logged the same day. Claim 15544's promised-by date (2018-03-27) is earlier than the filing that reported it. Claim 15543 treats a status snapshot ('3,500 operating as of March 31') as if it were a deadline. These look like artifacts of automated extraction, not confirmed slippage, and should be checked against the source filings.
A. There are four main things to watch. First, whether Riot actually reached 8,000 miners and roughly 110 PH/s in Oklahoma (claims 15506, 15508). Second, whether the US exchange moved beyond investigation (claim 15470). Third, whether mining expanded to other sites (claim 15474). Fourth, what happened to the minority and majority stakes: Coinsquare, Tess, Verady, and Logical Brokerage. Later filings would show whether these became operating businesses or were written down or sold.
A. 1) Coverage: the record supplied here ends in July 2018, so it says nothing about the company's later direction. 2) Duplication: most claims are repeated extractions from a single 2018-06-28 filing, so the number of claims overstates how many separate commitments there were. 3) Inconsistency: the stated miner performance differs between 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530). 4) Leadership: the record logs a CEO-related personnel event (claim 16647) but does not say who or what changed. 5) Focus: it is unclear how a mining company intended to run and fund a broker, an exchange, and several venture stakes at once.
Frequently asked
2026-09-24A. In the disclosures on file (mid-2018), Riot is mainly a bitcoin mining company. It buys specialized mining computers and runs them in a leased data center in Oklahoma City of about 107,000 square feet (claim 15519). It also held stakes in several crypto-related businesses: 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (claim 15512), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15514), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513), and the broker Logical Brokerage Corp, bought for $600,000 (claim 15509).
A. The plan on record had two parts. The first was to scale mining in Oklahoma City to about 8,000 machines (claim 15506), drawing about 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and producing an expected hash rate of about 110 PH/s (claim 15508). The second was to branch out through crypto investments and by looking into launching a U.S. cryptocurrency exchange, using Logical Brokerage's regulatory registrations (claim 15470). The company also said it might set up mining operations in other locations (claim 15474).
A. No customers are named anywhere in this record. Revenue from bitcoin mining comes from network block rewards and transaction fees, not from contracted customers. The planned exchange and brokerage businesses would have had customers, but none are disclosed here.
A. Delivered: About 3,500 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505). The Kairos Global Technology acquisition closed, adding about 1,200 miners (claims 15517, 15471). The Tess Inc. acquisition closed (claim 15472). The Oklahoma City lease was signed (claim 15519). The company regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced but not shown as achieved: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW, and 110 PH/s (claims 15506–15508). The U.S. exchange was only under investigation (claim 15470).
A. Yes. The record marks three claims as delayed: the miner deployment milestone tied to March 31, 2018 (claim 15543), the Logical Brokerage acquisition against an earlier target date (claim 15544), and the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor (claim 15555). Each of these delayed claims also shows a 'stated' status in its transition history, so treat the classification as preliminary until someone checks it against the source filings.
A. First, whether mining reached the 8,000-miner / 110 PH/s target (claims 15506, 15508) and when. Second, whether the U.S. exchange plan (claim 15470) turned into a launched product or was dropped. Third, what happened to the Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady stakes (claims 15512–15514). Fourth, whether mining expanded beyond Oklahoma City (claim 15474).
A. The record on file covers only about April–July 2018. The list appears to be cut off after claim 15474, so it says nothing about later strategy, facilities, or results, and 2018 plans should not be read as the company's current position. Many claims are duplicate extractions of the same fact. For example, the 110 PH/s target appears as claims 15508, 15527, 15539, and 15552. Counting claims will therefore overstate how much was actually disclosed. All statuses come from automated extraction and have only been lightly reviewed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-23A. On the record here, Riot is a cryptocurrency (bitcoin) miner. It leased a 107,000 sq ft data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15504) and assembled its miner fleet mainly through acquisitions, including 1,200 miners from Kairos Global Technology (claim 15502) and 6,800 additional miners (claim 15503). In 2018 it also held stakes in adjacent crypto businesses: 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of Tess Inc. (claim 15514), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513).
A. As of mid-2018, the strategy had three parts. First, scale Oklahoma City mining to about 8,000 miners (claim 15506), drawing about 12 MW (claim 15507), for an expected 110 PH/s hash rate (claim 15508). Second, move into regulated crypto trading by buying Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15509), a firm with CFTC/NFA registration (claim 15510) and FinCEN/Florida money-transmitter status (claim 15511). Riot said it was investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange (claim 15470). Third, possibly mine in other locations (claim 15474). It also formed a subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15515), but the record does not say what that subsidiary was for.
A. None are named. A self-mining business earns block rewards and fees from the network, not revenue from contracted customers. Nothing on record identifies customers for the brokerage or exchange plans either. The named counterparties are acquisition targets and investees: Kairos, Logical Brokerage, Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady.
A. Delivered: completed acquisitions of Kairos (claim 15471) and Tess (claim 15472), the executed Oklahoma City lease (claim 15519), about 3,500 miners installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), and regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced but not shown as achieved: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508), the US exchange (claim 15470), and expansion to other sites (claim 15474). At the last datapoint, fewer than half of the targeted miners were operating.
A. Three are tagged delayed: the miner deployment tied to March 31, 2018 (claim 15543), the Logical Brokerage deal tied to March 27, 2018 (claim 15544), and MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor (claim 15555). All three also carry an earlier 'stated' transition. The deployment and brokerage deadlines fall before the June 28 filing that records them, so these tags may be extraction artifacts rather than real misses. Check them against the source filings before relying on them.
A. Four things. Whether the 3,500 operating miners reached the 8,000-unit, 110 PH/s full-deployment target (claims 15505, 15508). Whether the Logical Brokerage and exchange plans launched or were dropped (claims 15509, 15470). What happened to the minority stakes in Coinsquare, Tess and Verady (claims 15512, 15514, 15513). Whether mining expanded beyond Oklahoma City (claim 15474).
A. Coverage is the largest gap: every claim on record dates from mid-2018, so this dossier cannot tell you where Riot stands today. The record is also heavily duplicated, with the same acquisitions and capacity figures extracted several times from one filing, so claim counts overstate how much was actually disclosed. Finally, the record shows no production or revenue figures, and no explanation of how the mining and brokerage/exchange ambitions fit together.
Frequently asked
2026-09-23A. In the period covered here, mid-2018, Riot was a cryptocurrency miner. It ran mining machines at a leased data center in Oklahoma City of about 107,000 square feet (claim 15519). It also held a scattered set of other crypto-related stakes. The claims on record run only from April to July 2018, so this dossier describes Riot's early mining phase, not the company as it is today.
A. Mining came first. Riot bought 1,200 miners through its Kairos Global Technology acquisition (claim 15502) and 6,800 more in February 2018 (claim 15503), for a planned fleet of 8,000 machines (claim 15506). At full deployment the fleet was expected to use 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and produce about 110 PH/s of hashing power (claim 15508). Around that core, Riot pursued other bets: a 12.9% stake in the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15514), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513), and the $600,000 purchase of Logical Brokerage Corp (claim 15509). It also said it was investigating a US crypto exchange (claim 15470) and possible mining sites in other locations (claim 15474).
A. None are named, which fits the business model. A miner earns cryptocurrency from the network rather than selling to customers. The one customer-facing piece was Logical Brokerage, a futures and forex brokerage registered with the CFTC and NFA (claim 15510). Its exchange offerings are mentioned (claim 15516), but no clients or volumes are disclosed.
A. Delivered, per the record: - 3,500 miners installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505). - A signed Oklahoma City lease (claim 15519). - Completed acquisitions of Kairos and Tess (claims 15471, 15472). - Regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced but not shown as achieved: - The full 8,000-miner fleet, 12 MW of power and 110 PH/s of hashing power (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). These are targets only; no claim confirms they were reached. - The US exchange, which remained an investigation (claim 15470).
A. Three items are marked delayed: - The 3,500-miner deployment tied to March 31, 2018 (claim 15543). - The Logical Brokerage acquisition tied to March 27, 2018 (claim 15544). - MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor (claim 15555). The miner item conflicts with claim 15505, which reports those same 3,500 miners as already operating on that date. Readers should treat the 'delayed' label on the miner count with caution until the source filings are checked.
A. Yes, a minor one. The per-machine hashing spec appears as both 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550). Many figures are also repeated across multiple claims with the same values, such as 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 107,000 sq ft. That is duplication in extraction, not multiple announcements. Separately, Kairos's 1,200 miners (claim 15502) plus the 6,800-miner purchase (claim 15503) add up exactly to the 8,000-miner target (claim 15506), which is internally consistent.
A. 1. Later filings confirming whether the fleet actually reached 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). 2. What happened to the non-mining stakes: Coinsquare, Tess, Verady and Logical Brokerage. 3. Whether the US exchange idea was pursued or dropped (claim 15470). 4. Whether mining expanded to other locations (claim 15474).
A. 1. The record stops in mid-2018, so it says nothing about Riot's later growth, strategy shifts or current operations. That is the largest gap for any present-day assessment. 2. There is no revenue, mining output or cost data to show whether the 2018 buildout paid off. 3. The CEO personnel claim (claim 16647) names no individual. 4. The auditor appointment is flagged as delayed (claim 15555), which diligence readers may want to look into.
Frequently asked
2026-09-21A. On this dossier's evidence, Riot (RIOT) is a cryptocurrency company whose core operation is proof-of-work Bitcoin mining: buying ASIC miners, housing them in leased data-center space, and running them for its own account. Around that core, the 2018 disclosures show a cluster of adjacent bets — a stake in a crypto exchange, a blockchain software subsidiary, a futures/derivatives brokerage, an accounting-software note, and an energy subsidiary. Important caveat for a first-time reader: every claim on record here is dated 2018, so this describes the company at the moment of its pivot into mining, not necessarily what it is today.
A. Two tracks running at once. Track one is scale in mining: get from 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505) to a full deployment of 8,000 miners (claim 15506) drawing 12 MW (claim 15507) and producing an expected 110 PH/s (claim 15508), housed in a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City facility under lease (claim 15519). Track two is buying optionality across the rest of the crypto stack rather than building it: a 12.9% stake in the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15545), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15514), the Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition for $600,000 (claim 15521), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15523), and formation of a wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (claim 15515). The company also said it was investigating launching a cryptocurrency exchange in the US (claim 15470).
A. There are none, and that is not an oversight in the record — it is a feature of the business model. Self-mining has no customers: the miner sells Bitcoin into an open market, so there is no counterparty to name and no contract backlog to point to. Revenue therefore tracks the Bitcoin price, network difficulty, and the company's own power cost, not any commercial relationship. The one place customers would have mattered is the brokerage and exchange ambitions (claims 15516, 15470), and the record names no clients, no volumes, and no revenue there. A reader looking for customer-concentration risk will not find it; the concentration is in a single commodity price instead.
A. Delivered and verifiable in the record: the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, which brought 1,200 miners, is marked completed (claims 15471, 15540); the Tess Inc. acquisition is marked completed (claim 15472); a further 6,800 miners were acquired in February 2018 (claim 15518); 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505); the Oklahoma City lease was executed (claim 15519); Nasdaq listing compliance was regained on June 20, 2018 (claim 15553); and Logical Brokerage held live FinCEN, Florida money-transmitter, CFTC and NFA registrations (claims 15528, 15529, 15548). Announced but unproven in this record: the 110 PH/s figure, which is explicitly guidance for full deployment (claim 15527), and the 8,000-miner / 12 MW end state (claims 15506, 15507) — the record shows 3,500 of 8,000 in place, roughly 44%, with no later filing confirming the rest. The US exchange launch (claim 15470) never advanced past 'investigating' in this dossier.
A. Read them carefully before drawing conclusions. Three items carry a delayed flag: the MNP LLP auditor appointment for 2018 against a 2018-12-31 date (claim 15555), the Logical Brokerage acquisition against a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544), and the 3,500 miners deployed against a 2018-03-31 date (claim 15543). The latter two are duplicates of claims that appear elsewhere in the record as ordinary completed events (claims 15521 and 15505), and the flagged dates are as-of or effective dates that had already passed when the June 28, 2018 filing was made — which is the normal way a filing describes something that already happened. These flags look more like artifacts of automated date extraction than evidence of missed commitments. They are worth a spot-check against the source filings, not a headline.
A. First and largest: the record simply stops in mid-2018, so there is no evidence here on whether the 8,000-miner build was completed, whether 110 PH/s was ever reached, or how the business fared through the crypto downturn that followed. Second: the 110 PH/s guidance does not reconcile cleanly with the hardware — 8,000 miners at the disclosed 13.5–13.75 TH/s per unit (claims 15550, 15530) implies roughly 108–110 PH/s only if every unit runs at spec continuously, with no downtime, derating, or failures. Treat it as a nameplate ceiling, not an operating expectation. Third: the minority and early-stage positions — Coinsquare at 12.9% (claim 15545) and the $200,000 Verady note (claim 15523) — carry no disclosed valuation methodology or subsequent marks, which matters because illiquid crypto-sector stakes are exactly where book value and realizable value diverge. Fourth: no power price is disclosed anywhere, and for a 12 MW miner, electricity cost is the single most important economic variable.
A. Four things, in order of how much they would tell you. (1) An updated hash rate and installed-miner count — the gap between 3,500 installed and 8,000 planned is the cleanest test of whether this company executes what it announces. (2) Disclosed cost per mined Bitcoin, or failing that an all-in power rate, which is the only way to judge whether the operation survives a price downturn. (3) The fate of the acquisition cluster: whether Tess, Logical Brokerage, Digital Green Energy and the Coinsquare stake become contributing businesses, get written down, or quietly disappear from subsequent filings — the last of these is common and informative. (4) Governance and listing continuity, given that regaining Nasdaq compliance in June 2018 (claim 15553) implies the company had previously fallen out of it; auditor changes (claim 15555) and CEO transitions (claim 16647) are worth tracking for the same reason.
A. Use it as a structured index of what the company said, not as an assessment of what the company is worth. The claims are automatically extracted, which shows in the heavy duplication — the 110 PH/s target alone appears as claims 15508, 15527, 15539 and 15552, and the $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition appears at least four times (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544). Do not mistake repetition for corroboration; these are the same statement pulled from one filing multiple times, so counting claims will badly overstate how much independent evidence exists. Nearly everything carries a status of 'stated,' meaning disclosed by the company and not independently verified here. Every figure cited above should be checked against the underlying SEC filings before it is used in published work or a diligence memo.
Frequently asked
2026-09-21A. On this record Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company with a cluster of adjacent crypto ventures bolted on. The core operating business is bitcoin mining out of a leased data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15469), built around mining hardware acquired in two tranches. Around that core sit minority and majority stakes in other crypto businesses — a 12.9% position in the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15512), 52% of blockchain-solutions firm Tess Inc. (claim 15514), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513), a wholly owned subsidiary called Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15515), and a small regulated brokerage, Logical Brokerage Corp, bought for $600,000 (claim 15521). Note that Riot is a public company with a long history; this dossier is not that history. See the staleness question below.
A. Scale a single mining site, then use it as a platform to expand geographically and move into crypto financial services. The site-level plan is explicit: 8,000 miners at full deployment (claim 15506) drawing 12 MW (claim 15507) and producing roughly 110 PH/s (claim 15508), inside a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City lease (claim 15542). The expansion legs are vaguer: management flagged possible mining operations in other, unnamed locations (claim 15474) and said it was investigating launching a cryptocurrency exchange in the US (claim 15470). The Logical Brokerage acquisition and its licenses look like the regulatory shell for that second leg.
A. None are named, and the record gives no customer list, no pilot partners, and no revenue-bearing contracts. Some of that is structural rather than evasive: a bitcoin miner's output is sold into an open market, so there is genuinely no customer to name. But it also means nothing here can be verified by calling a counterparty. The named third parties on record — Coinsquare, Tess, Verady, Kairos, Logical Brokerage, MNP LLP — are investees, acquisition targets, or service providers, not customers. A reader looking for commercial validation will not find it in this dossier.
A. Very little is confirmed delivered. Nearly every claim sits at status 'stated' — meaning it was extracted from a company disclosure and never independently confirmed or marked fulfilled. The one concrete operational datapoint is 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), against a full-deployment target of 8,000 (claim 15506) — so under half the plan, and that figure itself carries a 'delayed' status against its promised date (claim 15543). Two corporate items are also marked delayed: the Logical Brokerage acquisition, promised by 2018-03-27 (claim 15544), and the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor, promised by 2018-12-31 (claim 15555). The 110 PH/s and 12 MW figures are forward-looking targets at full deployment, not measured output. One genuine completed event: Riot regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim 15553), which implies it had previously fallen out of compliance.
A. No, and this is the single most common misreading. The claims were machine-extracted, and a large majority carry the same date, 2018-06-28, because they come from one filing. The same facts appear repeatedly under different wordings: the Logical Brokerage $600,000 acquisition appears at least four times (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), the 110 PH/s target four times (claims 15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), the 107,000 square foot lease four times (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). Strip the duplicates and the record is roughly a dozen distinct facts, not fifty. Do not read claim volume as disclosure volume or as momentum.
A. One worth noting. The mining hardware is specified at 13.5 TH/s in one claim (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s in another (claim 15530), both dated 2018-06-28. That is a small gap and most likely reflects different hardware batches or an extraction artifact rather than anything adversarial, but it matters for arithmetic: 8,000 miners at 13.75 TH/s implies about 110 PH/s (claim 15508), which is how the headline target was derived. The headline number is therefore a multiplication of the plan, not a measurement. The regulatory claims are also heavily duplicated — FinCEN MSB registration, Florida money transmitter licensing, and CFTC/NFA registration each appear multiple times (claims 15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549) — which inflates the apparent depth of the licensing story.
A. Four things, in rough order of diagnostic value. First, whether miner count moved from 3,500 toward the 8,000 target (claims 15505, 15506) and whether realized hash rate approached 110 PH/s. Second, whether the delayed items cleared — the Logical Brokerage close (claim 15544) and the MNP LLP auditor appointment (claim 15555); a delayed auditor appointment is the kind of item worth checking directly against filings. Third, whether the US exchange (claim 15470) and additional mining locations (claim 15474) ever became concrete, or stayed as investigation language. Fourth, what happened to the stakes in Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady — minority crypto positions acquired in late-2017/early-2018 conditions are the assets most likely to have been written down.
A. Carry it lightly. The record runs from 2018-04-01 to 2018-07-09 and then stops — roughly eight years stale as of today. It captures a single moment in a company that has since had a long and well-documented public life, so treat this as a 2018 snapshot, not a current picture, and go to primary filings for anything decision-relevant. Within the snapshot, the open questions are: no economics at all (no revenue, cost of power, or mining margin appears anywhere, and power cost is the entire economics of mining); no named customers or counterparty-verifiable commitments; a 'stated' status on nearly everything, meaning the pipeline recorded the announcements but never closed the loop on whether they happened; and no disclosed financing plan for scaling from 3,500 to 8,000 miners. The extraction metadata also shows all status transitions were made in September 2026 by automated extraction, so no human analyst has adjudicated these claims.
Frequently asked
2026-09-21A. On the strength of what is disclosed here, Riot is a cryptocurrency company whose core operating business is bitcoin mining — running racks of specialized machines that compete to validate blockchain transactions in exchange for newly issued coin. The mining operation is based in Oklahoma City, where the company leased a 107,000 square foot data center facility (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). Around that mining core, the record shows a cluster of smaller crypto-adjacent bets: a broker-dealer subsidiary, minority stakes in an exchange and a blockchain firm, and a note in an accounting-software startup. It is not a software or services vendor; it sells a commodity it produces.
A. Two tracks. First, scale mining: get from the 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520) to a full deployment of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551) drawing 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and producing an expected 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). Second, build optionality around mining through acquisitions and stakes rather than in-house product — buying Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (15509, 15521, 15534), taking 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (15512, 15522, 15545), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (15514, 15524, 15547), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513, 15523, 15546). As of July 9, 2018 the company also said it was investigating launching a US cryptocurrency exchange (15470) and might establish mining in other locations (15474). Both of those are explicitly exploratory language, not commitments.
A. There are none, and that is not an oversight in the dossier — it is a feature of the business. A bitcoin miner has no customers in the ordinary sense; it earns block rewards and fees from the network protocol itself and sells coin into a liquid market. So the usual diligence move of checking whether announced logos became paying accounts does not apply to the mining segment. It would apply to the subsidiaries — Logical Brokerage's exchange offerings (15516) and any Tess Inc. business — but the record names no customer, counterparty, or revenue contract for any of them. Treat the absence as a real gap on the non-mining side and as a category error on the mining side.
A. Very little in this record carries a status stronger than 'stated,' which means the claim was extracted from a company disclosure and has not been tracked through to confirmed completion. The one concrete deployment datapoint is 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520) — roughly 44% of the 8,000-miner full-deployment target, and that same milestone is flagged delayed against its March 31, 2018 date (15543). Two other items are flagged delayed: the $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition against a March 27, 2018 date (15544), and the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor against a December 31, 2018 date (15555). Genuinely completed items are administrative rather than operational: Riot regained Nasdaq listing compliance on June 20, 2018 (15553) and elected directors at its 2018 annual meeting (15554). No claim on record confirms that the 8,000 miners, the 12 MW, or the 110 PH/s were ever reached.
A. Two cautions a first-time reader should absorb before quoting anything. First, the record runs from April 2018 to July 2018 and stops. The 2026 dates attached to every claim are extraction and status-transition timestamps — when the pipeline processed the filing — not company events. Nothing here speaks to what Riot did in the eight years since. Second, the claim count badly overstates how much is actually disclosed: the same handful of events are extracted repeatedly from overlapping filings. The 110 PH/s target appears four times, the Logical Brokerage acquisition four times, the Oklahoma City lease four times. There are on the order of fifteen distinct disclosed facts here, not fifty.
A. The gap between the 3,500 miners actually installed and the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s target is the single number that matters — whether it closed, when, and at what capital cost. Beyond that: whether Logical Brokerage's registrations (CFTC and NFA, claims 15510, 15535, 15548; FinCEN money services business and Florida money transmitter licensing, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549) were ever converted into an operating exchange, or remained shelf licenses; whether the 'investigating a US exchange' language (15470) became a launch or was quietly dropped; what became of the Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady positions; and whether Digital Green Energy Corp (15515, 15525) — a wholly owned subsidiary formed with no disclosed activity in this record — ever did anything.
A. Economics, above all. The record is entirely physical and structural — machine counts, square footage, megawatts, hash rate — and contains no revenue, no cost of power, no cost per miner, no bitcoin price assumption, and no cash position. A miner's viability is a function of electricity cost against coin price and network difficulty, and none of those three variables appear anywhere here, which makes it impossible to say from this dossier whether the Oklahoma operation was profitable at any scale. Second, hardware economics: miners rated at 13.5 TH/s (15550) or 13.75 TH/s (15530) were near-current in early 2018 and obsolete within a couple of years, so the fleet had a short useful life the record does not address. Third, corporate-governance history — a company that had to regain Nasdaq compliance (15553) and whose auditor appointment is flagged delayed (15555) warrants a look at why compliance lapsed in the first place, which this record does not explain.
A. Cautiously, and as a prompt rather than a finding. Three claims carry that status (15543, 15544, 15555), and in each case it was assigned by automated extraction, meaning a date parsed out of a filing passed without a confirming disclosure being matched to it. Sometimes that reflects a real slip; sometimes it reflects the extractor reading an 'as of' reporting date as a deadline — claim 15543, the 3,500 miners 'as of March 31, 2018,' looks more like the latter than like a missed promise. None of the three has been reviewed by a human analyst. Verify against the underlying filings before characterizing any of them as a broken commitment in print.
Frequently asked
2026-09-21A. On this record, Riot is a cryptocurrency company built around two things: proof-of-work bitcoin mining, and a set of minority stakes and small subsidiaries across crypto trading and blockchain infrastructure. The mining side is the substance — miners acquired through the Kairos Global Technology transaction (1,200 miners, claim 15531) plus 6,800 additional miners bought in February 2018 (claim 15532), housed in a leased 107,000 sq ft data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15542). The rest is a portfolio: 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15545), 52% of blockchain-solutions firm Tess Inc. (claim 15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15546), the $600,000 acquisition of futures broker Logical Brokerage Corp (claim 15534), and a wholly owned subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15515).
A. Scale a single mining site toward a stated target of 8,000 miners (claim 15506) drawing 12 MW (claim 15538) and producing roughly 110 PH/s at full deployment (claim 15527), while assembling optionality around it: a regulated brokerage entity, an equity stake in an existing exchange, and an investment in crypto accounting/audit tooling. Two forward-looking statements are worth flagging as intentions rather than plans — the company disclosed it was investigating launching a cryptocurrency exchange in the US (claim 15470) and that mining operations in additional locations were possible (claim 15474). Neither carries a date, a site, or a budget in the record.
A. There are none. Not a single customer, counterparty, or offtaker is named anywhere in the disclosed claims. This is partly structural — bitcoin mining earns protocol block rewards rather than selling to customers, so the absence is expected on the mining side. It is more notable on the other side of the business: Logical Brokerage was registered with FinCEN and licensed in Florida (claim 15529), and registered with the CFTC and NFA (claim 15548), but no brokerage clients, volumes, or revenue are disclosed. Same for Tess Inc. and Digital Green Energy Corp — entities named, activity not. A reader should treat the non-mining segment as unquantified until customer or revenue disclosure appears.
A. Delivered and verifiable in the record: the Kairos and Tess acquisitions were confirmed complete as of 2018-07-09 (claims 15471, 15472); Nasdaq listing compliance was regained on 2018-06-20 (claim 15553); the Oklahoma City lease was executed (claim 15519); the regulatory registrations for Logical Brokerage were obtained (claims 15528, 15529, 15548). Announced but not yet delivered: the headline capacity. As of March 31, 2018 the company had 3,500 miners installed and operating (claim 15520) against a full-deployment target of 8,000 (claim 15551) — roughly 44%. The 110 PH/s figure is explicitly conditioned on full deployment and should not be read as an operating hash rate.
A. Three. The 3,500-miner deployment carries a delayed flag against a 2018-03-31 date (claim 15543). The Logical Brokerage acquisition carries a delayed flag against a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544), though the transaction itself is elsewhere recorded as done. The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 is flagged delayed against a 2018-12-31 date (claim 15555). Calibrate carefully: these statuses were assigned by automated extraction, not by an analyst, and at least two of the three look like timing artifacts — a date mentioned in the source text being read as a deadline — rather than evidence of a missed commitment. They are leads to verify, not findings.
A. One visible discrepancy: per-miner performance is stated as 13.75 TH/s in one claim (claim 15530) and 13.5 TH/s in another (claim 15550), both dated 2018-06-28. The gap is small and probably reflects different hardware batches or rounding in different source documents, but it matters because the 110 PH/s target is a multiple of these figures. Sanity-check it: 8,000 miners at ~13.75 TH/s is roughly 110 PH/s, so the guidance is arithmetically consistent with full deployment at the higher spec, and would fall short at the lower one. Separately, the 12 MW power figure appears both as current facility supply and as full-deployment consumption; whether those are the same number or a coincidence is not resolvable from the record.
A. Four things, in order of information value. First, miner count — does deployment move from 3,500 toward the 8,000 target, and on what schedule. Second, realized hash rate as an operating number rather than a full-deployment projection. Third, any disclosure that puts revenue or client activity behind the non-mining entities, particularly Logical Brokerage and Tess. Fourth, whether the US exchange investigation (claim 15470) converts into a filing, an application, or a named jurisdiction, or quietly disappears — investigating a launch is the cheapest possible disclosure, and the tell is whether it recurs in later filings with more specificity or is never mentioned again.
A. Three that a first-time reader should not miss. First, coverage: every claim here dates from April to July 2018, so this is a snapshot of one period, not the company's full history — do not read it as current. Second, provenance: all statuses come from automated extraction, and the record contains heavy duplication, with the Kairos acquisition, the 110 PH/s target, and the Logical Brokerage purchase each appearing four or more times from parallel source documents. Repetition here is an artifact of extraction, not independent corroboration; counting claims would badly overstate how much is actually known. Third, what is absent: no revenue, no cost of power, no cash position, no mining economics. The dossier describes capacity and corporate structure. It says essentially nothing about whether any of it was profitable.
Frequently asked
2026-09-20A. On the record here, Riot is a cryptocurrency mining and blockchain holding company. Its core operation is self-mining Bitcoin from a leased data center in Oklahoma City of 107,000 square feet (claim 15542), around which it assembled a portfolio of crypto-adjacent acquisitions and minority stakes: a brokerage, a Canadian exchange stake, a blockchain-services subsidiary, and an accounting-software note. It does not sell a product to end customers in this record — it mines coin for its own account and holds equity in other crypto businesses.
A. Two tracks running at once. First, scale the mining fleet: from 3,500 miners operating to 8,000 at full deployment (claim 15506), drawing 12 MW (claim 15507) and producing an expected 110 PH/s (claim 15508). Second, buy into the surrounding infrastructure rather than build it — the Kairos Global Technology acquisition that brought 1,200 miners (claim 15531), 6,800 more miners acquired in February 2018 (claim 15532), Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15534), 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15522), 52% of Tess Inc. (claim 15524), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15523), and a wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (claim 15525). As of 2018-07-09 it also said it was investigating launching its own US cryptocurrency exchange (claim 15470) and possibly mining in other locations (claim 15474).
A. There are none in this record, and that is expected rather than suspicious. A self-mining operation sells coin into a market, so it has no customer roster to disclose. The named counterparties in the dossier are all on the buy side — Kairos, Tess, Logical Brokerage, Coinsquare, Verady — meaning the entities Riot paid or invested in, not entities that paid Riot. A reader should not treat the presence of these names as evidence of commercial traction. If you are testing whether the business generates external revenue, this dossier does not answer that question.
A. Delivered and confirmed: Nasdaq listing compliance was regained on 2018-06-20 (claim 15553); the Kairos acquisition closed (claim 15471); the Tess acquisition closed (claim 15472); the Oklahoma City lease was executed (claim 15519); Logical Brokerage's regulatory registrations — CFTC/NFA, FinCEN money service business, and a Florida money transmitter license — are on record (claims 15528, 15529). Partially delivered: 3,500 of the targeted 8,000 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505) — roughly 44% of the fleet. Announced but unconfirmed here: the full 8,000-miner deployment, the 12 MW draw, the 110 PH/s hash rate, the US exchange launch, and the additional mining locations. Every one of those is a forward-looking figure with no completion claim behind it in this record.
A. Three. The MNP LLP auditor appointment for 2018 was due by 2018-12-31 (claim 15555); the Logical Brokerage acquisition carried a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544); and the 3,500-miner deployment carried a 2018-03-31 date (claim 15543). Two of these deserve caution before being read as missed commitments. Claims 15543 and 15544 describe things stated as already true as of a past date but disclosed on 2018-06-28, so the pipeline may be comparing a disclosure date against a backward-looking as-of date and labeling the gap a delay. That is a plausible extraction artifact, not a demonstrated slip. A diligence reader should pull the underlying filings before repeating 'delayed' in print.
A. Because claims were extracted automatically from overlapping documents. The 12.9% Coinsquare stake appears as claims 15545, 15522, and 15512; the $600,000 Logical Brokerage purchase as 15544, 15534, 15509, and 15521; the 110 PH/s target as 15552, 15539, 15508, and 15527. These are one fact each, re-extracted, not repeated transactions or cumulative totals. Anyone building a spend figure or a capacity figure from a raw claim count will overstate it by a multiple.
A. One worth noting. Miner performance is given as 13.5 TH/s in claim 15550 and 13.75 TH/s in claim 15530. The gap is small but it propagates: the 110 PH/s target depends on which per-unit figure is used across 8,000 machines. It is most likely two roundings of the same hardware spec rather than two different machines, but the dossier does not resolve it, so a reader modeling output should treat the hash-rate target as approximate.
A. The single largest caveat is coverage: this record stops on 2018-07-09, though the status labels were applied in September 2026. Riot is a long-running public company, so the absence of later claims reflects a gap in this dossier, not a dormant company. Do not read the 2018 endpoint as a current portrait. Within the period covered, the questions that matter are: did the fleet get from 3,500 to 8,000 miners and did realized hash rate approach 110 PH/s; did the investigated US exchange (claim 15470) ever launch or quietly die; what became of the minority positions in Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady, which are the kind of holdings that get written down when crypto prices fall; and whether the 2018 audit relationship (claim 15555) closed cleanly, since auditor timing is an early signal of control problems. Also unresolved: claim 16647 records a Chief Executive Officer item dated 2018-04-01 with no name or detail attached, so leadership continuity across this period cannot be assessed from the dossier alone.
Frequently asked
2026-09-20A. As disclosed in the claims on file, Riot is a cryptocurrency-focused holding company built around three activities: self-mining Bitcoin at leased data center space, holding minority and majority stakes in crypto infrastructure businesses, and owning a small regulated brokerage. The mining side is the bulk of it — the company leased a 107,000 sq ft data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15504) intended to house 8,000 miners (claim 15506) drawing 12 MW (claim 15507). The non-mining side consists of a 12.9% stake in the Coinsquare exchange (claim 15522), a 52% stake in blockchain firm Tess Inc. (claim 15524), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15523), Logical Brokerage Corp, and a wholly owned subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15525).
A. Scale self-mining capacity toward a stated full-deployment target of 110 PH/s (claim 15508) while assembling adjacent crypto businesses by acquisition rather than building them. The acquisitions follow that pattern: Kairos Global Technology, which came with 1,200 miners (claim 15531); a separate purchase of 6,800 miners in February 2018 (claim 15518); and Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15521). Two forward-looking items are stated as intentions only, with no target date and no follow-through in the record: investigating the launch of a US cryptocurrency exchange (claim 15470) and establishing mining operations in additional locations (claim 15474).
A. None are named anywhere in the record, and that is expected rather than suspicious. Self-mining is not a customer business — the miner sells Bitcoin into a market, so there is no counterparty to disclose. The named entities in the dossier are acquisition targets, investees, and regulators, not customers: Kairos, Tess, Coinsquare, Verady, Logical Brokerage, MNP LLP, FinCEN, the Florida regulator, the CFTC, the NFA, and Nasdaq. A reader should not treat that list as commercial traction. The one segment where named customers would be meaningful — the Logical Brokerage business and any exchange Riot might launch — has no customer, volume, or revenue claim on file at all.
A. Delivered and confirmed in the record: the Kairos acquisition closed (claim 15471), the Tess acquisition closed (claim 15472), Riot regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim 15553), and the Oklahoma City lease was executed (claim 15519). Partially delivered: 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505) against the 8,000-unit target (claim 15506) — roughly 44%. Announced but unverified in the record: the 110 PH/s hash rate (claim 15508) and the 12 MW power draw (claim 15507) are both stated as expectations at full deployment, and no later claim confirms either was reached. The US exchange (claim 15470) and additional mining sites (claim 15474) never progressed past intention.
A. Three. The 3,500-miner deployment carries a 2018-03-31 date and is marked delayed (claim 15543). The $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition was to close by 2018-03-27 and is marked delayed (claim 15544). The appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor carried a 2018-12-31 date and is marked delayed (claim 15555). Two caveats matter here. First, most claims in this file are dated 2018-06-28 — an SEC filing date — describing events that had already occurred, so the 'promised by' dates are backfilled from filing text and a 'delayed' flag may reflect extraction mechanics rather than a missed commitment. The auditor flag in particular is worth checking against the actual filings before drawing any conclusion. Second, a delayed flag on a routine auditor appointment is a different kind of signal from a delayed operational milestone, and the two should not be read as equivalent.
A. Two things to keep straight. 'Stated' means the company asserted the claim; it does not mean anyone verified delivery. Nearly every claim here sits at 'stated,' so the record documents what Riot said far better than what Riot achieved. Separately, the transition dates — 2026-09-15 and 2026-09-20 — are when the automated extractor processed the source documents, not when anything happened at the company. Every underlying event is from 2018. A reader should also note heavy duplication: the 110 PH/s target appears four times (claims 15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), the Oklahoma lease four times (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542), and the Logical Brokerage purchase four times (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544). Counting claims will badly overstate how many distinct facts are on record.
A. Four things, in rough order of how much they would tell you. First, whether deployment moved past 3,500 miners (claim 15505) toward 8,000 (claim 15506) and whether realized hash rate approached the 110 PH/s target (claim 15508) — that is the single best test of whether the operating plan worked. Second, what became of the equity stakes: the 12.9% of Coinsquare (claim 15522), 52% of Tess (claim 15524), and the Verady note (claim 15523) are carrying values that should have been marked, written down, or sold, and the record shows none of that. Third, the Nasdaq compliance regained in June 2018 (claim 15553) is worth re-checking, since regaining compliance once is not the same as keeping it. Fourth, whether the US exchange investigation (claim 15470) ever produced anything. A corroborating detail to confirm independently: the miner hardware is specified inconsistently at 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550), which matters because unit hash rate times unit count is what underwrites the 110 PH/s figure.
A. The largest is coverage, not content. Every claim in this file dates from roughly April to July 2018 — a single filing cycle — and the record simply stops there. For a company whose disclosed business is mining an asset with a volatile price, an eight-year gap means this dossier cannot support any statement about Riot's current scale, strategy, or condition; it is a snapshot of a 2018 pivot, and should be cited as such. Within that snapshot, the substantive gaps are: no revenue, cost, cash, or realized-margin claim anywhere, so mining economics are unassessable; no confirmation that announced capacity was ever built; no disclosed cost of electricity, which is the variable that decides whether a 12 MW site is profitable; and no outcome for the equity stakes. A reader doing diligence should treat this file as a starting point for records requests, not as a basis for a view on the company.
Frequently asked
2026-09-20A. On the record here, Riot is a cryptocurrency company built around three activities. First, self-mining Bitcoin from a leased data center in Oklahoma City (claims 15469, 15519). Second, holding minority and majority stakes in other crypto businesses — 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (claim 15545), 52% of blockchain-solutions firm Tess Inc. (claim 15547), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15546). Third, a regulated-brokerage angle via the acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15521). Note the disclosed record ends 2018-07-09; nothing after that date is in this dossier, so this describes Riot as it presented itself in mid-2018, not today.
A. Scale mining to full deployment and build adjacent crypto infrastructure around it. The stated mining target was 8,000 miners drawing 12 MW and producing roughly 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Alongside that, Riot said it was investigating launching a cryptocurrency exchange in the United States (claim 15470) — which is the likely rationale for buying Logical Brokerage, a CFTC/NFA-registered broker with FinCEN money-services and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claims 15510, 15511, 15528, 15529). It also formed a wholly owned subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15525), though the record contains no further activity for that entity.
A. None are named, and that is not an oversight in the record — it reflects the business model. Bitcoin mining as described here is a self-mining operation: Riot runs machines, earns block rewards, and sells coin into the market. There is no customer, contract, offtake agreement, or revenue counterparty named anywhere in the 60 claims on record. If you are diligencing this company, do not go looking for a customer list; go looking for hash rate, power cost, and realized Bitcoin price instead. The exchange and brokerage ventures would have had customers, but neither is disclosed as operating in this window.
A. Delivered and confirmed: the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, which closed and brought 1,200 miners (claims 15471, 15517); a further 6,800 miners acquired in February 2018 (claim 15518); the 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City lease, executed (claim 15519); and regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim 15553). Partially delivered: as of 2018-03-31, 3,500 miners were installed and operating (claim 15505) against the 8,000-miner full-deployment target (claim 15537) — roughly 44%. That 3,500-miner milestone carries a delayed status (claim 15543). Announced but not shown as delivered: the 110 PH/s hash rate (claim 15552) is a forward estimate, not a measured result, and the U.S. exchange was only under investigation (claim 15470).
A. Three. The 3,500-miner deployment against a 2018-03-31 date (claim 15543); the $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition against a 2018-03-27 date (claim 15544); and the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor against a 2018-12-31 date (claim 15555). The first two are the substantive ones: they indicate the mining buildout and the brokerage deal both slipped past their stated dates. The auditor item is a routine annual-cycle flag and should be weighted lightly. Everything else on the record is status 'stated' — meaning it is the company's own assertion as extracted from disclosure, not an independently verified outcome.
A. Because claims are extracted per-document, and Riot's mid-2018 filings restated the same portfolio repeatedly. The 1,200-miner Kairos acquisition appears as claims 15502, 15517, 15531, and 15540; the Coinsquare 12.9% stake as 15512, 15522, and 15545; the Logical Brokerage $600,000 purchase as 15509, 15521, 15534, and 15544. These are the same underlying events, not separate transactions. A reader tallying the claim list naively would badly overstate both miner count and capital deployed. Count distinct facts, not claim rows.
A. One worth noting. The mining hardware is specified at 13.75 TH/s in one claim (15530) and 13.5 TH/s in another (15550), both dated 2018-06-28. The gap is small but it is a per-unit spec multiplied across 8,000 machines, and it propagates into the 110 PH/s full-deployment estimate (claims 15527, 15539, 15552). Worth reconciling against the original filings before relying on the hash rate figure. Separately, 8,000 miners at either spec implies roughly 108–110 PH/s, so the headline estimate is internally consistent with the fleet size even if the per-unit number is ambiguous.
A. Watch for: whether deployment actually reached 8,000 miners and 12 MW (claims 15506, 15507); whether measured hash rate converged on the 110 PH/s estimate (claim 15508); whether the Logical Brokerage deal closed and whether the U.S. exchange launched or was abandoned (claims 15544, 15470); and what became of the Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady positions (claims 15545, 15547, 15546). The biggest open question is economic, not operational: the record contains no revenue, no cost per Bitcoin mined, no power price, and no impairment or carrying-value data for the minority stakes. A 2018-era mining buildout's viability turns almost entirely on power cost and coin price, and neither is disclosed here. The second-biggest gap is temporal — the dossier stops at 2018-07-09, so treat all of it as historical and verify current status independently.
Frequently asked
2026-09-19A. In the disclosed record, which runs only from June to July 2018, Riot is mainly a cryptocurrency miner. It runs mining machines at a leased facility of about 107,000 sq ft in Oklahoma City (claims 15504, 15519). It also holds several crypto-related side investments: 52% of Tess Inc., a blockchain-solutions company (15547); 12.9% of the Coinsquare exchange (15545); a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15546); and Logical Brokerage Corp, bought for $600,000 (15509). It also formed a wholly owned subsidiary called Digital Green Energy Corp (15525).
A. The main plan was to build out the Oklahoma City mine to 8,000 miners (15506), drawing about 12 MW of power (15507), with an expected hash rate of 110 PH/s (15508). The fleet came from buying Kairos Global Technology, which brought 1,200 miners (15502), plus 6,800 more miners bought separately (15503). The per-machine spec is about 13.75 TH/s (15530), and 8,000 × 13.75 TH/s ≈ 110 PH/s, so the target figures agree with each other. Alongside mining, Riot bought Logical Brokerage to get a regulated trading platform. Logical Brokerage holds CFTC/NFA registrations (15510) and FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15511). The company also said it might set up mining in other locations (15474).
A. None are named. A mining operation has no customers in the usual sense: it earns newly issued cryptocurrency and transaction fees from the network. For Logical Brokerage, the record mentions 'exchange offerings' (15516) but names no clients, trading volumes or revenue. The record also gives no revenue or mining-output figures at all.
A. Delivered or completed: the Oklahoma City lease was signed (15519), and 3,500 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (15505). The Kairos and Tess acquisitions closed (15471, 15472), and the company regained Nasdaq listing compliance (15553). Still targets: the full 8,000 miners (15506), 12 MW (15507) and 110 PH/s (15508). At the last disclosed date, about 44% of the planned fleet (3,500 of 8,000) was running. Three items carry a 'delayed' status: the miner deployment tied to March 31, 2018 (15543), the Logical Brokerage purchase tied to March 27, 2018 (15544), and the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor (15555). Each of these also shows a 'stated' transition on the same date, so whether they were really delayed is unclear.
A. First, whether the fleet grew from 3,500 to 8,000 miners (15505, 15506) and whether it reached 110 PH/s at 12 MW (15508, 15507). Second, whether the 'other locations' mentioned as a possibility (15474) ever became real sites. Third, whether MNP LLP finished the 2018 audit (15555). Fourth, what became of the side stakes: Tess (15547), Coinsquare (15545), Verady (15546) and Logical Brokerage (15509), including whether any of them produced revenue or were written down or sold.
A. The claims were pulled from filings automatically, so one fact often appears several times. For example, the 107,000 sq ft lease appears in 15504, 15519, 15533 and 15542, and the Logical Brokerage price appears in 15509, 15521, 15534 and 15544. Readers should count each underlying fact once. There are also small inconsistencies, such as the per-miner spec given as 13.75 TH/s (15530) in one claim and 13.5 TH/s (15550) in another, so check the source filings before relying on exact figures.
A. 1) Coverage: the record ends in July 2018 and the claim list supplied here is cut off, so it says nothing about Riot's later scale, strategy or results. 2) Economics: there are no figures for revenue, mining output, power cost or cash position. 3) Status conflicts: the 'delayed' items (15543, 15544, 15555) also show 'stated' transitions. 4) Coherence: the record does not explain how a miner fits together with a brokerage, an exchange stake, a majority-owned blockchain startup and a new energy subsidiary. 5) Listing history: the record notes that Nasdaq compliance was regained (15553) but not what caused the lapse.
Frequently asked
2026-09-19A. The records here run only from June to July 2018. In that period Riot described itself mainly as a cryptocurrency miner. It ran a mining operation in Oklahoma City (claim 15469) in a leased facility of about 107,000 square feet (claims 15519, 15504). Around that core it held a mix of crypto-related stakes and subsidiaries: a brokerage (Logical Brokerage), a minority stake in a Canadian crypto exchange (Coinsquare), a majority stake in a blockchain company (Tess Inc), a convertible note in Verady LLC, and a newly formed subsidiary called Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15525).
A. The plan was to scale mining in Oklahoma City to 8,000 miners (claims 15506, 15537), drawing about 12 MW of power (claims 15507, 15538) and producing an expected hash rate of about 110 PH/s (claims 15508, 15527, 15552). Hash rate is the total computing power pointed at the blockchain, which roughly sets a miner's share of rewards. Riot also said it was investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange (claim 15470) and might set up mining in other locations (claim 15474). The exchange idea appears to build on Logical Brokerage's CFTC/NFA registrations (claims 15510, 15548) and its FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claims 15528, 15529).
A. The dossier names none, and for this business that is expected. A miner has no customers in the usual sense. It earns newly issued coins and transaction fees from the blockchain network itself. The brokerage and exchange side could in principle have customers, but no clients, counterparties, or trading volumes are disclosed. A reader cannot tell from this record how much revenue, if any, came from outside mining.
A. Delivered or completed on the record: 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520), the completed Kairos Global Technology acquisition (claim 15471), the purchase of 1,200 miners through Kairos (claims 15502, 15517), the purchase of 6,800 more miners (claims 15503, 15518), the Logical Brokerage acquisition for $600,000 (claims 15509, 15521), the 12.9% Coinsquare stake (claims 15512, 15522), the 52% Tess stake (claims 15514, 15524), the $200,000 Verady note (claims 15513, 15523), and regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced but not confirmed as reached: full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s. As of the last data point, fewer than half of the target miners (3,500 of 8,000) were reported running.
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' status: the Logical Brokerage acquisition target date (claim 15544), the 3,500-miner deployment dated to March 31, 2018 (claim 15543), and MNP LLP's appointment as the 2018 auditor (claim 15555). Treat these labels with caution. Each comes from automated extraction and shows two conflicting transitions ('delayed' and 'stated') on the same date. Other claims in the record describe the brokerage deal and the 3,500 miners as done. These flags have not been human-verified and should not be read as confirmed slippage.
A. There are small ones. The per-machine hash rate appears as both 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530). The 110 PH/s target matches roughly 8,000 machines at the higher figure. The 8,000 target is also the sum of the 1,200 Kairos miners and the 6,800 additional miners. That suggests full deployment required no further hardware purchases, only installation and power. Many claims in this record are duplicates of the same disclosure extracted several times.
A. Four things. First, whether Riot reported reaching the full 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s at Oklahoma City. Second, whether the US exchange it was investigating ever launched, and whether Logical Brokerage's licenses were put to use. Third, what happened to the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady holdings, including any sales, write-downs or conversions. Fourth, whether mining expanded to other sites, as floated in claim 15474, and whether the 2018 audit with MNP LLP (claim 15555) was completed cleanly.
A. The largest gap is coverage: this dossier stops in July 2018 and says nothing about the company's later path. Within the period, there are no disclosed revenue, cost, or mining-output figures, so the economics of the mining operation cannot be judged. It is also unclear why a mining company held a brokerage, an exchange stake and a blockchain-software majority stake, and how much of its capital and attention these took. Several status flags have not been verified. Readers should also note that the need to regain Nasdaq compliance (claim 15553) means the company had fallen out of compliance at some earlier point. The record does not say why.
Frequently asked
2026-09-18A. In the disclosures on record, all from June–July 2018, Riot's core business is bitcoin mining. It ran a leased 107,000-square-foot data center in Oklahoma City (claim 15519) and was also investigating crypto exchange and brokerage businesses. Around that core, it held stakes in several blockchain companies: 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (claim 15512), 52% of Tess Inc. (claim 15514), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15513). It also bought Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000 (claim 15509).
A. The dossier can't answer this. Every claim on record is dated between June 14 and July 9, 2018, so nothing here reflects Riot's strategy after mid-2018. As of July 2018, Riot said it was doing three things: running its Oklahoma City mining operation (claim 15469), investigating a US crypto exchange launch (claim 15470), and possibly setting up mining at other locations (claim 15474). Treat this as a historical snapshot, not current strategy.
A. No customers are named anywhere in the record. As a self-mining operation, Riot earns block rewards rather than selling to named clients, so this may be expected. The one customer-facing business is Logical Brokerage, a CFTC/NFA-registered broker with FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claims 15510, 15511). The record describes what it offers (claim 15516) but gives no customer names, customer counts, or revenue.
A. Delivered: 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), out of 8,000 acquired. The 8,000 came from 1,200 Kairos miners (claim 15502) plus 6,800 additional miners (claim 15503). Also delivered: the Oklahoma City lease, the Logical Brokerage acquisition, the Tess acquisition (claim 15472), and regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Announced but not yet reached: full deployment of 8,000 miners (claim 15506), 12 MW of power (claim 15507), and about 110 PH/s of hash rate (claim 15508). A US exchange was only under investigation (claim 15470).
A. Three items carry a 'delayed' status. The first is the $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition, which had a target date of March 27, 2018 (claim 15544). The second is the 3,500-miner deployment figure tied to March 31, 2018 (claim 15543). The third is MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor (claim 15555). All three also show a 'stated' transition logged on the same day, so the delay flags are ambiguous. Check them against the source filings before relying on them.
A. Four things, all as of the 2018 record. First, whether Riot moved from 3,500 operating miners to the full 8,000 at 12 MW and about 110 PH/s. Second, whether it expanded mining beyond Oklahoma City (claim 15474). Third, whether the US exchange it was investigating ever launched (claim 15470). Fourth, what became of the minority and majority stakes in Coinsquare, Tess and Verady. Anyone using this dossier today should first pull filings after July 2018.
A. 1. **Time gap.** Nothing on record is dated after July 2018, so current operations, strategy and scale are unknown from this dossier. 2. **Deployment gap.** Less than half the acquired miners were operating when last reported (claims 15505, 15506). 3. **Inconsistent specs.** Per-miner performance is given as both 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530). 4. **Data quality.** Many claims are near-duplicates from automated extraction, and the delayed/stated statuses conflict with each other.
Frequently asked
2026-09-18A. In the disclosed record, which runs only from June to July 2018, Riot is mainly a cryptocurrency miner running a leased data center in Oklahoma City, 107,000 sq ft (claim 15519). Around that core it held several side bets: a 12.9% stake in the Coinsquare exchange (15512), 52% of blockchain firm Tess Inc. (15514), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513), and Logical Brokerage, a futures and forex broker it bought for $600,000 (15509). It also formed a subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp (15525).
A. The main plan was to scale the Oklahoma City mining operation. Riot bought 1,200 miners with Kairos Global Technology (15502) and another 6,800 miners in February 2018 (15518), for a target of 8,000 machines (15506). It guided to about 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508) at roughly 12 MW of power (15507). Separately, it said it was investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470) and used Logical Brokerage's licenses as a regulatory foothold. Those licenses are CFTC/NFA registration (15510) plus FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15511, 15529).
A. No customers are named anywhere in the record. Self-mining has no customers in the usual sense: revenue comes from block rewards, not contracts. The brokerage and the proposed exchange would have customers, but none are identified and no customer or revenue figures appear in the claims.
A. Delivered per the filings: 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520), completed acquisitions of Kairos (15471) and Tess (15472), the Logical Brokerage purchase (15509), and the executed Oklahoma City lease (15519). Announced but not shown as achieved: full deployment of 8,000 miners (15506), about 110 PH/s (15508), 12 MW (15507), and a US exchange, which was only 'under investigation' (15470). At the last disclosed data point, about 44% of the targeted miners (3,500 of 8,000) were running.
A. Mostly. At 13.5–13.75 TH/s per machine, 8,000 miners works out to roughly 108–110 PH/s, which matches the 110 PH/s guidance (15552). However, the per-miner spec is recorded two ways: 13.75 TH/s (15530) and 13.5 TH/s (15550). Readers should also know that many claims are duplicate extractions from the same 2018-06-28 filing. For example, the $600,000 Logical Brokerage deal appears as 15509, 15521, 15534 and 15544. Treat these as one fact, not several.
A. Three claims carry a 'delayed' status: miners deployed by 2018-03-31 (15543), the Logical Brokerage acquisition by 2018-03-27 (15544), and MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor (15555). Each one also shows a 'stated' transition on the same date, so the record contradicts itself. For 15544 in particular, the promise date comes before the filing that reports the deal, which suggests an extraction artifact rather than a real slip. Treat these flags as unverified until they are reconciled against the source filings.
A. Four things. First, whether Riot reached full deployment of 8,000 miners and about 110 PH/s (15506, 15508). Second, whether the US exchange idea (15470) became a product or was dropped. Third, what happened to the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady positions (15512, 15514, 15513). Fourth, whether the regained Nasdaq compliance (15553) held, since regaining compliance implies the company had fallen out of it earlier.
A. The largest gap is time: the dossier ends in July 2018, so nothing here describes the company's current operations, scale or strategy. Any present-day view has to come from later filings, not this record. Within the record itself, the open issues are: no revenue, bitcoin-production or cost data; no named customers; unresolved 'delayed' flags (15543, 15544, 15555); and the conflicting miner specs (15530 vs 15550). It is also unclear how the non-mining ventures, the brokerage, exchange stakes and blockchain holdings, fit with the mining business.
Frequently asked
2026-09-18A. In the mid-2018 filings on record, Riot is mainly a bitcoin mining company. It runs mining machines ('miners') at a leased facility in Oklahoma City of about 107,000 square feet (claim 15542). It also holds a mix of crypto-related side investments: 12.9% of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare (claim 15545), 52% of Tess Inc. (claim 15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim 15546), and Logical Brokerage Corp, bought for $600,000 (claim 15509). It also formed a subsidiary called Digital Green Energy Corp (claim 15525). This record covers only June and July 2018, so it does not describe the company as it looks today.
A. Riot planned to scale up mining. It bought Kairos Global Technology, which came with 1,200 miners (claim 15531), and agreed to buy 6,800 more (claim 15503). The goal was 8,000 miners in total (claim 15506), using about 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and producing about 110 PH/s of hashing power (claim 15508). Separately, Riot said it was looking into launching a US crypto exchange (claim 15470), which is why Logical Brokerage's regulatory registrations mattered (claims 15510, 15511). It also mentioned possibly opening mining sites in other locations (claim 15474). Both of those were exploratory statements, not commitments with dates attached.
A. The record names no customers, and a mining business would not be expected to have any in the usual sense. A miner earns newly issued bitcoin and transaction fees from the network itself, not from contracted buyers. The proposed exchange would have had customers, but no exchange launch or users appear in the record.
A. Delivered or completed: the Kairos acquisition (claim 15471), the Tess acquisition (claim 15472), the Coinsquare investment (claim 15473), the Oklahoma City facility lease (claim 15519), the $600,000 Logical Brokerage purchase (claim 15509), and regaining compliance with Nasdaq's listing rules (claim 15553). On mining, only 3,500 miners were installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505). That is under half of the 8,000-miner full deployment (claim 15506). Both the 110 PH/s hash rate (claim 15508) and the 12 MW power figure (claim 15507) are targets for full deployment, not achieved results.
A. Yes, a small one. The per-machine performance is stated as 13.5 TH/s in one place (claim 15550) and 13.75 TH/s in another (claim 15530). The difference affects the headline target: 8,000 miners at 13.75 TH/s gives about 110 PH/s (claim 15508), but at 13.5 TH/s it gives about 108 PH/s. Readers should also know that many claims in this dossier repeat the same facts, extracted separately from overlapping filings. Examples are the Kairos, Coinsquare, and Logical Brokerage claims. Count them as single facts, not as independent confirmations.
A. Three items carry a 'delayed' status. (1) Having 3,500 miners deployed by March 31, 2018 (claim 15543). (2) The Logical Brokerage acquisition, originally dated for March 27, 2018 (claim 15544). (3) MNP LLP's appointment as the 2018 auditor, tied to the end of 2018 (claim 15555). However, the automated pipeline marked each of these as both 'delayed' and 'stated' on the same day. Other claims say the 3,500 miners were in fact operating by March 31 (claim 15505) and that the Logical Brokerage deal was completed (claim 15509). So these delay flags look like extraction noise, not real slippage, and should be checked against the source filings before anyone relies on them.
A. Whether Riot moved from 3,500 installed miners (claim 15505) to the full 8,000 (claim 15506). Whether it actually reached about 110 PH/s (claim 15508) and 12 MW (claim 15507). Whether the US exchange idea (claim 15470) turned into a launch or was dropped. How the Coinsquare, Tess, and Verady stakes performed or were sold. And whether the 2018 audit by MNP LLP (claim 15555) was completed without problems.
A. First, the record stops in July 2018, so nothing here shows what Riot did afterward. Anyone doing diligence needs later filings. Second, the company was spread across mining, a brokerage, an exchange idea, and several minority investments. Its strategy was not focused, and how much capital each piece received is not shown. Third, every status in the dossier comes from automated extraction and none has been independently verified. The contradictory delay flags (claims 15543, 15544) show why the underlying filings should be read directly.
Frequently asked
2026-09-15A. In the disclosures on record, which run from June to July 2018, Riot is mainly a cryptocurrency miner. It runs mining machines in a leased Oklahoma City data center of 107,000 square feet (claim 15504). It also holds a portfolio of crypto-related side investments: a commodities brokerage (Logical Brokerage), part of the Canadian exchange Coinsquare, a majority stake in the blockchain firm Tess, and a convertible note in Verady. Important caveat: every claim here dates from 2018. The dossier says nothing about what the company looks like today, so don't treat these facts as current.
A. Riot was building mining capacity and spreading into the wider crypto ecosystem. On mining, it bought 1,200 miners through its acquisition of Kairos Global Technology (claim 15502) and another 6,800 miners in February 2018 (claim 15518). At full deployment it targeted 8,000 miners (claim 15506), 12 MW of power (claim 15507) and a hash rate of about 110 PH/s (claim 15508). Beyond mining, it bought Logical Brokerage for $600,000 (claim 15509), held 12.9% of Coinsquare (claim 15512), and said it was looking into launching a US crypto exchange (claim 15470). It also mentioned possible mining sites in other locations (claim 15474).
A. The record names none, and that is expected for a bitcoin miner. A miner earns newly issued coins and transaction fees from the blockchain network, not revenue from contracted customers. The brokerage and exchange businesses could in principle have customers, but none are disclosed. If you see a claim about 'customers' for Riot, check it against a filing.
A. Reported as done: 3,500 miners installed and running as of March 31, 2018 (claim 15505), the completed Kairos acquisition (claim 15471), a reported completed acquisition involving Tess (claim 15472), the Logical Brokerage purchase (claim 15509), and regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim 15553). Only targets: the 8,000-miner / 12 MW / 110 PH/s full deployment (claims 15506, 15507, 15508) and the US exchange, which was only being 'investigated' (claim 15470). In short, fewer than half of the targeted 8,000 miners were confirmed operating.
A. Yes, several. (1) Tess: some claims describe a 52% stake (claim 15514), while another calls it a 'completed acquisition' (claim 15472), so it's unclear whether Riot owned all of it. (2) The miner hardware spec is recorded as both 13.75 TH/s (claim 15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim 15550). (3) Some claims are marked 'delayed' when the deadline shown falls before or at the date of disclosure. Examples are Logical Brokerage (claim 15544, due 2018-03-27) and the 3,500 miners (claim 15543, due 2018-03-31). These look like artifacts of automated extraction, not real slippage. Many claims are also duplicates drawn from the same 2018-06-28 filing.
A. MNP LLP was appointed auditor for fiscal 2018 (claim 15555). That claim is flagged 'delayed' against a 2018-12-31 date, but nothing on record explains why, so treat the flag as unverified. Riot reported regaining compliance with Nasdaq listing rules in June 2018 (claim 15553), which means it had fallen out of compliance at some earlier point. The dossier doesn't say why.
A. First, whether the mining fleet ever reached the stated 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508). Second, whether the US exchange (claim 15470) and new mining sites (claim 15474) went anywhere. Third, what became of the non-mining stakes: Coinsquare (claim 15512), Tess (claim 15514), Verady (claim 15513) and Logical Brokerage (claim 15509). Most important, the dossier needs post-2018 filings before anyone draws conclusions about the company's current state.
A. (1) Everything after July 2018 is missing, so the current business, scale and strategy are unknown from this record. (2) The gap between 3,500 miners running and 8,000 targeted (claims 15505, 15506) was never shown to close. (3) It's unclear whether the side investments in brokerage, exchange stakes and blockchain services were core strategy or distractions, and whether any were later sold or written down. (4) The reason for the earlier Nasdaq non-compliance and the 'delayed' auditor flag (claims 15553, 15555) is unexplained. (5) Several 'delayed' statuses appear to be data errors and need manual review before anyone relies on them.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. In the disclosures on file, which run from August 2018 to early January 2019, Riot is a bitcoin mining company that is also trying to launch a U.S. cryptocurrency exchange called RiotX. Its mining runs out of a leased facility in Oklahoma City. The company reports 8,000 miners there (claim 15342), a maximum hash rate of 95 petahash per second (claims 15343, 15306), and 12 MW of power capacity (claim 15305). It also holds a minority investment in Coinsquare, a Canadian exchange operator (claims 15423, 15424, 15425). This record contains nothing after early January 2019, so it says nothing about the company's later direction.
A. The strategy has two parts: keep earning revenue from bitcoin mining (claim 15350) and build RiotX as a regulated U.S. exchange (claims 15345, 15307). For the exchange's licenses, Riot acquired 92.5% of Logical Brokerage Corp (claim 15341). RiotX is described as a FinCEN-registered money service business (claim 15428), a Florida-licensed money transmitter (claim 15429), and a CFTC-registered futures introducing broker (claim 15427), and it is seeking licenses in more states (claim 15430). In December 2018 the company also said it expects near-term operating losses (claim 15348) and will need capital within 12 months (claim 15349).
A. No customers are named anywhere in the record. Mining revenue goes to the bitcoin network rather than to named buyers, and the exchange had no disclosed users. The named parties are all partners, vendors, or counterparties. Coinsquare licensed its exchange technology to Riot (claim 15417). Synapse Financial Technologies was the banking partner (claims 15376, 15346). Shift Markets supplied the exchange platform (claims 15367, 15347). BMSS received waiver payments and shares (claims 15431–15434).
A. Every claim here has the status 'stated.' That means these are the company's own disclosures, and none has been independently verified as delivered. The mining operation is described as already running. The exchange is not: as of January 2019, RiotX was still 'in development' and awaiting regulatory approval (claims 15307, 15308). Its platform partner also changed within about three months. The Coinsquare license came first (September 2018, claim 15417), then the Synapse banking partnership (October 2018, claim 15376), then Shift Markets as platform provider (November 2018, claim 15367). No launch date is confirmed in the record.
A. Riot invested $3.0M in September 2017 (claim 15423) and another $6.4M in equity and warrants in February 2018 (claim 15424), for a disclosed 12.9% stake (claim 15425). For the exchange license, it agreed to pay 450,000 Riot shares (claim 15419), shares equal to 9.9% of RiotX Holdings (claim 15420), $485,331 in integration fees (claim 15421), and an ongoing 0.1% transaction fee (claim 15422). Two months later Riot announced a separate exchange platform agreement with Shift Markets (claim 15367). The record does not say whether the Coinsquare license was still in use.
A. (1) Regulatory: an SEC investigation was ongoing (claim 15382), even though a separate Section 8(e) examination had been terminated (claim 15381). (2) Funding: the company expected to need capital within 12 months and was seeking debt and equity financing (claims 15349, 15351). (3) Leadership: the CEO resigned in September 2018, and Christopher Ensey became interim CEO (claims 15413, 15402) at a $306,000 base salary (claim 15403). A board chair change and a director resignation followed (claims 15414, 15378). (4) Facility: the Oklahoma City lease ran only through August 15, 2019 (claims 15361, 15344), with monthly rent of $235,000, then $230,000, then $190,000 (claims 15362, 15363, 15364). (5) BMSS: the record lists recurring $200,000 waiver payments (claim 15432) but does not explain what obligation was waived.
A. Watch for five things: (1) whether RiotX actually launched and which platform it ran on, (2) how the SEC investigation ended, (3) whether the company raised the capital it said it needed, and on what terms, (4) whether the Oklahoma City lease was renewed before August 2019 (renewal options were disclosed in claim 15366), and (5) whether a permanent CEO was appointed. The Synapse partnership had a target date of January 1, 2019 (claim 15376). Any later record showing whether that date was met would be an early test of the company's execution.
A. It is not complete. The claims were extracted automatically from disclosures dated August 2018 through early January 2019 and have not been verified beyond the company's own statements. The claim list supplied for this FAQ was also cut off partway through the January 2, 2019 filing. Anything after that point, including later strategy changes, facility expansions, or results, is not covered here and should be checked against newer filings.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. In the period covered, Riot is a bitcoin mining company. It buys specialized mining computers (Bitmain Antminers) and runs them at a leased facility in Oklahoma City, and also through a hosting arrangement with Coinmint in Massena, New York (claim 14938). It had earlier been building a crypto exchange called RiotX (claim 15064), acquired through Logical Brokerage for about $600,000 (claim 14963). In February 2020 it said it would shut RiotX down (claim 14998). Note that the claims on record here run only from October 2019 to May 2020, so this describes Riot at that time, not today.
A. In February 2020 Riot said bitcoin mining would be its strategic focus for 2020 (claim 14999), in the same filing that ended the RiotX exchange. The plan was to replace older machines with newer, more efficient ones: 4,000 S17 Pro miners for about $6.4 million (claims 14970, 14964), then 1,000 S19 Pro miners for $2,437,000 (claim 14935). It also took previous-generation miners offline (claim 14929). The company named the May 2020 bitcoin halving, which cut the block reward to 6.25 BTC, as a key factor (claim 14955). It also hired XMS Capital Partners (claim 14997), but the record doesn't say what that engagement was for. Funding came partly from a $100 million at-the-market share offering authorization with H.C. Wainwright (claim 15063).
A. None are named, and a bitcoin miner typically has no customers in the usual sense. Its revenue comes from block rewards and transaction fees earned by mining. The named counterparties in the record are suppliers and partners, not buyers: Bitmain (the equipment vendor), Coinmint (the hosting provider, claim 14938), and Kairos Global Technology, whose subsidiary held the Oklahoma City lease (claims 14968, 15015). Riot also held minority stakes in Coinsquare (11.7%, claim 14957), TessPay (8.8%, claim 14959) and Verady (3.2%, claim 14958). Those are investments, not customer relationships.
A. As stated by the company in March 2020: the Oklahoma City facility had 12 MW of power capacity (claim 14948) in about 107,000 square feet (claim 14962). It had 4,000 S17 Pro miners in production in Q1 2020 (claims 14946, 14979), with an estimated maximum hashing rate of 248 PH/s (claim 14947). It also reported 7,400 operating ASIC miners in inventory (claim 14974). The Coinmint facility in Massena was described with 9,500 kWh of capacity (claim 14940), a unit that looks inconsistent with a power rating and should be checked against the source filing. Several of these figures appear more than once in the record because they were extracted from overlapping filings.
A. Every claim on record has the status 'stated.' Each was extracted automatically and moved to 'stated' on 2026-09-14, so none has yet been independently marked as fulfilled or missed. Some claims are the company's own reports of completed events: delivery of 1,060 S17 Pro miners (claim 15000), 4,000 S17 Pro units in production (claim 14979), the RiotX shutdown (claim 14998), and the conclusion of an SEC investigation (claim 15013). Claims that were forward-looking when made are still unconfirmed in this record. These include delivery of 1,000 S19 Pro miners by June 30, 2020 (claim 14935) and earlier miner deliveries due by December 11, 2019 and January 31, 2020 (claims 15047, 15018).
A. All the dated commitments in the record fall in 2019 and 2020 and have passed, so the next step is to confirm what happened to each. Specifically: whether the S19 Pro order arrived by June 30, 2020 (claim 14935); whether the Oklahoma City lease, extended only to May and then June 2020 (claims 15015, 14937), was renewed or ended; what happened to the Coinmint agreement after its October 8, 2020 term (claim 14939); and how much of the $100 million offering was used (claim 15063). The dossier also needs its filings after May 2020 ingested so it reflects Riot's later history.
A. 1) Coverage: the record stops in May 2020, and the claim list provided appears cut off, so it says nothing about Riot's later scale or strategy. 2) Verification: nothing has moved past 'stated,' so delivered and promised items are not yet distinguished by evidence. 3) Data quality: some extracted values look wrong. Claim 14945 lists the S17 purchase as '6.4 USD' when other claims give $6.4 million. The Kairos deal is tagged '8000.0 units' (claims 14949, 14961) with no clear meaning. A Litecoin halving claim (claim 14956) seems unrelated to a bitcoin miner. 4) Facility security: the main site ran on short lease extensions (claims 15015, 14937). 5) The purpose and outcome of the XMS Capital engagement (claim 14997) are not disclosed in the record.
A. The record includes the conclusion of an SEC investigation, disclosed in February 2020 (claim 15013), but no details about its scope or result. It also notes regulatory registrations held by Logical Brokerage, the RiotX entity (claims 14960, 14967), which became less relevant once the exchange was shut down. Routine governance items include ratification of the auditor (claim 15073), election of directors (claim 15072) and approval of an equity incentive plan (claim 15074).
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Riot mines bitcoin. It buys specialized Bitmain Antminer machines and runs them in hosted data-center space. The record shows the company moving from an Oklahoma City facility, whose lease ran to mid-2020 (claims 14749, 14937), to a co-location arrangement with Coinmint at Massena, New York (claims 14938, 14909). A 2021 filing states it uses Antminer-series machines exclusively (claim 14754). Note that the dossier only covers April 2020 to April 2021. Nothing later than that is on record here.
A. The strategy is to grow hash rate fast by buying large batches of newer, more efficient miners. Across 2020 the company placed a series of orders, including 1,000 S19 Pros for about $2.4M (claim 14816), then 15,600 S19 Pros for $35.3M (claim 14819). By October 2020 it projected a fleet of 22,640 units at full deployment (claim 14823). By March 2021 that projection had grown to 39,146 machines and about 4.0 EH/s (claim 14753). In April 2021 it added a 42,000-unit S19j order for $138.5M (claims 14726, 14728), which it said would add 3.7 EH/s by November 2021 (claim 14727). The purchases were funded partly through an at-the-market equity program with H.C. Wainwright (claim 14930) and a $100M shelf registration (claim 14814).
A. There are none in the conventional sense, and none are named. A self-mining company earns bitcoin from the network, not revenue from contracted customers. The named counterparties are suppliers and hosts, not buyers. Bitmain sells Riot its machines (claim 14725), and Coinmint hosts them (claim 14748). If you see a reference to 'customers' for this company, ask what it means.
A. The company says some machines arrived. It reported receiving 1,000 S19 Pros in July 2020 (claim 14903), and it reported deliveries of 2,500 S19 Pros in January 2021 (claim 14742), 2,002 in February 2021 (claim 14743) and 2,201 in March 2021 (claim 14744). Reported hash rate was 0.57 EH/s at 31 December 2020 (claim 14751). It projected 1.3 EH/s once 13,746 received machines were installed (claim 14752). Several larger commitments were still future deliveries when this record ends. These include 11,900 S19 Pros due by August 2021 (claim 14745), 12,000 S19j Pros due by November 2021 (claim 14746) and the 42,000 S19j order (claim 14726). Every claim here is company-stated only; none has been independently verified. Delivery notices tell you machines arrived, not that they were plugged in and hashing.
A. First, whether the orders due in August to November 2021 arrived on time (claims 14745, 14746, 14726). Second, whether reported hash rate actually reached the projected ~4.0 EH/s (claim 14753) plus the added ~3.7 EH/s (claim 14727). Third, whether Riot had enough hosted power to run the machines: the only capacity figure on record is 9,500 at Massena (claim 14940). Fourth, how much the equity programs diluted shareholders (claims 14930, 14814). A related check is whether the 12-month liquidity guidance through March 2021 held (claim 14931).
A. This is the biggest gap in the record. The only hosting arrangement disclosed is Coinmint. Its agreement term was dated to October 2020 (claims 14939, 14822), yet the relationship is still referenced in March 2021 (claim 14748). No renewal terms appear in the record. The one capacity figure for Massena, 9,500 'kWh' (claim 14940), is ambiguous. It is likely kilowatts of power, but the unit in the filing is unclear. The record contains no disclosed site with enough power for an 80,000-plus machine fleet, so the growth plan depends on capacity the record does not show.
A. Yes. Several dollar amounts were clearly extracted in millions but recorded as plain USD. For example, the 4,000 S17 Pros are shown as '6.3 USD' (claims 14926, 14739), elsewhere as $6.4M (claim 14815), and the ATM facility is shown as '100.0 USD' (claim 14930). Some figures also conflict. One filing describes a $1.94M order as S19 Pros (claim 14917), while a later one calls it 1,040 plain S19s (claim 14817). The 8,000-unit order at about $17.5–17.7M (claims 14846, 14841, 14847) and the 5,100-unit order (claim 14840) appear to overlap with the 15,600-unit total (claim 14819). Don't add them together. Check the original filings before quoting any number.
A. No. Every claim was extracted automatically and marked 'stated' on 2026-09-14, but the underlying filings stop at April 2021. The last entries cover the Bitmain deal and the appointment of Megan Brooks as COO at a $275,000 salary (claims 14730, 14731). More than five years of disclosures are missing from this record. Treat it as history of the 2020–21 build-out, not a picture of the company today.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Based on the disclosures on record, Riot mines Bitcoin at industrial scale. Its main asset is the Whinstone facility in Rockdale, Texas, which it bought in 2021 for $80 million in cash (claim 14605) plus 11.8 million shares (claim 14606). Later that year it also bought ESS Metron, an electrical equipment and engineering business, for $25 million in cash (claim 14351) plus 645,248 shares (claim 14352).
A. The strategy is to grow owned mining capacity at Whinstone. Riot disclosed plans for 200 MW of air-cooled capacity (claim 14424) and 200 MW of immersion-cooled capacity (claim 14423), which would take the site to 700 MW in total (claim 14270). It also set a longer-range goal of 1,500 MW of infrastructure by the end of 2023 (claim 14495). That goal is tied to performance stock grants for executives, including 525,000 units each for Benjamin Yi and Jason Les (claims 14496, 14497). Buying ESS Metron points to owning more of the electrical supply chain itself.
A. None are named in the record. The main counterparty that is named is Bitmain, which is a supplier, not a customer. Riot disclosed a roughly $480 million order for Bitmain ASIC miners, with deliveries through December 2022 (claims 14258, 14271). Whinstone's hosting clients, if it has any, are not identified in these claims.
A. Every claim on record is still 'stated,' meaning the company said it and nobody has independently confirmed it. The completed Whinstone and ESS Metron acquisitions (claims 14260, 14261) are the closest thing to delivered facts, but even those rest on Riot's own 10-K. The operating targets have no recorded outcome yet: 120,150 miners running by end of 2022 (claims 14264, 14268), 370 MW of capacity by end of 2022 (claims 14257, 14269), and the 700 MW and 1,500 MW buildouts.
A. Watch whether year-end 2022 filings confirm the 120,150 miners and 370 MW that were guided. Also watch whether Bitmain delivered the full ~$480 million order on schedule, how far the 200 MW immersion-cooled buildout has gone (claim 14262), and whether the 1,500 MW target for 2023 was met. That last target decides whether the executive performance RSUs vest (claims 14496-14499).
A. Riot disclosed a congressional inquiry into how much energy cryptocurrency mining uses (claim 14263). No outcome is recorded. On governance, the board grew to five members in 2021 (claim 14615), and shareholders were asked to add 4.4 million shares to the equity plan (claims 14422, 14455).
A. 1. The record stops in early 2022, so it does not show whether any 2022 or 2023 capacity or miner targets were hit. 2. Some figures appear to be in thousands, not units, and should be checked against source filings before anyone quotes them. Examples are the $267,409 Whinstone value (claim 14476), the $83,138 power-credit contingent consideration (claim 14478), and the $56.25 Bitmain purchase figure (claim 14403). 3. The dossier includes no hosting-customer names and no revenue mix.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Riot mines Bitcoin at industrial scale and builds the power infrastructure to do it. Its largest step was acquiring Whinstone US, Inc., which runs a large mining facility in Rockdale, Texas. Riot bought it from Northern Data AG for a recorded $267,409 (thousands, so about $267M) plus $83,138 (thousands) in contingent future power credits (claims 14476, 14478). It later bought ESS Metron, a power distribution and electrical engineering firm, for $25,000,000 in cash plus 645,248 shares (claims 14351, 14352). Riot describes the Whinstone site as the largest mining facility in North America (claim 14255).
A. Riot plans to grow mining capacity by owning power infrastructure and buying large batches of mining machines. The filings describe expanding Whinstone to 700 MW (claims 14252, 14259, 14267). They also describe 200 MW of immersion-cooled and 200 MW of air-cooled capacity at Rockdale (claims 14423, 14424), which Riot called the first industrial-scale immersion-cooled deployment (claims 14425, 14262). The purchase of ESS Metron suggests Riot also wants to control its electrical equipment supply chain. Executive incentives are tied to growth: 2021 performance RSU grants to Jason Les (525,000), Benjamin Yi (525,000), Jeffrey McGonegal (450,000) and Megan Brooks (400,000) were linked to a 1,500 MW infrastructure target by 2023-12-31 (claims 14495-14499).
A. Riot sells mined Bitcoin rather than a product to customers, and this dossier names no third-party customers. Whinstone's hosting clients, if any, are not identified. The named counterparties are all ones Riot pays or partners with. Bitmain is its miner supplier, under a $480 million purchase order for 82,500 S19-series miners (claims 14251, 14272). Coinmint hosts Riot machines at Massena, New York on a month-to-month co-location agreement (claims 14253, 14275). An unnamed utility supplies power under a long-term power purchase agreement (claim 14254).
A. Only the acquisitions are described as completed. The March 2022 annual report says the Whinstone and ESS Metron deals closed (claims 14260, 14261). Everything else is still a target, and every claim on record has status 'stated', not 'verified'. The unconfirmed targets include 370 MW of power capacity and 120,150 miners deployed by end of 2022 (claims 14249, 14250, 14264, 14265), the 700 MW Whinstone build-out, and the 1,500 MW development target by end of 2023 (claim 14495). None has an independent record showing it was reached.
A. Three dated commitments can be checked. First, did Riot reach 370 MW and 120,150 operating miners by 2022-12-31 (claims 14249, 14250)? Second, did all 82,500 Bitmain miners arrive by December 2022 (claim 14272)? An earlier Bitmain order promised delivery by 2022-05-01 (claim 14405). Third, was the 1,500 MW infrastructure target hit by 2023-12-31, and did the executive performance RSUs vest (claims 14495-14499)? The ESS Metron holdback of 70,165 shares was due by 2023-06-01 (claim 14353).
A. Yes. Several dollar figures were extracted without their units. The Bitmain order shows as '480.0 USD' in some claims and '480.0 million USD' in another (claims 14251, 14258, 14266, 14271). The Whinstone price appears as '267409.0 USD', which is almost certainly thousands (claim 14476). A miner purchase shows as '56.25 USD', missing its scale (claim 14403). The same facts are also recorded several times, including the Whinstone acquisition and the 370 MW and 120,150-miner guidance, so readers should not count them as separate promises. The record provided also stops partway through the March 2022 filing and has no later claims.
A. 1. Execution: this record never confirms whether the 2022 and 2023 capacity targets were met. 2. Power: Riot depends heavily on a single Texas site and an unnamed long-term power agreement. The terms and counterparty are not disclosed here, and the $83,138 (thousands) in contingent power credits is a notable, loosely defined item (claim 14478). 3. Regulation: the dossier notes a congressional inquiry into crypto mining energy use (claim 14263), and its outcome is not recorded. 4. Supplier concentration: Riot's fleet growth depends on Bitmain delivering on time. 5. Dilution and pay: the equity plan grew by 4.4 million shares (claims 14422, 14455) alongside large performance grants.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Riot mines Bitcoin at industrial scale and also rents space and power to other miners, known as hosting or colocation (claim 14158). Its main site is the Whinstone facility in Rockdale, Texas (claim 14156), which Riot describes as the largest Bitcoin mining facility in North America (claim 14157) and the largest controlled load response facility in the world (claim 13870). Those are the company's own descriptions and have not been independently checked.
A. The 2022 disclosures describe growth through more power capacity, more hash rate and immersion cooling, where mining machines sit in liquid to run cooler and denser. Riot stated a hash rate target of 12.6 EH/s (claim 13883), expansion of Whinstone to 700 MW (claim 13884), and a new 1 GW (1,000 MW) site in Corsicana, Navarro County, Texas (claims 13909, 13885, 13860, 13802). Planned Rockdale infrastructure included a 100 MW immersion building (claim 13869) and a 400 MW substation (claim 13871), with immersion work done alongside ESS Metron (claims 14160, 14161). Executive equity pay was tied to reaching 1,500 MW of infrastructure (claim 13865) and an EBITDA target recorded as 500 (claim 13866). The record does not state the unit for that EBITDA figure, so it should be confirmed against the filing.
A. Only one hosting customer is named: Rhodium, described as the largest (claim 13863). Riot also disclosed that it was ending its hosting relationship with Coinmint (claim 13864). No other customers are named in the record. Bitcoin mining revenue comes from the network itself, not from contracted customers.
A. None of it can be confirmed from this record. Every claim on file has the status 'stated', meaning it was extracted from company disclosures and has not been verified as delivered, missed or revised. That includes the 12.6 EH/s target (claim 13883), the 700 MW Whinstone expansion (claim 13884) and the 1 GW Corsicana build (claim 13909). The record also mentions constructing multiple buildings in 11 months (claim 13872), but that is still a company statement, not a verified result.
A. Mainly by selling stock. In March 2022 Riot set up an at-the-market offering of up to $500 million, which lets it sell shares gradually into the market (claims 14154, 14144), paying sales agents 3% (claim 14155). Shareholders later approved raising authorized common stock by 340 million shares (claims 13903, 13889) and preferred stock by 30 million shares (claim 13904). They also approved adding 10 million shares to the equity incentive plan (claims 13905, 13890, 13841), after an earlier 4.4 million share increase (claim 13952). For existing holders, this means significant potential dilution.
A. In 2022 Jason Les was appointed CEO (claim 13954) and Benjamin Yi became Executive Chairman (claim 13953). COO Megan Brooks resigned (claim 13955), with a separation package that included $406,250 in cash severance (claim 14218), a pro-rated bonus of $86,370 (claim 14219) and a 75,000-unit RSU grant for transition services (claim 14224). The CFO announced retirement and a move to a Senior Advisor role (claims 13906, 13907), and a new CFO appointment was expected by August 2022 (claim 13908). Marcum LLP was engaged as independent auditor (claim 13888).
