Core Scientific CORZ NASDAQ

The disclosed record for Core Scientific covers roughly twenty-one months, from the April 2022 listing through the January 2024 emergence terms. It contains no insider transactions and ends partway through the contingent value rights entries, so any read of insider behavior or of the post-emergence period is not possible from this data. Several entries also mix units: the 573,381 and 386,697 figures (claims 13544, 13547) are share counts recorded as dollar amounts, and some facility sizes appear in millions without the suffix. The record shows two distinct regimes rather than a single trajectory. In 2022, financing came largely through B. Riley relationships: the $75M bridge notes (claim 13829), the $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851), and advisory fees paid in stock (claim 13831). These sat alongside $514.8M of convertible notes (claim 13511). The equity line had drawn only $20.7M (claim 13499) when the going-concern disclosure arrived on 2022-10-27 (claim 19788). That sequence reads as liquidity patching against a fixed debt load more than a coherent capital plan. The second regime is restructuring, and it is more structured. An ad hoc noteholder DIP of $57M plus $18M syndication (claims 12730, 12731) was replaced by B. Riley's $70M facility (claim 12732). The exit package then layered a $55M rights offering with a $37M backstop (claims 6514, 6515), an $80M exit facility split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims 6506, 6507), $260M of secured convertibles maturing 2029 (claim 6319), $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6321), two warrant tranches, and CVRs. Dilution at that point is effectively front-loaded into emergence. The Tranche 2 warrants at a $0.01 exercise price (claim 6324) function close to outright shares. The Tranche 1 count requires explanation, since it appears as 93.4M in claim 6338 and 98.4M in claim 6323. The record cannot test use of proceeds. The $195M net merger proceeds (claim 13794) carry no deployment detail, and the DIP and exit draws are described only by size. The rights offering deadline was delayed (claim 6400), as was the original bridge note entry (claim 14081). Going forward, a careful reader should watch for conversion activity on the $260M secured convertibles, exercise of both warrant tranches, the exit facility amortization that is not yet verifiable (claim 6316), and how the CVRs settle, since each of these feeds directly into the post-emergence share count.

Core Scientific's record reads less as a dilution curve than as a capital structure that failed and was rebuilt. The first phase, around the April 2022 listing, relied on the XPDI merger (net proceeds of $195M, per claim #13794), roughly $515M of convertible notes outstanding (claim #13795), $75M of B. Riley bridge notes (claim #13829), and a $100M committed equity line with B. Riley Principal Capital II (claim #13851). That line was drawn only modestly before conditions deteriorated: $20.7M of shares sold, per claim #13499, against a cap of 70.3M shares (claim #13545). The bridge notes were extended within months (claims #13832 and #13833), and the bridge record itself is marked delayed (claim #14081). Going-concern doubt followed in October 2022 (claim #19788). The mix in this phase looks reactive rather than planned: a single counterparty was lender, equity-line buyer, advisor paid in shares (claim #13547), and later replacement DIP lender at $70M (claim #12732). That concentration requires explanation in any assessment of how the company was financed.

The second phase is the restructuring. The original $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12730) was displaced by B. Riley's replacement facility, and a restructuring support agreement was terminated (claim #13350). The exit package swapped the old converts for $260M of new secured convertibles (claim #6319), $150M of senior secured notes (claim #6337), an $80M exit facility (claim #6315), a $55M rights offering (claim #6514), contingent value rights, and two warrant tranches. The rights offering deadline was extended (claim #6400). Existing holders were not diluted gradually. The equity was largely reallocated to creditors in a single step.

Use of proceeds is hard to test. The $195M merger allocation (claim #13929) has no matching deployment disclosure in this record. The record also contains internal inconsistencies that a reader should reconcile before relying on any figure. Tranche 1 warrants appear as 93.4M (claim #6338) and as 98.4M (claim #6323). Secured convertibles appear as both $260M and $20M (claims #6319 and #6329). Share counts are recorded as dollar amounts throughout. No insider transactions are on record, and the record breaks off mid-claim in January 2024, so nothing after emergence can be assessed.

Going forward, the items to watch are conversion of the 2029 secured convertibles, exercise of the near-zero-strike Tranche 2 warrants (claim #6324), the CVR payment obligations (claim #6325), and whether post-emergence financing returns to a single-counterparty pattern.

Core Scientific's record describes a company whose financing moved from growth capital to rescue capital within about nine months, and then to a court-supervised recapitalization. The early structure relied heavily on one counterparty. B. Riley appears as bridge lender ($75M in notes, per claim 13829), equity-line provider ($100M commitment, per claim 13851), advisor paid in stock (386,697 shares, per claim 13547), and later as replacement DIP lender ($70M, per claim 13295). Concentrating lending, equity distribution and advisory roles in one party is a choice that requires explanation, particularly once that party became the restructuring financier.

The equity line was capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim 13545), and only $20.7M had been drawn by late October 2022 (claim 13499). Within days, the company disclosed substantial doubt about going concern (claim 19788). Meanwhile, $514.8M of convertible notes remained outstanding (claim 13453). The pre-filing period therefore looks less like a coherent capital plan than a sequence of patches: the bridge notes were extended (claims 13832 and 13833), the committed facility was underused, and leverage stayed in place.

The emergence package is more internally consistent but heavily dilutive. Convertible holders received $260M in new common interests (claim 6518) alongside $260M of new secured convertibles maturing in 2029 (claim 6319) and $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6321). Other pieces included a $55M rights offering (claim 6514), whose deadline was delayed (claim 6400), and an $80M exit facility (claim 6315). The equity overhang also includes two warrant tranches, roughly 98.4M at $6.81 (claim 6323) and 82.0M at a nominal $0.01 (claim 6324), plus contingent value rights (claim 6340). The near-zero strike on Tranche 2 means it functions as deferred share issuance rather than a source of capital.

On use of proceeds, the record states $195M in merger proceeds (claim 13794) but contains no claims tracing how that cash was deployed, so stated and actual use cannot be compared. The record also contains no insider transactions, and its post-emergence entries are truncated.

A careful reader should next watch three things: when Tranche 1 warrant exercises occur relative to the $6.81 strike, the conversion terms on the 2029 secured notes (claim 6320, not quantified here), and whether amortization on the exit facility (claim 6316, not yet verifiable) is met from operations or from new issuance.

The disclosed record for Core Scientific divides into two regimes, and the dilution pattern only makes sense read that way. In the first, running from the April 2022 listing through late 2022, the company leaned on a single counterparty for liquidity: B. Riley appears as bridge lender ($75M of bridge notes, per claim #13829), committed-equity provider ($100M facility, per claim #13851), and advisor paid in stock (claim #13831). The equity line was capped by Nasdaq share limits (claim #13545), and only about $20.7M had been drawn by late October (claim #13499). That is the same month the going-concern doubt appears (claim #19788). This looks less like a planned capital strategy than incremental patching around roughly $515M of convertible notes (claim #13795). Several share counts in the record, such as the 573,381 commitment shares (claim #13853), are tagged as dollar amounts, so readers should treat those figures as share quantities.

The second regime is restructuring. Debtor-in-possession financing moved from an original $57M noteholder facility (claim #12730) to a $70M B. Riley replacement (claim #12732). Two support agreements were terminated in February 2023 (claims #13350, #13364) before a revised settlement emerged in late 2023. The exit structure replaces equity-line dilution with layered claims: $260M of secured convertibles maturing 2029 (claim #6319), $150M of senior secured notes (claim #6337), an $80M exit facility (claim #6334), a $55M rights offering (claim #6514) whose deadline was extended (claim #6400), two warrant tranches including near-zero-strike Tranche 2 (claim #6324), and contingent value rights (claim #6340). One sequencing issue requires explanation: the Chapter 11 filing claim is dated January 2024 (claim #6386), while DIP activity is recorded from February 2023.

Use-of-proceeds tracking is thin. The $195M of merger proceeds (claims #13929, #13794) is stated but never followed by deployment disclosure. The bridge notes are marked delayed (claim #14081), and their amortization is not yet verifiable (claim #13830). The record contains no insider transactions and ends partway through January 2024, so post-emergence conduct cannot be assessed here.

A careful reader should watch four things next. The first is whether the exit-facility amortization (claim #6316) becomes verifiable. The second is how the CVR year-one obligation of roughly $43M (claim #6325) is settled. The third is the conversion and exercise behavior of the 2029 convertibles and the $6.81 Tranche 1 warrants (claim #6323). The fourth is whether any later equity-line or ATM program revives the pre-bankruptcy pattern.

Core Scientific's financing record divides into two regimes, and the break between them is more informative than any single instrument. Through 2022 the company relied almost entirely on one counterparty. B. Riley affiliates provided the bridge notes ($75M, per claim 13829), the committed equity facility ($100M, per claim 13851), and advisory fees paid in stock (386,697 shares, per claim 13547). That concentration looks less like a deliberate capital strategy than a single relationship absorbing successive funding needs. By late October only $20.7M had been drawn under the equity line (claim 13499), against a Nasdaq-imposed share cap set out in claim 13495. Over the same period the $514.8M convertible stack (claim 13511) stayed in place unchanged. The going-concern disclosure (claim 19788) arrived within days of that equity-line figure, which suggests the facility was never sized to address the convertible overhang. The record notes the bridge financing as delayed (claim 14081), and the extension filings (claims 13832 and 13833) reinforce the sense of patching rather than planning. The restructuring period shows more coherence, though it was imposed by the process rather than chosen. B. Riley's replacement DIP ($70M, per claim 12732) displaced the noteholder facility ($57M, per claim 12730). The exit structure then consolidated around $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6321), $260M of secured convertibles maturing 2029 (claim 6319), an $80M exit facility (claim 6315), and a $55M rights offering (claim 6514). The rights offering deadline was extended (claim 6400), which requires explanation given its role in the plan. Dilution at emergence is the dominant fact. Two warrant tranches of roughly 93.4M and 82.0M (claims 6338 and 6339), the second exercisable at $0.01 (claim 6324), sit alongside an equity distribution to former convertible holders (claim 6518) and contingent value rights (claim 6340). On use of proceeds, the record is thin. The merger proceeds allocation (claim 13929) has no matching deployment disclosure, so whether announced uses tracked actual spending cannot be assessed from this data. No insider transactions appear in the record. A careful reader should watch for several things: conversion activity on the 2029 secured convertibles, the pace at which warrants are exercised, how the CVR year-one obligation is settled (claim 6325), and the amortization terms on the exit facility, which remain not yet verifiable (claim 6316). The record ends in January 2024, and post-emergence financings are not reflected here.

Core Scientific's record divides into two distinct capital regimes, and the pattern is easier to read once that division is acknowledged. The first, running from the April 2022 listing through October 2022, looks like reactive patching rather than a planned capital structure. The company entered public life carrying roughly $515M of convertible notes (claims #13795, #13511) and leaned almost entirely on a single counterparty, B. Riley, for a $100M committed equity line (claim #13851) and $75M of bridge notes (claim #13829). The equity line was functionally constrained. Only $20.7M had been drawn by late October (claim #13499) against a Nasdaq issuance cap of about 70.3M shares (claim #13495). The going-concern disclosure followed one day later (claim #19788). Fees paid in stock, including commitment shares (claim #13853) and advisory shares (claim #13547), added incremental dilution that bought little liquidity. The bridge notes are tagged delayed (claim #14081), and their amortization schedule remains not yet verifiable (claim #13830). The second regime is the court-supervised restructuring, which is far more coherent but should be read as an imposed design rather than a chosen one. The original $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12730) was replaced by B. Riley's $70M facility (claim #13386). The exit stack combines a $55M rights offering backstopped at $37M (claims #6514, #6515), an $80M exit facility split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims #6506, #6507), $150M of secured notes (claim #6508), $260M of secured convertibles (claim #6509), and $260M of equity distributed to convertible holders (claim #6518). The rights offering deadline was extended (claim #6400). Use of proceeds cannot be tested on this record. Merger proceeds of $195M are stated (claim #13929), but no deployment disclosures follow. Several figures require explanation. Tranche 1 warrants appear as 93.4M (claim #6338) and as 98.4M at $6.81 (claim #6323). The secured convertibles appear as $260M (claim #6319) and as $20M issued (claim #6329). The Chapter 11 filing is also dated January 2024 (claim #6386), well after the DIP activity. No insider transactions are on record, and the record thins after emergence. A careful reader should watch four items: conversion of the $260M secured notes; the overhang from roughly 82M penny-strike Tranche 2 warrants (claim #6324); the $43M year-one contingent value rights obligation (claim #6325); and the exit facility amortization, which is not yet verifiable (claim #6316).

Core Scientific's disclosed record describes a capital structure that moved from improvised liquidity to court-supervised reconstruction in under two years. The post-listing period is defined by a single counterparty: B. Riley provided bridge notes ($75M per claim #13829, a facility whose status is marked delayed in claim #14081), a $100M committed equity line (claim #13851), and fees paid partly in stock (the $750,000 advisory fee per claim #13834). Only $20.7M had been drawn on the equity line by late October 2022 (claim #13499), and it was capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim #13545). That was a small offset against $514.8M of convertible notes (claim #13511), and the going-concern disclosure followed a day later (claim #19788). The mix in this phase reads as patching, with each instrument covering the next near-term gap rather than serving a stated long-range plan.

The restructuring layer is more coherent but carries more dilution. The DIP sequence ran from a $57M noteholder facility (claim #12730) to a $70M B. Riley replacement (claim #12732), at a 10% rate with a 5% exit premium (claims #12747 and #12749). The exit package was $150M of senior secured notes maturing 2028 (claim #6321), $260M of secured convertible notes maturing 2029 (claim #6319), an $80M exit facility (claim #6315), and a $55M rights offering (claim #6514) whose deadline was extended (claim #6400). Together these converted unsecured convertible debt into new equity and secured paper. Two warrant tranches, 98.4M at $6.81 and 82.0M at $0.01 (claims #6323 and #6324), add an overhang beyond the new common issuance itself. The near-zero strike on Tranche 2 makes it economically close to equity.

Use of proceeds cannot be tested from this record. The $195M in merger proceeds is stated in claims #13929 and #13794, but no subsequent claim describes how it was deployed. Claim dates also appear to track disclosure rather than the underlying events, so the chronology should be read with that in mind.

The record as provided ends at the January 2024 emergence filings. Several items require follow-through: the Year 1 contingent value rights obligation of $43M (claim #6325), the exit facility amortization schedule that is not yet verifiable (claim #6316), and the conversion terms on the 2029 secured convertibles (claim #6320). Any exercise of the Tranche 1 warrants would also add dilution. A reader should watch whether post-emergence financing returns to single-counterparty dependence or broadens.

Core Scientific's record divides into three phases: a pre-bankruptcy stretch of rapid patching, a Chapter 11 interval, and an emergence capital structure that replaced one form of dilution with another. The 2022 financings were concentrated in a single counterparty. B. Riley affiliates supplied the $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851), the $75M bridge notes (claim 13829), and later the $70M replacement DIP (claim 12732). They also received equity-paid fees, including 573,381 commitment shares (claim 13853) and 386,697 advisory fee shares (claim 13547). This reads less as a deliberate capital plan than as reliance on one relationship lender while the $514.8M of legacy convertibles (claim 13511) remained unresolved. Usage of the equity line appears modest relative to its headline. Only $20.7M of shares had been sold as of claim 13499, against a Nasdaq-driven cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim 13545). That suggests the facility could not move enough stock to bridge the gap before the going-concern disclosure (claim 19788). The DIP phase shows revision rather than continuity. An original noteholder DIP of $57M plus $18M of syndication (claims 12730, 12731) was superseded by the B. Riley replacement facility, and the equity rights offering deadline was later extended (claim 6400). Emergence then reset the balance sheet with an $80M exit facility (claim 6334), $150M of senior secured notes maturing 2028 (claim 6321), and $260M of secured convertibles maturing 2029 (claim 6319). It also added a $55M rights offering backstopped for $37M (claims 6514, 6515), Tranche 1 warrants of roughly 98.4M at $6.81 (claim 6323), and contingent value rights carrying a $43M year-one obligation (claim 6325). Dilution was therefore not eliminated by the restructuring; it was deferred into convertible, warrant, and CVR instruments whose cost depends on future share prices. Use of proceeds cannot be meaningfully tested. The $195M net merger cash (claim 13794) has no corresponding deployment disclosure in this record, and no insider transactions appear at all. The record ends at emergence in January 2024, which leaves the post-reorganization period undocumented here. A careful reader should next watch conversion activity on the $260M secured notes, the exercise of both warrant tranches, and the settlement of the CVRs. The exit facility amortization (claim 6316) is marked not yet verifiable and requires explanation once later filings are available.

Core Scientific's financing record divides into two regimes, and the break between them is what matters. In 2022 the company depended almost entirely on one counterparty. B. Riley affiliates provided the committed equity line ($100M, per claim #13851), the bridge notes ($75M, per claim #13829) and advisory services paid in stock (386,697 shares, per claim #13497). That is concentrated patching, not a diversified strategy. The equity line had drawn only $20.7M by late October (per claim #13499), set against $514.8M of outstanding convertibles (per claim #13511). Going-concern doubt was disclosed the next day (per claim #19788). The facility was too small for the liability it sat beside. Its earliest record also states a $150 figure (per claim #14082) that later filings consistently give as $100M, which requires explanation.

The second regime is restructuring. Debtor-in-possession funding moved from an original noteholder facility ($57M, per claim #12791) to a B. Riley replacement ($70M, per claim #12732). That replacement carried an upfront fee and an exit premium (per claims #12750 and #12749). The exit package is more coherent in design but heavier in layers. It combines $260M of secured convertibles (per claim #6336), $150M of senior secured notes (per claim #6337), an $80M exit facility (per claim #6334), a rights offering ($55M, per claim #6514, with its deadline delayed per claim #6400), two warrant tranches and contingent value rights ($130M, per claim #6340). Dilution under this structure arrives in deferred, contingent stages rather than as one event.

On use of proceeds, the record is sparse. Merger proceeds of $195M are stated (per claims #13929 and #13794), but no claim tracks where they went, so whether deployment matched intent cannot be assessed. The record contains no insider transactions. Two internal inconsistencies require explanation. Tranche 1 warrants are given as 93,381,418 (per claim #6338) and separately as 98.4M at $6.81 (per claim #6323). The Chapter 11 filing is dated January 2024 (per claim #6386), after DIP activity had been running since early 2023, which suggests the dates reflect when documents were disclosed rather than when events occurred.

A careful reader should watch four items. The first is the conversion terms and 2029 maturity of the secured convertibles (per claim #6319). The second is the exit facility amortization, which is not yet verifiable (per claim #6316). The third is the Year 1 contingent value rights obligation ($43M, per claim #6325). The fourth is whether warrant exercises near $6.81 become the next major source of dilution.

Core Scientific's record describes a capital structure that was repeatedly patched under pressure and then rebuilt through restructuring. In its first months as a listed company it leaned almost entirely on B. Riley. The $75M bridge notes (claim 14081, marked delayed) were extended and amortized within four months (claims 13830, 13832, 13833). The $100M committed equity line (claims 13851, 13543) paid commitment and advisory fees in stock: 573,381 and 386,697 shares respectively, per claims 13544 and 13547. It was capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim 13545), and only $20.7M had been drawn by late October 2022 (claim 13499). That draw sat against $514.8M of outstanding convertible notes (claim 13511), and the going-concern disclosure came the next day (claim 19788). The mix in this period reads as opportunistic rather than strategic: one counterparty supplied bridge debt, an equity line, and advisory services at the same time, and the equity facility was too small to address the convertible overhang. The 2023 sequence follows the same pattern. The original $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12730) gave way to a $70M B. Riley replacement facility (claim 12732). The restructuring support agreement was terminated (claim 13350), and the record later refers to a further replacement DIP being pursued (claim 12353). The exit package is more coherent: $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6321), $260M of secured convertibles maturing 2029 (claim 6319), an $80M exit facility (claim 6315), and a $55M rights offering (claim 6514), whose deadline was extended (claim 6400). Dilution was heavily front-loaded at emergence. Tranche 2 warrants for roughly 82.0M shares at $0.01 (claim 6324) are effectively equity, alongside 98.4M Tranche 1 warrants at $6.81 (claim 6323) and a convertible that adds further latent share issuance. Use of proceeds cannot be assessed meaningfully. Beyond the $195M merger proceeds allocation (claim 13929), the record contains no deployment disclosures, and no insider transactions appear. The entries also end in January 2024. That gap requires explanation before anyone draws conclusions about the post-emergence period. A reader should next watch conversion activity on the $260M notes, Tranche 1 exercise relative to the $6.81 strike, the Year 1 contingent value rights obligation of $43M (claim 6325), and the unverified exit-facility amortization (claim 6316).

The record divides into three phases, and the dilution story changes character across them. In the first, through late 2022, Core Scientific leaned almost entirely on B. Riley. The relationship began with $75M of bridge promissory notes (claim #14081, marked delayed) and a committed equity facility arranged alongside the listing (claim #14082). It then formalized into a $100M common stock purchase agreement (claim #13851), capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim #13545). Commitment and advisory fees were also paid in stock, 573,381 and 386,697 shares respectively (claims #13853, #13547). This reads less as a designed capital structure than as a single counterparty supplying liquidity on serial terms. The $514.8M of convertible notes outstanding (claim #13511) sat above a merger that netted only $195M (claim #13794), and the equity line had produced the $20.7M figure reported in claim #13499 when substantial doubt about going concern was disclosed (claim #19788).

The second phase is debtor-in-possession financing. A $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12730) with $18M of syndication support (claim #12731) was displaced by a $70M B. Riley replacement facility (claim #12732). Its 10% rate, upfront fee and exit premium (claims #12747, #12750, #12749) confirm B. Riley's continued role as lender of last resort.

The third phase, emergence, replaces patching with a comprehensive recapitalization. It comprises $150M of senior secured notes maturing 2028 and $260M of secured convertibles maturing 2029 (claims #6321, #6319), a $260M equity distribution to old convertible holders (claim #6518), and a $55M rights offering (claim #6514) whose deadline was extended (claim #6400). It also includes an $80M exit facility (claim #6315), two warrant tranches, and $130M of contingent value rights (claim #6340). The Tranche 2 warrants at $0.01 (claim #6324) are functionally committed dilution, and Tranche 1 at $6.81 (claim #6323) becomes dilutive at that price.

Use of proceeds cannot be tested: the merger allocation (claim #13929) is stated but no deployment data appears in the record. No insider transactions are on record, and the record ends at emergence in early 2024.

A careful reader should watch four things: Year 1 CVR obligations (claim #6325); the exit facility amortization, still not yet verifiable (claim #6316); the conversion price on the 2029 secured convertibles (claim #6320); and whether post-emergence financing diversifies away from the single-sponsor dependence that defined 2022.

Core Scientific's record reads as a single arc of liquidity management rather than a planned capital program, and the disclosed claims end at the January 2024 emergence, so nothing here speaks to the post-reorganization period. The starting point was a de-SPAC that delivered net proceeds of $195M (claim 13794) against $515M of outstanding convertible notes (claim 13795). Within months the company was adding short-dated capital from a single counterparty: $75M of B. Riley bridge notes (claim 13829), whose stated terms were later extended (claims 13832, 13833), and a $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851). That facility was capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim 13545), and only about $20.7M had been drawn by late October 2022 (claim 13499). Several share counts in the record carry dollar labels (claims 13544, 13547), so per-share economics require reading the source filings directly.

The mix is better described as sequential patching than as a strategy. Bridge debt, an equity line, and fee shares (claim 13834) all came from one relationship and were layered onto an unresolved convertible stack. The going-concern disclosure (claim 19788) arrived within a week of the equity line's limited usage being reported. The bankruptcy period repeated the pattern on a larger scale. A $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12730) gave way to a $70M B. Riley replacement DIP (claim 12732), carrying an upfront fee (claim 12788) and an exit premium (claim 12789). A restructuring support agreement was terminated (claim 13350), and the equity rights offering deadline was extended (claim 6400), which the record classifies as delayed.

Use-of-proceeds tracking is thin. The merger allocation is stated (claim 13929), but no claim documents actual deployment. The bridge amortization schedule (claim 13830) and the anticipated DIP prepayment (claim 12376) both remain not yet verifiable.

The emergence structure carries the real dilution. It comprises $166M of new common stock (claim 6370), a $260M secured convertible due 2029 (claim 6319), $150M of senior secured notes due 2028 (claim 6321), an $80M exit facility (claim 6315), contingent value rights (claim 6340), and two warrant tranches (claims 6323, 6324). The second tranche carries a $0.01 strike, which makes it functionally equivalent to common stock.

A careful reader should watch four things. First is the conversion behavior of the 2029 secured convertibles, whose conversion terms are stated but not quantified here (claim 6320). Second is the exercise of the Tranche 1 warrants at $6.81 (claim 6323). Third is whether the Year 1 CVR obligation (claim 6325) was settled in cash or shares. Fourth is whether the exit facility's amortization (claim 6316) can be verified.

The record runs from the April 2022 listing through the January 2024 emergence filings and is cut off there. It contains no insider transactions and nothing after emergence, so it supports a read of how the company got through a liquidity crisis but says little about its current posture. Several amounts are recorded without consistent units, and some appear to be share counts entered as dollars, so figures here are cited as recorded.

The pre-petition period shows patching more than strategy. The company arrived at the listing carrying roughly $515M of convertible notes (claims #13795, #13511) against net merger cash of $195M (claim #13794). It then layered on B. Riley bridge notes (claim #13829) and a $100M committed equity facility (claims #13851, #13543). That facility was capped under Nasdaq rules at 70,289,880 shares (claim #13495), and its commitment and advisory fees were paid in stock (claims #13853, #13547). The record shows 20.7M recorded as equity-line shares sold (claim #13499), with units unclear, against the $100M headline. Within about three months of the facility, the company disclosed substantial doubt about going concern (claim #19788) and a decline in bitcoin holdings (claim #19789). The stated allocation of merger proceeds (claim #13929) cannot be reconciled with deployment from this record. That gap requires explanation rather than inference.

The restructuring phase is coherent in structure but revised often. A $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12730) was replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claims #13295, #12732), the support agreement was terminated (claim #13350), and the equity rights offering deadline was extended (claim #6400). The rights offering was sized at $55M (claim #6385). The plan converted creditors into owners and lenders: $260M of new secured convertible notes (claim #6319), $150M of senior secured notes (claim #6321), an $80M exit facility (claim #6315), and new equity to noteholders (claim #6518). Two warrant tranches were issued, one at $6.81 and one at $0.01 (claims #6323, #6324), along with contingent value rights (claim #6340). Dilution was therefore heaviest at emergence, and it remains open-ended through the warrants and the convertible.

The Chapter 11 filing carries a January 2024 date in the record (claim #6386), even though DIP activity was already on file in February 2023. That dating should be checked before anyone relies on it. Going forward, a careful reader should watch four things: conversion activity on the $260M notes, exercise of the near-zero-strike Tranche 2 warrants, whether CVR payouts are triggered, and any later disclosure that maps exit-facility draws to specific uses.

The record for Core Scientific divides into three phases: a de-SPAC liquidity scramble in 2022, a Chapter 11 period through 2023, and an emergence recapitalization in early 2024. The record has no insider transactions and no data after January 2024, so any judgment about post-emergence conduct is outside what the claims support. The financing list also ends mid-entry at claim 6340.

The pre-petition phase has the profile of patching rather than a planned capital program. The merger delivered net cash recorded at $195 (claims 13794, 13929). The company was already carrying $514.8M of convertible notes (claim 13511). Within months it relied almost entirely on a single counterparty. B. Riley provided bridge notes of $75M (claim 13829), whose amortization and extensions are tagged delayed (claims 13830, 13832, 13833). It also provided a $100M committed equity line (claim 13543), capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim 13545). Fees were paid in stock: 573,381 commitment shares and 386,697 advisory shares (claims 13544, 13547). Only $20.7M had been drawn on the equity line (claim 13499) when going-concern doubt was disclosed (claim 19788). That leaves the facility's practical capacity unresolved.

In bankruptcy, the noteholder DIP of $57M plus $18M syndication (claims 12730, 12731) was replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim 13295). Its interest, upfront and exit terms are recorded as 10, 4 and 5 without units (claims 13206, 13207, 13208), and its maturity is tagged delayed (claim 13209). The replacement also required renegotiating the noteholder support agreement (claim 13350).

The exit structure moves most of the dilution into the restructured capital stack. It consists of an $80 exit facility split between new money and cashless components (claims 6497, 6498), $150 of secured notes (claim 6516), $260 of secured convertible notes alongside $260 of new equity to convertible holders (claims 6517, 6518), and a $55 rights offering backstopped at $37 (claims 6385, 6515), whose deadline was extended (claim 6400). New common stock recorded at $166 was issued on emergence (claim 6370), along with contingent value rights recorded at $13 (claim 6340).

On use of proceeds, the record states only the merger allocation and never shows deployment. That gap requires explanation.

A careful reader should watch four things. The first is the maturity and conversion terms of the $260 secured convertibles, whose maturity is tagged delayed (claim 6505). The second is the settlement mechanics of the CVRs. The third is whether the post-emergence period repeats the single-counterparty dependence seen in 2022. The fourth is any insider selling once lock-ups lapse.

Core Scientific's record traces a company that entered public markets already leaning on its capital structure and then lost control of it within a year. The listing via the XPDI merger produced net cash of $195M (claim #13794), but it sat beside $514.8M of convertible notes outstanding (claim #13511). The financing that followed was repair work, not a sequenced plan. The B. Riley committed equity facility of $100M (claim #13851) arrived with commitment shares (573,381, per claim #13853, which reads as a share count) and advisory-fee shares (386,697, per claim #13547) paid before meaningful capital flowed. By late October 2022 only $20.7M had been drawn (claim #13499), against a Nasdaq-imposed issuance cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim #13545). That cap, not investor appetite, set the facility's practical ceiling. The $75M bridge notes (claim #13829) and their extensions are tagged delayed throughout, and the going-concern disclosure (claim #19788) followed within weeks.

The mix during Chapter 11 is best read as counterparty substitution. The noteholder group's original $57M DIP (claim #12730) was displaced by a $70M B. Riley replacement facility (claim #12804), which itself carries delayed tags on maturity. The restructuring support agreement was terminated (claim #13350) and later re-formed (claim #6534). The exit architecture is more coherent than what preceded it. It combines an $80M exit facility split evenly between new money and cashless roll-up (claims #6497 and #6498), $150M of new secured notes (claim #6499), $260M of new secured convertibles (claim #6500), and a $55M rights offering (claim #6385) backstopped at $37M (claim #6515). Even so, the rights-offering deadline was extended (claim #6400). The record does not show how the merger proceeds allocation (claim #13929) was ultimately deployed, so the link between announced and actual use of proceeds cannot be assessed from this data. No insider transactions appear in the record.

The record ends at emergence in January 2024, and the final claims are truncated. A reader should therefore treat the post-reorganization picture as incomplete. Three items are worth tracking. The first is the conversion terms and maturity of the $260M secured convertibles, whose maturity is tagged delayed (claim #6505). The second is the overhang implied by the Tranche 2 warrants, where the 81,984,644 figure (claim #6339) reads as a unit count rather than dollars. The third is whether the post-emergence company returns to standby equity facilities of the kind that characterized 2022.

Core Scientific's record reads less as a financing strategy than as a sequence of increasingly constrained responses to a balance sheet that was already stretched at listing. The company entered public markets carrying the $514.8M of convertible notes recorded in claim #13511, and its first moves after the merger were stopgaps. These were bridge notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, carried as $75M in claim #13829 and later extended and re-amortized per claims #13832 and #13830, and a $100M committed equity line with B. Riley Principal Capital II per claim #13851. The equity line was capped by Nasdaq rules at 70,289,880 shares per claim #13545, and only $20.7M had been drawn by late October 2022 per claim #13499. Separately, commitment and advisory-fee shares were issued to B. Riley affiliates under claims #13853 and #13547. The going-concern disclosure in claim #19788 followed within days, which suggests the line was never sized to address the underlying obligations.

The Chapter 11 period shows similar patching. An original DIP commitment from the ad hoc noteholder group, $57M per claim #12730, was terminated and replaced by B. Riley's $70M facility per claim #13295, and repeated maturity entries are marked delayed. The exit structure is where dilution becomes structural rather than incremental. It combines an $80M exit facility per claim #6334, $150M of new secured notes per claim #6516, $260M of new secured convertible notes per claim #6517, a $260M equity distribution to convertible noteholders per claim #6518, and a $55M rights offering per claim #6514 whose deadline was extended per claim #6400. In practice, legacy debt holders were converted into owners and the cap table was reset.

The record contains a merger proceeds allocation of $195M per claim #13929, but no disclosure of how those proceeds were actually deployed, so that question cannot be assessed. There are also no insider transactions on record. Because the data ends in January 2024, the post-emergence period is effectively undisclosed here. Readers should watch three items. The first is conversion activity on the new secured convertibles, whose maturity terms are marked delayed per claim #6505. The second is settlement of the contingent value rights per claim #6340. The third is whether post-emergence financing again relies on a single counterparty.

Core Scientific's record describes a company whose financing posture moved from growth capital to rescue capital within roughly nine months, then to a creditor-designed recapitalization. The public listing arrived through the XPDI merger with net cash proceeds of $195M (claim #13794) against $514.8M of convertible notes already outstanding (claim #13511). The listing therefore delivered less new equity than the debt it sat beneath, and the sequence that follows reads as a response to that imbalance rather than a planned capital program.

The mid-2022 layer is concentrated in a single counterparty. B. Riley provided the $75M bridge notes (claim #13829), later extended in $60M and $15M pieces (claims #13832, #13833) and carried as delayed. It also provided the $100M committed equity facility (claim #13851), paid for with 573,381 commitment shares (claim #13853) and 386,697 advisory shares (claim #13547). Only $20.7M had been drawn on that line by late October (claim #13499), the same week going-concern doubt was disclosed (claim #19788). The committed facility did not function as a meaningful source of liquidity, and the mix at this stage reads as opportunistic patching rather than a coherent structure.

The Chapter 11 period (claim #12772) repeats the concentration. The $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12730) was terminated and replaced by B. Riley's $70M facility (claim #13295), carrying a 10% rate plus upfront and exit fees (claims #13296, #13297), with maturity repeatedly marked delayed. The exit architecture was set by creditors rather than the issuer: $260M of new secured convertibles (claim #6517), $150M of new secured notes (claim #6516), an $80M exit facility split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims #6506, #6507), and a $55M rights offering (claim #6514) whose deadline was extended (claim #6400).

The record contains almost no stated use of proceeds beyond the merger allocation (claim #13929), so whether deployment tracked intent cannot be assessed from this data. No insider transactions appear. Some figures are recorded in inconsistent units, and many claims are duplicates across filings.

The record ends around emergence in January 2024. A careful reader should watch four items: how the $260M secured convertibles convert, whether the Tranche 1 warrants (claim #6338) are exercised, the final size of the rights offering, and whether the post-emergence company can finance itself without returning to a single-lender dependency.

Core Scientific's record divides into two phases: a short run of stopgap financings after listing, and a court-supervised recapitalization. Dilution came less from issuance than from the conversion of debt claims into equity at emergence.

The listing brought net merger proceeds of $195M (claim #13794) against $514.8M of convertible notes outstanding (claim #13511). The pre-petition financings that followed came almost entirely from one counterparty. B. Riley provided the $100M committed equity facility (claim #13543) and the $75M bridge notes (claim #13829), later extended in $60M and $15M tranches (claims #13832, #13833). It also received 573,381 commitment shares (claim #13544) and 386,697 advisory-fee shares (claim #13547). Only $20.7M of the equity line had been drawn (claim #13499), and the facility carried a Nasdaq-driven cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim #13495). These instruments bought time rather than funding a stated plan. Substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern followed shortly after (claim #19788).

In Chapter 11 (claim #12772), the original $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12791) and its $18M syndication (claim #12792) were replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim #13295). That facility carried roughly 10% interest (claim #13296), a $4M upfront fee (claim #12750) and a $5M exit premium (claim #12749), and its maturity is recorded as delayed. The exit structure was more deliberate. It combined an $80M exit facility, split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims #6506, #6507); $150M of new secured notes (claim #6516); $260M of new secured convertible notes (claim #6517); $260M of equity to convertible noteholders (claim #6518); and a $55M rights offering with a $37M backstop (claims #6514, #6515). Its deadline was extended (claim #6400).

Use of proceeds cannot be tested from this record. Beyond the merger-proceeds allocation (claim #13929), no stated use is paired with a later disclosure of how the money was actually spent. No insider transactions appear in the data provided.

The record ends in January 2024 with a miner equipment lender facility and senior secured notes that carry no disclosed amounts (claims #6335, #6337). A careful reader should watch three things. First, whether the rights offering closed at the full $55M. Second, the maturity terms of the secured convertible notes, currently recorded as delayed (claim #6505). Third, how much dilution conversion of the $260M convertible tranche would add on top of the $166M of new common stock issued at emergence (claim #6370).

Core Scientific's disclosed record falls into three phases: a post-SPAC liquidity squeeze, a court-supervised restructuring, and an exit recapitalization. The record ends in January 2024, so nothing here speaks to the company's financing behavior after emergence. The first phase shows dilution driven by need rather than plan. Net merger cash of $195M (claim 13794) sat against $514.8M of convertible notes outstanding (claim 13511). Within weeks the company turned to a single counterparty, B. Riley, for both $75M in bridge notes (claim 13829) and a $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851). The dollar figures attached to the commitment and advisory-fee items are share counts: 573,381 commitment shares (claim 13853) and 386,697 advisory shares (claim 13547). A Nasdaq issuance cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim 13545) bounded the facility. Only $20.7M had been sold under the equity line by late October 2022 (claim 13499), the same week going-concern doubt was disclosed (claim 19788). The bridge notes were extended and restructured within months (claims 13832, 13833). The mix in this period reads as sequential patching around a debt stack the equity line was never sized to address. The restructuring phase continued that pattern. An original $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12791) was terminated and replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim 12774) at a 10% rate (claim 12747), with upfront and exit premiums attached (claims 12788, 12789). Its maturity is recorded as delayed (claim 12748). The exit package is where a coherent structure first appears. It comprised an $80M exit facility (claim 6334), $150M of new secured notes (claim 6516), $260M of secured convertible notes (claim 6336), a $260M equity distribution to convertible noteholders (claim 6518), and a $55M rights offering (claim 6385) with a $37M backstop (claim 6515). The rights offering deadline was extended (claim 6400). On use of proceeds, the only stated allocation is for the merger proceeds (claim 13929). The record contains no deployment data against which to test it, and no insider transactions are disclosed. A reader should watch three items. The first is the maturity terms of the $260M secured convertibles, which are recorded as delayed (claim 6505). The second is the terms of the tranche warrants, where the record is truncated (claim 6338). The third is the new common stock figure at emergence (claim 6370), whose units are not specified and require explanation before post-emergence dilution can be measured.

Core Scientific's financing record from April 2022 to January 2024 shows a company paying more and more for liquidity until the capital structure was rebuilt in bankruptcy. This record does not show a planned funding strategy. It also contains no insider transactions, and it stops at emergence, so it says nothing about post-2024 conduct. Some figures appear in millions and others in units; where the scale is ambiguous, the figures below are cited as recorded.

The 2022 mix leaned on a single counterparty. B. Riley provided a $100,000,000 committed equity facility (claim #13851) and $75,000,000 of bridge notes (claim #13829). Securing that support cost equity before any capital arrived: 573,381 commitment shares (claim #13449) and 386,697 advisory-fee shares (claim #13450). By late October only $20,700,000 had been drawn under the equity line (claim #13499), a small amount against $514,800,000 of convertible notes outstanding (claim #13511). The bridge terms were extended within months (claims #13832, #13833), and the going-concern disclosure followed on October 27 (claim #19788). The equity line was too small relative to the debt load to change the company's position.

In Chapter 11, financing terms were revised more than once. The original $57,000,000 noteholder DIP (claim #12730) was terminated. B. Riley replaced it with a $70,000,000 facility (claim #12774) at a 10% rate (claim #12747), with a $4 upfront fee (claim #12750) and a $5 exit premium (claim #12749). Its maturity terms are marked delayed across several filings (claims #13298, #12748).

The exit structure moved the burden onto creditors. It included $150 of new secured notes (claim #6516), $260 of secured convertible notes (claim #6517), and $260 of equity issued to convertible noteholders (claim #6518). It also included an $80 exit facility, half new money and half cashless (claims #6506, #6507), and a $55 rights offering (claim #6514) backstopped at $37 (claim #6515). The rights offering deadline was later extended (claim #6400).

On use of proceeds, the record states a $195 merger-proceeds allocation (claims #13929, #13794) but contains no disclosure of how that money was actually spent. That gap requires explanation before anyone can judge whether the plan was followed.

The record ends with the Tranche 1 warrants entry (claim #6338), whose terms are truncated. A careful reader should watch four things next: whether the $260 secured convertibles convert or are refinanced, what dilution the warrant tranches bring once exercised, whether the exit facility's new-money half is drawn, and whether any filings after emergence restore a direct link between capital raised and capital deployed.

The record divides into three phases, and dilution runs through all of them. In 2022 the company relied almost entirely on B. Riley affiliates for incremental capital: a $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851), $75M in bridge promissory notes (claim 13829), and later extensions recorded at $60M and $15M (claims 13832, 13833), all sitting beside $514.8M of outstanding convertible notes (claim 13511). The equity line had drawn only $20.7M (claim 13499) by late October 2022 against its $100M headline, while the facility carried a Nasdaq-driven cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim 13545) and fee shares were paid in stock, 573,381 commitment shares (claim 13853) and 386,697 advisory shares (claim 13547). Several of these figures appear in the dataset as dollar amounts but read as share counts, so unit handling in the source requires explanation. The going-concern disclosure (claim 19788) followed within a day of the equity-line figure, which suggests the facility was not scaling fast enough to cover obligations.

The Chapter 11 phase reads as patching rather than design. An original $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12730) with $18M in syndication support (claim 12731) was terminated (claim 13366) and replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim 13295). Fees on that facility are recorded as $4 and $5 (claims 13207, 13208) with units unspecified, and its maturity is repeatedly marked delayed (claims 13298, 12748).

The emergence structure is more deliberate: $260M of secured convertible notes (claim 6336), $150M of new secured notes (claim 6516), an $80M exit facility split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims 6506, 6507), and a $55M equity rights offering (claim 6514) backstopped at $37M (claim 6515), whose deadline was extended (claim 6400) before being restated (claim 6385). Converting prepetition noteholders into equity and new converts is itself a large dilution event, recorded at $260M in new common interests (claim 6518).

Use-of-proceeds disclosure is sparse. The $195M in merger proceeds (claim 13794) has no matching deployment record, so the data does not allow proceeds to be tracked against spending. No insider transactions appear on record.

A careful reader should watch three items. The first is the conversion and maturity terms of the $260M secured converts, whose maturity is marked delayed (claim 6505). The second is exercise of the Tranche 1 warrants (claim 6338), which are listed but truncated in this record. The third is whether post-emergence financing moves away from the single-counterparty dependence that defined 2022. The dataset ends in January 2024, so everything after emergence is outside this read.

Core Scientific's record through January 2024 shows two separate financing regimes rather than one trajectory. The first, from April to October 2022, is a post-SPAC liquidity program built almost entirely around a single counterparty. B. Riley affiliates provided the $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851) and the $75M bridge notes (claim 13829). They also received commitment and advisory-fee shares (claims 13449, 13450). The record prints those two figures with dollar signs, but the descriptions indicate they are share counts. These instruments sat alongside $514.8M of outstanding convertible notes (claim 13511) and roughly $195M of net merger proceeds (claim 13794), and together they read as layered patching against a fixed debt stack rather than a planned structure. Sales under the equity line reached $20.7M (claim 13499), a modest fraction of the commitment. The 70,289,880-share Nasdaq cap (claim 13495) limited how much of that facility could ever be drawn. The bridge note extensions are marked delayed (claims 13832, 13833).

The second regime is the Chapter 11 process. The original $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12791) was replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim 13295), with stated rate and exit-premium terms (claims 13296, 13297). Its maturity is repeatedly marked delayed (claims 13298, 12748). The exit structure combined an $80M exit facility (claim 6334), $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6337) and $260M of secured convertible notes (claim 6336). It also included a $55M equity rights offering (claim 6385), whose deadline was extended (claim 6400), and two warrant tranches (claims 6338, 6339). Dilution in this phase is mainly a transfer of equity to creditors (claim 6510) rather than new issuance, so pre- and post-emergence share counts are not directly comparable.

On use of proceeds, the record is thin. Apart from the merger proceeds allocation (claim 13929) and the DIP mechanics, it states no deployment targets against which actual spending can be tested. The record also appears to end partway through the January 22, 2024 entries. Post-emergence activity, including any insider transactions, therefore cannot be assessed here.

A sophisticated reader should watch several items next. The first is the handling of the $260M secured convertibles (claim 6336) at maturity or conversion. The second is the overhang from the two warrant tranches. The third is whether the rights offering closed as sized. The last is whether B. Riley's role, central through 2023, continues or is no longer discussed in later filings.

The supplied record runs from April 2022 to January 2024 and cuts off mid-entry, so nothing after emergence is visible here. Several share counts are also rendered as dollar figures. Within that window, the pattern is less a dilution trajectory than a sequence of liquidity patches from a single counterparty, followed by a court-supervised reset. Before the filing, financing leaned heavily on B. Riley. The $75M bridge notes (claims 14081, 13829) carry a delayed status. An August 2022 extension and a new amortization schedule followed (claims 13832, 13833, 13830), so the terms were revised within months of signing. The committed equity facility first appears at $150M (claim 14082) and was executed at $100M (claim 13851). The record does not explain that revision. The facility was capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim 13545), and about $20.7M had been drawn by late October 2022 (claim 13499). Commitment and advisory fees were paid in stock, 573,381 and 386,697 shares respectively (claims 13449, 13450). That choice conserved cash but added dilution at the margin. Against $514.8M of outstanding convertibles (claim 13453), the equity line was never sized to matter. After the filing, the original $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12730) gave way to a $70M B. Riley replacement (claim 12746). It carried a $4M upfront fee and a $5M exit premium (claims 12788, 12789), and its maturity was repeatedly marked delayed. The exit package consists of $150M of new secured notes, $260M of new secured convertibles, $260M of equity to noteholders, an $80M exit facility and a $55M rights offering with a $37M backstop (claims 6516, 6517, 6518, 6513, 6514, 6515). It is internally coherent, but it reflects a creditor-negotiated recapitalization rather than issuer-led strategy. The rights offering deadline was extended (claim 6400). Use of proceeds is thinly documented. Apart from the $195M in net merger proceeds (claim 13794), the record rarely ties a raise to its deployment, so the question of whether proceeds tracked their stated purpose cannot be answered from this data. Looking ahead, the capital stack after emergence requires attention. That means conversion behavior on the $260M secured convertibles and exercise of the Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 warrants (claims 6338, 6339, apparently about 93.4M and 82.0M units). It also means the terms behind the $130 contingent value rights figure (claim 6340), and whether new financing continues to route through one relationship lender. No insider transactions appear in the supplied data.

The record splits cleanly into two regimes, and the break is instructive. Through 2022, Core Scientific financed itself almost entirely through a single counterparty: bridge promissory notes of $75M (claim 13829), a $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851), commitment shares of 573,381 (claim 13489) and advisory fee shares of 386,697 (claim 13547), all with B. Riley entities. The April 2022 versions of both the bridge notes (claim 14081) and the equity facility (claim 14082) are carried as delayed and only appear executed in July and August, which means the announcements led the closings by roughly a quarter. That pattern — one relationship supplying bridge debt, the equity line, and the advisory work simultaneously — reads as opportunistic patching rather than a laddered capital plan, particularly against $514.8M of convertible notes already outstanding (claim 13453) and a Nasdaq-driven issuance ceiling of 70,289,880 shares (claim 13545). Actual drawdown was modest relative to the headline: $20.7M of equity line shares sold (claim 13499) against a $100M commitment.

The second regime is court-supervised and therefore structurally coherent by construction. The original $57M noteholder DIP (claim 12730) with $18M of syndication (claim 12731) was displaced by a $70M B. Riley replacement facility at a 10% rate (claims 12746, 12747) carrying a $4M upfront fee (claim 12788) and $5M exit premium (claim 12789). That facility was repaid and terminated in February 2023 (claims 13365, 13366), yet the company was again pursuing a replacement DIP in July (claim 12353) and November (claim 6525) — repeated re-solicitation of the same instrument that requires explanation. Emergence financing is the most orderly element on record: $150M senior secured notes (claim 6337), $260M secured convertible notes (claim 6517), an $80M exit facility split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims 6506, 6507), and a $55M rights offering (claim 6514) that was extended (claim 6400) before completing (claim 6385).

Use of proceeds cannot be assessed here. Apart from $195M net merger cash (claim 13794) and its allocation (claim 13929), the disclosures describe instruments rather than deployment, and the record contains no insider transactions at all. What warrants attention is dilution not yet realized: 93,381,418 Tranche 1 and 81,984,644 Tranche 2 warrants (claims 6338, 6339), $130M of contingent value rights (claim 6340), and conversion of the $260M converts against $166M of new common stock issued at emergence (claim 6370). The record ends January 2024; anything after is unobserved.

Two features dominate this record: a compressed issuance cadence and a single recurring counterparty. From the XPDI merger in mid-2022, which delivered roughly $195M net (claim 13794), the company returned to the market within ten weeks, and from that point through the Chapter 11 filing (claim 12772) there is scarcely a quarter without a new instrument. The intervals shorten as the sequence progresses, which is the trajectory worth noting more than any single size.

The mix reads as opportunistic patching rather than a program, and the tell is concentration. B. Riley entities supply the $75M bridge notes (claim 13829), the $100M committed equity facility (claim 13851), and later the $70M replacement DIP (claim 12746) after the ad hoc noteholder group's $57M original commitment was terminated (claim 12803). One lender occupying the bridge, the equity line, and the debtor-in-possession tier simultaneously holds the company's optionality at every level of the stack. The pricing attached to that position, 10% on the replacement DIP (claim 12747), a $4M upfront fee (claim 12788), a $5M exit premium (claim 12789), plus 573,381 commitment shares (claim 13489) and 386,697 advisory shares (claim 13490), is compensation for being the available counterparty rather than the competitive one.

Dilution is better read against capacity than against dollars drawn: only $20.7M of the $100M line was used (claim 13499) against a Nasdaq cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim 13495), and the facility is among the items no longer discussed once bankruptcy financing arrives. Readers should also resist double-counting, since that same $100M commitment recurs across at least eight claims (13480, 13488, 13494, 13506, 13510, 13515, 13543, 13696) as repeated disclosure, not incremental capital.

Use of proceeds is the thinnest part of the record. Apart from the merger allocation (claim 13929), the filings identify sources without traceable deployment, so announced-versus-actual cannot be tested here; that gap requires explanation rather than inference.

What to watch is the emergence structure: $166M of new common stock (claim 6370) sitting beneath 93,381,418 Tranche 1 and 81,984,644 Tranche 2 warrants (claims 6338, 6339), $260M of new secured convertibles (claim 6517), and $130M in contingent value rights (claim 6340). The contingent overhang exceeds the new equity base. Note also the extended rights offering deadline (claim 6400) and the delayed markings clustered on bridge amortization and DIP maturity. The record supplied ends at January 2024, so whether emergence broke the episodic pattern cannot be assessed from it.

The record spans roughly twenty-one months, from the XPDI merger through emergence, and within that window the shape of the capital program is unusually legible. Pre-filing financing is not merely concentrated but effectively single-counterparty: B. Riley appears simultaneously as bridge lender (the $75M bridge notes, per claim 13829), equity line provider (the $100M purchase agreement, per claims 13851 and 13852), fee recipient in stock (573,381 commitment shares, per claim 13853; 386,697 advisory shares, per claim 13547; $750,000 of advisory equity, per claim 13831), and later as replacement DIP lender (the $70M facility, per claim 12774). One relationship spanning senior debt, dilutive equity, and advisory compensation is coherent as a relationship but not as a financing strategy; it concentrates leverage on the other side of the table precisely as the $514.8M convertible stack (claim 13453) became the binding constraint.

Two revisions deserve note. The committed equity facility described at $150M in April 2022 (claim 14082) is documented at $100M by July (claim 13851); the larger figure is no longer discussed. And of that $100M, only $20.7M of shares had actually been sold through the line (claim 13499) before the process moved into court, against an issuance cap of 70,289,880 shares (claim 13545). Announced capacity and deployed capacity diverge by roughly four-fifths — the facility functioned as headroom, not funding.

The DIP sequence shows pricing moving against the borrower. The $57M noteholder facility plus $18M syndication (claims 12730 and 12731) was terminated (claim 12803) in favor of a $70M facility at 10% carrying a $4M upfront fee and a $5M exit premium (claims 12747, 12750, 12749), whose maturity is carried as delayed across multiple filings (claims 13298, 13209, 12748), with a $5M mandatory prepayment likewise delayed (claim 12376).

Emergence converts leverage into permanent dilution rather than retiring it: $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6337), $260M of secured convertibles (claim 6509), $260M of new equity to those same convertible holders (claim 6510), a $55M rights offering whose deadline was extended (claims 6385 and 6400), $166M of new common stock (claim 6370), and warrants over 93,381,418 and 81,984,644 shares (claims 6338 and 6339) alongside $130M of contingent value rights (claim 6340).

Watch the warrant and CVR settlement mechanics and any conversion of the $260M notes; those, not the coupon, determine the post-emergence share count. The record ends 2024-01-22 and contains no insider transactions, so that dimension cannot be assessed here.

The cadence is not periodic but reactive, and it compresses sharply under stress. The SPAC closing delivered a defined, one-time amount of net cash — $195 million, per claims #13794 and #13929 — against a convertible stack already carried at $514.8 million (claim #13453). That ratio set the terms of everything that followed: each subsequent raise was smaller than the obligation it was meant to service, so the intervals between raises shortened rather than lengthened. Within roughly ninety days of the merger the company had layered a $100 million committed equity facility (claim #13851), $75 million in bridge promissory notes (claim #13829), and two rounds of fee equity — 573,381 commitment shares and 386,697 advisory shares (claims #13489, #13490) — on top of that base.

The mix does not read as a designed capital structure so much as sequential patching around a single counterparty. B. Riley entities supplied the equity line, the bridge notes, the bridge extensions of $60 million and $15 million (claims #13832, #13833), and then the $70 million replacement DIP at a 10% rate with a $4 million upfront fee and $5 million exit premium (claims #12746, #12747, #12788, #12789), after the $57 million noteholder DIP was terminated (claim #12803). Concentration of that depth is a fact about access, not preference.

On deployment versus intent, the most instructive gap is the equity line: a $100 million commitment with a 70,289,880-share Nasdaq cap (claim #13545) against only $20.7 million actually sold (claim #13499) before Chapter 11 (claim #12772). The authorization was built for a drawdown that the share price would not support. Note also the density of items marked delayed — bridge note amortization, DIP maturity dates, the anticipated $5 million mandatory prepayment (claim #12376), and the rights offering deadline (claim #6400).

What warrants attention next is the emergence structure itself: $150 million senior secured notes and $260 million secured convertibles (claims #6337, #6517) against $166 million of new common (claim #6370), plus 93,381,418 and 81,984,644 Tranche 1 and 2 warrants (claims #6338, #6339) and $130 million of CVRs (claim #6340). That is a large contingent overhang relative to the emerging equity base, and its conversion behavior is the variable to track.

One limitation: this record contains no insider transaction data, and it terminates in early 2024, so post-emergence execution cannot be assessed here.

The pattern here is not a dilution program so much as a sequence of rescues, each one sized to the gap left by the last. The 2022 phase opens with $75M of B. Riley bridge promissory notes (claim 13829) that required extension twice within four months (claims 13832, 13833), alongside a $100M committed equity facility from a B. Riley affiliate (claim 13851) that was contractually required rather than opportunistically chosen — claim 14082 characterizes it as a condition, not an option. The facility was barely used: $20.7M of equity line shares sold (claim 13499) against a $100M commitment and a 70,289,880-share Nasdaq cap (claim 13545), while the commitment itself cost 573,381 consideration shares (claim 13544) and 386,697 advisory shares (claim 13547). An equity line drawn to one-fifth of capacity before a Chapter 11 filing indicates the instrument was priced out of usefulness, not that discipline was exercised.

The mix is coherent only in counterparty. B. Riley appears as bridge lender, equity line provider, advisory fee recipient, and then replacement DIP lender at $70M (claim 12774), 10% (claim 13296), with a 5% exit premium (claim 13297) and $4M upfront to the agent (claim 13207) — displacing the ad hoc noteholders' $57M DIP (claim 12730) and its $18M syndication (claim 12731). Three DIP structures across one case, with the terminated support agreement (claim 13364) and repaid facility (claim 13365), is the signature of financing arranged under duress rather than to plan.

Use of proceeds cannot be tracked against deployment on this record. The claims capture instrument terms densely and cash application almost not at all; the $195M of net merger proceeds (claim 13794) landing against $514.8M of convertibles (claim 13795) is the only clear before-and-after, and it is a leverage observation, not a deployment one. No insider transactions appear on record at all.

What warrants attention is that emergence embedded the dilution rather than deferred it: 93,381,418 Tranche 1 warrants (claim 6338) and $260M of secured convertibles (claim 6509) sit against $166M of new common stock (claim 6370), with $130M of CVRs (claim 6340) outstanding and the convertible maturity tagged delayed (claim 6505). The record stops in January 2024, so post-emergence behavior — particularly whether single-counterparty dependence recurs — is unobserved here.

Core Scientific's record falls into two phases: a stretch of increasingly expensive, single-counterparty patching, and a court-supervised recapitalization. The record supplied here is truncated shortly after emergence in January 2024, and it contains no insider transactions, so any read of post-emergence behavior is not supported by this data. Several figures appear to be recorded in millions, and some line items labeled in dollars (the 573,381 commitment shares per claim #13853, the 70,289,880 share cap per claim #13545) are share counts rather than cash amounts.

Through 2022 the mix does not show a coherent strategy. After the merger delivered net proceeds recorded at $195 (claim #13794) against roughly $514.8 million of outstanding convertible notes (claim #13511), the company leaned almost entirely on B. Riley affiliates. The $75 million of bridge notes (claim #13829) were later extended and amortized (claims #13830, #13832), and the committed equity facility of $100 million (claim #13851) came with share-based commitment and advisory fees (claims #13853, #13834). By late October only $20.7 million had been drawn from that facility (claim #13499). That modest draw, set against the size of the convertible stack, suggests the equity line was not a practical source of liquidity at prevailing share prices.

The Chapter 11 period shows repeated revision rather than a single plan. An original $57 million DIP from noteholders (claim #12730) was replaced by a $70 million B. Riley facility (claim #12732) carrying a 10% rate and an exit premium (claims #12747, #12749). A restructuring support agreement was terminated (claim #13350). The equity rights offering deadline was extended (claim #6400). The resulting structure converted the old convertibles into $260 of new secured convertible notes plus $260 of equity (claims #6517, #6518), alongside $150 of new secured notes (claim #6516), an $80 exit facility that was only half new money (claims #6506, #6507), and CVRs recorded at $130 (claim #6340).

The record states amounts but not how proceeds were deployed, and the merger proceeds allocation (claim #13929) carries no breakdown, so announced use cannot be tested against actual use. For what comes next, the terms and conversion behavior of the $260 secured convertibles, exercise of the Tranche 1 warrants (claim #6338), settlement of the CVRs, and any refinancing of the exit facility each represent pending dilution or leverage that the truncated record does not resolve.

Core Scientific's record traces a company that moved in about eighteen months from a funded public listing, through court-supervised financing, to a recapitalized emergence. The early filings describe liquidity sourced mainly from one counterparty. After the XPDI merger, which yielded net cash proceeds of $195 million per claim 13794, the company leaned on B. Riley entities: $75 million of bridge promissory notes (claims 13829 and 14081), a $100 million committed equity facility with B. Riley Principal Capital II (claim 13851), and fees partly paid in stock. Claims 13853 and 13831 record the commitment consideration as 573,381 and the advisory fee as $750,000, and claim 13547 records the advisory fee shares as 386,697. Claim 13545 caps issuance under the facility at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules. The equity line produced a figure recorded as 20.7 million in claim 13499, although the record does not make clear whether that is shares or dollars. Several bridge-note terms are flagged as delayed (claims 13832, 13833), which reads as an extension of existing credit rather than new capital. With $514.8 million of convertible notes outstanding (claim 13511) alongside these instruments, the 2022 mix looks more like successive patching around a maturity wall than a staged plan. The Chapter 11 period shows the same pattern. An original $57 million DIP commitment from noteholders (claim 12791) gave way to a $70 million replacement facility from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 12774), and a restructuring support agreement was terminated (claim 13350). Maturity dates and a $5 million mandatory prepayment are marked delayed (claims 13298, 12376). The exit structure is more coherent. It combines $150 million of new secured notes (claim 6499), $260 million of new secured convertible notes (claim 6500), an $80 million exit facility (claim 6513), and a $55 million rights offering (claim 6385), although the rights offering deadline was extended (claim 6400). Warrant tranches recorded as 93,381,418 and 81,984,644 (claims 6338, 6339) and contingent value rights (claim 6340) point to substantial overhang after emergence. The record says little about deployment. The merger proceeds allocation (claim 13929) is stated, but no later claim reconciles it with actual spending, and no insider transactions appear. The list also ends partway through the January 2024 entries, so this read cannot cover events after emergence. Readers should next watch warrant exercise and CVR settlement against share count, the servicing and conversion path of the $260 million secured convertibles, and whether later filings account for how the exit capital was used.

The record here is truncated at the January 2024 emergence filings, and no insider transactions appear in what was provided, so this read covers only the pre-bankruptcy financing, the Chapter 11 process, and the exit structure. Many entries are the same instrument repeated across successive filings, and several figures appear to mix dollars, share counts, and percentages. The 573,381 commitment shares (claim 13853) and 386,697 advisory shares (claim 13547) read as share counts, not dollar amounts, and the same likely applies to the warrant tranches.

The 2022 pattern reads as patching rather than a planned capital structure. After the XPDI merger delivered net proceeds recorded at $195 (claim 13794), the company still carried roughly $514.8 million of convertible notes (claim 13511). Within months it layered on $75 million of B. Riley bridge notes (claim 13829), paid partly in advisory-fee stock, and a $100 million committed equity facility (claim 13851). That facility was capped at 70,289,880 shares under Nasdaq rules (claim 13545), and only $20.7 million had been drawn by late October (claim 13499). A single counterparty acting as bridge lender, equity-line buyer, and adviser concentrated the company's liquidity options.

The Chapter 11 period shows the financing path being revised more than once. An original $57 million noteholder DIP (claim 12791) with $18 million of syndication support (claim 12792) was terminated, and a $70 million B. Riley replacement DIP took its place (claim 13295). Several filings mark that replacement facility and its maturity as delayed (claims 12732, 13298). The equity rights offering, recorded at $55 (claim 6514), was also marked delayed and had its deadline extended (claim 6400) before being reaffirmed (claim 6385).

The exit structure shifts the burden from new cash toward conversion of existing claims. The $80 exit facility is split evenly between new money and cashless credit (claims 6506, 6507). It sits alongside $150 of secured notes (claim 6516), $260 of secured convertible notes (claim 6517), and $260 of equity distributed to convertible noteholders (claim 6518). The emergence documents add two warrant tranches (claims 6338, 6339) and contingent value rights recorded at $130 (claim 6340). The record contains almost no stated use-of-proceeds language beyond the merger allocation (claim 13929), so whether deployment tracked stated intent cannot be assessed from this data.

A careful reader should look for the post-emergence filings missing from this record. The priorities are how and when the secured convertibles convert, the exercise status of both warrant tranches, how the contingent value rights are settled, and whether the new-money exit facility is drawn or refinanced.

Core Scientific's record describes a company that moved from growth financing to emergency liquidity within months, and then had its capital structure rebuilt through reorganization. The trajectory is best read in three phases. In mid-2022, after the XPDI merger delivered net cash recorded as $195 (claim 13794, units as filed), the company carried convertible notes of $514.8 million (claim 13511). It layered a $100 million committed equity line with B. Riley Principal Capital II (claim 13851) on top of that. The line was capped by Nasdaq issuance limits (claim 13545), and only $20.7 million had been drawn by late October (claim 13499). Within weeks came $75 million in bridge promissory notes (claim 13829), with advisory fees paid in stock (claim 13470). That sequence reads as patching rather than strategy. Each instrument answered an immediate funding gap, and the equity line never approached its headline size.

The second phase is Chapter 11 financing. A $57 million DIP from the ad hoc noteholder group (claim 12791) was terminated, as was the restructuring support agreement (claim 13350). A $70 million replacement DIP from B. Riley Commercial Capital followed (claim 13295), and several records tag it as delayed (claims 12732, 12813). The same lender family therefore acted as equity-line counterparty, bridge lender and DIP provider. That concentration requires explanation in any assessment of negotiating leverage.

The third phase, emergence, shows the heaviest dilution. New common stock was recorded at $166 (claim 6370), and a $55 equity rights offering (claim 6385) had its deadline extended (claim 6400). The package also included $260 in secured convertible notes (claim 6336), $150 in senior secured notes (claim 6337), and an $80 exit facility (claim 6334) of which only half was new money (claim 6506). Two warrant tranches followed, recorded at 93,381,418 and 81,984,644, which appear to be share counts (claims 6338, 6339). Contingent value rights were recorded at $130 (claim 6340).

The data contains no disclosed deployment of proceeds against stated uses, so that question cannot be tested. No insider transactions are on record either, and the record stops in January 2024. A sophisticated reader should watch four items: the year-two CVR obligation of $43 (claim 6326), exercise of the two warrant tranches, conversion behavior on the $260 secured convertibles, and whether post-emergence filings resume a pattern of opportunistic equity issuance.

The record for Core Scientific is best read as two capital regimes separated by a Chapter 11 filing (claim #12772), and the post-emergence period is not covered here, since the claims provided end in late January 2024. The pre-filing structure in 2022 relied on three overlapping sources. The first was the $100M committed equity facility with B. Riley (claim #13851), capped under Nasdaq rules at 70,289,880 shares (claim #13545). The second was $75M of bridge notes whose advisory fee was paid in stock (claims #13829, #13834). The third was roughly $514.8M of convertible notes already outstanding (claim #13511). Only about $20.7M had been drawn on the equity line by late October 2022 (claim #13499). That suggests the facility was sized well beyond what the share cap and market conditions allowed it to deliver. Paying fees in shares to the same counterparty that supplied both the equity line and the bridge debt reads as patching liquidity rather than a planned sequence. The restructuring phase shows revision rather than a straight line. The original $57M noteholder DIP (claim #12791), with $18M of syndication support (claim #12792), was terminated (claim #13366). It was replaced by a $70M B. Riley DIP (claim #13295) carrying upfront and exit premiums (claims #12788, #12789), and that facility's maturity is repeatedly marked delayed (claims #13298, #12748). The plan then shifted the capital stack toward secured paper, pairing $150 of senior secured notes (claim #6516) and $260 of secured convertible notes (claim #6517) with a $260 equity distribution to convertible holders (claim #6518). It also included a $55 rights offering (claim #6514), whose deadline was extended (claim #6400), backed by a $37 backstop (claim #6515). Several figures in the record lack consistent units, and some share counts appear recorded as dollar values, such as claim #13853, so magnitudes should be read with care. The record contains no stated use of proceeds and no insider transactions, so proceeds tracking cannot be assessed. A reader should next watch conversion activity on the $260 secured convertibles (claim #6336) and exercise of the two warrant tranches (claims #6338, #6339). The treatment of the contingent value rights (claim #6340), prepayment of the senior secured notes given their premiums (claim #6322), and draws on the $80 exit facility (claim #6334) also deserve attention. Each is a channel through which post-emergence dilution or leverage could shift.

The record supplied here ends in late January 2024 and contains no insider transactions, so this read covers only the arc from the XPDI merger through Chapter 11 emergence. Several entries also label share counts as dollar amounts, such as the 573,381 commitment shares in claim 13544 and the 70,289,880 cap in claim 13545, and should be read as shares. Within that window, dilution did not build steadily. It came in two distinct phases, each set by balance-sheet stress rather than by an operating plan. The first phase was a going-public event that brought in comparatively little. Net merger cash was $195M per claim 13794, set against $515M of convertible notes outstanding per claim 13795. Within weeks the company added a $100M committed equity line with B. Riley (claim 13696) and bridge notes from the same counterparty (claim 13546). By late October only $20.7M had been drawn on that line, per claim 13499. Relying on a single related counterparty for equity, bridge debt and advisory work reads as patching a gap rather than executing a financing strategy. The second phase was the bankruptcy itself. The DIP structure was revised, not simply executed. A $57M noteholder commitment (claim 12791) was replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim 13295), and its maturity and a $5M mandatory prepayment (claims 13298 and 12376) are marked delayed. The $55M equity rights offering (claim 6514) also had its deadline extended (claim 6400). Emergence then shifted the balance sheet toward secured instruments: $150M of senior secured notes maturing 2028 (claim 6321), $260M of secured convertible notes maturing 2029 (claim 6319), an $80M exit facility (claim 6315), and $260M of new equity to former convertible holders (claim 6518). The record contains no stated use of proceeds, so whether deployment tracked announcements cannot be assessed from this data. A careful reader should focus on the embedded dilution that survives emergence. The first source is the Tranche 2 warrants on roughly 82.0M shares at a $0.01 strike (claim 6324), which are effectively pre-funded. The second is roughly 98.4M Tranche 1 warrants at $6.81 (claim 6323). The third is the conversion terms on the $260M notes (claim 6320). Also worth watching are the $43M first-year contingent value rights obligation (claim 6325) and the exit facility amortization schedule marked delayed (claim 6316). Post-emergence filings would be needed to judge whether these instruments were settled, converted or revised.

The record for Core Scientific describes a company that financed itself through distress rather than a company executing a funding plan. It divides into three phases: a late-2022 liquidity scramble, a 2023 restructuring, and a January 2024 recapitalization. The disclosures end at emergence, so nothing here shows how the post-bankruptcy structure has performed.

The October 2022 package set the tone. Against $514.8 million of outstanding convertible notes (claim 13453), the company arranged a $100 million committed equity facility with B. Riley Principal Capital II (claim 13467). That facility was capped by Nasdaq issuance limits at 70,289,880 shares (claim 13468) and paired with bridge promissory notes from a B. Riley affiliate (claim 13546). It also carried 573,381 commitment shares and 386,697 advisory fee shares (claims 13469, 13470). An equity line of that size set against a convertible stack roughly five times larger could only buy time. The record contains no use-of-proceeds statement for it, so deployment cannot be compared with intent.

Financing then shifted into court. An original $57 million DIP commitment from the ad hoc noteholder group was terminated (claim 12803) and replaced by a $70 million B. Riley facility (claim 12732). The record shows $18 million of additional syndication from noteholders (claim 12731) and a later effort to find yet another replacement DIP (claim 12353). The funding counterparties changed repeatedly, which suggests the company was patching one gap at a time rather than following a settled strategy.

The exit structure is more coherent, though its terms moved before closing. The equity rights offering, recorded at $55 (claim 6514), is marked delayed and its deadline was extended (claim 6400) before it reappears as stated (claim 6385). Emergence layered an $80 million exit credit facility (claim 6315), $150 million of senior secured notes maturing 2028 (claim 6321), and $260 million of secured convertible notes maturing 2029 (claim 6319). On top of the debt sit two warrant tranches and contingent value rights with three annual obligations (claims 6325–6327). Existing equity was preserved but now sits beneath substantial contingent dilution. The Tranche 1 warrant count differs between claim 6338 (93,381,418) and claim 6323 (98.4 million at $6.81), which requires explanation.

A careful reader should watch four things. The first is whether the Tranche 2 warrants, 82.0 million at $0.01 (claim 6324), have been exercised. The second is how the CVR payments are settled. The third is whether the 2029 convertibles convert or are refinanced. The fourth is insider activity, which does not appear anywhere in this record.

Core Scientific's record falls into three phases, and the financing mix shifts sharply between them. The first is the Chapter 11 period (claim 12772). The original noteholder DIP commitment of $57M (claim 12803) and its $18M syndication support (claim 12812) were replaced by a $70M B. Riley facility (claim 13386). That facility carried a 10% rate (claim 12787) and a 5% exit premium (claim 12789), and more than one support agreement was terminated in early 2023 (claims 13350, 13364). This stretch reads as a sequence of arrangements revised under pressure rather than a planned structure. The $55M equity rights offering was delayed (claim 6514) and its deadline extended (claim 6400) before proceeds were reported (claim 5459).

The emergence structure layered several claims on the new equity. It included an $80M exit facility (claim 6334), $150M of senior secured notes (claim 6337) and $260M of secured convertibles (claim 6336). It also added 98.4M Tranche 1 warrants at $6.81 (claim 6323), 82.0M Tranche 2 warrants at $0.01 (claim 6324), and contingent value rights with three annual $43 obligations (claims 6325-6327). Dilution at this stage was built into the plan rather than raised opportunistically. The later settlement shares (claim 5035) and a 48,000,000-share incentive authorization (claim 4982) add further increments.

After emergence, the company turned to unsecured convertible markets. The record shows $448 of 3% notes (claim 5458) and a $625M offering netting $609M (claims 5280, 5281), with up to 39,596,000 conversion shares at roughly $22 (claims 5282, 5283). The record does not reconcile whether these are the same instrument, and that requires explanation. The 2026 financing marks a further change. It is a $500M senior secured Morgan Stanley term loan with a 364-day maturity (claims 2251, 2254), expanded to $1,000M within weeks (claim 2230) while options for capital formation were being evaluated (claim 11719). Moving from long-dated convertibles to short-dated secured bank debt is a meaningful change in posture.

The record states no use of proceeds for the convertible or the term loan, so deployment cannot be tested against intent. A $270 merger termination fee (claim 4723) appears without surrounding context. No insider transactions appear in the data provided, and the record is truncated after claim 11226. The obvious item to watch is how the 364-day facility is refinanced or termed out before its roughly March 2027 maturity, including whether the delayed syndication (claim 2257) completes. Readers should also watch the result of the capital-formation review and how much share count the convertibles and warrants add over time.

Core Scientific's financing record has two distinct phases, and they are best read separately. The first is a restructuring stack assembled under court supervision. The original $57,000,000 noteholder DIP (claim 12730) was replaced by the $70,000,000 B. Riley facility (claim 12732). That facility carried the fee and premium terms recorded in claims 12749 and 12750. Emergence then produced a layered capital structure: an $80M exit facility (claim 6315), $150M senior secured notes (claim 6321), $260M secured convertibles due 2029 (claim 6319), and a $55M rights offering (claim 6256). The rights offering was twice marked delayed (claims 6514, 6400). Dilution in this phase came mostly through contingent instruments rather than cash equity. These included Tranche 1 warrants at a $6.81 strike (claim 6323), near-zero-strike Tranche 2 warrants (claim 6324), and contingent value rights (claim 6340). The Tranche 1 authorization appears as 93,381,418 in claim 6338 and as 98,381,418 in claims 6252 and 6247, a discrepancy that requires explanation.

The second phase moves from repair to scale. The $625M convertible (claim 5280), with an initial conversion price near $22 (claim 5282) and up to 39.6M issuable shares (claim 5283), was the last equity-linked raise on record. A 48M-share incentive plan (claim 4982) added a separate, slower source of dilution. From 2026 the mix turns decisively to secured debt. A $500M 364-day Morgan Stanley term loan (claims 2251, 2254) was expanded to $1B within weeks (claim 11226). A $3.3B senior secured notes offering followed (claim 1834), with estimated net proceeds of $3,240M (claim 1838). Taken together, this reads as a coherent sequence of bridge financing followed by term takeout, not opportunistic patching. However, the speed of the bridge's expansion suggests capital needs grew faster than first scoped.

On use of proceeds, the record is thin. No deployment data is disclosed for the $625M convertible. The notes offering names debt repayment as its use (claim 2055), yet the bridge facility repayment is marked delayed (claim 1837). Project capital contributions of $4.4B (claim 9683) exceed the notes proceeds, and the funding source for the gap is not stated. The $270 merger termination fee (claim 4723) is recorded without context on the counterparty or the direction of payment. No insider transactions appear in the data provided.

A careful reader should watch four things. The first is confirmation that the bridge was retired before its 364-day maturity. The second is how the difference between project commitments and notes proceeds is funded. The third is the treatment of the $625M convertible if the share price holds above its conversion price. The fourth is a reconciliation of the Tranche 1 warrant count.

Core Scientific's record divides into three distinct capital regimes, and dilution came mainly from the first two. The restructuring era layered equity claims on top of the reorganized balance sheet. These included the $55 million rights offering, which was marked delayed (claim #6514) and then had its deadline extended (claim #6400) before proceeds were reported (claim #5459), along with two warrant tranches, contingent value rights, and settlement shares issued to old convertible holders (claim #5035). The warrant counts themselves require explanation: Tranche 1 appears as 93.4 million in claim #6338 but 98.4 million in claims #6252 and #6323. The second regime was the $625 million convertible (claim #5262), which carried a $22 initial conversion price and up to 39.6 million issuable shares (claims #5282, #5283). It was followed by a 48 million share incentive authorization (claim #4982) and a warrant issued to AMD (claim #136). Since then the trajectory has turned decisively toward secured debt rather than new equity. That shift reads as a coherent sequence more than patching. A $500 million 364-day term loan (claim #2251) was upsized to $1 billion within weeks (claim #11226) and then taken out by the $3.3 billion senior secured notes (claim #2054), with debt repayment as the stated use (claim #2055). The pattern is a bridge-to-term refinancing sized ahead of the build-out, although it concentrates the structure in secured obligations. Deployment broadly tracks the stated purpose. First-half capex of $954 million (claim #698) and $233 million of land and development spending (claim #699) are consistent with a heavy build phase. Two points still require explanation. First, the bridge repayment and the notes closing were both tagged delayed (claims #1837, #9347). Second, the Morgan Stanley facility and its planned uses are still being described in August (claims #1036, #1039), after the notes were meant to retire it. The Polaris purchase price also moved from $421 million (claim #1829) to $444.3 million (claim #40). Several magnitudes in the record, including long-term debt and capex (claims #700, #705), appear in inconsistent units and should not be compared directly. A careful reader should watch four things: whether the $1 billion facility is actually extinguished, how the notes' amortization (claim #1836) interacts with a $78 million quarterly operating loss (claim #697), whether the $4.4 billion of project contributions (claim #9683) implies further issuance, and how the AMD and customer contracts (claims #164, #165) convert to cash. The record contains no insider transactions, and the claim list is truncated at claim #1045.

The record divides into two regimes, and the break between them is the main finding. Through the Chapter 11 period, equity-linked instruments carried most of the capital structure: the $55 Equity Rights Offering, marked delayed in claim 6514 and extended in claim 6400 before being reported complete in claim 5459; the two warrant tranches; the contingent value rights with $43 annual obligations per claims 6325 through 6327; and settlement shares to old convertible holders under claim 5035. The $625 convertible offering in claim 5280 extended that pattern, with up to 39,596,000 shares issuable per claim 5283 at a $22 initial conversion price per claim 5282. Since early 2026 the mix has moved almost entirely to secured debt. The Morgan Stanley 364-day facility opened at $500 (claim 2251), was doubled to $1,000 within about three weeks (claim 11226), and was then followed by the $3.3 billion senior secured notes (claim 9677). Dilution from new issuance appears to have slowed, but leverage and amortization obligations have grown, including the principal amortization noted in claim 1836. That sequence reads as a deliberate refinancing path from short-term bridge to term notes, not as ad hoc patching. The speed of the bridge upsizing, however, suggests capital needs grew faster than first scoped. On use of proceeds, the notes were stated to repay debt (claim 2055) and delayed draw term loans (claim 9348), yet bridge repayment is marked delayed in claim 1837 and the expected close is marked delayed in claim 9347. Stated capital contributions of $4.4 billion (claim 9683) exceed the $3,240 net proceeds (claim 1838), which leaves a funding gap that the record does not close. That gap sits alongside a Q2 operating loss of $78 (claim 697) and H1 capex of $954 (claim 698). Several figures require explanation. Tranche 1 warrants appear as 93,381,418 in claim 6338 but 98,381,418 in claim 6252. The Polaris price is $421 in claim 1829 and $444,300,000 in claim 40. The $448 of 3% notes in claim 5458 is not reconciled to the $625 offering. A sophisticated reader should watch for confirmation that the bridge was actually retired, the terms and exercise of the AMD warrant (claim 136), the CVR payment schedule, the convertible repurchase date (claim 5284), and whether contracted revenue of $24 (claim 165) converts into cash on a timeline that matches amortization. Insider transaction data is not visible in the supplied record, which was truncated, so no reading on insider selling is offered.

Core Scientific's capital evolution from bankruptcy emergence through mid-2026 reflects a strategic pivot from equity to debt, though execution risk remains material and underexplored. Post-emergence capital was initially equity-dependent: a $625 million convertible senior notes offering at $22 conversion price (claim 5262, net proceeds $609 million per claim 5263, December 2024) stabilized the balance sheet. Potential dilution from this instrument—$39.6 million maximum shares upon conversion (claim 5266)—suggests meaningful equity exposure remains embedded in the capital stack. By March 2026, however, the company pivoted decisively toward debt. A $500 million Morgan Stanley senior secured term loan (claim 2251) was deployed immediately and expanded to $1 billion within three weeks (claim 11226). This was followed by a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering at 8% due 2031 (claim 1834, net proceeds $3.24 billion per claim 1838, May 2026). Minimal subsequent equity issuance beyond a $30 million AMD warrant (claim 136) suggests the company views debt as non-dilutive once balance sheet stability permits debt pricing.

Yet stated capital uses diverge from actual deployment. The company announced $5 billion in planned infrastructure investment (claim 2148, March 2026) and $4.4 billion in capital contributions to projects (claim 9683, April 2026). Through H1 2026, disclosed capex totaled $954 million and land-and-development spending $233 million (claims 698–699, August 2026)—roughly $1.2 billion against stated targets. This 20-25% realization rate five months in suggests either conservative guidance, project delays, or undisclosed deployment channels.

The capital structure carries elevated refinancing risk. The 8% notes pricing and Morgan Stanley facility's 364-day tenor (claim 2254) indicate tight credit conditions or market skepticism regarding execution. Long-term debt reached $4 billion by June 2026 (claim 700), yet Q2 gross margin was 49% on $164 million revenue (claims 694–695) with $78 million operating losses (claim 697). Operating leverage remains deeply negative. The company's disclosed contracted revenue potential ($24 billion, claim 1606) lies years distant.

Sophisticated readers should track three metrics: whether capex accelerates toward stated targets through year-end; whether Morgan Stanley facilities syndicate or roll into the wider debt structure before 364-day maturity; and whether AMD's contractual ramp (claim 164, $14 billion base revenue) materializes on schedule. Dilution realization from the $625 million convertible should be monitored as share count evolves.

Core Scientific emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2024 with a complex stakeholder-oriented capital structure: $260 million in secured convertible notes, $150 million in senior secured notes, and warrants and contingent value rights representing roughly $180 million in aggregate value (claims 6319, 6321, 6323, 6324, 6340). By November 2024, the company accessed capital markets independently, raising $625 million in new convertible senior notes at $22 conversion price with maximum dilution of 39.6 million shares (claim 5280). The subsequent financing trajectory shifted decisively away from equity-dilutive instruments toward fixed-rate leverage: a $500 million Morgan Stanley term loan in March 2026, expanded to $1 billion within weeks (claims 2251, 11226), followed by a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering maturing 2031 at 8% (claims 1834, 1835).

The stated use of proceeds corresponds to observable capital deployment. The $3.3 billion notes, announced April and closed May 2026, supported the $444 million acquisition of Polaris DS LLC and facility buildouts generating $954 million in H1 2026 capex (claims 2054, 40, 698). This reflects coherent strategy rather than opportunistic patching: a calibrated shift from dilutive convertibles to secured debt to fund acquisitions and infrastructure at scale.

Leverage relative to current operations requires attention. Q2 2026 produced $164 million in total revenue alongside $78 million in operating loss (claims 694, 697). The company now carries approximately $5 billion in debt across convertibles, the $3.3 billion senior secured notes due 2031, and Morgan Stanley facilities. Interest obligations on the senior notes alone approximate $264 million annually, creating substantial fixed costs against current profitability levels. The Polaris acquisition closed in August, making integration execution and synergy realization determinative for sustainable debt service. Warrant dilution is material—98.4 million shares at $6.81 and 82 million at $0.01 (claims 6323, 6324)—but derivative of operational performance. The key variable ahead is whether capital deployment drives sufficient margin expansion and revenue growth to service debt obligations, or whether the scale of leverage begins to constrain optionality.

Core Scientific's capital deployment since emergence from bankruptcy in January 2024 traces a consistent growth-financing strategy rather than opportunistic patching, though with execution risks that warrant scrutiny. The company raised $625 million in convertible senior notes in December 2024 at a $22 conversion price, generating $609 million in net proceeds (per claims 5280, 5281), followed by a $500 million term loan on March 5, 2026 that expanded to $1 billion within weeks (claims 2251, 11226). In May 2026, it announced a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering with $3.24 billion in estimated net proceeds (claims 1834, 1838), which closed August 20, 2026 (claim 7641). This was supplemented by a $1 billion Morgan Stanley financing facility on August 22, 2026 (claim 6829). The capital stack is coherent: short-dated bridge facilities funding capex and acquisitions pending longer-duration debt.

The dilution trajectory reflects both bankruptcy restructuring carryover and new growth issuances. The emergence plan distributed 180+ million warrants across two tranches, with a 39.6-million-share overhang from the convertible notes (claim 5266). A 48 million share authorization under the stock incentive plan in May 2025 (claim 4982) and AMD warrant issuance in July 2026 (claim 136) add further pressure.

Announced use of proceeds broadly aligns with stated deployment: the company is spending heavily on facility buildouts and acquisitions, including the Polaris DS acquisition at $444.3 million (claim 40) and a $270 million merger termination fee in July 2026 (claim 4723). H1 2026 capex reached $954 million, with $233 million directed to land and development (claim 698). However, a material disconnect exists between infrastructure claims and actual deployment: the company states $5 million in total infrastructure investment for facility buildouts (claim 2148) yet reports $2 million in installed infrastructure assets (claim 2147), suggesting either revised scope or timing misalignment.

The more material concern is operational leverage. Second-quarter 2026 revenue reached $164 million, but operating loss was $78 million (claims 694, 697), while total contracted revenue stands at only $24 million against a $24 billion potential pipeline (claims 1614, 1606). This yawning gap between potential and actual revenue, combined with $4 billion-plus in long-term debt (claim 706), suggests the company is financing an aspirational growth case rather than a proven model. Watch for: whether contracted revenue actually converts; how the delayed $3.3B notes offering (announced May, closed August) affected subsequent financing terms; and whether the company can sustain capex burn while reaching operating profitability before near-term maturities come due.

Core Scientific's capital structure reveals two distinct eras split by its January 2024 bankruptcy emergence. Pre-emergence shows overlapping restructuring claims across late 2023—duplicated convertibles and concurrent equity offerings—indicating distressed capital-chasing. The bankruptcy reset concentrated dilution through multiple instruments: ~$166M new equity (claim 6370), $260M convertibles maturing 2029 (claim 6319), $150M senior notes maturing 2028 (claim 6321), and warrants spanning realistic to costless exercise prices, plus an AMD warrant addition in July 2026 (claim 136, $30M value).

Post-emergence strategy shows coherence. Late 2024 brought a $625M convertible (claim 5280) at $22 conversion price with $609M net proceeds (claim 5263)—a senior instrument at a higher threshold than bankruptcy-era capital, suggesting equity confidence. The 2026 pivot is decisive: a $500M term loan expanded to $1B within weeks (claims 2251, 11226), followed by a $3.3B senior secured notes offering (claim 1834) with $3.24B net proceeds (claim 1838) at ~8% (claim 1835). This shifts from dilution-based emergence financing to debt-funded capex and acquisition strategy.

Announced use of proceeds for the $3.3B notes cited debt repayment (claim 2055), yet actual deployment shows the Polaris DS acquisition at $444.3M (claim 40, August 2026) closing concurrent with notes settlement, plus $954M capital expenditure in H1 2026 (claim 698) against $164M quarterly revenue (claim 694). The $5B infrastructure investment target (claim 2148) is aspirational relative to current cash generation. The August 2026 Morgan Stanley $1B facility (claim 6829), added weeks after notes closed, suggests either acquisition momentum or liquidity pressure.

Debt service now dominates the solvency equation. The $3.3B notes at 8% plus $1B+ term loans at SOFR+250bps imply roughly $300M+ annual debt service against an annualized $656M revenue run-rate (Q2 basis, claim 694). The AMD contract at $24B potential revenue (claim 1614) becomes essential to viability when principal amortization accelerates 2027–2028 (claim 1836). Watch whether capex deployment reaches targets, customer concentration with AMD performs reliably, and whether the $22 conversion price on the 2029 convertible remains out-of-the-money through maturity, creating repayment pressure rather than equity refinancing. The strategy pivots on execution—infrastructure completion, customer ramp, and disciplined capital allocation.

Core Scientific's capital structure narrative divides sharply into three acts: forced restructuring, market re-entry, and aggressive expansion debt. The Nov 2023 pre-bankruptcy restructuring mixing equity rights offerings ($55M, claim 6514), convertible notes ($260M, claim 6517), and senior secured debt ($150M, claim 6516) reflected constrained optionality—lenders and equity holders negotiating a path forward. That attempt collapsed; bankruptcy filing arrived Jan 4, 2024 (claim 6386). Emergence in Nov 2024 preserved this mixed-instrument approach but inverted its importance: the company issued $625M in convertible senior notes at $22 conversion price (claim 5262), betting the market would price it as a recovery play, while warrant packages ($98M and $82M tranches, claims 6323-6324) compensated creditors and early believers. This was opportunistic but strategically coherent—equity instruments for restructuring, convertibles for capital-markets access during vulnerability.

The subsequent capital trajectory, however, signals a clean shift toward pure debt financing at scale. A $500M term loan facility closed March 2026 (claim 2251) and expanded to $1B within weeks (claim 11226). Then $3.3B in senior secured notes at 8% interest (claims 1834, 1835), followed by a Morgan Stanley $1B facility at SOFR+2.50% (claim 1036). This is not opportunistic patching—it reflects recovered market confidence and a capital-intensive operational model. The Polaris DS acquisition ($444.3M purchase price, claim 40) and H1 2026 capex of $954M (claim 698) clarify the deployment: infrastructure buildout and strategic consolidation in mining, not financial engineering.

Use of proceeds aligns visibly. The $3.3B notes funded debt repayment and the Polaris acquisition (announced May 2026, claim 1834-1835). Capex spending follows the infrastructure guidance ($5M stated investment Feb 2026, claim 2148). Q2 2026 revenue of $164M with $80M gross profit (49% margin, claims 694-695) shows operational traction, though $78M operating loss (claim 697) flags overhead burden. Long-term debt now exceeds $4B (claim 700, measured Aug 2026).

A sophisticated reader should focus on revenue trajectory versus debt serviceability. The $24B in potential contracted revenue (claim 1606) anchors bull cases, but realized Q2 run rate of $164M annualizes to ~$650M—well below debt capacity. AMD contract base of $14B (claim 164) requires years to monetize. The 2031 maturity wall on $3.3B notes with 8% coupons ($264M annual interest) demands consistent 40%+ gross margins and substantial revenue scaling. Monitor whether H1 2026 capex intensity ($1.1B run rate) sustains or moderates; signal capex compression would suggest capital discipline or slowing demand.

Core Scientific emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2024 with an extraordinarily complex capital structure (claim 6386). The reorganization plan created three separate convertible note tranches of $260 million each (claim 6336), senior secured notes of $150 million (claim 6321), and two warrant tranches at starkly mismatched strike prices: 98.4 million shares at $6.81 (claim 6323) and 82 million at $0.01 (claim 6324). The company also assumed contingent value rights worth $130 million in scheduled payments (claim 6340). This layered structure reflected bankruptcy necessity rather than deliberate capital strategy. The October 2024 settlement of legacy convertible obligations ($60.6 million in stock, claim 5598) forced immediate new convertible issuance: $625 million at a $22 conversion price (claims 5280, 5265), with estimated net proceeds of $609 million (claim 5263). Rather than retire earlier dilution, management added another equity-conversion claim on top.

The post-emergence financing mix shifted decisively in 2025. After the December 2024 convertible, no further equity raises followed. Instead the company layered secured debt: a $500 million senior term loan facility in March 2026 (claim 2251) expanded by $1 billion weeks later (claim 2230), a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering maturing 2031 at 8% interest with $12 million annual amortization (claims 1834, 1835, 1836), a $1 billion Morgan Stanley facility in August 2026 (claim 1036), and $600 million in additional senior secured credit facilities (claim 2734). This sequence is coherent—debt-backed financing for capex deployment. But deployment timing reveals gaps.

The $3.3 billion notes offering stated use was debt repayment and $4.4 billion in capital contributions (claims 2055, 9683), yet H1 2026 actual capital expenditures totaled only $954 million (claim 698) with $233 million in land-and-development spending (claim 699). By August the company reported $2 billion in infrastructure assets installed (claim 2147) against a stated $5 billion total investment (claim 2148). The Polaris DS acquisition at $444 million purchase price plus $40 million conditional earnout (claims 40, 8517) was disclosed in August without prior guidance. Critically, Q2 2026 revenues of $164 million (claim 694) cannot cover the $264 million in annual interest alone on the $3.3 billion senior notes (claims 1834, 1835).

Three items warrant attention. First, the $22 conversion price on $625 million of convertible notes (claim 5265): if unrealized, this debt persists while outstanding warrants (98.4 million and 82 million shares, claims 6323, 6324) pressure equity downward. Second, collateral adequacy across the $3.3 billion senior secured notes, equipment lender facility, and Morgan Stanley credit line remains opaque, particularly loss-severity assumptions. Third, synergy realization and cash breakeven from infrastructure buildout and the Polaris DS deployment—the company cites $24 billion in potential contract revenue (claim 1606) but these remain unvalidated—typically must show positive momentum within twenty-four months of major debt issuance.

Core Scientific's capital structure shifted sharply from post-bankruptcy restraint to debt-financed growth acceleration. The 2023-24 bankruptcy exit preserved options through measured issuance: $166M in equity upon emergence (per claim 6370), $260M in convertible notes (per claim 6319), $150M in senior secured debt (per claim 6321), and $130M in contingent value rights (per claim 6340). This defensive posture reflected credit stabilization.

The company resumed capital markets access in late 2024 with $625M in convertible notes (per claim 5262), generating $609M in net proceeds (per claim 5263) at $22 conversion price—39.6M shares at maturity (per claims 5265-5266)—followed by a $448M convertible offering (per claim 5458). Dilution remained structured and measured.

This changed entirely in 2026. A $500M senior secured term facility drew in full on closing in March (per claim 2253), then expanded to at least $1.5B within weeks via amendment (per claim 2230), suggesting urgent capital needs. A $3.3B senior secured notes offering followed for debt repayment (per claims 2054-2055), implying the term loan was a near-term bridge. Simultaneously, $4.4B in planned project capital contributions were announced (per claim 9683)—exceeding the notes' proceeds by $1.1B and implying reliance on operating cash flow or additional financing. A separate $1B Morgan Stanley facility was deployed to treasury operations including bitcoin holdings and trading (per claims 1044-1045) rather than project deployment.

Execution has lagged stated ambitions. H1 2026 capex totaled $954M (per claim 698), running at half the annualized $4.4B target. The $444M Polaris DS acquisition in August (per claim 40) consumed near-term capital. Operating performance—$164M in Q2 revenue with $78M in operating losses (per claims 694, 697)—provides limited cushion for the enlarged debt stack.

The capital structure now rests on approximately $4.3B in debt ($3.3B notes plus $500M+ in term facilities and $1B Morgan Stanley) layered beneath modest profitability. Convertible dilution of 39.6M shares plus earlier warrant issuances remains embedded. Repaying debt or accelerating capex to stated levels requires rapid utilization of contracted revenue base ($24M actual, per claim 1614, against $24B in potential future exposure, per claim 1606). Slower buildout or contract materialization would pressure debt service coverage materially.

Core Scientific emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2024 with a structure heavy in convertible securities and warrants—$625M in convertible senior notes at a $22 conversion price (claim 5262), plus earlier warrant tranches from emergence totaling roughly $180M (claims 6323, 6324). By mid-2026, however, the company has pivoted decisively toward leverage-funded growth. It raised $500M in a term loan facility in March 2026 (claim 2251), increased that to $1.5B within weeks (claim 2230), followed by a $3.3B senior secured notes offering at 8% due 2031 (claim 1834), and a $1B Morgan Stanley facility in August 2026 (claim 6829). This represents not opportunistic patching but a coherent strategy shift: equity dilution (heavy in 2023–2024) has given way to debt-financed acquisitions and infrastructure buildout.

The capital deployment story tracks reasonably well, though with one material gap. The company deployed the Polaris DS acquisition ($444M, claim 40, closed August 2026 after May announcement) and executed $954M in capital expenditures in the first half of 2026 (claim 698), consistent with stated facility buildout. However, the $3.3B notes offering disclosed use of proceeds for debt repayment (claim 2055), while simultaneously announcing capital contributions of $4.4B (claim 9683)—a $1.1B funding shortfall that required explanation or reveals aspirational guidance. Q2 2026 results show $164M in revenue (claim 694) but a $78M operating loss (claim 697), suggesting Polaris and infrastructure assets are not yet cash-generative. The company reported $24B in total potential contracted customer revenue as of August 2026 (claim 1606), primarily backed by AMD's $14B contract base (claim 164), and this backlog appears to justify the high leverage assumption.

A sophisticated reader should monitor three vectors. First, the maturity wall: the $500M term loan matures 364 days after March 2026 (claim 2254), forcing refinancing or repayment by March 2027 unless extended. Second, execution risk on infrastructure deployment and Polaris integration—$954M half-year CapEx implies sustained high capital intensity, and an $78M operating loss on $164M revenue suggests near-term profitability pressure. Third, the trajectory of the $625M convertible notes at $22 conversion price; if the stock appreciates materially, further equity dilution is inevitable, while if it languishes below conversion, the notes remain an operational drag. The bitcoin sales announced in late August 2026 (claim 1044) merit scrutiny as a potential liquidity signal.

Core Scientific's financing pathway moved through three distinct regimes reflecting its evolution from distressed restructuring to capital-intensive deployment. The bankruptcy exit from November 2023 through January 2024 distributed $175 million across two tranches of warrants (claims 6338, 6339) and $130 million in Contingent Value Rights (claim 6340)—creditor recovery instruments that achieved dilution without direct capital infusion. The company emerged with equity heavily diluted but operationally liquid. Post-emergence financing inverted the structure. Between November and December 2024, the company issued $1.073 billion in convertible debt—$448 million at 3% in November (claim 5458) and $625 million at 3.375% in December (claim 5280). This velocity suggests urgent capital needs or confidence in near-term equity appreciation. The announced use of proceeds for the May 2026 $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering stated 'debt repayment' (claims 2054-2055), yet actual deployment applied $4.4 billion to capital contributions across projects (claim 9683) and the $444.3 million Polaris DS acquisition (claim 40). H1 2026 capex of $954 million plus land development spending of $233 million (claims 698-699) confirms project orientation, though the prospectus language suggested deleveraging rather than acceleration. Operational metrics create tension with the capital hypothesis. Q2 2026 generated $164 million in revenue and incurred a $78 million operating loss (claims 694, 697). The company discloses $24 billion in potential contracted revenue (claims 1606, 1614), establishing a substantial realization gap. In August 2026, simultaneous actions—releasing $300 million in restricted cash while drawing the initial $500 million tranche of a $1 billion Morgan Stanley facility (claims 5678, 1036)—indicate active cash management against near-term liquidity demands, despite unutilized debt capacity. The maturity schedule constrains optionality: the term loan matures 364 days from March 5, 2026, placing refinancing risk at March 2027 (claim 2254); convertible notes mature 2029. The capital strategy depends on capex deployment converting contracted revenue into realized cash flows before the maturity wall. Warrant issuance to AMD (claim 136) suggests potential movement toward customer-financed growth. Watch whether contracted revenue converts at scale and whether unit economics improve before debt maturities require action.

Core Scientific executed a textbook bankruptcy-to-growth transition: emergence from Chapter 11 in late 2023 yielded a restructured capital stack anchored by $260 million in secured convertibles (claim #6517) and $150 million in secured notes (claim #6516), paired with aggressive warrant distribution at $6.81 and $0.01 exercise prices (claims #6323-6324) to creditors. Through 2024-2025, the company raised growth capital via a $625 million convertible at $22 conversion (claim #5262) and a $448 million convertible at 3% (claim #5458), maintaining a convertible-forward approach to preserve equity for upside.

The pivot came sharply in March 2026. The company drew a $500 million term loan immediately (claim #2253), expanded it to $1.5 billion within weeks (claim #2230), then replaced it with $3.3 billion in permanent senior secured notes at 8% due 2031 (claim #9346). This refinancing enabled the $444 million Polaris DS acquisition (claim #40) and accelerated CapEx to $954 million in H1 2026 (claim #698). The financing mix shifted from equity-preserving (convertibles) to debt-heavy (term loans, secured notes), a coherent move for a company betting on infrastructure scale.

Yet the current financial profile requires scrutiny. Q2 2026 showed $164 million in revenue (claim #694) against a $78 million operating loss (claim #697) and $4 billion in long-term debt (claim #700). The $24 billion in total potential contracted revenue (claim #1606) is substantially offset by just $14 million in realized AMD revenue (claim #164), indicating concentrated execution risk. The company is not cash-generative: H1 CapEx of $954 million plus $233 million in land spending (claim #699) totaled $1.2 billion against normalized quarterly revenue of roughly $160 million.

The financing strategy's coherence lies in its sequencing—cleaner capital structures post-bankruptcy, growth raises preserving equity, then aggressive debt issuance to fund acquisition and infrastructure. But execution dependency is acute. If contracted revenue materializes on schedule, the debt load remains serviceable; if realization delays, the company faces refinancing risk or equity dilution within 24-36 months. Sophisticated readers should monitor whether Polaris DS acquisition economics deliver announced returns and whether AMD's contract revenue scales as implied by the $24 billion potential base.

Core Scientific's capital pattern from Chapter 11 exit (November 2024) through August 2026 reflects a transition from distressed restructuring to scaled operational financing, though the deployment cadence invites scrutiny.

The company raised approximately $4.5 billion in debt: $625 million in convertible senior notes (December 2024, claim 5262), secured term loan facilities (first $500 million in March 2026, claim 2251, expanded via amendment March 22, claim 2230), and $3.3 billion in senior secured notes (May 2026, claim 1834). This progression aligns with infrastructure spending—H1 2026 capex reached $954 million (claim 698) plus $233 million in land and development (claim 699). Earlier convertible issuances ($448 million and $625 million, claims 5458 and 5262) offered debt-with-equity optionality; the $3.3 billion offering shifted to pure debt (8% coupon, claim 1835), signaling confidence in operating cash flow.

The deployment narrative is incomplete. The May 2026 offering (net proceeds $3.24 billion, claim 1838) was stated for debt repayment and acquisition of Polaris DS ($444.3 million purchase price, claim 40). Yet capex in H1 2026 already consumed roughly $1.2 billion, and the Polaris acquisition represents only $444 million; the gap suggests either anticipated capex acceleration or undisclosed debt service. August 2026 credit facilities ($600 million senior secured, claim 2734) and release of $300 million restricted cash (claim 5678) followed within weeks, implying balance-sheet optimization or front-loaded capex.

Insider equity issuance remains limited: a $48 million share plan authorization (May 2025, claim 4982) and $30 million in warrants issued to AMD (July 2026, claim 136). The AMD warrants signaled customer alignment—the company reported $14 million in AMD revenue against $24 million contracted (claim 164), indicating concentration. This debt-heavy approach minimizes dilution but creates refinancing risk.

Maturity dates cluster in 2027–2029, and operating leverage depends entirely on capex productivity. Watch whether H1 capex ($954 million annualized to $1.9 billion) sustains, whether the $24 billion in announced potential customer revenue (claim 1606) translates to binding contracts, and whether rapid debt accumulation ($4.5 billion in 18 months) outpaces revenue growth (Q2 2026 revenue $164 million, claim 694). The company exited bankruptcy with a clean capital structure; the pace of re-leveraging now determines refinancing flexibility in 2027.

Core Scientific's capital trajectory splits across three phases with diverging strategies: compressed distressed restructuring from November 2023 through January 2024, post-emergence recapitalization in late 2024, and debt-intensive infrastructure deployment beginning March 2026.

The dilution trajectory accelerated through restructuring then shifted to debt. Bankruptcy announcements compressed multiple issuances of identical instruments within days: $150 million senior notes appear in three claims (6516, 6508, 6499) between November 16–26, as do $260 million convertible notes (6517, 6509, 6500). Warrant issuances at emergence reveal distressed creditor dynamics: $98 million Tranche 1 at $6.81 strike versus $82 million Tranche 2 at $0.01 strike (claims 6323, 6324) suggests junior holders accepted pennies on recovery. Post-emergence, the $625 million convertible issued December 2024 (claim 5262) at $22 initial conversion price created up to 39.6 million shares of dilution (claim 5266). Notably, this was the last equity dilution; subsequent capital raising shifted entirely to debt.

The capital mix structure shows strategy shifted between phases. Bankruptcy financing was opportunistic—repeated announcements of identical instruments within single days suggests piecemeal creditor negotiation rather than planned tranching. Equity rights offering of $55 million (claim 6385) closed post-emergence. Thereafter: pure debt. This progression is coherent for a company rebuilding post-chapter 11.

Announced use of proceeds matched actual deployment. The May 2026 $3.3 billion senior notes offering (claim 1834) targeted $421 million for the Polaris DS acquisition (claim 1829), $40 million contingent earn-out (claim 1830), and debt repayment (claim 2055). H1 2026 capex of $954 million (claim 698) and $233 million land development spending (claim 699) align with infrastructure expansion. AMD warrant issuance of $30 million (claim 136) correlates with $14 million AMD base contract revenue (claim 164).

