Ameris Bank v. Byrne — Entry #48: MOTION for Leave to File Counterclaims/Second Amended Complaint - filed by Patrick E
Case: Ameris Bank v. Byrne ded · 1:26-cv-00190
filed February 20, 2026
What this document is
Docket entry #48 · filed September 30, 2026
MOTION for Leave to File Counterclaims/Second Amended Complaint - filed by Patrick E. Byrne, The Patrick E. Byrne Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021, The Patrick E. Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February 23, 2001. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Chapple, Benjamin) Modified on 10/1/2026 (ceg). (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/1/2026: # 4 Certification Pursuant to D. Del.LR 7.1.1) (ceg). (Entered: 09/30/2026)
Who is involved
- Ameris Bank
- Patrick E. Byrne
- The Patrick E. Byrne Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021
- The Patrick E. Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February 23, 2001
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its former name “Riot Blockchain, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
…action between same parties); Takata v. Riot Blockchain, Inc., 2023 WL 7133219, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Aug…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 14, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
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Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 48-2 Filed 09/30/26 Page 1 of 29 PageID #: 670
Exhibit 2
Case 1:26-cv-00190-JLH Document 48-2 Filed 09/30/26 Page 2 of 29 PageID #: 671
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
AMERIS BANK,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
Case No. 1:2526-cv-01557-00190-JLH
PATRICK E. BYRNE, THE PATRICK E.
BYRNE REVOCABLE TRUST U/T/A
DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2001, and THE
PATRICK E. BYRNE IRREVOCABLE
TRUST U/T/A DATED JULY 22, 2021,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERIS BANK,
Defendant.Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.
FIRSTSECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT/COUNTERCLAIMS 1
Plaintiffs Patrick E. Byrne (“Byrne”), The Patrick E. Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated
February 23, 2001 (“Byrne Revocable Trust”), and The Patrick E. Byrne Irrevocable Trust U/T/A
Dated July 22, 2021 (“Byrne Irrevocable Trust”, with the Byrne Revocable Trust, the “Byrne
Trusts”) (collectively, “Sellers”) submit this FirstSecond Amended Complaint/Counterclaims, and
in support thereof, allege, upon knowledge as to themselves and their own actions and upon
information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:
1
Sellers previously filed their complaint and first amended complaint in Case No. 1:25-cv-01557-
JLH prior to the court consolidating that action with this action on August 24, 2026 and, in
connection with consolidation, designating Sellers as defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs.
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NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. Byrne is the founder, former majority shareholder, and former Chief Executive
Officer of Balboa Capital Corporation (“Balboa”), a financial technology company that provides
business lending solutions to small and medium-sized businesses nationwide for the purchase or
lease of business equipment.
2. On December 10, 2021, Sellers and Balboa entered into a Stock Purchase
Agreement (“SPA”) with Defendant Ameris Bank (“Ameris”) under which Ameris acquired
Balboa. Following the closing of the SPA, Balboa continued to operate in California as a
separately run and operated division of Ameris (the “Balboa Division”), with the now-former
Balboa employees continuing to perform essentially the same job duties they had previously.
3. Ameris, however, procured the SPA by fraud. Critical to the Sellers’ inducement
to sell Balboa to Ameris was the execution of the Balboa Capital Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan
(“LTIP”), which would provide cash bonus awards to employees of the continuing Balboa
Division based on the achievement of certain performance thresholds that were to be calculated
based on an agreed-upon formula that was laid out in the LTIP. 2 But, as Sellers would learn
following the close of the first LTIP cycle on December 31, 2022, Ameris never intended to honor
the LTIP and at its first opportunity breached its promise to Sellers and Balboa’s former employees
by intentionally miscalculating the cash bonus awards due thereunder in violation of the agreed
uponagreed-upon calculation formula in the LTIP. Had Sellers known that Ameris never intended
to honor the LTIP, Sellers would not have agreed to enter into the Stock Purchase Agreement with
Ameris.
2
Unless otherwise alleged herein, all of Ameris’s fraudulent representations and omissions were
made to Byrne on behalf of all Sellers.
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4. Ameris profited handsomely from its fraudulent acts. Not only did Ameris’s fraud
enable it to acquire Balboa by inducing Sellers to enter into the SPA, following the closing of the
SPA, the former Balboa employees who were parties to the LTIP were induced by the promise of
the cash bonus awards under the LTIP to work above and beyond their normal job responsibilities
to ensure that the performance thresholds necessary to trigger the cash bonus awards were met.
As a result of Ameris’s fraudulent inducement, the hard work of the former Balboa employees
increased the Balboa Division’s profitability substantially, resulting in additional profits for
Ameris and increased stock value for Ameris stockholders (value Sellers could have retained had
Ameris not fraudulently induced entry into the SPA).
5. Ameris’s fraudulent promise that it would comply with the terms of the LTIP was
also critical to Sellers’ agreement to certain indemnification rights in the SPA. More specifically,
in reliance on Ameris’s fraudulent representationpromise, Sellers agreed to indemnify and hold
harmless Ameris against losses incurred in certain litigation that was pending against Balboa at
the time of its acquisition. The transactions underlying that litigation had been written down to
zero on Balboa’s books before the acquisition date, in conjunction with the negotiation of the LTIP,
so Sellers had already absorbed the associated loss through the purchase price, which was
calculated as a multiple of Balboa’s closing equity.
6. Sellers accepted the residual indemnification exposure only because of Ameris’s
LTIP commitment.
7. 6. Sellers now bring this action for rescission or partial rescission of the SPA,
rescissory damages, and other relief. Ameris should be required to restore to Sellers the benefits
procured from Sellers under the SPA and pay any additional monetary damages arising from its
fraudulent inducement.
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7. In the alternative, Sellers seek equitable reformation of the SPA, on the basis of
fraudulent inducement, to void the indemnification provisions therein.
