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California Public Employees v. Palantir Technologies Inc. — Entry #32: [11224750] Appellant/Petitioner's reply brief filed by California Public Employees' Retirement System and Shijun Liu

Case: California Public Employees v. Palantir Technologies Inc. ca10 · 25-1178

filed May 06, 2025

What this document is

Docket entry #32 · filed October 21, 2025

[11224750] Appellant/Petitioner's reply brief filed by California Public Employees' Retirement System and Shijun Liu. Served on 10/21/2025. Manner of Service: email. Word/page count: 6482. This pleading complies with all required privacy and virus certifications: Yes. [25-1178] JDD [Entered: 10/21/2025 03:55 PM]

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Appellate Case: 25-1178     Document: 32    Date Filed: 10/21/2025   Page: 1


                                      No. 25-1178
                    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

      CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al.,

                                  Plaintiffs/Appellants,

                                           vs.

                       PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC., et al.,

                                 Defendants/Appellees.


                 Appeal from a Decision of the United States District Court
              for the District of Colorado, Case No. 1:22-cv-02384-GPG-SBP
                    Honorable Gordon P. Gallagher, U.S. District Judge

                     PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

                            ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
                                     & DOWD LLP
                                DARREN J. ROBBINS
                                  JOSEPH D. DALEY
                                  LUKE O. BROOKS
                             J. MARCO JANOSKI GRAY
                                  ERIKA L. OLIVER
                            655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
                                 San Diego, CA 92101
                               Telephone: 619/231-1058
                                   619/231-7423 (fax)

                            Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants


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                                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                      Page
I.       ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................1

         A.         Plaintiffs’ allegations confirm that Defendants acted with
                    scienter in connection with their scheme to defraud, false-and-
                    misleading statements, and insider selling. ........................................... 1

                    1.       Defendants’ arguments revolve around a specious theme
                             and several false premises. .......................................................... 1

                    2.       Pluralsight confirms Defendants’ billions of dollars in
                             insider sales at inflated prices bolster a strong inference
                             of scienter. ...................................................................................4

                    3.       Defendants’ construction and utilization of the SPAC
                             scheme was deliberate misconduct. ..........................................11

                    4.       Defendants’ conceded access to truthful information
                             bolsters a strong inference of scienter.......................................18

                    5.       Defendants’ trumpeted “strong visibility” into Palantir’s
                             revenue growth further establishes their scienter. ....................23

                    6.       Defendants’ deliberate manipulation of key reporting
                             metrics cannot be explained away. ...........................................25

         B.         Defendants haven’t satisfactorily defended the district court’s
                    failure to address the deliberate actions comprising their
                    scheme. ................................................................................................29

II.      CONCLUSION..............................................................................................32

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT.................. 33

DECLARATION OF SERVICE .............................................................................34


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                                    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

                                                                                                             Page

CASES
Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc.,
  340 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2003) ......................................................................4, 21

Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp.,
   284 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002) ...........................................................................15, 16
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
   556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................................1, 2, 13
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
   550 U.S. 544 (2007) ....................................................................................1, 2, 31

Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Karp,
  2025 WL 1213104 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2025) ........................................................ 3
City of Warren Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin., Inc.,
   70 F.4th 668 (3d Cir. 2023) ................................................................................20
Clem v. Lomeli,
   566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................. 4
Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
   63 F.4th 1264 (10th Cir. 2023) .................................................................2, 13, 30
Dirks v. SEC,
   463 U.S. 646 (1983) ............................................................................................12
Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Gov’t of the Virgin Is. v. Blanford,
  794 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) ...............................................................................21
Frank v. Dana Corp.,
   547 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2008) ..............................................................................31
Goldman v. Belden,
  754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985) ...............................................................................7

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                                                                                                            Page


Harris v. Union Elec. Co.,
  787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986) ................................................................................ 3

Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,
  251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ................................................7, 8, 16, 17

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
  459 U.S. 375 (1983) ............................................................................................16

In re Alphabet, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
    1 F.4th 687 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................................................................26

In re Daou Sys.,
    411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................21
In re Genius Brands Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
    97 F.4th 1171 (9th Cir. 2024) .............................................................................29
In re Grand Casinos Sec. Litig. Inc.,
    988 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1997)....................................................................17
Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. Pluralsight, Inc.,
   45 F.4th 1236 (10th Cir. 2022) ............................ 2, 4-9, 11, 15, 20, 23-25, 29, 31
Johnson v. Reyna,
   57 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2023) .............................................................................30

Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc.,
  937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991) ................................................................................. 6

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,
   565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) ..............................................................................21

Lovelace v. Software Spectrum,
   78 F.3d 1015 (5th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................6


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                                                                                                            Page


Meitav Dash Provident Funds & Pension Ltd. v. Spirit AeroSystems
  Holdings, Inc.,
  79 F.4th 1209 (10th Cir. 2023) .....................................................................18, 22

Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund,
  575 U.S. 175 (2015) ............................................................................................20

Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc.,
   339 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003) ..............................................................16, 26, 28
Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc.,
   407 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................25

Reese v. Malone,
   747 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled in part on other grounds
   by City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech.,
   Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................17
Ronconi v. Larkin,
  253 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogation recognized by Cai v. Eargo,
  Inc., 2025 WL 66041 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) ................................................9, 10
Schleicher v. Wendt,
   618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 3
Smallen v. W. Union Co.,
  950 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2020) ................................................................9, 10, 11

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd.,
   551 U.S. 308 (2007) ................................................. 1-2, 13, 17, 20, 23-24, 29-31

Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
   501 U.S. 1083 (1991) ..........................................................................................26


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                                                                                                                      Page


STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
15 U.S.C.
   §77k.....................................................................................................................20
Delaware Chancery Court
  Rule 23.1 ...............................................................................................................3
17 C.F.R.
   §240.10b-5 ..........................................................................................................20
   §240.10b5-1 ......................................................................................................5, 6


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I.       ARGUMENT
         Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief (“OB.__”) explained how Defendants

acted with scienter in undertaking their scheme to defraud, detailing deliberate

misconduct that included false-and-misleading statements as well as manipulation of

key metrics to facilitate $2.2 billion of insider selling.