Readers should monitor four items. First: the $22 convertible conversion threshold—whether stock prices remain above that level before any conversion mechanics trigger. Second: a bridge facility repayment marked delayed (claim 1837) from the May 2026 capital raise—what caused the delay and whether syndication proceeded. Third: the $300 million restricted cash release in August 2026 (claim 2724) suggests collateral gates tied to refinancing milestones—track what conditions unlocked this tranche and what remains restricted. Fourth: whether acquired assets and AMD customer revenue generate sufficient cash to service $4.9 billion in debt obligations, or whether further refinancing becomes necessary.

Core Scientific's post-emergence capital structure reflects active refinancing rather than organic growth. The company emerged from bankruptcy in November 2024 (claim 5461) and immediately issued $625 million in convertible senior notes (claim 5280, net proceeds $609M per claim 5263). By March 2026, management secured a $500 million term loan facility (claim 2251) that expanded to $1.5 billion within weeks (claim 2230), followed by a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering in May 2026 (claim 1834). The stated use of proceeds for the $3.3 billion offering was debt repayment (claim 2055), not capacity expansion. This cadence—$625 million convertible, then $1.5 billion term loan, then $3.3 billion notes, then a Morgan Stanley $1 billion credit facility and $600 million revolving facility (claims 6829, 2729)—totals roughly $6.5 billion in capital raises within 18 months of emergence.

The strategy appears to be layering different instruments to manage refinancing risk and covenant compliance. The release of $300 million in previously restricted cash in August 2026 (claim 2724) signals that prior creditors held security over working capital. Three items remain delayed: extended equity rights offering (claim 6400), bridge facility repayment (claim 1837), and syndication fee commencement (claim 2257), suggesting either execution constraints or covenant tightness.

The tension lies in deployment versus operating need. H1 2026 capital expenditure reached $954 million (claim 705) against quarterly revenue of $164 million (claim 694) and a $78 million operating loss in Q2 (claim 697). The Polaris DS acquisition for $444.3 million (claim 40) proceeded while unprofitable. AMD contracted revenue represents only $14 million (claim 164) of total revenue, yet warranted a warrant issuance (claim 136).

A reader should monitor whether capex intensity—approaching 6x quarterly revenue in H1—sustains into 2027, whether operating losses narrow as deployed capital matures, and whether management's path to profitability materializes before the senior secured notes require refinancing. The serial facility additions and restricted cash management indicate lender appetite, but also refinancing dependency: the company is running against implicit covenant headroom.

Core Scientific's capital structure reveals a company navigating from distressed reorganization into increasingly leveraged expansion. The January 2024 bankruptcy exit combined creditor-imposed restructuring instruments: $260M in secured convertibles, $150M in senior notes, $80M in exit credit (claims 6319, 6321, 6315), $98M in Tranche 1 warrants and $82M in Tranche 2 warrants (claims 6323, 6324), plus $130M in CVRs payable over three years (claim 6340). This mixture was survival-driven, not strategic.

Post-emergence strategy pivoted decisively toward debt-funded growth. The December 2024 $625M convertible offering at $22 conversion (claims 5262, 5265) was overtaken by a May 2026 $3.3B senior notes issuance at 8% interest, explicitly designated for debt repayment and acquisition (claims 1834, 1835). August 2026 brought a $1B Morgan Stanley facility (claim 1036) plus $600M in secured credit facilities (claim 2729), alongside release of $300M restricted cash (claim 2724). That timing—simultaneous facility access and cash unlocking—suggests either covenant relief or genuine acceleration in cash generation capability.

The strategic coherence question hinges on deployment: can capex absorption generate offsetting returns? H1 2026 capex spending reached $954M (claim 698) against $164M in Q2 revenue (claim 694) and an $78M operating loss in that quarter alone (claim 697). The Polaris DS acquisition priced at $444.3M (claim 40) appears to represent capacity rather than profitability inflection. AMD contracts nominally represent $14B of a $24B potential pipeline (claims 164, 165); whether those are achievable revenue or gross addressable market requires clarification.

The debt-to-revenue ratio has become extreme: $5B+ in debt and facilities against quarterly run-rate revenue below $200M, even as losses persist. The convertible securities—particularly the $625M issue—present dilution timing risk: at $22 conversion price, that represents 28M shares, but weak stock performance may have prevented exercise, deferring rather than resolving dilution.

Watch whether August's financing surge represents confidence in near-term cash generation or financial engineering to extend a runway. The Polaris DS integration and AMD revenue trajectory will indicate whether capex deployment is capital-efficient or speculative capacity building. Covenant compliance on the May 2026 notes, given current burn, requires close monitoring.

Core Scientific emerged from Chapter 11 in November 2024 with a capital structure anchored on convertible and secured notes from its bankruptcy plan. Post-emergence, it sold $625 million in convertible senior notes with a $22 conversion price (39.6 million shares of potential dilution, per claims 5262, 5266), but this convertible window closed quickly. Beginning March 2026, the company shifted to aggressive debt issuance: a $500 million term loan (claim 2251) was amended to exceed $1 billion within weeks (claim 2230), followed by a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering explicitly designated for debt repayment (claims 1834, 2055), plus a $1 billion Morgan Stanley facility with no stated deployment plan (claims 6829, 1039). In six months, Core Scientific issued approximately $4 billion in net new debt, a pattern that is reactive rather than strategic. The announced use of proceeds—debt refinancing and acquisition funding—partially tracks actual deployment. The company spent $954 million on capex in H1 2026 (claim 698) and acquired Polaris DS LLC for $444 million (claim 40). However, this deployment occurred while Q2 2026 showed only $164 million in revenue and a $78 million operating loss (claims 694, 697). The gap is material: total contracted customer revenue stands at $24 million, with an AMD base of $14 million (claims 1606, 164). Capex and acquisition spending thus far outpace near-term revenue visibility, suggesting the company is funding growth capacity on debt rather than contracted demand. Capital structure choices reflect post-bankruptcy constraints. Warrant overhang from the bankruptcy plan—98.4 million Tranche 1 warrants at $6.81 strike and 82 million Tranche 2 warrants at $0.01 strike (claims 6323, 6324)—created immediate dilution pressure, discouraging follow-on equity offerings. The company instead relied on debt, including release of $300 million in previously restricted cash (claim 5678), which represents relaxation of prior creditor protections, not new capacity. A sophisticated reader should watch whether Polaris and capex investments generate the contracted revenue needed to stabilize operating losses. If H1 2026's operating loss persists as revenue grows modestly, the $4 billion debt raise in six months becomes a runway measure—a sign that the company is burning capital faster than the growth story supports.

Core Scientific exited Chapter 11 in January 2024 with a capital structure designed to satisfy multiple claimant classes—heavy warrant issuances (Tranche 1 at $6.81, Tranche 2 at $0.01, per claims 6323-6324), contingent value rights totaling $130 million payable over three years (claims 6325-6327), and common distributions. This was forced restructuring. Post-emergence, management pivoted decisively toward debt funding for scale: $625 million convertible at $22 conversion price in December 2024 (claim 5280, potentially 39.6 million dilutive shares per claim 5266), then $3.3 billion senior secured notes in May 2026 (claim 1834) to finance debt repayment and the $444 million Polaris DS LLC acquisition (claim 40). Most recent: $500 million term loan in March 2026 (claim 2251) expanded to $1.5 billion (claim 2230), plus $1 billion Morgan Stanley facility (claim 6829) and $600 million credit facilities (claim 2729). The strategy is coherent—lever up to fund capacity buildout.

Deployment tracks stated use inconsistently. First-half 2026 showed $954 million capex (claim 698) and $233 million land-and-development spending (claim 699), supporting the capacity narrative. The May $3.3 billion issuance stated for debt repayment (claim 2055), yet the company simultaneously funded the Polaris acquisition, suggesting the financing partly funds growth investment disguised as refinancing. Contractual obligation data reveals acute tension: $24 billion in potential future revenue (claim 1606) but only $24 million contracted as of August 2026 (claim 1614). Q2 2026 showed $164 million revenue with $78 million operating loss (claims 694, 697). The $4 billion long-term debt (claim 700) rests on aspirational rather than demonstrated customer demand.

Sophisticated readers should watch the $22 conversion price on the December convertible (claim 5282)—stock trading above that level triggers material dilution. The floating-rate exposure on $1.5 billion at SOFR plus 250 basis points (claim 2255) creates refinancing risk. Most critically, the 365-day maturity on the March term loan (claim 2254) forces 2027 refinancing, coinciding with the requirement to materially accelerate customer contracts from announced to binding. Without that acceleration, the company faces a classic rollover squeeze on a leveraged capacity-build model.

Core Scientific emerged from bankruptcy in November 2024 with a restructured capital table featuring approximately 180 million warrants (98M at $6.81 and 82M at $0.01, per claims 6323 and 6324), followed by a $625 million convertible issuance in December 2024 at a $22 conversion price (claims 5280, 5281). The tranche 2 warrant strike of $0.01 represents a dilution deferral dependent on stock appreciation; if the $22 convertible conversion price is now out of money, both instruments signal underwater restructuring.

Capital raising from March through August 2026 has been torrential and tactically responsive rather than strategically coherent. The company drew a $500 million term facility on March 5, 2026 (claim 2251), expanded it to $1 billion within two weeks via amendment (claim 2230), then issued $3.3 billion in senior secured notes at 8% coupon in May 2026 (claims 1834, 1835), followed by a $1 billion Morgan Stanley facility at SOFR plus 250 basis points (claim 1036) and $600 million in senior credit lines by August 2026 (claim 2729). This mix of term debt, convertibles, and revolving facilities is opportunistic patching—each facility appears to address immediate liquidity needs rather than a unified capital plan.

The stated use for the $3.3 billion senior notes was debt repayment (claim 2055), yet actual deployment diverges. H1 2026 capex totaled $954 million with $233 million in land and development spending (claims 698, 699), and the company completed a $444 million acquisition of Polaris DS LLC in August 2026 (claim 40). Against Q2 2026 revenue of $164 million (claim 694), this capex run-rate implies spending at nearly 6x quarterly revenue. Gross profit of $80 million in Q2 (claim 695) theoretically covers operating overhead, but a $78 million operating loss in the same quarter (claim 697) reflects front-loaded infrastructure spending. The anticipated $300 million release of restricted cash (claim 2730) signals lender-controlled reserves, common in structures with tight covenants.

A reader should track (a) AMD contract revenue realization against $24 billion potential contracted revenue (claim 1606)—currently $14 billion of that base (claim 164)—(b) warrant dilution pressure, particularly 82 million shares at $0.01 strike if stock remains depressed, and (c) debt service capacity. With $3.3 billion senior notes at 8% coupon plus $1.5 billion in term loans, annual fixed charges exceed current operational capacity to service them, requiring either contract ramp or additional capital raises.

Core Scientific's capital trajectory from March through September 2026 reads as a pivot from failed large-scale refinancing to opportunistic assembly of smaller, disparate facilities. The firm opened with a $500 million senior secured term loan (claim 2251), immediately drawn, then rapidly amended to $1 billion (claim 2230) by late March. In April, it announced a $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering (claim 2054) explicitly earmarked for debt repayment (claim 2055), but withdrew that offering by May (claim 1834) without disclosed market conditions. The pivot from refinancing to growth-stage deployment is material: instead, it closed a $444 million acquisition of Polaris DS (claim 40) in August, modestly higher than the $421 million purchase price announced in May (claim 1829).

The financing mix itself is telling. After the notes withdrawal, Core Scientific layered in a $1 billion Morgan Stanley facility (claim 1036, initial $500M tranche per claim 1037) at SOFR plus 200 basis points, alongside a smaller $600 million senior secured credit facility (claim 2729), plus an AMD warrant issuance (claim 136) worth $30 million in apparent equity. By September, the firm disclosed $1.085 billion in senior unsecured convertible notes outstanding—$460 million (claim 2601) and $625 million (claim 2602)—suggesting convertible debt was the path when large-cap debt markets closed. A mandatory convertible conversion (claim 2540) eliminated $234 million of prior equity obligations.

Deployment tells a different story from stated intent. The withdrawn $3.3B offering was pitched for debt paydown, yet H1 capital expenditures reached $954 million (claim 698), with $750 million committed to CoreWeave data center buildout (claim 2624) and $104 million to an AMD capacity expansion (claim 2625). Operating losses ran $78 million in Q2 (claim 697) on $164 million revenue (claim 694), despite a $80 million gross profit (claim 695), implying overhead and interest consume 47 percent of gross margin. Contracted customer revenue stood at only $24 million (claim 1614), creating a 40-to-1 ratio of capex to existing revenue commitments.

A reader should watch whether CoreWeave capex generates the $850 million annualized colocation revenue (claim 2677) management projects, whether the AMD contract scales beyond $14 million base revenue (claim 164) into the $24 billion total potential cited (claim 1606), and whether $300 million in expected restricted cash release (claim 2735) sustains liquidity through debt maturities. The pattern—failed large refinancing followed by rapid-fire smaller facilities and convertibles—requires explanation of market access or credit conditions between May and August.

Core Scientific's record splits cleanly into one large, named, signed customer relationship and a long tail of agreements that are not customer contracts. The strongest item is CoreWeave. The company names it, describes a 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC hosting arrangement (claims 7765, 6060), and later disclosed that CoreWeave had exercised its first option for additional capacity (claim 5913). Before that, the identified hosting counterparties were Celsius Mining, a signed Master Services Agreement customer described as one of the largest (claims 13540, 13548), and Gryphon Digital Mining, whose 230 MW hosting deal (claim 19781) was attacked by a short seller as backed by a counterparty with little financial capacity (claim 19782). The BitFuFu and NuMiner figures (claims 19783, 19784) relate to Sphere 3D's arrangements, not Core's contracts, and should not be counted as Core revenue. Much of the remaining 'agreement' language is not customer demand. The Denton and Muskogee items (claims 20699, 14175, 20702, 13924) are site-development deals with municipalities and an energy affiliate. Bitmain and the Murphy Electric Power Board (claims 12740, 12741) are suppliers. The October and December 2023 items (claims 6536, 6393) are restructuring agreements in principle with creditors. The only anonymous customer is the July 2022 colocation deal with an unnamed 'third party customer' (claim 13845). That one should be discounted until the counterparty is identified. Concentration has shifted from one stressed counterparty to another single name. In 2022, exposure sat with Celsius, which filed chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (claims 13536, 13538), and with Gryphon. By mid-2024, management said bitcoin hosting clients would likely not renew (claim 30647), so the forward book is essentially CoreWeave. It noted 300 MW still unallocated (claim 19656) but named no second customer. The headline arithmetic is internally consistent. $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to about $292 million a year, which matches the stated average of about $290 million (claim 19643), or roughly $1.45 million per MW-year on 200 MW. The 75–80% margin (claim 2529) is management guidance, not disclosed results. The $58.3 million of remaining hosting obligations as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202) predates the June CoreWeave deal, so it neither confirms nor contradicts the $3.5 billion. Whether that figure includes the exercised option is not stated in the record, which as provided ends mid-entry at claim 2530.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small number of signed, named customer contracts and a larger body of site, power and restructuring agreements that are not customer revenue. The signed customer relationships are Gryphon Digital Mining's 230 MW hosting deal from October 2021 (claim 19781), the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13537), and the CoreWeave 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC hosting contracts (claims 7765, 6060, 19643), which CoreWeave extended by exercising an option (claim 5913). Bitmain equipment supply (claim 12740) and the Murphy Electric Power Board industrial power contract (claims 12741, 12799) are signed, but they are vendor and utility agreements, not sources of revenue. The Denton/Tenaska and Muskogee Port Authority announcements (claims 14175, 14184, 14185, 13922, 13924, 20702) are facility-development agreements, and the Muskogee deal was announced by the port authority itself. None of them names a tenant. The 2023 items (claims 6536, 6393) are explicitly agreements in principle with creditors, and the Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) are advisory mandates. The one anonymous customer is the July 2022 colocation deal with an unnamed "third party customer" (claim 13845). In 2024 the company also cited 300 MW of further HPC capacity "to offer" without naming any counterparty (claim 19656), which is capacity, not contracted demand. The Gryphon-related allegations (claims 19782, 19783, 19784) come from a third-party short thesis and concern Gryphon's and Sphere 3D's own ability to pay. They are not Core disclosures, but they do bear directly on the credit quality of Core's largest 2021 hosting deal. Counterparty concentration has stayed high while the name at the top has changed. In 2021-22 the exposure ran to thinly capitalised crypto miners, and one of them, Celsius, described as among the largest customers, entered chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (claims 13536, 13541, 13551). By mid-2024 the exposure sat with a single AI hyperscaler, CoreWeave. On revenue arithmetic, $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated $290 million average (claim 2528), although the 75-80% margin is management's projection (claim 2529). The only remaining-performance-obligation figure on record, $58.3 million as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), predates CoreWeave and covers 15-24-month terms. Reconciliation should therefore be tested against later backlog disclosures, which this record, truncated after claim 2530, does not include.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer contracts, and most of the remaining entries are not customer agreements at all. The hosting counterparties that are actually named are Celsius Mining LLC, under a Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13539), and CoreWeave, under a series of 12-year HPC hosting agreements (claims 6060, 7765, 19643) plus a later option exercise (claim 5913). Gryphon Digital Mining's 230 MW hosting deal (claim 19781) is also named, but the record shows it only through a short-seller report. That report questions whether Gryphon could fund its miners (claim 19782). The BitFuFu and NuMiner figures (claims 19783, 19784) are Gryphon and Sphere obligations, not Core revenue, so they should not be read as Core counterparties. The July 2022 colocation agreement leaves its counterparty unnamed as a 'third party customer' (claim 13845). The Denton/Tenaska and Muskogee Port Authority items (claims 14184, 14175, 20695, 13924) are site-development arrangements with municipal and energy partners. They are counted repeatedly across filings but do not generate hosting revenue. Bitmain and Murphy Electric (claims 12740, 12799) are suppliers, Weil and PJT (claims 13502, 13503) are advisers, and the 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393) concern restructuring support, not commercial demand.

Concentration has moved from one stressed customer to another single customer. In 2022, Celsius was 'one of' the largest customers, and its chapter 11 filing led to withheld payments and stay litigation (claims 13536, 13538, 19787). By mid-2024, management said legacy bitcoin hosting clients would likely not renew (claim 30647), which leaves CoreWeave as the dominant contracted counterparty. Management also noted another 300 MW of HPC capacity still marketed but uncontracted (claim 19656).

The headline arithmetic holds internally. $3.5 billion over 12 years implies about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated $290 million average (claim 19643). That figure is still a management estimate, however, as is the 75 to 80 percent margin (claim 2529), and the record does not make clear whether it covers the initial 200 MW only or includes the optioned expansion (claim 5913). Disclosed contracted backlog shows the gap: as of March 31, 2024, remaining performance obligations on multi-year hosting contracts were only $58.3 million (claim 6202), before the CoreWeave signing. Investors should therefore look for the post-June 2024 backlog figure in the filings to confirm how much of the $3.5 billion is in executed contracts. The supplied record is truncated after claim 2530, so later reconciliation evidence is not assessed here.

Core Scientific's record contains only a small number of named, signed customer contracts. Most of the other entries are site-development, supply, advisory or restructuring arrangements that should not be read as customer demand. The clearest signed relationships are the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13548) and the CoreWeave HPC hosting contracts (claims 6060, 7765, 19643). CoreWeave's exercise of a contractual option (claim 5913) is the only documented case of a named counterparty adding capacity after signing. The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal for 230 MW (claim 19781) was a named contract. However, claims 19782 through 19784 come from a third-party short-seller critique of Gryphon's ability to pay, not from company disclosure. Their NuMiner and BitFuFu figures relate to Gryphon's merger partner Sphere 3D rather than to Core itself. The Denton and Muskogee arrangements (claims 14175, 14185, 13922, 13924) are development agreements with municipalities and an energy affiliate. They describe facilities, not paying hosting customers, and they appear repeatedly across filings. The Bitmain and Murphy Electric Power Board contracts (claims 12740, 12741) are supplier relationships. The restructuring items (claims 6536, 6393) are explicitly agreements in principle. Two disclosures leave the counterparty unidentified: the July 2022 colocation deal with an unnamed third-party customer (claim 13845) and the 300 MW described as still available to offer for HPC (claim 19656), which has no buyer attached. Concentration risk has moved rather than eased. In 2022 the exposure sat with Celsius, described as one of the largest customers, which filed for chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (claims 13536, 13541). In the same period Core was exposed to Gryphon, whose financing was in question. By mid-2024 the exposure had moved to a single AI hyperscaler, CoreWeave. The revenue figures for CoreWeave are internally consistent: $3.5 billion over twelve years implies about $292 million a year, in line with the stated $290 million average (claims 2528, 19643). The contrast with the existing book is sharp. As of March 31, 2024, remaining hosting obligations on contracts of 15 to 24 months totalled only about $58.3 million (claim 6202). The CoreWeave contracts would therefore dominate contracted revenue. The 75 to 80 percent margin (claim 2529) is management's forecast, not a contractual term. The claim list provided was truncated after claim 2530, so any later expansions or amendments are not reflected here.

Core Scientific's record contains few true customer agreements once duplicates, site deals and supplier contracts are set aside. The signed, named customer contracts are the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13539) and the CoreWeave 12-year HPC hosting contracts (claims 6060, 19643, 2528). The Gryphon hosting deal for 230 MW (claim 19781) was also named, but this record documents it only through a short-seller report, not a company filing. That report questioned whether Gryphon could fund its miners (claim 19782) and whether Gryphon's own counterparties were real (claims 19783, 19784), so it should be treated as third-party allegation. The July 2022 colocation agreement (claim 13845) names no customer at all, only a "third party customer." The Denton and Muskogee items appear seven times between them (claims 14191, 14184, 20699, 14175, 13922, 14185, 20702, 20695, 13924). These are facility-development agreements with municipalities and an energy affiliate, not revenue-paying customers, and the repetition inflates the apparent count. The Murphy power contract and Bitmain supply agreements (claims 12799, 12741, 12740, 12826) are supply-side. The Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) are advisory. The restructuring "agreements in principle" (claims 6536, 6393) are creditor arrangements, not commercial wins.

Concentration has moved from one problem counterparty to another single dominant one. In 2022 Celsius was among the largest customers, then filed chapter 11, withheld billed charges and accused the company of violating the automatic stay (claims 13536, 13538, 13537, 19787). By mid-2024 CoreWeave had become the anchor. The company also disclosed 300 MW of uncontracted HPC capacity with no other named takers (claim 19656), so the HPC revenue base rests on one counterparty.

The headline arithmetic reconciles internally: $3.5 billion over 12 years implies about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated $290 million average (claims 19643, 2528). Several caveats apply. The figure was framed as an estimate the contract "could" generate (claim 7765). The 75–80% margin is management's anticipation. Renewal options (claim 30638) and the first option exercise (claim 5913) are separate from the base $3.5 billion and should not be added without disclosed terms. Before CoreWeave, contracted future hosting revenue was only about $58.3 million as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), which shows how heavily the backlog now depends on that one relationship. Claim 30637 carries no verbatim support and adds nothing independent.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small number of signed, named customer contracts and a larger body of development, supply, restructuring and third-party material that is easy to mistake for commercial traction. The firmest customer evidence comes from two counterparties. Celsius Mining LLC is identified as one of the company's largest customers under a Master Services Agreement (13540, 13539), but it was named only once it had filed for chapter 11, was withholding billed charges, and was litigating an alleged automatic-stay violation (13536, 13537, 13538, 19787). CoreWeave is the other: a 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC hosting arrangement with two five-year renewal options (7765, 6060, 30638), plus a first option exercise for additional infrastructure (5913). The July 2022 colocation agreement names no counterparty and describes only 'a third party customer' (13845). Claim 30637 carries no supporting quote and adds nothing beyond 2528.

Much of the remaining record is not customer revenue. The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (14191, 14184, 20699, 14175, 13922) and the 500 MW Muskogee Port Authority agreement (14185, 20702, 20695, 13924) are site-development arrangements, and the same two announcements are repeated across nine claim ids. The Murphy power contract and the Bitmain purchase agreements are supply-side (12799, 12741, 12740, 12826). The restructuring deals are explicitly agreements 'in principle' (6536, 6393). The Gryphon, BitFuFu and NuMiner items come from a short-seller report. That report describes Gryphon's 230 MW deal as Core's largest hosting contract while questioning whether Gryphon could pay for it (19781, 19782), and it alleges that the NuMiner agreement does not exist (19784). These are not Core disclosures.

Concentration has moved from one distressed crypto-mining counterparty to one AI-infrastructure counterparty. In 2021-22, Gryphon and Celsius dominated. By 2024, CoreWeave held the full 200 MW allocation, and 300 MW remained unallocated with no named prospect (19656).

On the arithmetic, $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to about $292 million a year, which is consistent with the stated $290 million average (19643, 2528). However, the headline figure is unchanged after the option exercise (5913). That leaves it unclear whether the exercised capacity was already inside the $3.5 billion or simply was not re-summed. The scale of the change is also stark. As of March 31, 2024, remaining hosting obligations on contracts longer than one year totaled only $58.3 million (6202), so the CoreWeave figures rest almost entirely on a single, later-signed contract. The BitFuFu numbers ($305.7 million total less $85.0 million paid, leaving $220.7 million) reconcile internally (19783), but they describe a third party's obligations rather than Core's.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed, named customer agreements; most of the remainder is supplier, municipal, advisory, or restructuring paperwork. Three counterparties clearly qualify as customers. The first is Celsius Mining, whose Master Services Agreement is disclosed as a contract with one of the company's largest customers (13540, 13548). The second is Gryphon Digital Mining, with a 230 MW hosting deal described as the company's largest ever (19781). The third is CoreWeave, under the 200 MW, 12-year HPC hosting contracts (7765, 6060, 19643). The Denton agreements with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (14184, 13922) and the Muskogee Port Authority agreement (20702, 13924) are site-development arrangements with municipal and energy counterparties, not revenue-paying customers. Bitmain (12740) and Murphy Electric Power Board (12799) are suppliers. Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) are advisers. The 2023 agreements in principle (6536, 6393) are restructuring term sheets. The July 2022 colocation agreement for a "third party customer" (13845) was never identified, and the 300 MW of capacity offered after the CoreWeave allocation (19656) has no named counterparty.

The quality of the named customers is uneven. Short-seller material questions whether Gryphon could fund the miners it had committed to install (19782). The same material calls a related $1.7 billion NuMiner purchase likely non-existent (19784), and notes that only $85.0 million of a $305.7 million BitFuFu order had been paid (19783). These are third-party allegations rather than company disclosures. Celsius, meanwhile, entered chapter 11, withheld billed charges, and sued Core over the automatic stay (13549, 13551, 13537).

Counterparty concentration has moved from several crypto-mining hosting clients to essentially one. Management said expiring bitcoin hosting clients will likely not renew (30647). That leaves CoreWeave as the dominant source of contracted revenue, and CoreWeave holds two 5-year renewal options and has already exercised its first expansion option (30638, 5913).

The headline arithmetic reconciles at the level disclosed. $3.5 billion over 12 years is about $292 million a year, consistent with the cited $290 million average (19643). The figure depends on the full term being honored, and the 75 to 80 percent margin estimate is a projection rather than a contracted figure. The incremental value of the exercised option (5913) is not quantified in these claims. The legacy business shows only $58.3 million of remaining hosting obligations as of March 2024 on 15- to 24-month contracts (6202), which shows how small contracted non-CoreWeave revenue had become. The claim record supplied here is truncated after 30637, so any later named deals fall outside this read.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer contracts with a named counterparty, and much of the rest is development, supply or advisory paper. Two named hosting customers are clearly contractual. The first is Celsius Mining, whose Master Services Agreement (claim 13540) is confirmed in filings. That relationship ended in chapter 11 litigation, with Celsius alleging stay violations and withholding billed charges (claims 13536, 13537, 13551). The second is CoreWeave, whose 200 MW, 12-year HPC hosting contracts (claims 6060, 7765, 19643) were followed by a first option exercise (claim 5913) and carry two five-year renewal options (claim 30638). The October 2021 Gryphon hosting deal for 230 MW (claim 19781) is named and was described as the largest ever. However, the record of its economics comes from a short-seller report questioning Gryphon's ability to pay (claim 19782). The Sphere/BitFuFu and NuMiner dollar figures (claims 19783, 19784) are Gryphon-side obligations, not Core revenue. The July 2022 colocation agreement (claim 13845) names no customer, only a "third party customer." The Denton/Tenaska and Muskogee Port Authority items appear five and four times respectively (claims 14184, 20699, 14175, 14191, 13922; 20702, 20695, 14185, 13924). They are site-development agreements with municipal and energy counterparties, not customer revenue. Bitmain and Murphy Electric (claims 12740, 12799) are suppliers. Weil and PJT (claims 13502, 13503) are advisers. The 2023 restructuring deals are explicitly "agreements in principle" (claims 6536, 6393). Counterparty concentration has swung from one problem customer to another single customer. Celsius was "one of the largest customers" (claim 13548) before its default. By mid-2024 legacy bitcoin hosting clients were not expected to renew (claim 30647), leaving CoreWeave as essentially the whole forward hosting book. The headline arithmetic broadly reconciles: $3.5 billion over 12 years is about $292 million a year, matching the stated $290 million average (claim 19643), or roughly $1.46 million per MW-year on 200 MW. Three caveats apply. First, claim 7765 frames the total as what the contract "could" generate, and the 75–80 percent margin is a projection. Second, it is unclear whether the first option exercise (claim 5913) is inside or on top of the $3.5 billion. Third, the only audited backlog figure, $58.3 million of remaining hosting obligations at March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), predates CoreWeave and cannot verify it. The 300 MW of remaining HPC capacity (claim 19656) is uncontracted. The supplied record ends mid-claim at 30637, so later amendments are not assessed here.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small number of named, contracted customers and a larger body of development, supply and in-principle language that does not represent hosting revenue. The signed customer relationships are Celsius Mining, under a Master Services Agreement (13540), and CoreWeave, under 12-year 200 MW high-performance-compute hosting contracts (19643, 6060) whose first expansion option has been exercised (5913). Gryphon Digital Mining's October 2021 230 MW hosting deal (19781) was also named and contracted, but a short report questioned whether Gryphon could pay for the miners needed to fill that capacity (19782). Its upstream miner orders were either largely unpaid, with $220.7 million of a $305.7 million BitFuFu purchase outstanding (19783), or their existence was disputed, as with NuMiner (19784). Those are Gryphon's and Sphere's agreements, not Core's. The Denton and Tenaska arrangements (14191, 14175) and the Muskogee Port Authority arrangement (20695, 14185) are site-development agreements with municipalities and an energy affiliate, not customer contracts. The same is true of the Murphy power contract (12741), the Bitmain supply agreements (12740) and the Weil and PJT engagements (13502, 13503). The October and December 2023 restructuring items are explicitly agreements in principle (6536, 6393). The one unidentified counterparty is the July 2022 colocation customer, described only as a third party (13845).

Customer concentration has moved from one at-risk counterparty to another single counterparty. In 2022 Celsius was among the largest customers. It filed chapter 11, withheld billed charges (13536, 13538) and alleged stay violations (13537, 19787). By mid-2024 the forward book rested almost entirely on CoreWeave. Management also flagged a further 300 MW of uncontracted capacity being offered for HPC hosting (19656).

The headline arithmetic broadly reconciles. $3.5 billion over 12 years is about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated average of about $290 million (19643, 30637). However, the $3.5 billion is framed as an estimate of what the contracts could generate (7765). It therefore depends on build-out and on the agreements running their full term, and the 75 to 80 percent margin is management's anticipation rather than a disclosed result. For scale, the remaining hosting performance obligations as of March 31, 2024 were only $58.3 million, on contracts typically running 15 to 24 months (6202). The CoreWeave agreements are therefore a step change rather than an extension of the existing backlog, and that change should show up in later remaining-performance-obligation disclosures. Claim 2528 carries no quote and cannot be assessed.

Core Scientific's record contains only two customer relationships that rise to named, executed contracts: the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement and the CoreWeave HPC hosting agreements. Celsius was identified only after it became a problem. The October 2022 filings describe it as "one of" the company's largest customers, cite the Master Services Agreement, and disclose that Celsius was withholding payment through its chapter 11 case (claims 13539, 13540, 13538, 13537). The October 2021 Gryphon hosting deal for 230 MW (claim 19781) is named, but it is sourced to a short-seller report that questions Gryphon's ability to pay (claim 19782). Claims 19783 and 19784 concern Gryphon's and Sphere's own miner purchases, not Core's revenue, and should not be read as Core counterparties. The July 2022 colocation agreement refers only to "a third party customer" (claim 13845), and the 300 MW of post-CoreWeave HPC capacity is described as available, with no counterparty attached (claim 19656). The Denton and Muskogee arrangements with municipalities and Tenaska (claims 14191, 20702, 13922, 13924) are site-development agreements, not revenue-bearing customer contracts, and they recur across filings without escalating to named offtakers. The October 2023 restructuring agreements in principle with noteholders and the equity committee (claims 6536, 6393) are financing arrangements and carry no customer weight. Concentration has moved from a book of self-mining plus several colocation clients, with Celsius and Gryphon among the largest, through a period when the largest named client was in bankruptcy and the other hosting clients went unnamed, to near-total dependence on one hyperscaler-adjacent tenant. CoreWeave signed for 200 MW over 12 years in June 2024, exercised a first expansion option weeks later (claims 6060, 5913), and holds two five-year renewal options (claim 30638). On revenue, the headline figures reconcile internally. $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated average of $290 million (claims 19643, 30637). That figure is roughly five times the $58.3 million of remaining hosting performance obligations disclosed as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), which shows how heavily forward revenue now rests on a single counterparty. The incremental value of the exercised option is not quantified in these claims, and the revenue-structure detail in claim 2528 is not visible in the record, so the 75 to 80 percent margin assertion (claim 19643) cannot yet be verified against contract terms.

Core Scientific's record has few signed customer contracts with named counterparties. Most of the other announcements are site, vendor or restructuring arrangements that should not count as customer demand.

The clearest signed customer relationship before 2024 is Celsius Mining, a named counterparty under a Master Services Agreement (13540) and described as one of the largest customers (13539, 13548). That relationship became a liability, not an asset. Celsius filed for chapter 11 (13549), withheld billed charges (13541, 13551) and accused Core of violating the automatic stay (13537, 19787). Gryphon Digital Mining's 230 MW hosting deal, called the largest ever (19781), comes to the record mainly through a short-seller report. That report questioned Gryphon's ability to pay for miners (19782) and challenged a related $1.7 billion NuMiner order (19784) and the Sphere/BitFuFu purchase (19783). The July 2022 colocation agreement names no customer at all, only "a third party customer" (13845).

The Denton and Muskogee announcements are development agreements with a city, a port authority and a Tenaska affiliate (14184, 14185, 13922, 13924). They are counted several times across filings (14175, 14191, 20695, 20699, 20702) and should not be read as revenue-bearing customers. The Murphy power contract and Bitmain equipment deals are supply-side agreements (12741, 12740, 12826). The Weil and PJT engagements are advisory roles (13502, 13503). The restructuring deals are agreements in principle, not executed contracts (6536, 6393).

Counterparty concentration has moved from one distressed crypto counterparty to another single, named hyperscaler. CoreWeave's 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC agreements (7765, 6060, 19643) were followed quickly by a first option exercise (5913). Management also signaled that legacy bitcoin hosting clients will probably not renew (30647), so CoreWeave's dependence is likely to grow. The remaining 300 MW is described as available capacity, with no named takers (19656).

On revenue, $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to about $292 million a year, which matches the stated average of $290 million (19643). That figure excludes the two five-year renewal options (2530). The 75 to 80 percent margin is a projection, not a reported result (19643). The $58.3 million of remaining hosting commitments as of March 31, 2024 (6202) comes before the CoreWeave deals and covers 15- to 24-month contracts. The record does not yet show those contracts converting into reported backlog, and no dollar value is disclosed for the option exercise (5913). The headline contract value should therefore be treated as estimated lifetime revenue, not recognized revenue.

Core Scientific's record contains relatively few signed customer contracts, and the agreements that are documented have tended to concentrate exposure in a single counterparty at a time. The clearest signed customer agreement before 2024 is the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining LLC, which the company itself called one of its largest customers (13540, 13539). The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal, described as 230 MW and the company's largest ever (19781), comes to this record mainly through a third-party short-seller report. That same report questioned Gryphon's ability to fund its miners (19782) and pointed to unpaid balances on the related BitFuFu purchase (19783). The NuMiner allegation (19784) concerns Sphere 3D and bears on Core only indirectly. The Denton and Muskogee items (14184, 14175, 20699, 14185, 20695, 13922, 13924) are site-development agreements with a municipality, a port authority and a Tenaska affiliate. They are not customer revenue. The Muskogee deal was announced by the port authority rather than by Core. The July 2022 colocation agreement names only a "third party customer" (13845), so it cannot be attributed to anyone. The Murphy power contract and the Bitmain arrangements are supplier relationships (12741, 12740), and the two restructuring items are explicitly agreements in principle (6536, 6393).

Concentration has moved in sequence. The 2021–22 book leaned on Celsius and Gryphon. Celsius's chapter 11 filing, its withholding of billed charges and its stay litigation (13549, 13551, 13537, 19787) came just before Core hired Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) and later restructured. After emergence, the named-customer story is almost entirely CoreWeave: a 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC hosting arrangement (7765, 6060, 19643), a first option exercise (5913), and two five-year renewal options (2530, 30638). That replaces one dominant credit with another, larger one.

The arithmetic broadly reconciles. $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated $290 million average (19643). That is roughly $1.45 million per MW per year at 200 MW. Remaining hosting performance obligations of only $58.3 million at March 31, 2024 (6202) predate the CoreWeave signing, so they confirm how thin the legacy hosting backlog was rather than contradicting the new deal. Two caveats apply. The $3.5 billion figure is presented as an estimate ("could", 7765), and the 75–80% margin is a projection (19643). Neither should be read as contracted backlog until it appears in filed performance obligations. The 300 MW of additional capacity (19656) is uncontracted availability, not demand.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a few named, signed customer contracts and a larger body of site, supply and restructuring arrangements that are not customer revenue at all. The signed hosting customers are all identified: Gryphon Digital Mining, a 230 MW deal described as the company's largest ever (claim 19781); Celsius Mining under a Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13539); and CoreWeave, under a 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC agreement (claims 7765, 6060, 19643). One colocation contract is disclosed only as hosting for a "third party customer" with no name (claim 13845). The Muskogee and Denton announcements are development agreements with a port authority, a city and a power affiliate, not offtake customers (claims 14185, 14191, 20702). The Murphy power contract and the Bitmain purchases are supplier relationships (claims 12799, 12740). The October and December 2023 restructuring items are agreements in principle and a term sheet, not binding commercial contracts (claims 6536, 6393). The Gryphon-related NuMiner and BitFuFu figures come from a short-seller critique of Gryphon's counterparties, not from Core's own disclosures (claims 19783, 19784).

Concentration has stayed high while the anchor has rotated. In 2021–22 the book leaned on Gryphon and Celsius. A third party questioned whether Gryphon could fund its miners (claim 19782). Celsius then filed chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (claims 13536, 13541, 13551), which preceded Core's own advisory engagements and restructuring (claims 13502, 6536). By mid-2024 the forward story rests almost entirely on a single counterparty, CoreWeave. Its first option exercise (claim 5913) deepens that dependence even as management points to 300 MW of uncommitted HPC capacity (claim 19656).

The headline arithmetic is internally consistent: $3.5 billion over 12 years implies about $292 million a year, matching the stated $290 million average (claims 19643, 2528). Two caveats apply. The March 31, 2024 remaining-obligation figure of $58.3 million reflects legacy 15–24 month hosting contracts that predate CoreWeave, so it cannot corroborate the new total (claim 6202). It is also unclear whether the $3.5 billion includes the later option capacity or the two 5-year renewals (claims 5913, 2530). The 75–80% margin is a management projection, not a reported result (claim 19643). The supplied record cuts off mid-claim at 2529, so later CoreWeave amendments are not assessed here.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer agreements with named counterparties, and many of its claims are something else. Much of the 2022 material describes municipal and energy development arrangements rather than customer contracts. Examples are the Denton facility with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (claims 14191, 14175, 20699, 14184, 13922) and the 500MW Muskogee site, announced by the Port Authority rather than by Core (claims 14185, 20695, 20702, 13924). Neither names a paying hosting customer. The same is true of the Murphy Electric Power Board power contract (claims 12741, 12799), the Bitmain supply agreements (claims 12740, 12826), the Weil and PJT adviser engagements (claims 13502, 13503) and the restructuring 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393), which are explicitly non-binding. The July 2022 colocation deal leaves its counterparty unnamed as 'a third party customer' (claim 13845).

The named hosting customers show how concentrated the base has been. Gryphon was billed as the largest-ever deal at 230 MW (claim 19781), but a short-seller's critique questioned whether Gryphon could fund its miners (claim 19782). That critique also challenged the NuMiner and BitFuFu purchase commitments linked to Gryphon's merger partner, Sphere 3D (claims 19784, 19783). The BitFuFu figures do reconcile internally: $305.7 million total less $85.0 million paid leaves the $220.7 million cited. Celsius surfaced as 'one of' the largest customers under a Master Services Agreement only when it went bankrupt, withheld payment and litigated over the automatic stay (claims 13536, 13539, 13540, 13551, 19787). Concentration then moved from distressed self-mining hosting clients to a single HPC counterparty, CoreWeave.

The CoreWeave contracts are the clearest signed, named agreements on record: roughly 200 MW over 12 years (claims 7765, 6060, 19643), followed by an exercised option (claim 5913). The arithmetic broadly holds. $3.5 billion over 12 years is about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated $290 million average (claims 2528, 19643). That figure dwarfs the $58.3 million of remaining hosting performance obligations disclosed at March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), so before CoreWeave the contracted backlog was thin and short-dated. The 75 to 80 percent margin (claim 2529) is management guidance, not contracted economics. The additional 300 MW described as available (claim 19656) has no named customer. The record provided ends partway through claim 2530, so later option exercises and any diversification beyond CoreWeave cannot be assessed here.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a few signed, named customer contracts and a larger body of site, supply, advisory and restructuring arrangements that are not customer revenue. The signed customer agreements are the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement (13540), the Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal for 230 MW (19781), and the CoreWeave 12-year, roughly 200 MW HPC hosting contracts (7765, 6060, 19643), later extended by CoreWeave's first option exercise (5913). The Gryphon figure reaches the record through a short-seller report, not Core's own filings, and that report questions whether Gryphon could fund the miners it committed to (19782). The NuMiner and BitFuFu items (19784, 19783) concern Gryphon's merger counterparty, not Core, and should not be read as Core contracts. The Muskogee 500 MW and Denton/Tenaska announcements (14185, 20695, 20702, 13924, 14191, 14175, 20699, 14184, 13922) are site-development agreements with municipalities and an energy affiliate, not paying customers. Murphy Electric (12741, 12799) and Bitmain (12740, 12826) are supply-side contracts, PJT and Weil (13503, 13502) are advisers, and the October and December 2023 restructuring items (6536, 6393) are explicitly agreements in principle. On naming, the main anonymous counterparty is the July 2022 colocation deal with an unidentified "third party customer" (13845). The 300 MW of remaining HPC capacity (19656) is an offer to the market with no counterparty attached. Concentration has swung between single names. In 2022 Celsius was among the largest customers (13539, 13548), and its July 2022 chapter 11 filing, its withholding of billed charges and its stay-violation motion (13536, 13549, 13551, 13537, 19787) preceded Core's own restructuring. By mid-2024 CoreWeave had become the defining counterparty, so dependence on one customer has continued rather than spread across several. The CoreWeave headline arithmetic is internally consistent: $290 million a year over twelve years is about $3.48 billion, in line with the $3.5 billion total (2528, 19643). The 75 to 80 percent margin (2529) is a projection, and the June 2024 description says the contract "could" reach that value (7765). The only disclosed backlog figure is $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (6202), which predates CoreWeave and cannot confirm it. The record supplied here is truncated after claim 2530, so later remaining-performance-obligation disclosures that would test whether the $3.5 billion has entered contracted backlog are not available for reconciliation.

Core Scientific's record splits into hosting contracts with named counterparties and a larger body of site, utility and restructuring 'agreements' that generate no customer revenue. The signed, named customer relationships are Gryphon Digital Mining, Celsius Mining and CoreWeave. Gryphon's October 2021 hosting deal for 230 MW, about 71,000 machines or 7.1 EH/s, was described as the company's largest ever (claim 19781). A short-seller questioned whether Gryphon had the money to buy and install those miners, pointing to unpaid balances on BitFuFu orders and a NuMiner purchase it called fictitious (claims 19782, 19783, 19784). Those disputes involve Gryphon and Sphere's supply chain, not Core's own contracts, but they go directly to whether the 230 MW would ever be filled and paid for. Celsius appears in the record only once it was already a problem: a Master Services Agreement customer described as 'one of' the largest, which filed for chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (claims 13536, 13540, 13541, 13787). The July 2022 colocation agreement names no customer at all, only 'a third party customer' (claim 13845). The Denton/Tenaska and Muskogee Port Authority items are development and siting agreements, and several of them are the same announcement logged more than once (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20699, 13922; 14185, 20695, 20702, 13924). They show where capacity will be built, not who will buy it. The same applies to the Murphy power contract and the Bitmain supply agreements (claims 12741, 12740), and to the restructuring 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393). The customer base has narrowed over time. A crypto-hosting mix led by Gryphon and Celsius went through Celsius's bankruptcy and Core's own restructuring, and then shifted toward a single AI tenant. CoreWeave's 200 MW, 12-year contracts (claims 7765, 6060, 19643), followed by its first option exercise (claim 5913), make one counterparty the core of the forward story. The 300 MW still offered for HPC hosting (claim 19656) is available capacity, not contracted demand. On the numbers, $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to roughly $292 million a year, which matches the stated $290 million average (claims 2528, 19643). The 75-80% margin, however, is management's projection and not a contract term (claim 2529). That headline sits far above the $58.3 million of remaining hosting obligations disclosed as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), so before CoreWeave the contracted backlog was modest. The Gryphon arithmetic also checks out, since 7.1 EH/s across 71,000 machines is about 100 TH/s each, but whether it reconciles in practice depends on Gryphon's ability to fund the miners, which was contested. The record supplied ends at claim 2530, so later CoreWeave developments are not assessed here.

Core Scientific's record is dominated by a small number of named, signed hosting relationships, surrounded by site-development, vendor, and restructuring agreements that are not customer revenue. The clearest signed customer contracts are the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13539) and the CoreWeave HPC hosting agreements announced in June 2024 (claims 7765, 6060, 19643, 2528). CoreWeave's exercise of its first expansion option (claim 5913) shows that relationship moving past a single headline deal. The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal of 230 MW (claim 19781) is a named agreement, but the record presents it mainly through a short-seller lens. That source says Gryphon lacked the financial means to buy or install the contracted miners (claim 19782). It also questions the NuMiner and BitFuFu equipment arrangements tied to Gryphon's merger counterparties (claims 19784, 19783). The Gryphon capacity is therefore better treated as contracted but doubtfully fundable than as bankable revenue.

Several 'agreements' are not customer contracts at all. The Muskogee Port Authority 500 MW project (claims 14185, 20702, 13924) and the Denton/Tenaska facility (claims 14191, 14175, 13922) are site-development and power arrangements, and they appear repeatedly across filings. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12741, 12799) is a power-supply input. The Bitmain agreements (claims 12740, 12826) are vendor purchases. The Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) are advisory. The 2023 restructuring terms are explicitly 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393). The one unidentified counterparty is the 'third party customer' in the July 2022 colocation release (claim 13845). The 300 MW described as still available for HPC hosting (claim 19656) has no named customer.

Concentration has moved from one risky anchor to another dominant one. Celsius was 'one of [the] largest customers' (claim 13548), and its Chapter 11 filing and withheld payments (claims 13536, 13551, 13537) preceded Core's own restructuring. CoreWeave now dominates contracted forward revenue.

The headline CoreWeave figures reconcile internally: $3.5 billion over 12 years implies about $292 million a year, consistent with the stated $290 million average (claims 19643, 2528). The 75 to 80 percent margin, however, is a management projection rather than a contracted figure (claim 2529). By contrast, remaining hosting commitments as of March 31, 2024 were only about $58.3 million on 15- to 24-month terms (claim 6202). That shows how completely forward visibility depends on a single counterparty. The supplied record is cut off after claim 2530, so later CoreWeave amendments or new named customers could not be assessed.

Core Scientific's record contains fewer distinct commercial agreements than the claim count suggests, and the signed customer contracts are concentrated in a handful of named counterparties. The Denton facility appears five times (14191, 14175, 20699, 14184, 13922) and the Muskogee project four times (20695, 14185, 20702, 13924), each repeating the same filing sentence. Both are site-development arrangements with municipal bodies and a power affiliate (City of Denton, Tenaska, Muskogee City-County Port Authority), not revenue-bearing customer contracts. The Muskogee deal was 'announced' by the Port Authority rather than by the company (20702). Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) are advisers, and the restructuring items (6536, 6393) are agreements in principle with creditors, not commercial counterparties.

The agreements that clearly qualify as signed customer contracts all name their counterparty. They are the Gryphon hosting deal for 230 MW (19781), the Celsius Master Services Agreement (13540), and the CoreWeave HPC hosting agreements (6060, 7765, 19643), along with supply-side contracts with Bitmain (12740) and Murphy Electric Power Board (12741, 12799). The one exception to naming is the July 2022 colocation agreement, which refers only to 'a third party customer' (13845). The 2023 equipment disclosure likewise refers to unnamed 'vendors' and 'users' (12826).

Customer concentration has moved in sequence from one dominant counterparty to the next. In 2021-22 the largest hosting relationship was Gryphon, whose ability to fund its miners was disputed by a short report (19782). Claims 19783 and 19784 concern Gryphon's merger partners' purchase commitments rather than Core directly and should be read as counterparty-quality evidence, not Core revenue. Celsius, described as one of the largest customers (13539, 13548), filed for chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (13536, 13551, 13537). By mid-2024 the forward book centered on a single hyperscaler, CoreWeave, which then exercised an expansion option (5913). Management said another 300 MW remained unallocated (19656), so no second HPC customer had been named.

The headline arithmetic is internally consistent. $3.5 billion over 12 years is about $292 million a year, which matches the stated $290 million average (19643, 2528). The 75-80% margin is a projection, not a contracted figure (2529). The contrast in scale is notable: as of March 31, 2024, remaining multi-year hosting obligations were only $58.3 million (6202), so the CoreWeave contracts represent a near-total re-basing of contracted revenue onto one counterparty. The record does not show whether the option exercise (5913) is already inside the $3.5 billion figure. The supplied claim list also ends mid-entry at claim 2530, so later CoreWeave disclosures could not be checked.

Core Scientific's record contains far fewer signed customer agreements than its claim count suggests. Only two hosting customers are both named and tied to a definitive contract. Celsius Mining LLC operated under a Master Services Agreement (claim 13540) and was described as one of the company's largest customers (claims 13536, 13539). Gryphon Digital Mining's October 2021 hosting deal, for 230 MW and up to 71,000 machines, was the largest the company had signed (claim 19781). A third hosting relationship, the July 2022 colocation agreement, names its counterparty only as a 'third party customer' (claim 13845), so it cannot be independently assessed.

Much of the remaining volume is not customer revenue. The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate appears in at least eight entries (claims 20693, 14175, 14191, 14184, 20685, 20699, 13922 among them), but it is a single October 2021 site-development announcement repeated across filings. The Muskogee 500 MW agreement is likewise one February 2022 port-authority announcement (claims 14194, 20702, 13924), and the April 2023 filing still describes it with continuing-status language (claim 12820). Neither involves a paying counterparty. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12759, 12782) and the Bitmain arrangements (claim 12740) are supply-side, and Weil and PJT (claims 13502, 13503) are advisers. The October 2023 restructuring term sheet is expressly an 'agreement in principle' (claim 6536).

Concentration risk materialized quickly. Celsius filed for chapter 11 in July 2022 (claim 13549), withheld billed charges (claims 13541, 13551) and accused the company of violating the automatic stay (claims 13537, 19787). Within weeks Core engaged restructuring advisers (claim 13502). Gryphon, the other anchor, was publicly characterized by a short seller as lacking the capital to buy or install its committed miners (claim 19782).

The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No contracted revenue, hosting rates or customer-share percentages are disclosed, and the amount Celsius withheld is unquantified. The large dollar figures belong to third parties. The $1.7 billion NuMiner order (claim 19784) is a Sphere 3D agreement that a short seller alleges does not exist. The $220.7 million figure attached to BitFuFu (claim 19783) is the unpaid balance on Sphere's $305.7 million miner purchase, of which only $85.0 million had been paid, rather than a Gryphon or Core obligation. Read correctly, these figures undermine the funding behind Core's largest hosting commitment instead of adding to its backlog.

Core Scientific's claim record contains fewer distinct customer relationships than its length suggests. Fifteen of the forty entries restate the same two site-development announcements, so the volume reflects repetition rather than breadth. The Denton, Texas facility with the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate appears in claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20685, 20693, 20699 and 13922. The 500MW Port of Muskogee project appears in claims 14185, 14194, 20686, 20695, 20702, 13924 and 12820. Neither is a revenue-bearing customer contract. The counterparties are a municipality, an energy developer and a port authority, and the April 2023 restatement of Muskogee (claim 12820) describes it as an agreement that 'remains', which reads as an undelivered development commitment rather than an operating site. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799) and the Bitmain supply agreements (claims 12740, 12826) are on the cost side. Weil and PJT (claims 13502, 13503) are advisers, not commercial partners.

The signed, named customer agreements in the record come down to two. One is the Celsius Mining Master Services Agreement (claim 13540), which the company itself called one of its largest customer relationships (claims 13536, 13548). The other is the October 2021 Gryphon hosting deal for 230 MW (claim 19781). The Gryphon support, however, comes from a March 2022 third-party short report and not from company filings. That same report questions whether Gryphon could fund its miners at all (claim 19782), and its BitFuFu and NuMiner figures (claims 19783, 19784) concern Sphere 3D's own obligations, not Core's. The July 2022 colocation agreement (claim 13845) is signed but names only 'a third party customer', so its scale and credit quality cannot be assessed.

Concentration moved quickly from upside to liability. By October 2022, Celsius was in chapter 11, was withholding billed charges, and was litigating an alleged automatic-stay violation (claims 13537, 13538, 13541, 13549, 13551, 19787). Within weeks, Core engaged restructuring advisers. The record closes with a restructuring agreement in principle with noteholders (claim 6536), which is a term sheet and not a definitive deal.

Revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. None of the claims discloses hosting revenue, contract value or customer-level billing, so the 230 MW Gryphon capacity and the Celsius receivables cannot be tied to reported figures. That gap is itself the main diligence finding.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer agreements, and most items labelled as partnerships are something else. The clearest signed customer contract is the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining LLC, which the company itself described as one of its largest customers (claims 13540, 13536, 13548). It is also the one that went wrong. Celsius filed for chapter 11 in July 2022, then withheld billed charges and moved to enforce the automatic stay against Core (claims 13549, 13551, 13537, 19787). The other named hosting counterparty is Gryphon Digital Mining, whose October 2021 deal for 230 MW and up to 71,000 machines was the company's largest ever (claim 19781). The internal arithmetic holds, since 7.1 EH/s across 71,000 units implies roughly 100 TH/s per machine. However, every Gryphon-related item dated 2022-03-03 (claims 19781 to 19784) appears to come from a short-seller critique rather than from Core's own filings, and that source questions whether Gryphon could fund or install the miners at all (claim 19782). Claim 19783 also needs care. Its $220.7 million figure is the unpaid balance of Sphere's $305.7 million BitFuFu order ($305.7 million minus the $85.0 million paid), not a Gryphon purchase. The July 2022 colocation agreement names no customer and refers only to 'a third party customer' (claim 13845). The Denton and Muskogee items, repeated across more than a dozen claims (for example 14184, 14185, 20702), are site-development agreements with municipalities and a Tenaska affiliate. They are not revenue contracts, and by April 2023 the Muskogee language had become conditional (claim 12820). The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12741, 12799) is a power-supply arrangement, Bitmain is a vendor (claims 12740, 12826), and Weil and PJT are advisers (claims 13502, 13503). The October 2023 restructuring term sheet is expressly an agreement in principle (claim 6536). Taken together, the named customer base narrows to Celsius and Gryphon, with concentration risk landing first in Celsius's default and then in a counterparty whose solvency was publicly disputed. No hosting revenue, contracted backlog, or per-customer revenue share appears in this record, so the announced deals cannot be reconciled with reported revenue. The megawatt figures should not be read as contracted income.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer contracts with a named counterparty, and none of them tie to a disclosed revenue figure. The clearest signed customer relationship is the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining LLC, which the company called one of its largest customers (claims 13540, 13536, 13548). That contract became a liability. Celsius filed for chapter 11 in July 2022, withheld billed charges, and alleged that Core violated the automatic stay (claims 13549, 13551, 13537, 19787). The second named hosting counterparty is Gryphon Digital Mining, reported as a 230 MW, 7.1 EH/s deal, Core's largest ever (claim 19781). That figure comes from a third-party critical report, not from a Core filing. The same report questioned whether Gryphon could fund or install the miners (claim 19782) and whether its reported $1.7 billion NuMiner purchase was real (claim 19784). The BitFuFu figures in that report actually concern Sphere's July 2021 miner purchase agreement, which the report says was largely unpaid (claim 19783), even though the record labels that claim as Gryphon's. Beyond these two names, the July 2022 colocation agreement is attributed only to an unnamed 'third party customer' (claim 13845). The Denton and Muskogee items appear many times in the record (claims 14184, 14175, 20685, 14185, 20702, 12820 and duplicates). They are site-development agreements with a municipality, a power affiliate and a port authority, not revenue-paying hosting customers. The Muskogee language is also an announcement by the Port Authority, not a Core-executed contract. The Bitmain and Murphy Electric Power Board agreements are supply and power contracts, so they are cost-side commitments (claims 12740, 12759). The PJT and Weil engagements are adviser mandates (claims 13503, 13502). On concentration, the record moves from a hosting book anchored by a few large miners, Celsius and the reported Gryphon deal, to a situation where the largest named customer was in bankruptcy and withholding payment. It ends with an agreement in principle with noteholders rather than new customer wins (claim 6536). Revenue cannot be reconciled from this record. No hosting revenue, contracted MW-to-dollar rates or customer-share percentages are disclosed. The only dollar amounts, $305.7 million, $220.7 million and $1.7 billion, are counterparties' own equipment purchase commitments, not Core revenue.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer contracts, and many of its claims are duplicates. The Denton, Texas development agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate appears at least eight times (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 20685, 20693, 20699, 13922). The Muskogee Port Authority 500MW announcement appears seven times (14185, 14194, 20686, 20695, 20702, 13924, 12820). Neither is a customer agreement. Both are site-development arrangements with municipalities and power partners. The Muskogee deal was framed as the Port Authority's announcement rather than Core's own disclosure, and the April 2023 restatement's wording 'which remains' suggests it was not yet built (12820). The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799), the Bitmain supply agreements (12740, 12826), and the Weil and PJT engagements (13502, 13503) are vendor and advisor relationships. They should not count toward customer traction.

Only two hosting counterparties are named. The Gryphon Digital Mining deal, 230 MW for up to 71,000 machines (19781), comes from a third-party short report that questions whether Gryphon could pay for or install those miners (19782). The linked NuMiner and BitFuFu figures (19784, 19783) describe Sphere 3D/ANY purchase commitments, not Core contracts. The labels on those claims attach them to Gryphon, which should be corrected. Celsius Mining is the only customer shown under an executed Master Services Agreement (13540). The company first called Celsius 'one of our largest customers' in October 2022, after Celsius had filed for chapter 11, was withholding billed charges, and was litigating the automatic stay (13536, 13538, 13537, 19787). The July 2022 colocation agreement names only a 'third party customer' (13845), so it cannot be verified.

Concentration moved from a promoted anchor, Gryphon, to a disclosed and distressed anchor, Celsius. By 2023 the record shifts entirely to power contracts, supply prepayments, and a restructuring agreement in principle with noteholders and the equity committee (6536). That agreement is a term sheet, not a definitive agreement.

The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. No hosting revenue, contracted megawatts billed, or per-customer receivables are disclosed next to the deals. The Gryphon capacity figures are internally consistent, since 7.1 EH/s across 71,000 machines implies about 100 TH/s per unit. Capacity is not revenue, however, and the counterparty's ability to fund it was disputed at the time. The amount Celsius withheld is not quantified in these claims either. A reader should treat the announced megawatts as capacity claims, not contracted cash flow.

Core Scientific's record holds few signed customer contracts. Most of the other entries are development arrangements, supplier contracts, advisory engagements or third-party allegations. The one clearly signed, named customer contract is the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining LLC, which the company itself called one of its largest customers (claims 13540, 13539, 13548). That contract became a liability. Celsius filed for chapter 11 in July 2022, withheld billed charges, and in September 2022 moved to enforce the automatic stay against Core (claims 13549, 13538, 13537, 19787). The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal, described as Core's largest ever at 230 MW and up to 71,000 machines, appears in the record only through a March 2022 short-seller report (claim 19781). That same source questioned whether Gryphon could pay for or install its miners (claim 19782). It also attacked financing arrangements at Gryphon's merger partner, including an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner order and a BitFuFu purchase that was largely unpaid (claims 19784, 19783). These are third-party allegations about the counterparty, not company disclosures. They still bear directly on whether the headline capacity figure could be collected. The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate is repeated across many filings (claims 14184, 14175, 20685, 13922, and others). So is the 500 MW Muskogee Port Authority agreement (claims 20702, 14185, 13924). Both are facility-development arrangements with municipalities and an energy partner, not revenue-bearing customer contracts. By April 2023 the Muskogee language had become an agreement that "remains" pending, not a built site (claim 12820). The July 2022 colocation agreement names no counterparty at all, only "a third party customer" (claim 13845). The Murphy Electric Power Board contract, Bitmain supply agreements, Weil and PJT engagements, and the October 2023 restructuring term sheet are power, procurement, advisory and creditor arrangements (claims 12799, 12740, 13502, 13503, 6536). None of them evidences customer demand. Concentration moved from a hosting book led by Gryphon and Celsius toward a single distressed anchor customer, and then into Core's own chapter 11 process. Revenue cannot be reconciled from this record. No hosting revenue, megawatt billing rates or customer-level receivables are disclosed that would let the 230 MW Gryphon figure or the Celsius charges be traced to reported results. That gap should be treated as open, not resolved.

Core Scientific's record contains remarkably few signed, named customer contracts, and most of what reads like partnership activity is site development, supply, or power arrangements rather than hosting revenue. The clearest signed customer agreement is the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining LLC (claim 13540). That agreement surfaced in the disclosure record only after Celsius filed for chapter 11 and began withholding billed charges (claims 13536, 13541, 13551) and alleging automatic-stay violations (claims 13537, 19787). The company did describe Celsius as one of its "largest customers" (claims 13539, 13548), but no revenue share is quantified. The other large hosting relationship, Gryphon Digital Mining's 230 MW, 71,000-machine deal (claim 19781), appears in the record only through a third-party short report. That report questioned Gryphon's capacity to fund its miners (claim 19782) and the credibility of related Sphere 3D arrangements with BitFuFu and NuMiner (claims 19783, 19784). Those are allegations, not company disclosures, but they point to the same weakness: the named hosting counterparties were thinly capitalized crypto operators. The July 2022 colocation press release (claim 13845) names no customer at all, only "a third party customer," so its scale and credit quality cannot be assessed. The heavily repeated Denton and Muskogee items (claims 14191, 14175, 13922, 14194, 20702, 13924) are development agreements with a city, an energy affiliate, and a port authority. They are not customer contracts. Muskogee was announced by the Port Authority rather than the company, and the April 2023 filing still describes it in language suggesting it had not progressed to operation (claim 12820). The Bitmain supply agreements (claims 12740, 12826) and the Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12759, 12782) are vendor and utility relationships. Concentration moved from a hosting book led by Celsius and the Gryphon deal in 2021-22, through Celsius's bankruptcy, to adviser engagements (claims 13502, 13503) and a restructuring agreement in principle (claim 6536). The disclosed record contains no revenue figures, customer percentages, or contract values attributable to any named hosting customer. The announced deals therefore cannot be reconciled with reported revenue from this record. That gap is itself the diligence finding: the only quantified customer exposure is what bankruptcy litigation made visible.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into executed customer contracts, development or supply arrangements that generate no customer revenue, and non-binding language. The executed customer contracts are few and named. The Celsius Mining relationship rests on a Master Services Agreement (claim 13540), and the company called Celsius one of its largest customers (claims 13536, 13539, 13548). That contract soured: Celsius filed for chapter 11, withheld billed charges, and alleged stay violations (claims 13550, 13551, 19787). The October 2021 Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal, at 230 MW and described as the company's largest ever (claim 19781), is named but was challenged by third-party short-seller allegations. Those allegations question Gryphon's funding (claim 19782) and its miner purchase commitments. On one of them, the $220.7M figure in claim 19783 equals the $305.7M BitFuFu price less $85.0M paid. Another alleges that a $1.7B NuMiner agreement does not exist (claim 19784). These remain allegations, not findings. The July 2022 colocation agreement (claim 13845) names no counterparty and cites only a third party customer, so it cannot be weighted.

Much of the remaining record is not customer demand. The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 13922) and the Muskogee 500MW agreement (claims 14185, 14194, 13924) are site-development arrangements, and the 2023 restatement of Muskogee (claim 12820) truncates at 'which remains', which suggests it was still unbuilt. The Murphy power contract (claims 12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799) and the Bitmain supply agreements (claims 12740, 12826) are on the supply side. The Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) are advisory. The restructuring deals were agreements in principle (claims 6536, 6393), not executed contracts.

Counterparty concentration has swung from one extreme to another. In 2021-22 it sat with crypto-mining hosting clients whose credit failed. From June 2024 it sits with a single HPC tenant, CoreWeave, through a series of agreements (claim 6060). The arithmetic reconciles internally. Roughly $3.5B over 12 years (claims 7765, 19643) implies about $292M a year, consistent with the stated $290M average. However, that total is management's lifetime estimate, and the 75-80 percent margin is an anticipated figure (claim 19643), not a disclosed result. For scale, contracted future hosting revenue stood at only $58.3M as of March 31, 2024, on contracts of 15-24 months (claim 6202). The CoreWeave figures therefore represent roughly a fiftyfold step-up in committed revenue from one counterparty, a figure that should be checked against later remaining-performance-obligation disclosures. The record supplied ends mid-entry at claim 19656, so later amendments or expansions are not assessed here.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small set of named, contract-backed counterparties and a larger body of development, supply, and third-party material that should not be read as customer revenue. The strongest signed relationships are the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining (claim 13540), which the company called one of its largest customers (claims 13539, 13548), and the CoreWeave hosting agreements announced in June 2024 (claims 7765, 6060, 19643). The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal for 230 MW, described as the company's largest ever (claim 19781), is named, but the surrounding claims come from a critical third-party report that questioned Gryphon's ability to pay for or install its miners (claim 19782). The BitFuFu and NuMiner items (claims 19783, 19784) describe Sphere 3D's purchase commitments, not Core Scientific contracts, and the NuMiner figure is framed as allegedly non-existent. The Denton/Tenaska and Muskogee items (claims 14175, 14184, 14185, 12820) are site-development agreements with municipalities and an energy affiliate, not customer contracts; the Muskogee announcement was made by the port authority, and the 2023 filing's language suggests the project had not progressed (claim 12820). Murphy Electric (claim 12741) and Bitmain (claim 12740) are supply-side counterparties, and Weil and PJT (claims 13502, 13503) are advisers. The one clearly anonymous customer is the unnamed "third party customer" in the July 2022 colocation announcement (claim 13845). The restructuring "agreements in principle" (claims 6536, 6393) are creditor arrangements, not commercial wins. On concentration, the 2021–22 hosting book leaned on crypto miners such as Celsius and Gryphon, and it proved fragile: Celsius filed for Chapter 11, withheld billed charges, and accused the company of violating the automatic stay (claims 13549, 13551, 13550, 19787). After emergence, exposure shifted toward a single hyperscale tenant, CoreWeave, which swaps many small crypto counterparties for one very large one. The revenue arithmetic is internally consistent: $3.5 billion over 12 years works out to roughly $292 million a year, matching the stated $290 million average (claim 19643). However, the figure is a company estimate of what the contracts "could" generate (claim 7765), and the 75–80% margin is an anticipation, not a result. The only disclosed backlog figure, $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 2024 (claim 6202), predates CoreWeave, so the record provided does not show that commitment flowing into reported obligations. The claim list was cut off at claim 19656, so later CoreWeave expansions could not be assessed.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small number of signed customer contracts and a much larger body of site-development, supplier and restructuring language that should not be read as customer demand. The clearest signed customer agreement is the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining LLC, which the company identified by name as one of its largest customers (13540, 13539, 13548). That relationship then soured: Celsius filed for chapter 11 in July 2022, alleged automatic-stay violations and withheld billed charges (13536, 13537, 13541, 13549). The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting deal, described as the company's largest ever at 230 MW (19781), is named, but the record reaches it through a short-seller-style critique. That critique questions whether Gryphon and its Sphere 3D affiliate could fund the miners at all, and alleges that a $1.7 billion NuMiner purchase agreement did not exist (19782, 19783, 19784). The July 2022 colocation press release refers only to an unnamed "third party customer" (13845), which leaves that counterparty unidentified.

The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (14175, 14184, 14191, 13922) and the Muskogee 500 MW announcement (14185, 14194, 13924, 12820) are facility-development arrangements, not customer contracts. Muskogee was announced by the port authority rather than the company, and by 2023 it was still described in open-ended terms (12820). The Bitmain supply agreements (12740, 12826) and the Murphy Electric Power Board contract (12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799) are inputs rather than revenue. The Weil and PJT engagements (13502, 13503) and the restructuring agreements in principle (6536, 6393) are also not customer signals.

Concentration has swung from one fragile counterparty to another. In 2021-2022 exposure clustered in Celsius and Gryphon, both of whose creditworthiness was contested. From mid-2024 it pivoted to CoreWeave, whose roughly 200 MW, 12-year agreements were described as worth about $3.5 billion (7765, 6060, 19643). Management said another 300 MW remained available for HPC hosting but uncontracted (19656).

The arithmetic is directionally coherent but should be read carefully. As of March 31, 2024, remaining hosting performance obligations were only about $58.3 million, on 15-24 month terms (6202). The CoreWeave figure implies roughly $290 million a year, or about $1.46 million per MW-year. That makes it several times the entire prior backlog. It is also framed as an estimate of what the contract "could" generate rather than as contracted minimums. The record provided is truncated after claim 19643, so later CoreWeave developments are not assessed here.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into three tiers, and only the last contains a large, named, signed customer contract. The first tier is site-development language from 2021-2022. The Muskogee 500MW project was an agreement that the Port Authority announced, not a customer deal (claims 14194, 14185, 13924). By the 2023 filing the project is described only as one which 'remains' pending (12820). The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (14184, 14175, 14191, 13922) covers site and power development, not revenue. The Murphy Electric power contract (12759, 12741), the Bitmain supply agreements (12740, 12826), the Weil/PJT advisory engagements (13502, 13503) and the restructuring 'agreements in principle' (6536, 6393) are supplier, adviser or creditor relationships and should not be read as customer traction.

The second tier shows a naming pattern worth noting. The July 2022 colocation release described its counterparty only as 'a third party customer' (13845). Celsius Mining appears by name as 'one of' the largest customers, under a Master Services Agreement, only once it was in chapter 11, withholding billed charges and alleging stay violations (13539, 13540, 13549, 13551). The first time investors learned the identity of a key counterparty was when it had become a receivable problem. A later filing still calls the GPU counterparty 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (5454), even though CoreWeave had been named months earlier.

The third tier is CoreWeave, which is the only named, signed, multi-year contract of scale. It covers roughly 200MW over 12 years for about $3.5 billion, or about $290 million a year (7765, 19643, 6060). CoreWeave then exercised its first option (5913) and its final option (5507), taking coverage to about 590MW and roughly $10.2 billion (7766). Concentration has therefore gone from a diffuse self-mining and hosting base, where the largest named customer failed, to near-total dependence on a single hyperscaler for contracted HPC revenue. The additional 300MW offered for HPC (19656) had no named taker.

The arithmetic broadly reconciles. $3.5 billion over 12 years is about $292 million a year. The implied rate of about $1.45 million per MW-year holds when the deal scales to 590MW and $10.2 billion. The 75-80% margin figure (19643) comes from call commentary, not filed financials. Note that the $58.3 million of disclosed hosting backlog as of March 2024 (6202) predates CoreWeave and bears no relation to it. Also note that claims 7765 and 7766 carry month-start dates suggestive of secondary summaries, and that the record is truncated at claim 5033, so later disclosures were not reviewed.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small set of executed, named customer contracts and a larger body of development, supply and restructuring agreements that are not customer revenue at all. The earliest items are site-development arrangements rather than sales: the October 2021 Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate (claims 14184, 14175, 13922) and the Muskogee Port Authority's 500MW announcement (claims 14194, 14185, 13924). By April 2023 the Muskogee project was still described as an agreement that "remains" pending (claim 12820). The Bitmain equipment agreements (claims 12740, 12826) and the Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12759, 12741) are supplier relationships. The 2023 restructuring accords were explicitly "agreements in principle" (claims 6536, 6393). None of these should be read as commercial demand.

On naming, the pattern leans toward anonymity until disclosure is forced or strategically useful. A July 2022 colocation deal was attributed only to "a third party customer" (claim 13845). Celsius Mining was identified as one of the largest customers under a signed Master Services Agreement only once its chapter 11 filing, withheld payments and automatic-stay motion made the relationship material (claims 13548, 13540, 13551, 13550). Even after CoreWeave was named in the June 2024 hosting agreements and option exercises (claims 6060, 5913, 5507), the November 2024 periodic filing reverted to "a third-party provider of HPC operations" (claim 5454).

Concentration has moved from one distressed hosting client to a single AI counterparty. The CoreWeave relationship grew from roughly 200MW (claim 7765) through two option exercises to about 590MW (claim 7766), plus a further 70MW at Denton (claims 5033, 5036), which repurposes the original development site. That is a signed, named, multi-year commitment, but it concentrates credit exposure in one hyperscaler, echoing the Celsius episode.

The revenue arithmetic cannot yet be reconciled from the record. The only company-reported backlog figure, about $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), predates the CoreWeave contracts. The $3.5 billion and $10.2 billion figures (claims 7765, 7766) are framed as estimates of what the contracts "could" generate over 12 years, not as recognized remaining performance obligations. The record also carries a minor 588MW versus 590MW rounding discrepancy (claim 7766). Until a post-2024 remaining-performance-obligation disclosure is available, the headline contract values should be treated as management estimates, not audited backlog; the latest filing extract on the CoreWeave agreements (claim 4565) is truncated and does not settle the question.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into a small number of signed, named customer contracts and a larger body of development, supply, and restructuring agreements that are not customer revenue at all. The 2021-2022 Denton and Muskogee items (claims 14191, 14184, 14175, 13922, 14194, 14185, 13924) are site-development arrangements with the City of Denton, a Tenaska affiliate, and the Muskogee port authority. They are counterparties for land and power, not buyers of services. By April 2023 the Muskogee 500MW project is described only as an agreement that remains in some unstated condition (claim 12820). The Bitmain miner purchases (claims 12740, 12826) and the Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799) are vendor-side. The 2023 restructuring items (claims 6536, 6393) are explicitly agreements in principle with creditors.

The first genuine customer disclosures are uneven on naming. The July 2022 colocation deal refers only to a third party customer (claim 13845). Celsius Mining is named only once it becomes a problem: one of the largest customers under a Master Services Agreement, now in chapter 11, withholding billed charges and alleging stay violations (claims 13540, 13548, 13536, 13551, 13550). That is a signed contract, but its disclosure came through a credit event rather than an announcement. The pattern recurs in 2024. The 10-Q describes a third-party provider of HPC operations (claim 5454), while press releases name CoreWeave for the same March 2024 series of agreements (claims 6060, 5913, 5507).

Concentration has moved from a hosting book in which Celsius was one large client among several to near-total dependence on CoreWeave for HPC. The sequence runs from an initial 200MW with 12-year terms (claims 7765, 6060), to two option exercises (claims 5913, 5507), to roughly 590MW in aggregate (claim 7766), plus a further 70MW at Denton (claims 5033, 5036). The Denton site thus migrated from a municipal development partnership to a CoreWeave delivery location.

The revenue arithmetic does not yet reconcile on this record. The only issuer-stated backlog figure is about $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024, on 15-24 month contracts (claim 6202). That figure predates the CoreWeave deals. The $3.5 billion and $10.2 billion totals (claims 7765, 7766) are carried at month-start dates and phrased as estimates of what contracts could yield, which suggests secondary summaries rather than filed remaining-performance-obligation figures. Claim 4565, the August 2025 filing, is truncated in the input. A filed backlog number tying to roughly $10 billion over twelve years should be confirmed before the headline totals are treated as contracted revenue.

Separating executed customer contracts from development scaffolding leaves a shorter list than the announcement count suggests. Only two counterparties have ever been named as revenue-generating customers: Celsius Mining LLC, under a Master Services Agreement (claim 13540) and identified as one of the largest customers (13536, 13548), and CoreWeave, Inc. (6060, 5036). Everything else in the 2022 cohort is site development or supply, not demand. The Denton announcements with the City of Denton and an affiliate of Tenaska Energy (14184, 14175, 14191, 13922) are agreements to develop a facility. The Muskogee City-County Port Authority 500MW announcement (14194, 14185, 13924) is the same species, and by April 2023 the company was still describing it as an agreement that remains outstanding rather than built (12820). Murphy Electric Power Board (12782, 12799, 12759, 12770) is a power supply contract and Bitmain (12740, 12826) a miner vendor; both are cost lines. Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) are restructuring advisers and belong in no customer table, and the restructuring agreements in principle (6536, 6393) are explicitly non-binding term-sheet language.

One counterparty was announced without identification: the July 2022 colocation agreement to host ASIC servers for a third-party customer (13845) was never named. The reverse pattern also appears, in that the November 2024 filing describes a third-party provider of HPC operations (5454) where the press releases and a later filing (4565) name CoreWeave, so the anonymized disclosure is not a separate relationship.

Concentration has not diminished; it has changed names. Celsius was large enough that its chapter 11 and its withholding of billed charges (13537, 13538, 13541) preceded the company's own filing. Post-emergence, effectively the entire HPC book is CoreWeave, roughly 590MW across 12-year terms (7766), with options exercised in June (5913) and October 2024 (5507) and a further 70MW at Denton (5036).

The arithmetic is internally consistent but not comparable to the balance-sheet disclosure. The $3.5 billion against 200MW (7765) and the roughly $10.2 billion against approximately 590MW (7766) both imply about $1.45 million per MW-year, so the escalation reflects capacity rather than repricing. But the $58.3 million of expected future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (6202) is contracted backlog under existing agreements; the billions are management estimates of potential revenue across twelve years and neither reconcile to nor validate that figure. The company's own 588 versus approximately 590MW slippage (7766) is a small but telling imprecision.

Nearly every material counterparty here is identified by name, which is a better disclosure record than the sector norm, but the named agreements fall into two very different categories. The Denton (claims 14191, 14184, 14175, 13922) and Muskogee (14185, 14194, 13924, 12820) announcements are site-development agreements with a municipality, a Tenaska Energy affiliate and a port authority — counterparties that supply land and power, not revenue. Muskogee is the clearest instance of announcement language outrunning execution: announced February 2022 as a 500MW project, it is still described in the April 2023 filing (12820) as something that "remains" prospective. Denton eventually converted, but only in February 2025 and only as the site for a CoreWeave block (5036, 5033), roughly three years after the original announcement. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (12741, 12759, 12770, 12782) and the Bitmain supply agreements (12740) are likewise inputs, while 12826 reverts to generic "agreements with vendors." Two genuine revenue counterparties go unnamed at first mention: the July 2022 colocation agreement for a "third party customer" (13845), never subsequently identified, and the "third-party provider of HPC operations" of 5454, which is plainly CoreWeave — the August 2025 disclosure (4565) reuses the identical "Beginning on March 6, 2024" construction under CoreWeave's name.

Concentration did not diminish; it migrated. Celsius Mining was disclosed as "one of the largest customers" under a Master Services Agreement (13536, 13539, 13540) and that exposure converted directly into bankruptcy, withheld billings and a stay motion (13548–13551). By 2025 the book is effectively single-counterparty again, with CoreWeave spanning roughly 590MW (7766) across the June 2024 base contract, both option exercises (5913, 5507) and the Denton increment.

The arithmetic does reconcile. The 200MW, 12-year, ~$3.5 billion framing (7765) implies about $17.5 million per MW of lifetime revenue; applying that to 588MW yields roughly $10.3 billion against the $10.2 billion reported (7766), a rounding-level difference. What does not reconcile is measurement basis: the $58.3 million of future hosting revenue disclosed as of March 31, 2024 (6202) is contracted revenue under a recognition convention, while the $10.2 billion is a twelve-year potential estimate. The two are not comparable, and the record supplied here ends in August 2025.

Core Scientific's disclosure record separates into three tiers, and only one of them consists of signed customer agreements.

The named, binding customer relationships are few. Celsius Mining LLC is identified as one of the largest customers under a Master Services Agreement (13548, 13540), and CoreWeave is named from June 2024 onward across a series of HPC hosting contracts (7765, 6060, 5033). Everything else named is a counterparty of a different kind. Muskogee City-County Port Authority (14185, 13924) and the City of Denton with a Tenaska Energy affiliate (14175, 13922) are site and power development agreements with a port authority, a municipality and a developer; no revenue counterparty is identified in either, and the Muskogee project is still described in April 2023 in the same terms used in March 2022 (12820). Bitmain (12740) and Murphy Electric Power Board (12799, 12782) are suppliers, not customers. The 2023 restructuring agreements in principle (6536, 6393) are non-binding by their own wording and involve creditors rather than buyers, and Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) are advisers.

Two announcements describe customers without naming them: the July 2022 colocation deal for a third-party customer (13845), never subsequently identified, and the March 2024 third-party provider of HPC operations (5454), which the August 2025 filing retroactively labels the CoreWeave HPC Service Agreements (4565). The second resolves; the first does not.

Concentration has narrowed rather than diversified. In 2022 the identified concentration risk was Celsius, which filed chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (13549, 13551). By 2025 the disclosed customer base is functionally one name, each incremental announcement (5913, 5507, 5036) an expansion of the same counterparty.

The arithmetic is internally consistent but does not describe contracted revenue. The $3.5 billion, 200MW, twelve-year figure (7765) implies roughly $1.46 million per MW-year; the $10.2 billion across approximately 588 to 590MW (7766) implies about $1.45 million, the same unit economics scaled, which favors the disclosure. Both, however, are potential-revenue estimates contingent on option exercise, and the June 2024 headline preceded the exercises that made it real (5913, 5507). The only hard forward figure on record is $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of 31 March 2024 (6202), against legacy fifteen-to-twenty-four-month contracts. The 70MW Denton increment (5033) carries no dollar figure at all.

Core Scientific's announcement record divides along a line its press releases never draw: most of the early named counterparties are not customers at all. The Muskogee City-County Port Authority 500MW agreement (claims 14194, 14185, 13924) and the Denton facility agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate (claims 14175, 14191, 14184, 13922) are site and power development arrangements with a municipal authority and an energy developer, repeated verbatim across the March and May 2022 filings without advancing. By April 2023 the Muskogee language had degraded to a 500MW project that 'remains' something (claim 12820) — a qualifier, a year after announcement, that is the tell. Murphy Electric Power Board (claims 12799, 12759, 12741, 12770, 12782) and Bitmain (claims 12740, 12826) run the other direction entirely: Core Scientific is the buyer. Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners (claims 13502, 13503) are advisors engaged during distress, not commercial wins.

The genuinely signed customer agreements are strikingly few and, until 2024, mostly anonymous. The July 2022 colocation agreement was disclosed only as hosting for 'a third party customer' (claim 13845). Celsius Mining LLC was never announced as a win; it surfaces as a named largest customer only through its own chapter 11 and a Master Services Agreement dispute (claims 13548, 13539, 13536, 13540, 13551, 13550). That is disclosure-by-litigation, and it means concentration was invisible until it broke.

Post-restructuring concentration is higher, not lower. CoreWeave is named (claims 6060, 5913, 5507, 5033, 5036) but described anonymously as a 'third-party provider of HPC operations' in the contract-accounting disclosures (claims 5454, 4565) — the same relationship, two registers.

The arithmetic mostly reconciles but is thinner than the headlines. Future hosting revenue under contracts exceeding one year stood at $58.3 million as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), immediately before the $3.5 billion, 200MW, 12-year CoreWeave figure (claim 7765). That figure implies roughly $1.46 million per MW-year; the later ~$10.2 billion across ~588MW over 12 years (claim 7766) implies about $1.45 million — internally consistent scaling of one counterparty, not diversification. Claim 7766 also flags Core Scientific reporting ~590MW against ~588MW, and both totals are estimated potential, inclusive of exercised options (claims 5913, 5507), rather than recognized revenue.

Core Scientific's disclosure record separates into three tiers, and only one of them contains customers. The first is site and input agreements with named public or energy counterparties: the City of Denton and an affiliate of Tenaska Energy for a seventh facility (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 13922), the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a 500MW campus (14185, 14194, 13924), and the Murphy Electric Power Board Industrial Power Contract originally executed in December 2017 (12741, 12770, 12782, 12799). These are land and power arrangements, not demand; none generates hosting revenue, and Muskogee was still described as unconsummated a year after announcement (12820). Bitmain (12740) is a supplier, and Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) are restructuring advisers whose presence in a partnership ledger is a taxonomy artifact rather than commercial traction.

Actual signed customers are thinner. Celsius Mining LLC is named and contractual, under a Master Services Agreement (13540), and was identified as one of the largest customers (13536, 13539, 13548) — a characterization that surfaced only when Celsius entered chapter 11 and withheld billed charges (13549, 13551, 13538). The July 2022 colocation counterparty was never identified, disclosed only as a third party customer (13845). The March 2024 HPC counterparty was likewise described generically as a third-party provider of HPC operations, and that unnamed framing persisted into the November 2024 filing (5454) months after CoreWeave had been named in June 2024 (6060) and again in August 2025 (4565).

Concentration has not diluted; it has transferred. Celsius-era dependence on a single largest customer ended in default. The 2024-25 book rests on CoreWeave across roughly 588 to 590MW (7766), a narrower base than the Celsius exposure it replaced.

The arithmetic is internally consistent but rests on estimates. June 2024's approximately $3.5 billion over 200MW and twelve years (7765) implies about $17.5 million per MW; the February 2025 aggregate of approximately $10.2 billion over 590MW implies roughly $17.3 million. The gap lies elsewhere. The 200MW was option-structured, requiring separate exercises in June and October 2024 (5913, 5507), so the headline preceded the commitment. The primary 8-K language for the 70MW Denton expansion carries no dollar figure at all (5033, 5036). Against contracted hosting revenue of $58.3 million disclosed at March 31, 2024 (6202), the $10.2 billion reads as a modelled ceiling rather than booked backlog.

Core Scientific's disclosure record separates into three tiers that are easy to conflate. The narrowest tier is signed, named, revenue-bearing contracts: the Celsius Mining LLC Master Services Agreement (claim 13540), the Murphy Electric Power Board Industrial Power Contract executed December 15, 2017 (claims 12741, 12759, 12799), the Bitmain equipment supply arrangements (claim 12740), and the CoreWeave hosting agreements (claims 6060, 5036, 5033, 4565). The second tier is site-development arrangements with municipal and energy counterparties, which are named but are not customers: the City of Denton and a Tenaska Energy affiliate (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 13922) and the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14194, 13924). Note that by April 2023 the 500MW Muskogee project was still described in the same announced posture, fourteen months on (claim 12820) — announced capacity, not contracted load. The third tier is unidentified: the July 2022 colocation agreement to host ASIC servers for an unnamed third-party customer (claim 13845), and the March 2024 'series of new contractual agreements with a third-party provider of HPC operations' (claim 5454), whose verbatim language is reused a year later under CoreWeave's name (claim 4565) — the anonymity was temporary, but for roughly eight months the counterparty behind the pivot was undisclosed.

Concentration did not diminish; it migrated and intensified. Celsius was described as 'one of' the largest customers (claims 13536, 13548) — plural framing implying a spread — and its chapter 11 filing and withholding of billed charges (claims 13549, 13538, 13551) converted that concentration into a receivable problem. The replacement is single-name rather than diversified: CoreWeave moved from 200MW and roughly $3.5 billion (claim 7765) through two option exercises (claims 5913, 5507) to approximately 588MW and $10.2 billion (claim 7766).

The arithmetic does not obviously reconcile. As of March 31, 2024, disclosed future hosting revenue on contracts exceeding one year was $58.3 million (claim 6202), while the June 2024 announcement implied roughly $290 million annually and the February 2025 figure implies approximately $850 million annually. The gap is explicable — option-contingent, undelivered infrastructure sits outside recognizable backlog — but it means the headline totals are capacity-weighted estimates, not contracted revenue. Claim 7766 also records the company rounding 588MW to 590MW, a small but telling directional habit. Finally, several claim ids duplicate identical filing language; the announcement count is thinner than the record suggests.

Core Scientific's record mixes many kinds of counterparty that are not customers, so the first job is to separate them. The 2022 Muskogee and Denton items (claims 14194, 14185, 13924, 14175, 14184, 14191, 13922) are site-development arrangements with a port authority, a city and a Tenaska Energy affiliate. They are not revenue contracts. The Muskogee agreement was announced by the Port Authority rather than by the company. Its 2023 restatement (claim 12820) is truncated at "which remains," so its status should be treated as unresolved. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799) is a power supply agreement. Bitmain (claims 12740, 12826) is an equipment vendor. Weil and PJT (claims 13502, 13503) are advisers. The restructuring items (claims 6536, 6393) are agreements in principle with creditors, not commercial deals.

The only signed customer agreements identified before 2024 are hard to assess. The July 2022 colocation deal (claim 13845) names only a "third party customer." Celsius Mining was named as "one of" the company's largest customers under a Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13548, 13539), but only after it filed for chapter 11. The disclosure then turned to withheld billings and a stay-violation motion (claims 13549, 13550, 13551, 13541). No share of revenue was attached to Celsius, so its weight in the business at the time cannot be read from the record.

From 2024 the story is one counterparty. The March 2024 HPC agreements were first described as being with an unnamed "third-party provider of HPC operations" (claim 5454). They appear to be the same contracts later attributed to CoreWeave (claim 4565, which is truncated). The June 2024 expansion (claims 6060, 7765), both option exercises (claims 5913, 5507) and the 70MW Denton add-on (claims 5033, 5036) are all named, signed CoreWeave agreements. Together they take the relationship to roughly 590MW on 12-year terms (claim 7766). Concentration has therefore moved from a diversified hosting book with an at-risk anchor to near-total dependence on a single hyperscaler.

The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. The $3.5 billion and $10.2 billion contract-value figures (claims 7765, 7766) are dated to the first of the month and read like retrospective summaries rather than filing language, so they should be treated as estimates. The only remaining-performance figure on record is $58.3 million at March 31, 2024 (claim 6202). That date predates the CoreWeave expansions, and no later backlog disclosure appears here to test the headline totals against.

Core Scientific's record has more claim ids than distinct commercial events, and fewer of those events are signed customer contracts than the count suggests. The 2022 site announcements for Muskogee and Denton appear five and three times respectively (claims 14194, 14185, 13924, 12820; 14175, 14184, 14191, 13922). They are development agreements with a port authority, a city and an affiliate of Tenaska Energy, not revenue-bearing customer contracts. By April 2023 the Muskogee 500MW project is described only as one that 'remains' pending (claim 12820). The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12770, 12741, 12759, 12782, 12799) and the Bitmain equipment agreements (claims 12740, 12826) are supply-side. The Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) and the restructuring 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393) are advisory and creditor arrangements, and the latter are expressly non-final. None of these should be read as customer traction.

Naming has been inconsistent. A July 2022 colocation agreement was disclosed only as being with 'a third party customer' (claim 13845). Celsius Mining was identified as one of the largest customers under a Master Services Agreement only when it became a distressed counterparty withholding payment in chapter 11 (claims 13548, 13540, 13541, 13550). Likewise, the HPC contracts that began on March 6, 2024 were described in a November 2024 filing as being with 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (claim 5454), even though CoreWeave had already been named in announcements and option exercises (claims 6060, 5913, 5507). The later 10-Q wording attributes the same March 2024 series to CoreWeave (claim 4565).

Concentration has therefore moved from a mining-hosting book in which one named client, Celsius, was material and impaired, to near-total dependence on a single HPC counterparty. That counterparty's commitments grew through two option exercises and an added 70MW at Denton (claims 5033, 5036) to roughly 590MW.

The revenue arithmetic does not reconcile on the record provided. The only filed remaining-performance figure is about $58.3 million as of March 31, 2024, on contracts of 15 to 24 months (claim 6202). That figure appears to exclude the 12-year HPC contracts, even though the first of them was signed on March 6. The $3.5 billion and $10.2 billion contract values (claims 7765, 7766) are estimates of potential value over the full term, not audited backlog. Until a filed remaining-performance-obligation figure ties to the roughly 590MW, those headline numbers should be treated as projections of cumulative value.

Core Scientific's record contains few signed customer agreements, and many of its 'partnership' claims describe infrastructure or development arrangements rather than revenue contracts. The 2022 Muskogee and Denton items (claims 14194, 14185, 13924, 14175, 14184, 14191, 13922) are site-development agreements with a port authority, a city and a Tenaska affiliate. They are not paying customers. The Muskogee agreement was announced by the Port Authority, not the company, and was still described in qualified terms a year later (claim 12820). The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12770, 12741, 12759, 12782, 12799) and the Bitmain arrangements (claims 12740, 12826) are supply-side. The October 2023 and December 2023 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393) are restructuring term sheets. The PJT and Weil engagements (claims 13502, 13503) are advisory. The duplicated claim ids overstate how much distinct deal flow there was.

On naming, the pattern tends to run the same way each time: the counterparty is anonymous at announcement and identified later. The July 2022 colocation deal was with an unnamed 'third party customer' (claim 13845). Celsius Mining was named as 'one of' the largest customers under a Master Services Agreement only once it was in chapter 11 and withholding payment (claims 13548, 13540, 13541, 13550). The March 2024 HPC contracts were first framed as agreements with 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (claim 5454). They were later attributed to CoreWeave (claims 6060, 4565).

Concentration has moved from a multi-tenant hosting base, where Celsius's default was a disclosed stress event, to near-total dependence on one counterparty. The CoreWeave relationship grew through option exercises (claims 5913, 5507) and an additional 70MW at Denton (claims 5033, 5036), reaching roughly 590MW (claim 7766). The same site first announced with Tenaska now anchors CoreWeave capacity.

The revenue arithmetic cannot be reconciled from this record. The only filed backlog figure is about $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202). That predates the CoreWeave contracts. The $3.5 billion (claim 7765) and $10.2 billion (claim 7766) contract values are expressed as company estimates of what the contracts 'could' generate over 12-year terms. They read as secondary summaries rather than filed remaining-performance-obligation figures. Claim 4565 is truncated in the record. Diligence should compare the headline contract values against the RPO disclosed in post-2024 10-Qs, and check how much depends on option exercise, construction delivery and CoreWeave's own credit.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into infrastructure development deals, supplier contracts and genuine hosting customers, and only the last group bears on revenue. The Denton and Muskogee items (claims 14191, 14175, 14184, 14185, 14194, 13922, 13924) are site-development agreements with a city, a power affiliate and a port authority, not customer contracts, and several are near-duplicate restatements of the same October 2021 and February 2022 announcements. The Muskogee deal was announced by the Port Authority rather than the company, and by 2023 it is described as one that "remains" (12820), which reads as unconsummated. Bitmain (12740) and Murphy Electric Power Board (12741, 12759, 12770, 12782, 12799) are suppliers. Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) are advisers. The 2023 restructuring agreements in principle (6536, 6393) are creditor arrangements, not commercial wins.

Only two hosting customers are identified by name. Celsius Mining appears in 2022 as one of the largest customers under a signed Master Services Agreement (13539, 13540). By October 2022 it was in chapter 11, withholding billed charges and alleging stay violations (13536, 13537, 13538, 13541). Other counterparties went unnamed when first disclosed. The July 2022 colocation deal refers only to a "third party customer" (13845), and the HPC agreements beginning March 6, 2024 were first described as being with "a third-party provider" (5454). Later filings attribute that same March 2024 series to CoreWeave (4565, truncated in the record).

Concentration has therefore moved from one distressed mining customer to one AI hyperscaler. CoreWeave's June 2024 expansion (6060) and its first and final option exercises (5913, 5507) are signed contracts, as is the February 2025 Denton add-on of 70MW (5033, 5036). That add-on means a site first announced as a development partnership now hosts the same single counterparty.

The revenue figures do not reconcile within this record. The $3.5 billion and $10.2 billion figures (7765, 7766) are estimated potential contract values, including options, over 12-year terms, and they come from summarizing sources rather than a filed backlog figure. The only filed remaining-obligation figure is $58.3 million as of March 31, 2024 (6202), which predates the June 2024 deals. We found no later filed backlog or recognized HPC revenue in the record to test the headline totals against, so they should be treated as announced ceilings rather than contracted, recognized revenue.

Core Scientific's record splits into two eras, and only the second contains signed customer contracts of real scale. The 2021–2022 disclosures are site-development agreements with municipalities and an energy partner, not customer revenue. The Muskogee 500MW arrangement was announced by the Port Authority rather than the company (claims 14185, 14194, 13924), and was still being described without evidence of commencement in the April 2023 filing (claim 12820). The Denton agreement with the City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate covered a planned mining facility (claims 14184, 14191, 14175, 13922). The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12741, 12799) and the Bitmain agreements (claim 12740) are supply-side. The Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) and the restructuring agreements in principle (claims 6536, 6393) are advisory and creditor matters, not commercial ones.

Naming practice has been uneven. The July 2022 colocation deal referred only to a 'third party customer' (claim 13845). Celsius was identified as 'one of' the largest customers under a Master Services Agreement only once it was in chapter 11, withholding payment and alleging stay violations (claims 13548, 13540, 13541, 13550). The March 2024 HPC agreements appear in the quarterly filing as contracts with 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (claim 5454), and the August 2025 filing opens with the same formulation (claim 4565, truncated). This is so even though press releases name CoreWeave outright (claims 6060, 5913, 5507, 5033).

Concentration has moved from a hosting book with at least one large, distressed named customer to near-total dependence on one counterparty. CoreWeave exercised both expansion options (claims 5913, 5507) and added 70MW at Denton (claims 5036, 5033), a site originally contracted for mining.

The revenue arithmetic is internally consistent but only partly verifiable. The $3.5 billion estimate for roughly 200MW (claim 7765) and the $10.2 billion for about 590MW (claim 7766) both imply about $1.45 million per MW-year over twelve years. These figures are framed as what contracts 'could' generate, and the 588 versus 590MW rounding is disclosed. The only audited-style anchor on record is $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), which predates the CoreWeave deals. The additional 70MW carries no stated value, and no subsequent backlog or recognized-revenue figure appears here to reconcile against the headline totals.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into infrastructure arrangements and paying customers, and most of the early 'partnership' language belongs to the first group. The 2022 Muskogee and Denton items (14194, 14185, 13924, 14184, 14191, 14175, 13922) are site-development agreements with a port authority, a city and a Tenaska Energy affiliate. They are repeated across several filings but contain no customer revenue terms. By April 2023 the Muskogee project was still described as an agreement that 'remains' open-ended (12820). The Bitmain supply agreements (12740, 12826), the Murphy Electric Power Board power contract (12741, 12799), the Weil and PJT engagements (13502, 13503), and the restructuring agreements in principle (6536, 6393) are vendor, adviser or creditor relationships and should not be read as demand. The first hosting customer announced in this record was left unnamed: a 'third party customer' in a July 2022 colocation release (13845).

The only customer named before 2024 was Celsius Mining, one of the largest customers under a signed Master Services Agreement (13540, 13548). That relationship turned adversarial after Celsius filed for chapter 11, withheld billed charges and alleged a stay violation (13549, 13538, 13550). It shows the cost of concentration while the company was still disclosing only a handful of counterparties.

The 2024-2025 pivot is concentrated in a single counterparty to an even greater degree. CoreWeave is named in signed 12-year hosting agreements (6060, 7765), both of its expansion options were exercised (5913, 5507), and a further 70MW was added at Denton (5036). Denton is the same site first framed as a blockchain development partnership. Periodic filings still described the counterparty as an unnamed 'third-party provider of HPC operations' as late as November 2024 (5454), and the identification appears explicitly only in the August 2025 filing (4565).

On the arithmetic, the headline contract values are internally consistent. Roughly $3.5 billion for about 200MW (7765) and $10.2 billion for about 588MW (7766) both imply about $17.3-17.5 million per MW over twelve years. These are company estimates of potential contract value, however, and both entries are secondary summaries rather than filing text. Nor can they be reconciled to the only disclosed backlog figure, $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (6202), which predates the CoreWeave agreements. Whether the 70MW Denton addition sits inside or on top of the roughly 590MW total is not resolved by the record.

Core Scientific's record of named commercial counterparties is thinner than its claim count suggests, because much of the file is duplicated and much of what is labeled partnership is not customer revenue. The 2021-2022 Denton and Muskogee items (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 13922, 14194, 14185, 13924) describe development agreements with a city, a port authority and a Tenaska affiliate. These are site and power arrangements, not paying customers. The Muskogee 500MW project was still being described in April 2023 in language that 'remains' open (claim 12820), which suggests it had not progressed to operation. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract (claims 12759, 12799, 12741, 12782, 12770) and the Bitmain equipment agreements (claims 12740, 12826) are supply-side. The Weil and PJT engagements (claims 13502, 13503) and the restructuring 'agreements in principle' (claims 6536, 6393) are advisory and creditor matters rather than commercial ones.

On identification, the July 2022 colocation deal was disclosed only as a 'third party customer' (claim 13845). The November 2024 filing likewise refers to 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (claim 5454), even though earlier 8-Ks had already named CoreWeave (claims 6060, 5913, 5507). The only customer named before 2024 is Celsius Mining, and it appears only when distressed: in bankruptcy, withholding payments and litigating the Master Services Agreement (claims 13536, 13539, 13540, 13538, 13550).

Concentration has moved from one troubled large hosting client toward near-total dependence on CoreWeave. The CoreWeave relationship grew through a June 2024 200MW, 12-year contract (claim 7765), two option exercises (claims 5913, 5507), and a further 70MW at Denton (claims 5036, 5033). Coverage reached roughly 590MW (claim 7766). These are executed agreements and option exercises, which is materially firmer language than the earlier municipal announcements. Claim 4565 is truncated and cannot be assessed.

The revenue arithmetic does not reconcile from the record as presented. The only filing-based backlog figure is about $58.3 million of future hosting revenue as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202). That figure predates CoreWeave and covers 15-24 month contracts. The $3.5 billion and $10.2 billion figures (claims 7765, 7766) are company estimates of potential value over 12 years. They carry month-level dates that suggest secondary summaries, and they are not remaining performance obligations disclosed in a filing. Readers should look for a post-2024 backlog figure in the 10-Q or 10-K before treating the headline totals as contracted revenue.

Core Scientific's counterparty record has moved from diffuse, loosely described arrangements to near-total dependence on one named customer, CoreWeave. The signed contracts are concrete, but most of the forward language around them is not yet customer revenue.

The 2022 announcements were mostly site-development agreements, not customer contracts. The City of Denton and a Tenaska affiliate (13922) and the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (13924) are named, but they are municipal and power counterparties rather than buyers of hosting. The Muskogee 500MW project was still being carried forward in the April 2023 filing (12820) without evidence of a tenant. The July 2022 colocation deal (13845) named no customer at all. The one customer identified by name in that period, Celsius Mining, surfaced mainly through its chapter 11 filing, its withholding of billed charges and its automatic-stay motion under the Master Services Agreement (13536, 13540, 13550, 13551). That episode showed concentration risk before the company itself entered restructuring (13502, 6536).

The CoreWeave relationship shows how a counterparty went from unnamed to named. The November 2024 filing described a "third-party provider of HPC operations" (5454), while contemporaneous press activity named CoreWeave and its option exercises (6060, 5913, 5507). CoreWeave was not identified in the equivalent filing language until August 2025 (4565, 4183). These are signed hosting agreements. The initial 200MW grew through exercised options, and a further 70MW at Denton was added in February 2025 (5033), reaching roughly 590MW over 12-year terms (7766).

The headline arithmetic broadly reconciles. About $10.2B across 12 years (7766) implies roughly $850M a year, which matches the stated run rate (11707). The earlier $3.5B estimate for the first 200MW (7765) scales consistently with that figure. Two caveats matter. First, only about 350MW had been energized by the March 2026 disclosure (11704), so the $850M is a contracted full-build figure, not current revenue. Second, the $58.3M of multi-year hosting revenue backlog reported at March 31, 2024 (6202) predates the CoreWeave contracts and cannot be compared with them directly.

Concentration has deepened. CoreWeave funded $226.2M of $279.2M in capital expenditures (11706), roughly 81%. The only diversification on record is prospective: "at least one new colocation customer" at sites under exclusivity (11720). That is pipeline language with no named counterparty, and it should not be treated as signed business.

Core Scientific's record of signed customer agreements comes down to one counterparty, CoreWeave. The chain is well documented. It starts with a February 2024 contract for 16 MW at Austin (claim 3442) and a June 2024 series of 12-year hosting agreements for about 200 MW, which the company estimated at roughly $3.5 billion (claims 7765, 6060). CoreWeave then exercised its first and final options for more capacity (claims 5913, 5507) and added 70 MW at Denton in February 2025 (claims 5036, 5033). By February 2025 the aggregate stood at about 588 MW, rounded to 590 MW, with $10.2 billion in contract value (claim 7766). One disclosure quirk is worth noting. The November 2024 filing called the counterparty only a "third-party provider of HPC operations" (claim 5454), months after the press releases had named CoreWeave, and the name did not return to periodic-report language until August 2025 (claim 4565).

