Ameris Bank v. Byrne — Entry #49: OPENING BRIEF in Support re 48 MOTION for Leave to File Counterclaims/Second Amended Complaint, filed by Patrick E
Case: Ameris Bank v. Byrne ded · 1:26-cv-00190
filed February 20, 2026
What this document is
Docket entry #49 · filed September 30, 2026
OPENING BRIEF in Support re 48 MOTION for Leave to File Counterclaims/Second Amended Complaint, filed by Patrick E. Byrne, The Patrick E. Byrne Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021, The Patrick E. Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February 23, 2001.Answering Brief/Response due date per Local Rules is 10/14/2026. (Chapple, Benjamin) Modified on 10/1/2026 (ceg). (Entered: 09/30/2026)
Who is involved
- Ameris Bank
- Patrick E. Byrne
- The Patrick E. Byrne Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021
- The Patrick E. Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February 23, 2001
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its former name “Riot Blockchain, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
…action between same parties); Takata v. Riot Blockchain, Inc., 2023 WL 7133219, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Aug…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 14, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
28 page(s), 62,959 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
Full text
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 1 of 28 PageID #: 700
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
AMERIS BANK,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v. Case No.: 1:26-cv-00190-JLH
PATRICK E. BYRNE, THE PATRICK E. BYRNE (Consolidated)
REVOCABLE TRUST U/T/A DATED
FEBRUARY 23, 2001, and THE PATRICK E.
BYRNE IRREVOCABLE TRUST U/T/A DATED
JULY 22, 2021,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF THEIR MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE COUNTERCLAIMS / SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Dated: September 30, 2026 Benjamin P. Chapple (No. 5871)
John T. Miraglia (No. 6682)
REED SMITH LLP
1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1500
Wilmington, DE 19801
302-778-7500
bchapple@reedsmith.com
jmiraglia@reedsmith.com
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Patrick E. Byrne, The Patrick E.
Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February
23, 2001, and The Patrick E. Byrne
Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 2 of 28 PageID #: 701
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
II. NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS .................................................................. 1
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 1
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 3
A. Sellers Select Ameris Because it Promises to Take Care of Balboa
Employees ............................................................................................................... 3
B. Ameris Never Prepares to Honor the LTIP—and Breaches It at the
First Opportunity..................................................................................................... 5
C. A California Jury Finds Ameris Acted with Malice, Oppression, or
Fraud ....................................................................................................................... 6
D. Ameris Sues Sellers in the Wrong Forum............................................................... 6
V. LEGAL STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 7
VI. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 7
A. The Motion Is Timely, Not in Bad Faith, and Will Not Prejudice
Ameris ..................................................................................................................... 7
B. The Proposed Amendments Are Not Futile ............................................................ 9
1. The SAC Alleges Ameris Falsely Represented that it
Intended to Comply with the LTIP to Induce Execution of
the SPA ....................................................................................................... 9
2. Delaware’s Anti-Bootstrapping Rule Does Not Apply ............................ 12
3. The SPA’s Integration Clause Does Not Bar Extra-
Contractual Fraud...................................................................................... 14
4. Sellers’ Equitable Fraud Claim Is Well Pled ............................................ 16
5. Ameris’s Remedy-Based Arguments Are Premature (and
Mistaken) .................................................................................................. 16
6. Sellers’ Compliance with the SPA’s Mandatory Forum
Selection Provision Does Not Amount to Claim-Splitting ....................... 18
7. Ameris’s Judicial Estoppel Arguments Are Fundamentally
Flawed ....................................................................................................... 19
-ii-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 3 of 28 PageID #: 702
8. Ameris’s Breach of the SPA’s Forum Selection Provision
Is Actionable ............................................................................................. 20
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 20
-iii-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 4 of 28 PageID #: 703
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Advanced Paving Servs., LLC. v. Metra Indus., Inc.,
2026 WL 2620377 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2026)..................................................................17
AgroFresh Inc. v. MirTech, Inc.,
257 F. Supp. 3d 643 (D. Del. 2017) .........................................................................................17
Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. USX Corp.,
249 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2001).....................................................................................................16
Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. UBS Real Est. Secs., Inc.,
2012 WL 3525613 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) .........................................................................18
Berk v. Choy,
607 U.S. 187 (2026) .................................................................................................................10
Black Horse Cap., LP v. Xstelos Hldgs., Inc.,
2014 WL 5025926 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2014) ..........................................................................15
Bolton v. Ford Motor Co.,
2024 WL 3328522 (D. Del. July 8, 2024) ...............................................................................10
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997).....................................................................................................9
Byrne v. Ameris Bank,
No. 8:24-cv-01989-MWC-JDE (C.D. Cal.) ...............................................................................5
Cavi v. Evolving Sys., Inc.,
245 F. Supp. 3d 604 (D. Del. 2017) .........................................................................................17
Cheffers v. Ideagen Software Inc.,
2025 WL 2549411 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2025) ..............................................................................13
Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
573 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978).......................................................................................................7
CrowdStrike, Inc. v. NSS Labs, Inc.,
2018 WL 6716094 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2018).............................................................................17
Cureton v. NCAA,
252 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001).......................................................................................................7
Dalton v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr.,
2025 WL 2808156 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2025) ...............................................................................8
-iv-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 5 of 28 PageID #: 704
Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney,
199 A.3d 109 (Del. Ch. 2018)..................................................................................................17
Evans v. Cantor Ins. Grp., LP,
2022 WL 3908005 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2022) ............................................................................14
Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178 (1962) ...................................................................................................................7
Garfield v. Allen,
277 A.3d 296 (Del. Ch. 2022)..................................................................................................18
Goureau v. Lemonis,
2021 WL 1197531 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2021)...........................................................................18
Haney v. Blackhawk Network Hldgs., Inc.,
2016 WL 769595 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2016) .......................................................................16, 17
Idearc Media LLC v. Glassman,
