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Phlaum, et al. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, et al. — Entry #39: REPLY BRIEF submitted for filing by Appellant Blanche Phlaum, Appellant Jason Jones.--[COURT UPDATE: Corrected PDF attached as of 8/10/2026, REPLACING original…

Case: Phlaum, et al. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, et al. ca9 · 25-7070

filed November 07, 2025

What this document is

Docket entry #39 · filed August 10, 2026

REPLY BRIEF submitted for filing by Appellant Blanche Phlaum, Appellant Jason Jones.--[COURT UPDATE: Corrected PDF attached as of 8/10/2026, REPLACING original attachment] [Entered: 08/10/2026 09:02 AM] [Edited: 08/10/2026 12:54 PM]

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Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (1 of 38)


             Jn tbt fflnttebS5>tate~
                                  ~ourt of ~peal~
                      fortbt ~tntb ~trcutt
                          BLANCHE PHLAUM;jASONjONES,
            individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
                                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                           V.


                           NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
                                   Defendant-Appellee,

                                          and

                               DOES, 1-100INCLUSIVE,
                                      Defendants.

                On Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
          Case No. 5:24-cv-00765:JGB-DTB (The Hon.Jesus G. Bernal)


              REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS


TARAS KICK                                      MATTHEWW.H.    WESSLER
KATHERINE LEHE                                  ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN
THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC                          STEFANIE OSTROWSKI
815Moraga Drive                                 GUPTA WESSLERLLP
Los Angeles, CA 90049                           1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 225
(310)395-2988                                   Washington, D.C. 20036
taras@kicklawfirrn.com                          (202)888-1741
                                                matt@guptawessler.com

August 10, 2026                                 Counselfor Plaintiffs-Appellants


                           Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (2 of 38)


                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of authorities ..................................................................................................           .ii

Introduction ................................................................................................................      1


Argument ...................................................................................................................       2


          I.        Navy Federal's contract does not unambiguously permit it to
                    charge multiple insufficient-funds fees for a single payment that
                    a consumer authorizes ..........................................................................               2


                    A.         Navy Federal's interpretation conflicts with the contract's
                               ordinary and natural reading .....................................................                  3

                    B.         At a minimum, reading the contract to permit Navy
                               Federal to charge only a single insufficient-funds fee is a
                               plausible interpretation ..............................................................            12


          II.       There are no alternative grounds for affirmance ................................. 18

                    A.         The Lambertsettlement does not preclude Mr.Jones's
                               claims .........................................................................................   18

                               1.        Mr.Jones's claims do not fall within the scope of
                                         the Lambertrelease ...........................................................           19

                               2.        To the extent the Lambert settlement purports to
                                         release Mr.Jones's claims, it is unenforceable ............... 20

                    B.         The notice-of-claim provision in Navy Federal's new
                               contract does not apply to this suit. ..........................................                   24

                               1.        Navy Federal's contract does not contain a notice-
                                         of-claim provision ...........................................................           25

                               2.        Mr.Jones complied with any such provision .................                              26


Conclusion ...............................................................................................................        28


                                                                   1


                         Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (3 of 38)


                                        TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

AmchemProducts)Inc. v. Windsor,
   521U.S. 591 (1997)...............................................................................................        23

Atenciov. TuneCore)Inc.,
    2016 WL 11518598(C.D. Cal. 2016)......................................................................                  26

Baptistev. GTE FederalCreditUnion,
    2020 WL 13600942 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2020) ................................................................                   5

CharterCommunicationsEntertainmentI, DST v. Burdulius,
   460 F.3d 168 (1stCir. 2006) .................................................................................             21

Chenv. AllstateIns. Co.,
   819 F.3d 1136(9th Cir. 2016).................................................................................            27

Colemanv. Alaska USA FederalCreditUnion,
    2020 WL 1866261(D. Ala. 2020) ...........................................................................                6

DoswellLtd. Partnershipv. VirginiaElectric& PowerCo.,
   468 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 1996).....................................................................................             13

Eichman v. FotomatCorp.,
    759 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985)...........................................................................             21,22

Eure v. Noifolk Shipbuilding& DrydockCorp.,
    561 S.E.2d 663 (Va. 2002) ................................................................................            3, 12

Farleyv. LincolnBenefi,tLife Co.,
    150 F.4th 1197(9th Cir. 2025) ..............................................................................            23

Fellerv. TransamericaLife InsuranceCo.,
     2016WL 6602561(C.D. Cal. 2016).................................................................                     20, 21

Fosterv. Wilson,
    123S.E. 527 (Va. 1924).........................................................................................          13

Gardnerv. FlagstarBank) FSB,
   2025 WL 1721191  (6th Cir. 2025)....................................................................                7, 16, 17
                                                               11


                         Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (4 of 38)


Germainv. Shearin,
   653 F. App'x 231(4th Cir. 2016)...........................................................................             27

Government
         EmployeesInsuranceCo. v. Moore,
   580 S.E.2d 823 (Va. 2003) ....................................................................................          5

Hessev. Sprint Corp.,
    598 F.3d 581(9th Cir. 2010)...........................................................................             20, 23

Hicks v. PGA Tour,Inc.,
    897 F.3d 1109(9th Cir. 2018)............................................................................            3, 12

In reAmericanExpressFinancialAdvisors,
     672 F.3d 113(2d Cir. 2011).....................................................................................       21

In reHyundai & Kia FuelEconomyLitigation,
     926 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2019)................................................................................         24

Jarrett v. PanasonicCorp.efNorthAmerica,
     8 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (E.D. Ark. 2013)....................................................................              26

Kearneyv. StandardInsuranceCo.,
    175F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999)................................................................................           17

King v. Nal!YFederalCreditUnion,
    713F. Supp. 3d 729 (C.D. Cal. 2024) ..................................................................                26

Lucasv. MetropolitanTowerLife InsuranceCo.,
    2013WL 12097639(M.D. Fla. 2013).....................................................................                  22

Mawyer v. Atlantic UnionBank,
   2022 WL 1049311(E.D. Va. 2022).........................................................................                 17

McAdams v. Robinson,
   26 F.4th 149 (4th Cir. 2022)..................................................................................         22

McIntosh v. Gailius,
   2025 WL 901691(7th Cir. 2025)............................................................................              27

Melito v. ExperianMartketingSolutions,Inc.,
    923 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2019)....................................................................................        22

                                                             lll


                        Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (5 of 38)


Metric Constructors,
                  Inc. v. NASA,
     169 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................           12

                 & OhioRailway Co.,
Moorev. Chesapeake
     167S.E. 351(Va. 1933)..........................................................................................        14

