Trevino v. Wellpoint Texas Inc — Entry #1: COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against Wellpoint Texas, Inc
Case: Trevino v. Wellpoint Texas Inc txnd · 3:26-cv-02697
filed August 13, 2026
What this document is
Docket entry #1 · filed August 13, 2026
COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against Wellpoint Texas, Inc. filed by Mario Trevino. (Filing fee $405; Receipt number ATXNDC-16701061) Clerk to issue summons(es). In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements and Judge Specific Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information - Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Sheet) (Lippe, Emil) (Entered: 08/13/2026)
Who is involved
- Trevino
- Wellpoint Texas, Inc.
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its name “Riot Platforms, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
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- Applied Digital: its name “Applied Digital Corporation” appears in a filing in this case.
…3:23-cv-01805-E McConnell v. Applied Digital Corporation et al 20 3:23-cv-01887-E Commodity…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 18, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
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Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 1 of 34 PageID 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARIO TREVINO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-2697
Plaintiff,
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
v. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
WELLPOINT TEXAS, INC.,
Defendant.
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Mario Trevino (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint on behalf of
himself, and all others similarly situated, against Defendant WellPoint Texas, Inc. (“WellPoint” or
“Defendant”), alleging as follows based upon information and belief and investigation of counsel,
except as to the allegations specifically pertaining to Plaintiff, which are based on personal
knowledge:
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. Plaintiff brings this class action against Defendant WellPoint for its failure to
properly secure and safeguard Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated individuals (“Class
Members”) personally identifying information, including names, dates of birth, addresses and
health insurance information (collectively “PII” or “Private Information”). 1
1
Data Security Breach Reports, Office of the Texas Attorney General,
https://oag.my.site.com/datasecuritybreachreport/apex/DataSecurityReportsPage (last visited
August 13, 2026).
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 2 of 34 PageID 2
2. WellPoint Texas, Inc. is a Wellpoint subsidiary and Texas Medicaid/CHIP
managed care organization that administers state health benefits and maintains a provider network
throughout Texas.
3. Plaintiff and Class Members are individuals who were required to indirectly and/or
directly provide Defendant with their Private Information. By collecting, storing, and maintaining
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information, WellPoint has a resulting duty to secure,
maintain, protect, and safeguard the Private Information that it collects and stores against
unauthorized access and disclosure through reasonable and adequate data security measures.
4. Despite WellPoint’s duty to safeguard the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class
Members, Defendant allowed that Private Information to be compromised. On August 10, 2026,
WellPoint reported the Data Breach to the Office of the Texas Attorney General, indicating the
Data Breach compromised the Private Information of 101,047 individuals (the “Data Breach”). 2
5. The Data Breach occurred when cybercriminals infiltrated Defendant’s
inadequately protected network servers and accessed highly sensitive PII that was being kept.
6. Defendant has not issued any public statement acknowledging or explaining the
incident and has not provided, and does not appear to have provided, any notice regarding the Data
Breach.
7. WellPoint maintained the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members in a negligent and/or
reckless manner. In particular, the PII was maintained on WellPoint’s computer system and
network in a condition vulnerable to cyberattacks. Upon information and belief, the mechanism of
the cyberattack and potential for improper disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII was a
2
Id.
2
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 3 of 34 PageID 3
known risk to Defendant, and thus Defendant was on notice that failing to take steps necessary to
secure the PII from those risks left that property in a dangerous condition.
8. Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by intentionally,
willfully, recklessly, and/or negligently failing to implement adequate and reasonable measures to
ensure that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII was safeguarded, failing to take available steps to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of data and failing to follow applicable, required and appropriate
protocols, policies, and procedures regarding the encryption of data, even for internal use.
9. As a result, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII was compromised by an
unauthorized third-party. Plaintiff and Class Members have a continuing interest in ensuring that
their information is and remains safe and are entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief.
10. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s failure to implement and follow
basic security procedures, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information is now in the hands
of cybercriminals.
11. Plaintiff and Class Members are now at a significantly increased and certainly
impending risk of fraud, identity theft, intrusion of their privacy, and similar forms of criminal
mischief, risk which may last for the rest of their lives. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members
must devote substantially more time, money, and energy to protect themselves, to the extent
possible, from these crimes.
12. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, alleges claims for
negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment and declaratory judgment arising from
the Data Breach. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief, including the adoption reasonably
sufficient practices to safeguard the Private Information in Defendant’s custody to prevent
3
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 4 of 34 PageID 4
incidents like the Data Breach from reoccurring in the future, and for Defendant to provide identity
theft protective services to Plaintiff and Class Members for their lifetimes.
PARTIES
13. Plaintiff Mario Trevino is an adult, who at all relevant times, was a resident and
citizen of the state of Texas.
14. Plaintiff has suffered actual injury from having his Private Information exposed
and/or stolen as a result of the Data Breach, including: (a) required mitigation efforts, including
researching the Data Breach and needing to monitor his financial statements to ensure his
information is not used for identity theft and fraud; (b) damages to and diminution of the value of
his Private Information, a form of intangible property that loses value when it falls into the hands
of criminals; (c) loss of privacy; and (d) continuous imminent and impending injury raising from
increased risk of financial identity theft and fraud.
15. As a result of the Data Breach, and the sensitivity of the Private Information
compromised, Plaintiff will continue to be at a substantial and certainly impending risk for fraud
and identity theft, and their attendant damages, for years to come.