8. Ameris is no stranger to willful misconduct relating to its failure to comply with
the LTIP, evidenced by the outcome of the related proceeding in Patrick Byrne v. Ameris Bank,
Case No. 8:24-cv-01989-MWC-JDE (C.D. Cal.) (the “California Action”). Specifically, the jury
in the California Action found that “Ameris acted with malice, oppression, or fraud” (D.I. 227 at
8; D.I. 246 ¶ 27) in connection with Ameris’s retaliatory termination of Byrne as an employee in
June 2024 following Byrne raising concerns about Ameris’s incorrect LTIP calculations. 3 The
California Action jury further found that Ameris owed Byrne wages under the LTIP for 2022 and
2023, that Ameris willfully failed to pay the full amount of earned wages, that Ameris breached
3
The California Action and this action involve distinct plaintiffs proceeding in different capacities
and seeking different relief. In the California Action, Byrne brought suit solely in his individual
capacity as a former employee of Ameris, asserting employment-related claims: (i) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, (ii) whistleblower retaliation under California Labor
Code § 1102.5, (iii) failure to pay all wages at termination in breach of California Labor Code
§§201 and 203, (iv) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, and (v) breach of Byrne’s
employment agreement and the LTIP. The damages sought and awarded in the California Action
compensated Byrne for harms suffered as an employee: lost wages, non-economic damages arising
from his wrongful termination, and waiting-time penalties. See California Action Am. Compl.
(D.I. 207).
By contrast, this action is brought by the Sellers—Byrne and the Byrne Trusts—in their capacities
as the former shareholders of Balboa who were parties to the SPA. The claims asserted here—
fraudulent inducement, equitable fraud, and breach of the SPA—arise from Ameris’s fraudulent
procurement of the SPA itself, and the relief sought is rescission and/or rescissory damages
flowing from the fraudulently induced sale of Balboa. Neither the Byrne Revocable Trust nor the
Byrne Irrevocable Trust was a party to the California Action, and no claim for rescission of the
SPA was or could have been asserted in that proceeding because, among other things, the SPA’s
forum-selection clause requires SPA-related disputes to be litigated in Delaware (and Byrne’s
claims in the California Action were required to be litigated in California under the LTIP’s separate
forum-selection clause). The California Action’s findings are relevant here as evidence of
Ameris’s fraudulent intent and course of conduct in connection with the LTIP—the very
instrument Ameris used to induce Sellers to enter the SPA—but the causes of action and damages
in this case are distinct.
-4-
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its contract with Byrne, and that Ameris willfully miscalculated the LTIP bonus pool. (D.I. 246
¶¶ 11-12, 26-27, 30, 42). The jury awarded Byrne $62,906,613 in punitive damages, and the
California court entered judgment in Byrne’s favor in the amount of $79,548,170.80. (D.I. 253).
The California court’s Findings of Fact dated June 29, 2026, further found that Ameris owed Byrne
$3,234,276 in earned LTIP wages for 2022 and 2023, that Ameris willfully miscalculated the LTIP
bonus pool for performance periods 2022 and 2023, and that Ameris breached the LTIP and
Byrne’s Employment Agreement by failing to calculate the LTIP bonus pool in a manner
consistent with the LTIP’s terms for all applicable performance periods (2022, 2023, and 2024).
(D.I. 246 ¶¶ 13-14, 25, 29, 42, 45-46). 4
PARTIES
9. 8. Plaintiff Byrne is an individual residing in Orange County, California.
10. 9. Plaintiff Byrne Revocable Trust is a revocable trust that was formed in and under
the laws of the State of California.
11. 10. Plaintiff Byrne Irrevocable Trust is an irrevocable trust that was formed in and
under the laws of the State of California.
12. 11. Defendant Ameris is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Georgia with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia.
4
Many of the amended allegations herein rest on factual information disclosed in the California
Action that was not public before the jury trial. Sellers requested that Ameris consent to Sellers’
use of non-public information exchanged in the California Action that Sellers could rely on to
support this Second Amended Complaint, subject to the protective order entered in this action.
Ameris agreed only to permit Sellers to rely on that information once it is produced in discovery
in this action. Sellers asked Ameris to reconsider its position because Sellers were in the process
of amending their complaint, but Ameris never agreed. As a result, Sellers cannot rely on the full
breadth of information discovered through the California Action to support their claims.
-5-
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
because this action involves an amount in controversy that exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.
14. 13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Ameris because, pursuant to Section
10.8 of the SPA, it Ameris consented to this Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of any
actionAction arising out of the SPA or the transactions contemplated thereby, as provided in
Section 10.8 of the SPA.
15. 14. Venue is proper in this Court because, pursuant to Section 10.8 of the SPA,
Ameris
irrevocably and unconditionally waived any objection to the laying of venue of anythis
action arising out of the SPA in this Court, as provided in Section 10.8 of the SPA.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
16. 15. Founded in 1988 by Byrne, Balboa is a financial technology company that
provides business lending solutions to small and medium-sized businesses nationwide for the
purchase or lease of business equipment. Through Byrne’s leadership, Balboa grew into one of
the nation’s largest privately held finance companies. Byrne, in conjunction with the Byrne
Revocable Trust and Byrne Irrevocable TrustTrusts, owned all shares of Balboa prior to its
acquisition by Ameris.
16. Ameris became interested in acquiring Balboa and began negotiations with Byrne.
17. Because of the reputation Byrne had built for Balboa, many companies were
heavily interested in acquiring Balboa—one of which was Ameris.
18. Accordingly, in 2021, Ameris began negotiations with Byrne to acquire Balboa.
As Jim LaHaise, Chief Strategy Officer of Ameris, testified at the California trial, Ameris was
aware that it would have to consider Byrne’s preferences for the future of Balboa “to win” the
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Balboa transaction over other potential acquirors. A critical consideration for Byrne throughout
the negotiation process, when considering to whom he would sell Balboa, was to ensure that
Balboa’s employees would not lose their jobs following Ameris’s acquisition of the company, and
that the soon-to-be former employees of Balboa would be fairly compensated for the time, effort,
and energy they put intoinvested in Balboa’s continued success as they transitioned intoto being
employees of Ameris.
