Pugh v. Nelson University — Entry #1: COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against Nelson University filed by Courtney Pugh
Case: Pugh v. Nelson University txnd · 3:26-cv-02548
filed July 31, 2026
What this document is
Docket entry #1 · filed July 31, 2026
COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against Nelson University filed by Courtney Pugh. (Filing fee $405; Receipt number ATXNDC-16666119) Plaintiff will submit summons(es) for issuance. In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements and Judge Specific Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information - Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Sheet) (Loginov, Leanna) (Entered: 07/31/2026)
Who is involved
- Nelson University
- Pugh
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its name “Riot Platforms, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
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- Applied Digital: its name “Applied Digital Corporation” appears in a filing in this case.
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A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 19, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
49 page(s), 104,376 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
Full text
Case 3:26-cv-02548-E Document 1 Filed 07/31/26 Page 1 of 49 PageID 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
COURTNEY PUGH, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly Case No.
situated,
Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION
NELSON UNIVERSITY, JURY DEMAND
Defendant.
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Courtney Pugh (“Plaintiff”), by and through undersigned counsel, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, alleges the following Class Action Complaint (the
“Action”) against Defendant Nelson University (“Defendant”) upon personal knowledge as to
herself and her own actions, and upon information and belief, including the investigation of
counsel as follows:
I. SUMMARY
1. Plaintiff brings this Action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated
victims as a result of a recent cyberattack and data breach involving personally identifiable
information and personal health information (collectively “Private Information”) suffered by
Defendant, which Defendant detected on or about April 6, 2025 (the “Data Breach”).
2. Defendant is a private, Christian university in Waxahachie, Texas.1
1
https://www.nelson.edu/about/ (last visited July 31, 2026).
1
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3. Plaintiff and individuals impacted by the Data Breach (the “Class” and the “Class
Members”) provided their Private Information to Defendant in connection with the education
services Defendant provides.
4. On or about April 6, 2025, Defendant became aware that certain systems on its
network environment were affected by a data breach, and subsequently launched an investigation
into the matter. 2
5. On June 15, 2026, Defendant began sending notice letters to Plaintiff and Class
Members, informing them that their Private Information was exfiltrated in the Data Breach
(“Notice”).3
6. The following types of Private Information were compromised as a result of the
Data Breach: names, Social Security numbers, and individual taxpayer identification numbers.4
7. Defendant failed to adequately protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information––and failed to even encrypt or redact this highly sensitive information. This
unencrypted, unredacted Private Information was compromised due to Defendant’s negligent
and/or careless acts and omissions and its utter failure to protect individuals’ sensitive data.
Hackers targeted and obtained Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information because of its
value in exploiting and stealing the identities of Plaintiff and Class Members. The present and
continuing risk to victims of the Data Breach will remain for their respective lifetimes.
8. As a result of Defendant’s inadequate security and breach of its duties and
obligations, the Data Breach occurred, and Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information
was accessed and disclosed. This action seeks to remedy these failings and their consequences.
2 See Defendant’s notice letter, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3 Id.
4 Id.
2
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Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all persons whose Private Information was
exposed as a result of the Data Breach.
9. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s Private Information is available on the dark
web as a result of the Data Breach.
10. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons whose Private Information was
compromised as a result of Defendant’s failure to: (i) adequately protect the Private Information
of Plaintiff and Class Members; (ii) warn Plaintiff and Class Members of Defendant’s inadequate
information security practices; and (iii) effectively secure hardware containing protected Private
Information using reasonable and effective security procedures free of vulnerabilities and
incidents. Defendant’s conduct amounts at least to negligence and violates federal and state
statutes.
11. Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by (a)
intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and reasonable measures
to ensure that its network servers were protected against unauthorized intrusions; (b) failing to
disclose that it did not have adequately robust security protocols and training practices in place to
safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information; (c) failing to take standard and
reasonably available steps to prevent the Data Breach; (d) concealing the existence and extent of
the Data Breach for an unreasonable duration of time; and (e) failing to provide Plaintiff and Class
Members prompt and accurate notice of the Data Breach.
12. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injury as a result of Defendant’s
conduct. These injuries include: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii)
lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated
with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the
3
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bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and (viii) the continued and certainly
increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for
unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant’s
possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to
undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.
13. Through this Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to remedy these harms on behalf of herself
and all similarly situated individuals whose Private Information was accessed during the Data
Breach.
14. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant seeking redress for its
unlawful conduct and asserting claims for: (i) negligence and negligence per se, (ii) breach of
implied contract, and (iii) unjust enrichment.
15. Plaintiff seeks remedies including, but not limited to, compensatory damages,
reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs, and injunctive relief including improvements to
Defendant’s data security systems, future annual audits, as well as long-term and adequate credit
monitoring services funded by Defendant, and declaratory relief.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and
costs. The number of class members is more than 100 and at least one member of the Class defined
below is a citizen of a different state that is diverse from Defendant’s citizenship5. Thus, minimal
diversity exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d) (2) (A).
5
Defendant reported the Data Breach to multiple states’ attorney generals, including California, Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Vermont. At least 9 Vermont residents and 295 Indiana residents were victims of the Data Breach.
See https://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/consumer-protection-division/id-theft-prevention/files/DB-Year-to-Date-
4
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17. This Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant
maintains its principal places of business in Texas, regularly conduct business in Texas, and enters
into contracts within the state of Texas.
18. Venue is proper in this Court because Defendant’s principal place of business is
located in this District, and because a substantial part of the events, acts, and omissions giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District.
III. PARTIES
Plaintiff
19. Plaintiff is an individual citizen and resident of Oak Leaf, Texas.
Defendant
20. Defendant is a private university in the State of Texas, maintaining its principal
place of business at 1200 Sycamore St., Waxahachie, Texas 75165.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Defendant’s Business
21. Defendant is a private, Christian university in Waxahachie, Texas. 6
22. Defendant collects personally identifiable information in the course of doing
business. This personally identifiable information includes the Private Information of Plaintiff and
Class Members which was compromised in the Data Breach alleged herein. But for Defendant’s
collection of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information, Defendant would be unable to
provide its services.
Report-7_2026.pdf; https://ago.vermont.gov/categories/security-breach-notices;
https://oag.ca.gov/ecrime/databreach/reports/sb24-624948.
6
https://www.nelson.edu/about/ (last visited July 31, 2026).
5
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23. Upon information and belief, Defendant promises to maintain the confidentiality of
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information to ensure compliance with federal and state
laws and regulations, and not to use or disclose Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information
for non-essential purposes.
24. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff’s and Class
Members’ Private Information, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or should
have known that it was responsible for protecting Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information from unauthorized disclosure.
25. Plaintiff and Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the
confidentiality of their Private Information. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted
Defendant with their Private Information had they known that Defendant would fail to implement
industry standard protections for that sensitive information.
26. Plaintiff and the Class Members relied on Defendant to keep their Private
Information confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business purposes
only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information.
27. Defendant assumed sole and exclusive control over its data security. Once Plaintiff
and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant, Defendant was in the
exclusive position to protect and safeguard the Private Information.
The Attack and Data Breach
28. On June 15, 2026, Defendant began sending notice letters (“Notice”) to affected
individuals, informing them of the Data Breach. 7 The Notice states:
What Happened?
7 Ex. A.
6
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On or about April 6, 2025, our IT team became aware of potential unauthorized
access on our network. Upon learning of this issue, we took steps to ensure the
security of our systems and we commenced a prompt and thorough investigation.