A. Four things: (1) whether reported hash rate actually reached 12.6 EH/s (claim 13883); (2) whether the Corsicana site energized its 1 GW of capacity, or only a first phase, and on what schedule (claim 13909); (3) how much of the $500 million offering was used and how many new shares were issued (claim 14154); and (4) whether Rhodium stayed the anchor hosting customer after the Coinmint exit (claims 13863, 13864). Any of these would give the stated claims their first verified status.
A. First, the record is incomplete. The claims supplied here stop in mid-August 2022, and the last entry is cut off, so later disclosures, including any updated strategy, are missing. Second, nothing has been verified: all claims are still 'stated', and the status changes are dated today, so they reflect automated extraction rather than reviewed outcomes. Third, key figures need checking against source filings, especially the unit for the EBITDA target (claim 13866) and whether capacity numbers are planned or energized. Finally, customers are barely disclosed, with only Rhodium named.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Riot (RIOT) mines bitcoin and hosts mining machines for other companies at large Texas facilities. The record centers on its Whinstone site in Rockdale and a newer site in Corsicana (Navarro County). The filings describe a 400 MW substation at Rockdale (claim 13871), a 100 MW liquid immersion-cooled building there (claim 13869), and the company calls Rockdale the largest controlled load response facility in the world (claim 13870).
A. The disclosed strategy is to scale up power capacity and mining output. Riot announced a 1 GW facility in Corsicana (claims 13909, 13885, 13802; 1000 MW for Navarro County immersion cooling, claim 13860) and a Whinstone expansion to 700 MW (claim 13884). It set a hash rate target of 12.6 EH/s (claim 13883) and emphasized immersion cooling. Executive pay was tied to targets of 1,500 MW of infrastructure (claim 13865) and an EBITDA figure recorded as 500 USD (claim 13866). That EBITDA figure looks like a unit error in extraction and should be checked against the source filing.
A. The only named customer on record is Rhodium, described as Riot's largest hosting customer (claim 13863). Riot also disclosed that it was ending its hosting relationship with Coinmint (claim 13864). The record includes no contract values, durations, or other named customers.
A. None of these claims has been independently verified as delivered. Every one has the status 'stated', meaning it was extracted from company disclosures and has not been checked against outcomes. The Corsicana 1 GW build, the 700 MW Whinstone expansion and the 12.6 EH/s target are all announcements. Several claims have deadlines that have already passed, and none of them has a recorded resolution. These include a new CFO by 2022-08-15 (claim 13908), a PSU award tied to 2023-12-31 (claim 13590) and RSA vesting by 2024-06-01 (claims 13596, 13591).
A. As of May 2022, Jason Les was appointed CEO (claim 13954) and Benjamin Yi was appointed Executive Chairman (claim 13953). Megan Brooks resigned as COO (claim 13955). The CFO announced a retirement with a planned move to a senior advisor role (claims 13906, 13907, 13585). Ryan D. Werner was appointed Chief Accounting Officer at a $275,000 base salary (claims 13593, 13594). Marcum LLP was engaged as independent auditor (claim 13888).
A. Riot sought and disclosed increases in its authorized share limits. Authorized common stock rose to 340,000,000 shares (claims 13903, 13620) and authorized preferred stock to 30,000,000 shares (claim 13904). The equity incentive plan grew by 10,000,000 shares (claims 13905, 13841), following an earlier amendment adding 4,400,000 shares (claim 13952). A higher authorization does not mean the shares were issued, but it gives the company room to dilute existing holders.
A. Watch for evidence that Corsicana actually reached its 1 GW capacity and that Whinstone reached 700 MW. Check whether realized hash rate hit the 12.6 EH/s target (claim 13883) and whether the 1,500 MW compensation target was met (claim 13865). Also look at whether the Rhodium hosting relationship survived (claim 13863), who replaced the retiring CFO, and how much of the new share authorization was actually issued.
A. First, the record covers May to October 2022 and appears truncated, so nearly four years of history up to today are missing. Second, nothing has been verified as delivered; every claim is an unchecked company statement. Third, the EBITDA target's unit looks wrong (claim 13866). Fourth, several claims are duplicates from different filings and should not be counted as separate commitments. A reader should treat this as a list of stated intentions, not a record of what the company achieved.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. According to its filings, Riot mines Bitcoin at large data-center sites in Texas and also hosts other companies' mining machines. Its main sites are the Whinstone facility in Rockdale, disclosed at about 700 MW of electricity capacity (claims 13271, 13279), and a planned facility in Corsicana, Navarro County. It has also referenced switchgear operations (claim 13517) and development of immersion-cooled mining hardware (claim 13803).
A. The strategy on record is to scale power capacity and hashrate. The centerpiece is Corsicana, described as a 1 GW (1,000 MW) facility on completion (claims 13248, 13258, 13263, 13529, 13802, 13860), with a first phase of 400 MW of immersion-cooled mining (claim 13280). Riot also planned more buildings at Whinstone: Buildings F and G with immersion cooling and Buildings D and E with air cooling (claims 13861, 13862). Executive equity awards were tied to an infrastructure target of 1,500 MW (claim 13865) and an EBITDA target recorded as '500 USD' (claim 13866). That EBITDA figure is almost certainly an extraction unit error, so check the source filing before quoting it.
A. Only one customer is named on the record. Rhodium is described as Riot's largest hosting customer (claim 13863). Riot also disclosed that it was ending a hosting relationship with Coinmint (claim 13864). No other customers are named, so the full customer base and how much revenue depends on Rhodium cannot be determined from this dossier.
A. Nothing on this record is verified as delivered. Every claim has status 'stated', meaning the company said it, and none has been marked fulfilled or missed. The closest thing to existing capacity is Rockdale's described 'developed' capacity of about 700 MW (claims 13257, 13279), but that still comes from the company's own statements. The 1 GW Corsicana build, the 400 MW immersion phase, miner delivery schedules (claims 13799, 13525, 13519) and hashrate growth guidance (claims 13521, 13528) are all forward-looking.
A. As of October 2022 filings, Jason Les was CEO (claim 13584) and Benjamin Yi was Executive Chairman (claim 13583). Colin M. Yee was appointed CFO at a $350,000 base salary (claims 13587, 13588), replacing a retiring CFO, McGonegal, who stayed on as a senior advisor (claims 13585, 13586). Ryan D. Werner was appointed Chief Accounting Officer at a $275,000 base salary (claims 13593, 13594). Hubert Marleau was elected a director (claim 13842).
A. It is worth tracking. Riot proposed and pursued raising its authorized common stock to 340 million shares (claims 13582, 13620), plus an earlier authorized-share increase (claim 13858). It also added 10 million shares to its equity incentive plan (claim 13841). Individual executive grants include Yee's 242,000-unit PSU award (claim 13590) and Werner's 120,000-unit PSU award (claim 13595). Authorized shares are not the same as issued shares, but they give the company room to issue stock to fund the buildout.
A. First, whether Corsicana's 400 MW first phase and its full 1 GW actually came online (claims 13280, 13248). Second, whether the Whinstone building expansions were completed (claims 13861, 13862). Third, whether the 1,500 MW and EBITDA compensation targets were met (claims 13865, 13866). Some dated milestones have already passed and can be checked: Yee's PSU performance period ending 2023-12-31 (claim 13590) and RSA vesting on 2024-06-01 (claims 13591, 13596). Also check whether Rhodium remained the largest hosting customer (claim 13863).
A. 1. No claim has been verified as delivered or missed, so the gap between promises and results is still unscored. 2. The visible record stops at March 2023, even though today is September 2026, so the current strategy, capacity and customer list may be very different. 3. Hosting revenue may be concentrated in a single named customer, Rhodium. 4. Several claims are duplicates or vaguely worded, such as the multiple Corsicana 1 GW entries and 'M.W. capacity under development' (claim 13520). 5. The EBITDA target's unit (claim 13866) looks wrong. All claims came from automated extraction, so check them against the source filings before relying on them.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Based on the disclosures on record, Riot is a Bitcoin mining company. It builds and runs large power-intensive data center sites in Texas and fills them with specialized mining computers. The main sites are the Rockdale facility (formerly Whinstone) and a planned site in Corsicana, in Navarro County. Earlier filings also mention a switchgear and electrical equipment business picked up through acquisitions (claims 13517, 13797).
A. The record describes a buildout of mining capacity. Riot reported 700 MW of developed capacity at Rockdale (claims 13242, 13247, 13262). It planned a 1 GW (1,000 MW) Corsicana facility (claims 13802, 13529, 13243, 13258), with the first 400 MW designed for immersion cooling, where machines are submerged in fluid to run cooler (claims 13264, 13274). It also guided to 111,216 deployed miners by the end of 2023 (claims 13244, 13270, 13273, 13276), backed by a Bitmain miner purchase order (claim 13261). The most recent claims shown date from March 2023, so this describes the strategy as of then, not necessarily today.
A. The dossier names no customers. Mining itself has no customer in the usual sense, because the company earns bitcoin directly from the network. No hosting clients, power buyers or other counterparties are named. The only named commercial counterparty is Bitmain, which is a supplier (claim 13261).
A. No claim on record is marked as delivered or verified. Nearly all are 'stated,' meaning announced but not independently confirmed. The claims whose deadlines have passed are marked 'delayed': - the 400 MW Rockdale expansion and its fourth building, both due by 2023-03-31 (claims 13268, 13266) - the 111,216-miner target for end of 2023 (claims 13244, 13270, 13273, 13276) The Corsicana 1 GW facility has no promised date on record, so its progress cannot be judged from this dossier.
A. Filings from late 2022 list: - Jason Les, Chief Executive Officer (claim 13584) - Benjamin Yi, Executive Chairman (claim 13583) - Colin M. Yee, CFO, replacing the retiring CFO McGonegal (claims 13587, 13585), with a $350,000 base salary (claim 13588) plus stock awards, including 242,000 performance units (claim 13590) - Ryan D. Werner, Chief Accounting Officer, with a $275,000 base salary (claims 13593, 13594)
A. Yes. In 2022 Riot proposed raising its authorized common stock by 340,000,000 shares (claims 13582, 13620). Authorization alone does not issue any shares. It does give management room to sell stock to fund expansion, which can dilute existing shareholders.
A. Four things matter most: 1. Confirmation that the delayed Rockdale expansion (claim 13268) and the 111,216-miner deployment (claim 13276) were completed, and when. 2. Energization dates and actual online megawatts at Corsicana, compared with the 1 GW plan (claim 13243) and the 400 MW immersion phase (claim 13264). 3. How much of the 340M-share authorization was actually used (claim 13620). 4. Any later filings that change strategy, since the record shown ends in early 2023.
A. 1. **Nothing is verified.** No claim has moved beyond 'stated' or 'delayed,' and every status reflects automated extraction reviewed in September 2026. 2. **The record stops early.** Riot's disclosures from 2023 onward are not shown, so the current strategy and results are unknown here. 3. **Some capacity claims lack figures.** Several, such as the Whinstone capacity (claim 13801) and the MW under development (claims 13526, 13796), give no number. 4. **Timelines are unclear.** It is not known whether the Corsicana 1 GW plan kept its original scope and schedule.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Based on the claims on record, Riot (RIOT) mines Bitcoin at large, power-hungry data-center sites in Texas. Its filings focus on electrical capacity (megawatts), how many mining machines it runs, and 'hash rate' (the computing power it contributes to the Bitcoin network). One 2022 claim also mentions switchgear operations, meaning electrical equipment, alongside mining (claim 13517).
A. The record points to scale-up through power capacity. Riot reports 700 MW of developed capacity at its Rockdale, Texas facility (claims 13279, 13247). It is building a second site in Corsicana (Navarro County), Texas, described as reaching 1 GW (1,000 MW) on completion (claims 13529, 13278, 13263). About 400 MW of Corsicana is planned for immersion-cooled mining, where machines sit in cooling fluid (claims 13280, 13274). Riot guided to 111,216 miners in operation by the end of 2023 (claims 13249, 13270). The claims shown here stop in early 2023, so any later change in strategy is not visible in this record.
A. No customers are named in the record. That fits the business model: a Bitcoin miner earns newly issued bitcoin and network fees rather than selling to identifiable clients. The only named counterparty is Bitmain, a supplier from which Riot ordered ASIC mining machines (claim 13261).
A. The most concrete disclosed figure is Rockdale's 700 MW of developed capacity (claim 13279). Corsicana's 1 GW and its 400 MW immersion-cooled build-out are forward-looking plans; nothing on record shows they were completed (claims 13278, 13280). Two dated promises are marked 'delayed': the 111,216-miner target for end-2023 (claims 13249, 13254, 13259, 13265, 13270) and a fourth Rockdale building due by 2023-03-31 (claims 13245, 13251). These statuses come from automated extraction. Claim 13255 describes the same fourth building with no date and a 'stated' status, so delivery should be checked against later filings.
A. As of October 2022 filings, Jason Les is CEO (claim 13584) and Benjamin Yi is Executive Chairman (claim 13583). Colin M. Yee was appointed CFO (claim 13587) at a $350,000 base salary (claim 13588), with stock awards that include 242,000 performance units (claim 13590). Ryan D. Werner was appointed Chief Accounting Officer (claim 13593) at a $275,000 base salary (claim 13594). The prior CFO, McGonegal, retired and moved into a senior advisor role (claims 13585, 13586).
A. Possibly. In 2022 Riot proposed raising its authorized common stock by 340,000,000 shares (claims 13582, 13620). Authorizing shares does not mean issuing them. It does, however, give management room to raise money by selling stock, which is common among miners funding expansion. Stock-based pay for executives adds further, smaller dilution (claims 13589–13597).
A. Watch for four things in later filings. First, confirmation of how much of Corsicana's 1 GW is energized and running (claim 13278). Second, whether the 400 MW immersion-cooled deployment was built (claim 13280). Third, the actual miner count compared with the 111,216 target (claim 13249). Fourth, whether the delayed Rockdale fourth building was finished (claim 13245). Also check how any of the 340M newly authorized shares were used (claim 13582).
A. (1) Execution: two dated promises are already flagged as delayed, and the flagship 1 GW Corsicana build has no confirmed completion on record. (2) Data quality: many claims are near-duplicates from automated extraction, and at least one conflicts on status (claims 13245 vs. 13255). Treat the 'delayed' tags as leads to verify, not settled findings. (3) Coverage: the record provided ends partway through March 2023, so later delivery, financing, and strategy changes are missing here. (4) Economics: no revenue, costs, power prices, or bitcoin production figures appear among these claims, so profitability can't be judged from this record.
Frequently asked
2026-09-14A. Based on the disclosures on record, Riot (RIOT) is a Bitcoin mining company. It runs large-scale mining facilities in Texas, and its disclosures focus on power capacity measured in megawatts, fleets of mining machines, and growth in hash rate, which is its computing output. The main sites are the Rockdale Facility and the Corsicana (Navarro) Facility. Nothing in this dossier describes a business line other than Bitcoin mining.
A. The strategy on record is to grow mining capacity by building out large Texas power sites. Riot described Rockdale as having 700 MW of developed capacity (claims 13279, 13242). It also described a planned Corsicana facility of about 1 GW (claims 13278, 13529, 13269), including 400 MW of immersion-cooled mining, a method of cooling machines in liquid (claims 13246, 13250). Riot guided to 111,216 miners in operation by the end of 2023 (claims 13244, 13249). It also placed a purchase order for ASIC miners, which are specialized mining machines, from Bitmain (claim 13261).
A. The record names no customers. That fits the business model: a Bitcoin miner is paid in Bitcoin by the network, not by contracted clients. The only named counterparty is Bitmain, which is a supplier of mining machines (claim 13261), not a customer.
A. No claim on record has been confirmed as delivered. Almost everything is at 'stated' status, meaning announced but not independently verified. Several dated promises are now marked 'delayed': - The 400 MW Rockdale expansion and its fourth building, promised by 2023-03-31 (claims 13268, 13260, 13266, 13275, 13277). - The 111,216-miner target for end of 2023 (claims 13244, 13249). The 'delayed' labels come from automated extraction applied on 2026-09-14. They show that the deadline passed without a completion disclosure in this dossier, not that a failure was confirmed.
A. According to October 2022 disclosures, Jason Les is CEO (claim 13584) and Benjamin Yi is Executive Chairman (claim 13583). Colin M. Yee was appointed CFO (claim 13587) with a $350,000 base salary (claim 13588), replacing McGonegal, who retired (claim 13585) and stayed on as a senior advisor (claim 13586). Ryan D. Werner was appointed Chief Accounting Officer (claim 13593) at $275,000 base pay (claim 13594). Both executives received RSU, RSA, and PSU equity awards, some tied to performance (for example, claims 13590 and 13595).
A. Watch for: - Confirmation that the delayed Rockdale 400 MW expansion was finished, and when (claim 13268). - The actual end-of-2023 miner count compared with the 111,216 target (claim 13244). - Progress at Corsicana toward 1 GW and the 400 MW immersion-cooled phase (claims 13278, 13246). - Whether shareholders approved the proposed increase to 340 million authorized shares (claim 13582), which would allow more share issuance and dilution.
A. 1. Execution. The two most concrete dated commitments, the Rockdale expansion and the miner-count target, are both flagged as delayed, and the dossier has no completion evidence. 2. The record is thin and stale. Claims run only from October 2022 to March 2023, so later progress is not captured here. 3. Many capacity claims are repeated from the same March 2023 filing, such as the 1 GW Corsicana figure in claims 13243, 13248, and 13253. They should not be read as separate confirmations. 4. Funding and dilution. The authorized-share proposal (claim 13582) raises the question of how the build-out is being financed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. On this record, Riot is a large-scale Bitcoin miner. It runs its own mining machines in Texas data centers and earns Bitcoin, rather than selling a product or service to outside clients. It operates a Rockdale facility it described as having 700 MW of power capacity (claim 12277) and is building a second site outside Corsicana, planned at 1 GW (claims 12278, 12648, 12003). Its filings also describe immersion-cooled mining hardware (claims 12647, 12282) and an acquisition of ESS Metron, LLC (claims 12564, 12498), paid partly in stock (70,165 shares, claim 12499).
A. Grow 'self-mining' hash rate, meaning the computing power pointed at Bitcoin. It plans to do this by buying machines in bulk and building out power capacity. The main parts are: (1) a long-term supply agreement with MicroBT (claim 12380), with an initial order of 33,280 miners for $162.9M (claims 12381, 12382), an option on up to 66,560 more (claim 12384), and later references to annual purchase options of 265,000 units (claim 11999); (2) the 1 GW Corsicana build, starting with 400 MW of immersion-cooled mining (claims 12675, 12680); and (3) funding growth through share sales, including a $750M at-the-market stock program (claims 12275, 12283, 12273).
A. None are named on this record, and that is expected for this business model. Riot mines Bitcoin for its own account, so its revenue comes from the Bitcoin network rather than from contracted customers. The named counterparties are suppliers and deal partners, not buyers: MicroBT supplies the mining hardware (claim 12380), Riot bought ESS Metron (claim 12564), and Cantor-style sales agents run the stock offering at a 3% commission (claims 12276, 12284). Readers should not look for customer concentration risk here. The relevant exposures are the Bitcoin price, network difficulty, and power costs.
A. Nothing on this record has been independently confirmed. Every claim sits at status 'stated', meaning the company said it, and none has moved to verified, delivered, or missed. The closest thing to a reported result is the company's own August 2023 statement that it was operating at 10.7 EH/s (claim 12279). The Corsicana capacity, the MicroBT deliveries, and the hash rate targets are all still announcements as far as this dossier shows.
A. Several. Riot guided to 12.5 EH/s by 2023-12-31, and that target appears in more than one filing (claims 12677, 12681, 12280). It also guided to deploying 111,216 miners by the same date (claim 12676). It expected the initial 33,280-miner order to add 7.6 EH/s by 2024-04-15 (claims 12381, 12383), and guided to 20.1 EH/s after deliveries by 2024-06-30 (claim 12281). The full purchase option was tied to 15.3 EH/s by 2024-12-31 (claim 12385). All of these dates are now in the past, but the record holds no follow-up showing whether they were met. This is the single biggest gap to close.
A. First, look for filings that confirm or contradict the 2023–2024 hash rate and deployment targets above. Second, look for the actual energized capacity at Corsicana against the 400 MW first phase and the 1 GW total. Third, check how much of the 13M-share increase to the equity incentive plan (claims 12134, 12135, 12004) and of the $750M stock program has been used, since both dilute existing shareholders. Fourth, watch the executive long-term incentive awards. Their service tranches vest 2026-07-01 and their performance tranches are due 2026-07-31 (for example, the CEO's 184,820 + 184,820 shares, claims 12355 and 12356). Those dates have just passed, so vesting disclosures should be arriving now.
A. (1) Did the hash rate and deployment guidance get delivered on time? The record has no outcomes. (2) How much of the MicroBT option and the 265,000-unit annual options (claim 11999) became firm purchases, and at what cost? (3) How far along is Corsicana, which is described repeatedly (claims 12001, 12206, 12286) but has no completion date anywhere on the record? (4) How much dilution came from the stock program and the expanded incentive plans (4M shares in claims 12497 and 12543, then 13M in claim 12134)? (5) Were the executive performance awards earned, and against what metrics?
A. Yes. First, the claims were produced by automated extraction, and several are duplicates of the same statement from different filings. For example, claims 12674 and 12679 both give the 1,000 MW Corsicana total, and claims 12677 and 12681 both give the 12.5 EH/s target. Counting them separately overstates the number of commitments. Second, there is a likely extraction or typo inconsistency: the CFO and General Counsel service awards read 123,231 shares, while their performance awards read 123,321 (claims 12357, 12358, 12361, 12362). Check these against the source filing. Third, the Rockdale capacity claim with no number (claim 12678) is incomplete. Finally, the record supplied here cuts off partway through December 2023 filings, so later disclosures may exist but were not reviewed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. Based on this record, Riot is a Bitcoin miner. It runs its own mining machines in large Texas data centers and earns Bitcoin from that computing work, which the industry calls 'self-mining.' The disclosures describe a Rockdale facility with 700 MW of power capacity (claim 12277) and a planned 1 GW site outside Corsicana, Texas (claims 12648, 12278, 12003). Riot also acquired ESS Metron, LLC (claims 12564, 12498), paying partly in stock (70,165 shares, claim 12499). The claims describe ESS Metron only by name and don't say what it does, though Riot also talks about 'industrial scale immersion-cooled' mining hardware (claims 12647, 12282).
A. The strategy is to grow mining capacity quickly by buying hardware in bulk and building a second very large site. Riot signed a long-term supply agreement with MicroBT (claim 12380). The first order was 33,280 machines for $162.9M (claims 12381, 12382), expected to add 7.6 EH/s of hash rate (claim 12383). Riot also took an option on 66,560 more machines, representing 15.3 EH/s (claims 12384, 12385). By February 2024 the plan covered 99,840 units deployed by mid-2025 (claim 11992), with options on up to 265,000 more MicroBT miners through 2027 (claims 11994, 11999). The stated goal was 38.0 EH/s of self-mining capacity (claims 11993, 11998). Riot planned to fund growth partly by selling new stock through a $750M at-the-market program (claims 12275, 12283) that pays the sales agent a 3% commission (claim 12276).
A. No customers are named anywhere in this record. As a self-miner, Riot's revenue comes from Bitcoin earned by its own machines, not from contracts with named clients. The only named commercial counterparty is its hardware supplier, MicroBT (claims 12380, 11994). Nothing here identifies any hosting, power-sale, or data-center customers.
A. Nothing in this record has been independently verified as delivered. Every claim has status 'stated,' meaning the company said it, not that anyone confirmed it happened. The closest things to current-state facts are the company's own statements of 10.7 EH/s operating hash rate as of August 2023 (claim 12279) and Rockdale's 700 MW capacity (claim 12277). Everything else is a forward commitment. That includes 12.5 EH/s by end of 2023 (claim 12280), 20.1 EH/s by mid-2024 (claim 12281), Corsicana Phase 1 (400 MW) operating by end of Q1 2024 (claims 11995, 11987), and 38.0 EH/s by mid-2025 (claim 11993). All of those deadlines have now passed, but the record doesn't show whether they were met.
A. Several disclosures would increase the share count. The $750M at-the-market equity program (claims 12275, 12273) lets Riot sell new stock over time. The equity incentive plan was expanded by 4,000,000 shares (claims 12543, 12497) and then by 13,000,000 shares (claims 12134, 12004, 11996). Executives also received long-term incentive awards. For example, the CEO and Executive Chairman each got 184,820-share service awards and 184,820-share performance awards (claims 12355, 12356, 12359, 12360). This record doesn't show how much of the ATM program was actually used.
A. 1. Whether Riot actually reached the hash rate targets it gave: 12.5 EH/s (claim 12280), 20.1 EH/s (claim 12281) and 38.0 EH/s (claim 11993). 2. Whether Corsicana Phase 1 started operating on schedule (claim 11995), and how far the site has progressed toward its full 1 GW (claim 12278). 3. Whether all 99,840 MicroBT units were delivered and deployed (claim 11992), and whether Riot exercised any of the options through 2027 (claim 11994). 4. Whether the executive awards vested. Their deadlines were July 2026 (claims 12355–12364), so the outcomes should be disclosed soon or may already be public.
A. 1. Verification: every claim is company-stated. Every dated promise in the record is now past due, and none has been confirmed as delivered or missed. 2. Coverage gap: this dossier ends in February 2024, and the list appears cut off. More than two years of disclosures may be missing, so conclusions about current operations should wait until the record is complete. 3. Data quality: claim 11997 lists a MicroBT purchase order of '290.5 USD,' which is almost certainly an extraction error (likely $290.5M) and should be checked against the source filing. 4. Duplicates: several claims restate the same event from different filings (e.g., claims 12564/12498 and 12275/12283/12273), so counts of 'promises' overstate how many distinct commitments exist.
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. Riot mines Bitcoin at industrial scale in Texas, using its own data centers and its own mining hardware ("self-mining"). Its filings describe immersion-cooled mining hardware (claims 12282, 12285) and two main sites: the Rockdale Facility, at 700 MW of power capacity (claim 12277), and a planned 1 GW facility near Corsicana (claims 12003, 11959).
A. The strategy is to grow hash rate (the computing power used to mine Bitcoin) quickly by buying hardware in bulk and building a second large site. Riot signed a long-term supply agreement with MicroBT (claims 12380, 11971). The first order was 33,280 miners for $162.9M (claims 12381, 12382), with an option for 66,560 more (claim 12384). A later filing cites 99,840 ordered units (claim 11972) and options on up to 265,000 more through 2027 (claim 11967). Hash rate guidance rose step by step: 12.5 EH/s by end-2023 (claim 12280), 20.1 EH/s by mid-2024 (claim 12281), 28 EH/s by end-2024 (claims 11961, 11969), and 38 EH/s by mid-2025 (claim 11962). Growth is funded partly by a $750M at-the-market stock program (claims 12275, 12283).
A. None are named, and that is expected. As a self-miner, Riot's revenue comes from Bitcoin block rewards and fees, not from contracted customers. The only named counterparty on record is its supplier, MicroBT. Nothing in the record describes hosting or data-center services for third parties.
A. Very little is confirmed. The one operating figure on record is 10.7 EH/s of hash rate as of August 2023 (claim 12279). Every other capacity, deployment, and timeline claim is still marked 'stated', meaning it was extracted from filings but not verified as completed. That includes the 12.5, 20.1, 28 and 38 EH/s targets, the Corsicana start of operations by Q1 2024 (claim 11965), and its 400 MW first phase (claim 11966). All of these deadlines have now passed, and the record shows no confirmation for any of them.
A. Yes, some dollar figures look like unit errors from automated extraction. One MicroBT purchase order appears as $290.5 (claim 11997) and MicroBT orders as $453,400 (claim 11964). These were most likely $290.5M and $453.4M in the filings. Read them as unverified until checked against the source documents. The executive award figures are also slightly inconsistent: service awards of 123,231 shares against performance awards of 123,321 shares for the CFO and General Counsel (claims 12357, 12358, 12361, 12362).
A. Executives received long-term incentive awards that vest in mid-2026, split into service awards (July 1, 2026) and performance awards (July 31, 2026). The CEO and Executive Chairman each received 184,820 shares per tranche (claims 12355, 12356, 12359, 12360). Shareholders approved adding 13M shares to the equity plan (claims 12135, 12004, 11996), on top of an earlier 4M-share reserve (claim 12386). Dilution can also come from the $750M stock program (claim 12275).
A. First, any filing that confirms or misses the passed hash rate targets: 28 EH/s by end-2024 (claim 11969) and 38 EH/s by mid-2025 (claim 11962). Second, confirmation that Corsicana is running and at what power level versus its 1 GW plan (claim 12003). Third, whether the 99,840-unit MicroBT deployment was completed by June 2025 (claim 11968) and whether Riot uses any of its further purchase options (claim 11967). Fourth, how the July 2026 executive awards actually vested (claims 12356, 12358).
A. 1) Did any of the guided capacity actually get built? Nothing past 10.7 EH/s is verified (claim 12279). 2) How much of the $750M stock program was used, and how much dilution did it cause (claim 12275)? 3) What were the true dollar values of the MicroBT orders, given the extraction errors (claims 11964, 11997)? 4) What happened after early 2024? This record is truncated there, so later strategy shifts, results, or revised guidance are not captured.
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. Based on the claims on record, Riot mines Bitcoin at industrial scale using its own hardware in its own Texas data centers. It operates the Rockdale Facility, described at 700 MW of power capacity (claim 12277), and is building a second site near Corsicana, Texas, planned at 1 GW (claims 12278, 12003, 11978). It has also repeatedly described developing immersion-cooled mining hardware (claims 12282, 12205, 12000).
A. The strategy is to grow self-mining hash rate by buying miners in bulk and building out power capacity. In August 2023 Riot reported 10.7 EH/s of operational capacity (claim 12279). It guided to 12.5 EH/s by end of 2023 (claim 12280) and 20.1 EH/s by mid-2024 (claim 12281). In February 2024 it raised guidance to 28 EH/s by end of 2024 (claims 11988, 11969) and 38 EH/s once MicroBT deliveries finish, targeted for mid-2025 (claims 11993, 11970). Growth is funded partly through a $750M at-the-market stock offering at a 3% sales commission (claims 12275, 12273, 12284) and a 13 million share increase in the equity incentive plan (claims 12134, 12004), both of which dilute existing shareholders.
A. None are named in the record. Riot's disclosed model is self-mining, so its revenue comes from Bitcoin it earns rather than from contracted customers. The main named counterparty is MicroBT, which is a supplier, not a customer. Riot has a long-term master purchase agreement with MicroBT (claims 11990, 11971), an order for 99,840 miners for $453.4M (claims 11991, 11982), and options on up to 265,000 more units through 2027 (claims 11994, 11967).
A. Nothing in this record has been independently confirmed as delivered. Every claim has the status 'stated', meaning it is a company assertion taken from filings and not checked against later results. The only figure presented as current rather than forward-looking is the 10.7 EH/s operational capacity as of August 2023 (claim 12279). The hash rate targets, the Corsicana Phase 1 start date, and the miner deployments are all still unverified promises in this dossier.
A. Several promised dates are now in the past and have no recorded outcome. They are: 12.5 EH/s by 2023-12-31 (claim 12280); Corsicana Phase 1 (400 MW) operations by 2024-03-31 (claims 11995, 11987); 20.1 EH/s by 2024-06-30 (claim 12281); 28 EH/s by 2024-12-31 (claim 11988); MicroBT purchase-order delivery by 2025-04-30 (claim 11997); and deployment of all 99,840 miners for 38 EH/s by 2025-06-30 (claims 11992, 11993). Checking these against later filings is the top priority.
A. Watch for five things. First, later 10-Q and 10-K filings or production reports that confirm or miss the hash rate targets. Second, whether Corsicana goes beyond Phase 1 toward its full 1 GW (claim 11989). Third, whether Riot uses its MicroBT options, which run through 2027-12-31 (claim 11994). Fourth, how much of the $750M ATM has been sold (claim 12275). Fifth, how the regulatory dispute over an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey turns out; plaintiffs allege the survey violated statutory requirements (claim 6235).
A. There are four. (1) Verification: no claim has moved past 'stated', so this dossier cannot tell you whether any target was met. (2) Data quality: several figures look like extraction errors. The MicroBT order appears as both 453.4 and 453,400 'USD' (claims 11991, 11964), where $453.4 million is the likely meaning, and the purchase order in claim 11997 is recorded as '290.5 USD', which is probably $290.5M. Many claims are also duplicates. (3) Coverage: the record shown ends in February 2024, so over two years of later disclosures may be missing or cut off. (4) Scope: the regulatory claim (claim 6235) does not say which agency is involved or what it means for Riot.
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. According to its disclosures, Riot (RIOT) mines Bitcoin at large data centers in Texas. Its flagship site is the Rockdale Facility, described as having 700 MW of developed capacity (claim 11949). It is building a second site near Corsicana, planned at 1 GW (claims 11989, 12003). It also deploys immersion-cooled mining hardware (claims 12000, 12002).
A. The strategy is to grow hash rate, meaning mining computing power, by adding sites and buying machines in bulk. Riot reported 12.4 EH/s of operational hash rate as of December 31, 2023 (claim 11951). It guided to 28 EH/s by the end of 2024 (claim 11961) and about 38 EH/s, or 38.3 EH/s in one filing, once its MicroBT miners were deployed (claims 11993, 11956). Funding sources on record include a $750M at-the-market stock offering (claim 11948) and a 13 million share increase to its equity incentive plan (claim 12004).
A. None are named. Riot mines Bitcoin for itself, so it earns block rewards rather than serving named clients. The main named counterparty is a supplier, MicroBT. Riot ordered 99,840 miners for $453.4M (claim 11991), placed a follow-on order for 66,560 units (claim 11954), and holds options to buy up to 265,000 more miners through 2027 (claim 11994).
A. The record does not show much delivered. Almost every claim has status 'stated', meaning it was pulled from a filing but not checked against later results. The only verified item is a February 2024 court order temporarily blocking an emergency federal survey of crypto miners (claim 6236). Several deadlines have passed with no recorded outcome: Corsicana Phase 1 at 400 MW by Q1 2024 (claim 11995), 28 EH/s by end of 2024 (claim 11961), and full MicroBT deployment by mid-2025 (claim 11992). Treat these as promises, not accomplishments, until they are verified.
A. Plaintiffs challenged a federal emergency cryptocurrency-mining energy survey, arguing it broke statutory requirements (claim 6235). A court granted a temporary restraining order against enforcing the survey (claim 6236, verified). The record does not show how the case was finally resolved.
A. First, whether later filings confirm that Corsicana Phase 1 (400 MW) is running and the site is progressing toward 1 GW (claims 11995, 11989). Second, whether reported hash rate reached the 28 EH/s and roughly 38 EH/s targets (claims 11961, 11993). Third, how many of the 265,000 MicroBT options are exercised before the end of 2027 (claim 11994). Fourth, how much of the $750M offering was drawn (claim 11948), and how much shareholders were diluted as a result.
A. First, verification: the Q1 2024, end-2024 and mid-2025 deadlines have all passed, but no outcome is recorded for any of them. Second, data quality: many claims are duplicates from the same filing, and some dollar amounts appear to have lost their 'millions' scale. For example, claim 11964 shows 453,400 USD and claim 11997 shows 290.5 USD. Third, coverage: the list we reviewed was cut off, so later filings may exist that update or contradict these early-2024 promises.
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that operates Bitcoin mining facilities and makes strategic investments in other mining operations.
A. Jason Les is CEO (claim 5366), Benjamin Yi is Executive Chairman (claim 5367), William Jackman is EVP General Counsel (claim 5368), and Colin Yee is CFO (claim 6054).
A. Riot invested $202.18 million to acquire a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd., a Canadian mining company (claim 5802). In September 2024, the companies reached a settlement agreement granting Riot board nomination rights (claim 5695), with the agreement set to expire June 1, 2026 (claim 5701).
A. In December 2024, Riot raised $525 million through convertible senior notes due January 15, 2030 (claim 5251), designated for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. No. Riot does not publicly identify specific customers for its mining operations in available disclosures.
A. Riot was involved in litigation over the Energy Information Administration's emergency cryptocurrency mining survey. A court granted a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement (claim 6236), the emergency authorization was discontinued (claim 6237), and the EIA agreed to destroy collected data (claim 6347).
A. Riot initially proposed acquiring all of Bitfarms but withdrew that proposal (claim 5926), instead building a minority stake. Its settlement agreement with Bitfarms has reached or passed its June 2026 expiration. The company announced Bitcoin acquisition as the use of convertible notes proceeds but has not disclosed how much Bitcoin was actually acquired.
A. Will Riot renegotiate or wind down its Bitfarms relationship post-June 2026? How much Bitcoin has it actually acquired with the convertible notes proceeds? What are its mining capacity, hash rate, and operating costs—none of which Riot publicly discloses?
Frequently asked
2026-09-13A. Riot is a Bitcoin mining company that generates revenue directly by mining cryptocurrency. It has no named corporate customers or clients—it does not sell products or services to third parties. Its business model is to operate computing facilities that validate blockchain transactions and receive Bitcoin rewards.
A. Since June 2024, Riot has focused on acquiring a major stake in Bitfarms Ltd., another Bitcoin mining operator. As of September 2024, Riot owns 19.9% of Bitfarms (claim 5801), having invested $202.18 million (claim 5802). Under a settlement agreement, Riot holds director nomination rights and voting commitments (claims 5705, 5696).
A. The 19.9% stake acquisition is complete as of September 2024 (claim 5801). However, Riot's broader intentions remain unclear: its settlement agreement with Bitfarms expires June 2026 (claim 5701), and whether Riot plans to acquire the full company, maintain its minority position, or exit is not disclosed.
A. Yes. The U.S. Energy Information Administration issued an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862) in early 2024. A court granted a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement (claim 6236), and the emergency authorization was discontinued by March 2024 (claim 6237). The EIA agreed to destroy collected data and use standard notice-and-comment procedures for future surveys (claims 6346, 6347).
A. The Bitfarms acquisition was funded from working capital (claim 5802). In December 2024, Riot raised $525 million through a convertible senior notes offering at 0.75% interest (claim 5251), designated for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252). The offering was announced but pricing was delayed past its December 11, 2024 deadline (claim 5259).
A. The main unknowns are: (1) Will Riot escalate its Bitfarms stake before the June 2026 agreement expiration (claim 5701)? (2) Has the $525M convertible notes offering been fully closed (claim 5259 was marked delayed)? (3) Will the EIA follow through on standard regulatory procedures for mining surveys (claim 6346)? (4) What is Riot's endgame strategy with Bitfarms?
Frequently asked
2026-09-11A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that operates mining facilities, including holdings in Corsicana, and invests in other mining operations. As of December 2024, the company raised $525 million through convertible notes (claim 5251) to fund Bitcoin acquisitions (claim 5252).
A. Riot invested approximately $90 million for an 11.3% stake in Bitfarms Ltd in June 2024 (claims 6052, 6053), increasing to a 19.9% stake by September 2024 (claims 5801, 5802). Initially pursuing board control, Riot reached a settlement agreement by September 2024 (claim 5695) granting board nomination rights (claim 5705) and conditional share purchase rights at 15% ownership (claims 5706, 5702). However, one claim about the settlement is marked 'withdrawn,' raising questions about the agreement's final status.
A. No specific customers or end-users are named in Riot's disclosed claims.
A. In December 2024, Riot issued $525 million of 0.75% convertible senior notes maturing January 15, 2030 (claim 5251), with stated plans to use proceeds for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. Riot faced challenges regarding an emergency Energy Information Administration cryptocurrency mining survey. A court granted a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement (claim 6236), and the emergency authorization was discontinued (claim 6237). The EIA agreed to destroy data (claim 6347) and use standard procedures for future surveys (claims 6234, 6346).
A. Key uncertainties include: the final status of the Bitfarms settlement given a claim is marked 'withdrawn'; actual completion timing and amounts of Bitcoin acquisitions; whether the company has acquired the Bitcoin it stated it would purchase; and current mining output and capacity relative to any stated targets.
A. Jason Les is Chief Executive Officer (claim 5366), Benjamin Yi is Executive Chairman (claim 5367), Colin Yee is Chief Financial Officer (claim 6054), and William Jackman is EVP and General Counsel (claim 6055).
Frequently asked
2026-09-11A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that generates revenue by mining Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. In 2024, it shifted strategy to aggressively acquire stakes in Bitfarms Ltd., another cryptocurrency miner (claim 5801).
A. No traditional customers. As a mining operation, Riot generates revenue directly from cryptocurrency mining rather than providing services to business clients. Its new strategy involves investing in other miners and accumulating Bitcoin.
A. Over $200 million in multiple tranches. Riot began with approximately $90 million for an 11.3% stake (claim 6052) and continued purchasing to reach 19.9% ownership for $202 million total (claim 5802).
A. No. While Riot holds 19.9% ownership (claim 5703), a September 2024 settlement agreement that would have granted it board nomination and voting rights was withdrawn (claim 5704). Riot has conditional purchase rights but no formal control (claims 5706, 5702).
A. Riot funded the Bitfarms acquisition from working capital (claim 5802). In December 2024, it raised $525 million through convertible senior notes (0.75% interest, maturing 2030) specifically for Bitcoin purchases (claims 5251-5252).
A. Riot's intent with Bitfarms is unclear. The withdrawn settlement agreement (claim 5704) suggests either negotiations collapsed or Riot changed strategy. Is the company pursuing full acquisition, a strategic partnership, activist pressure, or a passive investment?
A. An Energy Information Administration emergency mining survey in 2024 faced legal challenges (claim 6235), was discontinued (claim 6237), and its data destroyed (claim 6347). Future surveys will use standard procedures (claim 6234). This affected the broader mining industry rather than Riot specifically.
Frequently asked
2026-09-09A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that operates mining facilities, including the Corsicana facility (claim 6013). It generates revenue from mining and holding cryptocurrency rather than serving named business customers.
A. Riot's primary strategy is building a strategic stake in Bitfarms Ltd., another mining company. Riot owns 19.9% of Bitfarms (claim 5703) after investing $202.2M from working capital (claim 5802) and raising $525M via convertible senior notes due 2030 (claim 5251). The company has allocated capital to bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. None are disclosed. Riot's model is to mine cryptocurrency and sell on public markets, not to provide products or services to named corporate customers.
A. No. Riot pursued a hostile campaign in June 2024—requisitioning a shareholders meeting to replace the board (claim 5928) and applying to cease-trade Bitfarms' poison pill (claim 5929)—but then withdrew its acquisition proposal (claim 5926). Instead, Riot and Bitfarms reached a settlement agreement in September 2024 (claim 5695) giving Riot a 19.9% stake, director nomination rights (claim 5697), and conditional rights to purchase additional shares if Bitfarms falls below 15% ownership (claim 5702). However, records show the settlement agreement entry was withdrawn (claim 5704), creating ambiguity about whether the deal actually closed.
A. The U.S. EIA initiated an emergency Form EIA-862 survey requiring cryptocurrency miners to report operations but discontinued it in March 2024 (claims 6231, 6345). A court granted a temporary restraining order blocking enforcement (claim 6236), and future data collection must follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6234). This eliminated immediate compliance risk without preventing future regulation.
A. Riot abandoned its acquisition of Bitfarms, withdrawing its proposal in June 2024 (claim 5926) after pursuing hostile tactics. The resulting September settlement provides minority governance rights rather than control. Additionally, the settlement agreement entry was withdrawn (claim 5704), leaving the actual status of the arrangement unclear.
A. Key uncertainties: (1) Is the Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5695) actually in effect, given it was withdrawn (claim 5704)? (2) Will Riot exercise conditional purchase rights to increase its Bitfarms stake beyond 19.9% (claim 5702)? (3) How will the $525M in convertible proceeds be deployed after the bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252)? (4) The Bitfarms partnership agreement expires June 2026 (claim 5701)—what happens then?
Frequently asked
2026-09-07A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company. The company's primary recent activity is acquiring Bitfarms Ltd., another mining operation, rather than operating mines directly.
A. Riot's strategy centers on acquiring Bitfarms Ltd. The company increased its stake from 11.3% in June 2024 (claim 6053) to 19.9% by September 2024 (claim 5801). A settlement agreement reached in September 2024 (claim 5695) grants Riot director nomination rights (claim 5705), board voting commitments (claim 5698), and conditional purchase rights if ownership exceeds 15% (claim 5702). In December 2024, Riot raised $525 million in convertible senior notes (claim 5251), stating proceeds would fund Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. No customers are named in any disclosed claims. This is a significant gap for understanding Riot's revenue model and business dependencies.
A. In February 2024, Riot was subject to an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (claim 6235). Plaintiffs alleged it violated statutory requirements (claim 6235). A court issued a temporary restraining order (claim 6236), and the survey was discontinued (claim 6237). The EIA destroyed the collected data (claim 6347) and committed to standard procedures for future surveys (claim 6346). All regulatory outcomes were verified by March 2024.
A. Riot announced an acquisition proposal for Bitfarms in mid-2024, then withdrew it (claim 5926). Instead, it gradually built a 19.9% stake, investing $202 million from working capital (claim 5802). A settlement agreement was finalized September 22, 2024 (claim 5695), replacing the earlier hostile approach. The commitment expires June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), marking a key deadline to watch.
A. The biggest gaps are: Does Riot operate any mines itself, or only acquire stakes in other operators? What will it actually do with the $525 million raised in convertible notes? Why did the 2024 emergency mining survey get shut down, and what did it show? Will Riot complete acquisition of Bitfarms or remain a minority shareholder? The settlement agreement expires June 1, 2026—what happens then?
Frequently asked
2026-09-06A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company focused on Bitcoin. Rather than selling mined Bitcoin to customers, Riot retains it as a business asset. In 2024, they also began directly acquiring Bitcoin using debt financing proceeds (claim 5252).
A. Riot is pursuing a dual strategy: acquiring Bitcoin directly and investing in mining operations. The largest disclosed initiative is a stake acquisition in Bitfarms Ltd, reaching 19.9% ownership (claim 5801) for approximately $202 million (claim 5802), completed in 2024.
A. No. Disclosed filings do not name any external customers. Riot mines Bitcoin for itself and holds the output rather than providing mining as a service.
A. Delivered: Riot completed the Bitfarms investment (claim 5802) and settled disputes with Bitfarms, securing director nomination rights (claim 5705). Delayed: The $525 million convertible notes offering (claim 5251) was promised to close by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259) but is marked delayed.
A. In early 2024, Riot was sued over an emergency Form EIA-862 cryptocurrency mining survey. A temporary restraining order halted it (claim 6236), the emergency authorization was discontinued (claim 6237), and future surveys must use standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6233).
A. Riot holds 19.9% of Bitfarms (claim 5801) under a September 2024 settlement agreement (claim 5695) with director nomination rights (claim 5705) and conditional share purchase rights at the 15% threshold (claim 5702). The agreement's initial term was set to expire June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), but that deadline is now marked delayed, indicating ongoing negotiations.
A. The renegotiation or renewal of the Bitfarms agreement (past the June 1, 2026 expiration, now delayed per claim 5701). Completion of the $525 million convertible notes offering (claim 5251) currently delayed from December 2024. Disclosure of Riot's actual mining operations, capacity, and profitability.
A. Why an emergency mining survey was required and whether regulatory risks persist. Whether Riot's Bitcoin acquisition strategy requires additional financing. The outcome of the Bitfarms partnership renegotiation and whether Riot will increase its stake beyond 19.9% (claim 5801). Riot's mining operations, costs, and competitive position relative to Bitfarms.
Frequently asked
2026-09-06A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company with operations including the Corsicana Facility. The company mines Bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies using electrical power and specialized computing equipment.
A. Riot has pursued a strategy of acquiring stakes in other cryptocurrency mining companies. Most significantly, Riot acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd., financing this acquisition with approximately $202 million from working capital (claim 5802). The company also negotiated settlement agreements granting Riot board nomination rights (claim 5705) and conditional share purchase rights if Bitfarms' ownership falls below 15% (claim 5706).
A. No customers are named in Riot's disclosed materials. Riot's business model is based on mining cryptocurrency directly for its own account, not providing mining services to external customers.
A. Riot financed the Bitfarms acquisition through working capital (claim 5802). Additionally, Riot raised $525 million through convertible senior notes at 0.75% interest, due January 15, 2030 (claim 5251), and expanded authorized common stock from 340 million to 680 million shares to enable future equity issuance (claim 5964).
A. Riot was subject to an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862) in 2024. A court granted a temporary restraining order preventing the survey's enforcement (claim 6236), and the emergency collection was subsequently discontinued (claim 6231). Future cryptocurrency mining surveys were mandated to follow standard notice-and-comment procedures rather than emergency authority (claim 6234).
A. Riot and Bitfarms entered a settlement agreement in September 2024 (claim 5695) establishing Riot's 19.9% ownership stake, board nomination rights, and conditional purchase rights (claims 5705, 5706). The agreement was set to expire June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), marked as "delayed." A related settlement claim (claim 5704) was marked as "withdrawn" on September 4, 2026, leaving the current status of this arrangement unclear.
A. The disclosed materials do not include Bitcoin mining output, hash rate, profitability, or detailed operational metrics from Riot's facilities. Additionally, the current status of the Bitfarms settlement and the reasons for Riot's earlier withdrawal of a full acquisition proposal remain unexplained in the record.
Frequently asked
2026-09-06A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that acquires and manages stakes in mining infrastructure. Its disclosed strategy centers on acquiring significant equity positions in other mining operators rather than primarily operating its own facilities.
A. Riot's primary disclosed initiative is consolidating cryptocurrency mining assets through equity acquisitions. By September 2024, Riot had acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd. for approximately $202 million (claims 5801-5802), including director nomination rights and conditional purchase options.
A. Bitfarms Ltd. is Riot's only named business partner, in which Riot holds a 19.9% ownership stake (claim 5703). No end customers for mining operations are disclosed in available documents.
A. Riot completed a $525 million convertible notes offering in December 2024 maturing January 2030 at 0.75% coupon (claim 5251), and increased authorized common stock from 340 million to 680 million shares to support capital activities (claim 5964).
A. In early 2024, an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey triggered legal challenges. A temporary restraining order was granted (claim 6236), the emergency authorization was discontinued (claim 6237), and the government destroyed emergency survey data and agreed to use standard notice-and-comment procedures for future mining data collection (claims 6231-6233, 6347).
A. Riot and Bitfarms entered a settlement agreement in September 2024 (claim 5695) granting Riot director nomination rights (claim 5705) and conditional purchase options at 15% ownership (claim 5702). This agreement expires June 1, 2026 (claim 5701)—a critical date for determining whether Riot escalates its stake or exits.
A. Will Riot attempt full acquisition of Bitfarms after June 2026? What is Riot's own mining capacity and profitability? How will cryptocurrency mining regulation evolve post-2024? What triggered the shift from operating its own mines to acquiring minority stakes in other operators?
Frequently asked
2026-09-06A. Riot Platforms is a cryptocurrency mining company that operates mining facilities and has invested heavily in Bitfarms Ltd, acquiring a 19.9% stake (claim 5703) through approximately $202 million in capital (claim 5802).
A. Riot focuses on two pillars: (1) its Bitfarms investment with director nomination rights (claim 5705) and conditional share purchase options (claim 5702), and (2) capital deployment—it raised $525 million through convertible notes (claim 5251) to acquire Bitcoin (claim 5252).
A. Cryptocurrency mining companies do not operate on a traditional customer revenue model. Riot generates revenue by validating blockchain transactions. Its only significant named business relationship in disclosed documents is its equity stake in Bitfarms Ltd (claim 5703).
A. In early 2024, an emergency government survey of cryptocurrency mining (Form EIA-862) was initiated. Riot opposed it; a court blocked enforcement (claim 6236), the government discontinued the survey (claim 6237), and future surveys must follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6233).
A. Riot completed its phased Bitfarms acquisition: initial $90 million investment (claim 6052) growing to 19.9% ownership (claim 5703), financed from working capital (claim 5802), with a settlement agreement and director nomination rights (claims 5695, 5705). Its $525 million convertible notes were priced as promised (claim 5259), though Bitcoin acquisition execution details remain incomplete.
A. Execution of Bitcoin acquisition using convertible notes (claim 5252); stability of the Bitfarms partnership expiring June 2026 (claim 5701); and whether Riot exercises conditional share purchase rights if Bitfarms stock hits certain price thresholds (claim 5702).
A. How stable is the Bitfarms relationship after Riot previously requisitioned a special shareholder meeting challenging the board (claim 5928) before settling (claim 5695)? At what price and pace will Riot deploy capital into Bitcoin (claim 5252)? Will regulatory scrutiny of crypto mining increase despite resolving the 2024 emergency survey?
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company focused on Bitcoin mining operations. Regulatory filings reference cryptocurrency mining surveys [claims 6235-6237], and recent announcements indicate Bitcoin acquisition plans using proceeds from convertible notes [claim 5252].
A. Since June 2024, Riot has aggressively acquired shares in Bitfarms Ltd., a fellow mining operator. By September 2024, Riot held a 19.9% stake valued at approximately $202 million [claims 5801, 5802] with board nomination and conditional purchase rights [claims 5705, 5706].
A. No. The disclosed claims do not identify any customers. Cryptocurrency mining companies typically sell hashrate to institutional buyers through direct contracts rather than naming clients publicly.
A. In early 2024, Riot challenged an emergency government cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862). A court granted a temporary restraining order [claim 6236] and the emergency authorization was discontinued [claim 6237]. Future surveys will use standard notice-and-comment procedures [claims 6233, 6346].
A. In December 2024, Riot raised $525 million in 0.75% convertible senior notes due January 2030 [claim 5251] with a $75 million overallotment option [claim 5260]. Proceeds are designated for Bitcoin acquisition [claim 5252].
A. The September 2024 settlement agreement includes: 7.5% beneficial ownership threshold [claim 5700], conditional purchase rights if ownership exceeds 15% [claim 5702], board nomination rights [claim 5705], and voting commitments expiring June 2026 [claim 5701].
A. Watch for: (1) whether Riot exercises conditional purchase rights if Bitfarms exceeds 15% ownership, (2) the June 2026 expiration of voting commitments [claim 5701], which may trigger governance changes, and (3) how Riot deploys its $525 million in capital.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot's disclosed filings do not explicitly detail its primary business operations. The company owns a facility in Corsicana (claim 6013) and acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd. (claim 5703), a publicly traded company. Specific revenue sources, operational metrics, or mining capacity are not provided in these claims.
A. In 2024-2025, Riot pursued two major initiatives: (1) A significant Bitfarms investment, acquiring approximately $202 million in shares to reach 19.9% ownership (claim 5801), culminating in a September 2024 settlement granting board voting rights and director nomination rights (claims 5704, 5705). (2) Raising $525 million through convertible senior notes issued in December 2024 (claim 5251), designated for bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. No. Riot's documents do not identify any named commercial customers, suggesting it operates as a producer or investor rather than a service provider with client relationships.
A. Riot holds 19.9% of Bitfarms acquired for approximately $202 million (claims 5801, 5802). The September 2024 settlement agreement (claim 5704) grants Riot board voting rights, director nomination rights (claim 5705), and standstill provisions restricting Riot's further actions until June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). Riot also has conditional share purchase rights if its stake falls below 15% (claim 5706).
A. An emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862) was attempted in February-March 2024. Following legal challenge, the emergency collection was discontinued (claims 6231, 6237), the mandatory response obligation was eliminated (claim 6232), emergency data was ordered destroyed (claim 6347), and future mining surveys must use standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6233).
A. June 1, 2026: The Bitfarms standstill agreement expires (claim 5701), removing restrictions on Riot's future actions regarding Bitfarms. January 15, 2030: The $525 million convertible notes mature (claim 5251). These dates represent potential decision points for Riot's consolidation strategy.
A. What are Riot's actual mining capacity, production rates, and unit economics? Will Riot attempt to consolidate or take control of Bitfarms after June 2026? How profitable is mining given energy costs and ongoing regulatory scrutiny? What is Riot's strategy for bitcoin holdings acquired with the convertible proceeds? How will Riot service $525 million in debt maturing in 2030?
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency miner. The company appears in regulatory filings primarily through disputes over government data collection on mining operations, though operational details are not disclosed in available claims.
A. Acquire a major stake in Bitfarms Ltd. and obtain board influence. Riot escalated from 11.3% ($90M, claim 6052) to 19.9% ($202.2M, claim 5801) by September 2024, then settled disputes to secure director nomination rights (claim 5705). The company also raised $525M in convertible notes (claim 5251) for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. None. Bitfarms Ltd. is the only named counterparty, but this is a financial investment, not a customer relationship. No mining pools, clients, or operational partners are identified.
A. Completed: 19.9% Bitfarms stake and settlement agreement (September 2024). Stated but not detailed: $525M convertible notes offering and Bitcoin acquisition with proceeds. Missing: any operational metrics (mining output, hash rate, facility capacity, revenue).
A. In early 2024, an emergency EIA cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862) triggered a court restraining order (claim 6236), which forced discontinuation of emergency collection (claim 6237). Riot's obligation to respond was eliminated (claim 6232). Future data collection will follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6233).
A. Bitfarms settlement agreement expired June 1, 2026 (claim 5701)—now overdue. Unclear: what happens post-expiration, whether conditional purchase rights (claim 5706) were exercised, current Bitfarms relationship status, actual mining operations/production, and execution on $525M Bitcoin acquisition. No financial metrics disclosed.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company. It operates mining facilities, including the Corsicana Facility (claim 6013), and generates revenue by using computing hardware to validate cryptocurrency transactions and receive block rewards. It has also invested heavily in Bitfarms Ltd, a fellow mining operator.
A. No. Riot is a mining operator, not a service provider. It earns revenue directly from cryptocurrency mining rather than from selling services to clients. Its major disclosed investment is a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd as of September 2024 (claim 5801).
A. Riot operates its own mining facilities while building strategic influence in Bitfarms Ltd through substantial equity ownership. By September 2024, Riot had invested approximately $202 million to acquire 19.9% of Bitfarms and secured director nomination rights and voting commitments (claims 5801, 5802, 5697, 5705). The company raised capital through convertible notes offerings (claim 5251).
A. In early 2024, the U.S. Energy Information Administration launched an emergency survey of cryptocurrency miners using Form EIA-862. Plaintiffs challenged the survey's legality; a court granted a temporary restraining order (claim 6236), and the emergency authorization was discontinued (claim 6237). The EIA agreed to destroy collected data and use standard notice-and-comment procedures for future surveys (claims 6231, 6346).
A. Riot successfully increased its Bitfarms stake from 11.3% in June 2024 (claim 6053) to 19.9% by September 2024 (claim 5801), investing $202 million total (claim 5802). It obtained governance rights including director nomination authority. However, a settlement agreement with Bitfarms dated September 22, 2024 was withdrawn before completion (claim 5704), raising questions about Riot's ultimate strategy for the stake.
A. A settlement agreement with Bitfarms was withdrawn (claim 5704), and it remains unclear whether Riot intends to maintain a passive minority stake, eventually acquire Bitfarms, or pursue some other arrangement. A partnership agreement term expiration is promised by June 1, 2026 but is marked as delayed (claim 5701).
A. Monitor whether Riot's Bitfarms ownership increases beyond 19.9%, especially given conditional purchase rights tied to a 15% threshold (claim 5702). Watch for announcements about acquiring Bitfarms or maintaining the current stake structure. Track regulatory developments in U.S. cryptocurrency mining oversight (claim 6346). Bitcoin price movements and energy costs significantly affect mining profitability.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company. It operates mining facilities (including Corsicana) to produce cryptocurrencies, accumulates Bitcoin directly as a treasury asset, and invests in other mining operations.
A. No. Riot is not a B2B service provider. It generates revenue from mining cryptocurrencies and holding digital assets; no customer base is disclosed because mining companies sell to markets, not to named end-customers.
A. Riot is executing three complementary activities: (1) operating its own mining facilities, (2) building a Bitcoin treasury funded by a $525M convertible note offering at 0.75% interest maturing 2030 (claim 5251), with proceeds earmarked for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252), and (3) holding a 19.9% strategic stake in Bitfarms Ltd. with board nomination rights and conditional purchase options.
A. Riot acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms in stages from June–September 2024 (claim 5801), investing $202M+ (claim 5802). It initially pursued a full acquisition in June 2024 (claims 5921–5929) but withdrew the proposal by June 23 (claim 5926). In September, the parties settled (claim 5704): Riot retained its 19.9% stake, gained director nomination rights (claim 5705), and secured conditional purchase rights triggered if ownership thresholds change (claim 5706).
A. Delivered: 19.9% Bitfarms stake (claim 5703), settlement agreement with board influence (claim 5704), $525M convertible financing closed (claim 5251). Announced but unverified: Bitcoin acquisition plan using note proceeds (claim 5252). Regulatory background (claims 6231–6237): emergency EIA cryptocurrency mining surveys were discontinued, reducing compliance burden.
A. Execution timeline and scale of Bitcoin acquisition with the $525M raised; profitability and capacity metrics of Corsicana facility; whether Riot exercises conditional purchase rights at Bitfarms; regulatory developments affecting cryptocurrency mining operations; and Bitfarms' financial performance relative to Riot's 19.9% stake value.
A. Why did Riot shift from pursuing a full Bitfarms acquisition to settling for a minority stake? What are Riot's mining operation margins and expansion plans? What is the timeline and total target for Bitcoin accumulation from the $525M proceeds? How would Bitcoin price declines affect Riot's financial strategy? What new regulatory constraints or tailwinds emerge for crypto mining?
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that mines Bitcoin and invests in other mining operations. The company acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd., a major mining operator (claim 5801), financed with $202 million (claim 5802).
A. Riot operates its own mining facilities, including the Corsicana property (claim 6013), while building a minority stake in Bitfarms Ltd. through a settlement agreement giving Riot director nomination rights and conditional options to purchase additional shares (claims 5695, 5705, 5706). The company raised $525 million in convertible notes (claim 5251) to fund growth and Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. No customers are disclosed. Like most cryptocurrency mining companies, Riot monetizes by selling Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies produced by its own mining operations and its investments in other miners.
A. Riot successfully acquired its 19.9% Bitfarms stake after an initially hostile approach (claim 5926) that transitioned to a settlement agreement (claim 5695). The company completed its $525 million convertible notes offering (claim 5251) and financed Bitfarms with $202 million in working capital (claim 5802).
A. Monitor the status of Riot's Bitfarms settlement agreement—it was promised to expire in June 2026 (claim 5701) but remains delayed as of September 2026. Also track performance of the company's mining operations as capital from the new $525M convertible offering (claim 5251) is deployed and the notes mature in January 2030 (claim 5251).
A. Why is the Bitfarms settlement agreement in delayed status? Will Riot pursue operational control of Bitfarms beyond its current 19.9% stake? What are the actual mining outputs and profitability metrics from Riot's operations and Bitfarms investment? Revenue details and production capacity aren't disclosed in available company records.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that generates revenue by mining digital assets.
A. Riot is pursuing consolidation of the cryptocurrency mining industry through acquisitions. The primary focus is Bitfarms Ltd.: Riot owns 19.9% of Bitfarms (claim 5801) after investing approximately $202 million from working capital (claim 5802). Riot also holds conditional rights to acquire additional Bitfarms shares if ownership falls below 15% (claim 5702, 5706).
A. No. Riot is a mining operator, not a service provider. It generates revenue by operating cryptocurrency mining infrastructure, not by serving end customers.
A. Riot successfully built its Bitfarms stake from 11.3% in June 2024 (claim 6052-6053) to 19.9% by September 2024 (claim 5801), investing over $200 million. The attempted takeover proved contentious. In September 2024, Riot and Bitfarms settled (claim 5695), with Riot gaining a director nomination right (claim 5705) but accepting standstill provisions preventing further acquisitions (claim 5699). The settlement expires June 1, 2026 (claim 5701).
A. Bitfarms purchases were financed from working capital (claim 5802). In December 2024, Riot raised capital through convertible senior notes: $525 million at 0.75% interest (claim 5251) with an additional $75 million overallotment option (claim 5260). Riot stated proceeds will be used for bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. In early 2024, an emergency EIA cryptocurrency mining survey prompted legal challenges over statutory compliance (claim 6235). The court granted a restraining order (claim 6236), and the emergency authorization was discontinued (claim 6237). By March 2024, this was fully resolved and future data collection will follow standard procedures (claim 6233, 6346).
A. The Bitfarms settlement expires June 1, 2026 (claim 5701)—what happens after is uncertain. Key risks include: whether Riot can profitably deploy capital amid bitcoin price volatility; whether the company can service $525 million+ in convertible debt; whether the consolidation strategy will face antitrust scrutiny; and whether Riot's conditional share purchase rights will be triggered.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a Bitcoin and cryptocurrency mining company. It operates mining facilities including the Corsicana Facility (claim 6013) and generates revenue through Bitcoin mining and holdings.
A. Riot's primary strategy is building a strategic stake in Bitfarms Ltd, another major mining operation. By September 2024, Riot owned 19.9% of Bitfarms (claim 5801) acquired for approximately $202.2 million (claim 5802). In September 2024, Riot settled with Bitfarms (claim 5695), securing voting rights (claim 5696), director nomination rights (claim 5705), and conditional rights to acquire additional shares if Bitfarms' stock falls below 15% (claims 5702, 5706). The company also raised $525 million in convertible senior notes in December 2024 (claim 5259) specifically for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. No named customers are disclosed. Riot operates as a Bitcoin mining business rather than a traditional service provider; it generates revenue by mining and holding Bitcoin, not through customer contracts.
A. Riot has successfully executed its Bitfarms acquisition strategy, progressively building its stake from 11.3% in June 2024 (claim 6053) to 19.9% by September 2024 (claim 5801). It completed the December 2024 convertible notes offering as announced (claim 5259).
A. The executive team includes Jason Les (CEO, claim 5366), Benjamin Yi (Executive Chairman, claim 5367), Colin Yee (CFO, claim 6054), William Jackman (EVP General Counsel, claim 6055), and Jason Chung (EVP Corporate Development & Strategy, claim 5369).
A. The disclosed claims do not reveal Riot's current Bitcoin holdings, mining output, or profitability metrics. It is unclear how much of the $525 million in convertible proceeds has been deployed into Bitcoin, whether Riot plans to fully consolidate Bitfarms, or what happens after the Bitfarms settlement agreement expires on June 1, 2026 (claim 5701).
A. From February-March 2024, the federal government halted emergency cryptocurrency mining data collection (Form EIA-862) following a court restraining order (claims 6236, 6237). The authorization was discontinued (claim 6237) and collected data will be destroyed (claim 6347). Future mining surveys will follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claims 6233, 6234). These appear to be industry-level regulatory developments rather than enforcement actions against Riot specifically.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that operates mining facilities to earn cryptocurrency rewards and makes strategic investments in other miners. The company is pursuing consolidation of the crypto mining industry.
A. Riot is building mining capacity at facilities like Corsicana (claim 6013), acquiring stakes in competitors (e.g., 19.9% of Bitfarms - claim 5801), and raising capital through convertible debt ($525M offering - claim 5251) to fund Bitcoin acquisitions and growth.
A. Riot doesn't have named customers in the traditional sense—it generates revenue by mining cryptocurrency directly, similar to how gold miners earn by extracting gold rather than selling to named buyers.
A. Riot owns 19.9% of Bitfarms Ltd (claim 5801), invested $202.18M (claim 5802), has conditional share purchase rights (claim 5706), a director nomination right (claim 5705), and voting commitments (claim 5696) under a September 2024 settlement agreement (claim 5695).
A. Riot faced regulatory scrutiny over an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862) in early 2024. After legal challenges and a court-ordered temporary restraining order (claim 6236), the emergency survey was discontinued (claim 6237) and the obligation to respond was eliminated (claim 6232).
A. Riot raised $525M through convertible senior notes with a 0.75% coupon due January 2030 (claim 5251), explicitly intended for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. Key unknowns include: the specifics and profitability of Riot's mining operations; whether Riot will exercise its conditional purchase rights at Bitfarms (claim 5702 mentions a 15% threshold condition); and how the Bitfarms settlement agreement terms will evolve, given the expiration date was pushed to June 2026 (claim 5701).
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company that operates mining facilities, including the Corsicana Facility (claim 6013), and holds stakes in other mining companies.
A. Riot's strategy centers on gaining control of Bitfarms Ltd, a Canadian mining company. The company owns 19.9% of Bitfarms (claim 5801), negotiated for board nomination rights (claim 5705), and raised $525 million in convertible senior notes (claim 5251) designated for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. Riot does not serve named customers. It is a mining operator that generates revenue from mining operations and investments in other mining companies, not from providing services to clients.
A. Riot completed multiple purchases in Bitfarms, building its stake from 11.3% (claim 6053) to 19.9% (claim 5801) with over $200 million invested (claim 5802). However, a September 2024 settlement agreement granting board representation and voting rights (claims 5695-5705) was withdrawn the same day (claim 5704), leaving the current status of the relationship unclear.
A. Riot financed Bitfarms acquisitions through working capital (claim 5802) and raised $525 million in convertible senior notes at 0.75% interest due January 2030 (claim 5251), designated for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. In September 2024, Riot and Bitfarms entered a settlement agreement including director nomination rights and conditional purchase options for an additional 5.5% stake (claims 5695-5706). The agreement was withdrawn that same day (claim 5704) with no public explanation of the reason.
A. In early 2024, the U.S. Energy Information Administration conducted an emergency survey of cryptocurrency miners. Plaintiffs challenged it as violating statutory requirements (claim 6235), and a court granted a temporary restraining order (claim 6236). The emergency collection was discontinued (claim 6231), and all future crypto mining surveys must follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claims 6233, 6346).
A. Key unknowns include: Will Riot acquire control of Bitfarms despite withdrawing its settlement? How will the $525 million in convertible debt be deployed amid Bitcoin price volatility? Will regulatory scrutiny of crypto mining increase? What are Riot's actual mining operations, capacity, and profitability relative to its acquisition strategy? Disclosed documents provide minimal detail on operational metrics.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a Bitcoin mining company. It operates cryptocurrency mining facilities and acquires strategic stakes in other mining operations, positioning itself as both a direct producer and investor in the mining sector.
A. Riot's strategy combines mining operations with investment in other miners and Bitcoin accumulation. The company acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd (claim 5703), secured director nomination rights (claim 5705), and has conditional share purchase rights if Bitfarms ownership falls below 15% (claim 5702). In December 2024, Riot raised $525M in convertible senior notes (claim 5251) and deployed proceeds to acquire Bitcoin (claim 5252).
A. Not in the traditional sense. Riot is a Bitcoin producer and treasury holder, not a service provider. Its stakeholders are shareholders and note holders. No end-customer or client relationships are disclosed.
A. Riot completed its 19.9% Bitfarms acquisition for approximately $202M in working capital (claim 5802) and entered a settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695). The company successfully closed a $525M convertible notes offering (claim 5251) and acquired Bitcoin with the proceeds (claim 5252). Specific Bitcoin holdings and mining production numbers remain undisclosed.
A. Riot faced scrutiny over an emergency EIA Form EIA-862 cryptocurrency mining survey. A temporary restraining order was granted (claim 6236), the emergency survey was discontinued (claim 6237), and obligations to respond were eliminated (claim 6232). Future mining data collection was directed to follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6234). All matters were resolved by March 2024.
A. Will Riot's Bitfarms governance involvement yield favorable board outcomes? Will Bitfarms's ownership fall below 15%, triggering Riot's conditional purchase rights (claim 5702)? What are Riot's total Bitcoin holdings and operational mining capacity? How will the settlement agreement term expiration (delayed past June 2026, claim 5701) affect the partnership? What is Riot's long-term capital allocation strategy?
A. Monitor Bitfarms board composition changes and governance developments resulting from Riot's director nomination right. Track whether Bitfarms ownership approaches the 15% threshold. Watch Bitcoin price movements affecting Riot's treasury value. Monitor mining output and operating margin disclosures. Note that convertible notes mature January 2030 (claim 5251).
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a Bitcoin mining company. It owns and operates mining facilities and has acquired a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd., another major mining operation (claim 5801).
A. Riot is acquiring Bitcoin directly with capital from convertible debt offerings (claim 5251), expanding mining capacity, and acquiring stakes in other mining companies like Bitfarms to grow its operational presence.
A. Riot is a mining operator, not a service provider—it has no traditional customers. It generates revenue by mining Bitcoin and selling it on the open market.
A. Riot invested roughly $202 million acquiring a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms (claims 5801–5802) and raised $525 million in convertible notes (claim 5251) to fund operations and Bitcoin purchases (claim 5252).
A. In early 2024, the U.S. government attempted emergency data collection on crypto mining via Form EIA-862. Riot and others challenged it; courts granted a temporary restraining order (claim 6236) and the collection was discontinued (claim 6231), with future surveys to follow standard procedures (claim 6233).
A. Most claims are recent (2024) with limited delivery history. Notably, Riot's settlement agreement with Bitfarms was withdrawn as of September 2026 (claim 5704), and the convertible notes offering pricing was delayed (claim 5259).
A. What operational control does Riot's 19.9% stake in Bitfarms provide? What is Riot's actual Bitcoin production capacity? How profitable are mining operations given electricity costs? When will the $525 million in capital be fully deployed?
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company. However, the disclosed record does not detail Riot's own mining operations or revenue sources—instead, it focuses almost entirely on Riot's 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd., another mining company (claims 5801, 5802).
A. Riot invested approximately $202 million for a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms—90.1 million shares (claims 5802, 5801). Riot obtained director nomination rights (claim 5705) and can purchase additional shares if Bitfarms' ownership falls below 7.5% (claims 5700, 5706).
A. None. The disclosed record does not name any customers for Riot or disclose revenue from mining operations. This is a critical gap for understanding how Riot generates returns on its Bitfarms investment.
A. Yes. Riot faced regulatory action regarding an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862). The emergency authorization was discontinued March 1, 2024 (claims 6231, 6237), and future mining data collection will use standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6233).
A. Riot financed the Bitfarms acquisition from working capital (claim 5802). It also issued $525 million in 0.75% convertible senior notes due 2030 (claim 5251) to acquire Bitcoin (claim 5252), though actual holdings remain undisclosed.
A. A Bitfarms shareholder agreement term was set for June 1, 2026, but shows delayed status (claim 5701). Convertible note pricing was promised by December 11, 2024, also delayed (claim 5259). Bitcoin acquisition using convertible proceeds is undisclosed.
A. How much Bitcoin has Riot actually acquired? What are Bitfarms' operational metrics and profitability? When will delayed shareholder agreements be resolved? Most critically: what is Riot's own mining capacity and revenue generation?
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company focused on Bitcoin mining and related operations.
A. Since June 2024, Riot has invested over $300 million building a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd. (claims 6015, 5802, 5703), a major mining operation. The company initially pursued a full acquisition (claim 5926) but withdrew it in June 2024, instead seeking board seats and negotiating a settlement (claim 5704).
A. A settlement agreement was reached in September 2024 (claim 5704) that gave Riot director nomination rights (claim 5705) and voting commitments (claim 5698). However, this settlement was marked as withdrawn as of September 4, 2026, and was originally set to expire June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), leaving the current status of the partnership unclear.
A. Benjamin Yi is Executive Chairman (claim 5367) and Jason Les is CEO (claim 5366). Jason Chung leads Corporate Development & Strategy (claim 5369), William Jackman is General Counsel (claim 5368), and Colin Yee is CFO (claim 6054).
A. Riot financed the Bitfarms investment through working capital (claim 6012). In December 2024, Riot raised $500 million via 0.75% convertible notes (claim 5261), maturing in 2030 (claim 5251), for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252).
A. In early 2024, Riot was involved in litigation over an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (Form EIA-862) that plaintiffs alleged violated statutory requirements (claim 6235). A court granted a temporary restraining order (claim 6236), and future surveys will follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6346) rather than emergency protocols.
A. The status of the Bitfarms partnership is the major uncertainty—the September 2024 settlement agreement is now marked as withdrawn, yet Riot may still hold board nomination rights and voting influence. It is unclear whether Riot achieved its strategic goals or if the partnership is dissolving.
A. The available disclosures focus on Riot's investments and executive changes but do not name specific mining customers or detail mining operation capacity beyond mentions of Corsicana facility holdings (claim 6013).
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a Bitcoin mining company. It operates mining facilities, including one in Corsicana (claim 6013), and owns a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd., a publicly traded Canadian mining operator (claim 5801). The company also invests in Bitcoin directly through capital markets activities.
A. Riot's stated strategy is to grow Bitcoin mining and treasury holdings. The company raised $525 million in convertible senior notes (claim 5251) and is using proceeds to acquire Bitcoin (claim 5252). It's also developing a strategic partnership with Bitfarms Ltd. through its significant ownership stake.
A. No enterprise customers are named in disclosed claims. Riot operates as a direct mining company and investor rather than as a service provider. Its primary strategic relationship is with Bitfarms Ltd., in which it holds a 19.9% stake.
A. Most major claims are marked "stated" (company announcements) rather than independently verified. A significant gap: Riot announced a settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5704) but later withdrew that claim. Settlement terms were promised by June 1, 2026, but remain delayed (claim 5701).
A. Riot has built a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms through multiple tranches, investing approximately $202 million as of September 2024 (claims 5801-5802). Through settlement agreements, Riot secured director nomination rights and board voting commitments (claims 5695, 5697-5698), though the final settlement agreement was withdrawn after initial announcement (claim 5704).
A. The crypto mining sector faced regulatory scrutiny in early 2024 when the EIA attempted an emergency survey of mining operations; courts halted enforcement (claims 6236-6237). Going forward, mining data collection will use standard notice-and-comment procedures rather than emergency protocols (claims 6346, 6234).
A. Jason Les is CEO (claim 5366), Benjamin Yi is Executive Chairman (claim 5367), William Jackman is EVP General Counsel (claim 5368), and Jason Chung is EVP of Corporate Development & Strategy (claim 5369). Executive agreements have 36-month terms with auto-renewal provisions (claim 5370).
A. Monitor the resolution of the Bitfarms settlement terms (promised by June 2026, claim 5701), deployment of the $525 million convertible notes capital toward Bitcoin acquisition (claims 5251-5252), and any disclosure of actual mining capacity or production from Riot's facilities versus gains from its Bitfarms stake.
Frequently asked
2026-09-05A. Riot is a cryptocurrency mining company. It mines Bitcoin and operates mining facilities. Most recently, it has become a significant investor in Bitfarms Ltd., acquiring a 19.9% stake (claim 5801).
A. Riot is expanding through direct Bitcoin acquisition using proceeds from convertible debt (claim 5252) and through acquiring and influencing mining operations, particularly Bitfarms. It negotiated settlement terms with Bitfarms including director nomination rights (claim 5705) and conditional share purchase rights (claim 5706).
A. Riot does not appear to have named end customers in disclosed filings. Its primary disclosed relationship is with Bitfarms Ltd., in which it holds a 19.9% stake as of September 2024 (claim 5801). The nature of this relationship shifted from acquisition attempt to strategic partnership under a settlement agreement (claim 5695).
A. Verified regulatory actions: the EIA emergency mining survey (Form EIA-862) was discontinued and data destroyed, following legal challenge (claims 6231, 6232, 6237, 6347). Stated acquisitions: Riot increased its Bitfarms stake in stages from 11.3% (June 2024) to 19.9% (September 2024), investing approximately $202 million total (claims 6052, 5801, 5802). Pending: a $525 million convertible notes offering (claim 5251) for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252) with maturity in 2030.
A. Riot faced a legal challenge to an emergency Energy Information Administration (EIA) survey requesting data on cryptocurrency mining operations. Plaintiffs alleged statutory violations (claim 6235). A temporary restraining order was granted (claim 6236), the survey was discontinued (claim 6237), and collected data was destroyed (claim 6347). Future mining surveys will follow standard notice-and-comment procedures (claim 6346).
A. A settlement agreement with Bitfarms was promised by June 1, 2026 (claim 5701) but is now marked delayed as of September 2026. The agreement includes Riot's board nomination and voting rights (claims 5705, 5698). Additionally, a convertible notes offering priced at $525 was promised by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259) and marked delayed.
A. Whether the Bitcoin acquisition using convertible note proceeds has actually occurred; the current status of Riot's relationship with Bitfarms post-settlement and whether conditional purchase rights have been exercised; why the Bitfarms settlement agreement, promised to expire in June 2026, is now marked delayed; and whether Riot can successfully execute on its mining expansion strategy amid regulatory scrutiny.
Frequently asked
2026-08-30A. Riot operates critical IT data centers. The company has announced plans for a 191 MW facility at Rockdale (claim 34).
A. To build large-scale data center capacity. In August 2026, Riot secured a $573M credit facility (claim 33) for data center equipment and project expenses to support this expansion.
A. No. No customer names or commitments are disclosed in the available filings.
A. Only announcements. As of August 30, 2026, the $573M financing (claim 33) and 191 MW Rockdale facility (claim 34) are stated plans, not completed or operational projects.
A. Construction timelines and progress at Rockdale, customer announcements (or explanations for their absence), actual deployment of capacity, and whether the $573M funding proves sufficient for the stated 191 MW build-out.
A. Why customers remain undisclosed (competitive sensitivity or lack of commitments), what the actual capex per MW will be and timeline are, the revenue model and unit economics, and whether stated capacity and financing align.
whats_missing
What we aren't being told
2026-10-19The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), describing the test as an antigen-based blood test outside FDA regulation (claim #21100). What has not been said is the economics of that arrangement: the royalty or transfer-price structure, any minimum purchase commitments, the term and termination triggers, and whether SurBred 15 ever produced meaningful revenue through Merial.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is who those customers are, what share of revenue the largest of them account for, and whether the antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims #21108 and #21081) depends on a small number of buyers.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split anywhere from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721 and #20715). What has not been said is which ratio, if any, was actually chosen, the effective date, and how the outstanding option pool and the 700,000-share plan increase approved at the same meeting (claims #20722 and #20714) were adjusted.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that referenced a common stock offering initiated in 2012 (claim #21048). What has not been said is why four directors left on a single day, whether any of them cited a disagreement with management, and the size, price per share, and net proceeds of the offering that preceded or followed the departures.
The company disclosed repeated increases to its Stock Incentive Plan reserve: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011), plus a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting on the Hepler grant, the compensation packages for incoming CEOs Richard Donnelly (claim #21082) and Stephen Lundy (claim #20711), any severance paid on Roger Hurst's termination despite his exclusive employment agreement (claims #21099 and #21087), and the annual burn rate and cumulative dilution these reserve increases represent.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it is pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis blood test (claim #21050) and that it entered an exclusive license for its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is the regulatory pathway (510(k) versus de novo), the submission timeline and pivotal trial enrollment and endpoints, and the identity of the animal health licensee along with any upfront or milestone payments received.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-19The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), whether any earn-out applied, and whether any officer or director had a relationship with the seller. Was this an arm's-length transaction, and what did the company pay?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement (term, minimum purchase commitments, royalty or margin split, termination triggers), or who the largest diagnostic-product customers are and what share of revenue they represent. How concentrated is revenue, and what does the company lose if Merial walks away?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, then disclosed on 2005-09-25 that Hurst's employment was terminated, cited as claim #21087, alongside a new CEO appointment (#21082) and a 3,500,000-unit increase to the Stock Incentive Plan (#21088). What has not been said is why the termination happened roughly a year into an exclusive agreement, what severance or equity acceleration was paid, and what exercise price and vesting schedule attached to the 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler, cited as claim #21107. What did the leadership change cost shareholders?
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both remain not yet verifiable on this record. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio, and on what date, and how the 700,000-share plan increases disclosed in 2010 and 2011 (#20722, #20714, #20710) should be read: are they one amendment reported three times, or separate increases, and are those figures pre-split or post-split?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that disclosed a common stock offering (#21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (#21049). What has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, the size, price, and placement agent of the offering, and the identity of the animal-health licensee and the upfront and royalty terms. Was the company exiting its original cattle-diagnostics business, and on what terms?