19. 17. To that end, Byrne secured Ameris’s agreement to enter into the LTIP with
eligible former employees of Balboa that would continue on as employees of Ameriswho,
following the closing of the acquisition., would become employees of Ameris as part of Ameris’s
new “Balboa Division.” Under the LTIP, eligible employees of the Balboa Division would be
entitled to “Cash Bonus Awards” based on the achievement of certain “Performance Goals”
defined therein. The Performance Goals under the LTIP would be satisfied if Balboa reached a
minimum threshold of earnings before taxes (or “EBT”) of $37 million, $48.5 million, and $57.2
million for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024, respectively. If Balboa exceeded the Performance
Goals for these given years, 35% of the amount by which Balboa exceeded the Performance Goal
threshold would be placed in an “Incentive Pool” from which the Cash Bonus Awards would be
distributed to employees working in the Balboa Division.
20. 18. Critically, to avoid any inconsistencies in the payment of Cash Bonus Awards
to former Balboa employees, Byrne ensured that the LTIP contained a specific formula for
calculating when the Performance Goals were reached and exceeded that was consistent with
Balboa’s financial accounting methodologies—specifically, the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model.
To that end, the LTIP expressly provides that EBT—the critical component of determining
whether a Performance Goal was met—“is defined as actual annual earnings before tax as
-7-
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identified as ‘Actual Earnings Before Tax’ in the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model,.” which The
Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model was attached to the LTIP as Exhibit A. The LTIP further provides
that “[f]or purposes of the calculation of EBT under this Agreement and the Plan (defined below),
the Key Assumptions (defined below) must be used in interpretation and application of the Pioneer
1Q21 Operating Model for purposes of the calculation of EBT, and no costs of a type not
contemplated by the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model will be allocated to Balboa.” 5
21. 19. During the parties’ negotiations, Byrne (and, in some instances, other Balboa
personnel, including Phil Silva, Balboa’s Chief Financial Officer, and Rob Rasmussen, Balboa’s
Chief Operating Officer) held numerous focused discussions with Ameris personnel concerning
the application of the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model to the LTIP and the importance of adhering
to accounting methodologies consistent with Balboa’s past practices. During the conversations,
Ameris representatives repeatedly assured Byrne that Ameris would faithfully apply the Pioneer
1Q21 Operating Model in implementing the LTIP and adhere to accounting methodologies
consistent with Balboa’s pre-acquisition practices. Those discussions with Byrne included, among
others:
a. Phone calls with Jim LaHaise (then Ameris’s Chief Strategy Officer) and
Michael Jones and Daniel Larrea of Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Ameris’s
(“KBW”), Balboa’s financial advisor, between approximately July 2021
and December 9, 2021;
5
“Plan” is defined as the “Balboa Capital Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan” and “Key
Assumptions” are defined to include the following: (a) initial direct costs will be calculated using
GAAP methodology; (b) the indirect costs used will be 1%; (c) there will be no allocation of
indirect Ameris indirect expenses to Balboa by Ameris, and there will be no transfer pricing
between Ameris and Balboa; (d) Balboa will not be charged for any other cost of capital other than
the 1% cost of funds on the average outstanding balance on all earning assets; (e) Balboa will bear
all direct costs associated incurred in its operations, and Ameris will pass through at actual cost
without markup any discounts relating to Balboa’s operations that Ameris enjoys with suppliers
and vendors; and (f) the allowance for loan losses calculations and expenses for Balboa will be the
greater of (i) actual net charge-offs or (ii) 1.25% of net investment in direct financing leases.
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b. A phone call with Mr. LaHaise on or about August 1–2, 2021;
c. A phone call with Palmer Proctor, Ameris’s Chief Executive Officer, on or
about August 1–2, 2021;
d. Due diligence phone calls with Messrs. LaHaise and Proctor, Nicole
Stokes (Ameris’s Chief Financial Officer), Jon Edwards (Ameris’s Chief
Credit Officer), Jody Spencer (Ameris’s Chief Legal Officer), Ross Creasy
(Ameris’s Chief Information Officer), Bill McKendry (Ameris’s Chief Risk
Office), and Doug Strange (Ameris’s then-Executive Vice President and
current Chief Credit Officer), between November 15, 2021, and December
9, 2021;
d. e. Due diligence phone calls with Messrs. LaHaise, Edwards, McKendry,
Strange, and Spencer, and Ms. Stokes, between July and August 2, 2021;
e. f. An in-person meeting at Ameris’s office in Atlanta, Georgia with Messrs.
LaHaise, Proctor, and Edwards and Ms. Stokes in August 2021;
f. g. A dinner with Messrs. LaHaise, Edwards, and McKendry, and Ms. Stokes
in Atlanta, Georgia on the same evening as the parties’ in-person meeting
at Ameris’s office in August 2021; and
g. Due diligence phone calls with Messrs. LaHaise and Proctor, Nicole Stokes
(Ameris’s Chief Financial Officer), Jon Edwards (Ameris’s Chief Credit
Officer), Jody Spencer (Ameris’s Chief Legal Officer), Ross Creasy
(Ameris’s Chief Information Officer), Bill McKendry (Ameris’s Chief Risk
Officer), and Doug Strange (Ameris’s then-Executive Vice President and
current Chief Credit Officer), between November 15, 2021, and December
9, 2021; and
h. In-person meetings in Irvine, California: (i) between August 2 and
December 10, 2021 with: (a) Messrs. McKendry and Creasy; (b) Messrs.
LaHaise and Creasy; and (c) Mr. McKendry and Ms. Stokes; and (iid) with
Messrs. LaHaise and Proctor.
22. 20. Ameris, by and through Messrs. LaHaise and Edwards and Ms. Stokes,
affirmatively represented to Byrne during the aforementioned calls between August and November
2021, as well as during the aforementioned meeting and dinner in Atlanta, Georgia in August 2021,
that Balboa’s existing financial accounting methodologies and the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model
would continue to be used post-closing by Ameris for purposes of the LTIP and Cash Bonus
Awards calculations thereunder irrespective of Ameris’s financial reporting results or obligations;
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in other words, that Ameris would honor and comply with the LTIP’s terms post-closing.