2011 WL 570017 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2011) .............................................................................19
Indep. Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth.,
103 F.3d 1165 (3d Cir. 1997)...................................................................................................17
Johnson & Johnson v. Fortis Advisors LLC,
352 A.3d 229 (Del. 2026) ........................................................................................................14
Kronenberg v. Katz,
872 A.2d 568 (Del. Ch. 2004)..................................................................................................14
Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
337 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2003).....................................................................................................19
Levy Family Invs., LLC v. Oars + Alps LLC,
2022 WL 245543 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2022). .......................................................................12, 13
Long v. Wilson,
393 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2004).......................................................................................................7
Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger,
243 F.3d 773 (3d Cir. 2001).....................................................................................................19
Mullin v. Balicki,
875 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2017).......................................................................................................8
Namdar v. Fried,
340 A.3d 1184 (Del. Ch. 2025)..........................................................................................19, 20
-v-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 6 of 28 PageID #: 705
NoFar USA LLC v. Venter,
2026 WL 266529 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2026) .................................................................................14
Ocimum Biosolutions (India) Ltd. v. LG Chem. Ltd.,
2023 WL 12222694 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2023).............................................................................7
Patrick E. Byrne, et al. v. Ameris Bank,
No. 1:25-cv-01557-JLH (D. Del.)..............................................................................................1
Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Hldg. Corp.,
132 A.3d 35 (Del. Ch. 2015)....................................................................................................15
Rheault v. Halma,
2023 WL 8005318 (D. Del. Nov. 7, 2023) ..............................................................................13
Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig. v. Rockefeller,
311 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).....................................................................................................11
Roquette Freres v. SPI Pharma, Inc.,
2009 WL 1444835 (D. Del. May 21, 2009) ...............................................................................8
Sapp v. Indus. Action Servs., LLC,
2024 WL 3444633 (D. Del. July 17, 2024) .............................................................................13
Shane v. Fauver,
212 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2000).......................................................................................................9
Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Albertsons Cos.,
2021 WL 2311455 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2021) .............................................................................15
Spectrum Brands, Inc. v. Tristar Products, Inc.,
2026 WL 2322973 (D. Del. Aug. 11, 2026) ............................................................................10
Talkdesk, Inc. v. DM Trans, LLC,
2024 WL 2799307 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2024) ................................................................15
Transp. Workers Union of Phila., Loc. 234 v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
137 F.R.D. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1991) .................................................................................................8
Trifecta Multimedia Hldgs. Inc. v. WCG Clinical Servs. LLC,
318 A.3d 450 (Del. Ch. 2024)......................................................................................12, 14, 15
U.S. v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware,
230 F. Supp. 3d 354 (D. Del. 2017) .......................................................................................7, 8
Winner Acceptance Corp. v. Return on Capital Corp.,
2008 WL 5352063 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2008) .................................................................9, 10, 12
-vi-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 7 of 28 PageID #: 706
Winters v. Patel,
154 F. App’x 294 (3d Cir. 2005) .............................................................................................16
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 .......................................................................................................................10, 17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)................................................................................................................2, 17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ........................................................................................................1, 10, 11, 12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................20
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ................................................................................................................1, 7
-vii-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 8 of 28 PageID #: 707
I. INTRODUCTION
Patrick E. Byrne, the Byrne Revocable Trust, and the Byrne Irrevocable Trust (“Sellers”)
state the following in support of their motion (the “Motion”) for leave to file Counterclaims /
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 15(a)(2).
II. NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS
Sellers filed their complaint against Ameris Bank (“Ameris”) in December 2025, initiating
the action Patrick E. Byrne, et al. v. Ameris Bank, No. 1:25-cv-01557-JLH (D. Del.) (“Sellers’
Action”).1 On May 18, 2026, Sellers filed the FAC (D.I. 17), which Ameris moved to dismiss on
July 23, 2026 (the “MTD”) (D.I. 27). On August 24, 2026, this Court consolidated Sellers’ Action
with this action, which Ameris initiated against Sellers on February 20, 2026. D.I. 34. On
September 2, 2026, this Court stayed briefing on the MTD pending resolution of the Motion.
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Sellers should be granted leave to file their SAC. Leave to amend is freely given,
and the Motion is timely, made in good faith, and will not prejudice Ameris. The SAC rests largely
on evidence from the California Action trial, which did not reach a verdict until June 11, 2026—
after Sellers filed the FAC. The SAC adds no new parties or relief, and discovery has not begun.
2. The SAC is not futile because it adequately pleads that, to induce Sellers to execute
the SPA, Ameris falsely represented that it intended to comply with the LTIP—the instrument
Ameris proposed “to win” the Balboa transaction. FRCP 9(b) permits intent to be “alleged
generally,” and the standard is relaxed further here because Ameris’s intent was peculiarly within
its knowledge. The SAC sufficiently alleges Ameris knew before closing under the SPA that its
1
Unless otherwise indicated, citations to docket entries refer to those in Sellers’ Action and
capitalized terms have the meanings ascribed to them in the proposed SAC submitted herewith.
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 9 of 28 PageID #: 708
accounting methodologies deviated substantially from the LTIP’s required methodology, yet took
no steps to prepare to perform; its LTIP preparer could not identify the LTIP’s components; its
CFO admitted it did not apply Balboa’s CECL model, as required; it breached the LTIP at its first
opportunity; and within two weeks after an LTIP cycle closed, its executives were strategizing
about how charge-offs would reduce the LTIP accrual.
3. Delaware’s anti-bootstrapping rule does not apply. Sellers sue as parties to the SPA,
assert no claim for breach of the LTIP here, and their only SPA breach claim is unrelated to
Ameris’s fraud; there is no contract claim onto which the fraud claim is “bootstrapped.” Sellers’
fraud claims also fall within two well-recognized exceptions: the fraud caused distinct damage
(Sellers’ assumption of the SPA’s indemnification obligations, for which they seek rescissory
relief), and it was directed at inducing Sellers to sign the SPA.
4. The SPA’s integration clause does not bar Sellers’ fraud claims. A standard
integration clause lacking clear anti-reliance language does not bar such claims, and the SPA
contains no such language. Nor does the alleged fraud contradict the SPA’s express terms; the
LTIP is a separate instrument between different parties governing different obligations.
