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Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton — Entry #112

Case: Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton txwd · 1:25-cv-01153

filed July 24, 2025

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Docket entry #112 · filed October 26, 2026

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Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 112     Filed 10/26/26    Page 1 of 12


                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                 AUSTIN DIVISION

GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC,                      )
                                              )
              Plaintiff,                      )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
KEN PAXTON, in his Official Capacity as       )
Attorney General of Texas,                    )
                                              )       Civil Action No. 25-cv-01153-ADA
              Defendant;                      )
                                              )
THE TEXAS STOCK EXCHANGE and                  )
THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF                      )
BUSINESS,                                     )
                                              )
              Intervenor-Defendants.          )
                                              )

   INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF
       GLASS LEWIS’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA             Document 112         Filed 10/26/26       Page 2 of 12


        Intervenor-Defendants the Texas Stock Exchange (“TXSE”) and the Texas Association of

Business (“TAB”) (together, “Intervenors”) oppose Plaintiff Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC’s (“Glass

Lewis”) Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, Dkt. 109 (the “Motion”). Through its Motion, Glass Lewis

seeks to eviscerate the well-established First Amendment associational privilege to force TAB to reveal

the identities of its members and seeks discovery into issues that have no relation to SB 2337’s

constitutionality. This stands in stark contrast to Glass Lewis’s prior representations to the Court that

“[f]urther discovery is not needed” when it opposed Defendants’ request for additional time to

complete discovery into Glass Lewis’s practices pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Yet now, a day

before the end of fact discovery, Glass Lewis filed a motion that says the opposite.

        As explained below, TAB meets its initial “light” burden to gain the protections of the

associational privilege because disclosure of its members and their association-related activities may

have a chilling effect on the freedom to associate given Glass Lewis’s dominant market power, its

influence on investor voting, and the subjective nature of its recommendations along with its

demonstrated bias. And Glass Lewis has not explained (and cannot show) why it needs this

information or why it is relevant to the claims or defenses, which focus on the constitutionality of SB

2337. The information it seeks has no bearing on SB 2337’s constitutionality. Indeed, with the law

firmly against Glass Lewis, there is only one possible explanation for motivation here. It seeks

retribution against those companies that have dared to stand up to the proxy advisory duopoly by

supporting a law that commands transparency to benefit the everyday investors who are ultimately

impacted by Glass Lewis’s proxy advisory services. This motive is improper, and the Motion should

be denied.

                                          BACKGROUND

        Over the past 13 months, Intervenors have responded to numerous discovery requests from

Glass Lewis and objected to some where appropriate. Yet in the Motion, Glass Lewis falsely suggests


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 112         Filed 10/26/26       Page 3 of 12


that Intervenors ignored nearly all of Glass Lewis’s discovery requests, writing that “Intervenors have

produced zero documents in response to 25 requests” and accusing Defendants of “wholesale refusal

to participate in written discovery.” Motion at 1; see also Dkt. 109-1 ¶ 6 (counsel declaration stating,

“TAB and TXSE produced zero documents in response to Glass Lewis’ twenty-five requests for

production.”). Contrary to these false statements, Intervenors produced over 4,000 pages of materials

in this case and substantively responded to 52 of Glass Lewis’s requests for production and responded

to 29 of its interrogatories.

        Indeed, Intervenors responded to Glass Lewis’s first set of written discovery requests on

October 31, 2025.        Those requests included (a) 28 requests for production (“RFP”) and 15

interrogatories (“ROG”) to TXSE and (b) 27 RFPs and 13 ROGs to TAB. TXSE substantively

responded to all but one RFP, stating that it (1) would search for and produce any responsive

documents it had, (2) had no responsive documents, or (3) expected such documents to be within

Glass Lewis’s possession, since this case is about a law that regulates the conduct of Glass Lewis and

other proxy advisors like it. See Rasmussen Declaration (“Rasmussen Decl.”) at Ex. 1. TXSE objected

to 1 RFP as irrelevant to SB 2337’s constitutionality. TXSE also substantively responded to all

interrogatories. See id. at Ex. 2.