23. 21. Obtaining Ameris’s agreement to the terms of the LTIP and commitment to
enter into the LTIP with eligible employees of the Balboa Division was a critical consideration in
Byrne’s ultimate decision to sell Balboa to Ameris. The LTIP was a heavily-negotiated component
that was key in inducing Byrne to execute the SPA. For example, in the California Action, Mr.
LaHaise recognized that there were six or seven drafts of the LTIP exchanged between the parties
and that the LTIP “was part of the negotiations” and was “part of a benefit that the bank proposed
to Mr. Byrne” to ultimately win the acquisition. Put simply, Ameris knew how important the LTIP
was to Byrne in securing the acquisition of Balboa and thus worked extensively to negotiate the
final version of the LTIP to help secure the SPA.
24. Without the LTIP and assurances that the soon-to-be former Balboa
employees were protected and would be fairly compensated going forward, Byrne would
not have sold Balboa to Ameris. Mr. Rasmussen confirmed at trial in the California Action
that the LTIP was “very important” to the overall purchase agreement and was a key part
of the acquisition to ensure that Balboa’s employees were retained. The LTIP was also a
critical consideration
in Byrne’s decision to agree to certain indemnification provisions in the SPA. During the
negotiation process, Ameris insisted that Sellers indemnify Ameris for any losses associated with
certain litigation that was pending against Balboa at the time. The transactions underlying that
litigation had been written down to zero on Balboa’s books before the acquisition date, in
conjunction with the negotiation of the LTIP and the protections secured for Balboa’s employees.
Because the purchase price was calculated at 3.1 times Balboa’s closing equity, that write-down
meant Sellers absorbed the associated loss in the purchase price itself, and Section 5.14 of the SPA
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correspondingly directs recoveries from that litigation above $1,800,000, net of costs, to the Trusts,
returning to Sellers the upside on assets whose cost Sellers had already borne. The indemnification
provisions in Section 8 thus layered residual litigation exposure on Sellers on top of a purchase
price that already carried the loss. Byrne was willing to take on the risk that Sellers would have
to indemnify Ameris only because he understood that the soon-to-be-former Balboa employees
would be sufficiently protected and compensated post-acquisition. Accordingly, Sellers agreed to
the indemnification provisions found in Section 8 of the SPA.
22. On December 10, 2021, Ameris entered into the SPA with Sellers and agreed to the
25. Ameris, through its employees and representatives, made it clear that it knew the
importance of the LTIP to Byrne’s decision to choose Ameris over other competitive bidders.
Balboa’s investment bank, KBW, marketed Balboa in 2021 and contacted 164 depository
institutions—30 of which executed confidentiality agreements, six of which attended management
meetings, and four of which submitted indications of interest on May 26 and 27, 2021, including
Ameris. The two leading bids were within approximately one percent of one another on cash
consideration. Byrne asked the bidders three times, through KBW, whether they would improve
their bids, without sufficient progress. Ultimately, Ameris, in its August 2, 2021 letter of intent,
signed by LaHaise and accepted by Byrne, eliminated the earn-out component of Ameris’s prior
indication of interest, increased Ameris’s all-cash consideration to 310% of Balboa’s closing
equity, approximately $182 million, and committed to the uncapped incentive pool that became
the LTIP. Ameris’s pre-closing agreement to comply with the LTIP was what distinguished
Ameris from the rest of the bidders and ultimately swayed Mr. Byrne in choosing Ameris over the
other bidders.
26. On the same day—December 10, 2021—Ameris both entered into the SPA with
Sellers and agreed to the LTIP for the former Balboa employees. Although the LTIP is not
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expressly referenced in the SPA, the LTIP was negotiated contemporaneously with the SPA as an
integral component of the overall acquisition transaction.
LTIP.
27. 23. Ameris, contrary to its pre-closing representations to Byrne (who remained as
CEO of Balboa post-acquisition), breached the LTIP at its first opportunity. Specifically,
beginning with the first LTIP cycle for the year 2022, which closed on December 31, 2022, Ameris
intentionally miscalculated Balboa’s EBT in violation of the agreed uponagreed-upon calculation
methodology under the LTIP. More specifically, Ameris willfully used methods that were
inconsistent with the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model and disregarded the “Key Assumptions” that
the LTIP required to be applied. 6 Instead, Ameris calculated the EBT of Balboa using methods
that intentionally lowered Balboa’s EBT, and by extension, lowered or eliminated the Cash Bonus
Awards earned but not received by approximately 145 Balboa employees participating in the LTIP
from 2022 to 2024. Ameris’s intentional miscalculations resulted in a reduction of the Incentive
Pool for 2022 and eliminated the Incentive Pool for 2023, thereby depriving approximately 145
employees of the Cash Bonus Awards they rightfully earned under the LTIP for their work in 2022
and 2023.
28. 24. Sellers did not discover—and could not have reasonably discovered—
Ameris’s fraudulent intent and acts until after the first Cash Bonus Award became due
6
“Key Assumptions” are defined to include the following: (a) initial direct costs will be calculated
using GAAP methodology; (b) the indirect costs used will be 1%; (c) there will be no allocation
of indirect Ameris expenses to Balboa by Ameris, and there will be no transfer pricing between
Ameris and Balboa; (d) Balboa will not be charged for any other cost of capital other than the 1%
cost of funds on the average outstanding balance on all earning assets; (e) Balboa will bear all
direct costs associated with its operations, and Ameris will pass through at actual cost without
markup any discounts relating to Balboa’s operations that Ameris enjoys with suppliers and
vendors; and (f) the allowance for loan losses calculations and expenses for Balboa will be the
greater of (i) actual net charge-offs or (ii) 1.25% of net investment in direct financing leases.
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following the close of the first LTIP cycle on December 31, 2022. Byrne’s discovery of
discrepancies in the LTIP calculations did not itself reveal that Ameris had intended not to
comply with the LTIP when it entered into the SPA. As described below, Ameris continued
to present those discrepancies as accounting disagreements it would resolve in good faith,
while the internal communications bearing on its intent remained unknown to Sellers.