5. Sellers’ equitable fraud claim is well pled because Sellers allege fraudulent conduct
and seek equitable remedies (rescission or partial rescission) that are necessary, because the SPA’s
indemnification obligation is an ongoing liability of uncertain scope and Balboa is a unique asset.
6. Ameris’s remedy-based arguments are mistaken. Tender of consideration is not an
element of fraudulent inducement, partial rescission of Section 8 of the SPA would not require
return of the $186 million Sellers received, and Sellers may plead alternative and inconsistent
theories under FRCP 8(d)(2).
7. Sellers have not engaged in claim-splitting. The Byrne Trusts were not parties to
-2-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 10 of 28 PageID #: 709
the California Action; that action concerned Byrne’s employment, not fraudulent inducement of
the SPA; and the relief sought here could not have been pursued in California because Section
10.8 of the SPA mandates a Delaware forum.
8. Judicial estoppel does not apply. Sellers’ enforcement of Section 10.8 is consistent
with their fraud claims because a forum-selection clause is enforceable notwithstanding fraudulent
inducement of the underlying agreement; no court adopted Sellers’ prior position because Ameris
voluntarily dismissed the Superior Court Action; and Sellers have not acted in bad faith.
9. Ameris’s breach of Section 10.8 is actionable. Ameris’s fraud does not vitiate the
SPA’s forum-selection provision, and Sellers may recover the expenses they incurred defending
the Superior Court Action in a foreclosed forum.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Sellers Select Ameris Because it Promises to Take Care of Balboa Employees
Byrne founded Balboa in 1988 and spent more than three decades building it into one of
the nation’s largest privately held finance companies. SAC ¶ 16. When he decided to sell Balboa
in 2021, Byrne and the Byrne Trusts owned all of Balboa’s shares, and many potential buyers were
interested. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. But the purchase price was not Byrne’s only concern. He wanted
assurance that the employees who built Balboa would be fairly compensated after the sale. Id. ¶
18. Ameris knew this. As its Chief Strategy Officer, Jim LaHaise, testified, Ameris understood
that it had to account for Byrne’s priorities “to win” the deal. Id.
The Balboa auction was competitive. Four bidders submitted indications of interest, and
the two leading bids—including Ameris’s—were within roughly one percent of each other on cash.
SAC ¶ 25. Byrne asked the bidders three times to improve their offers. Id. Ameris’s August 2,
2021, letter of intent raised its cash consideration and committed to an uncapped incentive pool
-3-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 11 of 28 PageID #: 710
for Balboa’s employees—the pool that ultimately became the LTIP. Id. No competitor matched it,
and the LTIP is what set Ameris apart. Id. LaHaise later conceded that the parties traded six or
seven drafts of the LTIP, that it “was part of the negotiations,” and that it was “part of a benefit
that the bank proposed to Mr. Byrne” to win the acquisition. Id. ¶ 23.
Byrne negotiated the LTIP’s terms carefully. Employees would share in 35% of the amount
by which Balboa’s earnings before taxes (“EBT”) exceeded annual Performance Goals for 2022
through 2024. SAC ¶ 19. To keep Ameris from moving the goalposts, the LTIP required EBT to
be calculated using Balboa’s own accounting methodology—the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating
Model—and specified Key Assumptions. Id. ¶ 20. Byrne repeatedly pressed the point in his pre-
closing discussions with Ameris, and Ameris executives (including LaHaise and Chief Financial
Officer Nicole Stokes) repeatedly assured Byrne that Ameris would apply the Pioneer model and
honor the LTIP after closing. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
Ameris’s pre-closing assurances shaped the deal. Ameris insisted that Sellers indemnify it
for losses from certain litigation pending against Balboa. SAC ¶ 24. The underlying transactions
had already been written down to zero, so Sellers had already absorbed that loss through the
purchase price. Id. Byrne accepted the added indemnification exposure in Section 8 of the SPA
only because he believed the LTIP would protect Balboa’s employees. Id.; see also SAC ¶ 5.
On December 10, 2021, Ameris signed both the SPA with Sellers and the LTIP with
Balboa’s employees, including Byrne. SAC ¶¶ 2, 26. The SPA does not mention the LTIP;
however, the two agreements were negotiated together, and the LTIP was an integral component
of the acquisition. Id. ¶ 26. In Section 10.8 of the SPA, the parties agreed that this Court and the
Court of Chancery would be the exclusive forums for any lawsuit arising out of the SPA. Id. ¶ 50.
-4-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 12 of 28 PageID #: 711
B. Ameris Never Prepares to Honor the LTIP—and Breaches It at the First
Opportunity
Ameris’s promises to comply with the LTIP were hollow from the start. Before signing,
Ameris knew its accounting methodologies deviated substantially from the Pioneer model and that
performing under the LTIP would require substantial accounting and bookkeeping changes. SAC
¶ 32. Ameris made none of them—not before closing, and not after. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. The trial record
in the California Action2 shows how little Ameris did. The employee responsible for the LTIP
calculations could not even describe the basic formula he used, could not identify the LTIP’s
components, and pulled data solely from Ameris’s own reporting software. Id. ¶ 34. Ameris’s
CFO, Stokes, admitted Ameris did not apply Balboa’s “established CECL model,” as required,
and Ameris’s own accounting expert conceded Ameris did not follow the LTIP calculations. Id.
The first LTIP cycle closed on December 31, 2022. SAC ¶ 27. Ameris undercalculated
EBT that very first year, shrinking the 2022 Incentive Pool, and later eliminated the 2023 pool
altogether. Id.
Byrne objected to Ameris’s violating the LTIP, but Ameris cast the disputes as ordinary
accounting disagreements it would resolve in good faith. SAC ¶ 30. It did the opposite. When
Byrne proposed six revisions to the 2023 calculation in January 2024, Stokes and Ameris’s
Controller analyzed which revisions would push EBT over the net income hurdle—and which
would not. Id. ¶ 38. Over the next few days, Ameris personnel continued to analyze different
variations of the calculations proposed by Byrne and assess the impact they would have on the net
income threshold and LTIP calculation. Id. Ameris settled on a calculation that left EBT
approximately $611,000 short of the threshold. Id. ¶ 39. Stokes replied: “Thank you!” Id. Because
2
“California Action” refers to Byrne v. Ameris Bank, No. 8:24-cv-01989-MWC-JDE (C.D. Cal.).