16. Defendant WellPoint Texas, Inc. is a Texas corporation with its principal place of
business at 2505 N. Highway 360, Suite 300, Grand Prairie, TX 75050.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
17. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)
because this case is a class action where the aggregate claims of all members of the proposed class
are in excess of $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, there are 100 or more members of
4
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 5 of 34 PageID 5
the proposed class, and at least one member of the proposed class is a citizen of a state different
than Defendant. 3
18. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because a substantial part of
the events, omissions, and acts giving rise to the claims herein occurred in this District and
Defendant resides in this District.
19. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, this Court is the proper venue for this action because
a substantial part of the events, omissions, and acts giving rise to the claims herein occurred in this
District and Defendant resides in this District.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
20. Defendant specializes in administering Texas Medicaid and CHIP managed care
health benefits and operating a statewide provider network.
21. Plaintiff and Class Members are and/or were members of Defendant.
22. As a condition of obtaining Defendant’s services, Plaintiff and Class Members
directly or indirectly entrusted WellPoint with their sensitive Private Information.
23. Plaintiff and Class Members value the confidentiality of their Private Information
and, accordingly, have taken reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of their Private
Information.
24. In entrusting their Private Information to Defendant, Plaintiff and Class Members
reasonably expected that Defendant would safeguard their highly sensitive information.
25. By obtaining, collecting, and storing Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information, WellPoint assumed equitable and legal duties to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class
3
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (stating that for purposes of CAFA jurisdiction, an unincorporated
association deemed to be citizen of State where it has its principal place of business and under
whose laws it is organized).
5
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 6 of 34 PageID 6
Members’ highly sensitive information, to only use this information for business purposes, and to
only make authorized disclosures.
26. Despite these duties, WellPoint failed to implement reasonable data security
measures to protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information and ultimately allowed
threat actors to breach its computer systems and exfiltrate Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information stored therein.
THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION AND EFFECTS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
27. WellPoint understood that the Private Information it collects was highly sensitive
and of significant value to those who would use it for wrongful purposes.
28. WellPoint also knew that a breach of its computer systems, and exposure of the
Private Information stored therein, would result in the increased risk of identity theft and fraud
against the individuals whose Private Information was compromised.
29. These risks are not theoretical; in recent years, numerous high-profile breaches
have occurred at business such as Equifax, Facebook, Yahoo, Marriott, Anthem, and many others.
30. Private Information has considerable value and constitutes an enticing and well-
known target to hackers. Hackers can easily sell stolen data as there has been “proliferation of
open and anonymous cybercrime forums on the Dark Web that serve as a bustling marketplace for
such commerce.” 4
31. As the FTC recognizes, identity thieves can use this information to commit an array
of crimes including identity theft, and medical and financial fraud. 5 The prevalence of data
4
Brian Krebs, The Value of a Hacked Company, Krebs on Security (July 14, 2016),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/07/the-value-of-a-hacked-company/.
5
What To Know About Identity Theft, FTC Consumer Advice (Sept. 2024),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0271-warning-signs-identity-theft.
6
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 7 of 34 PageID 7
breaches and identity theft has increased dramatically in recent years, accompanied by a parallel
and growing economic drain on individual, businesses, and government entities in the U.S. In 2024
alone, there were 6,670 recorded breaches exposing more than 16.8 billion records - representing
a 6% year-over-year increase in the United States compared to 2023. 6 This trend is mirrored in
identity theft complaints, which doubled over a five-year span - from 3.2 million reports in 2019
to 6.5 million in 2024. 7
32. Indeed, a 2022 poll of security executives predicted an increase in attacks over the
next two years from “social engineering and ransomware” as nation-states and cybercriminals
grow more sophisticated. Unfortunately, these preventable causes will largely come from
“misconfigurations, human error, poor maintenance, and unknown assets.” 8
33. In tandem with the increase in data breaches, the rate of identity theft complaints
has also increased over the past few years. For instance, 2024 had the second-highest number of
data compromises in the U.S. in a single year since such instances began being tracked in 2005. 9
34. Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) is also reshaping the cybersecurity landscape. “AI-
related [common vulnerabilities and exposures] have surged, with 2,130 disclosed in 2025 alone
6
2025 Global Threat Intelligence Report, Flashpoint (Mar. 18, 2025),
https://go.flashpoint.io/2025_GTIR
7
Facts & Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, Insurance Information Institute,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-
cybercrime#Identity%20Theft%20And%20Fraud%20Reports,%202015-2019%20 (last visited
August 13, 2026).
8
Chuck Brooks, Alarming Cyber Statistics For Mid-Year 2022 That You Need to Know, Forbes
(June 3, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2022/06/03/alarming-cyber-statistics-
for-mid-year-2022-that-you-need-to-know/?sh=176bb6887864.
9
Facts + Statistics: Identity theft and cybercrime, Insurance Information Institute,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-
cybercrime#Identity%20Theft%20And%20Fraud%20Reports,%202015-2019%20, (last visited
August 13, 2026).
