Compass, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc. — Entry #196: DECLARATION of Debra J
Case: Compass, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc. nysd · 1:25-cv-05201
filed June 23, 2025
What this document is
Docket entry #196 · filed June 16, 2026
DECLARATION of Debra J. Aron, Ph.D. re: 195 Order,,,,,,,,,,, (Redacted Declaration of Debra J. Aron per the Court's Order (ECF No. 195)). Document filed by Compass, Inc...(Solh, Chahira) (Entered: 06/16/2026)
Who is involved
- Compass, Inc.
- Redfin Corporation
- Trulia, LLC
- Zillow Group, Inc.
- Zillow, Inc.
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its subsidiary “Whinstone US, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
…nonmoving party. GMO Gamecenter USA, Inc. v. Whinstone US, Inc., 2025 WL 2452164, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 15, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
133 page(s), 211,612 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
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Case 1:25-cv-05201-JAV-SDA Document 196 Filed 06/16/26 Page 1 of 133
EXHIBIT A
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – OUTSIDE COUNSEL’S EYES ONLY
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
COMPASS, INC., Case No. 1:25-cv-05201-JAV
Plaintiff
v.
ZILLOW, INC., ZILLOW GROUP, INC., and
TRULIA, LLC,
Defendants.
EXPERT DECLARATION OF DEBRA J. ARON, PH.D.
September 12, 2025
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
I. PURPOSE OF DECLARATION .....................................................................................3
II. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS .............................................................................................3
III. CONTEXT OF THIS CASE .............................................................................................4
A. The Residential Real Estate Marketplace in the United States ............................4
B. Zillow’s Business .......................................................................................................6
C. Compass’s Business ................................................................................................11
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
AND THE PARTIES INFORMS THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THIS CASE........................................................................14
A. The National Association of Realtors’ Clear Cooperation Policy and
Multiple Listing Options for Sellers ......................................................................14
B. Zillow’s Listing Access Standards .........................................................................20
C. Compass’s Three-Phased Marketing Strategy.....................................................22
D. The Timeline of Industry Events Illuminates the Context of the Zillow
Standards .................................................................................................................33
V. THERE IS A RELEVANT ANTITRUST MARKET FOR ONLINE HOME
SEARCH PLATFORMS IN THE UNITED STATES .................................................35
A. The Antitrust Product Market for Online Home Search Platforms ..................35
1. Zillow and Other Online Home Search Platforms Operate in Zero-Price
Markets ............................................................................................................38
2. The Practical Indicia of Market Definition ......................................................40
3. Industry or Public Recognition ........................................................................41
4. The Product’s Peculiar Characteristics and Uses.............................................42
5. Unique Production Facilities............................................................................48
6. Distinct Customers ...........................................................................................51
7. The Evidence Supports a Relevant Antitrust Product Market for Online
Home Search Platforms ...................................................................................52
B. A Relevant Geographic Market for Online Home Search Platforms is the
United States ............................................................................................................52
1. Zillow and Compass Both Engage in National Planning and Make
Decisions on a National Level .........................................................................58
2. Zillow and Compass Both Engage in National Agreements Covering
Activities in Many States .................................................................................61
i
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3. Participants In the Online Home Search Platforms Market Engage In
National Pricing Strategies ..............................................................................63
4. Zillow Considers Itself a National Online Home Search Platform
Competing Against Other National Online Home Search Platforms ..............63
5. The Zillow Standards Are National in Scope ..................................................64
VI. ZILLOW HAS MARKET POWER IN THE ONLINE HOME SEARCH
PLATFORMS MARKET ...............................................................................................65
A. Assessing Market Power in Zero-Price Markets .................................................65
B. The Zillow Standards Are Direct Evidence of Market Power ............................66
C. Indirect Evidence of Zillow’s Market Power .......................................................70
1. Zillow’s Market Share and the Market’s Concentration..................................70
2. Barriers to Entry ...............................................................................................73
VII. THE ZILLOW STANDARDS ARE ANTICOMPETITIVE.......................................83
VIII. THE HARM TO REAL ESTATE SELLERS AND BUYERS FROM THE
ZILLOW STANDARDS IS IRREPARABLE ..............................................................91
ii
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LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Curriculum Vitae
APPENDIX B: List of Materials Relied Upon
iii
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I. INTRODUCTION
1
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.
I. PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
II. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
3
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16. The indirect evidence of market power includes Zillow’s dominant market share in a
highly concentrated market in which Zillow’s platform has more than double the traffic of the
next largest competitor; and the substantial barriers to entry into the relevant product market.
III. CONTEXT OF THIS CASE
A. The Residential Real Estate Marketplace in the United States
19. Most residential properties in the United States are bought and sold with the help of
real estate brokers or sales agents. Both brokers and sales agents must meet minimum licensure
requirements to legally practice.3 Brokers are licensed to own their own businesses and practice
independently, whereas sales agents must work with a licensed real estate broker.4
3
Real Estate Brokers and Sales Agents,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August 28, 2025,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/real-estate-brokers-and-sales-agents.htm (hereafter, Real Estate Brokers-BLS).
4
Real Estate Brokers-BLS.
4
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20. A real estate brokerage is a legal entity that employs brokers and sales agents.5
Realtors are a subset of brokers or sales agents who are members of the National Association of
Realtors (NAR), the largest trade association in the United States involved in the real estate
industry. Not all brokers or sales agents are Realtors (i.e., not all brokers and agents are
members of NAR).6
22. Real estate brokers and agents earn money through commissions. The commissions
earned by real estate brokers and agents consist of a portion of the sale price of a property and
are paid out after the completion of a sale.
23. Brokerages compete with each other to provide agents to sellers of for-sale homes.
Properties that are for sale whose owners are represented by a brokerage’s agents can be thought
of as the brokerages’ inventories. Brokerages also compete with each other to provide agent
services to home buyers, and they compete with each other to attract and retain productive and
talented agents.8
24. Real estate brokers and sales agents representing buyers and sellers often leverage
online marketing avenues when searching for and advertising properties. For example, a 2024
survey conducted by the NAR found that the internet played a role in the home search process
5
“Choosing a real estate brokerage: What agents need to know,” Real Estate News, accessed September 9, 2025,
https://www.realestatenews.com/explainers/choosing-a-real-estate-brokerage-what-agents-need-to-know.
6
“About NAR”, National Association of Realtors, accessed September 9, 2025, https://www.nar.realtor/about-
nar; “When is a Real Estate Agent a Realtor,” National Association of Realtors, accessed September 9, 2025,
https://www.nar.realtor/about-nar/when-is-a-real-estate-agent-a-realtor.
8
Compass, Inc., Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024 (hereafter, 2024 Compass 10-K), p. 8.
5
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business, therefore, is brokerage services, and Compass competes with many other brokerages in
the market for brokerage services.47
38. Compass has been recognized as the largest brokerage in the U.S. by sales volume
(i.e., the total value of all properties sold by its agents) since 2021.48 Compass reported over
228,000 transactions and $231 billion dollars in sales volume in 2024. Compass currently
operates in 35 states across the U.S. with more than 400 offices and 33,000 agents. In 2024,
Compass generated a gross profit of approximately $995 million.49 In terms of the number of
transactions, however, eXp is considerably larger than Compass (350,119 “sides” vs 228,785 for
Compass).50
39. Compass invested approximately $1.6 billion dollars over the last ten years in
creating an end-to-end proprietary technology platform for real estate agents that, it claims,
“allows real estate agents to perform their primary workflows, from first contact to close, with a
single log-in and without leaving the platform,” and that “includes an integrated suite of cloud-
based software for customer relationship management, marketing, client service, brokerage
services and other critical functionalities.”51
40. As I discuss below, Compass has also developed an online search website and
mobile app (the “Compass mobile application”) that are public-facing, on which internet users
can search and learn about residential real estate properties that are for sale. Like Zillow and
47
2024 Compass 10-K, p. 8.
48
“Compass Named Top U.S. Brokerage for the Fourth Consecutive Year,” Compass Newsroom, April 4, 2025,
https://www.compass.com/newsroom/press-releases/65VhOYHcQFj2SbNNZ9r0fr/ (hereafter, 2025 Compass
News Release); “Best Real Estate Brokerages in United States,” Real Trends Verified, accessed June 23, 2025,
https://www.realtrends.com/ranking/best-real-estate-agents-united-states/brokerages-by-volume/ (hereafter,
2025 Real Trends Brokerage Ranking).
49
“About Us - Compass Real Estate,” Compass, accessed September 11, 2025, https://www.compass.com/about/
(hereafter, About Compass); 2024 Compass 10-K, p. 42; Compass, Inc. (COMP), Yahoo! Finance, accessed
September 11, 2025, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/COMP/financials/.
50
“RealTrends Verified 2025 Brokerage Rankings: Top Brokerages by Sides, Volume, and Growth,” RealTrends,
April 11, 2025, https://www.realtrends.com/blog/2025/04/11/realtrends-verified-2025-brokerage-rankings-top-
brokerages-by-sides-volume-and-growth/. Transactions are counted by sides, meaning the buyer side or the
seller side; transactions in which eXp agents represented both buyer and seller are counted twice.
51
2024 Compass 10-K, p. 4; “Compass Launches Compass One: The Industry’s First-Ever All-in-One Client
Dashboard Connecting Compass Agents to Their Clients in Real Time,” PR Newswire, February 3, 2025,
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/compass-launches-compass-one-the-industrys-first-ever-all-in-one-
client-dashboard-connecting-compass-agents-to-their-clients-in-real-time-302366747.html (hereafter, 2025 PR
Newswire); Robert Reffkin, Rory Golod, and Laura Monroe, “Step Inside the Compass Platform,” Compass,
accessed September 3, 2025, https://growatcompass.com/blog/step-inside-the-compass-platform.
12
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other third-party aggregator sites, Compass.com also acts as aggregators of real estate listings.52
A function of Compass’s online search website is to connect home buyers with properties,
allowing home buyers to search for properties by city, neighborhood, address, school, zip code,
agent, or MLS number.53 Compass’s online search website also supports individuals looking to
sell their homes by allowing them to submit their information and be connected with a Compass
agent, who can assist with the sale and earn commission income from those transactions.54 The
Compass mobile application similarly allows home buyers to browse a real-time inventory of
listings, save their favorite listings, and connect with a Compass agent.55 Compass’s online
search platform allows the user to see property-specific content, including days-on-market,
community features, nearby schools, and property history.56
41. Compass primarily generates revenues when it collects a share of the gross sales
commissions that agents earn from representing sellers and buyers in home sales.57 While the
current purpose of Compass’s online platforms is to support Compass’s primary business of
brokerage services, their capabilities and functionality have drawn comparisons to home search
platforms like Zillow, Trulia, Redfin, Homes.com, and Realtor.com,58 as they compete with
those other online platforms in the market for online home search platforms.
52
8/19/2025 Bhonsle Deposition, 189:14-190:10.
53
“Find your place”, Compass, accessed September 11, 2025, compass.com.
54
“Sell With Us”, Compass, accessed September 11, 2025, https://www.compass.com/sell/; 2024 Compass 10-K,
p. 4; Declaration of Will Hardy in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Compass, Inc, v.
Zillow, Inc., et al., United States District Court Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:25-cv-05201-JAV,
June 26, 2025, ¶ 9.
55
Compass: Real Estate & Homes, Compass Inc., App Store Preview, accessed September 11, 2025,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/compass-real-estate-homes/id692766504.
56
See, for example, the Compass online search platform result for 2252 Orrington Ave in Evanston, Illinois.
“2252 Orrington Ave, Evanston, IL 60201,” Compass, accessed September 12, 2025,
https://www.compass.com/listing/2252-orrington-avenue-evanston-il-60201/1901021970577702049/. And the
Compass online search platform result for 2951 Colfax St in Evanston, Illinois. “2951 Colfax St, Evanston,
IL,” Compass, accessed September 12, 2025, https://www.compass.com/listing/2951-colfax-street-evanston-il-
60201/1900284941774091345/.
57
2024 Compass 10-K, p. 4.
58
2024 Compass 10-K, p. 4. See, for example, Josephine Nesbit, “10 Helpful House Hunting Apps for 2025,”
U.S. News & World Report, Last Updated February 4, 2025, https://realestate.usnews.com/real-
estate/articles/the-best-apps-for-house-hunting.
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made available through private (non-MLS) networks or to other agents within the listing agent’s
own brokerage are sometimes referred to as “private listings” or “pocket listings.”76
50. While private listings and private listing networks are not a new phenomenon in real
estate,77 by 2019 technological advances had vastly broadened their efficiency and capabilities.