As part of our investigation, we have worked very closely with external
cybersecurity professionals experienced in handling these types of situations to
assist us in determining the full extent of the incident and the scope of any data
impacted. Our investigation revealed that an unauthorized actor accessed our
systems from on or about March 21, 2025, to on or about April 6, 2025, and, as a
result, possibly viewed and/or obtained certain files from our network. On or about
May 26, 2026, after an extensive forensic investigation and manual document
review, we discovered your personal information was included within the impacted
data.
What Information Was Involved
The impacted files contained your full name and Social Security number or
individual taxpayer identification number.8
29. To be clear, there are numerous issues with Defendant’s Data Breach, but the
deficiencies in the Data Breach Notice exacerbate the circumstances for victims of the Data
Breach: (1) Defendant fails to state whether it was able to contain or end the cybersecurity threat,
leaving victims to fear whether the Private Information that Defendant continues to maintain is
secure; (2) Defendant fails to state how the Breach itself occurred; (3) Defendant’s data security
measures are so insufficient that Defendant did not detect the Data Breach until the unauthorized
access had occurred for more than two weeks; and (4) Defendant waited over a full year after
learning of the Data Breach to notify affected individuals, depriving victims of the earliest
opportunity to take preventative measures to protect their Private Information. All of this
information is vital to victims of a data breach, let alone a data breach of this magnitude due to the
sensitivity of information compromised in this specific breach.
30. Despite Defendant’s intentional opacity about the root cause of this incident,
several facts may be gleaned from the Notice, including: a) that this Data Breach was the work of
8 Id.
7
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cybercriminals; b) that the cybercriminals first infiltrated Defendant’s networks and systems, and
downloaded data from the networks and systems (aka exfiltrated data, or in layperson’s terms
“stole” data); and c) that once inside Defendant’s networks and systems, the cybercriminals
targeted information including Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information and other
sensitive information for download and theft.
31. Moreover, in its Notice, Defendant failed to specify whether it undertook any
efforts to contact the Class Members whose data was accessed and acquired in the Data Breach to
inquire whether any of the Class Members suffered misuse of their data, whether Class Members
should report their misuse to Defendant, and whether Defendant set up any mechanism for Class
Members to report any misuse of their data.
32. Furthermore, Defendant’s delay in notifying Plaintiff and Class Members of the
Data Breach is in direct violation of Defendant’s responsibilities under the data breach notification
statute in Texas. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 521.053(b) which requires that the disclosure
notification be “made without unreasonable delay and in each case not later than the 60th day after
the date on which the person determines that the breach occurred”.
33. Defendant failed to meet this requirement by 375 days, as it learned of the Data
Breach on or about April 6, 2025, but waited to notify affected individuals until June 15, 2026.
34. Due to Defendant’s inadequate security measures, Plaintiff and the Class Members
now face a present, immediate, and ongoing risk of fraud and identity theft and must deal with that
threat forever.
35. Upon information and belief, the Private Information was not encrypted or redacted
prior to the Data Breach.
8
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36. Upon information and belief, the cyberattack was targeted at Defendant as a
company that collects and maintains valuable personal data from its many applicants, students,
employees, and other individuals interested in receiving Defendant’s services, including Plaintiff
and Class Members.
37. Upon information and belief, the cyberattack was expressly designed to gain access
to private and confidential data, including (among other things) the Private Information of Plaintiff
and Class Members.
38. Defendant had obligations to keep Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and disclosure.
39. Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant with
the reasonable expectation and on the mutual understanding that Defendant would comply with its
obligations to keep such information confidential and secure from unauthorized access.
40. Upon information and belief, Defendant made promises to Plaintiff and Class
Members to maintain and protect their Private Information, demonstrating an understanding of the
importance of securing Private Information.
41. Acknowledging the harm that the Data Breach presents, Defendant offered victims
one year of complimentary credit monitoring services – an offer that is inadequate considering that
victims of the Data Breach will likely suffer an increased risk of identity theft and other harms for
years into the future, if not for their respective lifetimes.9
The Data Breach Was Foreseeable and the Defendant Was Aware of Its Risk
42. It is well known that Private Information, including Social Security numbers in
particular, is an invaluable commodity and a frequent target of hackers.
9 Id.
9
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43. Defendant’s data security obligations were particularly important given the
substantial increase in cyber-attacks and/or data breaches targeting institutions that collect and
store Private Information, like Defendant, preceding the date of the Data Breach.
44. In 2023, a record 3,205 data breaches occurred in the United States, resulting in
about 349,221,481 sensitive records being exposed, a greater than 100% increase from 2019. 10
These statistics have held steady for 2024 – when 3,158 data compromises occurred. 11
45. Individuals place a high value not only on their Private Information, but also on the
privacy of that data. For the individual, identity theft causes significant negative financial impact
on victims as well as severe distress and other strong emotions and physical reactions.
46. In light of recent high profile data breaches at other industry leading companies,
including, T-Mobile, USA (37 million records, February-March 2023), 23andMe, Inc. (20 million
records, October 2023), Wilton Reassurance Company (1.4 million records, June 2023), NCB
Management Services, Inc. (1 million records, February 2023), LoanDepot (16.9 million affected,
January 2024), Evolve Bank & Trust (7.6 million affected, May 2024), Financial Business and
Consumer Solutions (4.2 million affected, February 2024), and Prudential Financial (2.5 million
affected, February 2024), Defendant knew or should have known that its electronic records would
be targeted by cybercriminals.
47. Indeed, cyberattacks have become so notorious that the FBI and U.S. Secret Service
have issued a warning to potential targets so they are aware of and take appropriate measures to
prepare for and are able to thwart such an attack.
10 10 ITRC (Identity Theft Resource Center), 2023 Data Breach Report (January 2024), available at
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/2023-annual-data-breach-report-reveals-record-number-of-compromises-72-percent-increase-
over-previous-high/ (last visited July 31, 2026).
11 11 ITRC (Identity Theft Resource Center), 2024 Data Breach Report (January 2025), available at
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/publication/2024-data-breach-report/ (last visited July 31, 2026).
10
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48. Additionally, as companies became more dependent on computer systems to run
their business, e.g., working remotely as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Internet of
Things (“IoT”), the danger posed by cybercriminals is magnified, thereby highlighting the need
for adequate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards.
49. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members and of the
foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant’s data security system was breached,
including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members
as a result of a breach.
50. Defendant was, or should have been, fully aware of the unique type and the
significant volume of data on Defendant’s server(s), and, thus, the significant number of
individuals who would be harmed by the exposure of the unencrypted data.
51. Despite the prevalence of public announcements of data breach and data security
compromises, and despite its own acknowledgment of its duties to keep the Private Information
private and secure, Defendant failed to take appropriate steps to protect the Private Information of
Plaintiff and the proposed Class from being compromised.
Defendant Could Have Prevented the Data Breach
52. Data breaches are preventable. 12 “In almost all cases, the data breaches that
occurred could have been prevented by proper planning and the correct design and implementation
of appropriate security solutions.” 13 “Organizations that collect, use, store, and share sensitive
12 Lucy L. Thomson, Despite the Alarming Trends, Data Breaches Are Preventable, DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK
(Lucy Thompson, ed., 2012), available at https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/394088.