-5-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 13 of 28 PageID #: 712
Sellers had no access to Ameris’s internal systems and Ameris kept promising compliance, Sellers
could not have uncovered the scheme sooner. Id. ¶ 28. In June 2024, Ameris wrongfully fired
Byrne based on his complaints about Ameris breaching the LTIP. Id. ¶ 40.
C. A California Jury Finds Ameris Acted with Malice, Oppression, or Fraud
Byrne sued Ameris in the California Action in his individual capacity as a former employee
and asserted employment claims including wrongful termination, whistleblower retaliation,
nonpayment of wages, and breach of his employment agreement and the LTIP. SAC ¶ 8 n.3. The
Byrne Trusts were not parties to the California Action, and no claim to rescind the SPA was or
could have been brought there because of the SPA’s Delaware forum-selection clause. Id. After a
June 2026 trial, the jury found that Ameris breached its contract with Byrne, willfully
miscalculated the LTIP bonus pool, and “acted with malice, oppression, or fraud,” and awarded
Byrne $62,906,613 in punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 8, 41–42. The court’s June 29, 2026 Findings of
Fact confirmed Ameris breached the LTIP by miscalculating the bonus pool for every performance
period, and the court proceeded to enter a $79,548,170.80 judgment for Byrne that compensated
him for the injuries he suffered as an employee—not the harm he and the Byrne Trusts suffered as
parties induced into the SPA. Id. ¶ 8 n.3; ¶ 27 n.9.
D. Ameris Sues Sellers in the Wrong Forum
On May 7, 2025, Ameris sued Sellers to enforce purported indemnification rights under
the SPA in Delaware Superior Court (the “Superior Court Action”), despite Section 10.8 of the
SPA not permitting suit in the Superior Court. SAC ¶¶ 48, 50. Sellers were forced to respond,
moving to dismiss for improper venue on December 18, 2025. Id. ¶ 49. Ameris then voluntarily
dismissed the case on February 18, 2026, and re-filed here. Id. Sellers seek to recover the costs of
defending that action as indemnifiable Losses under the SPA. Id. ¶¶ 51, 85–89.
-6-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 14 of 28 PageID #: 713
V. LEGAL STANDARDS
Leave to amend under FRCP 15(a)(2) shall be “freely given when justice so requires,” and
“amendments should be liberally granted.” Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2004).
“[P]rejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.” Cornell
& Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978). Courts
consider “whether allowing an amendment would result in additional discovery, cost, and
preparation to defend against new facts or new theories.” Cureton v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d
Cir. 2001). The non-moving party must demonstrate why leave should not be granted. See Ocimum
Biosolutions (India) Ltd. v. LG Chem. Ltd., 2023 WL 12222694, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2023).
The decision to grant leave is discretionary. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
VI. ARGUMENT
A. The Motion Is Timely, Not in Bad Faith, and Will Not Prejudice Ameris
Sellers did not delay bringing this Motion, through which they seek to introduce new
allegations based on testimony and other evidence from the recent trial in the California Action.
Sellers filed their FAC on May 18, 2026. The California Action did not reach a jury verdict until
June 11, 2026, and Ameris filed post-trial motions on August 21. The SAC incorporates: (i) sworn
trial testimony confirming that the LTIP “was part of the negotiations” culminating in the SPA and
that Ameris proposed the LTIP “to win” the transaction, SAC ¶ 23; (ii) the jury’s verdict that
Ameris breached the LTIP and acted “with malice, oppression, or fraud,” id. ¶¶ 8, 41; and (iii)
sworn trial testimony from the knowledgeable employees, demonstrating that Ameris failed to
even take preparatory steps necessary to comply with the LTIP, infra Section VI.B.1. A finding of
undue delay would be inappropriate because these new allegations rely primarily on information
that “was not available to [Sellers] at the time the [FAC] was filed.” U.S. v. Children’s Advocacy
-7-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 15 of 28 PageID #: 714
Center of Delaware, 230 F. Supp. 3d 354, 356 (D. Del. 2017); see also Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d
140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (undue delay requires “delay that is protracted and unjustified[.]”).
There is likewise no basis to conclude that the Motion is based on bad faith or dilatory
motives. Bad faith requires deliberate dilatory conduct, such as a “protracted failure to file and
proceed with [a] motion,” Transp. Workers Union of Phila., Loc. 234 v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 137
F.R.D. 220, 224 (E.D. Pa. 1991), or a “tactical amendment, aimed at circumventing the court’s
prior ruling[.]” Dalton v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 2025 WL 2808156, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2025); see also Roquette Freres v. SPI Pharma, Inc., 2009 WL 1444835, at *5 (D. Del. May 21,
2009) (granting leave to amend and noting that nothing presented “suggests willful or deliberate
conduct, the elements necessary for bad faith.”). Here, the Motion seeks to add new allegations to
cure purported deficiencies identified in Ameris’s MTD, including by incorporating previously
unknown (and highly relevant) trial evidence that was not available when the FAC was filed.3
Ameris will not be prejudiced by the filing of the SAC. The SAC does not add any new
parties, new claims, or seek broader relief than the FAC;4 it simply incorporates additional factual
allegations to support Sellers’ existing claims (including information not previously available).
And this case is in its infancy. See Children’s Advocacy Center, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 357 (“[B]ecause
this matter has not begun discovery, there is no undue prejudice to defendant as a result of granting
the motion. Defendant has not expended resources beyond filing responses to the initial complaint
and subsequent motions.”).
3
While the SAC incorporates information from the California Action that is now public, Sellers’
ability to rely on the full breadth of information supporting their claims remains limited because
Ameris would not agree to Sellers’ use of non-public information from the California Action
(subject to the protective order entered here) until it is produced in discovery. See SAC ¶ 8 n.4.
4
The SAC narrows the relief sought and claims asserted; it removes Sellers’ request for
reformation and one of their claims for equitable fraud.
