Smith v. United States — Entry #19: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Movant Cordell Victor Jerome Smith filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C
Case: Smith v. United States txnd · 3:23-cv-02338
filed October 13, 2023
What this document is
Docket entry #19 · filed April 14, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Movant Cordell Victor Jerome Smith filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). For the reasons detailed herein, Smith's motion is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 4/14/2026) (chmb)
Who is involved
- Smith
- United States
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Applied Digital: its name “Applied Digital Corporation” appears in a filing in this case.
…LLC 90 3:23-cv-01805-E McConnell v. Applied Digital Corporation et al 91 3:23-cv-01832-8 Doe v. Dallas…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved October 23, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
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Full text
Case 3:23-cv-02338-K Document 19 Filed 04/14/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID 68
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CORDELL VICTOR JEROME SMITH, §
#58759-177, §
Movant, §
§ CIVIL NO. 3:23-CV-2338-K
v. § (CRIMINAL NO. 3:19-CR-187-K-1)
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
Respondent. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Movant Cordell Victor Jerome Smith filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). For the
reasons detailed herein, Smith’s motion is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Smith challenges his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) federal convictions and sentences in
Cause No. 3:19-CR-187-K-1. The respondent is the United States of America
(“Government”).
A. Conviction and Sentencing
After being charged with 16 counts in a multi-defendant, 16-count indictment,
Smith pled guilty under a plea agreement to two counts of interference with
commerce by robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a)
and 2 (“Counts 4 and 14”), and two counts of using, carrying, brandishing, and
discharging a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing, brandishing, and
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discharging a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2 (“Counts 5 and 15”). See Crim.
Docs. 1, 83, 98. Among other provisions, Smith’s plea agreement contained an
appeal and collateral review waiver. See Crim. Doc. 83 at 7. In that waiver, Smith
waived his right to appeal his convictions and sentences and his right to otherwise
contest his convictions and sentences in a collateral proceeding, including under
Section 2255, except that he reserved the right (a) to bring a direct appeal of a
sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment or an arithmetic error at
sentencing, (b) to challenge the voluntariness of any of his guilty pleas or the appeal
and collateral review waiver, and (c) to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See id.
At his re-arraignment on June 2, 2020, Smith acknowledged under oath that
he understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and that he was waiving
his right to appeal or otherwise challenge his convictions or sentences except in the
limited circumstances of directly appealing a sentence that exceeds the statutory
maximum or math errors at sentencing, challenging the voluntariness of his guilty
plea or the appeal and collateral review waiver, and bringing a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Crim. Doc. 344 at 11-13, 22. Smith further acknowledged
that he voluntarily and freely entered into the plea agreement, and that aside from
what was contained in his plea documents, no one made any other promise or
assurance to him of any kind to get him to plead guilty. See id. at 23. The Court
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found that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. See id. at 26-27; Crim Docs.
99, 109.
By judgment dated October 5, 2022, the Court sentenced Smith to a total
imprisonment term of 260 months, comprised of 20 months on each of Counts 4 and
14, to run concurrent with each other, and 120 months on each of Counts 5 and 15,
to run consecutive to each other and consecutive to the terms imposed on Counts 4
and 14. See Crim. Doc. 274. His imprisonment is to be followed by three years of
supervised release. See id. Smith did not appeal the judgment.
B. Substantive Claim
Smith timely filed this Section 2255 motion on October 13, 2023, and
asserted one ground for relief:
I believe one of my 924(c)(iii) counts should be vacated due to 3553(a)
sentencing disparity. My cocon[s]pirator Freddie Lee Valentine pled
guilty to the same charges as me and rec[ei]ved just about 10 years less
than me. Which show[s] a huge sentence difference. We would both
have around the same time if my 924(c)(iii) were to get vacated, or just
simply was ran consecutive with my other 924(c)(iii) count.
Doc. 1 at 4 (capitalization altered). The Government filed a response on February
26, 2024. See Doc. 11. Smith did not file a reply.
II. SCOPE OF RELIEF UNDER § 2255
After conviction and exhaustion or waiver of the right to direct appeal, the
Court presumes that a defendant has been fairly and finally convicted. United States
v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Shaid, 937
F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Post-conviction “[r]elief under 28
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U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow
range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if
condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d
585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A defendant can challenge
a final conviction, but only on issues of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude.”).
III. WAIVER
In his only ground for relief, Smith contends that, because of a sentencing
disparity between his aggregate sentence and the lower aggregate sentence of a co-
defendant, the Court should vacate one of his § 924(c) sentences or run his two
§ 924(c) sentences concurrent with each other. See Doc. 1 at 4, 13. The Government
argues that his claim is barred by the collateral review waiver in his plea agreement,
procedurally defaulted, and meritless. See Doc. 11 at 5-6.
The plea agreement waiver in this case bars all claims on collateral review
under Section 2255, except for those that go to the voluntariness of Smith’s guilty
plea or the appeal waiver and the ineffectiveness of counsel. See Doc. 83 at 7. Smith
does not challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea or the collateral review waiver,
nor does he contend in his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Accordingly, even if the Court assumes arguendo that Smith’s claim is cognizable
under Section 2255, it is barred by his informed and voluntary collateral review
waiver.
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The Court notes that the Fifth Circuit recognizes exceptions to an informed
and voluntary plea agreement waiver where ineffective assistance of counsel claims
affecting the validity of the collateral review waiver or guilty plea are involved, and
“‘where the sentence facially (or perhaps indisputably) exceeds the statutory limits.’”
United States v. Hollins, 97 F. App’x 477, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
White, 307 F.3d 335, 343 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002)). These exceptions are inapplicable
here; Smith does not claim that his counsel was ineffective in any way that affected
the validity of his collateral review waiver or guilty plea, and he does not allege that
any of his sentences exceeded the applicable statutory maximum. He therefore has
failed to show that an exception to his plea agreement waiver applies.
Because Smith’s claim is barred by the knowing and voluntary collateral review
waiver in his plea agreement, and because he has failed to show that any exception to
that waiver applies, he is not entitled to Section 2255 relief on his claim. The Court
therefore denies Smith’s sole claim on this basis. Additionally, to the extent the
Government argues in the alternative that Smith’s claim is procedurally barred and
without merit, the Court does not address these arguments given that Smith’s claim is
barred by the collateral review waiver in his plea agreement, as discussed.
IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
To the extent Smith requests an evidentiary hearing on his claim, an
evidentiary hearing under Section 2255 is not required when “the motion and the
files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
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relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). A movant “is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
§ 2255 motion only if he presents ‘independent indicia of the likely merit of [his]
allegations.’” United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). Because Smith has failed to present independent indicia in support of the
likely merit of his claim, he has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Smith’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this
action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
Signed April 14th, 2026.
____________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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