13 Id. at 17.
11
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personal data must accept responsibility for protecting the information and ensuring that it is not
compromised[.]”14
53. Most reported data breaches “are a result of lax security and the failure to create or
enforce appropriate security policies, rules, and procedures. . . . Appropriate information security
controls, including encryption, must be implemented and enforced in a rigorous and disciplined
manner so that a data breach never occurs.”15
54. Here, many failures laid the groundwork for the Data Breach.
55. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has published guidelines that establish
reasonable data security practices for businesses.16
56. The FTC guidelines emphasize the importance of having a data security plan,
regularly assessing risks to computer systems, and implementing safeguards to control such risks. 17
57. The FTC guidelines establish that businesses should protect the confidential
information that they keep; properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed;
encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and
implement policies for installing vendor-approved patches to correct security problems. 18
58. The FTC guidelines also recommend that businesses utilize an intrusion detection
system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating
hacking attempts; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a
response plan ready in the event of a breach. 19
14 Id. at 28.
15 Id.
16 Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FTC (Oct. 2016), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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59. According to information and belief, Defendant failed to follow reasonable and
necessary industry standards to prevent a data breach, including the FTC’s guidelines.
60. Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the Private
Information of consumers under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(“FTCA"), yet failed to comply with such obligations. Defendant was also aware of the significant
repercussions that would result from its failure to do so. Accordingly, Defendant’s conduct was
particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of Private Information it obtained and
stored, and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that would result to Plaintiff
and the Class.
61. Based on allowing its security certificates to lapse and upon information and belief,
Defendant also failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following frameworks: the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, NIST Special Publications 800-53, 53A, or 800-171; the Federal
Risk and Authorization Management Program (FEDRAMP); or the Center for Internet Security’s
Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are well respected authorities in cybersecurity
readiness.
62. As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “[p]revention is the most
effective defense against ransomware and it is critical to take precautions for protection.” 20
63. To prevent and detect the attack here, Defendant could and should have taken, as
recommended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the following measures:
20 See How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE, at 3, available at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-
prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view.
13
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• Implemented an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets,
employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of ransomware and
how it is delivered.
• Enabled strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end
users and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy
Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and
Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent
email spoofing.
• Scanned all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable
files from reaching end users.
• Configured firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
• Patched operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using
a centralized patch management system.
• Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans
automatically.
• Managed the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege:
no users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and
those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when
necessary.
• Configured access controls—including file, directory, and network share
permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific
files, the user should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.
14
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• Disabled macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using
Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email
instead of full office suite applications.
• Implemented Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent
programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as
temporary folders supporting popular Internet browsers or
compression/decompression programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData
folder.
• Considered disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
• Used application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs
known and permitted by security policy.
• Executed operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized
environment.
• Categorized data based on organizational value and implement physical and
logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units. 21
64. According to information and belief, Defendant failed to do any of the above.
65. To prevent and detect cyberattacks, Defendant could and should have
recommended its employees take, as recommended by the United States Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency, the following measures:
• Updated and patched your computer. Ensure your applications and operating
systems (OSs) have been updated with the latest patches. Vulnerable
applications and OSs are the target of most ransomware attacks.
21 Id. at 3–4.
15
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• Used caution with links and when entering website addresses. Be careful
when clicking directly on links in emails, even if the sender appears to be
someone you know. Attempt to independently verify website addresses (e.g.,
contact your organization’s helpdesk, search the internet for the sender
organization’s website or the topic mentioned in the email). Pay attention to the
website addresses you click on, as well as those you enter yourself. Malicious
website addresses often appear almost identical to legitimate sites, often using
a slight variation in spelling or a different domain (e.g., .com instead of .net).
• Opened email attachments with caution. Be wary of opening email
attachments, even from senders you think you know, particularly when
attachments are compressed files or ZIP files.
• Kept your personal information safe. Check a website’s security to ensure
the information you submit is encrypted before you provide it.
• Verified email senders. If you are unsure whether or not an email is legitimate,
try to verify the email’s legitimacy by contacting the sender directly. Do not
click on any links in the email. If possible, use a previous (legitimate) email to
ensure the contact information you have for the sender is authentic before you
contact them.
• Inform yourself. Keep yourself informed about recent cybersecurity threats
and up to date on ransomware techniques. You can find information about
known phishing attacks on the Anti-Phishing Working Group website. You
may also want to sign up for CISA product notifications, which will alert you
16
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when a new Alert, Analysis Report, Bulletin, Current Activity, or Tip has been
published.
• Used and maintain preventative software programs. Install antivirus
software, firewalls, and email filters—and keep them updated—to reduce
malicious network traffic. 22
66. In addition, to prevent and detect the Data Breach Defendant could and should have
implemented, as recommended by the Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team, the
following measures:
• Harden internet-facing assets
- Apply latest security updates
- Use threat and vulnerability management
- Perform regular audits
• Thoroughly investigate and remediate alerts.
- Prioritize and treat commodity malware infections as potential full
compromise of the system
• Include IT professionals in security discussions.
- Ensure collaboration among security operations, security
administrators, and information technology administrators to
configure servers and other endpoints securely
• Build and maintain credential hygiene
22 See Protecting Against Ransomware, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (revised Sept. 2, 2021),
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/protecting-against-ransomware (internal citations omitted).
17
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- Use multifactor authentication or network level authentication and
enforce strong, randomized, just-in-time local administrator
passwords
• Apply principle of least-privilege
- Monitor for adversarial activities
- Hunt for brute force attempts
- Monitor for cleanup of Event Logs
- Analyze logon events
• Harden infrastructure
- Utilize Windows Defender Firewall
- Enable tamper protection
- Enable cloud-delivered protection
- Turn on attack surface reduction rules and Antimalware Scan
Interface for Office Visual Basic for Applications23
67. Specifically, among other failures, Defendant had far too much confidential
unencrypted information held on its systems. Such Private Information should have been
segregated into an encrypted system. 24
68. Moreover, it is well-established industry standard practice for a business to dispose
of confidential Private Information once it is no longer needed. 25
23 See Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster, MICROSOFT THREAT INTELLIGENCE (Mar 5, 2020),
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/.
24
See Adnan Raja, How to Safeguard Your Business Data With Encryption, DATAINSIDER (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/how-safeguard-your-business-data-encryption.
25 See Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/protecting-personal-information-guide-business.
18
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69. The FTC has repeatedly emphasized the importance of disposing of unnecessary
Private Information: “Keep sensitive data in your system only as long as you have a business
reason to have it. Once that business need is over, properly dispose of it. If it’s not on your system,
it can’t be stolen by hackers.”26 Rather than following this basic standard of care, Defendant kept
thousands of individuals’ unencrypted Private Information on its inadequately secured systems
indefinitely.
70. In sum, the Data Breach could have been easily prevented through standard
practices like the use of industry standard network segmentation, redaction, and encryption of all
Private Information—which Defendant negligently failed to do.
71. Further, the scope of the Data Breach could have been dramatically reduced had
Defendant utilized proper record retention and destruction practices—but Defendant negligently
did no such thing.
Defendant Had a Duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to Secure Private Information
72. At all relevant times, Defendant had a duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to
properly secure their Private Information, encrypt and maintain such information using industry
standard methods, train its employees, utilize available technology to defend its systems from
invasion, act reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm to Plaintiff and Class Members, and to
promptly notify Plaintiff and Class Members when Defendant became aware that their Private
Information may have been compromised.
73. Defendant’s duty to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the special
relationship that existed between Defendant, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and the Class Members,
on the other hand. The special relationship arose because Plaintiff and the Members of the Class
26 Id. at 6.
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relied on Defendant to secure their Private Information when they entrusted Defendant with the
information required in connection with the services Defendant provides.
74. Once Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant,
Defendant was in the exclusive position to protect and safeguard the Private Information.
75. Defendant had the resources necessary to prevent the Data Breach but neglected to
adequately invest in security measures, despite its obligation to protect such information.