         In         response,   Defendants-Appellees’    Answering    Brief    (“AB.__”)

mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ allegations, relies upon inapposite case law, and lauds the

district court’s erroneous pleading demands.

         As explained below, none of their gambits prevail.

         A.          Plaintiffs’ allegations confirm that Defendants acted with
                     scienter in connection with their scheme to defraud, false-
                     and-misleading statements, and insider selling.
                     1.    Defendants’ arguments revolve around a specious
                           theme and several false premises.

         Before addressing Defendants’ arguments, it’s helpful to note their underlying

theme, to wit: that Plaintiffs argue that scienter inferences need only be “plausible,”

versus the cogent-and-compelling “strong-inference” standard required by Tellabs,

Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See AB.53-54 (“[Plaintiffs]

incorrectly cite Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) several times for the proposition that all Plaintiffs must do is

‘plausibly’ allege scienter.”); accord AB.18; AB.23.

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         Defendants’ theme is specious. The Supreme Court and this Court recognize

that allegations’ “plausibility” co-exists with the PSLRA’s higher scienter-pleading

standard. See, e.g., Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323 (“in determining whether the pleaded

facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter, the court must take into account

plausible opposing inferences”);1 Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264,

1281 (10th Cir. 2023) (“particularized allegations plausibly allege [defendant]

engaged in a fraudulent scheme”); accord Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. Pluralsight, Inc., 45

F.4th 1236, 1268 (10th Cir. 2022).2

         Defendants build upon their specious theme utilizing three false premises:

(i) Palantir’s present condition and stock price somehow insulate Defendants’ Class

Period misconduct years ago; (ii) an unpublished decision in unrelated state-court

litigation means the district court here correctly dismissed the Complaint; and

(iii) because this appeal centers on scienter, Defendants’ alleged falsehoods don’t

figure into the Court’s analysis.

         None of the three premises should sway this Court.


1
   Throughout this brief internal citations and footnotes are omitted and emphasis
added, unless noted otherwise.
2
    Plaintiffs also cited Iqbal and Twombly for a second axiom: judicial disbelief of
factual allegations is reversible error. OB.40; OB.58; OB.64. Defendants offer no
real defense of that district-court error—nor could they. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-
56.

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         As to the first, it’s not only common sense but black-letter law that “[f]raud

depends on the state of events when a statement is made, not on what happens later.”

Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2010). Relatedly, that Palantir stock

now trades higher than at the Class Period’s end isn’t relevant; whatever Palantir

investors did (or didn’t do) with their stock following the fraud’s exposure doesn’t

undercut the fraud’s existence. See, e.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 372

(8th Cir. 1986) (by holding onto defendant’s securities after fraud’s discovery,

investors made “second investment decision”).

         As to the second premise, the state-court decision doesn’t control here. It was

issued in a different venue, in a separate lawsuit brought by different plaintiffs

asserting state-law claims. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Karp, 2025 WL 1213104

(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2025). Defendants also entirely ignore that the dismissal was on

“demand futility” grounds under Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1, and not for

failure to state a claim. Id. at *22. There’s no legal effect upon this litigation.

         As to the third, Defendants suggest that because the parties’ briefing focuses on

scienter, Defendants’ alleged misstatements regarding Palantir’s “growth, unit

economics and margins, bespoke versus SaaS-like offerings, and efficiencies” are “not

at issue.” AB.55 n.41.


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         Wishful thinking, for a trio of reasons: (i) Plaintiffs fully briefed Defendants’

misstatements in the Opening Brief and explained why they were false-and-

misleading; (ii) the misstatements provide this Court valuable context for ruling upon

the scienter issues (see, e.g., Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1106

(10th Cir. 2003)); and (iii) Defendants’ failure to address Plaintiffs’ scienter

allegations in connection with those misstatements constitutes waiver. Clem v.

Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (appellee waives issue by not addressing

it in answering brief).

         With Defendants’ specious theme and false premises dispatched, we now turn

to their remaining scienter arguments.

                    2.   Pluralsight confirms Defendants’ billions of dollars in
                         insider sales at inflated prices bolster a strong
                         inference of scienter.

         Plaintiffs explained how Defendants’ more-than-$2-billion in insider selling

satisfied this Court’s Pluralsight decision, where far-less-dramatic selling—$22

million for one defendant, and just $519,000 for another—helped raise a strong

inference of scienter. See OB.42-44; see also Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1264-67

(considering “‘amount of profit from the sales, the portion of stockholdings sold, the

change in volume of insider sales, and the number of insiders selling,’” along with

greater volume of sales inside class period “than outside”). Plaintiffs also explained


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the district court’s myriad errors while considering Defendants’ sales (OB.52-56),

along with its failure to “address, let alone analyze, Pluralsight’s scienter holdings.”

OB.47.3

         Defendants respond with a blunderbuss attack wrapped in arguments parroting

the district court’s erroneous analyses. Each scattershot volley misses its mark.

         One missed shot concerns ostensibly pre-placed stock-trading plans.

Defendants contend that most of their insider selling was conducted via Rule 10b5-1

“trading plans,” and therefore is immunized. AB.27-29. That untested contention has

multiple flaws.

         First, the district court refused to entertain that argument. Add:23 n.10 (“[T]he

Court does not consider Defendants’ automatic trading argument in its scienter

analysis.”). That refusal was for good reason—rather than submit their supposed

trading plans, Defendants proffered “exhibits consisting of SEC filings and attorney-

created documents aggregating data from those filings.” Add:22 n.10. Those filings

were mostly Form 4 trading records (id.)—the truth of which isn’t judicially


3
   It’s worth repeating that the district court mentioned this Court’s on-point
Pluralsight opinion only twice. OB.38-39.

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noticeable. Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); accord

Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1996).4

         In addition, this Court holds that Rule 10b5-1 trading plans aren’t a per se

defense to insider-selling charges. Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1265-66. As this Court

noted, experience shows such plans are easily manipulated:

         As Plaintiffs correctly explain, the text and history of Rule 10b5-1 shows
         that such plans can be manipulated easily for personal financial gain
         and thus cannot rebut the inference that personal financial gain was a
         motive for Defendants’ material misrepresentations.
Id. at 1266. Whether that occurred here is a fact-specific inquiry whose resolution is

impossible given one glaring fault: despite pushing their trading-plan theory,

Defendants never produced any of the plans’ details. As Plaintiffs explained below,

Defendants made no showing as to the plan details, and they: (i) admitted that not all

sales occurred pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan; (ii) failed to provide the district court with

date(s) on which any 10b5-1 plan was adopted or their terms; and (iii) had not

established that they were unaware of their schedule of trades. Appdx.V9.1970.