The increasing interest by brokerages in leveraging technology to advance new marketing
methods carried the risk to the MLSs, however, of eroding their centrality in the real estate
marketing process. And this, in turn, created concern among some MLSs that recognized an
impending threat.78
51. In November 2019, “in response to concerns about the use of pocket listings, and
other tactics to keep properties off the MLS to the disadvantage of homebuyers and sellers,” the
NAR adopted a new policy regarding the terms under which brokers are required to submit
listings to NAR-affiliated MLSs.79 The new policy was referred to as the Clear Cooperation
Policy (“CCP”), and it requires listing brokers to submit to the MLS any publicly-marketed
property within one business day of public marketing.80 According to the NAR, “[p]ublic
marketing includes, but is not limited to, flyers displayed in windows, yard signs, digital
marketing on public facing websites, brokerage website displays (including IDX and VOW),
76
“What Is a Pocket Listing?,” Zillow, January 24, 2025, https://www.zillow.com/learn/pocket-listing/.
77
“The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: Los Angles Regional Office Staff Report: Volumes I and II
and The Butters Report,” U.S. Federal Trade Commission, December 1983,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/The-Residential-Real-Estate-Brokerage-Report--Butters-
Report.pdf , p. 74.
78
In a Fall 2019 whitepaper by the MLS Roundtable, it acknowledged concerns with the technology such
platforms were able to build, “[r]eal estate has never had so many smart, software programmers and technology-
savvy companies working in such a focused direction on dramatically changing the real estate listing and data
game.” See MLS 2022 Agenda, Fall 2019, T360, MLS Roundtable, https://www.mlsroundtable.com/wp-
content/uploads/2021/01/MLS-2022-Agenda-PDF.pdf (hereafter, MLS 2019 Roundtable), p. 9. Further, the
whitepaper stated on behalf of the members of the MLS Roundtable, “[t]he multiple listing service as we know
it is in jeopardy and this call-to-action serves as an impassioned plea to brokers and MLSs to take immediate
action.” The whitepaper went on to identify some of the largest challenges MLSs face as “[t]he persistent, and
increasing, presence of off-MLS home marketing” and “[a] proliferating large broker strategy of marketing
homes exclusively on company websites before marketing in the MLS,” resulting in what it called “a dwindling
role as the market’s primary location for all available inventory.” See MLS 2019 Roundtable, pp. 4, 7, 8.
79
“Window to the Law: Understanding the MLS Clear Cooperation Policy: Transcript,” National Association of
Realtors, March 1, 2020, https://www.nar.realtor/window-to-the-law/understanding-the-mls-clear-cooperation-
policy (hereafter, Understanding MLS CCP). The NAR stated that “[i]n recent years, there has been a
significant growth in the use of pocket listings and misuse of various limited exposure marketing tactics,” which
created issues such as raising “questions about fair and equal opportunity leading to Fair Housing concerns,
have skewed MLS data, and have resulted in breach of fiduciary duties lawsuits.” See Understanding MLS
CCP.
80
2025 NAR Handbook, Part 2 E, Section 17 (Policy Statement 8.0).
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Realtor.com, and Zillow.com.175 Again, these analysts did not include the MLSs, general search
engines, or other potential avenues by which buyers or sellers of real estate may seek to buy or
find properties that I have not included in my proposed antitrust market.
111. Further, Statista, a provider of statistical data for a wide variety of industries,176
tracks average monthly visits to what it defines as “the five most popular real estate websites in
the United States.” In a recent chart, it included Zillow.com, Realtor.com, Redfin.com,
Trulia.com, and Homes.com.177
112. Indeed, Zillow views itself as competing with a separate and distinct group of
businesses. In a recent presentation to investors, Zillow described its own app as the “Housing
Super App,” an app that purports to help people with every step in the process of purchasing or
renting a new home. Zillow described itself as the “# 1 residential real estate app,” and included
competitors such as Realtor.com, Redfin.com, Rocket Homes (now Redfin), CoStar
Appartments.com, CoStar Homes.com, and various others.178
113. It appears from the evidence just described that industry analysts and Zillow itself
recognize and analyze online home search platforms as a separate and distinct product from other
real estate services and other search services.
4. The Product’s Peculiar Characteristics and Uses
114. According to this factor, a product or group of products is more likely to constitute
an antitrust market if the products in the group have characteristics and uses that are distinct from
those of other products. Online home search platforms have characteristics and uses that are
distinct from other means of searching for and marketing real estate. Buyers use online home
search platforms to view on a map the locations of homes that are for sale, and view their
175
4/21/2025 William Blair-Zillow, p. 5.
176
“Who we are: The company behind the success,” Statista, accessed September 9, 2025,
https://www.statista.com/aboutus/.
177
“Average monthly visits to the five most popular real estate websites in the United States from 2020 to 2024 (in
millions),” Statista, accessed September 12, 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/381468/most-popular-
real-estate-websites-by-monthly-visits-usa/.
178
“Zillow Investor Presentation,” Zillow Group, February 2024,
https://s24.q4cdn.com/723050407/files/doc_presentations/2024/Mar/13/zillow-investor-presentation-feb-
2024.pdf (hereafter, 2/2024 Zillow Investor Presentation), pp. 5, 10. The names of the “various others” were
not provided, but the slide reports that Zillow and the five named competitors accounted for 99.3% of “average
daily active app users;” Dan Onken, “Redfin is joining Rocket: Frequently asked questions,” Rocket Mortgage,
July 1, 2025, https://www.rocketmortgage.com/learn/rocket-redfin-faq.
42
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proximity to each other, to major streets, schools, shops, parks, and amenities. Searchers can
peruse photographs of the interiors and exteriors of the homes, review floor plans, and create
recallable lists of “favorite” properties to which the user may wish to return and review. In a
recent survey of home buyers and sellers, the buyers surveyed identified “photos,” “detailed
property information,” and “floor plans” as important website features.179
115. Zillow recognizes that online home search platforms have distinctive characteristics
that drive demand as well. For example, in an article appearing on Zillow.com intended to help
sellers “Write Listing Descriptions that Sell,” the author wrote that “[w]hen buyers (and their
agents!) are browsing online real estate listings, professional photos are what grab their attention
first, but it’s the listing description that really tells the story of the home.”180 Further, in 2025,
Zillow reported that “86% of buyers said they were more likely to view a home if the listing
included a floor plan they liked.”181 Zillow CEO, Jeremy Wacksman, stated that he believes
users’ preferences for one online home search platform relative to others is influenced by the
tools and services it can offer to buyers in their listing search that provide a better experience,
and therefore Zillow focuses its internal research on such tools and services as well.182 A Zillow
executive testified that Zillow believes its own competitive advantage is driven by features of its
platform such as the availability of floor plans and its augmentation of listings with climate
data.183
179
“Highlights From the Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers,” National Association of Realtors, accessed June 24,
2025, https://www.nar.realtor/research-and-statistics/research-reports/highlights-from-the-profile-of-home-
buyers-and-sellers.
180
Tali Bendzak, “Property Descriptions 101: How to Write Listing Descriptions That Sell,” Zillow, November 26,
2019, https://www.zillow.com/learn/listing-descriptions-that-sell/.
181
“2025 Consumer Housing Trends Report for Agents,” Zillow, 2025,
https://delivery.digitalassets.zillowgroup.com/api/public/content/2025_SZ_AgentCHTR-
MiniBook_Digital_downloadOriginal.pdf?v=4ab198e3, p. 32.
182
Deposition of Jeremy Wacksman, Compass, Inc., vs. Zillow, Inc., et al., United States District Court Southern
District of New York, Case No. 1:25-cv-05201-JAV, August 26, 2025 (hereafter, 8/26/2025 Wacksman
Deposition), p. 61:3–8.
183
Further, Zillow’s Chief Industry Development Officer stated that Zillow believes its competitive advantage is
created by “building great consumer experiences” highlighting “floor plans for photos,” its augmentation “of
climate data” to its listings, and the mobile apps ease of use. See Deposition of Errol Samuelson, Compass,
Inc., vs. Zillow, Inc., et al., United States District Court Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:25-cv-
05201-JAV, August 28, 2025 (hereafter, 8/28/2025 Samuelson Deposition), pp. 112:16–113:3; 8/26/2025
Wacksman Deposition, p. 9:5–12
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116. Sellers use online home search platforms to make the fact that their home is for sale
known to anyone searching on the platform, and to display photographs, characteristics, and the
location of the property in an easily accessible, attractive, and informative way. In addition,
sellers can use the platform to assess how many other homes are for sale in the neighborhood,
their characteristics, and their asking prices, which can provide the seller information useful for
their own pricing decisions.
117. These features and uses of online home search platforms are distinct from the uses
and features available on other means of real estate search. For example, the information from
MLS listings is provided to the public free-of-charge, but potential buyers and sellers of real
estate cannot typically search the MLS themselves. Direct access to MLSs is restricted to
licensed real estate agents, appraisers, and brokers and their assistants.184 A potential buyer or
seller could potentially find a broker willing to share her MLS login information, or convince a
broker to vouch for said buyer or seller as her assistant, then fill out the necessary paperwork and
pay for MLS access as an assistant, but the most straightforward way for potential buyers and
sellers to access information from MLS listings is through one of the online home search
platforms (like Zillow) that pull their information from MLSs.185
118. Indeed, many consumers turn to online search platforms before even engaging with
an agent. According to the NAR’s 2024 “Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers,”186 43 percent of
home buyers said their first step was to search for homes on the internet.187 Furthermore, while
86 percent of home buyers used a real estate agent, 100 percent used the internet to search for a
home.188 That is, many consumers continue to use online search platforms even after engaging
184
“How To Get MLS Access In 6 Ways (Even Without A License),” Real Estate Skills, accessed September 10,
2025, https://www.realestateskills.com/blog/mls-access (hereafter, How to Get MLS Access).
185
How to Get MLS Access.
186
“The NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS® Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers is an annual survey
of recent home buyers and sellers who recently completed a transaction between July 2023 and June 2024.”
See “Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers,” National Association of Realtors, 2024,
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024-profile-of-home-buyers-and-sellers-highlights-11-04-
2024_2.pdf, p. 6.
187
“Highlights from the 2024 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers,” National Association of Realtors, 2024,
https://www.nar.realtor/research-and-statistics/research-reports/highlights-from-the-profile-of-home-buyers-
and-sellers (hereafter, 2024 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers).
188
2024 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers.
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with an agent, suggesting that online search platforms and the services provided by real estate
agents (such as access to MLS listing information) are compliments, not substitutes.
119. The features and uses of online home search platforms are also distinct from online
classified ads such as Craigslist. Craigslist, like Facebook Marketplace and other online
classified ad sites, does not cater specifically to the convenience of homebuyers and sellers,
providing little or no contextual information about a property (e.g., neighborhood amenities and
nearby schools) or homebuyer-specific tools, such as payment calculators and suggestions of
similar listings, as do online home search platforms.189 A survey by Owners.com suggests that
consumers find these features valuable—more respondents (42 percent) indicated that they were
influenced in their decision to buy a particular property by “lifestyle data” like walkability scores
and the quality of nearby schools than did respondents who indicated that they were influenced
to buy a particular property by the investment potential (32 percent) of the property.190
120. The features and uses of online home search platforms are also distinct from the
features and uses of social media such as, Instagram and Snapchat. While real estate agents may
use social media to advertise inventory and communicate with clients,191 they do not provide
search functionality, mapping features, systematic lifestyle data, and listing details that are
available on home search platforms.192
189
“Real Estate near Chicago, IL,” Craigslist, accessed September 10, 2025,
https://chicago.craigslist.org/search/chicago-il/rea?lat=41.888&lon=-
87.635&search_distance=15#search=2~gallery~0; “CONDO For Sale - Chicago - West Loop - real estate - by
owner - apartment real estate sale,” Craigslist, accessed September 10, 2025,
https://chicago.craigslist.org/chc/reo/d/chicago-condo-for-sale-chicago-west-loop/7875868780.html; “Welcome
to charming, bright and sunny, beautiful one-bedroom condo in desirable Arlington Glen!” ClassifiedAds.com,
accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.classifiedads.com/condos/87197vrmk3dd3; “4 Beds 2 Baths
House,” Facebook Marketplace, accessed September 3, 2025,
https://www.facebook.com/marketplace/item/627261850066256/?ref=search&referral_code=null&referral_stor
y_type=post.
190
“Owners.com Survey Reveals Home Buyers Seek More Tech-Based Tools from Real Estate Agents,”
Altisource, May 17, 2018, https://ir.altisource.com/news-releases/news-release-details/ownerscom-survey-
reveals-home-buyers-seek-more-tech-based-tools.
191
“Social Media,” National Association of Realtors, accessed September 2, 2025, https://www.nar.realtor/social-
media; “2022 Technology Survey,” National Association of Realtors, accessed September 3, 2025,
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2022-technology-survey-11-01-2022.pdf, pp. 20–21.
192
Real estate search platforms often offer built-in search criteria. See, for example, “Chicago IL Real Estate -
Chicago IL Homes For Sale,” Zillow, accessed September 9, 2025, https://www.zillow.com/chicago-il/; Susan
Kelleher, “Where Should I Live,” Zillow, June 2, 2025, https://www.zillow.com/learn/where-should-i-live/.