        For its part, TAB substantively responded to 20 RFPs, stating that it (1) would search for and

produce any responsive documents it had (some of which were already included in pleadings, which

TAB identified), (2) had no responsive documents, or (3) expected such documents to be within Glass

Lewis’s possession as opposed to its own. See id. at Ex. 3. TAB stood on its objections for the

remaining 7 RFPs, which sought disclosure of TAB’s members or other information not relevant to

SB 2337’s constitutionality. 1 Id. TAB also substantively responded to 9 interrogatories. TAB objected


        1
          This includes requests for information that plainly have no bearing on the issues in this case,
including documents regarding the resignation of TAB’s prior President and CEO, an unrelated
lawsuit in which TAB is a defendant, and TAB political donations.


                                                   2


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA             Document 112          Filed 10/26/26       Page 4 of 12


to the remainder because three sought member identities and one had no bearing on SB 2337’s

constitutionality. Id. at Ex. 4.

        Nearly a year later, and ten months after moving for summary judgment, Glass Lewis served

its second set of written discovery requests on September 18, 2026, including an additional (a) 11 RFPs

and 7 ROGs to TXSE and (b) 14 RFPs and 7 ROGs to TAB. TXSE substantively responded to 4

RFPs and objected to the others either as duplicative of prior requests or because they have no bearing

on the issues related to Glass Lewis’s motion for summary judgment, such as requests concerning

TXSE’s intervention or its political donations. 2 Id. at Ex. 5. TXSE also substantively responded to 4

ROGs and objected to 3 others as duplicative of prior requests or irrelevant to this case. Id. at Ex. 6.

        TAB substantively responded to 1 RFP, objected to five others as duplicative of prior requests,

and objected to the remaining requests that either sought member information or information with

no bearing on SB 2337’s constitutionality, such as the resignation of TAB’s prior President and CEO,

a lawsuit in which TAB is a defendant, and TAB political donations. Id. at Ex. 7. TAB also

substantively responded to one interrogatory and objected to the remainder as either privileged,

irrelevant to SB 2337’s constitutionality, or outside of its possession. Id. at Ex. 8.

        On October 15, 2026, Glass Lewis asked to meet and confer regarding Intervenors’ discovery

responses and objections. See id. at Ex. 9. Yet Glass Lewis did not identify any specific discovery

requests it wanted to discuss and only identified a single objection Intervenors had made—the

associational privilege objection. Intervenors’ counsel offered availability for a meet and confer call

while also asking Glass Lewis to identify specific issues to discuss, including the basis for its privilege

challenge. Glass Lewis instead responded on October 16 by asking for Intervenors to “confirm by


        2
         TXSE inadvertently omitted two RFP responses from its initially-served responses. Glass
Lewis never raised this before filing the Motion. Upon learning this when reviewing the Motion,
Intervenors promptly supplemented their responses on October 19, 2026, which was within the
permitted time to respond to Glass Lewis’s second set of written discovery requests. Id. at Ex. 10.


                                                     3


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 112         Filed 10/26/26       Page 5 of 12


5:00 pm today, October 16, whether you will substantively answer our interrogatories and produce

responsive documents to our RFPs.” Id. After Intervenors’ counsel responded and again offered a

time to meet and confer, Glass Lewis sent an email declaring an impasse.

        Even now, the only specific issue that Glass Lewis raises with respect to Intervenors is the

associational privilege objection. It does not list a single specific discovery response that is deficient

and rests instead on broad accusations aimed at “Defendants” collectively.

                                            ARGUMENT

        The Motion should be denied. First, Glass Lewis seeks the identities of Intervenors’ members

and information on their support for intervention here (RFPs 35-38 & Interrogatories 14-15). This

information is shielded from disclosure by the First Amendment’s associational privilege. Second,

Glass Lewis has waived any argument it may have by failing to timely raise their concerns despite

knowing the nature of Intervenors’ objections for nearly a year.

I.      The First Amendment Protects Against Disclosure of TAB’s Membership Lists, Which
        Are Irrelevant to the Claims and Defenses in This Litigation.