Accordingly, Defendant breached its common law, statutory, and other duties owed to Plaintiff
and Class Members.
76. Security standards commonly accepted among businesses that store Private
Information using the internet include, without limitation:
a. Maintaining a secure firewall configuration;
b. Maintaining appropriate design, systems, and controls to limit user access to
certain information as necessary;
c. Monitoring for suspicious or irregular traffic to servers;
d. Monitoring for suspicious credentials used to access servers;
e. Monitoring for suspicious or irregular activity by known users;
f. Monitoring for suspicious or unknown users;
g. Monitoring for suspicious or irregular server requests;
h. Monitoring for server requests for Private Information;
i. Monitoring for server requests from VPNs; and
j. Monitoring for server requests from Tor exit nodes.
77. The ramifications of Defendant’s failure to keep Private Information secure are
long lasting and severe. Once Private Information is stolen, particularly Social Security numbers,
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fraudulent use of that information and damage to victims is likely to continue for years.
The Value of Personally Identifiable Information
78. The Private Information of consumers remains of high value to criminals, as
evidenced by the prices they will pay through the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web
pricing for stolen identity credentials. For example, personal information can be sold at a price
ranging from $40 to $200, 27 and bank details can have a price range of $30 to over $4,000.28
79. As a growing number of federal courts have begun to recognize the loss of value of
Private Information as a viable damages theory, the sale of Private Information from data breaches,
as in the Data Breach alleged herein, is particularly harmful to data breach victims – especially
when it takes place on the dark web.
80. The dark net is an unindexed layer of the internet that requires special software or
authentication to access. 29 Criminals in particular favor the dark web as it offers a degree of
anonymity to visitors and website publishers. Unlike the traditional or ‘surface’ web, dark web
users need to know the web address of the website they wish to visit in advance. For example, on
the surface web, the CIA’s web address is cia.gov, but on the dark web the CIA’s web address is
ciadotgov4sjwlzihbbgxnqg3xiyrg7so2r2o3lt5wz5ypk4sxyjstad.onion. 30 This prevents dark web
marketplaces from being easily identifiable to authorities or those not in the know.
81. A sophisticated black market exists on the dark web where criminals can buy or
sell malware, firearms, drugs, and frequently, sensitive personal information like the Private
27 Your personal data is for sale on the dark web. Here’s how much it costs, Digital Trends, Oct. 16, 2019, available at:
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/ (last visited July 31, 2026).
28 https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/
(last visited July 31, 2026).
29 What Is the Dark Web?, Experian, available at https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-the-dark-web/ (last
visited July 31, 2026).
30 Id.
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Information at issue here.31 The digital character of Private Information stolen in data breaches
lends itself to dark web transactions because it is immediately transmissible over the internet and
the buyer and seller can retain their anonymity. The sale of a firearm or drugs on the other hand
requires a physical delivery address. Nefarious actors can readily purchase usernames and
passwords for online streaming services, stolen financial information and account login
credentials, and Social Security numbers, dates of birth and other personal information.32 As
Microsoft warns “[t]he anonymity of the dark web lends itself well to those who would seek to do
financial harm to others.” 33
82. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information is a valuable commodity, a
market exists for Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information (which is why the Data
Breach was perpetrated in the first place), and Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information
is likely being sold by hackers on the dark web (as that is the modus operandi of data thieves). As
a result, Plaintiff and Class Members have lost the value of their Private Information, which is
sufficient to plausibly allege injury arising from a data breach.
83. An active and robust legitimate marketplace for Private Information also exists. In
2019, the data brokering industry was worth roughly $200 billion. 34 In fact, the data marketplace
is so sophisticated that consumers can actually sell their non-public information directly to a data
broker who in turn aggregates the information and provides it to marketers or app developers. 35
31 What is the Dark Web? – Microsoft 365, available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-life-hacks/privacy-and-
safety/what-is-the-dark-web (last visited July 31, 2026).
32 Id.; What Is the Dark Web?, Experian, available at https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-the-dark-web/ (last
visited July 31, 2026).
33
What is the Dark Web? – Microsoft 365, available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-life-hacks/privacy-and-
safety/what-is-the-dark-web (last visited July 31, 2026).
34 https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-11-05/column-data-brokers (last visited July 31, 2026).
35 https://datacoup.com/ (last visited July 31, 2026).
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Consumers who agree to provide their web browsing history to the Nielsen Corporation can
receive up to $60.00 a year.36
84. The Private Information stolen in this specific Data Breach was particularly
harmful, as it is difficult, if not impossible to change names, dates of birth, and Social Security
numbers.
85. Of course, a stolen Social Security number – standing alone – can be used to wreak
untold havoc upon a victim’s personal and financial life. The popular personal privacy and credit
monitoring service LifeLock by Norton notes “Five Malicious Ways a Thief Can Use Your Social
Security Number,” including: 1) Financial Identity Theft that includes “false applications for loans,
credit cards or bank accounts in your name or withdraw money from your accounts,” and which
can encompass credit card fraud, bank fraud, computer fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud and
employment fraud; 2) Government Identity Theft, including tax refund fraud; 3) Criminal Identity
Theft, which involves using someone’s stolen Social Security number as a “get out of jail free
card;” 4) Medical Identity Theft; and 5) Utility Fraud.
86. It is little wonder that courts have dubbed a stolen Social Security number as the
“gold standard” for identity theft and fraud. Social Security numbers, which were compromised in
the Data Breach, are among the worst kinds of private information to have stolen because they
may be put to a variety of fraudulent uses and are difficult for an individual to change.
87. According to the Social Security Administration, each time an individual’s Social
Security number is compromised, “the potential for a thief to illegitimately gain access to bank
accounts, credit cards, driving records, tax and employment histories and other private information
36 Nielsen Computer & Mobile Panel, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
https://computermobilepanel.nielsen.com/ui/US/en/faqen.html (last visited July 31, 2026).
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increases.” 37 Moreover, “[b]ecause many organizations still use SSNs as the primary identifier,
exposure to identity theft and fraud remains.”38
88. The Social Security Administration stresses that the loss of an individual’s Social
Security number, as experienced by Plaintiff and Class Members, can lead to identity theft and
extensive financial fraud:
A dishonest person who has your Social Security number can use it to get other
personal information about you. Identity thieves can use your number and your
good credit to apply for more credit in your name. Then, when they use the credit
cards and don’t pay the bills, it damages your credit. You may not find out that
someone is using your number until you’re turned down for credit, or you begin to
get calls from unknown creditors demanding payment for items you never bought.
Someone illegally using your Social Security number and assuming your identity
can cause a lot of problems. 39
89. In fact, “[a] stolen Social Security number is one of the leading causes of identity
theft and can threaten your financial health.” 40 “Someone who has your SSN can use it to
impersonate you, obtain credit and open bank accounts, apply for jobs, steal your tax refunds, get
medical treatment, and steal your government benefits.”41
90. What’s more, it is no easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security number.
An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant paperwork and
evidence of actual misuse. In other words, preventive action to defend against the possibility of
misuse of a Social Security number is not permitted; an individual must show evidence of actual,
ongoing fraud activity to obtain a new number.