-8-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 16 of 28 PageID #: 715
B. The Proposed Amendments Are Not Futile
In addition, the SAC is not futile.5 Futility of amendment occurs “when the complaint, as
amended, does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, the Court should accept all well-pleaded
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Sellers. See Shane v. Fauver, 212
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).
1. The SAC Alleges Ameris Falsely Represented that it Intended to Comply
with the LTIP to Induce Execution of the SPA
Ameris contends Sellers’ FAC fails to plead any misrepresentations relating to the SPA,
D.I. 28 at 11, and further fails to plead “promissory fraud” under Delaware law’s heightened
standard for pleading such a claim in Delaware’s courts, D.I. 28 at 14-15. Both arguments fail.
Sellers allege that, to induce Sellers to execute the SPA, Ameris falsely represented that it
intended to comply with the LTIP—the instrument Ameris itself proposed in order to win the
Balboa auction. SAC ¶ 45. The SAC identifies these misrepresentations—and their relation to the
SPA—by identifying the Ameris representatives who made them, the substance of their
assurances, and the pre-closing calls and meetings in which they were made. Id. ¶¶ 21–25, 53–54.
The fact the misrepresentations implicate Ameris’s “intent to comply with the LTIP” does not
mean they “cannot possibly give rise to a claim for fraudulent inducement of the SPA.” D.I. 28 at
9. In fact, that is the very claim they support.
Ameris claims that Sellers must satisfy Delaware’s heightened “specific facts” pleading
standard for promissory fraud claims in state court. See D.I. 28 at 14-15; see also Winner
5
Sellers do not address every argument Ameris raised in its MTD that it may assert as grounds for
a futility finding, without waiver of Sellers’ right to address any such argument in the reply in
support of the Motion.
-9-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 17 of 28 PageID #: 716
Acceptance Corp. v. Return on Capital Corp., 2008 WL 5352063, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2008)
(articulating pleading standard applicable to promissory-fraud allegations). This Delaware-law
standard—under which a claimant must plead “specific facts that lead to a reasonable inference
that the promissor had no intention of performing at the time the promise was made,” supporting
fraudulent intent, Winner Acceptance Corp., 2008 WL 5352063, at *10—cannot supplant FRCP
9(b), which provides that “intent … and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.” The U.S. Supreme Court recently confirmed this in Berk v. Choy, explaining that “a
valid Rule of Civil Procedure displaces contrary state law even if the state law would qualify as
substantive under Erie’s test,” so long as the federal rule “answers the question in dispute” and
does not “exceed[] statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power.” 607 U.S. 187, 192
(2026) (citation modified) (holding that FRCP 8 displaced Delaware statute requiring affidavit of
merit from expert to initiate medical negligence lawsuit), followed by, Spectrum Brands, Inc. v.
Tristar Products, Inc., 2026 WL 2322973, at *6 (D. Del. Aug. 11, 2026) (holding FRCP 9(b)
displaces any “extra-heightened pleading requirement” under Delaware law for fraudulent transfer
claims).
Here, FRCP 9(b) plainly answers the same question as Delaware’s common-law standard;
namely, how specifically a claimant must allege a speaker’s fraudulent intent or state of mind.
Accordingly, FRCP 9(b)’s relaxed standard for state-of-mind pleading controls. Berk, 607 U.S. at
192; Spectrum Brands, 2026 WL 2322973, at *6. Under this standard, knowledge may be averred
generally, and Sellers need only “plead the events which they claim give rise to an inference of
knowledge.”6 In fact, the pleading standard is relaxed even further because Ameris’s undisclosed
6
Bolton v. Ford Motor Co., 2024 WL 3328522, at *10 (D. Del. July 8, 2024) (quoting Devaney v.
Chester, 813 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1987)).
-10-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 18 of 28 PageID #: 717
intent not to perform the LTIP constitutes information “peculiarly within [Ameris’s] knowledge
or control.” Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig. v. Rockefeller, 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002).
The SAC readily clears the bar imposed by FRCP 9(b) (and would survive dismissal even
if this Court were to apply Delaware’s heightened promissory-fraud standard). It incorporates
additional particularized allegations regarding Ameris’s conduct before and shortly after executing
the SPA that support the inference that Ameris never intended to perform its obligations under the
LTIP. Among other things, the SAC incorporates testimony and evidence from the California
Action trial and alleges that, prior to closing, Ameris “did not take any steps prior to closing to
implement the bookkeeping procedures … [or] the financial accounting methodologies that would
be necessary to perform under the LTIP.” SAC ¶ 33. The SAC also identifies testimony concerning
Ameris’s actual implementation of the LTIP that supports this inference. Id. ¶ 34. The employee
responsible for preparing the LTIP calculations could not even identify the LTIP components, id.,
and Ameris’s CFO admitted that Ameris did not apply Balboa’s “established CECL model,” as
required under the LTIP, id. Ameris’s failure to take any preparatory steps is especially revealing
because Ameris knew, prior to entering into the SPA, that its existing accounting methodologies
deviated substantially from the required methodology for the LTIP calculations (and, as a result,
substantial accounting and bookkeeping changes were necessary). Id. ¶ 32.
In addition to failing to implement any of the bookkeeping procedures or accounting
methodologies necessary to comply with the LTIP, Ameris also breached the LTIP at its very first
opportunity. SAC ¶ 27. Against the backdrop of the competitive bidding process preceding
Balboa’s acquisition, Ameris’s failure to even prepare to perform under the LTIP reflects its pre-
SPA intent not to so perform. It is reasonable to infer that Ameris proposed the LTIP as nothing
more than a bidding tactic to “win” the transaction, without ever intending to honor it. Id. ¶ 25.
-11-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 19 of 28 PageID #: 718
The SAC also incorporates allegations regarding post-closing conduct that further supports
the inference that Ameris never intended to perform under the LTIP. Evidence presented in the
California Action reveals that, less than two weeks after an LTIP cycle closed, Ameris was
scheming about how to engineer the LTIP calculation by “cherry-picking” certain factors. SAC ¶
29 (referencing internal correspondence “strategizing” about “how certain charge offs would
reduce the LTIP accrual”); see also id. ¶¶ 37–39 (outlining additional internal correspondence
revealing Ameris’s consistent efforts to downwardly manipulate LTIP calculations). These
allegations are more than sufficient under FRCP 9(b) or Delaware’s heightened pleading standard.