Moorev. Yehling,
     2026 WL 1724735(9th Cir. 2026)..........................................................................               27

NationalSuperSpuds,Inc. v. New YorkMercantileExchange,
     660 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981)................................................................................           23, 24

New CastleCountyv. National UnionFireInsuranceCo.,
     174F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 1999)...................................................................................           17

Oliverv. Davis,
     25 F.4th 1228(9th Cir. 2022) ...............................................................................           28

Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.,
     527 U.S. 815 (1999)..............................................................................................      23

Ott v. L&J Holdings,LLC,
     654 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 2008) ...................................................................................           12

Pagev. Alliant CreditUnion,
     52 F.4th 340 (7th Cir. 2022) .................................................................................         16

Perksv. TD Bank, N.A.,
     444 F. Supp. 3d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ..............................................................                   7, 16

Petreyv. VisionsFederalCreditUnion,
    2021WL 2364971(N.D.N.Y. 2021)........................................................................                   16

PhillipsPetroleumCo. v. Shutts,
    472 U.S. 797 (1985) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
                                                                                                   24

Pitts v. TerribleHerbst,Inc.,
     653 F.3d 1081(9th Cir. 2011).................................................................................          27

Ross v. MetropolitanLife InsuranceCo.,
    411F. Supp. 2d 571(W.D. Pa. 2006) ....................................................................                  22

                                                               IV


                        Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (6 of 38)


Schertzerv. Bank qfAmericaJN.A.,
    109 F-4th 1200 (9th Cir. 2024)..............................................................................         14

Schuilingv. Harris,
    747 S.E.2d 833 (Va. 2013)......................................................................................       11

SecurityWatchJInc. v. Sentinel~stemsJInc.,
    176F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999)................................................................................          25

Sheinv. CanonUSAJInc.,
    2009 WL 3109721(C.D. Cal. 2009) ......................................................................               27

Storeyv. CelloHoldingsJLLC,
    347 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2003) .................................................................................         21

TechnoMarineSA v. GiftportsJInc.,
    758 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2014)..................................................................................        22

Twiggv. SearsJRoebuck& Co.,
   153F.3d 1222(nth Cir. 1998)................................................................................           24

Vuev. PentagonFederalCreditUnion,
   2023 WL 6387174(E.D. Cal. 2023).......................................................................                16

Walkerv. GatewayMilling Co.,
   92 S.E. 826 (Va. 1917)...........................................................................................      13

Westmoreland-LG&EPartnersv. VirginiaElectric& PowerCo.,
   486 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 1997)....................................................................................          13

Williamsv. BoeingCo.,
    517F.3d 1120(9th Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................          20

Williamsv. GE CapitalAuto LeaseJInc.,
    159F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998).............................................................................           21,22

Xiong v.JeunesseGlobalJLLC,
    2019WL 8011740(C.D. Cal. 2019).......................................................................                22

Yearbyv. AmericanNationalInsuranceCo.,
    2021WL 3855833 (N.D. Cal. 2021).......................................................................                21

                                                             V


                         Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (7 of 38)


Statutes

15U.S.C. § 1693a.......................................................................................................      15

15U.S.C. § 1693c.......................................................................................................      15

15U.S.C. § 1693e........................................................................................................     5

Va. Code§ 8.4-104.....................................................................................................       4

Regulations

12C.F.R. § 1005.10......................................................................................................     8

12C.F.R. § 707.3........................................................................................................     15

Other authorities

CFPB,
   Superoisory
             HighlightsJunk Fees UpdateSpecialEdition (Oct. 2023)........................... 14

Check
   Black's Law Dictionary(12thed. 2024)....................................................................                 10


Debit,
   Black's Law Dictionary(12thed. 2024).................................................................                   3, 4

Debit,
    The Merriam-Webster.com
                          Dictionary...................................................................                    3, 4

Item,
    Black's Law Dictionary(12thed. 2024).....................................................................                4

NACHA,
  ACH OperationsBulletin #1-2014: ()y,estionable
                                               ACH Debit Origination:         Roles
   and ResponsibilitiesefODFis and RDFis (Sept. 30, 2014)......................................... g

OCC Bulletin 2023-12,
   Overdrefi;
           ProtectionPrograms:Risk ManagementPractices(Apr. 26, 2023)................... 14


                                                              Vl


                   Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (8 of 38)


Treatises

Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 18.19(6th ed. 2026) ...............................                       20

Restatement of the Law,
    Consumer Contracts§        4 (2024) .....................................................................   14, 15


                                                       ..
                                                     Vll


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (9 of 38)


                                INTRODUCTION

      Navy Federal told its customers that it would charge them only "a" fee for

"each" "refused check" or "returned debit item." Any reasonable consumer would

read that to mean one fee per check, no matter how many times it bounced. And

they would interpret the contract's identical language about "debit items" the same

way: one fee per authorized payment.

      Navy Federal steadfastly resists that straightforward interpretation.   Instead, it

tries to muddy the waters with convoluted arguments about other contract provisions

and the mechanics of the ACH debit system-even              though both foreclose its

position. And it never once even attempts to define "debit item," simply insisting that

the term "necessarily" refers to a "merchant's   request for payment." That is not a

reasonable reading of the contract.

      But even if it were, Mr. Jones's interpretation   is reasonable too. It tracks the

dictionary definitions of the key terms. It matches how other financial institutions use

those terms in their own contracts. And it aligns with consumer expectations. At

minimum, then, the contract is ambiguous.

      Navy Federal concedes as much. It admits that "item"-one                of the fee

provision's key terms-is    "agnostic" as to whether it means a payment from a

consumer or a request from a merchant. That concession should resolve this appeal.


                                           I


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (10 of 38)


       Falling back, Navy Federal asks this Court to affirm on two alternative

grounds. First, it argues that a settlement agreement in a prior class action bars this

suit. Second, it asserts that Mr.Jones failed to plausibly allege that he notified Navy

Federal of his claims prior to initiating this lawsuit. Neither argument has merit. The

Lambert settlement did not-and       could not-release    Mr. Jones's claims. And the

notice-of-claim provision that Navy Federal accuses Mr.Jones of violating does not

apply here.

       If Navy Federal really intended its contract to permit it to assess duplicative

insufficient-funds fees, it needed to say so-as   other financial institutions, and Navy

Federal itself in its most recent contract, have had no trouble doing. Because the

language it used is at a minimum ambiguous, Mr.Jones's claims may not be resolved

on a motion to dismiss. This Court should reverse the district court's dismissal.

                                    ARGUMENT

I.     Navy Federal's contract does not unambiguously      permit it to
       charge multiple insufficient-funds fees for a single payment that
       a consumer authorizes.