        Glass Lewis seeks detailed information about TAB’s members and association-related

activities, including their identities and support for intervention (RFP 35 & ROGs 14 & 15), and

contributions to TAB (RFB 36). The First Amendment shields TAB’s members from these discovery

requests. 3

        A.      The Relevant Standard Favors Upholding the Privilege.

        The First Amendment secures a “right to associate with others,” including the right to do so


        3
           Glass Lewis did not identify specific discovery responses from Intervenors with which it
takes issue beyond the associational privilege. Thus, there are no other disputes before the Court.
Nevertheless, to the extent that Glass Lewis is moving to compel Intervenors to respond to any of
the irrelevant requests that Glass Lewis made, then that request should be denied. Rule 26(b)(1)
commands that discovery “not only be relevant but also proportional to the needs of the case.” Lopez
v. State Farm Lloyds, 348 F.R.D. 419, 428 (W.D. Tex. 2025). Glass Lewis’s requests on irrelevant topics
are neither. Indeed, Glass Lewis’s inquiries into a workplace human resources lawsuit, political
donations, and TAB’s own internal policies are far afield of the issues in this case.


                                                    4


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA             Document 112         Filed 10/26/26       Page 6 of 12


privately. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 606-07 (2021). Accordingly, the

Supreme Court has recognized an associational privilege that protects against the compelled disclosure

of one’s affiliation with advocacy groups when such disclosure would disturb the “vital relationship

between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations” and risk a “chilling effect.” Id. The

privilege applies to “discovery orders even if all the litigants are private entities.” Heartland Surgical

Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 2007 WL 852521, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 2007).

        Courts in the Fifth Circuit employ a balancing test to evaluate the privilege. Hastings v. N.E.

Indep. Sch. Dist., 615 F.2d 628, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1980). Thereunder, a party must first demonstrate a

reasonable probability that disclosure may expose its “members to economic reprisal, loss of

employment, threat of physical coercion, [or] other manifestations of public hostility.” Id. at 631. The

burden then shifts to the party seeking discovery to show “a compelling justification” to intrude upon

the First Amendment right. ACLU v. Martinez-Rivera, 2015 WL 13650010, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 10,

2015). In applying this balancing test, courts often consider: “(1) the importance of the information

sought to the interests in the case, (2) the availability of the information from alternative sources, (3)

the substantiality of the First Amendment interests at stake, and (4) whether the request is carefully

tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with protected activities.” Young Conservatives of Tex.

Foundation v. Univ. of N. Texas, 2022 WL 2901007, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2022).

        These factors weigh heavily in favor of upholding the associational privilege here.

        B.      TAB Has Met Its “Light” Burden.

        TAB’s burden is “light”—no “concrete showing” is required. Id. at *2; accord Bonta, 594 U.S.

at 616 (explaining “[e]xacting scrutiny” applied when action “may have the effect of curtailing the

freedom to associate” and may have a “possible deterrent effect”). TAB easily makes that showing.

        Glass Lewis is part of a duopoly with the other plaintiff in this case—Institutional Shareholder

Services Inc.—that controls 90-97% of the market for proxy advisory services. Glass Lewis makes


                                                    5


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA              Document 112          Filed 10/26/26        Page 7 of 12


recommendations over proxy voting matters at Texas companies that carry considerable influence

with investors in those companies. See Dkt. 22-5 at pgs. 10, 18. The nature of Glass Lewis’s business

model and the central question of this case—the constitutionality of a law regulating that business—

makes Glass Lewis’s bizarre quest for TAB’s member information suspicious. How will Glass Lewis

use this information when it provides voting recommendations on issues affecting these very

companies? Will it, for example, use its power to target members by recommending against board

members up for election at TAB member companies on the flimsy notion that supporting SB 2337 is

supposedly bad governance? Will it use the information to target member companies in making

recommendations about dubious shareholder proposals that do little, if anything, to promote the

company’s value? These are not remote possibilities—Glass Lewis’s recommendations are highly

subjective and it has already demonstrated arbitrariness and bias in making them 4—and they have

direct economic impact on the companies that are threatened by Glass Lewis’s demand for

membership records.

        Indeed, Glass Lewis seeks protected documents containing a roster of TAB’s members and

their association-related activities—information that, to date, has not been disclosed. Moreover, if a

company believes that there is a risk that their association with TAB will become public, then they

may be reluctant to associate in the first instance. This creates precisely the chilling effect that the

privilege is meant to prevent. TAB easily satisfies its burden.