See, e.g., Trifecta Multimedia Hldgs. Inc. v. WCG Clinical Servs. LLC, 318 A.3d 450, 465 (Del.
Ch. 2024) (refusing to dismiss fraud claim for lack of scienter where plaintiff alleged that post-
closing, defendant immediately took steps to undermine plaintiff’s business); Winner, 2008 WL
5352063, at *10 (finding promissory fraud sufficiently pled where investments and defendants
“disappeared shortly after” final lease payment and defendants failed to “make good on virtually
any of their obligations”).
2. Delaware’s Anti-Bootstrapping Rule Does Not Apply
Contrary to Ameris’s contention (D.I. 28 at 9-11), the anti-bootstrapping rule—i.e., “one
cannot ‘bootstrap’ a claim of breach of contract into a claim of fraud merely by alleging that a
contracting party never intended to perform its obligations”7—does not apply here. Sellers’ claims
in the SAC arise in their capacity as parties to the SPA, not as LTIP participants or Ameris
employees (indeed, the Byrne Trusts were never either one). SAC ¶ 8 n.3. The SPA governed a
corporate transaction, whereas the LTIP is an agreement between Ameris and its employees for
employment-based payments. Sellers assert no claim for breach of the LTIP in this Court—and
7
Levy Family Invs., LLC v. Oars + Alps LLC, 2022 WL 245543, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2022).
-12-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 20 of 28 PageID #: 719
their only breach of SPA claim is unrelated to the gravamen of the fraud. Because “there is no
breach claim on which to ‘bootstrap’ the fraud claim,” the anti-bootstrapping rule does not apply.
Levy Family Invs., 2022 WL 245543, at *8 (citation modified). Ameris itself recognizes
“bootstrapping is not directly applicable here in the absence of a breach of contract claim,” D.I. 11
at 17, yet Ameris relies on caselaw distinguishable on that very basis. See, e.g., Cheffers v. Ideagen
Software Inc., 2025 WL 2549411, at *7-8 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2025); Sapp v. Indus. Action Servs.,
LLC, 2024 WL 3444633, at *4 (D. Del. July 17, 2024).
In addition, Sellers’ fraud claims fall squarely within the recognized exceptions to the anti-
bootstrapping rule. First, the rule “does not prevent parties from bringing a fraud claim if …
damages for [the] fraud claim may be different from [the] breach of contract claim.” Levy Family
Invs., 2022 WL 245543, at *8 (citation modified). Here, the fraud caused a different injury than
the breach of the LTIP; whereas the fraud caused Sellers to enter into the SPA and assume the
indemnification obligations set forth therein, see SAC ¶ 59, the breach of the LTIP caused Byrne
lost wages as an employee—an injury addressed in the California Action. Because Sellers assert
fraud damages (and seek rescissory relief) distinct from the harm caused by the LTIP, the anti-
bootstrapping rule does not preclude their fraud claims. See Levy Family Invs., 2022 WL 245543,
at *9 (noting request for “rescissory damages” in refusing to preclude fraud claims).
Second, the anti-bootstrapping rule does not preclude the fraud claims Sellers assert here—
based on fraudulent “conduct [that] occurs prior to the execution of the contract and thus with the
goal of inducing the [claimant’s] signature and willingness to close on the transaction.” Levy, 2022
WL 245543, at *8 (citation modified); see also Rheault v. Halma, 2023 WL 8005318, at *5 (D.
Del. Nov. 7, 2023) (“[T]he bootstrapping doctrine does not apply when the fraud complaint is
directed to misrepresentations leading up to an agreement ….”). The SAC confirms this exception
-13-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 21 of 28 PageID #: 720
applies here with specific allegations of Ameris’s awareness that the LTIP was necessary “to win”
the transaction, SAC ¶ 23, and that Ameris falsely represented that it intended to comply with the
LTIP—an “integral component” of the overall transaction, id. ¶ 26—for the specific purpose of
inducing entry into the SPA. Id.; see also Evans v. Cantor Ins. Grp., LP, 2022 WL 3908005, at *3
n.8 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2022) (holding that anti-bootstrapping rule did not preclude fraud claim
where plaintiff “alleges fraud in the inducement to sign the [induced contract], not in the
performance of the contract”).
3. The SPA’s Integration Clause Does Not Bar Extra-Contractual Fraud
The SPA’s integration clause does not bar Sellers’ extra-contractual fraud claims. As the
Delaware Supreme Court recently reiterated in Johnson & Johnson v. Fortis Advisors LLC,
“standard integration clauses … will not relieve a party of its oral and extra-contractual fraudulent
representations.” 352 A.3d 229, 273 (Del. 2026); see also NoFar USA LLC v. Venter, 2026 WL
266529, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2026) (“Delaware courts have not given effect to so-called merger
or integration clauses that do not clearly state that the parties disclaim reliance upon extra-
contractual statements.” (citation modified)). An extra-contractual fraud claim will only be
precluded where a contract contains language that “add[s] up to a clear anti-reliance clause.”
Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004). Because standard integration clauses do
not contain such language, they generally will not bar an extra-contractual fraud claim. See
Johnson & Johnson, 352 A.3d at 273; Trifecta Multimedia Hldgs. Inc., 318 A.3d at 465. And here,
neither the SPA’s integration clause nor any other provision contains anti-reliance language that
meets the controlling Johnson & Johnson standard.
To evade application of this general principle, Ameris points to pre-Johnson & Johnson,
inapposite case law (from a trial court) involving extra-contractual representations that
-14-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 22 of 28 PageID #: 721
contradicted express terms of the at-issue contract. D.I. 28 at 12-13.8 In Shareholder
Representative Services LLC v. Albertsons Cos., 2021 WL 2311455 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2021), the
plaintiff sought to contradict a heavily negotiated merger agreement which granted the buyer “the
exclusive right to make all business and operational decisions” regarding the acquired business “in
its sole and absolute discretion.” 2021 WL 2311455, at *13. These express contractual terms were
directly inconsistent with the “alleged oral misrepresentations made during negotiations, including
that [buyer] promised to give … [seller’s] management team broad latitude in setting
compensation.” Id. at *11. The Court of Chancery held that the integration clause was sufficient
to preclude justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations because they amounted to “parol
evidence that would vary the extant terms in the subsequent integrated writings.” Id. at *12
(quoting Black Horse Cap., LP v. Xstelos Hldgs., Inc., 2014 WL 5025926, at *24 (Del. Ch. Sept.