       Navy Federal's contract permits it to charge "a" fee for "each" "refused

check" or "returned     debit item." ER-36-37, 69. That language unambiguously

permits Navy Federal to charge only a single insufficient-funds fee for each payment

that a customer     authorizes.   Navy Federal resists this reading by offering an

interpretation   that conflicts with any reasonable definition of "check" or "debit


                                            2


                   Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (11 of 38)


item," does not correspond with how those terms are used throughout the contract

or by others in the banking industry,            and contradicts    reasonable   consumer

expectations.

       Even if Navy Federal's interpretation were plausible, however, reversal would

still be warranted. At best, Navy Federal's contract can be "understood in more than

one way," making it "ambiguous." Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 561

S.E.2d 663, 668 (Va. 2002). And when a contract is ambiguous, its interpretation

"presents a question of fact inappropriate       for resolution on a motion to dismiss."

Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc., 897 F.3d 1109,m8 (9th Cir. 2018).

       A.       Navy Federal's interpretation        conflicts    with the contract's
                ordinary and natural reading.

       1.   Navy Federal pays lip service to Virginia contract law, observing (at 19), as

it must, that terms in a contract must be interpreted            according to their "plain

meaning." Yet it never once even attempts to define the most relevant term: "debit

item." Instead, Navy Federal simply asserts (at 21)that the term-at         least "as used"

in its contract-"necessarily    refers to the merchant's request for payment."

       The definitions of "debit" and "item" demonstrate otherwise. A "debit" is an

"instruction that one gives to a bank to pay money directly from one's account."

Debit, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Debit, The Merriam-Webster.com

Dictionary, https:/ /perma.cc/XXA2-ZBY5           ("a charge     against   a bank deposit

account"). And an "item" is a "negotiable instrument or a promise or order to pay

                                             3


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (12 of 38)


money." Item, Black's Law Dictionary(12th ed. 2024); see also Va. Code § 8-4-104(9).

Taken together, "debit item" can mean only one thing: A form of payment, akin to

a check or other negotiable instrument, through which a customer of a financial

institution authorizes a withdrawal from his account. See Opening Br. 2142, 26.

       Navy Federal offers no competing definition of its own. Instead, it quibbles

with Black's Law Dictionary, insisting (at 23) that its definition is inapplicable because

it recognizes that this type of debit can also be called a "direct debit." See Debit,

Black's Law Dictionary.But as our opening brief explained (at 22 n-4), that dictionary's

other definitions of "debit" reflect the use of that term in an accounting sense-as      a

"sum charged as due or owing" or a "record ... in financial accounting [that] shows

money to have been spent or to be owed." Debit, Black's Law Dictionary.Navy Federal

does not argue that those accounting-specific definitions apply here. So that leaves

the dictionary's remaining definition: "[a]n instruction that one gives to a bank to

pay money directly from one's account." Id. In any event, Navy Federal has no

objection to Merriam      Webster's   definition: "a charge against a bank deposit

account." Debit, The Merriam-Webster.comDictionary.

       Failing to meaningfully contest our definitions, Navy Federal next argues that

they do not support our interpretation.     Black's Law Dictionary does not help Mr.

Jones, Navy Federal says (at 2243), because "in an ACH debit transaction, the

account holder gives no such 'instruction' to his bank." That's not true; absent an


                                            4


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (13 of 38)


instruction from an accountholder,      a merchant's   request for payment would be

fraudulent. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) (requiring that ACH requests be "authorized by

the consumer"). Navy Federal's argument that it should prevail under Merriam

Webster's definition fails for a similar reason. According to Navy Federal (at 23),

every "request for payment ... initiated by a merchant"qualifies as "a charge against a

bank deposit account." If that were true, a third party's unauthorized or fraudulent

request to withdraw money from a customer's account-disconnected             from any

accountholder    authorization-would     constitute a "debit item" for which Navy

Federal could charge its customers a fee. The contract cannot be read to require that

"absurd result." Gov)tEmps. Ins. Co. v. Moore,580 S.E.2d 823, 829 (Va. 2003).

      2.   Although Navy Federal refuses to define "debit item," it offers definitions

of otherterms used throughout its contract. But none of these terms dictate when

Navy Federal may charge an insufficient-funds fee.

      First, Navy Federal accuses us (at 19-----<.20)
                                                of "ignor[ing]" what it says is the fee

provision's "operative verb": "returned."    But the fee provision never uses the verb

"returned."   It uses that word as an adjective, modifying "debit item." See ER-69

(permitting Navy Federal to charge a single fee "for each returned debit item");

Baptistev. GTE Fed. CreditUnion,2020 WL 13600942, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2020) (rejecting

the credit union's interpretation because, "[i]n the phrase 'each returned debit item,'

the word 'returned' is an adjective"). So a re-presented request for payment cannot


                                            5


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (14 of 38)


itself be a "returneddebit item" unless it first is a "debit item." See Colemanv. Alaska

USA Fed. Credit Union, 2020 WL 1866261,at *5 (D. Ala. 2020) (rejecting argument that

contract permitting    a fee for "each returned       item" unambiguously     permitted

multiple insufficient-fund fees). In other words, Navy Federal's contract permits it to

charge a fee per debit item only if that debit item was returned.

      Ultimately, Navy Federal's asks this Court (at 15) to rewrite its contract to

permit it to charge a fee "each time it has to return a debit item to a merchant."

Navy Federal could have drafted its contract along those lines. Other financial

institutions have. See, e.g., ER-40-41 ("[A] $32 fee will be imposed on you eachtime an

item and transaction resubmitted for payment is returned."(emphasis added)). And so

did Navy Federal-in      January    2021-when    it revised its contract to permit it to

charge a fee "[e]ach time [it] return[s] adebitforinsufficientfunds."    ER-38-39. This

Court should not rewrite Navy Federal's contract to implement a revision the credit

union didn't make until months after the fees at issue here were assessed.

      Navy Federal next sets its sights on another verb: "present." An "account

holder never presents their own ACH debit request for payment to the bank," Navy

Federal points out (at 21). That's true-and      irrelevant. Unlike other banks, Navy

Federal did not draft its contract to permit it to charge a fee per presentment. See,

e.g., ER-42 (contract permitting fees "each time an item is presented for payment");

ER-40-42    (contracts permitting     fees "per presentment").      Navy Federal's   fee


                                            6


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (15 of 38)


provision never even uses the word "present." Instead, it charges a fee per debit

item-not    per presentment of that item.

       A different provision in Navy Federal's        contract   does discuss an item's

presentment. That provision explains the order in which Navy Federal "posts items

presented on" a customer's account. ER-69. Navy Federal argues (at 22) that this

provision demonstrates that a merchant's presentation of an ACH debit is an "item."