7
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 8 of 34 PageID 8
–a 34.6% year-over-year increase.” 10 Further, 16% of all breaches in 2025 involved attackers using
AI. 11
35. The ramifications of WellPoint’s failure to keep Plaintiff’s and Class Members’
Private Information secure are long-lasting and severe. Once Private Information is stolen,
fraudulent use of that information and damage to victims may continue for years. According to the
U.S. Government Accountability Office, which conducted a study regarding data breaches: “[I]n
some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity
theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the [Dark] Web, fraudulent use of that
information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting
from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.” 12
36. The exposure of highly sensitive personal information creates ongoing risk because
“when highly sensitive types of data are exposed, the breach is only the beginning.” 13 That risk
persists as “[e]very breach feeds an underground ecosystem of exposed data. When attackers
obtain highly sensitive identity credential, they rarely use them just once. Instead, they combine
information from multiple breaches to construct detailed identity profiles that can be exploited
many time across different fraud scheme.” 14
10
Peter Girnus et al., Fault Lines in the AI Ecosystem: TrendAI State of AI Security Report, Trend
Micro (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/threat-
landscape/fault-lines-in-the-ai-ecosystem-trendai-state-of-ai-security-report
11
Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, IBM (2025), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/
documents/us-en/131cf87b20b31c91 (last accessed August 13, 2026)
12
Report to Congressional Requesters, Personal Information, June 2007, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf (last accessed August 13,
2026).
13
Matt Cullina, Small Breaches, Big Consequences, Forbes (August 13, 2026),
https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbesbusinesscouncil/2026/06/10/small-breaches-big-
consequences/
14
Id.
8
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 9 of 34 PageID 9
37. Even if stolen Private Information does not include financial or payment card
account information, that does not mean there has been no harm, or that the breach does not cause
a substantial risk of identity theft. Freshly stolen information can be used with success against
victims in specifically targeted efforts to commit identity theft known as social engineering or
spear phishing. In these forms of attack, the criminal uses the previously obtained PII about the
individual, such as name, address, email address, and affiliations, to gain trust and increase the
likelihood that a victim will be deceived into providing the criminal with additional information.
38. Although spear phishing attacks “make up only 0.1% of all email-based attacks,”
their outstanding impact is reflected in the fact that “2 out of 3 successful email attacks are spear
phishing attacks that use personalized messages, social engineering, and other tactics.” 15
39. A company does not become less likely to experience another breach simply
because it has already experienced one; to the contrary, “[o]nce hackers realize an organization is
vulnerable to an attack, they will repeatedly attempt to breach its network[.]” Further, “95% of
organizations surveyed by IBM between March 20222 and March 2023 said they had experienced
more than on data breach.” 16
40. Other research indicates that “[t]wo-thirds of companies that experience
cyberattack are hit again within a year. These successive incidents can play out in multiple ways:
simultaneously, a few days apart, or many months later.” 17
15
Market Report: 2023 Spear-Phishing Trends, Barracuda (May 24, 2023),
https://assets.barracuda.com/assets/docs/dms/2023-spear-phishing-trends.pdf
16
Beth Stackpole, MIT Report Details New Cybersecurity Risks, MIT Sloan (Apr. 30, 2024),
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/mit-report-details-new-cybersecurity-risks
17
Neil Clauson, When Cyberattackers Strike Again – and Again, Mimecast (Nov. 13, 2024),
https://www.mimecast.com/blog/when-cyberattackers-strike-again----and-again/
9
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 10 of 34 PageID 10
41. “It can take an average of 277 days – that’s about nine months – for an organization
to identify and contain a breach. During that extended period of time, not only might cybercriminal
remain in the environment wreaking havoc, but the means by which they entered remains available
to others as well.” 18
42. The specific types of personal data compromised in the Data Breach makes the
information particularly valuable to thieves and leaves Plaintiff and other Class Members
especially vulnerable to identity theft, tax fraud, medical fraud, credit and bank fraud, and more.
43. Based on the value of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII to cybercriminals,
WellPoint knew or should have known the importance of safeguarding the PII entrusted to it and
of the foreseeable consequences if its data security systems were breached. WellPoint failed,
however, to take adequate cyber security measures to prevent the Data Breach from occurring.
WELLPOINT BREACHED ITS DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF’S AND CLASS MEMBERS’
PRIVATE INFORMATION
44. On or about August 10, 2026, WellPoint was the target of a cybersecurity incident
that compromised its data network.
45. The Private Information exfiltrated in the Data Breach includes individuals’ names,
dates of birth, addresses, and health insurance information.
46. WellPoint has not issued, and does not appear to have issued, any notification, or
disclosure to affected individuals, regulatory authorities, or the public regarding the data breach,
including any explanation of the scope, nature, or potential consequences of the compromise.
47. Based on the public announcement of the Data Breach the cyberattack was
expressly designed to gain access to private and confidential data of specific individuals, including
18
Id.; see also Cost of a Data Breach, supra n.12.
10
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 11 of 34 PageID 11
(among other things) the PII of Plaintiff and the Class Members and that the cybercriminals were
successful in exfiltrating sensitive information from Defendant’s data network.
48. All in all, the Private Information of approximately 101,047 individuals was
compromised in the Data Breach.
49. The Data Breach occurred as a direct result of WellPoint’s failure to implement and
follow basic security procedures to protect its current and former members’ Private Information
that it had collected and stored.
WELLPOINT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH FTC GUIDELINES
50. WellPoint is prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(“FTC Act”) from engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has concluded that a company’s failure to maintain
reasonable and appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal information is an
“unfair practice” in violation of the FTC Act.
51. The FTC has promulgated numerous guides for businesses that highlight the
importance of implementing reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need
for data security should be factored into all business decision-making. 19
52. Among other guidance, the FTC recommends the following cybersecurity
guidelines for businesses in order to protect sensitive information in their systems: 20
a. Identify all connections to the computers where sensitive information is
stored;
19
Start with Security – A Guide for Business, United States Federal Trade Comm’n (Aug. 2023),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/920a_start_with_security_en_aug2023_508_final_
0.pdf
20
Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, United States Federal Trade Comm’n,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-
information.pdf (last accessed August 13, 2026).