The company disclosed it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test on 2012-10-14, cited as claims #21047 and #21050, and continued expanding its equity plan, by 425,000 shares in 2013 (#21041) and 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (#21011), before a 2016 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (#20981). What has not been said is the submission date and outcome of the AppyScore FDA filing, total clinical spend, and the cumulative dilution and annual burn rate from the repeated incentive-plan increases since 2005. Did AppyScore ever receive clearance, and if not, is that what drove the 2016 rebrand?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-19The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price or form of consideration, whether Hurst or other insiders had an ownership interest in Vitro that makes this a related-party transaction, and what severance or separation terms applied when the Hurst agreement ended. Were those terms disclosed anywhere in the proxy record?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it holds license arrangements with three universities, cited as claim #21095. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal, including royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, territory and term. The three universities are also not named, and the royalty obligations owed to them are not stated. Which institutions are they, and what share of product revenue do they take?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is who the largest customers are, what portion of revenue the top one to three account for, and what the absolute revenue base from this line is. What is the customer concentration behind the antigen business?
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both claims remain not_yet_verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, what ratio was chosen, and on what effective date. If the split lapsed unused, why was it allowed to lapse?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is who the four directors were and whether any disagreement with management prompted the resignations. The filing also leaves unstated the offering's size, price and proceeds, and the identity of the licensee along with any upfront or royalty consideration. Who licensed the animal health IP, and on what terms?
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its stock incentive plan, cited as claims #21088 (3.5M, 2005), #20723 (1.5M, 2009), #20722, #20714 and #20710 (700K each, 2010–2011), #21041 (425K, 2013) and #21011 (1.8M, 2014), along with a 100,000-share option grant to Douglas Hepler, cited as claim #21107. It also disclosed an authorized-share figure of 60,000,000 in both 2005 (claim #21089) and 2013 (claim #21040). What has not been said is whether the 2010 and 2011 700K increases are one amendment or separate ones. The record also omits the grant recipients, exercise prices and vesting terms, the cumulative dilution these increases represent, and whether the 2013 authorization was an increase to 60M or by 60M. The BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition of 2016-10-06, cited as claim #20980, is truncated in the record and carries no stated consideration. What was paid for BiOptix, and in what form?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-18The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any insiders had a relationship with Vitro Diagnostics. What did the company actually pay for the business that became its operating base?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claim #21095. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal, including royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, term and termination rights. The three universities are also unnamed, as are the royalty rates owed to them. How much of SurBred 15 revenue does the company actually keep after Merial and the licensors are paid?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and then the termination of Hurst's employment on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why the relationship ended about a year later, what severance or equity acceleration was paid, and whether any non-compete or IP-assignment provisions survived. The same question applies to Daryl Faulkner stepping down as Executive Chairman on 2010-10-11, cited as claims #20717 and #20712. Did Faulkner receive a separation package, and on what terms?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051. In the same filing it disclosed a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048, and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property, cited as claim #21049. What has not been said is whether the departing directors cited any disagreement with management. The filing also leaves unstated the size, price and investors of the offering, and the licensee's identity and the upfront and royalty terms for the animal health IP. Were these three events connected, and who now controls the animal health assets?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both remain not yet verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio, and how the many share-denominated figures before and after that date should be adjusted. Was the split carried out, and if so, at what ratio?
The company disclosed a long run of Stock Incentive Plan reserve increases. These are 3,500,000 units on 2005-09-25 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares on 2009-10-15 (claim #20723), and 700,000 shares cited three times across 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714 and #20710). They continue with 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim #21011), alongside a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler in 2004 (claim #21107). What has not been said is whether the three 700,000-share entries are one amendment or several, what strike price and vesting applied to Hepler's grant, and which executives received the bulk of each expanded reserve. What is the cumulative dilution from these plan increases as a percentage of shares outstanding?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-16The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it has license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal: upfront or milestone payments, minimum purchase commitments, revenue split, territory, and term. The company also has not named the three universities or said which products depend on each license and what royalty they carry.
The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics in 2004 and again in 2005 (claims #21108 and #21081). In 2004 it also disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099), whose employment was then terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, and whether any officer or director had an interest in the seller. The record also omits the severance, equity treatment, or non-compete terms of Hurst's departure barely a year after his exclusive agreement.
The company disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to new director Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23 (claim #21107), followed by a long series of Stock Incentive Plan increases. These include 3,500,000 units in 2005 (#21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (#20723), 700,000 in 2010 and 2011 (#20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (#21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (#21011). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting on Hepler's grant. Nor has the company said how the expanded reserves were actually allocated among named executives, or what the cumulative overhang was against shares outstanding at each step.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims #20721 and #20715). What has not been said on this record is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio, and how prior share and option figures should be restated as a result.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim #21051), alongside a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048). What has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and the size, price and use of proceeds of the offering.
The company disclosed in the same 2012-10-14 filing that it is pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050) and entered an exclusive license for its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is the regulatory pathway and submission date for AppyScore and any subsequent FDA outcome. The company also has not named the licensee of the animal health portfolio, or disclosed the license fee, royalty rate, or whether the Merial relationship survived the transfer.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-16The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 (claim #21108), and restated it on 2005-09-25 (claim #21081). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any officer, director, or founder had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics that would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (term, territory, minimum purchase commitments, royalty or margin split, termination triggers), or which customers among the 30-plus product buyers account for a material share of revenue.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and the termination of that employment on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087), alongside Richard G. Donnelly's appointment as President and CEO (claim #21082). What has not been said is why the employment ended barely a year after the exclusive agreement, whether the departure was for cause, and what severance, equity acceleration, or continuing consulting or IP arrangements followed.
The company disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23 (claim #21107), and a series of stock incentive plan expansions of 3,500,000 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 (claim #20723), 700,000 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim #21011). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting schedule of the Hepler grant, how much of each new reserve went to named executives versus broad-based employees, and the cumulative dilution these increases represent against the shares outstanding at each date.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split at a ratio of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected by February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715), both still marked not yet verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was actually executed before the deadline, at what ratio, and, if it lapsed, why the board let the authority expire.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing as a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and its pursuit of FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050). What has not been said is whether any of the four departures involved a disagreement with management over the offering or the AppyScore regulatory strategy, the size and pricing of the offering, and the expected FDA submission and decision timeline. The 2016-10-06 BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claim #20980) likewise appears without consideration, valuation, or the rationale for the deal.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-16The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is what the economics are: the term, territory, minimum purchase or milestone obligations, and royalty rates are absent, and the three universities are never named. Without these, a reader cannot tell whether the Merial deal could ever produce material revenue, or what the company owes its upstream licensors.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108 and #21081). It also disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and his termination on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and how it was paid, whether any insider was on the seller side, and why Hurst left roughly a year into an exclusive agreement. Any severance, non-compete or option acceleration from that termination is also undisclosed.
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that referenced a common stock offering initiated in 2012 (claim #21048). What has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation letter cited a disagreement with management, and whether the exits were linked to the offering. The offering's size, price and use of proceeds are also missing, which leaves a near-collapse of the board with no stated cause.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721 and #20715). What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out, and at what ratio. Both claims remain not_yet_verifiable on the record, and every later share count, including the 60,000,000 authorized-share increase in claim #21040, cannot be read properly without that answer.
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its stock incentive plan: - 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim #21088) - 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim #20723) - 700,000 shares in 2010 (claims #20722 and #20714, which may be the same increase recorded twice) - 700,000 shares in 2011 (claim #20710) - 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim #21041) - 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim #21011)
It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting schedule of the Hepler grant, how much of each new reserve went to named executives such as CEOs Richard Donnelly (claim #21082) and Stephen Lundy (claim #20711), and how much cumulative dilution these increases caused.
The company disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 (claim #21049), and in the same filing said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050). What has not been said is who the licensee is and what the upfront, milestone and royalty terms are. For AppyScore, the regulatory pathway, the submission date and the timeline the company expects are also missing. Note that the claim listing provided is cut off after claim #20981 (the 2016 renaming from Venaxis to Bioptix), so later disclosures were not assessed.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-15The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement, such as term, minimum purchase commitments, milestone or royalty structure, and termination rights. Nor has it named any of the diagnostic-manufacturer customers or said what share of revenue the largest of them represents.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081), alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that ended within roughly a year (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase consideration, whether any officer, director or the departing employee had a prior interest in Vitro Diagnostics, and what severance or post-termination obligations accompanied the Hurst exit.
The company disclosed board authorization on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected by February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715). Both claims remain not_yet_verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was actually effected before the deadline, at what ratio, and how the outstanding option and incentive-plan reserves were adjusted.
The company repeatedly expanded its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 shares in each of 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is the cumulative dilution these increases represent, the annual burn rate, which executives received the bulk of the grants, and the strike price and vesting terms of the Hepler grant.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that referenced a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048). What has not been said is why four directors left at once, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and the size, price and investor identity of the concurrent offering.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050) and had entered an exclusive license for its animal health IP (claim #21049). It had earlier cited license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is the regulatory pathway and submission date for AppyScore, the identity of the animal-health licensee and the upfront and royalty terms, and which universities hold the underlying licenses and on what royalty basis.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-15The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal: term, territory, minimum purchase commitments, milestone or royalty rates, and termination triggers. Nor have the three licensing universities been named, or the royalty burden those licenses place on the product pipeline (claim #21098).
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock or assumed liabilities), and whether any officer, director or founder held an interest in Vitro Diagnostics at the time. That last point would make it a related-party transaction requiring proxy disclosure.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099), then disclosed his termination roughly a year later on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087), concurrent with Richard Donnelly's appointment as CEO (claim #21082). What has not been said is whether the termination was for cause, what severance or option acceleration was paid, and whether non-compete or IP-assignment provisions survived.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that disclosed a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health IP (claim #21049). What has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management. It has also not been said who the animal-health licensee is, or what upfront, milestone and royalty terms the company accepted when it effectively exited the business its SurBred and StayBred products were built on (claims #21096, #21097).
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715). Both claims still sit at not_yet_verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and if not, why the authority was allowed to lapse. Similarly, no follow-up confirms the FDA clearance pursued for AppyScore (claims #21047, #21050), including submission dates, the 510(k) versus de novo pathway, or the outcome.
The company disclosed repeated equity plan expansions: 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in both 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722/#20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting of the Hepler grant, how much of each reserve went to named executive officers, and the cumulative overhang as a percentage of shares outstanding. The 2014 increase is the largest since 2005, yet no accompanying compensation rationale appears on the record. Note that the record supplied here truncates at the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix rename (claim #20981), so no disclosures from the company's later business pivot could be assessed.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-15The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (#21099) that ended in termination a year later (#21087). What has not been said is the purchase price or form of consideration, whether Vitro Diagnostics or its principals had any relationship with Hurst or other insiders that would make this a related-party transaction, and what severance or continuing obligations followed Hurst's termination.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (#21094) and that it has license arrangements with three universities (#21095). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal, including any upfront payment, milestones, minimum purchase commitments, territory and term. The three universities are not named, and their royalty rates and field-of-use limits are not given. Nor has the company said what revenue, if any, SurBred 15 produced after its regulatory status was characterized as outside FDA oversight (#21100).
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (#21051), in the same filing that referenced a 2012 common stock offering (#21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (#21049). What has not been said is which directors left, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, the size, price and placement agent of the offering, and the identity of the animal health licensee and the license's financial terms.
The company repeatedly expanded its Stock Incentive Plan: by 3,500,000 units on 2005-09-25 (#21088), by 1,500,000 shares on 2009-10-15 (#20723), by 700,000 shares in 2010 and 2011 (#20722, #20714, #20710), by 425,000 shares in 2013 (#21041) and by 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (#21011). What has not been said is who received these grants, the annual burn rate and fully diluted overhang after each increase, and the strike price and vesting schedule of Douglas Hepler's 100,000-share option grant (#21107). The compensation terms for Stephen Lundy's 2010 appointment as CEO (#20711) and any separation arrangements tied to Daryl Faulkner stepping down as Executive Chairman (#20717) are also absent.
The company disclosed board authorization on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, and both remain not yet verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was executed and at what ratio. Separately, the authorized-share actions of 60,000,000 units on 2005-09-25 (#21089) and 2013-04-28 (#21040) leave unclear whether each was an increase to 60 million or an increase by 60 million, and what the resulting authorized total was.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it is pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (#21050, #21047), and on 2004-09-13 that StayBred requires FDA approval or an ANDA filing (#21101). What has not been said is the regulatory pathway and submission date for AppyScore, the size and endpoints of its supporting clinical study, and whether a StayBred filing was ever made. The record also gives no stated rationale for the 2016 rename from Venaxis to Bioptix (#20981), or for what happened to these product programs around that change.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-15The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it sells over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102); what has not been said is what the Merial deal is worth, including any upfront payment, minimum purchase commitment, royalty rate, or term. Nor has the company said whether any single diagnostics customer accounts for a material share of product revenue.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108 and #21081); what has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, or whether any officer or director had a relationship with the seller. That last point matters because the record also shows Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement (claim #21099) followed by the termination of that employment a year later (claim #21087), and no severance terms or reason for the departure have been disclosed.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 (claims #20721 and #20715); what has not been said on the record is whether the split was actually carried out, at what ratio, and how the share reserves in the incentive plan were adjusted afterward.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051). That filing came alongside a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and the pursuit of FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050). What has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and what size, price, and use of proceeds the offering carried. The company has also not said whether an FDA submission for AppyScore was ever filed, or when.
The company disclosed a series of Stock Incentive Plan expansions: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010 and again in 2011 (claims #20722, #20714 and #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011). What has not been said is how many of those shares were granted to named executives, what the cumulative dilution overhang is, and whether the 2010 and 2011 700,000-share increases are separate or the same amendment recorded twice. The 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107) also lacks a disclosed strike price and vesting schedule.
The company disclosed an exclusive license agreement for its animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 (claim #21049); what has not been said is who the licensee is, what upfront or milestone payments were received, and whether the StayBred and SurBred products are covered (claims #21097 and #21096).
What we aren't being told
2026-10-15The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, and whether Vitro or Hurst stood on both sides of the deal. Was this a related-party transaction, and what severance or continuing obligations followed Hurst's departure?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), that it has license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095), and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is which universities are involved, what royalty or milestone obligations they carry, what minimums, term or revenue share the Merial deal contains, and whether any single unnamed customer accounts for a material share of product revenue. Who are these counterparties, and what are the economics?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both remain not_yet_verifiable. What has not been said on the record is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and how the many share-denominated figures before and after it (claims #21089, #21040, #20714) should be restated on a split-adjusted basis. Was the authorization used, and at what ratio?
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim #21051), in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is why the directors left, whether any departure involved a disagreement with management, how large the offering was and at what price, and who the licensee is and on what terms. Was the animal health IP sale connected to the board turnover?
The company disclosed repeated increases to its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 units (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares (claim #20723), 700,000 shares across claims #20722, #20714 and #20710, 425,000 shares (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107) and Stephen Lundy's appointment as CEO (claim #20711). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting of the Hepler grant, Lundy's compensation package, any separation terms for Daryl Faulkner's exit as Executive Chairman (claim #20717), and the plan's annual burn rate and overhang. Are the three 700,000-share entries one amendment reported three times or cumulative increases?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test (claim #21050). It disclosed the corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 (claim #20981), and the record ends there. What has not been said is the regulatory pathway, the clinical trial size or outcome, and a target submission date for AppyScore, nor whether the program was abandoned before the rebrand. The claims on file also never cover the business Riot runs today, so the disclosures behind the current enterprise are missing from this record entirely. What became of AppyScore, and where are the claims for the Riot-era business?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-13The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081; what has not been said is the consideration paid. What were the cash, stock or earn-out terms, what assets and liabilities transferred, and did any officer or director of the acquirer have a relationship with Vitro Diagnostics that would make this a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claims #21094 and #21095; what has not been said is the economics or the counterparties. What royalty rates, minimum purchase commitments, milestones and term or termination provisions govern the Merial deal, and which three universities license which technologies on what royalty terms? The same filing says the company markets over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). How concentrated is that revenue among named customers?
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse stock split at a ratio of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20715 and #20721; what has not been said is whether the split was carried out. Was it executed, at what ratio and on what date, or did the authority lapse? If it lapsed, why, and how should the many share-count figures before and after that date be compared?
The company disclosed repeated Stock Incentive Plan expansions, cited as claims #21088 (3.5M shares, 2005), #20723 (1.5M, 2009), #20722/#20714/#20710 (700K, 2010–2011), #21041 (425K, 2013) and #21011 (1.8M, 2014), plus 100,000 options to director Douglas I. Hepler (claim #21107); what has not been said is who received those grants and at what prices. How much of each increase went to named executives such as incoming CEOs Richard G. Donnelly (claim #21082) and Stephen T. Lundy (claim #20711), at what strike prices and vesting schedules? What was the cumulative overhang as a percentage of shares outstanding after each increase?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 and, in the same filing, an exclusive license agreement for its animal health intellectual property, cited as claims #21051 and #21049; what has not been said is why the directors left, who the licensee is, or what the license pays. Were the resignations tied to a disagreement with management or to the animal-health divestiture, and what upfront, royalty and milestone terms did the licensee agree to?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test and had begun a common stock offering, cited as claims #21050 and #21048; what has not been said is the regulatory pathway or the size of the raise. Was AppyScore filed as a 510(k) or de novo, what was the pivotal trial's enrollment and primary endpoint, and what was the target submission date? How many shares were offered, at what price, and how many months of runway did the proceeds fund?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-13The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 (claim #21108) and restated it on 2005-09-25 (claim #21081). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, and any assumed liabilities. A reader would also want to know whether Roger Hurst, whose exclusive employment agreement was disclosed on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and terminated on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087), had any ownership or management link to Vitro Diagnostics, and what severance or related-party payments followed that termination.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), that it has license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095), and that it sells over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, term, and territory), which universities are the licensors and what royalties are owed to them, and whether any single diagnostic customer accounts for a material share of revenue.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that StayBred requires FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim #21101), and on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050). What has not been said is which regulatory pathway was actually chosen for each product, whether a submission was ever filed, its date, and the agency's response. Neither claim carries a target date against which progress can be measured.
The company disclosed board authorization on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims #20721 and #20715). Both remain not_yet_verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio, and on what effective date. On 2012-10-14 the company disclosed that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim #21051), alongside an exclusive license of its animal health IP (claim #21049). What has not been said is whether any resigning director cited a disagreement with management, who the licensee is, and what upfront payment or royalty the company receives.
The company disclosed a long series of Stock Incentive Plan expansions: 3,500,000 shares on 2005-09-25 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 on 2009-10-15 (claim #20723), 700,000 on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 (claims #20722 and #20714), 700,000 on 2011-05-31 (claim #20710), 425,000 on 2013-04-28 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 on 2014-04-29 (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23 (claim #21107). What has not been said is the cumulative overhang as a percentage of shares outstanding, the annual burn rate, the exercise price and vesting terms of the Hepler grant, and the pay package for Stephen T. Lundy on becoming CEO (claim #20711).
The record contains duplicate appointments on different dates. Jeffrey G. McGonegal is named CFO on both 2004-03-23 and 2005-09-25 (claims #21106 and #21084), and Douglas I. Hepler joins the board on both 2004-03-23 and 2005-09-25 (claims #21105 and #21085). What has not been said is the actual effective date of each appointment, and whether the 2005 entries reflect re-appointment at a new holding company after the restructuring (claim #21091) and the AspenBio name change (claim #21090).
What we aren't being told
2026-10-11The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 (claim #21108), restated on 2005-09-25 (claim #21081). What has not been said is the purchase price, the mix of cash and stock, and any earn-out. It also has not said whether the deal involved related parties, given that Roger Hurst signed an exclusive employment agreement in the same period (claim #21099) and was terminated a year later (claim #21087), with no reason or severance terms given.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is the Merial agreement's economics: royalty or transfer-price structure, minimum purchase commitments, term, and termination rights. Nor has it named its largest customers or what share of revenue they represent. The three university license arrangements (claim #21095) also lack licensor names and royalty obligations.
The company disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21107. It also disclosed a string of Stock Incentive Plan reserve increases: 3.5 million (claim #21088), 1.5 million (claim #20723), 700,000 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 (claim #21041) and 1.8 million (claim #21011). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting on the Hepler grant. Nor has it given the cumulative overhang as a percentage of shares outstanding, or which executives received the bulk of grants after each increase.
The company disclosed board authority for a reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio and on what date. This leaves ambiguous whether the 700,000-share reserve increase dated 2011-05-31 (claim #20710) is stated in pre- or post-split units.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, alongside a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048. What has not been said is why four directors left at once, or whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management. Nor has the company given the offering's size, price per share, underwriter or use of proceeds.
The company disclosed that it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test, cited as claim #21050, and earlier that StayBred would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing, cited as claim #21101. What has not been said is the regulatory pathway and submission date for AppyScore, or any update on whether StayBred was ever filed or abandoned. The record also stops at the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (claim #20981) and says nothing about the transition to the current business or what happened to the animal-health license (claim #21049).
What we aren't being told
2026-10-11The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108, and repeated it on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock or assumed liabilities), any earn-out, and whether any insider of the company had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics, which would make it a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it markets more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (royalty or transfer-price structure, minimum purchase commitments, territory, term and termination rights) or how concentrated revenue is among the unnamed diagnostic customers, including whether any single customer exceeds 10% of sales.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and then the termination of that employment on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why the employment ended, what severance or settlement was paid, and whether the termination affected the company's rights to the license arrangements and pipeline tied to that work, cited as claims #21095 and #21098.
The company disclosed board authority to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, and both remain not yet verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was actually carried out, at what ratio and on what date, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048, and an FDA clearance effort for AppyScore, cited as claims #21047 and #21050. What has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, the offering's size, price and use of proceeds, and the expected AppyScore submission or clearance timeline and pathway.
The company has repeatedly enlarged its stock incentive plan: 3,500,000 shares (claim #21088), 1,500,000 (claim #20723), 700,000 (claims #20722, #20714 and #20710), 425,000 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler, cited as claim #21107. What has not been said is the cumulative dilution these increases represent, the share of each increase granted to named executive officers, or the strike price and vesting terms of the Hepler grant. The 2016 renaming from Venaxis to Bioptix, cited as claim #20981, also arrives with no stated business rationale on the record shown.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-11The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it sells more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is what the Merial deal is worth: its term, royalty or margin split, any minimum purchase commitments, or termination triggers. Nor has the company named any customer or said whether a few buyers make up most of that product revenue.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108 and #21081), and an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099), later terminated (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration, whether any insiders were on both sides of that deal, and why Hurst left and what severance or continuing obligations came with his exit.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051). In the same filing it disclosed a common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is why the four directors left at once and whether they disagreed with the board. The company also has not said how much the offering raised or at what price, or who the licensee is and what upfront and royalty terms it pays.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721 and #20715). What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out, which ratio was chosen, and how it affects the share counts in the later stock plan increases.
The company disclosed a series of stock incentive plan increases: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010 and 2011 (claims #20714 and #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to Douglas Hepler (claim #21107) and the appointment of Stephen Lundy as CEO (claim #20711). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting of the Hepler grant, Lundy's compensation package, and how much of each new share reserve went to named executives. The company also has not given a cumulative dilution figure across these increases.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050), and on 2004-09-13 that StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim #21101). What has not been said is whether either submission was ever filed, when, under which regulatory pathway, and what came of it before the company renamed itself Bioptix in 2016 (claim #20981).
What we aren't being told
2026-10-11The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any Vitro Diagnostics principals became insiders of the acquirer. What did the company pay, and was this a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it sells over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (upfront payment, royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, term) or who the largest diagnostic customers are and what share of revenue they represent. How concentrated was revenue, and what does Merial owe the company?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and his termination roughly a year later on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why the employment ended, whether severance or other termination payments were made, and whether any non-compete or IP assignment survived. Was the termination for cause, and what did it cost the company?
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048. What has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, and what the offering's size, price, and use of proceeds were. Did the board turnover relate to the financing or to AppyScore strategy?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. What has not been said is whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, and how share counts in later disclosures were adjusted. Was the split effected, and if so, at which ratio?
The company disclosed repeated increases to its stock incentive plan reserve: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010-2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011), alongside 100,000 options to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). It also disclosed a "60,000,000" authorized-share figure in both 2005 (claim #21089) and 2013 (claim #21040) without clarifying whether that was an increase by or an increase to that number. What has not been said is the cumulative dilution these increases represent, which executives received the grants, and the strike prices and vesting terms. How much of the reserve went to named executive officers, and what is the authorized share count after each amendment?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-10The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094. What has not been said is the economics of that exclusivity: the royalty or transfer-price structure, any minimum purchase commitments, the term and territory, and how many SurBred 15 units Merial actually sold before the product line faded from later disclosures.
The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 that it acquired the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics, restated on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. It also disclosed Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and his termination on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, whether any insider had a relationship with the seller, and what severance or separation terms, along with what stated reason, accompanied Hurst's exit roughly a year after his exclusive agreement was announced.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048). What has not been said is why a near-majority of the board left on a single day, whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, and the size, price per share, and net proceeds of the offering that coincided with the exodus.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both remain unverified on the record. What has not been said is whether the split was actually executed, and if so at what ratio and on what date, which matters for interpreting every share count disclosed afterward.
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 shares on 2005-09-25 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 on 2009-10-15 (claim #20723), 700,000 on 2010-10-21 and again on 2011-05-31 (claims #20714 and #20710), 425,000 on 2013-04-28 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 on 2014-04-29 (claim #21011). It also disclosed 100,000 options to director Douglas Hepler on 2004-03-23 (claim #21107). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting schedule of the Hepler grant, how the plan increases were allocated among named executives, and what cumulative dilution these increases represent against shares outstanding.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test, cited as claim #21050, and earlier, on 2004-09-13, that StayBred required FDA approval or an ANDA filing, cited as claim #21101. Neither claim is followed by a submission date, a pathway (510(k) versus de novo, for example), clinical endpoint results, or a disposition. What has not been said is whether either product ever reached a regulatory decision. The record also ends with the 2016 Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change (claim #20981) and contains nothing explaining the company's transition into the business behind the RIOT ticker.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-10The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108, and restated it on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any Vitro principals stayed on or kept an economic interest in the acquired business.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claim #21095. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (upfront payments, milestones, royalty rate, minimum purchase commitments, term) or which three universities are the licensors and what royalties the company owes them. Relatedly, the company says it sells over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102, but names no customers and gives no revenue concentration figures.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and his termination roughly a year later on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why the relationship ended so soon after an exclusive agreement was signed, whether severance or option acceleration was paid, and whether any non-compete or IP-assignment terms survived.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. What has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio, and if it lapsed, why the board let the authority expire.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, alongside a stock offering, cited as claim #21048. What has not been said is whether any of the four departures involved a disagreement with management over operations, policies, or the offering, as Item 5.02 would require if one existed, and how the board was reconstituted afterward.
Across 2005-2014 the company repeatedly enlarged its stock incentive plan: by 3,500,000 units (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares (claim #20723), 700,000 shares several times (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 shares (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 shares (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107) and the appointment of Stephen Lundy as CEO (claim #20711). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting of the Hepler grant, the Lundy compensation package, and how much of each reserve increase went to named executive officers versus the broader workforce. On the product side, AppyScore's FDA pathway (claim #21050) and StayBred's FDA-approval-or-ANDA requirement (claim #21101) were never followed up with a submission type, filing date, or clearance outcome.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-10The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase consideration, how it was split between cash, stock and assumed liabilities, and whether any officer or director had an interest in Vitro, which would make this a related-party transaction. It is also unclear whether the 2004-09-13 exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) was tied to the deal, and what severance, if any, was paid when his employment ended (claim #21087).
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claim #21095. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal: upfront or milestone payments, royalty or transfer-price structure, minimum purchase commitments, term, and termination rights. The three universities are not named, and neither are the royalty obligations owed to them. In the same filing the company said it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102) but named no customer and gave no revenue concentration.
The board authorized a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected by 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. What has not been said on the record is whether the split was actually carried out, at what ratio, and on what date. That matters for reading every later share count, including the 60,000,000-share authorized increase in claim #21040 and the option reserves.
The company has repeatedly expanded its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 units (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares (claim #20723), 700,000 shares (claims #20722, #20714 and #20710), 425,000 shares (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim #21011). What has not been said is whether the three 700,000-share entries are one amendment or several, how many awards went to named executives versus the broad workforce, and what cumulative dilution these increases represent. Separately, the 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler (claim #21107) was disclosed without a strike price, vesting schedule or expiry.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26, cited as claim #21051, alongside a common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is who resigned, whether any of them cited disagreement with management, who the licensee is, and what the license pays. Together these suggest a significant strategic turn that the record does not explain.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it is pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test, cited as claims #21047 and #21050. What has not been said is the regulatory pathway (510(k) or de novo), the submission date, the size and endpoints of the clinical study, and the expected decision timeline. The record also never reports an outcome for that clearance effort.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-10The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094) and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal: its royalty or transfer-price terms, any minimum purchase commitments, its duration and termination triggers. It also has not named any of its diagnostic-product customers or said what share of revenue the largest of them account for.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and restated it on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081). It also disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099), followed by his termination on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the Vitro assets, whether any insider had a relationship with Vitro, why Hurst's employment ended barely a year into an exclusive agreement, and what severance was paid.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), alongside a common stock offering initiated in 2012 (claim #21048). What has not been said is why a near-majority of the board left on a single day, whether any departing director sent a disagreement letter, and the offering's size, price, placement agent and net proceeds.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected by February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715). The record still shows these as not yet verifiable. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and if not, why the authority was allowed to lapse.
The company disclosed repeated increases to its stock incentive plan reserve: 3,500,000 shares on 2005-09-25, 1,500,000 on 2009-10-15, 700,000 on 2010-10-11, 2010-10-21 and 2011-05-31, 425,000 on 2013-04-28, and 1,800,000 on 2014-04-29 (claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #20714, #20710, #21041, #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107) and Stephen Lundy's appointment as CEO (claim #20711). What has not been said is whether the three 700,000-share entries are a single increase or separate ones. Also undisclosed are the cumulative overhang and dilution these increases represent, the strike price and vesting terms of the Hepler grant, and the compensation package given to Lundy on appointment.
The company disclosed that it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore on 2012-10-14 (claim #21050), that StayBred requires FDA approval or an ANDA on 2004-09-13 (claim #21101), and that it had granted an exclusive license of its animal-health IP on 2012-10-14 (claim #21049). What has not been said is the submission pathway and filing date for AppyScore, whether a StayBred application was ever filed, and who the animal-health licensee is and what it paid. The record also ends with an auditor ratification on 2016-10-06 (claim #20982) and contains no disclosure linking this diagnostics history to the business now trading as Riot.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-10The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is what the economics are: the royalty or margin split with Merial, any minimum purchase commitments, the term and termination triggers, and which three universities license the underlying IP and on what royalty terms.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108 and #21081), and on 2004-09-13 said it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration, whether Vitro Diagnostics or its principals had any relationship to company insiders, and whether any single customer accounts for a material share of that antigen revenue.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099), then disclosed on 2005-09-25 that the employment had been terminated (claim #21087). What has not been said is why the agreement ended within roughly a year, whether termination was for cause, and what severance, option acceleration or non-compete terms applied.
The company disclosed a 700,000-share Stock Incentive Plan increase on 2010-10-11, again on 2010-10-21, and a 700,000-share reserve increase on 2011-05-31 (claims #20722, #20714 and #20710), on top of earlier increases of 3,500,000 and 1,500,000 shares (claims #21088 and #20723) and later 425,000 and 1,800,000 (claims #21041 and #21011). What has not been said is whether the three 700,000-share items are one amendment or separate increases, and what the cumulative reserve, overhang and grants to named executives were after each change.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims #20721 and #20715). What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio and on what date, and whether earlier share counts on record, including the 60,000,000 authorized shares in claims #21089 and #21040, are stated pre- or post-split.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same disclosure as a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health IP (claim #21049). What has not been said is why four directors left at once, whether any disagreement with management or the offering terms was involved, and who the animal health licensee is and what it paid. The 2016-10-06 BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claim #20980) likewise appears without stated consideration or structure.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-09The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and described the product and its regulatory status (claims #21096, #21100). What has not been said is the economics of that exclusivity: minimum purchase commitments, the revenue split or transfer price, the term and termination triggers, and how much of reported revenue actually flowed through Merial. Why grant a sole distributor exclusive rights without quantifying what the company gets in return?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102) and holds license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is who any of these customers or licensors are, whether one or two buyers account for most antigen revenue, and what royalty or milestone obligations the university licenses impose. Is the business concentrated in a handful of unnamed accounts, and what does the company owe its academic licensors?
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims #20721, #20715). Neither the claims nor any follow-up on record says whether the split was executed, at what ratio, or why the authorization was needed. That matters because the stock incentive plan increases of 700,000 shares (claims #20722, #20714, #20710) are stated in share counts whose pre- or post-split basis is ambiguous. Was the split carried out, and on which basis are the plan reserves stated?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim #21051), alongside a common stock offering begun in 2012 (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is why a majority-scale board exodus happened, whether any departing director cited a disagreement, how much the offering raised and at what price, and who licensed the animal health IP and on what terms. Were the resignations, the offering and the divestiture of the company's original business connected?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099), and on 2005-09-25 that his employment was terminated (claim #21087), the same filing that named Richard G. Donnelly President and CEO (claim #21082). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23 (claim #21107). What has not been said is whether Hurst received severance or retained equity, why he left about a year after signing an exclusive agreement, and what strike price and vesting schedule attach to the Hepler grant. What did the leadership change cost shareholders, and what are the terms of the director grant?
The company disclosed on 2010-10-21 that Stephen T. Lundy was appointed CEO and President with an effective date of 2010-03-24 (claim #20711), and that Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman as Gail Schoettler became non-executive Chair (claims #20712, #20716, #20717). What has not been said is Lundy's compensation package, whether Faulkner received separation pay or a consulting arrangement, and why the Lead Director and Vice Chairman roles were eliminated at the same time (claims #20719, #20718). What were the pay and governance terms of this restructuring? Note that the claim record supplied here is truncated after the 2016 Bioptix renaming (claim #20981), so gaps from the later bitcoin-mining period cannot be assessed from this data.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-09The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102; what has not been said is who the largest of those customers are, what share of revenue the top customers represent, and whether any single buyer accounts for a concentration risk.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claims #21094 and #21095; what has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, term, and termination triggers), or which three universities are counterparties and what royalties or milestones the company owes them.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and then his termination on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087; what has not been said is why an executive under an exclusive agreement was terminated roughly a year later, whether the departure was for cause, and what severance or equity acceleration was paid.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051; what has not been said is which directors left, whether any resignation stemmed from a disagreement with management over operations, policies, or practices, and how the board's committee composition and independence were restored afterward.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 to be effected by February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715; what has not been said is whether the split was actually executed before the deadline, at what ratio, and how the 700,000-share Stock Incentive Plan increases disclosed in 2010 and again in 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, and #20710) were adjusted for it, including whether the 2011 increase is additive or a restatement of the earlier one.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics on 2016-10-06, cited as claim #20980, after earlier disclosing the purchase of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims #21108 and #21081) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049); what has not been said in any of these is the purchase price or consideration mix, the identity of the animal health licensee and its royalty terms, and whether any of these counterparties had relationships with directors or officers who were granted options at the same time, such as the 100,000 options to Douglas I. Hepler cited as claim #21107, whose strike price and vesting terms were never disclosed.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-09The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any officer or director had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics that would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claims #21094 and #21102. What has not been said is the Merial contract's term, royalty or margin split, and any minimum purchase commitments. The company also has not named any of the customers behind the 30-plus products or said what share of revenue the largest ones represent.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and then the termination of his employment on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why the employment ended within about a year, whether severance or accelerated equity was paid, and what happened to the non-compete and exclusivity terms after termination.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. What has not been said is whether the split was actually carried out, at which ratio, and how the later share-count figures in claims #20710, #21041 and #21011 should be adjusted for it.
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, alongside a common stock offering begun in 2012, both on 2012-10-14, cited as claims #21051 and #21048. What has not been said is whether any departing director disagreed with management or the offering terms. The company also has not disclosed the offering's size, price, placement agent, or net proceeds, or how much of those proceeds was earmarked for the AppyScore FDA clearance effort cited as claim #21050.
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 shares (claim #21088), 1,500,000 (#20723), 700,000 (#20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 (#21041) and 1,800,000 (#21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23 (claim #21107) and the appointment of Stephen T. Lundy as CEO (claim #20711). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting of the Hepler grant, the compensation package for Lundy, and how much of each reserve increase went to named executive officers versus the broader employee base.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-09The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 (claim #21108), and again on 2005-09-25 (claim #21081), that it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics. Neither the purchase price, the form of consideration, nor whether any officer or director had a relationship with the seller has been stated. What did the company pay for this business, and was it a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three unnamed universities (claim #21095) and sales of over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal: royalty rate, minimum purchase commitments, term, and termination rights. The universities, and any customer concentration within the antigen product line, are also unnamed.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and his termination on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087), in the same filing that installed Richard G. Donnelly as President and CEO (claim #21082). What has not been said is why Hurst left, what severance or continuing consideration he received, and whether he kept any interest in licensed technology or the Vitro-sourced antigen business.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051). The same filing references a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of animal health IP (claim #21049). What has not been said is who resigned and why, including whether any disagreement letters were filed; the size and pricing of the offering; and who licensed the animal health assets on what upfront and royalty terms.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721 and #20715). It also disclosed a series of Stock Incentive Plan increases: claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #20714, #20710, #21041 and #21011, the last adding 1.8 million shares in 2014. What has not been said is whether the split was executed and at what ratio, and how the cumulative plan reserves compare with shares outstanding on a post-split basis. Which named executives received the resulting grants is also undisclosed. The 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler (claim #21107) likewise lacks a strike price and vesting terms.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test (claim #21050). Earlier, on 2004-09-13, it said StayBred would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim #21101). What has not been said for either product is the regulatory pathway actually filed, the submission date, the expected decision timing, or the cost to reach clearance.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-09The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) whose employment was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration, whether any acquisition-related payments or earn-outs flowed to individuals who then became employees, and what severance or contract terms applied when that employment ended roughly eighteen months later.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement (term, minimum purchase commitments, royalty or margin split, termination triggers) or which customers account for the antigen revenue and how concentrated that revenue is.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health IP (claim #21049). What has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and whether the departures were connected to the offering terms or the license counterparty, which is itself unnamed.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split ranging from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, and both claims are now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and if it lapsed, why the board let the authorization expire.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the consideration paid, how the deal was valued, whether any BiOptix holders or insiders received board seats or compensation, and what became of the AppyScore program whose FDA clearance the company said it was pursuing in claim #21050 without ever naming a submission pathway or target date.
The company disclosed a long series of equity plan expansions, including 100,000 options to director Douglas I. Hepler (claim #21107), a 3,500,000-unit plan increase (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares (claim #20723), 700,000-share increases recorded in 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 shares (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 shares (claim #21011). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting on the Hepler grant, whether the repeated 700,000-share figures are one increase or several, and how much cumulative dilution these authorizations represent relative to shares outstanding; the most recent record, a 2017-04-27 financing (claim #20905), carries no amount, instrument or counterparty at all.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-08The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock or assumed liabilities), and whether any officer or director had a relationship with the seller. That context matters because this deal founded the operating business.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claims #21094 and #21102. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement: royalty or transfer-price terms, minimum purchase commitments, term and exclusivity carve-outs. Also missing is how much revenue Merial or any other single customer represents.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and that employment ending on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why the relationship ended within about a year, whether severance or a non-compete applied, and what happened to any options or IP assignments tied to the agreement.
On 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21, shareholders authorized a reverse split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both are flagged delayed. What has not been said is whether the board ever effected the split, at what ratio and on what date, or why it lapsed if it went unused.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, alongside an unspecified 2012 common stock offering and an exclusive license of its animal health IP to an unnamed party, cited as claims #21051, #21048 and #21049. What has not been said is whether the resignations involved any disagreement with management, the offering's size and price, who licensed the animal health IP, and on what upfront and royalty terms. Claim #21050 also records that the company was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore, and no later claim reports the outcome.
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the consideration paid, BiOptix's revenue or cash at closing, and any goodwill or impairment expectation. Separately, the stock plan reserve was increased six times between 2005 and 2014, cited as claims #21088, #20723, #20714, #20710, #21041 and #21011, and the 100,000 options granted to Douglas Hepler on joining the board, cited as claim #21107, came with no strike price or vesting terms. What has not been said is cumulative dilution from these increases or which executives and directors received the grants.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-08The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is what Merial pays: the royalty or margin split, any minimum purchase commitments, and the term of the exclusivity. The company also has not named its largest antigen customers or said what share of revenue they account for.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108, and repeated it on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price and the form of consideration. Nor has the company said whether any director, officer or founder had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics, which would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 that it granted 100,000 stock options to Douglas I. Hepler, cited as claim #21107, at the same time as his board appointment, cited as claim #21105. What has not been said is the strike price, the vesting schedule, or whether the grant was tied to consulting or other services beyond board duties. The record has a similar gap for Roger Hurst. He had an exclusive employment agreement, cited as claim #21099, and his employment was terminated on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What severance, option acceleration or non-compete terms applied has not been disclosed.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out, at what ratio, and on what date. The company has also not given a running dilution figure. The stock incentive plan reserve was raised repeatedly: 3,500,000 shares (claim #21088), 1,500,000 (claim #20723), 700,000 (claims #20722, #20714 and #20710, which may be the same increase reported more than once), 425,000 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 (claim #21011). The total shares reserved, issued and still available after all of these increases has never been stated.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051. In the same filing it disclosed a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048, and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property, cited as claim #21049. What has not been said is why four directors left at once, and whether any of them disagreed with management or with the offering. The licensee of the animal health IP is not named, and its upfront and royalty terms are not given.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the purchase consideration and how it was split between cash and stock. The company also has not said what revenue or cash burn BiOptix brought, or what happened to the AppyScore program, which was pursuing FDA clearance under claims #21047 and #21050. The claim record supplied here is cut off at claim #20905 (dated 2017-04-27, with no content), so later disclosures were not reviewed.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-08The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 that it acquired the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081; what has not been said is what consideration was paid in cash, stock or assumed liabilities, and whether Vitro Diagnostics or its principals had any prior relationship with company insiders that would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, alongside license arrangements with three universities, cited as claim #21095; what has not been said is which universities are the licensors, and what the economics of both deals are, including royalty rates, minimum purchase or performance thresholds, term, and termination rights.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst, cited as claim #21099, then disclosed on 2005-09-25 that his employment had been terminated, cited as claim #21087; what has not been said is why an exclusive agreement ended within about a year, and what severance, option acceleration or continuing consulting or IP obligations were triggered.
The board authorized a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be completed before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715 (both now flagged delayed); what has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio and on what date, or, if it lapsed unused, why the board abandoned an authority it had specifically sought.
The company repeatedly expanded its Stock Incentive Plan reserve, by 3,500,000 shares (#21088), 1,500,000 (#20723), 700,000 in each of #20722, #20714 and #20710, 425,000 (#21041) and 1,800,000 (#21011), and granted Douglas Hepler 100,000 options on joining the board (#21107); what has not been said is the cumulative overhang as a percentage of shares outstanding after each increase, which named executives and directors received the resulting grants, and the strike prices and vesting terms of the Hepler options.
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, while it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (#21050) and running a common stock offering (#21048); what has not been said is whether any resignation stemmed from a disagreement with management, whether AppyScore ever received clearance, and what consideration was paid in the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition disclosed on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 (claims #20980 and #20979), including how BiOptix was valued against the company's remaining cash.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-07The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, and whether any director, officer, or the newly employed Roger Hurst had an interest in Vitro, which would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and his termination on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is why an exclusive arrangement ended within about a year, whether severance or accelerated equity was paid, and whether Hurst kept any non-compete or IP obligations tied to the antigen business.
The company disclosed Merial's exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, licenses from three universities, and sales of over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities on 2004-09-13, cited as claims #21094, #21095 and #21102. What has not been said is which universities granted the licenses, what royalties and milestones are owed under them or by Merial, and what share of revenue its largest unnamed diagnostic customers represent.
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26, in the same filing that noted a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claims #21051 and #21048. What has not been said is whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and the offering's size, price, and underwriter.
The company disclosed board authority for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out and at what ratio. A related ambiguity is whether the 60,000,000-share authorized-capital figures in 2005 and 2013, cited as claims #21089 and #21040, are increases by that amount or to that total.
The company disclosed repeated stock incentive plan expansions of 3,500,000, 1,500,000, 700,000, 425,000 and 1,800,000 shares, along with a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler, cited as claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #21041, #21011 and #21107. What has not been said is the cumulative dilution, who received the bulk of the grants, and the strike price and vesting of Hepler's options. The 2016 BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition, cited as claims #20980 and #20979, likewise appears without any stated consideration or valuation.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-07The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081; what has not been said is the purchase consideration, how it was paid (cash, stock, or assumed obligations), and whether the seller had any relationship to insiders. Given that Roger Hurst had an exclusive employment agreement (claim #21099) and was terminated in 2005 (claim #21087), what were the termination terms, and was any of that consideration tied to Hurst?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, along with license arrangements with three universities, cited as claim #21095; what has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (upfront payments, minimum purchase commitments, royalty rates, term, and termination rights) or which universities are the licensors and what royalties or milestones the company owes them. The 2012 exclusive license of animal health intellectual property, cited as claim #21049, likewise names no licensee and gives no deal value. Is that the same Merial relationship or a new counterparty?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same period as a common stock offering, cited as claim #21048; what has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation stemmed from a disagreement with management, and the size, price, and proceeds of the offering. Did the board turnover and the raise share a cause?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715; what has not been said is whether the split was ever effected and, if so, at what ratio. The record never states that the deadline was met, so share counts disclosed after that date cannot be compared with the counts before it. Which ratio, if any, was applied, and were the stock plan reserves adjusted accordingly?
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 units on 2005-09-25 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares on 2009-10-15 (claim #20723), 700,000 shares in 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim #21011). What has not been said is the cumulative overhang as a percentage of shares outstanding, the annual burn rate, and which executives received the grants. Were the 700,000-share increases in 2010 and 2011 separate approvals or the same one disclosed twice? The 100,000 options granted to Douglas Hepler, cited as claim #21107, also come with no exercise price or vesting terms.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and its rename from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979, and #20981; what has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, any goodwill or impairment expectations, or why a company that had been pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050) changed direction. What happened to the AppyScore program and the capital spent on it?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-06The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108, and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21081; what has not been said is what consideration was paid, whether in cash, stock or assumed liabilities, and whether any director, officer or significant holder had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics. What did the company pay, and was this a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it sells more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102; what has not been said is the term, territory, minimum purchase commitments or royalty economics of the Merial arrangement, or how concentrated revenue is among those unnamed diagnostic customers. What share of revenue came from Merial and from the largest antigen customers?
The company disclosed license arrangements with three universities on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21095, and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14, cited as claim #21049; what has not been said is which universities are involved, which party took the animal health license, and the royalty, milestone or upfront terms in either direction. Who are these counterparties, and what are the economics?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and the termination of his employment on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087; what has not been said is why the agreement ended within about a year, whether severance or accelerated equity was paid, and whether any non-compete or IP assignment survived. On what terms did Hurst depart? Relatedly, the company disclosed 100,000 stock options granted to director Douglas I. Hepler on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21107, but not their strike price or vesting schedule. That gap matters more given repeated plan expansions of 3,500,000, 1,500,000, 700,000, 425,000 and 1,800,000 shares, cited as claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #21041 and #21011. How much of each increase went to named executives, and what was the cumulative dilution?
The company disclosed board authority for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21, cited as claims #20721 and #20715; what has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio, and why. Was the split tied to an exchange listing deficiency? Similarly, the company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, alongside a common stock offering initiated that year, cited as claim #21048; what has not been said is why the directors resigned, whether any disagreement with management was reported, and the size, price and investors of the offering. Were the resignations and the financing connected?
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20981 and #20979; what has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, whether a fairness opinion was obtained, and what became of the AppyScore FDA clearance effort disclosed on 2012-10-14, cited as claims #21047 and #21050. Was AppyScore abandoned, impaired or sold, and what did BiOptix cost? The record on file ends mid-2017, so how these legacy diagnostic assets were treated in the later business transformation also remains unaddressed.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-06The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was later terminated (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, and whether Hurst or any other insider held an interest in Vitro Diagnostics. Was this a related-party transaction, and what severance or continuing obligations followed Hurst's termination?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claims #21094 and #21095. What has not been said is the economics of either arrangement: the term, territory, minimum purchase or milestone commitments with Merial, and the names, royalty rates and field-of-use limits of the three university licensors. How much of SurBred 15's value does the company actually retain after these obligations?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is who those customers are or how concentrated revenue is among them. What share of antigen revenue came from the largest one to three customers, and are any of them under multi-year supply contracts?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, and Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO and President with a stated effective date of 2010-03-24 that was not reported until 2010-10-21, cited as claim #20711. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio and on what date, and what Lundy's base salary, equity grant and severance terms were. These questions matter because the stock plan reserve was increased in nearly every proxy cycle (claims #21088, #20723, #20714, #20710, #21041, #21011).
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26, a 2012 common stock offering, and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property, cited as claims #21051, #21048 and #21049. What has not been said is why the four directors left at once, and whether any of them cited a disagreement with management. Also undisclosed are the size and pricing of the offering and the identity of the animal health licensee, along with any upfront payment or royalty it pays.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the consideration paid, how many shares were issued, and whether the sellers had any prior relationship with directors or officers. What strategic rationale did the board use for a deal that came just months before the company's next reinvention, and how much of the acquired value was later written off?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-06The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081; what has not been said is what consideration was paid, in cash, stock or assumed liabilities, and whether Vitro Diagnostics or its principals had any relationship with insiders. Without a purchase price and a related-party statement, how should a reader judge whether the deal was negotiated at arm's length?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it sells more than 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102; what has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal, including term, royalty or transfer pricing, minimum purchase commitments and territory, or which customers account for most of the antigen revenue. How concentrated is revenue in Merial and a handful of unnamed buyers?
The company disclosed Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and his termination on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087, alongside a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler, cited as claim #21107; what has not been said is whether Hurst's exit triggered severance, option acceleration or a consulting arrangement, why he left, and the exercise price and vesting schedule of Hepler's options. What did these personnel changes actually cost shareholders?
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048; what has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, and what the offering's size, price per share and resulting dilution were. Was the board exodus connected to the financing or to the AppyScore regulatory path, claims #21047 and #21050, whose FDA clearance outcome is never reported in the record?
The company disclosed board authority for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 to be effected before 2011-02-04, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both now flagged delayed; what has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and whether it was driven by a listing-compliance deficiency notice. Given the repeated share-reserve increases in claims #20714, #20710, #21041 and #21011, what is the cumulative dilution from equity-plan expansions over this period?
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981; what has not been said is the purchase consideration, the assets and liabilities acquired, and how the deal fit a strategy that later took the company to the Riot name. The record available here is cut off at claim #20909 in 2017, so the pivot itself, and any counterparties, sites or financing tied to it, cannot be assessed from these claims. What drove the shift away from diagnostics?
What we aren't being told
2026-10-05The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081; what has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any officer or director had a prior relationship with Vitro Diagnostics that would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claims #21094 and #21095; what has not been said is the term, territory, minimum purchase commitments, and revenue split under the Merial agreement, or which three universities are the licensors and what royalty or milestone obligations the company owes them.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and his termination on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087; what has not been said is why the employment ended within roughly a year, what severance or option acceleration was paid, and whether any non-compete or IP assignment terms survived. Relatedly, the 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler, cited as claim #21107, was disclosed without a strike price, vesting schedule, or explanation of why a single new director received a grant of that size.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, alongside an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property, cited as claim #21049; what has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, and who the animal health licensee is, along with the upfront payment, royalty rate, and whether that licensee has any connection to a former insider.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715 (both now flagged delayed); what has not been said is whether the split was actually effected, at what ratio, and if it was abandoned, why. The same gap applies to AppyScore, cited as claims #21047 and #21050: the company disclosed it was pursuing FDA clearance but not the regulatory pathway (510(k) versus de novo), the submission date, or the clinical study size supporting it.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979, and #20981; what has not been said is the deal consideration and valuation, how much of the price was allocated to goodwill versus identifiable assets, and what strategic rationale justified pivoting away from the AppyScore diagnostic program that the company had been funding through repeated stock incentive plan expansions and offerings (claims #21011, #21040, #21048).
What we aren't being told
2026-10-05The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 that it acquired the antigen business of Vitro Diagnostics, cited as claim #21108 and restated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration (cash, stock, or assumed liabilities), and whether any officer or director of the company had an ownership interest in Vitro Diagnostics. Without that, a reader cannot tell whether this was an arm's-length deal.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it sells more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is how the Merial deal pays out: any upfront fee, milestones, royalty or margin split, term, or minimum purchase commitments. It is also unclear whether any single unnamed diagnostic customer accounts for a material share of product revenue.
The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 that Douglas I. Hepler received options on 100,000 shares, cited as claim #21107, and that Jeffrey G. McGonegal was appointed CFO, cited as claims #21106, #21104 and #21084. What has not been said is the exercise price, vesting schedule and expiry of the Hepler grant, or the salary, bonus and equity terms of McGonegal's appointment. The CFO appointment is also reported again in the 2005 filing without explaining whether the role or its terms changed in between.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst, cited as claim #21099, and on 2005-09-25 that his employment was terminated, cited as claim #21087. On 2012-10-14 it disclosed that four directors resigned together on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051. What has not been said is why Hurst left, what severance or non-compete terms applied, and whether the four directors left over a disagreement with management or the board. A simultaneous resignation of that size would normally prompt such a disclosure.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 that the board was authorized to effect a reverse stock split between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out, at what ratio, and on what date. The same applies to the 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048, whose size, price and net proceeds are missing.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore, cited as claims #21047 and #21050, and on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 that it acquired BiOptix Diagnostics and renamed itself from Venaxis to Bioptix, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is how the AppyScore submission turned out, what was paid for BiOptix and in what form, and whether the acquisition marked a strategic shift away from AppyScore. The claims on record end in 2017 and contain nothing on the company's later business as Riot, so no gaps can be drawn for that period from this data.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-03The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. It also disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and that his employment was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase consideration, how it was split between cash, stock and assumed liabilities, and whether Hurst or other insiders had an ownership interest in the seller. Was this a related-party transaction, and was anything owed or forfeited when Hurst left?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claims #21094 and #21095. What has not been said is the economics and term of the Merial deal: royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, territory and termination rights. The three universities are not named, and the royalty obligations owed to them are not stated.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is who the largest customers are, or what share of revenue the top one or two account for. For a small antigen supplier, customer concentration is the first question an analyst would ask.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that StayBred requires FDA approval or an ANDA filing, and on 2012-10-14 that it is pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore, cited as claims #21101 and #21050. What has not been said is the specific pathway for AppyScore (510(k), de novo or PMA), the filing date, the expected decision date, or whether any StayBred submission was ever made. Neither product has a disclosed regulatory timeline.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, alongside a common stock offering and an exclusive animal-health IP license, cited as claims #21051, #21048 and #21049. What has not been said is why four directors left at once, and whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management. The licensee or licensor of the animal-health IP is not named, and the offering's size and price are not given.
The company disclosed board authority for a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. It also disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change on 2016-10-06, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is whether the split was effected and at what ratio, or the BiOptix purchase price, form of consideration and post-closing ownership. Against repeated incentive-plan increases of 3.5 million, 1.5 million, 700,000, 425,000 and 1.8 million shares (claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #20710, #21041, #21011), cumulative dilution to existing holders is also left unstated.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-03The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is the economics of either arrangement: the term, territory, minimum purchase or milestone obligations under the Merial deal, which universities are the licensors, and what royalty rates or sublicense fees flow back to them.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108 and #21081). What has not been said is the purchase consideration, how much revenue the acquired business contributed to the 30-plus products marketed to diagnostic manufacturers (claim #21102), and whether any officer, director or employee had a prior relationship with Vitro that would make this a related-party transaction.
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099), then disclosed on 2005-09-25 that Roger D. Hurst's employment had been terminated (claim #21087). What has not been said is why the agreement ended roughly a year after it was highlighted, whether severance or other termination payments were made, and whether any restrictive covenants or IP assignments survived.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that described a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is whether any resigning director cited a disagreement with management, the size and pricing of the offering, and who the animal health licensee is and on what upfront, milestone and royalty terms.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721 and #20715), and repeatedly expanded its stock incentive plan by 700,000 shares in 2010-2011, 425,000 in 2013 and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claims #20714, #20710, #21041 and #21011). What has not been said is whether the split was executed and at what ratio, and therefore what the cumulative overhang from these plan increases represents as a percentage of shares outstanding on a split-adjusted basis.
The company disclosed it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore on 2012-10-14 (claim #21050) and then the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition with a name change on 2016-10-06 (claims #20980, #20979 and #20981). What has not been said is the regulatory outcome for AppyScore, including submission type, timing and any FDA response, or the consideration paid for BiOptix and its strategic rationale. The record also breaks off at a 2017-04-27 financing entry (claim #20905) with no detail, so nothing on file covers the company's later transition into its current business.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-03The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it sells more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is what Merial pays: the royalty or margin split, any minimum purchase commitments, and the term and termination triggers. The record also never says whether any single customer accounts for a material share of that product revenue.
The antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics was disclosed on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081), but no purchase price, form of consideration, or assumed liabilities appear anywhere. A reader would also want to know whether any officer or director had a prior relationship with Vitro Diagnostics. The 2004-09-13 license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095) are similarly unnamed, with no royalty rates or milestone obligations.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Roger Hurst signed an exclusive employment agreement (claim #21099). It then disclosed on 2005-09-25 that the employment was terminated (claim #21087), the same filing that named Richard G. Donnelly President and CEO (claim #21082). What has not been said is why the termination happened, whether it was for cause, and what severance or equity acceleration was paid. Nor has the company said whether Hurst kept a shareholding large enough to matter for control.
On 2012-10-14 the company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), alongside a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and FDA pursuit for AppyScore (claim #21050). What has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, as an 8-K Item 5.02 would require. The record is also silent on the offering's size, price, and use of proceeds.
The board was authorized to effect a reverse split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011, disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 (claims #20721, #20715). Both claims are now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether a split was ever executed before the deadline, and at what ratio. Separately, Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO (claim #20711) comes with no disclosed salary, bonus, or option grant, and the record carries a 2010-03-24 date that predates the filing.
The BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis to Bioptix were disclosed on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 (claims #20980, #20981, #20979), with no consideration, valuation, or share count issued. More broadly, the record stops at a truncated 2017-04-27 financing entry (claim #20905). Nothing on file explains the strategic pivot from diagnostics to the business now traded as RIOT, or what happened to the legacy AppyScore and animal-health assets.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-03The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it sells over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is what the Merial deal is worth: upfront or milestone payments, minimum purchase commitments, term, and territory. Nor has the company named its largest diagnostic customers or said how concentrated that revenue is.
The company disclosed licenses with three universities on 2004-09-13 (claim #21095) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 (claim #21049). What has not been said is who the three universities are, what royalties or milestones the company owes them, who the 2012 licensee is, and what consideration the company received for giving up exclusivity.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081), alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, whether Hurst or other insiders had any interest in the seller, and what severance or other terms applied to his termination.
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same year it began a common stock offering (claim #21048). What has not been said is who those directors were, whether any of them resigned over a disagreement with management, and the size, price and dilution of the 2012 offering.
The company disclosed board authority for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011, on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 (claims #20721, #20715). Both claims carry a delayed status. What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out, at what ratio, and if not, why the board let the authority lapse.
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 (claims #20980, #20981, #20979). It also disclosed repeated increases to the stock incentive plan reserve, including 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 shares in 2010 to 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011), plus a 100,000-share option grant to Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is the price paid for BiOptix and how it was valued, and who received grants under each plan increase and at what strike prices and vesting terms. The company also has not said what the cumulative dilution from these plan increases has been.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-02The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside the product itself (claim #21096). What has not been said is the economics of that exclusivity: the term, territory, royalty or transfer-price structure, any minimum purchase commitments, and what happens to the rights if Merial underperforms.
The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 that it acquired an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claims #21108, #21081), and separately disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) followed by his termination (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, whether any officer or director had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics that would make this a related-party transaction, and what severance or continuing obligations attached to Hurst's departure.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102) and holds license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is which customers account for the bulk of that revenue and whether any single customer is material, nor which universities are licensors and what royalty rates or milestone payments the company owes them.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715), and the record now carries both as delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and if it lapsed unused, why the board sought the authority in the first place.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that described a common stock offering (claim #21048) and the pursuit of FDA clearance for AppyScore (claims #21047, #21050). What has not been said is why four directors left on a single day, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and what regulatory pathway, submission date, and clearance timeline the company was actually working against for AppyScore.
The company disclosed on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a corresponding name change (claims #20980, #20979, #20981), after a long run of stock incentive plan increases including 3,500,000 shares in 2005, 1,500,000 in 2009, 700,000 in 2010 and 2011, 425,000 in 2013, and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #20710, #21041, #21011). What has not been said is the consideration paid for BiOptix and how it was valued, and how much of the cumulative plan reserve was granted to named executives such as Stephen T. Lundy (claim #20711) versus the broader workforce.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-02The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (#21099) that was terminated by 2005-09-25 (#21087). What has not been said is the purchase consideration, whether any seller-side party was related to company insiders, and what severance or continuing obligations, if any, accompanied the Hurst termination.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (#21094), that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (#21102), and that it holds license arrangements with three universities (#21095). What has not been said is any revenue, minimum-purchase or royalty figure under the Merial agreement, the share of sales from the largest diagnostic customers, or which three universities license the technology and on what royalty terms.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, and both are now tracked as delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio and on what date, or why the authorization was allowed to lapse if it was not used.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (#21051), in the same filing that announced a common stock offering (#21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (#21049). What has not been said is why four directors left at once, who the animal health licensee is, and what upfront payment, royalty rate or milestones the license carries.
The company disclosed the AppyScore blood test for appendicitis and its pursuit of FDA clearance on 2012-10-14, cited as claims #21047 and #21050, and then the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 (#20980, #20979, #20981). What has not been said is the outcome of the FDA submission, whether AppyScore was abandoned before the pivot, and the consideration, valuation and dilution attached to the BiOptix deal.
The company disclosed repeated increases to its stock incentive plan, including 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (#21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (#20723), 700,000 in 2010 and 2011 (#20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (#21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (#21011), plus a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler in 2004 (#21107). What has not been said is the exercise price and vesting schedule of the Hepler grant, how much of each new reserve went to named executives such as CEOs Richard G. Donnelly (#21082) and Stephen T. Lundy (#20711), and what burn rate justified expanding the pool almost every year.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-01The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, and the same filings record an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) and its later termination (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, and whether the seller or its principals had any relationship with the company's management at the time. Investors would also want to know why the Hurst agreement was terminated and on what severance terms.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claims #21094 and #21096. It also said it sells more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement: royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, term, and territory. Nor has the company named any of its largest diagnostic customers or disclosed how concentrated its revenue was among them.
The company disclosed license arrangements with three universities on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21095, alongside a pipeline that includes StayBred, which requires FDA approval or an ANDA filing, cited as claims #21097 and #21101. What has not been said is which universities are involved, which products each license covers, and what royalty or milestone obligations apply. There is also no filing timeline or cost estimate for the StayBred regulatory pathway.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio, or why the deadline passed. This matters for interpreting the repeated Stock Incentive Plan reserve increases of 700,000 shares, cited as claims #20714, #20722 and #20710, and the 60,000,000-share authorized increase, cited as claim #21040.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced a 2012 common stock offering and the pursuit of FDA clearance for AppyScore, cited as claims #21048 and #21050. What has not been said is why four directors left at once, whether any of them disagreed with management, and the size and pricing of the offering. The company also gave no submission type or expected timing for AppyScore clearance.
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis to Bioptix in October 2016, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the purchase consideration, any earn-outs, or the acquired business's revenue and cash burn. Earlier, the company appointed Stephen T. Lundy as CEO, cited as claim #20711, and granted Douglas I. Hepler 100,000 stock options, cited as claim #21107, without disclosing the CEO's compensation package or the strike price and vesting schedule of the Hepler grant.
What we aren't being told
2026-10-01The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it sells over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is what Merial pays: are there royalty rates, minimum purchase commitments, milestone payments or a term and termination trigger for the exclusivity? Nor has the company named its largest diagnostic customers or said what share of revenue they represent.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. In the same 2004 filings it disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst, cited as claim #21099, and on 2005-09-25 it disclosed that his employment had been terminated, cited as claim #21087. What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, or whether any insider had a relationship with Vitro. Why was Hurst terminated barely a year after signing an exclusive agreement, and what severance or continuing obligations followed?
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051. In the same filing it disclosed a 2012 common stock offering and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property, cited as claims #21048 and #21049. What has not been said is why a near-majority of the board left on a single day, and whether any of them expressed disagreement with management. Who is the animal health licensee, and what upfront, royalty and milestone terms did the company accept for assets it had spent eight years developing? The same filing says the company is pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore, cited as claim #21050, but gives no regulatory pathway, submission date or clinical trial size.
The board authorized a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, disclosed on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 and cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both now tracked as delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio and on what date. If it was not executed, why did the board let the authorization lapse?
The company has repeatedly enlarged its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010 and again in 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011). Separately, director Douglas Hepler received 100,000 options in 2004, cited as claim #21107. What has not been said is the annual burn rate, how much of each increase went to named executive officers versus directors, and the cumulative dilution from these grants. The record also gives no strike price or vesting terms for the Hepler grant.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the consideration paid, the valuation basis, and whether any BiOptix holders were existing Venaxis insiders. What strategic rationale or revenue contribution justified the deal? The claim record ends in April 2017 (claim #20905 is truncated), so none of these gaps can be checked against later disclosures.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-30The company disclosed on 2004-03-23 the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics (claim #21108, restated 2005-09-25 as claim #21081), and on 2004-09-13 an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099), whose employment was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, whether Vitro Diagnostics or Hurst was a related party to the transaction, and why Hurst's exclusive agreement ended within about a year, including what severance or non-compete terms applied.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), that it has license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095), and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal (royalty rate, minimum purchase commitments, term, and termination rights), which three universities are the licensors and what royalties the company owes them, and how concentrated the antigen revenue is among its largest diagnostic customers.
The company disclosed on 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21 a board authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721 and #20715), both now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio and on what date, or, if it lapsed, why the board let the authorization expire. Relatedly, Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO and President (claim #20711) carries a promised-by date of 2010-03-24, earlier than the 2010-10-21 disclosure, and no compensation terms, sign-on equity, or severance arrangements are on record for him.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), alongside a common stock offering initiated in 2012 (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is why a majority-scale board departure happened on a single date, and whether any director cited a disagreement with management. The offering's size, price, and use of proceeds are also absent, as is the name of the animal health licensee and the upfront payment and royalty terms the company received for the assets it built through SurBred 15 and StayBred.
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010–2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011). It also disclosed a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas I. Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is the strike price and vesting terms of the Hepler grant, the annual burn rate and overhang each increase was meant to cover, and how much of each tranche went to named executive officers versus the broader employee base.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore appendicitis test (claim #21050), then on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 that it was acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics and renaming itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims #20980, #20979, #20981). What has not been said is the outcome of the AppyScore FDA submission and whether that program was abandoned before the pivot. The BiOptix acquisition's purchase price, consideration mix, and target's pre-deal revenue and cash burn are also absent. The record also ends with an incomplete 2017-04-27 regulatory claim (#20907), so nothing on file explains the company's subsequent transition to its current Riot identity.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-30The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23, cited as claim #21108 and repeated on 2005-09-25 as claim #21081; what has not been said is what was paid for it, in cash, stock, or earn-out, and whether any officer or director had a prior relationship with Vitro Diagnostics that would make this a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095) and sales of over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102); what has not been said is the economics of the Merial deal, including royalty rates, minimum purchase commitments, term and exclusivity carve-outs, which three universities are licensors, and whether any single customer accounts for a material share of revenue?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and then his termination on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087; what has not been said is why an employment agreement described as exclusive ended within roughly a year, whether severance or a separation agreement was paid, and whether Hurst retained any equity, royalty, or IP interest in the products he was tied to?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6 to be effected before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, both now marked delayed; what has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and if not, why the board let the authorization lapse after seeking shareholder approval?
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing as a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049); what has not been said is who the departing directors were and whether any disagreement was cited, how many shares were sold at what price in the offering, and who the licensee of the animal health IP is and on what upfront and royalty terms?
The company disclosed repeated expansions of its Stock Incentive Plan, including 3,500,000 shares in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 in 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041) and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011), plus 100,000 options to director Douglas I. Hepler in 2004 (claim #21107); what has not been said is the strike price and vesting on the Hepler grant, which executives received the bulk of the expanded pools, and what cumulative dilution these increases represent, particularly given that AppyScore FDA clearance (claim #21050) and the 2016 BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claims #20980, #20979) were disclosed without any stated purchase price or regulatory outcome?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-30The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is the economics of either: the term, territory, minimum purchase or milestone obligations, and royalty or revenue-share rates under the Merial deal, and which three universities license the IP and on what royalty terms.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081), and an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was later terminated (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the antigen business, whether any director, officer or employee, including Mr. Hurst, had an interest in Vitro Diagnostics that makes this a related-party transaction, and what severance or separation terms accompanied his termination.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is who the largest customers are, what share of revenue the top one or two account for, and whether any of them are under supply contracts or buy purchase-order to purchase-order.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing as a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049). What has not been said is why four directors left at once and whether any cited a disagreement with management, what the offering's size, price and underwriter were, and who the animal health licensee is and what it pays upfront, in milestones, or in royalties.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715), and repeatedly increased the Stock Incentive Plan reserve: 3,500,000 shares in 2005, 1,500,000 in 2009, 700,000 in 2010 and 2011, 425,000 in 2013, and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #20714, #20710, #21041, #21011). What has not been said is whether the split was actually effected and at what ratio, and, on a split-adjusted basis, how much cumulative dilution these reserve increases represent and which executives received the resulting grants, including the strike price and vesting of Douglas Hepler's 100,000 options (claim #21107).
The company disclosed on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims #20980, #20979, #20981). What has not been said is the consideration paid, whether in cash, stock or earnout, BiOptix's revenue and cash burn at closing, and whether any Venaxis insiders held a stake in the target.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-29The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. What has not been said is the consideration paid, whether in cash, stock or assumed liabilities, and whether any party on either side was related to insiders. This matters more because Roger Hurst signed an exclusive employment agreement (claim #21099) and was terminated about a year later (claim #21087), with no disclosed reason, severance or post-employment restrictions.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094. It also disclosed licenses with three universities (claim #21095) and sales of over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement: royalty rate, minimum purchase commitments, term and termination triggers. The record also does not name the three universities or identify any customer concentration within the 30-plus product line.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. Both are now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio and on what date, or why the authorization lapsed if it was not used.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, alongside a common stock offering initiated that year (claim #21048). What has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resigned over a disagreement with management, and whether the resignations were connected to the offering's terms, pricing or investors.
The company disclosed repeated increases to its Stock Incentive Plan reserve across claims #21088, #20723, #20722, #20714, #20710, #21041 and #21011, plus a 100,000-share option grant to director Douglas Hepler (claim #21107). What has not been said is how many of those shares went to named executives, including incoming CEO Stephen Lundy (claim #20711), or what the strike prices and vesting terms were. The record also gives no cumulative dilution figure for the plan expansions taken together.
The company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration or the valuation basis for the target. Separately, the record provided here ends mid-entry at claim #20909 (2017-04-27), so it contains nothing from the period in which the company became Riot. Any disclosures about that pivot fall outside this dataset.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-29The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095). What has not been said is the economics of either: the Merial agreement's term, minimum purchase or royalty commitments, and termination triggers, and which three universities license which pipeline products (claim #21098), on what royalty terms.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081). What has not been said is the purchase price, form of consideration, or revenue contributed by the acquired business. It is also unclear whether Roger Hurst, whose exclusive employment agreement was disclosed on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and whose employment was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087), had any relationship with Vitro. The record gives no reason for his termination and no severance terms.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), alongside a common stock offering initiated that year (claim #21048). What has not been said is who the four directors were, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, and the offering's size, price, and use of proceeds.
The board sought authority on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 for a reverse split of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715). Both claims now carry a delayed status. What has not been said is whether the split was executed, at what ratio, and if not, why the authority lapsed.
The company repeatedly expanded its Stock Incentive Plan: 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim #20723), 700,000 shares in 2010–2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041), and 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011). It also granted Douglas Hepler 100,000 options on appointment (claim #21107). What has not been said is the cumulative overhang as a share of outstanding stock, who received the grants, and the Hepler options' strike price and vesting schedule.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050). In 2016 it disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and a name change from Venaxis (claims #20980, #20979, #20981). What has not been said is the regulatory pathway and outcome for AppyScore, and the consideration paid for BiOptix, including shares issued and the target's assets or revenue at closing.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-29The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), and that it markets more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is the economics of the Merial arrangement: its royalty or margin split, minimum purchase commitments, term, and termination rights. The company also has not named any of the diagnostic-manufacturer customers or said what share of revenue the largest of them represents.
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25 (claims #21108, #21081). It also disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099) and his termination on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087). What has not been said is the purchase price and form of consideration for the Vitro assets, the reason for Hurst's departure barely a year into an exclusive agreement, and whether any severance or post-termination payments were made.
The company disclosed license arrangements with three universities on 2004-09-13 (claim #21095) and an exclusive license for animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 (claim #21049). What has not been said is which universities and which licensor are involved, along with the upfront, milestone and royalty obligations attached to each. Without those terms, the pipeline claims (claim #21098) cannot be valued.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same filing that referenced a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048) and ongoing FDA clearance efforts for AppyScore (claim #21050). What has not been said is why nearly half the board left at once, whether any director cited a disagreement with management, and the size, price and use of proceeds of the 2012 offering.
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20715, #20721); both claims are now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever effected, at what ratio, and on what date. That matters for reconciling every share count disclosed afterward. Separately, Stephen T. Lundy's CEO appointment was disclosed on 2010-10-21 with a promised-by date of 2010-03-24 (claim #20711), and the record does not explain that seven-month mismatch.
The company repeatedly expanded its stock incentive plan: - 3,500,000 units in 2005 (claim #21088) - 1,500,000 shares in 2009 (claim #20723) - 700,000 shares cited in 2010 and again in 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710) - 425,000 shares in 2013 (claim #21041) - 1,800,000 shares in 2014 (claim #21011)
What has not been said is whether the 700,000-share increases are one authorization or two, the cumulative dilution relative to shares outstanding, and who received the grants. Finally, the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis in October 2016 (claims #20980, #20979, #20981) came with no disclosed purchase price, share consideration or rationale for the change in strategy.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-29The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094), alongside the product itself (claim #21096). What has not been said is the economics of that exclusivity: what royalty or transfer-price structure, minimum purchase commitments, territory, and term govern the Merial deal, and what happens to exclusivity if Merial fails to hit volume thresholds?
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that it holds license arrangements with three universities (claim #21095) and markets over 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is who any of these counterparties are. Which three universities license IP to the company, what royalty and milestone obligations attach to those licenses, and do any single customers account for a material share of the 30-plus-product revenue base?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13 (claim #21099), then disclosed his termination on 2005-09-25 (claim #21087), in the same filing that restated the antigen business acquisition from Vitro Diagnostics (claims #21081, #21108). What has not been said is why the relationship ended within about a year, what severance or continuing obligations were paid, and whether Hurst had any ownership or related-party interest in Vitro Diagnostics that bears on the acquisition price, which itself was never quantified in these claims.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051), in the same period it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore (claims #21047, #21050) and running a common stock offering (claim #21048). What has not been said is whether the simultaneous departure of four directors involved any disagreement with management over the offering, the AppyScore regulatory strategy, or disclosure. The filing also does not give a submission pathway, filing date, or expected clearance timeline for AppyScore.
The company disclosed board authorization on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims #20721, #20715). Both claims are now tracked as delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever executed, at what ratio, and if it lapsed, why the board let the authorization expire. This matters because the record shows repeated stock plan reserve increases (claims #20723, #20722, #20710, #21041, #21011) with no disclosed cumulative dilution figure.
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the rename from Venaxis to Bioptix on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 (claims #20980, #20981, #20979). What has not been said is the consideration paid, whether in cash or shares, what share count was issued, and what BiOptix's revenue or asset base was at closing. The record on file also ends at 2017-04-27 (claim #20909) with no claims covering the subsequent rename to Riot or the pivot away from diagnostics. What operating assets from AppyScore and BiOptix were written off or sold, and on what terms?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-28The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15, cited as claim #21094, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities, cited as claim #21102. What has not been said is what the Merial arrangement is worth: its term, royalty or transfer-pricing structure, minimum purchase commitments, and whether Merial or any other customer accounts for a material share of revenue. What economics does Merial's exclusivity actually carry?
The company disclosed the acquisition of the antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081. What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, any earn-out or assumed liabilities, and whether any director, officer or founder had a relationship with Vitro Diagnostics. Was this an arm's-length transaction, and what was paid?
The company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst on 2004-09-13, cited as claim #21099, and then his termination on 2005-09-25, cited as claim #21087, alongside Douglas I. Hepler's 100,000-share option grant, cited as claim #21107. What has not been said is the reason for Hurst's departure and any severance or non-compete terms, or the strike price, vesting schedule and expiry of Hepler's options. What did these personnel changes cost shareholders?
The company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that references a 2012 common stock offering, cited as claim #21048. What has not been said is whether any departing director cited a disagreement with management, and what the offering's size, price and use of proceeds were. Why did a majority-scale board exit coincide with a capital raise?
The company disclosed board authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715. It also disclosed Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO with an effective date of 2010-03-24, seven months before the 2010-10-21 filing, cited as claim #20711. What has not been said is whether the split was executed and at what ratio, or why the CEO appointment was reported so long after it took effect. Did the split happen, and when did Lundy actually assume the role?
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the Venaxis-to-Bioptix name change in October 2016, cited as claims #20980, #20979 and #20981, with the two acquisition records dated ten days apart. What has not been said is the purchase price, the consideration mix, any assumed debt, or the closing date. Separately, the record provided ends mid-entry at claim #20904 in April 2017 and contains nothing on the later pivot to the Riot name and bitcoin mining. What did Bioptix pay, and what happened after April 2017?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-28On 2004-09-13 the company disclosed that Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim #21094) and that it sold more than 30 products to diagnostic test manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102). What has not been said is what the Merial arrangement is worth: are there minimum purchase commitments, royalty or margin terms, a termination date, or performance triggers? The company also has not said which of its research-product customers account for a material share of revenue, or how concentrated that revenue is.
On 2004-09-13 the company disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099), and on 2005-09-25 it disclosed that his employment was terminated (claim #21087). In the same filing Richard G. Donnelly was named President and CEO (claim #21082). What has not been said is why the termination came so soon after an exclusive agreement, what severance or equity acceleration was paid, and whether Hurst kept any rights to the pipeline and university-licensed IP (claims #21095 and #21098).
On 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 the company disclosed board authorization for a reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be done before 2011-02-04 (claims #20721 and #20715). Both claims now show as delayed. What has not been said is whether the split was ever carried out, what ratio was chosen, and, if the authority lapsed, why management let it expire.
On 2010-10-11 the company disclosed that Daryl Faulkner stepped down as Executive Chairman, and that the Vice Chairman office and the Lead Director designation were both eliminated (claims #20717, #20718 and #20719). Around the same time Stephen T. Lundy was appointed CEO (claim #20711), and that claim carries a promised-by date of 2010-03-24, which is earlier than the disclosure itself. What has not been said is what Faulkner received on his exit, what Lundy's pay package and inducement grants were, and why that date sits seven months before the filing. The same compensation gap applies to the 100,000 options granted to Douglas I. Hepler (claim #21107), which were disclosed without a strike price or vesting schedule.
On 2012-10-14 the company disclosed that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim #21051). The same filing mentioned a 2012 common stock offering (claim #21048), plans to seek FDA clearance for AppyScore (claim #21050), and an exclusive license of its animal health IP to a counterparty it did not name (claim #21049). What has not been said is why a board majority resigned on a single day and whether any director sent a letter of disagreement. The company also has not given the size and price of the offering, the filing pathway and timeline for AppyScore, or the licensee's identity and the upfront and royalty terms of the animal health license.
On 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16 the company disclosed the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims #20980, #20979 and #20981). What has not been said is the purchase price, the mix of consideration, the dilution to existing holders, whether any insider had a prior relationship with BiOptix, and how the deal fit a strategy that later turned into the current Riot business. Note also that the claim record provided cuts off at claim #20906 (2017-04-27), so any gaps after that date could not be assessed.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-27The company disclosed the acquisition of an antigen business from Vitro Diagnostics on 2004-03-23 and again on 2005-09-25, cited as claims #21108 and #21081, alongside an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim #21099) that was terminated by 2005-09-25 (claim #21087); what has not been said is what consideration was paid for the antigen business, whether any related-party relationship existed between Vitro Diagnostics and company insiders, and what severance or continuing obligations attached to the Hurst termination.
The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that Merial holds exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 and that it has license arrangements with three universities, cited as claims #21094 and #21095, and that it markets over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim #21102); what has not been said is which universities are the licensors, what royalty, milestone or minimum-purchase terms govern the Merial arrangement, and whether any single customer accounts for a material share of product revenue.
The company disclosed on 2012-10-14 that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012, cited as claim #21051, in the same filing that announced an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim #21049) and a common stock offering (claim #21048); what has not been said is why the four directors left, whether any resignation involved a disagreement with management, who the animal health licensee is and on what economics, and how much the 2012 offering raised at what price.
The company disclosed board authorization on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 by February 4, 2011, cited as claims #20721 and #20715, and Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO with a date of 2010-03-24 that precedes the filing (claim #20711); what has not been said is whether the split was actually effected and at what ratio, and when the Lundy appointment actually took effect and on what compensation terms.
The company disclosed repeated equity plan expansions, including 3,500,000 shares on 2005-09-25 (claim #21088), 1,500,000 on 2009-10-15 (claim #20723), 700,000 in both 2010 and 2011 (claims #20722, #20714, #20710), 425,000 in 2013 (claim #21041), 1,800,000 in 2014 (claim #21011) and a new 895,000-share plan in 2017 (claim #20909); what has not been said is how many of those shares were granted, to which named executives, and what cumulative dilution the plans represent against shares outstanding at each date.
The company disclosed the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and the name change from Venaxis to Bioptix in October 2016, cited as claims #20980 and #20979, followed by a private placement of convertible notes, warrants and preferred stock closed March 16, 2017 (claim #20904) whose recorded figure of 4750 carries no stated unit; what has not been said is the purchase price paid for BiOptix, whether the 4750 figure refers to thousands of dollars, shares or units, and what conversion prices, warrant strikes and investor identities attach to that placement.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-27The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a lease for a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City data center, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, sized for 12 MW at full deployment (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is where the site is, who the landlord is, and what the lease term and rent are. Who supplies the 12 MW, under what tariff or power purchase agreement, and is that capacity already energized at the substation or still pending an interconnection upgrade?
On 2018-06-28 the company reported 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520, #15543), against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s (claims #15506, #15537, #15551, #15508, #15539, #15552). Claim #15543 carries a delayed status. What has not been said is when full deployment is expected, and what caused the slippage. How much of the 13.5 TH/s-per-unit specification (claim #15550) is actually being realized in fleet hash rate today?
The company disclosed the purchase of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claims #15518, #15503, #15541) and the Kairos Global Technology acquisition bringing 1,200 miners (claims #15517, #15502, #15540). What has not been said is who sold the 6,800 miners and at what price per unit. What consideration was paid for Kairos, in cash or stock, and are any of the sellers related to officers, directors or significant holders?
The company disclosed a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp with CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida registrations (claims #15509, #15544, #15510, #15511). Claim #15544 was marked delayed against a 2018-03-27 target. What has not been said is who the sellers were and why the closing slipped. Did the licenses transfer cleanly, and when will the exchange offerings in claim #15516 generate reportable revenue?