Meanwhile, social media search lacks similar built-in search criteria and listing information. See, for example,
Adam Mosseri, “Breaking Down How Instagram Search Works,” Instagram, August 25, 2021,
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area of the listing being viewed.”226 This matches moving patterns: between 2016 and 2020, 30
percent of people who moved did so across metro areas.227
145. Second, even if there are local markets, the union of those markets is also a
geographic market. According to the 2023 Merger Guidelines, a geographic area is a relevant
antitrust market if a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to increase price or decrease
quality in at least one location in that geographic area.228 An example is illustrative here.
Consider a geographic area A in which a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to
increase prices or decrease quality by a small but significant and non-transitory amount. Now
consider a geographic area B. Some of the customers that stopped purchasing the product in area
A in response to the SSNIPT may have switched to area B. A monopolist over A+B would still
be able to make a profit on these switching customers, thus making the price increase or quality
decrease in A more profitable than before. Because, by construction of the hypothetical, the
increase in price or decrease in quality in area A was already significant and non-transitory, area
A+B is a relevant geographic antitrust market, even if a hypothetical monopolist in area B alone
would not find it profitable to implement a small but significant non-transitory increase in price
or decrease in quality.229
226
“[S]ix of the 50 biggest metropolitan areas get a majority of their page views from non-residents: Las Vegas
(60.7% of listing views come from outside the area), Jacksonville (56.2%), San Antonio (55.2%), Riverside-San
Bernardino (54.7%), Raleigh (54.1%) and New Orleans (52.5%).” See Jeff Tucker, “Home Searchers: Who is
Coming and Going – And Who is Staying Put?” Zillow, January 29, 2020,
https://www.zillow.com/research/home-searches-2020-26463/. See also, Anushna Prakash, “The Comings and
Goings of Zillow Home Shoppers,” Zillow, March 20, 2025, https://www.zillow.com/research/home-search-
trends-34985/; Lauren Bretz, “Coming and Going: What Home Views Do, and Don’t, Reveal About Our
Potential Moves,” Zillow, September 9, 2016, https://www.zillow.com/research/home-searches-potential-
moves-13192/
227
See my backup calculations and 2020 ACS.
228
2023 Merger Guidelines, p. 45 (“If the HMT is used to evaluate the geographic scope of the market, it requires
that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present or future supplier of the relevant product(s)
at supplier locations in the region likely would undertake at least a SSNIPT in at least one location. In this
exercise, the terms of sale for products sold to all customers at facilities outside the region are typically held
constant.”)
229
A similar argument was also made by Professor Carl Shapiro, in the AT&T/Time Werner merger case in 2018.
There, after establishing that a narrow market (“Multichannel Video Distribution”) satisfies the HMT, he argued
that a broader market (“All Video Distribution”) in which the narrow one is included also satisfies the HMT.
“Since the candidate All Video Distribution market is broader than the Multichannel Video Distribution market,
the recapture rate calculated for the All Video Distribution market is at least as large as the recapture rate
calculated for the Multichannel Video Distribution market. Therefore, since the HMT is satisfied for the
Multichannel Video Distribution market, the HMT also is satisfied for the All Video Distribution market.” See
Expert Report of Carl Shapiro, United States v. AT&T Inc., DirectTV Group Holdings, LLC, and Time Warner
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146. The third reason that there exists a national geographic market for online home
search platforms is that the purpose of defining a geographic market is to capture the relevant
nexus of competition, as I described above and as the courts have articulated as well. That is, it
is useful to recall from first economic principles that the purpose of defining markets is to
delineate how competition functions and which market participants compete with which.230 As a
matter of economics, if companies operate as if they are responding to or creating comparable
competitive conditions in a broad geographic area, it is reasonable and correct to treat that broad
geographic area as a market.
147. Hence, relevant evidence that a product market is national in scope could properly
include evidence that business decisions are made on a national level, that some or all of the
relevant strategic interaction among rivals is fairly characterized as national, and that participants
and analysts view the marketplace as national. Consistent with these principles, I understand that
courts have credited evidence that a product market is national in geographic scope that has
included:
a) Whether the business of providing the relevant service entails national planning;231
INC., United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No.: 1:17-cv-02511 (RJL), February 2,
2018, p. 33. The court accepted both of these proposed product markets. See Memorandum Opinion, United
States v. AT&T Inc., DirectTV Group Holdings, LLC, and Time Warner INC., United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, June 12, 2018, pp. 62, 63 n.21. (“[D]efendants, for all of their objections to the
Government’s case, have not meaningfully challenged the Government’s proposed product or geographic
markets . . . I will thus accept the Government’s proposed product and geographic markets.”)
230
Professor Carl Shapiro, testifying in the T-Mobile and Sprint merger case in 2019, explained how defining
markets at different geographical levels can help capture the dimensions of competition. “Q. So as a matter of
antitrust economics, does it make sense to define a national market and also to define local markets that are
contained within that same national market? A. It does. I find talking to people, some people find this counter
intuitive, but it is correct as a matter of economics and merger analysis . . . [T]he national market will be a good
market to analyze dimensions of competition that occur nationally, and by and large, the national plans and the
basic plans and pricing by the nationwide carriers are done nationally . . . But at the same time, there are
dimensions of competition that take place locally, and if you didn't define local markets, you would not be
properly evaluating those dimensions of competition. So since competition with different dimensions occurs
with a different geographic scope, it is informative and correct to define the two types of geographic markets.”
Trial Transcript, State of New York, et al., v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al., United States District Court Southern
District of New York, December 11, 2019, at 636:1–18.
231
“We also agree with the District Court that the geographic market for the accredited central station service is
national. The activities of an individual station are in a sense local as it serves, ordinarily, only that area which
is within a radius of 25 miles. But the record amply supports the conclusion that the business of providing such
a service is operated on a national level. There is national planning.” US v. Grinnell, p. 575.
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b) Whether the business of providing the relevant service entails national agreements
covering activities in many states;232
c) Whether there is a national schedule of prices;233 and
d) Participants view their competition as national in scope.234
1. Zillow and Compass Both Engage in National Planning and Make Decisions on a
National Level
148. Even if it were the case that consumers did not, in significant numbers, seek a
product outside the boundaries of a local market (which, as I showed above, is not the case for on
Zillow’s own platform), when firms make decisions on a national basis it can be persuasive
evidence of a national market that coexists with a local market.235 Compass and Zillow both
compete within the market for online home search platforms, and the evidence in the record
shows that Compass’s 3PM strategy was intended as a national strategy that would enhance
Compass’s competitive presence in the home search market. The evidence also shows that
Zillow views Compass and its competitors within the online home search platforms market on a
national level.
149. The 3PM strategy was intended to be adopted across all areas where Compass
operates, aiming to drive consumer traffic from across the country to Compass’s website to see
its inventory of listings. The August 2024 board presentation, discussed above in Section IV.C,
emphasized that Compass’s “national presence” is “instrumental” to the success of its inventory
232
“The activities of an individual station are in a sense local . . . But the record amply supports the conclusion that
the business of providing such a service is operated on a national level . . . The agreements we have discussed
covered activities in many States. The inspection, certification and rate-making is largely by national insurers.”
US v. Grinnell, p. 575.
233
“The activities of an individual station are in a sense local . . . But the record amply supports the conclusion that
the business of providing such a service is operated on a national level . . . The appellant ADT has a national
schedule of prices, rates, and terms, though the rates may be varied to meet local conditions.” US v. Grinnell, p.
575.
234
In the Deutsche Telekom Decision, the Court found that both a national market, as well as local markets as
defined by “Cellular Market Areas” constituted the relevant geographic markets in this case. When making this
determination, it described the “Defendants’ contention regarding the national scope of carrier’s decision-
making processes is both accurate and relevant” in the determination of a relevant market, while also
highlighting the role played by “the realistic choices available to consumers.” See Deutsche Telekom Decision,
pp. 47-48, 52.
235
Memorandum Opinion, Mariam Davitaschvili, et al. v. Grubhub Inc., et al., United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, 20-cv-3000 (LAK), March 30, 2022, p. 7, referencing the prior precedence in
State of New York, et al. v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al., United States District Court, S.D. New York, 19 Civ.
5434 (VM), p. 47.
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strategy.236 Indeed, Compass agents across markets have shown their support for the 3PM
strategy, spending their own marketing budgets on the promotion of Private Exclusives and
Coming Soon listings.237 Furthermore, I understand that the relationship between Compass’s
3PM strategy and its online traffic was symbiotic; increased nationwide online traffic to
Compass.com benefitted the 3PM strategy by serving as a “core pillar of the Compass 3-Phased
Marketing Strategy.”238
150. Zillow likewise routinely sets competitive strategy at the national level and adopts
nationwide initiatives and features to compete with other national online home search platforms.
For example, Zillow marketed its “Showcase”239 offering in preparation for launching a
“nationwide seller offering.”240 Indeed, in one of Zillow’s marketing scenarios, a component of
its marketing strategy was to “garner insight about engaging the national Seller audience.”241
236
CZ_COMP_000111855 at 862–863. The presentation also detailed why some agents were seeing such value in
Private Exclusives where one agent stated that a “significant advantage COMPASS has over other firms is that
we are nationwide. This give us a much greater reach for Private Exclusive marketing over most other firms
which I ALWAYS highlight during listing presentations” (emphasis in original). While Compass may not
currently operate in all 50 states, it does operate in a national market. Compass’s Senior VP of Strategy and
Operations stated that while Compass does not operate in every state, it does in the majority of them and while
unsure if Compass’s online home search platform currently displays listings in all 50 states, stated that she
believed that Compass’s “long-term aspirations” would include an online home search platform and “maybe
even brokerage operations” in all 50 states. See 8/26/2025 Alexander Deposition, pp. 245:2–246:4, 247:20–
248:22. Further, according to a Zillow internal document, Zillow has described Compass as a national
competitor, noting “[b]ecause Compass has a presence in most major U.S. markets, its platform effectively has
nationwide MLS coverage (over 300 MLS feeds)” and “Compass’s app is competitive with other national real
estate apps,” underlining the fact that while Compass may not be present in every state, it is present in a national
market. See ZG-00031093 at 125–126.
237
CZ_COMP_000074350 at 355.
238
Compass’s online home search platform drew over 21 million visits between January and March 2025 which it
stated surpassed “every other traditional brokerage.” A Compass employee stated that “[t]his visibility is a key
advantage of the Compass 3-Phased marketing Strategy…The traffic on Compass.com gives our agents a real
advantage.” See CZ_COMP_000087757.
239
Amy Clark, Principal Product Manager at Zillow stated “[w]e’ve built a product called Zillow Showcase for
agents to help market their listings. For-Sale listings that have the Zillow Showcase treatment include virtual 3-
D tours and an interactive floor plan, which allows buyers to explore a home’s layout through a dynamic,
clickable interface that links room photos to their corresponding locations on the floor plan. It’s the most
immersive way for a buyer to search for homes on Zillow. It really gives buyers the ability to understand a
home’s layout, visualize their lives in it and make informed decisions before an in-person visit.” See Brian
Carberry, “Behind the Innovation: How Zillow Showcase is Transforming Home Shopping,” Zillow, March 28,
2025, https://www.zillow.com/tech/zillow-showcase-is-transforming-home-shopping/.
240
ZG-00023906 at 944–945. It is my understanding that this materials reference to a “nationwide seller offering”
is referring to Zillow’s program to support sellers in selling their home. See “Sell your home with confidence,”
Zillow, accessed September 12, 2025, https://www.zillow.com/sell/.
241
ZG-00023906 at 919–920, 932.
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154. When Zillow implemented the Zillow Standards it similarly acted with a national
viewpoint. Zillow looked to garner support for the Zillow Standards from brokerages through
agreements exclusively on a brokerage-wide scale, notably including any market in which the
brokerage operated which may have been “multi-state” and “multi-market.”249 Further,
regardless of local MLS differences, Zillow’s strategy was to apply the Zillow Standards for
public marketing as a nationwide policy that would govern its access to listings and online home
search platform.250
155. Furthermore, Zillow’s strategic planning surrounding enforcement of the Zillow
Standards maintained a nationwide focus. Zillow’s enforcement strategy identified brokers and
competitors to target, but did not identify any specific markets, states, or regions to target.251 By
March 2025, Zillow was implementing its proof-of-concept for its enforcement strategy across
four “entire broker sites.”252 Zillow outlined several milestones for the technical implementation
of its proof-of-concept for its enforcement strategy that progressed in three phases, the last of
which was “National Scale Implementation.”253 The approach and implementation that Zillow
undertook to begin enforcement of its Zillow Standards further demonstrates that Zillow is
making market evaluations and consequential strategic decisions pertaining directly to the
practices at issue in this lawsuit on a national basis.
2. Zillow and Compass Both Engage in National Agreements Covering Activities in
Many States
156. On April 28, 2025, executives from Compass and Zillow were negotiating a deal for
Compass to post on and receive a feed of for-sale listings from StreetEasy, Zillow’s New York
249
8/26/2025 Wacksman Deposition, pp. 14:12–17:3, 153:16–154:25.
250
Zillow’s CEO stated that “Zillow’s standards on public marketing are consistent,” in response to being asked if
Zillow applies differing rules by MLS. 8/26/2025 Wacksman Deposition, pp. 159:8–160:8.