Given that missing information, it’s no wonder the district court refused to entertain

Defendants’ argument. Add:22 n.10.


4
   Defendants say Plaintiffs don’t contest the filings’ validity (AB.27-28), but
Plaintiffs surely did. See ECF113:15 (“Defendants only offer the Forms 3 and 4 for
the improper inferences and arguments that they derive from them—which are not
proper subjects of judicial notice.”).

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         One final point regarding Defendants’ trading-plan argument: they’ve veered

dangerously close to misleading this Court by asserting that Pluralsight’s trading-plan

“holding is inapplicable, as the District Court rightly concluded.” AB.29. That

assertion is unsupportable: the district court said it wasn’t considering any trading-

plan argument—and it didn’t distinguish Pluralsight’s “per se” holding or conclude

that it didn’t apply. Add:22 n.10.

         Elsewhere, Defendants insist the district court never substituted its “‘benign

view’” of their multi-billion-dollar insider selling for Plaintiffs’ contrary allegations.

AB.26. Yet that’s precisely what happened: the court deemed it “unsurprising” that

Palantir insiders would cash out after taking the Company public while “candidly”

explaining their actions. OB.52-53. With that reasoning the court erred twice.

         First, accepting Defendants’ excuse versus the Complaint’s contrary

allegations—inflated-stock sales as part of an overall scheme—is erroneous.

Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1985) (indulging defendant’s

excuses for stock sales as “‘logical’” and “‘reasonable’” “impermissibly reached

beyond” complaint’s scope); see also Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 558 (6th

Cir. 2001) (en banc) (rejecting defendant’s self-serving explanation at the pleading


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stage).5 Moreover, the district court’s benign view sweeps too broadly. It gives

corporate insiders carte blanche to defraud when taking a company public, so long as

they announce they’re tapping newfound liquidity. That has never been the law. 6

         Nor do Defendants have a compelling defense to the stark contrast between

their $2.2-billion-plus insider selling proceeds and their annual compensation.7

(Recall, those proceeds represented an astronomical 13,900% to 95,200% more than

that compensation. Appdx.V1.129:¶190.) Defendants simply repeat the district

court’s rationale that tech executives are often paid with equity. AB.31.

         But that rationale doesn’t acknowledge the reality undermining it here: if equity

compensation was Defendants’ innocent motive, how to explain their actions after the

Class Period, when their insider selling dried up? Appdx.V1.129-30:¶192. That

cessation only adds to the strong-scienter inference. Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1267


5
   Defendants’ half-hearted response to Helwig and Goldman’s holdings observes
only that neither involved public offerings. AB.27 n.9.
6
   The court’s rationale also ignores that Defendants’ inflated-stock sales weren’t
confined to the Offering; instead, Defendants embarked upon a 13-month selling
binge while driving Palantir’s stock price higher with continuing misconduct.
7
  Defendants accuse Plaintiffs of conflating “proceeds” with “profits.” AB.25 n.7.
That accusation rings hollow, as the Opening Brief repeatedly speak of the proceeds
Defendants reaped. E.g., OB.14; OB.35; OB.43.

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(suspicious when “volume of sales within the class period was dramatically higher

than outside it”).8

         Defendants really miss the mark concerning the district court’s retained-equity

analysis. AB.29. For example, they don’t address the court’s error in reasoning that

“only” Glazer sold “a majority of his holdings” (Add:21)—when this Court doesn’t

require insiders to have sold a “majority” of their holdings to find the sales suspicious.

Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1267 (5% and 12% deemed suspicious). Defendants also

don’t address Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court didn’t even mention

Pluralsight while discussing percentages—error again. OB.55.

         Compounding those shortcomings, Defendants claim that in calculating their

retained equity, Plaintiffs disregarded “unvested options and [restricted stock units]”

that courts supposedly “routinely consider.” AB.29 (citing Ronconi v. Larkin, 253

F.3d 423, 435-36 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogation recognized by Cai v. Eargo, Inc., 2025

WL 66041 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025), and Smallen v. W. Union Co., 950 F.3d 1297,

1310-11 (10th Cir. 2020)). AB.29.


8
   The reduced sales also undermine Defendants’ “trading plan” defense. Wouldn’t
those plans still have been in place despite Palantir’s stock-price movements? Or
were Defendants manipulating the plans, too, while avoiding lower stock prices? The
resulting inference cuts against Defendants.

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         Defendants hoist themselves on their own petard. Unvested securities like

granted options or restricted stock units cannot be exercised or sold until they vest!9

Defendants’ authority even highlights that key distinction. See Ronconi, 253 F.3d at

435 n.25 (“Stock options should be considered in calculating the percentage of shares

sold unless the insider could not have exercised them.”).            Smallen doesn’t

acknowledge Ronconi’s distinction, but simply repeats that options are included in

overall holdings. Smallen, 950 F.3d at 1310.10

         Defendants have another problem with their retained-equity argument. Even

crediting the figures they list at AB.29—which Plaintiffs don’t—Defendants concede

still-dramatic selling percentages: 23% for Thiel, 19% for both Karp and Cohen, 24%


9
   Restricted stock units “have no tangible value until they are vested.” Jason
Fernando, Restricted Stock Unit (RSU): How It Works and Pros and Cons,
Investopedia (Sep. 18, 2025), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/restricted-stock-
unit.asp. Similarly, employee stock options “vest over a designated period of time.
Vesting means it becomes available to use.” James Chen, Understanding Stock
Options: Trading Basics and Practical Examples, Investopedia (Aug. 17, 2025),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stockoption.asp.
10
   Defendants inadvertently concede that unvested options shouldn’t be considered
part of their “retained equity.” Despite claiming that Karp “retained” 81% of his
equity (AB.29), Defendants elsewhere argue that the August 2020 stock awards to him
don’t add to the scienter inference because “more than 90% of Karp’s options did not
vest” by the Class Period’s end “and thus could not be sold” until then. AB.32.