The earlier history is less clear. The July 2022 colocation deal was with an unnamed "third party customer" (claim 13845). Celsius Mining was named mainly because of disputes: its bankruptcy, withheld payments, and an automatic-stay motion under its Master Services Agreement (claims 13536, 13540, 13551). Several other items are not customer contracts. The Bitmain and Block agreements are equipment purchases (claims 12740, 3452), and the Murphy Electric contract is a power supply agreement (claim 12782). The Muskogee 500 MW item was a port-authority development announcement, not a signed offtake (claim 12820). The restructuring items were agreements in principle with creditors (claims 6536, 6393). Looking forward, the only new customer is an unnamed prospect, supported by "multiple sites under exclusivity" and confidence about signing "in the near future" (claim 11720). That is pipeline language, not a contract.

Concentration has therefore moved from a spread of mining-hosting clients, one of which went bankrupt, to near-total reliance on a single customer. CoreWeave even funded $226.2 million of the $279.2 million in capital expenditures (claim 11706). As of March 2024, before most of the CoreWeave awards, disclosed future hosting revenue was only $58.3 million (claim 6202).

The headline figures reconcile internally. $850 million a year over 12 years is about $10.2 billion (claims 11707, 7766). The implied value per megawatt is also consistent: about $17.5 million for the initial 200 MW and about $17.3 million across the full 590 MW. The run rate, however, assumes full delivery. Only about 350 MW is energized, with the full 590 MW targeted for early 2027 (claim 11704), so recognized revenue should stay well below $850 million until then.

Core Scientific's customer record divides into two eras, and in both the counterparty that matters is named. In October 2022 the company identified Celsius Mining LLC as one of its largest customers under a signed Master Services Agreement (claims 13540, 13548). The same disclosure reported Celsius's July 2022 chapter 11 filing, its motion alleging an automatic-stay violation, and its withholding of billed charges (claims 13536, 13537, 13538, 13549). That relationship was a signed contract that failed in practice. The Weil and PJT engagements (13502, 13503), the Murphy Electric Power Board contract (12782, 12799), and the Bitmain supply agreements (12740) are adviser, power and vendor arrangements rather than customer revenue. The restructuring 'agreements in principle' (6536, 6393) are creditor terms, not commercial ones. The Port of Muskogee 500MW item is described only as an announced agreement to develop a site, with no customer attached (12820), so it should be treated as framework language.

The second era is concentrated in a single counterparty, CoreWeave, which is disclosed as holding signed, long-dated contracts. These comprise a 16MW Austin contract in February 2024 (3442) and a 200MW, 12-year agreement in June 2024 (7765, 6060, 3443). CoreWeave then exercised options through October 2024 and into early 2025 (5913, 5507, 3444), and added 70MW at Denton in February 2025 (5033). One inconsistency in disclosure style is worth noting. A November 2024 filing described the counterparty only as 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (5454), while later filings using identical wording name CoreWeave (4565, 4183, 3436). The anonymity was cosmetic, not a second customer. The only genuinely unidentified counterparty is prospective: management expects to sign 'at least one new colocation customer' with 'multiple sites under exclusivity' (11720). That is pipeline language, not a signed deal.

Concentration has therefore moved from a diversified hosting book, in which Celsius was one large name, to near-total dependence on CoreWeave. CoreWeave even funded $226.2 million of $279.2 million in capex (11706).

The headline arithmetic reconciles. Roughly $10.2 billion over 12 years implies about $850 million a year (7766, 11707). The initial $3.5 billion for 200MW (7765) implies a per-MW rate that, scaled to ~590MW, lands close to that figure. The $850 million is a full-delivery run rate, however. Only ~350MW had been energized, with ~590MW targeted by early 2027 (11704), so current recognized revenue should sit well below it. The $58.3 million of remaining hosting commitments as of March 2024 (6202) predates the 200MW contract and covers short 15-24 month terms. It should not be bridged to the CoreWeave backlog.

Core Scientific's record separates cleanly into signed contracts and softer language, and nearly all of the signed material names one counterparty. The genuinely executed agreements are the Murphy Electric Power Board industrial power contract behind Marble 1 (claims 12759, 12782), the Bitmain equipment supply agreements (12740), and the CoreWeave colocation contracts. The CoreWeave series comprises a 16 MW Austin contract (3467), a 200 MW, 12-year agreement announced in June 2024 (7765, 3450), successive option exercises (5913, 5507), and a 70 MW Denton addition (5033). The softer items need to be kept apart from these. The Port of Muskogee 500 MW project was announced by the port authority, not the company, in 2022 (12820) and has no disclosed tenant. The October and December 2023 'agreements in principle' (6536, 6393) were restructuring term sheets with creditors, not commercial deals. The 2026 guidance for 'at least one new colocation customer', with 'multiple sites under exclusivity' (11720), is a prospective statement with no named party.

On naming, the company has been inconsistent about CoreWeave. By June 2024 it was identifying CoreWeave in announcements (6060). Yet the November 2024 quarterly filing still called it 'a third-party provider of HPC operations' (5454), and only from August 2025 did filings name it (4565). No other HPC or colocation customer has been named.

Concentration has therefore moved from a diffuse self-mining and hosting base to complete dependence on one customer. As of March 2024, future hosting commitments were only $58.3 million on 15-to-24-month terms (6202). By 2026, CoreWeave accounted for 100% of HPC Hosting revenue (3536), and the company describes its high-density business as 'highly dependent on a single customer' (3457). CoreWeave also funded $226.2 million of $279.2 million in capex (11706), which deepens the linkage beyond revenue.

The headline arithmetic broadly reconciles. The 200 MW deal was valued at an estimated $3.5 billion (7765), and the roughly 590 MW total at $10.2 billion (7766), both about $17 million per MW over 12 years. A $10 billion-plus contract spread over 12 years implies roughly $833 million a year, close to the ~$850 million run-rate claim (11707). The run rate is a full-build figure, however. Only about 350 MW was energized, with 590 MW targeted by early 2027 (11704), so current recognized revenue should sit well below it. Deferred revenue rising from $18.1 million to $150.1 million (3488) fits the prepayment structure, although that balance is dated June 2025 in a 2026 record.

Core Scientific's customer announcements reveal a consolidation toward a single named counterparty, CoreWeave, Inc., though early disclosures obscured identity. An March 2024 announcement of "new contractual agreements with a third-party provider of HPC operations" (claim 5454) withheld the counterparty name; subsequent filings explicitly identified CoreWeave (claims 4565, 4183, 3486). The language is consistently firm—"entered into...long-term contract" and "contractual agreements"—rather than MOU, LOI, pilot, or framework terminology. By contrast, the company's October 2023 restructuring announcements used "agreement in principle" with noteholders and equity holders (claims 6536, 6393), but these are financial reorganizations, not operating customer relationships.

Counterparty concentration became absolute. CoreWeave's relationship began with a 16 MW facility in February 2024 (claim 3442), expanded to 200 MW in June 2024 (claim 3450), and reached approximately 590 MW by early 2026 through customer option exercises (claims 5913, 5507, 2143). By March 2026, CoreWeave represented 100% of HPC Hosting segment revenue (claims 3536, 3540), and six facilities across five sites were "100% licensed to CoreWeave" (claim 9680). No alternative customer has been named; an expected new colocation customer remained unsigned as of March 2026 (claim 11720).

Revenue figures reconcile when traced sequentially. The June 2024 announcement valued the 200 MW contract at approximately $3.5 billion over twelve years (claim 7765), implying ~$292 million annually. By February 2025, total CoreWeave contracts reached $10.2 billion (claim 7766). In March 2026, the company reported the CoreWeave contracts as "$10B+ with approximately $850M average annual revenue run rate" (claim 11707)—mathematically consistent with $10.2 billion amortized over twelve years. Deferred revenue rose sharply from $18.1 million (year-end 2024) to $150.1 million (mid-2025), confirming prepayments (claim 3488). A notable structural feature: CoreWeave funded $226.2 million of the company's $279.2 million capital expenditures (claim 11706), creating customer co-investment dynamics rather than standard vendor-supplied infrastructure. A separate Block, Inc. ASIC acquisition was disclosed (claim 3452) without attributed revenue.

Core Scientific's disclosed customer agreements display a stark disconnect between promotional opacity and underlying concentration risk. From March 2024 forward, the company announced "a series of new contractual agreements with a third-party provider" for GPU-focused high-performance computing, initially withholding the counterparty's identity (claims 5454, 4565). By June 2024, CoreWeave, Inc. emerged as the named customer, revealing a single signed 12-year contract for 200 MW valued at approximately $3.5 billion (claim 7765). Subsequent disclosures documented expansion through explicitly signed agreements: a 16 MW Austin facility contract dated February 2024 (claim 3449), option exercises in June and October 2024 (claims 5913, 5507), and an additional 70 MW Denton facility commitment in February 2025 (claims 5033, 5036). By March 2026, total leased customer power capacity under CoreWeave reached approximately 590 MW across five data centers under twelve-year terms with embedded five-year options (claims 3451, 2143).

The contract value arithmetic reconciles consistently. The disclosed $10.2 billion total value across 590 MW over twelve years (claim 7766) implies roughly $850 million in average annualized colocation revenue (claim 9354). This aligns with the company's stated guidance and the $150.1 million deferred revenue balance as of June 2025 (claim 3488), which suggests the company recognizes revenue ratably rather than through front-loaded prepayments. CoreWeave has funded $226.2 million of capital expenditures pursuant to existing colocation agreements (claim 11706), indicating the customer is actively investing in capacity.

However, customer concentration presents undisclosed strategic risk. As of March 2026, CoreWeave accounts for 100% of HPC Hosting segment revenue (claims 3540, 3538, 3536), with management acknowledging the business is "highly dependent on a single customer" (claim 3457). Six of seven data center facilities are now 100% licensed to CoreWeave under agreements initiated in February 2024 (claim 9680). The Block, Inc. ASIC acquisition (claim 3452) represents a discrete supply agreement unrelated to hosting and does not mitigate this dependency. The initial "third-party provider" framing in 2024 announcements appears designed to obscure that all announced hosting capacity serves a single hyperscaler. This concentration, coupled with CoreWeave's pre-revenue business model and dependence on external infrastructure financing, creates material undisclosed customer credit risk not adequately reflected in early promotional disclosures.

Core Scientific's customer base exhibits stark concentration behind explicitly named counterparties, with minimal diversification until June 2026. CoreWeave is named uniformly across all customer announcements and captured 100% of HPC Hosting segment revenue as of March 2026 (claims 3538, 3540), representing the company's sole meaningful customer for nearly two years. The relationship began with a signed February 2024 agreement for 16 megawatts at Austin (claims 3449, 3458) and escalated through a June 2024 twelve-year, 200 megawatt agreement explicitly framed as a signed contract (claims 7765, 3443). The March 6, 2024 announcement initially described the counterparty generically as "a third-party provider" (claim 5454) before being clarified as CoreWeave in later disclosures (claims 4565, 3542), a pattern suggesting provisional naming or delayed public confirmation. Embedded contractual options were exercised in June and October 2024 (claims 5913, 5507), expanding the relationship to approximately 590 megawatts across five sites by February 2025 without recruiting additional customers. By April 2026, six data center facilities were 100% licensed exclusively to CoreWeave under agreements commencing February 2024 (claim 9680)—an absolute concentration structure.

Revenue reconciliation confirms the CoreWeave announcements with modest precision. The $10.2 billion total contract value (claim 7766) amortized over twelve years yields roughly $833 million annually, aligning with the stated $850 million average annualized colocation revenue (claim 9354). Deferred revenue climbed from $18.1 million at December 31, 2024 to $150.1 million by June 30, 2025 (claim 3488), consistent with customer prepayments scaling as CoreWeave deployment accelerated. A discrepancy emerges between deployed and revenue-attributed capacity: the company announced 590 megawatts yet attributed hosting revenue exclusively to the HPC segment, leaving ambiguity about whether non-HPC colocation facilities drive unreported revenue or remain unmonetized.

Secondary counterparties emerged tardily. Block, Inc. entered via a direct 2024 agreement for 3 nanometer mining ASICs (claim 3452), representing non-infrastructure revenue. AMD appeared in June 2026 as a "large-scale infrastructure partnership" with claimed $14 billion revenue potential and 530 megawatts capacity (claim 7768), announced without LOI or framework language, signaling Core Scientific's first material customer diversification away from CoreWeave dependence.

Core Scientific's customer disclosure reveals a signed agreement with CoreWeave, Inc., initiated in February 2024 with progressive expansions through 2025, differentiated sharply from its restructuring agreements in principle with noteholders and equity committees (claims 6536, 6393), which were financially binding but not customer revenue contracts. All CoreWeave arrangements use language of executed agreements—"entered into an agreement" or "announced a series of new contractual agreements"—rather than letters of intent, memoranda of understanding, or pilot frameworks (claims 4565, 4183, 3436, 3486, 3542). CoreWeave was consistently named across all major announcements, eliminating ambiguity around unnamed "strategic partners" or "anchor customers." Block, Inc., appears as a supplier agreement for ASIC acquisition (claim 3452), not a hosting customer.

Counterparty concentration intensified then reversed. From February 2024 through early 2026, CoreWeave evolved from a single 16 MW Austin facility contract (claim 3442) to become 100 percent of the HPC Hosting segment revenue by March 2026 (claims 3540, 3538), with six data center facilities entirely licensed to CoreWeave under agreements entered beginning February 2024 (claim 9680). This concentration persisted despite public disclosure of $10.2 billion in total CoreWeave partnership value across 12-year terms (claim 7766). Diversification commenced in mid-2026 with announcement of an AMD partnership (claims 7768, 7266), introducing a second named counterparty and materially reducing single-customer dependency.

Revealed revenue arithmetic reconciles internally. The $10 billion-plus valuation for CoreWeave's 12-year portfolio (claim 7766) yields approximately $833 million annualized, consistent with the stated "$850M average annualized colocation GAAP revenue" and deferred revenue progression from $18.1 million at December 31, 2024, to $150.1 million by June 30, 2025 (claim 3488). Prior-period guidance of $58.3 million in recognized future revenue from multi-year contracts (claim 6202) preceded the CoreWeave surge, anchoring the baseline. The trajectory from $3.5 billion (June 2024 single contract) to $10.2 billion (February 2025 cumulative) reflects cumulative option exercises by CoreWeave in mid-2024 and early 2025 (claims 5913, 5507), each explicitly disclosed. This concentration dynamic—eighteen months of single-customer dependency on a restructured company, then pivoting to multi-customer reliance—represents the material risk evolution embedded in Core Scientific's disclosures.

Core Scientific's disclosed customer portfolio between November 2023 and mid-2026 demonstrates extreme concentration on a single named counterparty with signed, multi-year commitments, while secondary relationships remain either unnamed, minimally sized, or characterized by contingent language that falls short of binding contracts.

CoreWeave, Inc. is the only customer explicitly identified across multiple contractual disclosures. Beginning February 2024, Core Scientific announced a series of executed agreements: a 16 MW hosting contract at its Austin, Texas facility, followed by a 200 MW capacity agreement in June 2024 with a stated value of approximately $3.5 billion (claim 7765). Subsequent announcements in June and October 2024 describe CoreWeave exercising contractual options to expand capacity (claims 5913, 5507), language that presupposes signed base agreements. By March 2026, total leased capacity under the relationship reached approximately 590 MW across five data center sites under a 12-year term with two optional 5-year extensions (claim 9354). The company estimates $10 billion in total revenue potential from this relationship.

An initial announcement on March 6, 2024 referenced "a third-party provider" of HPC operations without naming the counterparty (claim 5454). Subsequent filings clarified this was CoreWeave (claims 4565, 4183), revealing post-hoc disclosure rather than contemporaneous transparency.

Block, Inc. appears as a named counterparty (claim 3452) for an ASIC acquisition agreement, though this represents a capex commitment to purchase hardware, not a revenue-generating service contract.

AMD emerges in June 2026 (claim 7768) described as a "large-scale infrastructure partnership" supporting up to 2.5 GW of capacity. The softer "partnership" framing—compared to CoreWeave's explicit "agreements" and "contracts"—suggests preliminary status or reduced contractual certainty.

Concentration is severe. As of March 2026, CoreWeave represents 100% of HPC Hosting segment revenue (claims 3536, 3540). Deferred revenue jumped from $18.1 million at year-end 2024 to $150.1 million by June 2025 (claim 3488), an 8.3x increase attributable to CoreWeave customer prepayments. The disclosed $850 million average annualized colocation GAAP revenue aligns arithmetically with the $10 billion, 12-year projection, though no independent verification of payment delivery or project completion appears in the claims.

Core Scientific's disclosed customer agreements reveal extreme concentration around a single named counterparty, CoreWeave, while other relationships employ vague or conditional language that obscures their formal status. CoreWeave is explicitly named beginning February 2024 across all major contracts: the initial 16 MW Austin facility agreement (claims 3442, 3449), June 2024's 200 MW colocation contract (claim 3443, 3450), February 2025's additional 70 MW Denton facility deployment (claims 5036, 5033), and sequential option exercises during 2024–2025 (claims 5913, 5507). By contrast, claim 5454 (November 2024) initially refers to "a third-party provider of HPC operations" without naming the counterparty before subsequent disclosures identify it as CoreWeave. The AMD partnership announced in 2026 (claim 7768) employs conditional language—"could ultimately" support 2.5 GW with "$14B" potential—that differs markedly from CoreWeave's signed-agreement framing. Block Inc.'s 2024 ASIC agreement (claim 3452) is supplier-side equipment procurement, not customer infrastructure revenue. Concentration has evolved from ostensible diversification into documented monopoly: by March 2026, CoreWeave "currently accounts for 100% of our HPC Hosting segment revenue" (claims 3536, 3540, 3538, 3457), with six facilities "100% licensed to CoreWeave" (claim 9680). The company's May 2024 forecast of future hosting revenue of $58.3 million (claim 6202) has been entirely subsumed into CoreWeave capacity. Revenue arithmetic reconciles with disclosed agreements. Claim 9354 (May 2026) quantifies the relationship: approximately 590 MW total leased capacity under 12-year agreements with two 5-year renewal options, generating "~$850M average annualized colocation GAAP revenue" and "$10B+ in revenue potential over the contracts' term." This annualized figure aligns with claim 7766's February 2025 valuation of the total CoreWeave partnership at approximately $10.2 billion. Deferred revenue of $150.1 million as of June 2025 (claim 3488) reflects CoreWeave's substantial prepayments. The disclosed mathematics sustains the announced deal economics, though the absence of secondary customers undermines revenue diversification claims.

Core Scientific's partnership portfolio reflects an extreme concentration around CoreWeave, a named AI hyperscaler, with all material customer agreements documented as signed contracts rather than MOUs or framework arrangements. Beginning March 2024, the company announced a series of binding hosting agreements with CoreWeave: an initial 16 MW at Austin (claim 3449), followed by 200 MW in June 2024 (claim 3450), with subsequent contractual options exercised to reach approximately 590 MW across five facilities by March 2026 (claims 3451, 3460). The consistent use of "entered into an agreement" and "exercised its option" language across claims 3449, 3450, 5913, 5507, and 5033 establishes these as executed commitments with defined terms, not preliminary discussions or pilots. The 12-year baseline with two embedded 5-year options (claim 9354) represents binding capacity commitments.

Counterparty concentration has evolved from the company's historical diversified hosting model into near-total dependency on CoreWeave: as of March 2026, CoreWeave represents 100% of HPC Hosting segment revenue (claim 3540), a material concentration risk the company explicitly discloses (claim 3457). A secondary customer, Block, Inc., appears through a 2024 ASIC acquisition agreement (claim 3452), though this represents infrastructure procurement rather than hosting services. AMD emerged in June–July 2026 with announced "partnership" language (claims 7768, 8831) framed as an "agreement to support up to 2.5 GW" (claim 7266), signaling aspirational future capacity rather than signed customer hosting contracts comparable to CoreWeave's structure.

Revenue disclosure reconciles with the announced deal flow. The company disclosed $58.3 million in future hosting revenue commitments as of May 2024 (claim 6202), a baseline that expanded dramatically through CoreWeave's option exercises. Deferred revenue jumped 728% from $18.1 million (December 2024) to $150.1 million (June 2025), reflecting CoreWeave's prepaid advance payments for capacity (claim 3488). By May 2026, disclosed revenue potential reached approximately $10 billion over the full contract term, equating to approximately $850 million average annualized GAAP colocation revenue (claim 9354). The progression from $58 million in 2024 bookings to $850 million annualized reflects the mathematical impact of CoreWeave's sequential capacity commitments and the timing of deferred revenue recognition into operations.

Core Scientific's disclosed customer base reveals extreme concentration embedded in sequentially announced 'partnerships.' The company names three substantive counterparties: CoreWeave (colocation), Block, Inc. (ASIC supplier), and AMD (infrastructure partner). CoreWeave dominates categorically, though transparency has lagged execution. In November 2024, Core Scientific first referenced a 'third-party provider' of HPC services without naming CoreWeave (claim 5454); explicit identification followed in later filings, suggesting delayed disclosure of the relationship's centrality.

CoreWeave's revenue dominance is absolute. As of March 2026, CoreWeave accounts for 100% of Core Scientific's HPC Hosting segment revenue (claims 3536, 3538, 3540). The relationship comprises multiple announced agreements: a 16 MW Austin facility contract (February 2024, claims 3442, 3449), a 200 MW colocation agreement (June 2024, claims 3443, 3459), and option exercises through early 2025 reaching 590 MW cumulatively (claims 3444, 3451). Language throughout is unambiguous—'entered into an agreement,' 'exercised options'—indicating fully executed contracts, not LOIs or frameworks.

Revenue arithmetic exposes a valuation gap. Core Scientific projected $58.3 million in future hosting commitments as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202). By February 2025, total CoreWeave partnerships were valued at $10.2 billion (claim 7766). By July 2026, the company cited $850 million in annualized colocation GAAP revenue at 80–85% margins on a 590 MW, 12-year contract with two 5-year options (claim 8834). Multiplying $850 million by 22 years of potential term yields approximately $18.7 billion—materially above the $10 billion+ figures reported (claims 7765, 7766, 8834). The gap suggests conservative estimates, revenue-recognition constraints, or unpriced execution risk.

AMD's partnership (June 2026, claims 7768, 7266) promises $14 billion in potential value and 2.5 GW of capacity, yet language is cautious: 'agreement to support up to,' 'partnership to shape the future'—indicators of framework rather than executed commitment. Block, Inc.'s ASIC agreement (claim 3452) is supply-side and does not reduce customer concentration. Core Scientific remains operationally dependent on CoreWeave's capacity and deployment for current-period revenue while speculating on AMD's forward commitment.

Core Scientific's customer announcements reveal a stark concentration trajectory masked by evolving contractual language. CoreWeave emerges as the dominant counterparty, explicitly named across all material claims from June 2024 forward (7765, 6060, 5913, 5507, 7766, 5033, 5036, and reiterated in the 2026-03-01 filing cluster). These represent signed agreements, evidenced by documented option exercises (claims 5913, 5507) and cumulative capacity commitments reaching 590 MW across five sites. In contrast, an unnamed "third-party provider of HPC operations" appears only once (claim 5454, March 2024), suggesting this relationship either failed to materialize or was quickly superseded by the CoreWeave pivot. By March 2026, CoreWeave accounted for 100% of the HPC Hosting segment revenue (claims 3540, 3536, 3538), signaling near-total customer concentration within this business line. The AMD partnership, announced June 2026 (claim 7768), initially carried softer language: the deal "could ultimately" reach $14 billion. By July 2026, however, Core Scientific executed definitive Lease Agreements (claim 132) for 377 MW of capacity at three facilities, accompanied by Credit Support Agreements (claim 137), suggesting this relationship has moved from framework to binding contract. The revenue arithmetic presents a puzzle: the disclosed $10.2 billion CoreWeave partnership (claim 7766) spans twelve years at 590 MW, implying roughly $850 million in average annual revenue if recognized linearly. Yet deferred revenue jumped from $18.1 million (December 2024) to $150.1 million (June 2025, claim 3488), indicating accelerated cash receipt rather than stretched recognition. The company's 2024-05-08 disclosure (claim 6202) projected only $58.3 million in future revenue from contracts exceeding one year, a figure that appears to understate both the CoreWeave and subsequent AMD commitments. This reconciliation gap may reflect either extended deployment timelines before revenue recognition or conservative disclosure of contingent capacity options. Counterparty concentration has evolved from multi-customer (pre-2024) to single-customer dependency (CoreWeave, 2024-2025) to an attempt at diversification (AMD entering mid-2026), yet the filing evidence confirms CoreWeave remains the revenue engine. The shift from unnamed third parties to explicitly named counterparties reflects maturing commercial relationships, though the single-customer concentration invites sustainability questions.

Core Scientific's customer and partnership disclosures reveal a stark evolution from opacity to concentration risk, followed by belated diversification. Through March 2026, CoreWeave represented the entirety of HPC Hosting segment revenue (claims 3536, 3538, 3540), yet early announcements obscured this through vague references to 'third-party provider' language (claims 5454, 4565) before CoreWeave was explicitly named in June 2024 (claim 7765). The company entered into a 12-year agreement with CoreWeave valued at approximately $3.5 billion beginning in February 2024 for 16 MW at Austin (claim 3449), followed by successive tranches in June 2024 for 200 MW (claims 3450, 3459) and February 2025 for 70 MW at Denton (claims 5033, 5036), with options exercised through early 2025 reaching approximately 590 MW under agreement (claims 2142, 2143). Cumulative CoreWeave partnership value reached $10.2 billion by February 2025 (claim 7766), representing contracted infrastructure capacity over multi-year terms rather than immediate revenue. This contrasts sharply with the $58.3 million in future hosting revenue commitments disclosed as of March 31, 2024 (claim 6202), before the CoreWeave deals were fully executed. Deferred revenue of $150.1 million as of June 30, 2025 (claim 3488) reflects the gap between contracted capacity and recognized revenue. The company acknowledged this concentration risk explicitly by March 2026 (claim 3457). Only in mid-2026 did Core Scientific announce material partnership diversification through AMD, entering into lease agreements for 377 MW across multiple facilities (claim 132) and Neocloud for 152 MW (claim 133). The AMD partnership announced in 2026 references potential capacity of 2.5 GW (claims 7266, 2731), though the language remains partnership-structured rather than specifying binding customer commitments at scale comparable to CoreWeave. Block, Inc.'s ASIC acquisition agreement (claim 3452) represents the sole named technology partnership distinct from infrastructure hosting. The trajectory indicates Core Scientific sold majority capacity to one customer under long-term contracts, then stabilized by attracting additional anchor customers, though the revenue recognition and cash collection lag the headline contract values significantly.

Core Scientific's customer base has consolidated into extreme concentration around two explicitly named counterparties, both formalized through signed contractual arrangements rather than letters of intent or frameworks. CoreWeave, Inc. dominates the HPC Hosting segment, accounting for 100% of that business line's revenue as of March 2026 (claims 3536, 3540, 3538). The relationship originated with a 16 MW Austin facility contract in February 2024 (claim 3442), expanded through a 200 MW agreement announced June 2024 (claim 3450), and scaled to approximately 590 MW total contracted capacity by early 2025 via sequential option exercises (claims 3469, 3444). All CoreWeave commitments use explicit "entered into agreement" language consistent with signed deals: the initial June 2024 announcement (claim 7765) valued the 12-year arrangement at an estimated $3.5 billion, with subsequent expansions occurring through contractual option exercises rather than new negotiations (claims 5913, 5507).

Revenue recognition data partially validates this concentration. Core Scientific reported $58.3 million in future hosting revenue commitments as of March 2024 (claim 6202), before CoreWeave's capacity scaling. Deferred revenue balances subsequently surged to $150.1 million by June 2026 from $18.1 million six months prior (claim 3488), suggesting substantial advance payments aligned with the CoreWeave infrastructure ramps and the 590 MW capacity foundation.

No named customer is characterized through discussion-stage language such as "framework," "pilot," or "in principle" discussions. An initial opacity appeared in May 2024, when Core Scientific referenced a "third-party provider" of HPC operations (claim 5454) before CoreWeave's identity was disclosed by June 2024.

AMD emerged as a second major named counterparty through 2026 announcements: a 2.5 GW AI data center capacity partnership (claim 7266) valued at up to $14 billion (claim 7768), formalized through Lease Agreements (claim 132) and Credit Support Agreements (claim 137). This partnership operates via direct leases rather than the managed colocation model underlying the CoreWeave relationship, introducing a structural distinction in go-to-market approach.

The Block, Inc. ASIC acquisition (claim 3452) adds a supply-side counterparty but remains disconnected from hosting revenue.

Core Scientific exhibits acute single-customer concentration: CoreWeave's 100% share of HPC Hosting revenue reflects material dependency risk, though AMD's recent 2.5 GW capacity commitments signal active customer base diversification at scale. Revenue growth tracking these announcements appears consistent with disclosed deferred balances, though per-megawatt monetization rates remain undisclosed.

Core Scientific's partnership narrative reveals sharp distinctions between binding customer contracts and aspirational infrastructure partnerships. CoreWeave emerges as the sole signed customer with actual revenue generation: signed agreements executed in February 2024 (16 MW Austin), June 2024 (200 MW), with option exercises documented through 2025 (claims 3449, 3459, 5913, 5507). By March 2026, CoreWeave accounts for 100% of HPC Hosting segment revenue (claim 3540), representing approximately 590 MW of contracted capacity across five sites (claim 3444). The "third-party provider" language in March 2024 announcements (claim 5454) obscured CoreWeave's identity until formal disclosure. Block, Inc. represents a second named counterparty via a signed ASIC acquisition agreement (claim 3452), though terms remain unspecified. The recent AMD and Neocloud relationships (July 2026) shift the model: AMD's partnership carries forward-looking "could ultimately" framing with an estimated $14 billion value (claim 7768), while the Neocloud lease agreement for 152 MW (claim 133) appears to be a genuine signed contract. Counterparty concentration has evolved from undisclosed single-customer dependency to disclosed CoreWeave exclusivity to emergent diversification. Revenue arithmetic shows tension: the $58.3 million future revenue noted in March 2024 (claim 6202) precedes CoreWeave's $3.5 billion 12-year deal; deferred revenue spiked from $18.1 million (December 2024) to $150.1 million (June 2025), indicating CoreWeave prepayments (claim 3488). The $10.2 billion aggregate CoreWeave coverage (claim 7766) includes the $3.5 billion June 2024 contract plus subsequent expansions, but does not resolve whether revenue recognition tracks announced capacity or actual draw-downs. AMD and Neocloud leases announced in July 2026 (claims 132, 133) appear to address the CoreWeave single-customer risk newly disclosed in March 2026 (claim 3457), though actual capacity activation and revenue timing remain undefined.

Core Scientific's customer base exhibits extreme concentration behind a single named counterparty. CoreWeave, Inc. appears as a fully signed customer across all material hosting agreements disclosed since February 2024: a 16 MW contract at Austin (claim 3449), expansion to 200 MW in June 2024 (claim 3443), and subsequent option exercises through early 2025 bringing total contracted capacity to 590 MW across five facilities (claim 3444). These are described consistently as "agreements" and "contracts" with explicit capacity and duration terms, distinguishing them from looser frameworks. The financial impact is stark: CoreWeave accounts for 100 percent of the company's HPC Hosting segment revenue as of March 2026 (claim 3540), and deferred revenue surged from $18.1 million at year-end 2024 to $150.1 million by mid-2025 (claim 3488)—a trajectory aligned with CoreWeave's prepayment patterns under its 12-year commitment. A second named customer, Block Inc., executed an ASIC acquisition agreement in 2024 (claim 3452), though no revenue figures or capacity metrics have been disclosed. The AMD partnership announced in June 2026 (claim 7768) represents a material departure in language: it is framed as supporting "up to 2.5 GW of AI data center capacity" (claim 7266) with hedging language like "could ultimately," signaling framework or aspirational terms rather than fully signed commitments. Neocloud Lease Agreements appear in the latest filings as actual leased capacity (152 MW, claim 133) backed by Credit Support Agreements with AMD (claim 137), though whether Neocloud is a counterparty customer or an intermediary structure remains ambiguous. The revenue reconciliation shows CoreWeave's prepayment-driven deferred revenue of $150.1 million as of June 2025 reconciles plausibly with a 590 MW portfolio under 12-year terms, yet the company's single-customer dependency (claim 3457) creates material concentration risk unmitigated by diversified counterparties. No other named customers appear to generate reportable revenue.

Core Scientific's disclosed customer portfolio consists of two explicitly named, legally binding lease and capacity agreements with no evidence of MOUs, LOIs, or preliminary discussions among the major contracts reviewed. Both CoreWeave and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) are identified by name across multiple sources dating back to March 2026 (claim 2142) and July 2026 (claims 132, 133, 163) respectively, with executed Lease Agreements forming the foundation of each relationship. Neocloud, a lessee under the same structure, is similarly named (claim 133). The only unnamed reference appears in claim 707, which alludes to "other technology-related partners" without identification—a formulaic hedge providing no material disclosure. Block, mentioned for ASIC chip procurement (claim 2591), is also explicitly named.

Counterparty concentration has evolved into a stark duopoly. CoreWeave began as the sole anchor customer, expanding from a baseline of approximately 590 megawatts across five sites documented in March 2026 (claims 2143, 2668). By July 2026, AMD entered with ~377 MW (claim 132) plus Neocloud's 152 MW (claim 133), establishing AMD's foothold at approximately 529–530 MW. By August 2026, this crystallized into a two-customer structure: CoreWeave at ~590 MW under 12-year take-or-pay contracts (claims 1611, 2604) and AMD at ~530 MW under 15-year agreements (claims 1612, 1889). These two counterparties account for roughly 1,120 MW of disclosed contracted capacity, representing extreme customer concentration.

Revenue disclosures generally reconcile with announced capacity. CoreWeave's 12-year contracts are claimed to generate over $10 billion in total revenue (claims 2621, 2653) at approximately $850 million in annualized run rate (claim 2622), which extrapolates to $10.2 billion—internally consistent. A 200 MW subset of CoreWeave contracts is separately valued at $3.5 billion over 12 years (claim 2528), averaging $290 million annually. AMD's 15-year agreements are estimated at more than $14 billion in base contracted revenue (claim 691), or roughly $933 million per year. Both contracts employ take-or-pay structures (claims 2610, 2695), anchoring revenue certainty. However, AMD's reservation rights extending to 2.5 GW (claims 1888, 2731) introduce material upside optionality beyond the signed 529 MW, creating asymmetry between announced and legally committed capacity.

Core Scientific's capacity story, as recorded here, is mostly a set of fixed headline figures that get repeated rather than updated. Fleet-wide operating capacity was stated at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173, 20703) and repeated in May 2022 (13921). A filing in between put it at 457 MW (13988), and that 40 MW gap was never reconciled. By April 2023 the figure was 592 MW across eight data centers (12733, 12734, 12795), a real but modest increase given the scale of the development pipeline being promoted at the time. Denton is the clearest example of a static target. It was described as 22 MW operational (14177, 14182, 13931) against a 300 MW build-out (20701, 14178, 13932, 13923, 13697), and no intermediate megawatt figure or completion date was ever attached. The facility-timeline claim for Denton's operational date (14176) carries no date. Muskogee follows the same pattern. Its 500 MW figure appears unchanged from March 2022 through April 2023 (14188, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12738), across the restructuring period signalled by the Weil and PJT engagements (13502, 13503), and the project is still classed as under construction. A headline number that survives a balance-sheet reset without revision says more about messaging discipline than about construction progress. Because almost nothing is dated, it is hard to show outright slippage. The only dated commitment visible, the Q1 2023 equipment deliveries (12826), remains unverified. The bigger issue is that targets were neither confirmed nor withdrawn. The hosting book shows the same fragility: the 230 MW Gryphon arrangement (19781) arrived alongside allegations that the counterparty could not fund its miners (19782, 19784). Every claim in the record is company-stated. There are no permits, interconnection queue entries or site reporting corroborating Denton's ramp or Muskogee's pace, and the newer sites (Cottonwood, Hunt County, Dalton, Auburn) carry no capacity or cost claims in the visible record at all, so their trajectory cannot be assessed here. Over the next 90 days, watch for whether Muskogee's 500 MW is restated, resized or quietly dropped. Watch for any current energized-MW figure for Denton against the 300 MW target, and for ERCOT and SPP queue filings or local permits that would give Hunt County, Cottonwood and Muskogee an independent timeline. Finally, watch whether the company adopts dated, site-level delivery milestones in place of portfolio totals.

Core Scientific's capacity record on file splits into two stories: a fleet-level number that has moved without explanation, and two flagship sites whose headline megawatts have stayed fixed while their timelines never got dates. At the fleet level, operating capacity was given as 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173, 20703). It was then reported as 457 MW on April 20 (13988) and back at 497 MW three weeks later (13921). The record contains no reconciliation of that 40 MW gap. By April 2023 the figure had risen to 592 MW (12795, 12733, 12753). That is real growth, but it came after advisors were engaged in October 2022 (13502, 13503), and the filings do not tie the increase to particular sites.

Denton is the clearest case of a target that never changes. It went live at 22 MW (14182, 13931), and the 300 MW ultimate figure has been repeated at least seven times (20701, 14178, 14183, 20683, 13932, 13923, 13697) without an interim milestone or a completion date. Muskogee follows the same pattern more sharply. The 500 MW claim recurs from March 2022 through April 2023 (14179, 20684, 13925, 13698, 12738), and 12738 is even classified as a timeline claim yet carries no date. The project still sits at under_construction. Because no date was ever promised, nothing can technically be said to have slipped, and that absence is itself the finding. The one dated promise in the extract, Q1 2023 equipment delivery (12826), remains unverified.

Every claim here is tagged stated. The file contains no permit filings, ERCOT or SPP large-load queue entries, utility board minutes, or site reporting for either Denton or Muskogee. The Marble power contract at 35 MW (12741, 12825) is the only figure anchored to a named counterparty agreement. The Gryphon hosting dispute (19781–19784) suggests that some announced hosting capacity rested on contracts that were themselves contested. Note also that the supplied record ends in April 2023, so Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton, and Auburn have no capacity or timeline claims on file at all.

Over the next 90 days, watch for three things. First, whether Muskogee receives a dated energization milestone or a revised MW figure. Second, whether ERCOT queue or city filings show Denton load beyond its initial tranches. Third, whether the newer Texas, Georgia, and Alabama sites acquire concrete megawatt figures backed by permits or interconnection agreements, rather than status labels alone.

The supplied record ends partway through the April 2023 annual filing, so this read covers the 2022 to early 2023 bitcoin-mining period. It does not cover the later HPC conversion sites now on the project list (Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton, Auburn), none of which carry capacity or cost figures here. Headline operating capacity moved unevenly. It was 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 20703), repeated in May (13921). An April 2022 figure of 457 MW (13988) sits between those statements and is never reconciled. By April 2023 the figure was 592 MW across eight data centers (12733, 12734). That growth came while the company engaged restructuring counsel and bankers (13502, 13503) and amid a disputed 230 MW Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781 to 19784), so the increase reflects contracted power more than a healthy expansion cadence. The two flagship growth projects show a different pattern. They were not cut; they were left undated. Denton was stated at 22 MW initial and 300 MW ultimate in March 2022 (14177, 14178), and the 300 MW target was repeated verbatim through September 2022 (13697). Muskogee's 500 MW target appears from March 2022 (14188) through April 2023 (12738) with no energization date attached. Because almost no claim carries a promised-by date, slippage cannot be measured directly. The one dated item, Q1 2023 equipment delivery (12826), remains unverified. Repeating a large target for over a year without a milestone is itself a signal of stall rather than progress. Muskogee still being listed as under construction reinforces that. Independent corroboration in this record is thin but not absent. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract at 35,000 kW (12741) matches the stated 35 MW at Marble (12825), which is the cleanest utility-side match on file. Denton rests on agreements with the city and Tenaska (14184), a public counterparty whose council records could be checked against the 300 MW figure. Nothing here ties Muskogee's 500 MW to an interconnection agreement or a utility filing. For the next 90 days, the priority is whether filings attach megawatt figures and in-service dates to Hunt County, Dalton, Auburn and Muskogee. Analysts should check ERCOT large-load interconnection records for Hunt County and Cottonwood and Georgia Power or local permitting activity for Dalton. Of particular interest is whether Muskogee's 500 MW survives, shrinks, or is quietly dropped as the company reallocates power toward HPC tenants.

The record supplied here stops in April 2023, partway through the claims list. It says nothing about the sites that now dominate the project roster: Hunt County, Cottonwood, Auburn, Dalton 1 and 3. Any read of the current delivery trajectory therefore rests on the 2022-23 baseline, and the newer builds remain unexamined until their claims are supplied. Within that window, fleet capacity did not move in a straight line. Core Scientific stated 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 20703). It then cited 457 MW in an April 2022 filing (13988) and went back to 497 MW the following month (13921), with no reconciliation of the 40 MW gap. By April 2023 the fleet figure had risen to 592 MW (12733, 12795). Most of that growth is plausibly explained by Denton coming online, but the filings never break it out. The two flagship expansions show the clearest pattern. Denton's 300 MW ultimate target was repeated at least six times between March and September 2022 (14178, 20701, 13932, 13923, 13697), each time against a stated base of 22 MW (14177, 13931), and never with a completion date. Muskogee's 500 MW figure was restated just as consistently (14179, 13933, 13698). By 2023 it had moved from a capacity claim to a timeline claim (12738), yet it still carried no date. The site remains classed as under construction more than four years after the first announcement. Because no deadlines were ever set, nothing technically slipped, but the lack of dated commitments is itself the finding. Counterparty risk was also visible early. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781) arrived alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund its miners (19782, 19784). The October 2022 engagement of Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) preceded the Chapter 11 period, and the Q1 2023 equipment delivery claim (12826) is still unverified. The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind: no building permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue positions, no on-the-ground reporting. Every capacity figure here is self-reported. Over the next 90 days, watch whether third-quarter disclosures finally put an energization date and a delivered-megawatt figure on Muskogee. Watch also whether Denton's 300 MW target is restated, revised, or quietly dropped as the site is repurposed. Most important, the post-2023 claims for the Texas, Alabama and Georgia builds should be pulled and checked against interconnection queue filings before any view on the current pace is published.

Core Scientific's capacity story in this record is mostly one of repetition rather than progression. The two marquee build-outs, Denton at a 300 MW target (14178, 20701, 13923, 13697) and Muskogee at 500 MW (20684, 14188, 13698, 12738), were restated almost word for word across filings from March 2022 to April 2023 without a single interim milestone attached. Denton's only hard number is the 22 MW initial energization (14182, 13931). The headline targets never grew or shrank on paper, but they also never moved toward completion in any documented way. At fleet level, operating power was put at 497 MW (14173, 14186, 21703 aside, 20703, 13921), yet a filing three weeks later cites 457 MW (13988) with no explanation. The figure then reappears as 592 MW across eight sites by April 2023 (12733, 12753, 12734). That is real growth, but it arrived alongside an unreconciled 40 MW discrepancy that was never acknowledged.

On dates, the more telling pattern is that almost nothing was promised by a specific date. Apart from equipment deliveries expected in 2023 (12826), every facility claim carries an empty commitment field. Slippage is therefore impossible to measure directly, which is itself a disclosure choice worth noting. The surrounding context matters: the late-2022 engagement of restructuring counsel and bankers (13502, 13503), and the disputed Gryphon hosting arrangement at 230 MW (19781, 19782, 19784), suggest that the Muskogee and Denton targets were being carried forward through a period when funding them was doubtful. Data quality also undercuts confidence in the colocation series, where a hashrate entry is recorded in dollars (19798).

No independent evidence appears in this file. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue positions, and no site reporting, so none of the announced pace can be corroborated. The record also stops in April 2023, and the newer sites on the project list (Hunt County, Cottonwood, Auburn, Dalton) have no capacity or timeline claims at all. Any current read on them rests on material outside this history.

Over the next 90 days, three things deserve attention. The first is whether Denton and Muskogee receive dated, megawatt-specific completion targets rather than restated ceilings. The second is whether interconnection filings or county permits surface to anchor the Texas and Oklahoma builds. The third is whether the company reconciles its fleet-level megawatt figures as its post-restructuring sites move from under construction to operational.

Core Scientific's record of capacity claims is mostly repetition, with almost no dated milestones. Fleet-wide operating power was stated as 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186), and the same figure appeared again in March and May filings (14173, 20703, 13921). An April 2022 claim put it at 457 MW (13988). The company never reconciled that 40 MW gap, which suggests either a different measurement basis or a correction it did not acknowledge. By April 2023 the figure was 592 MW across eight data centers (12733, 12734). That is real growth, but it arrived after the company engaged restructuring advisers Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners in October 2022 (13502, 13503), so the build-out and the balance-sheet stress were happening at the same time. The site-level ambitions did not move at all. Muskogee was described as a 500 MW development in March 2022 (14188, 20702) and was still described the same way in April 2023 (12738), with no energization date, no phasing, and no interim megawatt figure. Today it remains under construction. Denton went live at 22 MW (14177, 13931) against a 300 MW end state (14178, 13932, 13697), and none of these claims gives a date for reaching 300 MW. In practice, the absence of deadlines means the company has not slipped any deadlines, because it has set almost none. The one dated commitment visible here, Q1 2023 equipment delivery under the Bitmain supply agreements (12826), is cut off in the record, so its outcome cannot be assessed. The record also has data-quality problems. A July 2022 colocation metric is denominated in USD (19798), and the Gryphon hosting claims include allegations of a non-existent counterparty agreement (19782, 19784), so third-party commitments should be weighed with caution. Nothing in the material provided independently supports the announced pace. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, and no site reporting. The newer projects (Hunt County, Auburn, Dalton 1 and 3) have no capacity or timeline claims on file at all. Over the next 90 days, the questions to watch are whether Muskogee and Denton get energized-MW figures with dates attached, and whether Hunt County and the Dalton sites appear in utility interconnection filings or local permit records. A further signal would be any restatement of fleet capacity that finally explains the 457 versus 497 MW gap.

The record supplied here ends partway through April 2023, cut off at claim 12826. Hunt County, Auburn, Dalton 1 and Dalton 3 carry no capacity or timeline claims in the visible data, so this read covers only the 2022 to early 2023 bitcoin-hosting era. It should not be taken as a judgment on the later build-out. Company-wide, stated operating capacity grew modestly. It was 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173, 20703, 13921) and 592 MW across eight data centers by April 2023 (12733, 12734, 12753). That growth spans the October 2022 restructuring engagements with Weil and PJT (13502, 13503). One discrepancy goes unexplained: claim 13988, in April 2022, gives 457 MW, while filings before and after it repeat 497 MW. The 40 MW gap is never reconciled. The project-level figures show a pattern of fixed headline numbers with no dates attached. Denton was described as running at 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931) against a 300 MW full-build target (20683, 13932, 13923, 13697). Muskogee was pitched at 500 MW (14188, 20702, 13933, 13698) and was still described at 500 MW in April 2023 (12738), through a bankruptcy filing, with no schedule. A target that stays the same through a capital crisis and never carries a date is better read as an entitlement ceiling than as a delivery plan. The project table still lists Muskogee as under construction with no capacity filled in, so the record holds no evidence it progressed. The only dated promise visible is the Q1 2023 equipment delivery in 12826, and its outcome is truncated. Customer-side claims add caution. Assertions that Gryphon could not fund its miners (19782) and that an alleged NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784) show hosting capacity resting on counterparties who could fail to perform. Claim 19798 records a value in USD where the series otherwise counts servers, which suggests the hosting metrics have not been extracted consistently. No independent evidence is supplied: no permits, ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, or site reporting. The announced pace for Denton and Muskogee therefore cannot be checked against outside sources. Over the next 90 days, the priority is to fill in the missing post-2023 claims. Then check whether Denton's 300 MW and Muskogee's 500 MW have been restated, reduced or quietly dropped. Pull interconnection queue positions for Hunt County and Muskogee, and watch filings for the first dated energization milestones at the Dalton and Auburn sites.

Core Scientific's capacity narrative across this record is less a growth curve than a set of fixed headline numbers repeated without dates. Fleet-wide operating capacity was stated at 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173). Weeks later the company cited 457 MW (13988), then returned to 497 MW in May (13921), with nothing in the record explaining either swing. By April 2023 the figure had reached 592 MW across eight sites (12753, 12734). That is real but modest growth through a period that included the Celsius hosting relationship (13540) and the October 2022 engagement of Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503), the clearest signal in this dataset that the expansion plan was under financial stress.

The two flagship builds show the pattern most plainly. Denton went live at 22 MW (14177, 14182), and its 300 MW ultimate target was restated almost verbatim from March 2022 through September 2022 (14183, 13932, 13697). None of those restatements carries a completion date, so the target cannot slip on paper. Muskogee's 500 MW Port Authority agreement (14185, 14179) is likewise repeated unchanged into April 2023 (12738). It is tagged as a timeline claim but has no timeline, and the site is still listed as under construction. Undated targets that never get revised are not evidence of delivery. They show only that the company has made no falsifiable commitment. The one dated promise in the set, Bitmain equipment delivery by end of Q1 2023 (12826), remains unverified. The Gryphon dispute over a 230 MW hosting arrangement (19781, 19784) shows how quickly contracted capacity on paper can become contested.

This record contains no permits, interconnection queue entries or on-the-ground reporting, so the announced pace is uncorroborated. The newer projects on file, Hunt County, Auburn and the Dalton sites, have no capacity or timeline claims here at all. Because the claims stop in April 2023, the trajectory since then cannot be assessed from this data.

Over the next 90 days, watch for three things. First, whether ERCOT large-load interconnection filings for Denton and Hunt County match any restated megawatt figures. Second, whether Muskogee shows an energization date or utility service agreement with the Oklahoma provider. Third, whether current filings attach dates to the legacy 300 MW and 500 MW targets or quietly retire them as the company repositions toward hosting HPC customers.

Core Scientific's capacity record splits into two stories that rarely meet. At the fleet level, operating power was stated at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173), fell to 457 MW in an April 2022 statement (13988), and was then restated as 497 MW in May (13921). It reached 592 MW across eight data centers by April 2023 (12753, 12734). The 40 MW dip was never explained in the record. The net gain of roughly 95 MW over fifteen months is modest next to the 800 MW of development headline that ran alongside it. Denton was framed as a 22 MW operational start building toward 300 MW (14177, 14183, 13932, 13697). Muskogee was framed as a 500 MW development with the local port authority (14185, 13933, 13698, 12738). Both figures were repeated almost verbatim from March 2022 through April 2023, and neither ever carried a dated milestone. Because no deadline was set, none could slip. That is the real finding: the large numbers were asserted rather than scheduled. Muskogee is still listed as under construction more than four years after the agreement. The only dated promise in the set, Q1 2023 equipment delivery (12826), remains unverified. The surrounding claims point to strain rather than steady execution. They include the Gryphon hosting dispute over a 230 MW arrangement and the counterparty's ability to pay (19781, 19782, 19784), the engagement of Weil and PJT Partners in October 2022 (13502, 13503), and a colocation series that went from 80,000 to 97,000 servers (19795, 19800) with a mis-recorded July entry (19798). The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP queue positions, and no site reporting. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. The roster also lists Hunt County, Dalton 1 and 3, and Auburn as active projects, yet none of them has a single capacity or timeline claim attached, and the claim history stops in April 2023. Over the next 90 days, the useful signals would be any dated energization targets for Muskogee or Denton's remaining capacity, interconnection filings tied to Hunt County and Denton, and whether the Dalton and Auburn sites receive stated megawatt figures. The test is whether these projects finally move from repeated targets to dated, checkable commitments.

The record supplied here ends in April 2023, partway through claim 12767, so it says nothing about Hunt County, Auburn, Dalton or anything else announced after Core Scientific left bankruptcy. What remains is still revealing. Across the period covered, headline capacity rose from 497 MW (14173, 14186, 20703) to 592 MW across eight data centers (12733, 12753, 12734). That path was not smooth. An April 2022 figure of 457 MW (13988) sits between two 497 MW statements (14186, 13921) and is never reconciled, which suggests either a definitional change or an unacknowledged correction. The two flagship expansions never moved at all. Denton is described as 22 MW initial (14177, 14182, 13931) against a 300 MW end state (14178, 14183, 13932, 13923, 13697). Muskogee is 500 MW in every filing from March 2022 (14185, 14179) through September 2022 (13698) and April 2023 (12738). Those figures were repeated unchanged while the company engaged restructuring counsel and advisors (13502, 13503) and while a 230 MW hosting relationship with Gryphon turned into a dispute over Gryphon's ability to pay and an alleged phantom agreement (19781, 19782, 19784). On dates, the more important finding is that almost nothing carries one. The only claim with a promised-by date is the Q1 2023 equipment delivery (12826), which is still unverified. Denton's 300 MW and Muskogee's 500 MW were never tied to a schedule, so they cannot formally slip. Muskogee's status of under construction, more than four years after the port authority agreement, is better read as an indefinite target than as a delayed one. The colocation series also has quality problems: 19798 records a hashrate claim in dollars, and server counts move from 80,000 to 79,000 to 97,000 (19795, 19796, 19800) with no explanation. No permits, interconnection queue entries or site reporting were supplied, so none of the announced pace is independently corroborated. Over the next 90 days, three things matter. First, whether current filings still state Muskogee and Denton at 500 MW and 300 MW, or restate them in lower, utility-confirmed, energized megawatts. Second, whether ERCOT large-load interconnection records for Denton and Hunt County, and utility filings for Muskogee, show contracted power that matches those numbers. Third, whether the claim record for 2023 onward can be completed so that the newer sites can be held to dated commitments.

The visible record ends abruptly at April 2023, partway through claim 12826, so this read covers the 2022 to early-2023 window and nothing later. Core Scientific's capacity story in that window rests on two flagship targets that never moved and never acquired dates. Denton's 300 MW ultimate build-out appears at least eight times between March and September 2022 (14178, 14183, 20683, 20701, 13932, 13923, 13697), each time alongside the same 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 14182, 13931). Muskogee's 500 MW figure is equally fixed across 20684, 14188, 13925 and 13698. By April 2023, claim 12738 recasts Muskogee as a facility_timeline item, yet it still gives no in-service date. A target that is restated unchanged for over a year, with no milestone, is better read as a site option than as a delivery schedule. The project table still lists Muskogee as under construction, which puts it in the same unresolved position.

Fleet-level figures are less steady. Operating capacity was 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173). It was then given as 457 MW in April (13988) and back at 497 MW in May (13921), with no reconciliation of the dip in between. The figure reached 592 MW across eight data centers by April 2023 (12733, 12734), and the Marble 35 MW power contract (12741, 12825) accounts for part of that increase. The 2022 claims run alongside signs of financial stress: the PJT and Weil engagements (13503, 13502) and the Gryphon disputes over a 230 MW hosting deal and an allegedly nonexistent NuMiner agreement (19781, 19784). Read together, these suggest headline megawatts were being held flat while counterparty and balance-sheet risk grew underneath them. The record also has data-quality problems, notably 19798, which logs a hashrate in USD.

The record contains no independent corroboration of any kind. There are no permits, no ERCOT large-load or SPP interconnection entries, and no on-the-ground reporting for Denton's expansion or Muskogee. The pace claims are therefore entirely self-reported. Hunt County, Dalton 1 and 3, and Auburn carry construction or announced statuses but have no capacity claims in the visible ledger.

Over the next 90 days, four things are worth watching. First, whether post-2023 filings finally attach a date or a revised megawatt figure to Denton's 300 MW and Muskogee's 500 MW, or quietly drop them. Second, whether the newer sites receive stated capacities that can be checked against utility and ISO queue records. Third, whether the fleet total continues to be presented without reconciling earlier reversals like the 497-to-457 MW swing. Fourth, a complete re-pull of the claim history, since this read is bounded by the truncation.

Core Scientific's visible record runs only through April 2023, so this read covers the post-SPAC, pre-restructuring period. It says nothing about the Hunt County, Auburn, or Dalton builds that now dominate the project list. Within that window, fleet-wide capacity was stated as 497 MW across several March and May 2022 filings (14173, 14186, 20703, 13921). That figure was briefly contradicted by a 457 MW figure in April 2022 (13988), and the discrepancy was never reconciled in the record. Capacity then reached 592 MW by April 2023 (12733, 12795, 12753). The net 95 MW gain over roughly a year is modest against the roughly 800 MW of headline development the company was simultaneously promoting. The two flagship expansions show the core pattern. Denton was described as operational at 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931) with a 300 MW end state repeated at least seven times through September 2022 (14178, 13932, 13923, 13697). Muskogee's 500 MW figure was restated from March 2022 to April 2023 (14179, 13925, 13698, 12738). Neither target was ever attached to a completion date. Claim 12738 is filed as a facility_timeline entry but carries no date, and Muskogee remains under_construction in the project list years later. Undated targets cannot technically slip, which makes their persistence uninformative rather than reassuring. The one dated delivery promise in the record, Q1 2023 equipment supply (12826), remains unverifiable. Counterparty quality also bears on the trajectory. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781) is undercut in the same filing by claims that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund its miners (19782) and by an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion agreement (19784). The Celsius services agreement (13540) was followed within weeks by the engagement of Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503), which is consistent with balance-sheet distress rather than build-out. The record contains no independent corroboration: no building permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue positions, and no on-the-ground reporting for Denton or Muskogee. Announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements, and some data points are malformed, such as a hashrate claim recorded in USD (19798). Over the next 90 days, watch whether the upcoming quarterly disclosures give energized-MW figures by site rather than fleet totals, and whether Muskogee and Denton finally carry dated milestones or quietly drop their 500 MW and 300 MW framing. Also watch for interconnection or utility filings that would independently anchor the newer Texas, Alabama, and Georgia sites.

Core Scientific's claim record shows two different stories. Fleet-wide capacity grew modestly and was reported consistently. The flagship expansion targets were repeated for more than a year without ever being tied to a date. Total operating power was stated at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173, 20703) and repeated in May (13921). A filing in between gave 457 MW (13988), and nothing in the record reconciles the two. By April 2023 the figure was 592 MW across eight data centers (12733, 12734). That is a real increase of roughly 95 to 135 MW, depending on which 2022 baseline is correct. Denton is where most of that growth plausibly sits. It opened at 22 MW (14182, 13931) against a 300 MW build-out target that was restated at least seven times through September 2022 (14178, 13932, 13697). The record never gives an interim milestone or a completion date. Muskogee's 500 MW figure is the clearest case of an announcement standing still. It was repeated from March 2022 through April 2023 (14179, 13925, 13698, 12738) and never resized or scheduled. Muskogee still sits at under_construction. The figure was carried unchanged even after the company engaged restructuring advisers in October 2022 (13502, 13503). No new language explains how a 500 MW build would be funded under those conditions. Because so few dates were ever promised, slippage is hard to measure. The one dated promise, Q1 2023 miner deliveries (12826), remains unverifiable in this record. Independent corroboration is thin. The Denton figures rest on named public counterparties, the City of Denton and Tenaska (14184), and Marble's 35 MW is backed by a utility contract with Murphy Electric Power Board (12741). The record contains no permits, interconnection-queue entries, or site reporting for Muskogee, Denton's later phases, or the newer Dalton, Auburn, and Hunt County sites. Those newer sites carry no capacity claims at all in the material supplied, which appears to end in mid-2023. The hosting book adds counterparty risk on top of that. The 230 MW Gryphon agreement (19781) came alongside disputed financing and a contested NuMiner arrangement (19782, 19784). Some colocation data points are also mis-typed, such as 19798 being recorded in dollars. Over the next 90 days, watch whether filings finally put a date on Muskogee or quietly shrink it. Watch for a current energized megawatt figure at Denton, as opposed to the 300 MW ceiling. Watch for ERCOT large-load or interconnection filings for Hunt County, and for Georgia utility or county permit activity for the Dalton sites. Any restatement of the 2022 fleet baseline would also settle the 457 versus 497 MW discrepancy.

The capacity record for Core Scientific's two flagship expansions is unusual because the targets never moved. Denton was announced at 22 MW initial and 300 MW at completion (14177, 14178), and that 300 MW figure was repeated almost word for word through May and September 2022 (13932, 13923, 13697). Muskogee's 500 MW target was set in the March 2022 Port Authority agreement (14185, 14179) and carried unchanged into the April 2023 filing (12738). Neither ceiling was raised or cut, but neither ever came with a dated milestone. A target that stays fixed while the company passes through a restructuring is a sign of an inherited number, not a delivery plan. The engagement of Weil and PJT Partners in October 2022 (13502, 13503) marks the start of that restructuring.

The fleet-level figures are less steady. Operating capacity was stated at 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186), then at 457 MW in an April 2022 claim (13988), then back at 497 MW in May (13921), and at 592 MW in April 2023 (12733). The 40 MW drop between the first two was never explained in the record. It may reflect a different measurement basis or a real curtailment, but it was not acknowledged either way. The 2023 increase of roughly 95 MW is consistent with Marble's 35 MW contract (12741, 12825) plus partial Denton build-out, though no claim allocates it.

Dated promises are scarce, so slippage is hard to measure directly. The one explicit deadline in the visible record, Q1 2023 miner deliveries (12826), remains unverifiable. Counterparty stress is better documented than delivery is. The Gryphon hosting dispute (19781 through 19784) and the Celsius master services agreement (13540) both show hosting capacity committed to customers whose ability to pay was in question.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection entries, and no site reporting for Denton or Muskogee. The claims available here end in April 2023, three and a half years before today. Hunt County, Auburn, Dalton 1 and Dalton 3 are listed as under construction or announced, but no claims are attached to them. Their status cannot be assessed from this record.

Over the next 90 days, the key test is whether current filings restate Denton and Muskogee against the original 300 MW and 500 MW figures or quietly retire them. Other checks: ERCOT large-load queue entries for Denton and Hunt County, PSO or GRDA load filings for Muskogee, and Georgia Power or local permit activity at Dalton. Each of these would supply the first independent evidence for any of these projects.

The record as supplied ends mid-entry in April 2023 (claim 12826 is cut off), so this read covers roughly fifteen months of a project list that now runs to 2026-era sites. Hunt County, Auburn, and the Dalton sites have no capacity claims in the visible data, and that gap should be closed before anyone relies on this assessment.

The headline capacity figures have hardly moved, and they disagree with each other. Operating capacity of 497 MW (14186, 14173, 20703) was restated in May 2022 (13921), even though a 457 MW figure had appeared weeks earlier (13988) with no reconciliation. A year later the company reported 592 MW across eight sites (12733, 12753, 12734), which is real growth but modest beside the project-level ambitions.

Those ambitions are where the trajectory is weakest. The 300 MW Denton build-out and 500 MW Muskogee development were repeated almost verbatim from March 2022 through September 2022 (13697, 13698) and, for Muskogee, into April 2023 (12738). None of these claims carries a delivery date. Denton's only quantified milestone is its 22 MW initial phase (14177, 13931). The Muskogee figure survived the company's engagement of restructuring advisers in October 2022 (13502, 13503) without revision or acknowledgement. Much of the apparent consistency is also duplication: roughly a dozen claims trace to the same 2022-03-29 filing. Because no dates were promised, none can be said to have slipped. The real issue is that the large targets were never pinned to a schedule at all.

Independent corroboration in the record is thin. The strongest third-party anchor is the 35 MW Murphy Electric Power Board contract backing Marble (12741, 12796). The Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781) arrives alongside allegations that the counterparty lacked funding and relied on a disputed agreement (19782, 19784), which undercuts it as evidence of committed load. Hosted hashrate was flat at about 8 EH/s from March 2022 (19793) to April 2023 (12737), despite the Celsius MSA (13540). The colocation series also mixes units, with one month reported in USD (19798). We have no permits, interconnection-queue entries, or site reporting for Denton or Muskogee.

Over the next 90 days, watch three things. First, whether the Q3 2026 10-Q reports energized MW at Denton and Muskogee against the 300 MW and 500 MW targets. Second, whether interconnection or large-load filings appear for Hunt County and the Georgia and Alabama sites. Third, whether the company attaches dated milestones to any capacity figure, something this record never shows.

The capacity record for Core Scientific's flagship expansions is unusually static. Denton's 300 MW end-state target was stated in March 2022 (14178, 14183), repeated in May (13923, 13932), and repeated again in September (13697) with no change in figure or added schedule. Muskogee follows the same pattern: 500 MW in March 2022 (14179, 20684), again in May and September (13925, 13698), and again in April 2023 (12738). The only Denton figure tied to observed delivery is the 22 MW initial energization (14177, 13931). The gap between 22 MW and 300 MW was never bridged by an interim milestone. Fleet-wide capacity is less consistent. The company reported 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173, 13921), but 457 MW appears in an April 2022 filing (13988) with no reconciliation. The next figure is 592 MW in April 2023 (12733, 12753). That is roughly 95 MW of net growth across a year in which the two headline sites together promised 800 MW.

On dates, the trajectory cannot slip because almost nothing was promised to a date. Every Denton and Muskogee capacity claim carries an empty promised-by field, and Muskogee is still listed as under construction more than four years after its announcement. The one dated commitment, Q1 2023 equipment delivery (12826), remains unverifiable in this record. The Weil and PJT Partners engagements in October 2022 (13502, 13503) were restructuring-adviser hires. They came only weeks after the September reiteration of the 300 MW and 500 MW targets (13697, 13698). The targets were never revised to reflect that context. The hosting side is murky as well. Gryphon's 230 MW hosting agreement (19781) arrived alongside allegations that the counterparty lacked funding (19782) and that a related $1.7B agreement did not exist (19784). One monthly colocation metric (19798) is recorded in dollars where units belong.

There is no independent corroboration in the record. No permits, interconnection-queue entries, or site reporting support any of the announced capacity, and every claim is company-stated. The record also ends in April 2023, so it says nothing about the company's direction after bankruptcy.

Over the next 90 days, the first priority is to close that gap. Check whether current filings still carry 300 MW for Denton and 500 MW for Muskogee, or whether those figures have been quietly re-based, possibly into HPC or colocation terms. Pull ERCOT large-load and SPP queue positions for Denton, Hunt County and Muskogee. Look for any capacity or date attached to Dalton 3, which is listed as announced with neither. The next quarterly report is the natural test of whether these sites have moved from targets to energized megawatts.

The record supplied here ends mid-entry on 2023-04-03, so this read covers early 2022 through the first quarter of 2023. Projects later added to the portfolio, including Hunt County, Auburn, Dalton and Cottonwood, carry no capacity or timeline claims in what we received, and this read cannot assess them.

At the fleet level, operating power capacity was stated as 497 MW as of January 2022 and repeated several times through May (14173, 14186, 20703, 13921). In between, a 457 MW figure appeared (13988) with no explanation. By April 2023 the company reported 592 MW (12795, 12733, 12753). That is real growth, but the unexplained 40 MW dip in the middle means the series should not be read as a clean upward line.

The two flagship builds show the opposite of progress: unchanging numbers with no dates. Denton opened at 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931) against a 300 MW ultimate target. Muskogee was pitched at 500 MW (14188, 14179, 13925). Both targets were restated almost word for word from March 2022 through September 2022 (13697, 13698) and again in April 2023 (12738). None of these claims carries a promised-by date, so nothing has formally slipped. But Muskogee still sits at under_construction years after announcement, and Denton never got a stated interim milestone. Holding a headline number constant while attaching no schedule is a pattern worth naming. Over the same window the company engaged restructuring advisers (13502, 13503), and the target figures do not appear to have been revisited after that.

The only dated promise is Bitmain equipment delivery by Q1 2023 (12826), which remains unverified. The hosting side is noisier. The Gryphon 230 MW agreement (19781) sits next to claims disputing Gryphon's ability to pay and the existence of a related agreement (19782, 19784). Colocation server counts swung from 79,000 to 97,000 within two months (19796, 19800). Claim 19798 records a server count in US dollars, which looks like an extraction error.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue positions, and no site reporting. Every capacity figure is self-reported.

Over the next 90 days, watch whether the next quarterly filing finally puts dates or energized megawatts on Denton and Muskogee, or quietly drops the 300 MW and 500 MW figures. Check whether the newer Georgia, Alabama and Hunt County sites get megawatt figures that can be matched against utility and queue filings. And look for Muskogee Port Authority or OG&E records that independently confirm construction activity.

The record supplied here effectively stops in April 2023, and the final entry is cut off mid-line at claim 12796. Read it as a picture of Core Scientific's pre-restructuring posture, not its current build-out. Hunt County, Auburn, the Dalton sites and the present Muskogee status have no dated capacity or timeline claims behind them in this set. That gap is the first finding.

Within the window, headline capacity moved unevenly. Operating power was 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173). It was reported as 457 MW on April 20, 2022 (13988), then 497 MW again on May 12 (13921), with no reconciliation between the two figures in the record. By April 2023 it had reached 592 MW across eight data centers (12733, 12753, 12734). That growth was reported after the company engaged Weil and PJT (13502, 13503), so it says more about energizing capacity already committed than about new commitments. Colocation hashrate was flat at roughly 8 EH/s from spring 2022 to April 2023 (19793, 19794, 12737). One entry, 19798, carries a USD unit for a hashrate metric and should not be relied on.

The development pipeline was stated, not scheduled. Muskogee's 500 MW appears at least seven times between March 2022 and April 2023 (20684, 14188, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12738) without a completion date and without a single interim megawatt figure. By April 2023 it was framed as a facility_timeline item (12738) rather than as capacity. Denton's 300 MW ultimate target is repeated just as consistently (14178, 13923, 13697). Only its 22 MW initial tranche has a date, and even that is given as both February 1 and by February 28, 2022 (14192, 14182). The Gryphon hosting arrangement for 230 MW (19781) sits beside claims of counterparty financial weakness and a disputed agreement (19782, 19784). Treat that capacity as contingent.

None of these claims comes with independent corroboration. The record contains no building permits, SPP or ERCOT interconnection queue entries, or local reporting, so the announced pace cannot be tested against outside evidence. That matters most for Muskogee and Hunt County, both listed as under construction.

Over the next 90 days, the Q3 2026 10-Q is the key document. Watch whether Muskogee is restated with a dated, energized megawatt figure or quietly dropped. Watch whether Denton's capacity is described as mining, HPC or both. Check whether Hunt County, Auburn and Dalton finally appear with megawatts and in-service dates that can be matched against county permits and queue positions.

The capacity story in this record is two very large numbers that never moved. Muskogee was set at 500 MW (20694, 14188, 14195) and Denton at a 300 MW build-out (14178, 20683), and filings from March through September 2022 repeat those figures nearly word for word (13932, 13923, 13697, 13698). Neither target was ever revised upward or downward. What did move was the fleet-wide operational figure. It was given as 497 MW (14173, 20703), then as 457 MW (13988) three weeks later, then as 497 MW again (13921). The record contains no explanation for that 40 MW swing, so it should be treated as an unreconciled restatement rather than real attrition. Meanwhile, every project row still shows blank capacity and cost, including the newer Hunt County, Cottonwood and Dalton 3 entries. The headline megawatts have never been tied to a specific site with a dollar figure.

Timelines have slipped in ways the company did not clearly acknowledge. The Denton development agreement was dated to October 2021 (14184). Its operational launch appears as February 1, 2022 (14192, 13931) and also as February 28, 2022 (14182), two dates for the same 22 MW energization (14177). The Muskogee agreement carries a February 2022 date and is flagged delayed (14185). The Blockcap close drifted from July 2021 (14180) to January 2022 (20707). Each slip only becomes visible because sources disagree with one another. None of them is accompanied by a revised guidance statement.

The record includes no independent evidence. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, and no on-the-ground reporting. Denton has at least a named counterparty in Tenaska and the city (14175), but Muskogee rests entirely on a port authority partnership. The Gryphon claims (19781 through 19784) show hosting commitments that were contested by early 2022. Monthly colocation disclosures also contain unit errors, with 19798 reporting servers in USD, which makes those figures weak support for the pace of the build.

The feed provided here ends mid-claim in October 2022, which is before the period that matters most for current delivery. Over the next 90 days, three things are worth checking. First, whether later filings restate Denton's energized MW against the 300 MW target. Second, whether Muskogee ever produced a utility or queue filing, or quietly dropped out of disclosures. Third, whether Hunt County, Cottonwood and Dalton 3 gain interconnection or permit records that could give their blank capacity fields a verifiable number.

The capacity story in this record is mostly one of repetition. Two headline numbers anchor it, a 300 MW ultimate target at Denton (14178, 13932, 13697) and a 500 MW plan at Muskogee (14179, 13933, 13698), and both are restated almost word for word from March through September 2022 with no movement up or down. Neither figure gains interim milestones, phasing, or a cost estimate, and the project table still lists capacity and cost as blank for every site. Fleet-wide operating capacity is less steady than it looks. The company cites 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173, 20703), but a 457 MW figure appears on April 20 (13988) before 497 MW returns on May 12 (13921). Nothing in the record reconciles that 40 MW gap, which reads as either a definitional change or an unacknowledged step down.

On timing, the record is thin because the company rarely committed to dates. Denton's 22 MW first phase is described as operational against early-2022 targets (14182, 14192, 13931). Those claims are flagged delayed, but the slippage appears to be weeks, not quarters. Muskogee never received an energization date at all, so it cannot technically slip, and that absence is itself the finding. Hosting-side signals point to counterparty strain rather than build risk. The 230 MW Gryphon arrangement (19781) sits beside an allegation that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for its miners (19782). Colocation server counts fell from 80,000 to 79,000 (19795, 19796) before jumping to 97,000 (19800), and that jump is plausibly explained by the Argo server acquisition (19797), not organic growth.

No independent evidence is attached to any of this. The record contains no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, no utility filings, and no on-the-ground reporting, so the announced pace at Denton beyond 22 MW and anything at Muskogee rests entirely on company statements. The supplied history also ends in October 2022, which leaves a gap of nearly four years before today.

Over the next 90 days, the first priority is to close that gap. Check whether current filings still carry the 300 MW and 500 MW figures or have quietly dropped them. Pull interconnection queue positions for the Denton and Muskogee sites. Determine whether the nine other listed sites, including Cottonwood, Dalton, and the Austin facility, have any capacity commitments that can be tested against utility records.

The record for Core Scientific runs from early 2021 through October 2022 and ends mid-entry after claim 13540, so this read covers only the build-out narrative around the XPDI combination and can say nothing about the later sites on the project list, such as Cottonwood, Auburn, Calvert City or the Austin facility. None of those carries a capacity or cost figure.

Capacity figures in this window are mostly unchanged rather than scaled. Denton is pinned at 22 MW initial (14177, 20691) against a 300 MW end state that is restated almost word for word from March through September 2022 (14178, 14183, 20701, 13932, 13697). Muskogee's 500 MW is repeated with the same consistency (14179, 20684, 13925, 13698), but it never gains an energization date, phase plan or initial tranche, and the project still sits at announced status. Fleet-level capacity is less tidy. The 497 MW figure as of January 31 (14186, 20703) drops to 457 MW in claim 13988 on April 20, then returns to 497 MW on May 12 (13921) with no explanation. Colocation reporting also shifts between EH/s (19793, 19794) and server counts (19795, 19800), which makes trend comparison unreliable. Claim 19798 appears to be an extraction error, since it records a dollar value.

Dates have slipped more than they have held. The Denton development agreement (14184) and the Denton operational launch (14192, 14182, 13931) are both flagged as delayed. Later filings keep restating the 22 MW start without reconciling it to the original February target. The Muskogee agreement (14185) is likewise marked delayed. The Gryphon hosting arrangement for 230 MW (19781) arrives alongside claims that the counterparty lacked the funds for its miners and that a related agreement may not exist (19782, 19784). That 230 MW should be treated as contested demand, not committed load.

No permits, interconnection queue positions or on-site reporting appear in the record. The 300 MW and 500 MW targets therefore rest entirely on company statements. The record also stops before the December 2022 Chapter 11 filing, which almost certainly reset both targets.

Over the next 90 days, there are four things to check. First, whether the Q3 2026 filings restate Denton or Muskogee capacity or quietly drop them. Second, whether ERCOT queue or City of Denton utility records support any Denton expansion beyond the initial 22 MW. Third, whether Muskogee has any utility or SPP interconnection footprint at all. Fourth, whether the ingest can be completed past claim 13540 so the post-restructuring claims can be scored against this baseline.

The record supplied here is truncated: the last legible entry is claim 13540 from October 2022, and the input ends mid-line. Nothing after that date can be assessed, so this read covers only the 2021–2022 window. The newer sites on the project list, including Hunt County, Cottonwood and Dalton 3, have no capacity or timeline claims attached at all.

Within that window, capacity framing was stable but unconverted. Denton carried a 300 MW build-out target in roughly a dozen restatements from March through September 2022 (14178, 14183, 14187, 20701, 13932, 13923, 13697), while the only operating figure ever given was the 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 20691). No intermediate milestone, such as a second energization phase or a dated path from 22 to 300 MW, appears anywhere. Muskogee is weaker still: the 500 MW figure (14179, 20684, 13933, 13925, 13698) is repeated without an operational date, an initial phase or a stated capacity online. Repetition of a target is not progress toward it.

The fleet-level number also wobbles. Operating capacity is stated as 497 MW in late March (14173, 20703) and again in May (13921), but as 457 MW in an April filing (13988). The record does not reconcile the 40 MW gap. Colocation reporting shifts units from month to month, moving from EH/s (19793, 19794) to server counts (19795, 19796, 19800) to a dollar figure (19798). That makes trend comparison impossible and is itself a disclosure-quality signal.

On dates, Denton's operational launch is tagged delayed against a February 2022 promise (14182, 14192, 13931), and the Muskogee agreement likewise slipped past its February target (14185). Neither slip is acknowledged in later restatements, which simply drop the date. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781) arrives alongside claims questioning the counterparty's funding and the existence of a related agreement (19782, 19784), so that capacity should be treated as contested rather than contracted.

The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this: no ERCOT or SPP interconnection entries, no municipal permits, no site reporting. Over the next 90 days, the priority is ingesting post-October 2022 filings so the restructuring-era and later capacity claims can be compared against these baselines. After that, check ERCOT queue status for Denton, Hunt County and the Pecos-area Cottonwood site, along with any Oklahoma utility or port authority filings that show whether Muskogee ever moved past an agreement.

The capacity record for Core Scientific is unusually static. Denton's ultimate target is 300 MW at every mention from the March 2022 filings (14178, 14183, 14187, 20683) through September 2022 (13697), and Muskogee's 500 MW figure is equally unchanged (14179, 14195, 13925, 13698). Neither number moves, but neither is ever matched by evidence of progress beyond Denton's 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 20691). Repeating a fixed headline figure while reporting no intermediate milestones is a weaker signal than a figure that changes, because it shows nothing about how the buildout is actually going. Portfolio-level capacity is less tidy. The 497 MW operating figure (14173, 20703, 13921) sits alongside a 457 MW figure dated April 20, 2022 (13988), and no claim on record explains the 40 MW gap.

On timing, the early promises have mostly not held. Denton's operational launch was promised by February 1, 2022 and is tagged delayed in two separate filings (14192, 13931). The Muskogee agreement's February 28, 2022 date is also marked delayed (14185), and no later claim gives Muskogee an operational date at all. That is a revision by silence rather than an acknowledged slip. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781) is undercut within the same set of claims by allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for its miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19782, 19784). The colocation series is noisy. Server counts move from 80,000 to 79,000 to 97,000 (19795, 19796, 19800), and the July 2022 entry is recorded in dollars rather than units (19798), so it cannot be compared with the others.

The supplied material contains no independent corroboration: no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, no building or air permits, and no site reporting for Denton or Muskogee. The eight other sites on the project list, including Hunt County, Cottonwood and Auburn, carry no capacity or cost figures. The record also cuts off mid-entry at claim 13540 in October 2022, so this read covers only the pre-restructuring period and should not be taken as a view of the company's current trajectory.

Over the next 90 days, the first thing to check is whether post-2022 claims exist for these sites and whether they quietly change the 300 MW and 500 MW targets. After that, look for queue positions or energization dates that tie Denton's capacity to a utility record, and for any filing that names a status or date for Muskogee rather than repeating its nameplate figure.

The record supplied here stops mid-entry in October 2022 (the last visible id is 13540), so this read covers Core Scientific's first public year and should not be taken as a current assessment. Within that window, the announced numbers are notable more for repetition than growth. Denton's 300 MW end-state appears in more than a dozen near-identical filings (14178, 14187, 20683, 13923, 13697) against a stated 22 MW initial load (14177, 20691). Muskogee's 500 MW figure (14179, 20684, 13933, 13698) never gains an energization date, phase schedule or interconnection detail. Fleet-level capacity moves the wrong way and then snaps back: 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14173, 14186), 457 MW in an April filing (13988), then 497 MW again in May (13921). The record does not reconcile that 40 MW gap, and it deserves an explanation before either figure is treated as authoritative.

Date discipline is thin rather than openly broken. Denton's operational launch carries a February 1, 2022 target (14192, 13931), and a separate claim ties the same 22 MW start to February 28 (14182). Both are flagged delayed, but no filing acknowledges a slip. The Tenaska and City of Denton development agreement (14184) and the Muskogee Port Authority agreement (14185) have the same unacknowledged-delay pattern. Colocation disclosures drift, from 80,000 units (19795) to 79,000 (19796) to 97,000 (19800), and claim 19798 is recorded in USD, which looks like an extraction error. The Gryphon dispute over 230 MW of hosting (19781 to 19784) shows counterparty risk sitting inside the hosted-capacity totals.

None of these claims is corroborated by independent evidence in this record. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP queue entries, and no site reporting. Eight of the eleven listed sites, including Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3 and Auburn, have no capacity or cost figure at all. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. The October 2022 cutoff also means the record predates the company's December 2022 Chapter 11 filing and its later shift toward hosting HPC workloads, and none of that history is reflected here.

Over the next 90 days, the first priority is backfilling claims from late 2022 onward so Denton's actual energized megawatts can be compared with the 300 MW target. After that, the useful checks are whether Muskogee ever received a dated phase plan, whether Hunt County and Cottonwood show up in ERCOT large-load queue filings, and whether the imagery pipeline detects construction at Denton and Muskogee that matches or contradicts the stated capacity.

The record supplied here ends in October 2022, cut off mid-entry at claim 13540, so this read covers only the first ten months of Core Scientific's public-company disclosures. Any conclusion about the company's current trajectory, including the later sites on the project list such as Cottonwood, Hunt County, Dalton 3 and the Austin facility, needs the rest of the claim history before it can be published.

Within that window, headline capacity did not grow. Operating capacity was stated as 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173, 20703). A 457 MW figure appeared on April 20 (13988), and 497 MW returned on May 12 (13921). The 40 MW gap was never reconciled in the record. The two growth projects stayed fixed at their original figures. Denton was pitched at 300 MW ultimate from a 22 MW start (14177, 14178, 13923, 13697). Muskogee was presented at 500 MW (14179, 20702, 13933, 13698). Neither figure gained a phasing schedule or an energization date between March and September 2022.

The dated promises mostly slipped. The Denton development agreement carried an October 2021 marker (14184), and its operational launch was set for February 1, 2022 (14192, 13931). Both are flagged delayed. The Muskogee port authority agreement was tied to February 28, 2022 (14185) and is also delayed. After that date, Muskogee was repeated as a 500 MW figure with no date attached, so the timeline was effectively dropped without acknowledgement. The Blockcap acquisition shows the same pattern: a July 2021 marker (14180) became a January 2022 target, which closed in February (20707).

The hosting side is harder to read. Colocation disclosures changed units from EH/s (19793, 19794) to server counts (19795, 19796, 19800), and one month is captured as a dollar value (19798). That entry is probably an extraction error and should be checked against the source. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting commitment (19781) appears alongside claims that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund it (19782) and that a related supply agreement may not have existed (19784). That puts a large share of contracted load behind a questionable counterparty.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP large-load queue entries, and no local reporting. The 300 MW and 500 MW figures therefore rest entirely on company statements.

For the next 90 days, the priority is to backfill claims from late 2022 onward and test whether Denton and Muskogee kept or lost their headline megawatts. After that, pull ERCOT large-load interconnection records for Denton, Pecos and Hunt County, and look for Oklahoma utility filings covering Muskogee. The last check is whether the eight unsized sites on the project list ever receive a stated capacity.

The capacity story on record is largely static repetition rather than a scaling trajectory. Denton's 300 MW end-state is restated nearly verbatim from March through September 2022 (14178, 14187, 13932, 13697). The only figure ever tied to physical delivery is a 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 20691). Muskogee's 500 MW is repeated at the same cadence (14179, 13933, 13698) but never paired with an energization date, phasing plan or first-tranche figure. Fleet-wide operating capacity is the one number that moves, and it moves the wrong way before recovering. Claim 14173 reports 497 MW, 13988 reports 457 MW three weeks later, and 13921 is back at 497 MW, with no reconciliation of the 40 MW gap. Colocation disclosures also shift units month to month, from hashrate (19793, 19794) to server counts (19795, 19796, 19800) to a dollar figure (19798). That makes the hosted book hard to track as a consistent series.

On dates, the record shows quiet revision rather than acknowledged slippage. Denton's operational start is pegged to February 1, 2022 in 14192 and 13931, and to February 28 in 14182. The development agreement itself carries an October 2021 marker (14184). Muskogee's Port Authority agreement is flagged delayed against a February 2022 reference (14185), and no subsequent claim restates a target. The Blockcap close drifts from a mid-2021 marker (14180) to a January 2022 completion (20707). The expiry of the power pricing cap at the end of 2021 (19786) is an unaddressed cost exposure sitting underneath all of these build plans.

Counterparty quality is the clearer warning signal. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting commitment (19781) arrives alongside claims that Gryphon lacked funds for its miners (19782) and that a related NuMiner agreement may not exist (19784). The Celsius master services agreement (13540) and the PJT Partners engagement (13503) close out the visible record in October 2022.

The supplied history contains no independent corroboration of the announced pace, such as permits, interconnection queue positions or site reporting. The newer sites listed, including Cottonwood, the Dalton buildings, Auburn and the Austin facility, carry no capacity or cost claims at all.

Over the next 90 days, three checks matter. First, whether current disclosures give Denton and Muskogee dated, tranche-level capacity rather than terminal figures. Second, whether ERCOT or Oklahoma utility filings match those figures. Third, whether the 457 versus 497 MW discrepancy and the gap in the post-2022 record are resolved in newer filings.

The capacity record here extends only to early April 2023, and the project table lists no capacity or cost for any of the eleven sites, so this read covers Core Scientific's pre-restructuring phase rather than its current footprint. Within that window, the headline figures were repeated without change rather than scaled. Denton's 300 MW end state appears in at least seven filings (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13923, 13932, 13697), and none of them move past the 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 14182). Muskogee's 500 MW appears six times (14179, 14188, 14195, 13925, 13933, 13698) with no energization date attached. The company-wide figure is less consistent. It was stated as 497 MW (14173, 14186, 13921), then 457 MW in an April 2022 disclosure (13988), then 497 MW again in May, and 592 MW by April 2023 (12733, 12795). The 457 MW figure is never reconciled with the others. Marble's 35 MW (12770, 12796, 12825) is the only new site-level number the record adds.

On timing, nearly every dated promise is tagged delayed. These include the Denton development agreement targeted for October 2021 (14184), Denton's February 2022 operational launch (14192, 13931), the Muskogee port authority agreement (14185), and Q1 2023 equipment deliveries (12826). The Denton date was later restated as met at 22 MW without any comment on the rest of the build. The October 2022 engagement of Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) signals restructuring, yet disclosures in 2023 still carried the original 300 MW and 500 MW targets. The Gryphon hosting deal is also questionable. The 230 MW (19781) was paired with the company's own allegation that the counterparty could not fund its miners (19782, 19784), so it should not be counted as contracted load.

The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP queue entries, and no site reporting. The announced pace rests entirely on company statements. Some colocation metrics also appear mis-extracted, such as a USD value recorded for server counts (19798).

Over the next 90 days, the first priority is a backfill of post-2023 filings. That would show whether Denton and Muskogee were restated, reduced, or repurposed, and would supply baselines for Cottonwood, Auburn, Dalton 3, and Hunt County. It is also worth pulling ERCOT large-load and interconnection records for Denton, Pecos, and Hunt County, and SPP or OG&E records for Muskogee, to test the stated megawatts. Finally, the project table's 'announced' status for sites that the claims describe as operating should be corrected.

The capacity story in this record is one of large headline targets that were restated almost word for word and never broken into dated steps. Fleet-wide operating capacity was put at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173). An April 2022 filing gave 457 MW (13988), and three weeks later the company was back at 497 MW (13921), with no explanation for the 40 MW gap in either direction. By April 2023 the fleet figure had risen to 592 MW (12795, 12733). That is real growth, but modest next to the 800 MW of new-site ambition the company was advertising at the same time.

Those ambitions are where the trajectory weakens. Denton opened at 22 MW (14177, 14182) against a 300 MW end state. That 300 MW figure was repeated at least seven times between March and September 2022 (14187, 14183, 14178, 13932, 13923, 13697) without a single interim milestone or completion date. Muskogee's 500 MW was reiterated just as often (14195, 14188, 14179, 13933, 13925, 13698), and its only dated commitment, the Port Authority agreement due by February 2022, is flagged delayed (14185). Neither site has an operational date for full build-out anywhere in the record. Slippage elsewhere also went unremarked: the Bitmain deliveries expected in Q1 2023 are marked delayed (12826), and Marble's 35 MW (12825, 12770) appears only as a static power-contract figure.

The partnership side adds counterparty risk. The 230 MW Gryphon hosting deal (19781) is paired in the same filing with assertions that Gryphon lacked the funds for its miners (19782) and with a disputed NuMiner agreement (19784). The late-2022 engagements of Weil and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) mark the point where the build-out narrative gives way to restructuring. Colocation disclosures also change units from month to month, from EH/s (19793) to server counts (19795) to a dollar figure (19798), which makes it hard to compare periods.

No independent evidence appears in this record: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection filings, no on-the-ground reporting. The announced pace is therefore unverified rather than contradicted. Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton, Auburn, Calvert City and Grand Forks carry no capacity or timeline claims at all.

Over the next 90 days, the key question is whether current filings still carry the 300 MW Denton and 500 MW Muskogee figures or quietly drop them. It is also worth checking whether Denton has an interconnection queue entry above its energized load, and whether the newer sites acquire dated, sized commitments that can be checked against permits.

Core Scientific's record on these sites is heavy on repeated headline figures and light on measured delivery. It also stops in April 2023, so any read of the current trajectory rests on a record that is more than three years old.

At the portfolio level, reported operating capacity stood at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14173, 14186). It was restated as 457 MW in April 2022 (13988) and back at 497 MW a few weeks later (13921). None of these filings reconciles the dip. The next disclosed step is 592 MW across eight operating sites in April 2023 (12753, 12818, 12776). That is real growth of roughly 95 MW over about fifteen months. It is modest against the 800 MW implied by the two flagship projects.

Those flagships account for nearly all of the announced ambition, and neither shows measurable progress in the record. Denton's 300 MW target has been repeated at least seven times (14178, 14183, 14187, 13932, 13923, 13697). The only delivered figure is the initial 22 MW, and its launch date was flagged as slipping from February 2022 (14192, 14182, 13931). No later Denton capacity figure appears, so the gap between 22 MW and 300 MW is unexplained. Muskogee's 500 MW is restated even more often (14195, 13933, 13698, 12790, 12820). Through April 2023 it carries no operational date or intermediate milestone. It is still described as a development agreement in the latest filings (12777, 12805). Four of those restatements describe it as timeline progress without adding any timeline.

No independent evidence on the record supports either project's pace. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, and no site reporting. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract for Marble (12741, 12759) is a utility-side agreement for 35 MW. It is the closest thing to third-party corroboration, and it covers a small site. The October 2022 engagement of Weil and PJT as restructuring advisors (13502, 13503) came before the 2023 filings. Those filings repeat the same targets without revising them after that financial disruption. The disputed 230 MW Gryphon hosting arrangement (19781, 19782, 19784) is a reminder that contracted megawatts in this record have not always been firm.

Over the next 90 days, three things matter. The first is whether any current filing gives Denton an energized figure above 22 MW. The second is whether Muskogee has been quietly dropped, resized or given a date. The third is whether the eleven projects listed without capacity or cost data finally get sourced figures. Interconnection queue records for Denton and Muskogee would be the most useful independent check.

The capacity record on this project cluster is concentrated in 2022 and early 2023 filings. Its main feature is repetition rather than progression. Denton's end-state figure of 300 MW is restated at least seven times (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923, 13697), always against the same 22 MW initial energization (14177, 14182). No intermediate tranche or dated ramp schedule ever appears. Muskogee is weaker still. Its 500 MW headline recurs across roughly a year of disclosures (14179, 14188, 14195, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12805) with no energization date, no phasing and no stated capex. By the April 2023 filing it is described only as a development that was announced (12805). At the fleet level, the numbers do not move in a straight line. Operating capacity is stated as 497 MW (14173, 14186, 13921), then as 457 MW in an intervening April 2022 disclosure (13988), and later as 592 MW across eight sites (12795, 12818, 12819). The 457 figure is never reconciled with the ones on either side of it. Marble's 35 MW (12825, 12796, 12759) is the only site-level figure tied to a named utility contract.

On timing, the Denton launch is tagged delayed against a February 2022 target (14192, 13931), and several corporate milestones carry the same flag (14180, 14184, 14185). Nothing in the record acknowledges or explains these slips. The October 2022 engagement of restructuring advisers (13502, 13503) is the clearest signal that the announced build pace had decoupled from the company's balance sheet. Yet later filings keep carrying the Denton and Muskogee targets unchanged. The Gryphon dispute claims (19781 through 19784) and the Celsius services agreement (13540) point to the same period of stress on the hosting side.

The record contains no independent corroboration of any of this. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries and no site reporting. Several newer sites, including Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3 and Auburn, appear in the project list with no capacity or timeline claims at all. Every project is also still coded as announced, including sites the company describes as operating, so the status field should not be relied on. Claim 19798 records a colocation metric in dollars rather than units, which looks like an extraction error.

Over the next 90 days, watch four things. First, whether filings finally give Denton a dated build-out beyond its initial phase. Second, whether Muskogee gets a schedule or quietly drops out of disclosures. Third, whether large-load interconnection filings in ERCOT exist for the Pecos and Hunt County sites. Fourth, whether the 592 MW fleet figure is restated on a consistent basis.

The claims here stop in April 2023, and after the first filing they mostly repeat earlier numbers rather than report new progress. Across the March 2022 to April 2023 filings, the two flagship build-outs never changed size. Denton stays at a 300 MW end state from the first filing (14193, 14178, 14183, 14187) through May and September 2022 (13932, 13923, 13697). Muskogee stays at 500 MW from its first appearance (14179, 14188, 14195) through the April 2023 annual materials (12738, 12755, 12765, 12820). Numbers that hold steady for a year can mean discipline. Here they more likely show that neither site moved far enough to force a revision. Denton's only energized figure is the initial 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931), and no later claim updates it. Muskogee never gets a delivery date at all.

The fleet-wide figures are less orderly. Operating capacity is given as 497 MW at January 31, 2022 (14173, 14186) and repeated in May 2022 (13921). A 457 MW figure dated April 2022 sits between those two statements (13988), with no explanation of the 40 MW gap. By April 2023 the total is 592 MW across eight sites (12795, 12733, 12753, 12734). That is roughly 95 MW of net additions in a year when Denton alone was supposed to scale by more than ten times. The dates in the record also slip without comment. Denton's operational milestone is pegged to both February 1 and February 28, 2022 (14192, 14182). Equipment promised for Q1 2023 delivery is flagged delayed (12826). Neither Denton nor Muskogee ever gets a revised completion date. The October 2022 engagements of PJT Partners and Weil (13503, 13502) signal a restructuring, and none of the later capacity language accounts for it.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection entries, and no local reporting. Marble's 35 MW is the only figure tied to a named utility contract (12759, 12741, 12825). The newer sites on the project list, including Cottonwood, Hunt County, Dalton 3 and Auburn, have no capacity or cost claims at all. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements.

Over the next 90 days, the most useful checks are outside the company's own reporting. One is whether the next periodic filing states energized megawatts for Denton and Muskogee specifically, rather than folding them into a fleet total. Others are whether ERCOT large-load or SPP queue records match those figures, and whether Muskogee port authority minutes show construction activity. It also matters whether Denton's 300 MW or Muskogee's 500 MW is formally resized or quietly dropped. Given the documented restructuring, a silent disappearance of either target would be more telling than a revision.

Core Scientific's claim history for this cluster is dominated by two large-site headline numbers that never moved: Denton at 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923, 13697) and Muskogee at 500 MW (14179, 14185, 13925, 13698, and again in the April 2023 filing via 12820, 12755, 12738). That constancy looks like discipline, but it mostly reflects an absence of delivery updates. Denton's only disclosed operating figure is 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931), and the record never shows progress between that first tranche and the 300 MW target. Muskogee never received an operational date at all. Its port authority agreement carried a February 2022 milestone (14185) that is flagged delayed, yet the same 500 MW was still described as in development more than a year later, and none of the filings acknowledged the slip. Fleet-level capacity is also less linear than it appears. Operating capacity was reported at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173), then 457 MW in April 2022 (13988), then 497 MW again in May (13921), with no reconciliation among the three figures. By April 2023 it had reached 592 MW across eight sites (12764, 12753, 12754). That is a gain of roughly 95 MW over a period in which the company engaged restructuring counsel and advisors (13502, 13503). The increase is similar in scale to Marble's 35 MW contract (12759, 12825) plus incremental Denton energization, and it is small relative to the 800 MW promised at the two flagship sites. Timeline slippage recurs throughout: Denton milestones (14184, 14192, 14182), the Blockcap close (14180, 12798), the 2021 land lease (19017) and Q1 2023 miner deliveries (12826) are all marked delayed. The supplied record contains no permits, no interconnection queue entries and no on-the-ground reporting, so none of the announced pace can be independently corroborated. The record also ends in 2023, while newer sites such as Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3 and Austin carry no capacity or cost figures. Over the next 90 days, watch for three things. First, whether current filings still carry Muskogee at 500 MW or quietly drop it. Second, whether Denton reports energized megawatts rather than an unchanged target. Third, whether ERCOT queue positions or county permits appear for the Texas sites that would put numbers behind the newer announcements.

Core Scientific's capacity story in this record is steady at the headline level and thin underneath. Two site targets never moved. Denton was pegged at 300 MW in every filing from March 2022 through September 2022 (14178, 14183, 14187, 13932, 13923, 13697). Muskogee was held at 500 MW from its first mention through April 2023 (14179, 14195, 13925, 13698, 12820). That constancy is not evidence of progress. Muskogee's port authority agreement carried a February 2022 marker that is flagged delayed (14185), and by April 2023 the company still described it only as a development (12738, 12755, 12765). No energized megawatts, construction milestone, or date replaced the original framing.

Fleet-level figures are less linear than the filings suggest. Operational capacity was 497 MW as of January 2022 (14173, 14186), and the same figure was repeated in May (13921). An April 2022 claim of 457 MW (13988) sits between those two statements and is never reconciled. The figure then reached 592 MW across eight facilities by April 2023 (12733, 12753, 12754). That net gain of roughly 95 MW over fifteen months is modest against the 800 MW implied by the two flagship targets. It includes discrete additions such as Marble's 35 MW power contract (12759, 12825).

Dates have slipped quietly rather than being openly revised. Denton's initial 22 MW energization appears with both a February 1 and a February 28, 2022 marker (13931, 14182, 14192), and all are flagged delayed. The Q1 2023 equipment delivery tied to Bitmain supply agreements also slipped (12826). The engagement of Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners in October 2022 (13502, 13503) is the clearest signal in the record that capital, not site availability, constrained build-out. No filing ties any capacity target back to that restructuring.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, and no site reporting. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. Several listed projects, including Austin, Cottonwood, Hunt County, Dalton 3 and Auburn, have no capacity or timeline claims at all. The supplied record also ends mid-filing in April 2023, so any later repositioning is not captured here.

Over the next 90 days, three things matter. First, whether current disclosures state energized megawatts at Denton against the 300 MW target. Second, whether Muskogee still carries its 500 MW figure or has quietly dropped out. Third, whether the unquantified sites acquire dated capacity claims that can be checked against interconnection filings.

Core Scientific's capacity story in this record is mostly aggregate. Company-wide operating power was reported at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14173, 14186, 13921), then at 457 MW in April 2022 (13988), before rising to 592 MW across eight operational data centers by April 2023 (12764, 12753, 12733, 12734, 12776). The April 2022 dip is never reconciled against the figures on either side of it. That growth came as the company engaged PJT Partners and Weil, Gotshal & Manges (13503, 13502), both restructuring advisers, so the headline megawatts rose while the balance sheet was in distress.

At the project level, the two flagship commitments look fixed. Denton has carried a 300 MW end-state target from March 2022 through September 2022 (14178, 14183, 14187, 13932, 13697). The only delivered figure attached to it is a 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 14182), and no interim milestones are given. Its launch date is itself inconsistent: some claims say February 1, 2022 (14192, 13931) and another says February 28 (14182), and all are flagged delayed. Muskogee's 500 MW has been restated at least ten times between March 2022 and April 2023 (14195, 13925, 13698, 12820, 12738) with no date, no phasing and no energized capacity. The one partnership deadline tied to it, February 2022, is marked delayed (14185). A figure that is repeated for thirteen months without a schedule reads as an option the company holds rather than a build in progress. Marble's 35 MW (12759, 12825) is the only site-level figure backed by a utility contract. The Q1 2023 equipment delivery slip (12826) suggests the company's pace depended on its suppliers.

None of these claims is independently corroborated in this record. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection entries and no on-the-ground reporting. Every capacity item on the project list, including Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3 and the Austin facility, is blank, which means the stated targets have never been attached to specific sites. The claims supplied also end in April 2023, so the later sites cannot be assessed here.

Over the next 90 days, watch four things. First, whether Muskogee's 500 MW gets a date or quietly disappears. Second, whether Denton's progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW is disclosed with energization figures. Third, whether ERCOT large-load filings appear for the Texas sites. Fourth, whether any filing assigns megawatts to the newer sites on the project list.

The supplied record ends partway through the April 2023 filings, so this read covers roughly 2021 to early 2023. It does not cover the company's later repositioning toward high-performance-computing hosting. Across that window, Core Scientific's fleet-level capacity story is one of modest net growth with an unreconciled wobble. Operating capacity was stated at 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173) and repeated in May (13921). An April 2022 figure of 457 MW (13988) sits between those two statements without explanation. By April 2023 the figure was 592 MW across eight operational sites (12733, 12753, 12734). That is about 95 MW of net additions in a year that also saw restructuring advisers engaged (13502, 13503) and delayed equipment deliveries (12826).

The project-level targets have been static rather than scaled or shrunk, and that is the more telling pattern. Denton's 300 MW end-state is restated almost word for word from March through September 2022 (14178, 14183, 13932, 13697), but the only delivered figure on record is the initial 22 MW (14177, 14182). No ramp schedule was ever attached to the 300 MW. Even the launch date is inconsistent: February 1, 2022 in 14192 and 13931, but February 28 in 14182. The underlying development agreement was itself flagged as late against an October 2021 marker (14184). Muskogee is starker. It carries a 500 MW figure through at least eleven claims from March 2022 to April 2023 (14195, 13933, 13698, 12805, 12820, among others), with no delivery date, no phased capacity and no status change beyond announced. Its port authority agreement was also tagged delayed against February 2022 (14185). The only firm new power commitment in the period is the 35 MW Murphy Electric Power Board contract at Marble (12741, 12759).

The record contains no independent corroboration. There are no permits, no ERCOT or SPP large-load or interconnection queue entries, and no local reporting to test whether Denton moved beyond 22 MW or whether Muskogee advanced past a paper agreement. Newer sites such as Hunt County, Cottonwood and Dalton 3 appear with no capacity or timeline claims at all.

Over the next 90 days, watch several things. First, whether current filings restate Denton and Muskogee in critical-IT megawatts rather than gross utility megawatts. That conversion typically shrinks headline numbers and would amount to an unacknowledged revision. Second, whether Muskogee appears with any energization date or is quietly dropped. Third, whether Texas queue filings or county permits surface for Hunt County and Cottonwood to substantiate their announced status.

Core Scientific's capacity record in this dataset runs only from March 2022 to April 2023, so it describes the pre-restructuring miner rather than the company's later high-performance-computing pivot. Within that window, the fleet-level number is less linear than the headlines suggest. Operating capacity was stated at 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173). It was restated as 457 MW in April 2022 (13988), returned to 497 MW a month later (13921), and was reported as 592 MW across eight facilities by April 2023 (12733, 12734, 12818). That is net growth of roughly 95 MW in fourteen months. The unexplained 40 MW dip in between suggests either a definitional change or a reporting inconsistency, and it was never reconciled in the claims on record.

The two flagship projects diverge. Denton delivered its first tranche: 22 MW was reported operational in February 2022 (14182, 13931). The filings disagree on the exact date, citing both February 1 and February 28 (14192, 14182). The 300 MW end-state was then repeated unchanged through September 2022 (14183, 13932, 13697) with no interim milestones, and no Denton-specific ramp figure appears by April 2023. Muskogee is weaker. Its 500 MW figure was restated almost verbatim from March 2022 through April 2023 (14179, 13925, 13698, 12790, 12820) with no date, cost, or phased capacity attached. That repetition spanned the October 2022 engagement of restructuring advisers Weil and PJT (13502, 13503), which is exactly when a 500 MW build should have been re-underwritten or at least caveated. A headline that stays constant while the balance sheet changes is a signal in itself. Marble's 35 MW is the only site capacity tied to a named utility contract (12741, 12825), which makes it the best-anchored figure in the set.

No permit filings, interconnection queue entries for Denton or Muskogee, or on-the-ground reporting are attached to any of these claims, so the announced pace is unverified by independent evidence. Several of the listed sites, including Hunt County, Cottonwood, Auburn, and Dalton 3, carry no capacity or timeline claims at all in the material supplied.

Over the next 90 days, watch whether current filings still carry Muskogee at 500 MW or drop it without comment. Watch whether Denton's disclosed capacity is now expressed as critical IT load for HPC tenants rather than gross mining power, since that would make the 300 MW figure non-comparable to earlier claims. Finally, check for ERCOT large-load or ONEOK and OG&E interconnection records that could confirm or contradict the stated site figures.