But if the presentationof an ACH debit is an "item," then the phrase "item presented"

would refer to a presentation that is itself presented. That is a nonsensical reading.

See Gardnerv. FlagstarBank, FSB, 2025 WL 1721191,
                                               at *6 (6th Cir. 2025) ("[I]f each

presentment itself forms an 'item,' this language becomes arguably redundant."). Far

from supporting Navy Federal, this provision makes plain that an "item" is the thing

that is presented-not    the act of presentment itself. SeePerksv. TD Bank, .NA., 444 F.

Supp. 3d 635, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (concluding that similar language is "ambiguous

with regard to whether a resubmission of an ACH transaction is a separate item").

       What's more, the provision's list of "items"-including        checks, debit card

transactions,   and     ACH   debits-share       a common    characteristic:   They   are

instruments through which an accountholder authorizes payments from his account.

So when the contract permits Navy Federal to assess a fee per "debit item," it too is

referring to an instrument through which an accountholder          authorizes payments

from his account-not     a third party's request for payment. SeeOpening Br. 22-23.


                                             7


                    Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (16 of 38)


       Other contract prov1s10ns emphasize that a debit item is a transaction

authorized by a consumer. See Opening Br. 25. The contract provides that "[a]n

ACH debit might be made as a result of an authorization you gave a third party to

automatically transfer funds from your account to pay your monthly insurance

premium."       ER-72. Navy Federal repeatedly argues (at 2, 7, 24) that this clause

demonstrates that an "ACH debit" includes the third party's request for payment

based on that authorization. That is wrong. By explaining that an ACH debit is made

as a result of an "authorization you gave a third party," this provision emphasizes that

ACH debits are payments authorized by accountholders-not               unilateral actions

taken by merchants.

       Navy Federal is therefore attacking a strawman when it argues (at 25-26) that

our interpretation    would permit it to charge only a single insufficient-funds fee for

automatic monthly ACH payments. When a consumer authorizes a merchant to

make automatic monthly payments via ACH, they have authorized multiple ACH

debits. See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10(d) (explaining that a person may authorize multiple

"transfers"     via a single authorization).   Each payment     made pursuant    to that

authorization     1s a separate "debit item": It is an instruction,     authorized   by a

consumer, to pay money directly from his account. And so for each month's

payment, Navy Federal may assess a single insufficient-funds fee.


                                               8


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (17 of 38)


       3. Navy Federal next turns to the NACHA rules, which it says (at 32)

demonstrate    that a "resubmitted      Entry" and the "original Entry" are distinct

"item[s]." But the rules take great pains to ensure that re-initiated payments are not

treated as transactions distinct from the original request. NACHA requires re-

initiated entries to "contain the identical data as the original Entry." NACHA, ACH

OperationsBulletin #1-2014:   ()yestionableACH Debit Origination:Roles and Responsibilitiesof

ODFis and RDFis 6 (Sept. 30, 2014), https:/ /perma.cc/3Z3Q-FV3U;               see also ER-25

§ 8.37(c) (providing that an "Entry          shall be deemed       an 'item'     within the

meaning ... of the Uniform Commercial Code"). And to ensure that a bank does not

wrongly take a re-initiated payment to be a new transaction, the rules require that a

re-initiated entry be labeled "RETRY PYMT." ER-25 § 2.13-4.2.NACHA's rules also

prohibit a merchant from altering a re-presented           entry to make it look like a

consumer has authorized a new payment. SeeACH OperationsBulletin #1-2014 at 6-7-

The rules thus make clear that a re-presented entry is just another attempt to collect

on the original entry-not      a separate "item" that can trigger an additional fee. Far

from supporting Navy Federal's interpretation, then, the NACHA rules reinforce the

distinction that the contract itself draws, between a customer's payment by ACH (a

"debit item") and a merchant's later attempt to collect those funds (the presentations

of that debit item). And for each such debit item, Navy Federal's contract permits it

to charge only a single insufficient-funds fee.


                                              9


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (18 of 38)


      4. Navy Federal's interpretation      would also lead to the absurd result that

bounced checks and returned debit items are treated differently.

       Like the fee provision governing debit items, the fee provision govermng

checks permits Navy Federal to charge a single fee "for each refused check." ER-69.

Navy Federal does not dispute that a check is an "order in writing ... requiring the

bank ... to pay on demand a sum certain in money to a designated person." Check,

Black's Law Dictionary(12th ed. 2024). So Navy Federal may charge only a single fee

per written check, however many times it is (re)submitted. See Opening Br. 23~4.

      Navy Federal only half-heartedly resists this common-sense interpretation. It

points out (at 28) that a bank's obligations do not go away when a check is

resubmitted. But the fact that a bank must follow the law each time a check is

submitted does not mean a check magically becomes a new check whenever it is re-

presented to a bank. Imagine a customer pays a merchant by check-signing,             say,

check number 123 for $25. According to Navy Federal, if the check is declined for

insufficient funds and the merchant       re-presents it to the bank, the check has

somehow transformed into a new check. It hasn't. It's still check number 123.

      Left with no way to argue that a re-presented check is a new check, Navy

Federal resorts to misrepresenting its contract, stating (at 28) that the contract permits

it to charge a fee upon "the refusal of a check." That's not what the contract says.

Accurately quoted, the contract permits fees only for "each refusedcheck." ER-69


                                            10


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (19 of 38)


(emphasis added). Once agam, if Navy Federal wanted to draft a prov1s10n

authorizing it to assess fees each time a check is refused, it knew how. It did so in its

January 2021contract. SeeER-38 ("Each time we refuse a check for insufficient funds,

we will assess a nonsufficient funds ... fee").

       Falling back, Navy Federal argues (at 27)that it doesn't matter ifit is permitted

to assess only one insufficient-funds fee per check, because the fee provision

governing checks and that governing debit items need not be interpreted              "in

precisely the same way." But no reasonable consumer would expect that a provision

authorizing a fee "for each refused check" permits only a single fee per payment,

whereas a provision authorizing a fee "for each returned           debit item" permits

multiple. Virginia law instructs courts to read contracts "as a whole" in a way that

"harmonize[s]" the "various provisions" to avoid such incongruous results. Schuiling


       1 Navy   Federal suggests (at 27) that this Court need not decide whether its
contract permits duplicate insufficient-funds fees each time a check is re-presented.
But the provision governing checks sheds light on how a reasonable consumer would
understand the provision governing debit items. And Mr.Jones alleged that he was
assessed an insufficient-funds fee whenever "the same item" was re-submitted and
seeks to represent a class of accountholders who were charged duplicate insufficient-
funds fees based on the resubmission of "an item"-encompassing      both checks and
ACH debits. ER-43-44.
                                            11


                    Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (20 of 38)


       B.        At a minimum,   reading the contract to permit Navy Federal
                 to charge only a single insufficient-funds fee is a plausible
                 interpretation.