251
ZG-00022345 at 357; ZG-00030566 at 567, 576, 611
252
ZG-00022345 at 358.
253
ZG-00030566 at 617–619.
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City platform.254 Compass’s CEO indicated that Compass would consider modifying its 3PM
strategy in New York City and the Hamptons, but not “globally.”255 In response, Zillow made
clear that it did not consider a regional response sufficient. The Zillow executive responding to
Compass’s CEO regarding the proposed modification wrote that while he appreciated the offer,
“for [Zillow] to be comfortable moving forward [Zillow would] need Compass to adopt the
revised 3-stage plan nationwide.”256
157. While Zillow’s CEO was reluctant to acknowledge in his deposition that Zillow has
national agreements, in fact he acknowledged that Zillow’s agreement with, for example, eXp,
consists of one agreement that covers all locations in which eXp operates, while emphasizing
that eXp does not operate everywhere.257 The fact that eXp does not operate everywhere in the
country does not diminish the inference of a national market, however. eXp operates throughout
the country,258 and has the most transaction sides of any brokerage in the country.259 The
companies did not make separate agreements for different geographic locations. In an email to
Compass, a Zillow executive again made clear that the companies needed to “reach agreement
on the Listing Access Standards (at a national level).”260 Zillow’s Chief Industry Development
Officer, Errol Samuelson also testified that Zillow’s agreements are with the brokerage, requiring
that the brokerage “adhere to [Zillow’s] listing access standards.”261
254
ZG-00002301 at 301–302; “StreetEasy Warns Against Becoming a ‘Former New Yorker’ in Latest Brand
Campaign,” StreetEasy, February 18, 2025, https://streeteasy.com/blog/streeteasy-brand-campaign-warns-
against-becoming-former-new-yorker/.
255
ZG-00002301 at 302.
256
ZG-00002301 at 303.
257
8/26/2025 Wacksman Deposition, pp. 153:14–155:9. (“Q Was the eXp agreement nationwide? . . . THE
WITNESS: I believe the eXp agreement applies in all the places where eXp has agents, I don't know how many
markets that is. Q You don't know if it's throughout country? A I know that they are in many markets, but I
don't know that-- I don't believe they're in all markets.”)
258
eXp World Holdings, Inc., Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, p. 3.
259
Transactions are counted by sides, meaning the buyer side or the seller side; transactions in which eXp agents
represented both buyer and seller are counted twice. “RealTrends Verified 2025 Brokerage Rankings: Top
Brokerages by Sides, Volume, and Growth,” RealTrends, April 11, 2025,
https://www.realtrends.com/blog/2025/04/11/realtrends-verified-2025-brokerage-rankings-top-brokerages-by-
sides-volume-and-growth/.
260
ZG-00002308.
261
8/28/2025 Samuelson Deposition, p. 29:3–23.
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3. Participants In the Online Home Search Platforms Market Engage In National
Pricing Strategies
158. As discussed above in Section V.A.1, none of the online home search platforms
charge sellers for posting property listings on their platforms, nor do they charge users to conduct
searches on their platforms. This means that online home search platforms have a national
pricing strategy—the price is zero everywhere, regardless of local real estate market conditions.
My understanding is that courts have found “a national schedule of prices, rates, and terms” to
provide support for the conclusion that a firm operates at a national level, and therefore a
national market better “reflects the reality of the way in which [it] built and conduct[s]” its
business.262 This approach is also both useful and informative from an economic perspective,
since a national market provides a better venue to analyze aspects of competition that occur
nationally.263
4. Zillow Considers Itself a National Online Home Search Platform Competing
Against Other National Online Home Search Platforms
159. The evidence suggests that Zillow considers itself a national online home search
platform and considers other home search platforms with national scope to be its primary
competitors. For example, Zillow’s Chief Executive Officer, Jeremy Wacksman, testified that
Zillow’s “home search site is nationwide” and identified other national portals as Zillow’s
competitors, explaining that “Zillow’s competition for home search is really the portals, Redfin,
Homes.com, Realtor.com.”264 Additionally, Curt Beardsley, Zillow’s Vice President of Industry
Development, has referred to Zillow as a “national portal site”265 and investment analysts
covering Zillow’s stock have likewise acknowledged the traditional listing process begins with
262
US v. Grinnell, pp. 575-576.
263
See, for example, the testimony of Carl Shapiro in the 2019 T-Mobile and Sprint merger case: Trial Transcript,
State of New York, et al., v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al., United States District Court Southern District of New
York, December 11, 2019, at 636:1-11 (“Q. So as a matter of antitrust economics, does it make sense to define a
national market and also to define local markets that are contained within that same national market? A. It
does. I find talking to people, some people find this counter intuitive, but it is correct as a matter of economics
and merger analysis. The way to do this is you -- the national market will be a good market to analyze
dimensions of competition that occur nationally, and by and large, the national plans and the basic plans and
pricing by the nationwide carriers are done nationally, and I think that's agreed by all.”)
264
8/26/2025 Wacksman Deposition, pp. 12:13–16; 7:4–17; see also 9/11/2025 Lake Deposition, pp. 46-47
(testifying that Zillow tries to win consumers from all over the country and that Zillow is available everywhere
in the United States).
265
ZG-00009289; 8/28/2025 Samuelson Deposition, pp. 136:23–25.
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MLS submissions and then moves to “national portal displays.”266 Furthermore, when Zillow
undertakes competitive analysis, it focuses on other national platforms like Realtor.com and
Homes.com.267 Similarly, Zillow analyzes its market share and audience reach at the national
level, telling investors it has 66 percent share of the real estate home search audience in the
United States, without regard for its localized presence or the regions in which its users reside.268
And Zillow has described Compass as a national competitor as well, noting that “[b]ecause
Compass has a presence in most major U.S. markets, its platform effectively has nationwide
MLS coverage (over 300 MLS feeds)” and “Compass’s app is competitive with other national
real estate apps, blending search and CRM-like collaboration features in one.”269
5. The Zillow Standards Are National in Scope
160. As I detail in Section V.B the Zillow Standards specify that any listing that is
publicly marketed must be listed on an MLS within one business day, with no geographic
exceptions.270 The Zillow Standards are uniform across the country; that is, there are no stated
terms or conditions that differ depending on local market conditions, local market rules, or
available competitive alternatives. There are also no stated exceptions that are defined to vary by
geographic location or local market differences. While the incremental impact of the Zillow
Standards may in fact vary depending on the pre-existing rules adopted and/or enforced by local
MLSs or competitive conditions, Zillow did not choose to incorporate any such facts into the
statement of its policy. Hence, Zillow’s own policy that is at issue in this case exhibits that it
adopts national strategies in the context of its competitive interaction with its rivals in the online
home search platforms market.
266
ZG-00015024.
267
ZG-00032723 at 782 (discussing a “Experience Quality Assessment” comparing shoppers experience on
Zillow, Homes.com, and Realtor.com).
268
“Zillow Investor Presentation,” Zillow Group, February 2025,
https://s24.q4cdn.com/723050407/files/doc_earnings/2024/q4/presentation/Zillow-4Q24-Investor-
Presentation.pdf (hereafter, 2/2025 Zillow Investor Presentation).
269
ZG-00031093 at 1125-1126.
270
“Zillow’s Listing Access Standards: What Agents Need to Know”, Zillow Premier Agent, May 20, 2025,
https://www.zillow.com/premier-agent/agents-know-listing-access-standards/; see also Deposition of Neda
Navab-Boshehri, Compass, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., et al, In the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Case No.: 1:25-cv-05201-JAV, August 26, 2025 (“Prior to the the Zillow ban, agents were able to
utilize and get the benefits of the Compass three-phased marketing strategy across our markets. The specifics
are now actually nationally consistent in terms of the restrictions as a result of the Zillow ban. The Zillow ban
has consistently restricted homeowners’ premarketing options in every single market in a way that did not exist
prior to the Zillow ban.”).
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to Zillow, Zillow would lose listings on its platform and would disadvantage itself relative to
competitive platforms.
170. Losing listings would be costly to Zillow for several reasons. First, Zillow’s
monetization strategy is to sell leads to buyers’ agents to platform users who have indicated
interest in a particular listing, as already discussed. Hence, Zillow’s monetization strategy
depends on having a robust inventory of listings. The larger the number of listings, the greater
the opportunity for Zillow to generate revenues.280 This is apparent from the evidence. For
example, in a strategy planning presentation for 2026 surrounding listing transparency, Zillow
wrote that “[l]isting inventory is critical to our value proposition, and our business” (emphasis in
original).281 In its own internal communications, Zillow itself acknowledges that listings are “the
lifeblood of our company.”282
171. Second, losing listings has a feedback effect that I discussed earlier. Listings drive
interest by buyers, and more buyers increases the value of listing on the platform to sellers
because it increases the eyeballs that will see and perhaps make an offer on the property. Hence,
losing listings not only has a direct effect on the potential to monetize the platform via selling
leads to buyers’ agents, but it potentially has a multiplicative effect through the network
feedbacks between buyers and sellers on the platform. As listings fall, the value to buyers of
using the platform falls, which can reduce the use of the platform by buyers, which in turn
280
8/26/2025 Wacksman Deposition, pp. 13:11-14:10, 194:21-195:17 (“A Zillow's monetization doesn't come from
number of listings. It comes from introducing buyers and sellers to agents and having them transact together.
Having the majority or as many listings as possible allows us to attract those buyers and sellers.”; “A …I mean,
Showcase for sure is monetization, but, again, we don't directly monetize listings outside of Showcase content
collection, so it's more about making sure our agents have broad listing exposure, and then if we have great
listing coverage, we then monetize by driving more transaction share by connecting more buyers and sellers
with more agents, so it is an indirect relationship.”).
281
ZG-00030111 at 112–117.
282
See, e.g., ZG-00003232 at 232 (“Listings are the lifeblood of our company. No listings, no eyeballs, no sales.
But it's not even a case of ‘no-listings’; even a degradation of our listing content will reduce leads and PA
revenues” and, in response, “I’m with you on the severity and intent of the threat…”); ZG-00005457 at 457
(“Compass is leveraging listings with a ‘coming soon’ status to circumvent CCP. A coming soon listing is
considered ‘off-market’ meaning Compass can publicly advertise them on their website without violating the
Clear Cooperation requirement to post a listing to the MLS within one day of public marketing...We'd like to
convince more MLSs to send us Coming Soon listings so that we can have listing parity with Compass and
other brokerages who are advertising these listings on their websites.”); ZG-00030111 at 117 (“Our Goal:
Maximize timely & accurate listings availability to all consumers on Zillow, by preventing degradation of
listing availability.”); ZG-00031370 at 377 (“CoStar will be spending big market by market, to erode consumer
trust in Zillow, market their exclusives, and promote their brokerage partners…The effect of this on Zillow will
be erosion of traffic, and eventually revenue.”).
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reduces the value of the platform to sellers who, thereby, would be less eager to list on the
platform, creating the potential for a negative spiral.
172. Third, losing listings and the potential feedback effect just described reduces the
opportunity for Zillow to monetize its traffic via sales of leads but also via the panoply of other
monetization strategies that Zillow has developed, as discussed earlier as well.
173. Clearly, putting itself in the position of triggering a negative feedback loop that
would diminish the attractiveness of and ability to monetize its platform would be risky and
imprudent if Zillow believed that it faced a material risk of material numbers of the listing clients
of Compass and other brokerages ignoring or snubbing the Zillow Standards, as would be the
case if Zillow did not have market power. Instead, however, Zillow is not seeking to make its
platform more attractive for Compass and other companies seeking to differentiate their
marketing strategies to list their properties on Zillow; rather, the Zillow Standards can be rational
for Zillow only if Zillow is confident that instead of triggering a significant reduction in the
robustness of its inventory of listings, it will induce significant numbers of property owners to
decline any pre-marketing strategies they would otherwise seek to pursue and will limit the risk
of the “contagion” of brokerages adopting similar strategies, as I discussed earlier.283 While
Zillow can undoubtedly tolerate losing some of its listings and still maintain its dominance
because of its brand and features,284 hemorrhaging listings would “severely” harm its
business.285 Because Zillow was demonstrably concerned about a contagion, it launched its
Zillow Standards as a deterrent against pre-marketing strategies, leveraging its market power.
174. The Zillow Standards appear to be achieving this objective. As I discuss in more
detail in Section VII, adoption of the 3PM strategy was as high as 38 percent in Q1 2025. And
Ashton Alexander, Compass’s Senior VP of Operations, stated in her declaration filed June 27,
283
ZG-00030111 at 116.
284
8/26/2025 Wacksman Deposition, p. 103:15–20 (“Q Could the existence of PLNs erode traffic to Zillow? A We
don’t believe that missing some listings would erode traffic or brand trust to Zillow. We would be concerned if
the database that all participants use to share all listings were to erode, that it would make it more challenging
for buyers and sellers to find those listings.”).