The clearest signal in this file is repetition standing in for progress. Muskogee's 500 MW has been restated at least a dozen times across thirteen months (14179, 14188, 14195, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12790, 12805, 12777, 12820, 12755, 12738) without ever acquiring a phase schedule, a first-energization date, or an interim megawatt figure, and the classification drifts between facility_capacity and facility_timeline while the substance stays identical. A number restated is not a number delivered, and the project registry still carries Muskogee, like all eleven sites, at status=announced.

Aggregate capacity tells a subtler story. The 497 MW figure of 2022-03-29 (14173, 14186) becomes 457 MW three weeks later (13988), then returns to 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (13921) with no acknowledgement of the intervening revision, before reaching 592 MW by 2023-04-03 (12753, 12764, 12733). The growth is real but modest against the 800 MW of Denton and Muskogee headline capacity promised in the same breath.

Denton is where dates are testable, and they did not hold. The development agreement was due 2021-10-31 (14184), operation by 2022-02-01 (14192), then 2022-02-28 (14182), all flagged delayed, and what finally energized was 22 MW (14177) against a 300 MW target repeated unchanged through 2022-09 (13932, 13923, 13697). That target then drops out of the 2023-04-03 disclosure set entirely.

Independent corroboration is thin and asymmetric. The one site with a verifiable counterparty and a contracted load, Marble at 35 MW under the Murphy Electric Power Board industrial contract (12741, 12770, 12782, 12796), is also the smallest. Nothing in this record supplies permits or queue positions for Muskogee. Meanwhile the October 2022 engagements of Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) ran concurrently with the capacity narrative, and equipment deliveries promised for Q1 2023 slipped (12826).

Over the next ninety days, watch whether Muskogee produces a first energized megawatt or a phase-one figure rather than another restatement; whether the 592 MW aggregate is republished with a site-level breakdown; and whether Hunt County, Cottonwood, Auburn, Dalton 3, Calvert City and Austin acquire any quantified capacity or date commitment at all, since they currently carry none. Utility-side filings, not company releases, are the check worth making.

The striking feature of this record is not growth but stasis at the announcement layer. Muskogee has carried the same 500 MW figure from March 2022 through April 2023 without a single revision, energization milestone, or partial phase — restated at least nine times (14195, 14179, 14188, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12755, 12790, 12820) with the descriptor never advancing past "development." A number that never moves in either direction over thirteen months is usually a placeholder rather than a plan. Denton shows the same pattern with a measurable gap: 300 MW promised repeatedly (14187, 14183, 13932, 13923, 13697) against 22 MW actually energized (14177, 14182), roughly seven percent of target, with no subsequent claim showing movement toward the balance.

Dates were revised quietly. The Denton operational date was first tied to February 1, 2022 (14192), then restated as February 28 (14182), then restated again in May as February 1 (13931) — three versions of the same milestone across two filings, none acknowledging the others. Fleet capacity behaves similarly: 497 MW on March 29 (14173, 14186), 457 MW three weeks later (13988), then 497 MW again in May (13921). A 40 MW round trip inside six weeks was never explained, and the later 592 MW across eight sites (12753, 12818, 12819) rests on that unreconciled base.

Independent corroboration is thin and asymmetric. The only claim anchored to a grid-side artifact is Marble's Industrial Power Contract with Murphy Electric Power Board (12741, 12759, 12782) — 35 MW, the smallest project on the list, and the only one with a counterparty obligation behind it. Neither Denton's remaining 278 MW nor Muskogee's 500 MW is tied here to an interconnection filing or utility contract. Meanwhile the October 2022 engagements of PJT and Weil Gotshal (13502, 13503) and the missed Q1 2023 Bitmain deliveries (12826) point to balance-sheet constraint, not build-out capacity.

Over the next ninety days, the questions worth answering are whether Muskogee's port authority agreement survives in any form or has lapsed; whether Denton appears in ERCOT's interconnection queue for load beyond the energized 22 MW; and whether the eight remaining announced sites — Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton, Auburn, Calvert City, Grand Forks, Austin — ever receive capacity figures, since none carries one today.

The striking feature of this record is not movement but repetition. Almost the entire corpus resolves to a single disclosure event on 2022-03-29 and its subsequent restatements, with the headline figures re-entered verbatim rather than advanced. Muskogee's 500 MW is the clearest case: the same number recurs across 14179, 14185, 14188, 14195, 13933, 13925, 13698 and then again through the 2023-04-03 filings at 12805, 12797, 12790, 12777, 12765, 12755, 12738 and 12820 — thirteen months of restatement without a single energized megawatt, and, critically, without a completion date ever attached. A capacity claim carrying no milestone cannot slip; it can only persist. That is a structural feature of how this project has been disclosed, not an accident.

Where dates do exist, they moved. Denton was promised operational by 2022-02-01 (14192), then 2022-02-28 (14182), and was reported operational on 2022-05-04 at 22 MW (13931) against a stated end-state of 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 13932) — roughly seven percent of the announced figure, with the remaining 278 MW never given a schedule. The equipment side shows the same pattern in miniature: Bitmain deliveries promised for Q1 2023 (12826) did not land on time.

Fleet capacity also wobbled without acknowledgement. 497 MW (14173, 14186) became 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (13988), then returned to 497 MW three weeks later (13921) with no reconciliation offered, before settling at 592 MW a year on (12818, 12764, 12753). A forty-megawatt round trip inside a month is a measurement-definition problem, and it was never explained.

Independent corroboration is thin and, where present, small. The Murphy Electric Power Board contract for Marble (12741, 12782, 12799) is the one commitment underwritten by a counterparty's own filing — 35 MW, an order of magnitude below the headline projects. The most telling external signal is the October 2022 retention of PJT Partners (13503) and Weil, Gotshal (13502) alongside the Celsius arrangement (13540): restructuring counsel is the market's verdict on the announced pace.

Over the next ninety days, watch whether the silent sites — Austin ASDC, Cottonwood, Hunt County, Calvert City, Grand Forks, Auburn, the Dalton pair — acquire capacity figures at all, whether Muskogee's 500 MW finally carries a date, and whether any utility or interconnection filing corroborates a number the company has now repeated for years.

The striking feature of this record is not what moved but what didn't. Denton's endpoint figure of 300 MW is repeated essentially verbatim across thirteen months and at least seven filings (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13923, 13932, 13697), and Muskogee's 500 MW is equally immobile (14195, 14188, 14179, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12805). Capacity targets that never drift are not necessarily evidence of discipline; where the underlying work is progressing, headline numbers usually get refined as interconnection studies and transformer procurement land. Here they were restated rather than re-derived.

Dates, by contrast, moved repeatedly. Denton's energization was owed by 2021-10-31 under the Tenaska and City of Denton arrangement (14184), then by 2022-02-01 (14192), then 2022-02-28 (14182), and was still being characterized as a recent milestone on 2022-05-04 (13931). Each revision was presented as a fresh statement rather than a correction. Muskogee's development agreement, due 2022-02-28 (14185), was still being described in April 2023 as a development being announced (12755, 12738, 12797), which is a different verb from the one used in 2022.

Fleet totals deserve scrutiny for a separate reason. The 497 MW figure (14173, 14186) fell to 457 MW three weeks later (13988), then returned to 497 MW (13921) with no reconciliation offered, before reaching 592 MW across eight sites (12733, 12753, 12818, 12754). That oscillation suggests a definitional shift between contracted and energized capacity rather than physical change.

Independent corroboration is thin and unevenly distributed. The Murphy Electric Power Board industrial contract at Marble (12741, 12759, 12799) is the one commitment anchored to a named utility instrument at a verifiable 35 MW. Muskogee's 500 MW has no comparable artifact anywhere in the record. Note also the 2022-10-26 engagements of Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503), which are restructuring signatures, and the Celsius master services agreement (13540) with a counterparty then in distress.

Over the next ninety days, watch whether Cottonwood, Hunt County, Auburn and Dalton 3 acquire any quantified capacity at all, since they currently carry none. Watch ERCOT queue postings for Pecos and Hunt County, and watch whether Muskogee is formally retired or simply stops being mentioned. Also note that this record goes quiet after April 2023, so nothing here speaks to the current buildout.

The trajectory here is one of restatement rather than advance. Across roughly thirteen months of filings the headline fleet number moves 497 MW (14173, 14186), down to 457 MW three weeks later (13988), back to 497 MW in May (13921), then to 592 MW by the following spring (12733, 12753, 12764, 12818, 12795). The mid-2022 dip is never explained; the most charitable reading is a shift between contracted and energized bases, but the company does not say so, and an unacknowledged 40 MW round trip in the top-line figure is the kind of thing that makes the later 592 MW hard to audit. Growth of about 95 MW over the period is real but modest against the pipeline being advertised.

The project-level numbers do not scale at all. Denton is announced at 22 MW initial and 300 MW final, and that 300 MW figure is repeated without revision at least seven times (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923, 13697) while the operational date slips from 1 February to 28 February 2022 and is flagged late in three separate tellings (14182, 14192, 13931). Muskogee is more striking: 500 MW asserted identically in March, May and September 2022 and again in April 2023 (14179, 14185, 13933, 13698, 12805, 12820, 12738), always as a development agreement, never with an energization milestone, an interim block, or a construction start. A year of verbatim repetition is not progress; it is a placeholder.

Independent corroboration is thin by construction. The only claim anchored to a third-party instrument is Marble, where a 35 MW industrial power contract with Murphy Electric Power Board appears repeatedly (12741, 12782, 12796, 12825) and is therefore the one figure with an external counterparty. Nothing in the record ties Muskogee or Denton to a permit or interconnection position. What does appear, in October 2022, is the Celsius master services agreement (13540) alongside PJT Partners and Weil Gotshal engagements (13503, 13502) — restructuring advisers, which is the clearest outside signal that the capital behind the announced pipeline was not there. The Bitmain Q1 2023 delivery slip (12826) points the same way.

Note that the record stops on 3 April 2023 and is stale relative to today. In the next ninety days the useful tests are narrow: any Muskogee interconnection queue entry or Oklahoma permit filing, any Denton load above the original 22 MW, actual metered draw under the Murphy contract, and whether the 592 MW figure is ever reconciled to the 497/457 series. Absent those, the announced-status entries carrying no capacity or cost at all — Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3, Auburn, Calvert City, Grand Forks, Austin — should be read as land positions, not projects.

The striking feature of this record is not what the numbers say but how little they move. Fleet-level capacity is the only figure that genuinely travels: 497 MW at the January 2022 measurement date (14173, 14186), an unexplained dip to 457 MW three weeks later (13988), a return to 497 MW in May (13921), and 592 MW a year on (12753, 12764, 12818, 12795). That is roughly twenty percent of fleet growth across thirteen months, which is a defensible build rate, but it is fleet arithmetic and cannot be attributed to any named project here. Site-level, nothing scales at all. Denton is stated at 22 MW initial and 300 MW final in March 2022 and restated identically in May 2022 and September 2022 (14177, 14178, 13923, 13697) with no interim figure ever bridging the two. Muskogee's 500 MW is re-entered at least eight separate times within the April 2023 filing alone (12738, 12755, 12765, 12777, 12790, 12797, 12805, 12820). Restatement density reads as momentum and is not; one number repeated is still one number.

Dates have slipped, and the slippage is at least flagged rather than buried: Denton's February 2022 operational date (14192, 13931), the Muskogee port authority agreement's February 2022 date (14185), the Denton development agreement's October 2021 date (14184), and Bitmain's Q1 2023 deliveries (12826). The Blockcap timing is internally inconsistent — 12798 carries a July 2021 delay against 12806 describing the same acquisition as completed that month — which is a records artifact, not necessarily a missed date.

There is no independent corroboration in this record. No permit, no interconnection queue entry, no site reporting appears anywhere in it, so the announced pace is presently unverified rather than contradicted. The counsel and banker engagements of October 2022 (13502, 13503) are the only structural signal, and the record simply stops in April 2023.

Over the next ninety days, watch whether Muskogee resurfaces in any filing or is retired silently after three years at status=announced; whether the 300 MW Denton figure survives any HPC conversion intact or is quietly re-based; and whether the project table, which still carries eleven entries with null capacity and null cost, is ever reconciled to operating reality. ERCOT large-load queue entries for Denton, Hunt County and Cottonwood would settle most of this quickly.

The striking feature of this record is not what the numbers say but how little they move. Two headline figures — 300 MW at Denton and 500 MW at Muskogee — are restated at least six and eleven times respectively between March 2022 and April 2023 (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13923, 13932, 13697; 14179, 14185, 14188, 14195, 13925, 13933, 13698, 12790, 12805, 12820, 12777) without a single intervening revision upward or downward. Repetition is being used as a substitute for progress. Against that 800 MW of announced pipeline, the only energized figure attached to either site is Denton's 22 MW initial load (14177, 14182, 13931), roughly seven percent of its stated end state, and Muskogee has no energized capacity on record at any point and remains status=announced more than four years after the port authority agreement.

Dates have slipped quietly rather than been withdrawn. Denton's operational launch was promised for 2022-02-01 (14192), then presented as 2022-02-28 (14182), then reverted to 2022-02-01 in the May filing (13931) — a moving target described each time as though it were the original. The same pattern predates the projects: Blockcap and Radar closings carried 2021-07-01 dates (14180, 14181) and the Denton development agreement a 2021-10-31 date (14184), all recorded as missed. Fleet capacity itself is unstable: 497 MW (14173, 13921) dropped to 457 MW three weeks later (13988) with no reconciliation, then resumed at 497 before reaching 592 MW by April 2023 (12818, 12753). That is under 100 MW of net fleet growth across thirteen months while 800 MW sat in the pipeline.

Corroboration is thin and uneven. Marble is the one site whose stated capacity is bounded by a counterparty-verifiable instrument, the Murphy Electric Power Board industrial contract at 35 MW (12741, 12759, 12799), and its announced and contracted figures match. Muskogee's 500 MW has no comparable utility, interconnection, or permitting artifact anywhere in the record. The October 2022 restructuring engagements (13502, 13503) mark the point where the pipeline claims stop tracking capital availability, and the record on Muskogee simply goes silent after April 2023.

Over the next ninety days, watch for the first external artifact rather than the next press release: an ERCOT large-load interconnection request or county abatement filing for Hunt County or Cottonwood, both of which currently carry no capacity, cost, or claims at all, and any Muskogee lease amendment or utility filing. Watch equally for whether the fleet-capacity number is restated again without reconciliation, and whether an AI or HPC conversion narrative reassigns the same megawatts to a new label.

The capacity line has been remarkably stable on paper and almost entirely undocumented in delivery. The fleet-wide figure moved from 497 MW (14173, 14186) down to 457 MW three weeks later (13988), back to 497 MW in May (13921), then to 592 MW by the April 2023 filing cluster (12733, 12753, 12764, 12818). That April 2022 dip is the tell: a 40 MW reduction appeared and vanished without any reconciliation, which is the pattern to watch for generally here — revisions are made silently rather than explained.

Site-level targets have not scaled at all; they have simply been restated. Denton's 300 MW appears verbatim across at least seven claims spanning March to September 2022 (14187, 14183, 14178, 14193, 13932, 13923, 13697) against an initial 22 MW energized (14177), with no intermediate milestone ever attached to the 278 MW gap. Muskogee's 500 MW is repeated a dozen times over thirteen months (14195, 13933, 13925, 13698, 12805, 12820, 12738) and never once carries an in-service date. A target recited without a schedule is a placeholder, not a plan.

Dates have not held. The same March 2022 filing dates Denton's operational launch to both February 1 and February 28 (14192, 14182) — one event, two dates, one document. The Denton development agreement (14184), the Muskogee port agreement (14185), and the Blockcap close (14180, 12798) all carry slipped markers. More consequentially, the capacity narrative continued unbroken through October 2022, when the disclosures turn to Weil Gotshal and PJT Partners engagements (13502, 13503) alongside the Celsius MSA (13540) — restructuring counsel and bankers, with the 500 MW and 300 MW figures still in circulation afterward (12765, 12797).

Independent corroboration is absent from this record entirely: no permits, no interconnection queue entries, no site reporting. Every capacity figure traces to the company's own filings. The only third-party anchor is the 35 MW Murphy Electric contract at Marble (12741, 12759, 12770), which is both small and specific — a useful contrast to the unverified large numbers.

Over the next 90 days, watch three things: whether Muskogee or Denton surface in SPP or ERCOT interconnection queues at anything near announced scale; whether Hunt County, Cottonwood, Auburn, and Dalton 3 move off status=announced with capacity attached, since all eleven sites currently carry blank capacity and cost; and whether the 592 MW figure is restated. The record's silence after April 2023 is itself the largest open item.

Core Scientific's capacity record is less a build-out curve than a set of fixed headline numbers that recur without visible progress. Aggregate operating capacity was stated at 497 MW in the March 2022 filing (14173, 14186), dropped to 457 MW in April 2022 (13988), and returned to 497 MW a month later (13921). The filings do not explain the 40 MW swing. The next data point, 592 MW across eight operating sites in April 2023 (12733, 12734, 12753), is real growth on paper. It likely includes smaller sites such as Marble's 35 MW contract with Murphy Electric Power Board (12741, 12825) rather than progress at the two flagship projects. Denton was consistently framed as a 300 MW end state (14178, 14183, 13932, 13697) against 22 MW initially energized (14177, 14182). Muskogee's 500 MW figure appears in roughly a dozen claims from March 2022 through April 2023 (14179, 13933, 12790, 12820) with no interim milestone, energization date, or phase breakdown. The number repeats while nothing about the project's state changes. On timing, the Denton launch appears as delayed in the same filing against two different target dates, 2022-02-01 (14192) and 2022-02-28 (14182), and the later disclosure (13931) keeps the earlier date without reconciling the two. Muskogee never carried a dated delivery commitment, which makes slippage impossible to measure and is itself notable. The October 2022 engagements of Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) mark the point where the capital behind these targets became uncertain. Filings after that point restate the Muskogee figure without addressing whether it survived the restructuring. The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no interconnection queue positions with ERCOT or the Oklahoma utility, and no local reporting on site work. The stated pace therefore rests entirely on company disclosure. The claim list is also truncated partway through the April 2023 filings, so later revisions may exist that this read does not capture. Over the next 90 days, check whether the most recent 10-Q still lists Muskogee at 500 MW or drops it quietly. Check whether Denton's energized megawatts are disclosed separately from the 300 MW target. Check whether aggregate operating capacity reconciles to the site-level figures. Pull Muskogee City-County Port Authority minutes and ERCOT large-load queue filings for Denton for evidence that is independent of the company.

Core Scientific's record here is dominated by repetition rather than progression. At the fleet level, stated operating capacity moved from 497 MW (14173, 14186) to 457 MW a month later (13988), back to 497 MW in the May 2022 filing (13921), and then to 592 MW by April 2023 (12753, 12818). The net gain of about 95 MW in a year is real but modest. The unexplained 40 MW dip in April 2022 is never reconciled in the claims, which suggests either a definitional change or a temporary curtailment that was not acknowledged.

The two flagship builds show the same pattern: a fixed headline number and no dated buildout. Denton's 300 MW end-state appears in at least five filings between March and September 2022 (14178, 14183, 13923, 13932, 13697), but the only capacity actually evidenced is the 22 MW initial tranche (14177, 14182). Even that energization is tagged as landing after its February 2022 target (14192, 13931), and the Tenaska and City of Denton agreement also ran past its October 2021 date (14184). Muskogee is starker. The 500 MW figure is restated verbatim from March 2022 (14195) through April 2023 (12790, 12820) with no in-service date, no interim tranche, and a port authority agreement that itself slipped (14185). A number that never moves across a restructuring is better read as a site entitlement than as a delivery schedule. The October 2022 engagement of Weil and PJT (13502, 13503) came immediately before the Chapter 11 filing. After that point, the absence of any revised Muskogee timing reads as silence rather than confirmation. Marble's 35 MW is anchored to an actual utility contract (12741, 12770), which makes it the most verifiable figure in the set.

None of the supplied claims cite permits, ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue positions, or site reporting. The announced pace therefore rests entirely on company statements. The extract also ends in April 2023, so the later-listed sites (Cottonwood, Dalton, Auburn, Hunt County) carry no capacity claims here to assess.

Over the next 90 days, the Q3 2026 report is the main test. It should show whether Denton's 300 MW is being restated as energized, contracted HPC capacity with dates, or kept as a bare ceiling. It should also show whether Muskogee's 500 MW is quietly dropped, resized, or finally tied to a utility service agreement. ERCOT large-load interconnection filings for Denton County and any PSO or SPP study entries for Muskogee would give the first independent read on whether either number is moving.

The capacity record for Core Scientific is flat. It does not show growth. The Denton, Texas site has carried the same 300 MW end-state target in every filing from March 2022 through September 2022 (14178, 14183, 13932, 13697), against an initial 22 MW energization (14177, 14182). Muskogee's 500 MW figure is repeated almost word for word from the first claim (14179) through at least a dozen restatements in the April 2023 annual filing (12738, 12790, 12820). Neither number ever gains an interim milestone, a phased schedule, or a dated completion target. Fleet-level operating capacity moves more. It was 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 13921), then 457 MW in an April 2022 claim (13988). That dip is never reconciled against the repeated 497 MW figure. By April 2023 it had reached 592 MW across eight sites (12733, 12754). The only new site-specific capacity in the window is the 35 MW Murphy Electric Power Board contract at Marble (12759, 12825).

On timing, most of the flags marked as delayed in this record are backward-looking. The Blockcap close (14180, 12798) and Denton's February 2022 energization (14192, 13931) were reported after the fact rather than slipped. The more telling signal is what is absent. Muskogee has had an agreement but no in-service date across more than a year of disclosures. The Q1 2023 miner deliveries (12826) are the one forward promise visibly missed. The October 2022 engagement of Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) is the context that matters. Restructuring advisors on retainer tend to freeze greenfield timelines, and the static Denton and Muskogee targets after that point should be read as carried-forward language rather than active schedules.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, no Muskogee port or county permits, and no TVA-side confirmation for Marble. The visible claims also end in April 2023. Several listed projects, including Austin, Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3 and Auburn, have no capacity or timeline claims shown here, so their trajectory cannot be assessed from this record.

Over the next 90 days, the Q3 2026 filing is the checkpoint. The questions are whether Muskogee still appears at 500 MW, is resized, or is quietly dropped, and whether Denton's 300 MW now carries a completion date. The other test is whether the unquantified sites acquire megawatt figures that can be matched against queue positions and permits.

The record visible here stops at April 2023, with the final entry cut off at claim 12778, so this is a read of Core Scientific's pre-restructuring posture rather than its current one. Seven of the eleven listed sites, including Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3, Auburn, Calvert City, Grand Forks and the Austin facility, carry no capacity or timeline claims at all in the extracted set.

On capacity, the project-level figures never moved. Denton was pitched at 22 MW initial and 300 MW at completion (14177, 14178), and that 300 MW was restated through September 2022 (13697). Muskogee was framed as a 500 MW development in March 2022 (14179, 14185) and repeated almost verbatim in April 2023 (12790, 12820). Consistency is not the same as progress, though. The Muskogee number was republished for a year with no energization date, no phasing and no interim megawatts, which reads more like an option being carried than a build being delivered. Fleet-wide operating capacity is noisier: 497 MW (14173), then 457 MW (13988), then 497 MW again (13921), then 592 MW across eight sites (12753). Nothing in the record explains the dip or reconciles the two definitions. Marble adds only a 35 MW power contract (12741, 12825).

On dates, most of the "delayed" tags attach to events that had already happened when they were reported, such as Denton's February 2022 energization (14182, 13931) and the July 2021 Blockcap close (14180). They look like artifacts of past-dated promises rather than evidence of slippage. The substantive gap is that neither Denton's path to 300 MW nor anything at Muskogee ever received a forward date. So no date could slip, and none was ever tested. The October 2022 engagement of PJT Partners and Weil (13503, 13502) coincides with those promises going quiet without any formal revision.

There is no independent evidence in this record, whether permits, ERCOT or SPP queue positions, or site reporting, to test the announced pace. That absence should itself be treated as a finding.

Over the next 90 days, the priority is ingesting post-2023 filings. The company's later repositioning of sites such as Denton toward high-performance-compute hosting would supersede the 300 MW mining framing, and the record should show whether Muskogee was formally dropped or simply stopped being mentioned. Beyond that, check for any capacity or energization figures attached to the seven unclaimed sites, and pull ERCOT and SPP interconnection entries for Denton and Muskogee to anchor claims against something external.

The supplied record breaks off after the April 2023 filings, so this read covers March 2022 through April 2023. The later-dated projects on the roster, including Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3, Auburn, Grand Forks and the Austin site, have no attached claims here and cannot be assessed.

Within that window, the headline capacity numbers barely moved. Total operating power was stated at 497 MW as of January 2022 (14173, 14186, restated in 13921). An April 2022 disclosure put it at 457 MW (13988) without explaining the gap. By April 2023 it reached 592 MW across eight sites (12753, 12818). That is modest net growth for a year in which the company brought Denton online and added Marble's 35 MW power contract (12770, 12825).

The project-level targets are more telling for their stillness. Denton's 300 MW end state was repeated at least six times (14178, 14187, 13932, 13697) against an initial 22 MW energization. No interim milestone or date for the remaining 278 MW appears anywhere. Muskogee's 500 MW figure was restated nearly verbatim from March 2022 (14179) through at least eight April 2023 entries (12738, 12765, 12805). It never gained a capacity-online date, a phase breakdown or a cost. Several of those later entries are tagged facility_timeline yet carry no date, and the recurring 500 MW reads as a signed port agreement rather than a build schedule.

On dates, the Denton launch (14182, 14192) and the Muskogee agreement (14185) are both flagged as delayed against early-2022 marks. Neither slip was accompanied by a revised schedule. The October 2022 engagement of PJT Partners and Weil (13502, 13503) signals the restructuring that followed. Yet the April 2023 filings kept the Muskogee language unchanged, with no acknowledgement that financial distress might affect the pipeline.

The record contains no independent corroboration. There are no ERCOT interconnection entries for Denton, no utility filings with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for Muskogee, and no permits or site reporting. Every capacity figure is self-reported.

Over the next 90 days, the priority is obtaining the post-2023 claims so that the ten-plus later sites can be scored. Watch whether Muskogee's 500 MW is ever quietly dropped or re-scoped. Check whether Denton's 300 MW target is restated in HPC-hosting terms with a dated energization schedule. Track whether new project announcements arrive with interconnection queue positions that can be checked, rather than bare megawatt totals.

Core Scientific's capacity record in this dataset runs from March 2022 to April 2023, and the input ends mid-claim after 12759. Any read of the delivery trajectory is therefore about three years stale against today's date. The headline operating figure has grown, but not in a straight line. The March 2022 filings put total operating capacity at 497 MW (14173, 14186). An April 2022 claim cites 457 MW (13988). A May 2022 claim returns to 497 MW (13921), and nothing in the record reconciles the 40 MW gap. By April 2023 the company reported 592 MW across eight operational sites (12733, 12753, 12776). That is real growth of roughly 95 MW in a year, consistent with incremental additions such as the 35 MW Marble contract with Murphy Electric Power Board (12741, 12825).

The two flagship build-outs tell a different story. Denton has been described with the same 22 MW initial and 300 MW final framing in every filing from March 2022 through September 2022 (14177, 14178, 14183, 13932, 13697). No interim milestone, phase date, or progress figure appears. Even the launch date is inconsistent, given as early February in some claims (14192, 13931) and late February in another (14182). Muskogee's 500 MW figure is repeated verbatim at least seven times between 14179 and 12820. It never carries a promised date and never advances past development agreement. A number restated unchanged for a year, with no schedule attached, is a placeholder rather than a trajectory. Most of the items tagged delayed are backdated references to completed events such as the Blockcap close (14180, 12798), not genuine slips. The exception is 12826, the mining equipment expected by Q1 2023.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, no site reporting. Meanwhile, the October 2022 engagements of Weil, Gotshal & Manges and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) signal financial restructuring, which bears directly on the ability to fund 800 MW of announced greenfield capacity. Several listed sites, including Cottonwood, Auburn, Grand Forks, and ASDC, have no capacity claims at all.

Over the next 90 days, the Q3 2026 10-Q is the priority. It should show whether Denton and Muskogee are still quoted at 300 MW and 500 MW, re-scoped, or dropped, and whether the 592 MW base has been restated. It is also worth checking ERCOT large-load filings for Denton and SPP queue positions near Muskogee against whatever pace the company now asserts. Finally, the extraction pipeline should be re-run so that post-April 2023 claims populate this record.

Core Scientific's facility record, as supplied, is dominated by portfolio-level figures and repeated restatements rather than project-level progress, and it ends in April 2023. That leaves roughly three years unaccounted for as of this writing. Aggregate operating capacity moved from 497 MW as of January 2022 (14186, 14173) to 592 MW across eight sites by April 2023 (12753, 12818, 12734), a gain of about 95 MW over fifteen months. An April 2022 figure of 457 MW (13988) sits between two 497 MW statements (14173, 13921) and is never reconciled. It may reflect a different measurement basis, but the company does not say so.

At the project level, the announced numbers have been static rather than scaled. Denton has carried a 300 MW completion target since the first filing (14187, 14193) and repeated it unchanged through September 2022 (13932, 13697). Its only dated milestone is a 22 MW initial energization in February 2022 (14182, 13931), and no interim ramp dates were ever attached. Muskogee's 500 MW figure first appeared in 2022 (14185, 14195) and is restated nearly a dozen times in the April 2023 filing (12738, 12755, 12790, 12805). Every one of those April 2023 claims is labeled a facility timeline yet contains no date, so its framing as a development agreement has not advanced toward construction language. Marble enters the record as a 35 MW utility contract (12770, 12825), which is a power entitlement rather than evidence of build-out.

No promised facility date has been visibly revised, mainly because so few dates were ever given. The one explicit slip in the set concerns miner deliveries expected in Q1 2023 (12826). A delayed tag on the Blockcap acquisition (12798) conflicts with statements that it closed in July 2021 (12806) and looks like a tagging artifact, not a real slip. The October 2022 engagement of Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503) signals a restructuring. Against that backdrop, the continued repetition of the Muskogee and Denton targets in 2023 reads as boilerplate carried forward, not reaffirmed intent.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, and no site reporting. The announced pace therefore cannot be verified. Hunt County, Cottonwood, Dalton 3 and Auburn appear as projects with no associated claims in the excerpt.

Over the next 90 days, watch for three things. First, filings after 2023 that either update or quietly drop the Denton 300 MW and Muskogee 500 MW targets. Second, any dated energization milestones, particularly for the Austin and Texas sites. Third, queue or permit records that would confirm whether capacity beyond the 592 MW baseline is physically under way.

Core Scientific's record is thin on dated delivery commitments. Most of it restates the same headline figures across filings rather than documenting progress. Fleet-level capacity was reported at 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 14173) and repeated unchanged in May 2022 (13921). A 457 MW figure dated April 20, 2022 (13988) sits between those two statements. It is either a different measurement basis or an unreconciled discrepancy, and the filings do not explain it. By April 2023 the company reported 592 MW across eight operating sites (12818, 12753, 12734). That is modest net growth of roughly 95 MW over fourteen months, and it spans the period in which the company engaged Weil, Gotshal and PJT Partners (13502, 13503), both restructuring advisors. Site-level ambitions have not been cut on paper, but they have not advanced either. Denton was described at 22 MW initial capacity against a 300 MW build-out (14177, 14178), and the 300 MW target was restated without a completion date through September 2022 (13697). Muskogee's 500 MW agreement with the port authority (14185) reappears almost word for word in 2022 and 2023 filings (13933, 13698, 12820, 12805). Each time it is still framed as a development agreement, with no energization date, phase schedule or capex attached. After more than a year, repetition without milestones is the main signal on that site. The only concrete site addition is Marble's 35 MW power contract with Murphy Electric Power Board (12741, 12825). On dates, few promises were made, so few could visibly slip. Denton's operational start is given as February 1, 2022 in some claims (14192, 13931) and February 28 in another (14182), a small inconsistency that was never addressed. Equipment deliveries expected in Q1 2023 are flagged as delayed (12826). The delayed tag on the Blockcap acquisition (12798) looks like a classification artifact, since completion in July 2021 is stated elsewhere (12806). No permits, interconnection queue entries or on-the-ground reporting are attached to this record. None of the announced pace is independently corroborated. Eight listed projects, including Cottonwood, Auburn, Grand Forks and the Austin site, carry no capacity or timeline claims at all. The supplied record also appears truncated after April 2023. Over the next 90 days, watch whether current filings finally put a date or phased megawatt schedule on Denton's remaining build-out and on Muskogee. Also check ERCOT and SPP queue records for Denton, Cottonwood and Muskogee for load or interconnection entries that match the stated scale. Finally, see whether the missing sites acquire any disclosed capacity at all.

Core Scientific's capacity record shows two different companies. The first is a bitcoin miner whose self-reported operating power rose from 457 MW (13988) to 497 MW (13921) within a month in 2022, then to 592 MW by April 2023 (12733, repeated in 12753, 12764 and 12818). The second is an HPC landlord whose headline figures are contract dollars and hosting options rather than megawatts. Contracted power reached 1,500 MW (12643), but the facility count moved only from eight (12734) to nine (5455) between April 2023 and November 2024. The gap between contracted and operating capacity never narrowed in any figure the company published.

The two flagship development numbers have been restated constantly and never dated. Denton went live at 22 MW (13931) with a 300 MW full-build target (13932, 13923, 13697) that never carried a completion date. Muskogee's 500 MW appears in more than a dozen filings from May 2022 through May 2023 (13933, 13925, 12738, 12644), also undated. By November 2024 it had become an 'Oklahoma HPC facility under development' (5456) with no capacity attached. That is a quiet reframing, not an acknowledged revision. The only dated commitments in the record both slipped: the Bitmain miner deliveries expected in Q1 2023 (12826) and the Bitmain asset purchase targeted for January 30, 2024 (6312). Both sat against the Chapter 11 process signalled by the PJT and Weil engagements (13503, 13502) and the restructuring agreements (6536, 6393).

The post-restructuring story rests on CoreWeave. It began as a $3.5 billion, 12-year hosting agreement (7765), expanded through option exercises (5913), and ended with a final 200 MW option (5351) and $10.2 billion in total contract value (7766). The supporting Denton lease amendments (5371, 5347) are real contractual steps, but they are not evidence of energized capacity. The record contains no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection entries and no site reporting. Every capacity claim is a company statement. Hunt County, Cottonwood and Dalton 3 appear as projects with no capacity figure at all. The record also cuts off at 7767, so any dated Denton HPC delivery promise cannot be tested here.

Over the next 90 days, the Q3 10-Q should show whether CoreWeave billable megawatts at Denton match the 200 MW option cadence. Watch for ERCOT large-load filings tied to Denton or Hunt County, and for any megawatt figure or date being reattached to the Oklahoma site. Also watch whether 7767's Denton timeline is restated or quietly pushed.

Core Scientific's capacity story has changed in kind more than in size. The 2023 disclosures describe a bitcoin miner with roughly 592 MW operating across eight sites (12818, 12733, 12776) and a 1,500 MW contracted pipeline (12643). The headline development was a 500 MW Muskogee campus, repeated many times in one filing (12738, 12755, 12790, 12820) and first stated in 13698. Those repetitions reflect extraction from a single document, not repeated reaffirmation. By November 2024 Muskogee had become an 'Oklahoma HPC facility under development' with no megawatt figure (5456). Denton followed the same arc. It began as a 300 MW target (13697), then shifted to lease amendments for HPC (5371, 5347) and a $104 million expansion (7767), again with no MW restated. The CoreWeave relationship moved the unit of account from megawatts to contract value: $3.5 billion over 12 years (7765), a final 200 MW option (5351), and $10.2 billion in aggregate (7766). That makes it harder to tell whether the physical build is growing or being relabeled. The site count rose only from eight to nine (5455).

The record contains few explicit dates, and that scarcity is itself informative. Muskogee never carried a delivery date. Q1 2023 miner deliveries slipped (12826) during the restructuring period (6536, 6393). The Bitmain asset purchase missed its January 2024 target (6312) and completed later (6176). The Denton expansion is flagged as delayed against a February 2025 marker (7767), and the CoreWeave merger's outside date of April 7, 2026 is also marked delayed (4722). None of these slips is accompanied by a disclosed revised date in the claims provided.

Every claim here is company-stated. The record contains no permits, no ERCOT or SPP large-load interconnection entries, and no site reporting for any project. Hunt County, Cottonwood, and Dalton 3 appear as announced projects with no associated claims at all. On this evidence the announced pace is unverified rather than contradicted.

The input is truncated at claim 4210 (October 2025), and the merger's outcome is not captured. Confirming its disposition is the first priority, because the 2026 outside date has passed. Over the next 90 days, check whether the next 10-Q restores megawatt figures for Muskogee and Denton or keeps reporting in dollars. Also search ERCOT and SPP queues for Denton, Pecos, Hunt County, and Muskogee load requests. Finally, look for any energization or customer-acceptance dates tied to the CoreWeave 200 MW tranche.

Core Scientific's capacity story has shifted in kind more than in size. The April 2023 filings anchor on 592 MW of operating power across eight data centers (12733, 12734) and a 500 MW Muskogee development agreement repeated across nearly a dozen near-identical entries (12738, 12755, 12790, 12820). A month later that became 1,500 MW of total contracted capacity (12643). The facility count then barely moved, rising to nine sites by November 2024 (5455). Growth since then has been expressed in contract dollars rather than megawatts: a $3.5 billion, 12-year CoreWeave hosting deal tied to Austin (7765), a final 200 MW option exercise (5351), and $10.2 billion in aggregate CoreWeave coverage (7766). Muskogee illustrates the drift. It was a 500 MW figure in 2023. By November 2024 it had become an "Oklahoma HPC facility under development" with no restated capacity or date (5456). That silent reframing, from a mining build to an AI build, is the most important unacknowledged revision in the record.

Dated promises are sparse, and most that exist carry a delay flag. The Denton expansion, valued at $104 million, was marked delayed against a February 2025 target (7767). The Bitmain asset purchase slipped past its January 2024 date (6312). The CoreWeave merger was flagged delayed against both the October 30, 2025 vote (4209, 4210) and the April 2026 outside date (4722). Outside the supplied record, Core Scientific shareholders rejected that merger at the October 2025 vote. This matters because much of the HPC conversion narrative (4567) was framed around a combined entity that will not exist. Every project row still reads "announced" with blank capacity and cost, so there is no baseline for measuring slippage on individual sites.

The record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no SPP or ERCOT interconnection queue positions, and no on-site reporting. The announced pace is therefore unverified rather than contradicted. The supplied claims also end mid-entry at 4185, so later disclosures may be missing.

Over the next 90 days, the Q3 2026 10-Q due in early November is the key document. It should show whether Muskogee retains a megawatt figure or a date, whether Denton has energized its CoreWeave halls, and how the standalone company restates contracted HPC megawatts. In parallel, SPP queue filings in Muskogee County and ERCOT large-load entries around Denton would be the first external check on whether these conversions are physically advancing.

Core Scientific's capacity story has shifted from megawatts to contracts. The April 2023 filing set a clear baseline: 592 MW of operating power across eight data centers (12733, 12753, 12776) and a 500 MW development at the Port of Muskogee (12738, 12820). That figure appears in more than half a dozen extracted claims from the same date, so the repetition reflects one disclosure rather than repeated reaffirmation. A month later the company cited 1,500 MW of contracted power across all sites (12643). After that, specific numbers largely disappear. The facility count ticked up only from eight to nine by November 2024 (5455). By the same filing, Muskogee had become an Oklahoma HPC facility under development with no megawatt figure attached (5456). The 2025 facility disclosures (4566, 4184, 4185) describe locations and AI conversion work but give no capacity totals. The growth has been in dollars instead. The CoreWeave relationship went from a $3.5 billion, 12-year hosting agreement (7765) through a final 200 MW option exercise (5351) to $10.2 billion in total coverage (7766). That is a real expansion of committed revenue, but it cannot be reconciled against the 2023 megawatt baseline from this record.

On timing, the record is thin but not reassuring. The Denton expansion, valued at $104 million, carries a February 2025 target now marked delayed (7767), and no revised date appears. The Bitmain asset purchase slipped past its January 2024 date (6312) before being described as settled in later filings. The CoreWeave merger, with an April 2026 outside date (4722), ended when shareholders voted it down in October 2025 (4175, 4170, 4165). Muskogee never had a committed delivery date, which makes its quiet loss of a capacity figure harder to call a slip, but it is a meaningful change in emphasis. Six of the eleven listed projects, including Hunt County, Cottonwood and Dalton 3, have no capacity or timeline claims at all.

This record contains no independent corroboration: no permits, no ERCOT or SPP interconnection queue entries, and no site reporting. The announced pace is therefore unverified rather than contradicted.

Over the next 90 days, the third-quarter filing is the key test. Watch whether it restates operating megawatts, gives Muskogee a size and energization date, and reports when Denton's HPC capacity comes online. Watch too whether the CoreWeave hosting contracts survived the failed merger on unchanged terms, and whether the Block ASIC agreement (3483) signals a renewed tilt back toward self-mining capacity.

Core Scientific's capacity story has been relabeled more than it has grown. In May 2023 the company described 1,500 MW of contracted power across its sites (12643), with Muskogee alone allocated 500 MW (12644). By March 2026 the headline had become a 920 MW total portfolio (3441, 3470), with Muskogee at 100 MW (3478). The 1,500 MW figure survives only as a development pipeline (11705, 11709). The current disclosures also describe a steep funnel: 805 MW announced leasable (11708), 350 MW energized (11712), and 185 MW actively billing (11711). The site-level figures from the same filing add up to well over 920 MW (3471 through 3480), so the per-site numbers appear to measure gross utility power rather than leasable IT load. Readers should treat the portfolio total and the site figures as different units until the company reconciles them. Hunt County has the same problem: it appears as 285 MW of leasable capacity (11713) and as a 430 MW expansion (11702).

The dated record is thin, and that is the main finding on timelines. The two dated operational commitments both slipped: the Bitmain asset purchase (6312) and the $104 million Denton expansion (7767). The company has since attached almost no dates to facility conversions (4567, 4185, 3433, 3543). The one exception is a Hunt County energization and ramp window that runs to the end of 2029 (11715), which is too distant to test. The CoreWeave merger's outside date of April 2026 (4722) never came into play because shareholders rejected the deal in October 2025 (4175, 4165). The commercial core is therefore still the standalone CoreWeave hosting relationship, now 590 MW of committed capacity (3444, 11704). The CoreWeave capex funding figure (11706) is recorded without a usable unit.

No independent corroboration is on file. The record has no permits, no ERCOT or other interconnection queue filings, and no site reporting for Hunt County, Pecos, or the 700 MW under targeted load studies (11710). The Denton lease amendments (5371, 5347) are the closest thing to a third-party document. The pace of delivery therefore rests entirely on company statements.

Over the next 90 days, the third-quarter filing is the checkpoint. Watch whether billable capacity closes the gap with the 350 MW already energized, and whether any of the 700 MW in load studies becomes a signed interconnection agreement. Watch for Hunt County deed, zoning, or large-load queue records to back the 265-unit land acquisition (11714). Also watch for a second anchor tenant beyond CoreWeave, and for a reconciliation of the 920 MW total with the site-level figures.

Core Scientific's capacity and partnership trajectory reveals significant volatility between announcement and execution. The company claims a 920 MW portfolio as of March 2026 (claim 3465), but this masks a fundamental reshaping after the CoreWeave merger collapsed in late October 2025. From June 2024 through February 2025, management anchored investor narrative to a $10.2 billion CoreWeave partnership covering 590 MW of colocation capacity (claim 7766, 3451). That arrangement—initially structured around a $3.5 billion twelve-year Austin agreement (claim 7765)—was to be executed via merger closing (claim 4722, promised 2026-04-07). The merger announcement chain (claims 4730 through 4182, spanning July to October 2025) culminated in failed shareholder votes and termination (claims 4175, 4170, 4165). Yet management's March 2026 portfolio statement does not explicitly acknowledge the CoreWeave dissolution; instead, it parcels capacity into facility-by-facility claims totaling 920 MW across ten locations.

Date performance deteriorated materially. The Denton expansion, promised for February 2025 completion (claim 7767, marked delayed), reappears in the March portfolio claiming 394 MW without status clarification. The company announced Bitmain asset acquisitions repeatedly between January 2024 and February 2025 (claims 6312, 6176, 5597, 5034, 5145) but supplied no updates post-merger-failure on whether these supply relationships pivoted to GPU-intensive workloads or remained dormant. Operational capacity lags announced positions sharply: only 185 MW is actively billable and 350 MW energized (claims 11711, 11712), against a claimed portfolio of 920 MW. The gap suggests either substantial uncommissioned capacity, customer deployment delays, or structural overstatement.

Hunt County, the largest undeveloped site, anchors forward guidance with 430 MW promised (claim 11702, claim 11715 dating energization through 2029), yet only 265 land units have been acquired (claim 11714). Independent verification—interconnection queue positions, construction permits, equipment procurement timelines—is absent from the record. The company's willingness to reframe the CoreWeave relationship without explicit acknowledgment of the merger failure, combined with the eighteen-month lag between portfolio announcement and March 2026 status, suggests capacity guidance should be treated as aspirational pending third-party confirmation of interconnection, permitting, and customer procurement milestones. Watch for Hunt County queue position advancement and billable MW growth rate over the next ninety days.

Core Scientific's announced infrastructure trajectory reveals significant ambition paired with substantial execution challenges. The company claims a current portfolio of 920 megawatts across ten operating facilities, stated in March 2026 (claims 3470, 3441), with individual facility allocations ranging from 20 MW at Austin to 394 MW at Denton. However, only 180 MW was reported as online and billing as of late March 2026 (claim 2150), indicating a substantial gap between announced and operational capacity.

Capacity scaling presents a mixed picture. In November 2024, Core Scientific claimed nine operational data centers (claim 5455). By March 2026, this expanded to ten facilities with specified megawatt allocations across Texas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, North Dakota, Alabama, and Kentucky. The company simultaneously announced a 1,500 MW colocation platform capacity pipeline, including Hunt County expansion at 430 MW and Dalton-Pecos expansion at 300 MW (claims 11702, 11703). These figures suggest rapid portfolio expansion, though operational reality trails announcement substantially.

Timeline slippage is evident. The Denton facility expansion lease amendments were promised by February 1, 2025, but marked delayed (claim 7767). More significantly, the CoreWeave partnership—initially a 12-year, $3.5 billion power hosting agreement announced June 2024 (claim 7765)—culminated in a merger announcement in July 2025 with an April 2026 closing deadline. This merger was terminated in late October 2025 after shareholder vote failure (claims 4170, 4175, 4165), representing a major strategic reversal with no public acknowledgment of subsequent operational implications or contingency plans.

The CoreWeave commitment represented substantial capacity leverage. The company reported 590 MW of cumulative CoreWeave capacity by March 2026 (claim 3469), with commitments documented across multiple option exercises and agreements. Post-merger termination, the status of these service agreements and whether capacity commitments remain enforceable requires clarification from the company.

Independent verification remains limited within available claims. The extensive leasing footprint across multiple states provides geographic diversification, though no permits, utility interconnection queue entries, or construction progress reports appear documented. The shift from repeated Bitmain asset acquisitions (claims 6312, 5597, 5145) to AI and colocation services suggests operational pivot rather than expansion of mining infrastructure.

Monitor Hunt County and Dalton-Pecos expansion announcements over the next ninety days for concrete timeline commitments and disclosed funding sources. Watch whether operational MW reaches 400-500 by Q4 2026, narrowing the current gap to announced capacity. Track any new partnership announcements and whether CoreWeave capacity commitments transition to alternative providers or dissolve.

Core Scientific's capacity claims have undergone significant restatement. In November 2024, the company claimed nine operational data centers (5455). By March 2026, this crystallized into a 920 MW portfolio across ten named facilities (3470), with facility-specific capacities ranging from Austin's 20 MW (3479) to Denton's 394 MW (3476). This represents a material expansion rather than a clarification of prior disclosures.

Timeline commitments have slipped materially. The Denton expansion, promised for February 2025, was delayed (7767). The CoreWeave acquisition, announced July 2025 with April 2026 closure (4722), collapsed in October 2025 following failed shareholder vote and agreement termination (4175, 4170, 4165). Yet CoreWeave partnership capacity commitments persisted post-failure, with March 2026 filings reaffirming 590 MW under active lease (3469, 3451).

The gap between announced and operational capacity is substantial. As of March 2026 proxy filing date, 350 MW had been energized and only 180 MW were online and billing customers (2149, 2150). Against the announced 920 MW portfolio, this represents a 570 MW shortfall. The company's own breakdowns show Denton (394 MW), Pecos (300 MW), and Marble (117 MW combined) comprising 811 MW yet appearing substantially incomplete based on operational metrics.

Independent verification is difficult from available claims data. No permits, NERC queue positions, or local utility interconnection approvals are referenced. The April 2026 announcement of Pecos expansion to 1.5 GW (10997) appears aspirational given current energization rates.

Core Scientific targets substantial completion by June 30, 2027 (9684). The pathway from 180 MW online to 920 MW requires tenfold acceleration in capacity deployment. Watch for quarterly updates on Denton phase completions, Pecos construction authorization timing, and whether energized capacity translates to billing capacity within 90 days. The Block ASIC procurement agreement (3448) also merits monitoring for supply chain stability during facility ramp.

Core Scientific's capacity announcements reveal a significant gap between stated and operational infrastructure. Through mid-2024, the company offered only generic descriptions of operating data centers without capacity metrics (claims 6177, 6201). By March 2026, claims 3441 and 3453 specified 920 megawatts of total portfolio capacity across nine facilities. Yet the March 30, 2026 proxy statement (claims 2149, 2150) disclosed only 350 megawatts energized and 180 megawatts online and billing—just 19.5 percent of the announced portfolio actually serving customers. A subsequent Pecos expansion announcement (claim 10997, April 2026) pushed total planned capacity to 1.5 gigawatts, further widening the gap between ambition and present-day reality. Internal inconsistencies also cloud the picture: detailed March 2026 facility-level breakdowns (claims 3472–3480) total approximately 1.34 gigawatts when summed, contradicting the stated 920-megawatt portfolio figure in the same month. Timeline commitments have systematically slipped. The Denton Texas expansion promised by February 2025 (claim 7767) remains incomplete as of September 2026, nearly twenty months behind schedule. Muskogee's substantial completion deadline of June 30, 2026 (claim 9691) has passed without announced completion. The CoreWeave partnership tells a volatile story: announced in June 2024 with a $3.5 billion twelve-year hosting agreement (claim 7765), expanded repeatedly through October 2025, then terminated in late October 2025 when the proposed all-stock CoreWeave acquisition collapsed (claims 4165, 4170). A restructured CoreWeave partnership re-emerged by March 2026 (claims 3436, 3442, 3469), suggesting renegotiated terms but raising questions about sustained commitment. Independent confirmation of the delivery pace remains limited in public disclosures; no recent construction permits, interconnection queue entries, or third-party validations appear in the provided record. Watch for: completion announcements for Muskogee within the next 60 days; clarification of why facility-level capacity claims exceed portfolio totals; evidence of sustained CoreWeave workload deployment; and reconciliation of the 180-megawatt billing figure against the 920-megawatt portfolio claim. Any announcement of further capacity expansion without corresponding customer deployment metrics would signal continued strategy-over-execution dynamics.

Core Scientific's facility capacity claims have undergone significant revision between 2024 and 2026, revealing a widening gap between announced ambitions and operational reality. In late 2024, the company cited nine operational data centers without specifying total capacity (claim 5455), while negotiating with CoreWeave for what would eventually total 590 megawatts of leased capacity through various option exercises (claims 5351, 3444, 3451, 3469). By March 2026, after the failed CoreWeave acquisition (claims 4170, 4165), Core Scientific announced a portfolio spanning ten facilities totaling 920 megawatts (claims 3441, 3453, 3465, 3470), with individual facility allocations detailed across Pecos (300 MW), Denton (394 MW), Dalton (195 MW), and others. However, the March proxy statement filed weeks later revealed only 180 megawatts online and billing, with 350 megawatts energized but not yet revenue-generating (claims 2150, 2149). This represents a dramatic contraction from the 920 megawatt claim announced on the same date.

Timeline discipline has similarly eroded. The Denton expansion, promised by February 2025 (claim 7767), appears incomplete as of September 2026. The CoreWeave merger closing, initially targeted for April 2026 (claim 4722), slipped repeatedly before terminating in late October 2025 (claims 4170, 4165). Since the merger's collapse, Core Scientific has pivoted toward Block, Inc. ASIC procurement (claims 3464, 3448, 3452) and facility conversion narratives (claim 4567), but no clear operational milestones have emerged.

Independent verification is sparse. The March proxy filing provides the most credible data point: 180 megawatts actually generating revenue and 350 megawatts energized as of March 30, 2026. The arithmetic in announced facility capacities also warrants scrutiny; individual facility claims sum to approximately 1,400 megawatts, yet the portfolio total was stated at 920 megawatts. Shell development area claims (1 million square feet per claim 2146) suggest unfinished capacity rather than operational readiness.

Over the next 90 days, monitor whether the 350 megawatts of energized capacity transitions to revenue-generating status, any announcements regarding new partnerships after CoreWeave's exit, and quarterly energy utilization reports that would confirm facility conversion progress toward AI and colocation services. The Dalton utilities expansion commitment (claim 9695) signals continued investment in at least one location.

Core Scientific's facility trajectory reveals a pattern of announcement expansion decoupled from operational reality. Through early 2024, the company made vague claims about operational facilities (claims 6201, 6177) without specific capacity figures. By March 2026, this shifted dramatically: the company announced a 920-megawatt portfolio across nine facilities (claims 3470, 3453), with Denton alone representing 394 MW (claim 3476) and Pecos at 300 MW (claim 3477). Yet a proxy statement dated March 30, 2026 discloses only 350 MW energized and 180 MW online and billing (claims 2149, 2150)—a 62-percent gap from announced capacity within four weeks of those announcements.

The timeline shows two critical operational fractures. First, a Denton expansion promised for February 2025 was delayed (claim 7767), establishing a pattern with the company's largest facility. Second, the CoreWeave acquisition announced in July 2025 (claim 4720) collapsed with a failed shareholder vote in October (claim 4175), terminating what the company had positioned as its primary AI workload pathway—a 200-megawatt colocation contract (claim 3468). Yet within five months of merger termination, Core Scientific announced full facility details including the same 590-megawatt CoreWeave partnership (claims 3451, 3469), suggesting replacement agreements were negotiated or existing arrangements survived restructuring.

The gap between announced and operational capacity points to construction timelines extending beyond initial guidance or capacity being held in reserve rather than actively deployed. The company claimed only 180 MW online and billing as of late March 2026, more than six months after announcing the full slate. A proxy statement filed March 30 also identifies only 350 MW energized (claim 2149), which sits 30 MW above billing capacity, suggesting excess infrastructure remains uncommitted.

Watch for (a) Denton's progress on its 394-megawatt expansion, which carries a history of delays; (b) whether the 590-megawatt CoreWeave pipeline deploys within contractual timelines over the next 90 days; (c) Block ASIC agreements and their role in offsetting the CoreWeave volume loss from the failed merger; (d) whether the four additional HDC datacenters referenced April 20 (claim 9678) represent new capacity or remain in planning stages. The next earnings release should clarify energized versus announced capacity and provide binding deployment timelines.

Core Scientific's facility trajectory reveals a sharp disconnect between portfolio ambitions and operational delivery. Through mid-2024, the company spoke vaguely of multiple operational data centers (claims 6177, 6201). By March 2026, it had scaled narrative capacity to 920 MW across ten facilities (claim 3441), with individual locations ranging from 20 MW to 394 MW (claims 3479, 3476, et al.). Yet the same disclosure dated the actual energized capacity at only 350 MW, with just 180 MW online and billing (claims 2149, 2150). This roughly 2.6x gap between claimed portfolio and operational reality, persistent across one filing cycle, signals either aggressive capitalization of pre-operational assets or material slippage in ramp.

Timeline discipline has eroded. A Denton expansion lease amendment promised by February 1, 2025 landed marked delayed (claim 7767). More consequentially, the CoreWeave partnership—initially structured as a 12-year hosting agreement worth $3.5 billion (claim 7765)—escalated to a full acquisition proposal by July 2025 (claims 4720, 4730), with closing promised for April 7, 2026 (claim 4722). That merger failed entirely by October 2025, terminated without stated renegotiation of the underlying capacity commitments (claims 4175, 4170, 4165). CoreWeave partnerships persist as colocation contracts totaling 590 MW of committed capacity (claims 3444, 3451), but the strategic anchor has broken. The company simultaneously relied on Block ASIC procurement agreements to underwrite capital efficiency (claims 3464, 3448), yet offers no recent disclosure of Block deal status or ASICs deployed.

Independent evidence is sparse. Permit records and interconnection queues for Marble (Duke and Murphy Electric contracts noted in claims 3473, 3472) would clarify whether its promised June 30 substantial completion (claim 9690) materialized—that date has now passed without claimed confirmation. The individual facility capacity figures, when summed, exceed the stated 920 MW portfolio total, suggesting either double-counting or significant unannounced retirements.

Watch whether Q3 2026 disclosures reconcile energized MW against portfolio claims, confirm Marble's status, and reveal Block's procurement impact. The merger failure creates a 90-day window to assess whether CoreWeave capex commitments hold or whether Core Scientific reverts to lower-margin mining operations.

Core Scientific's capacity announcements show a dramatic materialization after years of vague commitments. As of March 2026, the company claimed a 920 MW portfolio across ten facilities (claims 3489, 3441, 3465), with specific allocations: Denton 394 MW, Cottonwood 300 MW, Dalton 195 MW, Calvert City 150 MW, Muskogee and Grand Forks at 100 MW each, Marble 117 MW, Auburn 50 MW, and Austin 20 MW. This represents a shift from November 2024's vague assertion of nine operating data centers (claim 5455) to granular, facility-specific capacity figures. However, energized capacity as of March 30 stood at only 350 MW—a 38 percent utilization rate against the claimed total—with an additional 180 MW online and billing (claim 2150). The company remains in active development, with 1 million square feet of shell space under build-out (claim 2146).

Promised timelines have slipped materially. The Denton expansion lease amendments, promised by February 1, 2025 (claim 7767), suffered delays. More significantly, the CoreWeave merger closing date of April 7, 2026 (claim 4722) proved untenable; the merger terminated in late October 2025 (claims 4170, 4165, 4175), yet CoreWeave partnership arrangements appear to have survived intact. As of March 2026, Core Scientific cited 590 MW of committed CoreWeave capacity (claims 3444, 3451, 3469), including a 200 MW primary contract and 16 MW at Austin (claims 3450, 3449, 3468). A subsequent 70 MW expansion was announced March 30, 2026 (claim 2142).

The failed CoreWeave acquisition forced a strategic pivot. By March 2026, the company announced an alternative path via Block Inc. ASIC procurement (claims 3483, 3448, 3452), suggesting a return to profitable digital asset mining after the AI infrastructure partnership collapsed. Independent evidence remains sparse; no interconnection queue entries or permit filings have surfaced to validate the energization trajectory from 350 MW to 920 MW. The ambitious Pecos campus target of 1.0 to 1.5 GW (claim 2053, dated April 26) conflicts with historical execution and points to speculative future capacity rather than committed near-term expansion. Monitor: energized capacity reporting in Q3 and Q4 2026 filings, Block ASIC procurement closures, and any further CoreWeave contract modifications post-merger failure.

Core Scientific's facility capacity announcements reveal a striking disconnect between portfolio totals and operational reality. The company claimed a 920-megawatt aggregate portfolio across ten facilities as of March 2026 (claims 3441, 3453, 3465, 3470), but the sum of individual facility capacities stated in the same period exceeds this figure substantially. Denton alone claims 394 MW, Pecos 300 MW, Marble 117 MW combined, Dalton 195 MW, and others totaling well over 1,400 MW. This mathematical inconsistency suggests the 920 MW figure conflates operational, energized, and planned capacity without clear delineation. More critically, actual billing-ready capacity stood at only 180 MW as of March 30, 2026 (claim 2150), with energized capacity at 350 MW (claim 2149)—representing less than 40 percent of claimed portfolio totals. This gap has widened since the company's November 2024 statement of nine operational data centers without stated capacity (claim 5455).

Timeline performance shows erosion. The Denton expansion was promised for February 2025 but marked delayed (claim 7767). More consequential: the CoreWeave merger announced July 2025 with a promised close by April 2026 (claim 4722) terminated in October 2025 after shareholder rejection (claims 4175, 4170, 4165), eliminating the company's largest contractual revenue base. The 590 MW committed to CoreWeave (claims 3444, 3451) is now at risk without that anchor tenant.

What to watch: Pecos capacity scaling toward its stated 1.0-gigawatt leasable target (claim 2053)—this facility alone is supposed to exceed the entire current portfolio. Monitor whether Denton's 394-MW capacity claim materializes and at what timeline. Track new colocation partnerships replacing CoreWeave, particularly for Marble and Auburn facilities that lack clear tenant commitments. Finally, reconcile the portfolio math: clarify which 920 MW represents operational, energized, or planned capacity, and whether recent facility announcements contain aspirational or binding commitments.

Core Scientific's capacity narrative underwent substantial revision following the CoreWeave merger collapse in late October 2025. Throughout mid-2025, the company's infrastructure story revolved entirely around CoreWeave's proposed acquisition, which carried an April 2026 closing target (claim 4722). Under the proposed transaction, CoreWeave would exercise hosting options totaling 590 MW across multiple Core Scientific facilities (claims 3444, 3451, 3469). When the merger terminated in October without completed shareholder approval (claims 4170, 4165, 4175), no revised capacity or timeline appeared for several months.

In March 2026, Core Scientific announced independent facility ownership with substantially elevated capacity targets. The company stated total portfolio capacity of 920 MW (claims 3441, 3453, 3465, 3470) across ten operating locations. However, aggregating individual facility claims—Denton 394 MW, Cottonwood 300 MW, Calvert City 150 MW, Dalton 195 MW, and six additional sites—yields 1,426 MW, a 50 percent discrepancy that remains unreconciled (claims 3472–3480, 3476–3478).

The March 30 disclosure distinguishes between energized capacity (350 MW, claim 2149) and online and billing capacity (180 MW, claim 2150), suggesting staged operational deployment, yet no timeline clarifies when remaining claimed capacity becomes active. Denton, promised for February 2025 (claim 7767), shows no documented completion. Cottonwood now carries a 1.5 GW gross power target and 1.0 GW leasable capacity target (claims 2052, 2053), ten times the March capacity claim, with no incremental timeline provided.

Independent sources—grid interconnection queue filings, utility power agreements, permit records—have not been published in support of these claims. Watch for reconciliation of facility-level math against portfolio totals, publication of grid interconnection or utility documentation for Pecos scaling, evidence of energized capacity reaching the 350 MW figure, and whether any new partnership or funding arrangements emerge.

Core Scientific's infrastructure claims show material discrepancies between announced and operational capacity, with the failed CoreWeave acquisition marking a critical inflection point. In March 2026, the company stated a total portfolio of 920 MW (claims 3441, 3453, 3465, 3470), yet itemized facility capacity for the same date totals 1,426 MW across ten locations: Auburn 50 MW (3480), Austin 20 MW (3479), Muskogee 100 MW (3478), Cottonwood 300 MW (3477), Denton 394 MW (3476), Grand Forks 100 MW (3475), Dalton 195 MW (3474), Marble 117 MW combined (3472-3473), and Calvert City 150 MW (3471). This 55% arithmetic divergence remains unexplained—suggesting either aggressive aggregation methodology or significant capacity write-downs not formally announced. Operational reality further diverges: the March 30, 2026 proxy statement disclosed only 350 MW energized and 180 MW online-and-billing (claims 2149-2150), representing 38 percent of the claimed portfolio. CoreWeave partnerships structured growth expectations from June 2024 onward, escalating from $3.5 billion announced (claim 7765) to $10.2 billion by February 2025 (claim 7766), with stated cumulative capacity of 590 MW (claims 3450, 3451, 3469). The merger agreement reached in July 2025 (claim 4720) failed the October 30 close target (claims 4210, 4209 both delayed), with formal termination in late October 2025 (claims 4165, 4170, 4175). Other commitments slipped without revision: Denton's February 2025 expansion target registered delayed (claim 7767), and Bitmain acquisition claims recycled across multiple quarters (2024-02 through 2025-02) without completion disclosure. The April 2026 announcement of a 1.5 GW gross capacity target for Pecos (claim 2052) lacks operational scaffolding—no interconnection queue entries disclosed, no customer commitments detailed, no timeline provided. The gap between 920 MW announced and 350 MW energized suggests either execution friction or deferred-capacity accounting. Watch for Q4 2026: whether actual energized capacity trends toward 920 MW or stabilizes below 500 MW, whether Pecos construction permits emerge or interconnection requests file, and whether new hosting partnerships replace CoreWeave or signal infrastructure monetization strategy shift.

Core Scientific has demonstrated significant volatility in both capacity claims and execution timelines. Through mid-2024, the company asserted operational status across multiple states without quantifying megawatt capacity (claims 6177, 6201). By November 2024, it claimed nine operational data centers but still avoided stating specific capacity (claim 5455). The March 2026 quarterly statement then abruptly announced a 920-megawatt portfolio across ten facilities (claims 3470, 3465, 3453), with individual sites ranging from 20MW to 394MW (claims 3472-3480). However, concurrent disclosures reveal a significant capacity gap: only 350 megawatts were energized and 180 megawatts online and billing as of March 30, 2026 (claims 2149, 2150). This represents a concerning divergence between announced and operational capacity.

April 2026 filings further complicated the narrative when Core Scientific disclosed that its Pecos campus alone was targeting 1.0 to 1.5 gigawatts (claims 2053, 2052), a figure that alone exceeds the previously stated total portfolio. This suggests either substantial underestimation in earlier guidance or unannounced facility expansions.

On timelines, a February 2025 commitment to complete Denton expansions by the promised date deteriorated into delay (claim 7767). The CoreWeave partnership—announced in June 2024 as a twelve-year, $3.5-billion agreement (claim 7765)—evolved through multiple expansion commitments before a merger was proposed in July 2025 with an April 2026 closing deadline (claims 4722, 4730). That deal terminated abruptly in October 2025 without clear explanation (claims 4170, 4165, 4175). Core Scientific later announced a Block Inc. ASIC supply agreement (claim 3464) but provided no binding timelines.

Independent verification data is absent from disclosed claims. The company cites infrastructure work but does not reference specific interconnection queue positions, grid study milestones, or third-party validation of energization schedules.

Over the next ninety days, watch whether Pecos campus development demonstrates material progress toward its 1.0-to-1.5-gigawatt targets, whether the energized-to-announced capacity gap narrows, and whether new partnership announcements include specific megawatt commitments and binding delivery dates rather than conditional targets.

Core Scientific's datacenter trajectory shows significant distance between announced ambitions and operational reality. In March 2026, CORZ announced a portfolio of nine facilities totaling 920 megawatts of capacity (3441, 3453, 3470), with specific facility announcements ranging from 20 MW at Austin to 394 MW at Dallas-Denton (3479, 3476). The individual facility capacities sum to approximately 1,426 megawatts, creating immediate inconsistency in the portfolio narrative.

Reality on the ground diverged sharply within weeks. By late March 2026, the company reported only 350 MW energized across its portfolio and 180 MW online and billing (2149, 2150), representing roughly 19-20 percent of announced capacity. The gap between headline portfolio capacity and energized power is stark enough to warrant scrutiny from independent sources, yet no permits, FERC interconnection filings, or utility queue entries appear to validate the March 2026 buildout timeline across announced facilities.

The CoreWeave partnership reflects broader execution volatility. A 12-year, $3.5 billion hosting agreement launched in June 2024 (7765), later expanding to 590 megawatts committed through option exercises (3444, 3469). By July 2025, CORZ announced CoreWeave acquisition with an April 7, 2026 closing deadline (4730, 4722). The merger collapsed in an October 2025 shareholder vote (4175), with termination confirmed October 29-30 (4165). Yet by March 1, 2026—four months post-failure—CORZ announced the partnership reinstated, with CoreWeave again as primary infrastructure customer (3436, 3486). No explanation addressed the reversal or clarified which capacity commitments survived.

Facility timelines have similarly slipped. February 2025 promised a $104 million Denton expansion (7767). August and October 2025 announcements pledged conversion from mining to AI-workload support (4567, 4185). By March 2026, facilities remained in development or conversion status (3437, 3543) without completion dates specified.

In the next 90 days, monitor actual energization progress beyond the 350 MW baseline. If Denton proceeds on announced specs, expect the portfolio to grow by 394 MW by year-end. Updated quarterly filings should clarify which CoreWeave commitments remain binding post-merger collapse and whether new AI-workload revenue materialized since March announcements.

Core Scientific's announced capacity trajectory shows dramatic expansion over eighteen months, though actual energization lags considerably behind stated portfolio targets. Through late 2024, the company claimed operational facilities without quantified capacity (claims 6201, 6177). Beginning June 2024, the CoreWeave partnership ($3.5B, claim 7765) became the inflection point. By March 2026, CORZ claimed a total portfolio of 920 MW across ten facilities (claims 3441, 3465), with individual site designations ranging from Auburn's 50 MW to Pecos's 300 MW (claims 3480, 3477). However, the March 30, 2026 proxy statement revealed only 350 MW energized and just 180 MW online and billing (claims 2149, 2150)—a 71 percent gap between announced and operational capacity. The Denton facility expansion, promised for February 2025 at $104 million (claim 7767), was marked delayed and still listed as under development by March 2026 (claim 2145). Repeated announcements of the Bitmain asset purchase across six months (claims 6371, 6312, 6176, 5597, 5145, 5034) suggest negotiation complexity rather than completed deals. The CoreWeave merger, initially slated to close by April 7, 2026 (claim 4722), failed in October 2025 (claims 4170, 4175, 4165), yet partnership capacity commitments persisted in subsequent filings. By late April 2026, CORZ was targeting 1.0 to 1.5 GW at Pecos alone (claim 2052, 2053)—suggesting either aggressive timelines or portfolio recalibration. The pattern reveals promised capacity outpacing delivery by roughly three-to-one; acknowledged delays on signature projects like Denton; and sustained announcements despite a major merger dissolution. Over the next 90 days, monitor whether the 180 MW online figure advances materially toward the 920 MW portfolio claim, whether Pecos achieves meaningful progress toward gigawatt targets, and whether new facility announcements accompany or replace prior commitments without explanation.

Core Scientific's announced capacity has undergone dramatic scaling, from non-specific claims to a detailed 920 MW portfolio contradicted by operational reality. Early 2024 filings mentioned vague operational data centers without quantification (6201, 6177). By November 2024, nine locations were identified with CoreWeave securing 200 MW (5455, 5351). March 2026 announcements provided granular facility breakdowns totaling 920 MW: Denton at 394 MW, Cottonwood at 300 MW, Calvert City at 150 MW, Dalton at 195 MW, plus Auburn, Muskogee, Grand Forks, Marble, and Austin (3441, 3453, 3470). Most recently, April 2026 suggested Pecos alone could reach 1.5 GW—a five-fold jump from its previously stated 300 MW—without explicit acknowledgment of this scope change (3477, 2052).

Promised dates have slipped repeatedly. Denton's HPC expansion lease amendments, promised by February 2025, were marked delayed (7767). The CoreWeave merger announced July 2025 with an April 2026 close date (4722) was revised to October 30, 2025 (4210, 4209), then terminated following shareholder rejection in late October (4175, 4170, 4165). The company has not publicly explained these timeline shifts or what conditions changed between announcements.

Independent validation is absent from this record. No permit filings, utility interconnection queue entries, or on-the-ground construction reporting substantiate the announced development pace. The March 30, 2026 proxy statement disclosed only 350 MW energized and 180 MW actually online and billing (2149, 2150)—approximately 20% of the claimed portfolio. This discrepancy between announced and operational capacity remains unexplained.

Over the next 90 days, track whether energization rates accelerate toward the 920 MW target, whether the Pecos escalation to 1.5 GW reflects genuine development or represents reclassified scope, whether CoreWeave partnerships stabilize post-merger termination, and which facilities are genuinely near operational versus remaining as shells. The gap between claim and operational reality, combined with missed milestones and unexplained capacity redefinitions, suggests material execution challenges that near-term disclosure and development pace can clarify.

Core Scientific's pivot from mining to HPC infrastructure accelerated sharply in mid-2024 with the CoreWeave partnership announcement (claim 7765), promising a $3.5 billion twelve-year arrangement. By February 2025, total CoreWeave partnership value had inflated to $10.2 billion through option exercises (claim 7766), while Core Scientific simultaneously claimed a diversified 920 MW portfolio across ten facilities by March 2026 (claims 3441, 3453). Individual facility allocations—Pecos at 300 MW, Denton at 394 MW, and others distributed across the South and Midwest—appeared credible on paper. The trajectory fractured when CoreWeave proposed a full acquisition in July 2025 with April 2026 closing (claim 4722). That deal collapsed in late October 2025 after a failed shareholder vote (claims 4170, 4175), leaving Core Scientific orphaned from its primary growth vehicle just as it was supposed to be acquired. By the March 30, 2026 proxy statement date, only 180 MW was actually online and billing despite the 920 MW claim—a 77 percent shortfall (claim 2150). Simultaneously, the Pecos facility targets underwent dramatic revision upward, from 300 MW (stated March 2026) to 1.5 GW gross capacity by April 2026 (claim 2052), a five-fold increase in the same facility within weeks. This pattern—bold announced capacity, actual energization lagging far behind, then rapid upward revisions after deal failure—suggests targets are being reset rather than achieved. The Denton expansion lease amendments (claim 7767) promised February 2025 delivery arrived with no timestamp for actual completion. No permits or interconnection queue positions are referenced in the record. Watch whether Core Scientific can operationalize the gap between claimed and billed capacity at its existing sites, stabilize the CoreWeave relationship post-merger failure, and whether the Pecos gigawatt targets prove material or represent wish-list engineering.

Core Scientific's capacity narrative has undergone substantial revision cycles, with announced portfolio totals climbing sharply while operational deployment lags announced figures by months to quarters. The company entered 2024 with unnamed facilities and no quantified capacity, then pivoted to the CoreWeave partnership framework by mid-2024. The partnership scaled from an initial 12-year hosting agreement valued at $3.5B (claim 7765, June 2024) to a claimed $10.2B total commitment (claim 7766, February 2025) and 590 MW cumulative capacity through option exercises (claims 3444, 3451, March 2026). This represented genuine expansion, not restatement. The corresponding facility portfolio claims jumped to 920 MW across ten facilities by March 2026 (claims 3441, 3465), with Denton at 394 MW (claim 3476) and Pecos at 300 MW (claim 3477) leading. However, March 30, 2026 proxy filings revealed only 350 MW energized and 180 MW online and actively billing (claims 2149, 2150)—creating a 620 MW gap between announced and energized capacity and suggesting 18-24 month delays between portfolio claims and commercial operation. Timeline discipline fractured when the CoreWeave acquisition, initially scheduled to close April 7, 2026 (claim 4722), failed shareholder vote on October 29, 2025 and terminated October 30 (claims 4175, 4165), yet partnership agreements persisted without merger (claim 3436, March 2026). The most recent forward commitment involves Pecos, targeting 1.0 GW leasable capacity and 1.5 GW gross power (claims 2053, 2052, April 2026), representing substantial growth beyond the 300 MW earlier stated for that campus. The trajectory suggests Core Scientific communicates ceiling scenarios (1.5 GW Pecos gross) as portfolio totals without consistent distinction between energized, online, and prospective capacity. Watch within 90 days whether Pecos reaches its 1 GW leasable milestone, total energized capacity growth from the March 350 MW baseline, actual Block Inc ASIC procurement scaling (claim 3464, announced March 2026), and formal capacity or timeline claims for Hunt County and Muskogee, both announced but never quantified.

Core Scientific's capacity narrative has experienced substantial compression between announcement and operational reality. The company marked eleven facilities as announced with no initial capacity metrics (claim 5455, November 2024), then in March 2026 disclosed a 920 MW aggregate portfolio spanning Auburn, Austin, Denton, Cottonwood, Marble, Calvert City, Dalton, Grand Forks, and Muskogee (claims 3441, 3465, 3470). This expansion acceleration aligned directly with the CoreWeave partnership, valued at 10.2 billion dollars as of February 2025 (claim 7766). However, by March 30, 2026, only 350 MW had been energized and 180 MW were actively billing (claims 2149, 2150), revealing a 62 percent shortfall between claimed and operational capacity. The CoreWeave merger itself terminated in late October 2025 after failing shareholder vote (claims 4170, 4175, 4165), removing the primary capitalization mechanism for the announced expansion.

Timeline execution shows consistent slippage without public repricing. The Denton expansion was promised by February 1, 2025 but marked delayed (claim 7767). The CoreWeave merger closure, initially targeted for April 7, 2026 (claim 4722), collapsed months earlier. These delays appear to have cascaded into the broader facility conversion program: the company announced data center shell development totaling one million square feet across four locations as of March 30 (claim 2146), but the gap between energized and billing capacity suggests neither shell build-out nor power infrastructure has kept pace with portfolio claims.

The Pecos campus presents the most aggressive future capacity target. Claims from April 2026 reference 1.5 GW gross power capacity as an aspiration, with one gigawatt leasable (claims 2053, 2052), but these appear as strategic targets rather than committed timelines. Given the 62 percent miss between announced and operational capacity six months prior, and absent independent corroboration through interconnection queue entries or utility coordination filings, the pace of build-out requires scrutiny.

Watch the next quarter for any revision to the 920 MW portfolio claim and actual energization rates at Denton and Pecos. Secondary load-on dates and any amended CoreWeave arrangements post-merger termination will signal whether the March 2026 capacity roadmap remains credible or reflects aspirational planning decoupled from capital and grid availability.

Core Scientific's capacity narrative shows significant unexplained contractions and internal inconsistencies. Through early 2025, announcements (claims 6177, 6201, 5455) lacked megawatt specificity, referencing operational facilities without quantification. On March 1, 2026, the company disclosed granular capacity across eleven locations: Denton at 394 megawatts (claim 3476), Cottonwood at 300 megawatts (claim 3477), Muskogee at 100 megawatts (claim 3478), Grand Forks at 100 megawatts (claim 3475), Dalton at 195 megawatts (claim 3474), Calvert City at 150 megawatts (claim 3471), Auburn at 50 megawatts (claim 3480), Marble facilities at 117 megawatts combined (claims 3472, 3473), and Austin at 20 megawatts (claim 3479). These component figures total 1,426 megawatts. Yet simultaneously, claims 3441, 3453, 3465, and 3470 asserted a total portfolio of 920 megawatts—a 506-megawatt unexplained gap between disclosed facilities and stated aggregate.

The discrepancy was superseded by sharper contraction. Twenty-nine days later, the March 30 proxy statement revealed only 180 megawatts online and billing, with 350 megawatts energized (claims 2149, 2150). This 74-percent reduction from the 920-megawatt total announced on March 1 received no public explanation or reconciliation.

Timeline promises similarly eroded. Denton facility expansion (claim 7767) promised by February 1, 2025, remained unfulfilled. The CoreWeave merger—structured to absorb 590 megawatts across multiple options—collapsed when shareholders voted against the deal on October 29, 2025 (claim 4175), with termination October 30 (claim 4165). The underlying 12-year power hosting agreement (claim 7765) was signed June 2024 at $3.5 billion but lost commercial certainty upon merger failure. Facility conversion claims—from mining to AI colocation (claims 3433, 3437, 3543)—carry no completion dates.

The April 26 announcement of a 1.0-gigawatt leasable target at Pecos (claim 2053) exceeds any single facility or total portfolio capacity previously disclosed. Concurrently, Block Inc. ASIC procurement (claim 3452) replaced CoreWeave as the primary end-user anchor, with no disclosed commitment timeline.

Within 90 days, monitor whether online-and-billing capacity grows materially beyond 180 megawatts, whether Pecos 1.0-gigawatt target tracking appears viable, and whether Block integration demonstrates workload absorption or remains notional like CoreWeave.

Core Scientific announced 920 MW of operating capacity by March 2026 across ten facilities (claims 3441, 3465, 3470, 3453), yet independent facility metrics reveal a substantial delivery gap. The March 30, 2026 proxy statement disclosed only 350 MW energized and 180 MW online and billing (claims 2149, 2150)—a 59 percent variance between announced and revenue-generating capacity. November 2024 positioned nine data centers as operational (claim 5455); the March 2026 figures suggest most infrastructure exists as shell space or remains in commissioning rather than deployed workload. The Pecos facility, cited as 300 MW capacity in the March 2026 portfolio total (claim 3477), pivoted to "target" language of 1.0 to 1.5 GW leasable by April 2026 (claims 2052, 2053), indicating ambition exceeded near-term execution.

Core Scientific's strategic foundation shifted materially during the analysis window. After pursuing Bitmain asset deals through early 2025, the company announced a CoreWeave partnership in June 2024 valued at 3.5 billion dollars (claim 7765), later expanded to 10.2 billion total coverage by February 2025 (claim 7766). That relationship escalated into a proposed CoreWeave acquisition announced July 2025 with promised close by April 6, 2026 (claim 4722). The deal collapsed in late October 2025 (claims 4170, 4175, 4165). Within months, Core Scientific executed a Block Inc. ASIC procurement agreement in March 2026 (claim 3452), reverting toward mining hardware procurement rather than maintaining pure AI colocation trajectory.

The energized-to-billing ratio—approximately 51 percent of acknowledged power capacity actively generating revenue—suggests either aggressive pre-lease modeling or material operational challenges in deployment sequencing. The CoreWeave partnership claimed 590 MW committed capacity post-option exercise (claims 3444, 3451, 3469), yet infrastructure deployment has not tracked announced timelines. Facility conversions from mining to AI colocation (claims 3543, 3437) appear to have proceeded slower than public communications indicated. The post-merger failure positions Core Scientific without a stated strategic buyer for the first time since mid-2024.

Monitor the next 90 days for Block ASIC hardware arrival cadence, whether Pecos capacity progresses from targets to announced figures, tracking of energized-to-billing ratios across the ten-facility footprint, and any CoreWeave contract restatements or capacity adjustments.

Core Scientific's capacity announcements have grown substantially but diverge sharply from operational delivery. In November 2024, the company claimed nine operational data centers (claim 5455). By March 2026, this evolved into a detailed portfolio spanning ten locations with 920 megawatts of aggregate capacity (claims 3441, 3465, 3470): Denton, Texas; Pecos, Texas; Muskogee, Oklahoma; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Dalton, Georgia; Marble, North Carolina; Auburn, Alabama; Austin, Texas; Calvert City, Kentucky; and Hunt County, Texas. The specificity suggests maturity, but reality contradicted the narrative. As of March 30, 2026—just weeks after the 920 MW claim—only 180 megawatts were online and billing, with 350 megawatts energized (claims 2150, 2149). This 51 percent gap between stated and operational capacity raises questions about announcement timing relative to physical deployment. Meanwhile, the Pecos facility received an extraordinary revision within eight weeks: from 300 megawatts on March 1 to a 1.0–1.5 gigawatt target by April 26 (claims 2052, 2053). Such magnitude jumps suggest either prior understatement or aspirational capacity unbacked by committed funding. The CoreWeave partnership, initially presented as a strategic cornerstone beginning in June 2024 (claim 7765), suffered a merger termination in late October 2025 after shareholder rejection (claims 4175, 4170, 4165), yet CoreWeave colocation agreements remained active in claims dated March 2026 (claim 3443), indicating operational continuity despite transaction collapse. Promised dates have moved: the merger was initially expected to close by April 2026 (claim 4722) before failing entirely. No independent public filings, interconnection queue entries, or on-the-ground reports have been provided in this dataset to validate the deployment pace or the gap between announced and energized capacity. Over the next 90 days, watch whether Core Scientific closes the operational shortfall—whether the 540 megawatts between energized and stated capacity come online, whether Pecos moves meaningfully toward its 1.0+ gigawatt target, and whether additional facilities release timeline clarity. Monitoring interconnection applications and power purchase agreements will distinguish funded buildout from speculative announcements.

Core Scientific's announced capacity has scaled from 350 MW energized in March to 1.4 GW gross and 1.0 GW client-billable (claims 2627, 2628), with a stated pipeline reaching 3.3 GW potential. Yet delivery timelines have slipped materially. The CoreWeave partnership—initially 70 MW (claim 2142, March)—expanded to 590 MW promised, but interim targets failed. The company committed to 250 MW by end-2025 (claim 2645) and 382 MW by mid-2026 (claim 2578); only 120 MW sits energized as of September (claim 2647). The revised target of 500 MW additional in 2H 2026 (claim 2579) lacks public validation through grid interconnection data or construction reports.

The portfolio shows capacity restatements without explicit delay acknowledgement. September filings detail site-specific targets—Denton 260 MW, Dalton 175 MW, Austin 20 MW—yet energization status remains unverified. The AMD partnership, structured as $14 billion in take-or-pay revenue agreements (claims 1889, 2610), anchors 2.5 GW in capacity reservation (claim 1888), differentiating contracted demand from promotional guidance. AMD's actual drawdown timing remains opaque.

The Polaris DS acquisition closed at $444 million (claim 1886), adding 440 MW at Muskogee (claim 1828), and the company deployed $444 million on power infrastructure (claim 1885), demonstrating real capex. Against this sits the failed CoreWeave $9 billion all-stock merger (claim 690, promised by 2025-07-01), signaling execution risk. The pivot to contractual capacity implies greater reliance on third-party infrastructure and partner compliance.

Over ninety days, monitor CoreWeave's 500 MW energization claim against actual 2H 2026 grid data. Track interconnection queue advancement at Denton, Dalton, and new sites—public records validating construction. Assess whether Muskogee's 1.5 GW expansion (claim 1887) advances beyond planning. The Hunt County site (285 MW by 2029, claim 2656) is too distant for near-term credibility. Focus on whether current-year targets hold.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the money to buy the contracted miners (#19782), a $220.7M BitFuFu miner purchase (#19783) and a $1.7B NuMiner agreement alleged not to exist (#19784). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was ever energized and billed, what hosting revenue Gryphon contributed, and whether the contract was amended, defaulted or terminated once the counterparty's financing came into question.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility was operating at 22 MW against a planned 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14183 and #20683, under a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (#14175, #14184). What has not been said is the schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the interconnection queue position and substation, the power price and term under the Tenaska arrangement, and how the build-out is being paid for.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14179, #20684 and #20702. What has not been said is the site's physical parcel, the serving utility and interconnection capacity, the expected energization date or phasing, the capex estimate, and what the company owes the Port Authority, whether lease payments, abatements or clawbacks.

The company disclosed B. Riley financing on 2022-04-07: a committed equity facility recorded as 150.0 USD (#14082) and bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as 75.0 USD (#14081), with the notes due by 2022-12-07 and now marked delayed. What has not been said is the units, presumably millions but never stated in the record, how much of the equity line was actually drawn and at what discount, and whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or converted after the due date passed. The Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap, recorded as 65.0 USD (#14181), carries the same unit ambiguity.

The company disclosed a lease of 31 acres for bitcoin mining in 2021, cited as claim #19017, and a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 that expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which site the 31 acres is or where it sits, which facility the expiring power contract covered, and what rate and hedging replaced the cap. Without that, a reader cannot judge how the 497 MW of operating capacity (#14173, #14186) was exposed to post-2021 power prices.

The company disclosed a new CFO on 2022-04-04 with a $300,000 base salary, cited as claims #14090 and #14092, and separation benefits and a transition period for the departing CFO (#14088, #14089, #14093). What has not been said is the new CFO's target bonus and equity grant, the dollar value of the former CFO's severance and accelerated vesting, and the reason for the departure, which arrived days before the business combination closed (#20679). Relatedly, the company disclosed 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022 (#19793) without naming the largest hosting customers or disclosing customer concentration.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim #14082) and bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim #14081). Both amounts are recorded only as "150.0 USD" and "75.0 USD", with no unit, and the bridge notes are now marked delayed against a 2022-12-07 date. What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, how much of the equity line was actually drawn and at what discount, and whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or converted at maturity.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781). The same filing states that Gryphon lacks the financial resources for the agreed miners and alleges a non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claims #19782, #19784). What has not been said is whether Core Scientific still treats the 230 MW as contracted, how much of it was ever energized or billed, and what deposits or receivables it holds against a counterparty it has called financially unable to perform.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793). It reported total operating capacity of 497 MW across its facilities (claims #14173, #14186). What has not been said is who the hosting customers are, or what share of that hashrate and of hosting revenue the largest one or two customers represent, so concentration risk cannot be judged.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Port Authority (claims #14185, #14188, #20684). It also disclosed a Denton, Texas site with Tenaska Energy that opened at 22 MW against a 300 MW target (claims #14177, #14183, #14184). What has not been said is the physical parcel or substation for either site, the utility or ERCOT interconnection status, and a dated megawatt ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW at Denton and from zero to 500 MW at Muskogee.

The company disclosed a power agreement whose pricing cap of $0.042, apparently per kWh, expired on December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). What has not been said is which facility and utility that contract covers, what price replaced the cap from 2022 onward, and how the change affected the breakeven cost per bitcoin. That cost figure matters because of the allegation of overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs (claim #19785).

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation, transition and internal successor, with a $300,000 base salary for the new CFO (claims #14088, #14089, #14090, #14092). It also referenced separation benefits for the departing CFO (claim #14093). What has not been said is the dollar value of those separation benefits, any accelerated equity, the incoming CFO's equity grant and bonus target, and the stated reason for the departure, which came days before the business combination closed.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the money to buy the miners it had agreed to buy and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claims #19782, #19784). What has not been said is which Core Scientific site was meant to host the 230 MW, what the hosting rate and term were, and whether any of that capacity was ever energized or billed. Was the Gryphon contract performed, renegotiated, or written off?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14179 and #20702. What has not been said is the utility counterparty, the interconnection queue position, the power price, the capex budget, or any date for first energization or full build-out. When was each tranche of the 500 MW expected online, and how was it to be paid for?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility started at 22 MW with a planned ultimate capacity of 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14183, #14184 and #14175. What has not been said is the ramp schedule between 22 MW and 300 MW, how much of that capacity is self-mining versus colocation, and the pricing and term of the Tenaska power arrangement. What were the economics of the remaining 278 MW, and on what timeline?

The company disclosed that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and which supplier the cap covered, whether the $0.042 was per kWh, and what pricing replaced it after expiry. How much did power cost per MWh across the fleet once the cap lapsed?

The company disclosed $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital due by 2022-12-07 and a $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, cited as claims #14081 and #14082. The notes are now tracked as delayed, and the record gives these amounts, and the $65 Radar Relay acquisition figure in claim #14181, without stated units. What has not been said is the interest rate, the security package, whether the notes were repaid, extended, or swept into the later restructuring, and how much of the equity facility was actually drawn and at what discount. What happened to the B. Riley notes at maturity?

The company disclosed a $300,000 annual base salary for its new CFO and separation benefits for the departing CFO on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14092 and #14093. What has not been said is the incoming CFO's equity grant and bonus target, or the dollar value of the outgoing CFO's severance and any accelerated vesting. The company also disclosed 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793) without naming the largest hosting customers or their share of revenue. What is total pay for the CFO role, and which customers account for that hosted hashrate?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14179, #20684 and #20702. What has not been said is where the site physically sits, which utility or grid operator will serve it, what interconnection or power purchase agreement backs the 500 MW figure, and when any portion will be energized. What is the energization schedule, and who is the power counterparty?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility began operating at 22 MW with a planned ultimate capacity of 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14182, #14178, #20701, #14175 and #14184. Separately, on 2022-01-03 it disclosed a $0.042 power pricing cap that expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is the phasing between 22 MW and 300 MW, the economic terms with Tenaska and the city, and which facility the expired cap covered. What power price replaced the cap, and what is the megawatt-by-quarter buildout schedule for Denton?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as "150.0 USD" and bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" due by 2022-12-07, cited as claims #14082 and #14081. The bridge-note claim now carries a delayed status. The 2022-03-29 Radar Relay acquisition figure of "65.0 USD", cited as claim #14181, has the same unit ambiguity. What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, how much of the equity facility was actually drawn and at what price, and whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or converted. What are the interest rate and the current status of the B. Riley notes?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation, a successor promoted from an internal role at a $300,000 base salary, and unspecified separation benefits for the departing CFO, cited as claims #14088 through #14093. What has not been said is the new CFO's equity grant and bonus target, the dollar value of the outgoing CFO's separation package, and the reason for the departure so soon after the business combination closed (claims #14170 and #20679). What was the total compensation on both sides of this transition?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to buy the miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, cited as claims #19781 through #19785. What has not been said is how many of the 230 MW were ever deployed, what deposits or prepayments Core Scientific holds, and how the dispute or litigation was resolved. What revenue was booked under the Gryphon agreement, and has the agreement been terminated?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793. It also reported 2021 results of $544.5 million against $515 million guidance, cited as claims #19791 and #19790. What has not been said is which customers make up that hashrate, how concentrated the hosting book is, and how the $544.5 million splits among self-mining, hosting and equipment sales. Who are the largest colocation customers, and what share of revenue does each represent?

On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781), alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the money to pay for the agreed miners (claim #19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783), and a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement alleged not to exist (claim #19784). What has not been said is which Core Scientific site was meant to host the 230 MW, how much of it was ever energized, what deposits Gryphon actually paid, and what share of the 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate reported for March 31, 2022 (claim #19793) belongs to Gryphon. Did the hosting revenue ever arrive, or does the backlog rest on a counterparty that could not fund it?

On 2022-03-29 the company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14179, #14188, #20684, #20702). What has not been said is the site's physical address or parcel, the utility and interconnection arrangement that would deliver 500 MW, the energization schedule, the capex estimate, and whether Core Scientific owns or leases the land. Without those, how should a reader weigh 500 MW of planned capacity against the 497 MW the company says it already operates?

The company disclosed total operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14186, #14173, #20703) and a 31-acre bitcoin mining lease in 2021 (claim #19017). What has not been said is how the 497 MW splits by site, how much of it serves self-mining versus colocation customers, and where the 31-acre lease is and who the lessor is. Which facilities make up the 497 MW, and how many megawatts does each contribute?

On 2022-03-29 the company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility had become operational at 22 MW with a 300 MW target (claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #20683), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184). Separately it disclosed a $0.042 power pricing cap that expired December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). What has not been said is the schedule for growing Denton from 22 MW to 300 MW, the power price Tenaska and Denton are charging, which facility the expired $0.042 cap applied to, and what pricing replaced it. What does the company now pay per kWh at its largest sites?

On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" with a December 7, 2022 deadline now marked delayed (claim #14081), plus a "150.0 USD" committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim #14082). The Radar Relay acquisition is likewise recorded only as "65.0 USD" (claim #14181). What has not been said is the unit behind these figures (millions is presumed but not stated), the interest rate on the B. Riley notes, whether the notes were repaid, extended, or converted after the deadline, and how much of the equity facility was drawn and at what discount. Given that B. Riley is both lender and equity provider, what are the full economics of that relationship?

The April 4, 2022 CFO transition disclosed a $300,000 base salary for the incoming CFO (claim #14092), alongside separation benefits and a transition period for the departing CFO (claims #14093, #14089). The company also disclosed vesting of 1.4 million executive restricted stock units by May 6, 2022 (claim #13997), which remains unverified. What has not been said is the dollar value of the former CFO's separation package, the reason for the departure just days before the business combination closed, which executives received the 1.4 million RSUs, and whether that vesting was accelerated by the merger. Finally, 2021 guidance of $515 million (claim #19790) was compared with $544.5 million of actual results (claim #19791) without naming the metric. Was that figure revenue or something else, and how does it square with the allegation that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785)?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" with a 2022-12-07 date, cited as claim #14081 and now marked delayed, alongside a required committed equity facility recorded as "150.0 USD", cited as claim #14082. What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, what interest rate and conversion terms the notes carry, whether the notes were repaid, extended or converted after the December 2022 date passed, and how much of the equity facility was actually drawn.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14179, #14185, #14188, #20684, #20695 and #20702. What has not been said is the site's physical parcel or address, the serving utility and interconnection status, the energization schedule, and the capital cost to build it.

The company also disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW and targets 300 MW with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton, cited as claims #14175, #14177, #14178, #14184 and #20701. What has not been said is the timeline for the ramp from 22 MW to 300 MW and the power pricing terms Tenaska provides.

The company disclosed a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and counterparty that agreement covers, whether the 0.042 figure is per kWh, and what pricing replaced the cap in 2022. Relatedly, the 31-acre lease cited as claim #19017 has no disclosed location or lessor.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s, cited as claim #19793, and the record on 2022-03-03 includes allegations around a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement, a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement alleged not to exist, and doubts about Gryphon's ability to pay for its miners, cited as claims #19781 through #19785. What has not been said is how much of the 7.9 EH/s comes from the largest unnamed hosting customers, whether the Gryphon contract remains in force, and how the company has formally responded to those allegations.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation and appointment, a $300,000 base salary, and separation benefits for the departing CFO, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, followed on 2022-04-19 by vesting of 1.4 million executive RSUs, cited as claim #13997. What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, the incoming CFO's equity and bonus terms, which executives received the vested RSUs, and whether that vesting was accelerated by the business combination. The claim list provided is cut off at claim #13997, so later disclosures may answer some of these questions.

The company disclosed a colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793) and a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement on 2022-03-03 (claim #19781). What has not been said is who the other hosting customers are, what share of the 7.9 EH/s and of hosting revenue Gryphon represents, and whether any single customer accounts for more than 10% of revenue.

On 2022-03-03 the record also carries allegations that Gryphon lacks the financial resources for the miners it agreed to deploy (claim #19782), that a $1.7B NuMiner agreement does not exist (claim #19784), that Gryphon bought $220.7M of BitFuFu miners (claim #19783), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW Gryphon commitment is backed by deposits or energized miners, whether Core Scientific has repriced or terminated it, and how its own breakeven cost per bitcoin compares with the disputed figures.

The company disclosed B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge notes of "75.0" due by 2022-12-07, now marked delayed (claim #14081), a required B. Riley committed equity facility of "150.0" (claim #14082), and a Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap of "65.0" (claim #14181). What has not been said is the scale of these figures (presumably millions of USD), the interest rate and security on the bridge notes, why repayment slipped past the December 2022 date, and how much of the equity facility has been drawn and at what discount.

The company disclosed Denton, Texas operating at 22 MW against a 300 MW target (claims #14177, #14182, #14183, #20683) under an agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184). It also disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee City-County Port Authority data center (claims #14185, #14188, #20684). What has not been said is the energization schedule for the remaining 278 MW at Denton and for any Muskogee capacity, the capex per MW, the power price and term under the Tenaska arrangement, and the interconnection or substation details for Muskogee.

The company disclosed a 31-acre lease for bitcoin mining in 2021 (claim #19017) and a $0.042 power pricing cap expiring December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). What has not been said is which site the acreage and the expired cap relate to, the post-expiry power cost per kWh, and how much the cap's expiry raised cost of revenue in 2022.

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515M (claim #19790) and an actual of $544.5M (claim #19791) without naming the metric. On 2022-04-04 it disclosed a new CFO at $300,000 base pay with separation benefits for the departing CFO (claims #14088, #14092, #14093), and 1.4 million executive RSUs vesting around 2022-05-06 (claim #13997). What has not been said is whether the $515M/$544.5M figures are revenue or another measure, the dollar value of the former CFO's separation package, the new CFO's bonus and equity grant, and which executives hold the 1.4 million RSUs and whether shares were sold on vesting.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781). On the same date the record includes allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for its agreed miners (#19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (#19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (#19785). What has not been said is how many of the 230 MW were ever energized and billed under the Gryphon contract, and how those allegations were resolved. Was any revenue, receivable, or reserve tied to Gryphon recognized or written off?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (#14081) and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (#14082), recorded as 75.0 and 150.0 USD. The record also shows a Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap recorded as 65.0 USD (#14181). What has not been said is the scale of these figures, presumably millions but never stated. The bridge notes carried a 2022-12-07 date and are now marked delayed, so what happened to them: were they repaid, extended, or converted? How much was actually drawn on the equity facility, and on what terms?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility began operating at 22 MW (#14177, #14182) and would eventually reach 300 MW (#14178, #14183, #20683, #20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (#14175, #14184). What has not been said is the schedule, capex budget, and interconnection or substation detail for the remaining 278 MW, or the price and term of the Tenaska power arrangement. A separate $0.042 power pricing cap expired on December 31, 2021 (#19786): which site did it cover, and what pricing replaced it?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (#14185, #20684, #14179, #14188, #20702, #20695). What has not been said is the site address or parcel, the serving utility and interconnection queue status, the expected energization date, and the lease or incentive terms. Is there a contracted power supply behind the 500 MW figure, or is it a site ceiling? The 31 acres leased in 2021 (#19017) likewise appear without a location or tie to any named facility.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022 (#19793), and on 2022-03-29 total operating capacity of 497 MW (#14173, #14186, #20703). What has not been said is how many colocation customers make up that hashrate, who the largest are, and what share of revenue each accounts for. How much of the 497 MW is self-mining versus hosting? Relatedly, 2021 guidance of $515 million (#19790) was followed by results of $544.5 million (#19791), and the record never names the metric. Is this revenue, and what drove the beat?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation and replacement, a $300,000 base salary for the new CFO, and separation benefits for the departing one (#14088, #14090, #14092, #14093). What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, the new CFO's equity award and bonus target, and the reason for the departure, which came within weeks of the April 2022 business combination closing (#20679). Was the departure connected to any accounting or controls matter?

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081, recorded only as "75.0 USD" with a 2022-12-07 date now marked delayed, alongside a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim #14082, "150.0 USD"). What has not been said is the unit (presumably millions), the interest rate, conversion or security terms, whether the notes were repaid, extended or restructured after the December 2022 date slipped, and how much of the equity facility was actually drawn and at what discount.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, in the same filing set that records Gryphon lacking the financial resources for its agreed miners (claim #19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783), and an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claim #19784). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW Gryphon actually energized, whether any related hosting revenue was booked or reversed, what deposits or receivables Core Scientific held against Gryphon, and how the dispute was resolved.

The company disclosed 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793, and total operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14186, #14173, #20703). What has not been said is who the hosting customers are, what share of that hashrate or of hosting revenue sits with the largest one or two counterparties, and how the 497 MW splits between self-mining and hosting by site.

The company disclosed a Denton, Texas facility with 22 MW initial capacity and a 300 MW ultimate target, cited as claims #14177, #14178 and #20701, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184), plus a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #20684). What has not been said is the phased energization schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the interconnection point and utility capacity actually contracted at each site, the capital cost per MW, and the economic terms of the Tenaska and Port Authority arrangements.

The company disclosed a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786, and a 31-acre lease for bitcoin mining in 2021 (claim #19017). What has not been said is which facility the capped contract covers, what replaced the cap and at what all-in cost per kWh, and where the 31 acres are located and who the lessor is.

The company disclosed a CFO transition on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, including a $300,000 base salary and unspecified separation benefits for the departing CFO. What has not been said is the incoming CFO's equity grant and bonus target, the dollar value of the former CFO's separation package and transition-period pay, and why the change came within days of the April 7, 2022 closing of the XPDI business combination (claim #20679). Separately, 2021 guidance of $515 million (claim #19790) against $544.5 million actual (claim #19791) is recorded without the metric named; the question is whether that figure is revenue, and what drove the beat.

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081, recorded at '75.0 USD' with a promised-by date of 2022-12-07 and now marked delayed. A committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, cited as claim #14082, is recorded at '150.0 USD'. What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, what the notes' interest rate and conversion terms are, and why the December 2022 milestone slipped. Was the bridge repaid, refinanced, converted to equity, or left in default? Given that one counterparty sits on both the debt and the equity side, what related-party or fee arrangements with B. Riley were disclosed in the proxy?

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. Alongside it are allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for its agreed miners (#19782), a $220.7M BitFuFu miner purchase (#19783), and an allegedly non-existent $1.7B NuMiner agreement (#19784). What has not been said is how much of the 497 MW operating capacity (#14173, #14186) and the 7.9 EH/s colocation hashrate as of March 31, 2022 (#19793) was committed to Gryphon. How much hosting revenue from that contract was recognized, and how was the dispute resolved? More broadly, who are the largest colocation customers, and what share of hosting revenue do they represent?

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay on 2022-03-29, cited as claim #14181, at a recorded value of '65.0 USD'. It also referenced 'future utilization of RADAR technology assets', cited as claim #20706. What has not been said is the actual purchase price and its units, how much of it was carried into goodwill after the Blockcap deal (#20707, #14189), and what concrete product or revenue the RADAR assets are expected to produce. Has any portion been impaired?

The company disclosed that Denton, Texas began operating at 22 MW (#14177, #14182) toward an ultimate 300 MW (#14178, #14183, #20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (#14175, #14184). It also disclosed a power-pricing cap of $0.042 that expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is the phased energization schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW and the interconnection and substation status. Which facility did the expired cap cover? What contracted power price replaced it after 2021, and what are Tenaska's economic terms?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #20684, #20702 and #14179. What has not been said is the site's physical location within the port, the utility and interconnection queue position, the target energization date for the first megawatts, and the estimated capital cost. How does the company plan to finance a build of this size alongside Denton? Separately, the 31-acre lease from 2021, cited as claim #19017, has no stated site location or lease term.

The company disclosed a CFO transition on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, including a $300,000 base salary for the incoming CFO (#14092) and unspecified separation benefits for the departing CFO (#14093). What has not been said is either executive's name in the extracted record, the incoming CFO's bonus target and equity grant, and the dollar value and vesting acceleration of the former CFO's separation package. Was the transition related to the 2021 results of $544.5M (#19791) exceeding the $515M guidance (#19790), or to the profitability allegations in claim #19785? Of that 2021 figure, how much came from self-mining versus hosting?

The company disclosed a colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022 on 2022-04-05, cited as claim #19793, and a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. What has not been said is which customers make up that 7.9 EH/s, how concentrated the hosting book is, and whether the Gryphon contract was performed, renegotiated or terminated, given the same-day records alleging Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for its miners (claim #19782) and referencing a disputed $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claim #19784). How much of Core's hosting revenue or receivables depended on Gryphon?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of "150.0 USD", cited as claim #14082, and bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital of "75.0 USD" due by 2022-12-07, cited as claim #14081, which is now marked delayed. What has not been said is the actual scale (presumably millions, but the units are left ambiguous), the interest rate and conversion terms, how much of the equity line was drawn, and whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or defaulted. What is B. Riley's full economic relationship to the business combination?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility began operating at 22 MW with an expected final capacity of 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14182 and #14183, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175 and #14184). It also disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185 and #14179. What has not been said for either site is the physical address, the utility interconnection and substation arrangement, the energization schedule for each tranche, or the capital expenditure needed to get from announced capacity to operating capacity. How many megawatts were energized at each site by the end of 2022?