       Navy Federal has not put forth any definition of "debit item"-let        alone a

plausible one. But even if it had, reversal would still be warranted. At the very least,

our interpretation     is plausible too, rendering the contract "ambiguous." Eure, 561

S.E.2d at 668. And the interpretation of an ambiguous contract "presents a question

of fact inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss." Hicks, 897 F.3d at m8.

       1.   Navy Federal's argument that the contract unambiguously permits it to

charge multiple insufficient-funds fees per authorized payment is untenable given

that other financial institutions use the word "item" in precisely the way that we've

shown it's used: as referring to an accountholder's         authorized payment, not a

merchant's later presentment       of that payment. See Opening Br. 28-29 & n.5. An

interpretation    that accords with the common industry usage of a term cannot be

considered unreasonable. See Metric Constructors,Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed.

Cir. 1999) (industry usage of a term sheds light on the "reasonableness"     of parties'

"interpretations").   Indeed, Navy Federal itself admits (at 30) that the definition of

"item" is "agnostic" as to whether it refers to an order by an accountholder       or a

merchant. That concession dooms its argument. If the key contract term "refer[s] to

two or more things at the same time," the contract is ambiguous. Ott v. L&J Holdings,

LLC, 654 S.E.2d 902, 905 (Va. 2008).


                                             12


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (21 of 38)


      With no response to the overwhelming evidence of trade usage, Navy Federal

asks this Court (at 29-30) to ignore it. But in Virginia, evidence that contractual terms

"have acquired ... by usage of the trade, a peculiar meaning ... is admissible even

though the phrases or terms themselves are unambiguous." Doswell Ltd. P)ship v. Va.

Elec. & Power Co., 468 S.E.2d 84, go (Va. 1996).2 Navy Federal responds (at 30) that

trade usage nonetheless "has no bearing" here because this contract is between a

financial institution and a consumer-not        two industry participants. But "[i] t is a

cardinal rule of construction that in construing a written instrument, technical words

will be taken in their technical sense ... unless there appear in the writing a manifest

intention of using them in a different sense." Foster v. Wilson, 123 S.E. 527, 528 (Va.

1924).It is thus "well settled" that, "when parties enter into a contract with reference

to a particular ... trade, they are presumed to have contracted with reference to the

usages of that business or trade." Walker v. Gateway Milling Co., 92 S.E. 826, 828 (Va.

1917).Contracts should therefore be "interpreted consistently with such usage" unless

the trade usage is "inconsistent with the contract" by its "express terms." Id.

      It's true that a company may not appeal to trade usage to contravene a

consumer's reasonable expectations about the meaning of a contract where the

consumer had no reason to know that technical meaning. See Schertzer v. Bank efAm.)


      2 Westmoreland-LG&E Partners v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 486 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 1997),
did not hold otherwise. Contra Answering Br. 29. In that case, the Virginia Supreme
Court expressly "confirm[ed] what [it] said in Doswell." Id. at 293.
                                           13


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (22 of 38)


N.A., 109 F.4th 1200, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2024) (rejecting bank's proposed "technical

definition" of a term that did not "align D"with its "ordinary and popular meaning");

Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts§ 4 (2024)(terms in consumer contracts

should    be interpreted   "consistent   with the reasonable      expectations   of the

consumer").    But where, as here, the trade usage conforms with a reasonable

consumer's understanding of the contract, it would be perverse to permit a company

to use a term with a technical meaning and then argue against a consumer's reliance

on that meaning. Navy Federal "cannot use technical terms with a fixed meaning"

only to "disclaim such meaning" when inconvenient to its litigating position. Moore

v. Chesapeake& OhioRy. Co., 167S.E. 351,357 (Va. 1933).

         Navy Federal insists (at 36) that it would not contravene        a reasonable

consumer's expectations to charge them a fee each time a merchant            submits a

request for payment because accountholders       "maintain control over whether and

how they authorize merchants to seek payment from their accounts." But it never

explains how a consumer is supposed to prevent a merchant from re-presenting a

payment for which they possess insufficient funds. SeeCFPB, SupervisoryHighlightsJunk

Fees UpdateSpecialEdition 5-6 (Oct. 2023), https:/ /perma.cc/2HLS-7P27     (recognizing

that duplicate insufficient-funds fees are "not reasonably avoidable by consumers");

OCC Bulletin 2023-12, OverdrqftProtectionPrograms:Risk ManagementPractices(Apr. 26,

2023), https:/ /perma.cc/ AHQ.3-YUNX ("Consumers typically have no control over


                Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (23 of 38)


when a returned ACH transaction or check will be presented again."). And no

reasonable consumer would interpret a contract that permits just "a" single fee per

"check" or "debit item" to permit multiple fees for reasons completely outside their

control. See Opening Br. 30-31.3

      That's particularly true here, where duplicative fees would serve no apparent

purpose. See Restatement of Consumer Contracts § 4 (instructing courts to consider

the "typical purpose    of such transactions"    when discerning     the "reasonable

expectations of consumers"). As Navy Federal explains (at 6), the purpose of

insufficient-funds fees is to "deter" consumers from making payments for which they

have insufficient funds. That purpose is not advanced by charging additionalfees for

actions taken by merchants over which a consumer has no control. According to

Navy Federal (at 36), consumers should expect duplicative fees because the "true

victim" of a transaction for which a customer has insufficient funds is the merchant.

But Navy Federal's insufficient-funds fees do not go to merchants. They go to Navy

Federal.


      3 Navy Federal     suggests (at 37-38 n.1) that it is somehow exempt from federal
regulations requiring credit unions to disclose the fees they assess in a "readily
understandable" manner. See Opening Br. 32-33; 15U.S.C. § 1693c(a).It's not. See 15
U.S.C. § 1693a(g) (covering "credit union[s] "); 12 C.F.R. § 707.3(a) (same). These
regulations reinforce that a reasonable consumer would not expect to incur multiple
fees for a single transaction based on a contract that permits Navy Federal to charge
them only "a" fee for "each" "check" or "debit item."