285
“Our competitors . . . may engage in exclusionary conduct . . . such as by restricting access to proprietary listing
data or by putting homes for sale on a private listing network instead of publicly through the MLS . . . This
could markedly decrease the quantity and quality of the for sale and rental listing data and other real estate
information that we provide, reduce customer confidence in our products and services and cause customers to
go elsewhere for real estate listings and information, which could severely harm our business, results of
operations and financial condition.” See 2024 Zillow 10-K, p. 14.
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2025, that Compass listings using the 3PM strategy had dropped 23 percent since Zillow
announced its listing standards and testified in August that listings utilizing 3PM had dropped to
17-18 percent.286 These effects are based on a time period during which Zillow is not yet fully
enforcing its Zillow Standards, so the effect on Compass has come at very little cost to Zillow:
the evidence indicates that Zillow has so far banned only approximately 15 Compass listings.
175. That Zillow is apparently willing to risk its “lifeblood” by executing a strategy that
is beneficial to Zillow only if it can rely on its market power in the market for online home
search platforms287 is direct evidence of the existence of Zillow’s market power in that market,
and the precipitous reduction in Compass’s adoption rate of its 3PM is further direct evidence of
that market power. By the metric of direct evidence of market power, this fact supports an
inference that Zillow wields market power in the online home search platforms market.288
C. Indirect Evidence of Zillow’s Market Power
1. Zillow’s Market Share and the Market’s Concentration
176. The courts and antitrust agencies generally consider market share to be an indirect
indicator of whether a firm does or does not possess market power. The higher is a firm’s share
of the relevant antitrust market, all else equal, the stronger is the inference that the firm possesses
286
Declaration of E. Ashton Alexander In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Compass,
Inc, v. Zillow, Inc., et al., United States District Court Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:25-cv-05201-
JAV, September 12, 2025, ¶ 15; 8/26/2025 Alexander Deposition, p. 193:7-18.
287
Zillow itself acknowledged that listings are “the lifeblood of our company” and that implementing the Zillow
rule may result in “degradation of [its] listing content.” See ZG-00003232 at 232.
288
Zillow’s profitability or lack of profitability is not an indicator of market power. Firms can have market power
and have high, low, or negative profitability, which depends on the demand for the product and the costs of
production. Market power means that profits are higher than they would be without it, all else equal. In this
case, Zillow’s Continuing Operations (excluding losses from its Zillow Offers business, which it discontinued
in 2021) was profitable in 2020 and 2021 (see Zillow Group, Inc., Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2022 (hereafter, 2022 Zillow 10-K), pp. 77, 81). In 2022, Zillow’s Continuing Operations started
incurring losses (see 2022 Zillow 10-K, p. 77), due to macroeconomic factors (see “Zillow Group, Inc.
NasdaqGS:ZG, FY 2022 Earnings Call Transcripts,” S&P Global, February 15, 2023, p. 4, “the unprecedented
housing macro volatility continued, this time to the downside. The scenario we had feared could happen. 30-
year mortgage interest rates nearly doubled over the course of the first 6 months of 2022, meaningfully slowing
turnover and home price appreciation in the housing market.”). Zillow continued incurring losses in 2023 and
2024, but its performance has improved significantly in the first half of 2025 (see Zillow Group, Inc., Form 10-
Q, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2025, p. 5). Financial analysts predict that Zillow’s results from
operations will turn positive and continue to grow in profitability over the next few years. The median financial
analyst forecast of Zillow earnings before interest and taxes is a profit of $106 million in 2026, $272 million in
2027, and $484 million in 2028 (see S&P Capital IQ).
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market power.289 Moreover, some commentators have argued that, rather than serving as a proxy
for market power, the market share itself can allow firms to perform “foreclosure” practices
aimed at cutting “rivals off from sources of supply, distribution outlets and the like,” which are
only plausible because the firm occupies a large fraction of the market.290
177. There are several ways that, in principle and depending on data availability, one
may estimate market share for the online home search platforms market, including by a
platform’s share of total visits, searches, or page views; share of unique visitors, share of time
spent by users on the platform; and share estimates that attempt to control for whether users visit
multiple home search platforms or only one (practices sometimes referred to as “multi-homing”
versus “single-homing”). One primary way of measuring market shares that appears to be
common in the industry is the number or share of unique visitors; indeed, this appears to be
Zillow’s preferred measure.291 The evidence using this measure supports Zillow’s market power
in the online home search platforms market. The available data and associated commentary are
unambiguous that Zillow holds a predominant position in the online home search platforms
market.
178. Zillow itself has self-reported on its predominance among real estate searchers. In
its earnings call from the first quarter of 2025, Zillow CEO reported that “[a]bout 2/3 of the real
estate audience uses Zillow somewhere along their journey, more than twice any other company
in our category.”292 A presentation by Zillow to the investment community at around the same
time reflects similar figures.293 According to that presentation, in the last quarter of 2024, the
Zillow Group was more than two times larger than Realtor.com, its nearest competitor, as
measured by average monthly unique visitors. The data showed that the Zillow Group accounted
289
See 2015 Carlton & Perloff, p. 668. See also, Peter Davis and Eliana Garcés, QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 286-287.
290
See 2025 Hovenkamp, p. 66-67.
291
Zillow’s Chief Industry Development Officer, Errol Samuelson, testified that Zillow uses Google Analytics to
measure its own traffic and relies on data from Comscore on “unique users visiting each property, number of
visits, and so on” when making comparisons with other websites in the real estate sector. Although he stated
that “Comscore tends to undercount traffic,” he asserted that “when doing comparisons between Zillow traffic
and third-party sites, Comscore is the best source that we have for it.” 8/28/2025 Samuelson Deposition, 97:3-
98:8. In the presentations in the record that I have reviewed, Zillow always reports the share of unique visitors
(see, for example, ZG-00027801 at p. 18-21; ZG-00031713 at 717; ZG-00033142 at 185).
292
“Zillow Group, Inc. NasdaqGS:ZG FQ1 2025 Earnings Call Transcripts,” S&P Global, May 7, 2025 (hereafter,
2025 Q1 Zillow Earnings Transcript), p. 4.
293
2/2025 Zillow Investor Presentation, p. 6.
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for 66 percent of the “Real Estate Audience,” while companies not in the Zillow Group
accounted for the remaining 34 percent. (The exact period for the latter comparison was not
specified.294) Indeed, in measuring its audience share, as measured by total unique visitors,
Zillow reported its share was at least 60 percent in nearly every quarter from at least December
2020 through June 2025, and more than 20 percentage points ahead of its nearest reported
competitor.295
179. Mobile apps are another means by which users can view and interact with Zillow’s
home search platform. While the relevant metric to assess market power in the market for online
home search platforms is total platform users or views, it is notable that, in addition to the traffic
advantage enjoyed by Zillow that I have already documented, Zillow has a particular advantage
in mobile app search. According to Zillow’s CEO, Zillow has four times the mobile application
engagement of the next closest company with which it competes.296 A Zillow investor
presentation from February 2025 also provided usage statistics pertaining to daily active app
users among real estate marketplaces. These data revealed that, at the end of 2024, the Zillow
Group was more than four times larger than its nearest competitor (Realtor.com) in daily active
(mobile) app users. Furthermore, the data showed that the Zillow Group accounted for 64
percent of average daily active app users among real estate marketplaces (the precise time period
was not specified).297
180. Hence, by all of Zillow’s measures, Zillow has attracted 60 percent or more of the
traffic among what the analysts and Zillow itself consider to be the competitors of note in the
relevant market, according to multiple measures. Notably, Zillow’s internal documents depict
the highest shares, well above 60% and closer to two-thirds of the market.
294
2/2025 Zillow Investor Presentation, p. 6. The cited figures relied on Comscore’s monthly unique-visitor data
to compare Zillow with its nearest competitor. See About Comscore.
295
ZG-00027801 at 827; ZG-00033142 at 185; ZG-00031713 at 717. The figures rely on Comscore’s real estate
audience share data in which the metric is total unique visitors. Comscore is a U.S.-based media-measurement
and analytics company. It measures digital and TV audience engagement. See “About,” Comscore, accessed
September 10, 2025, https://www.comscore.com/About (hereafter, About Comscore).
296
2025 Q1 Zillow Earnings Transcript, p. 4. Zillow reported similar results in a recent presentation by Zillow to
the investment community. See 2/2025 Zillow Investor Presentation, p. 7.
297
2/2025 Zillow Investor Presentation, p. 7. The data on app usage relied on data supplied by data.ai, a provider
of data on mobile apps. See Oliver Yeh, “Sensor Tower acquires market intelligence platform data.ai,” Sensor
Tower, March 2024, https://sensortower.com/blog/data-ai-joins-sensor-tower.
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181. Market shares of this magnitude are at or above the level typically associated with
monopoly power.298 Numerous courts have found shares above 60 percent sufficient to establish
a dominant share and I understand that some have found so for shares as low as 54 percent.299
This dominant share can serve as indirect evidence for market power, especially in markets with
barriers to entry, which I will discuss in the next subsection.
182. Commentary by industry analysts is consistent with the inferences from the market
share statistics. For example, analysts assert that “Zillow’s level and quality of traffic is a huge
competitive advantage, and it is likely to hold a leading position in this category for at least the
next few years (it would be tough for anyone else to catch up with it, at least over the short
term).”300 Similarly, analysts at Wells Fargo Securities recently stated that an early mover
advantage had given Zillow “a deep moat” as they viewed “Zillow.com's material lead in organic
traffic as largely driven by its early-mover advantage in the residential for-sale marketplace and
to some extent network effects, as Zillow links are commonly shared between clients and their
agents, as well as with friends and family.”301
2. Barriers to Entry
183. A firm’s possession of a high market share in a relevant market is indirect evidence
that the firm possesses market power in that market, as already discussed. A high market share
is not a definitive indication of market power, however. It is well understood as a matter of
economics that a company with a high market share may nevertheless lack market power in the
relevant market if entry into the market by non-participants could be accomplished in a timely
manner, and is likely to occur in response to an incumbent’s exercise of market power to the
298
See Memorandum in Opposition, Federal Trade Commission v. Meta Platforms, Inc., United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, 1:20-cv-03590, April 7, 2021, p. 17. “Facebook does not dispute that a
market share ‘in excess of 60%’ is high enough to allege monopoly power— nor could it, as numerous courts
have held that such a share, or even a lower share, is sufficient for monopoly power.”
299
See Memorandum of Law in Opposition, Federal Trade Commission v. Meta Platforms, Inc., United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, 1:20-cv-03590-JEB, November 17, 2021, p. 4; Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Federal Trade Commission v. AbbVie Inc., et al., United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, June 29, 2018, pp. 72-73 (shares above 60%); Memorandum Opinion, 2301 M
Cinema LLC, et al., v. Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., et al., United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, September 28, 2018, pp. 28-29 (shares as low as 54% being considered sufficient to infer monopoly
power); Opinion & Order, CollegeNet, Inc., v. The Common Application, Inc., United States District Court for
the District of Oregon, No. 3:14-cv-00771-HZ, pp. 25-26 (shares above 60%).
300
See 4/21/2025 William Blair-Zillow, p. 5.
301
See 2/5/2025 Wells Fargo CoStar at p. 4.
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detriment of customers, and is likely to occur at a level sufficient to defeat the profitability of the
incumbent’s (or incumbents’) exercise of market power.302 Hence, indirect evidence that a firm
possesses market power typically entails an analysis of the presence, absence, and height of
barriers to entry by non-participants in the market. The presence of material barriers to timely
and significant entry into the relevant market is evidence that an incumbent with a dominant
market share possesses market power in that market.303
184. A number of factors can act as barriers to entry into a market. These may include
the need to make large capital investments in order to operate in a market at a competitive scale;
brand recognition enjoyed by the incumbent(s) in the market; costs faced by customers if they
switch from their current supplier to another supplier or use the products of another supplier, that
they do not incur with their current supplier (known as customer “lock-in” or “switching costs”);
and a feedback effect in which the more customers a company has, the greater is the value of the
company’s product to all customers, a phenomenon known as a “network effect.”304
a. Capital investments
185. If it is necessary to make very large capital investments to compete effectively with
an established incumbent, and if the prospect for success is risky (as is the case in most real-
world markets), the necessity of obtaining the required capital can form a barrier to entry.305
302
See, “Market shares are imperfect indicators of market power, so additional analysis of the economic conditions
is necessary before one can reach a conclusion about market power. For example, if entry is easy, then the
industry pricing is severely constrained regardless of whether an existing firm has a large market share.” 2015
Carlton & Perloff, p. 668. See also, Robert H. Lande, “Market Power Without a Large Market Share: The Role
of Imperfect Information and Other "Consumer Protection" Market Failures,” American Antitrust Institute
Working Paper No. 07-06, March 14, 2007, pp. 3-4. (“Even if some critical market share is reached, of course,
the firm has the power to raise prices only if entry is difficult and other conditions are met [references
excluded].”). See also, 2023 Merger Guidelines, pp. 12, 31-32. (“When evaluating a potentially unlawful
merger of current competitors, the Agencies will assess whether entry by other firms would be timely, likely,
and sufficient to replace the lost competition.”)