Between closing and when the first Cash Bonus
Award became due, Sellers did not have access to theAmeris’s internal financial systems,
accounting decisions, or other information within Ameris’s exclusive possession that would have
been necessary to detect Ameris’s departures in accounting methodologies. And, as recited above,
in numerous discussions and meetings spanning many months, Ameris had previouslyrepeatedly
represented to Byrne at all relevant times that it would comply with the terms of the LTIP.
29. Evidence in the California Action—namely internal correspondence among Ameris
executives—reflects Ameris’s strategic miscalculations of the LTIP and Ameris specifically
“cherry-picking” certain factors to include in its LTIP calculation based on how these factors
would lower the LTIP accrual. For example, less than two weeks after the LTIP cycle closed,
Ameris representatives (including its CFO, Ms. Stokes), were strategizing how certain charge offs
would negatively impact the LTIP accrual. Ameris repeatedly cherry-picked factors to include in
its LTIP calculations to avoid paying Byrne what he was rightfully owed, reflecting that Ameris
never intended to perform under the LTIP.
30. 25. Beginning in or about June 2023, after the close of the first LTIP cycle, Byrne
complained repeatedly to Ameris about its miscalculations but understood, following
conversations with Ameris personnel, those disputes to be ordinary post-closing accounting
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disagreements that Ameris would try to resolve in good faith. 7 For example, Mr. LaHaise told
Byrne in an email that he would only charge Balboa 1% cost of funds against the LTIP calculation
as agreed upon, but evidence introduced in the California Action established that Ameris had never
intended to abide by that promise and failed to remove any additional charges from the calculation.
31. Ameris’s intention to never comply with the LTIP is demonstrated by, among other
things, Ameris’s failure to take any steps prior to closing to enable it to comply with the financial
and accounting methodologies underlying the required LTIP calculations. Ameris failed to take
any preparatory steps because it never intended to comply with the LTIP.
32. Ameris’s failure to take any preparatory steps to comply with the LTIP is especially
notable because Ameris knew, prior to entering into the SPA, that its existing accounting
methodologies deviated substantially from the required methodology set forth in the Pioneer 1Q21
Operating Model and, as a result, substantial accounting and bookkeeping changes were required
internally to accurately account for payments due under the LTIP.
33. 26. Ameris, however, never intended to perform under the LTIP. Following
Byrne’s complaints, Sellers learned that Ameris, prior to (and after) its acquisition of Balboa,
utilized financial accounting methodologies that differed materially from Balboa’s financial
accounting methodologies and the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model. And Ameris never tookwas
required to comply with the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model immediately following closing but
failed to do so. Ameris did not take any steps prior to closing to implement the bookkeeping
procedures andthat would be necessary to perform under the LTIP. Likewise, Ameris did not take
7
Byrne’s belief that Ameris would act in good faith to resolve disputes about the LTIP calculations
continued into 2024, and Ameris’s fraudulent conduct was not apparent during this period due to
Ameris’s active concealment and because Ameris’s internal communications and documentations
evidencing Ameris’s fraud were not known to Sellers.
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any steps prior to closing to implement the financial accounting methodologies that would be
necessary to perform under the LTIP, either prior to or immediately after closing. In fact, Ameris
never took steps to implement the necessary bookkeeping procedures or financial accounting
methodologies.
34. Indeed, the Ameris employee responsible for preparing the LTIP calculations—
Sufhan Majid, Senior Vice President, Director of Accounting—testified at trial in the California
Action 8 that he could not describe the basic formula he used to calculate the LTIP, could not
identify the LTIP components, and pulled data exclusively from Ameris’s own reporting software
(TM-1) rather than from Balboa’s accounting systems. Nicole Stokes further testified that Ameris
failed to apply Balboa’s “established CECL model,” as was also required. Mr. Majid’s and Ms.
Stokes’s testimony confirms that Ameris failed to take any actions prior to closing or following
closing to establish the systems or procedures that would have been necessary to calculate EBT in
accordance with the Pioneer 1Q21 Operating Model and Balboa’s past practices, as required by
the LTIP. Ameris’s own accounting expert, Ms. Maryellen Sebold, admitted at the California trial
that Ameris did not follow the LTIP calculations.
35. 27. It thus became clear to SellersDiscovery in the California Action further
revealed to Byrne that Ameris never intended to apply Balboa’s financial accounting
methodologies to the newly formed Balboa divisionDivision—despite agreeing to do so in the
LTIP—or otherwise honor the LTIP’s terms. Instead, Ameris’s plan was always (including prior
to closing) to apply its own, materially different, financial accounting methodology to the newly
formed Balboa divisionDivision in a way that reduced or eliminated amounts payable under the
LTIP.
8
Mr. Majid’s testimony was introduced at trial through videotaped deposition.
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36. 28. Ameris’s fraudulent conduct did not end there. While Ameris personnel,
starting in or about June 2023, communicated with Byrne about his concerns regarding Ameris’s
miscalculations and its clear breach of the LTIP, Ameris never ultimately meaningfully addressed
themthe concerns or conformed its methodologies to comply with the LTIP. Instead, Quite the
opposite—Ameris selected adjustments to the required LTIP calculation that pushed EBT
downward, away from the threshold that would result in bonuses to Balboa’s hardworking
employees. And any adjustments that Ameris made after Byrne raised concerns were intentionally
designed to keep the final EBT below that same threshold.
37. Ameris’s internal communications demonstrate that Ameris’s focus was not on
ensuring that it accurately calculated the LTIP net income hurdle, but rather on creating the
impression that it was. 9 Beneath the façade presented to Byrne, Ameris was behind the scenes
scheming about ways to manipulate the LTIP net income hurdle to ensure Ameris would not have
to pay out bonuses pursuant to the LTIP. For example, in or about January 2024, when Byrne
raised additional concerns regarding the final 2023 LTIP calculations, instead of addressing
Byrne’s concerns regarding the accuracy of the LTIP calculations, Ameris schemed on ways to
ensure that the LTIP calculations did not meet the net income hurdle—while giving Byrne the false
impression that Ameris was legitimately addressing his concerns.
