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Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton — Entry #110

Case: Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton txwd · 1:25-cv-01153

filed July 24, 2025

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Docket entry #110 · filed October 21, 2026

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We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:

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Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA         Document 110      Filed 10/21/26     Page 1 of 7


                     IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                               AUSTIN DIVISION
GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC                  §
     Plaintiff,                          §
                                         §
 v.                                      §
                                         §
 KEN PAXTON, in his Official Capacity as §
                                                  Civil Action No.
 Attorney General of Texas               §
                                                1:25-cv-01153-ADA
        Defendant,                       §
                                         §
 THE TEXAS STOCK EXCHANGE LLC            §
 and THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF            §
 BUSINESS,                               §
        Intervenor-Defendants.           §
______________________________________________________________________________

   DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSED EXPEDITED MOTION FOR
            PROTECTIVE ORDER AND TO STAY RULE 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION
______________________________________________________________________________

KEN PAXTON                                     KIMBERLY GDULA
Attorney General of Texas                      Chief, General Litigation Division

BRENT WEBSTER                                  JOE NWAOKORO
First Assistant Attorney General               Attorney-in-Charge
                                               Texas Bar No. 24032916
RALPH MOLINA                                   Assistant Attorney General
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General        P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
                                               Austin, Texas 78711-2548
WILLIAM D. WASSDORF                            (512) 979-5382 | FAX: (512) 320-0667
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation   Joe.Nwaokoro@oag.texas.gov


 DEFENDANT KEN PAXTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL
                              OF TEXAS


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 110         Filed 10/21/26      Page 2 of 7


       Defendant, Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas (“Defendant”

or “Attorney General”), files this Reply to Plaintiff’s Response (Dkt. 107) in support of his Motion

(Dkt. 101), with the Declaration of Joe Nwaokoro (Ex. A, “Reply Decl.”).

                                        INTRODUCTION

       Plaintiff has repeatedly told this Court that it “can decide this case based on the plain terms

of the Act,” Dkt. 54 at 4, and that whether S.B. 2337 is constitutional “turn[s] on the law’s text

and operation,” id. at 1. It stated in its motion for summary judgment that, “The following analysis

turns on the statutory text and legislative history of the Act, with few material facts required. As

to those few facts, there is no genuine dispute.” Dkt. 60 at 1. And it stated in its response to

Defendant and Intervenor-Defendant’s Rule 56(d) motion that “[t]he requested discovery is

immaterial,” Dkt. 74 at 2, and “[f]urther discovery is not needed to resolve the case.” Id. at 1. Yet

it seeks discovery inconsistent with those positions. In this official-capacity challenge to the Act,

Plaintiff probes the Attorney General’s personal and political capacity, including his campaign

funds, and seeks to use this case as a vehicle for discovery in the State’s DTPA action in Collin

County (the “State DTPA Action”), Dkt. 101-1 (“Nwaokoro Decl.”) ¶ 2, where the court ordered

jurisdictional discovery of Glass Lewis and, as Plaintiff itself represents, “merits discovery ‘is not

open’ and would effectively be stayed pending disposition of Glass Lewis’ special appearance.”

Dkt. 109-1 ¶ 7; Reply Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. D. Plaintiff seeks to circumvent that order by demanding

Defendant’s investigative file, deliberations, coordination, and motive in enforcing a different law

in that separate suit. The Motion should be granted.

                                           ARGUMENT

I.     Rule 26(c) authorizes topic-specific relief.


                                                  1


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 110        Filed 10/21/26       Page 3 of 7


       Plaintiff invokes the “extraordinary circumstances” standard for “prohibit[ing] the taking

of a deposition altogether.” Dkt. 107 at 3 (citing Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.

1979)). But Defendant’s Motion asks the Court to bar inquiry into specific, identified topics, and

limit Topic 6 to authentication. Dkt. 101 at 10. He will designate a witness on any topic the Court

permits. Rule 26(c)(1)(D) authorizes “forbidding inquiry into certain matters,” and Rule

26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires the Court to limit discovery “outside the scope permitted by Rule

26(b)(1).” Salter concerned barring a deponent with relevant information, not irrelevant and

privileged inquiry.