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (24 of 38)


       2.   At best, then, Navy Federal's contract is ambiguous. Navy Federal cannot

dispute that the weight of authority holds that fee provisions similar to its own are

ambiguous. See Opening Br. 36-39. Instead, it leans on a single case-Page v. Alliant

CreditUnion, 52 F.4th 340 (7th Cir. 2022)-in which the Seventh Circuit held that a

different credit union's contract unambiguously permitted it to charge multiple

insufficient-funds fees per transaction. But the contract at issue in that case permitted

the credit union to charge a fee for each "Non-sufficient Fund Item"-not       each debit

item. Id. at 344. And "an 'Item' does not become a 'Nonsufficient Fund Item' until it

is 'presented' against insufficient available funds." Brief of Appellee, Page v. Alliant

CreditUnion,2022 WL 135907,at *55 (7th Cir. 2022). So unlike Navy Federal's contract,

the contract at issue in Pagepermitted the credit union to assess a fee per presentment.

       Navy Federal's contract is more similar to the contract in Gardner,2025 WL

      (6th Cir. 2025), which the Sixth Circuit held did not unambiguously permit
1721191

duplicative insufficient-funds fees. Other courts-the      vast majority, in fact-have

reached the same conclusion. See Opening Br. 36-39. 4 Navy Federal insists (at 38)


       4 Navy Federal   points out (at 33, 39-40 & n.6) that some of these cases-and a
brief authored by plaintiffs counsel-attempted      to distinguish La,mbert.But most did
 so on the ground that the plaintiff in La,mbertconceded that the term "item" means a
 "request for payment." See, e.g., Vuev. PentagonFed. CreditUnion, 2023 WL 6387174,at
 *8 (E.D. Cal. 2023); Perks,444 F. Supp. 3d at 641;Petreyv. VisionsFed. CreditUnion,2021
WL 2364971,at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2021);Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, Petreyv. VisionsFed. CreditUnion, 2021WL 5547962, at *12(Feb. 1, 2021).Mr.
Jones has not made any such concession here. SeeMawyer v. Atl. UnionBank, 2022 WL


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (25 of 38)


that its contract uses "materially different language" than the contract in Gardner.But

any differences work in Mr.Jones's favor. The Gardnercontract explicitly stated that

an insufficient-funds fee "may be assessed after 'an Item is presented to"' the bank.

Gardner, 2025 WL 1721191,at *6. Even with that clarification, the Sixth Circuit

concluded that customers could have "fairly interpreted the [contract] to permit just

one fee per transaction." Id. at *7. Navy Federal's contract, however, permits it to

assess a fee only per "returned debit item," without any reference to that item's

presentment. ER-69.

       In any event, that "different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations"

of similar contract language "is strongly indicative of [the contract's]        essential

ambiguity." New CastleCnry.v. Nafl UnionFireIns. Co., 174F.3d 338,347 (3d Cir. 1999);

accordKearneyv. StandardIns. Co., 175F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1999)(concluding that

a contract was ambiguous where different jurists had arrived at competing "fair

readings").

       Had Navy Federal wanted to draft a contract that unambiguously permits it

to assess multiple insufficient-funds fees, it could have done so. Many other financial

institutions have. SeeOpening Br. 28---ig.And so did Navy Federal, in itsjanuary 2021

contract. See Opening Br. 15, 35; ER-38. But in the contract at issue here, it did not.


1049311,at *5 (E.D. Va. 2022) (observing that "Lambertprovides limited guidance" due
to that concession).


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (26 of 38)


Because Navy Federal has not demonstrated that its interpretation is the only-or

even the most-reasonable      construction, the district court was obligated to allow the

case to proceed past the pleading stage. 5

II.    There are no alternative       grounds     for affirmance.

       Sensing weakness on the merits, Navy Federal devotes nearly half of its

argument to two alternative grounds for affirmance. Both fail. The Lczmbertsettlement

did not-and       could not-release    Mr. Jones's    claims. And the notice-of-claim

provision that Navy Federal insists Mr.Jones did not comply with does not apply to

this lawsuit.

       A.       The Lambert    settlement    does not preclude      Mr.Jones's
                claims.

       Navy Federal asks this Court to affirm even if its contract unambiguously

prohibits the fees it assessed because, it argues (at 42), the Lczmbertsettlement released

Mr.Jones's claims. It didn't. As the district court recognized, the Lczmbertsettlement

released only claims that arose during the Lczmbertclass period, and Mr.Jones's claims

arose after that class period. ER-89. And even if the settlement purported to release


       5 Navy Federal  confusingly argues (at 40) that any '"failure to disclose' theory
lurking in" Mr.Jones's contract claim is preempted. To be clear: Mr.Jones's claim
is that Navy Federal breached its contract by assessing insufficient-funds fees its
contract did not permit. And even Navy Federal concedes (at 40) that a breach-of-
contract claim is not preempted.
                                             18


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (27 of 38)


claims outside the Lambert class period, due process would prevent it from being

enforced to bar such claims.

             1.      Mr.Jones's  claims     do not fall within    the scope   of the
                     Lambert release.

      In Lambert, a group of Navy Federal customers sued the credit union for

assessing duplicative insufficient-funds fees in violation of its contract. See Opening

Br. 13-15. Navy Federal settled, agreeing to pay $16 million to class members to

compensate them for the duplicative insufficient-funds fees they were charged

between January 28, 2014, and October 27, 2020. ER-30, 104, 141;see also ER-Bg. In

return, class members agreed to release Navy Federal from liability for insufficient-

funds fees it assessed during that period. ER-123-i4.

      Navy Federal argues (at 43) that the release extends to all claims that Lambert

class members may everhave against Navy Federal related to its insufficient-funds

fees. But the release encompasses only "claims ... that were or could have been

alleged" in Lambert.ER-124. So, as the district court recognized, the settlement did

not release claims challenging fees assessed after the end of the Lambertclass period

because such claims "could not have been alleged" in Lambert.ER-92. The release

also provides that it applies only to claims that are "based upon" or that "relate to"

conduct that occurred "during the Class Period." ER-124. This, too, demonstrates

that the Lambertsettlement "did not contemplate the release of claims based on [Navy

Federal's] conduct afterthe [Lambert]Class Period." ER-89 (emphasis added).


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (28 of 38)


      Because Mr. Jones's       claims-and        the claims of the class he seeks to

represent-challenge     fees assessed qfter the class period, ER-43-44, they were not

released by the Lambert settlement. See Fellerv. TransamericaLife Ins. Co., 2016 WL

6602561, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that a similarly drafted settlement release

could not "reasonably" be interpreted as releasing claims based on future actions of

the defendant). That's why no class member objected to the scope of the release. See

Objections to Settlement, Lambertv.Navy Federal,No. 19-cv-103(E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2021)

(only objection to Lambertsettlement not challenging release). No one understood the

settlement to release such claims.