38. On January 15, 2024, Byrne proposed six revisions to the LTIP calculation. Upon
receipt of Byrne’s revised LTIP calculation, Nicole Stokes, Chief Financial Officer, and David
Sparacio, Executive Vice President, Controller, discussed which of Byrne’s revisions would
9
Discovery in the California Action was focused on Ameris’s post-closing conduct. Sellers’
ability to identify particularized pre-closing internal communications, among other evidentiary
support, is limited due to those documents being primarily (if not exclusively) within the
possession, custody and control of Ameris.
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overcome the net income hurdle, stating that “the only scenario . . . described that overcomes that
hurdle is accepting items 1 plus 5 plus 6.” Mr. Sparacio’s email reflects Ameris’s intent not to
comply with the LTIP by stating “items 1 plus 6 and in case of net income of $872,770 equals
LTIP net income hurdle still not met.” Over the next couple days, Ms. Stokes, Mr. Sparacio, and
Mr. Majid continued to analyze different variations of the calculations proposed by Byrne and
assess the impact such calculations would have on the net income threshold and LTIP calculation.
Id. At bottom, Ameris was conducting a sensitivity analysis to see to what extent they could agree
with Byrne without triggering a payment owed under the LTIP.
39. Roughly one week later, on January 25, 2024, Stokes proposed charge offs for
Ameris to charge against the net income hurdle to further avoid paying out Byrne under the LTIP.
Ultimately, Ameris decided on Majid’s proposal of “items 1 plus 5 plus 6 less the audit and
professional fees and no adjustment to charge offs, net income goes up by $2,529,992 and charge
offs goes up 1.88 million to $43,964,694 and the LTIP is not met by approximately 611K.” Id.
When Mr. Majid finally found a way to calculate the LTIP while leaving EBT just shy of the bonus
threshold, Ms. Stokes responded with an emphatic “Thank you!” Id.
40. This conduct shows that instead of addressing Byrne’s concerns regarding the
accuracy of Ameris’s LTIP calculations, Ameris terminated Byrne in June 2024 to further conceal
the fact that it never intended to honor the LTIP in the first place.
29. Unsurprisingly, then, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, in ruling on Ameris’s motion for summary judgment in pending litigation
between Byrne and Ameris in that District, found that “[a] rational jury could review the
numerous emails [Byrne] sent to [Ameris] regarding purported miscalculations, as well as
internal communications among Ameris employees discussing his contentions, and
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determine that [Ameris] willfully performed the LTIP calculations improperly.” Patrick
Byrne v. Ameris Bank, Case No. 8:24-cv-01989-MWC-JDE (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2026), Dkt.
121 at 16.
41. Moreover, in June 2026, the California Action proceeded to trial. At trial, the
claims before the jury were: (1) Ameris’s wrongful termination of Byrne in violation of public
policy; (2) retaliation against Byrne in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5 (whistleblower
protection); (3) failure to pay Byrne all earned wages; and (4) breach of the LTIP. See California
Action, D.I. 227. Trial of these claims required the California Action jury to consider key facts
central to the claims in this instant action. For example, to reach its verdict that Ameris engaged
in its wrongful conduct “with malice, oppression, or fraud,” the California Action jury heard
testimony regarding the factual circumstances of the acquisition of Balboa by Ameris, the
negotiation of the LTIP alongside the SPA, Ameris’s application of and deviation from the LTIP’s
EBT calculation methodology, and Ameris’s manipulation of LTIP calculations at Byrne’s
expense.
42. Ultimately, the California Action jury found in favor of Byrne on all counts.
Furthermore, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the California Action Court found
that Ameris violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by, among other things, “breaching the
LTIP and Byrne’s Employment Agreement by failing to calculate the LTIP bonus pool in a manner
consistent with the LTIP’s terms for performance periods 2022, 2023, and 2024.” D.I. 246 ¶ 46.
43. Notably, the California Action jury unanimously found that Byrne’s complaints
about Ameris’s failure to pay earned wages were a “substantial motivating reason” for Ameris’s
decision to discharge Byrne, and that Ameris could not prove by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have discharged Byrne for any legitimate, independent reason. This also allowed
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Ameris to conceal from Byrne that he was owed an LTIP bonus payment for 2024. At trial in the
California Action, Mr. LaHaise admitted that Byrne was eligible for a 2024 LTIP bonus, but no
bonus was paid. Instead, Ameris paid Byrne’s successor, Mr. Silva (who did not complain about
the LTIP), a “management bonus” and similar position and compensation structure after Byrne
was terminated.
44. The California Action’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reflect the same
continuous course of fraudulent and intentional misconduct underlying this action before the
Court. The issues decided in the California Action—including whether Ameris breached the LTIP,
whether Ameris’s LTIP calculations were willfully improper, and whether Ameris acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud—overlap substantially with core issues in this action. These issues
were litigated and necessarily decided by the California Action jury and court, and Ameris had a
full and fair opportunity to contest them. Accordingly, Ameris should be collaterally estopped
from relitigating the same issues in this action.
45. 30. Given Ameris’s willful breach of the LTIP at its first opportunity, as well as its
failure, prior to and immediately after closing, to implement any of the bookkeeping procedures
and financial accounting methodologies necessary to comply with the LTIP, it is clearsupport the
conclusion that Ameris never intended to honor its terms. Instead, Ameris fraudulently represented
(both by executing the LTIP and during the negotiation process with Byrne) that it would comply
with the terms of the LTIP.
46. 31. As a result of these fraudulent acts, Ameris received a windfall. Not only did
Ameris fraudulently induce Sellers to enter into the SPA, it turnedearned tens of millions of dollars
of additional profit for Ameris as a result of the efforts of the former Balboa employees who were
motivated by the promise of Cash Bonus Awards under the LTIP to go above and beyond their
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duties to increase Balboa’s profitability, all while being completely unaware that Ameris never
intended to honor the terms of the LTIP.
47. 32. The harms suffered by Sellers cannot be remedied by monetary damages
alone.