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for Sankar, and 55% for Glazer.11 Defendants’ self-serving percentages still dwarf the

numbers this Court in Pluralsight found suspicious—as does their overall $2.2 billion

in insider selling, which is nearly 100 times the sum that helped raise suspicion in

Pluralsight.

                    3.   Defendants’ construction and utilization of the SPAC
                         scheme was deliberate misconduct.

         Defendants’ primary defense to the round-trip SPAC scheme they concocted

(OB.17-25) centers on disclosure—that they supposedly disclosed all material

information about the deals, and thus didn’t mislead investors. AB.34-36.

         That’s untrue. Analysts covering Palantir certainly found the disclosures

lacking. Following Palantir’s May 9, 2022 announcement that the SPAC program had

been wound down in the prior quarter, analysts carped they lacked the ability to

calculate the underlying businesses’ strength. See Appdx.V1.126:¶182. Indeed,

William Blair and RBC analysts complained they were “disappointed with fewer

disclosures in the 10-Q,” and that they had been forced to guess about the state of

some of Palantir’s SPAC investments, without knowing some had already been

terminated. Id. It wasn’t until three months later that RBC published a report that


11
   Plaintiffs’ allegations of Defendants’ insider selling (including exercisable options
and vested RSUs) show dramatic percentages: 22.5% (Thiel); 27.8% (Cohen); 40.6%
(Karp); 41.3% (Sankar); and 71.7% (Glazer). Appdx.V1.128-29:¶189. Those
percentages are taken as true. Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1250.

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provided a deep dive into Palantir’s SPAC-related misconduct, and revealed how

poorly the SPACs had fared. Appdx.V1.127:¶185. That savvy analysts found

Palantir’s SPAC-related disclosures deficient speaks volumes. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.

646, 658-59 (1983) (securities analysts “‘ferret out and analyze [corporate]

information’” that “normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of

a corporation’s securities”).

         Moreover, while Defendants describe some general SPAC-related information

they supposedly disclosed (AB.34), the Complaint alleges other material facts that

weren’t disclosed. Significantly, Defendants didn’t disclose that because the SPAC

deals carried much-lower costs—90% lower than Palantir’s traditional commercial

deals—Palantir’s reported margins were materially inflated. Appdx.V1.91-95:¶¶103-

109.       Other SPAC-related non-disclosures also misled investors.       See, e.g.,

Appdx.V1.73:¶63 (although first SPAC deal executed in March 2021, no disclosures

until May 2021—and even then, misleadingly described as a “long-term strategy”);

Appdx.V1.77:¶73 (referencing just four SPAC deals while concealing the massive

SPAC Scheme expansion that was underway); Appdx.V1.79:¶76 n.16 (Defendants

kept two SPACs’s identities under wraps for six months); Appdx.V1.83:¶84 (at least

four SPACs were teetering on insolvency, as some publicly stated soon thereafter).


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         Defendants’ counter-narrative claims that the SPACs “used Palantir’s software”

(AB.35), implying the deals were specifically tailored and working well, but the

Complaint alleges otherwise. Palantir gave the SPACs off-the-rack, partial versions

of the complete Foundry software package, without providing the necessary support to

make Foundry work. Appdx.V1.85-86:¶89; Appdx.V1.91-92:¶103. The Complaint

alleges at least four SPACs that either couldn’t, or didn’t, use Foundry as Defendants

represented.        Appdx.V1.75-76:¶69       (Lilium);    Appdx.V1.76:¶70      (Sarcos);

Appdx.V1.81:¶80 (Celularity); Appdx.V1.81-82:¶81 (Wejo); see also Appdx.V1.85-

86:¶89 (Celularity’s Foundry-specific complaints). These facts must be accepted as

true. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.

         Defendants also insist the quid pro quo SPAC deals were “[l]egitimate,” and

that it’s “undisputed that Palantir received equity and cash consideration from the

SPACs.” AB.35-36. Not so.

         First, and most notably, Defendants don’t defend the district court’s error in

requiring that sham deals be “obviously lacking in commercial justification.” Add:23.

That heightened criterion ignored well-pleaded allegations that only needed to

“plausibly” allege the SPAC deals’ fraudulent nature. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also

Clinton, 63 F.4th at 1281 (“particularized allegations plausibly allege[d] … a

fraudulent scheme”).


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         Moreover, Palantir’s receipt of cash from the SPACs isn’t a defense; in fact,

receiving cash back after providing the SPACs with funding was the entire point of

the quid pro quo scheme! See, e.g., Appdx.V1.78:¶76 (Boxed agrees to pay back $20

million following Palantir’s $20 million infusion). And the notion that Palantir

received material “equity” in the SPACs is laughable: many of the 20-odd SPACs

were spiraling toward insolvency—seven of them going bankrupt. Appdx.V1.71-

72:¶60; see also Appdx.V1.127:¶185 (“at least 15 SPAC customers … have

substantial doubt as going concerns”).

         Trying to combat the damning inference arising out of the SPACs paying

millions of dollars back to Palantir, Defendants say some paybacks were “significantly

different” than Palantir’s cash infusions. AB.36 & n.23. Some were—but sauce for

the goose is sauce for the gander: several others involved dollar-for-dollar round-trips.

See, e.g., Appdx.V1.78:¶76 (Boxed agrees to pay back the $20 million after Palantir’s

$20 million infusion); Appdx.V1.87:¶93 (BlackSky assumes an $8 million Foundry

subscription after Palantir hands it $8 million); Appdx.V1.87:¶94 (Rigetti given $10

million in exchange for what appears to be an estimated $10 million Palantir

subscription agreement).       Other deals made no financial sense.           See, e.g.,

Appdx.V1.73:¶64 (in exchange for $41 million cash infusion, Lilium agrees to a $50


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million Foundry subscription—a sum approximately 1,000 times Lilium’s 2021

revenue). 12

         Taking aim at allegations that they knew how troubled the SPACs were given

in-depth due diligence and Palantir’s Foundry software, Defendants parrot the district

court’s “‘digital twin’” criticism—i.e., that supposedly only the SPACs, and not

Palantir, had access to the SPACs’s data after Foundry’s installation. AB.37; see

Add:19 n.8 (court rejects alleged access as “pure speculation”).