             2.       To the extent the Lanibert settlement purports            to
                      release Mr.Jones's  claims, it is unenforceable.

      a. Even if Mr. J ones's claims fell within the scope of the Lambertrelease, they

would not be precluded. A class action settlement agreement's "bare assertion that a

party will not be liable for a broad swath of potential claims does not necessarily

make it so." Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010). Class action

settlements are not ordinary contracts; they are court-approved           '~udgment[s]."

Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions§ 18.19(6th ed. 2026). The preclusive effect

of a class action settlement thus "parallels the scope of any litigated judgment." Id.

And like any judgment, a class settlement may preclude only claims that

upon the same set of facts." Williamsv. BoeingCo., 517F.3d 1120,1134(9th Cir. 2008). A

class action settlement thus may not preclude a future suit that "alleges wrongful

                                             20


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (29 of 38)


conduct occurring after the settlement date." Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434,

1439 (9th Cir. 1985);cf. Storey v. Cello Holdings) LLC, 347 F.3d 370, 383 (2d Cir. 2003)

(Sotomayor, J.) ("If the second litigation involved ... subsequent transactions, there

generally is no claim preclusion.").

      Mr.Jones's claims do not depend upon the "same set of facts" as the claims in

Lambert. They couldn't. At the time of the Lambert settlement, the fees Mr. Jones

challenges hadn't been assessed yet. So the Lambert settlement could not preclude his

claims challenging those fees. See Eichman, 759 F.2d at 1436, 1439; see also Charter

Commc)ns Ent. I, DST v. Burdulius, 460 F.3d 168, 179n.12 (1stCir. 2006) ("subsequently

committed violations" are not barred by a prior lawsuit even if they are "of the same

nature as the conduct complained of"); In reAm. Express Fin. Advisors, 672 F.3d 113,138-

39 (2d Cir. 2011)("[T]here can be no question that the [plaintiffs'] claims, to the extent

that they involve conduct occurring efter the Class Period, cannot be Released

Claims."); Yearby v. Am. Nafl Ins. Co., 2021WL 3855833, at *15(N.D. Cal. 2021)("[A]

class action settlement's release is unenforceable against claims predicated on the

defendant's post-settlement conduct."); Feller, 2016WL 6602561,at *6 (similar).

      In arguing otherwise, Navy Federal relies (at 46) on nonbinding cases that

permitted class settlements to release future claims challenging wrongful conduct

that occurred during the settlement period. In Williams v. GE Capital Auto Lease) Inc.,

159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998), for example, both suits challenged the same wrongful


                                            21


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (30 of 38)


conduct: The defendants' inclusion of allegedly unlawful terms in its leases. See id. at

274. Here, however, Mr.Jones does not allege that Navy Federal's fee provisions are

unlawful. He claims only that Navy Federal breached those provisions by charging

fees its contract does not permit. 6

      Nor would enforcing this Court's identical-factual-predicate     rule "undermine

the finality" of class settlements, as Navy Federal protests (at 47). Class settlements

can release claims that rest on the same facts that were at issue in the class action.

What they cannot do is extend beyond those facts and "in effect immunize"

defendants against all suits concerning future misconduct. TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports,


       6 Other   cases that Navy Federal cites (at 47 n.7) are inapposite for the same
reason. See, e.g., Xiong v. Jeunesse Glob., LLC, 2019 WL 8011740,at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
(subsequent suit was "not limited to conduct" post-dating the settled class period);
Lucas v. Metro. Tower Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 12097639, at *12 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (claims
were precluded because the challenged conduct "occurred during the class period
encompassed by the Settlement"); Ross v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 411F. Supp. 2d 571,578
n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (similar). To the extent other courts have held otherwise, those
decisions are inconsistent with this Court's pronouncement in Eichman that a
settlement does not preclude future claims "insofar as [they allege] wrongful conduct
occurring after the settlement date." 759 F.2d at 1439.
       Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sol'ns, Inc., 923 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2019), does not support
Navy Federal's position either. That case was an approval of a class action
settlement-not     a determination of the preclusive effect of that settlement. See id. at
88; McAdams v. Robinson, 26 F-4th 149, 161(4th Cir. 2022) (holding that the scope of
class-settlement release "is for a court enforcing the release to decide").
       7 It would have been easy for Navy Federal to avoid the "gap period" liability

it accuses (at 47) Mr. Jones of exploiting. All it needed to do was put its revised
contract terms into effect immediately following the settlement-or decline to charge

                                           22


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (31 of 38)


      b. The preclusive effect of a class action settlement is limited in another way

too: Absent class members cannot be bound by a settlement unless their interests

were "adequately represented." Hesse,598 F.3d at 589. And absent class members are

not adequately represented where some class members hold claims that others lack,

yet all class members are represented together in a single, unitary class. SeeAmchem

Prods.,Inc. v. Windsor,521U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997);Farleyv. LincolnBenefitLife Co., 150

F.4th 1197,1203(9th Cir. 2025).

       Some Lambertclass members were charged duplicative insufficient-funds fees

after the class period; some were not. But the settlement treated them all the same.

To the extent the settlement purports to release future claims, then, the subset of

class members with such claims were not adequately             represented.   See Ortiz v.

FibreboardCorp.,527 U.S. 815, 857 (1999)(recognizing that the decision to treat class

members with future claims "the same" as those without evidenced inadequate

representation); Nat'l SuperSpuds,Inc. v. N.Y. MercantileExch., 660 F.2d g, 18-19 (2d Cir.

1981)(inadequate representation    was "apparent"    where "a class member holding"

two claims "receives no more than another class member holding only one").

      c. Finally, if a class-settlement release is to bind absent class members, due

process requires that class members first be provided with adequate notice. SeePhillips


its customers duplicative insufficient-funds fees until the new contract went into
effect.


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (32 of 38)


PetroleumCo. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12(1985);In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.,

926 F.3d 539, 568 (9th Cir. 2019). Where a notice fails to "adequately apprise class

members" that failing to opt out will release certain claims, a settlement cannot

preclude class members from asserting those claims in the future. Naf l Super Spuds,

660 F.2d at 16;seealso Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.

      The Lambertnotice would not have communicated to an average class member

that failing to opt out would release claims challenging fees assessed after the class

period. The notice repeatedly told class members that failing to opt out would release

claims "related to the Settlement," which, the notice explained, encompassed the

assessment of insufficient-funds fees "between January 28, 2014, and October 27,

2020." SER 218; see also SER 215. Nowhere does the notice say anything about the

assessment of insufficient-funds fees efi;er October 27, 2020. To the extent the

settlement released claims outside of that time range, then, absent class members

were not adequately notified. See, e.g., Nat'l SuperSpuds, 660 F.2d at 13-14, 17; Twigg v.