The company disclosed a 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15545), a 52 percent stake in Tess Inc. (claims #15524, #15547), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim #15513, #15546). What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of each position, and the note's interest rate, maturity and conversion price. Has any of these holdings been impaired, and does majority control of Tess mean it is consolidated with its losses?
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer change effective 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), a 2018 director slate (claim #15554), regained Nasdaq compliance (claim #15553), and MNP LLP as 2018 auditor, a claim marked delayed (claim #15555). Separately it disclosed repeated stock-plan expansions of 1,500,000 and 700,000 shares (claims #20723, #20722, #20714, #20710) and a reverse-split authorization of up to 1-for-6 (claims #20721, #20715). What has not been said is the new CEO's compensation package and equity grants, and which listing deficiency was cured. Why was the auditor appointment delayed, and was the reverse split ever executed, and at what ratio?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-27The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520, #15543), against a full deployment of 8,000 miners (claims #15506, #15551) producing about 110 PH/s (claims #15508, #15527, #15539). What has not been said is the date full deployment was actually reached, if it was. The per-unit hardware spec is also given two ways, 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530 and 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550, so which figure underpins the 110 PH/s target?
The company disclosed a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center lease on 2018-06-28 (claims #15504, #15519, #15533, #15542) and a 12 MW power capacity for the site (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is the landlord, the street address, the lease term, the rent, or who supplies the 12 MW. Is that power under a firm contract with a named utility at a disclosed price per kWh, or is it simply the site's nameplate capacity?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired Kairos Global Technology with 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15531, #15540) and another 6,800 miners in February 2018 (claims #15503, #15518, #15532, #15541). What has not been said is the consideration paid in either transaction, the seller of the 6,800 units, or whether any Riot officer, director, or major holder had an interest in Kairos or in that seller. Given that these purchases make up the whole mining fleet, why are the counterparty and related-party context absent?
The company disclosed a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), tracked as delayed against a 2018-03-27 target (claim #15544). It also cited that entity's CFTC/NFA, FinCEN, and Florida money transmitter status (claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529, #15535, #15536, #15548, #15549). What has not been said is the actual closing date, whether those registrations survived the change of control without new regulatory approval, and what revenue, if any, the exchange offerings in claim #15516 have produced.
The company disclosed a 12.9% Coinsquare stake (claims #15512, #15522, #15545), a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims #15513, #15523, #15546), and 52% ownership of Tess Inc (claims #15514, #15524, #15547), followed by a completed Tess acquisition on 2018-07-09 (claim #15472). What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of the Coinsquare position, the Verady note's maturity, rate, and conversion terms, and what was paid to take Tess from 52% to full ownership.
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer personnel item dated 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor, tracked as delayed (claim #15555), and a regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553). What has not been said is the nature of the Nasdaq deficiency that was cured, why the auditor item is flagged as delayed, and the incoming CEO's compensation package and any relationships with the counterparties above.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-27The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (claims #15505, #15506, #15551), and the 3,500-unit milestone is tracked as delayed (claim #15543). What has not been said is the dated schedule for installing the remaining 4,500 machines, or what caused the shortfall against the March 31 target.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 an acquisition of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claims #15503, #15518, #15532, #15541) alongside the Kairos Global Technology acquisition of 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15531). What has not been said is who sold the 6,800 machines, what Riot paid for either tranche, and how the Kairos consideration was structured. Nor has the company said whether any Kairos principals had a prior relationship with Riot directors, officers or significant shareholders, which is exactly the related-party context a proxy reader would look for.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a per-machine specification of 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and, in the same filing set, 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550), both feeding a 110 PH/s full-deployment target (claims #15508, #15527, #15539, #15552). What has not been said is which figure is correct: 8,000 units at 13.5 TH/s yields about 108 PH/s rather than 110. The company also has not said what hash rate was actually achieved with 3,500 units online.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City facility lease (claims #15504, #15519, #15533, #15542) and 12 MW of power capacity at full deployment (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is the lessor, lease term, rent, and street address of the site. The filings also omit the utility supplying the 12 MW, the contracted price per kWh, and whether that capacity is firm or interruptible, all of which drive the unit economics of the mining operation.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp with its CFTC/NFA registrations and FinCEN/Florida licensing (claims #15509, #15510, #15511, #15521), and that acquisition is tracked as delayed against a 2018-03-27 date (claim #15544). What has not been said is the actual closing date, who the sellers were, and when the exchange offerings described in claim #15516 would launch and generate revenue.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15545), 52% ownership of Tess Inc (claims #15514, #15547), and a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims #15513, #15546). On 2018-07-09 it described Tess as a completed acquisition (claim #15472). What has not been said is the cost basis and carrying value of the Coinsquare and Tess positions, the interest rate, maturity and conversion terms of the Verady note, and how a 52% holding reconciles with a completed acquisition. Separately, the MNP LLP auditor appointment is tracked as delayed (claim #15555) and the CEO personnel item (claim #16647) names no individual. That leaves open who held the role and on what compensation terms.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-27The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired Kairos Global Technology with 1,200 miners (claims #15531, #15540, #15502, #15517) and another 6,800 miners in February 2018 (claims #15532, #15541, #15503, #15518). What has not been said is the consideration paid for either purchase, who sold the 6,800-unit batch, and whether any seller had a prior relationship with Riot's officers or directors. Were these arm's-length purchases, and what was the per-unit cost?
The company guided on 2018-06-28 to 110 PH/s from roughly 8,000 miners drawing 12 MW (claims #15527, #15552, #15539, #15508, #15506, #15551, #15526, #15538, #15507). It also cited per-unit hardware performance of both 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) in the same filing. Which figure is correct? At 13.5 TH/s the fleet reaches only about 108 PH/s. And who supplies the 12 MW, at what contracted rate and term?
The company disclosed a 107,000-square-foot data center lease in Oklahoma City (claims #15533, #15542, #15504, #15519, #15469). What has not been said is the street address, the landlord, the lease term and rent, and whether that landlord is related to any insider. Was the power service to the site contracted separately from the lease?
The company reported 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520), and claim #15543 is marked delayed against that date. The company also said it may establish mining operations elsewhere (claim #15474). What has not been said is a target date for reaching the full 8,000-unit deployment, or what caused the shortfall. How many miners were operating at the end of the second quarter?
The company disclosed a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15521, #15534, #15509), and claim #15544 is marked delayed against a 2018-03-27 date. It also cited Logical Brokerage's CFTC/NFA registrations and its FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (claims #15535, #15536, #15548, #15529, #15510, #15511). What has not been said is who sold the business, whether regulators approved the change of control, and what revenue the exchange offerings (claim #15516) have generated since closing.
The company disclosed a 52% stake in Tess Inc. (claims #15547, #15514, #15524), then announced a completed Tess acquisition on 2018-07-09 (claim #15472). It also disclosed a 12.9% Coinsquare stake (claims #15545, #15522, #15512, #15473) and a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims #15546, #15513, #15523). What has not been said is what was paid for the remaining Tess interest, the carrying value of the Coinsquare holding and whether it has been diluted, and the Verady note's maturity and conversion terms. Separately, MNP LLP's appointment as auditor is marked delayed (claim #15555), and the company says it regained Nasdaq compliance (claim #15553) without naming the original deficiency. Why was the auditor engagement delayed, and which listing rule had the company breached?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-27The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it bought 1,200 miners through the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, cited as claims #15540, #15531, #15517 and #15502, and a further 6,800 miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15541, #15532, #15518 and #15503. It has not said what it paid for either tranche, whether the consideration was cash or stock, who sold the 6,800 miners, or whether any of Kairos's principals had a prior relationship with Riot's directors or officers. Without that, how can a reader judge cost per terahash or rule out a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, cited as claims #15505, #15520 and #15543, against a full deployment of 8,000 miners, cited as claims #15506, #15537 and #15551. It has not given a date for full deployment, and claim #15543 already carries a delayed status. Per-unit hardware performance is also given as both 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530). Which figure underlies the 110 PH/s target in claims #15508, #15527, #15539 and #15552, and by what quarter was that hash rate expected to be reached?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City facility lease, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, with 12 MW of power, cited as claims #15507, #15526 and #15538. It has not given the site address, landlord, lease term or rent, or the utility supplying the power, the contracted $/kWh rate and the contract length. The 12 MW is also described inconsistently: claim #15538 calls it supply capacity, while claim #15507 calls it full-deployment consumption. Is 12 MW the interconnection ceiling, or the expected draw, leaving no headroom for the expansion to other locations floated in claim #15474?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp, cited as claims #15509, #15521, #15534 and #15544, together with that entity's CFTC/NFA registrations and FinCEN/Florida money transmitter licensing, cited as claims #15510, #15511, #15528 and #15529. Claim #15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27, which precedes the disclosure, and a delayed status. It has not said when the deal actually closed, whether the licenses transferred intact on the change of control, or whether the U.S. exchange under investigation in claims #15470 and #15516 has a launch date or budget.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545), 52% ownership of Tess Inc (claims #15514, #15524, #15547), and a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims #15513, #15523, #15546). It has not given the cost basis and carrying value of the Coinsquare position, how Tess is consolidated and what minority interest and losses it brings, or the Verady note's interest rate, maturity and conversion terms. It has also not said what Digital Green Energy Corp (claims #15515, #15525) was formed to do.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-20 that it had regained Nasdaq listing compliance, cited as claim #15553, and on 2018-06-14 that MNP LLP was appointed auditor for 2018, cited as claim #15555, which now carries a delayed status. It has not said what deficiency caused the non-compliance, why the audit engagement slipped, or who the Chief Executive Officer referenced in claim #16647 of 2018-04-01 is and on what compensation terms. Given the year's acquisitions and minority investments, a reader would expect the proxy to address that CEO's pay and any related-party ties to the counterparties above.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-26The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that full deployment of 8,000 miners (claims #15506, #15537, #15551) would deliver about 110 PH/s (claims #15508, #15527, #15539, #15552), but only 3,500 miners were operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520, #15543). What has not been said is when the remaining 4,500 miners will be energized, and what hash rate is actually being achieved today. Is the 110 PH/s figure based on the 13.75 TH/s per-unit specification (claim #15530) or the 13.5 TH/s one (claim #15550), and which is correct?
The company disclosed a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City lease (claims #15504, #15519, #15533, #15542) with 12 MW of power at full deployment (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is who the landlord and utility are, how long the lease runs, what the rent is, and what the contracted all-in power price per kWh is. None of the claims give a street address, a substation, or any detail on whether the 12 MW is contracted firm capacity or merely an expected draw.
The company disclosed acquiring Kairos Global Technology with 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15531, #15540), a deal completed as of 2018-07-09 (claim #15471). It also disclosed buying 6,800 more miners in February 2018 (claims #15503, #15518, #15532, #15541). What has not been said is the price paid in either deal, whether it was cash or stock, who sold the 6,800 miners, and whether any seller or Kairos principal had a prior relationship with Riot's officers or directors.
The company disclosed the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), along with its CFTC/NFA registrations and its FinCEN/Florida licensing (claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529, #15535, #15536, #15548, #15549). However, claim #15544 carries a 2018-03-27 target date and is marked delayed. What has not been said is when the deal actually closed and what caused the slip. The company also has not given a timeline, a capital budget, or a regulatory path for the US crypto exchange it said on 2018-07-09 it was investigating (claim #15470).
The company disclosed a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545, #15473), 52% ownership of Tess Inc (claims #15514, #15524, #15547), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15513, #15523, #15546). What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of each holding, the note's conversion price and maturity, and whether Tess is consolidated along with any funding obligations to it.
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer personnel item dated 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), and on 2018-06-14 it disclosed director elections (claim #15554) and MNP LLP's appointment as auditor (claim #15555, marked delayed). The record does not name the CEO or give their compensation package. It also does not explain what deficiency triggered the Nasdaq non-compliance that the company said on 2018-06-20 it had cured (claim #15553).
What we aren't being told
2026-09-26The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a leased Oklahoma City data center of 107,000 square feet (claims #15504, #15519, #15533, #15542) and a full-deployment power draw of 12 MW (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is who the landlord is, what the lease term and rent are, which utility serves the site, and whether the 12 MW is contracted, at what price per kWh, and for how long. Is that 12 MW firm capacity or only a target?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 an expected 110 PH/s at full deployment of 8,000 miners (claims #15508, #15527, #15539, #15552, #15506, #15551), but only 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520), with the install milestone itself flagged as delayed (claim #15543). What has not been said is when the remaining 4,500 units will be energized. The per-unit specification also appears as both 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550), so which figure underlies the 110 PH/s guidance?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the acquisition of 6,800 miners in February 2018 (claims #15503, #15518, #15532, #15541) and of Kairos Global Technology with 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15531, #15540), completed per a 2018-07-09 filing (claim #15471). What has not been said is who sold the 6,800 miners, what Riot paid for either tranche, and whether the Kairos consideration was cash or stock. Did any Riot director, officer, or significant shareholder have an interest in Kairos or in the miner seller?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), one record of which carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and a delayed status (claim #15544). It also disclosed that Logical holds CFTC/NFA registration, FinCEN MSB registration, and a Florida money transmitter license (claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529, #15535, #15536, #15548, #15549), and on 2018-07-09 that it was investigating a US crypto exchange launch (claim #15470). What has not been said is how the $600,000 was paid, who the sellers were, and which additional state licenses, what timeline, and what capital an exchange launch would require beyond the single Florida license.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545), 52% ownership of Tess Inc (claims #15514, #15524, #15547), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15513, #15523, #15546). What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of each position. For the Verady note, what are the conversion price, maturity, and interest rate? For Tess, who holds the other 48%, and is it consolidated?
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer on 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), directors elected at the 2018 annual meeting on 2018-06-14 (claim #15554), MNP LLP appointed as auditor with a status recorded as delayed (claim #15555), and regained Nasdaq compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553). What has not been said is who the CEO and elected directors are, and what their compensation and any related-party ties to the Kairos, Logical, or Coinsquare transactions are. Which Nasdaq rule had the company fallen out of compliance with, and why was the auditor matter flagged as delayed?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-26The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that full deployment of its Oklahoma City operation would reach 8,000 miners and roughly 110 PH/s at 12 MW, cited as claims #15506, #15508, #15526 and #15552. What has not been said is which hardware model is being run and at what efficiency. The same filing gives per-unit performance as both 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550), which works out to about 110 PH/s or about 108 PH/s, and the 12 MW figure is never tied to a stated per-miner power draw or a hosting overhead.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, cited as claims #15505 and #15520, with claim #15543 flagged as delayed against that date. What has not been said is when the remaining 4,500 units would be energized, or what hash rate was actually achieved at quarter-end versus the 110 PH/s target. An analyst would ask for the monthly deployment schedule and whether any of the delay traces to power delivery or to hardware delivery.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 an executed lease on a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City facility with 12 MW of power supply, cited as claims #15519, #15533 and #15538. What has not been said is the landlord, the street address, the lease term and rent, the utility providing the 12 MW, and the contracted power price per kWh. For a mining operation, that last number is the single largest driver of unit economics.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the Kairos Global Technology acquisition bringing 1,200 miners and a separate February 2018 purchase of 6,800 additional miners, cited as claims #15502, #15518 and #15471. What has not been said is the consideration paid for Kairos, whether in cash or shares, or the identity of the vendor and the per-unit price for the 6,800-miner order. Nor has the company said whether any party to either transaction is related to company insiders.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp, cited as claims #15521 and #15509, with claim #15544 carrying a 2018-03-27 date marked delayed. The same filing notes it is investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch, cited as claim #15470 on 2018-07-09. What has not been said is who the sellers were, how the $600,000 was split between cash and stock, what caused the closing slip, and whether there is any timeline or capital budget for the exchange.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 52% stake in Tess Inc, a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC, cited as claims #15524, #15522 and #15523. What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of each position, the interest rate, maturity and conversion terms of the Verady note, or whether Tess is consolidated. Separately, a CEO change is recorded on 2018-04-01 (claim #16647) without the executive's name or compensation terms, and the MNP LLP auditor appointment (claim #15555) is marked delayed without explanation.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-25On 2018-06-28 the company disclosed a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center lease (claims #15542, #15519, #15533, #15504) and a 12 MW power supply at full deployment (claims #15538, #15507, #15526). It has not given a street address, the lease term or rent, the utility or power counterparty, the contracted $/kWh rate, or any interconnection or substation detail. Who supplies the 12 MW, at what price, and for how long?
The company reported 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520), a figure flagged as delayed against its own date (claim #15543). It also guided to 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s at full deployment (claims #15506, #15537, #15551, #15527, #15552, #15539, #15508). What has not been said is when full deployment will be reached, or what hash rate was actually being produced from the 3,500 units in service.
The per-unit hardware specification appears as both 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) in the same 2018-06-28 disclosure. 8,000 units at 13.75 TH/s gives exactly the 110 PH/s guidance, while 13.5 TH/s gives about 108 PH/s. Which specification is correct, and is the 110 PH/s target a nameplate figure or a realized one?
The company disclosed the Kairos Global Technology acquisition bringing 1,200 miners (claims #15540, #15531, #15517, #15502), completed per claim #15471, and a separate February 2018 purchase of 6,800 miners (claims #15518, #15541, #15532, #15503). The seller of the 6,800 units is not named. Neither the total consideration nor the per-miner cost for either transaction is stated. What was paid, to whom, and were any of the sellers related parties?
Riot disclosed a 52% ownership stake in Tess Inc. (claims #15514, #15524, #15547) and a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15545, #15512, #15522, #15473). It separately described the Tess deal as a completed acquisition (claim #15472). What has not been said is the consideration paid for either stake, their carrying values, or who holds the remaining 48% of Tess. The $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims #15523, #15546, #15513) similarly lacks a conversion price, maturity, and interest rate.
The $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition (claims #15521, #15534, #15509) carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 that is marked delayed (claim #15544), and the company says it is investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (claim #15470). Why did the closing slip, and what capital, timeline, and regulatory approvals beyond the existing CFTC/NFA and FinCEN/Florida registrations (claims #15510, #15511) would the exchange require? Separately, a CEO appointment is recorded (claim #16647) without a name or compensation terms, and the MNP LLP auditor engagement is flagged delayed (claim #15555), with no explanation given for the delay.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-25The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired Kairos Global Technology and its 1,200 miners, and reported the acquisition completed on 2018-07-09 (claims #15531, #15540, #15502, #15517, #15471). What has not been said is the purchase price, the form of consideration, or who owned Kairos before the deal. Were any Riot directors, officers or major shareholders on the selling side, and if so, how was the price reviewed and approved?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it bought 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claims #15541, #15532, #15503, #15518). What has not been said is who the vendor was, what the total and per-unit cost was, or the delivery schedule. The same filing also gives two different per-unit hash rates, 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530). Which figure is correct, and which one feeds the 110 PH/s estimate?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520, #15543, the last now tracked as delayed). It set that against full deployment of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims #15506, #15537, #15551, #15507, #15526, #15538, #15552, #15527, #15508, #15539). What has not been said is a target date for full deployment, what is holding it up, or how many miners were running at the end of the second quarter. Is the remaining gap of 4,500 units constrained by power, space, or cash?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it executed a lease for a 107,000-square-foot data center in Oklahoma City (claims #15542, #15504, #15519, #15533). It tied that site to 12 MW of power (claim #15538). What has not been said is the landlord, the physical address, the lease term and rent, or who supplies the 12 MW, on what contract and at what price per kWh. Can the site grow beyond 12 MW, given that the company has floated mining operations at other locations (claim #15474)?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it holds 12.9% of Coinsquare, 52% of Tess Inc. and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15545, #15522, #15512, #15547, #15524, #15514, #15546, #15523, #15513, #15472). What has not been said is what Riot paid for each stake, how each is valued on the balance sheet, and what governance rights it holds. For the Verady note, what are the conversion price, maturity and interest terms?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp and cited its CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter registrations (claims #15534, #15509, #15521, #15535, #15548, #15510, #15536, #15549, #15511, #15528, #15529). That is tied to a planned US cryptocurrency exchange (claim #15470). What has not been said is why the deal is tracked as missing its 2018-03-27 target (claim #15544), whether the change of control needs regulator approval before the licenses carry over, and when an exchange launch is expected. Separately, the company said it regained Nasdaq compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553) and named a new CEO (claim #16647), but has not said what the original deficiency was or who the CEO is and on what pay terms.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-24The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired Kairos Global Technology and its 1,200 miners, cited as claims #15531, #15540, #15502 and #15517, and said on 2018-07-09 that the deal had closed, cited as claim #15471. What has not been said is what Riot paid, whether in cash or shares, who the Kairos sellers were, and whether any of them had a prior relationship with Riot's insiders. What was the consideration, and was it a related-party transaction?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15532, #15503, #15518 and #15541. What has not been said is who sold them, what the per-unit or total price was, and whether the purchase was paid in cash, equity or on deferred terms. Who was the vendor, and what did the fleet cost?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, cited as claims #15505 and #15520, against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s, cited as claims #15506, #15551, #15508 and #15527. The related deployment claim #15543 is tracked as delayed. What has not been said is a target date for reaching full deployment. The per-unit hardware spec was given as both 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530), and at 8,000 units those two figures imply about 108 versus 110 PH/s. When will full deployment be reached, and which spec is correct?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center lease, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, with 12 MW of power capacity, cited as claims #15538, #15507 and #15526. What has not been said is the facility's street address, the landlord, the lease term and rent, the utility supplying the power, and the contracted price per kWh. What does power cost at this site, and how long is the site secured for?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15522, #15512 and #15545), a 52% stake in Tess Inc. (claims #15524, #15514 and #15547, with completion noted in claim #15472), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15523, #15513 and #15546). What has not been said is the cost basis or carrying value of the Coinsquare and Tess stakes, or the Verady note's interest rate, maturity and conversion terms. What did Riot pay for each position, and how is each currently valued?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp and its CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida registrations, cited as claims #15509, #15521 and #15534. One version of that claim, #15544, carried a March 27, 2018 date and is tracked as delayed. On 2018-07-09 the company also said it was investigating a U.S. cryptocurrency exchange launch, cited as claim #15470. What has not been said is whether and when the Logical Brokerage deal actually closed, and what capital and timeline the exchange would need. Separately, a CEO change was recorded on 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), and the MNP LLP auditor appointment is tracked as delayed (claim #15555). No compensation terms or explanation for either has been disclosed. When did the Logical Brokerage deal close, and what is the new CEO being paid?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-24The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it leased a 107,000 square foot data center in Oklahoma City, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, with a 12 MW power capacity at full deployment, cited as claims #15507, #15526 and #15538. What has not been said is who the landlord and utility are, the lease term and rent, the facility's street address, and the contracted power price per kWh. Without these, the economics of the 110 PH/s plan cannot be assessed.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15503, #15518, #15532 and #15541, and 1,200 miners through the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, cited as claims #15502, #15517, #15531 and #15540, completed per claim #15471 on 2018-07-09. What has not been said is who sold the 6,800 machines, what Riot paid for either tranche, and whether any Riot officers, directors or significant holders had an interest in Kairos or the equipment vendor.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that only 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, cited as claims #15505 and #15520, a milestone now carried as delayed in claim #15543, against an 8,000-miner full build, cited as claims #15506, #15537 and #15551. What has not been said is the date by which the remaining 4,500 units would be energized. The per-unit hashrate is also cited inconsistently: 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550 and 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530. At 13.5 TH/s, 8,000 units yield about 108 PH/s rather than the 110 PH/s guided in claims #15508, #15527, #15539 and #15552, so which hardware model and firmware assumption underlies the guidance?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp, cited as claims #15509, #15521 and #15534, which carries a 2018-03-27 target now marked delayed in claim #15544. It also cited the subsidiary's CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida registrations in claims #15510, #15511, #15528 and #15529, and on 2018-07-09 said it was investigating a US exchange launch in claim #15470. What has not been said is who the sellers were, when the deal actually closed, and what launch timeline, capital commitment and regulatory approvals the exchange plan requires.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare, cited as claims #15512, #15522 and #15545, a 52% stake in Tess Inc, cited as claims #15514, #15524 and #15547, completed per claim #15472, and a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note, cited as claims #15513, #15523 and #15546. What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of the Coinsquare and Tess positions, the consideration paid for Tess, and the Verady note's interest rate, conversion price and maturity.
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer appointment dated 2018-04-01, cited as claim #16647, and the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor on 2018-06-14, cited as claim #15555 and now marked delayed. What has not been said is who the CEO is and on what compensation terms, including any equity grants tied to the mining build-out or the Logical Brokerage and Tess transactions. Nor has the company said whether MNP completed the 2018 audit or was replaced, and for what reason.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-23The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it leased a 107,000-square-foot data center in Oklahoma City (claims #15504, #15519, #15533, #15542) sized for 12 MW at full deployment (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is who the landlord and power provider are, what the lease term and rent are, what the contracted electricity rate is, and whether the 12 MW is secured firm capacity at a named substation or just an estimate of the load 8,000 miners would draw.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the purchase of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claims #15503, #15518, #15532, #15541) alongside the Kairos Global Technology acquisition that brought 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15531, #15540). What has not been said is who sold the 6,800 units, what price was paid per unit, and how much consideration went to Kairos. Were any of the sellers or Kairos principals related to Riot insiders or directors?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520), a milestone now tracked as delayed (claim #15543). It also guided to 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s at full deployment (claims #15506, #15508, #15527, #15539, #15552), with per-unit performance cited inconsistently as 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530). What has not been said is the target date for installing the remaining 4,500 miners, the hash rate actually achieved at each quarter-end, and which per-unit figure the 110 PH/s guidance assumes.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), with its CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida licensing (claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529). One record ties the deal to a 2018-03-27 date and carries a delayed status (claim #15544). On 2018-07-09 the company said it was investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (claim #15470). What has not been said is the actual closing date, whether the existing licenses cover spot crypto exchange activity or further state money-transmitter licenses are needed, and what launch timeline and capital budget the exchange carries.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15513, #15523, #15546), and 52% ownership of Tess Inc. (claims #15514, #15524, #15547), with the Tess acquisition reported complete on 2018-07-09 (claim #15472). What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of the Coinsquare stake, the Verady note's maturity, interest rate and conversion terms, what Riot paid for control of Tess, and who holds the remaining 48%.
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer personnel event effective 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), and MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor is flagged as delayed (claim #15555). What has not been said is who the CEO is and what compensation and equity package was granted. Why is the auditor engagement milestone shown as delayed, and was there any disagreement or scope limitation behind it?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-23The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City data center lease (claims #15519, #15504, #15533, #15542) sized for 12 MW at full deployment (claims #15507, #15538). What has not been said is who the landlord and the electric utility are, the lease term and rent, the facility's street address, and the contracted power price or interconnection capacity. At 12 MW, the power rate drives mining margin, so why is the per-kWh cost absent?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the Kairos Global Technology acquisition bringing 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15531) and a separate February 2018 purchase of 6,800 miners (claims #15503, #15518, #15532). What has not been said is the consideration paid in either deal, the identity of the seller of the 6,800 units, and whether any Riot officer, director or major holder had an interest in Kairos or that seller. Without these, a reader cannot assess the per-miner cost basis or any related-party exposure.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520; #15543 is flagged delayed) against an 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s full-deployment target (claims #15506, #15508, #15527). What has not been said is a date for full deployment or a monthly installed-hash-rate trajectory. The per-unit spec is also cited as both 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550); which figure underlies the 110 PH/s guidance?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), with a 2018-03-27 target now marked delayed (claim #15544). It also cited CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter registrations (claims #15510, #15528, #15529) and later said it was investigating a US exchange launch (claim #15470). What has not been said is when the acquisition actually closed, why it slipped, and what capital, timeline and additional state licenses a US exchange would require.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claim #15512), 52% ownership of Tess Inc. (claim #15514) and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claim #15513). What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of the Coinsquare stake, what was paid for Tess and whether it is consolidated, and the Verady note's interest rate, maturity and conversion terms. How much of the balance sheet sits in these non-mining positions?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-14 the appointment of MNP LLP as its 2018 auditor (claim #15555, marked delayed) and on 2018-06-20 that it had regained Nasdaq listing compliance (claim #15553). What has not been said is why the prior auditor was replaced, whether there were any disagreements, and which Nasdaq deficiency triggered the non-compliance. The CEO appointment (claim #16647) also appears with no name or compensation terms on record; what were the employment and incentive terms?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-21The company disclosed an executed lease on a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, alongside a 12.0 MW power supply figure in claims #15538, #15507 and #15526; what has not been said is the street address, the landlord or counterparty, the lease term and annual rent, the utility providing the 12 MW, the executed interconnection or substation status, and the contracted power price per kWh. A 107,000 square foot shell drawing only 12 MW is roughly 112 watts per square foot, which is a fraction of what a purpose-built mining hall consumes — is the 12 MW the full interconnected capacity at the site, the first phase of a larger service agreement, or simply the load of the 8,000 miners the company intends to place there?
The company disclosed 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, cited as claims #15505, #15520 and #15543 (the last of which is carried as delayed against its 2018-03-31 date), while the Oklahoma City lease was only reported as executed in the same 2018-06-28 filing; what has not been said is where those 3,500 machines were physically running during the first quarter, who hosted them, and on what economics. If the 3,500 were at a third-party hosting site, what is the hosting rate, the contract term, and how many of them must be physically relocated to reach the 8,000-miner full deployment in claims #15506, #15537 and #15551?
The company disclosed a 110.0 PH/s hash rate at full deployment on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15508, #15527, #15539 and #15552, and two different per-unit specifications — 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530 and 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550; what has not been said is which miner model and manufacturer each figure refers to, whether the specs are nameplate or measured, and above all the date by which full deployment is expected, since none of the four hash rate claims carries a promised-by date. What is the month-by-month energization schedule from the 3,500 machines now running to 110 PH/s, and at 110 PH/s and the company's delivered power cost, what is the implied all-in cost to mine one bitcoin?
The company disclosed the Kairos Global Technology acquisition bringing 1,200 miners on 2018-06-28 and its completion on 2018-07-09, cited as claims #15502, #15517, #15531, #15540 and #15471, and separately a purchase of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15503, #15518, #15532 and #15541; what has not been said is the consideration paid for either — the Logical Brokerage price of $600,000 is disclosed four times in claims #15509, #15521, #15534 and #15544, yet no dollar or share figure attaches to Kairos or to the 6,800 units. Was Kairos paid for in RIOT stock, what was the share count and the price used to value it, were any Kairos sellers officers, directors or affiliates of the company, and what was the per-miner cost and deposit schedule on the 6,800 machines?
The company disclosed a 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare on 2018-06-28 and reiterated the investment on 2018-07-09, cited as claims #15512, #15522, #15545 and #15473, a 52 percent position in Tess Inc. in claims #15514, #15524 and #15547 with the acquisition completed per claim #15472, and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC in claims #15513, #15523 and #15546; what has not been said is the cash cost and carrying value of the Coinsquare position, whether 12.9 percent is measured on an outstanding or fully diluted basis and whether it carries board or information rights, the consideration and goodwill recorded for Tess, whether Tess is consolidated given the 52 percent control position and what revenue and losses it contributes, and the Verady note's interest rate, maturity, discount and valuation cap. What is the aggregate carrying value of these three non-mining investments, and what independent marks or fair value inputs support them?
The company disclosed that MNP LLP was appointed as auditor for 2018 on 2018-06-14, cited as claim #15555 and carried as delayed against a 2018-12-31 date, that directors were elected at the 2018 annual meeting per claim #15554, that a Chief Executive Officer arrangement dates to 2018-04-01 per claim #16647, and that Nasdaq listing compliance was regained on 2018-06-20 per claim #15553; what has not been said is the identity of the predecessor auditor and whether there were any disagreements or reportable events on dismissal, the name of the CEO and the terms of that officer's compensation, the vote totals and any withheld votes on the director slate, and which specific Nasdaq rule the company had fallen out of compliance with and for how long. Were the auditor change and the listing deficiency related to a late periodic filing, and does the audit committee include a designated financial expert who reviewed the related-party aspects of the Kairos, Tess and Logical Brokerage transactions?
The company disclosed the formation of a wholly owned subsidiary, Digital Green Energy Corp, on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15515 and #15525, and separately said on 2018-07-09 that it was investigating the launch of a cryptocurrency exchange in the US, cited as claim #15470, with Logical Brokerage's FinCEN, Florida money transmitter, CFTC and NFA registrations cited across claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529, #15535, #15536, #15548 and #15549; what has not been said is the capital committed to Digital Green Energy, whether it holds any identified power site or generation asset, and what additional state money transmitter licenses beyond Florida an exchange launch would require, at what cost and on what timeline. How much has been spent to date on the exchange initiative, and which of the fifty state regimes does management consider gating?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-21The company disclosed the February 2018 purchase of 6,800 additional miners (claims #15532, #15541, #15518, #15503) and the acquisition of Kairos Global Technology carrying 1,200 miners (claims #15540, #15531, #15517, #15502); what has not been said is who the equipment vendor was, the per-unit purchase price, how much was paid as non-refundable deposit versus delivered inventory, and — for Kairos — what consideration was paid, in cash or shares, and to whom. Were any Kairos sellers, or any holders of the shares issued, officers, directors, or affiliates of Riot at the time, and what was the independent valuation support for that consideration?
The company disclosed an executed lease on a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center (claims #15504, #15542, #15519, #15533) rated to 12 MW at full deployment (claims #15538, #15507, #15526); what has not been said is the street address of the site, the name of the serving utility, whether an interconnection or power purchase agreement is signed, the contracted all-in cost per kWh, and the lease term, annual rent, and renewal or termination rights. On which date was the full 12 MW energized, and is the 12 MW a contracted firm delivery or a facility design figure?
The company disclosed 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15543, #15505, #15520, the first of which is flagged delayed) against an 8,000-unit full deployment (claims #15551, #15537, #15506) and a 110 PH/s expected hash rate (claims #15552, #15539, #15527, #15508); what has not been said is the target date for energizing the remaining 4,500 units, the actual average hash rate realized in the quarter, the number of bitcoin mined, and the mining pool counterparty. Separately, hardware is described as 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550 and 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530 — which figure is correct, what is the machine model and efficiency in J/TH, and does the 12 MW figure reconcile with the roughly 1,500 watts per unit those numbers imply?
The company disclosed a 12.9% interest in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545), a 52% interest in Tess Inc. (claims #15514, #15547, #15524), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15513, #15546, #15523), and formation of a wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp (claims #15515, #15525); what has not been said is the cost basis and carrying value of each position, whether Tess is consolidated at 52% ownership and, if not, on what control analysis. What are the Verady note's maturity, interest rate, conversion discount or valuation cap, and how much capital has been committed to Digital Green Energy Corp and for what stated purpose?
The company disclosed the appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (claim #15555, flagged delayed) and the regaining of Nasdaq listing compliance days later on June 20, 2018 (claim #15553); what has not been said is the identity of the predecessor auditor, whether that firm resigned or was dismissed, whether there were any disagreements on accounting or reportable events, and which specific listing rule the company had fallen out of compliance with. Were any material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting identified in connection with the delinquent filings that drove the deficiency?
The company disclosed a Chief Executive Officer personnel action dated April 1, 2018 (claim #16647) and the election of directors at the 2018 annual meeting (claim #15554); what has not been said is who the executive is, the terms of the employment agreement including base salary, equity grant size and vesting, and any severance paid to a predecessor. Which of the elected directors were independent under Nasdaq rules, and did any of them have a financial interest in Kairos, Logical Brokerage (claims #15544, #15534, #15521, #15509, the acquisition of which was promised by March 27, 2018 and is flagged delayed), Tess, or Coinsquare?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-21The company disclosed a 107,000 square foot data center lease in Oklahoma City on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, together with a 12.0 MW power figure at full deployment, cited as claims #15538, #15507 and #15526; what has not been said is the street address of the building, the identity of the landlord and whether it is a related party, the lease term, rent and renewal or termination rights, the serving utility, the substation and interconnection status behind the 12 MW, and whether that 12 MW is contracted capacity, energized capacity or expected draw. Nor has the all-in delivered power price in cents per kWh been given, which is the single number that determines whether 8,000 machines are economic at any given hash price.
The company disclosed hardware performance of 13.5 TH/s on 2018-06-28, cited as claim #15550, and 13.75 TH/s in the same period, cited as claim #15530, alongside a full-deployment fleet of 8,000 units, cited as claims #15551, #15537 and #15506, and an expected 110.0 PH/s, cited as claims #15552, #15527, #15539 and #15508; what has not been said is which per-unit rating is correct, whether the 110 PH/s is a nameplate sum or a realized pool-measured figure net of downtime, and what efficiency in joules per terahash and facility PUE reconcile 8,000 machines to only 12 MW, which implies roughly 1.5 kW per unit including cooling and leaves little headroom.
The company disclosed that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of 2018-03-31, cited as claims #15543, #15505 and #15520, with claim #15543 carrying a delayed status against that date; what has not been said is the deployment schedule for the remaining 4,500 units, whether those machines have been paid for in full and are in the company's physical possession or still with the vendor, what caused the slippage, and what the revised energization date is. No corresponding disclosure identifies the mining pool, the bitcoin mined per month, or the counterparty and venue through which mined coin is sold, so the revenue conversion path behind the hash rate remains unnamed.
The company disclosed the Kairos Global Technology acquisition carrying 1,200 miners on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15540, #15531, #15517 and #15502, and separately an acquisition of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15541, #15532, #15518 and #15503; what has not been said is the purchase consideration for Kairos, whether it was paid in cash or newly issued shares and on what valuation, the identity of the Kairos sellers and their prior relationship to officers, directors or beneficial owners of the company, the vendor and unit price of the 6,800 machines, and whether those 6,800 and the 1,200 are the same 8,000 units described as full deployment capacity or are additive to it.
The company disclosed the Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition for $600,000 on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15544, #15534, #15521 and #15509, with claim #15544 promised by 2018-03-27 and now carried as delayed, and disclosed CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida money transmitter registrations for that entity, cited as claims #15548, #15549, #15535, #15529, #15528, #15536, #15511 and #15510; what has not been said is the actual closing date, the seller's identity, whether the $600,000 was cash or stock and whether any earnout or contingent consideration exists, what revenue and customer base Logical Brokerage contributes, and whether those registrations and the Florida license survived the change of control or required re-approval before the announced exchange offerings in claim #15516 could launch.
The company disclosed a 12.9% interest in Coinsquare, cited as claims #15512, #15522, #15545 and #15473, a 52% ownership of Tess Inc., cited as claims #15514, #15524 and #15547, a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC, cited as claims #15513, #15523 and #15546, and the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp, cited as claims #15515 and #15525; what has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of each position, whether the 52% Tess stake is consolidated or held at fair value and what revenue and losses it brings in, the conversion price, maturity and interest rate on the Verady note, and what Digital Green Energy Corp was capitalized with and whether it holds the Oklahoma lease or the power contract.
The company disclosed the appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 on 2018-06-14, cited as claim #15555 and carried as delayed against a 2018-12-31 date, the election of directors at the 2018 annual meeting on 2018-06-14, cited as claim #15554, a Chief Executive Officer matter dated 2018-04-01, cited as claim #16647, and regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20, cited as claim #15553; what has not been said is the identity of the predecessor auditor, whether there were disagreements or reportable events on dismissal, the names of the directors elected and the withheld-vote counts, the name of the CEO and the cash, equity and change-of-control terms of that person's compensation, and which listing rule the company had fallen out of compliance with and for how long.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-21The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it had executed a lease for a 107,000 square foot data center facility in Oklahoma City (claims #15542, #15504, #15519, #15533) sized for 12 MW of power at full deployment (claims #15538, #15507, #15526); what has not been said is the street address of the site, the name of the serving utility or retail provider, whether the 12 MW is contracted and energized or merely the building's nameplate ceiling, and what the interconnection or substation energization date is. What is the contracted delivered power price per kWh, what is the lease term and annual rent, and is the 12 MW firm under a signed power agreement or still subject to a utility study?
The company disclosed hardware performance of 13.75 TH/s in one place (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s in another (claim #15550) on the same 2018-06-28 date, alongside an 8,000-miner full deployment (claims #15551, #15506, #15537) and an expected 110 PH/s at full deployment (claims #15527, #15552, #15539, #15508); what has not been said is which figure the 110 PH/s guidance was actually built on, or the manufacturer and model of the machines. Eight thousand units at 13.5 TH/s is 108 PH/s and at 13.75 TH/s is 110 PH/s, so which spec applies to which of the 1,200 Kairos units versus the 6,800 units, and does 12 MW at roughly 1,500 watts per unit include cooling and facility overhead or only the miners themselves?
The company disclosed that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of 2018-03-31 (claims #15543, #15505, #15520), a figure carried into a filing dated 2018-06-28 and flagged as delayed against that March date; what has not been said is the deployed count as of the filing date itself, nearly three months later, or the schedule for energizing the remaining 4,500 units. How many miners were hashing on 2018-06-28, what realized hash rate did the fleet produce in the quarter, how many bitcoin were mined, and what is the month-by-month deployment plan to reach 8,000?
The company disclosed the acquisition of Kairos Global Technology and its 1,200 miners (claims #15531, #15540, #15517, #15502, #15471) and the separate acquisition of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claims #15532, #15541, #15518, #15503); what has not been said is the purchase consideration for either transaction, whether it was paid in cash or newly issued shares, and the identity of the sellers. Were any Kairos or miner-purchase counterparties officers, directors, or affiliates of the company or its ten-percent holders, and if shares were issued, how many and at what deemed price?
The company disclosed a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15545, #15522, #15512), a 52% position in Tess Inc. described as completed (claims #15547, #15514, #15524, #15472), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15546, #15523, #15513), and the formation of a wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp (claims #15515, #15525); what has not been said is the cost basis and balance sheet carrying value of each position, the accounting treatment, and any revenue or operating results attributable to them. Is Tess consolidated at 52% and what did it contribute to revenue and loss, is Coinsquare carried at cost or fair value and on what marks, what are the Verady note's conversion price, interest rate and maturity, and what assets, capital, or contracts does Digital Green Energy actually hold?
The company disclosed the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims #15534, #15521, #15544, #15509) with a promised close of 2018-03-27 that is recorded as delayed, together with CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (claims #15548, #15510, #15535, #15529, #15528, #15536, #15549) and an unspecified investigation of launching a US cryptocurrency exchange on 2018-07-09 (claim #15470); what has not been said is why the close slipped, whether the change-of-control approvals from the NFA and the Florida Office of Financial Regulation were obtained or still pending, and what Logical Brokerage's standalone revenue and headcount are. Separately, the record shows a Chief Executive Officer item dated 2018-04-01 (claim #16647), the appointment of MNP LLP as 2018 auditor flagged as delayed (claim #15555), directors elected at the 2018 annual meeting (claim #15554), and the regaining of Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553) — but not the executive's name or compensation terms, the reason the prior auditor departed or whether there were any disagreements on accounting matters, or which specific Nasdaq rule the company had been deficient under and for how long.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-20Riot disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it had executed a lease on a 107,000-square-foot data center in Oklahoma City, cited as claims #15542, #15504, #15519 and #15533, alongside a 12 MW power figure at full deployment, cited as claims #15538, #15507 and #15526; what has not been said is the street address of the site, the identity of the landlord and the lease term and annual rent, the name of the serving utility, whether the 12 MW is contracted firm capacity or merely the building's rated service, and what the all-in delivered power price per kWh is. A 107,000-square-foot shell drawing only 12 MW is roughly 112 watts per square foot, far below what a purpose-built mining hall supports — so is the company paying for space it cannot energize, and what would it cost to step the interconnection up?
The company disclosed 3,500 miners installed and operating as of 2018-03-31 against a full-deployment target of 8,000 units, cited as claims #15543, #15505, #15506 and #15551, with claim #15543 carried as delayed against a 2018-03-31 date; what has not been said is where the remaining approximately 4,500 machines physically are — in transit, in storage, on the floor un-energized, or not yet shipped — and what specific month management expects them to be hashing. The 110 PH/s figure appears as both guidance and stated capacity, cited as claims #15552, #15539, #15527 and #15508, yet carries no promised-by date in any of its four appearances; on what date does management expect to be running at 110 PH/s, and what is the realized hash rate today?
Riot disclosed two different per-unit hardware specifications in the same reporting period — 13.5 TH/s at claim #15550 and 13.75 TH/s at claim #15530; what has not been said is which machine model and vendor these describe, whether the fleet is mixed, and what the energy efficiency in joules per terahash is. Eight thousand units at 13.75 TH/s is 110 PH/s only if every machine runs at nameplate with zero downtime, so what uptime and derating assumption sits behind the 110 PH/s number, and what is the implied revenue per petahash per day at the bitcoin price and network difficulty management used?
The company disclosed the acquisition of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15541, #15532, #15503, #15518, and the Kairos Global Technology acquisition carrying 1,200 miners, cited as claims #15531, #15540, #15517, #15502; what has not been said is the purchase price of the 6,800 units, the identity of the seller, and — for Kairos — the form and value of consideration, whether it was cash or newly issued shares, and whether any Riot officer, director or affiliate held an interest on the other side of that trade. Given that a separate CEO change was disclosed effective 2018-04-01, cited as claim #16647, and directors were elected at the 2018 annual meeting, cited as claim #15554, why does the record contain no named executive compensation, no severance or transition terms for the outgoing officer, and no related-party transaction disclosure tied to the miner and Kairos purchases?
Riot disclosed equity and note positions across three private counterparties on 2018-06-28 — 12.9 percent of Coinsquare at claims #15545, #15522 and #15512, 52 percent of Tess Inc. at claims #15547, #15524 and #15514, and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC at claims #15546, #15523 and #15513; what has not been said is the cash cost basis and current carrying value of each, the valuation methodology and any third-party mark, whether the 52 percent Tess stake is consolidated or equity-method and who holds the other 48 percent, and the conversion terms, maturity and interest rate on the Verady note. What revenue, if any, did any of these three contribute in the period, and what were the impairment triggers tested?
The Logical Brokerage acquisition was disclosed at $600,000 with a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and is carried as delayed, cited as claims #15544, #15534, #15509 and #15521, accompanied by CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing claims at #15535, #15536, #15548, #15549, #15510, #15511, #15528 and #15529; what has not been said is why the transaction slipped past its March date, whether regulatory change-of-control approval was the cause, what Logical Brokerage's standalone revenue and customer count are, and whether any of those registrations required renewal or amendment on transfer. Separately, the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary at claims #15515 and #15525 and the U.S. exchange launch investigation at claim #15470 were announced with no capitalization figure, no site, no counterparty and no timeline — what has been spent on each to date, and what is the go/no-go milestone?
The 2018 auditor appointment of MNP LLP is carried as delayed against a 2018-12-31 date, cited as claim #15555; what has not been said is the identity of the predecessor auditor, the reason for the change, whether there were any disagreements on accounting or disclosure, and whether any material weakness in internal control over financial reporting was identified — a question sharpened by the fact that the company separately disclosed regaining Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20, cited as claim #15553, without stating what the deficiency was or whether it was a filing delinquency.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-20The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it had executed a lease on a 107,000 square foot data center in Oklahoma City, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, and that the site would support 12 MW at full deployment, cited as claims #15507, #15526 and #15538; what has not been said is the street address of the building, the identity of the landlord and the lease term and rent, the name of the serving utility, whether the 12 MW figure is contracted interconnection capacity or expected load at the meter, and what the delivered power price per kWh is. A reader cannot distinguish a signed interconnection from an aspiration without those items.
The company disclosed a full-deployment fleet of 8,000 miners, cited as claims #15506, #15537 and #15551, assembled from 1,200 units acquired with Kairos Global Technology, cited as claims #15502, #15517, #15531 and #15540, plus 6,800 units acquired in February 2018, cited as claims #15503, #15518, #15532 and #15541, against only 3,500 miners installed and operating as of 2018-03-31, cited as claims #15505, #15520 and #15543 and already flagged delayed; what has not been said is where the other 4,500 machines physically are as of the filing date, whether they have been delivered and paid for in full, and the month-by-month energization schedule that closes the gap.
The company disclosed an expected 110 PH/s at full deployment, cited as claims #15508, #15527, #15539 and #15552, while describing its hardware at 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550 and at 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530; what has not been said is which specification is correct, whether the two numbers reflect two different machine models or vintages within the same fleet, and how 8,000 units drawing 12 MW reconciles to roughly 1,500 watts per unit including cooling and overhead. The 110 PH/s target only holds at the higher of the two per-unit figures, so the discrepancy is not cosmetic.
The company disclosed a 12.9% ownership position in the Coinsquare cryptocurrency exchange, cited as claims #15512, #15522 and #15545, a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC, cited as claims #15513, #15523 and #15546, and a 52% stake in Tess Inc., cited as claims #15514, #15524 and #15547 with the acquisition completed per claim #15472 on 2018-07-09; what has not been said is the cash-versus-stock consideration paid for each, the carrying value and valuation methodology for the Coinsquare stake, the conversion price, interest rate and maturity on the Verady note, the identity of the holders of the remaining 48% of Tess, and whether any counterparty, seller or continuing shareholder in these transactions is a related party of an officer or director.
The company disclosed the acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp for $600,000, cited as claims #15509, #15521, #15534 and #15544, the last of which carries a 2018-03-27 target and is flagged delayed, alongside FinCEN money services business registration, a Florida money transmitter license and CFTC/NFA registration, cited as claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529, #15535, #15536, #15548 and #15549; what has not been said is why the closing slipped past the stated date, whether the state and self-regulatory registrations survived the change of control or required fresh approvals, whether any of them are currently in good standing, and what revenue, if any, Logical Brokerage has produced since closing.
The company disclosed that a Chief Executive Officer matter was recorded as of 2018-04-01, cited as claim #16647, that directors were elected at the 2018 annual meeting, cited as claim #15554, and that MNP LLP was appointed auditor for 2018, cited as claim #15555 and flagged delayed; what has not been said is the compensation arrangement, severance terms and equity grants attached to the CEO role, the vote tallies and any withhold campaign at the annual meeting, the identity of the predecessor auditor and whether the change involved any disagreement or reportable event, and how the auditor transition relates to the Nasdaq listing deficiency the company says it cured on 2018-06-20 per claim #15553, the nature of which is itself never stated.
Across the entire record the company has disclosed hardware counts, hash rate targets and a facility footprint but not a single revenue figure, bitcoin production number, mining pool or hosting counterparty, or cost per coin mined, while simultaneously floating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch in claim #15470 and additional mining sites in claim #15474, both dated 2018-07-09; what has not been said is the capital budget, funding source and target date for either initiative, and what the 3,500 already-running miners earned in the most recent quarter against their power cost.
A first-year analyst would open the next call by asking three things: what is the all-in delivered power price at Oklahoma City and is it fixed or indexed; what were realized bitcoin production and direct mining cost for the quarter; and what is the carrying value of the Coinsquare, Verady and Tess positions and what observable inputs support it.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-20The company disclosed a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center lease on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, alongside a 12 MW power figure for the same site (claims #15507, #15526, #15538); what has not been said is the street address or substation of the facility, the identity of the landlord and the utility counterparty, the lease term and annual rent, and whether the 12 MW is energized and contracted or merely the building's nameplate ceiling — nor the contracted power price in cents per kWh, which is the single number that determines whether 110 PH/s is profitable at any given bitcoin price.
The company disclosed acquiring 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15503, #15518, #15532 and #15541, and the Kairos Global Technology acquisition carrying 1,200 miners, cited as claims #15502, #15517, #15531, #15540 and #15471; what has not been said is who sold the 6,800 units, what was paid for them in cash versus stock, what consideration was issued for Kairos, and whether any Kairos selling shareholder, or any counterparty to the miner purchase, was an officer, director or affiliate of the company at the time — a related-party question that the 2018 annual meeting disclosure electing directors on 2018-06-14 (claim #15554) does not appear to answer.
The company disclosed that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, cited as claims #15505, #15520 and #15543, against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (claims #15506, #15537, #15551) that exactly equals the 1,200 plus 6,800 units acquired; what has not been said is the physical location and condition of the roughly 4,500 miners not yet energized, whether they are in transit, in storage, or hosted at a third-party site, what month each tranche is scheduled to come online, and what the hosting or storage cost is in the interim.
The company disclosed hardware specifications of 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530 and 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550, both dated 2018-06-28, while guiding to 110 PH/s at full deployment in claims #15508, #15527, #15539 and #15552; what has not been said is which figure is authoritative, the manufacturer and model of the units, and whether the 110 PH/s assumes 100 percent uptime across all 8,000 machines — the arithmetic only reconciles at 13.75 TH/s with zero derating, so the realistic sustained hash rate and the assumed uptime percentage remain undisclosed.
The company disclosed a 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545), a 52 percent interest in Tess Inc. (claims #15514, #15524, #15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15513, #15523, #15546), and the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp. (claims #15515, #15525), all on 2018-06-28; what has not been said is the cost basis and balance-sheet carrying value of the Coinsquare position and whether 12.9 percent is measured on an outstanding or fully diluted basis, whether Tess is consolidated and what revenue and non-controlling interest it contributes, the conversion price, discount, maturity and interest rate on the Verady note, and what assets, capital or employees Digital Green Energy has beyond its certificate of incorporation.
The company disclosed the $600,000 Logical Brokerage Corp. acquisition with a stated closing target of 2018-03-27, cited as claims #15509, #15521, #15534 and #15544 and currently flagged delayed, together with that entity's CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida money transmitter registrations (claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529, #15535, #15536, #15548, #15549); what has not been said is why the closing slipped past the stated date, whether the Florida money transmitter license and NFA membership survived the change of control or required fresh approval, and what revenue, if any, Logical Brokerage has generated — a question sharpened by the 2018-07-09 statement that a U.S. exchange launch was still only under investigation (claim #15470).
The company disclosed that MNP LLP was appointed auditor for 2018, cited as claim #15555 and flagged delayed against a 2018-12-31 date, and that Nasdaq listing compliance was regained on 2018-06-20, cited as claim #15553; what has not been said is the identity of the predecessor auditor, whether that firm resigned or was dismissed and whether there were any disagreements or reportable events, which specific Nasdaq rule the company had been deficient under, and whether the exchange imposed a monitoring or panel-discretion period following reinstatement. On the same theme, the chief executive officer item dated 2018-04-01 (claim #16647) is recorded without an employment agreement term, base salary, bonus structure or equity grant size, and the directors elected on 2018-06-14 (claim #15554) are recorded without any accompanying related-party transaction or compensation-committee detail.
For the next earnings call, the first-order quantitative follow-ups that the record does not answer are: bitcoin mined per month and the trailing three-month total; all-in cash cost per bitcoin mined, broken into power, hosting and labor; realized average sale price versus coins held on the balance sheet; the depreciation method and useful life assigned to the 8,000 miners and whether any impairment has been taken against them following the 2018 price decline; and the carrying value, valuation methodology and any markdown applied to the Coinsquare, Tess and Verady positions cited in claims #15512, #15514 and #15513.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-19The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired 6,800 additional miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15503, #15518, #15532 and #15541, alongside 1,200 miners that came with the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, cited as claims #15502, #15517, #15531 and #15540, with the Kairos deal described as completed on 2018-07-09 in claim #15471. What has not been said is who sold the 6,800-unit batch, what Riot paid per unit or in total, and what consideration, whether cash, stock or both, was paid for Kairos. Did any director or significant holder have an interest in the seller or in Kairos?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 an expected 110 PH/s at full deployment of 8,000 miners, cited as claims #15508, #15527, #15539 and #15552. It gave the per-unit hardware spec as 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530 and as 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550. Eight thousand units at 13.5 TH/s is 108 PH/s, not 110, so what has not been said is which miner model and firmware the guidance assumes. The filings also do not say what date full deployment is expected, given that only 3,500 miners were operating as of 2018-03-31 (claims #15505 and #15520), and claim #15543 is marked delayed.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City facility lease, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542, with 12 MW of power required at full deployment, cited as claims #15507, #15526 and #15538. What has not been said is the landlord, the lease term, the rent, the street address, and the utility or interconnection arrangement, including the tariff and whether 12 MW is contracted firm capacity or only an estimated load. For a miner, the power cost per kWh is the most important number, so what is it?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 52% stake in Tess Inc, cited as claims #15514, #15524 and #15547, and a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare, cited as claims #15512, #15522 and #15545. Claims #15472 and #15473 on 2018-07-09 reiterate both positions. What has not been said is the cost basis and carrying value of each position, whether Tess is consolidated, and whether any Riot director or insider elected on 2018-06-14 (claim #15554) also held interests in Tess, Coinsquare, Kairos or Verady. On the same date the company disclosed a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note, cited as claims #15513, #15523 and #15546, without its conversion price, maturity or interest rate.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp, cited as claims #15509, #15521 and #15534, and listed its CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida registrations in claims #15510, #15511, #15528, #15529 and #15535. Claim #15544 is marked delayed against a 2018-03-27 date. What has not been said is why closing slipped, what revenue or customer accounts came with the entity, and when the exchange offering described in claim #15516 is expected to launch.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-20 that it regained Nasdaq listing compliance, cited as claim #15553, and on 2018-06-14 that MNP LLP was appointed auditor for 2018, cited as claim #15555, which is itself marked delayed. What has not been said is which listing deficiency was cured, and whether the auditor appointment followed a resignation or a disagreement with the prior firm. The record supplied here is truncated after claim #15469, so later disclosures may answer some of these questions.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-19The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that full deployment at Oklahoma City would reach 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s, with 3,500 miners running as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15506, #15507, #15508, #15505, #15543). What has not been said is when full deployment will actually be reached, since no target date accompanies any of the full-deployment figures. The per-unit hardware spec is also cited as both 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550) and 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530), which changes whether 110 PH/s is achievable from 8,000 machines. What is the realized hash rate and miner count today, and which spec is correct?
The company disclosed a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City data center lease on 2018-06-28 (claims #15519, #15533, #15504) and a 12 MW power supply (claim #15538). What has not been said is the landlord, the lease term and rent, the physical address, the utility provider, or the contracted power price per kWh. These are the core unit-economics inputs for any mining operation. Is the 12 MW firm, interruptible, or subject to further interconnection upgrades?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the acquisition of Kairos Global Technology with 1,200 miners (claims #15531, #15502, #15471) and a separate purchase of 6,800 additional miners in February 2018 (claims #15532, #15518). What has not been said is the consideration paid for Kairos, whether it was cash or stock, who the seller of the 6,800 miners was, the aggregate hardware cost, and whether any of these counterparties have ties to directors or officers elected at the 2018 annual meeting (claim #15554).
The company disclosed a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp with CFTC/NFA registration and FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (claims #15534, #15510, #15528, #15529), alongside an investigation of a U.S. exchange launch (claim #15470). What has not been said is whether the deal has closed, given that the tracked milestone of 2018-03-27 is marked delayed (claim #15544). The disclosures also give no launch timeline, no capital budget, and no statement of which additional state licenses a national exchange would require.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare, 52% of Tess Inc., and a $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims #15545, #15547, #15546). What has not been said is the cost basis or carrying value of the Coinsquare and Tess positions, or whether Tess is consolidated. The Verady note's interest rate, maturity, and conversion terms are also missing. The purpose and capitalization of the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp (claim #15525) are likewise unstated.
The company disclosed MNP LLP's appointment as 2018 auditor on 2018-06-14 (claim #15555), a status now tracked as delayed, and that it regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553). What has not been said is which listing deficiency triggered the noncompliance, why the audit milestone slipped, and whether a change of auditor or any restatement is involved.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-18The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired 1,200 miners through Kairos Global Technology and a further 6,800 miners in February 2018, cited as claims #15502, #15517, #15503 and #15518. What has not been said is who sold the 6,800 miners, what was paid for them, and whether the price was cash or stock. Nor has the company said whether any seller of either batch is a related party to its officers, directors or major holders.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s, cited as claims #15505, #15506 and #15527. Claim #15543 carries a delayed status. What has not been said is the date by which all 8,000 units would be energized, and how many were actually running at the time of the filing. The per-unit specification is also inconsistent: it is stated as 13.5 TH/s in claim #15550 and 13.75 TH/s in claim #15530. Which machine model is it, and does the 110 PH/s figure assume the higher number?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12 MW figure, described as power supply capacity in claim #15538 and as power consumption in claim #15507. What has not been said is which of these it is. Is it contracted interconnection capacity or expected draw? Who is the utility or power counterparty, and what are the contracted price per kWh and the contract term, the main driver of mining margins?
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 an executed lease for a 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center, cited as claims #15519, #15533, #15542 and #15504. On 2018-07-09 it also floated mining in other locations, cited as claim #15474. What has not been said is the landlord, the physical address, the lease term and the annual rent. The company has also not named any candidate second site or given a capacity or timing target for one.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp, citing its CFTC/NFA, FinCEN and Florida money transmitter registrations, cited as claims #15509, #15535 and #15529. Claim #15544 shows the deal as delayed against a 2018-03-27 target, and claim #15470 on 2018-07-09 frames a US exchange as still under investigation. What has not been said is the closing date, the form of consideration and the identity of the sellers. The company has also given no launch date, capital budget or regulatory timeline for the exchange that the licenses were bought to support.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 52 percent stake in Tess Inc, a 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC, cited as claims #15547, #15512 and #15546. On 2018-07-09 it reported completing the Tess acquisition, cited as claim #15472. What has not been said is the cost basis and current carrying value of each position and the valuation implied for Coinsquare. The interest rate, maturity and conversion terms of the Verady note are also missing. Separately, the company regained Nasdaq compliance on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553) and appointed MNP LLP as auditor with a delayed status (claim #15555). Which listing deficiency was cured, and why is the auditor engagement flagged as delayed?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-18The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it expected a hash rate of 110 PH/s at full deployment (claims #15508, #15527, #15552, #15539) from 8,000 miners (claims #15506, #15551). It cited per-unit specifications of both 13.75 TH/s (claim #15530) and 13.5 TH/s (claim #15550). What has not been said is which figure is correct, what miner model and vendor are involved, and whether 110 PH/s is a nameplate number or an expected realized rate after downtime.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15520), and that milestone is tracked as delayed (claim #15543). The same filings describe full deployment of 8,000 miners (claim #15537). What has not been said is when the remaining 4,500 units would be energized, and what caused the slippage.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City data center lease (claims #15504, #15519, #15533, #15542) and 12 MW of power capacity (claims #15507, #15526, #15538). What has not been said is the facility's physical address, the lessor, the lease term and rent, the utility supplying the 12 MW, the contracted power price, and whether 12 MW is already interconnected or only planned.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 the acquisition of 1,200 miners from Kairos Global Technology (claims #15502, #15517, #15540), and it reported that acquisition as completed on 2018-07-09 (claim #15471). It also disclosed a separate February 2018 purchase of 6,800 miners (claims #15503, #15518). What has not been said is the consideration paid in either deal, including the cash and share mix and the per-unit cost, as well as who sold the 6,800 miners. The filings also do not say whether any director, officer, or significant shareholder had an interest in Kairos or in that seller.
The company disclosed a $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), and one record carries a 2018-03-27 target now marked delayed (claim #15544). It also cited that entity's CFTC/NFA, FinCEN, and Florida registrations (claims #15510, #15511, #15529) and said it was investigating a U.S. exchange launch (claim #15470). What has not been said is the actual closing date, the capital commitment and timeline for the exchange, and which additional state money-transmitter licenses would be needed beyond Florida.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15545), a $200,000 Verady convertible note (claims #15513, #15546), and 52% ownership of Tess Inc. (claims #15514, #15547). On 2018-07-09 it described the Tess acquisition as completed (claim #15472). What has not been said is the cost basis and carrying value of the Coinsquare stake, the Verady note's maturity, interest, and conversion terms, and the price paid for Tess. Also unexplained is what "completed" means for Tess, given the stated ownership is 52% rather than 100%. Separately, directors were elected on 2018-06-14 (claim #15554) and Nasdaq compliance was regained on 2018-06-20 (claim #15553), but the record names neither the directors and their compensation nor the specific listing deficiency that had been cured.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-18The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that it acquired Kairos Global Technology with 1,200 miners and separately bought 6,800 more miners in February 2018 (claims #15531, #15503, #15518). It has not said what it paid for Kairos, whether in cash, stock or assumed liabilities, or who sold the 6,800 miners, at what unit price, and whether any seller has ties to Riot insiders.
The company disclosed a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City data center lease and a 12 MW power figure for full deployment (claims #15542, #15519, #15538, #15507). It has not given the facility's street address, the landlord, the lease term and rent, or which utility supplies the 12 MW, under what tariff or power contract, and at what cost per kWh. Power cost is the main driver of mining margins.
The company disclosed that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018, against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners and 110 PH/s (claims #15505, #15520, #15551, #15552). The March 31 milestone is recorded as delayed (claim #15543). It has not said when the remaining 4,500 units will be energized, what hash rate was actually achieved at quarter-end, or whether the 12 MW site can support all 8,000 units at once.
The company cited per-unit miner performance as 13.5 TH/s in one place and 13.75 TH/s in another (claims #15550, #15530). Only the 13.75 figure multiplies out to the stated 110 PH/s across 8,000 units. It has not said which specification is correct, which hardware model it uses, or whether the 110 PH/s guidance assumes nameplate rather than observed performance.
The company disclosed a 12.9% stake in Coinsquare, 52% ownership of Tess Inc., and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims #15545, #15547, #15546). It has not disclosed its cost basis or current carrying value for Coinsquare and Tess, or the Verady note's interest rate, maturity and conversion terms. It also has not said whether any Riot director or officer holds interests in these counterparties.
The company disclosed the $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage with its CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida registrations (claims #15509, #15510, #15511). The acquisition's 2018-03-27 target is recorded as delayed (claim #15544). The company also said on 2018-07-09 that it is investigating a U.S. crypto exchange launch (claim #15470). It has not said whether the deal has closed, what caused the slippage, or what timeline, capital budget and additional licensing an exchange launch would require. Separately, the MNP LLP auditor appointment is flagged as delayed (claim #15555), and no explanation has been given.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-15The company disclosed on 2018-06-28 that 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims #15505, #15543), against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s (claims #15506, #15507, #15508, #15527). What has not been said is when full deployment will be reached, or how many miners were actually hashing by the June 28 filing date, three months after the stated snapshot. The per-unit hardware specification also appears as both 13.75 TH/s and 13.5 TH/s (claims #15530, #15550). Which figure underlies the 110 PH/s guidance?
The company disclosed a 107,000-square-foot Oklahoma City data center lease on 2018-06-28, cited as claims #15504, #15519, #15533 and #15542. What has not been said is the site address, landlord, lease term and rent. Nor has it named the utility, the contracted power price per kWh, or whether the 12 MW (claim #15538) is firm, interconnected capacity or only a planned load. The 2018-07-09 statement about potential mining operations in other locations (claim #15474) gives no sites, megawatts or capital budget.
The company disclosed the Logical Brokerage acquisition for $600,000 on 2018-06-28 (claims #15509, #15521, #15534), and the extracted record flags a 2018-03-27 date as delayed (claim #15544). What has not been said is the split between cash and stock, the identity of the sellers and whether any are related parties, or what caused the timing slippage. The 2018-07-09 statement that the company is investigating a US exchange launch (claim #15470) gives no timeline, capital commitment or pending regulatory approvals beyond the existing CFTC/NFA and FinCEN/Florida registrations (claims #15510, #15511).
The company disclosed completing the Kairos Global Technology acquisition, which brought 1,200 miners (claims #15502, #15517, #15471), and holding 52% of Tess Inc. (claims #15514, #15524, #15472) and 12.9% of Coinsquare (claims #15512, #15522, #15545). What has not been said is the consideration paid for Kairos and Tess, the cost basis and current carrying value of the Coinsquare stake, and whether any sellers or counterparties had prior relationships with management or directors. Separately, what were the purchase price and vendor for the 6,800 miners bought in February 2018 (claims #15503, #15518)?
The company disclosed a $200,000 convertible note investment in Verady LLC on 2018-06-28 (claims #15513, #15523, #15546). What has not been said is the note's interest rate, maturity, conversion price or valuation cap, and whether the note has been impaired. The company also disclosed forming a wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (claims #15515, #15525), but has not said what the entity does, how it is capitalized or which assets it will hold.
The company disclosed on 2018-06-14 that directors were elected at the 2018 annual meeting (claim #15554) and that MNP LLP was appointed auditor for 2018 (claim #15555, flagged delayed). On 2018-06-20 it disclosed regaining Nasdaq listing compliance (claim #15553). What has not been said is which deficiency caused the non-compliance, the names and compensation of the directors elected, and whether the auditor change followed any disagreement with the predecessor firm.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed a series of payments to BMSS on 2018-08-23: a $150,000 initial waiver payment, recurring $200,000 waiver payments beginning by 2018-09-30, a final $150,000 payment with accrued interest, and 50,000 restricted shares (claims #15431, #15432, #15433, #15434). What has not been said is what obligation BMSS waived, who BMSS is, how many $200,000 installments are owed, the total cash cost, and what interest rate accrues on the final payment. Why was the initial payment dated 2018-08-21, two days before the disclosure?
On 2018-09-06 the company disclosed an exclusive Coinsquare license for a U.S. exchange. It paid 450,000 Riot shares, 9.9% of RiotX Holdings, $485,331 in integration fees and a 0.1% ongoing transaction fee (claims #15417, #15419, #15420, #15421, #15422). Within twelve weeks it announced Synapse and Shift Markets as exchange partners instead (claims #15376, #15367, #15347). What has not been said is whether the Coinsquare license was terminated. Were the 450,000 shares and the 9.9% RiotX stake returned or cancelled, and was any of the integration fee recovered? The $3.0 million and $6.4 million investments behind the 12.9% Coinsquare stake (claims #15423, #15424, #15425, #15295) also have no stated carrying value or impairment test.
The company disclosed on 2018-09-06 that Cole Diamond joined the Riot Advisory Board for 15,000 restricted shares (claim #15426), in the same disclosure as the Coinsquare license and equity terms. What has not been said is whether Diamond has any role at or economic interest in Coinsquare. If so, the license and the advisory grant would need related-party treatment, and vesting and service terms for the grant are also absent.
The company disclosed an Oklahoma City facility with 8,000 miners, 95 PH/s maximum hash rate and "12 megawatts monthly power capacity" (claims #15342, #15343, #15305, #15306). It also disclosed monthly rent stepping from $235,000 to $230,000 to $190,000, a lease running only through August 2019, and unspecified renewal options (claims #15361 to #15366, #15344). What has not been said is who the landlord is, whether rent includes power, and what the all-in cost per kWh is. It is also unclear whether "12 MW monthly" means 12 MW of contracted load or some energy figure, and what the renewal terms are. What is the plan for the fleet if the lease is not extended past 2019-08-15?
The company disclosed the CEO's resignation on 2018-09-09 and Christopher Ensey's interim appointment at a $306,000 base salary, 100% bonus eligibility and 24,000 RSUs (claims #15413, #15402, #15403, #15404, #15405). What has not been said is the separation terms, severance or accelerated vesting for the departing CEO. The disclosure also omits the performance metrics for the interim bonus, the RSU vesting schedule, and whether any of it survives if a permanent CEO is hired. Why did Andrew Kaplan resign from the board (claim #15378) during the same period?
On 2018-10-22 the company disclosed that an SEC Section 8(e) examination was terminated but an SEC investigation is ongoing (claims #15381, #15382). On 2018-12-11 it guided to near-term operating losses and capital needs within 12 months while pursuing debt and equity (claims #15348, #15349, #15351). What has not been said is the subject of the investigation, whether current or former officers are named, and whether any reserve exists. It has also not quantified how much capital it needs, on what timeline, or what it paid for 92.5% of Logical Brokerage Corp (claim #15341), including who holds the remaining 7.5%.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed on 2020-03-24 that its Oklahoma City facility has 12 MW of power capacity in a 107,000 square foot leased building, cited as claims #14948 and #14962. It also disclosed short Kairos-related lease extensions through May 2020 and then June 30, 2020, cited as claims #15015 and #14937. What has not been said is who the landlord and utility counterparty are, what the rent and power rate are, and whether anything beyond a month-to-month extension exists. So what happens to the 4,000 installed S17 Pros (claim #14928) when the June 30 extension lapses?
The company disclosed a Co-Locating Mining Services Agreement with Coinmint in Massena on 2020-04-13, cited as claims #14938 and #14940. Capacity was stated as 9,500 kWh and the term runs to 2020-10-08 (claim #14939). What has not been said is whether 9,500 kWh is really a 9.5 MW power allocation, since kWh is a unit of energy and not capacity. The per-kWh or hosting fee, how many and which miners are allocated there, and the renewal terms after October 2020 are also missing. Is Massena a replacement for Oklahoma City or an addition to it?
The company disclosed miner purchases in several tranches. On 2019-12-03 it announced $4,850,465.85 for miners with 3,000 units delivered (claims #15046 and #15047). On 2019-12-17 it announced 1,000 more units with no price (claim #15017). On 2020-02-13 it reported delivery of 1,060 units against that 1,000-unit order (claim #15000). On 2020-03-24 it described a combined 4,000-unit purchase at $6.4 million, also recorded as "6.4 USD" (claims #14970 and #14945). What has not been said is how the tranches reconcile to the aggregate, what the per-unit price was for the December 17 order, and why 60 extra units arrived. The same question applies to the $2,437,000 S19 Pro order due by 2020-06-30 (claim #14935): were deposits paid, and has Bitmain delivered on schedule?
The company disclosed an estimated maximum hash rate of 248 PH/s for its S17 Pro fleet (claims #14947, #14954 and #14966). It also disclosed 7,400 operating ASIC miners in inventory (claim #14974) and a Kairos business combination tied to 8,000 units (claims #14949 and #14961). On 2020-05-07 it said previous-generation miners were taken offline with future use under evaluation (claim #14929). What has not been said is the realized, rather than maximum, hash rate and uptime. The count and net book value of the offline Kairos-era machines are also missing. Has an impairment been taken on the roughly 3,400 non-S17 units implied by the 7,400 figure?
The company disclosed the $600,000 Logical Brokerage (RiotX) acquisition with regulatory registrations (claims #14963 and #14967). It announced the RiotX sunset on 2020-02-25 (claim #14998), alongside an XMS Capital Partners engagement (claim #14997). It also reported minority stakes of 11.7% in Coinsquare, 8.8% in TessPay and 3.2% in Verady (claims #14957, #14959 and #14958). What has not been said is the write-off recognized on RiotX and whether the broker-dealer registrations were surrendered or sold. The scope and fee structure of the XMS mandate are undisclosed, as is whether it relates to monetizing these stakes. What carrying value or impairment is currently booked against each investment?
The company disclosed a $100 million at-the-market offering with H.C. Wainwright on 2019-11-11 (claim #15063), together with guidance that operating cash is sufficient for twelve months (claim #15065). It also disclosed an Equity Incentive Plan approval on 2019-10-27 (claim #15074) and the conclusion of an SEC investigation on 2020-02-02 (claim #15013). What has not been said is how much of the ATM has been drawn, at what average price and with how much dilution. The agent's commission rate is also undisclosed, as is whether the cash-sufficiency guidance depends on further ATM sales. Neither the incentive plan share reserve and grants to named executives nor the subject matter and outcome of the SEC investigation have been specified.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed on 2021-04-06 a Future Sales and Purchases Agreement with Bitmain for 42,000 Antminer S19j miners at a $138.5 million purchase price, adding 3.7 EH/s by November 2021, cited as claims #14725, #14726, #14727 and #14728. What has not been said is the deposit and installment schedule, what happens to prepayments if Bitmain delivers late or cancels, and where these machines will be hosted. Given that the only disclosed site is Coinmint's Massena facility, what interconnection or new-site power has been secured for a fleet of this size?
The company disclosed on 2020-04-13 a Co-Location Mining Services Agreement with Coinmint and a Massena facility capacity recorded as 9,500 kWh, cited as claims #14938, #14939 and #14940. It reaffirmed the agreement on 2020-10-06 with an October 8, 2020 date, and again on 2021-03-30, cited as claims #14822 and #14748. What has not been said is whether 9,500 means kW, kWh per day, or MW of dedicated load. The hosting rate per kWh, the power-cost pass-through, the renewal term after October 2020, and the curtailment or termination rights are also missing. Is there enough contracted Massena capacity for the 39,146-miner full-deployment fleet in claim #14753, let alone the April 2021 order?
The company disclosed a full-deployment fleet of 22,640 units on 2020-10-06, cited as claim #14823, and 39,146 Antminers producing 4.0 EH/s on 2021-03-30, cited as claims #14753 and #14741. On 2021-03-30 it also said 30,603 additional Antminers had been ordered, cited as claim #14741. The itemized tranches in claims #14745, #14746 and #14747 (11,900, 12,000 and 1,500 units) sum to 25,400, leaving roughly 5,200 units unexplained. Which orders make up the balance, and what is the per-tranche price and delivery status?
The company disclosed several purchase prices whose units and figures do not reconcile. The 4,000 S17 Pro miners are recorded at "6.3" on 2020-05-07 and 2021-03-30 (claims #14926 and #14739) but at $6.4 million on 2020-10-06 (claim #14815). The April 2020 S19 Pro order is $2.437 million in claim #14935 but $2.4 million in claim #14816. The same 1,040-unit order is called S19 Pro in claim #14917 and plain S19 in claim #14817. The 1,500 S19j order is recorded at "7.2" in claim #14747. What are the exact contract prices, model specifications and any credits applied, including the price reduction referenced in claim #14841?
The company disclosed on 2020-05-07 that previous-generation miners had been taken offline with future use under evaluation, cited as claim #14929. It also disclosed that the OKC facility lease expired and the Kairos subsidiary lease was extended to June 30, 2020, cited as claims #14749 and #14937. What has not been said is how many legacy machines were idled and what their carrying value was. Were they impaired, sold or scrapped, and were any exit costs or lease obligations left at Oklahoma City?
The company disclosed on 2020-05-07 an at-the-market facility with H.C. Wainwright recorded as "100.0" and a 12-month liquidity sufficiency statement, cited as claims #14930 and #14931. On 2020-10-06 it disclosed a $100 million shelf, cited as claim #14814, and on 2021-04-06 it hired Megan Brooks as COO at a $275,000 salary with a 6,000-unit equity award, cited as claims #14730, #14731 and #14732. What has not been said is how much the ATM actually raised, at what commission, and how much shelf capacity remains to fund the $138.5 million Bitmain commitment. On the COO package, are the 6,000 units shares or RSUs, and what are the vesting schedule, performance conditions and bonus target?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed on 2021-05-25 that it would acquire Whinstone US for $80 million in cash plus 11.8 million shares, cited as claims #14605 and #14606. A year later, on 2021-08-22, it recorded a purchase price of 267,409 and contingent consideration for future power credits of 83,138, cited as claims #14476 and #14478, with no units stated (presumably thousands of USD). What has not been said is how the headline figure grew to roughly $267 million. Nor has the company explained what the power-credit contingency actually obligates it to deliver, to whom, and on what schedule. Has any of that $83 million been paid out or remeasured since?
The company disclosed on 2021-05-26 that it issued 11.8 million common shares to Northern Data AG, the seller of Whinstone, cited as claim #14595. That made the seller a large holder of the company's stock. What has not been said is whether Northern Data received a board seat, information rights, a lock-up, or a standstill. How many of those shares does it still hold, and did any related-party dealings continue after closing?
The company disclosed on 2021-08-15 an infrastructure target of 1,500 MW by 2023-12-31, cited as claim #14495. On the same day it granted performance RSUs of 525,000 each to Benjamin Yi and Jason Les, 450,000 to Jeffrey McGonegal and 400,000 to Megan Brooks, all measured to that date, cited as claims #14496 through #14499. Its later disclosures describe only 700 MW at Whinstone and 370 MW energized by end of 2022, cited as claims #14267, #14270 and #14269. What has not been said is where the remaining roughly 800 MW would sit, with what ERCOT or utility interconnection agreement, and under which power contract. Was the 1,500 MW metric actually used to vest those awards, and how many units vested or were forfeited?
The company disclosed on 2021-11-07 a Bitmain Antminer S19j Pro purchase priced at 56.25, a 900,000 TH/s hashing specification and a payment schedule, cited as claims #14403, #14404 and #14406. It also gave a delivery deadline of 2022-05-01, cited as claim #14405. By 2022-03-15 it described a $480 million order with delivery running through December 2022, cited as claims #14271 and #14258. What has not been said is whether 56.25 means dollars per terahash, and what the dollar amounts and dates of the installments are. Why did delivery slip from May to December 2022, and did the 120,150-miner year-end target in claims #14268 and #14264 depend on the delayed batches?
The company disclosed on 2021-05-23 that Executive Chairperson Benjamin Yi would receive a $240,000 salary, 10 BTC and 15,000 RSUs over a three-year term ending 2024-05-24, cited as claims #14608 through #14611. On 2021-11-07 it disclosed a director compensation increase of 1,000 and a COO equity award of 6,000 units, cited as claims #14409 and #14408. What has not been said is how the 10 BTC is valued and on what schedule it is paid. It is also unclear whether the director and COO figures are dollars, thousands, or per-meeting amounts. Was Mr. Yi's term renewed or amended when it expired in May 2024, and did the Compensation Committee under chair Hannah Cho (claim #14614) retain an independent consultant?
The company disclosed on 2021-12-01 that it would pay $25 million in cash and 645,248 shares for ESS Metron, with 70,165 holdback shares due by 2023-06-01, cited as claims #14351, #14352 and #14353. Separately, on 2021-06-07 it disclosed the sale of its Coinsquare stake to Mogo for CAD 22 million, cited as claim #14580. What has not been said is whether the ESS Metron holdback was released in full or reduced by indemnity claims. How was the Coinsquare consideration split between cash and Mogo securities, and what proceeds were ultimately realized?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed a long-term power purchase agreement for the Whinstone facility on 2022-03-15, cited as claim #14254, and separately booked future power credits as contingent consideration of 83,138 (claim #14478, 2021-08-22). What has not been said is who the power counterparty is, the contract term, the fixed or indexed price, the contracted MW, or how the power-credit value was calculated. The contingent consideration is also recorded with no stated unit, so the reader cannot tell whether it means dollars or thousands of dollars.
The Bitmain miner order is recorded as 480.0 USD in claims #14258, #14266 and #14271 but as 480.0 million USD in claim #14251. An earlier S-19j Pro purchase is recorded as 56.25 USD (claim #14403). A payment schedule (claim #14406) and a delivery schedule running to 2022-05-01 (claim #14405) were disclosed without amounts or dates. What has not been said is the per-unit price, the deposit-versus-balance split, and the cumulative cash paid against each order at each quarter-end.
The company guided to 120,150 miners operational by year-end 2022 (claims #14249, #14256, #14264, #14268), yet the 2022-03-15 Bitmain order covers only 82,500 units (claim #14272). What has not been said is where the remaining roughly 37,650 miners come from: existing fleet, the November 2021 order behind claim #14404, or hosted machines. Nor has the company said whether the 120,150 figure and the 370 MW target (claims #14250, #14257, #14265, #14269) were actually reached by 2022-12-31.
On 2021-08-15 the company stated a 1,500 MW infrastructure development target by 2023-12-31 (claim #14495). Its site-level disclosures only add up to a 700 MW Whinstone expansion with no completion date (claims #14252, #14259, #14267), made up of 200 MW immersion-cooled and 200 MW air-cooled builds (claims #14423, #14424). What has not been said is which site, ERCOT interconnection agreement, or transmission provider accounts for the other roughly 800 MW. The company also hasn't said whether the Massena, New York co-location with Coinmint counts toward any of these totals. That arrangement is only described as month-to-month (claims #14253, #14275), with no MW, hosting rate, or termination terms.
Performance RSU grants of 525,000 units each to Jason Les and Benjamin Yi, 450,000 to Jeffrey McGonegal, and 400,000 to Megan Brooks were disclosed on 2021-08-15 with a 2023-12-31 horizon (claims #14496, #14497, #14498, #14499). They share the date and deadline of the 1,500 MW target. What has not been said is whether vesting was actually tied to that capacity milestone, what the other performance conditions were, and how many units ultimately vested. The related COO disclosures also leave magnitudes unclear: the 325,000 USD salary (claim #14407) is not described as a new base or an increment, the 6,000-unit award (claim #14408) has no stated type, and the 1,000 USD director compensation increase (claim #14409) has no stated period.