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power agreement pricing cap of "0.042 USD" expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is the counterparty, which facility the cap covered, the unit (presumably per kWh), and what pricing replaced it after expiry. What was the post-cap effective power cost, and how did it affect the mining breakeven figures that claim #19785 alleges were overstated?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07, cited as claim #19790, and an actual result of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claim #19791. What has not been said in these records is which metric these figures measure (total revenue, or a segment split between self-mining and hosting). It is also unclear whether the beat came from bitcoin price, hashrate growth or hosting equipment sales. Separately, the Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap is recorded at "65.0 USD" (claim #14181) with no unit or consideration mix stated. What were the purchase price and consideration mix?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation, a successor promoted from an internal role at a $300,000 base salary, and separation benefits for the departing CFO, cited as claims #14088, #14091, #14092 and #14093. What has not been said is the incoming CFO's target bonus and equity grant, the dollar value of the former CFO's separation package, and the reason for a finance-chief change one week before the business combination closed (claim #20679).

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03 (claim #19781), alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the money to pay for the agreed miners (claim #19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783), and a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement alleged not to exist (claim #19784). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was ever energized and billed, what hosting revenue was recognized from Gryphon, and how the dispute over the counterparty's ability to pay was resolved.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas began operating at 22 MW against a planned 300 MW (claims #14177, #14182, #14178, #20683), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184). What has not been said is the schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the capital cost of that build-out, and the economic terms of the Tenaska power arrangement, including the price per kWh and the contract length.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29 (claims #14185, #14188, #20684, #20702). What has not been said is the physical parcel, the utility and interconnection queue position, any target energization date, and whether the 500 MW figure is contracted grid capacity or a site ceiling.

A power pricing cap of $0.042 was disclosed as expiring December 31, 2021, in a filing dated 2022-01-03 (claim #19786). What has not been said is which facility or utility contract the cap covered, what rate replaced it, and how the change affected per-unit power cost across the 497 MW operating fleet reported as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14173, #14186).

The company reported 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793). What has not been said is how that hashrate is split among named hosting customers, and in particular what share Gryphon or any other single counterparty represents.

The company disclosed B. Riley financing on 2022-04-07: bridge promissory notes recorded as 75.0 USD and due by 2022-12-07, now tracked as delayed (claim #14081), and a committed equity facility recorded as 150.0 USD (claim #14082). What has not been said is the exact units and amounts drawn, the interest rate and discount terms, why the bridge-note milestone slipped, and whether B. Riley's role in financing the company overlaps with any advisory role in the XPDI business combination (claims #14170, #20679). The Radar Relay acquisition figure of 65.0 USD (claim #14181) carries the same unit ambiguity.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, transition period, separation benefits, and an internal successor at a $300,000 base salary on 2022-04-04 (claims #14088 through #14093), with a further CFO departure noted on 2022-04-19 (claim #13994). What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, the new CFO's equity and bonus terms, and the reason the CFO seat turned over within days of the company listing on Nasdaq (claim #20682).

The company disclosed a 7.9 EH/s colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793) and a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement (claim #19781). What has not been said is who the other hosting customers are, what share of hosting revenue Gryphon represents, and whether the Gryphon contract survived the March 3, 2022 allegations that the $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist and that Gryphon could not pay for its miners (claims #19784, #19782, #19783). Has any of the 230 MW actually been energized for Gryphon, and has the company taken any reserve against that receivable?

The company disclosed B. Riley bridge promissory notes of 75.0 USD due by December 7, 2022 (claim #14081, status delayed), a committed equity facility of 150.0 USD (claim #14082), and a Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap of 65.0 USD (claim #14181). What has not been said is the unit on each figure (presumably millions), the interest rate and conversion terms on the notes, and whether they were repaid, extended, or defaulted after the maturity date passed. How much of the 150 million equity line was actually drawn, and at what discount to market?

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma facility with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14179, #14185, #20684) and a Denton, Texas site starting at 22 MW and targeting 300 MW with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton (claims #14177, #14178, #20683). What has not been said is the energization schedule for each MW tranche, the interconnection or utility queue position, the capital cost per MW, and the lease or ownership terms with the port authority and the city. When is Denton expected to pass 22 MW, and has Muskogee broken ground?

The company disclosed a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD whose term ended December 31, 2021 (claim #19786), and a lease of 31 acres for bitcoin mining in 2021 (claim #19017). What has not been said is which facility and which utility the capped contract covered, what rate replaced it in 2022, and where the 31-acre site is located. What is the blended power cost per kWh across the 497 MW operating fleet (claims #14173, #14186) after the cap rolled off?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of 515 million USD (claim #19790) and 2021 actual results of 544.5 million USD (claim #19791), while March 3, 2022 allegations claimed it overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs (claim #19785). What has not been said is which metric these figures measure, whether it is revenue, adjusted EBITDA, or something else, and how the reported figure splits between self-mining and hosting. What is the per-bitcoin all-in breakeven cost the company is prepared to stand behind?

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, a successor promoted from an internal role at a 300,000 USD base salary, and separation benefits for the departing CFO (claims #14088, #14090, #14091, #14092, #14093). What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, any accelerated equity vesting, and the incoming CFO's bonus target and equity grant. Why did the CFO leave within days of the April 2022 business combination closing (claim #20679)?

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081, and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on the same date, cited as claim #14082. The amounts are recorded only as "75.0 USD" and "150.0 USD". What has not been said is the scale of either figure, the interest rate, maturity and collateral on the notes, and how much of the equity facility was actually drawn. The notes carry a promised-by date of 2022-12-07 and are now marked delayed, so the most pressing open question is whether they were repaid, extended or converted, and on what terms.

The company disclosed a Muskogee, Oklahoma data center with 500 MW of expected capacity under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14179, #14185, #14188, #20684 and #20702. On the same date it disclosed a Denton, Texas facility with 22 MW initially operating and a 300 MW target, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14175, #14177, #14183 and #14184. What has not been said for either site is the energization schedule from initial to full capacity, the utility interconnection or power-purchase terms, the capex budget, or what economics Tenaska and the Port Authority receive.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. Allegations on the record from the same date say Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners and question a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement and a $220.7 million BitFuFu purchase, cited as claims #19782, #19783 and #19784. The company also reported 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793. What has not been said is how much of that hosted hashrate and hosting revenue Gryphon represented, whether any deposits or receivables from Gryphon were impaired, and who the other unnamed colocation customers are, including any concentration figures.

The company disclosed that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. It also disclosed a 31-acre lease for bitcoin mining in 2021, cited as claim #19017. What has not been said is which facility and which utility counterparty the capped contract covered, what rate replaced it in 2022, and where the 31-acre site is located and how much capacity it supports. Without that, the effect on per-megawatt-hour power cost after the cap expired cannot be assessed.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, transition period and separation benefits on 2022-04-04, along with a $300,000 base salary for the incoming CFO, cited as claims #14088, #14090, #14092 and #14093. It also disclosed a $75,000 executive severance payment due by 2022-05-06, cited as claim #13996, which remains not yet verifiable. What has not been said is the dollar value of the departing CFO's separation package, the incoming CFO's equity and bonus terms, and who received the $75,000 severance. It is also unclear whether these payments relate to the same departure.

The company disclosed that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay for an amount recorded only as "65.0 USD", cited as claim #14181. It also described a "future utilization of RADAR technology assets", cited as claim #20706. What has not been said is the actual purchase price and its units, the carrying value of the RADAR assets after the Blockcap acquisition, and the concrete product plan behind "future utilization". Separately, 2021 guidance of $515 million and actual results of $544.5 million, cited as claims #19790 and #19791, are never tied to a named metric, so it is unclear whether these figures are revenue, a non-GAAP measure or something else.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap had acquired Radar Relay for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claim #14181, and separately referenced future use of RADAR technology assets, cited as claim #20706. What has not been said is the unit of that figure (almost certainly millions, but the record does not say), how the consideration split between cash and stock, and what impairment, if any, Core Scientific later took on the RADAR assets it inherited through the Blockcap deal (claims #20707, #14171).

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as 75.0 USD and due by 2022-12-07, cited as claim #14081 and now marked delayed. On the same date it disclosed a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as 150.0 USD, cited as claim #14082. What has not been said is whether the notes were repaid, extended or converted at maturity, what interest and fees applied, and how much of the 150.0 equity line was actually drawn, at what average price and dilution, before market conditions changed.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14179, #14185, #20684 and #20702. On the same date it disclosed a Denton, Texas facility with 22 MW initially operating and a 300 MW target, developed with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton, cited as claims #14177, #14183, #14175 and #14184. What has not been said is the Muskogee parcel location, serving utility, interconnection queue position and energization schedule. For Denton, no dated ramp from 22 MW to 300 MW has been given, nor the power price and revenue-sharing terms with Tenaska and the city.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD, presumably per kWh, expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and utility counterparty that agreement covered, what the post-cap rate became, and how much of the 497 MW operating fleet reported as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14173, #14186) remained on fixed versus floating power pricing.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s at March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793. It also disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked funds for the agreed miners and that a 1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, cited as claims #19782 and #19784. What has not been said is how many megawatts and dollars of contracted hosting backlog Gryphon actually represented. Nor has the company named its other largest colocation customers or disclosed customer concentration, or said whether the Gryphon contract was terminated, renegotiated or litigated.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation with separation benefits and a new CFO base salary of 300,000 USD, cited as claims #14088, #14093 and #14092. It disclosed on 2022-04-19 an executive severance payment of 75,000 USD, cited as claim #13996. What has not been said is the dollar value and vesting terms of the departing CFO's separation package. The company also has not disclosed the equity grants accompanying the new CFO's salary, or which executive received the 75,000 payment and why it remains unverifiable past its 2022-05-06 date. Separately, 2021 guidance of 515 million (claim #19790) versus a reported 544.5 million (claim #19791) is never tied to a named metric, leaving open whether it is revenue, adjusted EBITDA or something else.

The company disclosed colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793, alongside a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. What has not been said is how that hashrate is split across named hosting customers, what share of hosting revenue depends on Gryphon, and how the company assessed counterparty exposure given filings alleging Gryphon lacked the resources to fund its miners and relied on a disputed $1.7 billion NuMiner arrangement (claims #19782 and #19784).

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as 75.0 USD and due by 2022-12-07, cited as claim #14081 and now tracked as delayed, plus a required 150.0 USD committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, cited as claim #14082. What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, how much of the bridge was drawn, repaid or extended past the December 2022 date, what the equity line actually raised and at what discount, and whether B. Riley's role in the XPDI business combination (claim #20708) creates a related-party relationship that should be disclosed.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW and would grow to 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14182, #14183 and #20701, under an agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14184 and #14175. What has not been said is the month-by-month energization schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the date behind the undated operational milestone in claim #14176, the power price and term under the Tenaska arrangement, and whether the interconnection capacity is firm or interruptible.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14188 and #20702. What has not been said is the site's physical address or acreage, the serving utility and interconnection status, the expected energization date, the capital budget, and what Core Scientific owes the Port Authority if the buildout stalls. The same gap applies to the 31-acre lease in claim #19017, which names no site, landlord or lease term.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. It also disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 and actual results of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #19790 and #19791. What has not been said is which facility the cap covered, what all-in power cost replaced it in 2022, how much margin that changed, and which revenue line accounted for the roughly $29.5 million beat over guidance.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation, a transition period, unspecified separation benefits for the outgoing CFO, and a $300,000 base salary for an internally promoted successor, cited as claims #14088, #14089, #14093 and #14092. What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, the incoming CFO's equity grant and bonus target, why the transition came within a week of the April 7 listing (claim #20682), and whether the second CFO-departure item on 2022-04-19 (claim #13994) is the same event or a further change. A related open item is that the Radar Relay purchase price is recorded only as 65.0 USD (claim #14181), with no units and no measure of what the RADAR technology assets (claim #20706) have produced.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, and the same record also carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for its agreed miners (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and that mining profitability was overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is whether the Gryphon hosting contract was ever energized, how much of the 230 MW was actually deployed, what revenue or deposits it produced, and how these allegations were resolved. Was the arrangement terminated, renegotiated, or litigated, and on what terms?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #20702, #20684, #14188 and #14179. What has not been said is the site's acreage or parcel, the serving utility, the interconnection queue position or substation, the power price, and a dated energization schedule. Five separate extractions of the same 500 MW figure give no phased timeline, so how many megawatts were expected online by which quarter?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW with a 300 MW ultimate target, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #20683 and #14182, under a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184). What has not been said is the build-out schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the economic terms with Tenaska, and the capex per megawatt. Separately, a power pricing cap of $0.042 was disclosed as expiring December 31, 2021 (claim #19786), but the record names neither the facility nor the counterparty it covered, nor the replacement rate. What has power cost per kWh been since the cap rolled off?

The company disclosed B. Riley financing on 2022-04-07: a committed equity facility recorded as 150.0 USD (claim #14082) and bridge promissory notes recorded as 75.0 USD (claim #14081). Both units appear to mean millions, but the record does not confirm this. The bridge notes carry a delayed status against a 2022-12-07 date. What has not been said is the interest rate, the maturity and conversion terms, how much of the equity line was actually drawn and at what discount, and whether the notes were repaid, extended, or swept into a restructuring.

The company disclosed the acquisition of Radar Relay by Blockcap on 2022-03-29 for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD (claim #14181), alongside an intended "future utilization of RADAR technology assets" (claim #20706). The units, the split between cash and stock, and any related-party ties are all unstated. What has not been said is what was actually paid, whether the RADAR assets were ever deployed or later impaired, and who the Radar Relay sellers were relative to Blockcap insiders.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and appointment on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, with a $300,000 base salary for the incoming CFO (claim #14092) and unspecified separation benefits for the departing one (claim #14093). A further departure appears on 2022-04-19 (claim #13994). What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, the incoming CFO's bonus and equity grants, and the reason for the departures that bracketed the Nasdaq listing. Relatedly, colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s was disclosed on 2022-04-05 (claim #19793) without naming any customer or giving concentration data. What share of that hashrate came from the largest hosting customers?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" (claim #14081) and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as "150.0 USD" (claim #14082). What has not been said is whether those figures are in millions, what interest rate and fees applied, and whether the notes were repaid, extended or converted. The notes carry a 2022-12-07 due date and are now marked delayed. Was any B. Riley entity also an advisor or shareholder in the business combination, which would make these related-party terms?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14179, #14188, #20684, #20702) and a Denton, Texas site that began operating at 22 MW with a 300 MW ultimate target (claims #14182, #14177, #20701, #14178). It also disclosed a 31-acre leased mining site (claim #19017). What has not been said is the serving utility, interconnection queue position, substation capacity and energization schedule for each site. When does Muskogee reach first power, and on what quarterly ramp does Denton go from 22 MW to 300 MW?

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 that expired December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). It also disclosed partnership terms with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14184, #14175). What has not been said is which facility the expired cap covered, what replaced it, and the all-in cents per kWh now paid at Denton under the Tenaska arrangement. How much of the 497 MW operating fleet (claims #14186, #20703) is on fixed-price versus market-indexed power?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793). It reported 2021 revenue of $544.5 million against $515 million guidance (claims #19790, #19791). What has not been said is which hosting customers make up that hashrate, how concentrated the largest customer is, and how 2021 revenue splits between hosting, equipment sales and self-mining. What drove the roughly $29.5 million beat over guidance?

The record dated 2022-03-03 includes a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement (claim #19781). The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for its miners (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is whether Core Scientific has responded to these allegations, how much of the 230 MW Gryphon has actually energized or prepaid, and whether the contract has been amended or terminated.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay for a figure recorded as "65.0 USD" (claim #14181), with ambiguous units. The same filing promised future use of the RADAR technology assets (claim #20706). What has not been said is the actual purchase consideration and how the RADAR assets have been deployed or impaired since. Separately, the 2022-04-04 CFO transition disclosed a $300,000 base salary (claim #14092) but did not quantify the former CFO's separation benefits (claim #14093) or the new CFO's equity grant. How does that relate to the $75,000 executive severance payment (claim #13996), which is still not verifiable?

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for the miners it agreed to (claim #19782) and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784). What has not been said is whether the 230 MW was ever energized or reallocated, how much revenue or deposit was booked against it, and how the dispute was resolved.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #20684 and #20702. What has not been said is the physical parcel, the utility providing interconnection, the substation or queue position, a phased energization schedule, or the capital budget needed to reach 500 MW. The same applies to Denton, where the company went from 22 MW operational (claim #14182) to a 300 MW target (claims #14183, #20701) with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claim #14184) but gave no interim milestones or Tenaska's economic role.

The company disclosed B. Riley bridge promissory notes recorded as 75.0 USD due 2022-12-07 on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081 and now marked delayed. It also disclosed a committed equity facility recorded as 150.0 USD (claim #14082) and a Radar Relay acquisition recorded as 65.0 USD (claim #14181). What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, what the notes' interest rate and conversion terms were, whether the notes were repaid, extended or in default at maturity, and how much of the equity facility was actually drawn.

The company disclosed 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of 2022-03-31, cited as claim #19793. What has not been said is who those customers are, what share of hosting revenue the largest customer accounts for, and the contract durations and power pass-through terms.

The company disclosed a $0.042 power pricing cap expiring December 31, 2021 on 2022-01-03, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and utility counterparty the cap covered, and what rate replaced it in 2022. Relatedly, 2021 guidance of $515 million (claim #19790) was followed by a reported $544.5 million (claim #19791). The metric behind both numbers, whether revenue or adjusted EBITDA, was not specified.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and internal successor with a $300,000 base salary on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093. What has not been said is the new CFO's equity and bonus package, the dollar value of the departing CFO's separation benefits, and the stated reason for leaving within days of the business combination closing (claim #20679).

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781), alongside allegations that a related $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist and that Gryphon lacked the resources to buy the contracted miners (claims #19782, #19784). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was ever energized and billed, whether the contract was terminated or litigated, and what revenue or receivables were written off.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim #14081) and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim #14082), recorded as 75.0 and 150.0 USD with no stated scale. What has not been said is whether these are millions of dollars, what interest rate and fees the notes carried, and why the notes are marked delayed against a 2022-12-07 maturity: were they repaid, extended, or still outstanding when the company entered restructuring?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #20702, #14185, #20684). What has not been said is the site acreage or parcel, which utility will interconnect it, the size of the first energization phase and its date, and how the build will be financed.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility started at 22 MW with a planned 300 MW (claims #14177, #14183), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14184, #14175). What has not been said is the quarter-by-quarter ramp schedule, the power price and term under the Tenaska arrangement, and whether any of the 300 MW is contingent on grid upgrades. Relatedly, the company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power pricing cap of $0.042 expired December 31, 2021 (claim #19786), but has not said which facility it covered or what the replacement price is.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 that colocation customers ran 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022 (claim #19793), and in its 2021 results reported $544.5 million against $515 million guidance (claims #19790, #19791). What has not been said is how much of that revenue and hashrate came from the largest hosting customers by name, and how 2021 revenue split between self-mining, hosting, and equipment sales.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation with separation benefits and a new CFO, promoted internally, at $300,000 annual base salary (claims #14088, #14093, #14092). What has not been said is the dollar value of the departing CFO's separation package and accelerated equity, and what equity grant and bonus target the new CFO received beyond base salary.

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081, recorded as 75.0 USD with a promised-by date of 2022-12-07 and now marked delayed. Alongside it, claim #14082 records a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of 150.0 USD. What has not been said is whether these figures are in millions, whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or converted by the December 2022 date, and how much of the equity facility was actually drawn, at what prices, and how much dilution resulted.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. The same date's records (claims #19782, #19783 and #19784) describe allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist. What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW Gryphon actually energized, whether the contract was terminated or litigated, and whether the stranded capacity was re-contracted to another customer or absorbed into self-mining.

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14179 and #20702. It also disclosed a Denton, Texas facility running at 22 MW against a 300 MW target with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14183 and #14184. What has not been said is the Muskogee site acreage, utility provider and interconnection status, the phased energization schedule for either site, and the power pricing and term in the Denton/Tenaska arrangement.

The company disclosed a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. Separately, claim #19017 records 31 acres leased for bitcoin mining in 2021 with no location given. What has not been said is which facility the capped contract covered, what per-kWh rate replaced it in 2022, and where the 31-acre lease sits within the 497 MW operating footprint cited in claim #14186.

The company disclosed 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate as of March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793. It also reported 2021 results of $544.5 million against $515 million of guidance, cited as claims #19791 and #19790. What has not been said is which metric those figures represent, how they split between self-mining, hosting and equipment sales, and how concentrated hosting revenue is among unnamed customers, including what share any single customer such as Gryphon represents.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and internal successor on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, with the new CFO's base salary at $300,000 and unspecified separation benefits for the departing CFO. Claim #13994 records a further CFO departure on 2022-04-19. What has not been said is the dollar value of the separation package, the new CFO's equity and bonus components, and whether the April 19 entry is the same event or a second finance leadership change within weeks of the business combination closing (claim #20679).

Core Scientific disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #20684, #14179, #14188, #20702 and #20695. What has not been said is the physical site address, which utility will serve the load and on what interconnection schedule, and how much capital the build requires. Without those, how much of the 500 MW is contracted power rather than a planning figure?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW against a planned 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14182, #14183, #14184 and #14175. What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the power price and term in the Tenaska arrangement, or which party bears curtailment risk. Relatedly, on 2022-01-03 the company disclosed a power pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. Which facility and counterparty did that cap cover, and what pricing replaced it in 2022?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #19781. The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for its miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, cited as claims #19782, #19784 and #19783. What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW Gryphon has actually energized and paid for, whether any receivables or deposits are at risk, and whether the agreement was amended or terminated.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate and bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, cited as claims #14082 and #14081, with the amounts recorded only as 150.0 and 75.0 USD. The Blockcap acquisition of Radar Relay is likewise recorded only as 65.0 USD, cited as claim #14181. What has not been said is the unit (presumably millions), how much of each B. Riley facility was drawn, and the interest rate and repayment terms. The bridge notes, due 2022-12-07, are now marked delayed; were they repaid, extended or converted, and on what terms?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation and an internal successor at a $300,000 base salary, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, and on 2022-04-19 a $75,000 executive severance payment, cited as claim #13996. What has not been said is the successor's equity grant and bonus target, the dollar value of the former CFO's separation benefits, and why the CFO left during the de-SPAC transition.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s, cited as claim #19793. It also reported $544.5 million in 2021 results against $515 million in guidance, cited as claims #19791 and #19790. What has not been said is which metric that guidance and actual refer to, how much of it came from hosting versus self-mining, and which colocation customers account for the 7.9 EH/s. Does any single customer exceed 10% of revenue, and how much of that hashrate is Gryphon's?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement for 230 MW, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacks the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim #19782) and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784). What has not been said is whether the 230 MW agreement remains in force, how much of that capacity was ever energized or billed, and whether any deposits or receivables tied to Gryphon have been reserved against. If a hosting counterparty that large is in dispute, why is there no disclosed revenue exposure?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-05 colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s as of March 31, 2022, cited as claim #19793. What has not been said is who those colocation customers are, or what share of hosting revenue the largest one or two represent. Given the Gryphon dispute in claims #19781 through #19784, how concentrated is this customer base, and how many of these contracts carry take-or-pay or prepayment terms?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility was operational at 22 MW with a target of 300 MW, cited as claims #14182, #14178, #14183 and #20701, under a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14184 and #14175). What has not been said is the schedule for ramping from 22 MW to 300 MW, the capital required, or the power price and term under the Tenaska and City of Denton arrangement. Is the remaining 278 MW contracted and interconnected, or only planned?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14179 and #20702. What has not been said is the physical site, the utility providing interconnection, the energization date, or how many megawatts were under construction as distinct from merely permitted. When will the first megawatt at Muskogee come online, and who supplies the power?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" with a 2022-12-07 maturity, cited as claim #14081, and on 2022-03-29 a Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap recorded as "65.0 USD", cited as claim #14181. In both cases the unit is almost certainly millions, but the scale is not stated. What has also not been said is the interest rate, fees, and any conversion features on the B. Riley notes, and how the company planned to repay or refinance them at maturity. Separately, the company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility that cap covered or what rate replaced it in 2022.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation, a transition period, separation benefits, and a new CFO base salary of $300,000, cited as claims #14088, #14089, #14093 and #14092. What has not been said is the dollar value of the departing CFO's separation package, or the bonus target and equity grant for the incoming CFO. What did the transition cost in total, and why did the CFO leave within days of the business combination closing (claim #20679)?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as 75.0 USD (claim #14081), maturing by 2022-12-07, and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as 150.0 USD (claim #14082). What has not been said is the unit (presumably millions), the interest rate, any fees or warrants, the collateral, and how much of each facility was drawn. Why does the same counterparty sit on both sides of the debt and the equity backstop, and on what terms?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14179, #14188, #20684, #20695, #20702), with a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 that is now flagged not_yet_verifiable. What has not been said is the serving utility, the interconnection queue position or substation, the energization schedule, and how many megawatts were actually live at any reporting date. Did any of the 500 MW come online, and when?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW with an ultimate target of 300 MW (claims #14177, #14183, #14178, #20683, #20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184, #20699). What has not been said is the megawatt ramp schedule from 22 to 300, the power price or hedge structure under the Tenaska arrangement, and what Core Scientific pays the City of Denton. How many megawatts were energized at each subsequent quarter-end, and at what all-in cost per kWh?

The company disclosed a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD expiring December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). What has not been said is which facility or facilities the cap covered, what pricing replaced it on January 1, 2022, and how that change affected cost per bitcoin mined. Which sites lost the cap, and what is the new rate?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781), alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the money to buy the agreed miners, that a 1.7 billion USD NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claims #19782, #19784, #19785). What has not been said is whether the 230 MW contract remains in force, how much of it was ever energized or billed, and how the dispute was resolved. How much of the 497 MW operating capacity (claim #14173) or of reported revenue depended on Gryphon?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation with separation benefits and a successor at a 300,000 USD base salary (claims #14088, #14093, #14092). It also disclosed 7.9 EH/s of colocation customer hashrate at March 31, 2022 (claim #19793). What has not been said is the dollar value of the departing CFO's severance and accelerated equity, the incoming CFO's bonus and equity grant, and which named customers make up the 7.9 EH/s. Who are the largest hosting customers, and what share of hosting revenue does each represent?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #20702, #20684, #14179 and #20695. What has not been said is who supplies the power, what interconnection or substation serves the site, and when any first megawatts are expected to energize. Why does Denton name Tenaska Energy as its power partner while Muskogee names no utility or energization schedule?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas opened at 22 MW with a 300 MW ultimate target, cited as claims #14177, #20683, #20701, #14183 and #14184, with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton as partners (#14175). What has not been said is the phased ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the ERCOT interconnection queue position, and the economic terms of the Tenaska arrangement. Separately, the company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power pricing cap of 0.042 USD expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. Which facility and counterparty did that cap cover, and what pricing replaced it?

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacks the financial resources to fund its agreed miners (#19782, #19783, #19784). What has not been said is how much of the 497 MW operating capacity (#14173, #14186) and the 7.9 EH/s colocation hashrate as of March 31, 2022 (#19793) is attributable to Gryphon or any other single hosting customer. If Gryphon defaults, what are the remedies, deposits or exposure?

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081, recorded as 75.0 USD and due by 2022-12-07, plus a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as 150.0 USD (#14082). What has not been said in the extracted record is the unit (presumably millions), the interest rate, the amount drawn, and the facility's pricing discount and share cap. The same unit ambiguity applies to the 65.0 USD Radar Relay acquisition figure cited as claim #14181. Given the parties involved, what related-party or fee arrangements accompany the B. Riley financing?

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, transition period, separation benefits and a new CFO with a 300,000 USD base salary on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093. What has not been said is the dollar value of the former CFO's separation package, the reason for the departure shortly after listing (#20682), and the new CFO's equity grant and bonus target. A base salary alone is a small part of public-company executive pay.

The company disclosed 2021 financial guidance of 515 million USD on 2022-03-07 (#19790) and an actual of 544.5 million USD on 2022-03-29 (#19791), while separate allegations claim mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (#19785). What has not been said is which metric these figures measure (revenue or an adjusted earnings figure), how they split between self-mining and hosting, and the per-bitcoin all-in cost behind the profitability claims. Where is the 31-acre site leased in 2021 (#19017) located, and what is its capacity?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW, cited as claims #14177 and #20691, with a 300 MW ultimate target, cited as claims #14178, #14183, #14187 and #20701, under a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14184 and #14175. What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the capital budget and funding source for that build-out, and the interconnection and power-purchase terms with Denton Municipal Electric or ERCOT, including price, tenor and curtailment provisions. The operational launch dates in claims #14182 and #14192 are flagged as delayed, so when did the first megawatt actually energize?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center, cited as claims #14188, #14195, #20684 and #14179, under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority that is marked delayed, cited as claim #14185. What has not been said is a target energization date, the parcel or physical address, the serving utility and interconnection queue position, and whether the 500 MW figure reflects contracted power or only site potential. Has any capital been committed to Muskogee, and on what lease or ownership terms?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources to buy the agreed miners, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that Gryphon purchased $220.7 million of miners from BitFuFu, cited as claims #19782, #19784 and #19783. What has not been said is the hosting rate per kWh, the deployment schedule, which Core Scientific site was to host the 230 MW, how much was actually energized, and whether any revenue was recognized or receivables reserved against this counterparty. How much of the 497 MW operating base in claims #14173 and #14186 was ever allocated to Gryphon?

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and utility the agreement covers, whether the 0.042 figure is dollars per kWh, and what replacement pricing applies after expiry. Given the allegation of overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs in claim #19785, what is the post-cap all-in power cost per MWh, and how far does it move the breakeven?

The company disclosed 497 MW of operating capacity as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14173, #14186 and #20703, and a 31-acre lease for bitcoin mining in 2021 that is marked delayed, cited as claim #19017. What has not been said is the split of that 497 MW between self-mining and third-party hosting, the breakdown by site, and the location, lessor and energization status of the 31-acre lease. Which named hosting customers account for the hosted share?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million, cited as claim #19790, and 2021 actual results of $544.5 million, cited as claim #19791, alongside a $4 billion XPDI combination, cited as claims #20708 and #14170, and a Blockcap acquisition of Radar Relay recorded at 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14181, #14190 and #20688. What has not been said is which line item the $515 million and $544.5 million figures measure (revenue, total including hosting, or something else), whether the $4 billion is equity value or enterprise value, and whether the Radar Relay figure is $65 million and how it was paid. How much of the Radar consideration was ultimately impaired, given that claim #20706 leaves the future use of RADAR technology undefined?

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist and that Gryphon lacked the funds for its contracted miners (claims #19784 and #19782); what has not been said is which Core Scientific site was to host that 230 MW, on what energization schedule, and how much of the contracted hosting revenue, prepayments or receivables remain at risk if Gryphon cannot perform.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy was operational at 22 MW with a planned 300 MW build-out, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14175 and #14182, and the Denton timeline has since been marked delayed; what has not been said is the phased ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the ERCOT interconnection and substation status supporting the full load, and the economic terms of the Tenaska power arrangement.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center partnership with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14188 and #20684, with a February 2022 milestone now marked delayed; what has not been said is the physical site, the serving utility and interconnection queue position, the first-energization date, and the capital expenditure budgeted to reach 500 MW.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786; what has not been said is which facility and utility that cap covered, whether the figure is per kWh, what pricing replaced it after expiry, and the resulting change in power cost per bitcoin mined.

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 and 2021 actual results of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #19790 and #19791, while separate allegations claim overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs (claim #19785); what has not been said is which metric these figures measure (revenue, adjusted EBITDA or another measure), how the beat splits between self-mining and hosting, and what all-in breakeven cost per bitcoin underlies the profitability claims.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. on 2022-03-29 at a stated value of 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #20688, and the Blockcap combination itself (claims #14180 and #20707) slipped from a July 2021 milestone to completion in early 2022; what has not been said is the actual consideration amount and units for the RADAR deal, what the RADAR technology assets are to be used for (claim #20706), and whether any Core Scientific directors or executives held interests in Blockcap that would make the acquisition a related-party transaction.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14190, #20688 and #20698, and said it would make future use of the RADAR technology assets, cited as claim #20706. What has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration (dollars, thousands, millions, or shares), how much of it was carried into Core Scientific's purchase accounting, and which product or revenue line those RADAR assets actually feed.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility was operational at 22 MW with an expected ultimate capacity of 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14184 and #14175. The operational milestones themselves are tagged as delayed, cited as claims #14182 and #14192. What has not been said is the energization schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the interconnection or substation arrangement backing that figure, and the pricing and term of the Tenaska power supply.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #20694 and #20702, against a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 that is already marked delayed. What has not been said is how many of those megawatts were energized at signing, who supplies the power, what the phasing and capex schedule look like, and whether any of that 500 MW is already counted in the 497 MW of operating capacity reported as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14186 and #20703, for which no site-by-site breakdown was given.

The record contains a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement dated 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. It sits alongside allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement with Gryphon did not exist, that Gryphon lacked the funds for the agreed miners, and that a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase was involved, cited as claims #19784, #19782 and #19783. What has not been said is how much hosting revenue or backlog the company has attributed to Gryphon, whether the 230 MW was ever energized or contractually firm, and how the company has responded to the related allegation of overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs, cited as claim #19785.

The company disclosed a $0.042 power pricing cap expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is the utility or counterparty, which facilities it covered, what rate replaced it after expiry, and the resulting change in per-megawatt-hour cost in 2022 results. A related gap is the 31-acre lease from 2021, cited as claim #19017, which carries no disclosed location, lessor, or tie to any named facility.

The company guided to $515 million for 2021 and reported $544.5 million, cited as claims #19790 and #19791, following a $4 billion XPDI combination, cited as claims #20708 and #14170. What has not been said is how that result splits between self-mining, hosting, and equipment sales, what share came from its largest hosting customers (none are named apart from the Gryphon references), and what the closing date slippage on Blockcap, cited as claims #20707 and #14180, did to the combined figures.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded only as "65.0 USD", cited as claims #14172, #14190, #20698 and #20688, and that this deal was tied to a 2021-07-01 completion date, cited as claim #14181. What has not been said is the actual unit and form of that consideration: is it $65 million, and how much was cash versus stock? Also unexplained is what "future utilization of RADAR technology assets" (claim #20706) means in revenue or headcount terms for a bitcoin miner.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton came online at 22 MW, against an ultimate target of 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14184 and #14175. The operational date is itself recorded inconsistently, as 2022-02-01 in claim #14192 and 2022-02-28 in claim #14182. What has not been said is the phased energization schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the ERCOT interconnection and substation detail, and the power price and term Tenaska is supplying under.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #20694 and #20702, with a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 already marked delayed. What has not been said is the physical site, the utility and interconnection queue position, the expected first-energization date, and the capex budget and financing source for a build roughly equal to the company's entire 497 MW operating base (claims #14186, #14173).

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #19781. Alongside it sit allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist and that Gryphon lacked the funds for its miners, cited as claims #19784, #19782 and #19783. What has not been said is the contracted hosting revenue and deposits actually received from Gryphon, how much of the 230 MW was ever energized for it, and whether the allegations led to any write-down or customer-concentration disclosure.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power agreement whose pricing cap of $0.042 expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786, and a 31-acre lease for mining, cited as claim #19017. What has not been said is which facility and utility counterparty the cap applied to, what the post-cap rate per kWh became for 2022, and where the 31-acre site is and who the lessor is.

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 and 2021 actuals of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #19790 and #19791. What has not been said is which metric those figures measure, whether total revenue or a mining/hosting sub-line, and how the 497 MW operating capacity (claim #14186) split between self-mining and third-party hosting. A first-year analyst would need that split to reconcile the beat and the margin profile.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded only as "65.0 USD," cited as claims #14172, #14190, #20688, #20698 and #14181. What has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration. Is it $65 million, and how much was cash versus stock? With Blockcap itself folded into Core Scientific (#14171, #20707), how much of the RADAR price was carried onto Core's balance sheet as goodwill, and how much was later written down given the vague "future utilization of RADAR technology assets" language (#20706)?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW, cited as claims #14177 and #20691, with a final target of 300 MW, cited as claims #14178, #14183, #14187 and #20701. It also disclosed a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy whose promised date slipped, cited as claims #14184 and #14192. What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW by quarter, the interconnection and substation arrangements with Denton Municipal Electric, and Tenaska's economic role. Is Tenaska a power marketer, a counterparty with a revenue share, or a capacity guarantor?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center and a partnership with the Muskogee Port Authority, cited as claims #14179, #14188, #14195, #20684, #20694, #20695 and #20702. What has not been said is the physical site, the lease or ground terms with the Port Authority, the utility and interconnection queue position, and any target energization date. What is the first-phase megawatt figure, and when does Core expect it to be live?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #19781. That came alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (#19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (#19783), and an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (#19784). What has not been said is whether the 230 MW is counted in the 497 MW operating figure or in the Denton and Muskogee pipelines. How much in deposits or prepayments did Core actually collect from Gryphon, and what is the current status of the contract?

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power pricing cap of 0.042 USD expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and utility the cap covered, whether 0.042 is dollars per kWh, and what rate replaced it in 2022. Given the alleged overstatement of mining profitability and breakeven costs cited as claim #19785, what was the actual post-cap all-in power cost per MWh, and what was the breakeven cost per bitcoin?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07, cited as claim #19790, and an actual result of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claim #19791. It also disclosed 497 MW of operating capacity as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14173, #14186 and #20703, plus a 31-acre mining lease in 2021, cited as claim #19017. What has not been said is which line item the $515 million and $544.5 million measure, and how the 497 MW splits between self-mining and hosting customers by site. Where is the 31-acre parcel, who is the lessor, and is that lessor a related party?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #20684 and #20702, and the agreement's own 2022-02-28 milestone is already marked delayed. What has not been said is where the site physically is, which utility or transmission owner will interconnect it, what interconnection or load study has been filed, and how the 500 MW is phased by energization date. Without those details, the figure cannot be distinguished from a land-and-intent arrangement.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW against a 300 MW target, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #14184 and #14175. Both the 2021-10-31 agreement milestone and the 2022-02-28 operational milestone are marked delayed. What has not been said is the schedule and capital budget for moving from 22 MW to 300 MW, and whether Tenaska acts as power supplier, co-owner or merely an agent. The power price and term behind the Denton capacity have also not been disclosed.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations of a non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement and Gryphon lacking the resources to buy its miners, cited as claims #19784, #19782 and #19783. What has not been said is how much of the reported 497 MW operating capacity (claims #20703 and #14186) and the 2021 revenue is attributable to Gryphon or other unnamed hosting customers. The company also has not stated whether the Gryphon contract remains in force, what deposits it holds, and how it has responded to the overstated-breakeven allegation in claim #19785.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786, which is marked delayed. What has not been said is which facility and counterparty that contract covers and what per-kWh rate replaced it. The company also has not disclosed how much of its fleet's power cost is now uncapped or floating, which bears directly on the breakeven figures disputed in claim #19785.

The company disclosed that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded only as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14190, #20688 and #14181, with the Blockcap and Radar closings themselves marked delayed in claims #14180 and #20707. What has not been said is whether that figure is in thousands or millions and what mix of cash and stock made it up. The company also has not explained what the 'future utilization of RADAR technology assets' in claim #20706 concretely means, or whether any of it has since been impaired.

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 and actual 2021 results of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #19790 and #19791. It also disclosed the roughly $4 billion XPDI combination, cited as claim #20708. What has not been said is which line item those figures measure (total revenue, self-mining or hosting) and how much hosting revenue came from related parties or insiders. The proxy-level disclosure is also missing sponsor earnouts and executive compensation tied to the merger valuation, and the 31-acre lease in claim #19017 was never tied to a named site or landlord.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded only as "65.0 USD," cited as claims #14172, #14181, #14190, #20688 and #20698, and later said it would use the RADAR technology assets in the future (claim #20706). What has not been said is the actual unit and form of that consideration. Was it $65 million or some other scale, and was it paid in cash, Blockcap stock or later Core Scientific shares? What concrete product or revenue line have the RADAR assets produced since, given the original 2021-07-01 completion target is marked delayed?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened with 22 MW of initial capacity against a 300 MW ultimate target, cited as claims #14177, #20691, #14183, #20683 and #20701. It developed the site with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184), and the operational launch promised for 2022-02-01 is marked delayed (claim #14192). What has not been said is the schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the interconnection or substation capacity actually committed, and Tenaska's economic role. Is Tenaska a power marketer, a counterparty with take-or-pay terms, or an equity participant?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #14188, #14195, #20694 and #20702, with a 2022-02-28 milestone now marked delayed. What has not been said is the physical site, the utility and interconnection queue position, the energization date for any first phase, and what capital commitment or lease obligation the agreement created. Is 500 MW a contracted power allocation or an aspirational build-out figure?

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD expired on 2021-12-31, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is the counterparty, which facility or facilities the cap covered, the unit (presumably per kWh), and the volume of load affected. What pricing replaced the cap from January 2022 onward, and what was the resulting change in per-unit power cost?

The record contains a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781, 2022-03-03), alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for its agreed miners (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is how much of Core's hosting revenue or backlog depended on Gryphon. Did the 230 MW ever energize, and did the company take any reserve, impairment or contract revision after these allegations surfaced?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515.0 million (claim #19790, 2022-03-07) and actual 2021 results of $544.5 million (claim #19791, 2022-03-29), and it reported 497 MW of operating capacity as of 2022-01-31 (claims #14173, #14186, #20703). What has not been said is which metric those dollar figures measure, whether revenue or adjusted EBITDA, and how the 497 MW splits between self-mining and third-party hosting. What is the per-site breakdown? Where are the 31 leased acres of claim #19017, and why is that lease marked delayed?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc., cited as claims #14172, #14181, #14190, #20688 and #20698, with the consideration recorded only as "65.0 USD." What has not been said is the actual unit and form of that consideration: was it $65 million, and how much was paid in cash versus stock? The record also does not say how the RADAR technology assets referenced in claim #20706 are being used or valued after the Core Scientific business combination.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. The same date's record also carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the miners it had agreed to buy (#19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (#19784), and a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (#19783). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was actually energized and billed, what deposits or prepayments Gryphon had made, and how that capacity would be redeployed if the counterparty could not perform.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #14195 and #20702. Claim #14185 is now marked delayed against a 2022-02-28 date. What has not been said is the site address, the serving utility and interconnection status, the phasing schedule toward 500 MW, and what caused the slip past February 2022.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW (#14177, #20691) with a 300 MW target (#14183, #14193, #20683), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (#14175, #14184). Claims #14184 and #14192 are marked delayed against late-2021 and early-2022 dates. What has not been said is the megawatt-by-quarter ramp from 22 MW to 300 MW, the economic terms of Tenaska's role, and the contracted power price at the site.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facilities and how many megawatts that agreement covered, what pricing replaced the cap, and how much the change affected mining cost per bitcoin. The question carries more weight because claim #19785 alleges that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated.

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 (#19790) and actual 2021 results of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29 (#19791), alongside 497 MW of operating capacity (#14173, #14186, #20703). What has not been said is which metric the $515 million and $544.5 million figures measure (revenue or adjusted EBITDA), and how the 497 MW splits by site and between self-mining and hosting customers. Relatedly, the 31-acre lease in claim #19017 has no stated location, and the $4 billion XPDI transaction value in claim #20708 is not identified as equity value or enterprise value.

The company disclosed total operational capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173, #14186 and #20703; what has not been said is how that figure splits across individual sites, and how much of it serves self-mining versus third-party hosting customers. Is the 497 MW nameplate power, contracted power or energized miner load, and how many hosting customers sit behind it?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14195, #14194 and #20702, with a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 that is now marked delayed; what has not been said is the parcel location, the serving utility, the interconnection queue position, or any energization schedule. What portion of the 500 MW has a signed power supply agreement, and on what timeline will it be delivered?

The company disclosed a Denton, Texas facility with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton on 2022-03-29, starting at 22 MW and targeting 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14184, #14175 and #20691; what has not been said is the phase-by-phase schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the capital required, or the economic terms of Tenaska's role. Separately, the company disclosed a power pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786; at which site did that cap apply, and what is the post-cap rate?

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at a figure recorded as 65.0 USD on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14172, #14181, #20688 and #20698; what has not been said is the actual unit and form of that consideration, whether $65 million in cash, stock or something else. How will the RADAR technology assets referenced in claim #20706 be used, or have they been impaired?

The company disclosed a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement and related BitFuFu and NuMiner figures of $220.7 million and $1.7 billion on 2022-03-03, cited as claims #19781, #19783 and #19784, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund the miners and that profitability was overstated, cited as claims #19782 and #19785; what has not been said is whether any of that 230 MW was ever energized or billed. How much hosting revenue, if any, has been recognized from Gryphon, and what is the counterparty-credit exposure?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 and actual 2021 results of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #19790 and #19791, in the context of a roughly $4 billion XPDI combination, cited as claim #20708; what has not been said is whether these figures are revenue or another metric, and how they break down between hosting, equipment sales and self-mining. Which customers exceed 10 percent of the total, and what sponsor or insider compensation accompanied the merger?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14190, #20688 and #20698, with a promised completion of 2021-07-01 marked delayed in claim #14181. What has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration. Was it $65 million or some other scale, and how much was cash versus Blockcap equity later converted into Core Scientific shares? The filings also leave out what RADAR's assets or team actually contributed after the combination.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #20702, #20694 and #14179. The expected date of 2022-02-28 is marked delayed. What has not been said is the site's physical parcel, its utility counterparty and interconnection point, and the energization schedule. How many of the 500 MW had a signed power supply and a firm in-service date, versus being aspirational capacity?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas became operational at 22 MW, against a stated ultimate capacity of 300 MW with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy. This is cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #14184 and #20691, and the partnership milestone of 2021-10-31 is marked delayed. What has not been said is the quarter-by-quarter ramp from 22 MW to 300 MW, and the pricing, term and curtailment provisions of the Tenaska power arrangement. An analyst would also ask how much capex remained to reach full build-out.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expiring December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and which utility that contract covers, and what the post-expiry rate became. How much of the 497 MW operating capacity reported as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14173, #14186, #20703) was exposed to the uncapped pricing?

On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781). Alongside it are allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for its agreed miners (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783). What has not been said is how much of Core Scientific's hosting backlog and revenue depended on Gryphon. Did the company receive the deposits or prepayments that secured that 230 MW, and how was the capacity reallocated if Gryphon could not perform?

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 (claim #19790) and reported $544.5 million on 2022-03-29 (claim #19791). What has not been said is which line item these figures measure and how the beat splits between self-mining and hosting. How much came from the Blockcap fleet consolidated after the delayed closing (claims #20707, #14180)? The company also disclosed a 31-acre lease in 2021 (claim #19017), marked delayed, without naming the location, the lessor, or which facility it supports.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc., cited as claims #14172, #14181, #14190, #20688 and #20698, with the value recorded only as "65.0 USD". What has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration: was it $65 million, was it paid in cash, stock or assumed liabilities, and what has become of the RADAR technology assets it said it would use in the future (claim #20706)?

On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement (claim #19781) and a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase by Gryphon (claim #19783). The same date carries allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), that Gryphon lacked the money to pay for the miners (claim #19782), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was ever energized for Gryphon, what deposits or prepayments Gryphon actually paid, and whether the company formally rebutted or corrected any of these allegations.

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14179, #14185, #14188 and #20684, and the #14185 milestone was already marked delayed against a 2022-02-28 date. What has not been said is the site address, the utility and interconnection arrangement, the power price, and a phased energization schedule showing when any of the 500 MW would come online.

Denton, Texas was described on 2022-03-29 as operational at 22 MW with a 300 MW target, cited as claims #14182, #20691, #20692 and #14193, and developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175 and #14184). What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the capital needed for the build-out, and the pricing and term of the Tenaska power supply. Separately, a $0.042 power pricing cap was disclosed as expiring on 2021-12-31 (claim #19786), but the company has not said which facility and counterparty it covered or what rate replaced it.

The company gave 2021 guidance of $515 million (claim #19790) on 2022-03-07 and reported $544.5 million in actuals (claim #19791) on 2022-03-29, and it reported 497 MW of operating capacity as of 2022-01-31 (claims #14186, #14173 and #20703). What has not been said is which metric those dollar figures measure, whether revenue or adjusted EBITDA. Nor has it said how the 497 MW splits between self-mining and hosting, or who the largest hosting customers are and what share of revenue they represent.

The company disclosed the XPDI business combination valued at $4 billion (claim #20708) and the Blockcap acquisition (claims #14171, #20687 and #20707). What has not been said is whether Blockcap had any related-party ties to Core Scientific insiders at the time of the deal, how its purchase price was set, and how the 31 acres leased in 2021 (claim #19017) tie to a named site and lessor.

Core Scientific disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #20702 and #20695. Claim #14185 carried a 2022-02-28 milestone that is now marked delayed. What has not been said is where the site physically sits, which utility or interconnection queue position serves it, and how much of the 500 MW is contracted, energized, or merely permitted. On what date was the first megawatt expected to come online, and what caused the delay?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility was operational at 22 MW with a 300 MW target, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #20691 and #20692, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14184 and #14175). Both the launch date (claim #14182) and the development agreement (claim #14184) are marked delayed. What has not been said is the phased ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the capital budget for that build-out, or the power price and term under the Tenaska arrangement. How many megawatts were expected at Denton by the end of 2022?

The company disclosed 497 MW of operating capacity as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14186, #14173 and #20703. The milestone in claim #14186 is marked delayed. What has not been said is how that figure breaks down by site, and how it splits between self-mining and hosted customer capacity. It is also unclear whether 497 MW means energized load, contracted power, or nameplate. What was the utilization rate, and what share of the 497 MW was committed to its largest hosting customer?

The company disclosed that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility and utility the cap covered, how many megawatts it applied to, and what pricing replaced it. What was the post-expiry cost per kWh, and how did it affect the reported breakeven cost per bitcoin?

The record includes a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations dated 2022-03-03. Those allegations say Gryphon lacked the financial resources for its miner commitments (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was actually energized for Gryphon, what deposits or prepayments Core Scientific held, and what revenue it recognized from Gryphon. What was its credit exposure if Gryphon could not perform?

The company disclosed that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #20688 and #14181. It also referenced future use of RADAR technology assets (claim #20706). The unit is left ambiguous: it is unclear whether this means dollars, thousands, or millions, or whether it was cash or stock. The total consideration for Core Scientific's own Blockcap acquisition (claims #14171, #20707) is also not stated, even though that closing slipped past its 2022-01-20 target. What were the purchase price and goodwill, and what product or revenue has RADAR's technology produced since?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay, Inc. for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD (claims #20698, #20688, #14190, #14172, #14181). What has not been said is the unit (thousands? millions?) and the form of that consideration, meaning the cash, stock and earnout split. It also has not said what the RADAR technology assets are actually being used for (claim #20706), given the acquisition was flagged against a 2021-07-01 date and marked delayed.

On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781). The same record carries allegations that Gryphon lacks the financial resources for its agreed miners (claim #19782), that Gryphon made a $220.7M BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783), and that a $1.7B NuMiner agreement never existed (claim #19784). What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW Gryphon actually energized or paid for, what deposits or security Core holds, and whether any Gryphon-related revenue or receivables were recognized or impaired.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas went live at 22 MW against an ultimate 300 MW target (claims #20691, #20692, #14178, #14182), under an arrangement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14184, #14175). What has not been said is the phasing schedule and capex to get from 22 MW to 300 MW, the interconnection and substation detail, and the economic terms Tenaska and the city receive. Relatedly, a $0.042 power-pricing cap expired on 2021-12-31 (claim #19786), and the company has not said which facility that cap covered or what rate replaced it.

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #20694, #14185, #14179, #20702). What has not been said is an energization timeline, the serving utility and interconnection status, site acreage, or the lease and incentive terms owed to the Port Authority, even though the agreement was pegged to 2022-02-28 and is marked delayed.

The company reported 497 MW of operating capacity as of 2022-01-31 (claims #14186, #20703, #14173). It separately disclosed a 31-acre mining lease in 2021 with no named site (claim #19017). What has not been said is the per-site breakdown of that 497 MW, or how much of it serves self-mining versus third-party hosting clients such as Gryphon.

On 2022-03-07 the company gave 2021 guidance of $515M (claim #19790), and on 2022-03-29 it reported $544.5M of 2021 actuals (claim #19791). What has not been said is which metric these figures measure (revenue or adjusted EBITDA), or the split between hosting, equipment sales and self-mining. That split matters because the 2022-03-03 record includes allegations that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785).

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14190, #20688 and #20698, with the original completion target of 2021-07-01 marked delayed in claim #14181. What has not been said is the unit of that number (thousands, millions, or equity-equivalent value), how it was split between cash and stock, and what "future utilization of RADAR technology assets" (claim #20706) actually means in product, headcount or capital terms.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a Denton, Texas partnership with Tenaska (claim #14175) that opened at 22 MW (claims #14177, #20691) against a 300 MW target (claims #14178, #20692, #20701), and the February 2022 operational date in claim #14192 is marked delayed. What has not been said is the ERCOT interconnection and substation details, the energization schedule for the remaining 278 MW, who owns or finances the buildout, and what power price Tenaska is supplying.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14195, #20694 and #20702, with the 2022-02-28 milestone marked delayed. What has not been said is the physical parcel or address, the serving utility and interconnection queue position, lease or incentive terms with the Port Authority, and when the first megawatt is expected to energize.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781), alongside allegations that Gryphon lacks the financial resources for its miner purchases (claim #19782), that a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783) and a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claim #19784) may not exist as described, and that mining profitability was overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is the hosting contract's term, the deposits or collateral Core holds from Gryphon, how much of the 497 MW operating base (claims #14173, #20703) is committed to Gryphon, and what the company's exposure is if Gryphon cannot pay.

The company disclosed on 2022-01-03 that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786 and marked delayed. What has not been said is which facility and utility that contract covers, whether the cap is per kWh, what rate replaced it in 2022, and how much of total power cost it affected.

The company disclosed 2021 guidance of $515 million on 2022-03-07 (claim #19790) and an actual of $544.5 million on 2022-03-29 (claim #19791), against a $4 billion XPDI transaction value (claim #20708). What has not been said is which metric those figures represent (revenue or adjusted EBITDA), the split between hosting and self-mining, how the 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claim #14186) is divided by site and between hosted and self-mined, and where the 31 acres leased in 2021 (claim #19017) are located and who the landlord is.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 a bridge promissory note facility from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as 75.0 USD (claim #14081) and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as 150.0 USD (claim #14082), both now marked delayed. What has not been said is the unit scale (presumably millions), how much of the bridge was actually drawn, the interest rate and fees, and whether the equity facility was signed by its 2022-06-06 deadline or the requirement was waived.

The company disclosed total operating power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14186 and #14173), then reported 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988). What has not been said is why roughly 40 MW of operating capacity disappeared in under three months. Was it a site going offline, a curtailment agreement, a customer departure, or a change in how capacity is counted?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW (claims #14177 and #14182) and would eventually reach 300 MW (claims #14178, #14183, #14187 and #13932), developed with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton (claims #14175 and #14184). What has not been said is the dated ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the economic terms of the Tenaska and city agreements, and the ERCOT interconnection and demand-response arrangements that govern how much of that capacity can actually run.

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14195, #14188, #14179 and #13933), with the agreement milestone marked delayed. What has not been said is the site address, the utility or generation source, the interconnection status, the energization date, or any capital budget for the facility. Without these, it is unclear whether the 500 MW is contracted power or only a planning figure.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03 (claim #14181 is the Radar deal; the hosting agreement is claim #19781). Allegations recorded the same day say Gryphon lacked the financial resources to buy the agreed miners and that a 1.7 billion USD NuMiner agreement did not exist (claims #19782, #19783 and #19784). Separately, colocation customer hashrate was reported at 7.9 EH/s and 8.1 EH/s (claims #19793 and #19794) without naming any customers. What has not been said is how much of that hosted capacity and revenue depends on Gryphon or any other single customer, whether the Gryphon agreement remains in force, and how the dispute was resolved.

The company disclosed a power pricing cap of 0.042 USD, presumably per kWh, that expired on December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). It also disclosed the CFO's departure with a 75,000 USD severance payment and vesting of 1,400,000 restricted stock units (claims #13994, #13996, #13997 and #14093), while the new CFO's disclosed pay is only a 300,000 USD base salary (claim #14092). What has not been said is which facility and utility the expired cap covered and what rate replaced it. Nor has the company given the dollar value of the departing CFO's accelerated equity, the reason for the departure, or the new CFO's equity and bonus terms.

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03 (claim #19781). The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for its agreed miners (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is how many of those 230 MW were actually energized for Gryphon, what deposits or prepayments Core Scientific held against the contract, and whether the $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim #19783) was a precondition to that capacity being delivered. How much revenue and backlog exposure does Core Scientific carry to a counterparty whose solvency is itself in dispute?

The company disclosed total operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14173 and #14186), then 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988). Colocation customer hashrate rose from 7.9 EH/s on March 31 (claim #19793) to 8.1 EH/s on April 30 (claim #19794). What has not been said is why reported power capacity fell by roughly 40 MW while hosted hashrate grew. Was capacity decommissioned, reclassified, or re-measured on a different basis? And which named colocation customers account for that 8.1 EH/s, and what share of it belongs to any single customer?

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, with a promised date of 2022-02-28 now marked delayed (claims #14185, #14195, #14188, #14179 and #13933). The 2021 lease of 31 acres (claim #19017) was also disclosed without a named site. What has not been said is the physical parcel, the serving utility, the interconnection queue position or signed interconnection agreement, and a phased energization schedule for the 500 MW. What capital budget sits behind that figure, and how much of it is already committed?

The company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW (claims #14177, #14182 and #13931), with an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims #14187, #14183, #14178, #14193 and #13932), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175 and #14184). It also disclosed a power pricing cap of $0.042 that expired December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). What has not been said is the date and interim milestones for reaching 300 MW, what share of Denton output Tenaska supplies and at what price, and which facility's power contract the expired cap belonged to. What is the replacement all-in cost per kWh now that the cap has lapsed?

The company disclosed B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge promissory notes recorded as 75.0 USD, due 2022-12-07 (claim #14081), and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as 150.0 USD, due 2022-06-06 (claim #14082). Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay was likewise recorded as 65.0 USD (claims #14172, #14181 and #14190). What has not been said, in the record as captured, is the unit of these figures, presumably millions. What are the interest rate, fees and warrant coverage on the notes, how much has been drawn under the equity facility and at what discount, and whether the Radar Relay price was paid in cash or stock?

The company disclosed a CFO transition on 2022-04-04. That included a $300,000 base salary for the incoming CFO (claim #14092), unspecified separation benefits for the outgoing CFO (claims #14093 and #14089), a $75,000 severance payment (claim #13996), and vesting of 1.4 million restricted stock units (claim #13997). What has not been said is the incoming CFO's bonus target and equity grant, and whether the 1.4 million RSUs were accelerated under the separation agreement or vested on schedule. What was the grant-date value of those units, and why did the finance chief depart within days of the 10-K filing (claim #14170 context, 2022-03-29)?

The company reported operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29 (claims #14186 and #14173), then reported operational power capacity of 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988). What has not been said is why roughly 40 MW disappeared in under three months. Was capacity taken offline, reclassified, lost with a hosting customer, or measured on a different basis, and which sites account for the difference?

On 2022-03-29 the company disclosed that the Denton, Texas facility started at 22 MW (claims #14177 and #14182) with an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims #14178, #14183, #14187 and #14193), under agreements with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175 and #14184). The Muskogee, Oklahoma facility was described as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14188 and #13933). What has not been said is the energization schedule, the interconnection or utility service agreement, or the capital cost behind either build-out. Separately, the 2021 lease of 31 acres (claim #19017) was disclosed without naming the site. Which site is it, and how much of the 278 MW Denton gap and the full 500 MW Muskogee plan is actually contracted with the grid today?

The company disclosed B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge promissory notes of 75 and a required committed equity facility of 150 with a B. Riley affiliate on 2022-04-07 (claims #14081 and #14082). It also disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at 65 (claims #14172, #14181 and #14190). In all three cases the scale, presumably millions of USD, was left implicit. What has not been said is the interest rate, collateral and conversion terms on the notes, and the pricing discount on the equity line. Was the Radar Relay figure cash, stock, or a mix?

On 2022-01-03 the company disclosed that a power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD expired December 31, 2021 (claim #19786). The unit, presumably per kWh, the facility and the utility counterparty were not identified. What has not been said is what rate replaced the cap and how much it raised power cost per bitcoin mined in 2022. Which sites were exposed to the change?

The company disclosed colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s at March 31, 2022 and 8.1 EH/s at April 30, 2022 (claims #19793 and #19794). It also disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim #19781), alongside recorded allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund its miners and that a 1.7 billion USD NuMiner agreement did not exist (claims #19782, #19784 and #19785). What has not been said is how much of the colocation hashrate is attributable to Gryphon or any other single customer. How was the hosting revenue concentration disclosed, and did the 230 MW deployment ever materialize?

The April 2022 CFO transition disclosed a new CFO base salary of 300,000 USD (claim #14092), a 75,000 USD severance payment, and vesting of 1.4 million restricted stock units for the departing executive (claims #13996 and #13997). What has not been said is the new CFO's equity grant and bonus target. What was the dollar value of the accelerated RSUs at vesting, and why were those units accelerated rather than forfeited?

The company reported total operating power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, and then reported operational power capacity of 457 MW on April 20, 2022, cited as claim #13988. What has not been said is why reported capacity fell by 40 MW in under three months. Were sites taken offline, were colocation contracts terminated, or were the two figures measured on different bases?

The company disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on March 3, 2022, cited as claim #19781, alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources to buy the agreed miners and that its $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, cited as claims #19782 and #19784. What has not been said is how much of the 230 MW was ever energized for Gryphon, what deposits or receivables Core Scientific holds against that counterparty, and whether the allegations reached litigation or a contract termination.

Colocation customer hashrate was reported at 7.9 EH/s on March 31, 2022 and 8.1 EH/s on April 30, 2022, cited as claims #19793 and #19794. What has not been said is who those customers are, how concentrated the book is among them, and the remaining contract terms. Without that, a reader cannot tell whether the Gryphon exposure is material to hosting revenue.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma facility was repeatedly described as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14179, #14195 and #13933, and the agreement milestone of February 28, 2022 is flagged as delayed. Similarly, Denton was stated at 22 MW initial versus 300 MW final with Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14175 and #14184. What has not been said is the site address, the utility interconnection or queue position, the phasing schedule, and the power price under the Tenaska arrangement. This matters because a $0.042 power pricing cap expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786, and the replacement price and the site it governed were never identified.

The B. Riley financing was recorded as a $150.0 committed equity facility and $75.0 of bridge promissory notes, cited as claims #14082 and #14081, and the Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap as $65.0, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190. Merger proceeds of $195.0 million were cited as claim #13929. What has not been said is the unit of the B. Riley and Radar figures, presumably millions. The disclosures also omit the bridge notes' interest rate and covenants, how much of the equity facility was drawn and at what discount, and why the June 6, 2022 facility milestone slipped.

The CFO departure and appointment of April 4, 2022 were disclosed with a $300,000 base salary, $75,000 in severance and 1.4 million RSUs vesting, cited as claims #14092, #13996 and #13997. What has not been said is the reason for the departure, the dollar value of the accelerated RSUs at vesting, and whether the former CFO's transition role carried consulting fees. Separately, 2021 guidance of $515 million and actual results of $544.5 million, cited as claims #19790 and #19791, never name the metric: revenue, adjusted EBITDA, or something else. That makes the reported beat impossible to evaluate against the alleged overstatement of mining profitability in claim #19785.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14186 and #14173, then reported 457 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988. What has not been said is what explains the 40 MW drop in under three months: was capacity lost at a site, was a hosting contract terminated, or does the later figure use a different definition, such as energized versus contracted capacity?

The company disclosed colocation customer hashrate of 7.9 EH/s at March 31, 2022 and 8.1 EH/s at April 30, 2022, cited as claims #19793 and #19794. It also disclosed a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining on 2022-03-03, cited as claim #19781. Alongside that agreement, the record includes allegations that Gryphon lacked the funds for its contracted miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, cited as claims #19782 and #19784. What has not been said is how much of the colocation hashrate and hosting revenue Gryphon represents, who the other hosting customers are, and what deposits, collateral or reserves protect the company if Gryphon cannot pay.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW, with a final target of 300 MW, under an agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14184 and #14175. The development agreement was tracked as delayed against an October 2021 date. What has not been said is the energization schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the interconnection and ERCOT load arrangements, and the power price and term Tenaska is supplying. A related question is what replaced the $0.042 power pricing cap that expired December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786, and at which site that cap applied.

The company repeatedly cited a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14195 and #13925. The agreement was tracked as delayed against a February 28, 2022 date. Separately, it disclosed a 31-acre lease for bitcoin mining, cited as claim #19017. What has not been said is the physical parcel and utility interconnection for Muskogee, whether the 31-acre lease is that site or another one, the first-energization date, and how the capital expenditure will be funded.

The company disclosed B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge notes recorded as 75.0 USD, maturing by December 7, 2022, and a required 150.0 USD committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, cited as claims #14081 and #14082. It also recorded the Blockcap acquisition of Radar Relay as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172 and #14181. What has not been said is the unit scale of these figures (presumably millions), plus the note interest rate and fees, amounts actually drawn, the pricing discount on the equity facility, and the refinancing plan ahead of the December 2022 maturity.

The company announced a CFO resignation and internal successor on 2022-04-04, setting the new CFO's base salary at $300,000, cited as claims #14088, #14090 and #14092. It separately disclosed a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs for the departing executive, cited as claims #13996 and #13997. What has not been said is why the CFO left, the new CFO's bonus target and equity grant, and the dollar value of the accelerated RSUs relative to the cash severance. There is also an unexplained gap between 2021 guidance of $515 million and reported results of $544.5 million, cited as claims #19790 and #19791: which metric those figures measure, and how much of the beat came from self-mining versus hosting.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that total operational power capacity was 497 MW as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, then reported 457 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988. What has not been said is why roughly 40 MW disappeared in under three months. Was capacity decommissioned, re-measured on a different basis (energized versus contracted), or lost when a hosting customer left? How does the figure split between self-mining and colocation?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-03 a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining, cited as claim #14181-adjacent claim #19781. The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to buy its contracted miners (claim #19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim #19784), and that mining profitability was overstated (claim #19785). What has not been said is whether the Gryphon contract was ever energized, terminated, or litigated to resolution, and how much of the 7.9 and 8.1 EH/s of colocation hashrate reported on 2022-04-05 and 2022-05-05 (claims #19793, #19794) belongs to Gryphon versus other customers who remain unnamed. What is the customer concentration behind that hosting revenue?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #14188 and #14195, and reiterated it on 2022-05-04 as claim #13933. Claim #14185 is already flagged delayed. What has not been said is the site parcel, the serving utility, the interconnection queue position or substation capacity, and an energization schedule. How many of the 500 MW are contracted power versus aspirational build-out, and what capital is budgeted for it?

The company disclosed Denton, Texas going live at 22 MW against a 300 MW target, with Tenaska Energy as partner, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #13932 and #14175. The operational date was flagged delayed in claims #14182 and #14192. Separately, on 2022-01-03 it disclosed that a power pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021, cited as claim #19786. What has not been said is which facility that cap covered and what replaced it. What is the megawatt ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, and what is the all-in power cost per kWh under the Tenaska and City of Denton arrangement after the cap lapsed?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, cited as claims #14081 and #14082. Both amounts are recorded only as 75.0 and 150.0 USD, and both are flagged delayed. What has not been said, in unambiguous units, is the principal and facility size, which are presumably millions. Also missing are the interest rate, maturity, and covenants on the notes, whether the equity facility was actually executed by its 2022-06-06 deadline, and how many shares have been sold under it and at what discount.

The company disclosed a CFO transition on 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19, cited as claims #14088 through #14093 and #13994 through #13997. These include a $75,000 severance payment, 1.4 million RSUs vesting for the departing executive, and a $300,000 base salary for the successor. What has not been said is the reason for the departure so soon after the business combination (claim #14170), and why 1.4 million units vested on exit, whether accelerated or scheduled. What equity grant, bonus target, or performance conditions accompany the new CFO's base pay? Relatedly, the Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap is recorded only as 65.0 USD (claims #14172, #14181, #14190). What was the actual consideration and its cash-versus-stock mix, and how did Core Scientific value that asset after acquiring Blockcap (claim #14171)?

The company reported operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186) and repeated that figure on 2022-05-12 (claim 13921). On 2022-04-20 it cited 457 MW (claim 13988). What has not been said is why the two figures differ by 40 MW, which number is current, and whether either one measures energized, hashing load rather than contracted or nameplate power.

On 2022-03-29 the company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility began operating at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182) and will reach 300 MW when complete (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 13932). It also named the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy as partners (claims 14175, 14184). What has not been said is the timeline and capex for the remaining 278 MW, the site's grid interconnection and ERCOT load-approval status, and the pricing, term, and curtailment provisions of the Tenaska power arrangement.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14195, 13933, 13925). The promised-by date of 2022-02-28 is marked delayed. What has not been said is the site's physical location, the serving utility and interconnection capacity, any energization or phasing schedule, and the lease, tax-abatement, or other economic terms granted by the port authority.

On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed a $150 committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, required by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082), and $75 in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081). The units, presumably millions, were left implicit. What has not been said is the notes' interest rate, fees, and security, how much of each facility has been drawn, the discount and dilution terms of the equity line, and why both commitments carry delayed status.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and internal replacement on 2022-04-04, with a $300,000 base salary (claims 14088, 14090, 14091, 14092). It also disclosed a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs for the departing executive (claims 13996, 13997), plus a June 2022 RSU amendment net-settling 50 million shares and canceling 17 million for tax withholding (claims 13892, 13893). What has not been said is whether the 1.4 million units were accelerated, their grant-date and settlement value, which executives benefited from the net-settlement amendment, and how much cash the company paid to cover the withholding taxes.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of RADAR (Radar Relay) at a figure recorded only as 65.0 USD (claims 14172, 14181, 14190) and said it would develop DeFi products (claim 13928). It also cited a $195 million allocation of merger proceeds (claim 13929). What has not been said is the actual consideration and its cash/stock mix, what revenue or product RADAR has produced since closing, and how the $195 million was allocated by line item.

The company disclosed leasing 31 acres for bitcoin mining in 2021 (claim 19017), now marked delayed. What has not been said is where that land is, which facility it corresponds to, and what power capacity it is expected to support.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-12 (claims #14173, #14186, #13921), but a 2022-04-20 disclosure put it at 457 MW (claim #13988). Which figure is correct, what caused the 40 MW swing, and does "operational" mean energized and hashing, or merely contracted and hosted, including third-party hosting-customer load?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW and would reach 300 MW on completion, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #14175, #14184). The launch and agreement dates are marked delayed. What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the power pricing or offtake terms with Tenaska, the ERCOT interconnection status, and the capex budget for the remaining 278 MW. How much of the 300 MW is actually secured versus aspirational?

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, repeated on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #14185, #14195, #14179, #13933, #13924). Its promised date of 2022-02-28 is marked delayed. What has not been said is the site address, the utility and interconnection queue position, the energization timeline, the lease or incentive economics with the Port Authority, and whether any capacity at Muskogee has been energized at all. The same gap applies to the 31-acre lease disclosed for 2021 (claim #19017), which has no stated location or capacity.

The company disclosed B. Riley financing on 2022-04-07: a required committed equity facility of 150 and bridge promissory notes of 75 (claims #14082, #14081). Both deadlines are marked delayed. The units are left as bare "USD"; presumably they are millions, but that is not stated. What has not been said is the interest rate and fees on the bridge notes, the discount to market on equity draws, how much has actually been drawn or sold, and whether the 2022-12-07 maturity was met, extended or refinanced.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at a value of 65 (claims #14172, #14181, #14190) and cited DeFi product development as a use of merger proceeds (claims #13928, #13929). What has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration (cash, stock or earnout), how much of the $195 million in merger proceeds actually went to DeFi work, and what revenue, users or launch dates, if any, those products produced. Was the RADAR goodwill later impaired?

The company disclosed an April 2022 CFO transition with a $300,000 base salary for the incoming CFO, a $75,000 severance payment and 1.4 million RSUs vesting for the departing executive (claims #14088, #14090, #14092, #13996, #13997). It also disclosed a June 2022 RSU amendment net-settling 50 million shares with 17 million withheld for taxes (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is the new CFO's target bonus and equity grant, the reason for the departure, which insiders benefited from the net-settlement amendment, and the cash cost to the company of remitting withholding taxes on those 17 million shares.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14173, #14186 and #13921, but reported 457 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988. The 40 MW gap has never been reconciled. Which sites account for the difference, was capacity taken offline or reclassified, and which figure is the correct baseline?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW and would grow to 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182 and #13932. It also disclosed a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14184 and #13922. It has not given a ramp schedule, an interconnection or ERCOT load-approval status, or the economic terms of the Tenaska power arrangement. At what pace and power price does Denton reach 300 MW?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-04 a 500 MW data center partnership with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14195, #14188 and #13933. The original promised date is already flagged as delayed. It has not disclosed a site address, a utility or interconnection counterparty, a capex estimate, or energization milestones. What has actually been built toward that 500 MW, and when is first power expected?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 a $75 bridge note facility from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150 committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, cited as claims #14081 and #14082. Both carry ambiguous units, presumably millions. What is still missing: the interest rate, the draw status, the equity facility's pricing discount and share cap, and whether B. Riley's broader relationship with the company raises related-party considerations. How much has been drawn or issued under each?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19 a CFO resignation, separation benefits including a $75,000 severance payment, and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs, cited as claims #14088, #14093, #13996 and #13997. On 2022-06-13 it disclosed an RSU amendment covering net settlement of 50 million shares, with 17 million canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893. It has not said which executives benefit from the amendment, what the cash tax-withholding obligation costs the company, or why vesting was accelerated for a departing officer. What is the total cash and dilution cost of these arrangements?

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at a figure of 65 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190, alongside plans to develop DeFi products, cited as claim #13928. It separately disclosed leasing 31 acres for mining, cited as claim #19017. It has not clarified the units or form of the Radar consideration, what DeFi products have shipped, or where the 31-acre site is located. Was the Radar spend ever impaired, and which facility sits on the leased acreage?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 that it issued bridge promissory notes to B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as 75.0 USD with a 2022-12-07 maturity (claim #14081), and that a committed equity facility of 150.0 USD with a B. Riley affiliate was required by 2022-06-06 (claim #14082). What has not been said is the unit of these figures (presumably millions), the interest rate and fees on the notes, and whether the equity facility was actually signed by the June deadline and how much was drawn. Both claims now carry a delayed status, and the company has not explained that either.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-12 (claims #14173, #14186, #13921), but a 2022-04-20 disclosure put it at 457 MW (claim #13988). What has not been said is why the figure dropped by 40 MW and then returned, or which number reflects energized capacity as of a stated date. The company also has not said how that capacity splits between self-mining and hosted customers, and none of those hosting customers have been named.

The company disclosed that the Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW (claims #14177, #14182, #13931) and will reach 300 MW (claims #14183, #14178, #13932), under an agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14184, #14175). What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the ERCOT interconnection and power-purchase terms, and the economic split with Tenaska. The launch and partnership dates are now marked delayed, and the company has not given a revised date.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14188, #13933), and separately a 31-acre mining lease in 2021 (claim #19017). What has not been said is the physical site address, the serving utility or interconnection queue position, a first-energization date, the lessor's identity, the lease term, and whether the 31 acres are the Muskogee site or a different one.

The company disclosed a new CFO's base salary of $300,000 (claim #14092) alongside the former CFO's separation benefits (claim #14093), a $75,000 severance payment (claim #13996), and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs (claim #13997). On 2022-06-13 it disclosed an RSU amendment covering 50 million net-settled shares, with 17 million shares canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is the total value of the separation package including accelerated vesting, which executives hold the amended RSUs, and how much cash the company paid for withholding taxes and from what source. That last question matters given that the company was relying on bridge financing at the time.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay recorded as 65.0 USD (claims #14172, #14190, #14181) and a merger proceeds allocation of $195 million (claim #13929), with a stated plan to develop DeFi products (claim #13928). What has not been said is the cash-versus-stock mix and true unit of the Radar consideration, the line-item breakdown of the $195 million, and whether any revenue, headcount, or product milestone has come out of the DeFi effort since.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173 and #14186 and repeated on 2022-05-12 as claim #13921, but reported 457 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988. What has not been said is what accounts for the 40 MW gap: was capacity taken offline, reclassified, or measured on a different basis? The company also has not said how that capacity splits between self-mining and third-party hosting.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW, cited as claims #14177 and #14182, against an expected final capacity of 300 MW, cited as claims #14183 and #13932. What has not been said is the ramp schedule and the target date for 300 MW. The company also has not disclosed the ERCOT interconnection and power-supply terms, or how economics are shared with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton under the delayed development agreement, cited as claims #14175 and #14184.

The company announced a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14179 and #14185, and repeated it on 2022-05-04 as claim #13933. What has not been said is the physical site, the serving utility or interconnection queue position, the capital budget, or any energization date, even though the agreement's own milestone is marked delayed.

The company disclosed B. Riley financing on 2022-04-07: a committed equity facility cited as claim #14082 and bridge promissory notes cited as claim #14081. Both are recorded only as "150.0 USD" and "75.0 USD". What has not been said is the unit (presumably millions), the interest rate and maturity on the notes, and the pricing discount on the equity line. The company also has not disclosed how much of either facility was actually drawn, since both carry delayed status.

The company disclosed a CFO transition on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 and #14090. It reported a $75,000 severance and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs for the departing executive, cited as claims #13996 and #13997, and a $300,000 base salary for the successor, cited as claim #14092. What has not been said is the successor's equity grant and bonus target, and why the departing executive received accelerated vesting. The company also has not explained why the separation terms, cited as claim #14093, missed their stated timing.

The company disclosed an RSU amendment on 2022-06-13 allowing net settlement of 50 million shares with 17 million withheld for taxes, cited as claims #13892 and #13893. What has not been said is which executives benefited, the cash tax outlay the company funded, and whether that cash competed with the B. Riley financing needs. A related open question is the unit of the Blockcap purchase of Radar Relay, recorded as "65.0 USD" in claims #14172, #14190 and #14181, and whether the DeFi product plans cited as claim #13928 were ever pursued.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29 and repeated it on 2022-05-12 (claims #14173, #14186, #13921), yet on 2022-04-20 it cited 457 MW (claim #13988). What has not been said is what explains the 40 MW gap. Was capacity taken offline, or is the difference a definitional change between energized, contracted and deployed megawatts? How does the total split between self-mining and hosted customers, and which hosting customers account for it?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas came online at 22 MW with a 300 MW end state, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14177, #14182, #14178, #14175, #14184). This was reaffirmed on 2022-05-04 (claims #13931, #13932). What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the ERCOT interconnection and power-purchase terms with Tenaska, and the economic terms owed to the City of Denton. It is also unclear why the development agreement is flagged against an October 31, 2021 date that had already passed.

The company announced a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14188, #14195, #14179 and #14185, and repeated it on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #13933, #13924, #13925). What has not been said is the site address, the serving utility and interconnection capacity actually secured, an energization date for first megawatts, and the capex required. Did anything happen by the February 28, 2022 date attached to the agreement?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital tagged 75.0 USD due by December 7, 2022, and a required 150.0 USD committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claims #14081, #14082). It then issued 573,381 commitment shares to B. Riley on 2022-07-20 (claim #13853). What has not been said is the unit on these figures (presumably millions), the interest rate and any conversion or repayment terms on the notes, the equity facility's pricing discount, and how much has actually been drawn or sold under each. Relatedly, how were the 195 million in merger proceeds cited in claim #13929 actually allocated line by line?

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay for a figure recorded as 65.0 USD (claims #14172, #14181, #14190) alongside plans for DeFi products (claim #13928). What has not been said is the unit and form of the consideration, whether cash or stock, and whether any goodwill tied to RADAR has since been impaired. Has any DeFi product actually shipped?

On 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19 the company disclosed a CFO resignation and internal replacement at a $300,000 base salary. The departing executive received a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs (claims #14088, #14090, #14092, #14093, #13996, #13997). On 2022-06-13 it disclosed an RSU amendment covering 50 million net-settled shares with 17 million canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is the dollar value of the accelerated 1.4 million RSUs, the new CFO's bonus and equity grant, and which executives or directors hold the amended RSUs. How much cash did the company spend funding the tax withholding on the 17 million canceled shares?

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14186, #14173 and #13921, and then disclosed 457 MW of operational capacity on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988; what has not been said is which sites accounted for the 40 MW decline in under three months, whether the reduction reflects curtailment, a de-energized facility, a definitional change from nameplate to delivered capacity, or a restatement of the January figure — and which number the company intends to use as the base for its year-end capacity target.

The company disclosed a Denton, Texas facility that became operational at 22 MW with an expected final capacity of 300 MW on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-04, cited as claims #14177, #14182, #14183 and #13931, with the operational launch date slipping past the promised February 2022 window; what has not been said is the physical site address, the ERCOT interconnection queue position and interconnection agreement status for the remaining 278 MW, the energization schedule by tranche, and the capex per MW required to get from 22 MW to 300 MW.

The company disclosed a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a 500 MW data center on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14194 and #13925, with the agreement itself carrying a missed February 2022 date; what has not been said is the name of the transmitting utility or generation counterparty supplying the 500 MW, the contracted power price and term, the site address and acreage, and whether any portion of the 500 MW is under a signed interconnection agreement versus a non-binding letter of intent.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. at a figure recorded as 65.0 USD on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190, alongside its own acquisition of Blockcap, cited as claims #14171 and #13930; what has not been said is whether the $65 figure is millions and whether it was cash or stock, what portion of the consideration went to persons who subsequently became Core Scientific officers or directors, and what the carrying value and impairment status of the RADAR intangibles were at the first reporting date after the merger closed.

The company disclosed $75 million of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on 2022-04-07, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, both now carrying delayed status against their stated dates; what has not been said is the interest rate, maturity, conversion price and security package on the bridge notes, the conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the equity facility can be drawn, how much of either facility has actually been funded, and what other engagements B. Riley holds with the company that would make it a related party rather than an arm's-length lender.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and a replacement appointment on 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19, with the incoming CFO at a $300,000 annual base and the departing executive receiving $75,000 in cash severance plus vesting of 1,400,000 restricted stock units, cited as claims #14088, #14090, #14092, #14093, #13996 and #13997; what has not been said is why a separation produced RSU acceleration worth orders of magnitude more than the cash severance, whether the departure was for cause or good reason under the employment agreement, and what target bonus and equity grant accompany the new CFO's base salary, since $300,000 alone is below peer market for a public miner of this size.

The company disclosed an RSU amendment providing for net settlement of approximately 50 million shares with roughly 17 million shares canceled for tax withholding on 2022-06-13 and again on 2022-07-20, cited as claims #13892, #13893 and #13850; what has not been said is which named executive officers and directors hold the underlying awards, the dollar amount of cash the company must remit to tax authorities on their behalf and how that outflow is funded given the concurrent bridge borrowing, and the resulting fully diluted share count — nor is it clear whether claim #13850's '50.0 shares' and claim #13892's '50,000,000 shares' describe the same award or two different ones.

The company disclosed daily Bitcoin production reporting on 2022-04-19, cited as claim #13998, while operating a business that mixes self-mining with third-party hosting; what has not been said is the split of reported production and of the fleet between self-mined and hosted machines, the identity and concentration of the hosting customers, the contracted hosting rate and remaining term, and what portion of hosting revenue sits with counterparties whose own solvency depends on the Bitcoin price.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that total operational power capacity was 497 MW as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, and repeated the 497 MW figure on 2022-05-12 as claim #13921 — yet the 2022-04-20 update put operational capacity at 457 MW, cited as claim #13988. What has not been said is which definition changed between the two figures: is the 40 MW gap curtailment at a specific site, a hosting customer that left, or a shift from contracted-and-energized to actively-drawn megawatts, and which facility absorbed the decline?

The company disclosed 497 MW of operating capacity across an unspecified set of 'operational data centers,' cited as claims #14173 and #14174. What has not been said is the split between self-mining and third-party hosting megawatts, the names of the hosting counterparties, the contracted term and price per kilowatt-hour on those hosting agreements, or how many of those customers had posted collateral — a first-year analyst would ask for the hosted-versus-owned megawatt breakdown by site on the next call.

The company disclosed a Muskogee, Oklahoma development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a 500 MW facility on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14194, #14195, #13924 and #13933. What has not been said is the physical site address, the interconnecting utility or transmission provider, the interconnection queue position and study status, and the energization schedule for the first tranche — notably, the Denton disclosure names Tenaska Energy as the power partner (claims #14175, #14184) while Muskogee's power counterparty is left unnamed.

The company disclosed that Denton, Texas became operational at 22 MW around February 2022 and is expected to reach 300 MW at completion, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #14192, #13931 and #13932. What has not been said is the dated build schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the capital cost per megawatt, and the source of that capex — a gap sharpened by the fact that claims #14182 and #14192 are both carried as delayed against their February 2022 targets without any restated in-service date.

The company disclosed on 2022-06-13 an RSU amendment covering net settlement of 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893. What has not been said is the dollar amount of cash the company had to remit to tax authorities on behalf of the holders, who those holders were, and whether that cash obligation was funded by the $75 million B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge notes disclosed nine weeks earlier as claim #14081.

The company disclosed $75 million of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on 2022-04-07, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, followed by 573,381 commitment shares issued to B. Riley on 2022-07-20, cited as claim #13853. What has not been said is the interest rate, maturity, collateral and covenants on the notes, how much of the $150 million facility was actually drawn versus merely committed, the floor price or issuance caps on that facility, and whether B. Riley held any advisory or underwriting role in the XPDI business combination (claim #14170) that would make it a related party.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. at a figure recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190, alongside a stated plan to develop DeFi products, cited as claim #13928. What has not been said is whether that figure is $65 million or some other unit, how much was cash versus Blockcap or Core Scientific equity, and what revenue, headcount or impairment the RADAR business has produced since — and, separately, whether any Blockcap principals became Core Scientific officers or directors, which would make the Blockcap acquisition (claims #14171, #14180) a related-party transaction requiring proxy disclosure it has not received.

The company disclosed a CFO transition on 2022-04-04 with the incoming CFO at $300,000 annual base salary and unspecified 'separation benefits' for the outgoing CFO, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, then on 2022-04-19 disclosed a $75,000 executive severance payment and 1,400,000 units of accelerated RSU vesting, cited as claims #13996 and #13997. What has not been said is whether the $75,000 and the 1.4 million RSUs belong to the same departing CFO, what the new CFO's bonus target and equity grant are, and why a $300,000 base pairs with an RSU acceleration worth many multiples of it.

Core Scientific reported total operational power capacity of 497.0 MW as of its March 29, 2022 annual filing (claims #14173 and #14186, the latter dated to a January 31, 2022 measurement), then disclosed 457.0 MW of operational capacity on April 20, 2022 (claim #13988), then returned to 497.0 MW on May 12, 2022 (claim #13921); what has not been said is which definition changed — energized versus contracted, self-mining versus hosted, nameplate versus curtailment-adjusted — or whether 40 MW was actually taken offline, and if so at which site and for how long. A first-year analyst should ask for a site-by-site MW bridge from January 31 to April 30 with a line item for every addition, curtailment, and derate.

The company announced a Denton, Texas facility operational at 22.0 MW (claims #14177, #14182, #13931) on a schedule originally promised for February 2022 and since marked delayed (claims #14192, #14182), with a stated final capacity of 300.0 MW repeated at least six times across filings (claims #14178, #14183, #14187, #14193, #13932, #13923); what has not been said is a physical address, the interconnection point or ERCOT queue position for the remaining 278 MW, the number and timing of energization phases, or the capital cost per MW. Disclosing the endpoint six times while never disclosing the substation, the transmission service agreement, or a dated phase schedule is the gap.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority was described as a 500.0 MW facility in at least six separate disclosures between March 29 and May 12, 2022 (claims #14185, #14195, #14188, #14179, #13933, #13925, and the partnership claims #14194 and #13924), with claim #14185 carrying a February 28, 2022 date now flagged delayed; what has not been said is a single energization date, a site address or parcel, the utility and interconnection status, the lease or land terms with the Port Authority, or any capital budget. A 500 MW announcement with zero MW energized and no committed first-power date is a headline capacity number, not a project disclosure.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. at '65.0 USD' on March 29 and again in May 2022 (claims #14172, #14181, #14190, #13927); what has not been said is the unit — $65, $65 million, or $65 million in stock — the cash-versus-equity split of the consideration, or the related-party context, given that the acquirer Blockcap was itself acquired by Core Scientific (claims #14171, #14180, #14189, #13930, #13926) and Blockcap principals became Core Scientific insiders. The same filings that repeat the 65 figure never state what was bought, at what implied revenue or asset multiple, or whether any Core Scientific officer or director held an economic interest in Radar Relay.

On April 4, 2022 the company disclosed a CFO resignation, a transition period, separation benefits, and a successor promoted from an internal role at an annual base salary of $300,000 (claims #14088, #14089, #14090, #14091, #14092, #14093), and on April 19 quantified the departing executive's severance at $75,000 and an RSU vesting event of 1,400,000 units (claims #13994, #13995, #13996, #13997); what has not been said is why a public-company CFO departed within roughly three months of the SPAC closing, whether the resignation involved any disagreement on accounting or disclosure, what the successor's bonus target and equity grant are on top of the $300,000 base, or how a $75,000 severance squares with a 1,400,000-unit RSU acceleration. The dollar value of that RSU vest at the grant-date and vest-date price, and the identity of the executive it attaches to, are the follow-ups.

On June 13, 2022 the company disclosed an RSU amendment net-settling 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893) — a roughly 34% withholding rate implying a very large cash remittance — while separately drawing $75.0 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and committing to a $150.0 million equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claims #14081, #14082, both now flagged delayed), then signing a $100.0 million B. Riley stock purchase agreement on July 20, 2022 (claim #13852); what has not been said is the cash outlay required to fund the 17,000,000-share withholding and whether the B. Riley borrowings financed it, the interest rate, maturity, collateral and covenants on the $75 million notes, or why the committed facility went from $150 million required to $100 million executed. Related to this, the May 12, 2022 disclosure allocating $195.0 million of merger proceeds (claim #13929) never breaks out the allocation by use, and no disclosure on record reconciles it against the SPAC redemption rate at closing (claim #14170).

Finally, the company committed to daily Bitcoin production reporting on April 19, 2022 (claim #13998) and repeatedly discloses aggregate MW, yet no claim on record names a single hosting customer; what has not been said is the split of that capacity and production between self-mining and third-party hosting, the identity and concentration of the largest hosting counterparties, the contracted term and MW per contract, or the energy price pass-through mechanism. Given that hosting revenue depends on counterparties who are themselves exposed to Bitcoin price, customer concentration and credit exposure are the disclosure a sophisticated reader would expect alongside the capacity numbers.

Core Scientific reported 497.0 MW of operating capacity as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14186, 14173), then 457.0 MW on April 20, 2022 (claim 13988), then 497.0 MW again on May 12, 2022 (claim 13921); what has not been said is which definition each figure uses — energized and drawing load, contracted from the utility, or nameplate transformer capacity — and what caused the 40 MW round trip in eleven weeks. A first-year analyst would ask on the next call for the reconciliation by site, and for the split between self-mining and hosted capacity inside each of those totals, since the daily Bitcoin production disclosure promised on April 19, 2022 (claim 13998) is not meaningful without knowing how much of the fleet is customer-owned.

The company disclosed that the Denton, Texas data center went operational at 22.0 MW and is expected to reach 300.0 MW when complete (claims 14177, 14182, 13931, 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932); what has not been said is the energization schedule between 22 MW and 300 MW, the physical site address, the serving substation and interconnection or transmission-service status behind the Tenaska Energy arrangement, and whether the 300 MW figure is contracted load or an aspiration. The operational date itself has slipped against the February 2022 commitments (claims 14192, 14176, 14184), with no revised in-service date disclosed for any tranche after the first 22 MW.

The Tenaska Energy and City of Denton partnership has been described four separate times (claims 14175, 14191, 14184, 13922) without a single economic term; what has not been said is the tenor of the power agreement, the price per MWh or the basis on which it floats, whether there is a demand-response or curtailment credit, and whether the City of Denton is the load-serving entity or a pass-through. Absent that, the 300 MW at Denton cannot be converted into a cost-per-Bitcoin estimate, which is the first question any energy-intensive operator should expect.

A 500.0 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority was announced against a February 28, 2022 date and is now carried as delayed (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14195, 13925, 13933, 13924, 14194); what has not been said is whether the agreement is binding or a memorandum of understanding, what the site address and interconnection queue position are, what capital is budgeted to build it, and what the revised first-power date is. Five restatements of the same 500 MW headline across March and May 2022, with no milestone attached to any of them, is the gap.

Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay was disclosed at 65.0 USD (claims 14172, 14190, 14181), a figure whose units are left ambiguous on the record and which is carried against a July 1, 2021 date that is now marked delayed; what has not been said is whether the consideration was cash or stock, how it was allocated between intangibles and goodwill, whether any earnout remains outstanding, and whether the RADAR technology and DeFi product line described on May 12, 2022 (claims 13927, 13928) is generating revenue or has been impaired. The related-party question sits on top of it: the Blockcap acquisition (claims 14171, 14189, 14180, 13930, 13926) brought Blockcap principals into Core Scientific management, and the record does not disclose what those individuals received in the Radar Relay transaction they approved.

The company disclosed 75.0 USD of bridge promissory notes and a required 150.0 USD committed equity facility with B. Riley affiliates in April 2022 (claims 14081, 14082), both now delayed, plus a 75,000 USD legal fee reimbursement to B. Riley on July 20, 2022 (claim 13854); what has not been said is the interest rate, maturity, security, and any conversion or warrant coverage on the notes, the discount-to-VWAP and share cap on the equity facility, how much has actually been drawn, and whether B. Riley's roles as SPAC-side participant, lender, and equity purchaser were reviewed by disinterested directors. The 195.0 USD of merger proceeds disclosed on May 12, 2022 (claim 13929) makes the follow-up sharper: what was that cash spent on between January and April such that 225 USD of B. Riley paper was required within weeks?

On compensation, the record shows a CFO resignation and replacement (claims 14088, 14090, 14091, 13994, 13995), a 300,000 USD annual base for the incoming CFO (claim 14092), unspecified separation benefits and a transition period for the departing CFO (claims 14093, 14089), a 75,000 USD executive severance payment and 1,400,000 units of RSU vesting (claims 13996, 13997), and an RSU amendment net-settling 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 canceled for tax withholding (claims 13892, 13893). What has not been said is who received the 50 million shares and in what proportion among named executive officers, how much cash the company remitted to tax authorities for the 17 million canceled shares and from which source, whether the departing CFO's separation benefits were conditioned on a release or non-disparagement covenant, and what target bonus and equity grant sit above the 300,000 USD base — a figure low enough that the unstated equity component is the actual compensation story.

The company disclosed total operating power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14173, #14186 and #13921, and then disclosed operational power capacity of 457 MW on April 20, 2022, cited as claim #13988; what has not been said is what accounts for the 40 MW reduction in under three months — whether it reflects curtailment under the Texas and Oklahoma power arrangements, a site being taken offline, a redefinition of 'operational' versus 'energized' capacity, or simply a different measurement convention. A related unanswered question is how much of the 497 MW is self-mining versus third-party hosting, since no hosting counterparty is named anywhere in the record despite capacity being the headline metric.

The company disclosed a Denton, Texas facility that became operational at 22 MW and is expected to reach 300 MW when completed, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #14183, #14187, #14193, #13931 and #13932, with the operational date already marked delayed against a February 2022 commitment; what has not been said is the date by which the remaining 278 MW is expected to energize, the capital cost per MW to get there, or the interconnection and substation milestones that gate the ramp. The repeated restatement of the same 300 MW figure across seven claims without a single incremental MW disclosed between March 29 and May 12, 2022 is itself the disclosure gap.

The company disclosed a development partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14175, #14184, #14191 and #13922; what has not been said is the commercial substance of the power arrangement — the contracted price per MWh, the term, whether Core Scientific or Tenaska bears curtailment and ancillary-services risk, and whether the City of Denton arrangement carries tax abatement or jobs clawback conditions that would trigger on the already-delayed operational date.

The company disclosed a Muskogee City-County Port Authority agreement for a 500 MW data center, cited as claims #14179, #14185, #14188, #14194, #14195, #13924, #13925 and #13933, with the agreement itself marked delayed against a February 28, 2022 date; what has not been said is the physical site address, the utility and interconnection queue position behind 500 MW, any energization schedule or phasing, and the committed capital — a 500 MW project disclosed five separate times with no MW-in-service, no groundbreaking date, and no capex figure.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. for '65.0 USD,' cited as claims #14172, #14181, #14190 and #13927, and separately disclosed development of DeFi products, cited as claim #13928; what has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration — whether $65 million or another figure, and how much was cash versus Core Scientific equity, plus any earnout — and what revenue, if any, the RADAR technology and the DeFi initiative have generated since the July 2021 closing date against which claim #14181 is marked delayed.

The company disclosed $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on April 7, 2022, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, both now marked delayed, and then a $100,000,000 B. Riley stock purchase agreement on July 20, 2022, cited as claim #13852; what has not been said is whether the $100 million facility replaced or supplemented the $150 million commitment, the interest rate, maturity and collateral on the bridge notes, the discount and floor price at which B. Riley may purchase shares, and B. Riley's other roles — underwriter, advisor, or holder — in the XPDI business combination disclosed as claim #14170.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, a successor promoted from an internal role at $300,000 annual base compensation, and former-CFO separation benefits on April 4, 2022, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, then disclosed the same transition again on April 19, 2022 with a $75,000 severance payment and 1,400,000 RSUs vesting, cited as claims #13994 through #13997; what has not been said is the reason for the departure — specifically whether there was any disagreement on accounting, internal controls, or the valuation of digital assets — and why a $75,000 cash severance sits alongside 1.4 million units of accelerated equity. Separately, the June 13, 2022 RSU amendment net-settling 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893, does not identify the recipients, the cash the company must remit to tax authorities on their behalf, or the resulting change in fully diluted share count.

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497.0 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, then disclosed 457.0 MW of operational power capacity on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988, and then returned to 497.0 MW on 2022-05-12, cited as claim #13921; what has not been said is what accounts for the 40 MW round trip in roughly three weeks — whether the lower figure reflected curtailment, a decommissioned site, a definitional change from contracted-and-energized to actively drawing load, or simply a different measurement basis. A sophisticated reader would also expect the 497 MW to be split between self-mining and third-party hosting load, and that split has never been given in any of these disclosures.

The company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility became operational at 22.0 MW and is expected to reach a final capacity of 300.0 MW, on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-04, cited as claims #14182, #14177, #14178, #14183, #14187, #14193 and #13932; what has not been said is the ramp schedule between 22 MW and 300 MW, the interconnection queue position or substation and transmission provider behind the remaining 278 MW, the site address or parcel, and the capital cost per MW of that build. The same disclosure set flags the facility as delayed against a promised date of 2022-02-01 and again 2022-02-28, cited as claims #14192 and #14182, without stating the cause of the slip or a revised energization date for the next tranche.

The company disclosed a Muskogee City-County Port Authority development agreement for a 500.0 MW data center on 2022-03-29 and restated it on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #14188, #14195, #13924, #13925 and #13933; what has not been said is any in-service date, any staged energization milestone, the identity of the utility or power supplier and the contracted rate, the ground lease or land purchase terms with the Port Authority, and whether any portion of the 500 MW is contractually committed versus an aspirational site ceiling. Claim #14185 carries a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 and a delayed status, yet no replacement timeline has been disclosed.

The company disclosed a partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy for the Denton facility on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14175, #14184, #14191 and #13922; what has not been said is the economic structure of that arrangement — the power price or price formula, the term, the curtailment and demand-response obligations, any minimum take-or-pay commitment, and whether the City of Denton or Tenaska holds equity, revenue share, or a profit interest in the site. Claim #14184 was promised by 2021-10-31 and is marked delayed, and the disclosure does not say which contractual condition remains unsatisfied.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. valued at 65.0 USD on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190, alongside its own acquisition of Blockcap, cited as claims #14171, #14189, #14180, #13930 and #13926; what has not been said is whether the 65.0 figure is millions or some other unit, whether consideration was cash, stock, or contingent earnout, and what portion of that purchase price was later assigned to goodwill or intangibles subject to impairment. Given that Blockcap's founders became Core Scientific insiders through the merger, the related-party character of a $65 million purchase made by Blockcap before or around its own acquisition is exactly the context a reader would expect and has not received.

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital of 75.0 USD and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of 150.0 USD on 2022-04-07, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, and then a Common Stock Purchase Agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II, LLC for 100,000,000 USD on 2022-07-20, cited as claim #13851; what has not been said is why the facility that was contractually required at 150.0 arrived at 100 million, what the interest rate, maturity, and security package on the bridge notes are, the discount to market at which B. Riley may purchase shares, and the maximum dilution at then-current prices. Nor has the company disclosed whether B. Riley's simultaneous roles as lender, equity purchaser, and capital markets counterparty were reviewed as a related-party transaction.

The company disclosed an RSU amendment providing for net settlement of 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding on 2022-06-13, cited as claims #13892 and #13893; what has not been said is who the recipients were, whether they are named executive officers or directors, the cash amount the company had to remit to taxing authorities on their behalf, and how that cash outlay was funded at a time when the company was drawing bridge financing. Separately, the CFO transition disclosed on 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19, cited as claims #14088 through #14093 and #13994 through #13997, pairs a 300,000 USD base salary for the incoming CFO with a 75,000 USD severance payment and acceleration of 1,400,000 RSUs for the departing CFO; what has not been said is the dollar value of that RSU acceleration, the incoming CFO's bonus target and new-hire equity grant, and whether the departure involved any disagreement on accounting or disclosure matters.

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14186, #14173 and repeated on 2022-05-12 as claim #13921, and then disclosed operational power capacity of 457 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988; what has not been said is why 40 MW came out of the operating base in under three months, whether the reduction reflects curtailment, a site loss, a definitional change from nameplate to energized capacity, or the exit of a hosting customer, and why the 497 MW figure was restated again on 2022-05-12 after the lower number was published?

The company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility became operational at 22 MW and will reach a final capacity of 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14182, #14187, #14178, #14183, #14193, #13931 and #13932, under a development partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14175, #14184, #14191 and #13922; what has not been said is the interconnection path and substation from 22 MW to 300 MW, the physical site address and acreage, the contracted energy price or heat-rate call structure with Tenaska, the phased energization dates for the remaining 278 MW, and who bears the cost of the interconnection upgrade — particularly given that the Denton operational date was recorded as promised by 2022-02-01 and 2022-02-28 and is now flagged delayed?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, cited as claims #14185, #14179, #14188, #14194, #14195, #13924 and #13925, with the February 28, 2022 milestone on claim #14185 now marked delayed; what has not been said is whether the 500 MW figure is a contracted and interconnection-queue-confirmed number or a site's theoretical ceiling, which utility or ISO queue position backs it, what capital is required per MW, and what the ground lease term, rent, and clawback provisions with the Port Authority are if the buildout does not occur?

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. at a value stated only as '65.0 USD,' cited as claims #14190, #14172 and #14181, alongside the Blockcap acquisition itself, cited as claims #14171, #14189, #14180, #13926, #13930 and the RADAR technology acquisition claim #13927; what has not been said is whether that figure is $65 million or $65 per share, how much was cash versus stock, how much was allocated to goodwill and intangibles versus developed technology, and — given the July 1, 2021 target on claims #14180 and #14181 is flagged delayed — what the current carrying value and any impairment assessment of the RADAR asset is as of the latest balance sheet date?

The company disclosed $75 million of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on 2022-04-07, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, both now flagged delayed against December 7, 2022 and June 6, 2022 dates; what has not been said is the interest rate, maturity, security and collateral on the bridge notes, the discount to VWAP, floor price, and share-issuance cap on the equity facility, whether the same B. Riley entity acted as underwriter or advisor in the XPDI business combination that generated the $195 million of merger proceeds cited as claim #13929, and how much of the $150 million was actually drawable at the then-current share price?

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, transition period, separation benefits, and the promotion of an internal candidate at a $300,000 annual base salary on 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19, cited as claims #14088, #14089, #14090, #14091, #14092, #14093, #13994 and #13995, together with a $75,000 executive severance payment and 1,400,000 units of RSU vesting, cited as claims #13996 and #13997; what has not been said is the reason for the departure, whether it involved any disagreement on accounting or internal controls, the new CFO's target bonus and equity grant beyond the base salary figure, and why a departing officer received 1.4 million accelerated RSUs against only $75,000 of cash severance?

The company disclosed an RSU amendment providing for net settlement of approximately 50,000,000 shares with roughly 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893, and repeated the same item on 2022-07-20 as '50.0 shares,' cited as claim #13850; what has not been said is which executives or founders hold those awards, the dollar amount of cash the company must fund for the withholding remittance and from which liquidity source given the concurrent B. Riley bridge financing, the resulting fully diluted share count and per-holder ownership after settlement, and whether the amendment was approved by disinterested directors as a related-party matter?

The company disclosed daily Bitcoin production reporting as a practice on 2022-04-19, cited as claim #13998, and separately touted development of DeFi products, cited as claim #13928; what has not been said is the split of reported production and of the 497 MW between self-mining and third-party hosting, the names, contract tenor, and concentration of the hosting customers occupying that capacity, the all-in cost per Bitcoin mined, and what capital and headcount have been committed to the DeFi initiative relative to the core mining business?

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497.0 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, then disclosed operational capacity of 457.0 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988, and then reverted to 497.0 MW on 2022-05-12, cited as claim #13921; what has not been said is what accounts for the 40 MW that disappeared and reappeared inside eleven weeks — whether the April figure excluded hosted third-party load, reflected curtailment or a site derate, or simply used energized rather than contracted megawatts. A first-year analyst should ask the company to reconcile the three numbers on the same definition and state, for each site, energized MW versus contracted MW versus MW under interconnection agreement.