        C.       Glass Lewis Fails to Meet Its Burden.

        The burden shifts to Glass Lewis to demonstrate a “compelling need” for the discovery. Young

Conservatives, 2022 WL 2901007, at *3. A compelling need “goes to the heart of the claims,” is “directly

relevant,” or is one that is “crucial to the party’s case.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,


        4
          See, e.g., Dkt. 72, Ex. A at 2 (Glass Lewis employee Slack messages demonstrating bias and
arbitrary decision-making, filed under seal).


                                                      6


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA             Document 112         Filed 10/26/26       Page 8 of 12


1985 WL 315, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1985) (quotations omitted). This is a “more demanding

standard of relevance” than under Rule 26(b)(1). Perry v. Schwarzenneger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1162 (9th Cir.

2010). Glass Lewis cannot carry that burden.

        First, whether SB 2337 is constitutional or not has nothing to do with the identities of TAB’s

members. Second, Glass Lewis has repeatedly represented that it needed no further discovery to make

its case. Specifically, Glass Lewis told the Court in December of 2025 that, “Further discovery is not

needed to resolve this case,” (Dkt. 74, at p. 1) and doubled-down in January 2026, stating, “Further

discovery is not going to change the Court’s analysis,” (Jan. 22, 2026, Hearing Tr. at 29:5-6). The

purpose of the discovery being taken pursuant to Defendants’ Rule 56(d) motions is to enable

Defendants to rebut Glass Lewis’s arguments about why SB 2337 is unconstitutional and to give

Defendants a view into whether Glass Lewis is making false statements about its proxy advisory

services that SB 2337 is designed to address. Accordingly, when Judge Albright granted Intervenors’

56(d) motion, he explained that the parties should “meet and confer about what specific discovery the

defendant believes it’s entitled to and whether or not plaintiff will … provide it.” Tr. at 35:16-20

(emphasis added).

        When Glass Lewis insists that “TAB put its members’ harm at issue,” Mot. 8, it badly

misconstrues both TAB’s role in this case and the issues involved. TAB did not intervene as a plaintiff,

and it does not bring claims against Glass Lewis on behalf of its members or press any member-

specific arguments. Rather, TAB intervened to “defend against Plaintiff’s [as-applied] claim,” Doc. 22,

at 17, which asks whether SB 2337 can be constitutionally applied against any of Glass Lewis’s activities.

See Doc. 69, at 10-15 (explaining why facts about Glass Lewis’s conduct are necessary to resolve as-

applied challenge). Defendants argue that SB 2337’s applications to Glass Lewis are permissible to

remedy Glass Lewis’s false and misleading speech. It is of no consequence whether the misleading

conduct relates to a TAB member or to a Texas public company that is not a TAB member. Contra


                                                    7


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 112          Filed 10/26/26       Page 9 of 12


Mot. 9. Tellingly, neither Intervenors’ response in opposition to Glass Lewis’s preliminary injunction

nor its Rule 56(d) briefing make any reference to the identities of TAB’s members or any arguments based

on members’ injuries. And Glass Lewis identifies no such issues or arguments in its motion to compel.

        Instead, Glass Lewis invokes Intervenors’ motion for intervention as the primary hook for

associational discovery. See, e.g., Mot. 8 (quoting Dkt. 22). But this fails many times over. TAB was

allowed to intervene more than a year ago; Glass Lewis cannot relitigate the issue now and requires

no discovery ex post. And even if discovery into TAB’s allegations at intervention were proper, TAB did

not claim an injury exclusive to its members but rather that its members are harmed when proxy advisors

disseminate false and misleading advice about any Texas company because this advice “degrades

Texas’s business environment” and “impedes [Intervenors’] efforts to attract companies to Texas.”

Doc. 22, at 1. 5

        This case thus stands in sharp contrast to many of the associational privilege cases Glass Lewis

relies upon (at Mot. 8-10), which granted narrow discovery into the identities of a plaintiff’s members

only to the extent the plaintiff placed their identities at issue. For instance, National Organization for

Women v. Sperry Rand Corp. (NOW), 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 1980) allowed limited discovery into a

plaintiff’s membership when the plaintiff brought claims on behalf of “a number of its members …

aggrieved by certain practices followed by” the defendant. Id. at 273. 6 The court emphasized that this

turned in large part on the association’s status as a plaintiff; where (as here) the association “is more