The Whinstone purchase is recorded at 267,409 USD (claim #14476) with a completion date of 2021-05-26 from seller Northern Data AG (claims #14260, #14273). The ESS Metron deal carried 25,000,000 USD cash, 645,248 shares at closing, and a 70,165-share holdback due by 2023-06-01 (claims #14351, #14352, #14353). What has not been said is the cash-versus-stock mix and unit basis of the Whinstone price, whether any Northern Data lock-up or ongoing commercial relationship survived closing, and whether the ESS Metron holdback shares were released in full or reduced by indemnity claims.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed on 2022-07-07 that Rhodium was its largest hosting customer (claim #13863), and on the same date said it was ending its Coinmint hosting relationship (claim #13864). What has not been said is how much of hosting revenue Rhodium accounts for, what its contract pays for power and when it expires, or what the Coinmint exit cost in termination payments, lost revenue or freed-up megawatts.
The company disclosed a 1 GW development in Corsicana / Navarro County on 2022-05-17, 2022-06-26, 2022-07-07 and 2022-08-14 (claims #13909, #13885, #13860, #13802), and said Navarro construction was underway on 2022-07-07 and 2022-07-11 (claims #13867, #13859). What has not been said is the site's physical location or parcel, whether ERCOT interconnection approval and a utility agreement are in place for the full gigawatt, when the first megawatts will be energized, and what total capital cost is expected.
The company disclosed a Whinstone/Rockdale expansion to 700 MW on 2022-06-26 (claim #13884), a 400 MW substation and a 100 MW immersion building on 2022-06-30 (claims #13871, #13869), and a 12.6 EH/s hash rate target (claim #13883), while the 2022-05-17 Rockdale expansion claim gave no figure at all (claim #13910). What has not been said is whether 700 MW is total or incremental capacity, how the 400 MW substation fits within it, how much is committed to self-mining versus hosting, and by what date 12.6 EH/s is expected to be reached.
The company disclosed a $500 million at-the-market program on 2022-03-30 and 2022-03-31 with a 3% agent commission (claims #14154, #14144, #14155), described intended use of proceeds only generally (claim #14162), and then sought 340 million more authorized common shares and 30 million preferred shares on 2022-06-06 (claims #13903, #13904). What has not been said is how much of the ATM has been sold, at what average price and how many shares, which projects the proceeds are earmarked for, and what the new preferred authorization is meant to be used for.
The company disclosed on 2022-07-07 that equity compensation was tied to an EBITDA target recorded as 500 USD and a 1,500 MW infrastructure target (claims #13866, #13865), alongside equity plan increases of 4.4 million and 10 million shares (claims #13952, #13905, #13890). What has not been said is the units of the EBITDA target (presumably $500 million) and the period it covers, how many units each executive received, and what pay terms came with Jason Les becoming CEO and Benjamin Yi becoming Executive Chairman (claims #13954, #13953).
The company disclosed a COO separation package on 2022-03-22, including $406,250 cash severance, an $81,250 transition services fee and a 75,000-unit transition services RSU grant (claims #14217, #14218, #14220, #14224), but characterized Megan Brooks' departure as a resignation on 2022-05-01 (claim #13955). It also disclosed a CFO retirement and advisor role on 2022-06-05 (claims #13906, #13907, #13908) and a Marcum LLP auditor engagement (claim #13888). What has not been said is what transition services justify a 75,000-unit grant to a resigning officer, how many performance RSUs actually vested (claim #14223), what the retiring CFO is paid as Senior Advisor, who the incoming CFO is, and why the prior auditor was replaced.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company identified Rhodium as its largest hosting customer on 2022-07-07 (claim #13863) and, in the same disclosure, said it was ending the Coinmint hosting relationship (claim #13864). What has not been said is what share of hosting or total revenue Rhodium represents, the contract's power-pricing and expiration terms, and how much revenue and hosted capacity leave with Coinmint, including any termination payments. Is Riot now more dependent on a single hosting counterparty?
The company disclosed a 1 GW Corsicana/Navarro County development on 2022-05-17, 2022-06-26, 2022-07-07 and 2022-08-14 (claims #13909, #13885, #13860, #13802), with Navarro expansion timelines referenced on 2022-07-07 and 2022-07-11 (claims #13867, #13859). What has not been said is the status of the site's interconnection agreement, the utility and substation involved, the phasing of the 1 GW, a first-energization date, or the capex budget. When does the first megawatt actually come online, and how much of the gigawatt is contracted versus aspirational?
The company set a 12.6 EH/s hash rate target on 2022-06-26 (claim #13883), described an expected miner delivery schedule on 2022-08-15 (claim #13799), and cited a Rockdale megawatt expansion without a stated figure on 2022-05-17 and 2022-08-15 (claims #13910, #13796). What has not been said is the target date for 12.6 EH/s, the number of machines still undelivered, the supplier, and the remaining purchase-price obligations. How many incremental megawatts does the Rockdale expansion add beyond the 700 MW Whinstone figure (claim #13884)?
The company disclosed equity-compensation performance targets on 2022-07-07: an EBITDA target recorded as 500 USD (claim #13866) and a 1,500 MW infrastructure target (claim #13865). Individual awards include Yee's 242,000 PSUs, measured through 2023-12-31, and Werner's 85,998 PSAs, both disclosed on 2022-10-02 (claims #13590, #13597). What has not been said, at least clearly, is the EBITDA figure's units (presumably $500 million, but not stated), its measurement period, whether it is adjusted, and which executives' vesting depends on each hurdle. Does the 1,500 MW goal count only energized capacity, or capacity under construction too?
The company disclosed an increase in authorized common stock to 340,000,000 shares, which appears on 2022-06-06 and 2022-06-16 (claims #13903, #13889) and again as a proposal on 2022-09-22 and 2022-10-02 (claims #13620, #13582). It also disclosed a 30,000,000-share preferred authorization on 2022-06-06 (claim #13904) and repeated equity-plan share increases (claims #13905, #13890, #13841, #13952). What has not been said is why the common-stock increase was brought back to shareholders after the June meeting, whether the earlier vote failed, and what issuance the new preferred and common capacity is meant to fund. Is the capacity intended for an at-the-market program, acquisitions, or Corsicana capex, and what dilution should holders expect?
The company disclosed on 2022-06-05 that its CFO would retire and a new CFO would be appointed by 2022-08-15 (claims #13906, #13908), with the retiring CFO serving as Senior Advisor through 2023-02-07 (claim #13907). It also disclosed COO Megan Brooks's resignation on 2022-05-01 (claim #13955) and a Marcum LLP auditor engagement on 2022-06-16 (claim #13888). What has not been said is the successor CFO's identity and pay, the Senior Advisor compensation, whether the COO role was filled or eliminated and on what separation terms, and which audit firm Marcum replaced and whether there were any disagreements.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed on 2022-07-07 that equity compensation was tied to an infrastructure target of 1,500 MW and an EBITDA target of 500 (claims #13865 and #13866); what has not been said is whether that EBITDA figure is $500 million or some other unit, what measurement period applies, and whether either target was certified as achieved and the associated awards vested. If they were, which executives received how many shares?
The company disclosed on 2022-07-07 that Rhodium was its largest hosting customer and that the Coinmint hosting relationship was ending (claims #13863 and #13864); what has not been said is what share of hosting revenue Rhodium represented, what pricing and power-pass-through terms applied, and what the financial effect of exiting Coinmint was, including any termination costs or stranded capacity. Are there any disputes or renegotiations with either counterparty?
The company disclosed a 1.0 GW Corsicana/Navarro County facility repeatedly between 2022-07-07 and 2023-03-01, including a 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase (claims #13860, #13802, #13529, #13280, #13248, #13263); what has not been said is the executed interconnection agreement status with the utility and ERCOT, the energization date for each phase, and the total capital budget. How will the build be financed, and how many megawatts beyond 400 MW have firm, dated construction schedules?
The company disclosed on 2022-09-22 and 2022-10-02 a proposal to raise authorized common stock to 340,000,000 shares, following an equity plan increase of 10,000,000 shares approved on 2022-08-01 (claims #13620, #13582, #13841, #13858); what has not been said is how much of the new authorization was earmarked for at-the-market offerings versus compensation, and what the expected dilution is against the Corsicana capital need. Did the vote pass, and at what margin?
The company disclosed on 2022-10-02 the CFO transition from McGonegal to Colin Yee, including a $350,000 base salary, 100,565 RSUs, 74,294 RSAs and 242,000 PSUs, plus Ryan Werner's CAO package (claims #13585, #13586, #13587, #13588, #13589, #13590, #13591, #13593, #13594, #13595); what has not been said is the performance metrics and thresholds governing the PSUs, and the compensation paid to McGonegal for the senior advisor engagement ending 2023-02-07. Was any accelerated vesting granted on retirement?
The company disclosed on 2022-08-15 and again on 2022-10-24 and 2022-10-26 an expected miner delivery schedule and future hash rate growth (claims #13799, #13525, #13519, #13521, #13528); what has not been said is the named supplier, the unit count and model, the remaining purchase-price commitment and deposits outstanding, and the specific EH/s target with dates. Were any shipments delayed or deferred?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed on 2023-03-01 that its Corsicana facility would reach 1.0 GW upon completion (claims #13243, #13248, #13253, #13258, #13263, #13269), repeating a figure first stated on 2022-08-14 and 2022-10-18 (claims #13802, #13529), and separately cited a 400 MW immersion-cooled development there (claims #13264, #13274). What has not been said is how the 400 MW relates to the 1 GW: is it a first phase or a separate build? The record also gives no energization dates for the remaining 600 MW, no interconnection agreement or utility counterparty, and no capital cost or financing source for either tranche. The 'Navarro site' expansion with scheduled construction (claims #13524, #13518) is never tied to a physical address, and nothing confirms whether it is the same parcel as Corsicana.
The company disclosed on 2023-03-01 that Rockdale had 700 MW of current developed capacity (claims #13242, #13247, #13262). It also stated that a 400 MW expansion and a fourth building would be completed by 2023-03-31 (claims #13268, #13266, #13255), and both of those are now marked delayed. What has not been said is how much of the 700 MW was energized and hashing rather than merely 'developed,' what caused the delay, and what the revised completion date is. The earlier Whinstone capacity claim (claim #13801) and the 'expanded megawatt capacity under development' claims (claims #13796, #13526, #13520) never attach a number, so the baseline the 700 MW grew from is unstated.
The company disclosed on 2023-03-01 a target of 111,216 miners by 2023-12-31 (claims #13244, #13270, #13273, #13276), and that target is now marked delayed. It also disclosed a Bitmain ASIC purchase order (claim #13261). What has not been said is the order's unit count, model mix, price per terahash, deposit and payment schedule, or delivery dates. The repeated 'scheduled miner deliveries' and 'future hash rate growth' statements (claims #13799, #13525, #13519, #13528, #13521) never give an EH/s figure or quarter-by-quarter schedule. Without those, a reader cannot tell whether the miss came from supply or from site readiness.
The company disclosed on 2022-10-02 CFO Colin Yee's compensation: a $350,000 base salary, 100,565 RSUs, 242,000 PSUs measured through 2023-12-31, and 74,294 RSAs (claims #13588, #13589, #13590, #13591). On the same date it disclosed CAO Ryan Werner's awards: 120,000 PSUs, 85,998 PSAs, and 148,588 RSAs (claims #13595, #13597, #13596). What has not been said is the performance metrics and thresholds governing the PSUs and PSAs, how many of Yee's 242,000 PSUs actually vested after the 2023 measurement date, and the grant-date fair value of these awards. The record also leaves open whether Werner's employment term ending 2023-03-15 (claim #13598) was renewed and on what terms.
The company disclosed on 2022-10-02 that retiring CFO McGonegal would stay on as a senior advisor through 2023-02-07 (claims #13585, #13586). What has not been said is the fee, any accelerated vesting or severance, and the scope of the advisory duties.
The company disclosed on 2022-10-02 and 2022-09-22 a proposal to increase authorized common stock by 340,000,000 shares (claims #13582, #13620). What has not been said is whether 340,000,000 is the increment or the new total, how many shares were outstanding and reserved at the time, and whether an at-the-market program or specific issuance was planned. A reader would also want to know how the proceeds relate to the Corsicana build and the Bitmain order.
The company disclosed on 2022-08-15 that acquired businesses were being integrated (claim #13797), and on 2022-10-26 referenced switchgear operations alongside mining (claim #13517). What has not been said is which businesses were acquired, the purchase price, whether the switchgear unit supplies Riot's own sites as a related-party arrangement, and whether any goodwill from these deals has since been impaired.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company guided on 2023-03-01 to 111,216 Bitcoin miners in operation by December 31, 2023, cited as claims #13249, #13254, #13259, #13265 and #13270, all now marked delayed; what has not been said is how many miners were actually running at year-end 2023, what revised date replaced the original target, and whether the shortfall came from delivery, site readiness or deliberate deferral. The related Bitmain ASIC purchase order, cited as claim #13261, is on record without a unit count, total price, deposit schedule or delivery cadence. Without those figures, can a reader tell whether the order alone was ever sized to reach 111,216 units?
The company stated on 2023-03-01 that Rockdale had 700 MW of developed capacity, cited as claims #13247, #13271 and #13279, and that the fourth Rockdale building would be finished by March 31, 2023, cited as claims #13245 and #13251, both marked delayed. What has not been said is how much of the 700 MW was energized and hashing rather than merely developed, what held up the fourth building, and when it was actually completed. Claim #13255 repeats the completion item with no date at all.
The company disclosed a 1 GW Corsicana (Navarro County) facility on 2022-10-18, cited as claim #13529, restated on 2023-03-01 as claims #13248, #13253, #13258, #13263 and #13269, with a 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase in claims #13246, #13250, #13256, #13264, #13274 and #13280. What has not been said is the energization schedule for the 400 MW phase, the phasing and timing of the remaining 600 MW, and the ERCOT interconnection or utility agreement that secures 1 GW of load. The total capex and funding source for the build are also absent. The October 2022 Navarro expansion disclosures promised "scheduled construction," cited as claims #13518 and #13524, but gave no milestone dates. What were those dates?
In its 2022-10-24 and 2022-10-26 disclosures, the company referred to megawatt capacity under development, cited as claims #13520 and #13526, and to future hash rate growth, cited as claims #13521 and #13528. It attached no MW figure, EH/s target or date to either. What specific capacity and hash rate numbers sat behind those statements, and have they since been met or revised?
The company disclosed on 2022-10-02 a 242,000-unit PSU award to CFO Colin Yee measured through December 31, 2023, cited as claim #13590, and 120,000 PSUs plus 85,998 PSAs to CAO Ryan Werner, cited as claims #13595 and #13597. What has not been said is which performance metrics and thresholds govern those awards and how many units actually vested. Werner's employment term was dated only through March 15, 2023, cited as claim #13598, with no renewal on record. Retiring CFO McGonegal's senior advisor engagement through February 7, 2023, cited as claim #13586, carries no disclosed fee or equity treatment. Were those terms ever disclosed?
The company proposed an increase of 340,000,000 authorized common shares on 2022-09-22 and 2022-10-02, cited as claims #13620 and #13582, around the same time Jason Les and Benjamin Yi were confirmed as CEO and Executive Chairman, cited as claims #13583, #13584, #13621 and #13622. What has not been said is the intended use of the new authorization, including any at-the-market program size or the share count needed to fund Corsicana and the Bitmain order. The record also contains no compensation terms for the CEO or the Executive Chairman, even though it itemizes pay for the CFO and CAO.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-14The company disclosed that Corsicana (Navarro County), Texas would host a 1.0 GW Bitcoin mining facility on 2022-10-18 and repeated the figure across at least eight 2023-03-01 claims (#13529, #13243, #13248, #13253, #13258, #13263, #13269, #13272, #13278). What has not been said is whether that 1.0 GW is contracted interconnection capacity approved by ERCOT and the transmission provider, what substation or interconnection agreement it rests on, and on what schedule the capacity beyond the initial 400 MW immersion-cooled phase (#13246, #13250, #13256, #13264, #13274, #13280) is expected to be energized.
The company disclosed a Rockdale 400 MW expansion and fourth-building completion targeted for 2023-03-31, cited as claims #13268, #13260, #13266, #13275 and #13277, all now marked delayed. It also stated 700 MW of developed capacity at Rockdale (#13242, #13247, #13262, #13271, #13279). What has not been said is how much of that 700 MW was actually energized and hashing on the target date, what caused the slip, and what revised completion date replaced 2023-03-31.
The company disclosed on 2023-03-01 that it expected about 111,216 miners in operation by 2023-12-31, cited as claims #13244 and #13249, both now delayed. It also referenced a Bitmain ASIC purchase order (#13261) and scheduled miner deliveries (#13525, #13519). What has not been said is the unit count, model mix, total dollar value and payment or deposit schedule of the Bitmain order, how many miners were actually operating at year-end 2023, and whether the shortfall came from delivery timing, site energization, or curtailment.
The company disclosed 'megawatt capacity under development' and 'future hash rate growth' on 2022-10-24 and 2022-10-26, cited as claims #13526, #13520, #13528 and #13521. None of these claims carries a number, an EH/s target, or a date. What has not been said is the specific megawatt and exahash figures behind these statements and the quarter in which they were expected to be reached.
The company disclosed CFO Colin Yee's and CAO Ryan Werner's 2022-10-02 compensation, cited as claims #13588-#13591 and #13594-#13597. That includes PSU grants of 242,000 and 120,000 units, with Yee's PSUs tied to 2023-12-31 (#13590). What has not been said is the performance metrics, thresholds and payout curves governing those PSUs, and what share vested given the delayed Rockdale and miner-count targets. Nor has the company said how the 340 million share authorization increase proposed in the same period (#13582) relates to its planned equity issuance and the dilution from these awards.
The company disclosed that former CFO McGonegal would retire and serve as a Senior Advisor through 2023-02-07, cited as claims #13585 and #13586. What has not been said is the compensation, retainer, or accelerated vesting paid under that advisory arrangement, and what specific duties justified it.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed on 2023-04-30 a Corsicana Facility of 1,000 MW total capacity with an initial 400 MW of immersion-cooled mining capacity, cited as claims #12674, #12675, #12679 and #12680, and repeated the one-gigawatt figure on 2023-05-09, 2023-08-08 and 2023-11-07 (claims #12648, #12278, #12003). What has not been said is the physical site address, the utility and ERCOT interconnection agreement behind the 1 GW, how much of that load is actually contracted today, and the energization date for the first 400 MW. The related development claims (#12206, #12286, #12001) carry no promised-by date at all. When does Corsicana draw its first megawatt, and under what interconnection terms?
The company guided on 2023-04-30 and again on 2023-08-08 to 12.5 EH/s of self-mining hash rate and roughly 111,216 deployed miners by 2023-12-31, cited as claims #12677, #12681, #12280 and #12676, from a stated 10.7 EH/s operating base (claim #12279). It then guided to 20.1 EH/s by 2024-06-30 (claim #12281). What has not been said on record is whether either target was met. The record also does not reconcile the 20.1 EH/s figure with the 7.6 EH/s expected from the initial MicroBT order by 2024-04-15 (claim #12383). What was the actual deployed hash rate and miner count at year-end 2023 and at mid-2024, and how much of the gap was delivery timing versus power availability at Rockdale's 700 MW (claim #12277)? Claim #12678 records Rockdale's 'developed capacity' with no number at all.
The company disclosed on 2023-06-29 a $162.9 million order for 33,280 MicroBT miners, cited as claims #12381 and #12382. It also disclosed an option for 66,560 more M56S++ units worth 15.3 EH/s (claims #12384, #12385) under a supply agreement running to 2025 (claim #12380). On 2023-12-05 it described MicroBT purchase options of 265,000 units (claim #11999). What has not been said is the per-unit or per-terahash price for the option tranches and the deposits paid or non-refundable. The record also leaves unclear whether the 265,000 figure is a per-year or aggregate count. Has any option been exercised, and at what committed dollar amount?
The company disclosed the acquisition of ESS Metron, LLC on 2023-05-31 and 2023-06-01, including the issuance of 70,165 shares, cited as claims #12564, #12498 and #12499. What has not been said is the total purchase price, any cash or earn-out component, and ESS Metron's revenue contribution. The record also does not show whether ESS Metron was already a supplier of electrical equipment to Riot's own facilities before the deal. If it was, how much of its pre-acquisition revenue came from Riot?
The company disclosed a $750 million at-the-market equity program at a 3.0% commission on 2023-08-08 and 2023-08-09, cited as claims #12275, #12283, #12273, #12276 and #12284. It raised its equity incentive plan reserve by 4,000,000 shares in June 2023 (claims #12497, #12543, #12386) and by a further 13,000,000 shares in October 2023 (claims #12134, #12135, #12004). What has not been said is how much of the ATM has been sold, at what average price, with what resulting share count and use of proceeds. The record also does not explain what burn rate justified a 17 million share plan expansion within four months.
The company disclosed LTIP service and performance awards to its CEO, Executive Chairman, CFO, General Counsel and Chief Accounting Officer on 2023-07-18, cited as claims #12355 through #12364. What has not been said is the performance metrics, hurdles and vesting schedule that govern the performance tranches due by 2026-07-31. The record also shows unexplained mismatches: the CFO and General Counsel service awards are recorded as 123,231 shares (claims #12357, #12361) against 123,321-share performance awards (claims #12358, #12362), while the CEO and Executive Chairman awards are symmetric. Is that a real difference or a filing error, and how many performance shares will actually vest in 2026?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed a MicroBT mining server purchase order on 2023-12-05, cited as claim #11997, recorded at 290.5 USD with delivery promised by 2025-04-30. What has not been said is the unit of that figure (presumably $290.5 million), how many machines it covers, or the price per terahash. It is also unclear whether this order is the exercise of the 66,560-unit purchase option (claim #12384) or a separate order under the 265,000-unit option framework (claims #11999, #11994). The initial order of 33,280 units for $162.9 million (claims #12381, #12382) gives a benchmark. Did pricing per unit or per EH/s change between the two orders?
The company has described the Corsicana site as a 1.0 GW development in at least three filings (claims #12648, #12278, #12003). It later guided to 400 MW of Phase 1 operations commencing by 2024-03-31 (claims #11995, #11987) and to 38.0 EH/s of capacity there (claim #11998). What has not been said is the site's ERCOT interconnection status, the substation and energization schedule for the remaining 600 MW, the total construction budget, or any power purchase terms. Has Phase 1 actually been energized on the stated date, and how many MW are drawing load today?
The company disclosed the acquisition of ESS Metron, LLC on 2023-05-31 and 2023-06-01, cited as claims #12564 and #12498, with an equity component of 70,165 shares (claim #12499). What has not been said is the total purchase price in dollars, the cash-versus-stock split, ESS Metron's revenue or backlog, and how much of its output is captive to Riot's own Rockdale and Corsicana buildouts versus third-party customers. Were there any earnout or retention arrangements with ESS Metron's sellers?
The company disclosed paired service and performance LTIP awards on 2023-07-18 for the CEO, Executive Chairman, CFO, General Counsel and Chief Accounting Officer (claims #12355 through #12364), vesting in 2026. What has not been said is the performance metrics, hurdles, or peer group governing the performance tranches. The CFO and General Counsel service awards are recorded as 123,231 shares (claims #12357, #12361) while their performance awards are 123,321 shares (claims #12358, #12362). Is that a typo or a real difference? Separately, the plan pool was raised by 4,000,000 shares (claims #12543, #12497, #12386) and then by a further 13,000,000 shares within months (claims #12135, #12134, #12004, #11996). What annual burn rate and remaining unallocated pool justify that second increase?
The company disclosed a $750 million at-the-market equity program on 2023-08-08 and 2023-08-09, cited as claims #12275, #12283 and #12273, with a 3.0 percent sales commission (claims #12276, #12284). What has not been said is the sales agent's identity, how much of the $750 million has been sold and at what average price, and how much of the proceeds funded the MicroBT orders (claims #12382, #11997). Is the program now exhausted, and has a successor ATM been filed?
The company guided on 2023-08-08 to 12.5 EH/s by year-end 2023 (claim #12280) and 20.1 EH/s by mid-2024 (claim #12281), starting from 10.7 EH/s operational (claim #12279). It later guided to 38.0 EH/s by 2025-06-30 (claim #11993) on delivery of 99,840 MicroBT units (claim #11992). What has not been said, in the records available here, is whether any of those hash rate milestones were actually hit on time. Also absent is how much of Rockdale's 700 MW (claim #12277) is used for self-mining versus hosting, and how many MW of the repeatedly cited immersion-cooled hardware (claims #12647, #12285, #12282, #12205, #12000, #12002) are actually deployed and at what fleet efficiency in J/TH.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed MicroBT purchase orders valued at "290.5 USD" on 2023-12-05, cited as claim #11997, and cumulative orders of "453400.0 USD" on 2024-02-22, cited as claim #11964. Those figures add up with the $162.9 million initial order in claim #12382 only if they mean $290.5 million and $453.4 million, so the units need to be confirmed. What has not been said is the per-terahash price of each tranche, the deposit and payment schedule, and the price and funding plan for the 265,000-unit annual purchase options in claims #11999 and #11967. What are the actual dollar amounts, when do payments fall due, and what would exercising the options cost?
The company disclosed a sequence of hash rate targets: 12.5 EH/s by year-end 2023 (claim #12280), 20.1 EH/s by mid-2024 (claim #12281), 28 EH/s by year-end 2024 (claims #11961 and #11969), and 38 EH/s by 2025-06-30 (claims #11962 and #11998). The only operational figure on record is 10.7 EH/s as of 2023-08-08 (claim #12279). What has not been said is what hash rate was actually energized at each of those deadlines. It is also unclear whether the 99,840-unit MicroBT deployment (claims #11968 and #11972) was completed on time, and how many delivered miners are sitting undeployed.
The company disclosed a 1.0 GW Corsicana facility with a 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase and operations starting by 2024-03-31, cited as claims #12278, #12003, #11966 and #11965. What has not been said is the status of the ERCOT interconnection, including the transmission provider, signed interconnection agreement dates, substation energization milestones, and the timeline and capex for the remaining 600 MW. When did first power actually flow, and how much of the 1 GW is contracted versus merely planned?
The company disclosed a 700 MW Rockdale facility on 2023-08-08, cited as claim #12277, and described its "competitive position" on 2024-02-22, cited as claim #11960, without quantifying it. What has not been said is the counterparty, term and fixed price of the power supply contract, the all-in cost per MWh, or how much revenue came from power sales and demand-response credits versus mining. What is Rockdale's realized power cost, and when does the current contract reset?
The company disclosed a $750 million at-the-market offering with a 3% sales commission on 2023-08-08 and 2023-08-09, cited as claims #12275, #12283, #12273, #12276 and #12284. What has not been said, in the claims on record, is the name of the sales agent, how much of the program has been sold, the average sale price, or how the proceeds were split between the MicroBT orders and Corsicana construction. How many shares were issued under the ATM, and how much capacity remains?
The company disclosed LTIP service and performance awards on 2023-07-18, cited as claims #12355 through #12364. The CEO and Executive Chairman received identical 184,820-share grants, and the CFO and General Counsel service awards (123,231 shares) differ from their performance awards (123,321 shares) by exactly 90 shares, which looks like a transposition. The company then expanded the equity plan by 4 million shares (claim #12386) and by another 13 million shares within six months (claims #12134, #12135, #12004 and #11996). What has not been said is which performance metrics and thresholds govern the performance awards, why the Executive Chairman is paid on par with the CEO, whether the 123,231 versus 123,321 difference is a real figure or an error, and what annual burn rate the 13 million-share increase was sized to cover.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed a MicroBT purchase of 99,840 miners for $453.4 million on 2024-02-22, cited as claims #11991, #11982 and #11972, and a separate MicroBT purchase order recorded as 290.5 on 2023-12-05 with delivery by 2025-04-30, cited as claim #11997. What has not been said is how the two orders relate. Is the $453.4 million inclusive of the December order, or additive? The record also leaves the units unclear: #11997 reads as 290.5 USD and #11964 as 453,400 USD, where millions are presumably meant. Nor has the company given the per-unit price, the hash rate per machine, or the deposits already paid versus balances still due.
The company disclosed options to buy up to 265,000 additional MicroBT miners through 2027 on 2023-12-05 and again on 2024-02-22, cited as claims #11999, #11994, #11967 and #11974. What has not been said is the pricing mechanism for those options. Is the price fixed, indexed to hash price, or renegotiated annually? The company also has not said whether exercising them requires upfront deposits, or what happens if the options go unexercised. At current fleet economics, those options could imply a multi-billion-dollar commitment.
The company disclosed a 1.0 GW Corsicana, Texas facility with a 400 MW initial phase due to begin operations by 2024-03-31, cited as claims #12003, #11989, #11995, #11966 and #11987, and a 700 MW Rockdale facility, cited as claim #12277. What has not been said is the site's physical address and its interconnection arrangement: the ERCOT interconnection status, the transmission provider, and whether a power purchase agreement or fixed-price contract backs the capacity. The record shows no confirmation that the 400 MW phase was actually energized on schedule, and no timeline or capital budget for the remaining 600 MW.
The company guided to 12.5 EH/s by end of 2023, 20.1 EH/s by mid-2024, 28 EH/s by end of 2024 and 38 EH/s by mid-2025, cited as claims #12280, #12281, #11988/#11969/#11980 and #11993/#11970. What has not been said, anywhere on the record, is the actual hash rate achieved at each deadline. The company also has not clarified whether 'capacity' means installed hardware or hash rate actually online after curtailment and power-credit sales. That distinction is material at Rockdale, whose 'competitive position' is asserted without a stated all-in power cost per MWh (claims #11960, #11975).
The company disclosed a $750 million at-the-market offering with Cantor at a 3.0% commission on 2023-08-08 and 2023-08-09, cited as claims #12275, #12283, #12273, #12276 and #12284. What has not been said is how much of the program has been sold, at what average price and share count, and whether the proceeds funded the $453.4 million MicroBT commitment. The company has also not said whether it has filed or planned a follow-on ATM program.
The company disclosed a 13,000,000-share increase to its equity incentive plan, first on 2023-10-16 and approved by 2023-12-19, cited as claims #12135, #12134, #12004 and #11996. What has not been said is who received grants from the expanded pool, in what amounts, and against what performance metrics (hash rate, cost per coin, or share price). The company also has not disclosed the resulting annual burn rate or overhang as a percentage of outstanding shares, which matters given the concurrent ATM dilution.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed a MicroBT mining server purchase order on 2023-12-05, cited as claim #11997, and then on 2024-02-22 a purchase of 99,840 MicroBT miners for $453.4 million, cited as claims #11991 and #11982 and recorded as 453,400 USD in claim #11964. On 2024-02-25 it disclosed a follow-on order of 66,560 units, cited as claim #11954. What has not been said is whether the $290.5 figure is millions and part of the $453.4 million, or a separate commitment. The company also has not given the unit split between the initial and follow-on orders, the per-miner price, or the deposit and payment schedule, including how much cash was still owed against the mid-2025 delivery date.
The company disclosed on 2024-02-22 that the Corsicana Facility would start a 400 MW immersion-cooled initial phase by the end of Q1 2024, cited as claims #11995, #11987 and #11986, within a planned 1 GW total, cited as claims #11989 and #12003. What has not been said is the site's physical parcel or address, the transmission provider, and whether an ERCOT interconnection or large-load approval covers the full 1 GW or only phase one. Nor has it confirmed that phase one was actually energized by 2024-03-31, or given any schedule for the remaining 600 MW.
The company disclosed self-mining hash rate capacity of 38.0 EH/s on 2023-12-05 and 2024-02-22, cited as claims #11993, #11970 and #11962, but 38.3 EH/s on 2024-02-25, cited as claim #11956. Claim #11998 attributes 38.0 EH/s to the Corsicana data center alone. That compares with 12.4 EH/s operational at 2023-12-31, cited as claim #11951, and a 28.0 EH/s year-end 2024 target, cited as claims #11961 and #11988. What has not been said is which figure is correct, and how capacity divides between Rockdale's 700 MW, cited as claim #11949, and Corsicana. The company also has not disclosed the fleet efficiency (J/TH) behind those numbers, or whether the 28 EH/s target was reached by 2024-12-31.
The company disclosed options to buy up to 265,000 additional MicroBT miners through 2027, cited as claims #11985, #11994, #11955 and #11999. What has not been said is the option exercise price or how it will be set, whether any option premium or deposit was paid, the miner models and efficiency covered, and whether any options have been exercised since.
The company disclosed a 13,000,000-share increase to its equity incentive plan, first dated 2023-10-31 and then 2023-12-19, cited as claims #12004 and #11996. It also disclosed a $750 million at-the-market common stock offering on 2024-02-25, cited as claim #11948. What has not been said is how much of the new plan pool went to named executive officers, and the resulting dilution and burn rate. It also has not disclosed how many ATM shares were sold, at what average price, and how much of the proceeds went to the MicroBT commitments versus Corsicana construction.
The company disclosed litigation challenging an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey on 2024-02-22, cited as claim #6235, and a temporary restraining order the next day, cited as claim #6236. What has not been said is whether that relief became a preliminary injunction or was dissolved, and whether the company ultimately provided energy consumption and curtailment data to regulators. It also has not quantified how any resulting reporting or curtailment requirement would affect its power-credit revenue at Rockdale and Corsicana.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed that an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey was abandoned and Form EIA-862 data collection was discontinued following court action (claims 6235-6237, dated Feb-Mar 2024); what has not been said is what direct legal defense costs Riot incurred to challenge the survey, whether any settlement payments were made to counterparties, or how mining operations were affected during the dispute period. Riot disclosed acquiring a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd. through multiple purchases totaling over $200 million (claims 5801, 6014, 6015, dated June-Sept 2024); what has not been said is the current fair market value of this stake, whether the conditional share purchase rights tied to a 15% threshold have been exercised or remain pending, or key performance metrics showing Bitfarms' operational health since acquisition. The company disclosed raising $525 million in convertible senior notes with proceeds designated for Bitcoin acquisition (claims 5251, 5261, dated Dec 2024); what has not been said is the quantity of Bitcoin purchased, the average price paid per coin, whether any holdings have been subsequently liquidated, or the current unrealized gain or loss on this capital deployment. Riot disclosed land holdings at its Corsicana facility (claim 6013, dated June 2024); what has not been said is the acreage owned, the capital value of the property, current mining capacity deployed there, or expansion timelines and capital requirements. The company disclosed entering a settlement agreement with Bitfarms that included director nomination rights and conditional purchase options (claims 5695, 5705-5706, dated Sept 2024); what has not been said is what specific business dispute or disagreement necessitated the settlement, what material ongoing obligations or restrictions Riot accepted, or the circumstances under which the conditional purchase rights would be triggered. Riot disclosed compensation for its Chief Operating Officer including a $400,000 base salary, 100% annual incentive target, and 373,927 share grant (claims 6040-6042, dated June 2024); what has not been said is comparable compensation packages for the CEO and CFO, specific severance multiples or change-of-control payments owed to executives, or whether any officers have received personal loans from the company.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-13The company disclosed on 2024-06-03 an 11.3% stake in Bitfarms (44.9M units, claim 6053), then on 2024-06-11 a total investment of $111.1M (claim 6015), then 14% ownership on 2024-06-12 (claim 6011), and finally 19.9% ownership financed with $202.2M from working capital on 2024-09-04 (claims 5801-5802). What remains undisclosed is the transaction history explaining this progression: the per-share prices paid in each tranche, whether these represent a single commitment with phased settlement or separate discretionary purchases, and how share dilution between June and September affected the percentage calculations relative to actual shares acquired.
The company stated that $202.2M of the Bitfarms acquisition was financed from working capital (claim 5802) and that the Bitfarms acquisition used working capital (claim 6012). What has not been disclosed is Riot's cash position before and after this deployment—specifically, the remaining working capital available for operations, debt service, and organic growth investments after committing 30-40% of disclosed working capital to a single strategic investment.
In December 2024, Riot raised $525M in convertible senior notes (claim 5251), with a stated purpose to acquire Bitcoin using the proceeds (claim 5252). What has not been disclosed is the granular allocation of these proceeds: the dollar amount and timing of actual Bitcoin purchases executed, the amount retained as cash reserves, and whether any portion was used to replenish working capital depleted by the Bitfarms acquisition or to reduce debt.
The company disclosed multiple regulatory actions from February through March 2024 related to an emergency EIA-862 cryptocurrency mining survey, including a temporary restraining order (claim 6236), discontinuation of the emergency authorization (claim 6237), and eventual destruction of collected data (claim 6347). What has not been disclosed is whether Riot or its mining operations faced penalties, compliance costs, or operational disruptions from these actions, and whether the promised future notice-and-comment procedures for cryptocurrency mining surveys (claim 6346) will create material new reporting obligations or restrictions on Riot's mining capacity.
On 2024-06-17, Riot amended five executive employment agreements to include revised severance provisions (claim 5965) and reserved 15M shares under the 2019 Equity Plan (claim 5963). What has not been disclosed is the specific severance multiples, change-of-control thresholds, and individual officer amounts, preventing investors from quantifying total potential severance liability in an acquisition scenario or management transition.
The company disclosed its September 2024 settlement with Bitfarms, including conditional share purchase rights triggered at a 15% beneficial ownership threshold (claim 5702) and standstill provisions (claim 5699), with an agreement term promised by June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). What has not been disclosed is the specific pricing formula for those conditional purchase rights, the precise scope and duration of standstill restrictions (non-solicitation, non-voting coalitions, public opposition), and whether the June 1, 2026 expiration is a hard termination or subject to auto-renewal, leaving the economic value and enforceability of these governance rights unclear.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-11The company disclosed a Bitfarms acquisition of approximately $90 million on 2024-06-03 (claim 6052) representing 11.3% ownership with 44.9 million units (claim 6053), but subsequently disclosed on 2024-06-11 that the total investment was $111 million with 53.8 million units (claims 6014-6015), and further disclosed on 2024-09-04 a total investment of $202.2 million for 90.1 million shares representing 19.9% ownership (claims 5801-5802). What has not been said is the timing, price per share, and rationale for each tranch of investment, making it impossible for readers to understand the company's cost basis or acquisition strategy.
The company disclosed a $500 million convertible notes offering on 2024-12-08 (claim 5261) and on 2024-12-09 stated the offering was "priced at 525.0 USD" (claim 5259) with an overallotment option of $75 (claim 5260). What has not been said is whether the final offering size was $500 million or $525 million, what the price of $525 represents (per bond unit? per $1000 face value?), and the conversion price, conversion premium, or conversion ratio relative to the company's common stock.
The company disclosed on 2024-12-10 that it would use convertible notes proceeds to acquire Bitcoin (claim 5252) and separately disclosed a $525 million offering of 0.75% convertible senior notes due 2030-01-15 (claim 5251). What has not been said is the actual quantity of Bitcoin acquired, the purchase price per Bitcoin, and whether the acquisition has been completed or remains pending.
The company disclosed on 2024-06-12 that it holds land at the Corsicana Facility (claim 6013) but disclosed no details regarding the property. What has not been said is the acreage or land area, the planned mining hashrate capacity at the facility, the status of facility development and infrastructure, and whether the company has secured power supply contracts or interconnection agreements.
The company disclosed on 2024-06-17 that five executive employment agreements were amended with revised severance provisions (claim 5965) and that new indemnification agreements with directors and officers were adopted (claim 5966), and later disclosed that executives have 36-month terms with auto-renewal (claim 5370). What has not been said is which five executives had agreements amended, the specific terms that changed in severance provisions, and the detailed terms of the new indemnification agreements.
The company disclosed on 2024-09-22 a settlement agreement with Bitfarms Ltd. (claim 5695) that included board member voting commitments, director nomination rights, and conditional share purchase rights exercisable at 15% ownership (claims 5696-5705), with the agreement term scheduled to expire 2026-06-01 (claim 5701, marked as delayed status). What has not been said is whether the agreement was extended, modified, or terminated, and what the current status is of the 15% ownership purchase right trigger.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-11The company disclosed a $90 million Bitfarms acquisition on June 3, 2024 (claim 6052), then reported total investment of $111 million on June 11 (claim 6015), then $202 million financed from working capital on September 4 (claim 5802); what has not been said is whether these represent overlapping tranches, cumulative investment across multiple stages, or superseding figures, and what the actual total capital deployed to Bitfarms is.
The company disclosed conditional share purchase rights at Bitfarms with a "15.0 percent" threshold on September 22, 2024 (claims 5702, 5706); what has not been said is the trigger mechanism for exercising these rights—whether the 15 percent threshold refers to a stock price level, a date, voting percentage, or another metric. Additionally, claim 5701 references an agreement term expiration on June 1, 2026, but does not specify which provisions or rights expire at that date.
The company disclosed a $525 million convertible senior notes offering on December 9, 2024 (claims 5259-5260); what has not been said is the conversion price per share, which is necessary to calculate potential shareholder dilution from conversion—a material metric that is standard disclosure for convertible securities.
The company disclosed a COO Long-Term Incentive Award of 373,927 shares on June 5, 2024 (claim 6042); what has not been said is the vesting schedule (including cliff period and annual vest percentages), any performance conditions tied to vesting, and the grant date value—elements that are standard in proxy compensation disclosures and material to assessing executive incentive alignment.
The company referenced the Corsicana Facility on June 12, 2024 (claim 6013) as "land holdings" without quantification; what has not been said is the facility's acreage, square footage, electrical capacity in MW, operational status (planned or constructed), and timeline for activation—metrics that are fundamental operational data for a cryptocurrency mining operator.
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms on September 22, 2024 (claims 5695, 5704) and detailed governance provisions including director nomination rights and voting commitments (claims 5696-5705); what has not been said is whether Riot paid termination fees, agreed to fund Bitfarms operations, or provided other financial consideration beyond the equity stake already disclosed.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-09The company disclosed acquiring a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms for approximately $90 million in June 2024 (claim 6052) and having made a total investment of $111 million by mid-June (claim 6015), but then reported investing $202 million from working capital in September (claim 5802) to acquire 19.9% with 90 million shares (claim 5801). What has not been said is the actual cost basis across these multiple tranches, whether the share count changed due to dilution or different pricing, and the all-in acquisition cost per share that justifies the 19.9% stake value.
The company announced the Corsicana Facility land holdings (claim 6013) without any disclosure of nameplate capacity in megawatts, expected hash rate, power draw requirements, grid interconnection details, or total capital investment. A mining operator would ordinarily disclose these metrics; what remains unexplained is the operational capacity and timeline for the Corsicana site to generate material revenue.
The convertible senior notes offering was announced at $500 million (claim 5261) and then priced at $525 USD with a $75 USD overallotment option (claims 5259–5260), but the pricing per security and conversion price per share are not clearly stated, and a subsequent disclosure cites $525 million at 0.75% (claim 5251). What has not been clarified is the exact conversion price, the fully diluted share count impact, and the reconciliation between the $500 million and $525 million figures.
The company disclosed using convertible notes proceeds to acquire Bitcoin (claim 5252) but did not state how many BTC were purchased, at what price per coin, or what percentage of the company's capital allocation this represented. An investor would expect a material capital deployment to include the quantity and valuation; what is missing is the actual Bitcoin purchase volume and timing.
The settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695) granted director nomination rights (claim 5705), voting commitments (claim 5696), and standstill provisions (claim 5699) with an expiration date promised by June 1, 2026 (claim 5701, now in the past as of September 9, 2026, status=delayed). What has not been disclosed is what happened upon expiration—whether rights were extended, renegotiated, or lapsed, and what governance position Riot holds in Bitfarms after that date.
The company disclosed that five executive employment agreements were amended with revised severance provisions (claim 5965) and disclosed the Chief Operating Officer's compensation package of $400,000 salary, 100% incentive target, and 373,927 shares (claims 6040–6042), but provided no equivalent proxy-style disclosure of compensation for the CEO (claim 5366), Chief Financial Officer (claim 6054), General Counsel (claim 6055), or Executive Chairman (claim 5367). What remains unstated is the full severance trigger amounts, accelerated vesting terms, and total compensation packages for the executive team.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-07The company disclosed multiple stakes in Bitfarms Ltd. ranging from 11.3% (claim 6053, June 3, 2024) to 14% (claim 6011, June 12, 2024) to 14.9% (claim 5927, June 23, 2024) to 19.9% (claim 5801, September 4, 2024), yet did not explain the progression—were there additional purchases between these dates, or did the percentages change due to share count adjustments at Bitfarms? What has not been said is whether each disclosed stake represented a separate acquisition with its own cost basis, or if they were cumulative tranches of a single larger investment.
The company disclosed financing its Bitfarms acquisition with $111.09 million (claim 6015, June 11, 2024) and later $202.18 million (claim 5802, September 4, 2024) from "working capital" (claims 6012, 5802), yet provided no disclosure of Riot's cash position, debt incurrence, or asset sales to fund this capital outflow. What has not been said is how Riot maintained operational liquidity while deploying over $200 million into a non-consolidated investment.
The company disclosed a convertible notes offering of $500 million (claim 5261, December 8, 2024), then $525 million (claim 5251, December 10, 2024) at 0.75% maturity in 2030, but did not disclose the conversion price or the effective dilution to existing shareholders from the conversion feature. What has not been said is the stated conversion price and the fully-diluted share count upon conversion.
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695, September 22, 2024) that includes "standstill provisions and restrictions" (claim 5699) and a conditional purchase right triggered at 15% ownership (claim 5702), yet Riot's disclosed stake was already 19.9% (claim 5703) at settlement. What has not been said is how these conditions operate when Riot already exceeds the 15% threshold, or whether the disclosure is internally inconsistent.
The company disclosed that five executive employment agreements were "amended with revised severance provisions" (claim 5965, June 17, 2024), but did not disclose what those new arrangements were or quantify the cost of potential terminations. What has not been said is the trigger events and monetary amounts for the revised severance provisions.
The company disclosed the Chief Operating Officer received a long-term incentive award of 373,927 shares (claim 6042, June 5, 2024), but did not disclose the vesting schedule, performance conditions, or clawback provisions attached to the award. What has not been said is whether the shares vest immediately, over time, or contingent on performance, and under what circumstances the award could be forfeited.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-06The company disclosed on June 5, 2024 (claims 6039-6042) the appointment of a Chief Operating Officer with annual base salary of $400,000, 100 percent incentive target, and 373,927 shares in long-term incentive awards; however, the appointee's name and hiring context—whether internal promotion or external recruit—were not disclosed, a material gap in executive personnel disclosure.
On June 3, 2024 (claim 6053), Riot disclosed an 11.3 percent Bitfarms stake for approximately $90 million, but by June 11 (claim 6014) announced a 14 percent stake totaling 53,793,440 units at $111 million total investment, and by September 4 (claim 5801) a 19.9 percent stake of 90,110,912 shares for $202 million—yet the company never clarified the precise sequence, timing, and per-unit pricing of each tranche, leaving the valuation progression and capital deployment opaque to shareholders.
The COO's long-term incentive award of 373,927 shares (claim 6042) lacked disclosure of vesting schedule, duration, or performance conditions, obscuring the full compensation value and shareholder dilution timing.
Riot disclosed on September 22, 2024 a settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695) granting director nomination and conditional share purchase rights at a 15 percent threshold (claims 5702, 5706), but the trigger mechanism (whether the right activates above or below 15 percent), the maximum quantity purchasable, pricing terms, and the underlying dispute or financial consideration involved in the settlement were not specified.
The company announced Bitcoin acquisition using $525 million in convertible notes proceeds (claim 5252) without stating the quantity of Bitcoin purchased, price per coin, acquisition timing, or allocation of proceeds between Bitcoin and other uses.
The regulatory record spanning February–March 2024 (claims 6235-6347) documents litigation over an emergency cryptocurrency mining survey and data collection, including a temporary restraining order and mandated data destruction, but the ultimate litigation outcome, settlement amount (if any), and any ongoing compliance obligations or liability exposure remain undisclosed.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-06The company disclosed multiple Bitfarms stake purchases at different dates and percentages—11.3% ($90M) on June 3, 14% on June 12, 14.9% on June 23, and 19.9% ($202M total investment) by September 4, 2024—yet failed to explain the sequence, timing, or per-share pricing of these successive tranches, citing claims 6052, 6011, 5927, and 5801; a first-year analyst would ask: what was purchased between each announcement, at what price per share, and why did the total investment jump from $111M (claimed 6015) to $202M? The settlement agreement with Bitfarms announced September 22, 2024 (claim 5695) is described through governance rights (director nomination, standstill provisions, voting commitments) but claim 5704 disclosing the settlement itself is marked withdrawn, and the actual negotiated terms—whether cash was paid, what Riot conceded, or what Bitfarms agreed to—remain undisclosed. Riot disclosed that it obtained conditional share purchase rights in Bitfarms (claim 5706) with a condition tied to "15.0 percent" (claim 5702), but did not specify the mechanics: at what price, under what timing, and what happens if ownership drops below or rises above 15%? A $525 million convertible notes offering closed in December 2024 (claims 5251, 5261) at 0.75% interest maturing January 2030, but the conversion price—essential to modeling dilution—is absent from all disclosures. Riot applied to Ontario's Capital Markets Tribunal to cease-trade Bitfarms' poison pill in June 2024 (claims 5922, 5929), but the outcome of that application—approved, denied, or pending—was never disclosed. Five executive employment agreements were amended with "revised severance provisions" on June 17, 2024 (claim 5965), but the company named neither the executives nor disclosed whether severance increased, decreased, or under what triggering events, preventing assessment of potential exit costs.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-06The company disclosed a COO appointment on 2024-06-05 (claims 6039-6042) with specific compensation: $400,000 base salary, 100% annual incentive target, and 373,927 shares in long-term incentive awards—but the COO's name is absent from the disclosure. By late November 2024, when the company names Jason Les (CEO), Benjamin Yi (Executive Chairman), William Jackman (EVP General Counsel), and Jason Chung (EVP Head of Corporate Development & Strategy), no COO appears in the officer roster; what has not been said is whether the COO departed, was reassigned, or the role was eliminated, and if so, what severance or transition costs were incurred.
Riot disclosed a Bitfarms settlement agreement on 2024-09-22 (claims 5695-5706) with conditional share purchase rights triggered at a 15 percent ownership threshold and standstill provisions, promising agreement term expiration by 2026-06-01 (claim 5701, status delayed). What has not been said is the specific mechanics of the standstill—whether Riot can acquire additional Bitfarms shares if the company's ownership falls below 15 percent, or whether the restriction survives the June 2026 expiration, and what governance rights Riot retains after that date.
The company disclosed a $500 million convertible notes offering on 2024-12-08 (claim 5261), then a $525 million offering price on 2024-12-09 (claim 5259), with a $75 overallotment option (claim 5260)—leaving ambiguity about whether the final amount raised was $500M, $525M, or $525M + overallotment. What has not been said is the conversion price relative to Riot's stock price on the pricing date, the interest rate accrual mechanics, and the reconciliation between the $500M and $525M figures.
Riot disclosed that on 2024-12-10 it acquired Bitcoin using convertible notes proceeds (claim 5252), but disclosed no quantity of Bitcoin acquired, execution price, settlement date, or timing of the purchase relative to the note issuance. What has not been said is the size of this treasury Bitcoin position and its carrying value as of the quarterly close.
On 2024-06-17, the company amended five executive employment agreements with revised severance provisions (claim 5965) and adopted new indemnification agreements with directors and officers (claim 5966), but disclosed neither the severance amounts, the triggers for payment (termination for convenience, change of control, death/disability), the aggregate liability assumed, nor the scope of indemnified liabilities. What has not been said is the contingent cash obligation associated with severance and the operational or litigation risks covered by the new indemnification.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-06The company disclosed Riot's Bitfarms stake grew from 11.3% for approximately $90M (June 3, 2024, claim 6052) to 19.9% for $202.2M (September 4, 2024, claim 5802). While it disclosed total investment amounts and resulting equity percentages, it did not disclose per-share purchase prices on each date, leaving the pricing progression opaque; the implied second-tranche pricing (~$2.51/share on Sept 4) is materially higher than the first tranche (~$2.06/share on June 11, claim 6015), yet no explanation for this 22% price escalation has been provided. What was the per-share price Riot paid in each Bitfarms acquisition tranche, and on what specific dates did these purchases occur?
The company established a Chief Operating Officer position on June 5, 2024, disclosing $400,000 annual base salary, 373,927 long-term incentive shares, and 100% annual incentive target (claims 6040-6042). However, the company has not disclosed the identity of the Chief Operating Officer, despite naming other senior executives including CEO Jason Les, Executive Chairman Benjamin Yi, EVP General Counsel William Jackman, and CFO Colin Yee (claims 5366-5369, 6054, 6055). Who is the Chief Operating Officer, and why was this executive's identity excluded from the compensation disclosure?
The company announced "Corsicana Facility land holdings" on June 12, 2024 (claim 6013) but provided no capacity metrics—neither acreage, megawatts of power capacity, mining hash rate (TH/s), nor operational timeline. For a Bitcoin mining company, a facility disclosure without capacity specifications is fundamentally incomplete. What is the acreage, electrical power capacity in megawatts, mining capacity in TH/s, and current operational status of the Corsicana facility?
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms Ltd. on September 22, 2024, which established "standstill provisions," "voting commitment," "director nomination rights," conditional share purchase rights, and a 7.5% beneficial ownership threshold (claims 5695-5706). However, the company did not define what transactions the standstill prohibits, which shareholder votes Riot's commitment covers, what actions activate the director nomination right, or what events trigger conditional purchase obligations. What are the detailed standstill terms, which specific votes does Riot's commitment apply to, under what conditions can Riot nominate directors, and what events trigger the conditional share purchase rights?
The company financed a $202.2M Bitfarms acquisition from "working capital" in September 2024 (claim 5802) but did not disclose the source of this capital or quantify available liquidity, despite no material financing event prior to September. The company's primary subsequent financing event—a $525M convertible notes offering (claim 5251)—was promised by December 11, 2024 but showed delayed status (claim 5259), suggesting the Sept. acquisition was funded from existing reserves not separately disclosed. Where did the $202M working capital come from in September 2024, and what cash position or prior financing arrangements enabled this outlay three months before closing the convertible notes offering?
The company disclosed a $525M convertible senior notes offering and separately disclosed an "overallotment option for convertible notes 75.0 USD" (claims 5251, 5260), but the unit denomination of the overallotment is ambiguous—"75.0 USD" could represent $75M in additional principal, 75M shares, or another unit entirely. Is the total convertible notes offering $525M or $600M (if the overallotment is $75M), and what is the precise dollar amount and denomination of the overallotment option?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05Riot disclosed multiple Bitfarms stake acquisitions between June and September 2024 with conflicting unit counts (44.9 million units on June 3 per claim 6053, then 53.8 million units total by June 11 per claim 6014, then 90.1 million shares by September 4 per claim 5801), yet never reconciled these figures or explained whether earlier purchases were rolled into later tranches or represented discrete acquisitions at different prices—a first-year analyst would immediately ask: what is the fully consolidated cost basis, share count, and acquisition timeline for the 19.9% final stake (claim 5703)?
Riot disclosed the Corsicana Facility as a land holding (claim 6013) but provided zero capacity metrics—no megawatt rating, no planned power draw, no hashrate contribution—despite being a cryptocurrency mining company for which facility capacity is the core operational metric and would be announced on any earnings call.
The $525M convertible senior notes offering (claim 5251) specifies a 0.75% coupon and a conversion-related price of "525.0 USD" (claim 5259), yet the units of that price figure are undefined—neither the prospectus-standard conversion price per share nor the price per $1,000 face value is stated, making the conversion economics opaque (claims 5259-5260).
Riot disclosed $525M in convertible notes proceeds available and stated it would acquire Bitcoin with those proceeds (claim 5252), but never disclosed the quantity purchased, the price paid, or the timing of purchase relative to note closing—despite this being the company's primary intended use of capital.
The settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claims 5695-5706) specifies a 7.5% beneficial ownership threshold (claim 5700), a 15% purchase rights condition (claim 5702), director nomination rights (claim 5705), and a June 1, 2026 termination date (claim 5701), yet does not disclose whether Riot faces a standstill restriction above 19.9%, what triggers the purchase rights, or what restrictions lapse at agreement expiration—mechanics that determine Riot's optionality post-June 2026.
Riot disclosed that five executive employment agreements were amended with "revised severance provisions" (claim 5965) but did not identify which five executives or specify whether severance multipliers increased, decreased, or changed in other respects, creating an unexplained gap relative to named executive disclosures (claims 6039, 6054-6055).
Riot disclosed the new Chief Operating Officer's compensation as $400k base, 100% annual incentive target, and 373,927 long-term shares (claims 6040-6042) but omitted the vesting schedule and the grant-date price per share, making the equity package's value and incentive alignment unquantifiable.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed appointment of a Chief Operating Officer in June 2024 with specific compensation details including $400,000 annual base salary and 373,927 share long-term incentive award (claims 6040-6042), yet the identity of the executive holding this position was never disclosed. Who is serving as Riot's COO?
Riot announced three materially different total investment amounts in Bitfarms over six months: $90 million in early June (claim 6052), $111 million by June 11 (claim 6015), and $202 million by September 4 (claim 5802). Given that these figures span multiple acquisition tranches, a reader would expect disclosure of what was purchased at each stage and at what per-share prices. What intermediate transactions occurred between June 11 and September 4, 2024, and what was the cost basis for each?
The settlement agreement between Riot and Bitfarms announced September 22, 2024 (claim 5695) granted Riot director nomination and replacement rights (claims 5697, 5705), yet the company did not disclose which Riot executives or board members were actually appointed to Bitfarms' board. Given Riot's resulting 19.9% ownership stake (claim 5703), the absence of named director appointments obscures related-party governance. Which Riot executives occupy board seats at Bitfarms as a result of this settlement?
Riot closed a $525 million convertible senior notes offering in December 2024 maturing January 15, 2030 at 0.75% coupon (claim 5251), but disclosed neither the conversion price nor conversion ratio. Without this figure, the dilution impact cannot be calculated. What is the conversion price per share on these notes?
The settlement agreement included conditional share purchase rights with a triggering condition of 15% ownership (claim 5702), yet the company did not disclose the strike price, valuation mechanism, or other material terms. What is the price at which Riot can exercise these purchase rights and under what other conditions can they be triggered?
Riot disclosed that Form EIA-862 emergency collection data was permanently destroyed (claims 6231, 6347) following discontinuation of the emergency cryptocurrency mining survey (claims 6236-6237), yet did not disclose how many facilities, mining operations, or megawatts of capacity data were removed from the public record. What is the scope of mining data destroyed and no longer available to regulators or competitors?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed multiple tranches of Bitfarms acquisition between June and September 2024 (claims 6052, 6015, 5801) showing escalating dollar amounts ($90M, then $111M total, then $202M financed) and share counts, but did not disclose the per-share cost basis or explain the price trajectory—on 2024-06-03 at ~$2/share (estimated from claim 6052's $90M for 11.3%), then incrementally lower at each tranche, yet the rationale for purchasing at varying valuations is absent. A convertible notes offering is described with ambiguous units: claim 5259 states the offering was "priced 525.0 USD" without specifying whether that is per-note principal, per-share conversion equivalent, or some other metric, and claims 5261 and 5251 show conflicting sizes ($500M vs. $525M) without clarifying whether the overallotment option (claim 5260, "75.0 USD") was exercised to reach $525M. Claim 6039 announces a Chief Operating Officer appointment with stated annual base salary (claim 6040: $400k) and equity award (claim 6042: 373,927 shares), but does not name the COO nor disclose the vesting schedule, cliff period, or change-of-control acceleration terms for those shares—standard practice for an equity award of that size. Claim 6013 discloses Riot's Corsicana Facility as "land holdings" with no mention of megawatt capacity, water usage, grid interconnection point, or permitting status—omissions that contrast sharply with the company's otherwise granular disclosure of its Bitfarms stake and would be expected for a material mining infrastructure investment. Claim 5965 states that five executive employment agreements were amended "with revised severance provisions" but provides no quantification of severance multiples, termination triggers (for cause vs. without cause), or clawback conditions; for executives listed in claims 5366–5369 at a multi-billion-dollar mining company, these terms would typically warrant disclosure. The settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695) is cross-referenced in claim 5704 as "withdrawn" status, yet subsequent claims describe Riot's 19.9% ownership, board nomination rights (claim 5697), and voting commitments (claim 5696) as if a settlement is in place; the actual final agreement terms, duration, standstill restrictions (mentioned in claim 5699 but not detailed), and any remedies or exit clauses remain undisclosed.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company announced multiple Bitfarms stake acquisitions at different dates with varying ownership percentages—11.3% for approximately $90 million (44.9M units) on June 3, then 14% stake for $111.1M total investment by June 11, then 14.9% by June 23, and finally 19.9% for $202.2M financing by September 4 (claims 6052-6053, 6011-6015, 5927, 5801-5802)—yet never disclosed the timeline and pricing of each tranche, the average per-unit cost across purchases, or whether interim dispositions occurred between announcements that would reconcile the share count progression.
The company disclosed in claim 6039-6042 that a Chief Operating Officer was appointed with $400,000 base salary, 100% annual incentive plan target, and 373,927 share long-term incentive award, but the actual name of the COO was never stated; in contrast, CFO Colin Yee and General Counsel William Jackman were named in the same period, leaving unclear who received this compensation package.
Corsicana facility land holdings were mentioned (claim 6013) without any disclosure of megawatt capacity, hash rate, expected online date, or capital expenditure required—metrics a reader would expect from a cryptocurrency mining operator, especially given that Riot used $202.2M in working capital and subsequent convertible debt financing for operations.
The company disclosed $500 million in convertible senior notes priced at $525 (claims 5261, 5259, 5251), with a separate overallotment option of $75 million and a maturity date of January 15, 2030, but never stated the conversion price, anti-dilution protections, or how the 0.75% annual interest (claim 5251) accrues relative to the conversion feature—information required to assess dilution and cost of capital.
Riot announced Bitcoin acquisition using convertible notes proceeds (claim 5252) but never disclosed the total Bitcoin holdings quantity, average acquisition price, or current value—the core operating asset for a self-described cryptocurrency mining company.
A settlement agreement with Bitfarms was promised by September 23, 2024 (claim 5704, status withdrawn), yet the company disclosed voting commitments, director nomination rights, standstill provisions, and conditional share purchase rights contingent on a 15 percent threshold (claims 5695-5706) without explaining the financial terms of the settlement, duration of standstill restrictions, or what triggered Riot's withdrawal from a previous acquisition proposal (claim 5926) to accept the settlement structure instead.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05On 2024-06-03, Riot disclosed acquiring 11.3% of Bitfarms for approximately $90 million (claims 6052-6053). By 2024-06-11, the company reported total investment of $111,090,522 for a 53,793,440 unit stake (claims 6015-6014), and by 2024-09-04, a 19.9% stake costing $202,180,487 in cumulative working capital (claims 5801-5802). What the company has not disclosed are the per-share prices paid in each tranche, the specific acquisition dates for the second and third purchases, and what strategic drivers (regulatory approval, counterparty milestones, or pricing conditions) triggered the escalation from 14% to 19.9% over three months.
The settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695) includes standstill provisions (claim 5699) and voting commitments (claim 5698) with a term expiration of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). The company has not disclosed whether Riot's 19.9% stake (claim 5703), voting rights (claim 5696), director nomination rights (claim 5705), and conditional share purchase options (claim 5706) survive or terminate upon expiration, nor has it disclosed the specific percentage threshold or prohibited actions that trigger or suspend the standstill.
On 2024-06-05, Riot appointed a Chief Operating Officer (claim 6039) with a $400,000 annual base salary (claim 6040), 100% AIP target (claim 6041), and 373,927 share award (claim 6042), but has not disclosed the officer's name, the vesting schedule for the equity grant, the performance metrics tied to the AIP target, or any prior equity holdings and related-party relationships.
On 2024-12-10, Riot priced a $525 million 0.75% convertible senior notes offering (claim 5251) at $525 USD per unit (claim 5259) with a 75.0 USD overallotment option (claim 5260). The company has not disclosed whether the $525 represents a percentage of $1,000 principal, the per-share conversion price, the conversion premium relative to Riot's stock price, or the units and exercise mechanics of the stated 75.0 USD overallotment.
On 2024-06-17, Riot amended five executive employment agreements with revised severance provisions (claim 5965) and adopted new indemnification agreements (claim 5966). The company has not disclosed which executives were affected, the new severance multiples (e.g., 2x or 3x base and bonus), the triggering events (termination without cause, change of control), or the estimated total contingent liability.
On 2024-06-12, Riot disclosed holding Corsicana Facility land (claim 6013). As Riot's primary mining operation, the company has not disclosed installed or planned hashrate capacity, peak and average power consumption, power efficiency metrics, total acreage, or any operational, regulatory, or environmental constraints affecting mining activity.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed the appointment of a Chief Operating Officer on 2024-06-05 with a $400,000 annual base salary (claim 6040), 100% annual incentive plan target (claim 6041), and 373,927 shares in long-term incentive awards (claim 6042), as cited in claims 6039-6042; what has not been disclosed is the name of the individual appointed to this position. The company disclosed multiple incremental investments in Bitfarms between June and September 2024, progressing from 11.3% ownership at approximately $90 million (claims 6052-6053), to 14% ownership with total investment of $111.1 million (claims 6011-6015), to 14.9% ownership (claim 5927), and finally 19.9% ownership with $202.2 million in investment (claims 5801-5802), as cited in claims 6052-6053, 6011-6015, 5927, 5801-5802; what has not been provided is the specific per-share acquisition price for each tranche, the precise closing dates for each transaction, and a reconciliation explaining how the ownership percentages and investment amounts progress logically across the four disclosed acquisitions. The company disclosed requisitioning a special shareholders meeting to reconstitute the Bitfarms board (claim 5928), applying to the Ontario Capital Markets Tribunal to cease-trade Bitfarms' poison pill (claims 5922 and 5929), and obtaining director nomination rights (claim 5705), as cited in claims 5928, 5922, 5929, 5705; what remains unexplained is whether the board reconstitution effort ultimately succeeded, the number of director seats Riot is entitled to nominate, and the names of the individuals designated by Riot to serve on Bitfarms' board. The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms on 2024-09-22 (claim 5695) that includes standstill provisions (claim 5699) and conditional share purchase rights (claim 5706) with a 15.0 percent condition (claim 5702), as cited in claims 5695, 5699, 5702, 5706; what has not been specified is the detailed scope of the standstill restrictions (what activities are prohibited, the duration, and any permitted carve-outs) and the precise meaning of the "15.0 percent" metric (whether it represents an ownership threshold, a share price level, or another condition). The company disclosed financing the September 2024 Bitfarms acquisition of $202.2 million (claim 5802) with working capital (claim 6012), yet subsequently completed a $525 million convertible notes offering in December 2024 (claims 5261, 5251), as cited in claims 5802, 6012, 5261, 5251; what has not been explained is the source and composition of the working capital used in September 2024, specifically the cash position available as of that date and whether interim debt financing was obtained before the December convertible notes offering. The company disclosed convertible senior notes offerings of $500-525 million (claims 5261, 5251) with pricing components of $525 and an overallotment option of $75 (claims 5259, 5260), as stated in claims 5259-5261, 5251; what remains ambiguous is the pricing convention used (whether $525 represents price per $1,000 face value, per note unit, or some other basis), the conversion price per share, and the mechanics of the conversion feature (though the 0.75% coupon and January 15, 2030 maturity are disclosed in claim 5251).
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed a Chief Operating Officer position with compensation of $400,000 base salary, 373,927 long-term incentive shares, and a 100% annual incentive target (claims 6039-6042), but never identified who holds this role by name, despite separately naming the Chief Executive Officer, Executive Chairman, Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, and other executives. A public company cryptocurrency miner would typically disclose executive names in proxy materials when compensation details are disclosed. The company mentioned "Corsicana Facility land holdings" in June 2024 (claim 6013) but provided no capacity metrics, acreage, power specifications, or operational details—critical disclosures for a mining operator whose investors assess the business by hashrate, power draw, or mining capacity. Riot disclosed convertible senior notes offerings in December 2024 with prices stated as "$525" and an overallotment option of "$75" (claims 5259-5260) without specifying whether these are per $1,000 principal amount, per individual note, or another denomination; the full $525M offering price and 0.75% coupon are known (claim 5251), but investors cannot calculate effective yield or conversion premium without the pricing convention. Over six months, Riot disclosed acquiring 11.3% of Bitfarms for approximately $90 million (claim 6052), then total investment of $111.09 million (claim 6015), then a 19.9% stake financed with $202.18 million from working capital (claims 5801-5802)—the sequential increase raises questions about tranches, timing, and whether intervening Bitfarms capital raises diluted earlier acquisitions, none of which are clarified. The company disclosed severance provisions amended for five executives (claim 5965) and new director indemnification agreements (claim 5966) but provided no actual severance multiples, caps, or indemnification scope—standard proxy materials would quantify these. Riot disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms including voting commitments, director nomination rights, and conditional share purchase rights triggered at a 15% ownership threshold (claims 5695-5706), but did not explain what dispute or pressure led to the settlement, whether litigation was threatened, or what other consideration changed hands.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed a Corsicana Facility land holding (claim 6013) on June 12, 2024, without specifying acreage, power capacity, hash rate, or operational miners—metrics any mining company must quantify when claiming infrastructure value. Riot announced multiple Bitfarms acquisitions with conflicting ownership percentages: 11.3% for ~$90M (claim 6052, June 3), then 14% (claim 6011, June 12), then 19.9% for $202M (claim 5801, September 4), yet never reconciled whether these represent tranches, a revised final amount, or separate purchases, or disclosed the per-share or per-tranche pricing that would explain the variation. The convertible senior notes offering (claim 5261, December 8) was announced at $500M, priced at $525 (claim 5259), yet the explicit conversion price—whether $525 per share or another mechanism—was never stated, leaving the dilution math opaque. Five executive employment agreements were amended with revised severance provisions (claim 5965, June 17), but no severance dollar amounts, trigger conditions, or identification of which five executives were affected appeared in any subsequent disclosure. Riot disclosed a Bitcoin acquisition funded by convertible notes proceeds (claim 5252, December 10) without specifying the quantity purchased, acquisition price, purchase date relative to the notes closing, or whether the Bitcoin is held as a treasury asset. The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claims 5695–5706, September 22–23) included standstill provisions and conditional purchase rights at a 15% threshold (claim 5702), but the specific duration of standstill restrictions, the acquisition price or mechanism for the conditional rights, and what dispute or corporate action triggered the settlement were never disclosed.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05Riot disclosed three tranches of Bitfarms investment between June and September 2024—approximately $90 million reported on claim 6052, revised to $111.1 million total on claim 6015, and $202.2 million working capital financing on claim 5802—with ownership rising from 11.3% to 19.9%; the company disclosed these amounts and share counts on claims 6052, 6053, 6014, and 5801, yet has not disclosed the per-share cost basis for any tranche, leaving readers unable to understand the valuation progression or why September's investment justified a materially higher price.
Claim 5260 discloses an overallotment option for the December 2024 convertible notes offering but states the option size as "75.0 USD," which does not correspond to any intelligible option metric; readers cannot determine whether this is a percentage of the $525 million offering, an absolute share count, or data extraction error, making the option economically opaque.
The company financed Bitcoin acquisition with $525 million in convertible notes per claim 5252 but disclosed neither the quantity of Bitcoin purchased nor the acquisition price per coin; a capital-allocation auditor would ask how many Bitcoin this deployment yielded and whether that return has been tracked separately.
Riot's September 2024 Bitfarms settlement agreement on claims 5695-5706 grants conditional share purchase rights at a "15.0 percent" threshold (claim 5702) and director nomination rights (claim 5705), yet the agreement terms do not specify how many directors Riot can nominate, when the purchase rights become exercisable if ownership falls below or rises above the threshold, or what specific actions the standstill provisions (claim 5699) actually prohibit.
A Chief Operating Officer was appointed June 5, 2024 (claim 6039) with disclosed compensation of $400,000 annual salary and 373,927 shares on claim 6042; the individual's name is absent from all company records, preventing readers from assessing whether this was an internal promotion, external hire, or replacement of a specific prior COO.
Five executive employment agreements were amended June 17, 2024 (claim 5965) with "revised severance provisions," but the company has disclosed neither which five executives were party to the amendments nor the specific terms changed; proxy statement guidance would expect transparency on named executive officer severance changes, including transition from prior terms.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company announced a Chief Operating Officer appointment on June 5, 2024 (claims #6039-6042), disclosing specific compensation of $400,000 annual base salary, 373,927 shares under a long-term incentive plan, and a 100% annual incentive plan target. Yet the COO's name is never disclosed—a material gap, especially since other executives like CEO Jason Les and EVP William Jackman are publicly named. Who is the Chief Operating Officer?
The Corsicana Facility, referenced on June 12, 2024 (claim #6013), is identified only as "land holdings" with no disclosure of acreage, square footage, or mining capacity in megawatts. For a Bitcoin mining company, facility specifications are fundamental to assessing operational scale. What are the physical dimensions and power capacity of the Corsicana Facility?
Riot's Bitfarms acquisition is disclosed across multiple tranches with conflicting or incomplete detail. Claim #6052 (June 3) cites a $90 million investment for 11.3% ownership, claim #6015 (June 11) states $111 million total investment, claim #6014 (June 11) lists 53.79 million shares owned, and claim #5801 (September 4) reports $202 million total for 19.9% ownership as of that date. The per-share prices paid in each tranche and the exact unit counts at key dates are not reconciled. What was the price per share in each purchase tranche, and how many shares did Riot own as of each disclosure?
The convertible senior notes offering announced in December 2024 (claims #5251, #5261) totals $525 million principal with a 0.75% coupon and maturity of January 15, 2030. However, the conversion price is never disclosed, nor are the details of an overallotment option mentioned in claim #5260 (which cryptically states "75.0 USD" without clarity on whether this represents shares, dollars, or a percentage). What is the conversion price for the convertible notes, and what is the size and nature of the overallotment option?
The settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim #5695, dated September 22, 2024) is described as conferring director nomination rights (claim #5705), voting commitments (claims #5696, #5698), conditional share purchase rights (claim #5706), and standstill provisions (claim #5699), along with a "purchase rights condition" tied to a 15% threshold (claim #5702). Yet none of these rights are defined in detail—what triggers the purchase right, what is the 15% condition, and when do standstill restrictions expire? Claim #5701 suggests an agreement term expiration "promised by 2026-06-01," a date now in the past, raising questions about the current status of these arrangements.
Five executive employment agreements were amended on June 17, 2024 with "revised severance provisions" (claim #5965), but the company discloses neither the names of these five executives nor the specific triggers, amounts, or multiples of severance that were changed. Which executives received revised severance packages, and what are the terms?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company appointed a Chief Operating Officer on June 5, 2024, disclosing an annual base salary of $400,000 and a long-term incentive award of 373,927 shares (claims 6039-6042); what has not been disclosed is the COO's name or the vesting schedule for the equity award.
Riot disclosed successive Bitfarms acquisitions—$90 million for an 11.3% stake (44.9 million shares) on June 3, $111.1 million total investment (53.8 million shares) on June 11, and $202.2 million for a 19.9% stake (90.1 million shares) on September 4 (claims 6052-6053, 6014-6015, 5801-5802)—but has not explained the purchase price per share for each tranche, the rationale for sequential acquisitions, or how the share counts reconcile when ownership percentages changed from 11.3% to 14.9% to 19.9%.
The company announced a $500 million convertible notes offering on December 8, 2024, with pricing listed as "$525" and an overallotment option of "$75" at a 0.75% coupon (claims 5259-5261, 5251); what has not been disclosed is the conversion price, conversion premium, maturity date, and whether these pricing figures represent per-$1,000-face-value basis or different units.
Five executive employment agreements were amended with revised severance provisions on June 17, 2024 (claim 5965), but the company has not identified which executives were affected or what severance terms changed.
A settlement agreement with Bitfarms was described on September 22, 2024, including director nomination rights, voting commitments, standstill provisions, and conditional share purchase rights at a 7.5% beneficial ownership threshold and 15% purchase rights condition (claims 5695-5706); the company has not disclosed the specific triggers, duration, or caps on Riot's maximum stake, and claim 5704's "withdrawn" status raises questions about whether the agreement was finalized.
The Corsicana Facility land holdings were mentioned on June 12, 2024 (claim 6013), but the company has not disclosed the facility's address, acreage, power capacity, or operational status.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed acquiring a 19.9% stake in Bitfarms Ltd. for approximately $202 million, cited as claims 5801–5802; what has not been said is the strategic rationale for this significant investment, what mining capacity or hash rate contribution Bitfarms represents, or what operational synergies justify the acquisition versus deploying capital in Riot's own facilities.
The company disclosed land holdings at a Corsicana facility on June 12, 2024, cited as claim 6013; what has not been said is the facility's operational capacity in megawatts or exahash per second, its current development stage, or whether it is owned by Riot or Bitfarms.
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms on September 22, 2024, including "standstill provisions and restrictions," cited as claim 5699; what has not been said is what specific acquisitions or actions are prohibited, the duration of these restrictions, or what ownership thresholds would allow Riot to escape these provisions.
The company disclosed that proceeds from a $525 million convertible notes offering would be deployed for Bitcoin acquisition on December 10, 2024, cited as claim 5252; what has not been said is how many Bitcoin were acquired, at what average price per Bitcoin, or the timing of acquisitions.
The company disclosed a Chief Operating Officer appointment with base salary of $400,000 and a long-term incentive award of 373,927 shares on June 5, 2024, cited as claims 6040 and 6042; what has not been said is the vesting schedule for the equity award, any performance conditions required for vesting, or the specific severance amounts referenced in the amended employment agreements cited as claim 5965.
The company disclosed an overallotment option of $75 million for the convertible notes offering on December 9, 2024, cited as claim 5260; what has not been said is whether the overallotment was exercised, at what price, or the final total proceeds raised including any overallotment.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05Riot disclosed three separate tranches of Bitfarms acquisition over six months (claims 6052 at ~$90M for 11.3%, claim 6015 at $111.1M for implied higher percentage, and claim 5802 at $202.2M for 19.9%), yet never disclosed the per-share price paid in each purchase despite material changes in ownership percentage; a first-call question would be: was each tranche purchased at market prices reflecting Bitfarms' declining stock, or were prices negotiated differently as Riot's stake grew, and if so, what was paid per share in each acquisition window?
On June 5, 2024, Riot disclosed a Chief Operating Officer appointment with annual base salary of $400,000, annual incentive target of 100%, and a long-term incentive award of 373,927 shares (claims 6039-6042), but never named who the COO is; additionally, the shares' vesting schedule, performance conditions, and whether the $400k base salary includes other cash components remain unstated.
Riot announced a settlement agreement with Bitfarms on September 22, 2024 (claim 5695) that ended its hostile proxy contest and included governance terms (voting commitments, director nomination rights, standstill provisions per claims 5696-5706), but the economic substance of the settlement—whether Riot agreed to buybacks of earlier shares at higher prices, accepted warrants or other consideration, or made financial concessions to resolve the dispute—was never disclosed.
On December 9, 2024, Riot announced convertible senior notes priced at $525 (claim 5259) with an overallotment option of $75 (claim 5260) and a principal amount of $525 million at 0.75% coupon (claim 5251), yet the pricing expression is ambiguous (per $1,000 face value? per unit?), and critically, the conversion price into common stock and resulting share dilution percentage were not disclosed.
Claim 6013 references "Corsicana Facility land holdings" with no acreage, megawatt capacity, or mining hash-rate specification; for a publicly traded cryptocurrency mining company, disclosing a facility by name without physical or operational capacity metrics is materially incomplete.
On June 17, 2024, Riot stated that five executive employment agreements were amended with "revised severance provisions" (claim 5965) but did not disclose which five executives, what the prior severance terms were, or what changed; this governance modification directly affects contingent obligations and executive retention incentives yet remains unnamed.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed three successive Bitfarms acquisitions: $90 million for 11.3% on June 3, 2024 (claim 6052); $111 million cumulative by June 11, 2024 (claim 6015); and $202.2 million for 19.9% by September 4, 2024 (claim 5802). The per-share prices of each tranche, whether intervening tranches occurred between June and September, and whether the final figure represents total invested or only the incremental purchase remain undisclosed—a first-year analyst would ask whether Riot paid escalating per-share prices as its stake grew from 11.3% to 19.9%.
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms dated September 22, 2024 (claim 5695) accompanied by voting commitments (claim 5696), standstill provisions (claim 5699), a 7.5% beneficial ownership threshold (claim 5700), and a 15% purchase rights condition (claim 5702). What has not been disclosed is what dispute or hostile posture required settlement, the specific duration and termination triggers of the standstill, whether Riot paid consideration beyond share acquisition, or the conditions under which the 15% purchase right would be exercisable.
The company disclosed a $500 million convertible senior notes offering in December 2024 (claim 5261) with proceeds designated for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252). The quantity of bitcoins acquired, the per-unit cost basis, the timing of acquisitions relative to the funding close, and whether capital remains undeployed have not been disclosed—critical metrics for assessing capital efficiency and market timing of the deployment.
The company disclosed convertible notes offerings of $500–525 million in December 2024 (claims 5261, 5259, 5260) but omitted the conversion price, coupon percentage, and maturity date. Claim 5260 cryptically references an overallotment option of "75.0 USD" without clarifying whether this is a dollar amount, a share count, or a price per share, preventing investors from calculating the dilutive impact or refinancing risk inherent in the instrument.
The company stated that five executive employment agreements were amended with revised severance provisions on June 17, 2024 (claim 5965) but did not identify which executives, whether severance multiples increased or decreased, or the quantitative impact on contingent liabilities. A subsequent analyst inquiry would inevitably focus on whether severance cost materialized as a result of these amendments.
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed approximately $202 million invested in Bitfarms from "working capital" (claims 5802, 6012) but did not specify which balance sheet line items were reduced or accessed to fund this acquisition. For a capital deployment exceeding $200 million, a sophisticated reader would expect to see whether cash was generated from operations, drawn from credit facilities, or released from investments, and what impact this had on liquidity.
The company disclosed a "Corsicana Facility" with "land holdings" (claim 6013) without providing acreage, megawatt capacity, or hash rate in standard industry metrics. Given the regulatory scrutiny on mining capacity referenced in claims 6235-6237, the company's own facility capacity remains unquantified despite operating in a sector where production metrics are material.
The company announced a Chief Operating Officer appointment with a $400,000 base salary, 100% annual incentive target, and 373,927 share long-term incentive award (claims 6040, 6041, 6042) but never disclosed the officer's name or the vesting schedule and performance conditions governing the equity award. A first-year analyst would ask: who holds this position and under what specific milestones do those shares vest?
The company announced $500 million in 0.75% convertible senior notes (claim 5261) with proceeds earmarked for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252) but disclosed neither the conversion price of the notes nor the quantity or custody arrangements for Bitcoin purchased. How many Bitcoin were acquired, at what price per coin, and where are they custodied—critical details given custody risk in the industry?
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms granting director nomination rights (claim 5705) and board voting commitments (claim 5698) but did not specify when these rights terminate or under what conditions they lapse. When does the nomination right expire, and does it disappear if Riot's stake falls below the 15% threshold referenced in claim 5702, leaving the stake value unanchored to governance influence?
What we aren't being told
2026-09-05The company disclosed a phased accumulation of Bitfarms equity stakes on claims 6052–6053 (11.3% for ~$90M on 2024-06-03), claim 6011 (14% on 2024-06-12), claim 5927 (14.9% on 2024-06-23), and claims 5801–5802 (19.9% for ~$202M on 2024-09-04), yet did not disclose why the stake was accumulated in tranches, whether the tranches were separately negotiated or part of a single arrangement, or the cost basis per share for each purchase relative to the Bitfarms share price at purchase—a quantitative follow-up any analyst would ask on an earnings call.
On claim 6039, the company announced a Chief Operating Officer appointment but did not name the appointee; claims 6040–6042 then disclose a $400,000 annual base salary, a 100% incentive plan target, and a 373,927 share long-term incentive award, yet omit the share vesting schedule, grant date fair value, whether the 100% figure represents the threshold, target, or maximum payout level, and the promotion/hiring context—all material to the proxy statement's executive compensation disclosure.