37 See https://www.ssa.gov/phila/ProtectingSSNs.htm#:~:text=An%20organization’s%20collection%20and%20use,and%20othe
r%20private%20information%20increases. (last visited July 31, 2026)
38 Id.
39 Social Security Administration, Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, available at: https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-
05-10064.pdf (last visited July 31, 2026)
40 See https://www.equifax.com/personal/education/identity-theft/articles/-/learn/social-security-number-identity-theft/ (last
visited July 31, 2026)
41 See https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ssn.asp (last visited July 31, 2026)
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91. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be effective. According to Julie
Ferguson of the Identity Theft Resource Center, “[t]he credit bureaus and banks are able to link
the new number very quickly to the old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly
inherited into the new Social Security number.” 42
92. For these reasons, some courts have referred to Social Security numbers as the
“gold standard” for identity theft. Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 3:17-CV-30111, 2019 WL
7946103, at *12 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (“Because Social Security numbers are the gold standard
for identity theft, their theft is significant . . . . Access to Social Security numbers causes long-
lasting jeopardy because the Social Security Administration does not normally replace Social
Security numbers.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-30111, 2020 WL 877035
(D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2020); see also McFarlane v. Altice USA, Inc., 2021 WL 860584, at *4 (citations
omitted) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (the court noted that Plaintiff’s Social Security numbers are:
arguably “the most dangerous type of personal information in the hands of identity thieves”
because it is immutable and can be used to “impersonat[e] [the victim] to get medical services,
government benefits, ... tax refunds, [and] employment.” . . . Unlike a credit card number, which
can be changed to eliminate the risk of harm following a data breach, “[a] social security number
derives its value in that it is immutable,” and when it is stolen it can “forever be wielded to identify
[the victim] and target him in fraudulent schemes and identity theft attacks.”)
93. Private Information can be used to distinguish, identify, or trace an individual’s
identity, such as their name and Social Security number. This can be accomplished alone, or in
combination with other personal or identifying information that is connected or linked to an
42 Bryan Naylor, Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It’s Hard to Bounce Back, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015), available at:
http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millions-worrying-about-identity-theft (last
visited July 31, 2026).
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individual, such as their birthdate, birthplace, and mother’s maiden name.43
94. Given the nature of Defendant’s Data Breach, as well as the unreasonable delay in
notification to Class Members, it is foreseeable that the compromised Private Information has been
or will be used by hackers and cybercriminals in a variety of devastating ways. Indeed, the
cybercriminals who possess Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information can easily obtain
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ tax returns or open fraudulent credit card accounts in Class
Members’ names.
95. The injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members were directly and proximately caused
by Defendant’s failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures.
The Harm Caused by the Data Breach Now and Going Forward
96. Victims of data breaches are susceptible to becoming victims of identity theft for
years to come. The FTC defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the
identifying information of another person without authority.” 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(9).
97. The type of data that may have been accessed and compromised here can be used
to perpetrate fraud and identity theft and Plaintiff and Class Members face a substantial risk of
identity theft given that their Private Information was compromised in the Data Breach.
98. When malicious actors infiltrate companies and copy and exfiltrate the Private
Information that those companies store, the stolen information often ends up on the dark web,
where malicious actors buy and sell that information for profit. 44
99. For example, when the U.S. Department of Justice announced their seizure of
AlphaBay—the largest online “dark market”—in 2017, AlphaBay had more than 350,000 listings,
43 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB MEMORANDUM M-07-16 n. 1.
44 Shining a Light on the Dark Web with Identity Monitoring, IDENTITYFORCE (Dec. 28, 2020)
https://www.identityforce.com/blog/shining-light-dark-web-identity-monitoring (last visited July 31, 2026).
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many of which concerned stolen or fraudulent documents that could be used to assume another
person’s identity.45 Marketplaces similar to the now-defunct AlphaBay continue to be “awash with
[Private Information] belonging to victims from countries all over the world.” 46
100. The link between a data breach and the risk of identity theft is simple and well
established. Criminals acquire and steal Private Information to monetize the information.
Criminals monetize the data by selling the stolen information on the black market to other
criminals who then utilize the information to commit a variety of identity theft-related crimes
discussed below.
101. Because a person’s identity is akin to a puzzle with multiple data points, the more
accurate pieces of data an identity thief obtains about a person, the easier it is for the thief to take
on the victim’s identity—or track the victim to attempt other hacking crimes against the individual
to obtain more data to perfect a crime.
102. For example, armed with just a name and date of birth, a data thief can utilize a
hacking technique referred to as “social engineering” to obtain even more information about a
victim’s identity, such as a person’s login credentials or Social Security number. Social
engineering is a form of hacking whereby a data thief uses previously acquired information to
manipulate and trick individuals into disclosing additional confidential or personal information
through means such as spam phone calls and text messages or phishing emails. Data breaches can
be the starting point for these additional targeted attacks on the victim.
103. One such example of criminals piecing together bits and pieces of compromised
45 Stolen PII & Ramifications: Identity Theft and Fraud on the Dark Web, ARMOR (April 3, 2018)
https://res.armor.com/resources/blog/stolen-pii-ramifications-identity-theft-fraud-dark-web/ (last visited July
31, 2026).
46 Id.
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Private Information for profit is the development of “Fullz” packages.47
104. With “Fullz” packages, cyber-criminals can cross-reference two sources of Private
Information to marry unregulated data available elsewhere to criminally stolen data with an
astonishingly complete scope and degree of accuracy in order to assemble complete dossiers on
individuals.
105. The development of “Fullz” packages means here that the stolen Private
Information from the Data Breach can easily be used to link and identify it to Plaintiff’s and Class
Members’ phone numbers, email addresses, and other unregulated sources and identifiers. In other
words, even if certain information, such as emails, phone numbers, or credit card numbers, may
not be included in the Private Information that was exfiltrated in the Data Breach, criminals may
still easily create a Fullz package and sell it at a higher price to unscrupulous operators and
criminals (such as illegal and scam telemarketers) over and over.
Loss of Time to Mitigate the Risk of Identity Theft and Fraud
106. According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2019 Internet Crime
Report, “rapid reporting can help law enforcement stop fraudulent transactions before a victim
loses the money for good.”48 Defendant did not rapidly report to Plaintiff and Class Members that
47 “Fullz” is fraudster speak for data that includes the information of the victim, including, but not limited to,
the name, address, credit card information, social security number, date of birth, and more. As a rule of thumb,
the more information you have on a victim, the more money that can be made off those credentials. Fullz are
usually pricier than standard credit card credentials, commanding up to $100 per record (or more) on the dark
web. Fullz can be cashed out (turning credentials into money) in various ways, including performing bank
transactions over the phone with the required authentication details in-hand. Even “dead Fullz,” which are Fullz
credentials associated with credit cards that are no longer valid, can still be used for numerous purposes,
including tax refund scams, ordering credit cards on behalf of the victim, or opening a “mule account” (an
account that will accept a fraudulent money transfer from a compromised account) without the victim’s
knowledge. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Medical Records for Sale in Underground Stolen from Texas Life Insurance
Firm, Krebs on Security (Sep. 18, 2014), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-
underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-firm/.(last visited July 31, 2026).
48 2019 Internet Crime Report Released, FBI (Feb. 11, 2020) https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2019-internet-
crime-report-released-
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their Private Information had been stolen. Defendant did not notify impacted people for over
fourteen months after learning of the Data Breach.
107. As a result of the recognized risk of identity theft, when a data breach occurs, and
an individual is notified by a company that their Private Information was compromised, as in this
Data Breach, the reasonable person is expected to take steps and spend time to address the
dangerous situation, learn about the breach, and otherwise mitigate the risk of becoming a victim
of identity theft or fraud. Failure to spend time taking steps to review accounts or credit reports
could expose the individual to greater financial harm—yet the resource and asset of time has been
lost.