         But Defendants (and the district court) ignore the well-pleaded allegation that,

given Foundry’s “digital twin” function, shortly after each deal closed, Palantir had

as much information about the SPACs as the SPACs themselves. Appdx.V1.71:¶59;

see also Appdx.V1.86:¶90 (Palantir’s Form 10-Q boasts of Company’s “proximity to

these [SPACs]”). Those well-pleaded facts are accepted as true. Pluralsight, 45 F.4th

at 1250.

         Concerning “due diligence” allegations, Defendants say the district court simply

followed precedent when it demanded the “‘specific facts or data’” Defendants

gleaned from their pre-deal examinations. AB.37. But that’s untrue; the court

12
   Defendants also try to counter the “sham” nature of their deals by noting Plaintiffs
haven’t alleged an accounting restatement or revenue-recognition violation. AB.4;
AB.35 n.21. The suggestion is a straw man, as accounting restatements aren’t
required to show scienter. See, e.g., Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 83 (1st
Cir. 2002).

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demanded far-more-granular, internal data—which isn’t required to sufficiently plead

fraud.       Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983)

(“circumstantial evidence” of scienter “can be more than sufficient”); see also

Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1193 n.14 (10th Cir. 2003) (demanding

alleged internal paperwork “is asking too much” at the pleading stage). 13

         Defendants’ final attack on the SPAC scheme centers on Plaintiffs’ “temporal

proximity” argument (AB.38), which explains that abruptly terminating the SPAC

program shortly after extolling its contributions adds to a strong-scienter inference.

OB.49-50; see, e.g., Helwig, 251 F.3d at 552 (“closeness in time” one of “fixed

constellations of facts … relevant to scienter”). Defendants argue that the six-month

span between their SPAC-program cheerleading and its sudden wind-down is

insufficient as a matter of law (AB.38)—but cite no precedent so holding.

         Instead, Defendants lift a couple of time periods from Helwig and two other

decisions—2, 4, and 11 weeks—and present them as the final word on acceptable

temporal proximity. AB.38 n.26. That arbitrary cherry-picking is twice wrong.


13
   Defendants’ criticism that Plaintiffs haven’t identified “a single fact” gleaned in
due diligence is unfounded. See, e.g., Appdx.V1.82:¶82 (Glazer participated in
extensive due diligence into Fast Radius, which focused on Fast Radius’s financing
and cash positions for the coming 12 months.). Fast Radius declared bankruptcy a
mere nine months after Palantir’s funding. Id.

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         First, the salient point is that Defendants reassured Palantir investors that the

SPAC deals were part of the Company’s “long-term strategy,” and that “[t]hese are

companies that we think we will be working with for a very long time.”

Appdx.V1.82-83:¶83. Yet within a few months of those reassurances, Palantir shut

down the SPAC program in 1Q22 (Appdx.V1.125-26:¶181)—which shutdown, along

with disappointing revenue-growth figures, helped drive Palantir’s stock down 21%

during a single trading day, with an additional 10% drop over the next two days.

Appdx.V1.126:¶183. The contrast between Defendants’ reassurances and their 180-

degree turnaround is “relevant to scienter.” Helwig, 251 F.3d at 552.

         Second, Defendants’ focus on those three time periods is easily countered by

other periods deemed sufficient—illustrating there’s no hard-and-fast temporal-

proximity span as a matter of law. See, e.g., Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 574-75

(9th Cir. 2014) (“three to six months” temporal proximity bolsters scienter inference),

overruled in part on other grounds by City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police &

Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Grand Casinos

Sec. Litig. Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1273, 1283 (D. Minn. 1997) (seven months is “short time

frame” bolstering strong inference of defendants’ knowledge).

         Under Tellabs’s holistic approach, temporal proximity remains relevant, and is

yet one more factor bolstering Defendants’ scienter.


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                    4.   Defendants’ conceded access to truthful information
                         bolsters a strong inference of scienter.

         Defendants have no real answer to Plaintiffs’ charge that the district court erred

when proclaiming that “‘access alone’” wasn’t enough to support a strong inference

of their scienter (Add:19), given that here—unlike in Meitav Dash Provident Funds &

Pension Ltd. v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., 79 F.4th 1209 (10th Cir. 2023)—

Plaintiffs alleged more than mere access. OB.62-64. And Defendants conspicuously

ignore the court’s error in opining that it was “pretty unlikely that Defendants actually

had access” to the data “that Plaintiffs allege they did.” OB.64 (noting erroneous

“judicial disbelief”).

         Instead, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ “lone response” to the district court’s

access reasoning is that the Complaint attributed certain falsehoods to certain

Defendants—which attribution, they say, has nothing to do with scienter. AB.39.

         Defendants’ assertion is incorrect on multiple levels.

         First, Defendants themselves repeatedly confirmed their access to relevant

information. See, e.g., Appdx.V1.103:¶126 (Palantir tells investors that its sales

efforts have “historically depended on the significant direct involvement of [its] senior

management team, including Mr. Karp”); see also Appdx.V1.57-58:¶25 (regular

“sales ops” team meetings attended by Karp, Cohen, or Sankar); Appdx.V1.71:¶59

(after installation Foundry unlocks a “digital twin” of each company’s “entire

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enterprise” and customer data in hours, or even “minutes”);14 Appdx.V1. 102-03:¶125

(on investor/analyst conference call, Defendants emphasized a “number of factors that

provide strong visibility and stability for future revenue growth”); Appdx.V1.103-

04:¶127 (Defendants confirm they’re aware of negative trends in Palantir’s revenues

several periods before publicly reporting them); Appdx.V1.103:¶126 (Karp insisting,

“I know how the business is doing.”).

         Second, Defendants’ alleged misstatements did communicate their access to

information contradicting those public statements. See, e.g., Appdx.V1.67:¶47

(“customers are increasingly adopting our software, which can be ready in days”);

Appdx.V1.85:¶88 (Kawasaki insists Palantir is delivering the “full power of Foundry”

to the SPACs); Appdx.V1.107:¶¶135-136 (Sankar boasts that government growth is

“just at the tip of the iceberg,” while commercial segment’s pipeline is ostensibly

“substantial and growing”); Appdx.V1.61-62:¶34 (Sankar claims Palantir now

possesses “SAAS[-]like economics,” and isn’t doing “bespoke applications”

anymore). 15        Public statements like those raise the unassailable inference that

Defendants were privy to data and facts underlying the subjects about which they


14
     Plaintiffs dealt with the Defendants’ incorrect “digital twin” argument supra.
15
   At the Class Period’s end, Sankar admitted that was false; Palantir had continued
building bespoke applications all along. Appdx.V1.62:¶35.