II.    Topics 4, 5, 6, and 8 seek the Attorney General’s file, deliberations, coordination, and
       motive, which are irrelevant to the as-applied question.

       Discovery must relate to a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff fails to

identify any count in its Second Amended Complaint for which motive is an element; its “pretext”

theory is an unpleaded retaliation claim. Dkt. 107 at 5. Defendant’s Motion addressed the pretext

theory with United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), Frederick Douglass Foundation, Inc.

v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2023), and Penthouse International, Ltd. v. Meese,

939 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1991), all First Amendment cases. Dkt. 101 at 5. Penthouse permits

motive discovery only when the violation “turns on an unconstitutional motive.” Id. at 1020.

Plaintiff ignores all three. Its footnote distinguishes Morgan, F.D.I.C., and Inspector General as

non-First Amendment cases, Dkt. 107 at 6 n.1, but the bar on probing executive decision-makers’

mental processes absent “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” does not depend on

the right asserted. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).

Plaintiff makes no such showing. Nor does it answer La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 68

F.4th 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2023) (legislative purpose is off limits “even when constitutional rights

are at stake”). Defendant did not enact S.B. 2337, so its legislative purpose is not his to explain. In


                                                  2


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 110         Filed 10/21/26       Page 4 of 7


any event, the merits are not motive-dependent: “Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of

a violation of the First Amendment,” Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. Hudson, 667 F.3d 630, 640 n.15

(5th Cir. 2012).

       The preliminary injunction bars enforcement of S.B. 2337 only, and the Court has

confirmed that it does not bar the Attorney General “from enforcing other provisions of the law.”

Dkt. 107 at 2. The DTPA petition asserts no claim under S.B. 2337. Nwaokoro Decl. ¶ 2.

Whether that petition is baseless or retaliatory is for the state court to decide, and Plaintiff has

agreed there that merits discovery would wait. Dkt. 109-1 ¶ 7; Reply Decl. Ex. D. As Plaintiff

concedes, the Rule 56(d) deferral reaches “issues that are covered by the summary judgment

motions,” not the State DTPA Action. Dkt. 107 at 1.

       Plaintiff does not address the legislative privilege, the common-interest privilege, or

Topic 5’s cumulative nature, Dkt. 101 at 6–7, 9, or dispute that Defendant has no non-privileged

Topic 5 witness who is not also counsel. Nwaokoro Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff disclaims any deposition

of the Attorney General, Dkt. 107 at 9, yet its Request No. 29 seeks his campaign-contribution

and legal-defense-fund records. Dkt. 109-3 at 13–14. An official-capacity suit is “not a suit

against the official personally.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Topics 4, 5, 6,

and 8 fare no better, because a designee could answer them only by reporting what the Attorney

General and his closest advisers weighed and decided. In re F.D.I.C., 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th

Cir. 1995).

III.   Topics 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9 seek work product, protected sources, and information that
       Plaintiff already has.

       Under Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993), the burden to show real harm is on

the State, so Plaintiff needs nothing from the investigative file to argue the State has not carried it.

Whether a statement is misleading depends on the statement and its audience, not on who


                                                   3


        Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA                Document 110            Filed 10/21/26         Page 5 of 7


complained. Topics 1 and 9 probe statements Defendant identifies as misleading, and he has

provided a written response. Reply Decl. Ex. E (Interrog. No. 17). Anything more is counsel’s

selection and opinion work product, which is not limited to documents. Hickman v. Taylor, 329

U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B). Topic 7 asks about Glass Lewis’s own Texas

contacts, the subject of the jurisdictional discovery ordered against it in Collin County. Dkt. 109-

1 ¶ 7; Reply Decl. Ex. D. Topics 2 and 3 seek the investigative-file and privileged material

addressed in the Motion. Dkt. 101 at 7–9.

IV.     The privilege showing is specific, and Plaintiff responds with state-law authority.

        The Stone Declaration is not a blanket assertion; it identifies the categories of material and

the basis for each privilege. 1 Stone Decl. ¶¶ 1–5. Privilege has been sustained over an agency’s

investigative file. De La Cruz v. Blinken, No. 2:19-CV-22-AM-CW, 2021 WL 2709679, at *2–3

(W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2021). The law-enforcement privilege’s purpose does not depend on whether

the pending action is civil or criminal. In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 941 (2d Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff’s state-law authorities do not control; federal common law governs privilege in this

federal-question case. Fed. R. Evid. 501.