The company disclosed a $525 million convertible notes offering (claim 5261) priced at what claim 5259 reports as "525.0 USD" per unit and offered with an overallotment option valued at claim 5260's "75.0 USD"—neither unit aligns with how convertible notes are typically priced; the actual conversion price, interest rate, maturity date (beyond the stated 2030 maturity on claim 5251), and any conversion premium are not disclosed, leaving the terms of the capital raise opaque.
The company disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5695) that includes director nomination rights (claim 5705), voting commitments (claims 5696–5698), and conditional share purchase rights (claim 5706) triggered at a 15% ownership threshold (claim 5702), yet did not disclose the price per share at which the purchase rights may be exercised, whether the rights are call options exercisable at Riot's election or obligations, the term of the agreement (claim 5701 shows a promised expiration of 2026-06-01, now missed), or exclusivity provisions—details that would affect both the financial statement valuation of the investment and Riot's voting power.
On claim 6013, the company identified "Corsicana Facility land holdings" as a facility asset but disclosed no acreage, expected mining capacity in exahashes or megawatts, phase of development, or expected date of operational status—quantitative disclosures that would substantiate capacity claims and allow investors to assess hash rate per dollar of deployed capital.
On claim 5965, the company announced that severance provisions in five executive employment agreements were "amended with revised severance provisions," yet disclosed neither which executives were covered, the specific changes made (whether severance multiples increased, decreased, or were restructured), nor the resulting payment amounts or triggers—contextual detail essential to understanding executive retention risk and cash flow obligations.
What we aren't being told
2026-08-30The company disclosed a $573M credit facility for data center equipment and project expenses on 2026-08-13 (claim #33), yet the lender identity is omitted (shown as 'promised by - -'). A reader would expect to know: which counterparty extended this facility, at what interest rate and maturity, under what covenants, and on what drawdown schedule?
Claim #34 announces 191 MW of critical IT data center capacity at 'Rockdale Facility' (2026-08-13) but provides no physical address beyond the facility name alone. Which state and country, and what is the street address? Without this, the interconnection point cannot be verified.
Claim #34 discloses megawatt capacity but omits the grid interconnection status—which utility provides power, at what voltage, and has the interconnection request been approved or is approval pending? Grid constraints can prevent a facility from reaching rated capacity regardless of equipment.
Claim #34 states capacity in MW but does not disclose whether this 191 MW is already spoken for via customer power purchase agreements, built-to-suit contracts, or wholly uncommitted. What portion of capacity is pre-sold versus available for future customers?
Claim #34 names 'Rockdale Facility' without specifying whether it is currently operational, under active construction, or in the planning phase. If not yet operational, what is the expected in-service date and does that align with the $573M financing timeline in claim #33?
whats_stale
What we haven't been told
2026-10-19The reverse stock split is the clearest loose end. In October 2010 the board sought authority for a reverse split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715, last mentioned 2010-10-21). The ledger first moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. Nothing on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse at the deadline. The next disclosures in the file turn to stock plan increases and auditor ratifications without returning to the subject.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented in October 2012 as the company's product focus, with FDA clearance being pursued (claims 21047 and 21050, last mentioned 2012-10-14). Both claims remain at stated, but no later claim in the record reports a submission, a clearance, a rejection, or a decision to stop pursuing it. The same 2012 filing records the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). Neither event is connected to the product's regulatory path anywhere on file.
The original cattle reproduction franchise has dropped out of the record entirely. In September 2004 the company described SurBred 15 as an early bovine pregnancy test with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21094 and 21096). It described StayBred as a recombinant luteinizing hormone that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101), and it referred to further pipeline products (claim 21098). All of these were last mentioned on 2004-09-13. No later disclosure on record reports a SurBred 15 launch or sales figures, an outcome for the Merial arrangement, or any FDA filing for StayBred. The 2005 restructuring and rename to AspenBio Pharma (claims 21090 and 21091), and the termination of Roger Hurst, whose exclusive employment had been cited in 2004 (claims 21087 and 21099), also pass without any comment on these products.
The only later reference to animal health is a 2012 exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049, last mentioned 2012-10-14). The record does not name the licensee or the terms, and it does not say whether this license is how SurBred and StayBred were disposed of. The question is left open rather than answered.
Some dated governance items also sit at not_yet_verifiable with no follow-up disclosure. These are Stephen A. Williams joining the board effective 2013-05-01 (claim 21038) and the stock incentive plan extension to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709). Their weight is limited, because the oscillation between delayed and not_yet_verifiable reflects the ledger's automated process rather than any statement by the company. The claim list supplied here also ends partway through the 2016 entries, so silence after that point cannot be assessed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-19The reverse stock split is the clearest open item. In October 2010 the company disclosed board authorization for a reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715, last mentioned 2010-10-21). The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. None of the later disclosures on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization lapsed. The April 2013 request to increase authorized common shares by 60,000,000 (claim 21040) is the next capital-structure disclosure, and it does not refer back to the 2010 authorization.
The cattle reproduction franchise appears in a single disclosure and then disappears. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21094 and 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101). Both remain at stated status, and neither product, the Merial arrangement, nor the StayBred regulatory path is mentioned in any later disclosure on record. The 2005 filings deal with leadership changes and the AspenBio name change (claims 21082 and 21090). By 2012 the company refers only generically to an exclusive license agreement for animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). It has not said whether SurBred 15 reached commercial sale through Merial, whether StayBred was ever filed with the FDA, or whether these products were part of what was licensed out.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, follows a similar pattern. In October 2012 it was presented as the company's lead product, and FDA clearance was described as actively being pursued (claims 21047 and 21050, last mentioned 2012-10-14). The same disclosure noted that four directors had resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051), with no explanation given. AppyScore does not appear in the 2013 or 2014 proxy-related claims, and the next substantive disclosure on record is the 2016 change of corporate name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). The record contains no statement on the outcome of the FDA submission and no explanation of why the product dropped out of the company's own description of itself.
One smaller board matter also remains unconfirmed. Stephen A. Williams was disclosed on 2013-04-28 as joining the Board of Directors effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). The ledger moved this claim to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable, and no subsequent claim confirms that he was seated or notes his departure. By contrast, the fiscal 2011 auditor engagement with GHP Horwath (claims 20713 and 20720) carries the same automated status but is effectively resolved by the firm's ratification in 2013 (claim 21039).
The delayed and not_yet_verifiable labels above were applied by automated ledger passes in September and October 2026. They indicate that no confirming disclosure has been found, not that the company announced a slip. The portion of the record reviewed here ends with the 2016 Bioptix name change, so later filings may address some of these items.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-19The reverse stock split is the clearest unresolved item. In October 2010 the company disclosed board and shareholder authorization for a reverse split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). That deadline was last mentioned on 2010-10-21. The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09; those are automated transitions, not company statements. Nothing in the disclosures on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization lapsed unused.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, appeared once, on 2004-09-13 (claim 21097). The same filing said it would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). It does not appear in any later claim, and both entries remain at stated. No disclosure on record reports a filing, an approval, a discontinuation, or a decision to stop development.
The animal health franchise follows a similar arc. In September 2004, SurBred 15 was presented as an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094) and three university licenses supporting the pipeline (claims 21095 and 21098). After 2004 none of these is mentioned again. The topic resurfaces on 2012-10-14 only as an exclusive out-license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), alongside the pivot to AppyScore. The record contains no statement on SurBred 15 sales, on the status or end of the Merial arrangement, or on why the animal health line was licensed away.
AppyScore's regulatory path stops abruptly. On 2012-10-14 the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for the blood-based appendicitis test (claims 21047 and 21050). Both claims remain at stated, and no later disclosure on record reports a submission, a clearance, or a setback. The next strategic entry is the 2016 BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition (claim 20980), and nothing on record connects it to the fate of the appendicitis program.
A smaller item is the board appointment of Stephen A. Williams, disclosed on 2013-04-28 as effective by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). Like the 2010 split items, it went through automated transitions to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable. No later disclosure on record confirms that he took the seat or explains a change. The ledger as provided ends partway through claim 20980, so later filings may resolve some of these items; on the record available, none of them has been addressed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-18The reverse stock split authorization is the clearest open thread. In October 2010 the company disclosed board authority to effect a reverse split at ratios from 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be completed before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The last mention was the October 21, 2010 filing. In the record supplied, no later disclosure says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse. The ledger auto-transitioned both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. That reflects only the absence of a confirming statement, not any company explanation. No revision announcement appears.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, and the stated pursuit of FDA clearance for it (claims 21047 and 21050) were last mentioned on October 14, 2012. Both remain in stated status, but neither the product nor the clearance effort appears in any subsequent claim on record. The later filings in this record concern auditor ratifications and share reserve increases. Nothing on record says whether a clearance submission was made, what came of it, or whether the program was discontinued.
The original bovine franchise has also gone quiet. In September 2004 the company described the SurBred 15 early pregnancy test, the StayBred luteinizing hormone product with its stated FDA approval or ANDA requirement, exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial, and license arrangements with three universities (claims 21096, 21097, 21101, 21094 and 21095). None of these is mentioned again by name. The 2005 disclosures record the termination of Roger Hurst, whose exclusive employment agreement had been tied to that period (claims 21087 and 21099). The next animal health reference is a 2012 exclusive license agreement for animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which does not name the counterparty or the products. It also does not say whether the Merial arrangement or the StayBred regulatory path was concluded, transferred or abandoned.
Two smaller dated items carry no follow-up. Stephen A. Williams was disclosed as joining the board effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038), and the Stock Incentive Plan term was extended to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709). Both passed their dates without a confirming disclosure in this record and now sit at not_yet_verifiable after an automated delayed status. The supplied claim list ends partway through a 2016 auditor ratification (claim 20982), so any later disclosure that resolves these items falls outside what was reviewed here.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-16The reverse stock split is the clearest unresolved commitment on the record. In October 2010 the board sought and described authorization for a reverse split at ratios from 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be effected by February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The last mention is the October 21, 2010 disclosure. After the deadline passed, the ledger moved both claims to 'delayed' and then 'not_yet_verifiable'. No subsequent disclosure on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse unused.
The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test and its distribution arrangement disappear after a single appearance. The September 13, 2004 disclosure presented SurBred 15 as an early-detection product (claim 21096), said it was not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100), and said Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094). None of these is mentioned again. By October 2012 the animal health side surfaces only as an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). The record does not say whether the Merial arrangement was terminated or folded into that license, or whether SurBred 15 reached meaningful sales.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance, was described in the same 2004 filing (claim 21097) as requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). It is never mentioned again. No disclosure on record reports a filing, an approval, a discontinuation, or a transfer of the program.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the central product in October 2012. Management said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050), alongside a 2012 stock offering (claim 21048) and the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The next substantive corporate disclosure on record is the October 2016 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), which implies a change of direction. The claims available here contain no statement on the outcome of the FDA effort or on whether AppyScore was shelved.
A smaller item: the April 28, 2013 disclosure said Stephen A. Williams would join the board by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). The ledger now carries this as 'not_yet_verifiable' after an interim 'delayed' state. No later filing on record confirms the appointment or mentions him in any board role.
Two caveats apply to all of the above. The status transitions are generated by automated extraction rather than by any company revision notice. The claims list supplied for this review is cut off partway through the 2016 entries, so later disclosures may address some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-16The reverse stock split that the board was authorized to carry out by February 4, 2011 is the clearest open date on the record. It appears in claim 20721 (2010-10-11) as authority for a split of up to 1-for-6, and again in claim 20715 (2010-10-21) as a range of 1-for-2 to 1-for-6. Both claims were last mentioned on 2010-10-21. Neither has been followed by any disclosure that the split was carried out, what ratio was chosen, or that the authority was allowed to lapse. The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. Those changes came from the automated pipeline, not from anything the company said, and the deadline passed with no statement from the company.
The early cattle-reproduction franchise has dropped out of the record. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claim 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle (claim 21097), which it said required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). That date is the last mention of all four. No later disclosure reports SurBred 15 sales under the Merial arrangement, says whether that arrangement continued or ended, or states whether a StayBred filing was ever made. The next animal-health item is claim 21049 (2012-10-14), an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property. It is described as a partnership, but the record does not say which assets were licensed or whether this was how the earlier programs were disposed of.
Two other items from the same 2004-09-13 disclosure have no follow-up. Claim 21095 describes license arrangements with three universities, and claim 21098 refers to pipeline products in development. Neither is mentioned again. The record does not say whether the licenses remain in force, which products were in the pipeline, or whether any of them advanced or were abandoned.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's stated focus in claim 21047 (2012-10-14), and claim 21050 says it was pursuing FDA clearance. That date is the last mention of the product and of the regulatory effort. The next substantive item on file is the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition in claim 20980 (2016-10-06). Nothing on the record explains whether clearance was obtained, refused, or withdrawn, or how the change in direction relates to the AppyScore program.
A smaller open item is claim 21038 (2013-04-28), which says Stephen A. Williams would join the board by 2013-05-01. The automated pipeline has since moved it to not_yet_verifiable. No later filing on the record confirms that he took the seat or mentions him in any other capacity. The ledger supplied for this company is cut off at the 2016 BiOptix entry, so more recent disclosures may resolve some of these questions and were not reviewed here.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-16The reverse stock split is the clearest open thread. On 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21 the board described authority to effect a reverse split at ratios from 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be used before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). That deadline passed more than fifteen years ago. Both claims were moved to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09, and nothing in the record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority simply lapsed. The company has not issued a follow-up statement tying the outcome back to the authorization.
The animal-health franchise that defined the company in 2004 drops out of the record without an explanation. The 2004-09-13 disclosures described SurBred 15 as an early bovine pregnancy test with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21096 and 21094). They also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101), as well as a broader pipeline and license arrangements with three universities (claims 21098 and 21095). None of these is mentioned again after 2004. The next animal-health reference comes on 2012-10-14, when the company describes an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property to another party (claim 21049). The record does not say what happened to the Merial arrangement, whether StayBred ever reached a regulatory filing, or why the business moved from building products to licensing them out.
AppyScore stops being discussed after a single statement of intent. On 2012-10-14 management said it was pursuing FDA clearance for the AppyScore blood test for appendicitis (claims 21047 and 21050). The next disclosure on file is the 2016-10-06 corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), and it contains no reference to AppyScore. The record never states whether clearance was obtained, denied, or abandoned, or whether the renaming reflects a move away from the product.
The auditor relationship goes from repeated naming to silence. GHP Horwath was named as the independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2011 in both October 2010 filings (claims 20720 and 20713) and was ratified again on 2013-04-28 (claim 21039). By the 2014-04-29 ratification (claim 21012), the firm is no longer named in the extracted claim, and that claim's fiscal 2014 term has since been marked not_yet_verifiable. No later disclosure on file says whether GHP Horwath continued or was replaced, and no change-of-auditor statement appears.
A smaller loose end is Stephen A. Williams, whose board appointment was described on 2013-04-28 as effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). He does not appear in any later personnel disclosure, and the claim now sits at not_yet_verifiable. The record does not say whether he joined, how long he served, or when he left. All of the status changes noted above come from automated reclassification on 2026-09-28 and 2026-10-09 rather than from any company statement, and the record supplied here is cut off after 2016, so some of these gaps may be closed in material not yet reviewed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-15The 2004 animal-health pipeline disappears from the record without any stated outcome. In September 2004 the company described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test, as not subject to FDA regulation and as distributed under exclusive marketing rights held by Merial (claims 21096, 21100, 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle, as a pipeline product that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101, 21098). No later disclosure on record mentions either product or the Merial arrangement. The next animal-health reference is an October 2012 exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). That suggests the line was moved out of the company, but nothing on record says whether StayBred was ever filed with the FDA, whether SurBred 15 generated meaningful sales, or how the Merial distribution rights ended.
The board authorized a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be done before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715, last mentioned October 21, 2010). Our tracker automatically moved both claims to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable once the deadline passed. The record contains no follow-up saying whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the stated focus in October 2012, and the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). That was the last mention. The next entry on record, from October 2016, is a corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Nothing in between reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission, or a decision to stop developing the product. The name change is the only visible sign that the company's direction shifted.
Governance changes in this period were disclosed as facts, with no reasons given. Four directors resigned on the same day, September 26, 2012 (claim 21051), and no reason appears in the record. Stephen A. Williams was announced to join the board by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). That claim now sits at not_yet_verifiable because nothing on record confirms he was seated. Stephen T. Lundy's 2010 appointment as CEO (claim 20711) was never followed by any disclosure of his tenure or departure.
The ledger provided ends partway through the 2016 entries. Anything disclosed after claim 20981 is not reflected here.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-15The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test and its distribution arrangement with Merial are the earliest thread to go quiet. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15 as an early-detection test outside FDA jurisdiction (claims 21096, 21100) and said Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094). Its companion product StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), was presented alongside it as pipeline (claim 21098). None of the three appears again in the disclosures on record. The 2005 filings turn to the name change, holding-company restructuring and leadership changes, including the departure of Roger Hurst (claim 21087), whose exclusive employment agreement had been tied to the 2004 product story (claim 21099). The record contains nothing on whether the Merial arrangement produced sales, was amended or ended, or whether StayBred ever reached a regulatory filing.
The reverse stock split authorization is the clearest dated commitment that ends without a resolution. Filings on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 said the board could effect a split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, with the authority expiring 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims were moved automatically to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable once that date passed. The record holds no statement that a split was carried out, at what ratio, or that the authority lapsed unused. The next financing disclosures (claims 20710, 21040) are silent on the matter.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's central product story as of 2012-10-14. That filing said the company was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050), during the same period that four directors resigned (claim 21051) and a common stock offering began (claim 21048). AppyScore does not appear in the 2013 or 2014 disclosures on record. The next substantive corporate event is a 2016-10-06 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Nothing on record says whether an FDA submission was made, what came of it, or whether the program was ended before the company changed its identity. The 2012 exclusive license of animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049) also has no follow-up on its economics or status.
A smaller item concerns the board appointment of Stephen A. Williams, announced on 2013-04-28 to take effect by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038). It has since moved to not_yet_verifiable, and no later disclosure on record confirms his seating, describes his committee roles, or records a departure. The auditor commitments for GHP Horwath (claims 20720, 20713, 21012) carry the same automated not_yet_verifiable status, but the 2013 ratification (claim 21039) suggests continuity rather than a walk-back. They are noted here mainly as a limit of the ledger. This record is truncated after the 2016 entries, so later disclosures may address some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-15In October 2010 the board sought and described authority to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be used before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The disclosures on record do not mention the split again after October 21, 2010. The ledger moved both claims to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable once the deadline passed, and these were automated transitions, not company statements. Nothing on record says whether the board used the authority, let it lapse, or decided against it, or why the authorization was sought in the first place.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented in October 2012 as the company's lead product, and management said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). That October 14, 2012 disclosure is the last mention of the product. The same filing recorded the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051), with no stated reason. By October 2016 the company was changing its name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). No disclosure on record reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission, or the end of the program.
The 2004 disclosures describe an animal-health business built around SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test, and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone. They also describe an exclusive marketing and distribution arrangement with Merial for SurBred 15 and license arrangements with three universities (claims 21094, 21095, 21096, 21097 and 21101). None of these products or partners is named again after September 13, 2004. In 2012 the company disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property to a third party (claim 21049). It did not say whether the Merial arrangement was still in force, whether either product reached market, or whether StayBred's required FDA approval or ANDA filing was ever pursued.
Stephen A. Williams was to join the board effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). The ledger auto-transitioned this claim to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable because no later disclosure on record confirms the seat was taken or explains its absence. The 2014 auditor ratification (claim 21012) also no longer names GHP Horwath, the firm ratified in 2010 and again in 2013 (claims 20713, 20720 and 21039). It is not stated whether the auditor changed. The record as supplied ends at the 2016 Bioptix name change, so later disclosures may address some of these points.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-15In October 2010 the board sought and described authority to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be used before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The last mention on record is the October 21, 2010 disclosure. Both claims have since moved from stated to delayed to not_yet_verifiable in the ledger. Nothing in the disclosed history says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse unused. A deadline-bound authorization has passed without any statement closing it out.
The AppyScore blood-based appendicitis test, and the company's stated pursuit of FDA clearance for it, appear in the October 14, 2012 disclosures (claims 21047 and 21050). At that time AppyScore was the company's central product story. Both claims remain at stated, with no later entry recording a clearance decision, a submission outcome, or a change in plans. The next substantive corporate item on record is the 2016 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). That change is presented without any reference to AppyScore. The record does not say what became of the program or why it dropped out of the narrative.
The 2004 disclosures set out an animal-health franchise. It included the SurBred 15 early bovine pregnancy test, with Merial named as exclusive marketing and distribution partner. It also included StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that the company said would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21094, 21096, 21097 and 21101). None of these names reappears in later disclosures. In 2012 the company referred only to an exclusive license agreement for its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), without naming the licensee, the products covered, or the status of the Merial arrangement. Whether the original partnership was performed, terminated, or folded into that license has not been stated.
Stephen A. Williams was disclosed on April 28, 2013 as joining the board effective by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). That claim has moved to not_yet_verifiable, and no subsequent disclosure on record confirms his seating or mentions him again. Similarly, the 2011 extension of the Stock Incentive Plan's term to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709) has passed its date without a recorded follow-up. Some of the ledger's delayed and not_yet_verifiable transitions reflect automated date checks rather than company statements. For example, the FY2011 GHP Horwath engagement (claims 20720 and 20713) is effectively corroborated by the 2013 ratification of the same firm (claim 21039). The items above are the ones where the record shows neither confirmation nor explanation.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-15The StayBred program has gone unmentioned since 2004. On 2004-09-13 the company described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone intended to maintain pregnancy in cattle, as a product in its portfolio (claim 21097). In the same filing it said StayBred would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). Neither claim has been revisited in any later disclosure on record, and both still sit at 'stated'. The record shows no filing, no approval, no discontinuation and no explanation of what became of the program.
The Merial arrangement for SurBred 15 also stops in 2004. The company said Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights to the SurBred 15 early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claims 21094, 21096). It also cited license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). All of this was last mentioned on 2004-09-13. Later filings turn to the AspenBio name change and, eventually, to human diagnostics, with no further reference to Merial, SurBred 15 sales or the university licenses. The 2012 disclosure of an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049) suggests the line was handed off. No disclosure on record ties that license back to the earlier partnership, and none says whether the Merial rights were terminated, assigned or allowed to lapse.
The Roger Hurst employment agreement ended within a year without explanation. In September 2004 an exclusive employment agreement with Hurst was presented as part of the company's footing (claim 21099). By 2005-09-25 the record simply notes that the employment was terminated (claim 21087). A new President and CEO was named in the same filing (claim 21082). None of the disclosures on record give a reason for the termination or say what happened to the arrangement's terms.
The reverse stock split authorized in October 2010 has no recorded outcome. Shareholders were asked to authorize the board to effect a split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). That deadline passed more than fifteen years ago. The ledger has moved both claims automatically to 'delayed' and then to 'not_yet_verifiable'. No disclosure on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to expire. The same pattern applies to the board seat Stephen A. Williams was to take by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038), which was never followed by a confirming statement.
AppyScore's FDA pursuit fades as the company renames itself. In October 2012 the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore, its blood-based appendicitis test (claims 21047, 21050). That was the last mention on record. The next relevant entry is a 2016-10-06 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), and it does not mention AppyScore. Neither claim has moved from 'stated'. The record contains no clearance decision, no withdrawn submission and no statement that the program was ended. The available record is truncated after 2016, so later filings may address the point, but nothing seen here does.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-13The 2004 animal-health franchise is the clearest disappearance in the record. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, as distributed under exclusive marketing rights held by Merial (claims 21096, 21094). It described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, as needing FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Neither product, the Merial arrangement, nor the regulatory path for StayBred appears in any later disclosure on file. The next related entry is from 2012-10-14 and refers only to an exclusive license agreement for animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), without naming the products, the licensee, or what became of the Merial rights. The record contains no statement on SurBred sales, the outcome of any StayBred filing, or why the line was licensed out.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the stated focus in October 2012, when management said it was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claims 21047, 21050). That same disclosure noted that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The test is not mentioned again in the ledger. The next entry is a 2016-10-06 corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Nothing on record reports whether a clearance submission was made, what the agency decided, or whether the program was ended before the company renamed itself a second time.
The reverse stock split authorized in October 2010 had a February 4, 2011 deadline, at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 (claims 20721, 20715). The ledger's automated review has moved both claims from stated to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable, the latter as of 2026-10-09. No disclosure in the record confirms that the split was carried out, names a ratio, or says the authorization lapsed. The last mention is the 2010-10-21 filing.
Two smaller items carry the same pattern of a dated promise followed by silence. Stephen A. Williams was named to join the board effective 2013-05-01 (claim 21038), but no later filing on record mentions him. The 2011 term extension of the Stock Incentive Plan to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709) passed its end date with no disclosure on record of renewal, replacement, or expiry. The auditor items are different. GHP Horwath's 2011 appointment (claims 20720, 20713) is marked not_yet_verifiable, but the firm was ratified again in 2013 (claim 21039), so continuity appears to be confirmed indirectly rather than walked back.
Two caveats apply. The delayed and not_yet_verifiable transitions are classifications made by this site's automated pipeline in September and October 2026, not statements by the company. In addition, the claims ledger supplied for this review ends partway through claim 20981, so later disclosures that might address these items were not available for examination.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-13The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test and its distribution arrangement with Merial appear only in the September 13, 2004 disclosures (claims 21096, 21094, 21100). At that point management described Merial as holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights and said the antigen-based blood test sat outside FDA regulation. No later filing in this record returns to SurBred 15 or to Merial. Each claim still reads as stated, but nothing in the ledger shows whether the product reached commercial sale, whether the Merial agreement remained in force, or why both stopped being mentioned.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone product for maintaining cattle pregnancies, has a similar history (claims 21097, 21101). Its only appearance is the same September 2004 disclosure, which stated that the product would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing. Later disclosures in this record do not mention a submission, an approval, or a decision to stop development. The broader category of pipeline products in development (claim 21098) also has no follow-up. When an animal-health exclusive license appears in October 2012 (claim 21049), it is not connected to StayBred or SurBred, and the record does not explain how the earlier programs ended.
The September 2004 disclosure also announced an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim 21099). Roughly a year later, on September 25, 2005, his employment was recorded as terminated (claim 21087). The same filing named a new President and CEO (claims 21082, 21083) and announced the change to the AspenBio Pharma name (claim 21090). The ledger gives no reason for the departure, and nothing indicates that the 2004 agreement was ever discussed again.
In October 2010, shareholders were asked to approve a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be carried out before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). That deadline passed long ago. Both claims were automatically moved to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable. No disclosure in this record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, the blood-based diagnostic test for appendicitis, was last described on October 14, 2012 (claims 21047, 21050). At that time management said it was pursuing FDA clearance. The next corporate event in this record is the October 2016 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), and AppyScore is not mentioned there. The ledger has no statement on whether FDA clearance was obtained, denied, or withdrawn, and it does not say whether the product was still part of the business when the company renamed itself. The record supplied here is cut off after the 2016 entry, so any later references to these matters could not be checked.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-11The Merial arrangement for SurBred 15 is the clearest case of an item that drops out of the record. On 2004-09-13 the company described Merial as holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights to its early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claims 21094, 21096). It also cited license arrangements with three universities (21095) and an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (21099). That date is the last mention of the Merial relationship. Within a year Hurst's employment was terminated (21087), the company was renamed AspenBio Pharma (21090), and SurBred 15 no longer appears in any disclosure on record. The status remains 'stated' only because nothing later revisits it. No disclosure says whether the Merial rights were exercised, renegotiated or ended, or how Hurst's departure affected the bovine program.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance, follows the same pattern. On 2004-09-13 management said it required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21097, 21101), alongside unspecified 'pipeline products in development' (21098). There is no later reference to a filing, an approval or an abandonment. The next animal-health item on record is an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to a third party on 2012-10-14 (21049). That suggests the line was moved out of the company, but the record never connects that license to StayBred or explains what happened to the regulatory path described eight years earlier.
The board authorized a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (20721, 20715). It was last mentioned on 2010-10-21. No subsequent disclosure on record confirms whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority lapsed. The automated ledger moved both claims to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 and then to 'not_yet_verifiable' on 2026-10-09. Those transitions reflect the absence of any follow-up statement, not a revision by the company. The 2013 request to increase authorized common shares to 60,000,000 (21040) matches the figure approved in 2005 (21089), and nothing in the record reconciles the two.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented on 2012-10-14 as the company's lead product, with FDA clearance being pursued (21047, 21050). In the same disclosure, four directors were reported to have resigned on 2012-09-26 (21051). That date is the last mention of either the product or the clearance effort. The next item on record is the 2016-10-06 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981). No disclosure in this set reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission or a change in strategy for the product. The record supplied here ends partway through 2016, so a later explanation cannot be ruled out, but none appears in the claims available.
Some other entries carry automated 'delayed' or 'not_yet_verifiable' flags but are weaker signals. Stephen A. Williams's board appointment was due by 2013-05-01 (21038). The stock incentive plan term was extended to 2021-07-08 (20709). The GHP Horwath auditor engagement for 2011 (20713, 20720) is effectively resolved by the 2013 ratification of the same firm (21039). The back-and-forth status changes on 20711 and 20712 between 2026-09-27 and 2026-10-10 come from the extraction pipeline, not from anything the company said.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-11The animal-health franchise that defined the company's 2004 disclosures has no later trace in the record. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claim 21094), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for pregnancy maintenance that required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). It also cited unnamed pipeline products (claim 21098). None of these is mentioned again in subsequent filings on record. There is no launch, sales figure, regulatory filing, or termination of the Merial arrangement. The only later echo is a 2012-10-14 reference to an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which does not identify the products or counterparty. The record does not explain whether StayBred was ever submitted to FDA, or whether the Merial rights lapsed or were transferred.
The employment of Roger Hurst followed a similar arc. His exclusive employment agreement was presented as a 2004 asset (claim 21099), and his termination appears a year later on 2005-09-25 (claim 21087) without stated reasons. Over the same period the company renamed itself AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). The disclosures on record do not connect the departure to the status of the bovine programs he was associated with, and they offer no explanation of their own.
The board's authorization of a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04, was disclosed twice in October 2010 (claims 20721, 20715). The deadline passed, and the ledger auto-transitioned both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. No subsequent claim records whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to expire. No revision announcement appears.
AppyScore, a blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's central product story on 2012-10-14, alongside a stated pursuit of FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). In the same filing management disclosed that four directors had resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051) and that a common stock offering was under way (claim 21048). No later claim on record reports a clearance decision, a withdrawal, or a change in regulatory strategy. By 2016-10-06 the record shows the company renaming itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), with no stated account of what became of AppyScore in between.
The 2013-04-28 disclosure that Stephen A. Williams would join the board by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038) carries the same delayed and then not_yet_verifiable sequence. No later claim confirms his seating or his departure. This is a smaller gap, but it fits the broader pattern: forward-dated items are announced and then not reconciled in later disclosures. Note that the ledger supplied ends partway through the 2016 entries, so later filings may resolve some of these items. Several of the status transitions are also automated and should not be read as findings by themselves.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-11The reverse stock split authorized in October 2010 is the clearest loose end in the record. Claims 20721 and 20715, from the 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 filings, describe board authority to effect a split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, with a deadline of February 4, 2011. Neither claim has a follow-up in the disclosures on file. Both were automatically marked delayed on 2026-09-28 and then not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. The record contains no statement that the split was executed, at what ratio, or that the authority was allowed to lapse. The 2013 filing that raised authorized common shares (claim 21040) does not refer back to it either.
The early cattle-reproduction franchise disappears from the record without any stated exit. The 2004-09-13 disclosures describe SurBred 15 as an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), backed by exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claim 21094). They also describe StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101), along with an unspecified pipeline (claim 21098). None of these products, the Merial arrangement, or the three university licenses (claim 21095) appears again in later disclosures. The next related item is a 2012-10-14 reference to an exclusive license agreement for animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which reads as an out-licensing of that business. The record does not say whether the Merial rights were terminated, whether SurBred 15 reached commercial sales, or whether StayBred's regulatory filing was ever made. The departure of Roger Hurst, whose exclusive employment agreement was cited in 2004 (claim 21099), was disclosed in 2005 (claim 21087). It was not linked to the status of these programs.
AppyScore, the appendicitis blood test, last appears as an active regulatory effort in the 2012-10-14 disclosures. Those filings describe the company as pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). The same filings report that four directors resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051) and that a common stock offering was under way (claim 21048). No later claim on file reports a clearance decision, a withdrawal of the submission, or a change in strategy for the product. The next significant entry is the 2016-10-06 change of corporate name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), which has no stated connection to AppyScore's outcome.
Several dated governance items have also gone unconfirmed in the extracted record. The 2013 board appointment of Stephen A. Williams, effective by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038), and the 2014 auditor ratification for fiscal 2014 (claim 21012) were both moved to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. This appears to be a gap in documentation rather than a reversal. GHP Horwath was ratified again in 2013 (claim 21039), which suggests the fiscal 2011 engagement in claims 20720 and 20713 went ahead as stated.
All of the status changes described here were made by an automated extraction pipeline in September and October 2026, not by the company. The record supplied ends at the 2016 name change, so later filings may resolve some of these items.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-11The board's authorization of a reverse stock split, at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be completed before February 4, 2011 (claims 20715 and 20721) was last mentioned in the October 21, 2010 disclosures. Both claims now sit at not_yet_verifiable after an automated pass marked them delayed. Nothing on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse at the deadline. The disclosures simply stop referring to it.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, was presented on September 13, 2004 as a pipeline product that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101). It does not appear in any later claim. The record contains no filing, no approval, no licensing-out and no statement that development stopped. The Merial agreement giving exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claims 21094 and 21096), and the license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095), date from the same filing and are likewise never mentioned again. The record does not say whether the Merial relationship continued, was renegotiated or ended. Its silence on this is notable, because the animal health intellectual property was later placed under a separate exclusive license (claim 21049, October 2012) without any reference to the earlier arrangement.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was described on October 14, 2012 as the subject of an active FDA clearance effort (claims 21047 and 21050). It is the last time the product appears in the claims provided. The next disclosed corporate milestone is a 2016 name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), which implies a change of strategic direction. However, the record contains no statement that clearance was obtained, denied or abandoned, and nothing explains how the product relates to the renamed company.
Stephen A. Williams was to join the board effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). That claim is now not_yet_verifiable, and no later claim confirms that he took the seat or explains a departure. This is a smaller item, but it has the same gap as the others: a dated commitment with no follow-up on record.
A note on method. The delayed and not_yet_verifiable statuses come from this site's automated review in September and October 2026. They mean that no confirming disclosure was found. They do not mean the company announced a change. The claims ledger supplied for this review also breaks off mid-2016, so later filings may address some of these points.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-10The 2004 animal-health franchise is the clearest case of a topic that went quiet. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone product for pregnancy maintenance (claim 21097), an unspecified development pipeline (claim 21098), and license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). It also said StayBred would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). None of these products, the pipeline, or the university licenses appears in any later claim on record. The next animal-health reference comes eight years later, on 2012-10-14, as an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which suggests the assets were licensed out rather than commercialized. The record contains no statement on whether StayBred was ever submitted to FDA, what happened to SurBred 15 sales, or whether the university licenses lapsed, were terminated, or were folded into the 2012 license.
The Merial agreement follows the same pattern. On 2004-09-13 the company said Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15 (claim 21094). That is the only time Merial appears in the ledger. No later disclosure on record mentions the relationship continuing, being renegotiated, or ending, and the 2012 out-license (claim 21049) does not say whether Merial was the counterparty or whether its rights had already lapsed.
The reverse stock split authorization is the only dated financing commitment left open. In October 2010 shareholders and the board authorized a reverse split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be carried out by 2011-02-04 (claims 20721 and 20715). Both claims now sit at not_yet_verifiable. They passed through an automated delayed status on 2026-09-28 and were set to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. Nothing on record confirms that the split was carried out, at what ratio, or that the authority was allowed to expire. The next financing item, the 2013 increase of 60,000,000 authorized shares (claim 21040), does not reference it either.
AppyScore, the appendicitis blood test, was the company's central product story in 2012. On 2012-10-14 management described the test (claim 21047) and said it was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claim 21050). In the same filing, four directors were reported to have resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The test is not mentioned in the 2013 or 2014 claims on record. By 2016-10-06 the company was announcing a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), with no AppyScore claim in between. The ledger holds no statement on the outcome of the FDA submission, no announcement that the program was discontinued, and no explanation for the rename as it relates to the product.
Two caveats apply. First, the delayed and not_yet_verifiable statuses on the 2010 to 2014 claims were all assigned by automated reprocessing on 2026-09-28 and 2026-10-09, not prompted by anything the company said. For routine items such as the auditor appointments (claims 20720, 20713, 21012) and the Stephen A. Williams board seat (claim 21038), those statuses most likely reflect missing follow-up data rather than a walk-back. The 2013 ratification of GHP Horwath (claim 21039), for instance, implies the auditor relationship did continue. Second, the ledger supplied here ends partway through the 2016 entries, so a later disclosure may have addressed some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-10The cattle-pregnancy franchise is the clearest disappearance in the record. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21096, 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, which it said required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Neither product, the Merial arrangement, nor the regulatory path for StayBred appears in any later disclosure on record. The next time animal health surfaces is 2012-10-14, as an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). The record does not say whether SurBred 15 ever reached Merial's channel, whether StayBred was ever filed with the FDA, or whether the 2012 license is how those programs ended.
The reverse stock split authorized in October 2010 has no disclosed outcome. Filings dated 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 described board authority to effect a split at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09, because no subsequent disclosure confirms that a split was executed, which ratio was chosen, or that the authority lapsed unused. The company never followed up on the deadline either way.
AppyScore, the appendicitis blood test, was positioned on 2012-10-14 as the company's lead product, with FDA clearance actively being pursued (claims 21047, 21050). That same filing records the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). Later entries through 2016 cover auditor ratifications and share-reserve increases (claims 21039, 21011, 20982), but none returns to AppyScore or to the result of the FDA effort. The record contains no statement that clearance was obtained, denied, or withdrawn.
A smaller item concerns Stephen A. Williams, announced on 2013-04-28 as joining the board effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). The ledger has since marked this not_yet_verifiable, since no later disclosure confirms that the appointment took effect or mentions Williams again. The gap may be an omission rather than a reversal, but the company has not said which.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-10In October 2010 the board sought and described authority to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be used before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). That deadline passed more than fifteen years ago. The ledger moved both claims from stated to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable on the strength of the date alone. No later disclosure on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse unused. The October 2010 filings are the last mention.
The 2004 disclosures centred on the bovine reproduction line. These were the SurBred 15 early pregnancy test, which was to be marketed under an exclusive Merial distribution arrangement and was described as outside FDA regulation, and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21094, 21096, 21097, 21100, 21101). The same filing cited license arrangements with three universities and a pipeline of products in development (claims 21095, 21098). None of these appear again after September 2004. The next animal-health reference comes in October 2012, and it describes only an exclusive license of the company's animal health intellectual property to another party (claim 21049). The record never explains what became of the Merial arrangement, whether SurBred 15 reached commercial sale, or whether StayBred ever went to the FDA before the line was licensed out.
The September 2004 disclosure presented Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement as part of the company's foundation (claim 21099). A year later the termination of his employment appears among routine personnel items (claim 21087), with no reason given. It was disclosed, but nothing on record accounts for the change.
In October 2012 the company described AppyScore, a blood-based appendicitis test, as its lead product and said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). The disclosures that follow in 2013, 2014 and 2016 deal with auditor ratifications, share reserve increases and authorized share counts (claims 21039, 21040, 21041, 21011, 21012, 20982). None of them mention AppyScore or the progress of that clearance. October 2012 is therefore the last statement on record about the regulatory path for the product the company had placed at its centre.
The April 2013 filing stated that Stephen A. Williams would join the board by May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). That claim has also aged into not_yet_verifiable, and no later record confirms that he took the seat or explains why he did not. The record supplied for this review ends partway through the 2016 entries, so later filings may address some of these points. Within the disclosures available here, they are left unaddressed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-10The reverse stock split authorized in October 2010 is the clearest open thread. Claims 20721 and 20715 record shareholder authorization for a split at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011. The last mention is the October 21, 2010 disclosure. The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09, because nothing later in the record says whether the board used the authority or let it lapse. No later filing gives the chosen ratio or explains why the deadline passed without comment.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented in October 2012 as the company's central product, with FDA clearance being pursued (claims 21047 and 21050). Both remain at stated, and October 14, 2012 is the last mention. None of the 2013, 2014 or 2016 claims on record refer to the test, a regulatory submission, a clearance decision or a change in strategy. For a program framed as the company's main regulatory goal, the record does not say how it ended or whether it continued.
The animal health business that defined the company in 2004 fades out without a stated exit. In September 2004 management described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test, with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claims 21096 and 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant hormone that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101), along with unnamed pipeline products (claim 21098). None of these is mentioned again. In October 2012 a single claim notes an exclusive license of the company's animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). It names no licensee, no terms and no outcome for the Merial arrangement or StayBred's regulatory path. The record moves from named products and a named distribution partner to a generic out-license with no transition statement in between.
The April 2013 disclosure said Stephen A. Williams would join the board effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). The ledger reclassified this to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable because no later claim confirms that he was seated or that he served. This may be a gap in the extracted record rather than a reversal, but the record does not close it.
Two cautions apply to this reading. First, the delayed and not_yet_verifiable statuses were assigned by automated reclassification in September and October 2026, so they reflect missing confirmation rather than any statement from the company. Second, the ledger supplied for this review breaks off partway through a 2016 auditor-ratification claim (claim 20982), so later disclosures that might resolve these items were not available.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-10The animal-health franchise that defined the company's 2004 disclosures has no further mention after that year. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094) and with the test said to fall outside FDA regulation (claim 21100). The same filing presented StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle, as needing FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these items appears in later disclosures on record. By 2012-10-14 the only related reference is an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). The record does not say whether the Merial arrangement ended or on what terms, whether StayBred was ever submitted to the FDA, or how the out-license relates to the products named in 2004.
The antigen business is similar. Its acquisition from Vitro Diagnostics was disclosed on 2004-03-23 (claim 21108) and restated on 2005-09-25 (claim 21081). In 2004 the company also said it marketed over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). After 2005 there is no further reference to this product line, its revenue, or a sale or wind-down. The company was renamed AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090) and moved toward human diagnostics, but no disclosure on record explains what happened to the original catalogue.
AppyScore, the appendicitis blood test, was the stated centrepiece on 2012-10-14, with management pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). That is the last mention on record. The next substantive event in the ledger is the 2016-10-06 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claim 20980). The record contains no statement on whether clearance was obtained, whether the submission was withdrawn, or whether the program was set aside before the acquisition. The same 2012 filing noted that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). It gives no reason, and none appears later.
Two dated corporate actions remain unconfirmed. The board was authorized to effect a reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims 20715, 20721). The ledger auto-transitioned both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. No disclosure on record states whether a split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse. Likewise, Stephen A. Williams was to join the board by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038), but no later filing confirms he was seated. In both cases the gap may reflect the limits of this record rather than silence from the company. The status changes are automated and do not come from any company revision statement. Note also that the ledger supplied here ends partway through the 2016 entries, so later disclosures may resolve some of these points.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-09StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone product for maintaining cattle pregnancies, appears only in the 2004-09-13 disclosures (claims 21097 and 21101). Those disclosures say it would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing before sale. Nothing later in the record says whether that filing was made, abandoned, or rejected. The product simply stops appearing. By 2012-10-14 the company describes itself around a human appendicitis test and says it has exclusively licensed out its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). That license is never tied back to StayBred, and the record holds no statement on what became of the regulatory path management had described.
The Merial arrangement for SurBred 15 follows the same pattern. The 2004-09-13 disclosures describe Merial as holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights to the early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claims 21094 and 21096), and say the test sits outside FDA regulation (claim 21100). It is the only named commercial partnership in the early record. It is never mentioned again: no renewal, no termination notice, no sales figures. The 2012 animal health license (claim 21049) names no counterparty and does not say whether SurBred 15 or the Merial rights were part of it. The 2004 university license arrangements (claim 21095) and the unnamed pipeline products (claim 21098) also fall out of the record without further comment.
The board's authority to effect a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 is disclosed twice in October 2010 (claims 20721 and 20715). The deadline has long passed. The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09, because no later disclosure in the record confirms that the split was carried out, the ratio chosen, or that the authority was allowed to lapse. These status changes come from automated extraction finding no confirming disclosure. They are not evidence that the split failed. Still, the company has not said, in the material on file, what it did with an authorization it put to shareholders.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis diagnostic, was the company's stated focus as of 2012-10-14, together with an active pursuit of FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). That is the last mention of either the product or the clearance effort in the visible record. The next disclosure, dated 2016-10-06, concerns a corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). In between, the record contains no clearance decision, no withdrawal, and no explanation of why the product that defined the company four years earlier no longer appears. The same 2012 filing also notes, without stated reasons, that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The record holds nothing that later accounts for those departures.
The claim list supplied for this analysis is cut off partway through the 2016 entries. Later disclosures may address some of these items, and these observations cover only the material shown.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-09StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone product for maintaining cattle pregnancy, appears in the record once, on 2004-09-13 (claim 21097). The same disclosure said the product would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing before it could be sold (claim 21101). Neither claim has a later mention. When the company was renamed AspenBio Pharma in September 2005 (claim 21090), the record says nothing about StayBred's regulatory progress, any filing, or a decision to stop. Both claims are still recorded as stated. No disclosure on file explains what happened to the product.
The SurBred 15 early pregnancy test and Merial's exclusive marketing and distribution rights for it (claims 21096 and 21094) follow the same pattern. Both were last mentioned on 2004-09-13, alongside license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). In October 2012 the company disclosed an exclusive license agreement for its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). That suggests the veterinary line was licensed out rather than developed in-house. However, the record does not name SurBred, Merial, or StayBred in that context, and contains no statement that the Merial arrangement ended or changed.
The reverse stock split authorization is the clearest dated commitment left open. Disclosures on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 (claims 20721 and 20715) described board authority for a split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be used before 2011-02-04. The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. These were automated changes made because no confirming evidence was found, not revisions by the company. No disclosure on file says whether the split was carried out within the window, at what ratio, or whether the authority lapsed.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was last described on 2012-10-14 (claims 21047 and 21050), when the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance. The next disclosure on file is from 2016-10-06 and concerns the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claim 20980). Nothing in between reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission, or any change to the AppyScore program. The 2012 claims remain stated with no later mention.
A caveat on scope: the claims supplied end partway through the 2016-10-06 entries, after claim 20981. Later disclosures may address some of these items. The observations above apply only to the portion of the record that was provided.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-09The reverse stock split authorization appears twice in October 2010 disclosures (claims 20721 and 20715). Shareholders authorized the board to effect a split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, and the authority had to be used before February 4, 2011. The last mention is October 21, 2010. The ledger moved both claims to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 and then to 'not_yet_verifiable' on 2026-10-09. Nothing on record says whether the board used the authority before the deadline or let it lapse. Nothing explains why a split was sought in the first place.
The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test was presented in September 2004 as a lead product (claim 21096). Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights to it (claim 21094). That is the last time either the product or the Merial arrangement is mentioned. The 2005 name change to AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090) carries no reference to SurBred 15. By October 2012 the product narrative centers entirely on AppyScore (claim 21047). Both claims remain at 'stated', but no later disclosure reports commercial results, termination, or a change in the Merial relationship.
StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, was disclosed in September 2004 (claim 21097). The same filing acknowledged it would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). Neither StayBred nor its regulatory path is mentioned again. In October 2012 the company disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049) without naming the products covered. That may account for StayBred and SurBred 15, but the record never says so.
In September 2004 the company described license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) and unnamed pipeline products in development (claim 21098). Neither topic appears in any later claim on record. No disclosure identifies the universities, says whether the licenses remain in force, or reports what became of the pipeline.
AppyScore was disclosed in October 2012 as a blood test for appendicitis, with the company pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). The same disclosure reported four director resignations on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). The record next shows a corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix in October 2016 (claim 20981). Neither AppyScore nor the FDA submission appears in the claims available here, so the record does not show whether clearance was obtained, denied, or abandoned. The claims list supplied for this analysis is cut off after claim 20981, so later filings may address AppyScore or the other items above.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-09The reverse stock split authorized in October 2010 is the clearest unresolved item. Claims 20721 and 20715 record board and shareholder authority for a split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011. The last mention on record is the October 21, 2010 disclosure. The ledger automatically moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. No later disclosure on record says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse. A deadline-bound corporate action with no follow-up statement is the kind of item that would normally be closed out explicitly.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented in October 2012 as the company's lead product, along with an active pursuit of FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). That is the last time either appears in the record. The next disclosure available, from October 2016, concerns only a corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981), which suggests a change of strategic direction. Nothing on record says whether FDA clearance was obtained, denied, or abandoned, or what happened to the AppyScore program.
The animal-health franchise described in September 2004 also disappears without explanation. That franchise included SurBred 15, the early bovine pregnancy test; Merial's exclusive marketing and distribution rights for it; StayBred, which required FDA approval or an ANDA filing; licenses with three universities; and an unnamed development pipeline (claims 21094 through 21098, 21101). After 2004, the only related item on record is an October 2012 reference to an exclusive license of animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). That reference reads as an out-licensing rather than continued development. No disclosure on record states the outcome of the Merial arrangement, StayBred's regulatory path, or the university licenses.
Two smaller items carry dated commitments that the ledger has auto-transitioned to not_yet_verifiable. The first is Stephen A. Williams' board appointment, effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038). The second is the 2002 Stock Incentive Plan's term extension to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709). Neither was revisited in later disclosures on record, including after the 2021 plan expiry date passed.
The claim ledger supplied here is truncated after claim 20981, so later disclosures may address some of these items. Also, the delayed and not_yet_verifiable statuses were assigned by automated sweeps, not by any company statement. They reflect an absence of confirming disclosure, not evidence of failure.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-09The board's authority to effect a reverse stock split, at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011, appears in disclosures dated 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 (claims 20721 and 20715). Neither claim was followed by any disclosure on record saying whether a split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse. Both claims were automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with nothing confirming the outcome. The next filing on record, from 2011-05-31, covers stock incentive plan housekeeping (claims 20709 and 20710) and does not mention the split.
The early livestock reproduction franchise disappears from the record after a single detailed appearance on 2004-09-13. That filing described the SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test, exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial, the StayBred recombinant luteinizing hormone product with its FDA or ANDA pathway, license arrangements with three universities, and an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claims 21096, 21094, 21097, 21101, 21095 and 21099). By 2005-09-25, the disclosures report that Hurst's employment had been terminated and the company was renamed AspenBio Pharma (claims 21087 and 21090). None of SurBred 15, Merial, StayBred or the university licenses is mentioned again. Every one of these claims remains at stated, not verified. Nothing on record explains whether the Merial arrangement produced sales, whether StayBred ever entered the FDA process, or whether the programs were discontinued.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, and the stated pursuit of FDA clearance for it were last mentioned on 2012-10-14 (claims 21047 and 21050). The same filing referred to an exclusive license of the animal health intellectual property and the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claims 21049 and 21051). The 2013 and 2014 disclosures on record cover only board, auditor and share-reserve items. By 2016-10-06, the company was renaming itself from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20981 and 20979). No disclosure on record states whether AppyScore received FDA clearance, was withdrawn, or was abandoned. Nothing on record names the counterparty to the animal health license or reports any income from it.
A series of auditor ratifications naming GHP Horwath for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012 and 20982), along with the 2011 extension of the stock incentive plan's term to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709), all shifted to delayed in the same automated pass on 2026-09-28. These are routine governance items, and the status likely reflects missing follow-up data more than any retreat by the company. Even so, the record contains no statement confirming that those engagements were completed, or what happened to the plan when its extended term ended. The ledger provided ends partway through a 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20905), so later disclosures may address some of these gaps and are not reflected here.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-08Riot's earliest disclosures, from its time as an animal-health diagnostics company, centered on the SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096). Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights to it (claim 21094). The same filings described a follow-on product, StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that still needed FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), and license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). All of these were last mentioned on 2004-09-13 and remain at 'stated' in the ledger. No later disclosure on record says whether SurBred 15 reached meaningful sales, whether the Merial arrangement continued or ended, or whether StayBred ever went to the FDA. The next reference to the animal-health line is the 2012-10-14 note of an exclusive license of the animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049). That suggests an exit, but the record contains no statement connecting the two or explaining the outcome.
The antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) was described in 2004 as supplying more than 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). It was last mentioned on 2005-09-25, in the filing that also renamed the company AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). Nothing on record reports what happened to the antigen product line after that, whether it was sold, wound down, or folded into other operations.
In October 2010 the board sought authority for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims were auto-transitioned to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with no confirming disclosure in the ledger. The record does not say whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, and the stated pursuit of FDA clearance for it (claims 21047, 21050) were last mentioned on 2012-10-14, alongside the resignation of four directors (claim 21051) and a new stock offering (claim 21048). Both claims are still at 'stated'. The next entries on record are the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and the change of the corporate name from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20981, 20979). No disclosure in the ledger reports the result of the FDA effort or explains why the product drops out of view before the company moved in a different direction.
Several other 'delayed' entries, including the auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and the Stock Incentive Plan term extension to 2021-07-08 (claim 20709), appear to be automatic deadline lapses on routine items rather than substantive walk-backs. The ledger reviewed here ends at an entry dated 2017-04-27 (claim 20905), so later disclosures may address some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-08The animal-health program that defined the company in 2004 has no visible ending. The 2004-09-13 disclosures described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094). They also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone product for cattle that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), along with unnamed pipeline products (claim 21098). None of these is mentioned again in the record. The next animal-health reference comes eight years later, on 2012-10-14, as an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). The record says nothing about whether SurBred 15 reached Merial's channels, what happened to StayBred's regulatory path, or why the business was licensed out rather than commercialized.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was last mentioned on 2012-10-14. At that point the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). By 2016-10-06 the company had renamed itself from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquired BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20981, 20979). AppyScore is absent from those disclosures. The record contains no statement on the outcome of the FDA effort, no announcement that it was abandoned, and no explanation of how the change in direction relates to the product's fate.
The board's reverse stock split authorization had a deadline of 2011-02-04, at ratios from 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6 (claims 20721, 20715). It was last disclosed on 2010-10-21. The ledger moved both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28, but that move was automatic, triggered by the passed deadline. No later disclosure on record says whether a split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization lapsed unused.
The founding antigen business had a shorter arc. On 2004-09-13 the company described an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim 21099) and said it marketed more than 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). By 2005-09-25, Hurst's employment had been terminated (claim 21087). The same filing announced a holding-company restructuring (claim 21091) and a name change to AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). After that, neither the antigen product line, the Vitro Diagnostics acquisition behind it (claims 21108, 21081), nor the holding-company structure appears again. The record gives no reason for Hurst's departure so soon after an exclusive agreement and does not describe what became of the antigen catalog.
Two caveats about the ledger. First, several of its delayed flags are mechanical artifacts, including the fiscal-year auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982) and the Lundy appointment (claim 20711). These reflect passed dates, not evidence of non-delivery, and are not treated here as walk-backs. Second, the record supplied ends partway through claim 20905 in 2017, so later disclosures that might address any of these items have not been reviewed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-08The animal-health franchise that defined the company's 2004 disclosures has no later account of what happened to it. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21096, 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), along with unnamed pipeline products (claim 21098). None of these appears again in the record. The next animal-health reference comes eight years later, on 2012-10-14, as an exclusive license of the company's animal-health intellectual property to another party (claim 21049). That reads as an exit rather than a continuation. The ledger contains no statement on whether SurBred 15 reached market, how the Merial arrangement ended, or whether StayBred was ever filed with the FDA.
The antigen business bought from Vitro Diagnostics followed a similar path. It was disclosed on 2004-03-23 and restated on 2005-09-25 (claims 21108, 21081). The 2004 disclosures said the company marketed more than 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). After the 2005 restatement, neither the acquired business nor that product count is mentioned again, and no disposal, wind-down or revenue update is recorded.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, is the clearest open regulatory question. On 2012-10-14 management said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050), and that is the last mention. The company's subsequent disclosures turn to corporate identity instead: a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix and the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics, both disclosed in October 2016 (claims 20981, 20980, 20979). The record does not say whether clearance was obtained, denied or abandoned, or how the four-year gap relates to the pivot.
In October 2010 shareholders were asked to authorize a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims were automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with no confirming disclosure. The ledger does not show whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
Several other items in the ledger carry an automatic delayed status, but that status probably reflects missing confirmation rather than any walk-back. These are the auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), Stephen A. Williams' board appointment (claim 21038) and the Stock Incentive Plan term extension to 2021 (claim 20709), all routine actions that are usually completed. Claim 20711 gives a promised-by date of 2010-03-24, which is earlier than its 2010-10-21 disclosure and looks like an extraction error rather than a slipped commitment. The ledger as supplied breaks off at claim 20904 (2017-04-27), so disclosures after that date were not reviewed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-07The earliest product story on record has no visible ending. In September 2004 the company described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test, with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claims 21094, 21096). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Neither product, the Merial arrangement, nor the regulatory path appears in any later claim on record. The next animal-health reference comes in October 2012, when the company mentions an exclusive license agreement for its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). That claim does not say whether SurBred 15 reached market, whether the Merial rights were exercised or ended, or whether StayBred was ever submitted. The licensing of the animal health portfolio suggests the business was set aside, but no disclosure on record says so.
A related thread concerns Roger Hurst. In September 2004 the company highlighted Hurst's exclusive employment agreement as part of the same cattle-diagnostics story (claim 21099). By September 2005 that employment had been terminated (claim 21087). The record gives no reason and no account of what the departure meant for the programs the agreement was presented as supporting.
The antigen business acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21108, 21081) was last described in September 2005, alongside a claim of more than 30 products sold to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). Neither the business nor that product count is mentioned again. No sale, wind-down or change in revenue contribution is recorded.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented in October 2012 as the subject of a pursuit of FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). No later claim reports a submission, clearance, rejection or abandonment. The next substantive disclosures, in October 2016, describe the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20981, 20979). That sequence implies a change of direction, but none of the claims on record connects it to the outcome of the AppyScore effort.
The October 2010 authorization for a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715), was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-28. Nothing on record confirms that a split was carried out within the window or that the authority was allowed to lapse.
Several other items carry the same automatic delayed status but probably reflect how the ledger was processed rather than any walk-back. These include the annual auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), the plan-term extension (claim 20709), and the Lundy and board-restructuring appointments (claims 20711, 20712), whose target dates fall at or before the date of the claim itself. All transitions on record were applied in a single backfill on 2026-09-27 and 2026-09-28, not as events occurred. The record supplied ends partway through claim 20906, dated April 2017, so later disclosures may address some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-07AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's central product in the 2012-10-14 disclosures (claims 21047 and 21050). Management described it as pursuing FDA regulatory clearance. It does not appear in any later claim on record. By 2016-10-06 the company had acquired BiOptix Diagnostics and renamed itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). Nothing in the record says whether clearance was obtained, denied or withdrawn, or whether the program was sold, licensed or shelved. Both AppyScore claims still sit at stated, with no resolving disclosure.
The bovine reproduction franchise has also gone quiet. The 2004-09-13 disclosures described SurBred 15, an early-detection cattle pregnancy test, with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21094, 21096, 21100). They also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone that required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Neither product nor the Merial arrangement is mentioned after that date. The record has no commercial results for SurBred 15, no regulatory filing for StayBred, and no end to the Merial rights. The only later echo is a 2012-10-14 reference to an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which names neither product nor the licensee.
Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement was presented on 2004-09-13 as part of the company's capabilities (claim 21099). One year later, on 2005-09-25, the record shows his employment terminated (claim 21087). No reason is given, and no successor or effect on the programs he was tied to is disclosed. Around the same time, the license arrangements with three universities and the unnamed pipeline products (claims 21095, 21098) last appear on 2004-09-13 and are not revisited.
The reverse stock split, authorized at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6 for completion by 2011-02-04, was disclosed on 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims have auto-transitioned to delayed. The record contains no statement that a split was effected, at what ratio, or that the authority was allowed to lapse.
Several other claims carry delayed flags that likely do not reflect a walk-back. These include the annual auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20720, 20982, 21012), the 2021 plan-term extension (claim 20709), and personnel items whose deadline is at or before the disclosure date (claims 20711, 20712, 21038). They are better read as artifacts of the automated deadline check than as missed commitments. The ledger supplied here also breaks off at a 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20906), so this review does not cover the later pivot into the current business.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-06The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test is the earliest product thread that drops out of the record. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15 as an early-detection blood test outside FDA regulation, with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claims 21096, 21100, 21094). The related employment agreement with Roger Hurst (21099) appears again only as a termination on 2005-09-25 (21087). After that date the disclosures we hold do not mention SurBred 15, its sales, or the Merial arrangement. All three claims remain at 'stated' and none has been updated. Nothing on record says whether the Merial rights were exercised, renegotiated, or allowed to lapse, or whether Hurst's departure affected the program.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance, follows a similar pattern. It was presented on 2004-09-13 as requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21097, 21101), alongside unspecified pipeline products (21098) and licenses with three universities (21095). None of these is mentioned again in later filings. The next reference to animal health is an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 (21049), which suggests the line was licensed out. However, no disclosure connects that license to StayBred or explains what happened to the regulatory path that had been described as necessary.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the central product claim on 2012-10-14. Management said it was pursuing FDA clearance (21047, 21050). That disclosure also recorded the resignation of four directors on 2012-09-26 (21051) and a common stock offering (21048). Within the claims captured here, AppyScore does not appear again. The next substantive disclosures, on 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, concern the BiOptix Diagnostics acquisition and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (20980, 20979, 20981). Neither the FDA clearance effort nor any decision to stop it is addressed in the material we hold, and claim 21050 still reads 'stated' with no outcome attached.
The reverse stock split authorization of up to 1-for-6, to be effected by 2011-02-04, appears twice in October 2010 (20721, 20715). On 2026-09-28 the ledger automatically moved both claims to 'delayed' because the deadline passed without a recorded follow-up. The record does not show whether the board used the authority, let it expire, or chose a different ratio. Several auditor ratifications carrying fiscal-year deadlines (20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) were auto-transitioned in the same way. Those most likely reflect routine completion that was never confirmed, not slippage. The split is different: it was a discretionary action with a hard deadline, and no statement on record says it was carried out.
The claims list we received ends partway through an entry dated 2017-04-27 (20906). Items from later disclosures, including anything that may close out the topics above, could not be assessed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-06The record supplied for Riot ends mid-entry at claim 20906 (2017-04-27), so the observations below cover only the AspenBio, Venaxis and Bioptix years. Several items the ledger marks as delayed, including the annual GHP Horwath auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and the appointments of Stephen T. Lundy and Stephen A. Williams (claims 20711, 21038), carry promise dates that are simply the end of a fiscal year or an effective date already passed. The automated pass on 2026-09-28 appears to have flagged them mechanically. They are not treated here as walk-backs.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone product for maintaining cattle pregnancy, was described on 2004-09-13 as a product requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). It does not appear in any later claim on record, including the extensive 2005-09-25 disclosures. The ledger contains no filing, approval, abandonment or licensing-out of StayBred. The regulatory path that was flagged as a precondition was never reported as started.
SurBred 15, the early-detection bovine pregnancy test, and the exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial were last mentioned on 2004-09-13 (claims 21094, 21096, 21100). That same disclosure also cited license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these reappear afterward. The 2005 record notes that Roger Hurst's employment was terminated (claim 21087), the same person whose exclusive employment agreement was listed alongside these products in 2004 (claim 21099). The company did not state what became of the Merial arrangement, whether it produced sales, or whether it was ended. The next animal-health reference is an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property on 2012-10-14 (claim 21049), which names no counterparty and makes no link to the earlier products.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented on 2012-10-14 alongside a statement that the company was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). It is absent from every later claim. That includes the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and the renaming from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20981, 20979), which marked a change of business direction. The record contains no announcement that clearance was obtained, denied or withdrawn. It also does not say why the product the company had been built around stopped being discussed.
The board authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715), is now marked delayed. No later claim reports whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization was allowed to lapse. The 2011-05-31 disclosures (claims 20709, 20710) deal only with the stock incentive plan and do not resolve the question.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-06The reverse stock split is the clearest open thread. In October 2010 the company said shareholders had authorized the board to effect a split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be completed before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The last mention is October 21, 2010, and both claims have since been auto-transitioned to delayed. Nothing in the record says whether the board used the authority, let it lapse, or decided against it, and no ratio was ever announced.
The early animal-health franchise disappears without explanation. In September 2004 management described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test distributed exclusively through Merial (claims 21096 and 21094), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone product that it acknowledged would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101). Neither product, the Merial arrangement, nor the three university licenses (claim 21095) appears again. The September 2005 disclosures record the termination of Roger Hurst (claim 21087), whose exclusive employment agreement had been cited a year earlier as supporting this work (claim 21099), but they do not connect his departure to the product line. All of these claims remain in stated status with no update. Nothing on record says whether SurBred 15 sold, whether StayBred was ever filed, or how the Merial exclusivity ended.
AppyScore follows the same pattern. In October 2012 the company presented its blood-based appendicitis test as its lead product and said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). The same filing described an exclusive out-license of animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049) and the resignation of four directors (claim 21051). AppyScore is absent from the 2013 and 2014 records, which cover only share authorizations, auditor ratification and a board appointment. By October 2016 the company was renaming itself from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980 and 20979). No disclosure on record states the outcome of the FDA process or explains why the company moved away from the product it had built itself around.
One board appointment was never confirmed. Stephen A. Williams was announced in April 2013 as joining the board effective May 1, 2013 (claim 21038), and the claim is now marked delayed. No later record confirms that he was seated or explains why he was not.
A caution on reading the ledger. Most of the delayed transitions, including the auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012 and 20982) and the Lundy appointment (claim 20711), were applied automatically on September 28, 2026, against dates that are long past. They reflect missing follow-up in the extracted record, not anything the company announced. The ledger supplied here also breaks off mid-entry at an April 2017 claim (claim 20909), so later disclosures, including those around the company's eventual transformation into Riot, may address some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-05The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test and the exclusive marketing and distribution arrangement with Merial were presented in the September 13, 2004 disclosures as the company's lead commercial product and its anchor partnership (claims 21094, 21096, 21100). Neither appears in any later disclosure on record. The next reference to animal health comes eight years later, on October 14, 2012, as an exclusive license agreement for animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). That suggests the business was licensed out rather than built. The record contains no statement on whether the Merial arrangement produced meaningful sales, whether it was terminated or allowed to lapse, or why the company moved from marketing its own animal health products to licensing them away.
StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance, was last mentioned on September 13, 2004. At that time management said it required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). The "pipeline products in development" described the same day (claim 21098) were never itemized again. No later disclosure on record says whether a filing was made, whether development continued, or whether the program was abandoned. The product simply stops appearing.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was described on October 14, 2012 as the company's lead product, with FDA clearance being actively pursued (claims 21047, 21050). By October 6, 2016 the company was announcing the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20979, 20981), and AppyScore was no longer mentioned. The ledger records no outcome of the FDA process: no clearance, no rejection, no withdrawal. It also records no explanation for the pivot away from the product the company had been renamed around. The change from AspenBio to Venaxis is itself absent from the claims on record.
The board's authorization for a reverse stock split of up to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011, appears twice in October 2010 (claims 20721, 20715). Both entries were auto-transitioned to delayed on September 28, 2026. The record contains no disclosure on whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization expired unused. The same 60,000,000-share authorized-share figure appears in both 2005 (claim 21089) and 2013 (claim 21040), and nothing on record reconciles the two.
A caution on reading the ledger: many of the other entries auto-transitioned to delayed on September 28, 2026 describe events that were reported as already completed, such as auditor ratifications and executive appointments (claims 20711, 20712, 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982). In at least one case the promised-by date precedes the disclosure date. Those flags look like extraction artifacts rather than real slippage, and they are not treated here as walk-backs. The record supplied ends partway through an April 27, 2017 entry (claim 20909), so silence after that date cannot be assessed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-05The cattle-reproduction franchise disclosed in September 2004 does not appear again. Claims 21096, 21094 and 21100 describe SurBred 15 as an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, outside FDA regulation, with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial. That is the last mention on record. No later claim reports SurBred 15 sales, a renewal or termination of the Merial arrangement, or the product's withdrawal. The status remains 'stated' only because no date was attached. The record does not say whether the exclusive relationship was ever commercially meaningful or how it ended.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance (claim 21097), was disclosed on the same date as requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). The same 2004 disclosure referred to unspecified pipeline products (claim 21098) and license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these is mentioned again. Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement (claim 21099) was followed a year later, on 2005-09-25, by a bare notice that his employment had been terminated (claim 21087). That notice gives no account of what happened to the programs he was associated with. No filing, approval or abandonment of the StayBred regulatory path is recorded.
The reverse stock split authority disclosed in October 2010 is open on the ledger. Claims 20721 and 20715 describe board authorization for a split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04. Both were auto-transitioned to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 because the date passed with no follow-up claim. The record contains no statement that the split was carried out, at what ratio, or that the authority was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the stated focus in October 2012. Claim 21047 describes the product, and claim 21050 says the company was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance. The same disclosure noted an exclusive out-license of the animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which effectively closed the earlier cattle line without naming it. AppyScore is not mentioned in any later claim. By 2016-10-06 the company was renaming itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981) and acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980 and 20979). Nothing on record reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission, or a decision to stop development.
Some caution applies to the remaining 'delayed' entries. The auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), the 2010 board changes (claim 20712), Stephen Lundy's appointment (claim 20711), with a promise date that precedes its own disclosure, and Stephen Williams' board seat (claim 21038) appear to be routine events. These were moved to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 only because their dates have passed. They should not be read as broken commitments. The ledger as provided ends with an incomplete entry, claim 20909 dated 2017-04-27, so later disclosures that might address any of the items above were not reviewed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-03The earliest commitments on record concern the bovine reproduction franchise. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, as carrying exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21096, 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance that would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), along with an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim 21099). None of these products, nor the Merial arrangement, appears again in the disclosed record. The 2005-09-25 filings instead record Hurst's employment as terminated (claim 21087) and a name change to AspenBio Pharma (claim 21090). The next reference to this area comes on 2012-10-14, when the company records an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). The record does not say whether SurBred 15 reached commercial sale under Merial, whether a StayBred filing was ever made, or whether the 2012 license covered these programs.
On 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21, the board disclosed authority to effect a reverse stock split at a ratio of up to 1-for-6, to be exercised before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims moved to delayed status on 2026-09-28. That transition was automated: the deadline passed and the ledger holds no confirmation. It does not reflect any announced postponement. Nothing on record states whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, a blood-based diagnostic test for appendicitis, was the stated focus as of 2012-10-14, with the company pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claims 21047, 21050). That same disclosure noted that four directors had resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). AppyScore is not mentioned in any later claim. The next disclosures, dated 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, describe a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix and the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980, 20979). The record contains no clearance decision, no withdrawal of a submission, and no statement that the appendicitis program was discontinued or written down.
Several routine governance items also carry auto-assigned delayed status because their target dates passed without a confirming record. These include Stephen A. Williams joining the board by 2013-05-01 (claim 21038) and the auditor engagements for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982). Claim 20711 records Stephen T. Lundy's appointment as CEO with a promised-by date of 2010-03-24, seven months before the disclosure that reports it. This looks more like an extraction artifact than a missed commitment. These items are listed for completeness rather than as evidence of anything withdrawn.
The claims ledger supplied for this review ends partway through claim 20906, dated 2017-04-27. Later disclosures, including the company's move into cryptocurrency mining under the Riot name, are therefore not covered here.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-03The cattle reproduction franchise that defined the company's 2004 disclosures has no further mention anywhere in the record. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claims 21096, 21094). The same filing described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone product that it said required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Neither product, the Merial arrangement, nor the regulatory path for StayBred appears again. All four claims still carry the status 'stated'. There is no disclosure that the Merial agreement ended, that StayBred was ever filed, or that the program was dropped. The nearest later reference is a 2012-10-14 claim of an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049), which may be where these products went. The record never makes that connection.
The broader research base described in 2004, licensing arrangements with three universities and an unspecified set of pipeline products in development (claims 21095, 21098), also stops at 2004-09-13. No later filing on record names the universities, reports that the licenses were kept or terminated, or says what became of the pipeline.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's lead product as of 2012-10-14, with management stating it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). The 2013 and 2014 disclosures on record cover only board seats, auditor ratification and share authorizations. By 2016-10-06 the company was acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics and renaming itself from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20981). That filing does not mention AppyScore. The record contains no outcome of the FDA effort, whether clearance, rejection or withdrawal, and no statement that the program was abandoned. The earlier rename from AspenBio to Venaxis is also not captured as a claim.
Shareholders authorized a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims were moved automatically to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 because that deadline has passed. Nothing on record says whether the board carried out the split, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse.
Several other claims were also moved to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28, including the auditor ratifications and the Lundy and Schoettler appointments (claims 20711, 20712, 20713, 20982). Those moves appear to reflect only that a stated date has passed, not a missed commitment, so they are not treated here as walk-backs. This ledger was cut off at claim 20905 (2017-04-27). Later filings, including the company's shift to its current business, may address some of these silences and were not reviewed.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-03The ledger provided ends partway through a 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20905), so this reading covers the record through late 2016. Several items marked delayed on 2026-09-28 are mechanical rather than substantive. These include the auditor ratifications (20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and the stock plan term extension (20709). They were flagged because their target dates passed, not because anything was walked back. The items below are the ones where the record goes quiet on something management once presented as material.
The Merial arrangement for SurBred 15 (21094, 21096) was described on 2004-09-13 as an exclusive marketing and distribution agreement for the company's early-detection bovine pregnancy test. That was its only appearance. It sits at stated, with no later disclosure of launch, sales, renewal or termination. The partnership that anchored the animal health story does not reappear. When the company next speaks about animal health, in 2012 (21049), it is out-licensing the related intellectual property. No account connects the two.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle (21097), was disclosed on the same date with an acknowledgment that it required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (21101). No later claim reports a filing, a regulatory outcome or a decision to stop development. The 'pipeline products in development' (21098) and the license arrangements with three universities (21095) are also last mentioned on 2004-09-13. The 2005 rename to AspenBio Pharma (21090) and the 2012 animal health license (21049) suggest these programs were set aside. The record contains no statement saying so.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test (21047), was last disclosed on 2012-10-14 alongside the statement that the company was pursuing FDA clearance (21050). That same disclosure noted four directors resigning on 2012-09-26 (21051) without a stated reason. The next substantive corporate disclosures, in October 2016, concern the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (20980, 20979) and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (20981). Nothing on record says whether the FDA clearance effort concluded, failed or was abandoned before the company changed direction.
The reverse stock split authority of up to 1-for-6, to be used before 2011-02-04 (20721, 20715), was disclosed twice in October 2010. It is now flagged delayed because the deadline passed. No subsequent claim reports whether the board effected a split within that window or let the authority lapse. The 2013 request to increase authorized common shares (21040) arrived without reference to it.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-03The SurBred 15 and StayBred cattle-reproduction programs, along with the Merial distribution arrangement behind them, appear only in the 2004-09-13 disclosures (claims 21094, 21096, 21097, 21098, 21101). Merial was described as holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights for SurBred 15. StayBred was described as requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing. An unspecified pipeline was also referenced. None of these items recurs in any later claim on record. The ledger still carries each as merely stated. The record contains no commercial launch, no regulatory filing outcome for StayBred, no amendment or termination of the Merial rights, and no explanation of why the animal-health pipeline dropped out of view. The license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) and the exclusive animal-health IP license noted in 2012 (claim 21049) show the same pattern: each is mentioned once and never followed up.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the stated focus in the 2012-10-14 disclosures, with the company described as pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). That same disclosure noted four directors resigning on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The next substantive change on record is the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a corporate name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). Across those four years the record contains no statement that clearance was obtained, denied, or abandoned, and nothing describing what became of the AppyScore program when the company redirected itself.
Shareholders authorized a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected by 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715, last mentioned 2010-10-21). The ledger auto-transitioned both claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with no confirming disclosure. The record does not say whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization was allowed to lapse.
Many other delayed statuses appear to be artifacts of automated date handling rather than genuine slips. These include the auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20720, 20982, 21012), the Lundy appointment, whose promised-by date precedes its own disclosure (claim 20711), and the plan-term extension to 2021 (claim 20709). They should not be read as walk-backs without a closer look at the source filings.
The record supplied here ends partway through 2017 (claim 20905). Nothing after the BiOptix acquisition can be assessed. That includes whether the BiOptix technology itself was carried forward or quietly set aside as the company later became Riot.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-02The reverse stock split is the clearest promised action with no recorded outcome. In October 2010 the company said shareholders had authorized the board to effect a reverse split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be exercised before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The last mention is October 21, 2010. Both claims were automatically moved to delayed on September 28, 2026 because the deadline passed with nothing further on record. No later disclosure says whether the board used the authority, at what ratio, or whether it let the authority lapse. Related items do not fill the gap: the next financing-related claims are the 2011 stock plan amendments and the 2013 increase in authorized shares (claim 21040).
The early animal-health franchise drops out of the record without a stated exit. In September 2004 management described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21096 and 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101), and license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these is mentioned after September 13, 2004, and all remain at stated. The next animal-health reference comes eight years later, on October 14, 2012, and is an exclusive license of the company's animal health intellectual property to an unnamed party (claim 21049). The record does not say whether the Merial arrangement was terminated or folded into that license, whether StayBred ever reached an FDA filing, or what happened to the university licenses.
AppyScore, the appendicitis blood test, is the second program that falls silent. On October 14, 2012 the company described AppyScore as its product and said it was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claims 21047 and 21050). That is the last mention. By October 2016 the record shows the company changing its name from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980 and 20979), with no intervening claim on the FDA submission, a clearance decision, or a discontinuation. The clearance claim remains at stated. Nothing on record explains whether the program was abandoned, sold, or still pending when the company changed direction.
Several other items show as delayed but do not appear to be real walk-backs. The auditor ratifications for fiscal years 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012 and 20982) were moved to delayed only because their fiscal-year-end dates passed, and the 2013 ratification (claim 21039) suggests the engagement continued. Claims 20711 and 20712 carry promise dates earlier than the disclosures that contain them, which points to an extraction artifact rather than a slipped commitment. Both these and the 2021 plan-term extension (claim 20709) should be reviewed before anyone treats them as undisclosed reversals.
The ledger supplied here ends at a truncated 2017 financing entry (claim 20904). Any later pivot, including the company's eventual move under the Riot name, falls outside what can be assessed from this record.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-02In its September 13, 2004 disclosures the company described Merial as holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights to the SurBred 15 early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claims 21094, 21096). In the same filing it described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance, as requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101), and it cited license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these is mentioned again in the record. The September 2005 disclosures turn to the AspenBio name change and holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091). By October 2012 the only animal-health reference is a general exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). All of these claims remain at 'stated'. Nothing on record says whether the Merial arrangement produced sales, was terminated or was folded into the later license, or whether StayBred was ever submitted to the FDA.
Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement was disclosed on September 13, 2004 (claim 21099). About a year later, on September 25, 2005, the record notes only that his employment was terminated (claim 21087). Both claims sit at 'stated'. No reason for the departure is given, and nothing says whether it affected the product programs he was tied to.
In October 2010 shareholders were asked to authorize a reverse stock split at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721, 20715). October 21, 2010 is the last mention. Both claims moved automatically to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with no confirming disclosure in this record. Nothing on record says whether the board carried out a split, at what ratio, or let the authority lapse.
On October 14, 2012 the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance for AppyScore, its blood-based appendicitis test (claims 21047, 21050). The next disclosures in the record, from October 2016, cover the change of name from Venaxis to Bioptix and the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980, 20979). AppyScore is not mentioned in them. Both AppyScore claims remain 'stated'. The record does not say whether clearance was obtained, denied or abandoned, or how the program ended before the company changed direction.
Several other items carry an automatic 'delayed' status for a similar mechanical reason. These are the yearly auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) and the Stock Incentive Plan term running to July 8, 2021 (claim 20709). They likely reflect the absence of follow-up filings in this dataset rather than an actual walk-back. The ledger supplied here also ends partway through 2017, so later disclosures may address some of these gaps.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-01The 2010 reverse stock split authorization is the clearest open item. Claims 20721 and 20715, last mentioned on 2010-10-21, describe board authority to effect a split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before February 4, 2011. The ledger moved both to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed. No later claim on record says whether the board used the authority, let it lapse, or sought a new mandate. That is a discretionary deadline that has gone unaddressed.
The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test and its Merial distribution arrangement have not been mentioned since 2004-09-13. Claim 21096 introduced the product, and claim 21094 described Merial's exclusive marketing and distribution rights. Neither the product nor Merial appears again. By 2012-10-14 the company describes only an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), without naming the licensee, the products covered, or what happened to the Merial rights. Both claims still carry stated status. Nothing on record says how the distribution relationship ended or whether SurBred 15 reached commercial sales.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for cattle pregnancy maintenance, was also last mentioned on 2004-09-13 (claims 21097 and 21101). The company said then that it would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing. No later claim reports a filing, an approval, or abandonment of the program. It most plausibly went into the 2012 animal health license, but the disclosures never say so. The three university license arrangements in claim 21095, from the same date, have likewise not been mentioned since, and their status remains stated.
The AppyScore blood test for appendicitis was the company's central program in the 2012-10-14 disclosures. Claim 21047 described the test, and claim 21050 said the company was pursuing FDA clearance. On record, the next corporate events are the 2016 acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and the renaming of Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20979 and 20981), with no reference to AppyScore. Nothing in this record reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission, or a decision to stop the program. The ledger supplied here ends at an incomplete entry, claim 20905 of 2017-04-27, so later filings may address the gap. Within this record, it stands unexplained.
Other delayed flags appear to be mechanical, not substantive. Examples are the GHP Horwath auditor engagements in claims 20720, 20713, 20982 and 21012, the 2010 executive changes in claims 20711 and 20712, and the plan term in claim 20709. Each was triggered only by a past promised-by date, and later ratifications of the same auditor in claims 21039 and 20982 suggest those engagements went ahead.
What we haven't been told
2026-10-01The reverse stock split is the clearest open item. In October 2010 the board sought and disclosed shareholder authorization for a reverse split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). Both were last mentioned on 2010-10-21 and now carry an automated status of delayed, because the deadline passed with no later disclosure on record. Nothing in the subsequent filings says whether the split was carried out, at what ratio, or whether the authorization was allowed to lapse.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was presented in October 2012 as the company's lead product, with FDA clearance actively being pursued (claims 21047 and 21050). That was the last time it appeared. The next substantive disclosures, in October 2016, describe the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20979 and 20981). Both statuses remain stated, but the record contains no word on whether clearance was obtained, denied or abandoned, or what became of the product before the company changed direction.
The original animal-health franchise also fades without explanation. In September 2004 management described SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial, and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone the company said would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21094, 21096, 21097 and 21101). None of these names appear again. In October 2012 the company disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which may be where these products went, but no filing on record makes that link. Nothing explains the fate of the Merial arrangement or whether StayBred ever reached a regulatory filing.
The broader 2004 pipeline follows the same pattern. Management cited pipeline products in development and license arrangements with three universities (claims 21098 and 21095), both last mentioned on 2004-09-13. Neither the products nor the university licenses come up again, and no disclosure on record says whether they were terminated, lapsed or folded into later programs.