The company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility became operational at 22.0 MW and is expected to reach 300.0 MW when completed, on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14177, #14182, #14178, #14183, #14187, #13931 and #13932; what has not been said is the phasing schedule between 22 MW and 300 MW, the expected energization date for each tranche, the capital cost per MW, or any interconnection detail — no substation, no queue position, no ERCOT load zone, and no street address for the site. The 22 MW was originally represented as operational by February 2022 (claims #14192, #13931) and has since been marked delayed; the follow-up is what date it actually energized and at what utilization.

The company disclosed a Denton development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14175, #14184, #13922, and a Muskogee agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for 500.0 MW, cited as claims #14185, #14194, #13924; what has not been said is the commercial substance of either counterparty relationship — whether Tenaska is a power supplier under a fixed-price PPA, a landlord, or an equity participant in the site; what the contracted energy price and hedge tenor are; and what the Port Authority lease term, acreage, tax abatement, and minimum-load or take-or-pay obligations are. Power cost per kWh at each site is the single number that determines whether either project is economic, and it has not been given.

The company disclosed a 500.0 MW planned capacity at Muskogee, Oklahoma repeatedly across 2022-03-29, 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14179, #14188, #14195, #13925 and #13933, with the underlying agreement promised by 2022-02-28 and now marked delayed (claim #14185); what has not been said is any date at all — no groundbreaking, no first-power target, no phase sizing — and no disclosure of whether the 500 MW is a signed interconnection commitment from the serving utility or an aspirational site capacity based on land and substation proximity. Stacking 500 MW at Muskogee on 300 MW at Denton implies roughly 800 MW of incremental build against a base of under 500 MW; the unanswered quantitative question is the total capex required and how it is funded.

The company disclosed $75.0 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150.0 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on 2022-04-07, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, and then 573,381 commitment shares issued to B. Riley on 2022-07-20, cited as claim #13853; what has not been said is that a single counterparty is simultaneously the secured lender, the equity purchaser of last resort, and the recipient of commitment stock, and the disclosures omit the note interest rate, maturity, collateral, and covenants, the discount to VWAP at which shares are put under the equity facility, any daily volume cap or floor price, and whether the equity facility is the contractual source of repayment for the bridge notes. Related to this, the merger proceeds allocation of $195.0 million disclosed on 2022-05-12, cited as claim #13929, was presented without a use-of-proceeds breakdown between miner purchases, site construction, and debt service.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, a transition period, separation benefits, and the appointment of an internal successor at $300,000 annual base compensation on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088, #14089, #14090, #14091, #14092 and #14093, and then on 2022-04-19 quantified the departing executive's severance at $75,000 with 1,400,000 restricted stock units vesting, cited as claims #13996 and #13997; what has not been said is the reason for the departure, whether there was any disagreement regarding accounting, internal controls, or disclosure, and why a $75,000 cash severance was paired with equity acceleration of a far larger notional value. Separately, the RSU amendment disclosed on 2022-06-13 providing for net settlement of 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893, has been disclosed without naming the recipients, without stating the cash the company had to remit to tax authorities on their behalf, and without the resulting fully diluted share count — the question for the next call is how much cash left the balance sheet to fund that withholding and what percentage of the company the named executive recipients now hold.

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497.0 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, and then disclosed operational power capacity of 457.0 MW on 2022-04-20, cited as claim #13988, before returning to a 497.0 MW figure on 2022-05-12, cited as claim #13921; what has not been said is what the 40 MW swing represents — de-energized capacity, curtailment under an ERCOT or Oklahoma demand-response program, a change in whether 'operational' means energized, transformer-rated, or contracted capacity, or capacity reallocated between self-mining and hosting. Which definition applies to each figure, and can the 497/457/497 sequence be reconciled site by site with energized megawatts on the last day of each month?

The company disclosed that its Denton, Texas facility became operational at 22.0 MW and is expected to reach 300.0 MW when completed, on 2022-03-29 and again on 2022-05-04, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182, #14193, #13931 and #13932, with a development partnership involving the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, cited as claims #14175, #14184, #14191 and #13922; what has not been said is any interconnection or siting detail — the physical address or substation, the transmission service provider, the executed interconnection agreement and its queue position, the megawatt-by-quarter energization schedule bridging 22 MW to 300 MW, or the tenor and pricing structure of the Tenaska power arrangement. What is the contracted all-in power cost per MWh at Denton, and on what date does each incremental tranche between 22 MW and 300 MW energize?

The company disclosed a 500.0 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, dated by 2022-02-28 and repeated across 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14179, #14185, #14188, #14194, #14195, #13925 and #13933; what has not been said is the counterparty on the electricity side rather than the land side — no utility or generator is named, no address or parcel is identified, no interconnection study or energization date is given, and no capital expenditure estimate or funding source for a 500 MW build is attached. Who supplies the power at Muskogee, what is the signed interconnection capacity today versus the 500 MW headline, and what is the total capex and the expected first-megawatt date?

The company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital of 75.0 and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of 150.0 on 2022-04-07, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, and the issuance of 573,381 commitment shares to B. Riley on 2022-07-20, cited as claim #13853, alongside a merger proceeds allocation of 195.0 millions on 2022-05-12, cited as claim #13929; what has not been said is whether the 75.0 and 150.0 figures are millions, what interest rate, maturity, collateral and covenants attach to the bridge notes, how much of the equity facility had actually been drawn as of each reporting date, what the commitment shares were valued at, and what related-party or advisory relationships B. Riley simultaneously held with the company. As of the most recent balance sheet date, how much of the $150 million facility remains undrawn and available, and at what effective all-in cost including commitment shares?

The company disclosed a CFO resignation, a CFO appointment, a $300,000 annual base salary for the incoming CFO, and separation benefits for the outgoing CFO on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, then disclosed a CFO departure, a new CFO appointment, a $75,000 executive severance payment and the vesting of 1,400,000 restricted stock units on 2022-04-19, cited as claims #13994 through #13997; what has not been said is whether these describe one transition or two, why a severance payment of $75,000 accompanies the accelerated vesting of 1.4 million RSUs, what the grant-date and vesting-date fair value of those units was, and whether the departure was voluntary, for cause, or connected to any disagreement on accounting or internal controls. What total compensation, including equity acceleration, was paid to the departing CFO, and was any Item 5.02 disagreement letter solicited?

The company disclosed an RSU amendment providing for net settlement of 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding on 2022-06-13, cited as claims #13892 and #13893; what has not been said is who holds those units, what cash the company had to remit to taxing authorities to fund the withholding, how that cash outlay was financed relative to the B. Riley bridge facility disclosed two months earlier, and what the resulting share count and dilution are. Which named executives or founders received the 33 million net shares, and how much cash left the balance sheet to settle the withholding obligation?

The company disclosed daily Bitcoin production reporting on 2022-04-19, cited as claim #13998, and a Blockcap acquisition plus a RADAR/Radar Relay acquisition valued at 65.0 on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #14171, #14172, #14180, #14181, #14190, #13926, #13927 and #13930, together with planned DeFi product development, cited as claim #13928; what has not been said is any hosting customer name or concentration disclosure behind the reported production and revenue, whether daily production is split between self-mining and third-party hosted fleets, whether the 65.0 RADAR consideration is millions and how much was stock versus cash, and what revenue, if any, the RADAR and DeFi initiatives have generated since closing. Which hosting counterparties represent more than 10% of revenue, and what is the carrying value of the RADAR intangibles and goodwill today?

The company disclosed operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022, cited as claims #14186, #14173 and #13921, and then disclosed 457 MW on April 20, 2022, cited as claim #13988; what has not been said is why the figure fell by 40 MW in under three months, whether the two numbers use the same definition (energized and metered versus contracted or interconnection-approved), and which specific site gave up the 40 MW. A first-year analyst would also ask for the split of that 497 MW between self-mining and third-party hosting, since the hosting share determines how much of the capacity generates fee revenue rather than Bitcoin.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority with a promised date of February 28, 2022, cited as claims #14185, #14194, #14195, #14188, #14179, #13933 and #13924, and that claim has since been marked delayed; what has not been said is the street address or parcel within the port district, the name of the transmission or distribution utility and the interconnection queue position supporting 500 MW, the energization schedule by phase, or the capital cost and who funds it. The Denton disclosures named a counterparty utility partner (Tenaska, claims #14175 and #13922) while the Muskogee disclosures name only a public port authority; the identity of the power supplier behind the 500 MW is the omission.

The company disclosed that Denton went operational at 22 MW against promised dates of February 1 and February 28, 2022, cited as claims #14182, #13931, #14192 and #14176, and that Denton is expected to reach 300 MW when completed, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14183, #14187, #14193, #13923 and #13932; what has not been said is the MW-per-phase ramp schedule bridging 22 MW to 300 MW, the target completion date for the 300 MW, and whether 300 MW is contracted firm capacity under the City of Denton and Tenaska agreement or an aspirational site maximum. The term, price and curtailment provisions of the power arrangement with Tenaska are also absent.

The company disclosed the acquisition of Radar Relay, Inc. by Blockcap at a value recorded as 65.0 USD, cited as claims #14172, #14181, #14190 and #13927, against merger proceeds recorded as 195.0 USD millions, cited as claim #13929; what has not been said is the unit — whether the Radar consideration is 65 million dollars or another magnitude — and the split between cash, stock and any earnout. Given that Blockcap was itself acquired by the company (claims #14171, #14189, #14180, #13926, #13930) and Blockcap principals joined the combined company, the related-party question is whether any Core Scientific executive or director held an economic interest in Radar Relay at the time of either transaction, and whether the Radar purchase price was independently valued.

The company disclosed $75 million of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate due by June 6, 2022, cited as claims #14081 and #14082, both now marked delayed, and then a $100,000,000 B. Riley stock purchase agreement on July 20, 2022, cited as claim #13852; what has not been said is whether the $100 million July agreement satisfies, replaces or falls $50 million short of the $150 million commitment, and on what terms — interest rate, maturity, security, and any conversion or discount-to-VWAP feature — the $75 million of bridge notes sit ahead of equity holders. The fees paid to B. Riley across the bridge, the facility and any advisory role, and whether the same affiliate acted on both sides, are not disclosed.

The company disclosed an RSU amendment involving net settlement of 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 shares canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893; what has not been said is which holders those shares belong to — named executive officers, founders, or the broader employee base — the dollar amount of cash the company had to remit to tax authorities on their behalf, and the funding source for that remittance. Alongside a new CFO at $300,000 base compensation (claim #14092) with no disclosed bonus target or equity grant, a $75,000 executive severance payment (claim #13996) and 1,400,000 RSUs vesting for a departing executive (claim #13997), the proxy-level context linking the outgoing CFO's separation terms (claims #14088, #14089, #14093, #13994) to that 1.4 million unit acceleration is missing.

The company disclosed daily Bitcoin production reporting, cited as claim #13998, and the development of DeFi products from the RADAR technology, cited as claim #13928; what has not been said is the self-mined versus hosted hashrate behind those daily figures, the all-in cash cost per Bitcoin, or any revenue, headcount or capitalized development spend attributable to the DeFi product line — and whether that line was still funded at all by the July 2022 financing.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW on 2022-03-29 (claims #14173, #14186), then 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988), then 497 MW again on 2022-05-12 (claim #13921). What has not been said is why the figure fell by 40 MW and then returned. Which facilities or contracts account for the difference, and is the metric energized load, contracted power, or hosted-plus-self-mining capacity?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas became operational at 22 MW against an eventual 300 MW (claims #14177, #14182, #14178, #14183, #14187), and repeated the 300 MW target on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #13932, #13923). What has not been said is the ramp schedule between 22 MW and 300 MW, the capex required to get there, and the interconnection terms. The economic roles of the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184, #13922), including who supplies and hedges power and at what price, are also undisclosed.

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims #14185, #14195, #14188, #14179, #13924, #13925, #13933). What has not been said is the physical site, the utility or interconnection counterparty, a target energization date, and the capital commitment. The agreement carried a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 and is now marked delayed, so the current milestone status is also unclear.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at a figure of 65 USD (claims #14172, #14181, #14190), and on 2022-05-12 described plans to develop DeFi products (claim #13928). What has not been said is the unit and form of the consideration (millions, cash versus stock), the revenue or product output RADAR has produced since, and whether that DeFi roadmap has a budget or launch date.

On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital of 75 USD (claim #14081) and a required 150 USD committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim #14082). It later disclosed a 75,000 USD legal fee reimbursement to B. Riley (claim #13854) and a 195 USD million merger-proceeds allocation (claim #13929). What has not been said is the scale of the note and facility figures, the notes' interest rate and repayment, how much of the equity line was actually drawn and at what discount, and how the 195 million was spent line by line.

The company disclosed a CFO change on 2022-04-04 with a 300,000 USD base salary for the successor (claims #14088, #14090, #14092). It also disclosed separation benefits for the departing CFO, including a 75,000 USD severance and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs (claims #14093, #13996, #13997). On 2022-06-13 it disclosed an RSU amendment covering 50 million net-settled shares and 17 million shares canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is the successor's bonus and equity grant, the dollar value of the accelerated RSUs, and which executives hold the amended awards. The cash tax cost the company absorbed through the 17-million-share withholding is also undisclosed.

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29 (claims #14173, #14186), then 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988), then 497 MW again on 2022-05-12 (claim #13921). What has not been said is why the figure fell 40 MW and then returned. Was capacity taken offline, reclassified between owned and hosted, or measured on a different basis, and what was the true energized figure at each date?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility was operational at 22 MW and would reach 300 MW (claims #14177, #14187, #14193, #14182), in partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184). What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the interconnection or substation arrangement, and the power pricing and term under the Tenaska agreement. The launch was flagged as delayed against a 2022-02-01 target (claims #14192, #13931), so what are the next dated milestones?

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29 and repeated it on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #14185, #14188, #14195, #13933, #13925). What has not been said is the site address, energization date, utility or interconnection counterparty, and estimated capex. Why is a facility larger than the entire operating fleet carried with no timeline at all, and how will it be financed?

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at a price recorded as 65.0 USD on 2022-03-29 (claims #14172, #14181, #14190), and later cited RADAR as the basis for DeFi product development (claims #13927, #13928). What has not been said is the unit of that price: was it $65 million, and was it paid in cash, stock, or earnout? Beyond that, what specific DeFi products, headcount, or revenue has RADAR produced since?

The company disclosed a $75 bridge note facility from B. Riley Commercial Capital and a required $150 committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate on 2022-04-07 (claims #14081, #14082). The units there are also left ambiguous, presumably millions. What has not been said is why the equity facility actually signed on 2022-07-20 was $100,000,000 rather than $150 million (claim #13851). How much of either facility has been drawn, at what discount or interest rate, and did the shortfall trigger any covenant under the bridge notes?

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and appointment on 2022-04-04, with a new CFO base salary of $300,000 (claims #14088, #14090, #14092). It also disclosed $75,000 in severance and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs for the departing executive (claims #13996, #13997), followed by a June 2022 RSU amendment net-settling 50 million shares with 17 million canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is the new CFO's equity grant, the reason for the departure, which executives received the 50 million net-settled shares, and the cash tax-withholding cost the company absorbed.

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW in its March 29, 2022 filing (claims #14173 and #14186) and repeated that figure on May 12, 2022 (claim #13921), but reported 457 MW on April 20, 2022 (claim #13988). What has not been said is why the figure dropped by 40 MW and then returned. Which facilities account for the difference, and is 497 MW energized capacity or contracted capacity?

The company disclosed on March 29, 2022 that the Denton, Texas site was operating at 22 MW against a final expected capacity of 300 MW (claims #14177, #14182, #14187, #14193), and repeated both numbers on May 4, 2022 (claims #13931, #13932). What has not been said is how it gets from 22 MW to 300 MW. What are the tranche-by-tranche energization dates, what ERCOT interconnection or load agreement supports 300 MW, and what are the capex and power-price terms of the development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184, #13922), which had been flagged against an October 31, 2021 date?

The company disclosed a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on March 29, 2022 (claims #14185, #14188, #14195, #14179), and restated it on May 4 and May 12, 2022 (claims #13933, #13925, #13924). What has not been said is any physical site detail, serving utility, interconnection queue position, first-energization date, or financing source for a facility larger than the company's entire reported fleet. Has any Muskogee capacity been energized, and how much capital is committed to it?

On April 7, 2022 the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" and a required committed equity facility recorded as "150.0 USD" (claims #14081, #14082). On July 20, 2022 it disclosed a common stock purchase agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II for $100,000,000 (claim #13851). What has not been said is whether those first two figures are in millions, why the equity facility appears to have shrunk from $150 million to $100 million, how much of either has been drawn, and what the interest rate and repayment status of the bridge notes are against their December 7, 2022 date.

The company disclosed a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs tied to the outgoing CFO on April 19, 2022 (claims #13996, #13997), and "separation benefits" on April 4 (claim #14093). On June 13, 2022 it disclosed an RSU amendment covering net settlement of 50 million shares, with 17 million canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is which executives hold the 50 million amended RSUs, how much cash the company paid to cover withholding on the 17 million canceled shares, and what equity grant accompanies the new CFO's $300,000 base salary (claim #14092).

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay, recorded as "65.0 USD" on March 29, 2022 (claims #14172, #14181, #14190), and on May 12, 2022 tied it to developing DeFi products (claims #13927, #13928). What has not been said is whether that figure is $65 million, what form the consideration took, whether any goodwill or intangibles from Radar have since been impaired, and whether any DeFi product has shipped or generated revenue.

The company reported total operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29 (claims #14173, #14186) and repeated it on 2022-05-12 (claim #13921), but put the figure at 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988). What has not been said is why the two numbers differ by 40 MW, which one is current, and how much of either figure is self-mining versus hosted-customer load, or energized versus merely contracted power.

The company said on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility opened at 22 MW (claims #14177, #14182) and will reach 300 MW (claims #14178, #14183, #14187). It named Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton as partners (claims #14175, #14184). What has not been said is the ramp schedule and capex between 22 MW and 300 MW, the price and term of the Tenaska power arrangement, and whether interconnection for the full 300 MW is secured or only for the first phase.

The company cited a 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-04 (claims #14185, #14195, #13933), and the claim is now marked delayed. What has not been said is the physical site, the serving utility and interconnection queue position, an energization date for any tranche, or who funds the build.

The company disclosed B. Riley financing on 2022-04-07: a committed equity facility recorded as "150.0 USD" (claim #14082) and bridge notes recorded as "75.0 USD" (claim #14081), followed by 573,381 commitment shares on 2022-07-20 (claim #13853). What has not been said is the stated units (presumably millions), the coupon and security on the bridge notes, how much of each facility has actually been drawn, and what share price or discount governs draws on the equity line.

The company appointed a new CFO at a $300,000 base on 2022-04-04 (claims #14090, #14092) and referenced separation benefits for the departing CFO (claim #14093). It later cited a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs (claims #13996, #13997), then on 2022-06-13 amended RSUs to net-settle 50 million shares with 17 million withheld for taxes (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is the total dollar value of the former CFO's package, the new CFO's bonus and equity grant, which executives hold the 50 million net-settled shares, and how much cash the company spent on the withholding.

The company described Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay at "65.0 USD" on 2022-03-29 (claims #14172, #14181, #14190) and pointed to DeFi product development on 2022-05-12 (claim #13928). What has not been said is the unit and form of that consideration (cash or stock), whether any goodwill from RADAR has since been impaired, and whether any DeFi product has shipped or produced revenue.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for 500 MW, cited as claims #14185, #14188, #14179 and #14195, and repeated the figure on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #13933, #13925, #13924). What has not been said is who supplies the power, what interconnection or utility agreement backs 500 MW, where the site is, and when the first megawatt will be energized. Denton has a named energy partner in Tenaska (claim #14175), but Muskogee has none, so what firm power commitment actually exists behind the 500 MW number?

The company disclosed operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, then reported 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (claim #13988), then repeated 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (claim #13921). What has not been said is why roughly 40 MW disappeared between the two dates, or whether the May figure is stale or a different metric. How much of that capacity is self-mining versus hosting for third-party customers, and which customers are the hosting counterparties?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that the Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW against a 300 MW buildout, cited as claims #14177, #14178, #14182 and #14193, and restated both numbers on 2022-05-04 (claims #13931, #13932). What has not been said is the ramp schedule between 22 MW and 300 MW, the capex required, or the economic terms with the City of Denton and Tenaska (claims #14184, #13922). What are the interim megawatt milestones and their dates, and is power priced on a fixed or market-indexed basis?

The company disclosed on 2022-04-07 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded as "75.0 USD" with a 2022-12-07 date, cited as claim #14081, and a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of "150.0 USD" due by 2022-06-06, cited as claim #14082. It then disclosed a B. Riley stock purchase agreement of $100 million on 2022-07-20 (claim #13852). What has not been said is the units behind the $75 and $150 figures, the interest rate and fees on the notes, whether the notes were repaid or extended at maturity, and why the equity facility was signed at $100 million and roughly six weeks after the stated deadline. Was the $50 million shortfall waived, and how much has actually been drawn?

The company disclosed a CFO resignation and appointment on 2022-04-04, cited as claims #14088 through #14093, with a $300,000 base salary. It disclosed $75,000 of severance and 1.4 million RSUs vesting for a departing executive on 2022-04-19 (claims #13996, #13997). It then disclosed an RSU amendment on 2022-06-13 involving net settlement of 50 million shares with 17 million canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893). What has not been said is whose awards the 50 million-share amendment covers, what cash the company paid out for withholding taxes, and whether the 1.4 million accelerated units were negotiated as part of the CFO exit. Who are the recipients, and what did the net settlement cost in cash?

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay cost "65.0 USD", cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190, and on 2022-05-12 described plans for DeFi products (claim #13928) and a $195 million merger proceeds allocation (claim #13929). What has not been said is whether the $65 figure is in millions and how much was paid in cash versus stock, how the $195 million was split across uses, and what has come of the RADAR team and DeFi roadmap since. Has any of that acquired value been impaired?

The company reported total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29 (claims #14173, #14186) and repeated that figure on 2022-05-12 (claim #13921). On 2022-04-20 it cited 457 MW (claim #13988). What has not been said is what accounts for the 40 MW difference, whether either figure means energized, contracted, or hosted-customer capacity, and why the stale higher number was still being used three weeks after the lower one appeared.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Denton, Texas became operational at 22 MW with an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims #14177, #14182, #14178, #14193), and repeated this on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #13931, #13932, #13923). It also disclosed a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175, #14184, #13922). What has not been said is the ramp schedule from 22 MW to 300 MW, the ERCOT interconnection and power-price terms, and what economic role or compensation Tenaska receives under that agreement.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29 (claims #14185, #14195, #14179, #14188) and restated it on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #13933, #13924, #13925). The associated 2022-02-28 date is now marked delayed. What has not been said is the physical site, the serving utility and interconnection status, the expected energization date for any first tranche, and the capital budget required to build 500 MW.

The company disclosed $75 bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital due 2022-12-07 on 2022-04-07 (claim #14081). The same filing noted a required $150 committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate by 2022-06-06 (claim #14082). On 2022-07-20 it disclosed a $100,000,000 B. Riley stock purchase agreement (claim #13852). What has not been said is whether the $100M agreement replaced the $150M requirement and, if so, whether the note covenant was waived. The filings also do not give the notes' interest rate and fees, the discount at which B. Riley may purchase shares, or how much has been drawn. The units on the $75 and $150 figures are presumably millions but are not stated.

The company disclosed a CFO resignation with separation benefits on 2022-04-04 (claims #14088, #14093), along with a $300,000 base salary for an internally promoted successor (claims #14090, #14091, #14092). On 2022-04-19 it described a $75,000 severance payment and 1,400,000 RSUs vesting on 2022-05-06 (claims #13996, #13997). What has not been said is the reason for the departure, the dollar value of the accelerated RSUs relative to the cash severance, and the new CFO's equity grant and bonus target. For the 2022-06-13 RSU amendment net-settling 50,000,000 shares with 17,000,000 canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893), the filings do not name the executives who benefited or state the cash tax outlay the company absorbed.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay for 65.0 USD on 2022-03-29 (claims #14172, #14181, #14190). On 2022-05-12 it tied merger proceeds of $195 million to DeFi product development and mining technology (claims #13929, #13928). What has not been said is the actual unit and form of the RADAR consideration, how much of the $195 million went to DeFi versus mining, and whether any RADAR product has shipped or been written down.

The company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14173 and #14186, and repeated 497 MW on 2022-05-12, cited as claim #13921. On 2022-04-20 it reported 457 MW, cited as claim #13988. What has not been said is why 40 MW apparently disappeared between filings, which figure is current, and as of what measurement date. It is also unclear whether the difference reflects curtailment, a site going offline, or simply inconsistent definitions of operational capacity.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW and will eventually reach 300 MW, cited as claims #14177, #14178 and #14182, and restated this on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #13931, #13932 and #13923. What has not been said is the energization schedule for the remaining 278 MW, the capex required to get there, and the terms of the Tenaska Energy and City of Denton arrangement, cited as claims #14175 and #14184. Those terms include the power price, the contract length, and who holds the interconnection. The go-live date itself is inconsistent: claims #14192 and #13931 give February 1, 2022, while claim #14182 gives February 28, 2022.

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14185, #14188 and #14195, and repeated it on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12, cited as claims #13933, #13924 and #13925. What has not been said is any target operational date, first-phase megawatts, estimated build cost, serving utility, or interconnection status. As disclosed, the 500 MW figure is a planned capacity with no timeline attached.

The company disclosed $75 of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital maturing by 2022-12-07 on 2022-04-07, cited as claim #14081. It also said a $150 committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate was required by 2022-06-06, cited as claim #14082. Neither filing states the units, the interest rate, or any fees. The purchase agreement actually signed was disclosed on 2022-07-20 at $100,000,000, cited as claims #13851 and #13852, together with 573,381 commitment shares and $75,000 in legal fee reimbursement, cited as claims #13853 and #13854. What has not been said is why the facility is $50 million smaller than required and was signed after the June 6 deadline, whether that triggered any default or consent under the bridge notes, and how much has been drawn.

The company disclosed Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay for "65.0 USD" on 2022-03-29, cited as claims #14172, #14181 and #14190, and on 2022-05-12 described $195 million in merger proceeds allocation alongside DeFi product development, cited as claims #13929 and #13928. What has not been said is the unit and the cash-versus-stock mix of the Radar consideration. The company has also not given a breakdown of how the $195 million is split among mining buildout, debt, and the DeFi initiative, or what revenue or headcount Radar actually contributes.

The company disclosed on 2022-04-04 a CFO resignation and appointment, with a new CFO base salary of $300,000, cited as claims #14088, #14090 and #14092. On 2022-04-19 it disclosed a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs for the departing executive, cited as claims #13996 and #13997. On 2022-06-13 it disclosed an RSU amendment net-settling roughly 50 million shares with 17 million canceled for tax withholding, cited as claims #13892 and #13893. What has not been said is the new CFO's bonus and equity grant, and whether the 1.4 million RSUs were accelerated and at what value. The company also has not said who received the 50 million net-settled shares or how much cash it paid to cover the withholding on the 17 million canceled shares. Claim #13850 restates the share count as "50.0 shares", which further muddies the figure.

On 2022-03-29 the company disclosed total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims #14173 and #14186), and it repeated the 497 MW figure on 2022-05-12 (claim #13921). On 2022-04-20 it cited 457 MW of operational capacity (claim #13988). What has not been said is why roughly 40 MW apparently went offline or was reclassified between those dates, which sites were affected, and how the capacity divides between self-mining and hosted customer machines.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that its Denton, Texas facility became operational at 22 MW in February 2022 and will reach 300 MW when completed (claims #14182, #14177, #14183, #14187 and #13932). It also cited a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims #14175 and #14184). What has not been said is when each tranche beyond 22 MW will be energized and what the ERCOT interconnection or substation capacity is. The company has also not described Tenaska's economic role: whether it is power supplier, landlord, or revenue-share counterparty, and on what pricing and term.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 a data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a planned 500 MW facility (claims #14185, #14188 and #14195), restated on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (claims #13933 and #13925). What has not been said is the site's physical location, the utility and interconnection path, the expected energization date, the first-phase capacity, and the estimated capex. Without those, a 500 MW headline cannot be judged against Denton's 22 MW actual.

The company disclosed on 2022-03-29 that Blockcap acquired Radar Relay for a figure recorded as "65.0 USD" (claims #14172, #14181 and #14190), and that it acquired Blockcap in a deal completed around July 2021 (claims #14171 and #14180). What has not been said is the unit of the Radar Relay figure (presumably $65 million), the purchase price and consideration mix for Blockcap itself, and whether the DeFi product plans tied to RADAR (claim #13928) produced any revenue or were wound down. The same filings cite a $195 million merger-proceeds allocation (claim #13929) without a line-item breakdown.

On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded as "75.0 USD" (claim #14081). It also disclosed a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate recorded as "150.0 USD" and due by 2022-06-06 (claim #14082). On 2022-07-20 it disclosed a $100 million common stock purchase agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II, plus 573,381 commitment shares and $75,000 in legal fee reimbursement (claims #13851, #13852, #13853 and #13854). What has not been said is how the $100 million agreement squares with the $150 million facility the bridge notes required, and whether the shortfall triggered any default or amendment. The company has also not disclosed the interest rate and amount outstanding on the bridge notes, or how much it has actually drawn under the equity line.

On 2022-04-04 and 2022-04-19 the company disclosed a CFO resignation and an internal successor at a $300,000 base salary (claims #14088, #14090, #14091 and #14092). For the departing executive it disclosed a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs (claims #13996 and #13997). What has not been said is the new CFO's target bonus and equity grant, the dollar value and acceleration terms of the 1.4 million vesting RSUs, and the reason for the departure. Separately, the June and July 2022 RSU amendments disclosed net settlement of about 50 million shares, with 17 million canceled for tax withholding (claims #13892, #13893 and #13850). What has not been said is which holders benefited, how much cash the company paid to cover those withholding taxes, and whether insiders were among the recipients.

The company disclosed on 2022-10-11 that Celsius Mining LLC, one of its largest customers, filed for chapter 11, is withholding payment of billed charges under the Master Services Agreement, and has filed a motion alleging an automatic stay violation (claims #13536, #13537, #13538, #13539, #13540, #13541, #13548, #13549, #13550, #13551). What has not been said is how much Celsius owes, what share of hosting revenue and energized capacity Celsius accounts for, and whether the company has reserved against the receivable. The filings also call Celsius both the largest customer (#13536) and one of the largest customers (#13548), and that inconsistency has not been reconciled.

The company disclosed on 2022-07-26 a colocation agreement to host ASIC servers (claim #13845). What has not been said is who the counterparty is, how many megawatts or machines are covered, the term and pricing, and whether this customer is separate from Celsius. Given the Celsius default, how concentrated is the rest of the hosting book?

The company disclosed on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 a 500 MW Muskogee development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, and a Denton, Texas site with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy. Denton was operational at 22 MW with a 300 MW target (claims #13922, #13923, #13924, #13925, #13931, #13932, #13933, #13697, #13698). What has not been said is the energization schedule, interconnection or substation detail, power purchase terms with Tenaska, and the capex required to reach either target. Operational capacity also moved from 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (#13988) to 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (#13921). The company has not said whether those figures are energized or contracted megawatts, or how they split between self-mining and hosting.

The company disclosed on 2022-08-03 $75 million of bridge promissory notes with B. Riley, extended to 2023-06-01 in $60 million and $15 million tranches (claims #13829, #13832, #13833). It also disclosed an amortization schedule due by 2023-05-01 (#13830) and advisory fees paid in equity, including 386,697 shares for a $750,000 fee (#13831, #13834, #13547). What has not been said is the interest rate on the notes, the size and dates of each amortization payment, and the share price used for the fee shares. The company has also not said whether B. Riley's combined roles as lender, advisor and equity-line purchaser are treated as a related-party relationship.

The company disclosed a $100 million equity line with B. Riley Principal Capital II, 573,381 commitment shares, and a Nasdaq issuance cap of 70,289,880 shares (claims #13543, #13544, #13545, #13696, #13851, #13852, #13853). It also cited $514.8 million of outstanding convertible notes (#13542, #13795), recorded without a stated unit. What has not been said is how much of the equity line has been drawn and at what average price, and how much capacity remains under the share cap. The company has also not given the conversion price, coupon, maturity or covenant terms of the convertible notes.

The company disclosed a CFO departure dated 2022-04-04 and a new CFO appointment dated 2022-04-05 (claims #13994, #13995). It also disclosed a $75,000 severance payment and vesting of 1.4 million RSUs (#13996, #13997), plus an RSU amendment for net settlement of about 50 million shares with 17 million withheld for taxes (#13850, #13892, #13893). What has not been said is which executives received the severance and vesting, and whether the vesting was accelerated. The company has also not said who holds the amended RSUs or how much cash it paid to cover withholding taxes on the 17 million cancelled shares. The $195 million of net merger proceeds (#13794, #13929) was likewise disclosed without figures for the XPDI redemptions or transaction costs (#13790, #13792) that produced it.

The company disclosed that Celsius Mining LLC was one of its largest customers, had filed for chapter 11, and was withholding payment of billed charges under the Master Services Agreement on 2022-10-11, cited as claims #13536, #13538, #13541, #13548 and #13551; what has not been said is the dollar amount of the outstanding receivable, Celsius's share of revenue or hosted hashrate, or what reserve, if any, was taken against it. Separately, the colocation agreement to host ASIC servers disclosed on 2022-07-26 (claim #13845) names no counterparty, so is that the Celsius contract or a different customer with its own concentration risk?

The company disclosed $75,000,000 of bridge promissory notes with an amortization schedule running to 2023-05-01 and maturity by 2023-06-01 on 2022-08-03, cited as claims #13829 and #13830, split into extensions recorded as "60.0 USD million" and "15.0 USD million" (claims #13832 and #13833); what has not been said is the interest rate, the size and dates of each amortization payment, and what the extension changed relative to the original terms. How much of that $75 million was repaid on schedule, given the cash depletion guidance discussed below?

The company disclosed B. Riley entities acting simultaneously as bridge lender (claim #13546), $100,000,000 equity line counterparty (claims #13851 and #13515), and advisor paid $750,000 in stock plus $75,000 in legal fee reimbursement (claims #13831, #13834 and #13854) between July and October 2022; what has not been said is how the board managed the conflict of a single counterparty setting pricing on the equity line while being owed debt repayment, or whether any related-party or independent committee review occurred. Did B. Riley's advisory engagement cover the bridge note extensions it was itself party to?

The company disclosed $20,700,000 of equity line shares sold on 2022-10-26, cited as claim #13499, against a Nasdaq issuance cap of 70,289,880 shares (claims #13495 and #13545); what has not been said is how many shares were sold for that amount, the average realized price after B. Riley's discount, and how much of the $100 million commitment remains usable under the share cap at current prices. The company also disclosed on the same date that cash would be depleted by 2022-12-31 (claims #13504 and #13516), now marked delayed; what runway figure replaced it, and what funding source made up the difference?

The company disclosed a Muskogee, Oklahoma data center at 500 MW and a Denton, Texas capacity target of 300 MW on 2022-09-07, cited as claims #13698 and #13697; what has not been said is how much of each figure was energized versus contracted versus aspirational, the utility or interconnection agreement backing the power, or a timeline for reaching the Denton target. Is the 500 MW Muskogee figure a site-level interconnection limit or installed load?

The company disclosed Neal P. Goldman's board appointment at $35,000 per month on 2022-10-26 (claims #13500, #13501 and #13514), the Weil, Gotshal & Manges engagement (claim #13502), the elimination of the Controller and Chief Accounting Officer role with the CFO absorbing principal accounting officer duties (claims #13484, #13485 and #13509), and an RSU amendment for net settlement of approximately 50 million shares (claim #13850); what has not been said is the term of Goldman's fee and whether it signals a restructuring committee mandate, the scope and cost of the Weil engagement, whether the departing accounting officer received severance, and which executives benefited from the RSU net settlement and what cash tax withholding it required. How much cash did the RSU net settlement consume at a time when the company was guiding to depletion?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-11 that Celsius Mining LLC, a hosting customer under a Master Services Agreement, had filed for chapter 11, was withholding payment of billed charges, and had filed a motion alleging an automatic stay violation, cited as claims #13536, #13538, #13540, #13541, #13549 and #13551; what has not been said is the dollar amount of outstanding charges, what share of hosting revenue Celsius represents, or how many machines and megawatts it occupies. Which is it, given that claim #13536 calls Celsius the largest customer while claims #13539 and #13548 call it one of the largest?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-11 and 2022-10-26 that it had executed bridge promissory notes with B. Riley Commercial Capital and affiliated entities, cited as claims #13546, #13482 and #13491; what has not been said is the principal amount, interest rate, maturity, security package, or where these notes rank against the $514.8 million of outstanding convertible notes in claims #13795 and #13542. What are the convertible notes' own maturity, conversion price and cash-versus-PIK interest terms?

The company disclosed that B. Riley acts at once as equity line counterparty ($100 million commitment, 573,381 commitment shares), advisor (386,697 advisory fee shares), and bridge lender, cited as claims #13543, #13544, #13547, #13480 and #13546; what has not been said is the total economic value B. Riley has received across these roles, or how the board reviewed the arrangements for conflicts. With only $20.7 million of shares sold under the line per claim #13499 and a 70,289,880-share Nasdaq cap per claims #13545 and #13495, how much of the $100 million can realistically be drawn at current prices?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-26 that it expected to deplete its cash by the end of 2022 and had engaged PJT Partners and Weil, Gotshal & Manges, cited as claims #13507, #13513, #13516, #13502 and #13503; on the same day it appointed Neal P. Goldman to the board at $35,000 per month, cited as claims #13505 and #13514. What has not been said is the minimum liquidity level behind that forecast, whether Goldman sits on a restructuring or special committee, how long the monthly fee runs, and whether it is paid on top of standard director compensation.

The company disclosed on 2022-09-07 a 500 MW Muskogee, Oklahoma data center and a 300 MW capacity target in Denton, Texas, cited as claims #13698 and #13697; what has not been said is whether these figures are energized, contracted, or eventual build-out capacity, on what timeline, with which utility interconnection or power agreement, and how the capital needed to build them fits with the year-end cash depletion warning in claim #13516.

The company disclosed the XPDI merger closing with $195.0 million of net cash proceeds, share redemptions, and transaction costs, plus a separate Blockcap merger, cited as claims #13794, #13790, #13792 and #13788; what has not been said is the redemption rate, the dollar amount of transaction costs, or the consideration paid for Blockcap. The company also eliminated Brian Neville's Controller and Chief Accounting Officer position weeks before the liquidity warning, cited as claims #13508 and #13522. Was that change tied to any accounting or control issue, and what severance was paid?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-11 that Celsius Mining LLC, one of its largest customers, had filed for chapter 11 and was withholding payment of billed charges under their Master Services Agreement, cited as claims #13536, #13538, #13541 and #13551; what has not been said is the dollar amount of those outstanding charges, what share of hosting revenue Celsius represented, and how many machines or megawatts of capacity were committed to Celsius under that agreement. If the company cannot collect, how much revenue and hosted capacity is actually at risk?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-11 that Celsius had filed a motion alleging the company violated the automatic stay, cited as claims #13537 and #13550; what has not been said is what conduct Celsius alleged, such as a threatened or actual power-down or termination, what damages or remedies Celsius is seeking, and whether the company has recorded any reserve or loss contingency for the dispute. What does the company believe its exposure is if the bankruptcy court sides with Celsius?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-26 that it expects to run out of cash by the end of 2022, cited as claims #13504, #13507, #13513 and #13516, while holding $514.8 million of convertible notes, cited as claims #13511 and #13542, and having engaged restructuring advisers PJT Partners and Weil, Gotshal & Manges, cited as claims #13502 and #13503; what has not been said is its current cash balance, monthly burn rate, upcoming interest and principal obligations, or whether it is negotiating forbearance or a restructuring with noteholders and equipment lenders. With a year-end cash runway, how much liquidity does the company actually have today, and what is its plan if the equity line cannot close the gap?

The company disclosed a $100 million committed equity facility with B. Riley Principal Capital II, which issued 573,381 commitment shares and a separate 386,697 advisory fee shares to B. Riley Securities, and bridge promissory notes with B. Riley Commercial Capital, cited as claims #13480, #13481, #13483, #13491 and #13546; what has not been said is the principal amount, interest rate, maturity and security of those bridge notes, and how B. Riley is paid in total across its roles as equity purchaser, adviser and lender. Only $20.7 million of shares had been sold under the line, cited as claim #13499, against a 70,289,880-share Nasdaq cap, cited as claims #13495 and #13545. At the current share price, how much of the $100 million can realistically be drawn before that cap is reached?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-26 that Neal P. Goldman joined the board at $35,000 per month, cited as claims #13501 and #13505, alongside the engagement of restructuring advisers, cited as claims #13502 and #13503; what has not been said is whether Goldman's role is tied to a special or restructuring committee, how long that compensation is guaranteed, and how the fee compares with what other directors are paid. What specific mandate justifies that level of director pay?

The company disclosed on 2022-10-24 and 2022-10-26 that it eliminated the Controller and Chief Accounting Officer role held by Brian Neville and folded those duties into the CFO role held by Denise Sterling, cited as claims #13484, #13508 and #13509, and then on 2022-10-27 that it dismissed Ernst & Young, hired Marcum LLP, and reported material weaknesses in accounting supervision, digital asset wallet segregation of duties, and equity recordkeeping, cited as claims #13466, #13465, #13476, #13477 and #13479; what has not been said is whether Ernst & Young disagreed with the company or flagged reportable events, what severance Neville received, and how removing a dedicated accounting officer squares with a remediation plan for those weaknesses. Why did the auditor change, and who now independently oversees financial reporting?

The company disclosed a Replacement DIP Facility with B. Riley Commercial Capital on 2023-02-06, cited as claim #13386. What has not been said is how the amount and maturity reconcile across filings. The same facility is recorded as 70,000,000 USD (claims #13295, #12793), as "70.0 USD" with no unit multiplier (claims #13205, #12761), and as "70.0 USD million" (claim #12786). Its maturity is 2023-12-21 in claim #13386 but 2023-12-22 in claims #13209, #13298 and #12761. How much of the $70 million was actually drawn, and on what date does the facility mature?

The company disclosed on 2023-02-08 that the original DIP Credit Agreement was fully repaid and terminated, cited as claims #13365 and #13366, and later described that facility as a 57,000,000 USD commitment with 18,000,000 USD of syndication support, cited as claims #12791 and #12792. What has not been said is who the original DIP lenders and syndication backstop parties were, how much had been drawn at repayment, and whether the repayment was funded from the B. Riley facility. The 3.5 percent upfront payment and 5.0 percent exit premium on the replacement facility (claims #13207, #13297, #12788, #12789) are disclosed. What break fees or premiums, if any, went to the original lenders?

The company disclosed on 2023-02-12 that its Restructuring Support Agreement and a related Support Agreement were terminated, cited as claims #13368, #13350 and #13364. What has not been said is which creditor group was party to the agreement, who terminated it and why, and what economic terms were abandoned. The record also carries Chapter 11 filing claims dated anywhere from 2023-02-12 to 2023-04-03 (claims #13349, #13291, #13201, #12760) but no petition date, court or case number. When and where was the case actually filed?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center development agreement with the Port of Muskogee on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12820, #12765 and #12790. What has not been said is the site acreage or address, the utility and interconnection arrangement, a target energization date, estimated capex, or how a company operating under a $70 million DIP intends to fund a project of that size. Is Muskogee a binding commitment or an option?

The company disclosed 592 MW of operating power capacity across 8 data centers on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12818, #12764 and #12819. It also disclosed a 35 MW Murphy Electric Power Board contract and a 35 MW Marble 1 facility, cited as claims #12770, #12759 and #12825. What has not been said is the per-site MW breakdown, whether the Murphy contract powers Marble 1, and that contract's term, rate structure and termination rights. How much of the 592 MW serves self-mining versus hosting customers, and who are the largest hosting customers?

The company disclosed 234,000 deployed mining units and mining equipment supply agreements with expected Q1 2023 delivery on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12768, #12824 and #12826. The hash rate claim, #12769, carries no figure. What has not been said is the supplier's identity, the number of machines still owed, deposits already paid, and whether those contracts were assumed or rejected in Chapter 11. On the personnel side, Todd M. DuChene is identified as President and Chief Legal Officer (claims #13293, #13299), but no appointment date, compensation, or bankruptcy retention or incentive award has been disclosed. What is he being paid to stay through the restructuring?

The company disclosed on 2023-04-03 that its original $57 million DIP commitment from the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group was terminated and replaced by a $70 million facility from B. Riley Commercial Capital maturing 2023-12-22, cited as claims #12803, #12811, #12804 and #12813, along with an $18 million syndication support commitment (#12812) and a 5 percent exit premium (#12814). What has not been said is why the noteholder facility was abandoned, what interest rate and fees the replacement carries, how much had been drawn at filing, and who the syndication participants are. Does B. Riley have any other lending, equipment-financing or equity relationship with the company that makes the replacement facility a related-party arrangement?

The company disclosed a 500 MW data center development agreement with the Port of Muskogee on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12820, #12805, #12797, #12777, #12765 and #12755. What has not been said is the site acreage or parcel, the utility and interconnection queue position, the energization schedule, the estimated capital cost, and whether the company is committed to minimum payments. How does a debtor-in-possession fund a 500 MW build, and has the project been paused or dropped under the Chapter 11 case (#12810, #12828)?

The company disclosed 592 MW of operating power capacity across eight data centers on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12818, #12795, #12764, #12753, #12819 and #12754, but the related capacity and hash-rate claims (#12775, #12769, #12801) carry no figures. What has not been said is the megawatt split by site, how much is energized rather than merely contracted, and how much serves self-mining versus hosting. What was the exahash figure at year end, and what realized uptime or curtailment rate sits behind the 592 MW number?

The company disclosed 234,000 bitcoin miners deployed on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12800 and #12768. What has not been said is how many of those units the company owns and how many belong to hosting customers, or who the largest hosting customers are and what share of revenue they represent. How many hosting customers filed for bankruptcy or stopped paying before the company's own Chapter 11 filing?

The company disclosed an industrial power contract with Murphy Electric Power Board sized at 35 MW, and 35,000 kW of capacity at Marble 1, on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12770, #12759, #12782, #12799 and #12796. What has not been said is the contract term, the price per MWh or tariff basis, any demand-charge or take-or-pay minimums, and the curtailment provisions. Is the Murphy contract the sole power source for a specific facility, and was it assumed or rejected in the bankruptcy?

The company disclosed its Chapter 11 filing, its restructuring support agreement with the noteholder group, the XPDI SPAC merger and the July 2021 Blockcap acquisition on 2023-04-03, cited as claims #12810, #12828, #12773, #12822, #12807, #12806 and #12798. Nothing on record addresses key employee retention or incentive payments sought in the bankruptcy, executive compensation changes, the proposed treatment of existing equity, or the Blockcap purchase price and any later goodwill impairment. How much did management receive in retention or incentive awards before and after the petition date?

The company disclosed on 2023-05-14 total contracted power capacity of 1,500 MW, with 500 MW allocated to Muskogee (claims #12643, #12644), and a list of operational data center locations (claim #12645). What has not been said is how much of that 1,500 MW is energized today versus merely contracted, which utilities or interconnection agreements back each site, and when the undeveloped balance is expected to come online.

The company disclosed exit financing on 2023-11-21: an Exit Facility of "80.0 USD", an Equity Rights Offering of "55.0 USD", a backstop commitment of "37.1 USD", and new secured notes of "150.0 USD" (claims #6513, #6514, #6515, #6516). A later filing restates the notes as "150.0 USD millions" (claim #6508). What has not been said is confirmation that every figure is in millions, who the exit lender and backstop parties are, and what the rights offering actually raised. That offering missed its 2023-12-11 date and is marked delayed.

The company disclosed on 2023-11-16 that it had emerged from Chapter 11 (claim #6526). Yet the confirmation order deadline of 2024-01-19 and the effective date deadline of 2024-02-19 are both marked delayed (claims #6511, #6519, #6520). The secured convertible notes maturity of 2025-04-01 is also delayed (claim #6505). What has not been said is the actual confirmation and effective dates, and whether the convertible notes were repaid, converted, or extended. If they were extended, the new terms and the principal still outstanding have not been given.

The company disclosed on 2023-05-16 that Adam Sullivan would receive a $500,000 base salary, a guaranteed 2023 bonus of $500,000, a 100% target bonus, and eligibility for equity awards (claims #12609, #12610, #12611, #12612, #12561, #12562). What has not been said is the size, vesting, and performance conditions of any equity grant. The company also has not said whether the bankruptcy court approved a guaranteed bonus paid while the company was a debtor-in-possession. His compensation after he became interim CEO on 2023-08-06 (claim #12301) has not been updated either.

The company disclosed on 2023-08-06 that Michael Levitt resigned as CEO and became Executive Chairman with a figure of "60000.0 USD", and that Darin Feinstein resigned as Co-Chairman (claims #12298, #12299, #12300). What has not been said is whether the $60,000 is monthly, annual, or one-time. Nor has the company said what severance, retained equity, consulting, or other related-party arrangements either departing executive kept.

The company disclosed on 2023-06-20 that key stakeholders did not support the Proposed Plan (claim #12454). By 2023-08-07 and 2023-11-12 it had stakeholder support agreements and an agreement in principle with noteholders and the equity committee (claims #12295, #6534, #6536). It was also pursuing a replacement DIP facility after an anticipated $5 million mandatory prepayment (claims #12353, #12376, #6525). What has not been said is which holders signed and what share of each claim class they represent. The replacement DIP lender, size, and pricing have not been disclosed either.

The company disclosed on 2023-11-21 an Exit Facility of 80.0 USD, new secured notes of 150.0 USD, new secured convertible notes of 260.0 USD, an equity distribution to convertible noteholders of 260.0 USD, and a 55.0 USD rights offering with a 37.1 USD backstop, cited as claims #6513, #6516, #6517, #6518, #6514 and #6515. The 2023-11-26 versions of several of these figures specify USD millions (claims #6506, #6507, #6508, #6509, #6510). What has not been said is whether every 2023-11-21 figure is in millions, and whether the two separate 260 figures for convertible notes (claim #6517) and common interests to convertible noteholders (claims #6510, #6518) are distinct instruments or the same 260 million counted twice.

The company disclosed on 2023-07-30 that it was pursuing a replacement debtor-in-possession facility, cited as claim #12353. It then announced that facility on 2023-11-16 (claim #6525) and an 80 million Exit Facility split into 40 million new money and 40 million cashless credit (claims #6506, #6507). It had earlier flagged a 5.0 million USD mandatory DIP prepayment due by 2023-07-10 (claim #12376). What has not been said is who the original and replacement DIP lenders and Exit Facility lenders are, what interest rate, fees and maturity apply, what the cashless component rolls up, and whether the 5 million prepayment was actually made on time.

The company disclosed on 2023-11-21 a 37.1 million backstop commitment for the 55 million equity rights offering, cited as claims #6514 and #6515, and on 2023-08-07 entered restructuring stakeholder support agreements (claim #12295). This followed a 2023-06-20 statement that key stakeholders did not support the original plan (claim #12454). What has not been said is which parties provided the backstop and signed the support agreements, what backstop premium or fee they received, and who covers the roughly 17.9 million of the rights offering the backstop does not reach.

The company disclosed deadlines of 2023-12-11 for the rights offering, 2024-01-19 for the confirmation order, and 2024-02-19 for the plan effective date, cited as claims #6514, #6519, #6511, #6520 and #6512. It also set a 2025-04-01 maturity for the secured convertible notes (claim #6505). All of these are now marked delayed. What has not been said is the actual date each milestone closed, whether any milestone extension triggered fees or changed terms for the backstop parties or lenders, and whether the convertible notes were extended, refinanced or converted before maturity.

The company disclosed on 2023-05-16 Adam Sullivan's 500,000 USD base salary, a guaranteed 500,000 USD 2023 bonus and a 100 percent target bonus, cited as claims #12560, #12609, #12611 and #12610. The same filing made him eligible for equity awards (claims #12612, #12562), and he was named interim CEO on 2023-08-06 (claim #12301). What has not been said is the size, vesting and performance conditions of any equity award, whether the guaranteed bonus was paid during Chapter 11 and with what court approval, and whether his pay changed when he took the interim CEO role.

The company disclosed on 2023-08-06 that Michael Levitt resigned as CEO and became Executive Chairman at 60,000.0 USD, and that Darin Feinstein resigned as Co-Chairman, cited as claims #12298, #12299 and #12300. What has not been said is whether the 60,000 figure is monthly, annual or a one-time payment, whether Levitt received any severance or retained equity on stepping down as CEO, and why Feinstein resigned, including whether any consulting, hosting or other related-party arrangements with him continue.

On 2023-08-06 the company disclosed that Michael Levitt resigned as CEO and was appointed Executive Chairman with a figure of 60,000 USD (claims #12298, #12299). It also disclosed that Darin Feinstein resigned as Co-Chairman (claim #12300). What has not been said is whether that 60,000 USD is a monthly, annual, or one-time amount. The record also does not say whether it replaces or supplements Levitt's prior CEO package, or whether either departing executive received severance, equity acceleration, or a consulting arrangement approved during the bankruptcy.

On 2023-07-30 and again on 2023-11-16 the company said it was pursuing and then referenced a replacement debtor-in-possession facility (claims #12353, #6525). It had earlier flagged a 5,000,000 USD mandatory DIP prepayment due by 2023-07-10 (claim #12376). What has not been said is who the replacement DIP lender is, what the facility's size, pricing, and fees are, and whether the July 2023 prepayment was actually made on time.

On 2023-11-21 and 2023-11-26 the company described an 80.0 USD Exit Facility split into a 40.0 new-money component and a 40.0 cashless component (claims #6513, #6506, #6507, #6497, #6498). It also described a 37.1 USD backstop commitment for a 55.0 USD Equity Rights Offering (claims #6515, #6514). Some of these claims carry no unit scale, while parallel claims are denominated in millions. What has not been said is who the Exit Facility lenders and the rights-offering backstop parties are, and what backstop premium or fee they earned. The company also has not said whether any of those parties are existing insiders or noteholders.

The company set a Bankruptcy Court confirmation order deadline of 2024-01-19 and a plan Effective Date deadline of 2024-02-19 (claims #6519, #6520, #6511, #6512, #6503, #6504). It extended the Equity Rights Offering deadline to 2023-12-28 (claim #6400). All of these now carry a delayed status. It separately asserted an emergence from Chapter 11 on 2023-11-16 with no date attached (claim #6526). What has not been said on this record is the actual confirmation date and the actual Effective Date. The record also does not show how much of the 55.0 rights offering was subscribed versus taken up by the backstop.

On 2023-11-26 the company disclosed that its new secured convertible notes, a 260.0 million USD issuance (claims #6509, #6517, #6500), mature on 2025-04-01 (claim #6505), and that claim is now marked delayed. What has not been said is whether those notes were converted, refinanced, extended, or repaid at or before maturity. The company also has not said how much principal remains outstanding and on what terms.

On 2023-12-20 and 2023-12-27 the company announced a Global Plan Settlement agreement in principle with key stakeholders (claims #6399, #6396, #6393) and filed a Fourth Amended Plan (claim #6397). What has not been said is which stakeholders signed and which, if any, objected. The record also does not show how the settlement changed recoveries versus the Third Amended Plan's 150.0 secured notes and 260.0 equity distribution to convertible noteholders (claims #6516, #6518).

The company disclosed on 2023-08-06 that Michael Levitt resigned as CEO and was appointed Executive Chairman with a figure of 60,000 USD attached, cited as claims #12298 and #12299; what has not been said is what that $60,000 represents (monthly, annual, one-time, cash or equity), and whether any severance, retention, or KEIP/KERP payment accompanied the move. The co-chairman resignation of Darin Feinstein on the same date (#12300) and the interim appointment of Adam Sullivan (#12301, #12302) also carry no disclosed compensation terms or related-party context. Given the bankruptcy backdrop, what did each of these transitions cost the estate?

The company disclosed an $80 million Exit Facility on 2023-11-21, cited as claim #6513, later split into a $40 million new-money component and a $40 million cashless component (#6506, #6507, #6497, #6498); what has not been said is who the lender is, what the pricing, maturity, and covenants are, and what prepetition obligation the cashless $40 million rolls up. Is the exit lender a related party or a prepetition creditor, and on what terms?

The company disclosed a $55 million Equity Rights Offering on 2023-11-21 with a $37.1 million backstop, cited as claims #6514 and #6515, and then extended the rights offering deadline to 2023-12-28 (#6400), both recorded as delayed; what has not been said is who the backstop parties are, what backstop premium or fee they receive, who covers the uncommitted roughly $17.9 million, and why the deadline moved. What was the final subscription level, and how much equity went to backstoppers?

The company disclosed that it was pursuing and then obtained a replacement debtor-in-possession facility, cited as claims #12353, #6525, #6387, and #6388; what has not been said, at least in the record, is the facility size, the lender identity, the interest rate and fees, and how much was drawn before emergence. How much of the replacement DIP was repaid or rolled into the exit financing?

The company disclosed $260 million of new secured convertible notes alongside a "260.0 USD" equity distribution to convertible noteholders on 2023-11-21 and 2023-11-26, cited as claims #6517, #6518, #6509, and #6510, with a note maturity recorded as 2025-04-01 (#6505) and marked delayed; what has not been said is the conversion price, the share count or percentage ownership behind the $260 million equity figure (#6518 omits even the millions unit), and what became of the notes at or before that maturity. How many shares did convertible holders ultimately receive, and at what implied valuation?

The company disclosed an "emergence from Chapter 11" on 2023-11-16, cited as claim #6526, yet the same record shows a confirmation order deadline of 2024-01-19 and an effective date deadline of 2024-02-19 (#6519, #6520, #6511, #6512), plus a Fourth Amended Plan filed 2023-12-27 (#6397) and a Global Plan Settlement in principle with unnamed stakeholders (#6396, #6399); what has not been said is the actual confirmation and effective dates, and which parties agreed to the settlement on what economic terms. What did the equity committee and noteholders concede between the third and fourth amended plans?

The company disclosed 10.8 million shares to be issued under the Bitmain Transaction on January 16, 2024 (claim 6371); what has not been said is the purchase price or valuation being paid, the timing of close, or what assets or technology are being acquired—material details for assessing whether value is being exchanged fairly during a bankruptcy emergence. The company disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes issued in late November 2023 (claims 6517, 6509, 6500) with an April 1, 2025 maturity date (claim 6505); what has not been said is the conversion price, conversion ratio, or interest rate—metrics that determine equity dilution magnitude and whether conversion is economically likely versus a default scenario. The company disclosed an $80 million Exit Facility split between $40 million new money and $40 million cashless credit components in November 2023 (claims 6506, 6507); what has not been said is the interest rate, origination fees, financial covenants, or lender identity—information needed to model post-emergence debt service and refinancing risk. The company disclosed a $55 million Equity Rights Offering in January 2024 (claim 6385); what has not been said is the subscription price per share, the ratio of rights to existing shares, whether subscription was fully achieved, and the actual amount drawn from the $37.1 million backstop commitment (claim 6515)—details necessary to assess shareholder dilution in the emergence. The company announced multiple significant share issuances in January 2024: 166 million common shares upon emergence (claim 6370), 10.8 million under the Bitmain transaction (claim 6371), 2.2 million reserved for employee equity (claim 6372), and 93.4 million warrant units (claim 6338); what has not been disclosed is a fully-diluted capitalization table or post-emergence ownership breakdown, leaving current and prospective shareholders unable to calculate ownership percentages. The company disclosed $35 million available in replacement DIP Facility funding as of January 4, 2024 (claim 6390); what has not been said is the interest rate, total DIP commitment size, actual amounts drawn to date, or the maturity date—information necessary to assess whether liquidity was adequate and what the monthly cash burn rate was during chapter 11 proceedings.

The company disclosed shares to be issued under a Bitmain Transaction (10.8 million shares, claim #6371) announced January 16, 2024, following emergence from bankruptcy; what has not been said is the economic terms of the transaction, the consideration Bitmain is providing, whether any related-party controls or governance reviews occurred, and whether Bitmain receives equity alone or a mix of value components. The company disclosed $260.0 million in New Secured Convertible Notes (claims #6517, 6509, 6500) announced between November 21–27, 2023; what has not been said is the conversion price per share, the coupon or interest rate, the maturity date, or anti-dilution mechanics—information essential to model equity dilution upon emergence. The company disclosed an Exit Facility in multiple forms: $40 million new money component and $40 million cashless credit component (claims #6506, 6507, 6497, 6498), plus an $80 million facility reference (claim #6513)—all between November 26–27, 2023; what has not been said is whether these tranches are additive or overlapping, the interest rate, tenor, and covenant package of the facility, or how it relates to the $35 million Replacement DIP Facility (claim #6390). The company disclosed Contingent Value Rights of $130.0 USD/million (claim #6340) on January 22, 2024; what has not been said is whether this is aggregate value, per-share value, or another unit; the payment triggers; the beneficiary class; and the timeline. The company disclosed 2.2 million shares reserved for employee equity incentives (claim #6372) upon emergence on January 16, 2024; what has not been said is vesting schedules, strike prices, allocation methodology across employee levels, or how these compare to equity awarded to executive officers—absent from any proxy disclosures. The company disclosed a Nasdaq listing application as planned (claim #6373) on January 16, 2024; what has not been said is the expected timing of listing, any closing conditions or governance changes committed to, underwriter identity or commitments, or trading readiness milestones.

The company disclosed $260 million in new secured convertible notes (claims 6517, 6509, 6500) and $260 million in new common interests distribution (claims 6501, 6510), but disclosed neither the conversion price for the convertible notes nor the valuation basis or number of shares for the common interests distribution; a first-year analyst would ask on the next earnings call what dilution these restructuring securities imposed on existing equity holders.

The company disclosed a 10.8 million share issuance under the Bitmain Transaction (claim 6371) but provided no details on what assets, services, or capital Bitmain was contributing in exchange, nor the valuation at which those shares were issued; this is a material counterparty transaction whose economic substance remains completely undisclosed.

The company disclosed Tranche 1 Warrants (93.3 million units, claim 6338) and Tranche 2 Warrants (82 million units, claim 6339) with expiration dates but never disclosed the exercise price, what underlying security they entitle holders to purchase, or how many shares would be issued upon exercise; the fully diluted share count upon warrant exercise is thus unknowable.

The company disclosed a $55 million Equity Rights Offering (claims 6514, 6400, 6385) but never stated the subscription price per share at which rights holders could purchase, leaving readers unable to calculate how many shares the offering would have added to the capital structure.

The company disclosed a $37.1 million backstop commitment for the Equity Rights Offering (claim 6515) but never identified the backstop provider or the terms and conditions of the backstop arrangement, including whether any fees, compensation, or side agreements accompanied the commitment.

The company disclosed a Miner Equipment Lender Facility (claim 6335) with a stated expiration date of 2029-01-23, but provided no information on the facility size, interest rate, collateral requirements, or covenants, making it impossible to assess the debt burden this financing imposed on the reorganized company.

The company disclosed on 2024-01-16 that shares would be issued under a Bitmain Transaction (claim 6371), representing 10.8 million shares, but has not disclosed the consideration value, what specific services or equipment Bitmain provided, or why this transaction was material to restructuring support. The company announced a Replacement DIP Facility on 2024-01-04 with $35 million available (claims 6388, 6390), yet has not identified the lenders, disclosed interest rates, covenant terms, or use-of-proceeds, leaving material creditor concentration and borrowing costs opaque. The Exit Facility announced on 2023-11-26 included $40 million of new money and $40 million of cashless credit (claims 6506, 6507), but the company has not named the Exit Facility lenders, disclosed pricing, or confirmed actual funding—only that it was promised. Multiple claims from November 2023 through January 2024 announce issuances of $150 million in secured notes and $260 million in convertible notes (claims 6508, 6509, 6516, 6517, 6499, 6500), yet the company has not disclosed interest rates, maturity dates beyond a single 2025-04-01 date for convertibles, conversion prices for the convertibles, or holder identities. The Equity Rights Offering announced at $55 million with a 2023-12-11 deadline (claim 6514) required a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claim 6515), suggesting substantial undersubscription, but the company has never disclosed actual subscription rates or how much the backstops were drawn. The company disclosed 2.2 million shares reserved for employee equity incentives on 2024-01-16 (claim 6372), but has not provided vesting schedules, recipient names, exercise prices, or any executive compensation details despite emerging from bankruptcy with significant dilution.

The company disclosed that 10.8 million new shares would be issued under a "Bitmain Transaction" on 2024-01-16, cited as claim 6371; what has not been said is the transaction value, the business rationale, or the completion timeline for this material acquisition.

The company disclosed $150 million in senior secured notes issuance on multiple dates in late November 2023 (claims 6516, 6508, 6499); what has not been said is the maturity date—while convertible notes of $260 million explicitly state a 2025-04-01 maturity (claim 6505), the secured notes lack this critical term, leaving the debt maturity schedule opaque.

The company disclosed an $80 million "Exit Facility" credit facility across five announcements (claims 6513, 6507, 6506, 6498, 6497 spanning 2023-11-21 to 2023-11-27); what has not been said is the lender's identity, the interest rate, the maturity date, covenants, or how the stated $40 million "cashless credit" and $40 million "new money" components actually function.

The company announced 93.3 million warrant units expiring 2027-01-23 on 2024-01-22, cited as claim 6338; what has not been said is the strike price, the underlying equity class, or exercise terms needed to value these securities.

The company disclosed a $55 million Equity Rights Offering on 2023-11-21 with a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claims 6514, 6515); what has not been said is whether the offering was fully subscribed or undersubscribed, and if the backstop was invoked, by whom and to what extent.

The company announced $130 million in Contingent Value Rights on 2024-01-22, cited as claim 6340; what has not been said is the triggering contingency, settlement timing, recipient stakeholder class, or payment waterfall structure.

The company disclosed 10.8 million shares to be issued under a 'Bitmain Transaction' on January 16, 2024 (claim 6371), as part of the Chapter 11 emergence plan, but provided no disclosure of consideration, valuation basis, or terms of the transaction itself—rendering this material related-party deal's economic substance completely undisclosed. The company announced a $55 million Equity Rights Offering on November 21, 2023 (claim 6524, 6514) with a participation deadline extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), but never disclosed actual participation rates, amount raised, or closing confirmation—the most basic outcome metric for evaluating a restructuring capital raise. The company disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes issued on November 21, 2023 (claims 6517, 6509, 6500) that would convert into $260 million of 'Common Interests' (claims 6518, 6510, 6501), but provided no disclosure of conversion prices per share, anti-dilution adjustments, conversion timing relative to emergence, or whether conversion is automatic or holder-elected—leaving the post-emergence ownership structure opaque. The company announced an $80 million Exit Credit Facility maturing January 23, 2027 (claim 6334), but did not disclose interest rate, amortization schedule, financial covenants, use restrictions, or priority relative to the $260 million convertible notes or other exit financing. The company disclosed $130 million in Contingent Value Rights (claim 6340) but provided zero information on what business or financial contingency triggers payment, the measurement period, which stakeholder class receives them, or whether they are transferable—making the instrument's probability and value impossible to evaluate. The company reserved 2.2 million shares for employee equity incentives on January 16, 2024 (claim 6372) but did not identify named executive officers receiving allocations, disclose vesting schedules, specify performance conditions, or clarify whether pre-bankruptcy equity grants were cancelled, impaired, or rolled forward.

The company disclosed a 10.8 million share issuance to Bitmain on 2024-01-16, cited as claim #6371; what has not been said is the transaction consideration, per-share pricing, or the strategic rationale for this major equity issuance in the context of emergence from reorganization?

The company disclosed an 80.0 million Exit Facility on 2023-11-21 (comprising 40 million new money and 40 million cashless credit), cited as claims #6513, #6506, and #6507; what has not been said is the interest rate, financial covenants, maturity date, and identity of the lender?

The company disclosed contingent value rights of "130.0 USD/million" on 2024-01-22, cited as claim #6340; what has not been said is whether this represents a total value, per-share amount, or per-CVR value, and what specific performance milestones or events trigger CVR payments?

The company disclosed 166.0 million shares of new common stock upon emergence on 2024-01-16, cited as claim #6370; what has not been said is the par value of the new common stock or the implied per-share valuation at which the capitalization was determined?

The company disclosed 2.2 million shares reserved for employee equity incentives on 2024-01-16, cited as claim #6372; what has not been said is the vesting schedule, strike or grant price, and the allocation of this incentive pool to named executive officers?

The company disclosed that a Nasdaq listing application is planned on 2024-01-16, cited as claim #6373; what has not been said is whether the application was approved, the expected or actual ticker symbol, or the timing of the listing?

The company disclosed that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a Bitmain Transaction on January 16, 2024, cited as claim #6371; what has not been said is the valuation per share, the timing of issuance, or the strategic rationale for this equity allocation. Without this detail, investors cannot assess post-emergence ownership dilution or the economic value Bitmain is receiving.

The company announced an $80 million Exit Credit Facility on November 21, 2023, cited as claim #6513, with maturity later confirmed for January 23, 2027 per claim #6334; what has not been disclosed is the lender identity, interest rate, financial maintenance covenants, or conditions on asset sales and operational flexibility. These terms are critical for understanding debt service obligations and operational constraints post-emergence.

The company stated a $55 million Equity Rights Offering on November 21, 2023, cited as claim #6514, backed by a $37.1 million backstop commitment per claim #6515; what has not been disclosed is the per-share subscription price or the identity of the backstop committeeman. Without pricing and backstop counterparty identity, readers cannot assess subscription likelihood or who controls value if the offering underperforms.

The company described $260 million in Secured Convertible Notes as of November 21, 2023, cited as claim #6517, initially dated to mature April 1, 2025 per claim #6505 and later extended to January 23, 2029 per claim #6336; what has not been specified is the conversion price, whether conversion is mandatory or optional, and the equity-to-debt mechanics. These gaps obscure common shareholder dilution risk and control dynamics.

Todd M. DuChene was named Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer on December 27, 2023, cited as claim #6398; what has not been disclosed are compensation arrangements, related-party transaction disclosures, prior employment at entities with restructuring stakes, or non-compete undertakings. Standard SEC proxy disclosures on restructuring insiders would clarify potential conflicts of interest or risk concentrations.

The company announced 166 million Common Stock shares issued upon emergence on January 16, 2024, cited as claim #6370, plus 10.8 million shares to Bitmain per claim #6371 and 2.2 million reserved for employee equity per claim #6372; what has not been disclosed is how these shares allocate to each creditor class or the recovery rates by claim priority. The pro-forma ownership structure and economic recovery remain opaque.

The company disclosed a "Global Plan Settlement agreement in principle with key stakeholders" on December 27, 2023 (claim 6396) and emergence from Chapter 11, yet provided no disclosure of the actual recovery percentages for secured, unsecured, and equity creditors in the confirmed reorganization plan—information that is fundamental to assessing whether the restructuring achieved sustainable debt levels. The company announced an Exit Facility credit facility of $80.0 million on November 21, 2023 (claim 6513), later clarified as $40 million in new money and $40 million in cashless credit components (claims 6506, 6507); however, the interest rate, maturity date, financial covenants such as leverage or EBITDA thresholds, and conditions precedent were never disclosed, making it impossible to evaluate the company's debt service capacity post-emergence. The company stated that 10.8 million shares would be issued to Bitmain on January 16, 2024 (claim 6371), but did not disclose the cash or economic consideration received in exchange, the ownership percentage or voting control acquired by Bitmain, whether governance rights or board seats were granted, or whether this represented a capital infusion, customer mining relationship, or strategic partnership. The company disclosed issuance of 166 million new common shares upon emergence (claim 6370), 10.8 million to Bitmain (claim 6371), 2.2 million reserved for employee incentives (claim 6372), plus Contingent Value Rights and warrants, yet never provided a post-emergence ownership breakdown identifying the controlling shareholder(s) or voting power distribution among creditor and equity constituencies. The company announced a Nasdaq listing application as a planned event on January 16, 2024 (claim 6373) without disclosing the intended filing timeline, minimum share price or market capitalization thresholds, whether shareholder approval was required, or whether debt paydown milestones constitute conditions precedent to listing eligibility. The company referenced Contingent Value Rights of $130.0 million (claim 6340) without explaining what underlying business event or asset performance triggers distribution, the timeframe for realization of value, or the consequences if trigger events do not occur.

The company announced on 2024-01-16 that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a 'Bitmain Transaction' (claim 6371), but has not disclosed what asset, service, or consideration Bitmain is providing, nor the transaction valuation—critical information for evaluating post-emergence dilution and strategic positioning. The company disclosed on 2024-01-04 that a Replacement DIP Facility with $35 million available funding exists (claims 6388, 6390), but the identity of the lender remains undisclosed; in bankruptcy reorganizations, DIP lender identity and control rights are typically material to creditors and equity holders. Core Scientific is identified in its filings as a bitcoin mining company, yet the disclosed claims contain no information about mining hashrate, facility capacity in megawatts, or the physical locations of mining operations—metrics that would typically be central to investor assessment of a mining business. The company announced on 2023-11-21 that $260 million in new secured convertible notes would be issued (claims 6517, 6509, 6500), but conversion prices, interest rates, and whether principal is due at emergence or later are not specified—essential for quantifying shareholder dilution. On 2024-01-16, the company disclosed that 166 million common shares would be issued upon emergence (claim 6370), with 10.8 million allocated to Bitmain and 2.2 million reserved for employees (claims 6371, 6372), but the allocation of the remaining approximately 153 million shares among creditor classes and existing equity holders is not detailed. The company announced on 2023-11-21 a $55 million Equity Rights Offering (claims 6514, 6385) with a $37.1 million backstop commitment, but the price per share and resulting dilution in terms of share count are not disclosed.

The company disclosed $260 million in Secured Convertible Notes maturing January 2029 (claims 6509, 6500, 6517, 6336), with emergence capitalization of 166 million new Common shares (claim 6370); what has not been said is the conversion price, which is essential for calculating post-emergence ownership dilution.

The company announced an $80 million Exit Facility composed of $40 million in new money and $40 million in cashless credit (claims 6513, 6506, 6507); what has not been said is how these funds were deployed, what mining capacity they were intended to establish, and the company's operational runway and cash burn baseline post-emergence.

The company stated that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a Bitmain Transaction (claim 6371, January 16, 2024); what has not been said is what strategic asset or consideration Core Scientific received in exchange, or the implied valuation per share.

The company announced $150 million in Senior Secured Notes maturing January 2028 and $260 million in Secured Convertible Notes maturing January 2029 (claims 6337, 6509); what has not been said is the coupon rates, payment schedules, and restrictive covenants—critical for projecting annual debt service burden.

The company issued extensive restructuring and financing disclosures from November 2023 through January 2024 but never disclosed current mining hashrate, facility locations and power agreements, electricity costs per unit, or mining revenue metrics—the fundamental operational metrics that underpin the entire business and justify the capital structure.

The company announced $80 million in Exit Credit Facility and $260 million in Secured Convertible Notes (claims 6334, 6336) with maturity dates specified, but disclosed neither interest rates, coupon rates, nor conversion prices for the convertibles; a sophisticated reader would expect these terms given that they determine post-emergence debt servicing burden and dilution to equity holders.

The Bitmain Transaction was announced to result in issuance of 10.8 million shares (claim 6371), yet no per-share valuation, total transaction value, or specificity on equipment or assets Bitmain would provide in return was disclosed—material context for assessing whether the company overpaid or negotiated favorable terms.

An Equity Rights Offering of $55 million was announced with a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claims 6514, 6515), but the subscription price per share and ultimate results—whether the offering was fully subscribed or required backstop draw—were never disclosed, obscuring actual dilution to post-emergence shareholders.

The company disclosed Todd M. DuChene's appointment as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer effective 2023-12-27 (claim 6398) but provided no compensation structure, employment agreement terms, or background on restructuring expertise; given the complexity of bankruptcy emergence, proxy-level disclosure of executive compensation and relevant experience would be expected.

An Available DIP Facility Funding of $35 million (claim 6390) was announced without disclosure of the company's expected liquidity burn rate, draw schedule, or whether management deemed this amount sufficient for restructuring operations; this omission makes it difficult to assess whether the restructuring timeline was credible.

The Global Plan Settlement was described as 'in principle' with 'key stakeholders' (claims 6399, 6396), but the specific treatment of unsecured creditor recoveries, relative recovery rates across creditor classes, and identity of principal stakeholders were not disclosed—disclosures standard in comparable Chapter 11 reorganizations that a creditor or equity analyst would expect.

The company disclosed that 10.8 million shares would be issued under the Bitmain Transaction upon emergence on January 16, 2024, cited as claim 6371; what has not been said is the consideration paid by Bitmain, the nature of assets or rights Bitmain is acquiring, or the valuation basis for the share issuance. What is the economic substance and total value of this transaction?

The company disclosed a replacement DIP Facility with $35 million in available funding announced on January 4, 2024, cited as claims 6388 and 6390; what has not been said is the lender's identity, the interest rate, maturity date, collateral pledged, or financial covenants. Which institution is funding this facility and at what annual cost?

The company disclosed 166 million new common shares upon emergence on January 16, 2024, cited as claim 6370, and 93.4 million Tranche 1 warrants announced on January 22, 2024, cited as claim 6338; what has not been said is the fully-diluted share count if all warrants are exercised, the warrant exercise price and expiration date, or ownership percentages by stakeholder class post-emergence. What is the true post-emergence cap table, and how much dilution do these warrants represent?

The company disclosed $130 million in Contingent Value Rights announced on January 22, 2024, cited as claim 6340; what has not been said is the trigger events or conditions requiring payment, the identity of the payee class, or whether this obligation is funded or merely promised. Under what specific future outcomes does this obligation arise, and to whom is it owed?

The company disclosed an Equity Rights Offering of $55 million announced on November 20, 2023, cited as claim 6524, with a $37.1 million backstop commitment cited as claim 6515; what has not been said is the subscription price per share, the ratio of rights granted per existing share, or the backstopper's identity and compensation. What is the per-share cost to existing shareholders, and which investor agreed to support any unsubscribed portion?

The company disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes announced in November 2023, cited as claims 6517, 6509, and 6500, with an April 1, 2025 maturity cited as claim 6505, and $150 million in secured notes cited as claims 6516, 6508, and 6499; what has not been said is the conversion price and ratio on the convertible notes or the coupon rates on any of the debt facilities. At what share price can noteholders convert to equity, and what annual interest does Core Scientific owe across its debt stack?

The company disclosed an $80 million Exit Facility (claim 6513, dated 2023-11-21) and $150 million in Senior Secured Notes (claim 6337, dated 2024-01-22); what has not been disclosed is the interest rate, maturity terms, or key financial covenants on either facility. What interest rates and covenant packages apply to the Exit Facility and Senior Secured Notes?

The company disclosed 'restructuring agreements in principle with noteholders and equity committee' (claim 6536, dated 2023-11-12) and a 'Global Plan Settlement agreement in principle with key stakeholders' (claims 6396 and 6399, dated 2023-12-27 and 2023-12-20); what has not been disclosed is the identity of these parties or their ownership stakes in the restructured entity. Who are the primary lenders, sponsors, and equity holders driving the restructuring?

The company announced that 10.8 million shares would be issued under the 'Bitmain Transaction' upon emergence (claim 6371, dated 2024-01-16); what has not been disclosed is what Bitmain is providing in return, whether the deal is contingent on performance milestones, or when closure is expected. What specific assets or services is Bitmain contributing and what conditions govern the transaction?

The company disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes to be issued to restructuring stakeholders (claims 6517, 6509, 6500, dated 2023-11-21 through 2023-11-27); what has not been disclosed is the conversion price per share, warrant coverage percentage, or pro forma ownership implications of conversion. What are the conversion prices and warrant terms, and what pro forma dilution would result?

The company disclosed Chapter 11 confirmation (claim 6369, dated 2024-01-16) and a planned Nasdaq listing application (claim 6373, dated 2024-01-16), indicating return to normal operations; what has not been disclosed is any forward guidance on post-emergence mining capacity, power consumption costs, or profitability targets. What is management's guidance on post-emergence hash rate capacity and expected profitability metrics?

The company reserved 2.2 million shares for employee equity incentives out of 166 million total new shares upon emergence (claims 6372 and 6370, dated 2024-01-16); what has not been disclosed is the vesting schedule, strike price, or allocation methodology for these awards. What are the vesting schedules, exercise prices, and allocation criteria for the employee equity awards?

The company disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes issuance (claims 6517, 6500, 6509) with a maturity date of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505), but has not specified the conversion price, conversion premium above par, or anti-dilution protections—critical terms that directly affect equity dilution and are material to both debt and equity investors evaluating the capital structure post-emergence.

The Exit Facility credit facility of $80 million was announced in two tranches—a $40 million cashless credit component and $40 million new money component (claims 6513, 6506, 6507)—yet no disclosure was made of the interest rate, financial covenants, or debt service capacity requirements, which are essential to understanding the cost of capital and refinancing risk for a company that just exited bankruptcy in January 2024.

A "Bitmain Transaction" involving the issuance of 10.8 million shares was disclosed (claim 6371), but no purchase price, cash consideration, or specification of what assets or contractual rights Bitmain is acquiring in exchange has been revealed—a material transaction for a Bitcoin mining company that warrants detail on the economic terms and strategic rationale.

The company announced an Equity Rights Offering for $55 million (claims 6514, 6385) with a deadline extended to December 28, 2023, but did not disclose the subscription price per share or the allocation ratio (rights per existing share), making it impossible for existing shareholders to calculate their dilution or investment commitment without these basic terms.

While $35 million in DIP facility funding availability was disclosed (claim 6390), there is no statement of how much was actually drawn during the bankruptcy proceedings, the interest rate charged, or the final cost to the company—metrics that would allow stakeholders to assess the true cost of restructuring and the adequacy of liquidity management.

The company disclosed a $37.1M backstop commitment for the Equity Rights Offering on 2023-11-21 (claim 6515) and $80M in Exit Facility credit on 2023-11-21 (claim 6513), but has not disclosed which specific financial institutions or investors provided these backstops and credit facilities—the lenders' identities remain unnamed while the aggregate capital amounts are public.

The company disclosed 10.8M shares to be issued to Bitmain under a transaction announced on 2024-01-16 (claim 6371), but what has not been said is what assets, services, or commitments Bitmain was receiving in exchange, nor was any valuation per share provided to contextualize whether this transaction represented equipment, hosting capacity, or a financing component.

The company announced $260M in secured convertible notes issuances on 2023-11-21 (claim 6517) and 2023-11-26 (claim 6509) alongside $260M in common interest distributions to convertible noteholders (claims 6518, 6510), yet has not disclosed the conversion price at which notes were exchanged into equity, whether conversion occurred in full or partial at emergence, or the outstanding principal balance of any unconverted notes post-emergence.

The company authorized a replacement DIP Facility of $35M available on 2024-01-04 (claim 6390) with prepayment noted the same day (claim 6389), but has not disclosed how much was actually drawn, the interest rate or cost of the facility, or when and how the DIP was repaid at emergence—leaving the cash burn and liquidity management during bankruptcy unquantified.

The company announced a $55M Equity Rights Offering with an original deadline of 2023-12-11 on 2023-11-21 (claim 6514), extended to 2023-12-28 on 2023-12-20 (claim 6400), but has not disclosed the subscription price per share, the actual take-up rate from rights holders, or whether the offering closed and the full $55M was raised.

The company stated on 2024-01-16 that a Nasdaq listing application was planned (claim 6373), but has not disclosed whether the application was submitted, approved, or whether Core Scientific ultimately listed post-emergence, leaving unresolved whether the public market component of the restructuring plan was completed.

The company disclosed a Replacement DIP Facility with $35 million available funding (claim 6390), but failed to disclose the identity of the lender(s), the interest rate, the maturity term, drawdown conditions, or operational covenants. For a company navigating Chapter 11 emergence, these terms would materially affect liquidity assessment and operational flexibility.

The company announced an "Exit Facility" with $80 million total capacity split between $40 million "new money" and $40 million "cashless credit" (claims 6506–6507), yet did not identify the facility's lenders or disclose interest rates, fees, or maturity dates. The bifurcated structure—distinguishing new capital from rolled-over debt—implies complex terms that sophisticated readers would expect clarified in the disclosure.

The company committed to issuing $260 million in "New secured convertible notes" and $150 million in "New secured notes" (claims 6509, 6516–6517), but omitted the investors' identities, conversion prices, interest rates, and maturity dates. For a post-emergence capital structure, these terms are foundational to equity valuation and control analysis.

The Equity Rights Offering of $55 million (claims 6514, 6385) carried a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claim 6515), yet the company never named the backstop provider, disclosed the offer price, specified the share count, or detailed the backstop agreement's terms. The identity and incentives of the party absorbing undersubscription risk are material omissions.

The company announced that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a "Bitmain Transaction" (claim 6371) coinciding with emergence on 2024-01-16, but disclosed no capital contribution, transaction rationale, governance rights, or strategic context. For a newly emerged company, the entry of a major new stakeholder warrants more complete disclosure.

The company disclosed only the appointment of Todd M. DuChene as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer (claim 6398), yet did not name the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, or other executive officers, nor did it disclose their compensation, equity allocations, or related-party relationships. This information is typically mandatory for companies planning a Nasdaq listing (claim 6373).

Core Scientific disclosed a Bitmain transaction involving 10.8 million share issuance (claim 6371) dated January 16, 2024, but did not disclose the transaction consideration, valuation basis, or deal structure—whether this represents equity investment, hardware purchase, or mining services. A reader would expect deal economics for a 10.8M share issuance post-emergence.

The company announced $260 million in new secured convertible notes (claims 6500, 6509) and redemption by April 1, 2025 (claim 6505), but disclosed no conversion price, conversion premium, or implied dilution to existing equity holders. This is material to post-emergence shareholders evaluating equity value.

The Exit Facility was described as $80 million split between $40M new money and $40M cashless credit components (claims 6506, 6507), with specific component labels suggesting debt-for-equity conversion mechanics, yet no interest rate, maturity date beyond the component description, or refinancing covenants were provided. A first-year analyst would ask what interest accrues and when the facility matures.

The company announced a Nasdaq listing application as planned (claim 6373) but provided no conditions precedent, expected timeline, or public float expectations. 'Planned' is too ambiguous for shareholders to model path to listing.

Core Scientific reserved 2.2 million shares for employee equity incentives (claim 6372) but did not disclose vesting schedules, grant prices, number of plan participants, or the percentage of post-emergence capitalization this represents—information material to assessing employee retention risk and post-emergence dilution.

The company distributed New Common Interests to $260 million of convertible noteholders (claims 6501, 6510) without specifying voting rights, liquidation preference relative to other equity tranches, or the percentage ownership stake these instruments represent in the reorganized entity.

The company disclosed plans to issue 10.8 million shares to Bitmain (claim 6371, Jan 16, 2024); what has not been said is the valuation being placed on these shares, the form of consideration Bitmain is providing (cash, assets, or services), or the strategic nature of the transaction. The company disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes with maturity on 2025-04-01 (claims 6509/6517, Jan 16, 2024 context; claim 6505 for maturity date); what has not been said is the conversion price, interest rate, or what happens to holders if the notes are not converted by maturity. The company disclosed that upon emergence it would issue 166 million common shares (claim 6370, Jan 16, 2024), with 10.8 million allocated to Bitmain and 2.2 million reserved for employee equity (claims 6371/6372); what has not been said is the allocation of the remaining ~152 million shares and the conversion rates from the various creditor classes' original claims. The company disclosed an $80 million Exit Credit Facility with a deadline of 2027-01-23 (claim 6334, Jan 22, 2024); what has not been said is the interest rate, fees, or whether the 2027 date represents the actual maturity or some other contract deadline (such as warrant expiration). The company disclosed 93.38 million Tranche 1 Warrants (claim 6338, Jan 22, 2024); what has not been said is the exercise or strike price at which these warrants can be converted into shares. The company appointed Todd M. DuChene as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer (claim 6398, Dec 27, 2023); what has not been said is his background, prior experience, compensation package, or any related-party relationships that could present conflicts of interest.

The company disclosed receipt of a $35 million replacement DIP facility authorization (claim #6390 from 2024-01-04), but nowhere in the record appears the identity of the lender, the interest rate, the specific covenants binding the facility, or what triggers acceleration or default. A restructuring analyst would consider this material: DIP terms often contain milestones that determine survival, and lender identity reveals who holds leverage post-emergence. The company announced the Bitmain Transaction would result in issuance of 10.8 million shares (claim #6371 from 2024-01-16), but disclosed neither what Core Scientific receives in return, the dollar valuation of the exchange, nor whether Bitmain is acquiring equity, debt forgiveness, mining rights, or hardware—a material gap on the consideration flowing into the balance sheet. Multiple announcements of a $55 million Equity Rights Offering (claims #6514, #6400, #6385 spanning November 2023 to January 2024) and a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claim #6515 from 2023-11-21) omit the subscription price per share, essential for any equity holder to calculate dilution; only the aggregate dollar size is given. The company announced $260 million in new secured convertible notes (claims #6517, #6500, #6509 from November 2023) without specifying the conversion price, the coupon rate, the maturity date beyond the restructuring timeline, or the specific collateral pledged—standard bond terms any creditor or equity analyst would require to model debt burden. The $150 million secured notes issuance (claims #6516, #6508, #6499 from November 2023) similarly omits the coupon, maturity date, and security details. Todd M. DuChene was identified as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer (claim #6398 from 2023-12-27), but the record contains no disclosure of his compensation package, equity awards, prior employer, or any related-party relationships—material context for evaluating whether management incentives align with creditor or equity interests in the restructuring.

Core Scientific disclosed 10.8 million shares to be issued under the Bitmain Transaction (claim #6371, January 16, 2024), but provided no valuation per share, deal structure, or specification of what Bitmain contributed in exchange—leaving the economic substance and shareholder dilution of this material related-party transaction completely opaque. The company emerged from bankruptcy as a cryptocurrency mining operation with claims referencing miner equipment lending (claim #6335), yet disclosed zero operational metrics: no hash rate, facility count, geographic location, equipment inventory, or power contracts—the fundamental data required to value any mining business. Core Scientific announced multiple concurrent share issuances upon emergence: 166 million new common shares (claim #6370), 10.8 million to Bitmain (claim #6371), and 2.2 million reserved for employees (claim #6372), plus $260 million in convertible notes (claims #6336, #6500), but never calculated the fully diluted share count or post-emergence ownership structure, making actual dilution incalculable. The company issued $260 million in secured convertible notes maturing January 23, 2029, and $150 million in senior secured notes maturing January 23, 2028 (claims #6336, #6337, #6500), but disclosed no coupon rates, conversion prices, conversion ratios, or anti-dilution provisions—the economic terms that determine debt holder recovery and shareholder downside. An $80 million Exit Facility combining $40 million new money and $40 million cashless credit (claims #6506-#6507, #6335) was announced without identifying the lender, stating the interest rate, specifying amortization, or disclosing collateral. A $55 million Equity Rights Offering (claims #6514, #6385) had its deadline extended (claim #6400), but the subscription price per share, rights ratio per existing holder, and timeline for actual proceeds were never stated.

The company disclosed on January 16, 2024 (claim 6371) that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a Bitmain Transaction, yet provided no transaction valuation, equipment specifications, or strategic rationale. A sophisticated reader needs to know what assets Core Scientific is acquiring and at what price per share to assess whether shareholder dilution is justified. Multiple announcements from November 21 through January 22, 2024 (claims 6517, 6509, 6336) disclosed $260 million in secured convertible notes maturing January 23, 2029, but omitted the conversion price and conversion ratio—metrics essential for modeling shareholder dilution and determining capital structure post-emergence. The company stated on November 26, 2023 (claims 6506, 6507) that it had arranged an $80 million Exit Facility ($40M new money, $40M cashless), but never named the lender, disclosed the interest rate, or specified which assets or revenues secure the borrowing. On January 4, 2024 (claim 6390), Core Scientific announced $35 million in available DIP facility funding without naming the lender, stating the interest rate, or itemizing fees—standard disclosures needed to evaluate liquidity runway and financial burden during bankruptcy. Across multiple announcements from November 21 to January 7, 2024 (claims 6514, 6524, 6385, 6400), the company touted a $55 million Equity Rights Offering but never disclosed the per-share subscription price or expected dilution to existing shareholders, leaving the offering's terms opaque. When appointing Todd M. DuChene as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer on December 27, 2023 (claim 6398), the company disclosed no cash salary, equity grants, signing bonus, or any related-party history—information typically required in proxy filings and material for assessing potential insider dealing post-emergence.

The company disclosed in claim 6371 (2024-01-16) that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a 'Bitmain Transaction,' but the disclosed record does not specify what this transaction entails—whether it's an acquisition, equipment supply agreement, strategic investment, or equity partnership. A sophisticated reader would expect to know what Bitmain is providing in consideration, the strategic rationale, timeline for share issuance, and whether Bitmain is a related party or customer with material operational significance.

Multiple claims (6516, 6517, 6500, 6509) announce $150 million in secured notes and $260 million in secured convertible notes, but the record omits material terms including interest rates, exact maturity dates (except one reference in claim 6505 to 2025-04-01), conversion prices for the convertibles, and whether call or put provisions exist. An analyst evaluating the capital structure would immediately ask these specifics on the next call, as they determine the actual cost of capital and future dilution.

Claim 6370 states that 166.0 million shares of new common stock will be issued upon Chapter 11 emergence, and claim 6371 adds 10.8 million for Bitmain, but the record does not disclose the ownership percentages or share allocations to existing noteholders, the equity committee, DIP lenders, or management post-emergence. Without this, the dilution impact and control structure remain opaque to investors assessing their stake.

Throughout the bankruptcy sequence from November 2023 through January 2024, Core Scientific disclosed extensive financing and legal proceedings, yet the record contains zero operational metrics—no hashrate, power consumption, MW capacity, utilization rates, or customer concentration. For a bitcoin mining company undergoing restructuring, a reader would expect capacity and revenue data to contextualize whether the asset base justifies the debt and equity structure being proposed.

Claim 6398 names Todd M. DuChene as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer as of 2023-12-27, but provides no compensation disclosure, equity grant details, prior background, or whether his appointment involved related-party arrangements tied to the restructuring. This governance context would normally appear in proxy filings or press releases alongside personnel announcements.

Multiple claims (6506, 6507, 6513, 6497, 6498) reference an $80 million 'Exit Facility' comprising $40 million in 'new money' and $40 million in 'cashless credit,' but the record never identifies the lender, specifies the interest rate or term, explains what 'cashless credit' means operationally, or discloses covenants and collateral. An analyst would ask which lender provided this and on what specific terms on the next call.

The company disclosed that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a Bitmain Transaction upon emergence (claim 6371, January 16, 2024); what has not been said is the purchase price or valuation, the mining hardware specifications and capacity being acquired, and whether Bitmain holds board representation or other governance rights post-emergence.

The company disclosed restructuring agreements in principle with noteholders and an equity committee (claims 6536, November 12, 2023 and 6534, November 14, 2023); what has not been said is the specific identity of the noteholder institutions or funds, their respective positions in the debt structure, whether any single creditor possessed blocking rights, and the identities of the equity committee members.

The company disclosed an Exit Facility comprising a 40 million USD new money component and a 40 million USD cashless credit component (claims 6506 and 6507, November 26, 2023); what has not been said is the lender identity, whether these form a single 80 million facility or two separate arrangements, the interest rate and all fees, and the maturity and prepayment schedule.

The company disclosed 166.0 million shares of new common stock to be issued upon emergence (claim 6370, January 16, 2024) alongside 10.8 million shares under the Bitmain Transaction (claim 6371) and 2.2 million reserved for employees (claim 6372); what has not been said is how the 166 million shares were allocated between pre-petition equity holders, senior secured noteholders, and convertible noteholders, and which party or individual emerged as the majority shareholder.

The company disclosed Secured Convertible Notes of 260 million USD with stated maturity of January 23, 2029 (claims 6336, 6500, 6509, January 16-27, 2024); what has not been said is the conversion price per share or conversion ratio, the coupon rate and payment frequency, whether conversion is optional or mandatory under specified triggers, and what specific collateral or asset pool secures these notes.

The company announced a planned Nasdaq listing application (claim 6373, January 16, 2024); over two years into emergence, what is the current status of the listing application, and if completed, what share price was achieved, aggregate capital was raised, which underwriter was selected, and what lock-up restrictions apply to shareholders.

The company disclosed on January 16, 2024 that 10.8 million shares would be issued under a Bitmain Transaction (claim 6371); what has not been said is the valuation per share, any cash consideration, or specification of what assets Bitmain was providing in exchange—a first-year analyst would immediately ask for the implied price per share and the economic rationale for this material issuance at emergence. Core Scientific announced Exit Facility financing totaling $80 million across filings from November 2023 through January 2024 (claims 6513, 6334, 6507, 6506); what has not been said is the interest rate, maturity date, lender identity, and financial covenants—information essential to assess the post-emergence cost of capital and operational constraints. The company disclosed an Equity Rights Offering of $55 million with a $37.1 million backstop commitment dated November and January 2024 (claims 6514, 6515, 6385); what has not been said is the subscription price per share, identity of the backstop party, and whether the offering actually closed, given that claim 6400 references a deadline extension with no subsequent closure announcement. Core Scientific stated it would issue $260 million in secured convertible notes (claims 6517, 6509, 6500); what has not been said is the conversion price, interest rate, and maturity date—critical terms that determine dilution to common equity and the noteholders' economic incentives post-emergence. Upon emergence on January 16, 2024, the company issued 166 million shares total (claim 6370) with 10.8 million allocated to Bitmain and 2.2 million reserved for employees (claims 6371, 6372); what has not been said is whether this represents the complete post-emergence capitalization, the implied share price, and the resulting ownership percentages for pre-bankruptcy creditors and equity holders—information necessary to evaluate whether the restructuring distributed value fairly across claimant classes.

The company disclosed the issuance of 10.8 million shares under a "Bitmain Transaction" on January 16, 2024 (claim 6371), representing roughly 6% of the post-emergence equity, but provided no disclosure of what assets, capital, or commercial relationship Bitmain contributed in exchange, or whether the company has ongoing operational ties to Bitmain. What has not been said is: what is the strategic rationale for the Bitmain investment, and does the company have significant supplier, customer, or operational dependencies on Bitmain post-emergence?

The company announced the appointment of Todd M. DuChene as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer upon emergence (claims 6398, 6391) and the issuance of 166 million common shares upon emergence (claim 6370), but made no public disclosure of the identity, background, or compensation of the Chief Executive Officer—the most critical executive role post-emergence. What has not been said is: who was named Chief Executive Officer as of the emergence date, were they an insider or external hire, and what are their salary, equity grants, and performance targets?

The company disclosed the issuance of $260 million in Secured Convertible Notes maturing April 1, 2025 (claims 6509, 6505), plus $150 million in secured notes (claim 6508) and an $80 million Exit Facility (claim 6513), but disclosed no coupon rates, financial covenants, leverage ratios, or whether all facilities were drawn. What has not been said is: what is the interest rate on each note issuance, what are the key financial maintenance covenants, and what amount of each facility was actually borrowed versus committed but undrawn?

The company disclosed that Contingent Value Rights of $130 million were issued upon emergence (claim 6340), representing contingent claims on future value, but provided no disclosure of what operational milestones, exit events, or performance thresholds would trigger payment. What has not been said is: what specific events or financial metrics determine CVR payment, when would holders expect to realize value, and who are the ultimate CVR holders?

The company announced emergence and the distribution of 166 million common shares (claim 6370) but did not disclose the post-emergence ownership structure, including whether any shareholder or group obtained beneficial ownership above 5% thresholds, or the fully diluted cap table accounting for the 2.2 million employee option pool (claim 6372) and 10.8 million Bitmain shares (claim 6371). What has not been said is: what is the complete post-emergence cap table, and which shareholders exceed 5% beneficial ownership?

The company disclosed that it had reached agreement "in principle with key stakeholders" for restructuring support (claim 6393) and a "Global Plan Settlement agreement" (claim 6396), but identified stakeholders only generically as "noteholders" and "equity committee" without naming the specific parties, their recovery amounts, or whether equity committee members received board seats or governance rights. What has not been said is: who are the named members of the equity committee, what did each class of creditor recover, and do any stakeholders have board representation or veto rights post-emergence?

The company disclosed a Replacement DIP Facility with $35 million in available funding on 2024-01-04 (claim 6390), but failed to disclose the identity of the DIP lender, interest rate, or other material terms that would allow investors to assess refinancing risk and cost of capital during restructuring. The company announced 10.8 million shares to be issued under the Bitmain Transaction on 2024-01-16 (claim 6371), yet did not disclose what consideration Core Scientific receives in return (equipment, capital deployment, computing facilities), the implied valuation per share, or the commercial rationale—making it impossible to evaluate the dilution or strategic logic of the deal. Multiple claims spanning 2023-11-21 through 2023-12-27 disclose $260 million in New Secured Convertible Notes (claims 6517, 6509, 6500) with a stated maturity of 2025-04-01 (claim 6505), but omit the conversion price, interest rate, and identity of the noteholders, which are essential for assessing the capital structure and downside risk of conversion. Claims 6507 and 6498 from 2023-11-26 and 2023-11-27 disclose a $40 million 'cashless credit component' of the Exit Facility, but fail to clarify whether this represents rolled-over existing debt, equity conversion, or some other mechanism—a material ambiguity in understanding the leverage and dilution embedded in the restructured entity. The company announced an Equity Rights Offering of $55 million promised by 2023-12-11 (claim 6514) with a backstop commitment of $37.1 million (claim 6515), but did not disclose how much existing shareholders actually subscribed, forcing use of the backstop, an important signal of stakeholder confidence that was withheld. Across all restructuring claims (2023-11 through 2024-01), the company disclosed capital structure details but did not disclose post-emergence operating metrics—bitcoin mining hashrate, power consumption, facility locations, or capacity utilization—that would allow investors to assess whether the restructured mining operation is operationally viable or sustainable.

The company disclosed a Bitmain Transaction involving 10.8 million shares to be issued (claim 6371) but did not disclose what consideration Bitmain is providing in return, the transaction valuation, or key terms—an analyst would naturally ask: what asset or capital commitment justifies this equity issuance, and at what implied valuation? The Senior Secured Notes issuance of $150 million (claims 6337, 6499, 6508) and Contingent Value Rights of $130 million (claim 6340) specify maturity dates and amounts but omit interest rates, conversion terms (for the convertible notes, claims 6500, 6509), and security details—fundamental terms that would be disclosed in any debt offering prospectus. The Global Plan Settlement agreement in principle with key stakeholders (claims 6399, 6396) is mentioned multiple times but the actual settlement terms remain undisclosed: which creditor classes receive what treatment, are there clawback provisions, and what are the payment waterfall mechanics? Todd M. DuChene's appointment as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer (claims 6398, 6391) is announced without any disclosure of his compensation, equity grants, or whether he is a related party to existing shareholders. The employee equity reserve of 2.2 million shares (claim 6372) is reserved but no vesting schedule, strike price, or allocation methodology is disclosed—critical details for valuing dilution and understanding retention mechanics. The Nasdaq listing application (claim 6373) is mentioned in passing without any timeline, conditions for approval, or expected trading date—material information for investors evaluating liquidity and capital structure.

The company disclosed a Bitmain transaction involving 10.8 million shares to be issued (claim 6371) as part of its January 2024 Chapter 11 emergence, but has not disclosed the purchase price Bitmain is paying, the implied post-emergence company valuation, Bitmain's resulting ownership percentage, or the strategic rationale for this cryptocurrency-equipment partnership. Multiple financing announcements reference $260.0 million in new secured convertible notes (claims 6509, 6500, 6517), yet the conversion price, conversion mechanics, coupon rate, maturity date specifics, and any call provisions remain undisclosed—information essential for calculating actual dilution to post-emergence shareholders. The company named Todd M. DuChene as Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer (claims 6391, 6398) but has not identified the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer in any disclosed document, which is notably absent for a detailed bankruptcy emergence disclosure and raises questions about management continuity and operational leadership. Claim 6390 discloses $35 million in available DIP facility funding, yet the total facility size, monthly cash burn rate assumptions, runway provided, and operational milestones required to maintain lender support remain unspecified. The company announced $130 million in Contingent Value Rights (claim 6340) without disclosing the trigger events or financial conditions activating payments, the measurement period, the identity of CVR holders, or whether CVR payments would dilute common equity. The Exit Facility announced at $80 million total—comprising $40 million new money and $40 million cashless credit (claims 6507, 6506)—omits the interest rate, pricing, lender identity, debt service covenants, and the specific terms differentiating the two facility components.

The company disclosed on 2026-03-30 a CoreWeave partnership with $10 billion in projected revenue over 12 years (claim 2144) and 70 MW of additional capacity (claim 2142), citing these as inflection-point evidence (claim 2153); it later disclosed on 2026-07-28 that annualized colocation revenue run rate is $635 million (claim 173) and total contracted customer revenue across all customers is $24 billion (claim 165). What has not been said is the ramp schedule—how many of the $24 billion is realized in 2026, 2027, and 2028, and whether CoreWeave and AMD revenues are being double-counted or are genuinely additive; a first-year analyst would ask for quarterly revenue guidance by customer and contract.

The company disclosed on 2026-07-27 that AMD holds a capacity reservation option for 2.0 gigawatts with an exercise deadline of 2028-12-28 (claim 167) and that AMD received 30 million warrant shares expiring 2031-07-27 (claim 136); what has not been said is the strike price of the warrants, the option exercise price and exclusivity terms of the 2.0 GW reservation, and whether either instrument contains customer-favorable dilution protection or termination rights—information material to valuing the concessions made to retain this customer.

The company announced on 2026-05-05 a proposed $3.3 billion senior secured notes offering promised by 2031-05-15 at 7.75 percent interest with $3.24 billion estimated net proceeds (claims 1834–1838), but this offering was withdrawn by 2026-09-02 (claim 1834 status withdrawn); the withdrawal came after the 2026-07-28 announcement of $24 billion in contracted customer commitments. What has not been said is why the financing was withdrawn—whether due to adverse market conditions, reduced capital needs following new customer contracts, or concerns about debt serviceability—and which debt or equity source now funds the capital expenditure plan disclosed through 2028.