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spoke. E.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund,

575 U.S. 175, 189 (2015) (investors reasonably believe issuer’s statement “fairly

aligns with the information in the issuer’s possession at the time”). 16

         Third, while Defendants dispute or deny Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual

allegations going to their access, it’s axiomatic that those allegations are accepted as

true, with the resulting inferences taken in Plaintiffs’ favor. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.

In refusing to do so, the district court committed reversible error. Pluralsight, 45

F.4th at 1261, 1263.

         Trying to chip away at “‘access,’” Defendants paint as commonplace corporate-

speak CEO Karp’s insistence that “‘I run this business, for better or worse. I know

how the business is doing.’” AB.41.

         Karp’s admission of his involvement and knowledge is accepted at face value,

and goes directly to his scienter. See, e.g., Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1264 (defendant

admitted monitoring key metric that he “regularly reported to investors and analysts”);


16
    Defendants say Omnicare is “no help” because it was addressing non-fraud claims
and falsity under Securities Act §11. AB.40 n.27. They’re mistaken; that investors
understand corporate public statements to reflect “the information in the [speaker’s]
possession at the time” (Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 189) is surely a universal truth across
all types of securities lawsuits involving both fraud and non-fraud claims. See, e.g.,
City of Warren Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin., Inc., 70 F.4th 668, 685 (3d
Cir. 2023) (“every other Court of Appeals to encounter the issue has applied the
Omnicare framework for opinion falsity to claims for Rule 10b-5 violations”).

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see also In re Daou Sys., 411 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (“specific admissions

from top executives that they are involved in every detail of the company … are

factors in favor of inferring scienter”); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228,

254 (5th Cir. 2009) (defendants’ admissions “directly and cogently tend to prove”

their state of mind).17

         Defendants also try to soft pedal their admission that Palantir’s sales efforts

depended upon the “significant direct involvement” of the Company’s “‘senior

management team’” while singling out CEO Karp. AB.41; see Appdx.V1.103:¶126.

Defendants say the admission is much ado about nothing because they simultaneously

noted that the direct involvement had been done historically—implying the

executives’ participation was long past. AB.41.

         It takes more than a self-serving implication to undercut the Complaint’s

allegations. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Gov’t of the Virgin Is. v. Blanford, 794 F.3d 297,

307 (2d Cir. 2015) (defendants’ excuses “[are] entitled to little weight at this stage of

litigation, when we must ‘accept all factual claims in the complaint as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor’”). Whatever was happening with


17
    Under this Court’s precedents, that Karp was Palantir’s CEO also adds to the
strong-scienter inference. Adams, 340 F.3d at 1106 (“that [defendant] was the most
senior executive of the Company is a fact relevant in our weighing of the totality of
the [scienter] allegations”).

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Palantir’s sales-force ranks during the Class Period, 18 the logical inference arising out

of Defendants’ assurances about senior management’s involvement was that top

executives had been, and were continuing to be, “significant[ly]” and “direct[ly]”

involved in Palantir’s sales efforts. Appdx.V1.103:¶126. The opposing inference—

that their “significant direct involvement” suddenly halted the day Palantir went

public—lacks any record support and is nonsensical. In fact, Palantir repeated this

representation in every 10-Q and 10-K filed during the Class Period.19

         Finally, Defendants spend several pages dissecting the Meitav decision (AB.42-

44), but scrupulously avoid specific language that the district court deemed so

important that it block-quoted the text:

         [I]t would make little sense to draw a strong inference of scienter from
         access to information. If access alone were enough, a strong inference of
         scienter would exist for high-level executives whenever they make a
         public statement contradicting something in the company’s files.
Add:19 (quoting Meitav, 79 F.4th at 1217).


18
   Plaintiffs do not “concede” that Palantir was successfully doubling its sales force
during the Class Period. AB.41. The Complaint only notes Karp’s claim in February
2021 that Palantir “was in the midst of an effort” to do so. Appdx.V1.65:¶40 n.10.
19
    A quick search reveals that Palantir continued to make this representation in its 10-
Ks and 10-Qs long after the Class Period ended, including in its most-recent 10-Q,
filed with the SEC on August 5, 2025. See Palantir Technologies Inc., Quarterly
Report           (Form             10-Q)            (Aug.            5,           2025)
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001321655/000132165525000106
/pltr-20250630.htm, at 47.

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         Defendants’ avoidance is understandable, perhaps, because Plaintiffs have

alleged much more than access-alone facts: e.g., Defendants’ self-proclaimed “strong

visibility” and “significant direct involvement” of senior executives, Karp’s own

words, Palantir’s admitted proximity to the SPACs, etc. Plaintiffs then complemented

those facts with additional allegations of Defendants’ deliberate actions: e.g.,

breathtaking insider selling of $2.2 billion-plus, scheming conduct vis-à-vis the round-

trip SPAC transactions, manipulation of reported metrics, etc.—all of which are

(i) taken as true, and (ii) considered collectively. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322-23;

Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1259, 1261.

         When they are, Meitav’s fact-specific “access alone” criticism has no

application here.

                    5.   Defendants’ trumpeted “strong visibility” into
                         Palantir’s revenue growth further establishes their
                         scienter.

         Defendants claim Plaintiffs “do not dispute” the district court’s holding that

“‘strong visibility’” isn’t enough to find that they misled Palantir investors (AB.45),

but nothing is further from the truth.         Time and again Plaintiffs argued that

Defendants’ constant claims of “strong visibility” into growth and revenue provided

direct on-ramps to their knowledge that the two areas were not progressing as

represented. See, e.g., OB.26 (the opposite of Defendants’ representations was true,


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and Defendants were aware of this at the time they spoke, given their “strong

visibility” into Palantir’s future revenue); accord OB.40; OB.41; OB.46; OB.50;

OB.61.