10
Sellers would not have entered into the SPA, and would not have agreed to indemnify
Ameris, had itthey known that Ameris never intended to comply with the LTIP. The
indemnification obligation under the SPA is an ongoing liability of uncertain scope, making it
impossible to calculate a damages figure that would fully compensate Sellers. Accordingly,
rescission (or partial rescission) of the SPA is warranted.
33. Alternatively, Sellers seek equitable reformation of the SPA to void the
indemnification provisions in Section 8 of the SPA.
48. 34. Balboa, as a company, is a unique asset whose present and future value
is not readily ascertainable. Thus, only equitable relief in the form of rescission or
reformation can afford Sellers an adequate remedy.
35. In addition, Ameris sued Sellers in Delaware Superior Court under the same SPA that
Ameris fraudulently obtained by misleading Sellers into believing it would honor the terms of the
LTIP. The action initiated by Ameris was captioned Ameris Bank v. Patrick E. Byrne et al., C.A.
No. N25C-05-071 KMM CCLD (Del. Super. Ct.) (the “Superior Court Action”).
49. 36. Ameris eventually voluntarily dismissed the Superior Court Action on February
18, 2026, and re-filed its Complaint in this Court, but not until after Sellers were forced to defend
10
The injuries Sellers sustained due to Ameris’s fraudulent conduct are separate from (and in
addition to) damages Byrne personally suffered that were redressed in the California Action. The
jury in the California Action awarded damages for the injuries Byrne suffered in his individual-
employee capacity (specifically, employment-based compensation in the form of unpaid wages
and unpaid bonuses), whereas this action seeks to redress the harms Byrne and the other Sellers
suffered in their commercial-party capacity in connection with their entry into the SPA based on
fraudulent misrepresentations of Ameris’s intention to comply with the LTIP.
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the action and respond to the Complaint on December 18, 2025 by filing a Motion to Dismiss for
Improper Venue.
50. 37. By initiating the Superior Court Action, Ameris breached Section 10.8 of the
SPA, which designates the “United States District Court for the District of Delaware and the Court
of Chancery” as the “exclusive” venue “for the purposes of any Action arising out of [the SPA].”
51. The damages Sellers suffered as a result of Ameris’s breach of Section 10.8 of the
SPA constitute indemnifiable Losses under Section 8.3 of the SPA, which requires Ameris to
indemnify Sellers for, among other things, “the failure of Purchaser to perform any covenant or
agreement of Purchaser under this Agreement.”
COUNT I
(Fraudulent Inducement)
52. 38. Sellers incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.
53. 39. During the parties’ negotiation of the SPA, Ameris fraudulently, or with
reckless indifference to the truth, misrepresented and/or omitted material facts concerning its
intention to comply with the LTIP.
54. 40. During the parties’ negotiation of the SPA, Ameris represented, by
executing the LTIP and in conversations with Byrne regarding the same, that it would
honor and comply with
the LTIP’s terms.
55. 41. These representations were false. Ameris never intended to comply with the
terms of the LTIP, and indeed, at its first opportunity to do so, intentionally miscalculated EBT in
breach of the agreed-upon calculation methodology provided for in the LTIP.
56. Moreover, Ameris’s internal communications—introduced at the California Action
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trial—reflect that Ameris executives deliberately analyzed which adjustments to Byrne’s proposed
LTIP revisions would keep EBT below the Performance Goal threshold, proposed additional
changes to ensure the threshold was not met, and selected calculation methodologies specifically
because they prevented LTIP payouts.
57. The LTIP was the critical differentiating factor that caused Sellers to choose Ameris
over competing bidders—and Ameris was aware of the LTIP’s importance in the transaction for
Sellers.
58. 42. Sellers would not have entered into the SPA had itthey known these
representations were false.
59. 43. Sellers would not have agreed to Section 8 of the SPA had they known these
representations were false.
60. 44. Ameris made these representations with the intention of inducing Sellers’
reliance and to induce Sellers to enter into the SPA.
61. 45. Sellers reasonably and justifiably relied on Ameris’s misrepresentations.
62. 46. Sellers have suffered harm due to Ameris’s fraudulent inducement of Sellers’
entry into the SPA in reliance on Ameris’s material misrepresentations and/or omissions.
63. Sellers are ready, willing, and able to return consideration Ameris paid in
connection with the parties’ entry into the SPA and reserve the right to elect that remedy after
Sellers have the ability to evaluate their preferred remedy following discovery in this action.
64. 47. Accordingly, Sellers seek a remedy for Ameris’s fraudulent inducement in the
form of rescission or partial rescission of the SPA.
65. 48. In addition, Sellers seek a remedy for Ameris’s fraudulent inducement in the
form of rescissory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
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49. In the alternative, Sellers request reformation of the SPA to void Section 8 therein.
COUNT II
(Equitable Fraud (In the Alternative)) to Count I)
66. 50. Sellers repeat and reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them as if
fully set forth herein.
67. 51. During the parties’ negotiation of the SPA, Ameris fraudulently, or with
reckless indifference to the truth,negligently misrepresented and/or omitted material facts
concerning its intention to
comply with the LTIP.
68. 52. During the parties’ negotiation of the SPA, Ameris represented, by executing
the LTIP and in conversations with Byrne regarding the same, that it would honor and comply
with the LTIP’s terms.
69. 53. These representations were false. Ameris never intended to comply with the
terms of the LTIP, and indeed, at its first opportunity to do so, intentionally miscalculated EBT in
breach of the agreed-upon calculation methodology provided for in the LTIP.
70. Moreover, Ameris’s internal communications—introduced at the California Action
trial—reflect that Ameris executives deliberately analyzed which adjustments to Byrne’s proposed
LTIP revisions would keep EBT below the Performance Goal threshold, proposed additional
changes to ensure the threshold was not met, and selected calculation methodologies specifically
because they prevented LTIP payouts.
54. Sellers would not have entered into the SPA had they known these
representations were false.
55. Sellers would not have agreed to Section 8 of the SPA had they known these
representations were false.
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56. Ameris made these misrepresentations with the intention of inducing Sellers’
reliance.
57. Sellers reasonably and justifiably relied on Ameris’s misrepresentations.
71. The LTIP was the critical differentiating factor that caused Sellers to choose Ameris
over competing bidders—and Ameris was aware of the LTIP’s importance in the transaction for
Sellers.