        5
          Indeed, when Glass Lewis writes that, “TAB claimed its members were ‘harmed by false and
misleading proxy advice.’” Mot. 9, it truncates the relevant sentence, which explained that, absent SB
2337’s requirements, “Texas public companies” that happen to include TAB members, “will continue
to be harmed by false and misleading proxy advice.” Doc. 22, at 11.
        6
          Likewise, ERISA Industry Committee v. Asaro-Angelo, 2023 WL 2808105 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2023),
held that a plaintiff asserting associational standing would not be harmed by disclosing “the identity
of a single, injured member for the purposes [of] supporting [its] standing to bring its claim.” Id. at *7.
And NIACCF, Inc. v. Cold Stone Creamery, Inc., held that a plaintiff’s membership list was disclosable
when plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to disclose certain information to those members. Id.
at *2.


                                                    8


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA             Document 112          Filed 10/26/26          Page 10 of 12


analogous to a defendant than to a plaintiff,” associational rights receive their “fullest protection.” Id.

at 275 (quoting Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182, 192 (5th Cir. 1976)) (punctuation omitted).

Similarly, La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbot, 2022 WL 17574079 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2022) offers no

support for Glass Lewis’s position. There, the Court was dealing with communications between an

association and unrelated third-parties. Yet it explicitly pointed to member lists and participation in

association activities as information covered by the privilege. See id. at *6, 8, 9.

II.     Glass Lewis Has Waived its Argument as to Associational Privilege.

        Glass Lewis waived its argument against TAB’s assertion of associational privilege by failing

to raise it for approximately a year. The Motion addresses requests that Glass Lewis made in its first

set of written discovery requests. Yet Intervenors served their responses and objections to Glass

Lewis’s first set of written discovery requests on October 31, 2025, wherein TAB explicitly asserted

the First Amendment associational privilege. Glass Lewis never engaged with that objection and never

raised it through a prior motion.

        Accordingly, it has waived any argument challenging the associational privilege claim by failing

to raise it for nearly a year after TAB first asserted it and after it already filed for summary judgment

(telling this Court it needed nothing more). See, e.g., Tim W. Koerner & Assocs., Inc. v. Aspen Labs, Inc.,

492 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Koerner & Assoc. v. Aspen Labs, 683 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.

1982) (denying plaintiff’s motion to compel and noting that “Plaintiff has been inexcusably dilatory in

its efforts to pursue an order to compel discovery” when it “filed [its discovery motion] nine months

after [Defendant’s] responses to Plaintiff’s third request for production of documents and almost two

months after Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”). Glass Lewis’s conduct here is even more

inexcusable than in Koerner given that Glass Lewis itself moved for summary judgment.

                                                CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Glass Lewis’s Motion.


                                                     9


     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA   Document 112      Filed 10/26/26       Page 11 of 12


Dated: October 26, 2026                Respectfully submitted,


                                       By: /s/ Mark W. Rasmussen
                                            Mark W. Rasmussen
                                            Attorney-in-charge
                                            Texas State Bar No. 24086291
                                            Sidney Smith McClung
                                            Texas State Bar No. 24083880
                                            Timothy M. Villari
                                            Texas State Bar No. 24125870
                                            JONES DAY
                                            2727 N. Harwood St., Suite 500
                                            Dallas, Texas 75201
                                            mrasmussen@jonesday.com
                                            smcclung@jonesday.com
                                            tvillari@jonesday.com
                                            Telephone: +1.214.220.3939
                                            Facsimile: +1.214.969.5100

                                             Noel J. Francisco (admitted pro hac vice)
                                             D.C. Bar No. 464752
                                             Brinton Lucas (admitted pro hac vice)
                                             D.C. Bar No. 1015185
                                             JONES DAY
                                             51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
                                             Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
                                             njfrancisco@jonesday.com
                                             blucas@jonesday.com
                                             Telephone: +1.202.879.3939
                                             Facsimile: +1.602.626.1700

                                             Attorneys for Intervenors the Texas Stock
                                             Exchange and the Texas Association of Business


                                     10


     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 112         Filed 10/26/26      Page 12 of 12


                                  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

         I certify that on October 26, 2026, I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served by

the Electronic Case Filing System for the United States District Court for the Western District of

Texas.


                                               /s/ Mark W. Rasmussen
                                               Mark W. Rasmussen


                                                  11