30, 2014)); see also Trifecta Multimedia Hldgs. Inc., 318 A.3d at 466-67.
Here, unlike in Albertsons, Ameris’s alleged fraud—its undisclosed intent not to perform
the LTIP—does not contradict express terms of the SPA.9 The LTIP is not part of the SPA, it is
not referenced in the SPA, it is between different parties, and it governs different obligations
(employee compensation). Ameris’s fraud thus falls far outside the scope of the SPA’s integration
clause. SPA § 10.5 (superseding only agreements “with respect to the subject matter hereof”).
8
In addition to these cases, Ameris also cites to Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Hldg. Corp.,
132 A.3d 35 (Del. Ch. 2015), which is distinguishable because (unlike here) the at-issue contract
contained express anti-reliance language.
9
The remaining cases cited by Ameris are inapposite for the same reason; they each involved
alleged promises that contradicted, or would have varied, the express terms of the integrated
writing. Black Horse, 2014 WL 5025926, at *25 (noting that fraud claim “so plainly conflicts with
[contractual] language” that allowing it would “render the integration clauses contained in [the
contracts] mere surplusage”); Talkdesk, Inc. v. DM Trans, LLC, 2024 WL 2799307, at *9-11 (Del.
Super. Ct. May 31, 2024) (dismissing fraud claim that sought to “avoid the deal [claimant] made
in favor of the deal it now wishes it made” (citation modified)).
-15-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 23 of 28 PageID #: 722
4. Sellers’ Equitable Fraud Claim Is Well Pled
Under Delaware law, a plaintiff can state a claim for equitable fraud wherever “one of the
two fundamental sources of equity jurisdiction exist: (1) an equitable right founded upon a special
relationship over which equity takes jurisdiction, or (2) where equity affords its special remedies,
e.g., rescission, or cancellation[.]” Haney v. Blackhawk Network Hldgs., Inc., 2016 WL 769595,
at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2016). In Haney, where the underlying agreement was between
“sophisticated parties” who had “engaged in an arm’s length transaction,” the Court of Chancery
rejected an attempt to dismiss an equitable fraud claim because the plaintiff: (i) had adequately
pled facts supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant “engaged in fraudulent conduct”;
and (ii) sought “equitable remedies[.]” Id. at *10.
As in Haney, Sellers adequately plead that Ameris engaged in fraudulent conduct that
requires an equitable remedy (rescission or partial rescission) because the harms Sellers suffered
cannot be remedied by monetary damages alone.10 The indemnification obligation under the SPA
is an ongoing liability of uncertain scope, making it impossible to calculate a damages figure that
would fully compensate Sellers. SAC ¶ 47. Additionally, Balboa is a unique asset whose present
and future value is not readily ascertainable, thus necessitating equitable relief. Id. ¶ 48.
5. Ameris’s Remedy-Based Arguments Are Premature (and Mistaken)
Ameris’s arguments regarding Sellers’ ability to obtain specific remedies have no bearing
on the sufficiency of Sellers’ allegations. D.I. 28 at 14-15.11 Regardless, the SAC pleads sufficient
10
SAC ¶ 47; supra Section VI.B.1 (discussing alleged fraud and why it is actionable); see Haney,
2016 WL 769595, at *10 (refusing to dismiss equitable fraud claim because plaintiff adequately
alleged fraudulent conduct and “seeks multiple equitable remedies”).
11
The summary-judgment decisions on which Ameris relies do not inform the pleading-stage
sufficiency of the SAC. See Winters v. Patel, 154 F. App’x 294, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2005); Allied
Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 2001).
-16-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 24 of 28 PageID #: 723
facts to support Sellers’ request for rescission, partial rescission, and rescissory damages.
Sellers’ failure to plead that they are “ready, willing, and able” to repay the $186 million
received under the SPA does not support dismissal of their fraud claims on the pleadings. D.I. 28
at 15. Although tendering consideration may be a condition of ultimately being awarded
rescission, it is not a condition of pleading fraudulent inducement or equitable fraud. See
AgroFresh Inc. v. MirTech, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 643, 662 (D. Del. 2017) (reciting elements
required to prove fraudulent inducement); Haney, 2016 WL 769595, at *10. Ameris’s argument
also ignores Sellers’ request for partial rescission of the indemnification provisions in Section 8
of the SPA, a result which would not require returning all consideration Ameris paid. SAC ¶ 64.
Further, Ameris cannot obtain dismissal of Sellers’ fraud claim simply because one of the
remedies sought by Sellers purportedly is inconsistent with its claim for breach of the SPA’s venue
provision (it is not inconsistent, see infra Section VI.B.8). It is well-established that a plaintiff may
“plead alternative theories of recovery” and a court “need not ‘wrestle at the pleading stage how
one claim might interact with another.’” Advanced Paving Servs., LLC. v. Metra Indus., Inc., 2026
WL 2620377, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2026) (citation omitted); see also Indep. Enters. Inc.
v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1175 (3d Cir. 1997) (FRCP 8 “permits
inconsistency in both legal and factual allegations”); CrowdStrike, Inc. v. NSS Labs, Inc., 2018
WL 6716094, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2018) (same); Cavi v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d
604, 605 (D. Del. 2017) (holding that a plaintiff may “pursue a multitude of conflicting and
possibly unnecessary claims.”).
Sellers need not choose between remedies at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., FRCP 8(d)(2);
Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney, 199 A.3d 109, 178 (Del. Ch. 2018) (“Whether and
what kind of remedy issues should be addressed at a future date”); Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v.
-17-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 25 of 28 PageID #: 724
UBS Real Est. Secs., Inc., 2012 WL 3525613, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (same); Garfield v.