108. Plaintiff and Class Members have spent, and will spend additional time in the
future, on a variety of prudent actions to remedy the harms they have or may experience as a result
of the Data Breach, such as contacting credit bureaus to place freezes on their accounts; changing
passwords and re-securing their own computer networks; and checking their financial accounts for
any indication of fraudulent activity, which may take years to detect.
109. These efforts are consistent with the U.S. Government Accountability Office,
which released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches (“GAO Report”) in which it noted that
victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and time to repair the damage to their good
name and credit record.”49
110. These efforts are also consistent with the steps that FTC recommends that data
breach victims take to protect their personal and financial information after a data breach,
021120#:~:text=IC3%20received%20467%2C361%20complaints%20in,%2Ddelivery%20scams%2C%20an
d%20extortion (last visited July 31, 2026).
49
See United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-737, Personal Information: Data Breaches
Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown (June
2007), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf. (last visited July 31, 2026).
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including: contacting one of the credit bureaus to place a fraud alert (and considering an extended
fraud alert that lasts for seven years if someone steals their identity), reviewing their credit reports,
contacting companies to remove fraudulent charges from their accounts, placing a credit freeze on
their credit, and correcting their credit reports. 50
Diminution of Value of Private Information
111. Private Information is a valuable property right. 51 The value is axiomatic,
considering the value of Big Data in corporate America, and the consequences of cyber thefts
include heavy prison sentences. Even this obvious risk-to-reward analysis illustrates beyond a
doubt that Private Information has considerable market value.
112. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information,
which has an inherent market value in both legitimate and dark markets, has been damaged and
diminished by its compromise and unauthorized release. However, this transfer of value occurred
without any consideration paid to Plaintiff or Class Members for their property, resulting in an
economic loss. Moreover, the Private Information is now readily available, and the rarity of the
data has been lost, thereby causing additional loss of value.
113. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, and of the
foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant’s data security system was breached,
including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members
as a result of a breach.
50 See Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft.gov, https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps. (last visited July 31,
2026).
51 See, e.g., Randall T. Soma, et al., Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable
Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, at *3-4 (2009) (“PII,
which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the
value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted). (last visited July 31, 2026).
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114. As a result of the Data Breach, the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class
Members has been exposed to criminals for misuse. The injuries suffered by Plaintiff and Class
Members, or likely to be suffered as a direct result of Defendant’s Data Breach, include: (a) theft
of their Private Information; (b) costs associated with the detection and prevention of identity theft;
(c) costs associated with time spent and the loss of productivity from taking time to address and
attempt to ameliorate, mitigate, and deal with the consequences of this Breach; (d) invasion of
privacy; (e) the emotional distress, stress, nuisance, and annoyance of responding to, and resulting
from, the Data Breach; (f) the actual and/or imminent injury arising from actual and/or potential
fraud and identity theft resulting from their personal data being placed in the hands of the ill-
intentioned hackers and/or criminals; (g) damage to and diminution in value of their personal data
entrusted to Defendant with the mutual understanding that Defendant would safeguard their
Private Information against theft and not allow access to and misuse of their personal data by any
unauthorized third party; and (h) the continued risk to their Private Information, which remains in
the possession of Defendant, and which is subject to further injurious breaches so long as
Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect Plaintiff’s and Class
Members’ Private Information.
Future Cost of Credit and Identity Theft Monitoring is Reasonable and Necessary
115. In addition to a remedy for economic harm, Plaintiff and Class Members maintain
an interest in ensuring that their Private Information is secure, remains secure, and is not subject
to further misappropriation and theft.
116. Given the type of targeted attack in this case and sophisticated criminal activity, the
type of Private Information involved, and the volume of data obtained in the Data Breach, there is
a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been placed, or will be placed,
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on the black market/dark web for sale and purchase by criminals intending to utilize the Private
Information for identity theft crimes.
117. Such fraud may go undetected for years; consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members
are at a present and continuous risk of fraud and identity theft for many years into the future.
118. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members also request relief in the form of the future
cost of credit and identity theft monitoring, which is reasonable and necessary. The retail cost of
credit monitoring and identity theft monitoring can cost around $200 a year per Class Member.
This is a reasonable and necessary cost to monitor and protect Class Members from the risk of
identity theft that arose from the Data Breach.
Loss of the Benefit of the Bargain
119. Furthermore, Defendant’s poor data security deprived Plaintiff and Class Members
of the benefit of their bargain. When agreeing to provide their Private Information to Defendant,
Plaintiff and other reasonable applicants, students, employees, and individuals interested in
receiving Defendant’s services, understood and expected that in exchange, Defendant would
implement necessary data security to protect the Private Information, when in fact, Defendant did
not provide the expected data security. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class Members received services
that were of a lesser value than what they reasonably expected to receive under the bargains they
struck with Defendant.
Plaintiff’s Experience
120. Plaintiff is a former student of Defendant, and provided her Private Information to
Defendant as a condition of enrollment with Defendant.
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121. On or around June 15, 2026, Plaintiff received Defendant’s Notice informing her
that her Private Information was exposed in the Data Breach.52 Plaintiff is a victim of the Data
Breach.
122. To date, Defendant has done next to nothing to adequately protect Plaintiff and
Class Members, or to compensate them for their injuries sustained in this Data Breach particularly
given the fact that Plaintiff’s Private Information has already been “impacted” in the Data Breach
and likely been made available on the dark web to anyone wishing to purchase it.
123. Nor has Defendant compensated Plaintiff and Class Members for the time they will
spend monitoring their accounts, placing credit freezes and fraud alerts, changing online passwords
and other actions.
124. Plaintiff and Class Members have been further damaged by the compromise of their
Private Information in the Data Breach which was “impacted” and is in the hands of cybercriminals
who illegally accessed Defendant’s network for the specific purpose of targeting the Private
Information.
125. Plaintiff typically takes measures to protect her Private Information and is very
careful about sharing her Private Information. Plaintiff has never knowingly transmitted
unencrypted Private Information over the internet or other unsecured source.
126. Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and
secure location, and she diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for her online
accounts.
127. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered a loss of time and has spent
and continues to spend a considerable amount of time on issues related to this Data Breach. In
52 Ex. A.
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response to the Data Breach, Plaintiff has spent time monitoring her accounts and credit score,
changing her online account passwords, freezing her bank accounts, enrolling in credit monitoring,
verifying the legitimacy of the Data Breach, and on other necessary mitigation efforts. This is time
that was lost and unproductive and took away from other activities and duties.
128. Plaintiff also suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the
value of her Private Information — a form of intangible property that she entrusted to Defendant
for the purpose of obtaining services from Defendant, which was compromised in and as a result
of the Data Breach.
129. Plaintiff suffered lost time, annoyance, interference, and inconvenience as a result
of the Data Breach and has anxiety and increased concerns for the loss of her privacy.
130. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress and increased stress and anxiety as a result of
the Data Breach because of the actions she has been forced to undertake, the loss of control over
her most intimate information, and the fact that she must remain vigilant for the remainder of her
life.
131. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the increased
risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from her Private Information being placed in the
hands of criminals.
132. Further, since the Data Breach occurred, Plaintiff has experienced actual misuse of
her Private Information; for example, an unauthorized individual attempted to open an Amazon
account and other accounts using her Private Information. Because of the timing of the suspicious
activities that Plaintiff has experienced and the Data Breach, Plaintiff believes that the suspicious
activities are a result of criminals acquiring her Private Information in the Data Breach.
133. Defendant obtained and continues to maintain Plaintiff’s Private Information and
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has a continuing legal duty and obligation to protect that Private Information from unauthorized
access and disclosure. Defendant acquired Plaintiff’s Private Information. Plaintiff, however,
would not have entrusted her Private Information to Defendant had she known that it would fail to
maintain adequate data security. Plaintiff’s Private Information was compromised and disclosed
as a result of the Data Breach.
134. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time and
money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach. As a
result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at a present risk and will continue to be at increased risk of
identity theft and fraud for years to come.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
135. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, individually and on behalf of all members of the following
class:
All persons whose Private Information was compromised as a result
of the Data Breach, including all persons who received Defendant’s
Notice (the “Class”).
136. Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Defendant
and Defendant’s parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and any entity in which
Defendant has a controlling interest; all individuals who make a timely election to be excluded
from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting out; and all judges assigned to hear any
aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members.
137. Numerosity. The Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. Upon information and belief, approximately 37,313 individuals have been affected
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by this breach53. The identities of Class Members are ascertainable through Defendant’s records,
Class Members’ records, publication notice, self-identification, and other means.
138. Commonality. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, which
predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. These common
questions of law and fact include, without limitation:
i. Whether Defendant unlawfully used, maintained, lost, or disclosed
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information;
ii. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the
information compromised in the Data Breach;
iii. Whether Defendant’s data security systems prior to and during the Data
Breach complied with applicable data security laws and regulations;
iv. Whether Defendant’s data security systems prior to and during the Data
Breach were consistent with industry standards;
v. Whether Defendant owed a duty to Class Members to safeguard their
Private Information;
vi. Whether Defendant breached its duty to Class Members to safeguard their
Private Information;
vii. Whether computer hackers obtained Class Members’ Private Information
in the Data Breach;
viii. Whether Defendant knew or should have known that its data security
systems and monitoring processes were deficient;
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https://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/consumer-protection-division/id-theft-prevention/files/DB-Year-to-Date-
Report-7_2026.pdf
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ix. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members suffered legally cognizable damages
as a result of Defendant’s misconduct;
x. Whether Defendant’s conduct was negligent; and
xi. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages, civil
penalties, punitive damages, and/or injunctive relief.
139. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of other Class Members because
Plaintiff’s Private Information, like that of every other Class Member, was compromised in the
Data Breach.
140. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and
protect the interests of the Members of the Class. Plaintiff’s Counsel is competent and experienced
in litigating Class actions, including data privacy litigation of this kind.
141. Predominance. Defendant has engaged in a common course of conduct toward
Plaintiff and Class Members, in that all the Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ data was stored on the
same computer systems and unlawfully accessed in the same way. The common issues arising
from Defendant’s conduct affecting Class Members set out above predominate over any
individualized issues. Adjudication of these common issues in a single action has important and
desirable advantages of judicial economy.
142. Superiority. A Class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class treatment of common questions of law and fact is
superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation. Absent a Class action, most Class
Members would likely find that the cost of litigating their individual claims is prohibitively high
and would therefore have no effective remedy. The prosecution of separate actions by individual
Class Members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
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individual Class Members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
Defendant. In contrast, the conduct of this action as a Class action presents far fewer management
difficulties, conserves judicial resources and the parties’ resources, and protects the rights of each
Class Member.
143. Defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a whole, so that
Class certification, injunctive relief, and corresponding declaratory relief are appropriate on a
Class-wide basis.
144. Issue Certification. Likewise, particular issues under Federal Rule 23(c)(4) are
appropriate for certification because such claims present only particular, common issues, the
resolution of which would advance the disposition of this matter and the parties’ interests therein.
Such particular issues include, but are not limited to:
xii. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiff and the Class to exercise
due care in collecting, storing, and safeguarding their Private Information;
xiii. Whether Defendant’s security measures to protect its data systems were
reasonable in light of best practices recommended by data security experts;
xiv. Whether Defendant’s failure to institute adequate protective security
measures amounted to negligence; and
xv. Whether Defendant failed to take commercially reasonable steps to
safeguard Private Information.
145. Finally, all members of the proposed Class are readily ascertainable. Defendant has
access to Class Members’ names and addresses affected by the Data Breach. Class Members have
already been preliminarily identified and sent notice of the Data Breach by Defendant.
VI. CAUSES OF ACTION
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COUNT I
NEGLIGENCE/NEGLIGENCE PER SE
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
146. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 145 of this Complaint
and incorporates them by reference herein.
147. Defendant knowingly collected, came into possession of, and maintained Plaintiff’s
and Class Members’ Private Information for pecuniary gain, and had a duty to exercise reasonable
care in safeguarding, securing, and protecting such information from being compromised, lost,
stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties.
148. Defendant had a duty under common law to have procedures in place to detect and
prevent the loss or unauthorized dissemination of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information.
149. Defendant had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information and the
types of harm that Plaintiff and Class Members could and would suffer if the Private Information
were wrongfully disclosed. The harm that Plaintiff and Class Members experienced was within
the zone of foreseeable harm known to Defendant.
150. Defendant’s duty to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the special
relationship that existed between Defendant and Plaintiff and the Class. That special relationship
arose because Plaintiff and the Class directly or indirectly entrusted Defendant with their
confidential Private Information, a mandatory step in obtaining services from Defendant. While
this special relationship exists independent from any contract, it is recognized by Defendant’s
representations, as well as applicable laws and regulations. Specifically, Defendant actively
solicited and gathered Private Information as part of its business and was solely responsible for
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and in the position to ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the foreseeable risk
of harm to Plaintiff and Class Members from a resulting data breach.
151. Once Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant,
Defendant was in the exclusive position to protect and safeguard the Private Information.
152. Defendant was subject to an “independent duty,” untethered to any contract
between Defendant and Plaintiff and the Class, to maintain adequate data security.
153. A breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiff and the
Class was reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Defendant’s inadequate security practices
and the frequency of data breaches in general.
154. Defendant also had a common law duty to prevent foreseeable harm to others.
Plaintiff and the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims of Defendant’s inadequate
security practices and procedures. Defendant knew or should have known of the inherent risks in
collecting and storing the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class, the critical importance of
adequately safeguarding that Private Information, and the necessity of encrypting Private
Information stored on Defendant’s systems. It was foreseeable that Plaintiff and Class Members
would be harmed by the failure to protect their personal information because hackers are known
to routinely attempt to steal such information and use it for nefarious purposes.
155. Defendant’s conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and the Class.
Defendant’s wrongful conduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to take the steps and
opportunities to prevent the Data Breach as set forth herein. Defendant’s misconduct also included
its decision not to comply with industry standards for the safekeeping of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s
Private Information, including basic encryption techniques available to Defendant.
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156. Plaintiff and the Class had and have no ability to protect their Private Information
that was in, and remains in, Defendant’s possession.
157. Defendant was in a position to effectively protect against the harm suffered by
Plaintiff and the Class as a result of the Data Breach.
158. By assuming the responsibility to collect and store this data, and in fact doing so,
and sharing it and using it for commercial gain, Defendant had a duty of care to use reasonable
means to secure and safeguard its computer property—and Class Members’ Private Information
held within it—to prevent disclosure of the information, and to safeguard the information from
theft. Defendant’s duty included a responsibility to implement processes by which it could detect
a breach of its security systems in a reasonably expeditious period of time and to give prompt
notice to those affected in the case of a data breach.
159. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information within Defendant’s possession.
160. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and
prevent dissemination of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information.
161. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
timely disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members that the Private Information within Defendant’s
possession might have been compromised and precisely the type of information compromised.
162. Defendant’s breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and Class Members caused
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information to be compromised.
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163. Pursuant to Section 5 of the FTCA, Defendant had a separate and independent duty
to provide fair and adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s
and Class Members’ Private Information.