303
“[C]ourts examine market structure in search of circumstantial evidence of monopoly power . . . Under this
indirect, structural approach, monopoly power may be inferred from a firm’s possession of a dominant share of
a relevant market that is protected by entry barriers.” [internal quotes omitted]. See Memorandum and Order,
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, United States of America et al. v. Google, August 5,
2024 p. 153, citing Opinion for the Court, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, United
States of America et al. v. Microsoft Corporation, June 28, 2021 p. 51.
304
For a discussion of barriers to entry and switching costs, see, among others, 2015 Carlton & Perloff, pp. 100-
104 and pp. 395-397 and Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer, “Coordination and lock-in: Competition with
switching costs and network effects,” Handbook of Industrial Organization volume 3 (2007) at pp. 1967-2072.
305
See 2015 Carlton & Perloff, pp. 103-104 for a discussion of large-scale investments involving large sunk costs
as a potential barrier to entry.
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186. An indicator of the magnitude of the capital investment necessary for an entrant to
compete effectively in a market is the capital that the incumbent(s) have had to spend to obtain
and maintain their position in the market. Available evidence suggests that Zillow has invested
billions of dollars in various forms of marketing and advertising to distinguish itself from
competitors and build its powerful market position that I documented in the previous subsection.
187. It has been estimated that, between 2022 and 2024 alone, Zillow invested a total of
about $2.11 billion in sales and marketing and about $1.64 billion in technology and
development.306 These investments, combined ($3.75 billion), amounted to about 78 percent of
Zillow’s gross profits ($4.82 billion) over the same period.307 These figures indicate that
massive investments would be necessary for a newcomer to enter the market for online home
search platforms and develop a platform and brand name capable of competing effectively.
Indeed, even a company with an existing presence in the real estate market would require
substantial capital investment to become competitive.
188. The recent experience of the CoStar Group with the Homes.com site is illustrative.
According to a Wells Fargo Equity Research report, The CoStar Group bought the Homes.com
site in 2021. CoStar invested about $900 million in Homes.com in 2024, largely spent on
advertising. The same report pointed out that CoStar would invest an additional $900 million in
2025, with the main goal of building a permanent sales force.308 CoStar reported that
Homes.com grew at a rapid pace in 2024, but the CoStar growth figures for Homes.com have
been challenged as false advertising.309 In February 2025, the Wells Fargo analysts wrote: “We
haven’t seen the heavy advertising translate to meaningfully higher organic traffic yet,” and
added: “we don’t see enough differentiation to draw users away from Zillow which has a strong
first-mover advantage and network effects.”310 Hence, despite its massive investments in
306
2024 Zillow 10-K, p. 60.
307
2024 Zillow 10-K, p. 60.
308
2/5/2025 Wells Fargo CoStar at p. 1.
309
“Homes.com Residential Network Reaches All-Time High of 149 Million+ Unique Monthly Visitors in
February 2024,” CoStar Group Press Release, March 14, 2024, accessed September 10, 2025,
https://investors.costargroup.com/news-releases/news-release-details/homescom-residential-network-reaches-
all-time-high-149-million. See also, Harvey Hancock, “Homes.com Agrees To Change Advertising Claims
After Realtor.com "Smoke And Mirrors" Pushback,” OnlineMarketplaces, July 10, 2024, accessed September
12, 2025, https://www.onlinemarketplaces.com/articles/homes-com-agrees-to-change-advertising-claims-after-
realtor-com-pushback/.
310
2/5/2025 Wells Fargo CoStar at p. 1.
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Homes.com, CoStar does not appear to have succeeded at making Homes.com a true challenger
for Zillow or Realtor.com. Zillow concluded similarly, explaining that Homes.com has less
quality traffic than Zillow.311
189. Indeed, perhaps the best evidence that even well-capitalized entities with powerful
brand names may not be able to successfully enter and compete in the online home search
platforms market is that both Yahoo and Google made forays into the online home search
platforms market by giving users access to real-estate listings. Both ultimately ceased their
efforts to compete in the market for online home search platforms.
190. Yahoo made a foray into the online home search platforms market with Yahoo!
Real Estate (later renamed Yahoo! Homes). Yahoo! Homes partnered with Zillow in 2006 and
later “handed over” real-estate listings and advertising to Zillow.312
191. Google attempted to offer a real estate search competitor by leveraging its Google
Maps application and the information in Google Base, a database into which any user could add
almost all types of content, including text, images, and structured information in a variety of
formats. For example, it added real estate listings from Google Baseto Google Maps.313 Google
received real estate listings in its Google Base database from various sources, including For-
Sale-By-Owner sites and Homes and Land, a real estate site.314 Many of the listings came
directly from real estate agents and brokerages.315
192. In late 2010, however, Google stopped displaying real-estate listings on Google
Maps. Google gave three reasons for this decision: “low usage, the proliferation of excellent
311
9/11/2025 Lake Deposition, pp. 29:20-30:4.
312
See Hugh Collins, “Yahoo Hands Over Real Estate Listings to Zillow.com,” Yahoo, July 9, 2020, accessed
September 10, 2025, https://sports.yahoo.com/2010-07-09-yahoo-zillow-com.html. See also, Matt Jones,
“Welcome to Yahoo! Homes,” Yahoo, July 30, 2012, accessed September 10, 2025,
https://www.yahoo.com/news/blogs/spaces/welcome-yahoo-homes-020532210.html.
313
Richard Trenholm, “Google Maps adds property listings: Google your dream home,” CNET, June 16, 2010,
accessed September 10, 2025, https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/google-maps-adds-property-
listings-google-your-dream-home/.
314
See, for example, Janis Mara, “Google moves further into real estate,” American Land Title Association, April
7, 2006, accessed September 10, 2025, https://alta.org/news-and-publications/news/20060407-Google-moves-
further-into-real-estate.
315
See “Land Grab: Google Expands Real Estate Listings,” Search Engine Land, July 6, 2009, accessed September
10, 2025, https://searchengineland.com/google-expands-real-estate-listings-
21999#:~:text=The%20results%20are%20coming%20directly,part%20of%20their%20online%20marketing.
76
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property-search tools on real-estate sites, and the infrastructure challenge posed by the
impending retirement of the Google Base API.”316
193. Hence, even large general search engines with well-known brand names such as
Yahoo and Google chose not to invest the resources necessary to challenge the websites that
focused on real estate search at the time, including Zillow. This was an implicit
acknowledgment that developing tools such as the user interfaces and search functionality, as
well as the industry expertise necessary to compete in the online home search platforms market
would have involved higher upfront investments with a lower prospect of being able to
successfully and profitably compete than they were willing to make.
194. Zillow, for all its market share success, is still not profitable on a net basis, as
discussed above. This is also an entry barrier because potential entrants, seeing this, would be
discouraged from entry and their investors discouraged from investing.
195. Thus, evidence from the marketplace and Zillow’s own documents suggest that
capital investment is a substantial barrier to entry in the online home search platforms market.
b. Brand recognition
196. When incumbents in a market have strong brand recognition, that fact alone can
impede the ability of entrants without similar brand recognition—at least, those without brand
recognition in the market at issue—to make headway in competition with the established
incumbent(s).317
197. Zillow’s investments in brand recognition have been successful. As the figures I
cited in earlier sections indicate, Zillow has become a clear leader in home search platform
traffic, which, according to at least one investment analyst, gives Zillow a “Massive Competitive
Advantage.”318 As the statistics presented earlier demonstrate, Zillow “has consistently had
more monthly visits than its next three biggest portal competitors in the United States combined
(Realtor.com, Redfin, and Homes.com).” Zillow also claims that 80 percent of its traffic comes
316
See Retiring Real Estate 2011. See also, Union Street Media 2011.
317
See, for example, Carl Shapiro, “Advertising as a barrier to entry,” FTC Working Paper No. 74, July 1982.
Shapiro argues that the true entry barrier is not advertising but rather brand loyalty, which is associated with
brand recognition.
318
See 4/21/2025 William Blair-Zillow, p. 5.
77
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either from “organic sources” or is “direct” traffic (that is, comes from people typing Zillow.com
directly into their browsers), which reveals strong customer awareness of the Zillow brand.319
198. Perhaps the strongest evidence of Zillow’s brand recognition is that in March 2016,
consumers were, for the first time, more likely to search “Zillow” on Google than to search “real
estate.” In that month, Google gave Zillow a “search interest” score of 52, compared with 49 for
“real estate,” a nine for Trulia, and a five for Realtor.com.320 At the time, a real estate industry
journalist commented that “the fact that searches of ‘zillow’ have eclipsed searches of the word
that describes Zillow’s focus reflects formidable brand recognition, and may partly explain why
agents sometimes have trouble persuading consumers to trust their opinion and data over
Zillow’s data.”321
199. I also analyzed “search interest” with respect to other potential real estate search
terms. I entered four real estate related terms into Google Trends: “zillow," “real estate,”
“homes for sale,” and “houses for sale.” Exhibit 2 shows the trend over time of the “search
interest” for these four terms.322 The Exhibit shows that soon after the launch of the Zillow
brand (in 2006), “zillow" was slightly less popular as a search term as “houses for sale.” The
popularity of the term “zillow” increased rapidly starting in 2011, surpassing “homes for sale” in
2015 and “real estate” in early 2017 and, with the exception of a temporary spike in popularity of
“homes for sale” in 2021, “zillow” has remained the most popular of these four search terms
since 2017.323 Finally, I analyzed “search interest” with respect to other online home-search
platforms, see Exhibit 3. The search interest for “zillow" surpassed that of “redfin” immediately
after Zillow’s launch, and it surpassed “realtor.com” in late 2011.324
319
See 4/21/2025 William Blair-Zillow, p. 5.
320
See Teke Wiggin, “Does Zillow overshadow ‘real estate’? Google search traffic gives credence to theory,”
Inman, April 26, 2016, https://www.inman.com/2016/04/26/zillow-overshadow-real-estate/ (hereafter, 2016
Wiggin-Zillow); 2024 Zillow 10-K, p. 3.
321
See 2016 Wiggin-Zillow.
322
I normalize the data so that the popularity of “real estate” in February 2006, the month when Zillow.com
launched, equals 100.
323
Because the data are highly seasonal, I smooth each time series using a 12-month moving average. As a result,
the search popularity of “zillow” does not surpass that of “real estate” until January 2017. Without controlling
for seasonality, “zillow” tied “real estate” in April 2016, passed it briefly during May to June, was slightly
below it for the rest of 2016, and passed it for good in January 2017.
324
I do not include results for Homes.com nor Compass.com since their search interest cannot be readily
disentangled from that of the nouns “homes” and “compass.” The search popularity for “zillow” has been over
45 times that of “homes.com” and “compass.com” since as far back as 2016. See my backup materials.
78
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and competition.327 A textbook example of a network effect is a telephone network: if only one
person had a telephone, the telephone would have no value to that person at all, because there
would be no one to call. With two people, the value is greater because they can call each other,
but as each new person joins the network, they not only gain the benefit to themselves of being
able to call the others already on the network (and be called by them), but the new person
enhances the value to each of the existing members. Once a telephone network is in place and
has been joined by many customers, it would be difficult for a new and separate telephone
network (i.e., a telephone network that was not interconnected with the incumbent) to enter and
compete, because the initial customers on the new, small network would be provided few
potential opportunities to call and be called, while joining the incumbent network would
immediately present the opportunity to call and be called by many people.
201. As the example illustrates, network effects generate a competitive advantage from
greater scale or greater market share. For the same reason, they generate a competitive
disadvantage to being a small participant, and therefore network effects can constitute a barrier
to entry for potential entrants seeking to challenge the incumbent(s) or even to just coexist. In
markets that do not exhibit network effects, entrants must nevertheless overcome the advantages
that incumbents may enjoy, such as brand recognition, an established customer base, and product
know-how. Entrants normally seek to do this by offering a better product, better price (perhaps
by adopting more efficient means of production), or better customer service, as examples. But in
a market with network effects, entrants or small competitors must also overcome the incumbent’s
scale advantages due to the network effects, and therefore must have a product whose value
proposition to customers is even more superior to that of the incumbent than it would otherwise
be required to offer.
202. A 1989 paper by economist Brian Arthur established that in an industry with
network effects and switching costs (costs incurred by customers to switch from one supplier to
another), an incumbent with a large installed base of customers can prevent entry from an
equally or more efficient potential competitor.328 Extensive theoretical and empirical literature
followed, delineating the circumstances in which an incumbent firm can use its “incumbency
327
2023 Merger Guidelines, Section 2.6.A.
328
W. Brian Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events,” The
Economic Journal 99, no 394 (March 1989) (hereafter, 1989 Arthur), pp. 106–131.
81
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advantage” to prevent entry by a more efficient potential competitor;329 recent scholarly research
has highlighted how the incumbency advantage can be especially significant in industries in
which vast amounts of data are generated as a byproduct of users interacting in a platform.330 As
a consequence, in the presence of network effects, as discussed earlier, the entrant must offer a
product that is not just better, but sufficiently better than the incumbent’s that the challenger can
overcome the incumbency advantage.