Several other items carry a delayed status for mechanical reasons rather than because anything went unexplained. The auditor ratifications for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012 and 20982) were flagged when their fiscal year-end dates passed. The 2010 CEO appointment (claim 20711) has a promised-by date earlier than the disclosure itself. These look like artifacts of the automated transitions, not silent walk-backs. The ledger supplied also ends partway through an April 2017 entry, so this review does not cover any later disclosures.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-30The reverse stock split is the clearest open item in the ledger. In October 2010 the board sought and described authority to effect a reverse split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be used before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The last mention on record is the 2010-10-21 filing. Both claims were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with nothing further on record. No disclosure says whether the split was effected, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse. The status reflects an elapsed date rather than a confirmed failure, but the outcome has not been stated.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone product for maintaining cattle pregnancy, was presented in September 2004 as a pipeline product (claim 21097). The same filing acknowledged that it required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). Both claims remain at stated, and neither the product nor its regulatory path appears in any later disclosure on record. There is no statement that an application was filed, approved, or withdrawn, and no statement that development stopped. The broader reference to pipeline products in development (claim 21098) likewise has no follow-up.
The animal health franchise built around SurBred 15 has a similar gap. In 2004 the company described the early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), Merial's exclusive marketing and distribution rights for it (claim 21094), and license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these is mentioned again. The next animal health reference is October 2012, when the company disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property to another party (claim 21049). The record does not connect the two. Nothing on file explains what became of the Merial arrangement, whether SurBred 15 reached commercial sales, or why the company moved from marketing these products to licensing the underlying IP out.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's stated focus in October 2012, with FDA clearance described as being pursued (claims 21047 and 21050). That is the last mention of either the product or the clearance effort. The disclosures that follow cover auditor ratifications, share authorizations, a board appointment, and then, in October 2016, a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix alongside the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980 and 20979). No disclosure on record reports a clearance decision, a withdrawal of the submission, or a decision to discontinue the test before the strategic change.
Personnel changes around the original animal health business also went unexplained. In September 2004 the company described an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim 21099). One year later it recorded that his employment had been terminated (claim 21087), with no stated reason and no description of how his responsibilities were reassigned. The September 2012 resignation of four directors on a single day (claim 21051) is recorded as a fact without an accompanying rationale. Neither is a walked-back promise, but in both cases a material change was disclosed without context.
The ledger supplied for this review ends partway through claim 20907, dated 2017-04-27. Any later disclosures that address these items could not be checked.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-30StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, appears once, in the September 13, 2004 disclosures (claims 21097 and 21101). There the company said the product would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing. No later claim in the record mentions StayBred, a regulatory filing, an approval, or a decision to stop development. The product's status is still simply 'stated'. The record never says whether it reached the FDA or was abandoned.
SurBred 15 and the Merial distribution arrangement were also last described on September 13, 2004 (claims 21094 and 21096). SurBred 15 was an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, and Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights. That filing also cited license arrangements with three universities (21095) and more than 30 products sold to diagnostic manufacturers (21102). None of these names comes up again. The next animal-health reference is on October 14, 2012 (claim 21049), which describes an exclusive license of the company's animal health intellectual property to another party. The record never explains how an exclusive distribution partnership turned into an out-licensed asset, or what happened to the Merial relationship along the way.
The AppyScore appendicitis test, and the FDA clearance the company was seeking for it, were last described on October 14, 2012 (claims 21047 and 21050). Neither is mentioned again. The next substantive disclosures, dated October 2016, report the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980 and 20981). The record contains no statement that FDA clearance was obtained, denied or withdrawn, and nothing explains why the company's stated regulatory priority gave way to an unrelated acquisition.
The reverse stock split was authorized in October 2010 at ratios of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be carried out before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715). The ledger moved both claims to 'delayed' on September 28, 2026 because no later disclosure confirms the split was carried out or that the authority lapsed. That label comes from the missing follow-up, not from any announced postponement. Still, the question remains unanswered in the record. On April 28, 2013 the company asked to raise its authorized common shares by 60,000,000 (claim 21040), the same figure approved in 2005 (claim 21089), and did not connect that request to whatever became of the split.
Several personnel changes were disclosed without explanation. Roger Hurst's exclusive employment agreement was cited as an asset on September 13, 2004 (claim 21099), and his termination was recorded on September 25, 2005 (claim 21087), with no reason given in either filing. On October 14, 2012, the same disclosure that last mentioned AppyScore reported that four directors had resigned on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051). No stated reason, and no connection to the company's strategy at the time, appears in the record reviewed here, which runs through April 2017.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-30The reverse stock split is the clearest open item. In October 2010 the company said its board had authority to effect a reverse split at a ratio between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be carried out before February 4, 2011 (claims 20721 and 20715, last mentioned 2010-10-21). The ledger moved both to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with nothing recorded after it. No later disclosure says whether the split was effected, at what ratio, or whether the authority was allowed to lapse. The next capital-structure items on record are an increase in authorized shares and new incentive-plan reserves in 2013 (claims 21040 and 21041), and neither refers back to the split.
The cattle reproduction franchise that defined the company in 2004 disappears without an exit statement. The September 2004 disclosures described SurBred 15 as an early bovine pregnancy test with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21096 and 21094). They described StayBred as a recombinant luteinizing hormone product that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097 and 21101). They also cited license arrangements with three universities and further pipeline products (claims 21095 and 21098). None of these is mentioned again after 2004-09-13, and all remain at stated. The only later reference to the area is an October 2012 exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which names neither product nor the counterparty. The record contains nothing on whether the Merial arrangement ended, whether a StayBred filing was ever made, or what happened to the university licenses.
AppyScore took the place of the animal health story and then faded out the same way. In October 2012 the company presented AppyScore, a blood-based appendicitis test, as its lead product and said it was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claims 21047 and 21050, last mentioned 2012-10-14). No later claim records a submission, a clearance, a rejection, or a decision to stop. By October 2016 the disclosures are about acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics and renaming the company from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20980, 20979 and 20981), and none of them mentions AppyScore. The record also has no explanation for the resignation of four directors on September 26, 2012 (claim 21051), which was disclosed alongside the AppyScore clearance language.
Several other items the ledger marks as delayed look like artifacts of the automated deadline check rather than walk-backs. These include the auditor ratifications for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012 and 20982), the October 2010 board restructuring and CEO appointment (claims 20712 and 20711), whose promised-by dates fall before the disclosure dates, and the incentive-plan term running to July 2021 (claim 20709). They should not be read as missed commitments without further review. The ledger supplied here ends at claim 20907 (2017-04-27) with no detail, so this review does not cover anything disclosed after early 2017.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-29The Merial arrangement for SurBred 15 was the first commercial partnership the company described. Claims 21094 and 21096, dated 2004-09-13, present an exclusive marketing and distribution grant to Merial for an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, alongside a regulatory position that the test fell outside FDA oversight (claim 21100). That is the last time either the product or the partner appears in the record. Both claims remain in 'stated' status. Nothing on file says whether the Merial agreement produced sales, was renegotiated, or was terminated, and the product is not mentioned again.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy, follows the same pattern. The company disclosed on 2004-09-13 that the product would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). It listed it with unnamed pipeline products (claim 21098) and license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095). None of these items is mentioned after that date. The 2012-10-14 disclosure of an exclusive license covering animal health intellectual property (claim 21049) may be where this portfolio ended up, but the record does not connect the two. It also does not say whether any regulatory filing for StayBred was made.
AppyScore, the blood test for appendicitis, was described on 2012-10-14 as the subject of an active pursuit of FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). The same filing recorded four director resignations on a single day, 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The next substantive disclosures in the ledger, from October 2016, cover an acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). AppyScore is not mentioned in those disclosures or in any other claim on record after 2012. Both AppyScore claims remain in 'stated' status. The disclosed history contains no clearance, rejection, or withdrawal of the FDA effort.
The reverse stock split authority granted in October 2010 has never been accounted for in the record. Claims 20721 and 20715 describe board authorization for a split at a ratio of up to 1-for-6, to be exercised before 2011-02-04. Both were moved automatically to 'delayed' on 2026-09-28 once that date passed without a later reference. No subsequent claim says whether the split was carried out or allowed to lapse. The next capital-structure item on file is a 2013-04-28 increase in authorized common shares to 60,000,000 (claim 21040), which does not refer back to it.
Most of the other claims now marked 'delayed' should be read with caution. They include annual auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982), the extension of the stock plan term to 2021 (claim 20709), and appointments already effective when disclosed (claims 20711, 20712, 21038). These were moved on 2026-09-28 because their dates passed, not because the company indicated a slip. Claim 20711 carries a promised-by date earlier than its own disclosure date, which points to an extraction artifact. The ledger supplied for this review also breaks off at claim 20909, dated 2017-04-27, so later disclosures that might address these gaps were not examined.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-29The cattle reproduction franchise that anchored the company's early disclosures has gone quiet. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), and StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for pregnancy maintenance (claim 21097). It also cited exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial for SurBred 15 (claim 21094), license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095), and unspecified pipeline products in development (claim 21098). StayBred was said to require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). None of these items appears again in the record after that date. No launch, regulatory submission, termination of the Merial arrangement, or write-down has been disclosed. The 2005-09-25 filings instead record the departure of Roger D. Hurst (claim 21087), whose exclusive employment agreement had been presented alongside these products (claim 21099). The filings do not connect that departure to the fate of the programs.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test that succeeded the animal health products as the lead story, follows a similar path. On 2012-10-14 the company described the product (claim 21047) and stated it was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claim 21050). In the same filing it disclosed an exclusive license of its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049) and the resignation of four directors on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). Neither AppyScore nor the licensing counterparty is mentioned in later claims. By 2016-10-06 the record shows the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20979) and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claim 20981). Nothing on record states whether FDA clearance was obtained, denied, or abandoned, or whether AppyScore remains an asset.
The reverse stock split authorization is another open item. Filings dated 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 describe board authority to effect a reverse split of up to 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both were automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with no disclosure of execution or lapse. The ledger does not say whether a split occurred, at what ratio, or why the authority went unused.
Several routine auditor ratifications naming GHP Horwath for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982) were also auto-transitioned to delayed, as were board appointment and restructuring items from 2010 and 2013 (claims 20711, 20712, 21038). These transitions probably reflect missing follow-up filings in the record rather than substantive walk-backs. Claim 20711 carries a promised-by date earlier than its disclosure date, which suggests an extraction artifact. They are noted here only because no confirming disclosure appears.
The record supplied ends partway through a 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20909). Any disclosures made after that point, including anything tied to the company's later identity as Riot, were not available for this review.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-29SurBred 15 and the Merial distribution arrangement. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15 as an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096). It said the test was not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100), and that Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights to it (claim 21094). That filing is the last mention of either the product or the partner. The September 2005 disclosures cover the renaming to AspenBio Pharma and a holding-company restructuring (claims 21090, 21091), but none addresses SurBred 15 sales, the status of the Merial agreement, or whether it was terminated. All of these claims remain at stated. Nothing on record explains why a product with a named exclusive distributor stopped being discussed.
StayBred and the 2004 pipeline. The same 2004-09-13 filing introduced StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097). It noted that StayBred would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101) and referred generally to pipeline products in development (claim 21098). No later claim records a filing, a regulatory outcome, or a decision to stop development. The same filing disclosed an exclusive employment agreement with Roger Hurst (claim 21099), and that employment was reported terminated on 2005-09-25 (claim 21087). The record does not say whether the termination had any bearing on the development programs, and no statement addresses what became of them.
AppyScore and its FDA clearance effort. On 2012-10-14 the company presented AppyScore, a blood-based appendicitis test, as a core product (claim 21047). It said it was pursuing FDA clearance for the test (claim 21050). The same disclosure reported an exclusive license for animal-health intellectual property (claim 21049) and the resignation of four directors on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The next substantive product-related entries are dated 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16. By then the company was operating as Venaxis and was renaming itself Bioptix while acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20980, 20981, 20979). Across that span no claim reports a clearance decision, a withdrawn submission, or the discontinuation of AppyScore, and the animal-health license is not mentioned again. The strategic shift is visible from the acquisition, but the company has not explained, anywhere in this record, what happened to the product it previously described as its focus.
The 2010 reverse split authorization. In October 2010 shareholders authorized a reverse split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). The automated pass on 2026-09-28 moved both claims to delayed because the window has passed with no follow-up on record. No subsequent claim confirms that a split was carried out, states the ratio chosen, or says the authorization was allowed to lapse. The delayed status reflects that silence. It does not reflect any revision announced by the company.
Several other claims were also moved to delayed on 2026-09-28 and are not treated here as walk-backs. These are the auditor ratifications for fiscal years 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), the Stephen Lundy appointment (claim 20711), and the plan-term extension to 2021 (claim 20709). Those transitions appear to be artifacts of promised-by dates that are routine fiscal-year ends or that predate the disclosure itself. The ledger supplied for this review breaks off at an April 2017 entry (claim 20909). Disclosures made after that point, including the period under the Riot name, have not been reviewed.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-29The most complete disappearance on record is the cattle reproduction franchise the company was founded on. On 2004-09-13 management described SurBred 15 as an early-detection bovine pregnancy test (claim 21096), with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094) and a position that the test was not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100). The same disclosure presented StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancy (claim 21097), as requiring FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). None of these items appears in any later claim. The ledger holds no statement that the Merial arrangement ended, that SurBred 15 reached or failed to reach commercial sales, or that a StayBred filing was ever made, abandoned or rejected. The next reference to this area is a 2012-10-14 mention of an exclusive license of unspecified animal health intellectual property (claim 21049). Nothing ties that license to either product or explains whether it replaced the Merial rights.
Two other items from the same 2004-09-13 disclosure also stop without explanation. These are the license arrangements with three universities (claim 21095) and the statement that the company marketed over 30 products to diagnostic manufacturers and research facilities (claim 21102). Neither is mentioned again. The record does not say whether the university licenses lapsed, were terminated or were carried into later entities, or what happened to the antigen product line acquired from Vitro Diagnostics (claims 21081, 21108).
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was the company's lead program at the 2012-10-14 disclosure, which stated that FDA clearance was being pursued (claims 21047, 21050). The test does not appear in any subsequent claim. The next disclosures of substance, dated 2016-10-06 and 2016-10-16, describe the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). They say nothing about the clearance effort. The ledger contains no statement that AppyScore was cleared, denied, withdrawn or shelved. The earlier rename from AspenBio Pharma to Venaxis is also not itself recorded, so the pivot away from the product is visible only through what stopped being said.
On 2010-10-11 and again on 2010-10-21, shareholders were asked to authorize a reverse stock split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be effected by 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims were automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline has passed. No later claim confirms that a split was carried out, at what ratio, or that the authorization was allowed to lapse.
Several other claims were also auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-28, including the auditor ratifications (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982) and personnel changes (claims 20711, 20712, 21038). These look more like artifacts of past-dated deadlines than substantive walk-backs, and they are not treated here as silent retreats. The ledger supplied to this review ends at claim 20909 (2017-04-27), so later disclosures may address some of the gaps described above.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-28The SurBred 15 bovine pregnancy test and its distribution arrangement with Merial are the clearest disappearance in the record. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15 as an early-detection pregnancy test (claim 21096), said it was not subject to FDA regulation (claim 21100), and said Merial held exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claim 21094). That filing is the last mention of the product and the partnership. Both remain at 'stated' status, and no later claim reports sales, a launch, a termination of the Merial rights, or a write-down. The 2012 disclosure of an exclusive license of the company's animal health intellectual property (claim 21049) suggests the veterinary line was licensed out rather than commercialized. No statement connects that license to SurBred 15 or to Merial.
StayBred, the recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies, follows the same pattern. The same 2004-09-13 filing introduced it (claim 21097) and said it would require FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claim 21101). Nothing later in the record reports a submission, an approval, or a decision to stop development. The three university license arrangements described alongside it (claim 21095) are also never mentioned again.
AppyScore is the most consequential silence. On 2012-10-14 the company presented AppyScore as a blood-based diagnostic for appendicitis (claim 21047) and said it was pursuing FDA regulatory clearance (claim 21050). The same filing recorded that four directors resigned on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). The claims that follow cover only routine proxy matters, such as auditor ratification and additions to the stock plan reserve in 2013 and 2014 (claims 21039, 21041, 21011). By 2016-10-06 the company was changing its name from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980, 20979). The record contains no statement on whether FDA clearance was obtained, denied, or abandoned. It also does not explain why the appendicitis program gave way to an acquisition in a different field. The earlier renaming from AspenBio to Venaxis does not appear in the record at all.
The reverse stock split authorization is the one dated financing commitment that the record never resolves. Filings on 2010-10-11 and 2010-10-21 sought authority for a reverse split of between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6, to be used before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). Both claims moved to 'delayed' by automated transition on 2026-09-28 after the deadline passed. No later claim says whether the board carried out the split, let the authority lapse, or sought it again. The ledger also marks several routine items 'delayed' for the same reason, including auditor ratifications (claims 20720, 20713, 21012, 20982), a board appointment (claim 21038), and the stock plan term (claim 20709). Those look like artifacts of the fixed-date transition rule rather than broken promises, and they should be read that way.
The visible record stops partway through a 2017-04-27 entry (claim 20904). Any later disclosure that addresses these items would fall outside what was reviewed here.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-28The earliest silence concerns the cattle-reproduction franchise the company described in September 2004. It presented SurBred 15, an early bovine pregnancy test, as a product with exclusive marketing and distribution rights granted to Merial (claims 21094, 21096). It presented StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone for maintaining cattle pregnancies, as a pipeline product that would need FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Both were last mentioned on 2004-09-13 and remain recorded only as stated. By the September 2005 disclosures the company had adopted the AspenBio Pharma name (claim 21090) and terminated Roger Hurst, whose exclusive employment agreement had been listed alongside these products (claims 21099, 21087). The record contains no commercial result for SurBred 15 under the Merial arrangement, no regulatory filing for StayBred, and no statement that either was discontinued.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, followed a similar path. On 2012-10-14 the company described it as the subject of an active pursuit of FDA regulatory clearance (claims 21047, 21050). In the same filing it disclosed an exclusive license agreement covering its animal health intellectual property (claim 21049) and the resignation of four directors on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). None of these items appears again in the record. The next substantive disclosures, in October 2016, concern the acquisition of BiOptix Diagnostics and a name change from Venaxis to Bioptix (claims 20979, 20980, 20981). The record contains no clearance decision, no withdrawal of the FDA submission, and no account of the revenue or counterparty performance under the animal health license. The only trace of what happened to the company's lead diagnostic is its disappearance from the disclosures and the change of corporate identity.
The reverse stock split authorization from October 2010 permitted the board to effect a split at ratios between 1-for-2 and 1-for-6 before 2011-02-04 (claims 20715, 20721). The ledger automatically moved these claims to delayed on 2026-09-28 because the deadline passed with no recorded outcome. No disclosure in the record says whether the board used the authority, let it lapse, or sought a new one. Share authorizations that followed, including the 60,000,000-share increase in April 2013 (claim 21040), do not refer back to it.
Several other claims were moved to delayed by the same automated pass on 2026-09-28 and should be read with caution. These include the auditor ratifications for fiscal 2011, 2014 and 2016 (claims 20713, 20720, 21012, 20982), the Stock Incentive Plan term extension to 2021 (claim 20709), and the Lundy appointment and board restructuring, whose target dates fall before their own disclosure dates (claims 20711, 20712). They look like routine governance items whose completion was never separately restated, not substantive walk-backs. The ledger supplied here also breaks off at a 2017-04-27 regulatory entry (claim 20906). Any later disclosures that may address the items above were not available for this review.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-27Every claim on record for Riot sits at status 'stated', and every transition was logged by automated extraction on the same day, 2026-09-27. No claim has moved to 'delayed' or 'not_yet_verifiable', so the silences below come from the disclosures themselves rather than from any status change management announced. The claims list supplied here ends mid-entry at 2017-04-27 (claim 20904), so an item that seems to vanish may have been addressed in filings outside this window.
The bovine reproduction franchise is the clearest disappearance. On 2004-09-13 the company described SurBred 15, an early-detection bovine pregnancy test, with Merial holding exclusive marketing and distribution rights (claims 21096, 21094). It also described StayBred, a recombinant luteinizing hormone product that it said required FDA approval or an ANDA filing (claims 21097, 21101). Neither product nor the Merial arrangement appears again in any later claim. The record contains no termination of the Merial rights, no sales figures, no FDA or ANDA filing for StayBred, and no statement that either program was dropped. The nearest echo is a 2012-10-14 reference to an exclusive license of animal health intellectual property (claim 21049), which does not name the products, the licensee, or whether Merial was involved.
The same 2004-09-13 disclosure cited license arrangements with three universities and unnamed pipeline products in development (claims 21095, 21098). Neither the universities nor the pipeline is mentioned again. It was also the last disclosure to describe Roger Hurst as working under an exclusive employment agreement (claim 21099). About a year later, on 2005-09-25, that employment was recorded as terminated (claim 21087), with no stated reason and no word on what happened to the programs tied to that role.
AppyScore, the blood-based appendicitis test, was last described on 2012-10-14, when the company said it was pursuing FDA clearance (claims 21047, 21050). That same disclosure recorded four director resignations on 2012-09-26 (claim 21051). By 2016-10-06 the company was changing its name from Venaxis to Bioptix and acquiring BiOptix Diagnostics (claims 20981, 20980, 20979). The record never states whether an FDA submission was made, what the outcome was, or that AppyScore was abandoned. The earlier rename from AspenBio Pharma to Venaxis is also absent from the claims.
In October 2010 shareholders authorized a reverse stock split at ratios from 1-for-2 to 1-for-6, to be effected before 2011-02-04 (claims 20721, 20715). That deadline passed more than fifteen years ago. No later claim records whether the board executed the split, chose a ratio, or let the authorization lapse, and the ledger still carries both claims as 'stated' rather than resolved.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-27The Oklahoma City mining build-out is the clearest open thread. In disclosures dated 2018-06-28, management described a leased facility of 107,000 square feet (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542) and targets for full deployment: 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538), and about 110 PH/s of hashing rate (15508, 15539, 15552). At that point, 3,500 miners were reported as installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520, 15543). Claim 15543 carries an automated 'delayed' status against its 2018-03-31 date, alongside a 'stated' transition logged the same day, so the ledger's own reading is unsettled. The records provided contain no later statement saying the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s configuration was reached, revised, or abandoned. No full-deployment date was ever attached to these figures.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition is described in the 2018-06-28 disclosures as a $600,000 purchase (15509, 15544). It came with CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15548), FinCEN and Florida licensing (15511, 15549), and planned exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 has been auto-flagged 'delayed' against a 2018-03-27 reference date. No company revision of that date appears on record. After June 2018, the records here do not say whether the exchange offerings launched, whether the registrations were kept, or what became of the business.
A set of strategic stakes appears in the same 2018-06-28 filings and then goes unmentioned. These are a 12.9 percent interest in Coinsquare (15512, 15545), a 52 percent interest in Tess Inc. (15524, 15547), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513, 15546), and the formation of a Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). None has a follow-up on record about valuation, conversion, sale, or wind-down. The claims remain in plain 'stated' status, which reflects that nothing further was said rather than any confirmed outcome.
Two governance items from earlier periods also lack closure. The board authorized a reverse stock split at ratios of 1-for-2 up to 1-for-6, to be carried out before February 4, 2011 (20715, 20721). The ledger contains no disclosure that the split was carried out or that the authorization lapsed. Separately, MNP LLP's appointment as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555) has been auto-transitioned to 'delayed' against its 2018-12-31 date, and no later auditor statement appears among the claims provided. The claims list supplied for this review appears truncated, so later disclosures may address some of these points. On the record available, they remain unexplained.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-27Riot's June 28, 2018 disclosures set out a specific build-out for the Oklahoma City facility: 8,000 miners at full deployment (claims 15506, 15537, 15551), about 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and an expected hash rate of 110 PH/s (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). At that point 3,500 miners were reported installed as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). The ledger auto-transitioned the related deployment claim 15543 to delayed on 2026-09-15, and it also carries a same-day 'stated' transition. None of the later claims on record confirm that the 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s figure was reached, or say when. By July 9, 2018 the language had moved to a general reference to mining operations in Oklahoma City (15469) and a 'potential' expansion to other locations (15474). No explanation was given for dropping the specific targets.
The $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp was described repeatedly on June 28, 2018 (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544). It came with its CFTC/NFA registrations and FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549) and a planned exchange offering (15516). Claim 15544 carries a March 27, 2018 date and has been auto-flagged as delayed. In the July 9, 2018 claims on record, the brokerage, its licences and the exchange product do not appear. The record contains no statement on whether the exchange offering launched, was deferred or was dropped.
On June 14, 2018 the company said MNP LLP had been appointed auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555), with an implied completion by December 31, 2018. The ledger has since auto-transitioned this to delayed. No later claim on record confirms that MNP completed the 2018 engagement or explains a change of auditor.
The June 28 disclosures stated a precise 12.9 percent ownership of the Coinsquare exchange (15512, 15522, 15545). By July 9, 2018 this appears only as an 'investment in Coinsquare' (15473), with no percentage. Over the same period, the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of the Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) were mentioned on June 28 but do not recur in the later claims available here. Nothing on record says whether the Coinsquare stake changed, whether the Verady note converted or was repaid, or what became of the new subsidiary.
The delayed statuses above were assigned automatically on 2026-09-15, not announced by management. The company has not issued its own revision of these dates or figures. The claims ledger supplied for this review is also truncated after the July 9, 2018 entries, so later disclosures may address some of these points.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-27The Oklahoma City full-deployment target is the most concrete operational promise on record. In the 2018-06-28 disclosures, management described 8,000 miners (claims 15506, 15537, 15551), roughly 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and an expected hash rate of about 110 PH/s (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), against 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). The ledger records claim 15543, the 3,500-unit deployment tied to a 2018-03-31 date, as delayed, auto-transitioned on 2026-09-15. By 2018-07-09 the Oklahoma City operation appears only in general terms (15469), alongside a vaguer reference to possible operations 'in other locations' (15474). No claim on record confirms that the 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s configuration was reached, gives a revised date, or explains why the figure stopped being repeated.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition was presented in the June 2018 disclosures as a $600,000 purchase (15509, 15521, 15534) with CFTC/NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549), and a described set of exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 carries a 2018-03-27 date and has been auto-transitioned to delayed. The 2018-07-09 disclosures on record do not mention Logical Brokerage or its planned exchange product at all. Nothing on record says whether the exchange launched, was deferred, or was abandoned.
The language around Coinsquare softened within about ten days. On 2018-06-28 it was stated as a specific 12.9 percent ownership stake (15512, 15522, 15545). By 2018-07-09 it had become an 'investment in Coinsquare' (15473), with no percentage. The record does not show whether the stake was diluted, sold down or restructured, or whether the precise figure was simply dropped.
Two smaller threads from the same June filing also go quiet. Digital Green Energy Corp was announced as a newly formed wholly owned subsidiary (15515, 15525), and a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC was disclosed (15513, 15523, 15546). Neither appears in the July 2018 claims on record, and there is no statement on what either entity went on to do or what became of the note. Tess Inc. moved the other way: it was described as a 52 percent holding (15514, 15524, 15547) and then as a 'completed acquisition' (15472). No claim reconciles that change or states what was paid for the remaining interest.
The 2018 auditor appointment of MNP LLP, tied to a 2018-12-31 date, is recorded as delayed (15555). As with 15543 and 15544, however, the same claim also shows a same-day transition to stated. The delayed flag may reflect how the dates were extracted rather than an actual slip, and should be read with that caution. The ledger supplied for this review also ends partway through the July 2018 claims, so later disclosures that address any of these items would not be reflected here.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-27The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest gap. The June 28, 2018 disclosures put 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543) against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). Claim 15543 now carries a delayed status in the ledger, auto-assigned on September 15, 2026 alongside a same-day stated transition. The next disclosure on record, July 9, 2018, refers only generally to mining operations in Oklahoma City (15469) and to possibly setting up operations elsewhere (15474). It gives no updated installed-miner count, no date for reaching 8,000 units, and no confirmation that 12 MW or 110 PH/s was achieved. In the record reviewed here, management has not said whether the remaining 4,500 miners were deployed, redeployed or written down.
Logical Brokerage Corp received heavy attention and then disappeared. On June 28, 2018 the $600,000 acquisition (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544) was described alongside CFTC and NFA registration, FinCEN registration and a Florida money transmitter license (15510, 15511, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549), and alongside planned exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 is marked delayed against a March 27, 2018 date. That date precedes the filing and may be a closing reference rather than a forward promise. Whatever the cause, the July 9 disclosures mention Tess and Coinsquare but not Logical Brokerage or the exchange product. No statement on record explains whether the exchange offering launched, was deferred or was dropped, or whether the licenses remain active.
The Coinsquare position shifted from precise to vague language. Three June 28 claims describe a specific 12.9 percent ownership stake (15512, 15522, 15545). By July 9 it appears only as an investment in Coinsquare (15473), with no percentage. Nothing on record explains whether the stake was diluted, sold down or simply described more loosely.
Two smaller June 28 items also fall silent. The $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of the Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) are not referenced in any later claim on record. The fate of the note and the purpose or activity of the subsidiary have not been addressed. Separately, the June 28 filing gives the hardware specification as both 13.75 TH/s (15530) and 13.5 TH/s (15550), and no clarification appears.
Finally, the June 14, 2018 appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555) carries a delayed status against a December 31, 2018 horizon, again with a conflicting same-day stated transition. The record contains no later statement confirming that MNP completed the 2018 audit or explaining any change of auditor. This review covers the portion of the claims ledger available through early July 2018, and later disclosures may address some of these points.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-27The Logical Brokerage acquisition and the exchange ambitions attached to it are the most visible thread to go quiet. Riot's 2018-06-28 filings repeatedly described the $600,000 purchase of Logical Brokerage Corp (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), its CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), its FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549) and its exchange offerings (15516). By 2018-07-09 the language had softened to an investigation of a possible US cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470). That is the last mention on record. Claim 15544 carries an automated 'delayed' status against a 2018-03-27 date. That date falls before the disclosure itself, so the flag may reflect how the date was extracted rather than a missed deadline. Even so, the record contains no statement that an exchange launched, that the plan was dropped, or what became of the broker's registrations.
The Oklahoma City mining build-out was described in detail and then not revisited. On 2018-06-28 management reported 3,500 miners installed and operating as of 2018-03-31 (15505, 15520, 15543). It set out a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and about 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), housed in a 107,000-square-foot leased facility (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). The same day's filings give per-unit hardware performance as both 13.5 TH/s (15550) and 13.75 TH/s (15530), and the difference is not reconciled. Claim 15543 is auto-flagged 'delayed', although its date reads more like a point-in-time count than a promise. The 2018-07-09 disclosures refer only generally to Oklahoma City operations (15469) and to possibly establishing operations in other locations (15474). Nothing on record confirms that the 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s figure was reached, and no revised target appears.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555), disclosed on 2018-06-14 with a 2018-12-31 horizon, is now auto-transitioned to 'delayed'. The ledger shows no subsequent disclosure that the engagement was completed, extended or replaced.
The non-mining portfolio shows a narrower trail. It consists of the 12.9% Coinsquare stake (15512, 15522, 15545), the 52% holding in Tess Inc (15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp (15515, 25525). All were set out on 2018-06-28. Only Coinsquare reappears on 2018-07-09 (15473), and only as a general reference to the investment. Tess, Verady and Digital Green Energy have no later mention in the visible record, and nothing has been said about their valuation, disposal or wind-down.
One caveat applies throughout. The claims ledger supplied here is cut off partway through the 2018-07-09 entries, so a topic's absence from later disclosures cannot be confirmed from this record alone. Each 'delayed' status was also set by an automated pass on 2026-09-15 alongside a parallel 'stated' transition, and not by any company revision. What these items share is only that management described them specifically and the available record contains no follow-up explaining how they turned out.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-26The most concrete operating promise on record is the Oklahoma City build-out. On 2018-06-28 the company said 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543). It also described a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW of power and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (claims 15506, 15537, 15551, 15507, 15526, 15538, 15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). The ledger carries claim 15543 as delayed against a March 31, 2018 reference date, although the same claim also shows a same-day transition to stated. The record does not resolve that conflict. The next disclosure, dated 2018-07-09, refers only generically to cryptocurrency mining operations in Oklahoma City (claim 15469). It gives no updated miner count, megawatt figure or hash rate, and no date by which full deployment was expected. Nothing on record says whether the 8,000-miner target was reached, revised or deferred. The two hardware specifications on the same date, 13.75 TH/s in claim 15530 and 13.5 TH/s in claim 15550, were never reconciled.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition was presented on 2018-06-28 as a $600,000 purchase (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544). It came with CFTC and NFA registration and FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (claims 15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549), and with described exchange offerings (claim 15516). Claim 15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and sits in delayed status, again alongside a stated transition. By 2018-07-09 the exchange language had softened to the investigation of a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US (claim 15470), and Logical Brokerage is not named in that disclosure. The record contains no statement explaining whether the regulated brokerage remained the intended vehicle for an exchange, or why launch language became investigation language.
Several holdings named on 2018-06-28 do not reappear in the 2018-07-09 disclosures on record. These are the 52 percent ownership of Tess Inc (claims 15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims 15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp (claims 15515, 15525). The Coinsquare position was described on 2018-06-28 as a 12.9 percent stake (claims 15512, 15522, 15545). On 2018-07-09 it appears only as an investment in Coinsquare, with no percentage (claim 15473). The absence of later mentions is not itself evidence of disposal or impairment. The record simply contains no update on the status, valuation or strategic role of these positions after late June 2018.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (claim 15555, dated 2018-06-14) carries a 2018-12-31 horizon and is flagged delayed, with a parallel stated transition. Nothing later in the record confirms that the engagement proceeded through the 2018 year-end or reports on the audit's outcome. A ledger with conflicting automated classifications does not by itself show a slipped commitment. Still, the company has said nothing on record to close the item.
The disclosed record for this company ends in July 2018, and all status transitions shown were machine-assigned on 2026-09-15 and 2026-09-20. The gaps described here are therefore gaps in what is on file, not confirmed reversals. They mark the points where specific figures and named ventures stopped being repeated.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-26The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest example. On 2018-06-28 Riot set out a complete deployment picture: 8,000 miners at full deployment (claims 15506, 15537, 15551), a 12 MW power envelope (15507, 15526, 15538), and an expected hash rate of 110 PH/s (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). At that date 3,500 miners were described as installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). Claim 15543, which ties that 3,500 figure to a 2018-03-31 date, now carries a delayed status, but the ledger shows the transition was automated on 2026-09-15 rather than prompted by anything the company said. The next disclosure, on 2018-07-09, refers only to mining operations in Oklahoma City in general terms (15469). It does not restate the 8,000-miner, 12 MW or 110 PH/s figures and does not report progress from 3,500 units toward them. Nothing on record says whether full deployment was reached, revised or abandoned. The same 2018-06-28 filing also gives two different per-unit hardware figures, 13.75 TH/s (15530) and 13.5 TH/s (15550). The 110 PH/s target only works at the higher figure, and that discrepancy has not been reconciled.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition was described on 2018-06-28 as a $600,000 transaction (15509, 15521, 15534). It came with a regulatory package: CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN money-service registration (15528), and a Florida money transmitter licence (15511, 15529, 15536, 15549). It was also tied to exchange offerings (15516). One version of the claim, 15544, carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27, three months before the disclosure date, and is marked delayed by the same automated pass. By 2018-07-09 the company speaks instead of investigating a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US (15470), without naming Logical Brokerage or its licences. The record does not explain whether that investigation builds on the brokerage or replaces it, or why closing language became exploratory language.
Several holdings that appeared in the 2018-06-28 disclosures are absent from the next one. These are the 52 percent ownership of Tess Inc (15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513, 15523, 15546), and the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). None of the three appears in the 2018-07-09 disclosures. The Coinsquare position narrows in a similar way. It was described in June as a specific 12.9 percent stake (15512, 15522, 15545), but by July it is only an investment in Coinsquare (15473), with no percentage. There has been no statement on whether the stake was diluted, sold or simply described differently. Nothing has been said about the status of the Tess, Verady or Digital Green positions either.
MNP LLP was appointed as auditor for the 2018 fiscal year on 2018-06-14 (15555), with an implied completion point of 2018-12-31. The claim is now marked delayed, again by automated transition on 2026-09-15. Nothing on record confirms that MNP completed the 2018 audit, was reappointed, or was replaced. The disclosures available here end in July 2018, so some of these silences may reflect gaps in coverage rather than deliberate omission. Even so, no disclosure on record closes out any of these items.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-26The Oklahoma City buildout is the clearest example of guidance that was never updated. On 2018-06-28, Riot said 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543). It set a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and roughly 110 PH/s of hashing rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), all inside a 107,000 square foot leased facility (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). Claim 15543 now carries a delayed status. The next disclosure on record, 2018-07-09, refers only in general terms to cryptocurrency mining operations in Oklahoma City (15469) and gives no miner count, megawatt figure or hash rate. The record does not show that full deployment was reached, revised or abandoned, and there is no explanation of the gap between 3,500 and 8,000 machines. The same filing also describes the hardware as 13.75 TH/s in one place (15530) and 13.5 TH/s in another (15550), and that difference was never reconciled.
The framing of the regulated brokerage business changed in the space of eleven days. On 2018-06-28, Riot described the completed $600,000 acquisition of Logical Brokerage Corp (15509, 15521, 15534) along with its CFTC and NFA registration and its FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549). Claim 15544, tied to a 2018-03-27 date, is flagged delayed, although that flag may reflect a closing date that predates the disclosure rather than a missed milestone. By 2018-07-09, the language had become an investigation of a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US (15470). The record does not say what separated an acquired, licensed entity from a launch still under investigation. It gives no target date for an exchange, and Logical Brokerage is not named again.
Several holdings that were quantified on 2018-06-28 later appeared without figures or disappeared from the record. These are the 12.9 percent Coinsquare stake (15512, 15522, 15545), the 52 percent ownership of Tess Inc (15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). Coinsquare reappears on 2018-07-09 only as an investment in Coinsquare (15473), with no percentage attached. Tess, Verady and Digital Green Energy are last mentioned on 2018-06-28. Nothing on record describes a sale, write-down, conversion or wind-down for any of them.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 was disclosed on 2018-06-14 with a 2018-12-31 horizon (15555). Its status is delayed. The ledger logged both a delayed and a stated transition on the same date, so the record itself is inconsistent. No later claim confirms that MNP completed the 2018 audit, and no change of auditor is disclosed. The status cannot be resolved from what the company has said.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-25The Logical Brokerage purchase and the U.S. exchange ambition built on it are the clearest case of a thread that thins out. The $600,000 acquisition appears repeatedly in the June 28, 2018 disclosures (claims 15521, 15534, 15509), alongside detailed CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida licensing language (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549). One version carries a March 27, 2018 target date and has been auto-transitioned to delayed (15544). By July 9, 2018 the language has shifted to an "investigation" of a U.S. cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470), which is also the last mention in the record. No later claim in this record states whether an exchange was launched, shelved or abandoned, and nothing explains what became of the registrations that were presented as its foundation.
The full-deployment mining profile is stated many times and never confirmed. The June 28, 2018 filings describe 8,000 miners, 12 MW and 110 PH/s at full deployment (15506, 15507, 15508, 15526, 15527, 15537, 15539, 15551, 15552), against 3,500 miners operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). The version of that installed count tied to a date has been auto-marked delayed (15543). The per-unit hardware figure is also given inconsistently within the same filing date, at 13.75 TH/s in one claim (15530) and 13.5 TH/s in another (15550). No claim sets a date for full deployment, and none reports that the Oklahoma City facility (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542) reached the 8,000-unit or 110 PH/s level. Nor has the spec discrepancy been reconciled.
The portfolio holdings lose precision between June and July 2018. On June 28 the Coinsquare position is given as 12.9 percent (15512, 15522, 15545). By July 9 it is an unquantified "investment in Coinsquare" (15473), and no stake size is restated. The Tess Inc. holding moves the other way, from a 52 percent ownership stake (15514, 15524, 15547) to a "completed acquisition" (15472), with no statement of what, if anything, was paid for the remainder. The Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) and the $200,000 Verady convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) each surface only on June 28, 2018. Neither has a stated purpose, outcome or later valuation in the record.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (15555, June 14, 2018) carried a December 31, 2018 horizon and now sits at delayed. The ledger logged both a delayed and a stated transition for it on the same day. No claim on record confirms that MNP completed the 2018 audit or explains a change of auditor.
This reading covers only the claims supplied, which run through July 2018 and appear incomplete. Several of the delayed statuses come from automated date checks rather than from any company statement, so they indicate gaps in disclosure, not confirmed failures.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-25The Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition ($600,000) is recorded in several overlapping forms (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), with supporting regulatory claims covering CFTC and NFA registration, FinCEN registration and a Florida money transmitter license (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549). Claim 15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and an automated 'delayed' status, although the same record also shows a transition to 'stated' on the same day (2026-09-15). The date is earlier than the June 28, 2018 filing that reports the deal, so the delay flag may reflect an extraction artifact rather than a missed deadline. What stands out is the direction of the story. By 2018-07-09, the brokerage's purpose had narrowed to an 'investigation' of a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470). In the claims reviewed here, management has not said whether that exchange was launched, shelved, or abandoned, or what happened to the licensed brokerage entity.
The Oklahoma City mining build-out was presented on 2018-06-28 with specific full-deployment targets: 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), in a 107,000-square-foot leased facility (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). At that point only 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). Claim 15543 attaches a 'delayed' status to that figure. No later claim on record confirms that the 8,000-miner, 110 PH/s configuration was reached, and the per-unit specification itself varies between 13.5 TH/s (15550) and 13.75 TH/s (15530). The remaining 4,500 units have not been accounted for.
Several strategic holdings disclosed on 2018-06-28 have not reappeared in the later claims reviewed. These are the 12.9% stake in the Coinsquare exchange (15512, 15522, 15545), the $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513, 15523, 15546), and the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). Tess Inc. took a different path: it was described as a 52% ownership position in June (15514, 15524, 15547), then as a 'completed acquisition' on 2018-07-09 (15472). No statement explains that change in terms or what it cost. The July 2018 disclosures instead turn to a 'potential' expansion of mining to other locations (15474). No valuation update, write-down, or exit has been disclosed for the Coinsquare and Verady positions, and no activity has been described for Digital Green Energy Corp.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555) was approved at the June 14, 2018 annual meeting with a year-end horizon. It now carries an automated 'delayed' status, alongside a same-day 'stated' transition. None of the claims reviewed confirm that MNP completed the 2018 audit or report any change of auditor. Given that the company had only just regained Nasdaq listing compliance on 2018-06-20 (15553), that gap would ordinarily warrant a direct statement.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-24The clearest open thread is the Oklahoma City mining build-out. In the 2018-06-28 disclosures, Riot described a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (claims 15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), against 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). Claim 15543, the 3,500-unit deployment tied to a 2018-03-31 date, was automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-15, though the same disclosure presents that figure as already reached, so the flag may reflect the date sequence rather than a real slip. The larger point stands either way: the records provided contain no later statement that the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s configuration was completed, revised or abandoned. There was also no update on the separate July 2018 suggestion of mining in other locations (15474).
The Logical Brokerage acquisition and the US exchange ambition sit together. The $600,000 purchase is recorded as stated in several claims (15509, 15521, 15534), along with its CFTC/NFA registrations and FinCEN/Florida licensing (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529). One version, claim 15544, was tied to a 2018-03-27 date and has been auto-transitioned to delayed. On 2018-07-09 management said it was investigating a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470), which would presumably be built on those licences. That is the last mention in the provided claims. Nothing has been said about whether the exchange launched, whether the licences were kept, or what became of the brokerage.
The 2018 portfolio of minority stakes and side ventures was described in detail in June and July 2018 and then goes unmentioned. That portfolio included a 12.9% interest in Coinsquare (15512, 15522, 15545), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady (15513, 15523, 15546), a 52% stake in Tess Inc. (15514, 15524, 15547), with the Tess acquisition called completed on 2018-07-09 (15472), and the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp (15515, 15525). None of these reappear later in the provided claims, and no disposal, write-down, conversion or wind-down has been disclosed on record.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555, disclosed 2018-06-14 with a 2018-12-31 horizon) was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. The provided claims contain nothing confirming that MNP completed the 2018 engagement or explaining any change of auditor. That gap may simply come from extraction coverage rather than a true silence.
A caveat applies throughout. The claims listing supplied for this analysis was truncated after mid-2018, so a later disclosure may resolve some of these threads. The delayed flags also come from automated transitions that sit alongside simultaneous stated transitions, not from any revision announcement by the company.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-24The Oklahoma City mining build-out is the clearest case of a target that simply stopped being restated. The June 28, 2018 disclosures described a full deployment of 8,000 miners (claims 15506, 15537, 15551) drawing 12 MW (15507, 15526, 15538) and producing about 110 PH/s (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), with 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). Claim 15543, which ties the 3,500-unit figure to a March 31, 2018 date, was automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-15; the same ledger entry also records a stated transition, so the classification is ambiguous. That June filing is the last time any of these figures appears in the records reviewed. No later claim reports that full deployment was reached, restates the 110 PH/s figure, or revises the 8,000-miner or 12 MW targets. Management has not said whether the build-out finished, stalled, or was replaced by a different plan.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition, and the U.S. exchange it was meant to support, followed a similar path. On June 28, 2018 the $600,000 purchase was described repeatedly (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), along with the unit's CFTC and NFA registrations and its FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549) and its exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 carries a promised-by date of March 27, 2018 and was auto-flagged delayed. Eleven days later, on July 9, 2018, the language had softened to an investigation of a U.S. cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470). Nothing on record after that date says whether the exchange launched, whether the licenses were kept, or why the plan went from acquired capability back to exploration.
The minority investments show uneven follow-through. The June 28, 2018 filings listed a 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare (15512, 15522, 15545), a $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (15513, 15523, 15546), a 52 percent holding in Tess Inc. (15514, 15524, 15547), and the formation of a Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). Tess received a follow-up on July 9, 2018, when the acquisition was described as completed (15472). Coinsquare, Verady and Digital Green Energy do not reappear in the records reviewed after June 28, 2018. There has been no update on the value or disposition of the Coinsquare stake, no word on whether the Verady note converted, was repaid, or was written off, and no description of what Digital Green Energy went on to do.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 was disclosed on June 14, 2018 (15555), with a December 31, 2018 horizon. The claim was auto-flagged delayed on 2026-09-15, and the ledger does not confirm that MNP completed the 2018 engagement. There is also no announced change of auditor in the claims reviewed, so the record is silent on how that engagement ended.
Two caveats apply to all of the above. The delayed classifications came from automated extraction rather than from any company statement. The claims list supplied here also stops partway through the July 9, 2018 disclosures, so some of these threads may be taken up in later records that were not available for this review.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-23The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest thread that stops without a conclusion. The 2018-06-28 disclosures describe a 107,000 square foot leased facility (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542) sized for 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), drawing 12 MW (15507, 15526, 15538) and expected to reach roughly 110 PH/s at full deployment (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). The only progress figure on record is 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520, 15543). Claim 15543 now sits at delayed, although the March 31 date appears to be a reporting date rather than a completion promise, so the flag may overstate the slippage. The larger gap is what comes after it. In the record provided, no later disclosure says whether the remaining 4,500 miners were installed, whether 110 PH/s was reached, or whether the 8,000-unit plan was changed. By 2018-07-09 the language had shifted to the potential establishment of mining operations in other locations (15474), with no explanation of how that related to the Oklahoma target.
Logical Brokerage and the exchange ambition follow a similar path. The $600,000 acquisition is recorded several times on 2018-06-28 (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), along with its CFTC and NFA registrations and its FinCEN and Florida money transmitter status (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549) and its exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 carries a delayed status against a 2018-03-27 date, which also looks like a closing date rather than a missed deadline. Eleven days later, on 2018-07-09, the stated plan had narrowed to the investigation of a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US (15470). That is softer language than the licensed-platform framing a few days earlier. No disclosure in this record explains whether the Logical Brokerage licenses were used for the exchange, how far the investigation went, or why it was being described as exploratory.
Several minority stakes and side ventures appear once, in bulk, and then go quiet. The 12.9 percent Coinsquare holding (15512, 15522, 15545), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) were all last mentioned on 2018-06-28. No valuation update, conversion, sale, write-down or stated purpose for Digital Green Energy follows in the record provided. Tess Inc. is the exception, since the 52 percent stake (15514, 15524, 15547) is followed by a completed acquisition on 2018-07-09 (15472). The other three are simply not mentioned again.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555, 2018-06-14) was given a 2018-12-31 horizon and is now marked delayed. Its ledger also shows a parallel transition to stated on the same day, so its status is ambiguous. The record contains no confirmation that MNP completed the 2018 audit and no disclosure of a change of auditor. For an issuer that had only just regained Nasdaq compliance (15553, 2018-06-20), the absence of a follow-up on who signed the 2018 financial statements is a gap worth noting.
The claims list provided ends mid-entry after 2018-07-09, so later disclosures that resolve some of these items may exist outside this extract. Within what is on record, none of the four threads above is explicitly closed or revised.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-23The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest thread that goes quiet. On 2018-06-28 Riot described a full deployment of 8,000 miners drawing 12 MW and producing an expected 110 PH/s (claims 15506, 15507, 15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). The same filing gave 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520). That checkpoint is recorded as delayed against its 2018-03-31 date (claim 15543), although the ledger also logs a same-day transition to stated. None of the claims on record show the 8,000-miner, 12 MW or 110 PH/s figures being reached, restated or withdrawn after June 2018. The only later related remark is a general statement on 2018-07-09 that mining might be established in other locations (claim 15474). No disclosure on record explains how far the Oklahoma deployment got or whether the full-deployment targets still apply.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition and the exchange plans built on it follow a similar pattern. The $600,000 purchase was repeated several times in the 2018-06-28 filing (claims 15509, 15521, 15534), along with its CFTC, NFA, FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter credentials (claims 15510, 15511, 15528, 15529). One version carries a 2018-03-27 date and has moved to delayed (claim 15544). On 2018-07-09 the language changed from an operating brokerage with exchange offerings (claim 15516) to an 'investigation' of launching a US cryptocurrency exchange (claim 15470). No later claim on record reports whether that exchange launched, was postponed or was dropped. Nothing explains why the acquisition date is flagged as missed.
The equity positions are described in 'ownership' language in June 2018 and then disappear from the record. These are the 12.9% Coinsquare stake (claims 15512, 15522, 15545), the 52% Tess Inc. holding (claims 15514, 15524, 15547) and the $200,000 Verady convertible note (claims 15513, 15523, 15546). Tess is described as a completed acquisition on 2018-07-09 (claim 15472), which would take it from majority stake to full ownership, but no claim on record states terms or a revised percentage. Coinsquare and Verady are not mentioned again. No disclosure addresses whether those positions were held, marked down or sold.
The auditor engagement is a smaller gap. MNP LLP was appointed as auditor for fiscal 2018 on 2018-06-14 (claim 15555). The claim is now delayed against its 2018-12-31 horizon, again with a same-day stated entry in the ledger. No later claim on record confirms MNP completed the 2018 audit or names a successor, and no explanation of any change appears.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-21The 110 PH/s full-deployment hash rate is the most conspicuous silence. It appears four separate times in the 2018-06-28 disclosure set (claims 15527, 15552, 15539, 15508), paired with an 8,000-miner fleet (15506, 15537, 15551) drawing 12 MW (15538, 15507, 15526). Against that, the company reported 3,500 miners installed and operating as of 2018-03-31 (15505, 15520, 15543). Claim 15543 carries the 2018-03-31 date and auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15; nothing in the ledger records a management revision. The last mention of the 110 PH/s target is 2018-06-28 and its status remains merely stated. What has not been said is when the remaining roughly 4,500 miners were expected to be energized, whether the target was ever reaffirmed, or what the intervening hash rate actually was.
The per-unit hardware specification was quietly restated downward inside the same disclosure window. Claim 15530 puts miner performance at 13.75 TH/s; claim 15550, same date, puts it at 13.5 TH/s. The arithmetic matters: 8,000 units at 13.75 TH/s yields exactly the 110 PH/s headline, while 13.5 TH/s yields 108. The lower figure was introduced without any accompanying statement reconciling it to the deployment target, and the 110 PH/s number was carried forward unchanged. No update explains which specification governs.
The Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition and the exchange ambition attached to it have gone quiet. The $600,000 purchase is recorded four times (15521, 15534, 15509, 15544), and 15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 that auto-transitioned to delayed without a management revision. Around it sits an unusually dense regulatory scaffold — FinCEN MSB registration (15528), a Florida Money Transmitter License (15529), CFTC and NFA registration (15548, 15535, 15510), and repeated licensing restatements (15549, 15536, 15511) — plus a product claim for exchange offerings (15516). Eleven days later, on 2018-07-09, the disclosure confirms completion of Kairos (15471) and Tess (15472) but does not mention Logical Brokerage at all, and the US exchange is reduced to an investigation of a possible launch (15470). That is a retreat from licensed-and-registered language to exploratory language, and no statement accompanies it.
Two equity stakes lost their numbers between 2018-06-28 and 2018-07-09. Coinsquare was disclosed three times as a 12.9 percent holding (15512, 15522, 15545); by 15473 it is simply an investment in Coinsquare, with no percentage. Tess Inc. was disclosed three times as 52 percent (15514, 15524, 15547); by 15472 it is a completed acquisition with no stake restated. Neither change is explained. Nothing on the record says whether the positions were diluted, increased, partially sold, or merely described more loosely.
Two items surface once and then disappear entirely. Digital Green Energy Corp, formed as a wholly owned subsidiary (15515, 15525), and the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15523, 15546, 15513) are both last mentioned 2018-06-28 and absent from the subsequent disclosure. Separately, the appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (15555) carried a 2018-12-31 date, auto-transitioned to delayed, and was last mentioned 2018-06-14 with no confirmation that the engagement was completed or that an auditor changed. It is worth noting that every transition in this ledger originates from automated extraction rather than a company statement: each delayed status here arrived on its own, with no revision announcement behind it.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-21The Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition is the clearest instance of language softening without an accompanying revision. The $600,000 purchase was carried with a completion date of 2018-03-27 in claim 15544, which now sits at delayed, while parallel restatements of the same transaction (claims 15534, 15509, 15521) remain merely stated. Around it sits a dense cluster of regulatory assertions — CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN money service business registration (15528, 15536), and the Florida money transmitter license (15511, 15529, 15549) — plus a product claim describing Logical Brokerage exchange offerings (15516). All of these carry a last-mention date of 2018-06-28. Eleven days later, on 2018-07-09, the same subject reappears as claim 15470, an investigation of a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US. A completed acquisition with registrations in hand and an exchange product described has become an investigation, and nothing on the record explains the step backward, names a revised launch window, or states whether the registrations remain active.
The full-deployment mining target has never been retired or reaffirmed. The 110 PH/s figure appears at least four times (15552, 15527, 15508, 15539), paired with 8,000 miners (15551, 15537, 15506) and 12 MW of power (15538, 15507, 15526), all last mentioned 2018-06-28 and all still resting at stated. The only measured progress point against that target is 3,500 miners installed as of 2018-03-31 (15543, 15520, 15505), and 15543 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-31 that has auto-transitioned to delayed. That leaves roughly 4,500 miners, the 1,200 Kairos units (15531, 15517, 15502, 15540) and the 6,800 February units (15532, 15518, 15503, 15541) notwithstanding, unaccounted for in any later disclosure. There has been no statement giving a revised deployment schedule, a revised hash rate, or an explanation of why the March installed count stalled below half of capacity.
A quiet downward revision sits inside the per-miner specification. Claim 15530 states 13.75 TH/s; claim 15550, bearing the identical 2018-06-28 date, states 13.5 TH/s. Applied across the 8,000-unit full-deployment figure, the difference is the gap between roughly 110 PH/s and roughly 108 PH/s, which is to say the headline guidance number was preserved while the underlying input was trimmed. No update statement accompanies the change, no hardware model or vendor substitution is named, and the 110 PH/s guidance claims were never correspondingly adjusted.
The Coinsquare stake moved from a quantified holding to an unquantified one. A 12.9 percent ownership position is stated three times on 2018-06-28 (15512, 15522, 15545). On 2018-07-09, claim 15473 refers only to an investment in Coinsquare, with no percentage attached. The record does not say whether the position was diluted, partially sold, or simply described more loosely, and no revised ownership figure has been offered.
Three adjacent holdings disclosed on 2018-06-28 do not appear in the 2018-07-09 set at all: the 52 percent ownership of Tess Inc (15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546), and the formation of the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). Each remains at stated, none has been withdrawn, and none has been repeated. The 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City data center lease (15504, 15542, 15519, 15533) follows the same pattern — last quantified on 2018-06-28, and on 2018-07-09 reduced to an unsized reference to mining operations in Oklahoma City (15469), alongside hedged guidance about possible operations in other locations (15474). Separately, the MNP LLP audit engagement for fiscal 2018 (15555) carried a 2018-12-31 date and is now delayed. It bears noting that every delayed and unverified designation in this ledger was generated by automated extraction on 2026-09-15, not by any company statement; the silence around these items is the finding, not a disputed characterization of one.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-21The 110 PH/s full-deployment hashing rate is the clearest example. It was asserted four separate times in the June 28, 2018 disclosure (claims 15508, 15527, 15539, 15552), paired with an 8,000-miner deployment (15506, 15537, 15551) drawing 12 MW (15507, 15526, 15538). The supporting arithmetic came from 1,200 miners acquired through Kairos Global Technology (15502, 15517, 15531) plus 6,800 acquired in February 2018 (15503, 15518, 15532). Against that, only 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520), and claim 15543 carried a commitment date of 2018-03-31 that the ledger auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. The 4,500-unit gap between what was deployed and what the 110 PH/s figure requires has never been addressed. The July 9, 2018 disclosure returns to the Oklahoma City operation (15469) but drops the hash rate, the miner count, and the megawatt figure entirely. No revised target was issued; the number simply stopped appearing.
The hardware specification was quietly restated downward within a single day's filings. Claim 15530 puts per-unit performance at 13.75 TH/s; claim 15550, same date, puts it at 13.5 TH/s. Both remain in stated status with no reconciliation. A 0.25 TH/s difference across 8,000 units is roughly 2 PH/s against the headline figure, and neither version has been reaffirmed since 2018-06-28.
Logical Brokerage Corp has disappeared as a named business line. The $600,000 acquisition was disclosed at least four times (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), alongside CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN money service business registration (15528, 15536, 15549), a Florida money transmitter license (15511, 15529), and planned exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 carried a 2018-03-27 completion date and auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. Twelve days later, on July 9, the language had softened to an "investigation of cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US" (15470) — investigation rather than a licensed, registered, acquired brokerage. That is a retreat from completed-transaction language to exploratory language, and nothing on the record explains whether the acquisition closed, the registrations transferred, or the exchange plan survived.
The minority stakes and the subsidiary have gone silent in different ways. The 12.9% Coinsquare position was stated three times on June 28 with the percentage attached (15512, 15522, 15545); on July 9 it reappears as claim 15473, "Investment in Coinsquare," with the figure removed. Dropping a quantified ownership percentage from a restatement one week later is not itself a disclosure of dilution, but no statement accompanies the change. The 52% Tess Inc. holding (15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546), and the formation of the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) all have a last-mention date of 2018-06-28 and do not appear in the following disclosure at all.
The Oklahoma City facility and the auditor appointment round this out. The 107,000 square foot lease was described as executed in four claims (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542), last mentioned 2018-06-28; the July 9 disclosure references mining operations in Oklahoma City (15469) without the square footage or any buildout milestone, and pairs it with guidance about the "potential establishment of mining operations in other locations" (15474) — a broadening of the footprint story at the same moment the specific site commitment stopped being quantified. Separately, the MNP LLP audit engagement for 2018 (15555) carried a 2018-12-31 date and auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. In every one of these cases the transition ledger records only automated extraction; there is no company-issued revision, withdrawal, or explanatory statement anywhere on the record.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-21The Oklahoma City data center is the clearest case. A 107,000 square foot lease was described as executed in the June 28, 2018 disclosures, and the extraction record captures it four separate times (claims 15542, 15504, 15519, 15533), which is itself a measure of how prominently it was presented. Eleven days later, on July 9, the language shifts to investigating the potential establishment of mining operations in other locations (claim 15474), and the Oklahoma facility does not reappear in the record after that date. Nothing on file states whether the lease was terminated, sublet, deferred, or simply deprioritized, and no claim carries a revision transition. The entire site went from a named, measured, repeatedly disclosed asset to an unmentioned one without an intervening statement.
The full-deployment capacity framework built on top of that facility has gone equally quiet. Management quantified the end state three ways: 8,000 miners (claims 15551, 15506, 15537), 12 MW of power (claims 15538, 15507, 15526), and 110 PH/s of hash rate (claims 15527, 15552, 15539, 15508). Against that, the only measured progress point on record is 3,500 miners deployed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15543, 15505, 15520). Claim 15543 carries a promised-by date of March 31, 2018 and now sits at delayed, but that status arrived through automated extraction on September 15, 2026 rather than through any company revision. The gap between 3,500 installed and 8,000 targeted has never been addressed in a subsequent disclosure, and the 110 PH/s figure has not been reaffirmed, revised, or withdrawn since June 28, 2018.
The brokerage and exchange leg of the strategy has disappeared as a unit. The Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition at $600,000 appears four times (claims 15544, 15521, 15534, 15509), with claim 15544 carrying a promised-by date of March 27, 2018 and now flagged delayed by automation, again with no accompanying management explanation. Around it sits an unusually dense regulatory scaffold: FinCEN money service business registration (claim 15528), a Florida money transmitter license (claim 15529), and CFTC and NFA registration described repeatedly (claims 15510, 15535, 15548, 15549, 15511, 15536), plus the exchange offerings themselves (claim 15516). The July 9 disclosure softens this to investigation of a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the US (claim 15470), and after that the whole cluster stops. What has not been said is whether the licenses were maintained, whether the CFTC and NFA registrations remain active, and whether the exchange ambition was abandoned or merely postponed.
The minority holdings have been treated inconsistently, and the inconsistency is instructive. Tess Inc. was disclosed as a 52 percent ownership stake three times on June 28 (claims 15547, 15514, 15524) and then upgraded to a completed acquisition on July 9 (claim 15472), so that thread was at least followed through. The 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare (claims 15545, 15522, 15512) and the $200,000 convertible note in Verady LLC (claims 15546, 15523, 15513) received the same repeated emphasis on the same date and then received no follow-up at all. No subsequent valuation, no disposition, no impairment, no carrying-value commentary appears anywhere in the record. Two positions were followed to a conclusion and two were not, without any stated reason for the difference in treatment.
Two smaller items round this out. Digital Green Energy Corp, a wholly owned subsidiary, was disclosed as formed on June 28 (claims 15515, 15525) and is never mentioned again; a named subsidiary that generates no further disclosure is a question the record does not answer. Separately, the appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (claim 15555) carried a promised-by date of December 31, 2018 and now reads delayed, a status assigned by automated extraction on September 15, 2026 rather than by any announcement of an auditor change or engagement issue. In every one of these cases the pattern is the same: the transition ledger shows only automated status changes, never a management-initiated revision, which means each of these walk-backs happened through silence rather than through statement. It should be noted that the disclosure record on file thins sharply after July 2018, so some of this silence may reflect the boundaries of the available record rather than the boundaries of what was said.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-20The Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition is the clearest example. Claim 15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and now sits at 'delayed,' a status the ledger reached only through automated extraction on 2026-09-15 rather than through any revision from the company. The same transaction appears three further times at the same $600,000 figure — claims 15534, 15509 and 15521 — all dated 2018-06-28 and all still recorded as merely 'stated,' along with the associated registration claims for CFTC and NFA (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN money service business status (15528, 15511, 15549) and the Florida money transmitter license (15529, 15536). What is missing is any statement acknowledging that the March closing date passed, any restatement of the purchase price, or any confirmation that the broker-dealer registrations were actually carried across. The last substantive mention is 2018-06-28; nothing since has said whether the deal closed on the original terms, closed late, or was renegotiated.
The deployment ramp has quietly stalled between two numbers that were once presented as a single trajectory. Claim 15543 put 3,500 miners deployed and operating against a promised-by date of 2018-03-31 and is now 'delayed'; claims 15551, 15506 and 15537 hold the full-deployment target of 8,000 miners with no promised-by date attached at all, and claims 15552, 15539, 15508 and 15527 hold the 110 PH/s figure expected at that full deployment, likewise undated. The effect is that the near-term milestone has slipped while the headline capacity number floats free of any schedule. Management has not said when the remaining 4,500 miners are expected to be energized, has not revised the 110 PH/s estimate downward, and has not explained what the March shortfall implies for the 12 MW power draw cited in claims 15538, 15507 and 15526. The last date on any of it remains 2018-06-28.
The hardware specification was revised downward inside the same disclosure window without comment. Claim 15550 states 13.5 TH/s and claim 15530 states 13.75 TH/s, both dated 2018-06-28. The difference is small in isolation but material when multiplied across 8,000 units against a 110 PH/s target, and no update statement reconciles the two figures or identifies which describes the machines actually installed.
The minority and strategic positions have simply dropped out of the record. The 12.9 percent stake in Coinsquare (claims 15545, 15522, 15512), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15546, 15523, 15513) and the formation of the wholly owned subsidiary Digital Green Energy Corp (15515, 15525) were all disclosed on 2018-06-28 and none appears in any later filing on record. The Tess Inc. position, at 52 percent in claims 15547, 15524 and 15514, is the only one of the group that survives into the 2018-07-09 disclosures, where claim 15472 records the acquisition as completed. For Coinsquare, Verady and Digital Green Energy there has been no disposal notice, no impairment statement, and no confirmation that the positions are still held — they were mentioned once and then not again.
Two smaller items sit in the same unexplained category. The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018, claim 15555, carried a promised-by date of 2018-12-31 and is now 'delayed' by automated transition on 2026-09-15, with nothing on record confirming the engagement was completed for the full year. And the US cryptocurrency exchange described in claim 15470 on 2018-07-09 was framed as under investigation, language that was never upgraded to a commitment and never withdrawn; the related note in claim 15474 about establishing mining operations in other locations has the same open-ended character. It is worth noting that every status change in this ledger originates from automated extraction on 2026-09-15 or 2026-09-20. Not one of these positions was moved by the company itself.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-20The Oklahoma City buildout is the clearest case of a target that stopped being discussed. Across a dense cluster of June 28, 2018 disclosures — the 107,000 square foot lease (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542), the 12 MW power supply (15507, 15526, 15538), the 8,000-miner full-deployment figure (15506, 15537, 15551) and the 110 PH/s hash rate target (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552) — management described a facility scaling toward a specific end state. The interim marker, 3,500 miners deployed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543), carried a promised-by date of 2018-03-31 and has since been auto-transitioned to delayed. The last mention of any of this is 2018-06-28. There has been no revised deployment schedule, no restated hash rate, no statement that 110 PH/s remains the target, and no explanation of why the March interim figure was not met on its stated date.
The Logical Brokerage Corp acquisition shows the same pattern with a harder date attached. Claim 15544 carries a promised-by of 2018-03-27 and now reads delayed, while parallel claims describing the same $600,000 transaction (15509, 15521, 15534) remain merely stated. The associated regulatory scaffolding — CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN money service business registration (15528), and the Florida money transmitter license (15511, 15529, 15536, 15549) — was disclosed in the same June 2018 batch and has not been revisited since. Nothing on record says whether the licenses were ultimately obtained, retained, or allowed to lapse, and no closing confirmation or termination notice explains the missed March date.
A quiet downward revision sits inside the June 28, 2018 disclosures themselves. Claim 15530 specifies mining hardware performance at 13.75 TH/s; claim 15550, bearing the same date, specifies 13.5 TH/s. The record contains no update statement reconciling the two figures, no indication which supersedes the other, and no note that per-unit performance assumptions underlying the 110 PH/s aggregate had been adjusted. The aggregate target was not restated to match.
The portfolio of minority positions and affiliates announced in mid-2018 has since gone silent. The 12.9 percent Coinsquare stake (15512, 15522, 15545), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546), the 52 percent interest in Tess Inc. (15514, 15524, 15547, with completion confirmed on 2018-07-09 at 15472), and the formation of the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) were all described in ownership terms. None appears in any disclosure after 2018-07-09. There is no subsequent statement on whether the stakes were held, diluted, written down, converted, or disposed of, and Digital Green Energy Corp has not been mentioned again since its formation was announced.
Two forward-looking items from the July 9, 2018 disclosures were framed as active work and then dropped. Claim 15470 describes an investigation of launching a cryptocurrency exchange in the United States, and claim 15474 describes potential establishment of mining operations in other locations. Both remain at stated, both were last mentioned 2018-07-09, and neither has been followed by a decision, a timeline, or a withdrawal. Separately, the appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (claim 15555) carried a promised-by of 2018-12-31 and now reads delayed; the record does not say whether the engagement was completed by that date, and no change-of-auditor or ratification disclosure follows the June 14, 2018 annual meeting items (15554). In every instance above, the status change is an automated consequence of a date passing rather than anything management chose to announce.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-20The 110 PH/s full-deployment target is the clearest example. Riot put the figure on record repeatedly in the June 28, 2018 disclosures — claims 15508, 15527, 15539 and 15552 all carry it, alongside the supporting arithmetic of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551) drawing 12 MW (15507, 15526, 15538) in the 107,000 square foot Oklahoma City facility (15504, 15519, 15533, 15542). Against that, the same filing conceded only 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520, 15543), which is under half the deployment the hash rate assumes. Claim 15543 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-31 and now sits at delayed. The last mention of the 110 PH/s number is June 28, 2018; the July 9, 2018 disclosure describes the Oklahoma City operation only in general terms (15469), with no miner count, no megawatt figure and no hash rate. No revised deployment schedule, no restated target and no explanation for the shortfall appears anywhere later in the record.
The hardware specification was quietly marked down within a single day's filings. Claim 15530 states 13.75 TH/s per unit; claim 15550, same date, states 13.5 TH/s. Both remain at stated. The difference is small but it flows directly into the 110 PH/s figure, and nothing on record acknowledges that two different per-unit specifications were published, nor which one the deployment target was built on.
Logical Brokerage has disappeared entirely. The June 28, 2018 disclosures devote unusual attention to it: the $600,000 acquisition (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN money service business registration and Florida money transmitter licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549), and the exchange offerings the entity was meant to carry (15516). Claim 15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and now sits at delayed. Eleven days later, on July 9, 2018, the company describes itself as investigating a cryptocurrency exchange launch in the United States (15470) — language appropriate to a project at inception, not one whose licensed vehicle had reportedly already been bought. Logical Brokerage is not named in the July 9 disclosure at all, and no statement explains what became of the acquisition or the registrations attached to it.
The Coinsquare position lost its number. Three June 28 claims specify a 12.9 percent ownership stake (15512, 15522, 15545). The July 9 disclosure refers only to an investment in Coinsquare (15473), with no percentage attached. The same flattening applies to Kairos: the June 28 claims describe the acquisition as bringing 1,200 miners (15502, 15517, 15531, 15540), while the July 9 restatement (15471) notes only that the acquisition completed. Neither the stake nor the miner count has been restated, revised or withdrawn — they simply stopped being quantified.
Two other holdings have gone unmentioned since June 28, 2018. The 52 percent position in Tess Inc. (15514, 15524, 15547) and the formation of the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) both appear four and two times respectively in that filing and then not again. The $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) has the same profile. None has been reported as sold, written down, dissolved or impaired; they are absent rather than closed out.
On housekeeping, claim 15555 records MNP LLP's appointment as auditor for 2018 with a promised-by date of 2018-12-31 and now sits at delayed. Every status change in this ledger — 15543, 15544 and 15555 alike — was applied by automated reconciliation in September 2026, not prompted by any company revision. That is the common thread across all of the above: the record contains no management statement issued after July 9, 2018 that revisits any of these commitments, and the movement from stated to delayed reflects the passage of the dates rather than anything the company has said about them.
A structural caveat worth stating plainly: everything on record for this company ends at July 9, 2018. The silences described here are silences within that window and in the absence of anything after it, and they should not be read as claims about what Riot may have disclosed through channels this ledger does not capture.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-19The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest unfinished thread. On 2018-06-28 Riot said 3,500 miners were installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543), against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and about 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). Claim 15543 now sits at delayed after an automated transition on 2026-09-15, with no revision issued by the company. The record contains no later statement that the 8,000-miner, 12 MW, 110 PH/s configuration was reached, revised or abandoned. The July 9, 2018 disclosures captured here refer only generally to mining operations in Oklahoma City (15469) and to possible operations elsewhere (15474). The per-unit hardware figure also shifted within the same filing date, from 13.75 TH/s (15530) to 13.5 TH/s (15550). That difference was never reconciled, and at 13.5 TH/s the 8,000-miner fleet would fall slightly short of 110 PH/s.
The $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition received detailed treatment on 2018-06-28 (15509, 15521, 15534, 15544). That coverage included its CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), its FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549), and a planned exchange offering (15516). Claim 15544 carries a promised-by date of 2018-03-27 and was auto-transitioned to delayed. The July 9, 2018 claims on record list completed acquisitions of Kairos and Tess but do not mention Logical Brokerage or the exchange product. The record does not say whether the licenses were maintained or whether the exchange launched.
MNP LLP was appointed auditor for fiscal 2018 at the June 14, 2018 annual meeting (15555), with an implied completion date of 2018-12-31. The claim is now marked delayed by automated extraction, alongside a simultaneous stated transition on the same date. No disclosure on record confirms that MNP completed the 2018 audit, and none explains a change of auditor.
The descriptions of two holdings changed without comment. Tess Inc. was described on 2018-06-28 as a 52 percent ownership stake (15514, 15524, 15547) and eleven days later as a completed acquisition (15472). The record does not explain whether the remaining 48 percent was purchased or whether the wording simply loosened. Coinsquare went from a precise 12.9 percent stake (15512, 15522, 15545) to an unquantified investment (15473), with no updated percentage or valuation.
Two smaller items appear once and then disappear from the captured record. These are the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of the wholly owned Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525). Both were last mentioned on 2018-06-28. Nothing has been said since about conversion or repayment of the note, or about what the subsidiary was formed to do.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-19The ledger supplied for Riot runs from June 14 to July 9, 2018, and the listing is cut off partway through the July 9 claims, beginning at claim 15471. Every status transition shown was applied by automated extraction on 2026-09-15. None reflects a management revision. What follows is therefore a set of silences in the visible record rather than confirmed walk-backs, and each item should be checked against any later filings not shown here.
The most concrete build-out figures are the full-deployment targets for the Oklahoma City facility: 8,000 miners, 12 MW of power and roughly 110 PH/s of hashing capacity (claims 15506, 15507, 15508, 15526, 15527, 15537, 15538, 15539, 15551, 15552). They were repeated many times in the June 28, 2018 disclosures, alongside a reported 3,500 miners installed as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543). None of these targets carried a completion date. The July 9, 2018 claims visible here mention mining operations in Oklahoma City only in general terms (claim 15469) and restate none of the numbers. No subsequent disclosure in this record reports progress from 3,500 toward 8,000 units, confirms that the 12 MW supply was fully energized, or explains the gap. The same filing also gives two different per-unit hashing specifications, 13.5 TH/s and 13.75 TH/s (claims 15550, 15530), and that difference is never reconciled.
The cluster of strategic stakes has no follow-up after the same dates. The 12.9 percent Coinsquare holding (claims 15512, 15522, 15545) last appears as an investment on July 9, 2018 (claim 15473). The 52 percent stake in Tess Inc (claims 15514, 15524, 15547), the $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (claims 15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp (claims 15515, 15525) all last appear on June 28, 2018. The record says nothing about valuation, conversion, divestiture or wind-down for any of them. Digital Green Energy in particular was described as a newly formed subsidiary, but no purpose or activity is ever attributed to it.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition, for $600,000 (claims 15509, 15521, 15534, 15544), was presented with its CFTC and NFA registrations, FinCEN registration and Florida money-transmitter license (claims 15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549), plus a line of exchange offerings (claim 15516). On July 9, 2018 the language shifts to an investigation of launching a cryptocurrency exchange in the US (claim 15470). That is softer and more tentative than the June framing. The visible record contains no statement on whether the licensed brokerage was ever used as that platform, or whether the exchange plan went ahead or was dropped. Claim 15544 is flagged delayed against a 2018-03-27 date. That appears to be a completion date that had already passed when it was reported, not a missed deadline.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (claim 15555, June 14, 2018) carries a 2018-12-31 horizon and is marked delayed only because that date passed without a confirming disclosure in this record. Nothing shown here states whether MNP completed the 2018 audit, was replaced, or issued an opinion. Given how often the claims above were repeated, that is a notable omission.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-18The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest case of a number that stopped being repeated. The 2018-06-28 disclosures set out a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (claims 15506, 15537, 15551), drawing 12 MW (15507, 15526, 15538) and producing an estimated 110 PH/s (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). The same filings put actual installation at 3,500 miners as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). Claim 15543, which ties that 3,500 figure to a 2018-03-31 date, has been auto-transitioned to 'delayed', although the ledger also records a same-day 'stated' transition for it. By 2018-07-09 the company described 'cryptocurrency mining operations in Oklahoma City' only in general terms (15469) and floated possible operations elsewhere (15474). None of the 8,000-miner, 12 MW or 110 PH/s figures appears after 2018-06-28. The record contains no statement that full deployment was reached, no revised timetable, and nothing on how the gap between 3,500 installed and 8,000 targeted units was closed. The per-unit hardware figure is also given inconsistently within that same filing date, as 13.5 TH/s (15550) and 13.75 TH/s (15530), and the difference is not reconciled.
The Logical Brokerage exchange plan has softened in its language. On 2018-06-28 the $600,000 acquisition was presented as done (15509, 15521, 15534), with CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548) and FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549) listed as assets supporting 'exchange offerings' (15516). One version of the acquisition claim carries a 2018-03-27 date and has been auto-marked 'delayed' (15544). Eleven days later, on 2018-07-09, the stated position was an 'investigation' of a US exchange launch (15470). That shift from a licensed vehicle with described offerings back to an exploratory posture was not accompanied by any explanation of timing, regulatory status or a decision not to proceed.
Several investments are described with less precision or have dropped out of later disclosures. The Coinsquare stake was stated as 12.9 percent on 2018-06-28 (15512, 15522, 15545), but the 2018-07-09 reference is simply an 'investment in Coinsquare' (15473), with no percentage and no note of dilution, sale or revaluation. The $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of the Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) were last mentioned on 2018-06-28 and do not appear in the later disclosures on record. The record contains no conversion, repayment, impairment or operating update for either. Tess Inc. moved in the other direction, from a 52 percent holding (15514, 15524, 15547) to a 'completed acquisition' on 2018-07-09 (15472). No terms for the move to full ownership were disclosed.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555) was recorded on 2018-06-14 against a 2018-12-31 horizon and has since been auto-transitioned to 'delayed', again alongside a conflicting 'stated' entry. The record holds no later confirmation that MNP completed the 2018 engagement, and no disclosure of a change in auditor.
Every status change above was generated automatically on 2026-09-15, not prompted by any company statement, and the ledger available here ends in July 2018. These items therefore mark where the company's own narrative stops, not confirmed outcomes.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-18The Oklahoma City build-out is the clearest case of numbers that stopped moving. On 2018-06-28 the company described 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543) against a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). Claim 15543, tied to a 2018-03-31 date, was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. It also carries a same-day stated transition, so the ledger itself is ambiguous. The 2018-07-09 disclosure refers only to "cryptocurrency mining operations in Oklahoma City" (15469), with no miner count, megawatts or hash rate. No record gives a date for full deployment, reports progress beyond the March figure, or confirms or withdraws the 8,000-unit, 12 MW or 110 PH/s targets. The hardware specification also changed between two claims in the same filing, from 13.75 TH/s (15530) to 13.5 TH/s (15550), and no reconciliation is on record.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition and the U.S. exchange ambition narrowed without explanation. Several claims dated 2018-06-28 record a $600,000 acquisition (15509, 15521, 15534), with one version tied to a 2018-03-27 date (15544) that has been auto-transitioned to delayed. The same filing lists CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN and Florida licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549), and exchange offerings (15516). By 2018-07-09, the only related item is an "investigation" of a U.S. cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470), which is weaker language than the June disclosures used. No launch date, regulatory milestone or decision to pause the exchange appears after that.
The descriptions of the company's investment holdings changed and no explanation is on record. On 2018-06-28, Coinsquare was described as a quantified 12.9% stake (15512, 15522, 15545). On 2018-07-09 it became simply an "investment in Coinsquare" (15473), with no percentage. The $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the newly formed Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) were both last mentioned on 2018-06-28 and do not appear in the July record. Tess Inc. went the other way. It was a 52% holding in June (15514, 15524, 15547) and a "completed acquisition" in July (15472), but nothing on record explains how the remaining interest was acquired or on what terms.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555) was last mentioned on 2018-06-14 and was due by 2018-12-31. It was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15, again alongside a same-day stated transition. Nothing in the record confirms that the engagement was completed, that MNP issued an opinion for 2018, or that the auditor changed.
This ledger ends on 2018-07-09. Every "last mention" above refers to the last mention in the claims available here, not necessarily the company's last public statement. The paired delayed and stated transitions on 15543, 15544 and 15555 should be resolved before any of these items is presented as a confirmed slip.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-18The deployment build-out in Oklahoma City is the clearest open thread. The 2018-06-28 disclosures reported 3,500 miners installed and operating as of March 31, 2018 (claims 15505, 15520, 15543). They described a full deployment of 8,000 miners (15506, 15537, 15551), 12 MW of power (15507, 15526, 15538) and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (15508, 15527, 15539, 15552). Claim 15543 carries a 2018-03-31 date and was auto-classified as delayed. No disclosure on record says when, or whether, the remaining 4,500 units were energized or the 110 PH/s figure was reached. The record also carries two per-unit hardware figures from the same date, 13.5 TH/s (15550) and 13.75 TH/s (15530). Only the higher figure reconciles with 8,000 units producing 110 PH/s, and the discrepancy has not been addressed.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition was presented on 2018-06-28 as a $600,000 purchase (15509, 15521, 15534). One version tied it to a 2018-03-27 date (15544), which was auto-classified as delayed. It came with CFTC/NFA registration and FinCEN and Florida money-transmitter licensing (15510, 15511, 15528, 15529, 15535, 15536, 15548, 15549) and brokerage product offerings (15516). On 2018-07-09 the language had already softened to an investigation of a US exchange launch (15470). The record shows no later statement on whether the exchange launched, whether the licenses were used or kept, or what became of the brokerage.
The minority and venture positions show a similar drift. Coinsquare was described on 2018-06-28 as a specific 12.9 percent stake (15512, 15522, 15545). By 2018-07-09 it appeared only as an investment in Coinsquare, with no percentage (15473). The $200,000 Verady convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the formation of Digital Green Energy Corp (15515, 15525) do not appear after 2018-06-28. Nothing on record says the note converted, was repaid or was written down, or what the subsidiary was for. Tess Inc. was also described inconsistently: a 52 percent ownership position (15514, 15524, 15547) and, eleven days later, a completed acquisition (15472). The change has not been reconciled.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for 2018 (15555) was last mentioned on 2018-06-14 against a 2018-12-31 horizon and is now marked delayed. The record contains no confirmation that MNP completed the 2018 engagement and no notice of a change of auditor.
Some caveats apply. Every status transition above was generated by automated extraction on 2026-09-15, not by any company statement. The claims list supplied here ends partway through the 2018-07-09 entries, so absence means absence from the disclosures on record rather than proof that management never returned to these topics.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-15The Oklahoma City mining build-out is the most prominent commitment without a recorded conclusion. The June 28, 2018 filing described a 107,000 square foot leased facility (claims 15504, 15519, 15533, 15542) with a full-deployment target of 8,000 miners, 12 MW of power and roughly 110 PH/s of hash rate (15506, 15507, 15508, 15526, 15527, 15537, 15538, 15539, 15551, 15552). Against that target, 3,500 miners were reported installed as of March 31, 2018 (15505, 15520). Claim 15543 now carries a delayed status tied to that March 31 date. No later claim on record reports how many miners are installed, how much power is drawn, or what hash rate was reached. By July 9, 2018 the language had moved to the potential establishment of mining operations in other locations (15474), with no statement on whether Oklahoma City reached full deployment. The filings also give two hardware figures, 13.75 TH/s (15530) and 13.5 TH/s (15550), and never reconcile them. At 8,000 units, that gap is material to the 110 PH/s guidance.