11
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b. Assess the vulnerability of each connection to commonly known or
reasonably foreseeable attacks;
c. Do not store sensitive consumer data on any computer with an internet
connection unless it is essential for conducting their business;
d. Scan computers on their network to identify and profile the operating
system and open network services. If services are not needed, they should
be disabled to prevent hacks or other potential security problems. For
example, if email service or an internet connection is not necessary on a
certain computer, a business should consider closing the ports to those
services on that computer to prevent unauthorized access to that machine;
e. Pay particular attention to the security of their web applications - the
software used to give information to visitors to their websites and to retrieve
information from them. Web applications may be particularly vulnerable to
a variety of hack attacks;
f. Use a firewall to protect their computers from hacker attacks while it is
connected to a network, especially the internet;
g. Determine whether a border firewall should be installed where the
business’s network connects to the internet. A border firewall separates the
network from the internet and may prevent an attacker from gaining access
to a computer on the network where sensitive information is stored. Set
access controls -settings that determine which devices and traffic get
through the firewall - to allow only trusted devices with a legitimate
business need to access the network. Since the protection a firewall provides
is only as effective as its access controls, they should be reviewed
periodically;
h. Monitor incoming traffic for signs that someone is trying to hack in. Keep
an eye out for activity from new users, multiple log-in attempts from
unknown users or computers, and higher-than-average traffic at unusual
times of the day; and
i. Monitor outgoing traffic for signs of a data breach. Watch for unexpectedly
large amounts of data being transmitted from their system to an unknown
user. If large amounts of information are being transmitted from a
business’s network, the transmission should be investigated to make sure it
is authorized.
53. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain PII longer than is
needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to private data; require complex passwords
12
Case 3:26-cv-02697-E Document 1 Filed 08/13/26 Page 13 of 34 PageID 13
to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for suspicious activity
on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented reasonable security
measures. 21
54. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to
adequately and reasonably protect customer data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an
unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act. Orders resulting from these actions
further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security obligations.
55. WellPoint failed to properly implement basic data security practices. WellPoint’s
failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to
its members’ PII constitutes an unfair act of practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act.
56. WellPoint was at all times fully aware of its obligations to protect the PII of its
members given the reams of PII that it had access to as Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ service
provider. WellPoint was also aware of the significant repercussions that would result from a failure
to properly secure the Private Information it maintained.
WELLPOINT’S FAILURE TO PREVENT, IDENTIFY, AND TIMELY REPORT THE DATA BREACH
57. WellPoint failed to take necessary precautions and failed to employ adequate
measures necessary to protect its computer systems against unauthorized access and keep
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information secure.
58. The Private Information that WellPoint allowed to be exposed in the Data Breach
is the type of private information that WellPoint knew or should have known would be the target
of cyberattacks.
21
Id.
13
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59. Despite its own knowledge of the inherent risks of cyberattacks, and
notwithstanding the FTC’s data security principles and practices 22, WellPoint failed to disclose
that its systems and security practices were inadequate to reasonably safeguard individuals’ Private
Information.
60. The FTC directs businesses to use an intrusion detection system to expose a breach
as soon as it occurs, monitor activity for attempted hacks, and have an immediate response plan if
a breach occurs. 23 Immediate notification to individuals impacted by a data breach is critical so
that those impacted can take measures to protect themselves.
61. Plaintiff and Class Members remain in the dark regarding what data was stolen, the
particular malware used, and what steps are being taken to secure their PII in the future. Thus,
Plaintiff and Class Members are left to speculate as to where their PII ended up, who has used it,
and for what potentially nefarious purposes. Indeed, they are left to further speculate as to the full
impact of the Data Breach and how Defendant intends to enhance its information security systems
and monitoring capabilities to prevent further breaches.
PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBERS SUFFERED DAMAGES
62. The ramifications of WellPoint’s failure to keep Private Information secure are
long-lasting and severe. Once Private Information is stolen, fraudulent use of that information and
damage to victims may continue for years.
63. Once Private Information is exposed, there is virtually no way to ensure that the
exposed information has been fully recovered or obtained against future misuse. For this reason,
22
Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/protecting-personal-information-guide-business
(last visited August 13, 2026).
23
Id.
14
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Plaintiff and Class Members will need to maintain these heightened measures for years, and
possibly their entire lives as a result of Defendant’s conduct. Further, the value of Plaintiff’s and
Class Members’ Private Information has been diminished by its exposure in the Data Breach.
64. PII remains of high value to criminals, as evidenced by the prices they will pay
through the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web pricing for stolen identity credentials. For
example, credit card information can be sold at a price ranging from $10 to $240, and bank details
have a price range of $30 to $4,255 24 “Fullz” packages, which includes “extra information about
the legitimate credit card owner in case” the scammer’s “bona fides are challenged when they
attempt to use the credit card” are also offered on the dark web. 25
65. Plaintiff and Class Members are at substantial increased risk of suffering identity
theft and fraud or misuse of their Private Information as a result of the Data Breach. A recent study
found that “[v]ictims of identity theft (24%) were twice as likely as nonvictims (11%) to learn that
an entity with their personal information experienced a data breach in the past year.” 26
66. Further, Plaintiff and Class Members have incurred and will incur out of pocket
costs for protective measures, such as identity theft protection, credit monitoring, credit report fees,
credit freeze fees, and similar costs related to the Data Breach.