203. Online home search platforms experience a type of network effect. First, the more
sellers list on a platform, the more valuable the platform is to other sellers. This is because more
comprehensive listings allow online home search platforms to improve the quality of the search
results, therefore increasing the probability that potential buyers find a good match. The
improved quality of the search results (and increased probability of finding a better match)
attracts more potential buyers to the platform. Finally, more potential buyers using the platform,
and more agents affiliating with the platform, attracts more listings, further increasing the scale
of the platform. As the platform with by-far the most traffic, Zillow is the prime beneficiary of
those network effects.
204. Indeed, analysts argue that Zillow’s lead in organic traffic is driven by a
combination of first-mover advantages and network effects.331 Analysts have also noted the
entry barriers erected by Zillow’s sheer scale in the market.332
205. Zillow’s significant advantage in mobile search documented in Section VI.C.1
above buttresses the entry barriers erected around Zillow’s search engine. To threaten Zillow’s
dominant position in app downloads, a competitor would have to have a sufficient competitive
advantage that it would encourage users who have already downloaded the Zillow app to
download and use an additional app. The competitor’s differentiating features would also have
to be sufficiently attractive for users who are new to the online home search platforms market
(and have therefore not already downloaded the Zillow app) to download an app other than
Zillow or in addition to it.
329
See 2021 Jullien et al., pp. 485-592, especially Section 3, for a summary of the theoretical literature.
330
Gary Biglaiser, Emilio Calvano, and Jacques Crémer, “Incumbency advantage and its value,” Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy 28, iss. 1 (Spring 2019), pp. 41-48.
331
See 4/21/2025 William Blair-Zillow at pp. 1, 5. See also, 2/5/2025 Wells Fargo CoStar at p. 4.
332
See 4/21/2025 William Blair-Zillow at p. 5.
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As I also explained, these benefits to sellers can also engender benefits to buyers, because they
can facilitate better and faster matches between buyers’ preferences and available properties.
230. Certainly, because the decision of how to market her property is always ultimately
that of the client, and the client can choose conventional marketing even if the client engages a
Compass agent, the opportunity to opt instead for Compass’s 3PM or a premarketing strategy of
another brokerage is a benefit to customers. Being deprived of that opportunity is, conversely, a
harm.
231. These harms that I have described to sellers and buyers of real estate from the
enactment of the Zillow Standards is inherently irreparable. The irreparability is for several
reasons.
232. First, home sellers who would have benefited from the 3PM approach to marketing
their properties could not know if the 3PM, if it were available unimpeded by the Zillow
Standards, would have improved the outcome for their specific property. Each property is
idiosyncratic; there is no uniform “market price” that applies to all properties, and therefore one
cannot estimate on a market basis the effect on such a price of an alternative marketing approach.
The effect would be different for each property.
233. Indeed, it is not possible for any seller to know with reasonable certainty whether
the outcome for any specific property would have been better had it been pre-marketed. As I
have discussed, harm to sellers can occur in the form of a lower price than would otherwise have
been received, and/or in the form of the sales process taking a longer time, which imposes costs
of maintaining the property, possibly mortgage payments, delayed receipt of the sales proceeds,
and possibly delay in the ability of the seller to purchase another property (or even missed
opportunities to bid on desired properties). Hence, it is not possible to know which home sellers
were in fact harmed and which were unaffected. Moreover, estimating whether a sale of any
given property would have occurred earlier would necessarily require speculation about the
presence of buyers who would be interested in that property and whether such buyers would be
in a position to make an acceptable offer. Hence, estimating whether any seller was harmed at
all, let alone the magnitude of that seller’s harm, could not be estimated without speculation.
234. Second, it is not possible to know with reasonable certainty which buyers were
harmed as a result of depriving sellers of 3PM and similar marketing strategies. As already
92
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discussed, buyers may be harmed if the sale price of the property they purchased was higher than
it would have been had the property been pre-marketed, but determining which properties were
so affected and by how much would require speculation for the reasons just discussed. In
addition, determining whether the buyer would have found and successfully purchased a
property that better suited the buyer at an acceptable price or more quickly is not a problem that
is readily amenable to standard techniques of analysis. Attempting to estimate for each property
whether the buyer was harmed by being deprived of the opportunity to purchase a property better
suited to the buyer’s preferences or of finding a suitable property more quickly would be a
speculative endeavor.
__ _
Debra J. Aron, Ph.D.
September 12, 2025
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APPENDIX A
Curriculum Vitae
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Debra J. Aron
Charles River Associates Page 2
“The Economics of 5G Deployment in the “Race” to 5G: The State of 5G in the US, South Korea,
and Other Countries,” with Andy Baziliauskas, Olga Ukhaneva, and Chloe Sun, CRA Insights: The
Economics of 5G (December 2020).
“The Economics of 5G Deployment in the “Race” to 5G: The Role of Open RAN,” with Olga
Ukhaneva and Chloe Sun, CRA Insights: The Economics of 5G (October 2020).
“The Damaging Effects of Large Postal Service Price Increases on Online Retailers, Consumers,
and the U.S. Postal Service,” with Justin Lenzo, Charles River Associates Whitepaper, September
28, 2020.
“The Economics of 5G Deployment in the ‘Race’ to 5G: The Role of Massive MIMO,” with Olga
Ukhaneva and Chloe Sun, CRA Insights: The Economics of 5G (August 2020).
“The Economics of 5G Deployment in the ‘Race’ to 5G: The Role of Mid-Band Spectrum,” with Olga
Ukhaneva and Chloe Sun, CRA Insights: The Economics of 5G (July 2020).
“An Economic Perspective on Balancing Unquantified Harms and Benefits Under the Consumer
Welfare Standard,” with Steven Tenn, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (2019).
“Lessons from the Economic Deregulation of the Airline and Telecommunications Industries,”
Infrastructure 58, no. 2 (Winter 2019).
“An Empirical Analysis of Regulator Mandates on the Pass Through of Switched Access Fees for
In-State Long-Distance Telecommunications in the U.S.,” with David E. Burnstein, Ana Danies, and
Gerry Keith, June 19, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674082.
Contributing author, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, TELECOM ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, Second
Edition, (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2013).
“The Effects of Legacy Pricing Regulation on Adoption of Broadband Service in the United States,”
with Allan T. Ingraham, Review of Network Economics 11, issue 4, 2012.
“Social Welfare Implications of Liability Rules in Major Environmental Damages Cases,” with
Francis X. Pampush, Environmental Litigation Committee Newsletter, Fall 2011.
“Regulatory Policy and the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy,” with David E. Burnstein, Journal of
Competition Law and Economics 2010; doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhp033.
“Investment in Next Generation Networks and Wholesale Telecommunications Regulation,” with
Robert W. Crandall, November 3, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1294910.
“Pricing Principles and Pricing Methodologies for Essential Facilities,” May 2008.
Contributing author, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, TELECOM ANTITRUST HANDBOOK (Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2005).
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Debra J. Aron
Charles River Associates Page 3
“The Proper Treatment of Spare Network Capacity in Regulatory Cost Models,” with Ana Danies,
May 2005. Available at SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133365.
“State Commissions Systematically Have Set UNE Prices Below Their Actual Costs,” with Frank
Pampush and E. Gerry Keith, November 2003. Available at SSRN
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3327613.
“Broadband Adoption in the United States: An Empirical Analysis,” with David E. Burnstein, in DOWN
TO THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES,
Allan Shampine, ed. (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2003).
“Developments in the Theory of Vertical Foreclosure as Applied to Regulated Telecommunications
Markets” (March 2002), Prepared for Presentation at The American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law, 50th Annual Spring Meeting.
“Modifications at HHIs for Vertical Supply Relationships” with Wenqing Li and James Langenfeld,
White Paper submitted to European Commission, February 2000.
“Economic Theories of Tying and Foreclosure Applied—And Not Applied—in Microsoft,” with
Steven S. Wildman, Antitrust 14, no. 1 (1999), pp.48-52.
“Effecting a Price Squeeze Through Bundled Pricing,” with Steven S. Wildman, in COMPETITION,
REGULATION, AND CONVERGENCE: CURRENT TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH,
Gillett and Vogelsang, eds. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1999), pp. 1-17.
“Worldwide Wait? How the Telecom Act’s Unbundling Requirements Slow the Development of the
Network Infrastructure,” with Ken Dunmore and Frank Pampush, Industrial and Corporate Change
7, no. 4 (1998), pp. 615-621.
“The Pricing of Customer Access in Telecommunications,” with Steven S. Wildman, Industrial and
Corporate Change 5, no. 4 (1996), pp. 1029-1047.
“Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, With Application to Manufacturing
Systems,” with Pau Olivella, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10 (Spring 1994), pp. 1-
34.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 41-70.
“Using the Capital Market as a Monitor: Corporate Spin-offs in an Agency Framework,” RAND
Journal of Economics 22 (Winter 1991), pp. 505-518.
“Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management, American Economic
Review 80, no. 2 (May 1990), pp. 23-27.
“The Introduction of New Products,” with Edward P. Lazear, American Economic Review 80, no. 2
(May 1990), pp. 421-426.
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Debra J. Aron
Charles River Associates Page 4
“Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size, and Diversification,” RAND Journal of Economics 19 (Spring
1988), pp. 72-87.
“Worker Reputation and Productivity Incentives,” Journal of Labor Economics 5, no. 4 (October
1987), part 2, pp. S87-S106.
“The Role of Managerial Ability and Moral Hazard in the Determination of Firm Size, Growth and
Diversification,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, August 1985.
Presentations
Panelist, “Structural and Functional Separation to Remedy Abuse of Dominance,” 34th Annual
International Bar Association Communications and Competition Law Conference, Paris, France,
April 29, 2025.
Panelist, “Tuna Ahoy! Economic Analyses of Class Certification,” 71st ABA Antitrust Law Spring
Meeting, Washington, DC, March 2023.
“Lessons from the Experience of Telecommunications Regulation for Regulation in the EU Package
Delivery Industry, with Focus on Access Regulation,” with Geoff Edwards, 30th Conference on
Postal and Delivery Economics, Rimini, Italy, May 2022.
Panelist, “Competition Within the Canadian Telecommunications Landscape,” The Conference
Board of Canada Virtual Leadership Roundtable, February 2022.
Panelist, Platform Antitrust, “On the Intersection Between Antitrust Enforcement and Other
Regulatory Spheres as it Relates to Digital Platforms,” Global Competition Review Live 9th Annual
Antitrust Law Leaders Forum, Miami Beach, Florida, February 2020.
“Balancing Unquantified Benefits and Harms Under the Consumer Welfare Standard,” The New
York State Bar Association Antitrust Law Section, 2019 William Howard Taft Lecture, Commenter to
the remarks of The Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg, New York, New York, September 2019.
“The Impact on the U.S. Economy of Excluding Huawei from Participation in the U.S. Market for
Wireless Network Equipment,” Presentation at the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act, Section 889, Public Meeting of Department of Defense, General Services Administration, and
NASA, Washington, D.C., July 19, 2019.
Moderator, “Your Expert Is Your Friend: How to Effectively Deliver Expert Testimony,” ABA: The
Woman Advocate Committee Regional CLE Program: Raising the Bar, Chicago, Illinois, October
2018.
“Lessons from the Deregulation of the Airline and Telecommunications Industries,” ABA
Infrastructure and Regulated Industries Section, Dallas, Texas, August 2018.
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Debra J. Aron
Charles River Associates Page 5
“Economic Fundamentals: Vertical and Coordinated Effects in Mergers,” ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Fundamentals of Antitrust Economics Series, Chicago, Illinois, July 2018.
Panelist, “Considerations for the Economists’ Analysis in Opt-Out Relative to Class Action
Litigation,” ABA 5th Annual Western Regional CLE Program on Class Actions and Mass Torts, San
Francisco, California, June 2018.
“Lessons from the Deregulation of the Airline and Telecommunications Industries,” ABA
Infrastructure and Regulated Industries Section, Fall Council Meeting, Palm Beach, Florida, October
2017.
“Economic Fundamentals: Vertical and Coordinated Effects in Mergers,” ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Fundamentals of Antitrust Economics Series, Washington, D.C., May 2016.
Panelist, “Economic Fundamentals: Market Power,” ABA Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C., April
2016.
“The Economic Impact of Electricity Price Increases in Puerto Rico,” ABA Section of Public Utility,
Communications and Transportation Law, Spring Council Meeting, Naples, Florida, March 2016.
Moderator, “Effective Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness: Practical Tips and Video Clips,”
ABA Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, July 2015.
Moderator, “The Science of Persuasion: Practical Insights from Research on Expert Witness
Effectiveness and Jury Decision-Making,” ABA Section of Litigation Annual Conference, New
Orleans, Louisiana, April 2015.
Panelist, “How to Manage Conversations with Expert Witnesses,” ABA Section of Litigation,
Environmental, Mass Torts, & Products Liability Litigation Committees’ Joint CLE Seminar, Avon,
Colorado, January 30, 2014.
“The Effects of Legacy Pricing Regulation on Adoption of Broadband Service in the United States,”
Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., June 11, 2013.