Allen, 277 A.3d 296, 307 (Del. Ch. 2022) (“The pleadings are not the right time for the court to
determine whether success on one claim might obviate the need for another.”).
6. Sellers’ Compliance with the SPA’s Mandatory Forum Selection Provision
Does Not Amount to Claim-Splitting
The rule against claim-splitting is designed to “prevent burdening the same defendant with
duplicative proceedings in different courts brought by the same plaintiff based on different causes
of action arising out of a common underlying nucleus of facts.” Goureau v. Lemonis, 2021 WL
1197531, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2021); OB at 17. None of these predicates are present.
First, two of the Sellers (the Byrne Trusts) were not parties to the California Action.
Second, this action implicates a different core nucleus of facts (implicating different duties
and distinct time periods) than the California Action. The California Action involved multiple
claims relating to Byrne’s status as a former employee, including wrongful discharge, nonpayment
of wages, and breach of the LTIP after closing. SAC ¶ 41. Sellers’ claims in this action relate to a
different instrument (the SPA) and require proof of facts that were not necessary to establish the
claims in the California Action—e.g., fraudulent intent as of December 2021, justifiable reliance
on Ameris’s pre-closing representations and fraudulent inducement to enter the SPA. Id. ¶ 8 n.3.
Third, this action seeks relief that could not have been sought in the California Action—
i.e., rescission of the SPA and damages from the Superior Court Action—because the claims
seeking that relief could not have been brought in California. Section 10.8 of the SPA designates
certain Delaware courts as the exclusive forums for “any Action arising out of” the SPA. Sellers’
compliance with a mandatory forum selection provision does not amount to claim-splitting.
-18-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 26 of 28 PageID #: 725
7. Ameris’s Judicial Estoppel Arguments Are Fundamentally Flawed
Ameris’s estoppel arguments are contrary to the law and mischaracterize Byrne’s prior
positions. D.I. 28 at 18. A party asserting judicial estoppel must show (1) that the to-be-estopped
party took “two positions that are irreconcilably inconsistent”, (2) that party “changed [their]
position in bad faith – i.e., with the intent to play fast and loose with the court,” and (3) the district
court’s application must be “tailored to address the harm identified and no lesser sanction would
adequately remedy the damage done by the litigant’s misconduct.” Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile
GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); Idearc
Media LLC v. Glassman, 2011 WL 570017, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2011). Moreover, judicial
estoppel is inappropriate where an initial claim was not accepted or adopted by a court. See
Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 778 (3d Cir. 2001). Ameris
fails to meet its burden to show these prerequisites.
First, Sellers’ arguments regarding Section 10.8’s enforceability are not irreconcilably
inconsistent with their fraud claims. Under Delaware law, forum selection provisions are not
vitiated by fraud unless the alleged fraud goes directly to the forum selection provision. That is
because a forum selection clause “operates as a mini-contract (the forum selection contract) within
a larger contract (the container contract).” Namdar v. Fried, 340 A.3d 1184, 1206 n.83 (Del. Ch.
2025) (citation omitted). “A party might have induced the counterparty to execute the container
contract through fraud, but that would not affect the forum selection contract unless the fraud
went directly to the latter contract.” Id. (emphasis added). “A court therefore can enforce a forum
selection clause notwithstanding the alleged fraudulent inducement of the container contract.” Id.
Second, Ameris voluntarily dismissed the Superior Court Action before the court relied
upon Sellers’ prior characterization of the SPA. See Montrose, 243 F.3d at 782 (“[J]udicial estoppel
-19-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 27 of 28 PageID #: 726
is inappropriate unless the earlier position was accepted by a court or agency.”).
Third, Sellers have not acted with bad faith and Ameris doesn’t attempt to show otherwise.
Finally, Ameris’s estoppel arguments (like their remedies arguments) also ignore that
Sellers are entitled to plead in the alternative. If Sellers obtain partial rescission of the SPA, then
there can be no doubt as to the continued enforceability of its forum selection provision. Here,
again, Ameris is trying to cut off Sellers’ claims at the pleadings stage because of potential (or
imagined) inconsistencies in the relief sought in Sellers’ complaint. These election-of-remedies
issues do not present a pleadings-stage obstacle. See supra Section VI.B.5.
8. Ameris’s Breach of the SPA’s Forum Selection Provision Is Actionable
The fact that Sellers seek rescission of the SPA does not absolve Ameris of liability for
breaching it. As noted above, fraud with respect to the SPA as a whole does not vitiate either party’s
obligation to comply with the forum selection provision in Section 10.8. Supra Section VI.B.7.12
Sellers specifically allege the harm they suffered as a result of the breach. SAC ¶ 85. Sellers were
forced to litigate in a foreclosed forum, so they are entitled to recover the expenses they incurred
there. Namdar, 340 A.3d at 1203 (“The expenses incurred in the foreclosed forum provide the
measure of damages the non-breaching party suffered from the breach of the contractual right not
to be sued there.”).
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Sellers respectfully request the Court grant their Motion
and direct Ameris to answer the SAC.13
12
As Sellers previously explained, Section 8.4(c) does not override Ameris’s obligations under
Section 10.8. D.I. 29-1 at 10-12.
13
The futility standard mirrors the standard governing a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6).
-20-
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 49 Filed 09/30/26 Page 28 of 28 PageID #: 727
Dated: September 30, 2026 Respectfully submitted,
REED SMITH LLP
OF COUNSEL: /s/ Benjamin P. Chapple
Benjamin P. Chapple (No. 5871)
Matthew T. Sessions (pro hac vice) John T. Miraglia (No. 6682)
Stacey A. Villagomez (pro hac vice) 1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1500
ALLEN MATKINS Wilmington, DE 19801
2010 Main Street, 8th Floor (302) 778-7500
Irvine, CA 92614 bchapple@reedsmith.com
(949) 553-1313 jmiraglia@reedsmith.com
msessions@allenmatkins.com
svillagomez@allenmatkins.com Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Patrick E. Byrne, The Patrick E.
Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February
23, 2001, and The Patrick E. Byrne
Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021
-21-