        Plaintiff’s “unlogged” charge fails. Defendant has provided a privilege log, as Plaintiff’s

own motion to compel acknowledges, Dkt. 109 at 7, along with 39 records, not the “only five

documents” Plaintiff claims. Id. at 1, 3; Dkt. 107 at 4. Moreover, Rule 26(b)(5)(A) reaches only

“otherwise discoverable” information, so the duty to log attaches to relevant material withheld as

privileged, not material outside the scope of the action. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEVA

Logistics Singapore, Ltd., 348 F.R.D. 54, 83 (E.D. La. 2024). Defendant’s investigative file is not


1
 Plaintiff responds by citing state-law authority. See Dkt. 107 at 9, relying on Borden, Inc. v. Valdez, 773 S.W.2d
718, 720-21 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1989, no writ), West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1978),
City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Tex. 2000), and an Attorney General Opinion
applying the Texas Open Records Act – Att’y Gen. Op. Ord. 615, 1993 WL 720210, at *4 (June 29, 1993).


                                                         4


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 110         Filed 10/21/26      Page 6 of 7


“otherwise discoverable.”      Defendant nonetheless served an itemized log of its relevant

withholdings at 4:42 p.m. on October 16, ahead of the October 19 date Plaintiff accepted, and

supplemented it on October 20. Reply Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. B; Dkt. 107-6 at 2–3. Plaintiff filed its

Response, charging “unlogged” withholdings, at 6:28 p.m. that same day. Reply Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff

served its first log on October 19, after Defendant asked for one on October 15. Id. ¶ 8 & Ex. F.

Plaintiff’s accusation of bad faith, Dkt. 107 at 4, cannot be squared with that record.

V.     The conferral record does not support denial.

       Plaintiff’s September 30 email asked Defendant to identify a representative, or confirm it

would offer none, “no later than Friday, October 9.” Dkt. 101 at 12; Dkt. 107-6 at 3; Reply Decl.

¶ 2 & Ex. A. Defendant served objections on October 8 and proposed three resolutions and three

windows to confer. Dkt. 107-6 at 5–6; Reply Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C. Plaintiff’s October 9 reply

accepted none, did not offer to narrow the topics, and declared that Defendant had “already said

plainly” it would not produce a witness. Id. at 5. Rule 26(c)(1) requires only a certification that

the movant “conferred or attempted to confer,” and Defendant did both. Defendant also offered

to authenticate identified public statements by stipulation or declaration. Dkt. 101 at 11.

                                             PRAYER

       Defendant asks the Court to grant the Motion and enter the proposed order (Dkt. 101-3),

barring inquiry into Topics 1–5 and 7–9, confining Topic 6 to authentication. Alternatively,

Defendant asks the Court to limit any examination to non-privileged facts bearing on the as-applied

question and to a reasonable duration. Dkt. 101 at 10–11. Defendant asks that, if the Court denies

the Motion in any part, the stay remain in place briefly to permit objections under Rule 72(a).


                                                  5


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA         Document 110       Filed 10/21/26        Page 7 of 7


Dated: October 21, 2026.                    Respectfully submitted,

                                            KEN PAXTON
                                            Attorney General of Texas

                                            BRENT WEBSTER
                                            First Assistant Attorney General

                                            RALPH MOLINA
                                            Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

                                            WILLIAM D. WASSDORF
                                            Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

                                            KIMBERLY GDULA
                                            Chief, General Litigation Division

                                            /s/ Joe Nwaokoro
                                            JOE NWAOKORO
                                            Attorney-in-Charge
                                            Texas Bar No. 24032916
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
                                            Austin, Texas 78711-2548
                                            (512) 979-5382 | FAX: (512) 320-0667
                                            Joe.Nwaokoro@oag.texas.gov

                                            Defendant Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as
                                            Attorney General of Texas

                               CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I certify that on October 21, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed

electronically through the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of electronic filing to

all counsel of record.


                                            /s/ Joe Nwaokoro
                                            JOE NWAOKORO
                                            Assistant Attorney General


                                               6