         Indeed, Plaintiffs reject the district court’s reasoning that Defendants’ admitted

“strong visibility” cannot satisfy the “total visibility” it demanded. OB.60 (original

emphasis). The court’s demand is doubly wrong: (i) it undermines the “strongly

support[ed]” scienter inferences arising from Defendants’ admissions (Pluralsight, 45

F.4th at 1259-60); and (ii) improperly elevates the requisite inference to an

“irrefutable” level. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 20

         Defendants say Plaintiffs are asking this Court to infer that they had an

“omniscient view” of Palantir’s financial results in advance (AB.46), but that’s untrue.

Plaintiffs aren’t urging omniscience, but advance the commonsense argument that

Defendants’ self-professed “strong visibility”—specifically based on the nature of

their business and contracts—meant they saw Palantir’s existing revenue, growth, and

SPAC-related problems. See, e.g., Appdx.V1.103-04:¶127 (Defendants explain that


20
   Defendants defend the district court’s “‘total visibility’” demand as merely
“semantic.” AB.45 n.33. If Defendants mean the two levels of visibility are
fundamentally equivalent while using different words, they’re mistaken: “strong” isn’t
“total” by anyone’s measure.

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revenue-related problems arising in the present quarter won’t be “fully reflected in

our results of operations until future periods”).

         Defendants wind up their “‘total visibility’” screed by charging Plaintiffs with

ignoring Circuit precedent involving “growth forecasts.” AB.45, 46 & n.35. But

Plaintiffs’ case doesn’t concern Defendants’ forecasts, but rather their real-time

knowledge of, and misstatements concerning: (i) stagnating growth; (ii) revenue

impact; and (iii) the sham SPAC deals Defendants used to prop up (i) and (ii).

Defendants would have this Court to leave common sense at the courthouse steps, yet

Palantir’s SPAC customers’ myriad bankruptcies and insolvencies didn’t happen

overnight. Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1259-60; see also Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407

F.3d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2005) (“not unwarranted to infer that when a company’s big

deal collapses so fast, something was amiss at the outset”).21

                    6.   Defendants’ deliberate manipulation of key reporting
                         metrics cannot be explained away.

         Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief tabulates the five key metrics whose reporting

Defendants manipulated to further their scheme and conceal stagnation in Palantir’s


21
   Defendants say Plaintiffs overlooked new contracts that Palantir “hoped to sign” or
existing contracts that “could be renewed or upsized.” AB.47. Their charge is
toothless—“hope[]” and “could be” may be understandable aspirations, but cannot
excuse Palantir’s existing reality of stagnating growth, quid pro quo revenue from
unsustainable contracts, and manipulated metrics used in Palantir’s public
(mis)statements.

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two main business segments. OB.29-33. The brief further explains the district court’s

erroneous reasoning that because some truthful information was available elsewhere in

Palantir’s filings or public statements, their manipulative conduct was excused.

OB.64-66; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (“If

it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other,

whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow.”).

         Responding, Defendants criticize Plaintiffs for not offering any “[confidential

witnesses], internal document, or any facts—as to why these changes were

implemented.” AB.48 (original emphasis). Their criticism, untethered to precedent,

is fanciful and misplaced.

         Plaintiffs did explain why Defendants made the deliberate changes. See OB.29-

33 (detailing manipulated performance metrics, and explaining how each concealed

stagnation in Palantir’s business). And neither confidential witnesses nor internal

documents are required to plead a strong inference of scienter. See, e.g., In re

Alphabet, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1 F.4th 687, 707 (9th Cir. 2021) (“confidential witnesses are

not needed where, as here, other allegations in the complaint raise a strong inference

of scienter”); see also Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1193 n.14 (internal documents not

needed at the pleading stage).


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         Undaunted, Defendants proceed to give their own narrative of why each of the

reporting metrics was suddenly changed. Their excuses are not only premature, but

unpersuasive.

         As to Defendants’ sudden concealment of the “Acquire, Expand, and Scale”

information that undergirded Palantir’s entire business model (Appdx.V1.118-

20:¶¶164-168), Defendants claim that continuing to disclose those categories wouldn’t

have revealed anything “about non-SPAC clients” because SPACs would’ve still been

represented in the metric. AB.49. Even if true, that doesn’t mean that Palantir

investors wouldn’t realize that non-SPAC customers were also languishing in the first

or second phase; logically, investors would’ve understood precisely what the cessation

obscured: Palantir’s diminishing business prospects for its organic (i.e., non-SPAC)

customers, including the: (i) revenue and contribution margins associated with each

cohort of new customers acquired in FY21; (ii) rate at which Palantir’s customers

signed in 2021 had failed to advance through the cohorts to profitability; and

(iii) SPAC Scheme’s effect in masking this downward trend. Appdx.V1.120:¶168. In

other words, Palantir’s declining performance would have been obvious.

         As to the newly-expanded definition of “customer,” Defendants say they

provided “more[-]meaningful” period-over-period comparisons, and that Plaintiffs

don’t challenge that explanation. AB.49. But Plaintiffs certainly do—alleging that


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the change was deliberately done to: (i) artificially inflate Palantir’s existing customer

count; and (ii) rope in revenues from the temporarily boosted financial performance in

2Q20, 3Q20, and 4Q20 that reflected short-term COVID-19-related contracts.

Appdx.V1.117:¶162.

         As to obscuring the Total Remaining Deal Value breakdown between

government and commercial sectors (OB.32), Defendants say TRDV was disclosed on

nearly all earnings calls during the Class Period, and again at year-end. AB.50. But

that doesn’t address, let alone excuse, the fact that Defendants deliberately hid the

important metric for three straight quarters. Appdx.V1.120-21:¶170. Whether the

lengthy concealment mattered to investors, or was cured by year-end reports, cannot

be decided now. Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1192 n.13.22

         As to changing “average revenue per customer” from all customers to just

Palantir’s top 20 clients after the former figure dwindled (OB.32-33), Defendants say

they disclosed the change’s true impetus: acquiring more customers (especially

growth-stage ones) supposedly meant that only the top 20 demonstrated their


22
    Defendants offer the same excuse for omitting average contract duration despite
reliably citing it quarter after quarter as a revenue-visibility metric. Appdx.V1.117-
18:¶163. See AB.50 (Palantir included metric in 2021 annual report). Whether that
single disclosure cured Defendants’ omissions over three straight quarters is not
properly resolved now. Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1192 n.13.