58. Sellers have suffered harm due to Ameris’s fraudulent inducement of Sellers’
entry into the SPA in reliance on Ameris’s material misrepresentations and/or omissions.
59. Sellers lack an adequate remedy at law.
60. Accordingly, Sellers seek a remedy for Ameris’s equitable fraud in the form
of rescission or partial rescission of the SPA.
61. In addition, Sellers seek a remedy for Ameris’s equitable fraud in the form
of rescissory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
62. In the alternative, Sellers request reformation of the SPA to void Section 8 therein.
COUNT III
(Equitable Fraud (In the Alternative))
63. Sellers repeat and reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them as if
fully set forth herein.
64. During the parties’ negotiation of the SPA, Ameris negligently misrepresented
and/or omitted material facts concerning its intention to comply with the LTIP.
65. During the parties’ negotiation of the SPA, Ameris represented, by executing
the LTIP and in conversations with Byrne regarding the same, that it would honor and
comply with the LTIP’s terms.
66. These representations were false. Ameris never intended to comply with the
terms of the LTIP, and indeed, at its first opportunity to do so, intentionally miscalculated
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EBT in breach of the agreed-upon calculation methodology provided for in the LTIP.
72. 67. Sellers would not have entered into the SPA had they known these
representations were false.
73. 68. Sellers would not have agreed to Section 8 of the SPA had they known these
representations were false.
74. 69. Ameris made these misrepresentations with the intention of inducing Sellers’
reliance and to induce Sellers to enter into the SPA.
75. 70. Sellers reasonably and justifiably relied on Ameris’s misrepresentations.
76. 71. Sellers have suffered harm due to Ameris’s negligent inducement
ofmisrepresentations and/or omissions inducing Sellers’ entry into the SPA in reliance on Ameris’s
material misrepresentations and/or omissions.
77. 72. Sellers lack an adequate remedy at law.
78. 73. Accordingly, Sellers seek a remedy for Ameris’s equitable fraud in the form
of
rescission or partial rescission of the SPA.
79. 74. In addition, Sellers seek a remedy for Ameris’s equitable fraud in the form of
rescissory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
75. In the alternative, Sellers request reformation of the SPA to void Section 8 therein.
COUNT IVIII
(Breach of Contract)/Indemnification
80. 76. Sellers repeat and reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them as if
fully set forth herein.
81. 77. The SPA is a valid and enforceable contract, subject to its voidability at Sellers’
option by reason of Ameris’s fraud.
82. Ameris covenanted in Section 10.8 of the SPA to commence any Action arising out
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of the SPA or the transactions contemplated thereby only in the Delaware Court of Chancery or
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.
83. 78. Ameris breached Section 10.8 of the SPA by initiating the Superior Court
Action.
84. Ameris voluntarily dismissed the Superior Court Action in response to Byrne
arguing in the Superior Court Action that this Court and the Court of Chancery are the only
appropriate courts to adjudicate Ameris’s claims against Byrne under the SPA.
85. 79. Ameris’s breach of the forum-selection clause covenant in Section 10.8 of the
SPA caused Sellers to suffer damages, as they were forced to defend against the Superior Court
Action.
86. Delaware law, which governs the SPA, expressly recognizes that a party can
recover damages for breach of a forum selection clause, including in the form of expectation
damages measured by the legal fees and expenses incurred in the wrongly filed action. See El
Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp., 669 A.2d 36, 40 (Del. 1995); Namdar v.
Freid, C.A. No. 2024-0535-JTL (Del. Ch. June 6, 2025).
87. The damages Sellers suffered because of Ameris’s breach of Section 10.8 of the
SPA constitute indemnifiable Losses under Article VIII of the SPA.
88. Sellers have demanded Ameris provide Sellers with indemnification of their Losses
arising from Ameris’s breach of Section 10.8, but Ameris has failed to provide indemnification as
required.
89. 80. Accordingly, Sellers seek indemnification for the Losses they suffered as a
result of Ameris’s breach of Section 10.8 of the SPA, including monetary damages in an amount
to be determined at trial, equivalent to all costs and expenses incurred by Sellers in connection with
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the Superior Court Action.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PlaintiffsSellers request that this Court enter judgment against
DefendantAmeris awarding PlaintiffsSellers all appropriate relief, including the following:
a. Rescission or partial rescission of the SPA on the basis that Sellers’ agreement to
the same was fraudulently induced;
b. Awarding rescissory damages;
c. Alternatively, reformation of the SPA to void Section 8 therein;
c. d. Monetary damages in an amount to be determined at trial, equivalent to all costs
and expenses incurred by Sellers in connection with the Superior Court Action;
d. e. Sellers’ costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in connection with this
action; and
e. f. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
Dated: September 30, 2026 Respectfully submitted,
REED SMITH LLP
OF COUNSEL: /s/ DRAFT FOR MOTION TO AMEND
Benjamin P. Chapple (No. 5871)
Matthew T. Sessions (pro hac vice) John T. Miraglia (No. 6682)
Stacey A. Villagomez (pro hac vice) 1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1500
ALLEN MATKINS Wilmington, DE 19801
2010 Main Street, 8th Floor (302) 778-7500
Irvine, CA 92614 bchapple@reedsmith.com
(949) 553-1313 jmiraglia@reedsmith.com
msessions@allenmatkins.com
svillagomez@allenmatkins.com Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Patrick E. Byrne, The Patrick E.
Byrne Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated February
23, 2001, and The Patrick E. Byrne
Irrevocable Trust U/T/A Dated July 22, 2021
Dated: May 18, 2026 REED SMITH LLP
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/s/ Benjamin P. Chapple Benjamin
P. Chapple (No. 5871)
John T. Miraglia (No.
6682)
1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1500
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 778-7500
Counsel for Plaintiffs Patrick E.
Byrne, The Patrick E. Byrne
Revocable Trust U/T/A Dated
February 23, 2001, and The Patrick
E. Byrne Irrevocable Trust U/T/A
Dated July 22, 2021
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