164. The FTCA is intended, in part, to protect individuals whose Private Information is
maintained by another and who are unable to safeguard their information as they cannot exercise
control or direction over the data security practices.
165. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are within the class of persons that the FTCA
was intended to protect as their Private Information was collected and maintained by Defendant
and they were unable to exercise control over Defendant’s data security practices.
166. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the FTCA
was intended to guard against.
167. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of
their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices,
caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the members of the Class.
168. Defendant breached its duties to Plaintiff and the members of the Class under the
Federal Trade Commission Act by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer
systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information.
169. Had Plaintiff and the members of the Class known that Defendant would not
adequately protect their Private Information, Plaintiff and the members of the Class would not
have entrusted Defendant with their Private Information.
170. Defendant’s failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations constitutes
negligence per se.
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171. But for Defendant’s wrongful and negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiff
and the members of the Class, they would not have been injured.
172. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiff and the members of the Class was the
reasonably foreseeable result of Defendant’s breach of its duties. Defendant knew or should have
known that it was failing to meet its duties, and that Defendant’s breach would cause Plaintiff and
the members of the Class to experience the foreseeable harms associated with the exposure of their
Private Information.
173. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and negligence per se,
Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) actual
identity theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity to control how their Private Information is used; (iii)
the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their Private Information; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses
associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax fraud, and/or
unauthorized use of their Private Information for Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ respective
lifetimes; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort expended and the loss of productivity
addressing and attempting to mitigate the present and future consequences of the Data Breach,
including but not limited to efforts spent researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover
from tax fraud and other identity theft; (vi) costs associated with placing freezes on credit reports;
(vii) the continued risk to their Private Information, which remains in Defendant’s possession and
is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate
and adequate measures to protect the Private Information in its continued possession; and (viii)
present and future costs in the form of time, effort, and money that will be expended to prevent,
detect, contest, and repair the impact of the compromise of Private Information as a result of the
Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of Plaintiff and the Class Members.
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174. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and negligence per se,
Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm,
including, but not limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and
non-economic losses.
175. Additionally, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and
negligence per se, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will suffer the continued risks of
exposure of their Private Information, which remains in Defendant’s possession and is subject to
further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate
measures to protect the Private Information in its continued possession.
176. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and negligence per se,
Plaintiff and the Class are now at an increased risk of identity theft or fraud.
177. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and negligence per se,
Plaintiff is entitled to and demands actual, consequential, and nominal damages and injunctive
relief to be determined at trial.
COUNT II
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
178. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 145 of this Complaint
and incorporates them by reference herein.
179. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their Private Information to Defendant in
connection with the services Defendant provides. In so doing, Plaintiff and the Class entered into
implied contracts with Defendant by which Defendant agreed to safeguard and protect such
information, to keep such information secure and confidential, and to timely and accurately notify
Plaintiff and the Class if their data had been breached and compromised or stolen.
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180. At the time Defendant acquired the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class,
there was a meeting of the minds and a mutual understanding that Defendant would safeguard the
Private Information and not take unjustified risks when storing the Private Information.
181. Implicit in the agreements between Plaintiff and Class Members and Defendant to
provide Private Information was the latter’s obligation to: (a) use such Private Information for
business purposes only, (b) take reasonable steps to safeguard that Private Information, (c) prevent
unauthorized disclosures of the Private Information, (d) provide Plaintiff and Class Members with
prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or theft of their Private
Information, (e) reasonably safeguard and protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class
Members from unauthorized disclosure or uses, and (f) retain the Private Information only under
conditions that kept such information secure and confidential.
182. Plaintiff and the Class would not have entrusted their Private Information to
Defendant had they known that Defendant would make the Private Information internet-accessible,
not encrypt sensitive data elements, and not delete the Private Information when Defendant no
longer had a reasonable need to maintain it.
183. Plaintiff and the Class fully performed their obligations under the implied contracts
with Defendant.
184. Defendant breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiff and the Class by
failing to safeguard and protect their personal information, by failing to provide timely and
accurate notice to them that personal information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.
185. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s above-described breach of implied
contract, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered (and will continue to suffer) ongoing, imminent, and
impending threat of identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and
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economic harm; actual identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and
economic harm; loss of the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the illegal sale of the
compromised data on the dark web; expenses and/or time spent on credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements, credit card statements, and credit reports;
expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts; decreased credit scores and ratings; lost work
time; and other economic and non-economic harm.
186. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s above-described breach of implied
contract, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and nominal damages
to be determined at trial.
COUNT III
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
187. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 145 of this Complaint
and incorporates them by reference herein.
188. This Count is brought in the alternative to Count II, Breach of Implied Contract.
189. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant by
providing Defendant with their valuable Private Information. In so conferring this benefit, Plaintiff
and Class Members understood that part of the benefit Defendant derived from the Private
Information would be applied to data security efforts to safeguard the Private Information.
190. Defendant enriched itself by saving the costs it reasonably should have expended
on data security measures to secure Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information.
191. Instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the
Data Breach, Defendant instead calculated to avoid its data security obligations at the expense of
Plaintiff and Class Members by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures. Plaintiff and Class
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Members, on the other hand, suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s failure to
provide the requisite security.
192. Under the principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be
permitted to retain the monetary value of the benefit belonging to Plaintiff and Class Members,
because Defendant failed to implement appropriate data management and security measures that
are mandated by industry standards.
193. Defendant acquired the monetary benefit and Private Information through
inequitable means in that it failed to disclose the inadequate security practices previously alleged.
194. If Plaintiff and Class Members knew that Defendant had not secured their Private
Information, they would not have agreed to provide their Private Information to Defendant.
195. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.
196. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) actual identity theft;
(ii) the loss of the opportunity to control how their Private Information is used; (iii) the
compromise, publication, and/or theft of their Private Information; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses
associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft and/or unauthorized use
of their Private Information; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort expended and the loss
of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future consequences of the
Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent researching how to prevent, detect, contest,
and recover from identity theft; (vi) the continued risk to their Private Information, which remains
in Defendant’s possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant
fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect Private Information in its continued
possession; and (vii) future costs in terms of time, effort, and money that will be expended to
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prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of the Private Information compromised as a result
of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of Plaintiff and Class Members.
197. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm.
198. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive
trust, for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class Members, proceeds that it unjustly received from them.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class defined herein, prays for
judgment as against Defendant as follows:
a.) For an Order certifying this action as a Class action and appointing Plaintiff and
her counsel to represent the Class;
b.) For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct
complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiff’s
and Class Members’ Private Information, and from refusing to issue prompt,
complete and accurate disclosures to Plaintiff and Class Members;
c.) For equitable relief compelling Defendant to utilize appropriate methods and
policies with respect to data collection, storage, and safety, and to disclose with
specificity the type of Private Information compromised during the Data
Breach;
d.) For equitable relief requiring restitution and disgorgement of the revenues
wrongfully retained as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct;
e.) Ordering Defendant to pay for lifetime credit monitoring services for Plaintiff
and the Class;
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f.) For an award of actual damages, compensatory damages, statutory damages and
statutory penalties, in an amount to be determined, as allowable by law;
g.) For an award of punitive damages, as allowable by law;
h.) For an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other expense, including
expert witness fees;
i.) Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded and,
j.) All such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
DATED: July 31, 2026 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Leanna Loginov
Leanna A. Loginov
SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
2626 Cole Avenue, Suite 300
Dallas, Texas 75204
Tel: (305) 479-2299
lloginov@shamisgentile.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
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