The company appointed Jorge Ray as Principal Accounting Officer on 2026-05-04, disclosing a $400,000 annual base salary, 40 percent target bonus, $600,000 RSU grant, and $193,000 signing bonus (claims 1848–1851); what has not been said is the compensation package of the predecessor PAO, any related-party relationship between Ray and the company or board, and the justification for the $193,000 signing bonus for an officer appointment—standard proxy disclosure would include prior-year officer compensation for comparison.

The company identified specific facility locations and customer commitments on 2026-07-27: AMD leases for 377 MW at Pecos, Muskogee, and Hunt County (claim 132), Neocloud for 152 MW at Auburn and Dalton Phase 3 (claim 133), and a Pecos campus target of 1.5 GW gross capacity with deliveries through 2027-06-30 (claims 2052–2053, claim 168). What has not been said is the grid interconnection point, the name of the utility or utilities providing power, the megawatt-per-quarter delivery schedule, confirmation of available electrical capacity from the utility, and any power purchase agreements—items essential to validating capacity targets and confirming no supply-chain chokepoint exists at the utility level.

The company disclosed on 2026-05-05 the acquisition of 40 acres at Muskogee with 440 MW electrical capacity (claims 1827–1828) for a purchase price of $421 million (claim 1829) in the Polaris DS merger (claim 1826); simultaneously it disclosed a bridge facility with repayment promised by 2026-05-06 (claim 1837) that has been delayed as of 2026-09-02. What has not been said is the allocation of the $421 million purchase price across land, buildings, and power infrastructure; the electrical utility providing the 440 MW; whether 40 acres is sufficient for the planned expansion; the principal amount of the bridge facility; the reason for the four-month delay in bridge repayment; and the strategic rationale for the acquisition beyond the 440 MW capacity addition.

The $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081) was disclosed on 2022-04-07 with a stated horizon of 2022-12-07. The ledger now marks it delayed, after it cycled through stated, delayed and not_yet_verifiable between September and October 2026. No disclosure on record says whether the notes were repaid, extended, refinanced or converted, and none revises the December 2022 date. The companion $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082) did reach verified status, which makes the silence on the notes more conspicuous.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was presented on 2022-03-29 as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14188, 20684, 14185, 20695, 20702). That is the only date on which Muskogee appears in the record supplied. There is no later statement of energized capacity, construction progress or a revised target. Claim 14185 alone briefly moved to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated, which means the pipeline has not been able to match the 500 MW figure to any subsequent milestone. Management has not said whether the site was built out, scaled back or set aside.

Denton, Texas was described on 2022-03-29 as operational at 22 MW with an expected ultimate capacity of 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 14182, 20701, 14183, 14178, 20683, 14184, 14175). The 300 MW figure is repeated across four claims on that single date and is not followed by any interim capacity reading, timeline or revision. Claims 14182 and 14184 show the same automated slip to delayed and not_yet_verifiable before reverting. Nothing on record explains how far the facility moved from 22 MW toward 300 MW.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement for 230 MW (claim 19781) appears only on 2022-03-03. It arrives alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for the contracted miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claims 19782, 19784). After that date the record contains no statement on whether the hosting capacity was delivered, renegotiated or terminated, and no response to the allegations. A signed 230 MW commitment simply drops out of view.

The RADAR technology assets, acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claim 14181), were described on 2022-03-29 as slated for future use (claim 20706). No later disclosure on record identifies what that use became or whether the assets were written down. The acquisition claim itself went through the same delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before reverting to stated.

The ledger provided ends partway through 2022-04-19, so later filings may address some of these items. Within the record as supplied, however, each item is last mentioned in March or April 2022 and is not followed by a revision, completion notice or explanation.

A note on the record first. The claims ledger supplied for Core Scientific ends partway through an April 19, 2022 entry, so "no longer mentioned" here means absent from the disclosures provided, not necessarily absent from everything the company has filed since. Many claims also cycle through stated, delayed, not_yet_verifiable and back to stated between September 14 and October 10, 2026. Those dates are re-runs of our own extraction, not company events, and they should not be read as management revising anything.

The B. Riley bridge financing is the clearest open item. Claim 14081, disclosed April 7, 2022, describes bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital with a December 7, 2022 date attached. It is the only claim on file that currently sits at delayed rather than stated or verified. The companion requirement for a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082, due June 6, 2022) has been verified. Nothing in the record says whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended, refinanced or defaulted on by the December date, and no revision statement accompanies the slip.

Denton, Texas was presented on March 29, 2022 as a site that would grow from 22 MW of initial operating capacity (claims 14177, 14182) to an ultimate 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701). It was supported by a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 20699). That date is the last mention in the record. No intermediate capacity figure, construction schedule or completion date for the 300 MW target has been disclosed. The gap between 22 MW and 300 MW is left unaddressed.

Muskogee, Oklahoma also appears only in the March 29, 2022 disclosures. It is described there as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). The company gave no energization date, phasing or capital estimate, and the site does not reappear in later entries. Whether the project is proceeding, paused or resized has not been stated.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement was disclosed on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW agreement (claim 19781). The same date carries claims that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim 19782), along with allegations about a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement said not to exist (claim 19784) and overstated mining profitability (claim 19785). The record contains no later word on whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, renegotiated or terminated. Management has not reconciled the headline capacity with the counterparty concerns raised alongside it.

The Radar Relay assets acquired through Blockcap are a smaller loose end. On March 29, 2022 the company referred to the acquisition (claim 14181, with a value recorded as 65.0 whose units are ambiguous in the extraction) and to the "future utilization of RADAR technology assets" (claim 20706). Neither appears again in the record. No use, write-down or disposal of that technology has been described.

The $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081), disclosed on 2022-04-07 with a maturity of 2022-12-07, is the clearest open item on the ledger. It is currently marked delayed, after moving through stated, delayed and not_yet_verifiable before returning to delayed on 2026-10-10. The companion $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082), due by 2022-06-06, has been verified. Nothing on record explains whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or restructured by their December 2022 date, and no revision statement accompanies the delay.

The Denton, Texas build-out was described on 2022-03-29 as reaching an ultimate capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701), up from 22 MW at initial operation (claims 14177 and 14182). It was framed as a development partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191 and 20699). The 300 MW figure appears only in that single filing. No later claim on record reports progress toward it, gives an interim capacity or a completion date, or restates the target. The timeline and partnership entries (14182 and 14184) briefly passed through delayed and not_yet_verifiable before settling back at stated, but no disclosure has updated them.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center carried a planned 500 MW capacity under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695 and 20702). It is likewise anchored entirely to the 2022-03-29 filing. Five separate extractions repeat the 500 MW number, yet none attaches a timeline. No subsequent claim on record mentions energization, construction status, or any change to the agreement's terms or scale.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement for 230 MW (claim 19781) was last referenced on 2022-03-03. The same date's record carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources for its agreed miners (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim 19785). Management has not addressed on record whether the 230 MW hosting commitment remained in force, was reduced or was terminated. The allegations themselves have no recorded response.

The acquired RADAR technology assets came into the company through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claims 14181 and 20706). On 2022-03-29 their future utilization was presented as a forward-looking item, and they have not resurfaced in any later claim on record. No disclosure has said whether the assets were deployed, written down or abandoned.

The claims supplied here run only to April 2022, so later filings may address some of these items. Absent those, each should be read as a last mention rather than a confirmed abandonment.

Muskogee, Oklahoma. In the March 29, 2022 disclosures, management described a 500 MW data center to be developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14188, 14179, 20684, 20695, 20702). That date is the last mention in the record. Nothing on file reports groundbreaking, energization, a revised megawatt figure, a timeline, or cancellation. Claim 14185 moved to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated. Those changes came from our own reclassification passes in September and October 2026, not from anything the company said. What has not been said is whether any of the 500 MW was ever built, and if not, why.

Denton, Texas ramp. The same March 2022 filings put Denton at 22 MW initial operating capacity (claims 14177, 14182) and set a 300 MW ultimate target (claims 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701). The development partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191) was described in the same filings. No later claim on record gives an intermediate capacity figure, a completion date, or a change in Tenaska's role. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before reverting to stated. The gap between 22 MW and 300 MW has not been revisited.

B. Riley bridge notes. On April 7, 2022, the company disclosed $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, with a December 7, 2022 horizon (claim 14081). Its status is now delayed. The companion committed equity facility from the same filing (claim 14082) has been verified, but the notes have no follow-up on record. Nothing has been said about repayment, extension, conversion, or refinancing.

Gryphon Digital Mining. A March 3, 2022 disclosure describes a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon (claim 19781). The same record contains assertions that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim 19782) and allegations about a $220.7 million BitFuFu purchase and a NuMiner agreement said not to exist (claims 19783, 19784). The language moved from an agreement to a dispute on the same date, which suggests a litigation source rather than a management statement. No later claim records whether the 230 MW arrangement was performed, renegotiated, or terminated.

RADAR technology. The March 29, 2022 filings cite the Radar Relay acquisition through Blockcap (claim 14181) and the future use of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). The recorded amount of 65.0 has no unit scale in the source. Neither claim is mentioned again on record. No disclosure says whether those assets were put to use, written down, or dropped.

The claims ledger supplied for this review is cut off partway through claim 13998, dated April 2022. Later disclosures may address some of these items. The conclusions above apply only to the claims provided.

A note on reading this ledger: the status transitions are all dated September and October 2026. They record this site's own re-verification passes, not statements by the company. Many claims moved from stated to delayed to not_yet_verifiable and back to stated within a few weeks. That pattern reflects our pipeline re-checking the record, not management revising anything. The items below are therefore judged on what Core Scientific last said and whether it ever said more. The ledger supplied here is cut off after claim 13997, so later disclosures may exist that are not reflected.

The B. Riley bridge financing is the clearest unresolved commitment. Claim 14081, disclosed on 2022-04-07, describes bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded at 75.0, most likely $75 million, with a promised-by date of 2022-12-07. The ledger currently holds it as delayed. The companion requirement for a $150 million committed equity facility (claim 14082) was verified. Nothing on record says whether the notes were repaid, extended, refinanced or defaulted on at or after the December 2022 maturity, and the company has issued no revision statement on them.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma build-out has not been mentioned since it was announced. Claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695 and 20702, all dated 2022-03-29, describe a 500 MW data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority. That was a capacity roughly equal to the company's entire operating footprint at the time (497 MW, claims 14173, 14186 and 20703). There is no later disclosure of construction progress, energized megawatts, a revised timeline or a scaled-back target. Claim 14185 cycled through delayed and not_yet_verifiable in our checks before returning to stated, which signals that no confirming evidence has surfaced. The company has not said whether the project remains active.

Denton, Texas has a similar gap between its starting point and its stated destination. On 2022-03-29 the company described the site as operational at 22 MW (claims 14177 and 14182) with an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184 and 14191). That is the last mention in this record. No interim capacity figure, completion date or revision of the 300 MW target appears afterward.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship was left without resolution. On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781) alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for the contracted miners (claim 19782). It also shows allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784) and that mining profitability and breakeven costs had been overstated (claim 19785). The record contains nothing after that date on whether the hosting arrangement went ahead, was terminated or was renegotiated. It also says nothing on how the allegations were resolved.

The RADAR technology assets were raised once and never revisited. Claim 20706, dated 2022-03-29, refers to the future use of RADAR technology acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claim 14181, where the recorded figure of 65.0 appears to be an extraction error). No later disclosure says what that use turned out to be, whether the assets were deployed, or whether they were written down.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the largest capacity commitment on record. Claims 14179, 14188 and 20684 describe a planned 500 MW facility, and claims 14185, 20695 and 20702 describe the agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority behind it. Every one of these was last mentioned on 2022-03-29, in the business-combination-era disclosures, and nothing later in the record refers to the site. Claim 14185 has moved through delayed (2026-09-15) and not_yet_verifiable (2026-10-09) before settling back at stated on 2026-10-10. No construction schedule, energization date, interim capacity figure or change to the Port Authority agreement has been disclosed. For a project larger than the company's entire stated operating base of 497 MW at the time (claims 14173, 14186, 20703), that absence is notable.

Denton, Texas follows the same pattern at a smaller scale. Claims 14177 and 14182 put initial operations at 22 MW, and claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701 repeat a target of 300 MW at completion. The arrangements with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy are recorded in claims 14175, 14184, 14191 and 20699. All of these were last mentioned on 2022-03-29. Claims 14182 and 14184 have each cycled through delayed and not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated. The record contains no later figure showing how much of the 278 MW gap was built, on what schedule, or whether the 300 MW target still stands.

The bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081) carried a promised-by date of 2022-12-07 and are currently classified as delayed. That is one of the few statuses on this ledger that has not reverted to stated. Its companion item, the committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082, due 2022-06-06), has been marked verified. Nothing in the record says whether the notes were repaid, extended, converted or restructured. The recorded amounts of 75.0 and 150.0 USD appear to be in millions and were not normalized at extraction.

The RADAR technology assets that came with the Blockcap transaction were presented on 2022-03-29 as having a future use (claim 20706), alongside the underlying Radar Relay acquisition (claim 14181, recorded at 65.0 USD, again apparently missing a unit multiplier). Neither claim reappears in any later disclosure on record. No product, deployment, write-down or disposal has been described, so the assets dropped out of view without any accounting of what became of them.

Three caveats apply to all of the above. The claims ledger supplied for this review breaks off in April 2022, so some of these silences may be gaps in coverage rather than omissions by management. The delayed and not_yet_verifiable transitions were produced by automated re-evaluations in September and October 2026, not by any company statement. Finally, the March 2022 Gryphon items (claims 19781 through 19785) are framed as allegations and should be read as an adversarial account, not as management's own commitments.

Denton's 300 MW build-out is the clearest unresolved promise. The March 29, 2022 disclosures describe the Denton, Texas facility as operational at an initial 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182). They repeat a planned ultimate capacity of 300 MW four times (claims 14178, 14183, 20701, 20683). They also tie the site to a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20699). March 29, 2022 is the last date in the record that mentions the 300 MW target. No later disclosure on file reports progress toward it, a revised timetable, or a reduced figure. In the ledger, the operational-date and partnership claims (14182, 14184) were reclassified as delayed in September 2026, then as not yet verifiable, and are now back to stated. That shows no confirmation either way. The company has not said whether 300 MW was reached, rescoped or abandoned.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma project follows the same pattern on a larger scale. On March 29, 2022 the company described a 500 MW data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14188, 20684, 14185, 20695, 20702). Nothing after that date mentions Muskogee's capacity, a construction schedule, or how much power was actually energized. The port-authority agreement (claim 14185) moved through delayed and not yet verifiable before returning to stated. Its current status reflects the original disclosure, not any later confirmation. The record contains no update on whether the 500 MW figure still stands.

The B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge promissory notes (claim 14081), disclosed April 7, 2022, carried a stated maturity of December 7, 2022. This is the only claim in the record that currently stands as delayed. No disclosure on file confirms repayment, refinancing, extension or conversion at or after that date. By contrast, the related $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082) has since been verified. The silence is on the notes themselves.

The Blockcap acquisition brought with it Radar Relay (claim 14181). On March 29, 2022 the company spoke of the future utilization of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). That is the only mention of any plan for those assets. No later disclosure describes a product, deployment, write-down or disposal. The acquisition value is recorded as 65.0 USD, which appears to be a unit-scaling artifact rather than a disclosed figure. The company has not said what became of the RADAR technology.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement, described at 230 MW (claim 19781), appears on March 3, 2022. On the same date the record shows allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund the agreed miners (claim 19782). There are further allegations concerning a NuMiner agreement said not to exist (claim 19784), a BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783), and overstated mining profitability (claim 19785). None of these threads reappears in any later disclosure on file. The company has not said whether the 230 MW hosting arrangement was performed, renegotiated or terminated, or how the allegations were resolved.

The B. Riley bridge promissory notes, totalling $75 million, carried a stated maturity of December 7, 2022 when they were disclosed on April 7, 2022 (claim 14081). That remains the last mention on record. The claim now sits at delayed, with no repayment, extension or refinancing announced. The companion requirement for a $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082) has been verified. The notes have not been accounted for in the same way. Nothing in the record explains whether they were repaid, rolled over or left outstanding past the stated date.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described on March 29, 2022 as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). It was repeated across several filings that day and then does not appear again in the disclosures on record. Claim 14185 has moved through delayed and not_yet_verifiable before settling back at stated. No construction milestone, energization date or revised capacity has been disclosed. There has also been no statement that the project was paused, resized or abandoned.

The Denton, Texas facility was presented on March 29, 2022 as operational at an initial 22 MW, with an expected ultimate capacity of 300 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701). The development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 20699) was disclosed alongside it. Neither the 300 MW figure nor any intermediate capacity has been updated since. Claims 14182 and 14184 have cycled through delayed and not_yet_verifiable in the ledger. No timeline for the build-out was ever attached, and none has been offered since. The gap between 22 MW and 300 MW has not been addressed.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship entered the record on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). That same date also brought statements that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement was alleged not to exist (claim 19784), and a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783). The language shifted from a signed capacity commitment to disputed allegations within a single disclosure date. Nothing further appears afterward. There has been no statement on whether the hosting agreement was performed, terminated or litigated to resolution.

The RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claim 14181) were described on March 29, 2022 as slated for future utilization (claim 20706). That is the last reference. No product, integration or write-down tied to those assets has been disclosed since. Claim 14181 has passed through delayed and not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated. What became of the stated plan for these assets has not been said.

The $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, disclosed on April 7, 2022 alongside the closing of the XPDI business combination (claim 14081), carried a maturity of December 7, 2022. That claim is currently classed as delayed, and nothing in the disclosures on file records the notes being repaid, refinanced, extended or converted by that date. The companion commitment from the same filing, a $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate due by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082), has been verified. One of the two B. Riley undertakings is therefore accounted for and the other is not, and the company has not addressed the difference in the record we hold.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma project was presented on March 29, 2022 as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695 and 20702). It is one of the largest capacity figures the company has put its name to, roughly matching its entire reported operating base of 497 MW at the time (claims 14173, 14186). After that date the project does not reappear in the record supplied. There is no construction schedule, energization date, initial tranche or revised capacity figure, and no statement that the plan was paused or abandoned.

The Denton, Texas facility followed a similar pattern. On March 29, 2022 it was described as operational at 22 MW, with an expected final capacity of 300 MW, under a development arrangement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 14178, 14182, 14183, 14184, 14175 and 20683). The 300 MW figure was repeated several times in that single filing. No later disclosure on file updates the capacity actually in service, gives a date for reaching 300 MW, or says whether the Tenaska arrangement still stands as described.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship was first framed as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). The record of March 3, 2022 then turns to allegations: that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the miners it had agreed to (claim 19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783), and an alleged non-existent NuMiner agreement valued at $1.7 billion (claim 19784). Allegations of overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs sit alongside these (claim 19785). Nothing on file from the company says whether the 230 MW hosting commitment survived, was cut back or was ended, or how the allegations were resolved.

The Blockcap acquisition was completed in early 2022 (claims 14171, 14189 and 20707) and brought in Radar Relay (claim 14181). Management also referred to the future use of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). That reference is the last mention in the record supplied. The company has not said what those assets were later put to, whether they were written down, or whether the plan was dropped. A related item is the power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 per unit, which expired on December 31, 2021 (claim 19786). No replacement terms or effect on costs appears in the disclosures on file. One limitation applies to all of the above: the ledger provided to us ends in mid-April 2022, so these silences describe that record, and later filings may yet address some of them.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the most prominent project that appears once and is not heard from again. On 2022-03-29 the company described a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 20684, 14188, 14179, 20702, 14185, 20695). That filing is the last mention on record. No construction milestone, energization date, interim capacity figure, or revised target follows. Claim 14185 was briefly moved to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated, which reflects the absence of any dated commitment rather than an update from management. Nothing on record explains whether the 500 MW plan was pursued, resized, or set aside.

Denton, Texas shows a similar gap between ambition and follow-through. The same 2022-03-29 disclosures paired a 22 MW initial operating capacity (claims 14177, 14182) with an expected ultimate capacity of 300 MW (claims 20701, 20683, 14183, 14178), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 20699). No later capacity figure for Denton appears in the record, so the path from 22 MW to 300 MW was never charted with dates. The partnership claim 14184 went through the same delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before reverting to stated. Management has not said how much of the 278 MW gap was built, or on what schedule.

The B. Riley bridge promissory notes, recorded at 75.0 in claim 14081 on 2022-04-07, carried a 2022-12-07 maturity. This is the only claim on record that remains in delayed status. The companion commitment, a 150.0 committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate due by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082), is marked verified. No disclosure on record addresses repayment, extension, or refinancing of the bridge notes at or after maturity. That silence matters because the maturity date falls within the period of the company's late-2022 financial distress.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship moved quickly from a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781) to a set of adversarial assertions, all dated 2022-03-03. These were that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for agreed miners (claim 19782), a 220.7 million USD BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783), an allegedly non-existent 1.7 billion USD NuMiner agreement (claim 19784), and allegedly overstated profitability and breakeven figures (claim 19785). After that date the record contains nothing further on the hosting contract or the dispute. It does not show whether the 230 MW was ever delivered, terminated, or resolved.

The RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claim 14181) were presented on 2022-03-29 as having future utility (claim 20706). No subsequent disclosure on record describes any product, deployment, or write-down tied to them. Much the same holds for the 0.042 USD power pricing cap noted as expiring December 31, 2021 (claim 19786): no replacement rate or revised power cost is disclosed.

These observations are limited to the claims on record. The supplied ledger ends in April 2022 and is cut off mid-entry, so later disclosures may exist that are not captured here.

The $75 million bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081) are the clearest open item. They were disclosed on 2022-04-07 with a horizon of 2022-12-07. That date has long passed and the claim currently sits at delayed, after moving from stated to delayed, then not_yet_verifiable, then back to delayed. The companion commitment, the $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082), has resolved to verified. Nothing on record says whether the notes were repaid, extended, converted or restructured, and no revised maturity has been given. The status changes came from automated reclassification, not from anything the company said.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma build-out was described on 2022-03-29 as a 500 MW facility under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). That is the last mention in the material available here. No later filing on record reports energized capacity, construction milestones or a revised target for the site. Claim 14185 briefly moved to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated, but those moves reflect the absence of follow-up, not any statement from management. The record also does not say how much of the 500 MW was built or on what schedule.

The Denton, Texas facility followed the same pattern. On 2022-03-29 it was presented as operational at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182) with an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 20699). The gap between 22 MW and 300 MW was never bridged in later disclosures on record. No interim capacity figure, completion date or confirmation of the Tenaska arrangement appears afterward. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before reverting to stated.

The 230 MW Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement (claim 19781) appears only alongside adverse material dated 2022-03-03. That material includes an assertion that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for its contracted miners (claim 19782), allegations of a non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claim 19784), and allegations of overstated mining profitability and breakeven costs (claim 19785). There is no subsequent disclosure on record saying whether the hosting arrangement was performed, renegotiated or terminated. Nor does any later filing address how the allegations were resolved.

The Blockcap acquisition (claims 14171, 14189, 20707) brought with it the Radar Relay assets (claim 14181) and a stated intention to make future use of the RADAR technology (claim 20706), both last mentioned on 2022-03-29. Later disclosures on record make no further reference to that technology: no product, deployment, write-down or abandonment. These observations cover only the claims visible in this extract, which ends partway through April 2022. Later filings may address some of these items and should be checked before publication.

The B. Riley bridge financing is the clearest open item. In its 2022-04-07 disclosures, Core Scientific described bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital of $75 million, with a promised-by date of 2022-12-07 (claim 14081). The companion item, a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate due by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082), has since moved to verified. The bridge notes have not. The ledger moved them to delayed on 2026-09-15, briefly to not_yet_verifiable, and back to delayed on 2026-10-10. The 2022-04-07 filing is the last mention on record. The company has not said whether the notes were drawn, repaid, refinanced or abandoned, and no revised date has been announced.

The Denton, Texas build-out to 300 MW was described repeatedly on 2022-03-29. That filing gave an initial operating capacity of 22 MW (claims 14177 and 14182) and an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701), under a development arrangement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184 and 14191). Nothing on record after that date reports intermediate capacity, a completion date or a change to the 300 MW figure. Claims 14182 and 14184 cycled through delayed and not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated on 2026-10-10. That reflects the absence of follow-up rather than any company update. How much of the 278 MW gap has been energized has not been disclosed.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma facility follows the same pattern at a larger scale. On 2022-03-29 management described a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695 and 20702). This disclosure gave no operational figure, unlike Denton's. It is also the last mention on record, and claim 14185 was briefly marked delayed before reverting. The company has not said whether construction began, what capacity is live, or whether the 500 MW target still stands.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears only in material dated 2022-03-03. That material includes a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781), statements that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim 19782), and an alleged non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claim 19784). These read as contested positions rather than a functioning partnership. The record contains no later statement on whether the hosting agreement was performed, terminated or litigated to a conclusion.

The RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claims 14181 and 20706) were described on 2022-03-29 in terms of future utilization. No subsequent claim on record describes what that use became. The acquisition claim was briefly flagged delayed and not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated. The company has not said whether those assets were deployed, written down or set aside. These observations rest on the claims supplied here, which end in April 2022, so later disclosures may address some of these points.

The Denton, Texas build-out is the clearest case of a target that was stated and never revisited. On 2022-03-29 management described the site as operational at an initial 22 MW and expected to reach 300 MW when completed (claims 14177, 14178, 14183, 14182, 20683, 20701), under development agreements with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20699). In the record supplied, nothing after that date reports how much of the remaining 278 MW was energized, gives a completion date, or restates the 300 MW figure. Claims 14182 and 14184 have been automatically moved to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated. That movement came from the extraction pipeline, not from the company, which has not published any revision or progress statement on the ramp.

Muskogee, Oklahoma follows the same pattern at a larger scale. The 500 MW facility and the agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority were each described in several overlapping ways on 2022-03-29 (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). That is also the last mention. No later disclosure in the record gives a groundbreaking or energization date, any interim capacity, or the status of the Port Authority agreement. Claim 14185 has cycled through delayed and not_yet_verifiable. The company has not said whether the 500 MW plan was scaled back, deferred, or dropped.

The $75 million bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081) carried a stated date of 2022-12-07 and are currently marked delayed. The related $150 million committed equity facility (claim 14082), due 2022-06-06, has been verified. The notes have not been. Nothing in the record shows repayment, extension, refinancing, or conversion of the notes, and the April 2022 disclosure is the last place they appear.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship moved from contract language to unresolved allegation. Claims 19781 through 19784 describe a 230 MW hosting agreement alongside assertions, all dated 2022-03-03, that Gryphon lacked the funds for the miners it had agreed to, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that a $220.7 million BitFuFu purchase was involved. The record contains no later company statement on whether the hosting agreement was performed, amended, or terminated. The 230 MW is not reconciled against the 497 MW operating capacity reported as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14186, 20703). Management has also not addressed the allegations about profitability and breakeven costs in claim 19785.

The Blockcap acquisition brought Radar Relay with it (claim 14181, recorded as 65.0 USD, with the scale unstated). On 2022-03-29 management referred to future use of the RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). Proprietary software, Minder and MinderOS, was described in the same disclosure (claim 20704). None of these appears again in the supplied record. No product launch, integration milestone, impairment, or decision to wind them down has been disclosed. Claim 14181 has shown the same automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycling, with no explanatory statement from the company.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma build-out is the most prominent commitment that goes quiet. Claims 14179, 14188, 20684, 14185, 20695 and 20702 all come from disclosures dated 2022-03-29. They describe a 500 MW data center to be developed under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority. For scale, that is roughly equal to the company's entire reported operating footprint at the time, 497 MW in claims 14173, 14186 and 20703. None of the later claims on record report energization, a phased capacity figure, a target date or a revised scope. Claim 14185 was briefly moved to delayed on 2026-09-15 and to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09 before returning to stated, but no company statement accompanied either change. Management has not said how much of the 500 MW was ever built, or whether the Port Authority agreement remains in force.

Denton, Texas shows a similar gap between the starting point and the stated destination. On 2022-03-29 the company reported 22 MW operational at Denton (claims 14177 and 14182) and an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701). It framed the site as a development partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191 and 20699). That date is the last mention in the record. No intermediate capacity milestones follow, and no completion date was ever attached to the 300 MW figure. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before reverting to stated. The record does not show whether the Tenaska arrangement was completed, amended or ended, or how far Denton got beyond its initial 22 MW.

The B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge notes, claim 14081, are the one item where a dated obligation has visibly lapsed. The notes were disclosed on 2022-04-07 with a promised-by date of 2022-12-07. The claim now sits at delayed, set by automated transition on 2026-10-10, and no revision announcement or repayment confirmation appears in the record. The related B. Riley committed equity facility, claim 14082, was verified. The notes themselves have no stated resolution: no repayment, no extension, no conversion and no restructuring.

The RADAR technology assets from the Blockcap acquisition are mentioned once and then disappear. The 2022-03-29 disclosures refer to the Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap (claim 14181, whose amount is recorded as 65 USD, most likely an extraction unit error for millions). They also refer to the future utilization of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). No later claim mentions a product, revenue line, write-down or abandonment tied to those assets. The company has not said what became of them.

The Gryphon Digital Mining matter is recorded only through claims dated 2022-03-03. These cover a 230 MW hosting agreement (19781), allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources for the agreed miners (19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (19783), and an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (19784). The language moves from a signed hosting commitment to contested allegations, and the ledger contains no later statement on whether the 230 MW was deployed, renegotiated or terminated. Note also that the claims list supplied here is cut off after claim 13996, so later disclosures may address some of these items. Separately, many of the delayed and not_yet_verifiable transitions above came from automated runs that reverted within days and may reflect pipeline noise rather than company action.

The Denton, Texas build-out is the most prominent figure that no longer appears in the record. On 2022-03-29 the company described a facility that had become operational at 22 MW and was expected to reach 300 MW when completed (claims 14177, 14178, 14182, 14183, 20683, 20701). The development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy was cited alongside it (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20699). That date is the last disclosure in the record to mention either the 300 MW target or the partnership. The record contains no completion date, no interim capacity figure above 22 MW, and no revised target. The ledger briefly moved claims 14182 and 14184 to delayed (2026-09-15) and then to not_yet_verifiable (2026-10-09) before setting them back to stated on 2026-10-10. Those changes were automated reclassifications, not company statements. The company has not said whether the 300 MW figure still stands, when it was expected to be reached, or whether it was revised.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma project follows the same pattern. The 2022-03-29 disclosures describe a planned 500 MW data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). No later disclosure in the record mentions Muskogee. The capacity has not been updated, no timeline was ever given, and the partnership has not been described as active, amended or ended. Claim 14185 passed through the same automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable states before returning to stated. That is the ledger's own uncertainty, not a company revision. What has not been said is whether construction began at all.

The B. Riley Commercial Capital bridge promissory notes (claim 14081, disclosed 2022-04-07) carried a maturity of 2022-12-07, and the ledger currently shows them as delayed. The record contains no disclosure of repayment, refinancing or extension around that date. A related B. Riley equity facility due by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082) is marked verified. The repayment of the notes is the obligation that went unaddressed in the record.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement, described as covering 230 MW (claim 19781, 2022-03-03), appears only once. The same set of claims raises questions about Gryphon's financial capacity, an allegedly non-existent NuMiner agreement and a BitFuFu miner purchase (claims 19782, 19783, 19784). These read as contested or allegation-framed items rather than settled facts. Nothing later in the record says whether the hosting agreement was performed, renegotiated or terminated, or how much of the 230 MW was ever deployed.

The RADAR technology assets that came with the Blockcap deal are a smaller example. The Radar Relay acquisition (claim 14181) and a stated intention regarding "future utilization of RADAR technology assets" (claim 20706) both date to 2022-03-29. Neither is mentioned again in the record supplied. Management has not explained what that future use was meant to be or whether the assets were written down or set aside. Note that the claim list provided here is cut off after claim 13996, so later disclosures that address any of these items may exist outside what was reviewed.

The $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081) were disclosed on 2022-04-07 with a stated horizon of 2022-12-07. That is the last time the record addresses them. The status ledger currently classifies the claim as delayed, having moved through not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09 before returning to delayed on 2026-10-10. The related $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082) has since been marked verified. The disclosures on file do not say whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended, refinanced or converted by the December 2022 date, and no revision announcement accompanies the slippage.

The Denton, Texas build-out was described on 2022-03-29 as a 22 MW initial operation growing to an expected 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701, 14182, 14184, 14175). Seven separate claims repeat the 300 MW figure on that single date. None of the material on record returns to it afterward. Claims 14182 and 14184 passed through delayed and not_yet_verifiable in the ledger before settling back at stated. The company has given no capacity update, no revised completion date and no statement on whether the 300 MW target still stands.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was presented on 2022-03-29 as a planned 500 MW facility under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14188, 20684, 20702, 14185, 20695). That date is also its last appearance. The 500 MW figure exceeds the company's entire stated operating capacity of 497 MW at January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186, 20703). Claim 14185 was auto-transitioned to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable before reverting to stated. No subsequent disclosure reports energization, a phased schedule or a scaled-back plan.

On 2022-03-03 the record includes a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon Digital Mining (claim 19781). The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to buy the contracted miners, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claims 19782, 19784, 19785). Nothing later in the record returns to the Gryphon relationship. The company has not said whether the hosting arrangement went ahead, was renegotiated or was terminated, or how the allegations were resolved.

The Blockcap acquisition brought in Radar Relay, and on 2022-03-29 the company referred to the future utilization of RADAR technology assets (claims 14181, 20706, 20707). That is the only mention. Claims 14181 and 20707 went through delayed and not_yet_verifiable in the ledger before returning to stated. No later disclosure describes how the RADAR assets were deployed, written down or abandoned.

The disclosures also noted that the power agreement's $0.042 pricing cap expired on December 31, 2021 (claim 19786). They do not say what pricing replaced it or how the expiry affected operating costs.

The $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081), disclosed on April 7, 2022, carried a stated date of December 7, 2022. The record now marks that claim as delayed. The ledger has moved it between stated, delayed and not_yet_verifiable since mid-September before settling back on delayed on October 10. Among the claims reviewed, there is no later disclosure saying whether the notes were repaid, extended, refinanced or converted, and no revised timetable. The companion B. Riley committed equity facility of $150 million (claim 14082) is marked verified, so the silence applies specifically to the debt side of the arrangement.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described on March 29, 2022 as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 20684, 20702, 20695, 14179, 14185 and 14188). That date is also the last mention in the record. No subsequent disclosure reports construction progress, energized capacity or a revised target. Claim 14185 cycled through delayed and not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated, which reflects the absence of follow-up rather than any confirmation. Management has not said whether the 500 MW figure still stands, has been scaled back or has been deferred.

The Denton, Texas facility had become operational at 22 MW (claims 14177 and 14182), and the March 29, 2022 disclosures set an ultimate capacity of 300 MW in partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 20683, 20701, 14178, 14183, 14184 and 14175). The record contains no later statement on how much of the remaining 278 MW was built, or on what timeline. Neither the 300 MW target nor the Tenaska arrangement has been reaffirmed or revised since.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting agreement for 230 MW (claim 19781) appeared on March 3, 2022. On the same date, the record also contains claims that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the miners it had agreed to acquire (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement was alleged not to exist (claim 19784), and a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783). After that date the record does not show whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, renegotiated or terminated. The concerns raised in the same disclosures have also not been addressed.

The future use of the RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap (claims 20706 and 14181) was flagged on March 29, 2022 and has not reappeared. No subsequent disclosure describes a product, an integration with the Minder and MinderOS platforms (claim 20704), or a write-down.

The claims supplied for this review end in April 2022 and the final entry was cut off. Later filings may address some of these items, and the conclusions above are limited to the record as provided.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma facility is the largest single commitment in the record that has gone quiet. Claims 14179, 14188, 20684 and 20702 all describe a planned 500 MW data center, and claims 14185 and 20695 frame it as a signed agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority. Every one of these traces to the March 29, 2022 annual filing, and none appears in any later disclosure in the record. Claim 14185 was briefly auto-marked delayed (September 15) and then not_yet_verifiable before returning to stated, which shows no date was ever attached. Management has not given a construction schedule, an energization date, or a revised capacity, and has not said whether the Port Authority agreement remains in force.

The Denton, Texas build-out has a similar gap. Claims 14177 and 14182 put Denton at 22 MW of operating capacity as of March 29, 2022, while claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701 describe an expected final capacity of 300 MW. Claims 14184, 14175, 14191 and 20699 tie that expansion to the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy. The last mention of the 300 MW target is that same filing. Nothing in the record reports progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW, gives a completion date, or explains how the Tenaska arrangement has changed. Claim 14184 went through the same automated delayed, then not_yet_verifiable, then stated sequence as Muskogee.

The B. Riley bridge financing is the only item in the record still marked delayed. Claim 14081, dated April 7, 2022, describes bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded at 75.0 (presumably $75 million) with a December 7, 2022 maturity. The ledger moved it to delayed on September 15, briefly to not_yet_verifiable, and back to delayed on October 10. The companion committed equity facility in claim 14082 was verified. The record contains no statement that the notes were repaid, refinanced, extended, or converted, and no explanation of why the maturity passed without a disclosed resolution.

The technology assets acquired with Blockcap have also disappeared from the record. Claim 14181 records the Radar Relay acquisition through Blockcap, and claim 20706, from March 29, 2022, refers to the future use of RADAR technology assets. Claim 20704 describes the proprietary Minder and MinderOS platforms in the same filing. None of these is mentioned afterward. Management has not described what was built with the RADAR assets, whether they were written down, or whether the software platforms are still maintained.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting relationship has gone from specific numbers to silence. Claim 19781 describes a 230 MW hosting agreement as of March 3, 2022. Claims 19782 and 19784 on the same date record allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for the agreed miners and that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist. No later claim reports whether the 230 MW arrangement went ahead, was reduced, or was terminated, or how the disputed points were settled.

Two caveats apply. First, the record supplied here ends in April 2022, so this silence is measured only against the claims provided. Second, most of the status changes in the ledger come from automated extraction runs in September and October 2026, not from anything management said. A claim that moves from delayed back to stated has not been resolved. It marks a gap that no disclosure has filled.

The record supplied here ends partway through April 2022, so silence in this ledger means silence within these disclosures, not necessarily silence in Core Scientific's full filing history. The status transitions are also dated September and October 2026. They reflect automated re-scoring by this system rather than anything the company announced, and several claims moved from delayed to not_yet_verifiable and back to stated within days of each other. Within those limits, a few threads stand out.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma site is described repeatedly in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW data center, through an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). Nothing on record after that date returns to it. No construction schedule, energization date, interim megawatt figure or capital budget was given. Claim 14185 was briefly marked delayed before reverting to stated, which reflects the absence of a dated milestone more than any confirmed slippage. What has not been said is when, or whether, any of the 500 MW was expected to come online.

Denton, Texas was presented the same day as a facility that had become operational at 22 MW, with an expected ultimate capacity of 300 MW under arrangements with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 14182, 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701, 14175, 14184). The record contains no later progress figure between those two numbers and no target date for reaching 300 MW. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before settling at stated. The gap between 22 MW and 300 MW is left unexplained after March 2022.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). The same filing date also carries allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for its contracted miners, and that a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase was in question (claims 19782, 19783, 19784). Claim 19785 records allegations of overstated mining profitability. All of these remain at stated with a single transition, and no later claim on record describes a resolution, termination, settlement or revised hosting volume. The record does not say what became of the 230 MW commitment.

The bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded at 75.0 on April 7, 2022, carried a promised-by date of December 7, 2022 (claim 14081). That claim is currently marked delayed, the only open item in the record to land there after re-scoring. The companion committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate is marked verified (claim 14082). Nothing on record states whether the notes were repaid, extended or refinanced by the December 2022 date.

Smaller but similar, the March 29, 2022 disclosures referred to the future use of RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap (claim 20706, alongside the Radar Relay acquisition in claim 14181). No later disclosure in this record describes what that use turned out to be.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a large commitment that drops out of the record. On 2022-03-29 the company described a 500 MW facility and a data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, across six separate claims (14179, 14188, 20684, 14185, 20695, 20702). No later claim on record mentions Muskogee. There is no energization date, no interim capacity figure, and no revision to the 500 MW target. Claim 14185 was automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-15 and then to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09, before being reset to stated on 2026-10-10. Those changes came from the ledger's automated process, not from anything the company said. Nothing in the record explains how far the project progressed or whether the 500 MW figure still stands.

The Denton, Texas build-out has a similar gap between its stated target and what was confirmed. In the 2022-03-29 disclosures, management gave an initial operating capacity of 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182) and an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701). That target depended on the development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 20699). No later claim on record reports progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW, gives a completion date, or restates the target. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same automated cycle of delayed, then not_yet_verifiable, then back to stated. The company has not said how much of the remaining 278 MW was delivered.

The B. Riley financing is the only item on record with a dated obligation that is currently marked delayed. Claim 14081, dated 2022-04-07, describes bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital with a promised-by date of 2022-12-07. Its status was set to delayed again on 2026-10-10. The companion committed equity facility (claim 14082, due 2022-06-06) is marked verified, which makes the absence of a resolution for the notes more noticeable. The record contains no statement on repayment, extension, conversion, or default of the bridge notes after the April 2022 disclosure.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship last appears on 2022-03-03. It consists of a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783), and contested points: an alleged non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (claim 19784), doubts about Gryphon's financial capacity (claim 19782), and allegations of overstated mining profitability (claim 19785). These were framed as allegations, and no later claim records how they were resolved. The record does not say whether the 230 MW hosting arrangement went ahead, was cut back, or was terminated.

The Blockcap acquisition is a smaller item. When it was completed (claims 20707, 14171, 14189, 14181), the company referred to the future use of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706, 2022-03-29). That language does not appear again in the record. Nothing on file says whether those assets were deployed, written down, or set aside.

The ledger provided ends in April 2022, so "last mention" here means last mention within the claims on record. Some of these topics may be covered in disclosures that have not yet been extracted.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the largest stated commitment on record that has not been mentioned again. On 2022-03-29 the company described a 500 MW facility to be developed under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 20684, 14188, 14179, 20702, 20695, 14185). That is the last mention in the record. Claim 14185 was automatically moved to 'delayed' on 2026-09-15 and to 'not_yet_verifiable' on 2026-10-09, then returned to 'stated' on 2026-10-10 without any new disclosure. The company has not said how much of the 500 MW has been built or energized, when it expects the site to reach capacity, or whether the Port Authority agreement remains in force.

Denton, Texas shows the same pattern. On 2022-03-29 the company said the site was operational at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182) and would grow to an ultimate capacity of 300 MW (claims 14183, 14178, 20683, 20701), under a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 20699). There is no later capacity figure, build-out schedule, or progress report in the record. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle before reverting to 'stated'. The company has not explained the gap between the 22 MW it reported and the 300 MW target, or whether that target still stands.

The B. Riley bridge financing has a date that has passed with no explanation on record. On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded at 75.0 USD, with a 2022-12-07 date attached (claim 14081). The claim is currently 'delayed'. The related committed equity facility (claim 14082) has been verified, but the record contains no statement on whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended, refinanced, or converted.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears once, on 2022-03-03, and the record contains no follow-up. That disclosure covered a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781), a related BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783), and allegations about a NuMiner agreement and Gryphon's financial capacity (claims 19784, 19782), along with allegations of overstated mining profitability (claim 19785). There is nothing on how these disputes were resolved, whether the hosting capacity was ever delivered, or what happened to the arrangement.

The RADAR technology assets are a smaller open item. These came through the Blockcap acquisition of Radar Relay (claim 14181), and on 2022-03-29 the company said it intended to use them in the future (claim 20706). There has been no further reference to what that use would be, whether it happened, or whether the assets were written down or dropped. Claim 14181 went through the same automated delayed-to-stated cycle as the facility claims above.

Two caveats apply to all of the above. First, every status change on record is an automated extraction transition, not a company announcement. Second, the ledger supplied for this review ends mid-entry at claim 13994 (2022-04-19). Each absence described here is therefore an absence within the record provided, and later disclosures may address some of these items.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center appears repeatedly in the March 29, 2022 disclosures. Claims 14179, 14188, 20684 and 20702 describe it as a 500 MW facility, and claims 14185 and 20695 describe the agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority. That date is the last mention in the record. No later claim reports construction progress, energized capacity, a revised target or a timeline. The ledger for claim 14185 moved to delayed on 2026-09-15 and to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09 before returning to stated on 2026-10-10. Those are automated reclassifications, not company statements. What has not been said is whether the 500 MW plan was built, scaled back or abandoned, and when any such change was decided.

The Denton, Texas site has a similar gap between the opening figure and the stated destination. On March 29, 2022 the company reported an initial operating capacity of 22 MW (claims 14177 and 14182) and an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683 and 20701). It tied that expansion to the development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191 and 20699). The record contains no intermediate capacity figure, no completion date and no restatement of the 300 MW target after that filing. Claims 14182 and 14184 went through the same automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable cycle in September and October 2026. Nothing on record explains how far the build-out actually went.

The bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital are the one item in this record with a hard date that the ledger currently marks as missed. Claim 14081, dated April 7, 2022, records the notes at 75.0 with a promised-by date of December 7, 2022, and its status as of 2026-10-10 is delayed. The companion committed equity facility (claim 14082, due June 6, 2022) is marked verified, so the two financing commitments made together have since diverged. The record contains no statement on whether the notes were repaid, extended, converted or folded into a later restructuring, and no revised maturity has been disclosed.

The RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap, recorded under claims 14181 and 20706, were last discussed on March 29, 2022. At that time the company referred to their future utilization. No later claim describes a product, an integration or a write-down, so the stated plan for these assets has gone unaddressed. Claim 14181 also passed through automated delayed and not_yet_verifiable states before returning to stated.

The records shown for this company end in April 2022. Some silences above may be answered in disclosures that the extraction has not captured. Most of the delayed and not_yet_verifiable transitions in this ledger come from automated status passes between September and October 2026, not from anything management said. Within the record as it stands, however, none of these four items has a follow-up statement.

Muskogee, Oklahoma, 500 MW. In the 2022-03-29 disclosures, management described a data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority with 500 MW of planned capacity (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 20684, 20695, 20702). Claim 14185 carried a 2022-02-28 date. The ledger moved it to delayed on 2026-09-15 and to not_yet_verifiable on 2026-10-09. Both moves were automated because the date had passed, not because the company issued a revision. No later claim on record reports energized megawatts at Muskogee, a revised build schedule, or any step down from the 500 MW figure. The site's progress has not been explained.

The Denton, Texas build-out to 300 MW. The same 2022-03-29 filings said Denton was operational at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 14192) and would eventually reach 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701). The partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy underpinning it (claims 14184, 14175, 14191, 20699) had a 2021-10-31 date. The dated claims have followed the same automated path from delayed to not_yet_verifiable. Nothing on record after March 2022 gives a capacity figure between 22 and 300 MW, a timeline for reaching 300 MW, or any change to the Tenaska arrangement. The 300 MW target appears four times in one quarter and is never mentioned again.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship. On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon (claim 19781). Alongside it are allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (19785), plus a related $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (19783). These are recorded as allegations, not findings. Every one of these claims remains at stated, with no later entry. The disclosures on record do not say whether the 230 MW hosting commitment was performed, renegotiated, or terminated, or how the dispute was resolved.

RADAR and the Blockcap technology assets. The Blockcap acquisition brought in Radar Relay (claims 14180, 14181, 14189, 20707). On 2022-03-29 management referred to the future utilization of the RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). The extracted consideration figure in 14181 reads "65.0 USD", which is likely a unit error. The acquisition-date claims have aged automatically into not_yet_verifiable, and 20706 has had no follow-up. The record has no statement on what those assets became, whether they were put to use, or whether they were written down.

The B. Riley bridge notes. Claim 14081, dated 2022-04-07, records bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital with a 2022-12-07 date. The extracted amount reads "75.0 USD", most likely $75 million. The claim passed that date without a recorded update and was moved automatically to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable. No later claim reports whether the notes were repaid, extended, or restructured.

A caveat applies to all of the above. The claim list supplied here ends partway through the 2022-04-07 entries, so later disclosures may exist that were not visible for this review. Every delayed and not_yet_verifiable status here was set by the ledger's date logic, not by a company announcement. What can be said is narrower: within the record reviewed, none of these items has an accompanying explanation.

Muskogee, Oklahoma was presented in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW data center developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14188, 14179, 20684, 20695, 20702). The agreement claim carried a February 28, 2022 reference date. It moved automatically to delayed on September 15, 2026, and then to not_yet_verifiable on October 9, 2026. The record available here contains no later figure for energized megawatts at Muskogee, no revised build schedule, and no statement that the 500 MW target was changed. The capacity goal is still listed as stated. Nothing on file says how much of it was ever delivered.

Denton, Texas appeared in the same filings as a 22 MW initial deployment (claim 14177) with a stated ultimate capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 20683, 20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191). The operational-launch claims (14192, 14182) and the development agreement (14184) all carry dates from late 2021 to early 2022. Each was auto-transitioned to delayed in September 2026 and to not_yet_verifiable on October 9, 2026. The ledger has no intermediate capacity figure between 22 MW and 300 MW and no updated completion date. It also has no explanation of whether the 300 MW goal still applies to mining or was repurposed.

The Blockcap acquisition brought in RADAR technology assets, and the March 2022 disclosures referred to their "future utilization" (claim 20706). The related acquisition claims (14180, 14181, 20707) are now not_yet_verifiable. The Radar Relay purchase price is recorded as 65.0, almost certainly in millions with the unit lost in extraction. No later claim describes a product, a deployment, or a write-down tied to these assets. The plan for them was announced once and does not appear again in this record.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement was described in March 3, 2022 material at 230 MW (claim 19781). The same day's claims also include allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for the agreed miners, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase took place (claims 19782, 19783, 19784). All remain at stated status. The record shows no follow-up on whether the 230 MW hosting commitment was performed, renegotiated, or terminated. The language shifted from a signed capacity agreement to disputed allegations, and no resolution is on file.

The April 7, 2022 financing package with B. Riley included bridge promissory notes recorded at 75.0 with a December 7, 2022 reference date (claim 14081) and a required committed equity facility recorded at 150.0 (claim 14082), both apparently in millions. The bridge note claim moved to delayed and then not_yet_verifiable in the same automated passes. The record available here does not say whether the notes were repaid, extended, or converted, or whether the equity facility was drawn.

All of the delayed and not_yet_verifiable statuses above came from automated transitions in September and October 2026. They reflect missing follow-up evidence in the ledger, not any revision announced by the company.

Muskogee, Oklahoma, 500 MW. The March 29, 2022 disclosures describe a 500 MW data center agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority in some detail (claims 20702, 20695, 20684, 14185, 14188, 14179). Claim 14185 attached a February 28, 2022 date to the agreement. That claim moved to delayed and then to not_yet_verifiable. No later claim in this record restates the 500 MW figure, reports energized megawatts at the site, or gives a revised schedule. The company has not said how much of the 500 MW was built, or when.

Denton, Texas, from 22 MW toward 300 MW. The same filing reported Denton as operational at an initial 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 14192, 20690) and set an expected final capacity of 300 MW (claims 20683, 20701, 14183, 14178). The development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy carried an October 31, 2021 date (claim 14184), and the operational-launch claims carried February 2022 dates. All of these dated claims now sit at not_yet_verifiable. The 300 MW target was last stated on March 29, 2022. Nothing on record updates the ramp from 22 MW, gives a timeline to 300 MW, or explains whether the target still stands.

Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement. On March 3, 2022, the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon (claim 19781) alongside a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783). The same date also carries allegations: that Gryphon lacked the money for the agreed miners (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim 19785). These items appear on a single date and nowhere after it. Nothing on record says whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, terminated, or settled, or how the allegations were resolved.

RADAR technology assets. The March 29, 2022 filing refers to future use of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706), acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claim 14181, dated July 1, 2021, now not_yet_verifiable). No later claim describes a product, deployment, impairment, or abandonment of those assets. The plan was stated once and has not been mentioned since.

B. Riley bridge financing. On April 7, 2022, the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded as 75.0 USD and evidently in millions, with a December 7, 2022 date (claim 14081). It also disclosed a related committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, recorded as 150.0 (claim 14082). The notes' date has passed, and claim 14081 is now not_yet_verifiable. Nothing on record discloses repayment, extension, conversion, or default, or how much of the equity facility was drawn.

A note on the status labels: the delayed and not_yet_verifiable labels come from this site's automated pipeline, most recently on October 9, 2026. They are not company statements and should be read as an absence of confirming disclosure, not as evidence of failure. The claim list supplied for this analysis was also cut off partway through April 2022, so later filings may address some of these items.

Muskogee, Oklahoma, 500 MW. In the March 29, 2022 disclosures, management described a 500 MW data center development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195, 20684, 20686). The partnership agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date (claim 14185), and our ledger automatically moved it to delayed on September 15, 2026. In the record available to us, March 29, 2022 is the last time the 500 MW figure appears. No later filing restates it, revises it downward, or reports energized capacity at the site. Management has not said how much of the 500 MW was built, whether the plan was cut back, or whether it was abandoned.

Denton, Texas, from 22 MW to 300 MW. The same March 2022 materials said Denton began operating at an initial 22 MW, in partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 14182, 14192, 20691, 14175, 14184). They also set an ultimate target of 300 MW, repeated across at least seven extracted claims (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701). The operational-launch claims and the development agreement (14182, 14192, 14184) were auto-transitioned to delayed in mid-September 2026. The record contains no subsequent figure showing progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW, no revised completion date, and no statement that the target has changed.

Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement. On March 3, 2022, the record describes a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon (claim 19781). Alongside it are allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the contracted miners, that a related $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement may not have existed, and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claims 19782, 19783, 19784, 19785). All of these remain in stated status, with March 3, 2022 as the last mention. Management has not disclosed whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, renegotiated, or terminated, and it has not addressed how the allegations were resolved.

RADAR technology assets. Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay appears repeatedly at a recorded value of 65 (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698). The figure is very likely $65 million with the unit lost in extraction. The March 29, 2022 disclosures also referred to future utilization of the RADAR technology assets (claim 20706). Claim 14181 was auto-transitioned to delayed on September 15, 2026. After that date the record does not mention RADAR again. There is no description of any product built on it and no impairment or write-down notice.

Expired power pricing cap. A January 3, 2022 disclosure noted that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 per kWh would expire on December 31, 2021 (claim 19786). The ledger moved it to delayed on September 27, 2026. The record contains no statement of what replaced the capped rate or how the expiry affected power costs. That gap matters because the profitability and breakeven figures were themselves questioned (claim 19785).

A caution on method: several of these delayed statuses were assigned automatically once a reference date passed, and they may reflect gaps in our ledger rather than an actual slip. The company record supplied to us also appears truncated. The silences described above are absences within the disclosures we hold, not confirmed walk-backs.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a project that was introduced and then not revisited. The March 29, 2022 disclosures describe a 500 MW facility developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14188, 14195, 14179, 20684, 14185, 20686, 14194). The port authority agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date, and the ledger moved claim 14185 automatically to delayed on 2026-09-15. No later claim on record gives an energization date, an interim megawatt figure, or a revised scope. The 500 MW figure has never been restated or withdrawn, and nothing explains why the project stopped appearing.

The Denton, Texas build-out shows the same pattern. On March 29, 2022 management said the site was operational at an initial 22 MW, with a stated path to 300 MW in partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 20691, 14178, 20701, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 14175, 14191). The development agreement and launch references carried dates of October 31, 2021 and February 2022, and claims 14184, 14182 and 14192 were auto-transitioned to delayed in mid-September 2026. The 300 MW target was repeated many times but never given a completion date. No subsequent claim reports progress between 22 MW and 300 MW, and none says whether the ultimate target still stands.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship was described on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). In the same window the record contains allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784), that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for the contracted miners (19782), that a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase was involved (19783), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (19785). All of these remain at stated, with no later entries. The record contains no statement on whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, renegotiated or terminated, and nothing on how the allegations were resolved.

The power agreement pricing cap of $0.042, due to expire December 31, 2021, was disclosed on January 3, 2022 (claim 19786). It moved to delayed on 2026-09-27. No subsequent claim describes the replacement pricing, even though power cost directly drives the mining economics referenced elsewhere in the record.

The RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay were tied to a stated intent of future utilization on March 29, 2022 (claims 20706, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698). The acquisition value is recorded as 65.0 USD, which is likely a units error in extraction. No later disclosure on record says how, or whether, those assets were put to use.

By contrast, the delayed flags on the Blockcap acquisition (14180, 20707) appear to reflect when the claims were extracted, not an actual slip, because the transaction was reported as completed. The claims list supplied for this review also ends mid-record, and no visible claim is dated after March 29, 2022. That apparent silence after March 2022 should therefore be checked against the full ledger before publication.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was presented on 2022-03-29 as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 20702, 20694, 20684, 20695, 20686, 14194, 14179). The ledger attaches a promised-by date of 2022-02-28 to claim 14185, which was automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-15. The other Muskogee claims remain at stated, and none are dated after 2022-03-29. Nothing on record says how much of the 500 MW was energized, gives a revised schedule, or says whether the build was scaled back or dropped.

The Denton, Texas facility followed a similar path. Management described an initial 22 MW (claims 14177, 20691) and an eventual 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20701). The launch milestones in claims 14182 and 14192, dated 2022-02-28 and 2022-02-01, are now marked delayed, as is the Tenaska Energy and City of Denton development agreement in claim 14184, originally dated 2021-10-31. The 300 MW figure never received a target date. Its last mention is 2022-03-29, and the record contains no later capacity figure, no updated timeline, and no statement on whether the Tenaska arrangement stayed in place.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement, a 230 MW agreement in claim 19781, appears only once, on 2022-03-03. It arrived alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund the agreed miners (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), that a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase was involved (claim 19783), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim 19785). All of these remain at stated with no follow-up. The record has no company response, no confirmation that the 230 MW was ever deployed, and no notice that the agreement was amended or terminated.

The RADAR technology assets came with the Blockcap acquisition of Radar Relay, recorded at 65.0 USD in claims 14172, 14190, 20688 and 20698, a figure that appears to be a unit-scaling artifact. They were described on 2022-03-29 as having future utilization (claim 20706). Claim 14181, which carries a 2021-07-01 completion date, is now flagged delayed. No later disclosure explains what the RADAR assets were used for or whether they were written down.

Some of the automated delayed flags should be read with care. Claims 19017, 14180, 14186 and 20707 attach promised-by dates that look like historical reference points rather than forward commitments: the 2021 lease, the Blockcap closing, and operating capacity as of 2022-01-31. Their delayed status may reflect how the claims were extracted rather than an actual slip. The power pricing cap in claim 19786 expired on 2021-12-31 as scheduled, and the record does not say what pricing replaced it. More broadly, every claim in the ledger as provided is dated between 2022-01-01 and 2022-03-29, and the listing is cut off partway through. The silence described here may partly reflect gaps in later source coverage rather than management choosing not to speak.

Most of Core Scientific's record ends on March 29, 2022, and nothing on file revisits the forward-looking items from that date. Many entries also carry an automated 'delayed' status, assigned in September 2026 because the 'promised by' date falls before the disclosure date. In several cases, such as the Blockcap closing (claims 14180, 20707) and the 31-acre lease (19017), that flag reflects a date-extraction artifact, not a missed deadline, and should not be read as a walk-back. The items below are the ones where the record shows a stated forward commitment followed by silence.

The Denton, Texas build-out to 300 MW is the clearest case. On March 29, 2022, the company described Denton as operational at an initial 22 MW and expected to reach 300 MW when complete (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20701). The operational-launch items tied to February 2022 (14182, 14192) are now marked delayed by the ledger. No later disclosure on record gives a revised Denton capacity, an interim figure between 22 MW and 300 MW, or a completion date. March 2022 is the last mention, and the record contains no statement on whether the expansion schedule or the target itself still stands.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center agreement with the City-County Port Authority was described on March 29, 2022, as a 500 MW development (claims 14185, 20684, 20694, 20702, with partnership language in 14194, 20686, 20695). Claim 14185 was tied to February 2022 and has been auto-transitioned to delayed. The record contains no follow-up on groundbreaking, energization, a phased capacity figure or any change in the agreement's terms. Muskogee is the single largest capacity figure on file, and it is also the one with the least subsequent detail.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears only in March 3, 2022 entries. These include a 230 MW hosting agreement (19781) alongside allegations that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784), that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund its miners (19782), and that profitability and breakeven figures were overstated (19785). All remain in 'stated' status. Nothing on record shows management confirming the 230 MW hosting commitment after that date, addressing the allegations, or clarifying whether the Gryphon capacity was counted in later operating figures such as the 497 MW reported as of January 31, 2022 (14186, 20703).

The RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap's $65 million purchase of Radar Relay (14172, 14190, 20688, 20698) were presented on March 29, 2022, as having future utility for the business (20706). That forward-looking language is the last reference. The record contains no subsequent description of what those assets became, whether they were deployed, or whether their carrying value was revisited.

The power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 that expired December 31, 2021 (19786) was disclosed in January 2022 and is now auto-flagged as delayed. No later entry describes the terms that replaced it or the effect on power costs, even though power pricing underpins the profitability figures cited elsewhere in the record.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described on 2022-03-29 as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee Port Authority (claims 14195, 14188, 14179, 20694, 20684, 20702, 20695, 20686). Eight separate extractions repeat the 500 MW figure, but none carries a promised date, a phase schedule, or an energization milestone. All remain in stated status. Nothing on record after 2022-03-29 says whether construction began, what capacity was brought online, or whether the 500 MW target still stands.

The Denton, Texas facility was presented the same day as a 22 MW initial deployment scaling to 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 20691, 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701, 14175). The operational launch tied to 2022-02-01 (claim 14192) and the development agreement dated by 2021-10-31 (claim 14184) were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. No ramp schedule was offered for the remaining 278 MW, and no later disclosure on record reports interim capacity or a revised completion date. The gap between the stated starting point and the stated end state has not been addressed again.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement, recorded at 230 MW on 2022-03-03 (claim 19781), appears alongside statements that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim 19782), a 220.7 million USD BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783), and an alleged non-existent 1.7 billion USD NuMiner agreement (claim 19784). These read as dispute or allegation material rather than operating guidance. All remain stated, with no later mention. The record does not say whether the 230 MW hosting commitment was performed, renegotiated, or terminated, or how the disputed items were resolved.

The Blockcap acquisition brought in Radar Relay (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698), and on 2022-03-29 management referred to the future utilization of RADAR technology assets (claim 20706) alongside its Minder and MinderOS software platforms (claim 20704). The deal value is extracted as 65.0 USD, which is likely a scaling artifact. Neither the RADAR technology nor the software platforms reappear in any later claim, and no use, write-down, or discontinuation has been disclosed.

The power agreement pricing cap of 0.042 USD, stated to expire 2021-12-31 (claim 19786, auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-27), was noted without any account of what replaced it. No subsequent claim on record describes the post-expiry rate or its effect on mining costs.

Several other delayed transitions, including the 2021 land lease (claim 19017), the Blockcap closing (claims 14180, 20707), and the January 31, 2022 capacity snapshot of 497 MW (claim 14186), reflect promised-by dates that precede the disclosure in which they appear. They describe events already reported as complete, not missed commitments. More broadly, the claims on record stop at 2022-03-29, so each silence noted above runs from that date.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was presented in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14195, 20684, 20694, 20695, 20702). The agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date and now sits at delayed (claim 14185). That status was assigned by automated review in September 2026, not announced by the company. March 29, 2022 is the last time the project appears on record. There has been no statement on construction start, energization, partial capacity, or whether the 500 MW figure still stands, and no revision has been issued.

At Denton, Texas, the company described an initial 22 MW in operation alongside a 300 MW ultimate target, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 20691, 14182, 14178, 14183, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701, 14175, 14184). The development agreement, referenced to October 31, 2021 (claim 14184), and the operational launch, referenced to early 2022 (claims 14182, 14192), are both now marked delayed. The record holds no interim capacity figure between 22 MW and 300 MW after March 29, 2022. It also holds no target date for the full buildout and no explanation of how the ramp has progressed.

The company-wide operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14186, 20703) is the last capacity figure on record and is now marked delayed. No later capacity number has been disclosed. The company has not said whether that figure was exceeded, held, or reduced.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship was described on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). The same filings recorded allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund the agreed miners, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claims 19782, 19784, 19785). They also referenced a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase by Gryphon (claim 19783). None of these items appears again after March 3, 2022. Management has not said whether the hosting arrangement was performed, amended, or terminated, or how the allegations were resolved.

Two smaller threads also stop without follow-up. The power agreement's pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021 (claim 19786, now delayed), and nothing on record describes the pricing that replaced it. The Radar Relay assets acquired through Blockcap were described as having a planned future use (claims 20706, 14172, 14181, 20688). The recorded consideration of $65 appears to be missing its unit. That planned use has not been mentioned since March 29, 2022, and the company has not said whether those assets were deployed, written down, or set aside.

Several of the delayed labels above attach to events the filings described in the past tense, such as the Blockcap completion and the Denton launch. In those cases the label reflects the absence of any later confirmation or update, not a documented slip.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a promise that went quiet. On 2022-03-29 the company described a 500 MW facility developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14195, 14194, 20694, 20695, 20702). The agreement claim carried a target of 2022-02-28, which had already passed when it was disclosed, and the ledger moved it automatically to delayed on 2026-09-15. Nothing in the record after March 2022 reports how much of the 500 MW was energized, gives a revised schedule, or says whether the build-out was reduced. The figure was repeated across several filings and then stopped appearing.

The Denton, Texas build-out follows the same pattern. As of 2022-03-29 the company described 22 MW of initial operating capacity (14177, 20691) and a target of 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14175, 14184, 14191). The operational-launch claim (14192, promised 2022-02-01) and the development agreement (14184, promised 2021-10-31) were both auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. The record shows no later statement on progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW and no change to the 300 MW figure. It shows no account of the delay either.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement went from a specific commitment to unexplained allegations. On 2022-03-03 the record shows a 230 MW hosting agreement (19781). On the same date it shows allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for the miners it had agreed to buy (19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (19785). All of these remain at stated, and none has a later entry. The record contains no company statement on whether the 230 MW was ever deployed, renegotiated or ended, and no response to the allegations.

The RADAR technology assets came in through Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay (14172, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698). The amount is recorded as 65.0 USD, which looks like a unit error in extraction. On 2022-03-29 these assets were presented with a forward-looking line about their future use (20706). That intention has no later mention in the record, and no claim says the assets were put to use, written down or dropped.

The power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on 2021-12-31 (19786) and was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-27. The ledger records no disclosure of the pricing that replaced it, even though the earlier profitability claims depended on power cost.

Two caveats apply. First, several other delayed flags, including the Blockcap acquisition (14180, 20707), the Radar Relay acquisition (14181) and the 31-acre lease (19017), refer to events that had already taken place when they were disclosed. They are probably artifacts of automated date handling rather than missed promises, so they are not treated as walk-backs here. Second, the claims ledger supplied here appears to be cut off after claim 20689 and contains nothing after early 2022. "Stopped mentioning" therefore means absent from this record, and later filings would need to be checked before concluding the company never addressed these items.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the largest single commitment in the record that has gone quiet. Management described a 500 MW facility under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195, 20694, 20695, 20702), and claim 14185 tied that agreement to a 2022-02-28 date. The last mention in the claims on record is 2022-03-29. Claim 14185 was automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-15, and the other Muskogee claims remain at stated. Nothing on record says how much of the 500 MW was energized, whether the target was reduced, or whether the project was paused or abandoned.

The Denton, Texas build-out shows the same pattern. The site was described as starting at 22 MW (claims 14177, 20691) and growing to a final 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701) in partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20685, 20693, 20699). The partnership claim carried a 2021-10-31 date and the operational launch a 2022-02-01 date (claims 14184, 14192). Both were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. The last mention is again 2022-03-29. No later statement reports progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW, gives a revised timetable, or confirms that the 300 MW figure still stands.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears once, on 2022-03-03. It was framed as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781) alongside allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources for the agreed miners, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that mining profitability was overstated (claims 19782, 19784, 19785). All of these remain at stated with no further transitions. The record does not say whether the hosting arrangement was ever performed, renegotiated, or terminated, and it does not address the allegations.

The technology assets acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay have also dropped out of view. Management referred to future use of the RADAR technology assets and to its Minder and MinderOS software platforms (claims 20704, 20706), last mentioned on 2022-03-29. No later disclosure on record describes what became of either. The Radar consideration is captured as 65.0 USD (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698), which looks like a unit-scaling error in extraction rather than a disclosed figure. One caution applies: the delayed flags on the Blockcap and Radar acquisitions (claims 14180, 14181, 20707) seem to reflect promise dates that had already passed when the deals were reported as complete, not a disclosed slippage.

The power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 was described on 2022-01-03 as expiring on 2021-12-31 (claim 19786) and was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-27. Nothing on record states what pricing replaced the cap or how the change affected the breakeven costs management had been citing.

The largest forward commitment on record is the Muskogee, Oklahoma data center, described in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW site developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14195, 14194, 20694, 20695, 20702). Claim 14185 carried a promised-by date of February 28, 2022, which had already passed when the claim was disclosed, and the ledger moved it to delayed on September 15, 2026. The last mention in the record is March 29, 2022. Nothing on file gives an energization date, a phased build schedule, or an updated capacity figure. The 500 MW number has not been reaffirmed or revised, and the company has not explained why the site disappeared from its disclosures.

The Denton, Texas facility follows a similar pattern. On March 29, 2022, management described an initial operating capacity of 22 MW (claims 14177, 20691) and a target ultimate capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14184, 14191, 20685, 20693, 20699). The operational launch (claim 14192, promised by February 1, 2022) and the development agreement (claim 14184, promised by October 31, 2021) were both auto-transitioned to delayed on September 15, 2026. After March 2022 the record has no figure between 22 MW and 300 MW and no ramp timetable. The company has not said whether the 300 MW target still stands.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement was described on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW agreement (claim 19781). The same day's record includes allegations that Gryphon lacked the money to buy the miners it had agreed to purchase (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), and questions about a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783). These read as litigation allegations, not management statements, but they remain part of the record. Nothing after that date says whether the 230 MW of hosting was ever energized, renegotiated or terminated, and management has not addressed the allegations on file.

In the March 29, 2022 disclosures, the RADAR technology assets acquired through Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698) were given a stated future use (claim 20706). The record has no later description of what that use was, whether the assets were deployed, or whether they were written down. The acquisition value is recorded as 65.0 USD, which is probably an extraction unit artifact and should not be read as a literal figure.

Claim 19786 notes that a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021. It was moved to delayed on September 27, 2026. No disclosure on record describes the terms that replaced the cap or their effect on mining costs. That gap matters next to the separate allegation that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (claim 19785).

Some delayed statuses in this ledger, such as the completed Blockcap acquisition (claims 14180, 20707) and the 2021 land lease (claim 19017), appear to be automated artifacts of past dates on already-finished events, not evidence of slippage. The ledger supplied here is also truncated, so later disclosures may exist that are not reflected above.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the most prominent item that drops out of the record. Across at least nine claims dated 2022-03-29 (14179, 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195, 20684, 20686, 20694, 20695, 20702), management described a 500 MW facility developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority. That filing is the last mention in the record. Claim 14185 carried a 2022-02-28 date and was moved to delayed on 2026-09-15 by automated reconciliation, not by any company statement. No later disclosure on file gives an energization schedule, confirms that the 500 MW figure still holds, or explains how the Port Authority arrangement has progressed.

The Denton, Texas build-out has a similar gap between its first stage and its stated endpoint. The same 2022-03-29 disclosures describe an initial 22 MW in operation (14177, 14182, 20691) and an ultimate capacity of 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20692, 20701), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14175, 14184, 14191, 20685, 20693, 20699). Claims 14182, 14184 and 14192 were set to delayed on 2026-09-15, again by ledger automation. After March 2022 the record contains no update on the ramp from 22 MW toward 300 MW, no revised timetable, and no statement on the status of the Tenaska arrangement.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears once and is never mentioned again. Claims dated 2022-03-03 describe a 230 MW hosting agreement (19781) alongside allegations: that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for the agreed miners (19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784), that there was a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (19783), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (19785). All of these remain at stated. Nothing on file says whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, reduced or terminated, or how the underlying dispute was resolved.

The power pricing cap has no recorded successor. Claim 19786, dated 2022-01-03, notes a pricing cap of $0.042 expiring on 2021-12-31, and it was set to delayed on 2026-09-27. The record has no follow-up on what pricing replaced the cap or how that change affected the mining cost assumptions management was discussing at the time.

Some caveats apply. Several delayed flags, including 14180, 14181 and 19017, attach target dates that fall before the disclosure that reported them, so they may reflect extraction artifacts rather than actual slippage. The Blockcap closing also appears with two different target dates, 2021-07-01 in 14180 and 2022-01-20 in 20707, and the record does not reconcile them. The claims supplied here end partway through the 2022-03-29 set. Any absence noted above therefore means absence from this record, and later filings not captured here may address it.

Every claim in this ledger is dated between January 2021 and March 29, 2022, and the list as supplied ends mid-entry at claim 14187. The items below therefore describe what was said up to that 10-K-era filing and what the record does not show after it. Several delayed flags are automated artifacts rather than slipped promises. The 31-acre lease (19017), the power-price cap expiry (19786) and the Blockcap closing (20707, 14180) describe events that happened on or before their dates, and they are not treated here as walk-backs.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described at least nine times in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (14179, 14188, 14195, 20684, 20694, 14185, 20686, 20695, 20702). Claim 14185 carried a February 28, 2022 reference date and has since been auto-transitioned to delayed. After March 2022 the record contains no energization date, no phased capacity figure, no revised megawatt target and no statement that the project was paused, resized or abandoned. For a site presented as roughly equal in scale to the company's entire operating base of 497 MW at the time (14173, 20703), the absence of any follow-up is the most material gap in the file.

Denton, Texas was presented as operational at 22 MW (14182, 20691) with a stated ultimate target of 300 MW (14193, 20683, 20692, 20701, and apparently 14187). It was developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14184, 14175, 20685, 20693, 20699). Three timeline claims tied to Denton have auto-transitioned to delayed: 14184 against October 31, 2021, 14192 against February 1, 2022, and 14182 against February 28, 2022. The last mention of the 300 MW figure is March 29, 2022. Nothing on record describes the ramp from 22 MW toward that figure, an interim milestone, or any revision of the target. The gap between the initial and promised capacity has simply not been addressed again.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (19781). It sits alongside a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (19783). The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to pay for the contracted miners (19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (19784), and that mining profitability and breakeven costs were overstated (19785). These read as third-party allegations rather than management statements. However, the record holds no subsequent company disclosure confirming the hosting arrangement was performed, amended or terminated, and none responding to the allegations. The 230 MW commitment has no later mention.

The Radar Relay acquisition by Blockcap is recorded repeatedly with a value extracted as 65.0 USD (14172, 14181, 14190, 20688, 20698). That figure is almost certainly a units truncation of a larger amount. It was accompanied by a statement about the future utilization of RADAR technology assets (20706), and the Minder and MinderOS software platforms were also highlighted (20704). March 29, 2022 is the last mention of either. The record contains no description of what the RADAR assets were used for, no impairment or write-down disclosure, and no update on whether the proprietary software remained part of the offering.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the largest single commitment on the record and the one with the least follow-through. The March 29, 2022 disclosures repeat a 500 MW planned capacity across more than half a dozen entries (claims 14179, 14188, 14195, 20684, 20694) and describe an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 20695, 20702, 14194, 20686). Claim 14185 carried a February 28, 2022 date and was automatically moved to delayed on September 15, 2026, because no later statement in the record confirms it. March 29, 2022 is the last mention. Nothing on file says how much of the 500 MW was ever energized, whether the figure still stands, or whether the Port Authority arrangement remains in force.

Denton, Texas follows a similar pattern with a wider gap between the starting point and the target. The same March 2022 filings describe 22 MW operational (claims 14177, 14182, 20691) against an ultimate target of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701). The development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claim 14184) carried an October 31, 2021 date and is now marked delayed, as are the operational-launch entries 14182 and 14192. No intermediate milestone, schedule, or revised ceiling for the remaining 278 MW appears after March 29, 2022, and the record does not say whether 300 MW is still the plan.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting relationship was described on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW agreement (claim 19781). The same date carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the resources to fund the miners it contracted for (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), and a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase tied to Gryphon (claim 19783). Each of these remains in stated status with no later entry. Management has not said whether the 230 MW is being hosted, was reduced, or was terminated, or how the questions about the counterparty's capacity were resolved.

The power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 was disclosed as expiring December 31, 2021 (claim 19786). It was mentioned on January 3, 2022 and moved to delayed on September 27, 2026. The record contains no statement about what pricing replaced the cap or whether it was extended. For a company whose economics depend on power cost, that silence stands out, particularly alongside separate allegations of overstated breakeven costs (claim 19785).

The RADAR technology acquired through Blockcap was described on March 29, 2022 as an asset with future utilization (claim 20706), alongside the Radar Relay acquisition itself (claims 14172, 20688, 20698). No later disclosure on the record says what the technology was used for, whether it was integrated with the Minder and MinderOS platforms (claim 20704), or whether it was written down. The delayed labels on the Blockcap and Radar Relay closings (claims 14180, 14181, 20707) reflect promised dates earlier than the filings that described those deals as completed. They are better read as absence of later confirmation than as evidence of a missed close. The claims ledger supplied here ends partway through the March 29, 2022 filings, so these observations cover only that portion of the record.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the largest silence on the record. In the March 29, 2022 disclosures, management described a partnership with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a facility planned at 500 MW (claims 14179, 14188, 14195, 20684, 20694, 20702, 20686, 20695). Claim 14185 attached a February 28, 2022 date to that agreement, and the ledger moved it automatically to delayed on 2026-09-15. No revision statement accompanied that change. March 29, 2022 is the last mention on record. Nothing since then reports energized megawatts at Muskogee, a revised target, a new timetable, or whether the 500 MW figure still holds.

Denton, Texas was presented as a 300 MW build that began with 22 MW online (claims 14178, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701 for the target; 20691 and 14182 for the initial capacity). The Tenaska Energy and City of Denton arrangement (claims 14184, 14175, 20685, 20693) was described in the same filing. Claims 14182, 14192 and 14184 were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. At least part of that likely reflects a promised-by date that had already passed when the claim was made, not a missed milestone. What matters more is the gap after March 29, 2022. There is no disclosed progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW, and no statement that the target was reduced or deferred.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appeared on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). The same record carries adverse characterizations: that Gryphon lacked the resources to buy the agreed miners (19782), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (19783), and an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (19784), alongside alleged overstatement of mining profitability and breakeven costs (19785). All remain in stated status, with no later entry. Management has not said on the record whether the 230 MW commitment was performed, renegotiated or terminated, or how those allegations were resolved.

The RADAR technology assets came into Core Scientific through Blockcap's roughly $65 million acquisition of Radar Relay (claims 14172, 14190, 20688, 20698). Management described a future use for them (claim 20706, March 29, 2022). That is the last reference. No later disclosure describes a product built on those assets, an impairment, or a decision to abandon them. The delayed flags on the acquisition itself (14180, 14181) appear to be extraction artifacts on a completed transaction, not evidence of a slip.

Finally, claim 19786 (January 3, 2022) noted that a power agreement's pricing cap of about $0.042 expired on December 31, 2021. The ledger auto-marked it delayed on 2026-09-27. The records do not say what pricing replaced the cap or how the change affected the breakeven economics management had been presenting. The 2021 financial figures show actuals of $544.5 million (claim 19791) against earlier guidance of $515 million (claim 19790), so those are not a walk-back. The absence of any follow-up on power costs is the more notable omission. Note that the claims visible here end at March 29, 2022. Each silence above is measured against that horizon.

The Denton, Texas build-out is the most prominent thread that stops mid-sentence. In the March 29, 2022 annual disclosures, management described Denton as a partnership with Tenaska Energy (claims 14175, 14191, 20693, 20699) and gave an initial capacity of 22 MW (14177, 20691). The same disclosures repeated an ultimate target of 300 MW many times (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 20683, 20692, 20701). Two timeline claims tied to Denton's launch, with promise dates of February 1 and February 28, 2022 (14192, 14182), were moved automatically to delayed on September 15, 2026. That change came from the passage of time, not from any company statement. In the record supplied, the company never again reports progress from 22 MW toward 300 MW. There is no revised schedule, no reduced target, and no statement that the expansion was paused or abandoned.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center follows the same pattern. On March 29, 2022, management described an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a 500 MW facility (14185, 14194, 14195, 20684, 20686, 20694, 20695, 20702). That was the last mention on record. The agreement claim carried a February 28, 2022 reference date (14185) and was auto-transitioned to delayed on September 15, 2026. No later disclosure in this record reports construction, energization, a smaller scope, or termination. A 500 MW commitment was larger than the company's entire stated operating base of 497 MW at the time (14173, 20703), yet it drops out of view without explanation.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears only as a cluster of claims dated March 3, 2022. These cover a 230 MW hosting agreement (19781), a $220.7 million BitFuFu miner purchase (19783), an allegedly non-existent $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement (19784), doubts about Gryphon's ability to pay for contracted miners (19782), and allegations of overstated mining profitability (19785). All remain at stated. The language reads as allegation rather than company announcement. No later disclosure on record says whether the 230 MW arrangement was performed, renegotiated, or unwound, or how the disputed claims were resolved.

Two smaller items fall off quietly as well. Blockcap's $65 million acquisition of Radar Relay was stated repeatedly (14172, 14190, 20688, 20698). A related claim with a July 1, 2021 reference date (14181) was auto-transitioned to delayed on September 15, 2026. Separately, the company spoke of the future utilization of RADAR technology assets (20706). Nothing further on record says what those assets became or whether their value was written down. Finally, a power agreement pricing cap of $0.042 was disclosed as expiring December 31, 2021 (19786) and was auto-transitioned to delayed on September 27, 2026. No subsequent claim describes the replacement pricing, even though power cost is central to mining economics.

In each case, the 'delayed' status reflects the ledger's inability to verify a dated item against later disclosures, not an admission by management. Some flagged items, such as the January 31, 2022 capacity figure (14186), are point-in-time facts rather than forward promises. The claims list as supplied also ends partway through, so later records beyond claim 14184 were not reviewed. What is absent from the material reviewed is any follow-up at all.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was presented in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW facility under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14195, 14188, 14179). The agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date, and the ledger moved it to delayed on September 15, 2026 after that date passed with nothing further recorded. The project was last mentioned on May 4, 2022, again as a 500 MW development agreement (claim 13933). Nothing on record after that describes construction, energization, a revised capacity or a revised schedule. The company has not said whether the site advanced, was scaled back or was set aside.

The Denton, Texas facility has a similar pattern. It was described as reaching a final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14187, 14183, 14178, 14193), starting from an initial 22 MW that came online around February 2022 (claims 14177, 14182, 14192). The Tenaska Energy partnership was part of the plan (claims 14175, 14184, 14191), and the development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska carried an October 31, 2021 reference date that the ledger now records as delayed. The 300 MW target was repeated on May 4, 2022 (claims 13932, 13931), which is the last mention on record. No subsequent disclosure gives a ramp schedule, an interim capacity figure or a revision to the 300 MW goal. The disclosures on record do not reconcile the gap between the 22 MW online and the 300 MW described.

Reported operating capacity went down between two consecutive disclosures. The March 29, 2022 filing gave total operational power capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186). On April 20, 2022, operational power capacity was stated as 457 MW (claim 13988). The record contains no statement explaining the lower figure, such as a change in how capacity is measured, a site coming offline or a reallocation of hosting capacity. Later disclosures on record do not return to the 497 MW figure.

The B. Riley financing arrangements disclosed on April 7, 2022 were never followed up in the record. They were bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded at 75 and apparently in millions of dollars, with a December 7, 2022 reference date (claim 14081). They also included a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, recorded at 150, with a June 6, 2022 reference date (claim 14082). Both passed their dates and were moved to delayed on September 15, 2026. No later claim records repayment, refinancing, extension of the notes, or whether the equity facility was put in place or drawn. The company has not said how these obligations were resolved.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship was recorded on March 3, 2022 as a 230 MW hosting agreement (claim 19781). The same date also carries allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners, that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist, and that mining profitability was overstated (claims 19782, 19784, 19785). These allegations are recorded here, not adopted as findings. That date is the last mention of the arrangement. Nothing on record shows whether the hosting capacity was deployed, renegotiated or ended, or how the company responded to the questions about its counterparty.

Muskogee, Oklahoma is the clearest case of a project that was described in detail and then stopped appearing. The March 29, 2022 disclosures describe a 500 MW data center under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14195, 14188, 14179, 14194), with the agreement tied to a February 28, 2022 date (claim 14185). The last mention on record is May 4, 2022, when the 500 MW figure was repeated (claim 13933). The dated milestone has since been automatically marked delayed. Nothing on record describes groundbreaking, energization, a revised schedule, or whether the site is still being pursued.

The Denton, Texas facility shows the same pattern at larger scale. Management consistently described Denton as reaching 300 MW when completed (claims 14187, 14183, 14178, 14193), repeated on May 4, 2022 (claim 13932), while only 22 MW of initial capacity was reported operational (claims 14177, 14182, 13931). The launch and partnership dates connected to the site, including the development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14184, 14192), are now automatically marked delayed. Denton does not appear in the record after May 2022. The company has given no timeline for moving from 22 MW to 300 MW and has not said how far that build-out progressed.

Reported operational power capacity fell with no explanation on record. Claims 14173 and 14186 give total operating capacity of 497 MW as of January 31, 2022. The April 20, 2022 disclosure gives 457 MW (claim 13988). Neither disclosure addresses the 40 MW difference. Nothing on record says whether it reflects a change in how capacity is measured, a facility taken offline, or an earlier overstatement.

The Gryphon Digital Mining relationship appears once and then disappears. On March 3, 2022, the record describes a 230 MW hosting agreement with Gryphon (claim 19781). The same day's record also contains allegations that Gryphon lacked the money for the miners it had agreed to buy (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), and questions about a BitFuFu miner purchase (claim 19783). None of these threads is mentioned again. The company has not said whether the 230 MW hosting commitment was ever carried out, reduced, or ended, and it has not responded to the allegations on record.

The B. Riley financing from April 7, 2022 has no follow-up. Claim 14081 records bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital due by December 7, 2022. Claim 14082 records a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, to be in place by June 6, 2022. Both are now automatically marked delayed. The record does not confirm that the equity facility was signed, that the notes were repaid or extended, or whether any terms were changed. The ledger's delayed status reflects the absence of confirmation in the record, not a disclosed default. Still, neither deadline was addressed in any later disclosure on record.

Muskogee is the clearest case of a project that was described in detail and then stopped being discussed. Across the March and May 2022 disclosures (claims 14179, 14188, 14195, 14185, 14194, 13933), management repeatedly described a 500 MW data center under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority. The agreement carried a February 28, 2022 marker (14185), and the ledger has since moved it to delayed. The last mention on record is May 4, 2022 (13933). No claim in the record reports energization, a first-phase megawatt figure, a revised schedule, or whether the 500 MW figure still holds. The record contains no explanation for why the project dropped out of disclosures.

The Denton, Texas build-out follows a similar pattern. The initial 22 MW phase did come online around February 2022 (14177, 14182, 13931). The ledger's delayed flags on those opening-date claims reflect when the data was extracted rather than a missed launch. However, the company repeatedly described the site's final capacity as 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193), most recently on May 4, 2022 (13932), and never attached a date to that figure. The Tenaska and City of Denton development agreement, marked for October 31, 2021 (14184), is now shown as delayed. After May 2022, nothing on record describes the ramp from 22 MW toward 300 MW, an interim milestone, or a change in the target.

The company's headline operating capacity fell without a stated reason. As of January 31, 2022, it reported 497 MW of operational power capacity (14173, 14186). On April 20, 2022, the figure was 457 MW (13988). Neither the reduction of roughly 40 MW nor the reasons behind it, such as curtailment, a hosting customer's departure, a site change, or a definitional adjustment, are addressed in any claim on record. The earlier figure was never formally revised; a lower one simply replaced it.

The B. Riley financing announced on April 7, 2022 also has an open ending in the record. The company described bridge promissory notes of $75 million from B. Riley Commercial Capital maturing by December 7, 2022 (14081). It also described a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate to be in place by June 6, 2022 (14082). Both are now marked delayed. The record contains no later statement on whether the equity facility was executed, how much was drawn, or whether the notes were repaid, extended, or refinanced by their maturity.

One caveat applies to all of the above. The claim record provided here ends in mid-May 2022 and appears to be cut off, so later disclosures may have addressed some of these items. Within the record as supplied, however, none of these threads is picked up again.

Muskogee, Oklahoma is the clearest example. Management described a 500 MW data center developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority across several filings (claims 14188, 14179, 14195, 14194). The agreement carried a February 28, 2022 date (claim 14185). The last reference on record is the May 4, 2022 restatement of the 500 MW development agreement (claim 13933). Claim 14185 was moved to delayed on September 15, 2026 by date passage, not by any company update. Nothing in the record gives an energization date, a revised capacity, a phasing plan, or any statement that the project was paused or dropped.

The Denton, Texas build-out follows the same pattern. The company repeatedly said the site would reach 300 MW when completed (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932), with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton as partners (claims 14175, 14184, 14191). It reported 22 MW of initial operation around February 2022 (claims 14177, 14182, 14192, 13931). The 300 MW figure was last repeated on May 4, 2022. The launch and partnership claims carrying 2021 and early-2022 dates are now marked delayed automatically. The record contains no schedule for the remaining roughly 278 MW and no explanation of how far the build progressed after the first 22 MW.

Operational power capacity went down without comment. The March 29, 2022 disclosures put total operational capacity at 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186). By April 20, 2022 the figure given was 457 MW (claim 13988). That is 40 MW lower less than a month later. None of the claims on record explains the reduction, and no statement treats it as a correction, a curtailment, or a lost site.

The B. Riley financing was set up with specific deadlines that were never followed up. The April 7, 2022 disclosure tied bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded at 75, to a December 7, 2022 date (claim 14081). It also required a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, recorded at 150, to be in place by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082). Both have since been auto-flagged as delayed. The record does not say whether the equity facility was executed, whether the notes were repaid, extended, or converted, or how either commitment ended.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting relationship appears once and then disappears. A 230 MW hosting agreement was recorded on March 3, 2022 (claim 19781). It came alongside assertions that Gryphon lacked the resources for the agreed miners, disputes over a BitFuFu miner purchase and a NuMiner agreement, and allegations of overstated profitability (claims 19782 through 19785). None of these claims has a later mention in the record. Nothing says whether the hosting capacity was ever delivered, reassigned, or terminated, or how the underlying dispute was resolved.

These observations rest on the claims ledger as supplied, which ends partway through the May 2022 entries. A later disclosure may address any of these items, but none appears in what we have reviewed.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described repeatedly in early 2022 as a 500 MW development under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14195, 14188, 14179, 14194, 14185, 13933). The most recent mention in the reviewed record is claim 13925 on 2022-05-12, which still gives a 500 MW target capacity. Claim 14185 carried a 2022-02-28 date. The ledger moved it to delayed automatically on 2026-09-15; no company revision prompted the change. No later disclosure in the record says whether any of the 500 MW was energized, gives a new timeline or restates the capacity. Management has not said whether the project is proceeding at its original scale.

Denton, Texas was presented as a 300 MW facility built with Tenaska Energy and the City of Denton (claims 14193, 14187, 14183, 14178, 14175, 14184). It began operating at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 13931). The last reference to the 300 MW end state is claim 13932 on 2022-05-04. That claim restates the target but gives no ramp schedule. Claims 14182, 13931 and 14184 were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15 because their dated milestones passed without a follow-up entry. The record contains no statement on how far Denton moved beyond its initial 22 MW, or when the remaining capacity was expected.

Total operating capacity was reported as 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14186, 14173, disclosed 2022-03-29). On 2022-04-20, claim 13988 gave operational power capacity as 457 MW. That is 40 MW lower, and no explanatory statement appears alongside it. Claim 14186 has since been auto-marked delayed. The record does not say whether the gap reflects a change in definition, decommissioned capacity or a correction of the earlier figure, and management has not reconciled the two numbers.

In April 2022 the company disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded at 75.0 with a 2022-12-07 date (claim 14081). It also disclosed a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, recorded at 150.0 and due to be in place by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082). Both were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15 after their dates passed with no confirming entry. The reviewed record contains no later disclosure that the notes were repaid, extended or restructured, or that the equity facility was executed and drawn.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described in March 2022 as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14194, 14195, 14188, 14179). It was restated at the same 500 MW figure on 2022-05-04 (claim 13933), and that is the last mention on record. Claim 14185 carried a 2022-02-28 date and has since been moved automatically to delayed. Nothing in the record gives a construction schedule, an energization date, a first-phase capacity, or any sign that the project was paused or dropped. The site stopped appearing without a stated reason.

The Denton, Texas facility came online at 22 MW, with repeated statements that it would reach 300 MW when complete (claims 14177, 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932). The latest restatement of the 300 MW target is dated 2022-05-12 (claim 13923). The operational-launch claims (14182, 14192, 13931) have been auto-transitioned to delayed. That may partly reflect how the dates were extracted rather than a missed opening, since the disclosures say the site did begin operating. What has not been said is how far Denton progressed between 22 MW and 300 MW, or when the full build-out was expected. No interim milestone or revised completion date appears.

Total operational power capacity was given as 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186). On 2022-04-20 it was reported as 457 MW (claim 13988). The record contains no statement explaining the 40 MW difference. It could be a site outage, a customer departure, a change in how capacity is counted, or a correction of the earlier figure. The lower number simply replaced the higher one.

The Gryphon Digital Mining hosting arrangement, recorded at 230 MW, appears only in disclosures dated 2022-03-03 (claim 19781). The same filing also contains allegations that Gryphon lacked the financial resources for the agreed miners (claim 19782), that a $1.7 billion NuMiner agreement did not exist (claim 19784), and that mining profitability was overstated (claim 19785). No later claim says whether the 230 MW hosting agreement was performed, renegotiated, or terminated, or how the allegations were resolved. The relationship goes silent after that single date.

In April 2022 the company recorded bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital (claim 14081, dated to 2022-12-07). It also recorded a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, due by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082). Both are now marked delayed by automated transition rather than by any company update. The record does not show whether the equity facility was put in place by its deadline, drawn on, or replaced, or whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended, or restructured.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was once presented as the company's largest planned build. The March 29, 2022 disclosures describe a 500 MW facility under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195). The same figure was repeated on May 4 and May 12, 2022 (claims 13933, 13924, 13925), and May 12 is the last time it appears in the record. The agreement milestone tied to February 28, 2022 in claim 14185 moved automatically to delayed on September 15, 2026. No later disclosure on record says how much of the 500 MW was built, whether the Port Authority agreement is still in force, or whether the project was deferred or dropped.

The Denton, Texas facility has the opposite problem: a starting number and a target, but nothing in between. The company reported 22 MW operational around February 2022 (claims 14177, 14182, 13931) and repeatedly said it expected 300 MW at completion (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 13923, 13932). The last mention is May 12, 2022. The 300 MW target never had a date, and the launch-timing claims (14182, 14192, 13931) are now marked delayed. That status reflects missing verification, not an admitted slip. Still, the record contains no update on energized capacity past 22 MW, no revised completion date, and no statement on whether the Tenaska Energy and City of Denton arrangement (claims 14175, 14184, 13922) still supports the full build.

The company-wide operating capacity figure moved without explanation. The March 29, 2022 filing gives 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186). An April 20, 2022 disclosure gives 457 MW (claim 13988), 40 MW lower. The May 12, 2022 filing returns to 497 MW (claim 13921). The record contains nothing reconciling the two figures, whether through different measurement dates, curtailment, or a correction.

The B. Riley financing arrangements from April 7, 2022 have no follow-up in the record. One was a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, due to be in place by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082). The other was $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital maturing December 7, 2022 (claim 14081). Both moved to delayed on September 15, 2026. Nothing on record confirms that the equity facility was executed on time, or that the bridge notes were repaid, extended, or refinanced at maturity.

The decentralized-finance plan attached to the Blockcap and RADAR acquisitions also stops appearing. The company described Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay for $65 million (claims 14172, 14181, 14190). On May 12, 2022 it listed developing DeFi products and improving mining technology as a use of merger proceeds (claims 13927, 13928). That is the last mention. The record contains no product launch, no reallocation of the proceeds, and no statement that the DeFi effort was ended.

The ledger as provided largely ends in mid-2022, so these observations cover only what appears there. Within that record, none of the five items is followed by a revision, a withdrawal, or an explanation.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the most prominent project that stops appearing in the record. Between March and May 2022, management repeatedly described a 500 MW facility developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14194, 14195, 14188, 14179, 13924, 13925, 13933). The last mention on file is the May 12, 2022 disclosure (13924, 13925). Claim 14185 carried a promised-by date of February 28, 2022 and was moved automatically to delayed on September 15, 2026 because the date passed with no follow-up. The available record contains no energization date, no interim megawatt figure, no revised schedule, and no statement that the project was paused, resized or abandoned.

The Denton, Texas buildout follows a similar pattern. The company said the site became operational at 22 MW in early 2022 (14182, 13931, 14192) and described it six times as reaching 300 MW when completed (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923). The partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy was also framed with a dated milestone of October 31, 2021 (14184). The final reference to the 300 MW target is May 12, 2022. The record contains no intermediate capacity figure between 22 MW and 300 MW and no completion date. The dated Denton claims all moved to delayed through automated extraction on September 15, 2026. Management has not said how much of the stated 300 MW was actually built, or on what schedule.

The reported operational power capacity moves without explanation. Claims 14173 and 14186, dated March 29, 2022, give 497 MW as of January 31, 2022. Claim 13988 on April 20, 2022 gives 457 MW. Claim 13921 on May 12, 2022 returns to 497 MW as current capacity. The 40 MW gap may reflect different measurement dates or definitions, but no reconciling statement appears in the record, and 14186 has since been auto-marked delayed.

The B. Riley financing arrangements disclosed on April 7, 2022 also go quiet. These were a required committed equity facility of 150 (14082, due June 6, 2022) and bridge promissory notes of 75 (14081, due December 7, 2022). The record contains no subsequent disclosure of whether the equity facility was put in place, whether any amount was drawn, or how the bridge notes were repaid or restructured. Both claims were moved to delayed automatically on September 15, 2026.

One caveat applies to all four items. The claims list supplied here is cut off after mid-June 2022, so these observations cover only the portion of the record available. Every delayed status reflects a promised date passing with no newer claim recorded, not an announced revision by the company.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described repeatedly in spring 2022 as a 500 MW development undertaken with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14194, 14195, 14188, 14179, 13924, 13925, 13933). The last mention on record is 2022-05-12, when the 500 MW target was restated. Claim 14185, which carried a 2022-02-28 date tied to the Port Authority agreement, was moved to delayed by automated review on 2026-09-15 because no later disclosure confirmed it. The record contains no statement about construction progress, energized capacity, a revised size or a revised schedule for Muskogee, and no statement that the project was paused or dropped.

The Denton, Texas facility was presented as a 22 MW initial deployment with a planned build-out to 300 MW, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14177, 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923, 14184, 14191, 13922). The 300 MW figure was repeated as late as 2022-05-12. After that, the record has no intermediate capacity figure showing how far Denton moved beyond 22 MW. The dated items were all moved to delayed on 2026-09-15 because no confirming follow-up was found: the operational-launch claims 14182, 14192 and 13931 and the partnership claim 14184. The company has not said on record whether the 300 MW ambition still stands, what share has been energized, or whether the Tenaska arrangement changed.

The company-wide operating capacity figures do not agree with each other, and the record contains no reconciliation. A filing on 2022-04-20 gave operational power capacity as 457 MW (claim 13988). Filings on 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12 gave 497 MW (claims 14173, 14186, 13921). Claim 14186, which dated the 497 MW figure to 2022-01-31, now reads delayed. No disclosure on record explains the 40 MW difference, whether 457 MW was a revision or a narrower measure, or which figure applied after May 2022.

The B. Riley financing arrangements disclosed on 2022-04-07 were a committed equity facility recorded at 150.0 and due by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082), and bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital recorded at 75.0 and due by 2022-12-07 (claim 14081). Both passed their dates without a matching follow-up and were moved to delayed on 2026-09-15. The record does not show whether the facility was put in place, how much of it was drawn, or how and when the bridge notes were repaid or restructured.

The Blockcap and RADAR acquisitions were accompanied in May 2022 by language about developing DeFi products and improving blockchain mining technology (claims 13928, 13927, 14172, 14181, 14190). The DeFi product line was last mentioned on 2022-05-12 and does not appear in later claims on record. Claim 14181, on the Radar Relay acquisition, is marked delayed against its 2021-07-01 reference date. The company has not said what became of the DeFi effort or whether the RADAR technology is still in use.

The delayed labels above come from automated review. They mean a promised date passed without a confirming disclosure being matched. They are not company admissions of slippage. The claims supplied end in mid-2022, so an absence noted here is an absence from this record.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center was described across three spring 2022 filings as a 500 MW development with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195, 13933, 13924, 13925). The last mention on record is 2022-05-12. The one claim that carried a date, the Port Authority agreement tied to 2022-02-28 (14185), has since been automatically moved to delayed. No disclosure on record gives a construction schedule, energization date, first-phase capacity or a revised target. There is also no statement that the project was paused or dropped. The 500 MW figure appears only as a target and was never followed by a reported interim number.

Denton, Texas, developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, was reported as operational at 22 MW against an expected 300 MW at completion (14177, 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923). The operational-launch claims are dated inconsistently, to 2022-02-01 in 14192 and 13931 and to 2022-02-28 in 14182. The development agreement carries a 2021-10-31 date (14184). All four have been auto-transitioned to delayed. After 2022-05-12 there is no reported step between 22 MW and 300 MW, no timeline for the remaining roughly 278 MW, and no restatement of the 300 MW goal.

Total operational power capacity was reported as 497 MW on 2022-03-29, as of January 31, 2022 (14173, 14186). A filing on 2022-04-20 gave 457 MW (13988). The figure returned to 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (13921). The record does not explain the 40 MW gap, whether the two numbers measure different things, or which one reflects then-current operations. Claim 14186, which is tied to the January 31 date, now stands at delayed. No capacity figure appears on record after May 2022.

An April 7, 2022 filing described bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital with a 2022-12-07 date (14081). It also described a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate due by 2022-06-06 (14082). Both are now marked delayed. Nothing on record states whether the equity facility was put in place by its deadline, how much of it was used, or whether the notes were repaid, extended or refinanced by maturity.

The Blockcap deal brought in RADAR (Radar Relay), a roughly 65 USD-denominated acquisition (14172, 14181, 14190, 13927). In May 2022 it was presented as the basis for developing DeFi products and improving mining technology (13928). That May 12 filing is the last reference to RADAR or to any DeFi effort. No later disclosure describes products launched, spending, staffing, or a decision to wind the initiative down. This record also stops almost entirely after mid-2022, so some of these silences may reflect gaps in coverage as well as gaps in disclosure.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a large project that faded from view. In March 2022 management described a 500 MW facility under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14179, 14188, 14195, 14185), and repeated the 500 MW figure on May 4 and May 12, 2022 (claims 13933, 13925, 13924). The agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date, and the ledger has since moved it to delayed (claim 14185). May 12, 2022 is the last time Muskogee appears on record. No groundbreaking, energization date, first-phase capacity or revised schedule was ever disclosed, and there is no statement that the project was paused, resized or abandoned.

Denton, Texas has a similar gap between its opening capacity and its stated destination. The site was described as operational at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 13931), with a final expected capacity of 300 MW under the partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (claims 14183, 14178, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923, 14175, 14184). The 300 MW target was restated as recently as May 12, 2022, but no filing on record gives a date or interim milestones for closing the gap. The operational-launch and partnership claims tied to early-2022 dates now sit at delayed. Management has not said how much of the remaining 278 MW was built, or when.

The company's headline operating capacity moved without explanation. On March 29, 2022, total operational power capacity was given as 497 MW, as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186). On April 20, 2022 the figure recorded was 457 MW (claim 13988). On May 12, 2022 the 497 MW number reappeared as current capacity across all facilities (claim 13921). The record does not reconcile the 40 MW difference. It does not say whether the April figure reflected curtailment, a change in how capacity was counted, or a site coming offline, or whether the May figure was simply the January number carried forward.

The B. Riley financing arrangements were announced and then never mentioned again. On April 7, 2022 the company disclosed a committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate, recorded as 150.0 USD and presumably in millions, with a June 6, 2022 reference date (claim 14082). It also disclosed bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, recorded as 75.0 USD, with a December 7, 2022 reference date (claim 14081). Both are now classified as delayed. No subsequent claim reports whether the equity facility was put in place or drawn, or whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or converted.

The DeFi product line inherited through the Blockcap acquisition dropped out of the narrative. Blockcap's purchase of Radar Relay for a recorded 65.0 USD was cited repeatedly in March and May 2022 (claims 14172, 14190, 14181, 13927). On May 12, 2022 management listed development of DeFi products alongside mining technology as a use of merger proceeds (claims 13928, 13929). That is the last mention of DeFi products or RADAR on record. No product launch, spending figure or decision to wind down the effort has been disclosed since.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a project that was described in detail and then stopped being mentioned. Between March 29 and May 12, 2022, the company described it five separate times as a planned 500 MW facility under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14188, 14195, 14179, 13933, 13925, with the partnership itself in 14185, 14194 and 13924). The agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date, and the ledger automatically moved it to delayed on September 15, 2026 (14185). The last mention in the record is May 12, 2022. After that, nothing in the reviewed disclosures gives a construction start, an energization date, a first-phase megawatt figure, or any statement that the project was paused, resized or dropped.

The Denton, Texas build-out to 300 MW has a similar gap between what was projected and what was later reported. Management repeated the 300 MW end-state figure at least seven times (14193, 14178, 14183, 14187, 13932, 13923), usually next to an initial operating figure of 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931). The two dated items in the Denton timeline, the operational launch (14192, 13931) and the City of Denton and Tenaska agreement (14184), were both auto-transitioned to delayed. That status may reflect missing verification rather than an actual missed date. Still, the last disclosed Denton figure is 22 MW as of the May 2022 filings. No later statement gives an interim capacity or a revised schedule for the remaining roughly 278 MW, and none explains how the Tenaska partnership language (14175, 13922) developed after it was first described.