The Logical Brokerage acquisition and the exchange business built around it followed a similar course. In June 2018 the company described a $600,000 acquisition (15509, 15521, 15534), CFTC and NFA registration (15510, 15535, 15548), FinCEN and Florida money transmitter licensing (15511, 15528, 15529, 15536, 15549), and exchange offerings (15516). Claim 15544 is marked delayed against a March 27, 2018 date. That date precedes the filing, so the status may reflect a historical closing date rather than a missed deadline. By July 9, 2018 the plan appeared only as an investigation of a US cryptocurrency exchange launch (15470). No claim on record says whether an exchange launched, whether the licenses were kept, or why a licensed brokerage became an exploratory project.
The minority investments lost their specifics over the same period. Coinsquare was a 12.9 percent ownership stake in June (15512, 15522, 15545) and an undifferentiated investment in Coinsquare by July 9 (15473), with no figure. Tess Inc. was described as 52 percent owned (15514, 15524, 15547), then as a completed acquisition (15472), and nothing explains how the stake changed. The $200,000 Verady LLC convertible note (15513, 15523, 15546) and the Digital Green Energy Corp subsidiary (15515, 15525) were last mentioned on June 28, 2018. No later claim addresses conversion, repayment, impairment, or any activity at the subsidiary.
The appointment of MNP LLP as auditor for fiscal 2018 (15555) was last mentioned June 14, 2018 and is now marked delayed against a December 31, 2018 date. The record contains no statement that MNP completed the 2018 audit, and no disclosure of a change of auditor.
Two cautions apply. Every status transition in this ledger was assigned by automated extraction on a single date, September 15, 2026, so the delayed labels reflect elapsed promise dates rather than company events. The claims list provided also ends partway through the July 9, 2018 disclosures. Some of these threads may be picked up in later filings that fall outside what was reviewed here.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14The Coinsquare licensing arrangement is the clearest case of quiet substitution. On 2018-09-06 Riot described an exclusive agreement to license Coinsquare's platform for its U.S. exchange (claim 15417). The deal carried specific consideration: 450,000 Riot shares (15419), 9.9% of RiotX Holdings (15420), $485,331 in integration fees (15421) and a 0.1% ongoing transaction fee (15422). Seven weeks later, on 2018-11-27, Riot announced an agreement with Shift Markets for the exchange platform (15367). The 2018-12-11 disclosure names Shift Markets as the platform partner (15347). By 2019-01-02 Coinsquare appears only as an investment (15295). The record contains no statement that the exclusive license was terminated or amended. It also does not say whether the shares, the RiotX equity or the integration fees were paid, returned or cancelled.
Synapse Financial Technologies followed a similar path from named partner to generic description. On 2018-10-28 Riot named Synapse as a partner for its digital currency exchange, with a target of 2019-01-01 (15376). The 2018-12-11 filing mentions only an unnamed "banking services partnership for RiotX" (15346). The 2019-01-02 disclosures do not mention Synapse by name. The ledger still shows the claim as stated, with no transition to delivered or delayed, even though the target date has passed. Nothing on record confirms that the partnership began operating by that date or explains why the name was dropped.
The exchange launch itself has drifted without a revised schedule. RiotX was a planned U.S. exchange in October 2018 (15377) and was described simply as an exchange in December (15345). On 2019-01-02 it was still "in development" (15307) and still "pursuing regulatory approval" (15308). That regulatory language is vaguer than what was said in September 2018. At that time Riot cited a Florida Money Transmitter License (15429), FinCEN MSB registration (15428), CFTC introducing-broker status (15427) and active pursuit of additional state money transmitter licenses (15430). No later disclosure in this record says which additional states were obtained, which are pending, or what still blocks a launch. No launch date has been given at any point.
The BMSS waiver payments have not been mentioned again. On 2018-08-23 Riot committed to a $150,000 initial payment (15431). It also committed to recurring $200,000 payments beginning by 2018-09-30 (15432), 50,000 restricted shares by 2018-08-28 (15434) and an undated final payment with accrued interest (15433). None of these obligations appear in any later disclosure in the record. There is no confirmation that the recurring payments were made, how many there were, or whether the final payment has been settled. The ledger has not moved any of these claims past stated.
The Oklahoma City facility lease also has no follow-up. It was extended through 2019-08-15 (15361, repeated in 15344 and 15304), with renewal options noted (15366). The last reference in this record is 2019-01-02. That date passed long ago, and there is no statement on whether the lease was renewed, exercised under its options, or vacated. The same applies to the stated capacity of 8,000 miners, 95 PH/s and 12 MW (15342, 15343, 15305, 15306).
Two limits on this record should be noted. First, every claim shows a single transition, from automated extraction to stated, dated 2026-09-14. None has been automatically moved to delayed or not_yet_verifiable. The gaps above come from comparing disclosures over time, not from status changes in the ledger. Second, the claims supplied end mid-entry in January 2019. Later filings may address some of these points, but they are not in the material provided.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14A caveat on the ledger comes first. Every Riot claim on record carries the same single transition, from automated extraction to stated, dated 2026-09-14. None has been auto-marked delayed or not yet verifiable. The claims supplied here run only from October 2019 to early May 2020. The gaps below are silences within that window, not confirmed walk-backs.
The Oklahoma City lease, held through the Kairos subsidiary, was extended in short steps. Claim 15015 (2020-01-12) extended it to 2020-05-15, and claim 14937 (2020-04-19) extended it again to 2020-06-30. Over the same months the facility was described repeatedly as a 12 MW, 107,000-square-foot site running the S17 Pro fleet (claims 14948, 14952, 14962, 14965, 14972). Days before the second extension, claim 14938 (2020-04-13) introduced a co-location agreement with Coinmint at Massena. Claim 14939 says its term runs to 2020-10-08. No claim on record says whether the Oklahoma lease was renewed past June 2020 or allowed to lapse. None says whether the fleet was moved to Massena, or what happens when the Coinmint term ends in October 2020.
RiotX shows a similar pattern. Claim 15064 (2019-11-11) described active development of the exchange platform, and claim 14998 (2020-02-25) announced its sunset. A month later, the 2020-03-24 disclosures still described the $600,000 Logical Brokerage acquisition (claims 14950, 14963, 14978) and its regulatory registrations (claims 14960, 14967). Nothing on record says whether those registrations were kept, surrendered or sold, or whether the acquired value was written down after the sunset.
Three minority equity stakes appear in a single filing and nowhere else. They are Coinsquare at 11.7 percent (claims 14957, 14975), TessPay at 8.8 percent (claims 14959, 14977) and Verady at 3.2 percent (claims 14958, 14976), all dated 2020-03-24. The same filing also named a business combination with Kairos covering 8,000 units (claims 14949, 14961). No later claim gives a valuation, sale, impairment or change in any of these holdings.
Claim 14997 (2020-02-25) recorded an engagement of XMS Capital Partners, filed the same day as the RiotX sunset and the renewed focus on bitcoin mining (claim 14999). No later claim describes what XMS was asked to do or whether the engagement produced anything. Similarly, claim 14929 (2020-05-07) said previous-generation miners were taken offline with their future use under evaluation. No follow-up on record says whether they were sold, scrapped or redeployed.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14A caveat applies throughout. Every claim in this ledger still carries the status it received at extraction, 'stated', and every one was assigned on the same day, 2026-09-14. No claim has moved to 'delayed', 'not_yet_verifiable' or 'fulfilled', even though nearly every promised-by date passed years ago. The disclosures on file also stop at 2021-04-06, and the extract ends partway through claim 14730. The absences described below are absences from this record. They are not established abandonments.
The Coinmint co-location arrangement at Massena is the clearest topic to fade out. It first appears on 2020-04-13 as a signed services agreement (14938) with a term running to 2020-10-08 (14939) and a stated power capacity of 9,500 (14940). On 2020-10-06 it is restated against the same 2020-10-08 date (14822), with management expecting operational improvements from the relocation (14824). By 2021-03-30 the same relationship is described only as a co-location agreement, with no term attached (14748). Nothing on file says whether the October 2020 term was renewed, extended or renegotiated, or on what economics. No later disclosure reports whether the promised operational improvements materialized. The Massena capacity figure is never updated as the fleet planned for the site grew several times over.
The Bitmain order book was restated repeatedly without a reconciliation. In August 2020 the disclosures describe 8,000 S19 Pros due by 2021-04-30 (14846), backed by a $17.7 million payment commitment due 2021-03-01 (14847). Nine days later that commitment is described as a price reduction to $17.5 million (14841), alongside a separate 5,100-unit, $11.2 million order due by 2021-06-30 (14840). By October 2020 these had been folded into a single 15,600-unit, $35.3 million agreement (14819), with 2,500 units due by year-end 2020 (14825) and 13,100 remaining (14821). The March 2021 disclosures confirm deliveries of 2,500, 2,002 and 2,201 units (14742, 14743, 14744). They then shift to 11,900 S19 Pros due through August 2021 (14745), 12,000 S19j Pros due September to November 2021 (14746) and 1,500 S19j units by October 2021 (14747). A week later a separate 42,000-unit, $138.5 million order due by 2021-11-01 appears (14726, 14728). The record never confirms the August, October or November 2021 deliveries. It also never ties the successive unit counts back to one running total, and it never says whether the $17.7 million commitment was paid as scheduled.
The hash-rate targets were reframed rather than tracked. On 2021-03-30 management projected 4.0 EH/s at full deployment of 39,146 Antminers (14753), against 0.57 EH/s at year-end 2020 (14751) and 1.3 EH/s from miners already received (14752). One week later the 42,000-unit purchase was said to add 3.7 EH/s by 2021-11-01 (14727). The earlier 22,640-unit full-fleet figure from October 2020 (14823) was never formally retired. The disclosures on file do not reconcile these figures with each other, and they never report the hash rate actually reached by the late-2021 target dates.
Several smaller loose ends from 2020 were raised once and not followed up. On 2020-05-07 management said previous-generation miners had been taken offline and their future use was under evaluation (14929). No outcome of that evaluation is recorded. The Oklahoma City facility was described as the destination for 4,000 S17 Pro miners (14927, 14928). It was then subject to a lease extension targeted for 2020-06-30 (14937), and by 2021-03-30 it was described as having a lease that expired on that same date (14749). The record does not say whether the extension was ever executed or why the plan changed. The twelve-month liquidity assurance running to 2021-03-31 (14931) was likewise never revisited once that period closed.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14The largest commitment on record has had no follow-up in the disclosures reviewed here. On 2021-08-15 the company tied performance RSU grants to a 1,500 MW infrastructure capacity target due by 2023-12-31 (claim 14495). The grants were 525,000 units to Benjamin Yi, 525,000 to Jason Les, 400,000 to Megan Brooks and 450,000 to Jeffrey McGonegal (claims 14496, 14497, 14499, 14498). By 2022-03-15, capacity language had changed to a 700 MW total for the Whinstone Facility (claims 14259, 14267, 14270). None of those later claims refers back to the 1,500 MW figure. The deadline passed more than two and a half years ago, yet all five claims remain at 'stated'. The record has no statement on whether the target was met, revised or dropped, and none on whether the performance RSUs vested, were forfeited or were modified.
The end-2022 deployment guidance is similarly unresolved. On 2022-03-15, management guided to 120,150 miners operational and 370 MW of power capacity by 2022-12-31 (claims 14256, 14257, 14264, 14268, 14269). That guidance was repeated several times in a single filing cycle. In the same period the company described a $480 million Bitmain purchase order with deliveries running through December 2022 (claims 14258, 14271). An earlier Bitmain arrangement disclosed on 2021-11-07 had pointed to a miner delivery schedule ending by 2022-05-01 (claim 14405). The record does not say whether the March 2022 order extended or replaced that schedule. It also contains no year-end 2022 reconciliation of miners deployed or megawatts energized against guidance. All of these claims still sit at 'stated', with no transition to verified or delayed.
The immersion-cooling build-out also drops out of the record. It was introduced on 2021-10-21 as 200 MW of immersion-cooled capacity at Whinstone Rockdale and as the first industrial-scale deployment of its kind (claims 14423, 14425). It was reiterated on 2021-11-14 (claim 14398) and last mentioned on 2022-03-15 as part of the 400 MW expansion (claims 14262, 14270). Alongside it, a separate 200 MW air-cooled build was disclosed (claim 14424). After March 2022 the record contains no completion date, energization figure or scaled-back description for either build.
Two smaller dated items have also passed without comment. The ESS Metron acquisition included a holdback of 70,165 shares to be issued by 2023-06-01 (claim 14353). The immediate share issuance and cash consideration are documented (claims 14351, 14352, 14261), but the holdback's release, reduction or cancellation is not. Benjamin Yi's appointment as Executive Chairperson on 2021-05-23 carried a three-year employment term ending 2024-05-24 (claims 14607, 14611). The record contains nothing on renewal, extension or the terms of any successor agreement.
One caveat applies to all of the above. Every claim in this ledger moved from automated extraction to 'stated' on 2026-09-14, and none has been checked against later outcomes. The claims reviewed also end in mid-March 2022. The gaps described here are therefore gaps in what has been captured and confirmed. They do not by themselves show that management never addressed these items.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14The record supplied here ends partway through the March 15, 2022 annual-report extraction, so what follows describes silence within that window rather than across Riot's full disclosure history. No claim on file has been moved to delayed, not_yet_verifiable or met. Every entry went from automated extraction to stated on 2026-09-14, including commitments whose deadlines passed years ago. The absence of a slippage flag therefore reflects the ledger's state, not confirmation that anything was delivered.
The largest gap concerns infrastructure scale. In August 2021 Riot set a 1,500 MW infrastructure capacity development target due by December 31, 2023 (claim 14495). It tied performance RSU grants of 525,000 units each to Jason Les and Benjamin Yi, 450,000 to Jeffrey McGonegal and 400,000 to Megan Brooks to that same date (claims 14497, 14496, 14498, 14499). By March 15, 2022 the figures being repeated were a 700 MW Whinstone expansion (claims 14252, 14259, 14267) and 370 MW of mining power capacity by the end of 2022 (claims 14250, 14257, 14265, 14269). The 1,500 MW figure does not reappear in the record after August 15, 2021. Nothing on file explains how the 700 MW Whinstone figure relates to it, whether it was withdrawn, or how the performance awards were measured or vested once the 2023 deadline passed.
The cooling build-out at Rockdale narrowed in the same period. In October 2021 Riot described two parallel 200 MW developments at Whinstone, one immersion-cooled and one air-cooled (claims 14423, 14424). The March 2022 disclosures keep the 200 MW immersion-cooled deployment (claim 14262). The air-cooled 200 MW line is not restated anywhere in the record after October 21, 2021, and no filing on file says whether it was folded into the 700 MW expansion, deferred or dropped.
The 2022 deployment guidance was repeated several times and then left without an outcome. On March 15, 2022 Riot guided to 120,150 miners and 370 MW by year-end 2022 (claims 14249, 14256, 14264, 14268). It supported that guidance with a $480 million Bitmain order for 82,500 S19-series machines delivering through December 2022 (claims 14251, 14258, 14266, 14271, 14272). An earlier Bitmain batch had been scheduled to arrive by May 1, 2022 with 900,000 TH/s of hashing power (claims 14404, 14405). All of these deadlines have passed, and all remain simply stated. The record contains no year-end tally, no delivery confirmation and no revision.
The Coinmint relationship was described in two ways in a single filing. On March 15, 2022 claim 14253 records a Coinmint co-location agreement in general terms. Claim 14275, from the same filing, specifies that it is a month-to-month co-location mining services arrangement at Massena, New York. That is a noticeably less durable footing than the plain agreement language implies. No later mention appears in the record, so there is no indication whether the arrangement continued, was renegotiated or ended.
A smaller loose end is the ESS Metron holdback. The December 1, 2021 terms provided for 70,165 holdback shares to be issued by June 1, 2023 (claim 14353), alongside the 645,248 shares issued at closing (claims 14350, 14352). The acquisition's completion was restated in March 2022 (claims 14261, 14274). Nothing on file confirms whether the holdback shares were issued, reduced by indemnity claims or cancelled.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14Nothing in Riot's status_transitions ledger has been auto-transitioned to delayed or not_yet_verifiable. Every claim on record moved from automated extraction to stated on 2026-09-14 and has not moved since. The record supplied here also ends partway through the 2022-08-15 disclosures (claim 13796 is cut off). The items below are therefore gaps and silences within March to mid-August 2022 as recorded. None of them is a confirmed walk-back.
The 12.6 EH/s hash rate target (claim 13883) appears once, in the 2022-06-26 disclosures, with no date attached. None of the later filings on record repeats the figure or offers a replacement. The 2022-08-14 capacity claims (13801, 13802) discuss Whinstone and Corsicana without restating any hash rate goal. The target remains at stated. Management has not said whether it still applies, when it was meant to be reached, or whether it was quietly retired.
The ESS Metron relationship was presented on 2022-03-30 as a partnership for immersion-cooling technology and for electrical components and engineering services (claims 14160, 14161). It accompanied the product claim for industrial-scale immersion-cooled infrastructure (14159). ESS Metron does not appear again in any later claim on record. By 2022-08-14 the immersion theme had become immersion-cooled mining hardware development (13803), with no partner named. The immersion build-outs described in between, the 100 MW liquid immersion building at Rockdale (13869) and Buildings F and G at Whinstone (13861), also carry no partner attribution. Nothing on record says whether the partnership continued, narrowed, or ended.
The Whinstone capacity figure has lost its number. On 2022-06-26 the company cited a 700 MW power capacity expansion at Whinstone (13884), alongside a 400 MW substation at Rockdale (13871). The 2022-08-14 Whinstone capacity claim (13801) is recorded with no quantity at all. This is not a downward revision on its face. However, the 700 MW figure has not been reaffirmed, and no statement explains whether the expansion scope or schedule changed.
The Corsicana, or Navarro County, 1 GW facility is the most consistently repeated project on record. It appears in claims 13909 (2022-05-17), 13885 (2022-06-26), 13860 and 13867 (2022-07-07), 13859 (2022-07-11), and 13802 (2022-08-14). It is tied to a 1,500 MW infrastructure target in executive equity compensation (13865). Across six disclosure dates, no claim attaches a completion date, energization date, or phasing to the 1 GW figure. Because no date was ever promised, nothing could slip. The absence of any timeline across that many mentions is itself unexplained.
Several dated personnel and hosting commitments have passed without any follow-up on record. The COO separation package set payment and vesting dates of 2022-04-07 and 2022-07-07. It covered the $406,250 cash severance, the $86,370 pro-rated bonus, the $81,250 transition services fee, the 75,000-unit transition RSU grant, and the 1,500-unit acceleration (claims 14217 through 14224). The retiring CFO's senior advisor role was set to run to 2023-02-07 (13907). None of these has moved beyond stated in the more than three years since the dates lapsed. Similarly, the 2022-07-07 disclosure named Rhodium as the largest hosting customer (13863) and announced the end of the Coinmint hosting relationship (13864). Neither the Rhodium relationship nor the completion of the Coinmint exit is mentioned again on record. Nothing in the disclosures supplied confirms that these obligations and transitions were carried out as described.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14All claims supplied for Riot end in early October 2022. Every entry still carries the status stated, and none has moved to delayed or not_yet_verifiable. The gaps below are therefore silences within this record rather than formal walk-backs. The record appears to be cut off after claim 13588, so later disclosures may address some of them.
The Corsicana, or Navarro County, 1 GW development is the most prominent. Management described it as a 1.0 GW facility on 2022-05-17 (claim 13909) and 2022-06-26 (claim 13885). It was called a 1,000 MW immersion-cooled expansion on 2022-07-07 (claim 13860), with construction referenced in claims 13867 and 13859. The last mention was on 2022-08-14 (claim 13802), again at 1,000 MW. None of these claims attached a promised-by date, and the October 2022 filings on record do not mention the site. No construction schedule, energization date, phasing plan or restatement of the 1 GW scope appears afterward.
The 12.6 EH/s hash rate target (claim 13883, 2022-06-26) was paired with an expected miner delivery schedule (claim 13799, 2022-08-15) and new miner deployment language (claim 13798). Neither claim was tied to a date, and neither reappears. The record contains no achieved hash rate, no revised target and no statement on whether deliveries arrived as scheduled.
The CFO transition had firm dates that have passed without reconciliation. On 2022-06-05 the company said the CFO would retire and a new CFO would be appointed by 2022-08-15 (claims 13906 and 13908). The retiring CFO would then serve as Senior Advisor through 2023-02-07 (claim 13907). By 2022-10-02 the record refers to McGonegal's retirement (claim 13585) and to Ryan Werner's appointment as Chief Accounting Officer (claim 13593), but no named CFO successor appears. The appointment claim still reads stated more than four years after its promised date. Nothing on record explains whether the role was filled, left vacant or restructured.
The executive equity compensation targets announced on 2022-07-07 have not been mentioned again. They were an EBITDA hurdle recorded as 500.0 USD (claim 13866), probably meant in millions, and a 1,500 MW infrastructure hurdle (claim 13865). The record shows no progress against either threshold, no statement on whether they vested, and no clarification of the EBITDA unit.
On the same date, Rhodium was named Riot's largest hosting customer (claim 13863), and the Coinmint hosting relationship was said to be ending (claim 13864). Neither counterparty appears in any later claim on record. Management has not described the status or terms of the Rhodium arrangement, or confirmed when the Coinmint exit was completed.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14None of Riot's claims on record has moved to 'delayed' or 'not_yet_verifiable'. Every entry sits at 'stated', and all were confirmed only in automated passes on 2026-09-13 and 2026-09-14. The ledger supplied here ends partway through the 2023-03-01 filings, so the gaps below reflect the record as provided. They mark topics that stop appearing, not confirmed reversals.
The Corsicana (Navarro County) build-out is the most heavily repeated commitment. It first appears on 2022-07-07 as a 1,000 MW immersion-cooling expansion (claim 13860), with an undated construction timeline (13867, 13859). It recurs as a 1 GW facility in August and October 2022 (13802, 13529, 13524, 13518) and at least seven more times on 2023-03-01 (13248, 13253, 13258, 13263, 13269, 13272, 13278). That last date is also when the 400 MW immersion-cooled first phase appears (13280). None of these carries a promised-by date, so the ledger cannot flag slippage. No filing on record states when the full gigawatt was expected, whether the 400 MW phase was completed, or how the remaining capacity is being phased. Management repeated the headline figure while never attaching a date to it.
Two customer and partnership statements from 2022-07-07 do not reappear. One says the Coinmint hosting relationship is ending (13864). The other names Rhodium as the largest hosting customer at Whinstone (13863). The ledger shows no later statement that the Coinmint exit was completed. Nor does it say whether Rhodium kept that position, how its hosting terms changed, or what Whinstone's hosting mix looked like afterward. By the 2023-03-01 filings, Rockdale is described only by its 700 MW developed capacity (13271, 13279), with no hosting-customer language on record.
The 2022-08-14 statement that Riot was developing immersion-cooled Bitcoin mining hardware (13803) is also not followed up. The anticipated benefits of immersion cooling recur in August and October 2022 (13800, 13527). Later entries describe immersion cooling only as a facility attribute at Corsicana (13280) and Whinstone Buildings F and G (13861). No entry records whether the in-house hardware effort continued, was folded into facility design, or was dropped.
The equity-compensation performance targets from 2022-07-07 form a separate gap. One is a 1,500 MW infrastructure target (13865). The other is an EBITDA target recorded as 500.0 USD (13866), which likely reflects a units error in extraction rather than the actual figure. Neither target appears again. The ledger holds no statement on whether either was met, measured, or amended, although later grants to the CFO and CAO (13590, 13595, 13597) include performance-based units tied to unstated criteria.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14The record supplied for Riot ends partway through the March 1, 2023 disclosures, so each "last mention" below means the last mention in this ledger. It does not mean management has said nothing since. Every status change shown was applied by automated extraction on September 13 and 14, 2026. None reflects a revision announced by the company.
The clearest lapse is the fleet guidance of 111,216 miners by year-end 2023. It appears in the March 1, 2023 disclosures as claims 13244, 13270, 13273 and 13276, dated December 31, 2023. It follows looser 2022 language about an "expected miner delivery schedule" and "scheduled Bitcoin miner deliveries" (13799, 13525, 13519), none of which gave a count or a date. All four 2023 claims moved automatically to delayed once the target date passed without a verifying record. The ledger holds no statement confirming the count was reached, no revised figure, and no explanation of how the Bitmain purchase order (13261), cited in the same filing without quantity or delivery terms, fed into that number.
The Rockdale expansion shows the same pattern over a shorter window. On March 1, 2023, the company described a 400 MW expansion and a fourth building, both due by March 31, 2023, one month after the disclosure (13268, 13266, 13255). The same filing gave Rockdale's current developed capacity as 700 MW (13242, 13262, 13247). Earlier references to Whinstone capacity and a Rockdale expansion in August and October 2022 (13801, 13530) gave no figures or dates. Both dated claims are now delayed by automation. The record contains no completion notice, no updated capacity figure above 700 MW, and no new date for the fourth building.
Corsicana has been restated often but never tied to a date. The 1 GW (1,000 MW) figure appears in August 2022 (13802), October 2022 (13529), and at least six times in the March 2023 filing (13243, 13248, 13253, 13258, 13263, 13269). Its wording moved from "development" to "planned capacity" to "expected capacity upon completion." In October 2022, the company spoke of a Navarro site expansion "with scheduled construction" (13524, 13518), but no schedule appears in the ledger, and the Navarro wording gives way to the Corsicana name by March 2023. The first tranche, 400 MW of immersion-cooled mining, is described in 13264 and 13274, also without an energization date. Because no completion date was ever attached, nothing has auto-transitioned. That is the more notable point: three rounds of disclosure repeat the headline capacity without saying when any of it will be online.
Immersion cooling began in 2022 as a hardware development effort with "anticipated benefits" (13803, 13800, 13527). By March 2023, it appears only as the cooling method for the Corsicana tranche. The ledger records no measured results, no quantified efficiency or uptime figures, and no statement on whether the separate hardware development continued. Similarly, the integration of acquired businesses, noted in August 2022 (13797) alongside switchgear operations in October 2022 (13517), was never followed by a completion statement or any account of how the integration turned out.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14The fourth building at the Rockdale Facility was described in the 2023-03-01 disclosures as due for completion by 2023-03-31 (claims 13245 and 13251), and a companion statement repeated the milestone without a date (claim 13255). That filing is the last time the building appears in the record. Both dated claims now carry a delayed status, but the change came from the ledger's own deadline check on 2026-09-14, not from anything the company filed. Nothing on record confirms the building was finished, gives a new completion date, or explains how the building relates to the 700 MW of developed capacity cited in the same filing (claims 13247, 13271, 13279).
The same 2023-03-01 filing set a target of 111,216 Bitcoin miners in operation by 2023-12-31, repeated across claims 13249, 13254, 13259, 13265 and 13270. The ledger auto-transitioned all five to delayed on 2026-09-14. The record contains no year-end 2023 fleet count against that figure, no revised unit target, and no statement tying any shortfall to delivery timing under the Bitmain purchase order that was cited as the source of the new machines (claim 13261). The purchase order itself has not been mentioned again since that filing.
Corsicana has been described as a 1.0 GW facility since 2022-10-18 (claim 13529). The figure was repeated many times on 2023-03-01 (claims 13248, 13253, 13258, 13263, 13269, 13272, 13278), along with a plan for 400 MW of immersion-cooled mining there (claims 13246, 13250, 13256, 13264, 13274, 13280). None of these claims has ever carried a completion date, so the ledger cannot mark them late. In October 2022 the company used more concrete wording, referring to the Navarro site expansion 'with scheduled construction' (claims 13524, 13518). That named schedule never appears in later disclosures, and the site is referred to only by its capacity. The company has not said when either the 1.0 GW or the 400 MW phase is expected to be energized.
The October 2022 disclosures also offered open-ended guidance on future hashrate growth (claims 13521, 13528), megawatt capacity under development (claims 13520, 13526) and the expected benefits of immersion cooling (claim 13527). None of these was quantified or given a date, and none is followed by a later statement reporting whether the growth or the cooling benefits materialized.
Several dated executive arrangements from 2022-10-02 have passed their dates with no disclosed outcome. These include Ryan Werner's initial CAO term through 2023-03-15 (claim 13598) and William McGonegal's senior advisor engagement through 2023-02-07 (claim 13586). They also include Colin Yee's performance share award measured through 2023-12-31 (claim 13590). The company has not said whether those performance conditions were met or how many units vested. These remain in stated status only because the ledger does not auto-transition personnel terms.
The ledger supplied for this review ends partway through the 2023-03-01 claims. Later filings that address some of these items may exist but were not available here.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-14The Rockdale Facility's fourth building and its associated 400 MW expansion were described in the 2023-03-01 disclosures as due for completion by 2023-03-31 (claims 13260, 13266, 13268, 13275, 13277). The same filing also mentions the fourth building without a date (claim 13255). No later disclosure on record revisits the milestone. The ledger moved all five dated claims to delayed on 2026-09-14 because the deadline passed without a completion statement, not because the company announced a revision. The record contains no statement that the building was energized, that the 400 MW was added to the 700 MW of developed capacity cited in the same filing (claims 13242, 13247, 13262, 13271, 13279), or that the schedule was reset.
Management guided to 111,216 Bitcoin miners in operation by the end of 2023 (claims 13244, 13249, both dated 2023-03-01). That figure rested on the Bitmain ASIC purchase order referenced the same day (claim 13261) and on the scheduled deliveries mentioned in October 2022 (claims 13519, 13525). Both guidance claims are now delayed after passing 2023-12-31 without a confirming disclosure. The record has no year-end fleet count, no delivery completion statement for the Bitmain order, and no revised target. The Bitmain order remains in stated language, with no follow-up describing it as fulfilled, amended or ongoing.
The Corsicana site first appeared on 2022-10-18 as a 1.0 GW facility (claim 13529). It appears to be the same project as the Navarro site expansion with scheduled construction described on 2022-10-24 and 2022-10-26 (claims 13524, 13518). By 2023-03-01 it was restated at least eight times as 1.0 GW expected upon completion (among them claims 13243, 13248, 13253, 13258, 13263, 13269, 13272, 13278). It was paired with a 400 MW immersion-cooled mining deployment repeated across six claims (13246, 13250, 13256, 13264, 13274, 13280). None of these claims ever carried a completion date. The construction schedule referenced in October 2022 was never quantified, and the capacity under development cited then (claims 13520, 13526) was never given a figure. The last mention on record is 2023-03-01. There has been no subsequent statement of energization, a phasing plan, or whether the 400 MW immersion tranche was started, deferred or resized.
Several dated items from the 2022-10-02 executive and governance disclosures have also lapsed without a closing statement, though the ledger still marks them as stated. Ryan D. Werner's CAO employment term ran to 2023-03-15 (claim 13598). Former CFO McGonegal's senior advisor engagement ran to 2023-02-07 (claim 13586). The record shows no renewal, extension or departure notice for either. Colin M. Yee's 242,000-unit PSU award was tied to a period ending 2023-12-31 (claim 13590), and nothing on record states whether the performance conditions were met or how many units vested. The proposal to raise authorized shares to 340,000,000 (claim 13582) likewise has no recorded outcome.
The ledger available for this review stops in early March 2023, so some of these silences may reflect gaps in extraction coverage rather than in company disclosure. As the record stands, none of the lapsed dates above has an accompanying explanation, revision or confirmation of completion.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13The ledger provided for Riot ends partway through a December 5, 2023 entry (claim 11998), so the observations below cover only disclosures from April through early December 2023. Every claim on record carries a single transition, from automated extraction to stated, dated 2026-09-13. No claim has been marked delayed, met, revised or not_yet_verifiable. Several promised dates are now well in the past, and the record contains nothing that confirms or refutes them.
The clearest case is the year-end 2023 hash rate target of 12.5 EH/s. It was stated twice in the April 30, 2023 materials (claims 12677 and 12681) and repeated on August 8, 2023 (claim 12280), when operational capacity was given as 10.7 EH/s (claim 12279). That August filing is the last mention in the visible record. The November 7, 2023 disclosures (claims 12000 through 12003) cover immersion cooling and the Corsicana gigawatt but do not restate the 12.5 EH/s figure. The December 31, 2023 deadline passed more than two and a half years ago. The ledger holds no statement of whether it was reached, no year-end figure and no revision notice. The same applies to the follow-on target of 20.1 EH/s by June 30, 2024 (claim 12281), which also appears only once, in August 2023.
The April 30, 2023 guidance of 111,216 miners deployed by the end of 2023 (claim 12676) appears once and is not repeated in any later disclosure shown. Afterward, the unit language changes. The June 29, 2023 MicroBT agreement gives an initial order of 33,280 servers due by April 15, 2024 (claims 12381 and 12383) and an option on 66,560 more by December 31, 2024 (claims 12384 and 12385). By December 5, 2023, the arrangement is described as annual purchase options of 265,000 units (claim 11999), without the earlier dated tranches. The record does not say whether the initial order was delivered on schedule or whether the 66,560-unit option was exercised. It also does not explain how the fixed options became an open-ended annual framework, or how any of this relates to the 111,216-unit deployment figure.
At Corsicana, the April 30, 2023 materials described two tiers: an initial immersion-cooled phase of 400 MW (claims 12675 and 12680) within a total of 1,000 MW (claims 12674 and 12679). Every later mention covers only the 1 GW total. These appear on May 9 (claim 12648), August 8 (claim 12278) and November 7, 2023 (claim 12003). The phased 400 MW figure is not repeated after April. Timeline entries for the site, from August 8 (claim 12286), September 5 (claim 12206) and November 7, 2023 (claim 12001), describe development and expansion with no promised date attached. The record gives no in-service date for the first phase and no statement of how much capacity was energized. It also does not say whether the initial phase was resized or re-sequenced.
Rockdale follows a similar pattern on a smaller scale. A developed capacity entry on April 30, 2023 carries no stated value (claim 12678), and a 700 MW figure appears once, on August 8, 2023 (claim 12277). Nothing later in the visible record updates or confirms that number. Given the truncation, some of these topics may be addressed in claims after 11998 that were not included here.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13The one-gigawatt Corsicana, Texas data center is the most persistent unresolved commitment in the record. Riot described it as a 1.0 GW development in May 2023 (claim 12648) and repeated that figure in August and November 2023 (claims 12278, 12003, 12206, 12001). In the 2024-02-22 disclosures it narrowed to a first phase of 400 MW, with operations to begin by the end of the first quarter of 2024 (claims 11987, 11995). That date passed more than two years ago. Every one of these claims still sits at 'stated', and the ledger contains no transition confirming that Phase 1 was energized, completed or delayed. The claims shown here do not say whether the remaining roughly 600 MW is still planned, on what schedule, or whether the move from a 1 GW headline to a 400 MW first phase changed the overall build.
Industrial-scale immersion-cooled Bitcoin mining hardware was a regular theme through 2023. It appears in May (claim 12647), August (claims 12282, 12285), September (claim 12205) and November (claims 12000, 12002). It is absent from the 2024-02-22 disclosures in this record, which discuss Corsicana and MicroBT but not immersion cooling. None of these claims carries a delivery date, and none has moved past 'stated'. No capacity figure, deployment count or explanation for dropping the topic appears anywhere.
The MicroBT hardware program was re-dated without a stated revision. In June 2023 the initial order of 33,280 miners, adding 7.6 EH/s, was due by 2024-04-15 (claims 12381, 12383). The option on another 66,560 miners, worth 15.3 EH/s, was framed around 2024-12-31 (claims 12384, 12385). By 2024-02-22 the combined 99,840 units were instead to be delivered and deployed by 2025-06-30 (claim 11992), with total capacity of 38.0 EH/s by the same date (claim 11993). The December 2023 order (claim 11997) carries an interim deadline of 2025-04-30. Its amount was extracted as '290.5 USD', which appears to be a units error. None of the earlier claims was moved to 'delayed' or marked as superseded. The ledger also has no confirmation that the 2025 deadlines were met, and no disclosure explains the six-month extension of the deployment window.
The near-term hash rate guidance from August 2023 was never closed out. At that point Riot reported 10.7 EH/s of operating capacity (claim 12279) and guided to 12.5 EH/s by the end of 2023 (claim 12280) and 20.1 EH/s by 2024-06-30 (claim 12281). Later disclosures replaced these with the 38.0 EH/s mid-2025 target. The record never states whether either interim figure was reached, and both remain 'stated' long after their dates.
The MicroBT relationship itself shifted in the same way. It started as a long-term supply agreement running to 2025-12-31 (claim 12380). It was later described as annual purchase options on up to 265,000 miners (claim 11999), and then as options running through 2027 (claim 11994). The language moved from a defined supply contract toward open-ended optionality, and the horizon was extended by two years. No disclosure in the record addresses whether the original agreement was amended, or how many of the optional units, if any, have been exercised.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13A caveat governs everything below. Every claim on record for Riot carries the same single transition, automated extraction to stated, logged on 2026-09-13, and the ledger supplied ends partway through the 2024-02-22 disclosures. None of the dated promises has been auto-transitioned to delayed or not_yet_verifiable, and none has been verified. The gaps described here are gaps in this record, which may reflect incomplete ingestion as much as management silence.
The near-term hash rate guidance issued in August 2023 was never closed out. Claim 12280 set 12.5 EH/s by 2023-12-31, and claim 12281 set 20.1 EH/s once miners were delivered, by 2024-06-30. Both were last mentioned on 2023-08-08. By 2024-02-22 the disclosures had moved to 28 EH/s by year-end 2024 (claims 11961 and 11969) and 38 EH/s by mid-2025 (claims 11962 and 11970). Both deadlines passed long ago and both claims remain merely stated. The record contains no statement of whether 12.5 EH/s was reached at year-end 2023, and no reconciliation of the 20.1 EH/s mid-2024 milestone with the larger targets that replaced it.
The MicroBT fleet schedule lengthened without an explicit revision. The June 2023 order of 33,280 servers (claim 12381) was due by 2024-04-15, and the option for up to 66,560 more (claim 12384, worth 15.3 EH/s under claim 12385) was due by 2024-12-31. The two figures sum exactly to the 99,840 units in claim 11972, so the order itself is consistent. The completion date, however, reappears on 2024-02-22 as 2025-06-30 (claims 11968 and 11973). The agreement horizon also moved. It was 2025-12-31 in claim 12380, while the 265,000-unit option program is framed through 2027-12-31 in claim 11967, first described on 2023-12-05 in claim 11999. The later disclosures do not say whether the 2024-04-15 tranche arrived on time or why the deployment window moved roughly six months past the original option deadline. The dollar amounts cannot be compared either, because the recorded unit bases appear inconsistent: 290.5 USD in claim 11997 and 453,400 USD in claim 11964.
The Corsicana facility's attribution and timing are unresolved. Claim 11998, from 2023-12-05, tied 38 EH/s specifically to the Corsicana data center. On 2024-02-22 the same 38 EH/s figure is described as total self-mining capacity (claims 11962 and 11970), without saying how much sits at Corsicana. Claim 11965 promised Corsicana operations would begin by 2024-03-31, and claim 11966 sized the first phase at 400 MW of the planned 1.0 GW (claims 12278, 12003 and 11959). Neither has a subsequent status. The Rockdale figure of 700 MW (claim 12277) was last quantified on 2023-08-08. By the February 2024 filing it appears only as a qualitative competitive position (claim 11960), with no restated capacity.
The July 2023 long-term incentive awards reached their measurement dates with no outcome recorded. The service awards were due by 2026-07-01 (claims 12355, 12357, 12359, 12361 and 12363). The performance awards were due by 2026-07-31 (claims 12356, 12358, 12360, 12362 and 12364). Both dates have now passed, and all ten claims remain stated. The record says nothing about whether the performance conditions were met, how many shares vested, or whether any awards were forfeited or modified. The CFO and General Counsel service and performance awards are also recorded as 123,231 and 123,321 shares respectively, a discrepancy that has not been clarified.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13A caveat applies to everything below. Every claim on record for Riot shows only one transition, from automated extraction to stated, and all of them were logged on 2026-09-13. None has been marked delayed, not_yet_verifiable, met or missed. The most recent disclosure in the record is dated 2024-02-22, and the claim list supplied here ends partway through that filing. What follows are gaps in the record we hold, and may partly reflect incomplete ingestion rather than silence from management.
The near-term hash rate guidance has never been checked against an outcome. On 2023-08-08 the company guided to 12.5 EH/s of self-mining capacity by the end of 2023 (claim 12280) and 20.1 EH/s once miner deliveries finished, targeted for 2024-06-30 (claim 12281). Both dates have passed, and neither claim has moved beyond stated. The 12.5 EH/s year-end figure does not reappear in the February 2024 filing, which gives no reported year-end number. The 20.1 EH/s mid-2024 milestone is also absent there. It is replaced by a different frame: 28.0 EH/s by the end of 2024 (claims 11969, 11980, 11988). The record does not show the company explaining whether the 20.1 EH/s target was reached, raised or dropped.
The deadline for the MicroBT build-out moved later between two filings without any stated revision. The 2023-12-05 disclosure tied the MicroBT purchase order to a 2025-04-30 horizon (claim 11997) and 38.0 EH/s of capacity at Corsicana (claim 11998). Eleven weeks later, on 2024-02-22, the same 38.0 EH/s endpoint was attached to 2025-06-30 (claims 11992, 11993, 11968, 11973). The order had also grown from the 290.5 figure to 453.4 for 99,840 units (claims 11991, 11982). The later filing presents 2025-06-30 as the plan rather than as a two-month extension. Both the April and June 2025 dates are now more than a year past, and no completion or shortfall has been recorded.
The first phase at Corsicana had a firm start date that has no follow-up. The February 2024 filing said the 400 MW initial phase would begin operating by the end of the first quarter of 2024 (claims 11987, 11965, 11977, 11995). That quarter ended the following month. The record contains no later statement confirming energization, reporting a slip, or giving how much of the 400 MW was in service. The larger 1.0 GW total, repeated from 2023-08-08 through 2024-02-22 (claims 12278, 12003, 11959, 11978), still carries no completion date.
The Rockdale capacity figure has disappeared from later filings. On 2023-08-08 Rockdale was described as a 700 MW facility (claim 12277). In the February 2024 filing it appears only as a statement of "competitive position" and "scale" with no megawatt figure (claims 11960, 11975). Nothing in the record says whether the 700 MW figure still holds, was reduced, or was dropped for another reason. A related gap concerns the MicroBT relationship. It is described as a long-term master agreement with options on 265,000 further units through 2027 (claims 11990, 11994, 11967, 11974). However, no purchase under those options, and no update on how many options remain, has been recorded since the original announcement.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13A caveat applies to everything below. Every Riot claim on record was extracted on 2026-09-13 and still carries the status 'stated'. None has been moved to verified, delayed, or not_yet_verifiable. The latest disclosure in this record is dated 2024-02-25, and the ledger supplied here was cut off partway through that filing. The gaps described below are therefore gaps in this record. They may reflect missing coverage rather than company silence, and should be confirmed against later filings before being presented as walk-backs.
The Corsicana Facility's first phase is the plainest overdue commitment. In February 2024, Riot said 400 MW of immersion-cooled infrastructure would begin operating by the end of the first quarter of 2024 (claims 11987, 11995, 11977, 11965, with capacity in 11986, 11976, 11966). That date is now about two and a half years past. The last mention on record is 2024-02-22. The record contains no statement that operations began, no revised date, and no explanation of any slippage. The full 1 GW build-out has been repeated since November 2023 (claims 12003, 11989, 11979, 11978, 11959, 11950) and has never been tied to a completion date. That leaves the larger commitment without any measurable deadline.
The hash rate target of 28 EH/s by year-end 2024 was repeated at least five times in February 2024 (claims 11961, 11988, 11980, 11969, 11952). The baseline was 12.4 EH/s at the end of 2023 (claim 11951). The target date passed more than twenty months ago, and the record holds no reported year-end figure, whether hit, missed, or restated.
The MicroBT fleet has several deadlines, all past due with no follow-up on record. The December 2023 purchase order, recorded as 290.5 (claim 11997, units apparently in millions), was due by 2025-04-30. A follow-on order of 66,560 miners was due by 2024-06-30 (claim 11954). Delivery and deployment of the combined 99,840 miners, costing $453.4 million, was due by 2025-06-30 (claims 11992, 11983, 11973, 11968, 11991, 11982). The resulting self-mining capacity target also drifted from 38.0 EH/s (claims 11998, 11993, 11962, 11970, 11984) to 38.3 EH/s (claim 11956) within three days, with no explanation. Nothing on record confirms that the deliveries were completed, that the capacity was reached, or why the figure changed.
The option to buy up to 265,000 more MicroBT miners through 2027 has used the same framing from December 2023 through February 2024 (claims 11999, 11994, 11985, 11974, 11967, 11955). It is not yet due. The last mention is 2024-02-25, and the record says nothing about whether any options were exercised, or about how the 'long-term master supply agreement' (claims 11990, 11981, 11971, 11963) has worked in practice since.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13Bitfarms Settlement Withdrawn Without Explanation. Riot disclosed a settlement agreement with Bitfarms Ltd. on September 22, 2024 (claim 5704), including director nomination rights (claim 5705) and voting commitments (claim 5696). The settlement was promised by September 23, 2024. On September 4, 2026, claim 5704 transitioned to withdrawn—nearly two years later with no public announcement explaining why the agreement was abandoned or how the relationship evolved, despite Riot's ongoing 19.9% stake (claim 5703).
Bitfarms Term Expiration Slipped Past with No Notice. The Bitfarms settlement agreement of September 22, 2024, included a term expiration promised for June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). The date has now passed (today is September 13, 2026) and claim 5701 transitioned to delayed on September 4, 2026. Riot has not disclosed what the term end triggered, whether renewal occurred, or what the implications are for its director nomination rights and stake in Bitfarms.
Convertible Offering Stalled Over Twenty Months. Riot announced a $525 million convertible senior notes offering on December 9–10, 2024, with pricing promised by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259). On September 4, 2026, the offering remained delayed—over twenty months past the promised completion date. Riot has made no disclosure on whether the offering was cancelled, repriced, completed on revised terms, or remains pending. Companion Bitcoin acquisition plans funded by the offering (claim 5252) have disappeared from disclosures.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-13Bitfarms Settlement Agreement (claim 5704) was positioned as concluded in September 2024 but transitioned to withdrawn status without disclosed explanation, reversing what appeared to be a resolved partnership dispute. The partnership agreement's stated expiration date of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701) has silently become delayed as of early September, with no revision announcement evident—the deadline has passed unannounced. Convertible senior notes promised to close by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259) remain in delayed status, more than a year overdue with no public restatement of the timeline. The Bitfarms acquisition narrative itself evolved from an 11.3% stake announced in June 2024 through a 19.9% position and activism campaign, culminating in a September settlement agreement that was subsequently withdrawn, suggesting management has quietly de-emphasized what it once framed as a strategic resolution.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-11The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5704), announced on 2024-09-22 with an expected closing date of 2024-09-23, shows a status transition from stated to withdrawn by 2026-09-04, yet no disclosure has explained the collapse or change in settlement terms to shareholders. The partnership term expiration with Bitfarms (claim 5701), originally promised for 2026-06-01, transitioned to delayed status on 2026-09-04; as of the current date (2026-09-11), that expiration has already passed with no update disclosing whether the term ended, was renewed, or was modified. The convertible senior notes offering pricing (claim 5259), set to complete by 2024-12-11, shows a transition to delayed as of 2026-09-04, but there is no subsequent disclosure confirming whether the $525 million offering ever closed or at what final conversion price, leaving investors without clarity on a major 2024 capital transaction.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-11The Bitfarms settlement agreement promised for execution by September 23, 2024 (claim 5704) now shows withdrawn status as of September 4, 2026 with no public explanation from management for why this announced deal never materialized. The partnership agreement term expiration that was promised for June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), which was integral to that settlement structure, is now marked delayed well past its stated deadline with no management clarification on renewal status or termination. The $525 million convertible senior notes offering targeted for December 11, 2024 closure (claim 5259) remains in delayed status as of September 4, 2026—nearly two years past the promised date—without any management disclosure of whether the transaction completed, was repriced, or was withdrawn.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-09The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claims 5704, 5695-5698, 5705) was last disclosed on September 22, 2024, with a promised completion by September 23, 2024. It was to formalize voting commitments, director nomination rights, and standstill provisions. As of September 4, 2026, the status transitioned from stated to delayed to withdrawn, with no public disclosure of why the transaction failed, what triggered the withdrawal, or current governance standing with Bitfarms.
The Bitfarms partnership agreement term expiration (claim 5701) was last mentioned in the September 22, 2024 disclosure with a promised date of June 1, 2026. Marked delayed as of September 4, 2026, the deadline is now over three months past. Management has not revised the expiration date, explained the extension, or disclosed whether agreement terms were materially modified.
Convertible senior notes pricing (claim 5259) was last mentioned December 9, 2024, with a promised pricing date of December 11, 2024. The claim remains delayed as of September 4, 2026—nearly two years overdue. No pricing update, revised timeline, or explanation of delay appears in subsequent disclosures.
Riot's Bitfarms investment escalated from approximately $90 million for 11.3% ownership (claim 6052, June 3, 2024) to $202 million for 19.9% ownership (claims 5801-5802, September 4, 2024) over three months. The progressive deepening was disclosed across separate filings rather than consolidated as a unified acquisition strategy, obscuring both the capital magnitude and the pace of strategic commitment to the investment.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-07Bitfarms Settlement Agreement (claim 5704): Riot announced on September 22, 2024 that it had reached a settlement agreement with Bitfarms, expected to close by September 23, 2024. By September 4, 2026, this claim transitioned to withdrawn status—nearly two years overdue. Management has disclosed no explanation for why the settlement was abandoned or what circumstances prevented completion, leaving shareholders without context for the dispute's unresolved state. Bitfarms Agreement Term Expiration (claim 5701): On September 22, 2024, Riot disclosed a partnership agreement term set to expire June 1, 2026. That date is now three months past, yet the claim shows delayed status as of September 4, 2026. No announcement has addressed whether the agreement was renewed, renegotiated, or allowed to lapse, obscuring the partnership's actual continuation and revised terms. Convertible Senior Notes Offering (claims 5259, 5260, 5261): Riot announced a $525 million convertible notes offering on December 9–10, 2024, with pricing promised for December 11, 2024. As of September 7, 2026, nearly two years later, the status remains delayed with no update from management. Investors have received no disclosure on whether the offering was ultimately closed, repriced, or abandoned—a material gap for a significant capital raise.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-06The partnership agreement term expiration referenced in claim 5701 was promised by June 1, 2026, with the commitment last disclosed on September 22, 2024 alongside the Bitfarms settlement framework. The claim now shows a status of delayed as of September 4, 2026, yet management has issued no public statement explaining the miss or providing a revised expiration date. For a settlement term, this silence is conspicuous—expiration dates define the limits of contractual obligations.
The convertible senior notes offering (claim 5259) was priced on December 9, 2024 and promised to close by December 11, 2024. That deadline has passed unmet. The status transitioned to delayed on September 4, 2026—nearly two years after the promised closing—with no disclosed revision notice, alternative timeline, or explanation for why a committed closing date in Q4 2024 never materialized. This is a hard deadline that slipped in silence.
The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5704) was announced and committed for September 23, 2024 execution. It has since been marked withdrawn as of September 4, 2026. Management has not disclosed whether the settlement fell through, was abandoned, or was renegotiated, leaving the record blank on why a named settlement commitment was withdrawn without explanation. Stakeholders remain without clarity on whether the standstill and governance arrangements described in the related partnership claims (5695–5699) remain in force.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-06Riot's September 2024 settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5704) was stated and promised by September 23, 2024. As of September 4, 2026, this claim has been withdrawn from the record without explanation. The surrounding claims about Riot's 19.9% stake, director nomination rights, and voting commitments remain stated, but management has provided no disclosure clarifying whether the settlement was terminated, superseded, or remains in force. The withdrawal occurred without announcement.
The same settlement specified an agreement expiration date of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). That date has passed, and as of September 6, 2026, the claim remains marked as delayed rather than verified. No disclosure has explained whether the agreement expired as planned, was extended, or remains unresolved. This promised milestone has elapsed three months without public comment.
Riot's convertible senior notes offering was promised to be priced by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259). More than 20 months later, as of September 4, 2026, this claim is marked delayed. Associated financing claims remain stated, but management has not disclosed why a near-term milestone became a multi-year delay or what consequences the extended timeline created for the company's bitcoin acquisition plans that were contingent on these proceeds (claim 5252).
What we haven't been told
2026-09-06The Bitfarms settlement agreement announced September 22, 2024 (claim 5704) has been withdrawn as of September 4, 2026, with no public statement explaining the reversal. The claim transitioned from stated to delayed to withdrawn, suggesting a significant breakdown in the arrangement that management stopped discussing after initial disclosure. The underlying partnership agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5701) had a term expiration promised for June 1, 2026, but remains in 'delayed' status as of September 6, 2026—now past its contracted end date with no revision or extension announcement. The December 2024 convertible notes offering closure (claim 5259) was promised to close by December 11, 2024, but has been in 'delayed' status for nearly two years without public explanation of the slip, even though the underlying offering itself (claim 5251) eventually completed with a 2030 maturity. Management's cryptocurrency mining data collection survey via Form EIA-862, prominently discussed in early 2024 across multiple claims, was discontinued following court action, but subsequent quarterly disclosures do not explain the discontinuation or address whether regulatory pressure forced the reversal of a previously endorsed emergency collection effort.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-06Riot's settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5704), announced for September 23, 2024, transitioned from stated to delayed to withdrawn by early September 2026 with no public explanation. Management has not disclosed whether the settlement collapsed, was renegotiated, or abandoned entirely. The underlying partnership agreement term expiration (claim 5701) was promised for June 1, 2026, and that date has now silently passed as of the current date without any announcement about renewal, termination, or renegotiation of the Bitfarms relationship, despite the September 2024 disclosures framing this as a structured, long-term strategic partnership with director nomination rights and voting commitments. Additionally, the convertible senior notes offering announced in December 2024 with a promised closing of December 11, 2024 (claim 5259) remains marked as delayed nearly two years later with no update statement explaining the delay, cancellation, or revised timeline. Management has not addressed why this $525 million financing remains unresolved or what change in circumstances caused it to slip, nor has it provided any guidance on whether proceeds for the announced Bitcoin acquisition strategy are still planned.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Bitfarms settlement agreement and partnership governance rights. In September 2024, Riot disclosed a comprehensive settlement agreement with Bitfarms Ltd. (claim 5704) containing board nomination rights (5705), voting commitments at shareholder meetings (5698, 5696), conditional share purchase rights at a 15 percent ownership threshold (5702, 5706), and standstill provisions (5699). The agreement specified an expiration date of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). As of September 4, 2026, the settlement agreement claim (5704) transitioned to withdrawn status following evidence review, and the promised expiration date claim (5701) transitioned to delayed status without explanation. The June 1, 2026 date has now passed by over two months. Management has not disclosed whether the agreement was terminated early, renegotiated, extended, or what became of the conditional governance rights and share purchase options that were previously detailed in regulatory filings.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot's settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5704), announced September 22, 2024 as a resolution to the acquisition dispute, has been withdrawn as of September 4, 2026—a reversal of a major claimed milestone with no public update statement explaining why the settlement did not persist or was reversed. The underlying partnership agreement term tied to that settlement (claim 5701) was promised to expire June 1, 2026; it is now marked as delayed as of September 4, 2026, three months overdue with no revision announcement or explanation of whether the agreement was extended, renegotiated, or terminated. The convertible senior notes pricing (claim 5259), announced December 9, 2024 with a promised pricing date of December 11, 2024, remains delayed as of September 4, 2026—over eight months past the promised date. While the underlying convertible notes offering (claim 5251) shows a maturity date of January 15, 2030 and is marked as stated, the pricing milestone itself, which was prominently dated in December 2024 disclosures, has silently slipped without a formal delay or revision announcement tying the pricing promise to actual market conditions or other contingencies.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot's settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5704, announced 2024-09-22) transitioned from stated to withdrawn on 2026-09-04 without any corresponding press release or investor update explaining the reversal. The agreement had included director nomination rights and board voting commitments; the withdrawal suggests these arrangements were dissolved or superseded, but no public statement has addressed what changed or why. Related to this, the settlement agreement's term expiration date (claim 5701, promised by 2026-06-01) now shows as delayed as of 2026-09-04—meaning the June 1, 2026 milestone passed without Riot announcing a revised end date or renewal status, leaving investors in uncertainty about whether the Bitfarms partnership remains in force. Separately, Riot's convertible senior notes offering pricing (claim 5259, promised by 2024-12-11) remains in delayed status nearly two years after the promised close date; the company closed a $525M offering in December 2024, yet the specific claim about pricing continues to be tracked as delayed without clarification of whether pricing dates shifted or the claim itself was misaligned to the actual execution.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot disclosed in its September 2024 Bitfarms settlement agreement that a critical partnership agreement would expire on June 1, 2026. That date passed three months ago. The claim automatically transitioned from 'stated' to 'delayed' status on September 4, 2026, without any management announcement or revision letter explaining the slip, renewal status, or implications. No disclosure has addressed what this expiration entails for Riot's operations or strategic positioning. The Bitfarms settlement agreement itself—originally promised to finalize by September 23, 2024, and initially featuring director nomination rights, voting commitments, and standstill provisions—has been withdrawn from the disclosed record following evidence review, as of September 4, 2026. No public statement explains whether the settlement failed to execute, was superseded by separate arrangements, or was determined immaterial in retrospect. Shareholders have heard nothing about why a transaction Riot highlighted as a major governance milestone is no longer part of the verified claim ledger. Riot announced a $525 million convertible senior notes offering in December 2024 with a promised pricing date of December 11, 2024 (claim 5259). That claim now carries 'delayed' status without any formal update describing when pricing was completed or why the target date slipped. While the underlying offering appears to have closed (claim 5251, status stated, maturing 2030-01-15), management has not addressed the gap between the promised execution date and the delayed marking on the pricing itself.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot announced a settlement agreement with Bitfarms in September 2024, with promised completion by September 23, 2024 (claim 5704). As of September 2026, this settlement has been withdrawn without public explanation. The associated partnership agreement contained a term expiration date of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), which has now passed and shows as delayed in the status ledger. Management has not disclosed why the settlement was withdrawn or clarified Riot's current Bitfarms relationship status. In March 2024, Riot committed to future cryptocurrency mining data collection using standard notice-and-comment regulatory procedures (claims 6233, 6234, 6346). While this commitment was verified, no subsequent disclosure addressed survey execution, timing, results, or methodology. The project appears abandoned, with no mention in recent filings. Additionally, Riot's convertible senior notes offering announced in December 2024 carried a promised pricing completion date of December 11, 2024 (claim 5259). This deadline has slipped without announced revision, now showing as delayed as of September 2026, approximately two years past the promised date. While notes with a 2030 maturity date were eventually issued (claim 5251), investors were not given a revised close timeline or explanation for the delay.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5704) was announced on 2024-09-22 as a partnership arrangement with voting commitments, board nomination rights, and share purchase conditions. The claim transitioned to withdrawn status on 2026-09-04 without any management disclosure explaining why the settlement is no longer being acknowledged in the record. The partnership framework supposedly included multiple provisions (claims 5695-5706) that remain stated, creating a disconnect: the overarching agreement was walked back while its detailed terms remain on record.
Bitfarms agreement term expiration (claim 5701) carried a promised date of 2026-06-01, marking when the partnership terms would conclude. As of 2026-09-04, this milestone remains in delayed status—now three months past the stated expiration—with no announcement regarding extension, renegotiation, or termination. The silence is notable given that expiration of material partnership terms would ordinarily trigger disclosure updates.
Convertible senior notes offering pricing (claim 5259) was promised for 2024-12-11 at 525 USD per note, announced on 2024-12-09. Nearly two years later, on 2026-09-04, this claim remains in delayed status. Management has not provided a revision announcement explaining why a pricing event from December 2024 remains unresolved or unexecuted in September 2026, nor has the status been updated to reflect what actually occurred with the offering process.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05The Bitfarms settlement agreement announced on September 22, 2024 (claim 5704) has transitioned to withdrawn status as of September 4, 2026, yet management has made no public disclosure of the agreement's termination or the circumstances surrounding its failure. The agreement included material governance provisions including director nomination rights, board member voting commitments, and conditional share purchase rights at Bitfarms, all of which may now be voided, but investors have heard nothing about the loss of these positions. Additionally, the settlement agreement contained an expiration date promised for June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), which has now slipped three months past without announcement; claim 5701 transitioned to delayed status on September 4, 2026, suggesting the termination date was missed or the agreement's terms were materially altered, yet no revision statement has been issued explaining whether the June deadline was extended, voided, or simply allowed to lapse. The convertible senior notes offering announced in December 2024 at a promised closing date of December 11, 2024 (claim 5259) remains in delayed status as of September 4, 2026—nearly two years overdue—with no public update on whether the $525 million financing was repriced, cancelled, or indefinitely deferred. These three developments represent significant strategic pivots (from aggressive Bitfarms board engagement to apparent withdrawal, from imminent note issuance to indefinite delay) that management has allowed to slip from the record without commentary.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot's Bitfarms settlement agreement, announced with considerable fanfare on September 22, 2024, has become conspicuously absent from management's recent communications. The settlement included multiple binding commitments: voting pledges at shareholder meetings (claim 5696), director nomination rights (claim 5705), conditional share purchase rights at 15% ownership threshold (claim 5702), and standstill provisions (claim 5699). The agreement was explicitly stated to expire on June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). That date has now passed—we are currently September 5, 2026—yet Riot has made no disclosure regarding whether the agreement expired as scheduled, was renewed, was terminated early, or had its terms materially modified. The status of claim 5701 was marked 'delayed' on September 4, 2026, indicating the promised expiration event did not occur or could not be verified as stated. More strikingly, claim 5704, which documents the settlement agreement itself, transitioned from 'stated' status to 'withdrawn' on the same date following evidence review, suggesting the claim was deemed inaccurate or no longer applicable—yet no public retraction or clarification has been issued. The partnership remains undisclosed in current disclosures despite being material to Riot's Bitfarms position.
Riot's convertible senior notes offering, announced in December 2024 as a $525 million financing with December 11, 2024 pricing (claim 5259), has similarly vanished from management communication. The company stated its intention to use proceeds for Bitcoin acquisition (claim 5252), yet the offering pricing milestone was marked 'delayed' on September 4, 2026—nearly two years past the promised completion date. No subsequent 10-K, 10-Q, or press release has updated investors on whether this offering was completed, cancelled, repriced, or remains pending. The silence on a half-billion-dollar financing event promised nearly two years ago is remarkable.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot announced a settlement agreement with Bitfarms on September 22, 2024, with a promised close date of September 23, 2024 (claim 5704). The company used this settlement to justify director nomination rights, board voting commitments, and standstill provisions as part of its escalating stake in Bitfarms. However, the settlement agreement status was withdrawn as of September 4, 2026, with no public statement explaining why the deal that was announced as concluded has been reversed. The agreement term expiration date promised for June 1, 2026 (claim 5701) has also slipped into delayed status as of today, September 5, 2026, without accompanying disclosure of what changed or why the term remains unresolved.
Riot's $525 million convertible senior notes offering announced on December 9, 2024 was promised to close by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259). Nearly two years later, as of September 4, 2026, the offering remains in delayed status. This represents a significant capital raise that management described as priced and ready to close within two days, yet has apparently stalled with no public revision to the timeline or explanation of obstacles. The related $500 million convertible notes offering (claim 5261) also remains in stated status from December 2024 despite the apparent inability to execute the December close date, suggesting either the deal structure changed materially or demand circumstances shifted in ways management has not disclosed.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05The Bitfarms settlement agreement announced on September 22, 2024 (claims 5695, 5704) has been withdrawn from the record as of September 4, 2026, without any public explanation or revised disclosure. The agreement, which Riot had characterized as signed and binding, included specific voting commitments at a special meeting (claim 5696) and director nomination rights (claim 5705). No subsequent filing appears to address why this settlement was dissolved or under what circumstances. The partnership agreement term expiration (claim 5701) was promised for June 1, 2026, but now shows as 'delayed' as of September 4, 2026—meaning the deadline has already passed without any public announcement of a revised end date or acknowledgment that the agreement remains in force. The company has not disclosed whether the agreement has been extended, renegotiated, or terminated. The convertible senior notes offering (claim 5259) was promised to price and close by December 11, 2024, but transitioned to 'delayed' status on September 4, 2026, representing a twenty-month gap with no update to investors about completion or revised timeline. While the notes themselves are recorded as issued (claim 5251, maturity January 15, 2030), there has been no public statement reconciling the stated pricing date with the current state.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot's most significant walk-back is the Bitfarms settlement agreement itself (claim 5704), announced 2024-09-22 with a promised close date of 2024-09-23. The agreement was marked withdrawn as of 2026-09-04, yet no public announcement explained the reversal or what became of the partnership terms Riot had just negotiated—voting commitments (5696), director nomination rights (5705), standstill provisions (5699), and conditional share purchase rights (5706) all remain stated in the record, now orphaned from the agreement that housed them. The Bitfarms partnership agreement term itself (claim 5701) was promised to expire by 2026-06-01 and transitioned from stated to delayed on 2026-09-04; we are now three months past that date with no revision announcement or explanation of the extension. A third delay, the convertible senior notes pricing (claim 5259), was promised finalized by 2024-12-11, transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-04, and remains unresolved nearly eighteen months later with no update statement filed. None of these shifts—the settlement's sudden withdrawal, the partnership term's unexplained slip, or the convertible offering's stalled finalization—were accompanied by investor communications or SEC filings revising the original claims.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05The settlement agreement with Bitfarms (claim 5704) was announced on September 22, 2024 with a promised closing of September 23, 2024. This settlement included governance provisions, director nomination rights, standstill restrictions, and conditional share purchase terms (claims 5695-5706). However, claim 5704 was marked as withdrawn on September 4, 2026. Management provided no disclosure explaining the withdrawal or how the stated governance arrangements were affected.
The convertible senior notes pricing (claim 5259) was promised for December 11, 2024. While the $500 million offering was announced on December 8, 2024, the pricing announcement has not occurred nearly two years later. The claim status was marked delayed on September 4, 2026 with no explanation of the delay or the offering's current status.
The Bitfarms settlement agreement's term expiration (claim 5701) was promised for June 1, 2026, but the claim status was marked delayed on September 4, 2026, after that date had passed. This agreement was extensively detailed in September 2024 filings but appears in no subsequent disclosures. Management has not announced whether the agreement remains in effect, has been extended, or expired as originally contemplated.
Riot's Bitfarms investment and governance arrangements were central to disclosures from June through September 2024, featuring a disclosed stake that increased from 14.9% to 19.9% alongside detailed board nomination rights, voting commitments, standstill provisions, and conditional purchase options (claims 5927, 5801-5703, 5695-5706). After September 22, 2024, the Bitfarms relationship entirely ceased appearing in public filings. No announcement explains changes to Riot's ownership position, governance status, or the conditional purchase rights.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot's Bitfarms settlement agreement, announced in September 2024 with a promised close date of September 23, 2024 (claim 5704), has transitioned to 'withdrawn' status without any public statement explaining the reversal. The governance provisions that were contingent on this settlement—director nomination rights (5705), board voting commitments (5698), share purchase rights (5706), and beneficial ownership thresholds (5700)—all remain marked as 'stated' in the record despite the underlying agreement's withdrawal, creating ambiguity about whether these provisions are still operative. The partnership term expiration provision (5701) was promised by June 1, 2026, and has now been marked 'delayed' since September 4, 2026; management has disclosed no explanation for what occurred after the expiration date passed or whether the agreement was extended or terminated. Riot's convertible senior notes offering (5259), promised to be priced by December 11, 2024, remains in 'delayed' status as of today; no disclosure has addressed the $525 million offering's new timeline or cause of the nine-month postponement. Riot's ownership stake in Bitfarms escalated rapidly from 11.3% to 19.9% between June and September 2024 amid regulatory battles, board conflicts, and the now-withdrawn settlement; while individual acquisitions are documented, management has not articulated how these escalating commitments align with the collapsed settlement or what strategic value the governance rights provide without a functioning partnership.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot's September 2024 settlement agreement with Bitfarms contained an expiration date of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701), which has now passed by over three months without any disclosure revision or management statement addressing what happens next—whether the agreement lapsed, was renegotiated, or continues under modified terms. Simultaneously, the settlement agreement announcement itself (claim 5704) was withdrawn from the record on September 4, 2026, contradicting the earlier stated partnership claims (5695, 5696, 5705) that remain on file; no explanation has been provided for why management is walking back the existence of the deal. Riot disclosed a convertible senior notes offering priced on December 9, 2024, promised to close by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259), but this claim transitioned to 'delayed' status on September 4, 2026—nearly two years past the promised date—with no revision announcement or disclosure of obstacles. A related claim (5251) shows the notes as eventually issued with a 2030 maturity, but the original closing-date commitment vanished without explanation. These three items represent material governance and financing milestones that management committed to and then either silently allowed to slip or actively redacted from the record without offering shareholders or the market formal notice of the change.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05The Bitfarms settlement agreement (claim 5704) promised by September 23, 2024 entered delayed status in early September 2026 and then transitioned to withdrawn, representing a complete reversal of a major partnership milestone announced in late September 2024. Management has not disclosed why the settlement was withdrawn, whether the underlying disputes were resolved through other means, or what the current status of Riot's 19.9% stake and board nomination rights actually entails. The Bitfarms agreement term expiration (claim 5701) carried a June 1, 2026 deadline that has now passed while the claim remains in delayed status; there is no public update explaining whether the agreement actually expired, what provisions remain in effect, or whether the relationship was extended or renegotiated. The convertible senior notes offering (claim 5259) was promised to be priced by December 11, 2024, but sits in delayed status as of September 4, 2026—nearly nine months past the promised date with no explanation of why the $525 million financing was stalled, whether pricing or terms were modified, or what the current trajectory is. Taken together, these represent a pattern of specific commitments with hard dates that slipped past their announced windows without corresponding management statements acknowledging the delays or providing revised timelines.
What we haven't been told
2026-09-05Riot announced on September 22, 2024 a settlement agreement with Bitfarms Ltd. (claim 5704) with terms promised by September 23, 2024. This claim has since been withdrawn following evidence review as of September 4, 2026, indicating that what management disclosed as a binding settlement was not actually valid. No public statement has clarified what occurred or what arrangement, if any, replaced it.
The same September 2024 disclosures included a Bitfarms partnership agreement with an expiration date of June 1, 2026 (claim 5701). That date has now passed—we are at September 5, 2026—yet the claim remains marked as 'delayed' rather than completed or superseded. Management has released no update on whether the agreement expired as stated, was extended, renewed under new terms, or continues in some other form.
Riot announced a $525 million convertible senior notes offering on December 9, 2024, with pricing promised to be completed by December 11, 2024 (claim 5259). As of September 4, 2026, this pricing claim remains marked 'delayed'—nearly two years overdue. While the company did eventually issue convertible notes at 0.75% with a 2030 maturity (claim 5251, marked stated), the specific pricing milestone announced in December 2024 was never completed as promised, and no management communication has addressed the gap between the announced timeline and reality.
What we haven't been told
2026-08-30Insufficient disclosure history to identify silent walkbacks or pattern shifts. The record contains only two claims, both originated 2026-08-13 and auto-transitioned 2026-08-30 with no prior versions, revisions, or comparative statements in earlier periods. To detect what management has stopped mentioning or quietly revised, we would need multiple disclosure cycles showing prior commitments, subsequent restatements, or evidence of dropped references—none of which appear in the current ledger for Riot. No promised dates have slipped, no capacity figures have been revised downward, and no projects have vanished from mention (since mention history does not exist). Without baseline disclosures or quarterly tracking showing what was previously claimed versus current silence, no gaps can be responsibly identified.
Projects
| Fleet capacity | Megawatts | Share of anticipated |
|---|---|---|
| Energized today | 1,249 MW | 48% |
| Contracted | 1,012 MW | |
| Anticipated at full build-out | 2,612 MW | 100% |
Summed across 5 tracked project(s), from the capacity figures on each. Anticipated takes the firmest stage on record per project, so a site that is announced at 2 GW and contracted at 400 MW counts once, at 2 GW.
Corsicana
datacenter - 6980 FM 709, Corsicana, TX 75110
Status: partially operational
Kentucky Facility
mining
Status: partially operational
Massena
mining - Massena, New York
Status: cancelled
Oklahoma City
mining - Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Status: cancelled
Rockdale
datacenter - 2721 Charles Martin Hall Rd, Thorndale, TX 76577
Status: partially operational
Claims tracker
Executive compensation FY2025
| Year | Name | Role as filed | Salary | Stock awards | Option awards | Incentive | Other | Total | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Colin M. Yee | CFO (Principal Financial Officer) | $320.8K | $4.71M | $6.99M | $641.7K | $14.5K | $12.67M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2025 | Soo il Benjamin Yi | Executive Chairman | $1.58M | — | — | $1.87M | $8.9K | $3.45M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
As reported in the company's DEF 14A Summary Compensation Table (SEC Reg S-K Item 402(c)). Stock and option awards are grant-date fair values — what the award was worth on the day it was granted, not cash received and not what it is worth now. Every row here reconciles: its columns add up to the total the filing printed.
Show earlier years (FY2024, FY2023, FY2022, FY2021, FY2020, FY2019, FY2010, FY2009, FY2008, FY2007)
| Year | Name | Role as filed | Salary | Bonus | Stock awards | Option awards | Incentive | Other | Total | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Jason Les | CEO | $1.33M | — | $79.26M | — | $2.89M | $41.1K | $83.53M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2024 | Soo il Benjamin Yi | Executive Chairman | $1.37M | — | $79.26M | — | $2.87M | $9.6K | $83.50M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2024 | William Richard Jackman | EVP, General Counsel | $500.0K | — | $19.76M | — | $915.0K | $16.0K | $21.19M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2024 | Jason Chung | EVP, Head of Corporate Development & Strategy | $475.0K | — | $19.76M | — | $858.8K | $18.2K | $21.11M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2024 | Colin M. Yee | CFO (Principal Financial Officer) | $475.0K | — | $19.76M | — | $863.8K | $8.0K | $21.10M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2023 | Soo il Benjamin Yi | Executive Chairman | $986.1K | — | $10.99M | — | $1.50M | $28.5K | $13.50M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2023 | Jason Les | CEO | $963.8K | — | $10.99M | — | $1.50M | $39.1K | $13.49M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2023 | William Richard Jackman | EVP, General Counsel | $483.7K | — | $7.33M | — | $675.0K | $30.0K | $8.52M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2023 | Colin M. Yee | CFO (Principal Financial Officer) | $400.0K | — | $7.33M | — | $600.0K | $7.5K | $8.33M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2023 | Jason Chung | EVP, Head of Corporate Development & Strategy | $375.0K | — | $7.33M | — | $562.5K | $15.6K | $8.28M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2022 | Jason Les | Chief Executive Officer | $679.8K | — | $20.30M | — | $511.2K | $12.1K | $21.50M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2022 | Soo il Benjamin Yi | Executive Chairman | $679.8K | — | $20.30M | — | $512.8K | $8.9K | $21.50M | View cached copy (2026-08-31)Live source ↗ |
| 2022 | Chad Everett Harris | EVP and Chief Commercial Officer (Former) | $346.3K | — | $5.07M | — | $305.0K | $29.8K | $5.76M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2022 | William Richard Jackman | EVP, General Counsel | $358.8K | — | $5.07M | — | $315.3K | — | $5.75M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2022 | Colin M. Yee | EVP, Chief Financial Officer | $228.9K | — | $3.31M | — | $200.9K | — | $3.74M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2022 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer (Former) | $360.0K | — | $1.52M | — | $316.8K | — | $2.20M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2021 | Jason Les | Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) | $631.9K | — | $20.16M | — | $1.09M | $3.5K | $21.88M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2021 | Soo il Benjamin Yi | Executive Chairman | $484.9K | — | $20.12M | — | $732.2K | $5.3K | $21.35M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2021 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer (Former) | $354.1K | — | $17.23M | — | $601.9K | $11.2K | $18.20M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2021 | William Richard Jackman | EVP, General Counsel | $147.9K | — | $12.82M | — | $230.2K | — | $13.20M | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2020 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer (Former) | $294.1K | $90.0K | $300.0K | — | — | $14.5K | $698.6K | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2020 | Megan M. Brooks | Chief Operating Officer | $175.0K | $78.0K | $144.0K | — | — | $5.0K | $402.0K | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2019 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Executive Officer (former) and Chief Financial Officer | $252.2K | — | $175.0K | — | — | $89.2K | $516.4K | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2019 | Megan M. Brooks | Chief Operating Officer | $136.2K | — | $15.0K | — | — | $4.2K | $155.5K | View cached copy (2026-09-13)Live source ↗ |
| 2010 | Stephen T. Lundy | Chief Executive Officer | $212.6K | — | — | $726.4K | $42.1K | $17.0K | $998.1K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2010 | Daryl Faulkner | Executive Chairman and Fmr Chief Executive Officer | $192.3K | — | — | $220.8K | — | $37.9K | $451.0K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2010 | Gregory L Bennett | — | $225.0K | — | — | $88.3K | $50.0K | $7.0K | $370.3K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2010 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer | $200.0K | — | — | $88.3K | $35.0K | $19.7K | $343.0K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Daryl Faulkner | Executive Chairman and Fmr Chief Executive Officer | $234.0K | — | — | $696.0K | — | $61.3K | $991.3K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Robert Frederick Caspari | — | $222.6K | — | — | $445.2K | $50.0K | $10.5K | $728.3K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Vice P resident, Product Development and Manufacturing Senior | — | — | — | — | $340.2K | — | $51.0K | $391.3K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer | $167.5K | — | — | $54.8K | $40.0K | $18.4K | $280.7K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Gregory Pusey | Vice Chairman | $150.0K | — | — | $54.8K | $38.0K | $18.4K | $261.2K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Richard G Donnelly | Former Chief Executive Officer and Director | $31.2K | — | $54.8K | — | — | $167.9K | $253.9K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2009 | Mark Colgin | Chief Scientific Officer | $146.9K | — | — | $54.8K | $23.0K | $11.4K | $236.1K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2008 | Richard G Donnelly | Former Chief Executive Officer and Director | $250.0K | $37.5K | — | $140.7K | — | $30.9K | $459.2K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2008 | Gregory Pusey | Vice Chairman | $150.0K | — | — | $195.4K | — | $20.6K | $366.0K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2008 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer | $110.0K | — | — | $156.3K | — | $20.6K | $286.9K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2008 | Mark Colgin | Chief Scientific Officer | $125.0K | — | — | — | $26.6K | $12.4K | $164.0K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2008 | Donald L. Traul Dr. | — | $105.0K | $15.0K | — | $15.8K | — | $9.1K | $144.9K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2007 | Richard G Donnelly | Former Chief Executive Officer and Director | $222.9K | — | $74.0K | $234.9K | $280.0K | $31.8K | $843.6K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2007 | - Former | Chief Executive Officer and Director | $222.9K | $280.0K | $74.0K | $79.0K | — | $31.8K | $687.7K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2007 | Gregory Pusey | Vice Chairman | $100.0K | — | — | $117.5K | $125.0K | — | $342.4K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2007 | Jeffrey Mcgonegal | Chief Financial Officer | $100.0K | — | — | $117.5K | $80.0K | $20.9K | $318.3K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2007 | Projects Manager-Scientific | — | $90.0K | $40.0K | — | $91.5K | — | $8.2K | $229.7K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
| 2007 | Mark Colgin | Chief Scientific Officer | $105.0K | — | — | — | $60.0K | $12.4K | $177.4K | View cached copy (2026-09-27)Live source ↗ |
As reported in the company's DEF 14A Summary Compensation Table (SEC Reg S-K Item 402(c)). Stock and option awards are grant-date fair values — what the award was worth on the day it was granted, not cash received and not what it is worth now. Every row here reconciles: its columns add up to the total the filing printed.
Insider transactions (SEC Form 3/4/5)
Totals across all insiders
| Bucket | Invested (shares) | Invested (USD) | Divested (shares) | Divested (USD) | Net direction | Txns | Invested @ last price | Divested @ last price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All time | 12,160,992 | $0 | 11,464,818 | $182.86M | ↓ Divested $182.86M | 100 | $169.89M | $160.16M |
| 2026 | 12,128,786 | $0 | 9,820,442 | $155.58M | ↓ Divested $155.58M | 82 | $169.44M | $137.19M |
| 2025 | 32,206 | $0 | 1,644,376 | $27.27M | ↓ Divested $27.27M | 18 | $449.9K | $22.97M |
| 2025-Q4 | - | $0 | 379,600 | $7.14M | ↓ Divested $7.14M | 6 | $0 | $5.30M |
| 2026-Q1 | 11,562,718 | $0 | 78,850 | $999.0K | ↓ Divested $999.0K | 34 | $161.53M | $1.10M |
| 2026-Q2 | - | $0 | 2,897,208 | $16.11M | ↓ Divested $16.11M | 10 | $0 | $40.47M |
| 2026-Q3 | 566,068 | $0 | 6,844,384 | $138.48M | ↓ Divested $138.48M | 38 | $7.91M | $95.62M |
Invested = shares acquired (buys, grants, option exercises) — insider adding to the position. Divested = shares reduced (sells, dispositions, tax-withholding) — cash flowing TO the insider. Net direction shows which side wins on dollar terms in each bucket. % of holder's stake not yet computed (pending Form 3/4 holdings ingest). See methodology. The two @ last price columns restate the same share counts at the most recent share price we read (close of 2026-10-19); they are a valuation, not a cash flow, and they move every day the market does.
Individual filings
Show older filings (75 more)
Federal court dockets (via CourtListener/RECAP)
Every docket has its full metadata cached locally so we don't send visitors through a login wall. Click a case number to see our cached docket page.
| Court | Case number | Case title | Link | Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| txnd | 3:26-cv-01842 | Green Revolution Cooling Inc v. Riot Platforms Inc | Party | 2026-06-03 |
| txnd | 3:26-cv-00532 | Howell v. Riot Platforms Inc | Party | 2026-02-18 |
| txwd | 1:25-cv-02129 | Riot Platforms, Inc. v. Hash House Tech, Inc. | Party | 2025-12-23 |
| txwd | 7:25-cv-00567 | Malikie Innovations Ltd. v. Foundry Digital LLC | Party | 2025-12-12 |
| cod | 1:25-cv-02534 | Ess Metron, LLC v. Kratos Industries, LLC | Party | 2025-08-13 |
| txsb | 25-03047 | Rhodium JV LLC v. Whinstone US, Inc. | Party | 2025-02-11 |
| txwd | 6:24-cv-00099 | Texas Blockchain Council v. Department of Energy | Party | 2024-02-22 |
| nywd | 6:26-cv-06874 | Malikie Innovations Ltd. v. Foundry Digital LLC | Mentioned | 2026-08-28 |
| txwd | 7:26-mc-00323 | Neural AI, LLC v. CoreWeave, Inc. | Mentioned | 2026-08-18 |
| njd | 2:26-cv-00355 | MASAITIS v. COREWEAVE, INC. | Mentioned | 2026-01-12 |
| azd | 2:25-cv-04416 | Singh Family Revocable Trust U/A Dated 2/18/2019 v. Sprouts Farmers Market Incor | Mentioned | 2025-11-24 |
| txsd | 4:25-cv-04477 | Hernandez v. RCI Hospitality Holdings, Inc. | Mentioned | 2025-09-21 |
| cod | 1:25-cv-02770 | Lee v. Quantum Corporation | Mentioned | 2025-09-04 |
| ctd | 3:25-cv-01441 | Keller v. Tronox Holdings PLC | Mentioned | 2025-09-03 |
| cacd | 2:25-cv-07844 | Omar Abdul-Hameed v. Snap Inc. | Mentioned | 2025-08-21 |
| txed | 2:25-cv-00519 | Malikie Innovations Ltd. v. Core Scientific, Inc. | Mentioned | 2025-05-12 |
| cacd | 2:24-cv-08280 | Electric Solidus, Inc. v. Proton Management LTD. | Mentioned | 2024-09-25 |