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“‘expanding relationship with existing customers’”—and that Plaintiffs haven’t

contested that explanation. AB.50 (citing Appdx.V1.121-22:¶171).

         Defendants again twist the Complaint’s allegations. While Plaintiffs repeat

Palantir’s claim that growing customer counts meant lower average revenues,

Plaintiffs further allege that when revenues dropped, Defendants deliberately shifted

to just the top 20—along with the manipulated Acquire-Expand-Scale reporting—in

order to conceal from investors that Palantir’s newest customers were not scaling up

in size or profitability. Appdx.V1.121-22:¶171. That allegation, accepted as true, is

at least as compelling as Defendants’ self-serving excuse. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324;

Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1268.23

         B.         Defendants haven’t satisfactorily defended the district
                    court’s failure to address the deliberate actions comprising
                    their scheme.
         While Plaintiffs explained the district court’s erroneous scienter analyses

(OB.52-68), they also described what the court didn’t do—namely, that it failed to

23
    Defendants suggest that investors could have made “straightforward calculation[s]”
to discover what the actual average-revenue-per-customer was (AB.51), but cite no
authority requiring investors to dig through complex data to double-check corporate
representations. Cf. In re Genius Brands Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 F.4th 1171, 1186
(9th Cir. 2024) (“securities issuers should not escape liability for misrepresentations
merely because they can show that corrective information was publicly available on
some webpage tucked in a deep corner of the internet or buried in some unwieldy
spreadsheet”). Moreover, even if Palantir investors had attempted that excavation, the
truth would have been thwarted by the Company’s ever-changing definition of
“customer.”

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address how the deliberate actions comprising Defendants’ scheme and wrongful

course of conduct couldn’t be excused as mere negligence, and thus were intertwined

with their overall scienter. OB.48-52. Under this Court’s precedents, that failure was

error. See Clinton, 63 F.4th at 1288-89 (reversing district court that “ignored other

allegations” relevant to scienter associated with fraudulent scheme and

misstatements); Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2023) (court

“improperly construed Johnson’s complaint by overlooking his plain-language

allegations”).

         Defendants grudgingly admit that the district court “did not reach Plaintiffs’

falsity or scheme allegations.” AB.55. Their follow-on insistence that the court

wasn’t “required to reach” the alleged “misstatements or conduct” to analyze their

scienter (id.) is dead wrong. See, e.g., Tellabs, 551 U.S. 326 (court considering

scienter allegations must “assess all [of] the allegations”).

         Defendants also assert that even “‘deliberate’” conduct isn’t necessarily

fraudulent. AB.54. That may be so in a different context, but their actions here are

alleged to be fraudulent—and, when considered together “collectively” and

“holistically” (Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326), combine to form a strong inference of

Defendants’ scienter. Plotting for massive financial gain via quid pro quo SPAC deals

while concealing stagnated growth using manipulated metric-reporting levers doesn’t


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happen innocently, or even recklessly. Defendants’ deliberate misconduct was

paradigmatic securities fraud.

         Defendants also insist that the district court did do the comparative analysis that

Tellabs mandates (AB.54), but that’s overt question-begging. In truth, the court’s

abbreviated analysis was infected by (i) improperly-heightened pleading burdens, and

(ii) its disbelief of allegations that it should have accepted as true. Each error warrants

reversal. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 (scienter inferences “need not be irrefutable”);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (judicial disbelief).

         Relating to Defendants’ comparative-analysis argument, they assert that the

scienter-ties-go-to-plaintiffs truism is Plaintiffs’ “last-resort position” with no support.

AB.53 n.39. Defendants’ assertion is baffling, as both the truism’s existence—and

this Court’s embrace of it—are undeniable. Pluralsight, 45 F.4th at 1268 (plaintiffs’

scienter inference need only be “‘at least as compelling as any opposing inference one

could draw from the facts alleged’”) (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324); see also

Frank v. Dana Corp., 547 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir. 2008) (“‘Tellabs now awards the

draw to the plaintiff.’”).


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II.      CONCLUSION
         For the reasons given supra and in the Opening Brief, this Court should reverse

the district court’s dismissal.

DATED: October 21, 2025                    Respectfully submitted,

                                           ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
                                             & DOWD LLP
                                           DARREN J. ROBBINS
                                           JOSEPH D. DALEY
                                           LUKE O. BROOKS
                                           J. MARCO JANOSKI GRAY
                                           ERIKA L. OLIVER


                                                        s/Joseph D. Daley
                                                       JOSEPH D. DALEY

                                           655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
                                           San Diego, CA 92101
                                           Telephone: 619/231-1058
                                           619/231-7423 (fax)
                                           darrenr@rgrdlaw.com
                                           joed@rgrdlaw.com
                                           lukeb@rgrdlaw.com
                                           mjanoski@rgrdlaw.com
                                           eoliver@rgrdlaw.com

                                           Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants


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      CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT


                     Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limit,
                    Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements

1.    This document complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B)(i) because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R.
App. P. 32(f) and 10th Cir. R. 32(B):

         [X] this document contains 6,482 words, or
         []     this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains <state the number
         of> lines of text.

2.    This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:

         [X] this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
         using Microsoft Word 2016 in 14 point and Times New Roman typeface, or
         []     this document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using
         <state name and version of word processing program> with <state number
         of characters per inch and name of type style>.

Date: October 21, 2025
                                                        s/Joseph D. Daley
                                                       JOSEPH D. DALEY


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                                DECLARATION OF SERVICE

         I, the undersigned, declare:

         1.         That declarant is and was, at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the

United States and employed in the City and County of San Diego, over the age of

18 years, and not a party to or interested party in the within action; that declarant’s

business address is 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900, San Diego, California 92101.

         2.         I hereby certify that on October 21, 2025, I electronically filed the

foregoing document: PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF with the Clerk of

the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by using the

appellate CM/ECF system.

         3.         I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and

that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

         I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 21, 2025, at San Diego, California.


                                                             s/Joseph D. Daley
                                                            JOSEPH D. DALEY


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