67. Besides the monetary damage sustained in the event of identity theft, consumers
may have to spend hours trying to resolve identity theft issues. For example, the FTC estimates
24
Ben Luthi, Here’s What Your Data Sells for on the Dark Web, Experian (June 30, 2025),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-
selling-for-on-the-dark-web/
25
Stolen PII & Ramifications: Identity Theft and Fraud on the Dark Web, Armor (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://res.armor.com/resources/blog/stolen-pii-ramifications-identity-theft-fraud-dark-web/.
26
Erika Harrell, Just the Stats: Data Breach Notifications and Identity Theft, 2021, Bureau of
Justice Statistics (Jan. 2024), https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-breach-notifications-and-identity-theft-2021
15
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that it takes consumers an average of 200 hours of work over approximately six months to recover
from identity theft. 27
68. Plaintiff and Class Members are also at a continued risk because their information
remains in WellPoint’s systems, which the Data Breach showed are susceptible to compromise and
attack and are subject to further attack so long as WellPoint fails to take necessary and appropriate
security and training measures to protect the Private Information in its possession.
69. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered emotional distress as a result of the Data
Breach, the increased risk of identity theft and financial fraud, and the unauthorized exposure of
their Private Information to strangers.
70. As a result of WellPoint’s failure to prevent the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered and will continue to suffer injuries, including out of pocket expenses; loss
of time and productivity through efforts to ameliorate, mitigate, and deal with the future
consequences of the Data Breach; theft of their valuable Private Information; the imminent and
certainly impeding injury flowing from fraud and identity theft posed by their Private Information
being disclosed to unauthorized recipients and cybercriminals; damages to and diminution in value
of their Private Information; and continued risk to Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ Private
Information, which remains in the possession of Defendant and which is subject to further breaches
so long as WellPoint fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
Information entrusted to it.
27
Kathryn Parkman, How to Report identity Theft, ConsumerAffairs (Feb. 17, 2022),
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/finance/how-to-report-identity-theft.html (last accessed
August 13, 2026).
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71. Furthermore, Defendant has not offered identity theft monitoring and/or identity
theft protection for its members. This lack of resolution is inadequate when the victims will likely
face many years of identity theft.
72. The absence of these services is wholly inadequate as they fail to provide for the
fact that victims of data breaches and other unauthorized disclosures commonly face multiple years
of ongoing identity theft and financial fraud, and they entirely fail to provide any compensation
for the unauthorized release and disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
73. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all other individuals who
are similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
74. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of persons to be defined as follows:
All individuals in the United States whose Private Information was
compromised in the Data Breach (the “Class”).
75. Excluded from the Class are WellPoint, its subsidiaries and affiliates, officers and
directors, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, the legal representative, heirs,
successors, or assigns of any such excluded party, the judicial officer(s) to whom this action is
assigned, and the members of their immediate families.
76. This proposed class definition is based on the information available to Plaintiff at
this time. Plaintiff may modify the class definition in an amended pleading or when he moves for
class certification, as necessary to account for any newly learned or changed facts as the situation
develops and discovery gets underway.
77. Numerosity: Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that there are
at minimum, 101,047 of members of the Class described above. The exact size of the Class and
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the identities of the individual members are identifiable through Defendant’s records, including
but not limited to the files implicated in the Data Breach.
78. Commonality: This action involved questions of law and fact common to the
Class. Such common questions include but are not limited to:
a. Whether Defendant had a duty to protect the Private Information of Plaintiff
and Class Members;
b. Whether Defendant was negligent in collecting and storing Plaintiff’s and
Class Members’ Private Information, and breached its duties thereby;
c. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages as a result of
Defendant’s wrongful conduct; and
d. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to restitution as a result
of Defendant’s wrongful conduct.
79. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class.
The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise
from the same unlawful and willful conduct. Plaintiff and members of the Class were all members
of Defendant, and each had their Private Information exposed and/or accessed by an unauthorized
third-party.
80. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class
because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will
fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class
and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. In addition, Plaintiff has retained
counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. The claims
of Plaintiff and the Class Members are substantially identical as explained above.
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81. Superiority: This class action is appropriate for certification because class
proceedings are superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this
controversy and joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. This proposed class action
presents fewer management difficulties than individual litigation, and provides the benefits of
single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Class
treatment will create economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniform decision-
making.
82. Predominance: Common questions of law and fact predominate over any
questions affecting only individual Class Members. Similar or identical violations, business
practices, and injuries are involved. Individual questions, if any, pale by comparison, in both
quality and quantity, to the numerous common questions that dominate this action. For example,
Defendant’s liability and the fact of damages are common to Plaintiff and each member of the
Class. If Defendant breached its duty to Plaintiff and Class Members, then Plaintiff and each Class
member suffered damages by that conduct.
83. Injunctive Relief: Defendant has acted and/or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the Class, making injunctive and/or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the
Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
84. Ascertainability: Members of the Class are ascertainable. Class Membership is
defined using objective criteria, and Class Members may be readily identified through Defendant’s
books and records.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I
NEGLIGENCE
(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CLASS)
85. Plaintiff re-alleges the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.
86. Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant as a
condition of obtaining services from Defendant.
87. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to exercise reasonable care
in securing, safeguarding, storing, and protecting the PII collected from them from being
compromised, lost, stolen, accessed and misused by unauthorized parties. This duty includes,
among other things, designing, maintaining, overseeing, and testing Defendant’s security systems
to ensure that PII in WellPoint’s possession was adequately secured and protected.
88. Defendant had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information and the
types of harm that Plaintiff and Class Members could and would suffer if their Private Information
were wrongfully disclosed.
89. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to provide
reasonable security, consistent with industry standards, to ensure that its systems and networks
adequately protected their Private Information.
90. Defendant had a special relationship with Plaintiff and Class Members. Plaintiff’s
and Class Members’ willingness to entrust WellPoint with their Private Information as a condition
of receiving resources was predicated on the understanding that WellPoint would take adequate
security precautions to protect their PII.
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91. By assuming the responsibility to collect and store this data, Defendant had duties
of care to use reasonable means to secure and to prevent disclosure of the information, and to
safeguard the information from theft.
92. Plaintiff and members of the Class entrusted Defendant with their PII with the
understanding that WellPoint would safeguard their information.
93. Defendant’s conduct also created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and Class
Members by failing to: (1) secure its systems and exercise adequate oversight of its data security
protocols; (2) ensure compliance with industry standard data security practices, (3) implement
adequate system and event monitoring, and (4) implement the systems, policies, and procedures
necessary to prevent the Data Breach.
94. Defendant knew, or should have known, of the risks inherent in collecting and
storing PII, the vulnerabilities of its systems, and the importance of adequate security. Defendant
should have been aware of numerous, well-publicized data breaches in the months and years
preceding the Data Breach.
95. Defendant breached its common law duty to act with reasonable care in collecting
and storing the Private Information of its members, which exists independently from any
contractual obligations between the parties. Specifically, Defendant breached its common law,
statutory, and other duties to Plaintiff and Class Members in numerous ways, including by:
a. failing to adopt reasonable data security measures, practices, and
protocols;
b. failing to implement data security systems, practices, and protocols
sufficient to protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII;
c. storing former Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII longer than reasonably
necessary;
d. failing to comply with industry-standard data security measures; and
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e. failing to timely disclose critical information regarding the nature of the
Data Breach.
96. Defendant’s failure to implement and maintain adequate data security measures to
protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information created conditions conducive to a
foreseeable, intentional criminal act in the form of the Data Breach. Plaintiff and Class Members
did not contribute to the Data Breach or the subsequent misuse of their Private Information.
97. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to provide data
security consistent with industry standards and other requirements discussed herein, and to ensure
that its systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately protected the
Private Information.
98. Moreover, Defendant had a duty to promptly and adequately notify Plaintiff and
Class Members of the Data Breach.
99. Defendant had and continues to have duties to adequately disclose that the Private
Information of Plaintiff and Class Members within Defendant’s possession might have been
compromised, how it was compromised, and precisely the types of data that were compromised
and when. Such notice is necessary to allow Plaintiff and Class Members to take steps to prevent,
mitigate, and repair any identity theft and the fraudulent use of their Private Information by third
parties.
100. Defendant has acknowledged that the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class
Members was disclosed to unauthorized third persons as a result of the Data Breach.
101. Defendant’s conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of
Private Information it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense
damages that would result to Plaintiff and Class Members.
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102. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class
Members have and will suffer damages including, but not limited to: (i) the loss of value of their
Private Information and loss of opportunity to determine for themselves how their PII is used; (ii)
the publication and/or theft of their PII; (iii) out-of-pocket expenses associated with the prevention,
detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax fraud, and/or unauthorized use of their PII; (iv) lost
opportunity costs associated with addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future
consequences of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to, efforts spent researching how to
prevent, detect, contest and recover from tax fraud and identity theft; (v) time, effort, and expense
associated with placing fraud alerts or freezes on credit reports; (vi) anxiety, emotional distress,
loss of privacy, and other economic and non-economic losses; (vii) the continued risk to their PII,
which remains in Defendant’s possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
as WellPoint fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect it; and, (viii) future
costs in terms of time, effort and money that will be expended to prevent, detect, contest, and repair
the inevitable and continuing consequences of compromised for the rest of their lives.
103. But for Defendant’s wrongful and negligent breaches of duties owed to Plaintiff
and Class Members, the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members would not have been
compromised.
104. There is a close causal connection between Defendant’s failure to implement
security measures to protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members and the harm,
or risk of imminent harm, suffered by Plaintiff and Class Members. The Private Information of
Plaintiff and Class Members was lost and accessed as the proximate result of Defendant’s failure
to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding such Private Information by adopting, implementing,
and maintaining appropriate security measures.
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105. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy;
(ii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iii) lost time and opportunity costs associated
with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (iv) loss of benefit of the
bargain; (v) an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails; and (vi) the continued and certainly
increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for
unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant’s
possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake
appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.
106. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff and the Class
have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm, including, but not
limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and non-economic
losses.
107. In addition, WellPoint had a duty to employ reasonable security measures under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting
commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair practice of failing to use
reasonable measures to protect confidential data.
108. Defendant’s violation of federal statutes, including the FTC Act, constitutes
negligence per se.
109. Additionally, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and
negligence per se, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will suffer the continued risks of
exposure of their Private Information, which remain in Defendant’s possession and is subject to
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further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fail to undertake appropriate and adequate
measures to protect the Private Information in its continued possession.
110. Plaintiff and Class Members are therefore entitled to damages, including restitution
and unjust enrichment, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.