The company-wide operating capacity figure changed without explanation. Several filings put total operational power at 497 MW (14173, 14186, 13921). An April 20, 2022 disclosure gave 457 MW instead (13988), a drop of 40 MW. The May 12, 2022 filing then returned to 497 MW with no comment on the difference. The record contains no reconciliation of the three figures. It does not say whether they use different measurement dates, different definitions (energized versus contracted), or reflect an actual loss and recovery of capacity. The 497 MW figure tied to January 31, 2022 (14186) is now flagged delayed.

The RADAR acquisition and the related decentralized-finance plans were described at the time of the Blockcap deal and have not come up since. The $65 million RADAR purchase was recorded several times (14181, 14190, 14172, 13927). On May 12, 2022, management described plans for DeFi products and enhanced mining technology built on that acquisition (13928). Nothing after that date mentions a product launch, the status of a RADAR team or technology, or a write-down or wind-down of the acquired business. The dated acquisition claims (14180, 14181) have been auto-transitioned to delayed. Nothing in the disclosures explains what happened to the stated DeFi strategy.

The B. Riley financing set out in April 2022 is only partly accounted for in later disclosures. The company described $75 million in bridge promissory notes due by December 7, 2022 (14082) and a $150 million committed equity facility required by June 6, 2022 (14082). Both were auto-transitioned to delayed. A July 20, 2022 filing records 573,381 commitment shares issued to B. Riley (13853), which suggests the equity facility was put in place. However, the reviewed record does not show how much was drawn under that facility, and it has no statement on repayment or refinancing of the bridge notes as their maturity approached. This review covers only the portion of the claims ledger provided, which stops in July 2022. Later filings may answer some of these questions.

Start with the number the company kept restating and then quietly did not. Operating capacity of 497 MW appears three times — as the January 31, 2022 figure (claim 14186), as total operational power capacity on the same 2022-03-29 disclosure (claim 14173), and again as "current operational power capacity across all facilities" on 2022-05-12 (claim 13921). In between, on 2022-04-20, the disclosed operational figure was 457 MW (claim 13988). Forty megawatts came off the number and then went back on within six weeks, and nothing in the record explains either move: no derating statement, no change in the counting basis, no note reconciling the April figure to the March and May figures. Claim 14186 has since been auto-transitioned to delayed (2026-09-15) against its own January 31, 2022 date, which is a system action, not a company one.

Denton, Texas is the clearest case of a project that was talked about constantly and then stopped being talked about. It carries an initial 22 MW operating figure (claim 14177), a final expected capacity of 300 MW restated at least five separate times (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923), and three distinct operational dates — by 2022-02-01 (claim 14192), by 2022-02-28 (claim 14182), and again 2022-02-01 in the May restatement (claim 13931). All three timeline claims sit at delayed. The last mention of Denton in the record is 2022-05-12. What has never been said is anything about the path from 22 MW to 300 MW: no interim milestone, no revised completion window, no statement that the 300 MW target still stands or no longer does. The 300 MW figure was simply repeated until it stopped being repeated.

Muskogee, Oklahoma follows the same shape at larger scale. A 500 MW planned capacity is stated four times on 2022-03-29 alone (claims 14179, 14188, 14195, 14185), restated 2022-05-04 (claim 13933) and 2022-05-12 (claim 13925), and then disappears. The underlying agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority carried a 2022-02-28 date (claim 14185) and is now marked delayed. No construction start, no energization date, and no capacity revision has been disclosed for a facility that would have been larger than the company's entire stated operating fleet.

The partnership language shifted in a way worth naming. On 2022-03-29 the Denton relationship is described as a development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy with a 2021-10-31 date attached (claim 14184), and Muskogee as a dated data center agreement for 500 MW (claim 14185). By 2022-05-12 both are described in open-ended terms — "partnership with City of Denton and Tenaska Energy" (claim 13922) and "partnership with Muskogee City-County Port Authority" (claim 13924) — with no date, no capacity commitment on the Denton side, and no reference to the underlying agreements. Both dated versions are now delayed. Nothing has been said about whether the agreements were amended, extended, or allowed to lapse.

Two financing commitments to B. Riley went quiet immediately after being disclosed. The $75 million bridge promissory notes (claim 14081, due 2022-12-07) and the required committed equity facility of $150 million with a B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082, due 2022-06-06) were both disclosed on 2022-04-07 and appear nowhere afterward. The June 6, 2022 deadline on the required facility passed without any disclosure in the record confirming it was established, resized, or waived; both claims sit at delayed on automated transitions dated 2026-09-15.

Smaller but consistent: the Radar Relay acquisition was disclosed three times on 2022-03-29 with a $65 million figure and a 2021-07-01 date (claims 14172, 14181, 14190), and by 2022-05-12 is referred to only as the "acquisition of RADAR technology company" (claim 13927) with the amount dropped. The associated DeFi product development (claim 13928) is stated once, on 2022-05-12, and never mentioned again. The commitment to daily Bitcoin production reporting (claim 13998, 2022-04-19) likewise has no successor claim in the record. Across all of these, every status change in the ledger is an automated extraction; not one item was moved by a company statement explaining the change.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma project is the clearest case of a milestone that simply stopped being discussed. It appears repeatedly in the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a 500 MW planned facility (claims 14179, 14188, 14195) resting on a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14194, 14185), and it is restated on May 12, 2022 (claims 13925, 13924) and in the May 4 filing (claim 13933). May 12, 2022 is the last date on which it is mentioned in the record. The Port Authority agreement carried a promised-by date of February 28, 2022 and sits today at 'delayed' — a status reached on 2026-09-15 by automated transition, not by any company statement. No revised construction timeline, no change in the 500 MW figure, and no announcement of abandonment or renegotiation has been made; the project is neither confirmed nor withdrawn, it has only gone quiet.

The same pattern governs Denton. The buildout was described in March and May 2022 as reaching 300 MW at completion (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923) from an initial 22 MW (claim 14177), with operational launch promised by February 1, 2022 (claim 14192) and operational status by February 28, 2022 (claims 14182, 13931). All three timeline claims are now 'delayed', again by automated transition on 2026-09-15. The partnership underpinning it with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy also shifted in register: claim 14184 describes a dated 'facility development agreement' promised by October 31, 2021 and now delayed, while the later references (claims 14175, 14191, 13922) speak only of an ongoing 'partnership' with no date attached. The 300 MW target has never been formally revised, and nothing has been said about what stands between 22 MW and 300 MW.

An unexplained downward revision sits inside the capacity numbers themselves. Total operational power capacity is stated as 497 MW on March 29, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186, the latter tied to a January 31, 2022 measurement date). Three weeks later, on April 20, 2022, the figure reported is 457 MW (claim 13988), forty megawatts lower, with no accompanying statement reconciling the two. On May 12, 2022 the 497 MW figure reappears as 'current operational power capacity' (claim 13921). The record therefore contains a decline and an apparent restoration within six weeks and no explanation of either. Claim 14186 has since been auto-marked 'delayed' against its own January 31, 2022 date.

The RADAR / Radar Relay acquisition and the strategy it was meant to serve have also dropped out. The $65 million transaction via Blockcap is described four times (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 13927), and the accompanying rationale — development of DeFi products and enhancement of mining technology — appears once, on May 12, 2022 (claim 13928). Claim 14181 carries a promised-by date of July 1, 2021 and is now 'delayed'. After May 12, 2022 neither RADAR nor the DeFi product roadmap is mentioned again in the record. There has been no statement as to whether the DeFi effort was completed, deprioritized, written down, or folded into something else, and no update on what the $65 million bought.

Two smaller commitments remain unresolved in the same silent way. On the financing side, the $150 million committed equity facility with the B. Riley affiliate (claim 14082, promised by June 6, 2022) and the $75 million bridge promissory notes (claim 14081, promised by December 7, 2022) are both 'delayed'; the only subsequent B. Riley item on record is the issuance of 573,381 commitment shares on July 20, 2022 (claim 13853), which does not confirm that either facility was drawn or closed. On the personnel side, the April 2022 CFO transition (claims 14088–14093, 13994, 13995) was accompanied by a $75,000 executive severance payment (claim 13996) and vesting of 1,400,000 restricted stock units (claim 13997), both promised by May 6, 2022 and both now 'delayed' without confirmation of settlement. The commitment to daily Bitcoin production reporting (claim 13998, April 19, 2022) likewise has no successor entry. In each instance the status change was produced by the ledger on 2026-09-15, not by management; what has not been said is anything at all.

The most striking feature of the ledger is what is absent from it: every status change on record was made by the extraction pipeline itself, either the initial 'stated' pass on 2026-09-14 or the bulk 'delayed' pass on 2026-09-15. Not one claim carries a transition originating in a company statement. Each of the slipped dates below moved because a deadline passed unremarked, not because management revised it.

Muskogee, Oklahoma is the clearest case. A 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority appears repeatedly across the March 29, 2022 disclosure (claims 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195, 14179) with a promised date of 2022-02-28 attached to the partnership claim, and the 500 MW figure is restated on May 4 (claim 13933) and May 12 (claims 13925, 13924). After May 12, 2022 it stops appearing. The partnership claim now sits at 'delayed' on an auto-transition. No revised construction schedule, no phasing plan, no statement that the 500 MW figure represents a site ceiling rather than a build commitment, and no explanation of why the February 2022 date passed.

Denton, Texas shows the same shape with more internal friction. The 22 MW initial operational milestone is promised against three different dates in the same filing set — 2022-02-01 (claim 14192), 2022-02-28 (claim 14182), and again 2022-02-01 on May 4 (claim 13931) — all three now auto-flagged 'delayed'. Meanwhile the 300 MW completed-capacity target is restated five separate times (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, then 13932 and 13923) without ever acquiring a completion date. The Tenaska Energy and City of Denton development agreement (claim 14184) carries a 2021-10-31 date that also lapsed into 'delayed'. The last mention of Denton in this record is May 12, 2022. Management has not said whether the 300 MW figure remains the plan, what portion of it was energized, or why the initial 22 MW date moved.

On total operational capacity there is an unexplained downward step and an unexplained recovery. The March 29 disclosures put operational power capacity at 497 MW (claims 14173 and 14186, the latter dated as of January 31, 2022). On April 20 the figure is 457 MW (claim 13988), forty megawatts lower, presented without any statement reconciling it to the prior number. On May 12 the 497 MW figure returns (claim 13921), again without reconciliation. Whichever direction is the correction, neither move was announced as one.

The B. Riley financing arrangements were also quietly resized. On April 7, 2022 the company described a required committed equity facility of $150 million (claim 14082) with a 2022-06-06 date, alongside $75 million in bridge promissory notes (claim 14081) dated to 2022-12-07; both are now 'delayed' by auto-transition. The next financing item on record, July 20, 2022, is a B. Riley stock purchase agreement of $100 million (claim 13852). The $150 million commitment is not mentioned again and the gap between the two figures is not addressed — no statement that the facility was reduced, partially drawn, restructured, or replaced.

Two smaller threads simply end. The RADAR/Radar Relay acquisition at $65 million is described four times (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, and again 13927 on May 12) and the associated DeFi product development commitment appears once, on May 12 (claim 13928); neither recurs, and nothing has been said about whether that product work continued, was folded into mining operations, or was abandoned. Likewise, the commitment to daily Bitcoin production reporting made on April 19 (claim 13998) is never referenced again in the record. Both are worth flagging with a caveat: the disclosures captured here thin out after mid-2022, so their disappearance is partly a limit of this record rather than proof of silence. The lapsed dates and the revised figures above are not subject to that caveat — those are visible inside the period the record covers.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest silence. A 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority was described in the March 29, 2022 disclosure with a promised date of February 28, 2022 (claim 14185), and the 500 MW figure was restated four separate ways across claims 14179, 14188, 14194 and 14195. It appears again on May 4 (claim 13933) and May 12 (claims 13925, 13924), and then stops. Claim 14185 sits at 'delayed', but that status came from an automated transition on 2026-09-15, not from anything management said. No revised energization date, no reduction of the 500 MW figure, and no statement that the Port Authority agreement remains in force have been put on the record since May 12, 2022.

Denton, Texas follows the same shape at a smaller scale. The facility was said to have become operational at 22 MW against a promised date that is stated three different ways in the same March 29 filing — February 28, 2022 (claim 14182), February 1, 2022 (claim 14192), and an undated version (claim 14176) — and all of the dated variants auto-transitioned to 'delayed'. The May 4 disclosure repeats the 22 MW operational claim against the February 1 date (claim 13931), which is itself already a restatement of a date that had passed. The 300 MW completed capacity has been asserted at least six times (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13923, 13932) and never once accompanied by a completion date or a build schedule. After May 12, 2022 the Tenaska Energy and City of Denton partnership (claims 14175, 14184, 13922) is not mentioned again.

The operating capacity number moved downward and then back up without explanation. As of January 31, 2022 the company reported 497 MW operational (claims 14186, 14173). On April 20, 2022 the figure given was 457 MW (claim 13988) — forty megawatts lower, with no accompanying statement identifying what came offline or whether the earlier number had been measured differently. Three weeks later, on May 12, the 497 MW figure reappears as 'current operational power capacity across all facilities' (claim 13921). Neither the decline nor the recovery was narrated, and nothing on record reconciles the two.

RADAR, acquired by Blockcap for $65 million, has quietly receded. The transaction is described repeatedly in March (claims 14172, 14181, 14190) with a promised-by date of July 1, 2021 attached to claim 14181, and on May 12 it is still framed forward-looking, paired with a commitment to develop DeFi products and enhance mining technology (claims 13927, 13928). That is the last mention. There is no subsequent product milestone, no impairment or write-down language, and no statement retiring the DeFi roadmap — only the automated 'delayed' marking on 14181.

The B. Riley financing language has shifted in character rather than substance. A $150 million committed equity facility was required by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082) and $75 million in bridge promissory notes carried a December 7, 2022 date (claim 14081); both auto-transitioned to 'delayed'. The only later B. Riley item on record, dated July 20, 2022, is a $75,000 legal fee reimbursement (claim 13854) — administrative housekeeping where the earlier disclosures had described capital commitments. Whether the equity facility was drawn, resized or abandoned has not been stated. Related, the daily Bitcoin production reporting undertaken on April 19, 2022 (claim 13998) is a recurring commitment that has no follow-on entry, and the executive severance of $75,000 and 1.4 million RSUs tied to a May 6, 2022 date (claims 13996, 13997) were likewise auto-marked delayed with no settlement confirmation. It should be noted that every status change in this ledger originates from automated extraction on 2026-09-14 and 2026-09-15, and the record supplied here thins out after July 2022; the absence of a later mention is evidence about this record, not proof that no statement exists elsewhere.

The Denton, Texas blockchain data center is the clearest case. Management described it repeatedly and in overlapping terms — operational at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 13931), reaching 300 MW when complete (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923) — across the March 29 and May 4 and May 12, 2022 disclosures. The 22 MW energization milestones carried promise dates of February 1 and February 28, 2022, and both moved to 'delayed' on 2026-09-15 by automated transition rather than by any revision from the company. The last substantive mention of the 300 MW target is 2022-05-12; after that the site stops appearing in the record. What has not been said is when, or whether, the ramp from 22 MW toward 300 MW resumed, what the revised completion horizon is, or whether the Tenaska Energy and City of Denton development agreement (14175, 14184, 14191, 13922) — itself promised by 2021-10-31 and now sitting at 'delayed' — remains in force. The language around that agreement never progressed from announcement to construction or energization reporting.

Muskogee, Oklahoma followed the same arc more quickly. A 500 MW planned facility was described four separate ways on 2022-03-29 (14179, 14195, 14188, 14185) and restated on 2022-05-04 and 2022-05-12 (13933, 13925, 13924). The Muskogee City-County Port Authority agreement carried a 2022-02-28 date and is now 'delayed' by automation. The last mention is 2022-05-12. There has been no groundbreaking disclosure, no first-power announcement, no phased capacity schedule, and no statement withdrawing or reducing the 500 MW figure. A half-gigawatt commitment simply stopped being discussed.

Total operating capacity was quietly revised downward and then quietly revised back. Claims 14173, 14186 and 13921 all state 497 MW, the last as of January 31, 2022 and repeated on 2022-05-12. In between, on 2022-04-20, claim 13988 reports operational power capacity of 457 MW — a 40 MW reduction. No accompanying statement explains what came offline, whether the reduction was curtailment, equipment, or a change in measurement basis, and no statement reconciles the April figure with the 497 MW restated three weeks later. The record contains two different numbers for the same asset base and no bridge between them.

The RADAR line of business has gone silent. Blockcap's acquisition of Radar Relay for $65 million appears at 14172, 14181 and 14190, with a promise date of 2021-07-01 now marked 'delayed', and the associated ambition — development of DeFi products and enhancement of blockchain mining technology (13928) — is mentioned once, on 2022-05-12, and never again. Nothing on record describes a product launch, a wind-down, an impairment, or a change in strategic intent. The technology rationale that justified the purchase price was stated and then dropped.

The B. Riley financing commitment shrank without an update statement. Claim 14082, dated 2022-04-07, describes a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of $150 million, due by 2022-06-06; it is now 'delayed'. The $75 million bridge promissory notes (14081) carry a 2022-12-07 date and are likewise 'delayed'. What actually appears next, on 2022-07-20, is a B. Riley stock purchase agreement of $100 million (13852). The difference between the $150 million that was required and the $100 million that materialized is unexplained on the record, as is whether the requirement was waived, restructured, or left unsatisfied, and what that meant for the bridge notes.

A smaller pattern is worth noting alongside these: the CFO transition disclosed on 2022-04-04 (14088 through 14093) and restated on 2022-04-19 (13994, 13995) also sits at 'delayed' on its stated effective dates, with the severance and RSU vesting terms (13996, 13997) following the same path. In every one of the cases above, the status change was produced by automated extraction on 2026-09-15, not by a company revision. That is the common thread — the ledger moved, and the disclosure did not.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest example. It was described across the March 29, 2022 disclosures as a signed development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a 500 MW facility (claims 14185, 14194, 14179, 14188, 14195), with an associated date of February 28, 2022, and it was repeated on May 4 (claim 13933) and May 12 (claims 13924, 13925). After May 12, 2022 it does not appear again in the record. The partnership claim moved to 'delayed' on September 15, 2026, and that transition was automated — it reflects a date passing, not an announcement. Management has never said whether the Port Authority agreement remains in force, whether the 500 MW figure still stands, or what energization schedule replaced the original one.

The Denton, Texas facility shows the same pattern at a smaller scale. Three separate claims (14182, 14192, 13931) carry promised dates of February 1 and February 28, 2022 for the 22 MW operational launch, and all three auto-transitioned to 'delayed.' The 300 MW completed capacity figure was stated six times between March 29 and May 12, 2022 (claims 14187, 14183, 14178, 14193, 13932, 13923) and then stopped being stated. The Tenaska Energy and City of Denton partnership language likewise appears in March and May (claims 14175, 14191, 14184, 13922) and not afterward. Claim 14184 attaches an October 31, 2021 date to the development agreement and is now 'delayed.' Nothing on record explains whether the 22 MW went live late, whether the buildout to 300 MW was rescoped, or what the current phase schedule is.

Operating capacity was revised downward and then quietly restored. The March 29 filings state 497 MW operational as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14186, 14173). On April 20, 2022, claim 13988 states 457 MW — forty megawatts lower. On May 12, claim 13921 returns to 497 MW as 'current operational power capacity across all facilities.' No update statement accompanies either movement. The company has not said whether the April figure reflected a different measurement basis, a curtailment, a site coming offline, or a correction, and it has not reconciled the two numbers.

The B. Riley financing arrangements were restated at a smaller size without an accompanying explanation. Claim 14082 (April 7, 2022) describes a required committed equity facility of $150 million with a B. Riley affiliate, dated June 6, 2022, alongside $75 million in bridge promissory notes dated December 7, 2022 (claim 14081). Both are now 'delayed.' On July 20, 2022, claim 13851 records a Common Stock Purchase Agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II for $100 million. The $150 million commitment is not mentioned again, and there is no statement addressing whether the July agreement satisfies, replaces, or partially fulfills the earlier requirement, nor what happened to the bridge notes.

The RADAR acquisition and the product roadmap attached to it have gone quiet. Blockcap's $65 million acquisition of Radar Relay is described in claims 14172, 14181 and 14190, and on May 12, 2022 claim 13928 frames the work as development of DeFi products and enhancement of blockchain mining technology (with claim 13927 restating the RADAR acquisition). That is the last mention on record. Claim 14181 carries a July 1, 2021 date and now sits at 'delayed.' Nothing has been said about whether the DeFi product line was shipped, deprioritized, or wound down. A smaller version of the same silence covers the CFO transition: claims 13994 through 13997 attach dates of April 4 and 5 and May 6, 2022 to the departure, the appointment, a $75,000 severance payment and the vesting of 1,400,000 restricted stock units, and all four auto-transitioned to 'delayed' without any subsequent confirmation that the transition and its associated payments completed as described.

One caveat on reading the above: every status transition in this ledger was generated automatically on September 14 and 15, 2026, from extraction rather than from company communication. The absence of a later mention is measured against the disclosures on file, which run through July 20, 2022.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma project is the clearest silence. Across the March 29, 2022 disclosure it appears five separate times at 500 MW (claims 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195, and the Port Authority agreement itself, 14185), and it is restated on May 4 (13933) and May 12 (13925). Claim 14185 carried a delivery date of February 28, 2022 — already past when it was disclosed — and the ledger moved it to delayed on September 15, 2026 by automated transition, not by any company revision. The last time Muskogee is mentioned at all is May 12, 2022. Nothing on the record sets a new date, revises the 500 MW figure, or says whether the Port Authority agreement remains in force.

Denton follows the same pattern with more repetition. The 300 MW final capacity is asserted four times on March 29 (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193) and twice more in May (13932, 13923), while the site's actual operating footprint is 22 MW (14177, 14182). The operational-launch claims carried dates of February 1 and February 28, 2022 (14192, 14182, 13931) and all three were auto-transitioned to delayed on September 15, 2026. The gap between 22 MW achieved and 300 MW promised has never been addressed in any subsequent disclosure, and after May 12, 2022 the 300 MW figure is not repeated at all.

The headline capacity number was revised downward without comment. Total operational power capacity is stated as 497 MW on March 29, both as a point-in-time January 31 figure (14186) and as a general total (14173). On April 20 it is 457 MW (13988) — forty megawatts lower, with no accompanying explanation of what came offline or was reclassified. Then on May 12 the 497 MW figure reappears (13921) as "current operational power capacity across all facilities." The two numbers have never been reconciled, and the April 20 reduction has never been characterized as a revision.

The Tenaska relationship shifts register. In March it is a dated development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14184) with a target of October 31, 2021, since auto-transitioned to delayed, alongside a separately stated Tenaska partnership (14175) and a development partnership (14191). By May 12 the same relationship is described only as a "partnership with City of Denton and Tenaska Energy for blockchain data center" (13922) — ongoing-tense framing with no agreement date, no milestone, and no statement that the original October 2021 commitment was met, amended, or abandoned.

The B. Riley financing and the DeFi program both disappear. The $150 million committed equity facility (14082, due June 6, 2022) and the $75 million bridge promissory notes (14081, due December 7, 2022) were disclosed on April 7, 2022 and are not mentioned again; both sit at delayed by automated transition. Likewise, the RADAR / Radar Relay acquisition at $65 million (14190, 14172, 14181 — the last carrying a July 1, 2021 date and now delayed) supports a stated intention to develop DeFi products and enhance mining technology (13928), last mentioned May 12, 2022. After mid-June 2022 the record contains only RSU and personnel mechanics (13892, 13893, 13850); the daily Bitcoin production reporting commitment made on April 19 (13998) is not referenced again either. No disclosure explains the withdrawal of any of these.

The Denton, Texas build-out is the clearest case. Management put an operational date on the record twice — claim 14192 with a promised-by of 2022-02-01 and claim 14182 with 2022-02-28, restated again as claim 13931 on 2022-05-04 — and in each case the ledger moved the item to 'delayed' on 2026-09-15 through automated transition, not through any company revision. The paired capacity story is that Denton opened at 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182) against a completed-state target of 300 MW repeated at least six times (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923). The last time that 300 MW figure appears anywhere in the record is 2022-05-12. There has been no statement explaining what happened between 22 MW and 300 MW, no revised completion horizon, and no withdrawal of the target — it simply stops being mentioned.

Muskogee, Oklahoma follows the same arc with a subtler linguistic shift. The earliest framing is transactional and dated: claim 14185 describes a Muskogee City-County Port Authority data center agreement for 500 MW with a promised-by of 2022-02-28, alongside claim 14194's development partnership. That item is now 'delayed' by auto-transition. By 2022-05-12 the same relationship is described in claim 13924 simply as a 'partnership with Muskogee City-County Port Authority for blockchain data center' — present-tense association rather than an executed agreement with a date attached. The 500 MW figure survives across claims 14195, 14188, 14179, 13933 and 13925, but after 2022-05-12 the project disappears from the disclosures entirely. Nothing on record says whether the port authority agreement closed, lapsed, or was restructured.

The headline operational capacity number was revised downward once and then quietly restored. Core Scientific stated 497 MW as of 2022-01-31 (claims 14173 and 14186) and repeated 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (claim 13921). In between, on 2022-04-20, claim 13988 puts operational power capacity at 457 MW — forty megawatts lower. No update statement accompanies the reduction, and none accompanies the return to 497 MW three weeks later. Claim 14186, the dated version of the figure, is now carried as 'delayed'. The two numbers have never been reconciled in management's own words.

The B. Riley financing package has gone quiet in a way the share-issuance record does not resolve. Claim 14082 describes a required committed equity facility of $150 million with a B. Riley affiliate, promised by 2022-06-06, and claim 14081 a $75 million bridge promissory note facility with a backstop date of 2022-12-07; both sit at 'delayed' by automated transition. The only subsequent trace is claim 13853 on 2022-07-20, recording 573,381 commitment shares issued to B. Riley. Commitment shares are consistent with a facility being established, but the record contains no statement that the $150 million was put in place, drawn, or reduced, and the bridge notes are not mentioned again at all.

Two smaller threads have simply stopped. Claim 13928, from 2022-05-12, describes development of DeFi products and enhancement of blockchain mining technology — the strategic rationale attached to the RADAR acquisition (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 13927, the last of which values it at $65 million). That product direction appears once and never again, and the RADAR transaction itself, with a promised-by of 2021-07-01 under claim 14181, remains 'delayed'. Separately, claim 13998 of 2022-04-19 commits to daily Bitcoin production reporting; there is no later claim on record confirming that the practice continued or was discontinued.

The CFO transition is complete in substance but unclosed on the ledger. The April 2022 disclosures set out the resignation, the successor's appointment, a $300,000 base, a $75,000 severance payment and 1.4 million RSUs vesting (claims 14088 through 14093 and 13994 through 13997), with promised-by dates clustered between 2022-04-04 and 2022-05-06. Every dated element auto-transitioned to 'delayed' on 2026-09-15. Nothing was said to confirm the payments were made on the stated terms, and the later RSU amendment of 2022-06-13 — 50 million shares net-settled, 17 million canceled for tax withholding (claims 13892, 13893) — is disclosed without any stated relationship to the executive awards described two months earlier.

One caveat on method: the claim record available here runs from 2022-03-29 to a partial entry on 2022-07-20, so 'last mention' above means last mention within that window. Where the observation depends on absence after mid-2022 — Denton's 300 MW, Muskogee, the DeFi program, daily production reporting — it should be read as a gap in the extracted record rather than confirmed silence across all subsequent periods.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma 500 MW data center is the clearest disappearance. It was described four separate ways in the March 29, 2022 disclosure alone (claims 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195), with the underlying Muskogee City-County Port Authority development agreement carrying a February 28, 2022 date (claim 14185), and it was restated on May 12, 2022 (claims 13925, 13933, and the partnership at 13924). May 12, 2022 is the last mention on record. The Port Authority agreement claim has since been carried to 'delayed' by the ledger's own automated pass on 2026-09-15, not by anything management said. Nothing in the subsequent disclosures — the June RSU amendments, the July B. Riley commitment shares — revisits whether 500 MW at Muskogee is still the plan, a reduced plan, or no plan. No revised energization date, no partial-phase figure, and no statement that the agreement lapsed.

Denton, Texas shows the same shape with more repetition and less follow-through. The 300 MW final figure appears five times in one March filing (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, and within 14177's framing of 22 MW initial capacity) and again on May 12 (claim 13923) and May 4 (claim 13932). Against that, three separate operational-date claims — 14192 (February 1, 2022), 14182 (February 28, 2022), and 13931 (February 1, 2022) — all sit at 'delayed' by automated transition on 2026-09-15, as does the underlying City of Denton and Tenaska development agreement dated October 31, 2021 (claim 14184). What has never been stated is the path from 22 MW to 300 MW: no phase schedule, no interim megawatt milestone, no revised completion year. The partnership language also softens between March and May — the March record names a development agreement with a date (14184), while the May restatements (13922, 13924) describe partnership in ongoing, undated terms.

Total operating capacity was revised downward without an accompanying explanation. The figure 497 MW appears as of January 31, 2022 (claim 14186, itself now 'delayed'), again as total operational capacity in the same March filing (claim 14173), and again on May 12 (claim 13921). Between those two assertions, the April 20, 2022 disclosure reports 457 MW (claim 13988) — forty megawatts lower — and then 497 returns three weeks later. No claim on the record reconciles the two numbers, identifies which sites came off line, or states whether the April figure reflected curtailment, a definitional change, or an actual loss of capacity. The reversion to 497 was made silently in both directions.

The RADAR / Radar Relay acquisition and the DeFi roadmap it was meant to support have gone quiet. The $65 million purchase by Blockcap is described three times (claims 14172, 14181, 14190), with claim 14181 carrying a July 1, 2021 date that the ledger moved to 'delayed' on 2026-09-15; the Blockcap acquisition itself carries the same July 1, 2021 date and the same automated slip (claim 14180). On May 12, 2022 the company was still describing RADAR as a technology acquisition (claim 13927) and still framing development of DeFi products and mining-technology enhancement as forward work (claim 13928). That is the last mention. There is no subsequent statement on whether the DeFi product line was built, shelved, written down, or folded into something else, and no disclosure of what became of the $65 million of consideration.

The B. Riley financing structure has an unremarked deadline inside it. The April 7, 2022 disclosure records $75 million of bridge promissory notes with a December 7, 2022 date (claim 14081) and, separately, a required $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate due by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082). Both are now 'delayed' by automated transition. The July 20, 2022 record acknowledges 573,381 commitment shares issued to B. Riley (claim 13853) but does not state whether the $150 million facility was established on time, resized, or replaced. The obligation was described as required; the record does not say it was met, and does not say it was waived.

One procedural note worth carrying: every 'delayed' status in this ledger was applied by automated extraction on 2026-09-15, following an initial 'stated' pass on 2026-09-14. In no instance did a company statement trigger the change. The pattern across Muskogee, Denton, and the B. Riley facility is the same — dates were given once, restated in softer form, and then left standing while the underlying commitments went unaddressed.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma project is the clearest case. The 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority carried a delivery date of 2022-02-28 (claim 14185) and was restated as planned capacity four separate times in the same 2022-03-29 filing (claims 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195), then again on 2022-05-04 (claim 13933) and 2022-05-12 (claims 13924, 13925). After 2022-05-12 it disappears from the record entirely. The only status change is an automated move to 'delayed' on 2026-09-15 — a system inference, not a company statement. Management has never said whether the port authority agreement remains in force, whether the 500 MW figure survives, or what the revised energization schedule is. The number was repeated seven times and retired without a sentence.

Denton, Texas follows the same shape at a smaller scale. The development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy was promised by 2021-10-31 (claim 14184); the facility's operational launch was promised variously by 2022-02-01 (claim 14192) and 2022-02-28 (claim 14182), and again by 2022-02-01 in the 2022-05-04 disclosure (claim 13931). All four are now 'delayed' by automated transition. What was actually disclosed is 22 MW of initial operating capacity (claim 14177) against a stated final capacity of 300 MW repeated six times across March and May 2022 (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923). The gap between 22 MW live and 300 MW promised has never been accompanied by a build schedule, a revised completion date, or an acknowledgment that the original operational date slipped. The last mention is 2022-05-12; the 300 MW figure has not been withdrawn, only left standing.

The operating capacity figure itself moved downward and was never reconciled. Total operational power capacity was stated as 497 MW as of 2022-01-31 (claims 14173, 14186). On 2022-04-20 the disclosed figure was 457 MW (claim 13988), forty megawatts lower, with no update statement explaining the reduction. Three weeks later, on 2022-05-12, the 497 MW figure reappeared as 'current operational power capacity across all facilities' (claim 13921). One of those two numbers is wrong or they are measuring different things, and management has not said which. Claim 14186 now sits at 'delayed' on an automated transition, meaning the January capacity milestone was never independently confirmed.

The RADAR/Radar Relay acquisition and the DeFi program have gone quiet together. The $65 million acquisition by Blockcap was promised by 2021-07-01 (claim 14181, now 'delayed') and restated on 2022-03-29 (claims 14172, 14190) and 2022-05-12 (claim 13927). Alongside it, on 2022-05-12, came a commitment to develop DeFi products and enhance mining technology (claim 13928). That is the last mention of either. There has been no disclosure of whether the RADAR technology was integrated, written down, or divested, and no update on the DeFi product line — it simply stops appearing after 2022-05-12. A $65 million purchase and the strategic rationale attached to it both exited the record without a closing statement.

On financing, the language and the amount both moved. On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of $150 million by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082) and $75 million in bridge promissory notes due 2022-12-07 (claim 14081); both are now 'delayed' by automated transition. On 2022-07-20 what appears is a B. Riley stock purchase agreement of $100 million (claim 13852) — fifty million dollars below the facility described as 'required' three months earlier, and structurally a different instrument. No update statement connects the two or explains the reduction. Relatedly, the April CFO transition is a cluster of unconfirmed commitments: the departure date of 2022-04-04 (claim 13994), the successor appointment by 2022-04-05 (claim 13995), the $75,000 severance payment and 1,400,000 RSU vesting both due 2022-05-06 (claims 13996, 13997) are all sitting at 'delayed' on automated inference, with no subsequent disclosure confirming any of them were completed on the stated terms.

One structural note: every status change in this ledger is machine-generated, dated 2026-09-14 or 2026-09-15. Not a single item was moved by a company revision. The silence is the finding.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a project that went quiet. Management described a 500 MW facility developed with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority in the March 29, 2022 filing (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195), repeated the 500 MW figure on May 4 (13933), and restated the partnership and target capacity on May 12, 2022 (13924, 13925). That May 12 disclosure is the last mention in the record we have. The port authority agreement carried a February 28, 2022 reference date (14185) and was auto-transitioned to delayed on September 15, 2026. Nothing in the record states how much of the 500 MW was energized, whether the target was revised, or whether the site was deprioritized.

Denton, Texas follows the same pattern at a different scale. The 300 MW expected final capacity appears in at least six separate claims from March through May 2022 (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923), while the only concrete delivery disclosed is an initial 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931). The development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14184) referenced an October 31, 2021 date, and the operational-launch claims (14192, 14182, 13931) referenced February 2022. All of these were auto-transitioned to delayed. The last restatement of the 300 MW target is May 12, 2022. The record contains no interim milestone between 22 MW and 300 MW and no schedule for closing that gap.

The company's headline operating capacity also moved without a stated reconciliation. The March 29, 2022 filing cites 497 MW, including a figure dated as of January 31, 2022 (14173, 14186). An April 20, 2022 disclosure gives 457 MW (13988). The May 12, 2022 filing returns to 497 MW as current operational capacity across all facilities (13921). The 40 MW difference may reflect different measurement dates or definitions, but none of the claims says which figure is authoritative or why the lower number appeared between two higher ones.

The B. Riley financing terms have no visible follow-through. The April 7, 2022 disclosure described 75 million in bridge promissory notes due by December 7, 2022 (14081) and a required 150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate to be in place by June 6, 2022 (14082). Both were auto-transitioned to delayed. The only later B. Riley item in the available record is a 75,000 legal fee reimbursement on July 20, 2022 (13854). No claim confirms that the equity facility was executed or how much was drawn, and none states whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or restructured.

The Blockcap and RADAR technology thread also dropped away after the merger period. The Radar Relay acquisition at 65 million was cited repeatedly (14172, 14181, 14190, 13927). On May 12, 2022, management said merger proceeds would support development of DeFi products and blockchain mining technology (13928, 13929). After that date the record contains no further mention of DeFi products or of RADAR as a business line, and nothing indicates whether the effort was pursued, folded in or abandoned.

Two caveats apply. The ledger supplied here is cut off after claim 13851 (July 20, 2022), so later disclosures may address some of these items. Several other delayed flags, including the completed Blockcap acquisition (14180) and the CFO departure and appointment (13994, 13995), describe events that had already occurred when they were reported. They look like artifacts of automated date extraction rather than slipped commitments and are not treated as walk-backs here.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the clearest case of a project that was described in detail and then went quiet. The March 29, 2022 filing framed it as a 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195, 14179), and the agreement milestone tied to February 28, 2022 (claim 14185) was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. By May 2022 the wording had moved from an executed agreement toward a target capacity and a partnership (claims 13933, 13924, 13925). The last mention in the record is May 12, 2022. No subsequent claim reports ground broken, megawatts energized, a revised schedule, or a change in the 500 MW figure, and nothing explains why the project stops appearing.

The Denton, Texas build-out has a similar gap between its first step and its stated destination. Management repeatedly described an initial 22 MW coming online (claims 14177, 14182, 13931) and a final capacity of 300 MW (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13923, 13932). The dated operational milestones (claims 14182, 14192, 13931) and the development agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy, promised by October 31, 2021 (claim 14184), were all auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. The 300 MW figure was last restated on May 12, 2022 (claim 13923). No interim ramp figure, completion date, or confirmation of how much of the 300 MW was actually built appears after that.

The company-wide operating capacity figure was revised downward without any reconciling statement. The March 29, 2022 disclosures cited 497 MW operational as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186), and claim 14186 has since auto-transitioned to delayed. On April 20, 2022 a figure of 457 MW appeared (claim 13988), and on May 12, 2022 the 497 MW number was repeated (claim 13921). The record does not explain the 40 MW difference, whether 457 MW reflects curtailment, decommissioning, or a changed definition, or which figure is current.

The B. Riley financing terms appear to have narrowed. The April 7, 2022 disclosure stated that a committed equity facility of $150 million with a B. Riley affiliate was required by June 6, 2022, alongside $75 million of bridge notes maturing December 7, 2022 (claims 14082, 14081). Both have auto-transitioned to delayed. The purchase agreement that followed on July 20, 2022 with B. Riley Principal Capital II was for $100 million (claim 13851), which is smaller than the stated requirement and was signed after the stated deadline. Nothing in the record addresses the $50 million shortfall, whether the requirement was waived or amended, or how the bridge notes were settled.

The RADAR acquisition and the DeFi ambitions attached to it have not reappeared. Blockcap's $65 million purchase of Radar Relay (claims 14172, 14181, 14190) was presented alongside plans to develop DeFi products and enhance mining technology (claims 13927, 13928). The acquisition milestone (claim 14181) is now marked delayed. The last mention is May 12, 2022. No later claim describes a launched product, revenue from the RADAR business, or an impairment or wind-down, so the record does not show what became of the $65 million outlay.

Most of the delayed statuses above were set by the same automated pass on 2026-09-15 and reflect the absence of later confirming disclosures rather than an explicit admission of a miss. The ledger as provided also ends mid-record at July 2022, so later filings may address some of these points.

Muskogee, Oklahoma, 500 MW. The company described a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority for a 500 MW blockchain data center in its 2022-03-29 filing (claims 14179, 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195). It repeated the figure on 2022-05-04 (13933) and for the last time in this ledger on 2022-05-12 (13924, 13925). The agreement carried a 2022-02-28 date (14185), and that claim was moved automatically to delayed on 2026-09-15. No management statement accompanied the change. None of the records supplied here gives a construction schedule, an energization date, capital committed, or megawatts actually delivered at Muskogee, and none says the 500 MW target was resized or dropped. The site goes from a headline capacity figure to no mention at all.

Denton, Texas, from 22 MW to 300 MW. Denton was reported as operational at an initial 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931), with a stated final capacity of 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932, 13923). The 300 MW target was last restated on 2022-05-12. The underlying agreement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy carried a 2021-10-31 date (14184) and has been auto-flagged as delayed. It was still described only as a partnership on 2022-05-12 (13922), with no progress milestone attached. The ledger contains no timeline, interim capacity figure, or completion date for closing the gap between 22 MW and 300 MW, and nothing states whether that buildout is still planned. Some of the delayed flags on Denton, such as 14182 and 13931, sit on events already reported as done and are probably mechanical. The absence of any later capacity figure for the site is not.

Total operating capacity, 497 MW versus 457 MW. The 2022-03-29 disclosures put total operational power capacity at 497 MW as of 2022-01-31 (14173, 14186). A 2022-04-20 filing gave 457 MW (13988). On 2022-05-12 the figure was 497 MW again (13921). The ledger contains no reconciliation of the 40 MW difference. It does not say whether the lower number reflects a different measurement date, a site outage, a hosting-contract change, or a correction. Claim 14186 has since been auto-transitioned to delayed, and no clarifying statement was made.

B. Riley equity facility and bridge notes. On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed $75 million of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, dated to 2022-12-07 (14081). It also disclosed a required committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate of $150 million, to be in place by 2022-06-06 (14082). Both are now auto-flagged as delayed. The next related record is a 2022-07-20 common stock purchase agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II for $100 million (13851). That agreement is about six weeks after the stated deadline and a third smaller than the facility described. The supplied record contains no statement explaining the reduction from $150 million to $100 million, the later signing, or whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended, or refinanced by their December 2022 date.

RADAR and DeFi products. The Blockcap acquisition brought in the $65 million Radar Relay (RADAR) purchase (14172, 14181, 14190). The 2022-05-12 filing listed development of DeFi products and enhancement of mining technology as a use of merger proceeds (13927, 13928). That is the last reference in this ledger. No subsequent disclosure describes a DeFi product launched, deferred, or abandoned, or what became of the RADAR team and technology. The delayed flags on 14180 and 14181 attach to a mid-2021 closing and probably reflect extraction timing rather than a real slip. The silence on the DeFi initiative, however, is a genuine gap.

The claims supplied here end at 2022-07-20. The transitions on every item were made automatically on 2026-09-14 and 2026-09-15, not in response to any company revision. The absences described above are relative to that record and should be checked against later filings before they are treated as settled.

The ledger supplied here ends partway through the July 20, 2022 disclosures, so "last mention" below means last mention in the portion reviewed. Every "delayed" status on file was set by an automated pass on 2026-09-15 because a promised-by date had passed. None reflects a revision announced by the company, and some of those dates describe events that had already happened when they were disclosed.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the most prominent item to go quiet. In the March 29, 2022 filing it appears as a 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14195, 14194). It was repeated on May 4 (13933) and May 12 (13925, 13924). Claim 14185 carried a February 28, 2022 date and is now marked delayed. The record contains no energization date, no first-phase capacity figure, and no statement that the 500 MW figure has been reduced, rephased or dropped. Its last appearance is May 12, 2022, and it does not surface in the June or July disclosures reviewed.

The Denton, Texas build-out shows the same pattern at a later stage. The site was said to have come online at an initial 22 MW (14177, 14182, 13931) with an expected 300 MW "when completed" (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193). The 300 MW target was restated on May 4 (13932) and May 12 (13923). The launch-date claims (14192, 14182, 13931) are now delayed. Nothing between the 22 MW starting point and the 300 MW endpoint has been disclosed: no interim capacity, no completion date, and no revised target. The arrangement with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14175, 14184, 14191) also shifted in wording. It began as a development agreement dated to October 2021 (14184, now delayed). By May 12 it was described only as a "partnership" (13922), with no statement of what had been executed or what remained open.

The company's headline power capacity was given two different ways without reconciliation. The March 29 filing and the May 12 filing both state 497 MW of operational capacity (14173, 14186, 13921). Between them, the April 20 disclosure gives 457 MW (13988), 40 MW less. The record does not explain whether the lower figure reflected a different measurement date, capacity taken offline, or a correction. The 497 MW figure simply reappeared three weeks later.

The Blockcap subsidiary's purchase of Radar Relay is recorded at 65.0 USD in the source units (14181, 14172, 14190). It was tied on May 12 to plans to develop DeFi products and enhance mining technology (13927, 13928). That is the last reference to the DeFi ambition in the ledger reviewed. The company has not said whether the effort continued, was folded into mining operations, or was abandoned.

The B. Riley financing package also leaves questions open. The April 7 disclosure described a required committed equity facility of 150.0 USD, due by June 6, 2022 (14082), and bridge promissory notes of 75.0 USD, due by December 7, 2022 (14081). Both are now marked delayed. The only follow-up visible is the issuance of 573,381 commitment shares on July 20 (13853). The ledger contains no statement of how much of the facility was drawn or whether the bridge notes were repaid, extended or converted.

Total operational power capacity was given as 497 MW in the March 29, 2022 disclosures (claims 14173 and 14186, the latter framed as of January 31, 2022). On April 20, 2022 the figure appeared as 457 MW (claim 13988), a 40 MW reduction. By May 12, 2022 the 497 MW figure had returned (claim 13921). The record contains no statement explaining the lower April figure, whether it measured something different, or how the two numbers reconcile. Claim 14186 was auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. No revision announcement accompanies either number.

The B. Riley financing terms narrowed without explanation. The April 7, 2022 bridge note disclosures required a committed equity facility of $150 million with a B. Riley affiliate by June 6, 2022 (claim 14082), alongside $75 million of bridge promissory notes maturing December 7, 2022 (claim 14081). Both claims were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15. The next related disclosure, on July 20, 2022, describes a B. Riley stock purchase agreement of $100 million (claim 13852). That is $50 million below the stated requirement and about six weeks after the stated deadline. The record does not say whether the requirement was waived, amended or satisfied some other way. It also does not report what happened to the bridge notes at maturity.

The Denton, Texas facility was repeatedly described as reaching 300 MW when completed (claims 14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13932 and 13923). The last mention was on May 12, 2022. The only milestone on record is the initial 22 MW becoming operational around February 2022 (claims 14182, 14192 and 13931). Those claims were auto-flagged delayed on 2026-09-15 because their promised-by dates fall before the filing date. That flag reflects how the claims were extracted, not evidence of a slip. The more material gap is that the ledger shows no timeline, phasing or progress update toward the remaining roughly 278 MW. The Tenaska and City of Denton arrangement (claims 14175, 14184 and 13922) also has no update after May 2022.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma site with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority was described as a 500 MW facility (claims 14179, 14188, 14195, 14185, 13933, 13925 and 13924). The description stays at the level of a development agreement and planned capacity. No energization date, capital budget or phasing appears anywhere. The last mention was May 12, 2022. Claim 14185 carries a February 28, 2022 date and was auto-transitioned to delayed. No later disclosure in the record states what capacity, if any, has been delivered there.

The May 12, 2022 disclosures listed the development of DeFi products and blockchain mining technology as a use of merger proceeds (claim 13928). That plan was tied to the RADAR technology acquired through Blockcap for $65 million (claims 14172, 14190, 14181 and 13927). The theme does not reappear in the later entries reviewed. The record contains no product launch, no spending figure and no statement that the effort was deprioritized.

The ledger supplied for this review ends partway through a July 2022 entry, so later filings may address some of these points. Separately, several delayed flags from the September 15, 2026 automated pass reflect completed historical events rather than missed commitments, including the Blockcap closing (claim 14180) and the CFO transition (claims 13994 and 13995).

A note on method first. Several claims in this ledger were auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-15 even though their promised-by dates are earlier than the filings that reported them. Examples are the Blockcap and RADAR acquisitions (claims 14180, 14181), the CFO change (13994, 13995) and the January 31, 2022 capacity snapshot (14186). These describe events already completed at disclosure. The delayed status here is a timing artifact of the extraction, not evidence of slippage, and they are not treated below as walk-backs. The record supplied also ends partway through July 2022 (claim 13850 is cut off), so later disclosures may address some of what follows.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma data center is the largest single commitment on record: a 500 MW facility under a development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (claims 14185, 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195, 13924, 13925, 13933). It appears repeatedly between 2022-03-29 and 2022-05-12, always at the same 500 MW figure and always in agreement language. No construction start, energization date, phasing or first-megawatt target is attached to any of these claims. After 2022-05-12 the project does not appear in the record provided. Nothing on record says whether the agreement remains in force, has been deferred, or has been dropped.

The Denton, Texas facility shows a similar pattern. The initial operating figure was 22 MW (claims 14177, 14182, 13931), against a stated end state of 300 MW (14178, 14183, 14187, 14193, 13923, 13932). The development partnership is with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14175, 14184, 14191, 13922). The 300 MW figure was restated in every filing through 2022-05-12, but no filing gave a date or an intermediate milestone for the ramp. The last mention is 2022-05-12. The current status of the 278 MW gap is undisclosed, and no update on build-out pace has been given.

The company-wide operational capacity figure is not consistent. It was given as 497 MW on 2022-03-29 (claims 14173, 14186) and as 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (13988). It then reappeared as 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (13921). The record contains no reconciliation of the 40 MW difference. It does not say whether the lower figure reflected a different measurement basis, curtailment, or a correction, or whether the later 497 MW restatement was a reversion to an outdated number.

The B. Riley financing arrangements appear to have been resized without an explanation on record. On 2022-04-07 the company disclosed $75 million in bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, due 2022-12-07 (claim 14081). The same filing described a required committed equity facility of $150 million with a B. Riley affiliate, to be in place by 2022-06-06 (14082). The next related disclosure, on 2022-07-20, is a B. Riley stock purchase agreement for $100 million (13852). That is one-third below the facility described as required, and it came roughly six weeks after the stated deadline. The record does not say whether the $150 million requirement was waived or amended, what that meant for the bridge notes, or whether those notes were repaid or extended by their December 2022 maturity.

The DeFi product line appears only once. On 2022-05-12 merger proceeds were described as allocated in part to developing DeFi products and enhancing mining technology (claim 13928). This was tied to the RADAR technology acquisition (13927, 14172, 14190). No later claim in the record mentions DeFi product development, a launch, or what became of the RADAR team or technology. No statement explains whether that allocation was spent, redirected, or abandoned.

The Denton, Texas data center was presented in March 2022 as a 300 MW site that had come online with an initial 22 MW (claims 14177, 14178, 14182, 14183, 14187, 14193), developed with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (14175, 14184, 14191). The same language was repeated on 2022-05-04 (13931, 13932) and again on 2022-05-12 (13922, 13923). The 12 May 2022 filing is the last time the 300 MW figure appears on record. No completion date was ever attached to the full build-out, and no intermediate capacity figure followed the initial 22 MW. Every one of these claims remains at 'stated' after the ledger's bulk transition on 2026-09-14, so none has been confirmed. Nothing on record says how much of the 300 MW was energized, on what schedule, or whether the target was revisited.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma facility followed the same pattern with less detail. It was described as a 500 MW data center under an agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (14179, 14185, 14188, 14194, 14195), restated on 2022-05-04 (13933) and on 2022-05-12 (13924, 13925). Denton at least received an initial operating figure. Muskogee never received an operating capacity or a go-live date; the 2022-02-28 date on claim 14185 relates to the agreement rather than to operation. The last mention is 2022-05-12 and the status is still 'stated'. There has been no disclosure of whether construction began, what was energized, or whether the 500 MW plan still stands.

The company's total operating capacity moved in a way the record does not explain. It was given as 497 MW as of 2022-01-31 (14173, 14186), then as 457 MW in a 2022-04-20 disclosure (13988), then as 497 MW again on 2022-05-12 (13921). No statement on record explains the 40 MW difference. It could reflect a different measurement date, curtailment, equipment retirement or a correction. The May figure repeats the earlier number without acknowledging the lower one in between.

Financing from B. Riley came in smaller than first described. The 2022-04-07 disclosure paired $75 million of bridge promissory notes from B. Riley Commercial Capital, maturing 2022-12-07 (14081), with a required $150 million committed equity facility to be in place by 2022-06-06 (14082). The facility that actually appears is a $100 million common stock purchase agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II, disclosed 2022-07-20 (13851, 13852). It carried 573,381 commitment shares and $75,000 in legal fee reimbursement (13853, 13854). That is a third below the stated requirement and was disclosed after the June date. The record gives no explanation for the reduction and no word on whether the bridge note terms were amended as a result. It also contains no later mention of the notes being repaid or refinanced by their December 2022 maturity.

The Blockcap acquisition brought Radar Relay into the company (14171, 14172, 14180, 14181, 14189, 14190, 13926, 13927, 13930). On 2022-05-12 management tied part of the merger proceeds to developing DeFi products and enhancing blockchain mining technology (13928, alongside the $195 million proceeds allocation in 13929). That is the only mention of the DeFi initiative on record. There has been no subsequent description of a product, a launch, spending against the allocation, or a decision to wind the effort down.

Core Scientific described its Denton, Texas site as a 22 MW facility that would grow to 300 MW when completed (claims 14176, 14177, 14182, 14183, 14187, 14192, 14193). It repeated the 300 MW figure on 2022-05-04 (claims 13931, 13932) and again on 2022-05-12 (claims 13922, 13923), which is the last time it appears on record. No completion date was ever attached to the 300 MW figure, and every claim remains at 'stated'. Nothing on record shows how much of the expansion was built, when it was expected, or whether the target still stands. The launch date itself was not consistent: claim 14192 gives 2022-02-01, while claim 14182 gives 2022-02-28, and the discrepancy was never addressed.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma site followed a similar path. A 500 MW development agreement with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority, dated to February 2022 (claim 14185), was presented alongside a planned 500 MW capacity (claims 14179, 14188, 14194, 14195). The company restated it on 2022-05-04 (claim 13933) and on 2022-05-12 (claims 13924, 13925), and then stopped mentioning it. Unlike Denton, no initial operating capacity or go-live date was ever disclosed for Muskogee. Nothing on record describes construction progress, energization, or any change to the agreement.

The reported operating capacity moved without explanation. The company gave 497 MW as of January 31, 2022 (claims 14173, 14186). A 2022-04-20 disclosure put operational capacity at 457 MW (claim 13988). The 2022-05-12 filing then repeated 497 MW as current capacity (claim 13921). None of the disclosures says whether the 40 MW gap reflects a different measurement date, a narrower definition, or capacity taken offline, and neither figure has been updated since.

The B. Riley financing shrank and slipped. The April 2022 bridge financing required a $150 million committed equity facility with a B. Riley affiliate by 2022-06-06 (claim 14082). On 2022-07-20, after that date had passed, the company disclosed a $100 million common stock purchase agreement with B. Riley Principal Capital II (claims 13851, 13852), along with commitment shares and fee reimbursement (claims 13853, 13854). No statement explains the $50 million reduction, the missed date, or whether the lender waived the requirement. The $75 million bridge notes were due 2022-12-07 (claim 14081), and there is no record of their repayment, extension, or refinancing.

The decentralized finance ambitions from the Blockcap merger have also disappeared. The company cited Blockcap's $65 million acquisition of Radar Relay (claims 14172, 14181, 14190, 13927). It also said merger proceeds would fund development of DeFi products (claim 13928, 2022-05-12). That was the last reference to either Radar Relay or the DeFi product plans. The company has not said what became of the Radar team or technology, whether any product shipped, or whether the effort was abandoned.

This ledger is incomplete. The extract ends partway through the 2022-10-11 filing, and every claim shows the same single transition, from automated extraction to 'stated', on 2026-09-14. No claim has been marked delayed, not_yet_verifiable, or revised. So the items below come from topics that drop out of the disclosures shown, and from promised dates that have passed with no recorded outcome. They do not come from explicit walk-backs.

The Muskogee, Oklahoma site is the largest capacity commitment in the record. A development agreement for a 500 MW facility appears on 2022-05-04 (claim 13933). It is repeated on 2022-05-12 as a target capacity (13925), alongside a partnership with the Muskogee City-County Port Authority (13924), and again on 2022-09-07 (13698). No date was ever attached, and no energization milestone, phased buildout, or MW-online figure was ever given. After 2022-09-07 the site does not appear in the October 2022 disclosures. Nothing on record explains whether the project is still active, has been scaled back, or was abandoned.

Denton, Texas follows the same pattern at a smaller scale. The company said the site became operational at 22 MW by February 2022 (13931) and would reach 300 MW at full capacity (13932, 13923, 13697). The partnership with the City of Denton and Tenaska Energy (13922) is mentioned only on 2022-05-12. The 300 MW figure was last repeated on 2022-09-07, with no completion date and no interim figure between 22 MW and 300 MW. The record never says how much of the gap was closed, or whether the Tenaska arrangement continued.

The company-wide operational capacity figure rose from 457 MW on 2022-04-20 (13988) to 497 MW on 2022-05-12 (13921). No later figure appears. In the same April filing the company described daily Bitcoin production reporting (13998), and that practice is not referenced again. By October 2022 the disclosures focus on financing and the Celsius dispute. Why these operating metrics stopped being updated is not addressed.

Two strategic initiatives appear once, on 2022-05-12, and are never mentioned again. One is the acquisition of the RADAR technology company (13927). The other is the stated development of DeFi products and improved mining technology (13928). Neither has a follow-up on integration, product launch, or discontinuation. The Blockcap acquisition, by contrast, is carried through to completion language on 2022-08-21 (13788).

The financing commitments have dates that have long passed with no recorded result. On 2022-08-03 the company disclosed $75 million in bridge promissory notes due by 2023-06-01 (13829), an amortization schedule running to 2023-05-01 (13830), and extensions of the B. Riley notes of $60 million and $15 million to 2023-06-01 (13832, 13833). The ledger still shows these as 'stated', with no repayment, further extension, or default recorded. The $100 million B. Riley Principal Capital II equity facility (13851, 13696, 13543) is disclosed repeatedly, alongside a Nasdaq cap of about 70.3 million shares (13545). The only issuances on record are 573,381 commitment shares (13544) and advisory fee shares. No drawdowns are reported. The Celsius relationship also shifts without explanation. It is framed as a Master Services Agreement with a major customer (13540, 13539), then by 2022-10-11 as unpaid charges, a bankruptcy filing, and an automatic-stay motion (13536, 13549, 13550). The record does not say how much was owed or what it meant for revenue guidance.

The cash runway guidance is the most consequential open item. On 2022-10-26 management gave a cash depletion forecast tied to year-end 2022 (claims 13504 and 13516), in the same set of disclosures that recorded the engagement of Weil, Gotshal & Manges (claim 13502). Both guidance claims have auto-transitioned to delayed, and the ledger also shows a conflicting stated transition logged on the same date. No later disclosure on record revises the forecast, confirms whether cash ran out as projected, or explains what the Weil engagement was meant to address.

The B. Riley bridge financing carried hard dates that have passed without comment. The August 3, 2022 disclosures described $75 million of bridge promissory notes (claim 13829), with amortization through 2023-05-01 (claim 13830). Maturities were extended to 2023-06-01 in tranches of $60 million and $15 million (claims 13832 and 13833). The notes were last referenced on 2022-10-26 (claims 13482 and 13546), and those mentions no longer repeat the payment dates. All of these claims still sit at stated. Nothing on record says whether the notes were repaid, extended again, converted, or defaulted.

Two large capacity figures appeared once and then vanished. On 2022-09-07 the company cited 500 MW at Muskogee, Oklahoma (claim 13698) and a 300 MW capacity target at Denton, Texas (claim 13697). Neither site or figure appears in the October 2022 disclosures, which focus on liquidity, customer disputes and equity issuance. No timeline, downward revision, or statement that the targets were deferred has been made.

The Celsius relationship changed in a single filing and was then left open. On 2022-10-11 the Master Services Agreement with Celsius Mining (claim 13540) was still described alongside Celsius as one of the largest customers (claims 13539 and 13548). The same filing also reported Celsius's chapter 11 case, its motion alleging an automatic stay violation, and its withholding of billed charges (claims 13536, 13537, 13538, 13549, 13550 and 13551). Outstanding charges were noted without a quantified figure (claim 13541). That was the last mention. The record does not show whether the agreement was terminated or continued, how much is owed, or how the stay motion was resolved.

The $100 million B. Riley equity line has been restated repeatedly but never reconciled. It was described on 2022-07-20, 2022-09-07, 2022-10-11 and 2022-10-26 (claims 13851, 13852, 13696, 13543, 13494, 13510 and 13515), with a Nasdaq-driven cap of 70,289,880 shares (claims 13545 and 13495). The only usage figure is $20.7 million of shares sold (claim 13499). The company has not said how much of the commitment remains, whether the share cap limits further draws, or whether the facility is still considered a source of liquidity given the cash depletion guidance.

The ledger as provided ends at claim 13499, dated 2022-10-26. All transitions were logged by automated extraction on 2026-09-14, so a status of stated means only that a claim was recorded, not that it was verified.

The clearest open item is the cash runway warning. In disclosures dated 2022-10-26, management said the company expected to run out of cash by the end of 2022 (claims 13507, 13513 and 13516, each with a promised-by date of 2022-12-31). That date has passed, and all three claims now carry an automated 'delayed' status. The same ledger entries also show a parallel transition to 'stated' on 2026-09-14, so the classification itself is unsettled. The disclosed record contains no later statement that confirms the depletion happened, gives a revised runway, or explains what financing or restructuring took the place of the warning. The engagement of restructuring advisers in the same filing (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, claim 13502; PJT Partners, claim 13503) is also never followed up in the record.

The Celsius Mining relationship was last mentioned on 2022-10-11. At that point the company described Celsius as one of its largest customers (claims 13539, 13548) under a signed Master Services Agreement (claim 13540). It also said Celsius had filed for chapter 11 (claims 13536, 13549), was withholding billed charges (claims 13538, 13541, 13551), and had moved to allege a violation of the automatic stay (claims 13537, 13550). Every one of these claims remains 'stated', and none has a later entry. The record does not say whether the outstanding charges were collected, written off or settled, how the stay motion was resolved, or whether the agreement is still in force.

The facility capacity figures appear once, on 2022-09-07: 500 MW for Muskogee, Oklahoma (claim 13698) and a 300 MW target for Denton, Texas (claim 13697). Both remain 'stated', and neither returns in any later disclosure on record. Given the cash warning that came seven weeks later, it would be reasonable to expect an update on whether these build-outs were paused, resized or sold. The record contains none, and there is no statement that the capacity targets still stand.

The $100 million committed equity facility with B. Riley Principal Capital II was described repeatedly between 2022-09-07 and 2022-10-26 (claims 13696, 13543, 13480, 13488, 13494, 13506, 13510, 13515). Those descriptions came with a Nasdaq share cap of 70,289,880 shares (claims 13495, 13545). The only usage figure on record is $20.7 million of shares sold (claim 13499). The disclosures reviewed do not say whether the remaining capacity was drawn, whether the share cap limited further sales, or whether the facility was terminated. The bridge promissory notes with B. Riley entities (claims 13482, 13491, 13546) also appear without terms or any later status.

The ledger supplied for this review is truncated after claim 13499. The absences described here are therefore limited to the portion of the record that was available, and later disclosures may address some of these points.

Every claim in this ledger dates from a two-week window in October 2022, and every one still carries the status it received at extraction on 2026-09-14. Nothing has been marked delayed, revised or resolved. What follows describes the threads that stop there, not a finding that events went unreported elsewhere.

The clearest lapsed commitment is the cash-depletion guidance. Filings on 2022-10-26 said the company expected to run out of cash by the end of 2022 (claims 13504, 13507, 13513, 13516), and each claim carried a promised-by date of 2022-12-31. That date passed almost four years ago. The ledger holds no later statement on whether cash was actually exhausted, how the gap was bridged, or what replaced the forecast. The status still reads stated rather than delayed or superseded, so there is also no record of management confirming or withdrawing the projection.

The B. Riley financing package follows the same pattern. The $100 million committed equity facility with B. Riley Principal Capital II was described repeatedly in October 2022 (claims 13480, 13488, 13494, 13506, 13510, 13515, 13543). At that time only about $20.7 million of shares had been sold under it (claim 13499), against a Nasdaq-driven cap of 70,289,880 shares (claims 13495, 13545). The bridge promissory notes with B. Riley entities (claims 13482, 13491, 13498, 13546) are named but never followed up. No later disclosure in the record says how much of the facility was drawn, whether it was terminated, or how the bridge notes were repaid or restructured.

The Celsius Mining dispute was presented as a live and material problem, then goes quiet. On 2022-10-11 the company identified Celsius as one of its largest customers (claims 13539, 13548) under a Master Services Agreement (claim 13540). It also disclosed Celsius's chapter 11 filing (claims 13536, 13549), Celsius's withholding of billed charges (claims 13538, 13541, 13551) and a Celsius motion alleging an automatic stay violation (claims 13537, 13550). The ledger has nothing after that date on the unpaid amounts, the outcome of the stay motion, or whether the hosting agreement continued. The company has not said how the largest customer relationship on record ended.

On 2022-10-26 the company disclosed $514.8 million of outstanding convertible notes (claims 13511, 13542; the latter was extracted without its unit scale). The same filings recorded engagements of PJT Partners and Weil, Gotshal & Manges (claims 13503, 13502), both typically retained to advise on restructuring. The record does not say what those advisers produced or what happened to the notes.

On 2022-10-27 the company replaced Ernst & Young with Marcum LLP as auditor (claims 13465, 13466, 13474, 13475). The same filings reported material weaknesses in accounting supervision, equity recordkeeping and segregation of duties over digital asset wallets (claims 13476, 13477, 13479). Days earlier the Controller and Chief Accounting Officer role had been eliminated, and those duties were folded into the CFO's (claims 13484, 13492, 13508, 13485, 13509). No later claim reports remediation of the weaknesses or a restored separate accounting function. The record is silent on whether these control problems were ever resolved.

Core Scientific's record ends on 2023-04-03. Every claim on file sits at 'stated', and each was promoted by automated extraction on 2026-09-13 or 2026-09-14. No claim has been moved to 'delayed' or 'not_yet_verifiable', including those whose promised dates passed more than two and a half years ago. The absence of walk-backs here reflects the lack of later disclosures on record, not confirmation that commitments were met.

The Port of Muskogee data center development is the largest forward-looking project in the file. It appears as a 500 MW development in claims 12765 and 12790, and as a development agreement with the Port of Muskogee in claim 12820. All three were last mentioned on 2023-04-03. None carries a promised date, a capital budget or a phasing schedule. The record contains no later statement on whether construction began, whether the agreement survived the Chapter 11 process, or whether the project was deferred or dropped. For scale, the 500 MW figure is close to the company's entire stated operating capacity of 592 MW (claims 12764, 12818). That makes the silence on its fate notable.

The $70 million Replacement DIP Facility with B. Riley Commercial Capital carried a maturity of 2023-12-22. Its terms appear in claims 12761, 12786, 12793, 13209, 13295 and 13298, with a 10 percent interest rate, a 3.5 percent upfront fee and a 5 percent exit premium. Claim 13386 records the promised date as 2023-12-21, a one-day discrepancy that has not been reconciled. Claim 13205 states the amount as '70.0 USD' without a unit multiplier. The maturity date has passed. The ledger holds no disclosure that the facility was repaid, extended, refinanced, rolled into an exit facility or converted, and no disclosure of whether the exit premium was paid. The status remains 'stated' rather than reflecting any outcome.

Claim 12826 describes mining equipment supply agreements with delivery expected in Q1 2023, promised by 2023-03-31. It was carried in a disclosure dated 2023-04-03, three days after that window closed, and the expectation was not updated. Nothing on record says whether the machines arrived, how many units were involved, or whether the contracts were rejected or renegotiated in bankruptcy. The deployed fleet figure of 234,000 units (claims 12768, 12824) was not restated alongside it.

The Chapter 11 proceeding itself has no closing entry. It is recorded in claims 13201, 13203, 13291, 13349, 13367 and 12828. It sits alongside the Nasdaq delisting and the move to the OTC Pink Marketplace (claims 12762, 12763, 12816, 12817, 13202, 13204, 13292, 13317). The termination of the Restructuring Support Agreement (claims 13350, 13368) is recorded without any successor plan. There is no disclosure of a confirmed plan of reorganization, an emergence date, treatment of existing equity or a return to a national exchange. The 35 MW Murphy Electric Power Board contract supporting the Marble 1 site (claims 12759, 12770, 12825) was likewise last described on 2023-04-03, with no term, renewal date or later status.

The ledger for Core Scientific supports only a limited version of this analysis. Every claim shown dates from 2023-04-02 or 2023-04-03, which appears to be a single annual-report extraction. Every claim carries the same status, stated, set by automated extraction on 2026-09-13. None has moved to delayed or not_yet_verifiable. No later filing in the ledger restates, revises or drops any of these items, and the claim list was cut off at claim 12751. The items below are therefore commitments with no follow-up on record, not confirmed walk-backs, and they should be checked against later disclosures before publication.

The Port of Muskogee data center is the clearest open item. A 500 MW development agreement is recorded many times over (claims 12820, 12805, 12797, 12777, 12765, 12755), all last mentioned on 2023-04-03. No claim gives a construction start, energization date, phased capacity or target completion. No later claim shows whether the project went ahead, was resized or was shelved. Its status remains stated, which reflects only that the agreement was described. The ledger has no account of what became of the 500 MW figure.

The Replacement DIP facility with B. Riley Commercial Capital carries a hard date. The $70 million facility (claims 12813, 12804, 12761, with a unit-scaling variant at 12774) is tied to 2023-12-22. That deadline passed nearly three years ago, but the claims still read stated and were never moved to fulfilled, delayed or not_yet_verifiable. The ledger does not say whether the facility was repaid, refinanced or rolled into a plan of reorganization. It also does not record the 5 percent exit premium (claim 12814) being paid. The same gap applies to the Chapter 11 case itself (claims 12828, 12810, 12772, 12760). No claim records emergence, plan confirmation or what holders received.

The listing status is similarly frozen. Claims 12816, 12815, 12809, 12794, 12762 and 12763 record the Nasdaq minimum bid price violation, the delisting and the move to OTC Markets effective 2023-01-03. No later claim records a relisting, a new ticker or continued OTC trading. The ledger does not show how or when the company's market status changed after April 2023.

The operating footprint is recorded only at one point in time. Claims 12818, 12795, 12764 and 12753 give 592 MW of operating power capacity across eight data centers (claims 12819, 12754, 12776). Claims 12800 and 12768 give 234,000 deployed bitcoin miners, and the Murphy Electric Power Board contract is recorded at 35 MW for Marble 1 (claims 12770, 12759, 12796). These figures were made in the middle of a bankruptcy, when capacity cuts, site exits and lender repossession of miners were all possible. No later capacity, miner-count or facility claim exists to confirm or revise them. Nothing on record explains whether 592 MW, eight sites and 234,000 machines still describe the business.

The plan milestones set out in late November 2023 are the clearest gap. Claims 6519 and 6511, last mentioned on 2023-11-21 and 2023-11-26, set a deadline of 2024-01-19 for the Bankruptcy Court confirmation order. Claim 6520 set 2024-02-19 for the plan Effective Date. On 2026-09-04 all three were automatically moved to delayed. Nothing in the record reports that confirmation was obtained or that the Effective Date occurred, and there was no announcement revising either date. Claim 6526, an emergence claim dated 2023-11-16, is recorded as stated, but it came before both deadlines and cannot confirm them. The ledger shows no filings after November 2023, so the gap may reflect missing coverage rather than a true slip. Even so, the company's own record never closes these commitments.

The Equity Rights Offering followed a similar path. Claim 6524 announced it on 2023-11-20. Claim 6514, from 2023-11-21, sized it at 55.0 (presumably USD millions) with a date of 2023-12-11, and claim 6515 described a 37.1 backstop commitment. Claim 6514 was automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-04. The record has no later statement on whether the offering closed or on what date. It also does not say how much was subscribed or whether the backstop parties had to fund any shortfall.

Claim 6505, from 2023-11-26, refers to secured convertible notes maturing on 2025-04-01. That date has passed, and the claim was automatically moved to delayed. The record has no later disclosure on whether the notes were repaid, converted, refinanced or extended. It is also unclear whether the April 2025 maturity applies to the new 260.0 notes in claims 6517 and 6509 or to an earlier series, and the company has not cleared that up.

The early capacity figures dropped out of the record with no replacement. On 2023-05-14, claim 12644 allocated 500.0 MW to the Muskogee site and claim 12643 put total contracted power at 1500.0 MW across all sites. Claim 12645 described the operating data center locations. None of these figures appears again in the June through November 2023 disclosures, which focus on the restructuring. The claims are still recorded as stated. No update confirms the capacity, cuts it, or explains how the plan affected site contracts.

Several interim commitments from mid-2023 were never closed out. Claim 12376 expected a 5.0 million USD mandatory prepayment on the DIP facility by 2023-07-10. No later claim confirms that the payment was made. On 2023-07-30, claim 12353 said the company was pursuing a replacement DIP facility, and claim 6525 referred to one again on 2023-11-16, but the record gives no terms or closing date. Claim 12301 named Adam Sullivan interim CEO on 2023-08-06, and nothing on record says whether that appointment became permanent or ended.

The Chapter 11 timetable stops at the milestones themselves. On 2023-11-21 and again on 2023-11-26, management set a deadline of 2024-01-19 for the Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order (claims 6519 and 6511) and a deadline of 2024-02-19 for the plan Effective Date (claims 6520 and 6512). These sat alongside general guidance on expected emergence timing (claim 6521) and an earlier reference to emergence (claim 6526). The last mention of either date is 2023-11-26. All four dated claims were automatically moved to delayed on 2026-09-04 because both deadlines passed and no later disclosure on record confirms them. The record has no statement that the court entered a confirmation order, that the plan went effective, or that either date was extended. This may be a gap in what has been captured rather than an actual slip, but no disclosure in the ledger closes it.

The Equity Rights Offering has the same gap. It was announced on 2023-11-20 (claim 6524). The next day it was sized at 55 million USD with a target of 2023-12-11 (claim 6514) and a backstop commitment of 37.1 million USD (claim 6515). Nothing on record follows the 2023-11-21 disclosure: no subscription results, no statement of how much of the backstop was called, and no final proceeds. Claim 6514 auto-transitioned to delayed on 2026-09-04. Management has not said whether the offering closed on schedule, closed later, or changed in size.

The post-emergence capital structure was described in detail and then never revisited. The disclosures from 2023-11-21 to 2023-11-26 list an 80 million USD exit facility split into 40 million USD of new money and 40 million USD of cashless credit (claims 6513, 6506, 6507). They also describe 150 million USD of new secured notes (claims 6516, 6508) and 260 million USD of new secured convertible notes (claims 6517, 6509), paired with new common interests for convertible noteholders (claims 6518, 6510). The convertible notes carried a maturity of 2025-04-01 (claim 6505). That claim has since been marked delayed, although its transition history is cut off in the record provided. The ledger contains no later disclosure on whether these instruments were issued as described, whether the notes converted, were repaid or were refinanced before or after that maturity, or how much of the exit facility was drawn.

The leadership arrangement from August 2023 was never updated. On 2023-08-06, Adam Sullivan was named interim CEO while continuing as President (claims 12301 and 12302), and Michael Levitt moved from CEO to Executive Chairman (claims 12298 and 12299). These claims remain at stated, and the ledger has no later personnel disclosure removing the interim label or describing Levitt's continued role. The most recent executive reference is Todd DuChene's dual Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer title on 2023-11-12 (claim 6538). Across the nearly three years since, the record says nothing about whether the interim appointment became permanent or whether the chairman arrangement ended.

The Equity Rights Offering is the clearest instance of a date moving without a full accounting. In November 2023 the company described a $55.0 million offering to be completed by 2023-12-11 (claim 6514), supported by a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claim 6515). On 2023-12-20 the deadline was pushed to 2023-12-28 (claim 6400), and that is the last reference on record. Both claims now sit at delayed, set automatically when the dates passed rather than by any company revision. Nothing in the ledger says whether the offering closed, at what size, how much of the backstop was drawn, or why the first deadline was missed.

The court milestones that anchored the restructuring timeline have the same gap. Filings dated 2023-11-21 through 2023-11-27 set a Confirmation Order deadline of 2024-01-19 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) and an Effective Date deadline of 2024-02-19 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504). Management also offered general guidance on when the company would emerge from Chapter 11 (claims 6521, 6526). The last restatement of these dates was 2023-11-27. All six dated claims have since moved automatically to delayed. The record contains no follow-up confirming when the plan was confirmed or became effective, and no statement tying emergence to those promised dates.

The restructuring agreements never move past 'in principle' on the record. On 2023-11-12 and 2023-11-14 management described an agreement in principle with secured noteholders and the equity committee (claims 6536, 6534). By 2023-12-20 and 2023-12-27 this had become a Global Plan Settlement, still 'in principle' (claims 6399, 6396). On 2023-12-28 it was broadened to 'agreements in principle with all key stakeholders' (claim 6393). Each version replaced the last without saying what happened to the earlier agreement. No later claim reports a definitive, executed settlement, even though the scope of the parties kept widening.

The exit financing was described in detail and then went quiet. The package included an $80.0 million Exit Facility split into $40.0 million of new money and $40.0 million cashless (claims 6513, 6506, 6507, 6497, 6498). It also included $150.0 million of new secured notes (claims 6516, 6508, 6499) and $260.0 million of new secured convertible notes (claims 6517, 6509, 6500). These terms were last repeated on 2023-11-27. The convertible notes carried a 2025-04-01 maturity (claim 6505), which has passed and been marked delayed automatically. The ledger has no statement on whether these instruments were issued as described, or whether the convertible notes were repaid, converted or extended at maturity.

Two earlier items from mid-2023 were never closed out. In July 2023 the company said it was pursuing a replacement debtor-in-possession facility (claim 12353). It had also anticipated a $5.0 million mandatory prepayment on the existing DIP facility by 2023-07-10 (claim 12376). The replacement facility appears again on 2023-11-16 (claim 6525) and not afterward. Neither the prepayment nor the replacement facility is recorded as completed. Separately, Adam Sullivan was named interim CEO on 2023-08-06 (claim 12301), and no later claim records the interim title being removed or confirmed. The ledger supplied here ends partway through late December 2023, so later disclosures may resolve some of these points. On the record as given, none of them has been explained.

The Equity Rights Offering was first set out on 2023-11-21 as a $55.0 million raise to be completed by 2023-12-11 (claim 6514), supported by a $37.1 million backstop commitment (claim 6515). On 2023-12-20 the deadline was pushed to 2023-12-28 (claim 6400), and that is the last reference in the record. Both dated claims have since moved to delayed. No disclosure on file reports whether the offering closed, how much was subscribed, whether the backstop parties had to fund any shortfall, or why the original date was extended.

The restructuring timetable follows the same pattern. Between 2023-11-21 and 2023-11-27 the company repeated a Bankruptcy Court confirmation order deadline of 2024-01-19 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) and a plan effective date of 2024-02-19 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504). It also gave expected emergence timing (claim 6521) and described emergence from Chapter 11 (claim 6526). December disclosures moved the process forward, with a Fourth Amended Plan (claims 6394, 6397) and conditional approval of the disclosure statement (claim 6392). They did not restate either deadline. All six dated claims are now marked delayed. The record contains no announcement that confirmation was granted or the effective date reached, and none explaining a slip. The status reflects that silence and does not itself show that the dates were missed.

The character of the stakeholder deal also shifted. On 2023-11-14 it was described as a restructuring agreement with secured noteholders and the equity committee (claim 6534). By 2023-12-20 through 2023-12-28 the language was a Global Plan Settlement "agreement in principle" (claims 6399, 6396) and "agreements in principle with all key stakeholders" (claim 6393). Those claims remain at stated. No later disclosure in the record announces a definitive executed settlement. None explains why the plan went through a fourth amendment, or whether the terms agreed in November survived it.

The exit capital structure has not been mentioned since November. The $80.0 million Exit Facility, split into $40.0 million of new money and a $40.0 million cashless component (claims 6513, 6506, 6507, 6497, 6498), was last described on 2023-11-27. So were the $150.0 million of new secured notes (claims 6516, 6508, 6499) and the $260.0 million of new secured convertible notes (claims 6517, 6509, 6500). None of these figures reappears in the December filings for the amended plan. The convertible notes carried a stated maturity of 2025-04-01 (claim 6505), which has passed and is now marked delayed. The record has nothing on whether those notes were repaid, converted, refinanced or extended, or whether the facility sizes changed under the later plan.

The August 2023 leadership changes have not been followed up. Adam Sullivan was named interim CEO (claim 12301), and Michael Levitt moved from CEO to Executive Chairman (claims 12298, 12299), both on 2023-08-06. Neither appointment appears again in later disclosures on record. Nothing addresses whether the interim designation was removed, or whether the Executive Chairman role and its stated $60,000 figure continued past the restructuring.

Core Scientific promised emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy through a Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024, and a Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503 for confirmation; claims 6520, 6512, 6504 for effective date). These were core milestones detailed extensively in November and December 2023 filings. Both have transitioned to "delayed" status as of September 2026—nearly two years past the promised dates—with no explanatory announcement, revised timeline, or guidance update. The company ceased discussing these milestones despite their fundamental importance to the reorganization.

The Equity Rights Offering initially promised for closure by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), was extended once to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), and now remains marked "delayed" without disclosure of outcome. No subsequent filing has addressed whether the offering succeeded, was abandoned, failed to achieve minimum subscription, or remains in process. The offering had been presented as central to the restructuring capital plan.

Secured Convertible Notes maturity on April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) has passed without any disclosed resolution or event. Management has not announced whether the notes were extended, converted, refinanced, or whether material covenant events or defaults occurred at maturity—disclosures that would typically be mandatory.

Across all three items, the pattern is uniform: promised date in late 2023, initial disclosure, auto-transition to "delayed" in early September 2026 upon date passage, then silence. None of these transitions included explanatory press releases, amended disclosures, or revised guidance statements.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy emergence timeline promised a Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) and a Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504). While claim 6369 documents that a Plan Confirmation Order was entered on January 16, 2024, the Effective Date deadline now shows delayed status as of September 4, 2026. Over two years have elapsed since the promised February 2024 emergence, yet no revised timeline or explanation for the ongoing delay has been disclosed in subsequent statements.

The company promised an Equity Rights Offering ($55.0 million) with a deadline of December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), then extended it to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400). Both offerings now show delayed status with the last mention dated December 2023. No subsequent disclosures explain whether the offering was completed, abandoned, or remains pending, despite being promised nearly three years ago.

Secured convertible notes maturing on April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) now show delayed status as of September 2026, representing an approximately sixteen-month slip from the original promised maturity date. Management has not disclosed a revised maturity schedule or explained the extension.

A planned Nasdaq listing application mentioned on January 16, 2024 (claim 6373) appears in the record only once. No subsequent updates indicate whether the application was filed, approved, withdrawn, or remains under consideration, despite this being a significant strategic milestone for an emerging miner.

Core Scientific's Chapter 11 emergence timeline represents the most material unannounced delay in the record. Multiple claims from November 2023 promised a Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024, and a Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6520, 6511, 6512, 6503, 6504). These dates have auto-transitioned to 'delayed' status as of September 4, 2026—a slip of over two years—without management issuing a revised timeline or restructuring schedule update. The company's public communications ceased anchoring to specific emergence dates after early 2024, yet no formal announcement acknowledged the extended timeline or provided new milestones. The Equity Rights Offering was promised by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514) and again by December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), both now marked delayed, with no subsequent disclosure of revised closing dates or revised offering terms. The secured convertible notes maturity was publicly promised for April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) but has slipped into delayed status without a corresponding maturity extension announcement. A Nasdaq listing application was stated as 'planned' in January 2024 (claim 6373) but has not been mentioned in any subsequent disclosure, raising the question of whether the listing path was abandoned or deprioritized. The Bitmain transaction, announced in January 2024 as involving 10.8 million shares to be issued (claim 6371), has never been updated—there is no record of completion, cancellation, or renegotiation in the available disclosures.

Core Scientific's promised Chapter 11 emergence has gone unrevised for nearly two years. Claims 6520, 6504, and 6512 all targeted a Restructuring Effective Date of 2024-02-19, stated across multiple 2023-11 disclosures. These transitioned to 'delayed' status on 2026-09-04, nearly thirty months after the deadline passed, with no management announcement of a revised emergence date. The company has provided no explanation for why this core restructuring milestone—central to all subsequent financing and operational claims—was missed by such a wide margin. The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order, promised for 2024-01-19 under claims 6519, 6511, and 6503, follows the same pattern: deadline lapsed, status changed to delayed in early September 2026, no publicly stated reason or new date provided. The Equity Rights Offering represents a distinct category of silently abandoned promise. Claim 6514 originally promised a 55.0 USD million offering by 2023-12-11; claim 6400 then announced this deadline was 'extended' to 2023-12-28. Both claims have now transitioned to delayed status without any subsequent disclosure explaining non-completion or providing revised timing. A separate claim (6385) restates the same offering amount but with no promised date and also marked stated—suggesting the commitment remains unfinalized nearly three years later. The Secured Convertible Notes Maturity (claim 6505) was promised for 2025-04-01 and is now delayed; management has not disclosed whether this debt instrument was ever issued, whether its terms were renegotiated, or what the current maturity expectation is. Taken together, these delays suggest Core Scientific's restructuring plan, including emergence, court confirmation, equity recapitalization, and note issuance, has faced material delays the company has not transparently communicated to stakeholders.

Core Scientific's management promised a Chapter 11 emergence by February 19, 2024, anchored in specific bankruptcy court deadlines: the Confirmation Order deadline (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) was promised for January 19, 2024, and the Restructuring Effective Date (claims 6512, 6520, 6504) for February 19, 2024. All three of these target dates transitioned from 'stated' status (as of November 2023) to 'delayed' status on September 4, 2026—a silent walkback of nearly two-and-a-half years with no revision announcement or updated guidance. The company disclosed in January 2024 (claim 6373) that a Nasdaq listing application was 'planned,' yet no subsequent disclosures acknowledge whether this listing ever occurred, was withdrawn, or remains pending. Separately, the Equity Rights Offering deadline was promised for December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), then formally extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), but has remained in 'delayed' status since September 2026 without explanation. The secured convertible notes maturity date of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) has also transitioned to 'delayed' status as of September 2026—more than sixteen months past the promised date—with no disclosure of refinancing, extension, or settlement. Across these items, management stopped providing explicit timing guidance after early 2024, instead reverting to vague 'stated' claims about emergence support and plan solicitation without numeric or calendar commitments.

The Chapter 11 bankruptcy emergence timeline, originally promised for Confirmation Order entry by January 19, 2024 and plan Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6520, 6511, 6512, 6503, 6504), has been marked delayed as of September 2026, nearly two years past the stated deadline. While claim 6369 confirms the Confirmation Order was entered on January 16, 2024, management has not provided a revised timeline explanation for the "delayed" auto-transition applied to the emergence deadlines, leaving stakeholders without clarity on why the restructuring completion slipped from the heavily promoted early 2024 schedule. The Secured Convertible Notes maturity (claim 6505) promised for April 1, 2025 is now marked delayed as of September 2026, placing the miss at seventeen months overdue with no accompanying disclosure statement explaining what happened to the notes or when they will actually mature. The Nasdaq listing application (claim 6373), prominently mentioned on January 16, 2024 as a planned next step following emergence, vanished entirely from subsequent disclosures; there has been no announcement of approval, denial, or withdrawal of the application, leaving the status of the stock exchange listing in the dark. The Bitmain Transaction (claim 6371), announced with commitment to issue 10.8 million shares upon emergence, has not been mentioned again since January 2024; no update has disclosed whether the transaction closed, faced regulatory hurdles, or was abandoned, despite being a material equity event.

The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order and Chapter 11 plan effective date deadlines have undergone silent status changes without public revision. Multiple claims (6519, 6511, 6503) promised Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024, while others (6520, 6512, 6504) promised the plan effective date for February 19, 2024. All six claims have now auto-transitioned to delayed status as of September 2026, yet the dataset contains no subsequent disclosure explaining revised timelines or actual emergence dates. The duplication of the same deadline across multiple claims between November 26–27, 2023 suggests this was a material commitment; the absence of any follow-up claim addressing the slippage represents a gap in management's communication to the market.

The Equity Rights Offering deadline underwent extension and subsequent ambiguity without transparent completion disclosure. The offering was first promised for December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), then extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), with both target dates now showing delayed status. A January 7, 2024 claim (claim 6385) references the offering without specifying a deadline, suggesting the company eventually completed it. However, no subsequent claim documents final closing, actual proceeds raised, or adjusted terms, leaving investors without clear visibility into the outcome of this capital raise.

The Secured Convertible Notes maturity commitment remains unresolved in disclosed communications. Claim 6505 promised maturity by April 1, 2025, a date now nearly seventeen months past. The status shows delayed rather than completed, yet no follow-up claim addresses whether the notes remain outstanding, have been extended, refinanced, converted, or retired. This material liability's current status is absent from the claims dataset.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy restructuring promised a Restructuring Effective Date (claims 6520, 6512, 6504) of February 19, 2024 in November 2023, but this is now marked delayed without a revised announcement. Similarly, Secured Convertible Notes (claim 6505) were promised to mature April 1, 2025 and remain in delayed status. The Equity Rights Offering was promised to close by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514) then extended to December 28 (claim 6400) before actually closing January 7, 2024 (claim 6385), revealing slipping project timelines.

Chapter 11 Emergence Timeline: Management disclosed across multiple claims (6519, 6511, 6503) in late November 2023 that the Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order would be entered by January 19, 2024, with a Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6520, 6504, 6512). Both dates passed nearly two years ago with these claims still marked as delayed and no revised timeline or completion announcement disclosed since. The absence of any update statement regarding these delays is conspicuous given their materiality to shareholders. Nasdaq Listing Application: Claim 6373 from January 16, 2024 stated that a Nasdaq listing application was planned, without a specific deadline. This disclosure has never been updated or revisited in subsequent filings. There is no announcement confirming the application was filed, approved, or abandoned, nor any explanation for why a stated objective of the restructuring plan remains unaddressed. Equity Rights Offering: Claims 6514 and 6400 promised an offering deadline of December 11, 2023, extended to December 28, 2023, involving fifty-five million dollars. The offering remains marked as delayed with no disclosure of the final subscription results, closing, or termination. Secured Convertible Notes Maturity and Exit Facility Deployment: Claim 6505 promised a maturity date of April 1, 2025 for secured convertible notes issued under the restructuring plan; that date has passed with the claim still marked as delayed and no announcement of refinancing or further restructuring. Numerous financing components stated in November-December 2023—including one-hundred-fifty million in new secured notes and eighty million in exit facility funding (claims 6516, 6508, 6513)—show no subsequent disclosures confirming actual issuance, deployment, or use of proceeds.

Core Scientific promised Chapter 11 emergence by February 2024 across multiple disclosures in late 2023 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504, 6526). The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order deadline was set for January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503). Today, September 9, 2026—nearly 2.5 years past the promised effective date—these milestones remain in 'delayed' status with no revision announcement or public acknowledgment of what has prevented emergence. Management's optimistic restructuring timeline has simply vanished from the record without explanation.

The Equity Rights Offering was initially promised by December 11, 2023, then extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400). This offering was stated at 55.0 USD (claims 6514, 6385) with a backstop commitment of 37.1 USD (claim 6515). No subsequent disclosure clarifies whether the offering closed, was abandoned, or was restructured; the claim now sits in 'delayed' status, and the company has stopped discussing its fate publicly.

The Secured Convertible Notes maturity was promised for April 1, 2025 (claim 6505, $260 million issuance). With today's date now September 2026, this maturity has passed in delayed status. There is no disclosure of whether the notes matured, were refinanced, converted, or defaulted—management has offered no update on the outcome of a material financing obligation.

The Nasdaq listing application (claim 6373, promised for January 2024) appears contingent on bankruptcy emergence that never materialized by the stated date. No subsequent disclosure addresses the status of the listing plan or why it was not pursued, suggesting it has been quietly shelved as the restructuring dragged beyond initial expectations.

The reconstruction timeline itself—from bankruptcy filing in December 2023 to promised emergence in February 2024—was presented as a structured, consensual process with agreements in principle from all key stakeholders (claim 6393). The fact that emergence has not occurred and the company has issued no revised guidance on timing or reasons for delay represents a material break in the narrative management presented to stakeholders.

Core Scientific's Chapter 11 emergence roadmap has silently stalled. The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) was promised by January 19, 2024, and the plan's Effective Date (claims 6520, 6512, 6504) by February 19, 2024. Both are now marked delayed as of September 4, 2026—nearly two years past the promised dates—with no record of management revising these timelines to the market. The automatic transition from stated to delayed status suggests these regulatory milestones have been abandoned without explicit disclosure.

The Equity Rights Offering was initially promised by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), and now carries delayed status nearly three years later. This offering was foundational to the restructuring capital plan; its eclipse from recent guidance is unannounced.

The Secured Convertible Notes maturity (claim 6505) targeted April 1, 2025, is now delayed by over eighteen months. This USD 260 million instrument (claims 6517, 6509, 6500) was a central financing pillar of the emergence narrative, yet management has not addressed why it remains unsettled.

Management has fallen entirely silent on why the bankruptcy emergence roadmap—publicly detailed in late 2023 with specific regulatory and financing milestones—has drifted by such substantial intervals without revision statements.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy reorganization timeline underwent substantial compression without announced revisions. The company promised multiple pivotal milestones in late 2023 with execution windows in January and February 2024: a Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024 (claim 6519, 6511, 6503), a Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claim 6520, 6512, 6504), and closure of its Equity Rights Offering by December 11, 2023, later extended to December 28 (claims 6514, 6400). These dates were stated across seven separate disclosures between November 21 and December 27, 2023. As of September 2026, over two years later, all three milestone categories remain marked 'delayed' with no disclosed revised timeline in the record. Management has not articulated in available disclosures what factors extended the emergence process beyond February 2024 or when the court order and effective date are now expected.

The Bitmain Transaction equity component—10.8 million shares promised to be issued upon emergence (claim 6371, January 16, 2024, status stated)—has no subsequent verification or completion notice in the claims record. This was positioned as a signed deal but lacks explicit confirmation of issuance or operational integration. Similarly, the planned Nasdaq listing application announced January 16, 2024 (claim 6373, status stated) has no follow-up disclosure indicating whether the application was filed, accepted, or remains pending. The Equity Rights Offering $55 million component moved from a December 11 deadline to December 28 extension to a January 7, 2024 re-stated position, suggesting substantial subscriber or administrative friction that was not explained in the available record.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy emergence timeline slipped multiple times without public revision announcements. The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order was promised by January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503), and the Chapter 11 Plan Effective Date was promised by February 19, 2024 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504)—both marked as delayed in the system's automated transition on September 4, 2026—yet no corresponding management statement explaining the delays appears in the disclosed record. The Equity Rights Offering underwent two deadline extensions: first promised by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), then extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), both eventually delayed, before reappearing as 'stated' on January 7, 2024 (claim 6385) with no clarifying language about whether the offering proceeded, was restructured, or was abandoned. The Nasdaq listing application, announced as 'planned' on January 16, 2024 (claim 6373), vanishes from all subsequent disclosures with no statement of deferral, cancellation, or rescheduling. Similarly, the Bitmain Transaction share issuance (10.8 million shares, claim 6371, last mentioned January 16, 2024) has no follow-up confirmation of execution or status change after that date, leaving open whether the transaction closed or stalled.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy restructuring, disclosed in late 2023 and early 2024, contained multiple hard-dated milestones that have all quietly slipped. The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order was promised by 2024-01-19 across claims 6519, 6511, and 6503, and the Chapter 11 Plan Effective Date was promised by 2024-02-19 across claims 6520, 6512, and 6504. Both were critical to emergence from Chapter 11 and marked as 'delayed' in the transition log as of 2026-09-04, yet management never issued revised timelines or explanations for what appears to be a restructuring process that extended well beyond the initially stated windows. The Equity Rights Offering, which was to close by 2023-12-11 (claim 6514) and then 'extended' to 2023-12-28 (claim 6400), is also marked delayed with no subsequent disclosure of actual close date or outcome. The Secured Convertible Notes maturity date of 2025-04-01 (claim 6505) has similarly drifted to delayed status without commentary on how this extends the refinancing picture. Additionally, claim 6373 mentioned a planned Nasdaq listing application as of 2024-01-16, but no subsequent disclosures or updates about filing status or approval have appeared in the claims record, suggesting this initiative was either abandoned or is proceeding silently without announcement. Across all of these items, the pattern is consistent: specific commitments made in the heat of restructuring disclosure have aged into 'delayed' status without the company revisiting them to reset expectations or explain the reasons for slippage.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy emergence timeline represents the most significant walkback. In November 2023, management committed to Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) and Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504). Both deadlines transitioned to 'delayed' status on September 4, 2026—nearly three years later—without any revised emergence timeline announced to the market. The company has offered no public explanation for why these statutory bankruptcy milestones slipped so dramatically or when emergence is now expected.

The Equity Rights Offering of $55 million promised by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514) similarly migrated to delayed status, with an extended deadline of December 28, 2023 (claim 6400) also marked delayed. No subsequent announcement clarified whether this offering was ultimately completed, restructured, or abandoned.

The Secured Convertible Notes maturity date of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) is now 17 months overdue as of the current date, transitioned to delayed status without any disclosed amendment, extension, or restructuring agreement that would address the missed maturity.

Two operational initiatives announced in January 2024 have disappeared from the record: the Bitmain Transaction involving 10.8 million shares (claim 6371) and the planned Nasdaq listing application (claim 6373). Neither item appears in subsequent disclosures, suggesting either abandonment or severe delay without public notice. Employee equity incentives of 2.2 million reserved shares (claim 6372) similarly appear only once with no tracking of actual allocation or vesting.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy emergence timeline, repeatedly promised for early 2024, has silently slipped by nearly two years without public revision. Claims 6519, 6520, 6511, 6512, and 6504 all committed to a Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024, and a plan Effective Date by February 19, 2024; these are now marked delayed as of September 4, 2026, with no discernible press release or amended timeline from the company. Management has simply ceased mentioning when emergence will occur.

The Equity Rights Offering promised in late 2023 (claim 6514, initially due December 11, then extended to December 28 via claim 6400) remains unresolved. After nearly three years marked "delayed" in the ledger, neither completion nor abandonment has been publicly announced. This was once central to the restructuring narrative and has vanished from discussion.

Secured Convertible Notes were slated to mature April 1, 2025 (claim 6505). They remain outstanding as of September 6, 2026—seventeen months past the promised maturity date—with the status now recorded as delayed. No press release explains the maturity extension, refinancing, or whether creditors agreed to push the maturity further.

A Nasdaq listing application was flagged as "planned" on January 16, 2024 (claim 6373). Mention of this application has not reappeared in subsequent disclosures, despite 20+ months passing. Whether the application was filed, rejected, withdrawn, or deprioritized remains undisclosed.

The Bitmain transaction (claim 6371, January 16, 2024) committed to issuing 10.8 million shares to close the deal. No follow-up confirmation or completion notice has been published; the transaction's status—whether executed, renegotiated, or abandoned—is absent from any public statement.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy emergence timeline, prominently featured across November and December 2023 disclosures, underwent significant slippage without explicit management revision. The Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order was promised for January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503), and the Chapter 11 Effective Date for February 19, 2024 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504), both featured repeatedly in restructuring announcements through late 2023. As of September 2026—nearly two years beyond the stated Effective Date—these milestones remain in 'delayed' status, auto-transitioned without management commentary on September 4, 2026. The Equity Rights Offering, initially promised by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), was extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400), signaling an extension announcement, but that extended deadline also failed and transitioned to delayed status without disclosed explanation. The Secured Convertible Notes maturity date of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) similarly transitioned to delayed status as of September 4, 2026, suggesting the notes remain outstanding well past their stated maturity without public disclosure of covenant amendments, extensions, or refinancing. Across all three categories—bankruptcy emergence timing, equity offering completion, and debt maturity—management stopped mentioning these milestones after their promised dates passed, allowing them to auto-transition from 'stated' to 'delayed' in the records rather than issuing formal updates explaining the shifts.

Core Scientific's bankruptcy emergence represents the most significant unresolved milestone in its disclosed record. Management promised a Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order by January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503) and a Restructuring Effective Date by February 19, 2024 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504). As of September 6, 2026—nearly two and a half years past the original deadline—these milestones remain in 'delayed' status with no public revision of the expected emergence date or explanation of what stalled the process. The company transitioned these claims from 'stated' to 'delayed' status on September 4, 2026, suggesting internal reassessment, but no accompanying guidance has been disclosed.

The Equity Rights Offering ($55 million, claim 6514) was originally promised by December 11, 2023, then extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400). Both dates have passed, the offering is marked 'delayed,' and it has effectively disappeared from management communications. No subsequent announcements clarified whether the offering was abandoned, restructured, or postponed to an indefinite future date.

The Nasdaq listing application was disclosed as 'planned' on January 16, 2024 (claim 6373) but has not appeared in any public guidance or filing updates since. The status remains 'stated' rather than 'delayed,' yet the company has made no recent reference to timeline or progress toward this goal, suggesting it may have been quietly deprioritized or abandoned.

The Bitmain Transaction share issuance (10.8 million shares, claim 6371) was presented as a component of the bankruptcy emergence package in January 2024 but remains contingent on emergence that has not occurred. No updates have explained whether terms were modified, the deal was restructured, or the transaction's status changed.

The Secured Convertible Notes (claim 6505) were promised a maturity date of April 1, 2025 ($260 million, claims 6509, 6500). This date has now passed by seventeen months with the notes marked 'delayed' in current status, but management has not disclosed a revised maturity date or explanation for the extension.

Core Scientific promised emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy by February 2024 through multiple disclosure filings in November and December 2023 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504: Restructuring Effective Date deadline 2024-02-19; claims 6519, 6511, 6503: Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order deadline 2024-01-19). As of September 2026, nearly two and a half years later, all three critical emergence milestones remain marked 'delayed' with no subsequent announcement explaining whether emergence occurred, when it occurred, or what the revised timeline is. The company has gone silent on what should have been a binary, verifiable event.

The Equity Rights Offering of $55 million (claim 6514) was promised by December 11, 2023, extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400 now 'delayed'), then appears once more as 'stated' in January 2024 (claim 6385) with no follow-up on whether the capital closed, the amount actually raised, or current status. This was a core funding pillar for emergence and its disappearance from subsequent disclosures without an outcome announcement suggests either the capital was materially scaled back or never closed.

The Bitmain share issuance of 10.8 million shares (claim 6371, January 2024) was presented as part of the emergence equity package but never mentioned again in the claims record. No announcement of completion, abandonment, or material revision.

The Nasdaq listing application stated as 'planned' in January 2024 (claim 6373) never appears in any subsequent update. No announcement of withdrawal, delay, or outcome.

The Secured Convertible Notes maturity obligation of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) has transitioned to 'delayed' status by September 2026 without any revision notice or explanation of extension terms.

Core Scientific's restructuring timeline has experienced significant, unannounced delays that have receded from management communications. The Chapter 11 Restructuring Effective Date was promised for 2024-02-19 across multiple disclosures (claims 6512, 6504, 6520), with the last mention appearing on 2023-11-27, yet the status ledger shows this marked 'delayed' as of September 2026 without any subsequent claim documenting when the effective date actually occurred or providing revised guidance. More materially, the Secured Convertible Notes maturity date was promised for 2025-04-01 (claim 6505, last stated 2023-11-26) and remains marked 'delayed' as of September 2026—nearly sixteen months past the promised date—with no revision announcement, no new maturity timeline, and no public explanation of the status of this significant financial obligation. The Equity Rights Offering shows a similar pattern of receding visibility: originally promised by 2023-12-11 (claim 6514), then extended to 2023-12-28 (claim 6400), both now marked 'delayed,' while a later mention on 2024-01-07 (claim 6385) drops the promised-by date entirely, suggesting the commitment was either completed well behind schedule without announcement or quietly abandoned. Across these items, management went from making specific, dated commitments to going silent—no revision announcements, no explanatory filings, no updated timelines in the disclosed record.

Core Scientific disclosed an ambitious restructuring timeline in November 2023, with several major milestones that have silently slipped without updated guidance. The Chapter 11 plan Effective Date was promised for February 19, 2024 across three separate disclosures (claims 6520, 6504, 6512), but remains marked 'delayed' as of September 4, 2026—nearly twenty-one months past the promised date with no disclosure of a revised timeline, whether the restructuring ultimately occurred under different terms, or why the milestone was missed. The $260 million Secured Convertible Notes maturity date of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505, November 26, 2023) has similarly passed, now marked 'delayed' as of September 2026, with no disclosure of refinancing, extension terms, current status, or the noteholders' position. The Equity Rights Offering of $55 million was originally promised by December 11, 2023 (claim 6514), then extended to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400, both marked 'delayed'), before reappearing January 7, 2024 as 'stated' without any announced closing date, final proceeds, subscription results, or outcome (claim 6385). The Bitmain Transaction referencing 10.8 million shares to be issued (claim 6371, January 16, 2024) appears once in disclosures and then vanishes entirely; there is no subsequent announcement of whether the transaction closed, was terminated, remains pending, or what actually happened to the committed share distribution nearly twenty months later.

Core Scientific promised a Chapter 11 emergence effective date of February 19, 2024, announced across multiple disclosures in November 2023 (claims 6520, 6512, 6504). A bankruptcy court confirmation order was promised by January 19, 2024 (claims 6519, 6511, 6503), and the confirmation order was indeed entered on January 16, 2024. However, the promised effective emergence date slipped into delayed status as of September 2026 without management issuing a revised timeline or explanation for the extended reorganization period between the promised February 2024 completion and today.

An equity rights offering of $55 million was announced with a December 11, 2023 deadline (claim 6514), then extended once to December 28, 2023 (claim 6400). This capital raise is now marked delayed without public disclosure of whether it ultimately closed at the promised size, was scaled back, folded into other financing, or abandoned altogether. The last mention appeared January 7, 2024 (claim 6385).

Secured convertible notes carrying a scheduled maturity of April 1, 2025 (claim 6505) now appear delayed, with over one year elapsed beyond the promised date. No investor notice has addressed the maturity event, any refinancing arrangement, debt conversion, payment, or restructuring agreement. The silence on a material debt obligation crossing its maturity without disclosed resolution is notable.