Panelist, “A Primer: Getting the Most Out of Your Experts — Do’s and Don’ts in the Use of Expert
Witnesses: Learning from the Experts,” ABA Section of Litigation Annual Conference, Chicago,
Illinois, April 26, 2013.
“An Empirical Analysis of Regulator Mandates on the Pass Through of Switched Access Fees for
In-State Long-Distance Telecommunications in the U.S.,” with David E. Burnstein, Ana Danies, and
Gerry Keith, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, March 27, 2013.
“The Effects of Legacy Pricing Regulation on Adoption of Broadband Service in the United States,”
with Allan Ingraham, The 40th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet
Policy (TPRC), September 22, 2012.
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Debra J. Aron
Charles River Associates Page 6
Panelist, “Two Decades of Daubert: Junk Science Replaced by Junk Rulings?” ABA Section of
Litigation Annual Conference, Washington, DC, April 20, 2012.
“The Effects of Legacy Pricing Regulation on Adoption of Broadband Service in the United States,”
with Allan Ingraham, New America Foundation, workshop on Defining and Measuring Meaningful
Broadband Adoption, April 11, 2012, Washington, DC.
“Social Welfare Implications of Liability Rules in Major Environmental Damages Cases,” with
Francis X. Pampush, American Bar Association Sections of Litigation and Criminal Justice Joint
Annual Conference, April 15, 2011, Miami, Florida.
“Consumer Benefits of Intrastate Access Rate Reform in Minnesota,” Center for Science,
Technology and Public Policy, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, January
26, 2011.
“An Empirical Analysis of Regulator Mandates on the Pass Through of Switched Access Fees for
In-State Long-Distance Telecommunications in the U.S.,” with David E. Burnstein, Ana Danies, and
Gerry Keith, The 38th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy
(Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), October 3, 2010, George Mason University
Law School, Arlington, Virginia.
“Pricing Principles and Pricing Methodologies for Essential Facilities,” The 36th Research
Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC), September 27, 2008.
“Regulatory Policy and the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy,” with David E. Burnstein, 17th Biennial
International Telecommunications Society Conference, Montréal, Québec, Canada, June 24-27,
2008.
“The Use of Economic Analysis in ‘Industry Expert’ Testimony,” CLE course, XPRT Forum, March
7, 2008.
Presentations to the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and to the New Jersey Legislature’s
Telecommunications Utilities Committee regarding the economic principles for a forward-looking
regulatory agenda in light of the facts of competition nationwide and in New Jersey, and the costs of
regulation, October – November 2006.
“The Interaction of Regulation with Economics and Financial Analysis in Litigation, Policy, and
Strategy Consulting,” CLE course, XPRT Forum, October 7, 2006.
“Comments on ‘Economic Analysis in FCC Merger Proceedings,’” Conference on Economic
Analysis and FCC Decisionmaking, presented by the Federal Communications Bar Association
(FCBA) and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Washington, D.C., March 15,
2006.
“Economic Principles for Consumer Protection Rules,” Pri Telecom / Tech Briefing, Santa Clara,
California, October 11, 2005.
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“The Proper Treatment of Spare Network Capacity in Regulatory Cost Models,” Presentation at the
Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, Center for Research in Regulated Industries,
Skytop, Pennsylvania, May 2005.
“Telecommunications Regulation: What’s Obsolete? What Will Become Obsolete?” Presentation at
the State and City Telecom Reform Conference, Heartland Institute, Chicago, Illinois, December
2004.
“Trends in Telecommunications Demand & Supply,” Presentation at the 46th Annual NARUC
Regulatory Studies Program, Michigan State University, August 2004.
“The Economic Costs of Proposed Wireless Regulations in California,” Presentation to
Commissioners Brown and Kennedy, California Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco,
California, April 2004.
“The Economics of UNE Pricing: Presentation to Staff,” Ex parte presentation to the staff of the
FCC, in FCC WC Docket No. 03-173: Review of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the Pricing of
Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
March 2004.Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, March 2004.
“The High Cost of Proposed New Wireless Regulations,” Presentation to the Pacific Research
Institute conference “Regulating Wireless in California: Bill of Rights... or Wrongs?,” San Francisco,
California, April 2003.
“The TELRIC Showdown,” Panelist, NARUC Staff Subcommittee on Telecommunications, 2002
Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois, November 2002.
“Economic Principles for Efficient Pricing of Municipal Rights-of-Way,” National Association of
Telecommunications Officers and Advisors (NATOA), Chicago, Illinois, September 2002.
“Trends in Voice and Broadband Competition in Telecommunications Markets: Markets, Strategies,
and Regulation,” 82nd Annual Convention of the Indiana Telecommunications Association,
Lexington, Kentucky, June 2002.
“Broadband Deployment in the United States,” Emerging Opportunities in Broadband Symposium,
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, December 2001.
“Local Competition in Illinois,” Illinois Telecommunications Symposium, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Illinois, December 2000.
“Licensing and Access to Innovations in Telecommunications and Information Services,”
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Alexandria, Virginia, September 2000.
“Effecting a Price Squeeze Through Bundled Pricing,” Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C., May 1999.
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“Competitive and Strategic Use of Optional Calling Plans and Volume Pricing Plans,” The Institute
for International Research Conference for Competitive Pricing of Telecommunications Services,
Chicago, Illinois, July 1998.
“Effecting a Price Squeeze Through Bundled Pricing,” Consortium for Research in
Telecommunications Policy Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1998.
“The Pricing of Customer Access in Telecommunications,” Conference on Public Policy and
Corporate Strategy for the Information Economy, Evanston, Illinois, May 1996.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, February
1994.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon, “University of Buffalo, Buffalo, New York,
February 1994.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
California, December 1993.
“Strategic Pricing,” Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, Discussant, Anaheim, California,
December 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Michigan State University, Lansing, Michigan, November 1993.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New
Jersey, November 1993.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa
Cruz, California, November 1993.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” Graduate School of Business, Stanford
University, Stanford, California, November 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, September 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, June
1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
University of California, Department of Economics, Berkeley, California, May 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California, May 1993.
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“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” Stanford University, Graduate School of
Business, Stanford, California, April 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, April 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
University of California, Graduate School of Business, Berkeley, California, February 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Stanford University, Department of Economics, Stanford, California, February 1993.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, January 1993.
“Pricing Strategies,” Session Discussant, 1992 North American Winter Meeting of The Econometric
Society, Anaheim, California, January 1992.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada,
November 1991.
“Diversification as a Strategic Preemptive Weapon,” Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada,
November 1991.
“Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing
Systems,” University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, June 1991.
“The Timing of Entry into New Markets,” Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 1991.
“Innovation, Imitation, Productive Differentiation, and the Value of Information in New Markets,”
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, April 1991.
“Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing
Systems,” Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, Washington, D.C., December 1990.
“Corporate Spin-offs in an Agency Framework,” University of Washington, Seattle, Washington,
October 1990.
“The Timing of Entry Into New Markets,” University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British
Columbia, October 1990.
“Corporate Spin-offs in an Agency Framework,” Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas,
April 1990.
“Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management,” Winter Meetings of the
American Economic Association, New York, New York, December 1989.
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“Corporate Spin-offs in an Agency Framework,” Western Finance Association Meetings, Seattle,
Washington, June 1989.
“Corporate Spin-offs in an Agency Framework,” University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, May
1989.
“Corporate Spin-offs in an Agency Framework,” North American Summer Meetings of the
Econometric Society, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 1988.
“Competition, Relativism, and Market Choice,” North American Summer Meetings of the
Econometric Society, Berkeley, California, June 1987.
“Competition, Relativism, and Market Choice,” University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, April 1987.
“Rate Reform and Competition in Electric Power,” Discussant, Conference on Competitive Issues in
Electric Power, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, March 1987.
“Worker Reputation and Productivity Incentives,” New Economics of Personnel Conference, Arizona
State University, Tempe, Arizona, April 1986.
“Ability, Moral Hazard, and Firm Diversification,” Various Universities, 1985, 1994, including Yale
University, University of Rochester, Stanford University, University of Minnesota, California Institute
of Technology, Duke University, Northwestern University, Brown University, Harvard University,
University of California - Los Angeles, University of Pennsylvania.
Academic Journal Refereeing
Dr. Aron has served as a referee for The Rand Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political
Economy, the Journal of Finance, the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, the Journal of Industrial Economics, the Journal of Economics and Business, the
Journal of Economic Theory, the Journal of Labor Economics, the Review of Industrial
Organization, the European Economic Review, the Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, the International Review of Economics and Business, the Quarterly Review of Economics
and Business, Management Science, the Journal of Public Economics, the Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics, and the National Science Foundation.
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Testimony (2011-2025)
Prefiled Written Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Debra J. Aron in In the Matter of the Joint Application of
Verizon Communications Inc., Frontier Communications Parent, Inc., Frontier California Inc.,
Citizens Telecommunications Company of California Inc., Frontier Communications of the
Southwest Inc., Frontier Communications Online and Long Distance Inc., and Frontier
Communications of America, Inc. For Approval of the Transfer of Control of Frontier California Inc.
(U1002C), Citizens Telecommunications Company of California (U1024C), Frontier
Communications of the Southwest Inc. (U1026C), Frontier Communications Online and Long
Distance Inc. (U7167C), and Frontier Communications of America, Inc. (U5429C), to Verizon
Communications Inc. Pursuant to California Public Utilities Code Section 854., Before the Public
Utilities Commission of the State of California, Application No.: A.24-10-006, May 15, 2025.
Prefiled Written Testimony of Dr. Debra J. Aron in In the Matter of the Joint Application of Verizon
Communications Inc., Frontier Communications Parent, Inc., Frontier California Inc., Citizens
Telecommunications Company of California Inc., Frontier Communications of the Southwest Inc.,
Frontier Communications Online and Long Distance Inc., and Frontier Communications of America,
Inc. For Approval of the Transfer of Control of Frontier California Inc. (U1002C), Citizens
Telecommunications Company of California (U1024C), Frontier Communications of the Southwest
Inc. (U1026C), Frontier Communications Online and Long Distance Inc. (U7167C), and Frontier
Communications of America, Inc. (U5429C), to Verizon Communications Inc. Pursuant to California
Public Utilities Code Section 854., Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California,
Application No.: A.24-10-006, January 24, 2025.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in ERIS Information Inc, et al., v. The Sanborn Library LLC, et al.,
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 1:19-cv-02049-JHR-OTW,
February 29, 2024 and March 1, 2024.
Prefiled Written Testimony of Dr. Debra J. Aron in Thomas Fire and Debris Flow Cost Recovery
Application – Economic Policy Testimony, Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California, Application No.: A.23-08-013, August 22, 2023.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Dominique Freeman, et al., v. Mam USA Corporation, United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 1:20-cv-01834, July 26, 2023.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Mary Bilek, et al., v. National Congress of Employers, Inc., et al.,
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:16-cv-08637, November 16,
2022.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron In Re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:16-cv-08637, June 22, 2022.
Testimony of Debra J. Aron regarding Reciprocal Switching, Before the Surface Transportation
Board, STB Ex Parte No. 711 (Sub-No. 1), March 15, 2022.
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Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Jenny Brown, et al. v. DirecTV, LLC, United States District Court
Central District of California, Western Division, No. 2:13-cv-01170-DMG-E, June 18, 2021.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Robin Breda, et al. v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless,
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-11512-DJC,
June 3, 2021.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Naomi Gonzales v. Agway Energy Services, LLC, United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York, Case No. 5:18-CV-235 (MAD/ATB), October 22,
2020.
Trial Testimony of Debra J. Aron in Sumotext Corp. v. Zoove, Inc. et al., United States District
Court, Northern District of California, San Jose Division, Case No. 5:16-cv-01370-BLF-NMCx,
March 3, 2020.
Trial Testimony of Debra J. Aron in Motorola Solutions, Inc. et al. v. Hytera Communications
Corporation Ltd. et al., United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, Case No. 1:17-cv-01973, February 3-4, 2020.
Hearing Testimony of Debra J. Aron in Order Instituting Rulemaking into the Review of California
High Cost Fund-A Program, Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California,
Rulemaking 11-11-007, January 29-30, 2020.
Prefiled Written Testimony of Debra J. Aron in Order Instituting Rulemaking into the Review of
California High Cost Fund-A Program, Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California, Rulemaking 11-11-007, November 15, 2019.
Trial Testimony of Debra J. Aron in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Quanta Storage Inc. et al., United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, Case No. 4:18-cv-00762,
October 21, 2019.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Motorola Solutions, Inc. et al. v. Hytera Communications Corporation
Ltd. et al., United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Case No.
1:17-cv-01973, September 20, 2019.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Jonathan Coffey et al. v. WCW & Air, Inc. et al., United States
District Court, for the Northern District of Florida, Pensacola Division, Case No. 3:17-cv-90-TKW-
HTC, September 13, 2019.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Sumotext Corp. v. Zoove, Inc. et al., United States District Court,
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, Case No. 5:16-cv-01370-BLF-NMCx, August 1,
2019.
Deposition of Debra J. Aron in Waddell Williams, et al. v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., United States
District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 8:17-CV-1971-T-27AAS,
September 21, 2018.
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