Sears,Roebuck& Co., 153F.3d 1222,1228(nth Cir. 1998).

      B.     The notice-of-claim provision in Navy Federal's              new
             contract does not apply to this suit.

       Finally, Navy Federal argues (at 49) that this Court should affirm the district

court's dismissal because Mr.Jones failed to plausibly allege that he complied with a

notice-of-claim provision in its contract. There's just one problem: Navy Federal's


                                           24


                    Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (33 of 38)


contract does not contain a notice-of-claim provision. And even ifit did, Mr.Jones

complied with it.

               1.      Navy Federal's contract       does not contain       a notice-of-
                       claim provision.

       Mr. Jones alleges that Navy Federal breached             the Consumer       Account

Agreement that was in place in October 2020. ER-30, 35, 39, 43. That agreement

does not require customers to notify Navy Federal before filing a lawsuit. ER-66-73.

Navy Federal does not contend otherwise. Instead, it relies on a notice provision in

a later contract that Navy Federal admits (at 8) wasn't put into effect untilJanuary

2021(at the earliest). That provision, however, applies only to suits "alleg[ing] that"

Navy Federal "breached         any provision of ... this Agreement." SER-381 (emphasis

added); seealsoid. (explaining that the notice provision applies only to a judicial action

that "arises from" Navy Federal's actions "pursuant to this Agreement"(emphasis

added)).

       Customers alleging violations of the January 2021Agreement must therefore

comply with that agreement's notice-of-claim provision. But Mr.Jones did not allege

that Navy Federal breached the January 2021Agreement. He alleged only violations

of the original agreement, before the January 2021Agreement went into effect. ER-

39, 43-44. So the notice provision in the January 2021Agreement does not apply to

his claims. See Sec. Watch) Inc. v. Sentinel ~s.J Inc., 176 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1999)

(arbitration   provision governing      claims "arising out of or relating to ... this

                                             25


                   Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (34 of 38)


Agreement"    did not apply to dispute ansmg out of prior agreement); Atencio v.

TuneCore,Inc., 2016WL 11518598,at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2016)(similar).

              2.      Mr.Jones    complied    with any such provision.

       Even if the January       2021 Agreement's    notice-of-claim provision applies

retroactively, dismissal would not be appropriate.         Mr. Jones plausibly alleged

compliance with any such provision.

      Mr. Jones alleged that, years before the initiation            of this lawsuit, he

complained to Navy Federal over the phone about its assessment of duplicative

insufficient-funds fees and requested refunds. ER-50. According to Navy Federal (at

51),these calls do not count because Mr.Jones "fail[ed] to specify precisely when" they

took place. But courts hold allegations of notice via phone call sufficient, even where

a consumer fails to allege the precise date of the call. See, e.g., King v. Navy Fed. Credit

Union, 713F. Supp. 3d 729, 735-36 (C.D. Cal. 2024);Jarrett v. PanasonicCorp.efN. Am.,

8 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1083 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (allegations that "members                of the

Class ... called or otherwise complained" satisfied pre-suit notice requirement).

      Mr.Jones also alleged that, in April 2024-more         than five months before he

filed the operative complaint-he       mailed Navy Federal a notice-of-claim letter,

again contesting its assessment of duplicative insufficient-funds fees and requesting

refunds. ER-50; SER 322~3. Those allegations, too, satisfy any notice requirement.


                 Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (35 of 38)


See Shein v. Canon USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3109721,at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that

notice letter filed two months before amended complaint was sufficient notice).

       Ultimately, Navy Federal's notice arguments reveal the goal of its notice

provision: to enable it to avoid class liability by paying off named plaintiffs one by

one. Navy Federal insists (at 58) that its notice provision "does not prohibit class

actions"-it   simply gives it "the opportunity to resolve disputes." But Navy Federal's

actions in this litigation demonstrate its true intent. See ER-48-50 (describing Navy

Federal's attempts to avoid class liability). Permitting defendants to "pick off' named

plaintiffs would "undercut the viability of the class action procedure." Pitts v. Terrible

Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081,1091(9th Cir. 2011);see also Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d

1136,1143(9th Cir. 2016)(defendants should not be able to              off lead plaintiffs to

avoid a class action").

       Finally, if this Court were to affirm on the ground that Mr. Jones failed to

comply with the notice provision, it would need to modify the district court's

judgment to be without prejudice to Mr. Jones's initiation of another lawsuit after

complying with the notice provision. See Germainv. Shearin,653 F. App'x 231, 234-35

(4th Cir. 2016);McIntosh v. Gailius, 2025 WL 901691,at *1 (7th Cir. 2025); see also, e.g.,

Moore v. Yehling,2026 WL 1724735,at *1 (9th Cir. 2026). This Court should not affirm

on an alternative ground that the district court did not consider and that would not

even preclude Mr. Jones from re-initiating this lawsuit. See Oliverv. Davis, 25 F.4th


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (36 of 38)


1228,1237(9th Cir. 2022) (declining to consider alternative grounds that the district

court did not consider).

                                   CONCLUSION

      This Court should reverse the decision below.


                                               Respectfully submitted,

                                               /s/ Matthew WH. Wessler
                                               MATTHEWW.H.    WESSLER
                                               ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN
                                               STEFANIE OSTROWSKI
                                               GUPTA WESSLERLLP
                                               1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 225
                                               Washington, D. C. 20036
                                               (202)888-1741
                                               matt@guptawessler.com

                                               TARAS KICK
                                               KATHERINE LEHE
                                               THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
                                               815Moraga Drive
                                               Los Angeles, CA 90049
                                               (310) 395-2988
                                               taras@kicklawfirm.com

August 10, 2026                                 Counselfor Plaintiffs-Appellants


                    Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (37 of 38)


                         CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Circuit Rule 32-1(b)

because this brief contains 6,976 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(fj and Circuit Rule 32-1(c). This brief

complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

32(a)(5)and the type-style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6)because this brief has been

prepared   in proportionally     spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point

Baskerville font.


August 10, 2026                                  /s/ Matthew WH. Wessler
                                                 MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

                                                  Counsel
                                                       for Plaintiffs-Appellants


                  Case: 25-7070, 08/10/2026, DktEntry: 39.1, (38 of 38)


                           CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I hereby certify that on August 10, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with

the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

by using the Appellate Electronic Filing system. All participants are registered for

electronic filing and will be served by the Appellate Electronic Filing system.


August 10, 2026                                /s/ Matthew WH. Wessler
                                               MATTHEWW.H.        WESSLER

                                                Counsel
                                                     for Plaintiffs-Appellants