COUNT II
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
111. Plaintiff re-alleges the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.
112. In connection with obtaining services from Defendant, Plaintiff and Class Members
entered into implied contracts with WellPoint.
113. Plaintiff and Class Members were required to deliver their Private Information to
Defendant as part of the process of obtaining services from Defendant.
114. Defendant required Class Members to provide their Private Information in order to
obtain services from Defendant. Plaintiff and Class Members accepted Defendant’s offers and
provided their Private Information to Defendant.
115. Defendant accepted possession of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private
Information for the purpose of providing services to Plaintiff and Class Members.
116. When Plaintiff and Class Members provided their PII to WellPoint, either directly
or indirectly, as a pre-condition for services, they entered into implied contracts with WellPoint.
117. Pursuant to these implied contracts, in exchange for the consideration and PII
provided by Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant agreed to, among other things, and Plaintiffs
and Class Members understood that WellPoint would: (1) provide products and/or services to
Plaintiffs and Class Members; (2) implement reasonable measures to protect the security and
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confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII; and (3) protect Plaintiff’s and Class
Members’ PII in compliance with federal and state laws and regulations and industry standards
118. In entering into such implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably
believed and expected that Defendant’s data security practices complied with relevant laws and
regulations and were consistent with industry standards.
119. Implicit in the agreement between Plaintiff and Class Members and Defendant to
provide Private Information, was the latter’s obligation to: (a) use such Private Information for
business purposes only, (b) take reasonable steps to safeguard that Private Information, (c) prevent
unauthorized disclosures of the Private Information, (d) provide Plaintiff and Class Members with
prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or theft of their Private
Information, (e) reasonably safeguard and protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class
Members from unauthorized disclosure or uses, and (f) retain the Private Information only under
conditions that kept such information secure and confidential.
120. The protection of PII was a material term of the implied contracts between Plaintiff
and Class Members, on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other hand. Indeed, as set forth herein,
Defendant recognized its duty to provide adequate data security and ensure the privacy of its
members’ PII with its practice of providing a privacy policy on its website.
121. Plaintiff and Class Members performed their obligations under the implied contract
when they provided Defendant with their PII.
122. Defendant breached its obligations under its implied contracts with Plaintiff and
Class Members in failing to implement and maintain reasonable security measures to protect and
secure their PII and in failing to implement and maintain security protocols and procedures to
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protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII in a manner that complies with applicable laws,
regulations, and industry standards.
123. The mutual understanding and intent of Plaintiff and Class Members on the one
hand, and Defendant, on the other, is demonstrated by their conduct and course of dealing.
124. On information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant promulgated, adopted,
and implemented written privacy policies whereby it expressly promised Plaintiff and Class
Members that it would only disclose Private Information under certain circumstances, none of
which relate to the Data Breach.
125. On information and belief, Defendant further promised to comply with industry
standards and to make sure that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information would remain
protected.
126. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information to
Defendant in the absence of the implied contract between them and Defendant to keep their
information reasonably secure.
127. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information to
Defendant in the absence of their implied promise to monitor their computer systems and networks
to ensure that it adopted reasonable data security measures.
128. Plaintiff and Class Members fully and adequately performed their obligations under
the implied contracts with Defendant.
129. Defendant breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiff and the Class by
failing to safeguard and protect their Private Information, by failing to delete the information of
Plaintiff and the Class once the relationship ended, and by failing to provide accurate notice to
them that Private Information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.
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130. Defendant breached the implied contracts by failing to maintain adequate computer
systems and data security practices to safeguard Private Information, failing to timely and
accurately disclose the Data Breach to Plaintiff and Class Members and continued acceptance of
Private Information and storage of other personal information after Defendant knew, or should
have known, of the security vulnerabilities of the systems that were exploited in the Data Breach.
131. Defendant’s breach of its obligations of its implied contracts with Plaintiff and
Class Members directly resulted in the Data Breach and the injuries that Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered from the Data Breach.
132. Plaintiff and Class Members suffered by virtue of Defendant’s breach of their
implied contracts because: (i) they paid for data security protection they did not receive; (ii) they
face a substantially increased risk of identity theft - risks justifying expenditures for protective and
remedial services for which they are entitled to compensation; (iii) their PII was improperly
disclosed to unauthorized individuals; (iv) the confidentiality of their PII has been breached; (v)
they were deprived of the value of their PII, for which there is a well-established national and
international market; (vi) they have lost time and incurred expenses, and will incur future costs to
mitigate and remediate the effects of the Data Breach, including the increased risks of identity theft
they face and will continue to face; and (vii) they have overpaid for the services they received
without adequate data security.
133. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory, consequential, and
nominal damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.
134. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring
Defendant to, e.g., (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit
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to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) immediately provide
adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.
COUNT III
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
135. Plaintiff re-alleges the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.
136. This count is plead in the alternative to the breach of implied contract count above.
137. By its wrongful acts and omissions described herein, Defendant has obtained a
benefit by unduly taking advantage of Plaintiff and Class Members.
138. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit on Defendant, whereby they
provided their Private Information to Defendant in connection with receiving certain services.
139. Defendant prior to and at the time Plaintiff and Class Members entrusted it with
their PII, caused Plaintiff and Class Members to reasonably believe that it would keep that Private
Information secure.
140. The monies Defendant was paid in its ordinary course of business included a
premium for Defendant’s cybersecurity obligations and were supposed to be used by Defendant,
in part, to pay for the administrative and other costs of providing reasonable data security and
protection for Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information.
141. Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit upon it and
accepted and retained that benefit by accepting and retaining the Private Information entrusted to
it. Defendant profited from Plaintiff’s retained data and used Plaintiff’s and Class Members’
Private Information for business purposes.
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142. Defendant failed to disclose facts pertaining to its substandard information systems,
or defects and vulnerabilities therein before Plaintiff and Class Members made their decisions to
provide Defendant with their Private Information.
143. Defendant enriched itself by hoarding the costs it reasonably should have expended
on data security measures to secure Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information. Instead of
providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the Data Breach, Defendant
calculated to increase its own profit at the expense of Plaintiff and Class Members by utilizing
cheap, ineffective security measures and diverting those funds to its own personal use. Plaintiff
and Class Members, on the other hand, suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s
decision to prioritize its own profits over the requisite security and the safety of their Private
Information.
144. Defendant failed to provide reasonable security, safeguards, and protections to the
Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, and, as a result, Defendant was overpaid.
145. Under principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be permitted
to retain any of the benefits that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred upon it.
146. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.
147. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy;
(ii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iii) lost time and opportunity costs associated
with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (iv) loss of benefit of the
bargain; (v) an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails; and (vi) the continued and certainly
increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for
unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant’s
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possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to
undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.
148. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to full refunds, restitution, and/or damages
from Defendant and/or an order proportionally disgorging all profits, benefits, and other
compensation obtained by Defendant from its wrongful conduct. This can be accomplished by
establishing a constructive trust from which Plaintiff and Class Members may seek restitution or
compensation.
COUNT IV
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
149. Plaintiff re-alleges the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.
150. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq., this Court is
authorized to enter a judgment declaring the rights and legal relations of the parties and grant
further necessary relief. Furthermore, the Court has broad authority to restrain acts, such as here,
that are tortious and violate the terms of the federal and state statutes described in this Complaint.
151. An actual controversy has arisen in the wake of the Data Breach regarding
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information and whether WellPoint is currently maintaining
data security measures adequate to protect Plaintiff and Class Members from further data breaches
that compromise their PII. Plaintiff alleges that WellPoint’s data security measures remain
inadequate. Furthermore, Plaintiff continues to suffer injury as a result of the compromise of his
PII and remains at imminent risk that further compromises of his PII will occur in the future.
152. Pursuant to its authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act, this Court should
enter a judgment declaring, among other things, the following:
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a. WellPoint owes a legal duty to secure members’ Private Information and to
timely notify impacted individuals of a data breach under the common law,
and various state statutes; and
b. WellPoint continues to breach this legal duty by failing to employ
reasonable measures to secure Private Information in its possession.
153. This Court also should issue corresponding prospective injunctive relief requiring
WellPoint to employ adequate security protocols consistent with law and industry standards to
protect Private Information in WellPoint’s data network.
154. If an injunction is not issued, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, and lack an
adequate legal remedy, in the event of another data breach at WellPoint. The risk of another such
breach is real, immediate, and substantial. If another breach at WellPoint occurs, Plaintiff will not
have an adequate remedy at law because many of the resulting injuries are not readily quantified
and he will be forced to bring multiple lawsuits to rectify the same conduct.
155. The hardship to Plaintiff if an injunction is not issued exceeds the hardship to
WellPoint if an injunction is issued. Plaintiff will likely be subjected to substantial identity theft
and other damage. On the other hand, the cost to WellPoint of complying with an injunction by
employing reasonable prospective data security measures is relatively minimal, and WellPoint has
a pre-existing legal obligation to employ such measures.
156. Issuance of the requested injunction will not disserve the public interest. In contrast,
such an injunction would benefit the public by preventing another data breach at WellPoint, thus
eliminating the additional injuries that would result to Plaintiff and members whose confidential
information would be further compromised.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
A. For an Order certifying this action as a class action, appointing Plaintiff as class
representative for the Class, and appointing his counsel to represent the Class;
B. For equitable relief enjoining WellPoint from engaging in the wrongful conduct
complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’
PII, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete and accurate disclosures to Plaintiff and Class
Members;
C. For equitable relief compelling WellPoint to utilize appropriate methods and
policies with respect to member data collection, storage, and safety, and to disclose with specificity
the types of PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach;
D. For equitable relief requiring restitution and disgorgement of the revenues
wrongfully retained as a result of WellPoint’s wrongful conduct;
E. Ordering WellPoint to pay for not less than ten years of credit monitoring services
for Plaintiff and Class Members;
F. For an award of actual damages, compensatory damages, statutory damages, and
statutory penalties, in an amount to be determined, as allowable by law;
G. For an award of punitive damages, as allowable by law;
H. For an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other expense, including expert
witness fees;
I. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded; and
J. Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.
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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all claims so triable.
Dated: August 13, 2026 Respectfully submitted,
Law Offices of
LIPPE & ASSOCIATES
/s/ Emil Lippe, Jr.
Emil Lippe, Jr. (SBN 12398300)
Park Place at Turtle Creek
2911 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1250
Dallas, TX 75219
T: 214-855-1850
F: 214-720-6075
emil@texaslaw.com
LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
Gerald D. Wells, III (pro hac vice forthcoming)
Robert J. Gray (pro hac vice forthcoming)
1760 Market Street, Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
T: 267-609-6910
F: 267-609-6955
jerry@lcllp.com
rob@lcllp.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
34