Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton — Entry #110
Case: Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton txwd · 1:25-cv-01153
filed July 24, 2025
What this document is
Docket entry #110 · filed October 21, 2026
Who is involved
- Alliance for Corporate Excellence
- Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC
- Institutional Shareholder Services Inc.
- Ken Paxton
- Texas Association of Business
- Texas Stock Exchange LLC
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its name “Riot Platforms, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
…1989); Green Revolution Cooling, Inc. v. Riot Platforms, Inc., 2025 WL 2493527, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2025)…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 15, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
7 page(s), 15,532 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
Full text
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 1 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§
KEN PAXTON, in his Official Capacity as §
Civil Action No.
Attorney General of Texas §
1:25-cv-01153-ADA
Defendant, §
§
THE TEXAS STOCK EXCHANGE LLC §
and THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF §
BUSINESS, §
Intervenor-Defendants. §
______________________________________________________________________________
DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSED EXPEDITED MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND TO STAY RULE 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION
______________________________________________________________________________
KEN PAXTON KIMBERLY GDULA
Attorney General of Texas Chief, General Litigation Division
BRENT WEBSTER JOE NWAOKORO
First Assistant Attorney General Attorney-in-Charge
Texas Bar No. 24032916
RALPH MOLINA Assistant Attorney General
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
WILLIAM D. WASSDORF (512) 979-5382 | FAX: (512) 320-0667
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation Joe.Nwaokoro@oag.texas.gov
DEFENDANT KEN PAXTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 2 of 7
Defendant, Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas (“Defendant”
or “Attorney General”), files this Reply to Plaintiff’s Response (Dkt. 107) in support of his Motion
(Dkt. 101), with the Declaration of Joe Nwaokoro (Ex. A, “Reply Decl.”).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has repeatedly told this Court that it “can decide this case based on the plain terms
of the Act,” Dkt. 54 at 4, and that whether S.B. 2337 is constitutional “turn[s] on the law’s text
and operation,” id. at 1. It stated in its motion for summary judgment that, “The following analysis
turns on the statutory text and legislative history of the Act, with few material facts required. As
to those few facts, there is no genuine dispute.” Dkt. 60 at 1. And it stated in its response to
Defendant and Intervenor-Defendant’s Rule 56(d) motion that “[t]he requested discovery is
immaterial,” Dkt. 74 at 2, and “[f]urther discovery is not needed to resolve the case.” Id. at 1. Yet
it seeks discovery inconsistent with those positions. In this official-capacity challenge to the Act,
Plaintiff probes the Attorney General’s personal and political capacity, including his campaign
funds, and seeks to use this case as a vehicle for discovery in the State’s DTPA action in Collin
County (the “State DTPA Action”), Dkt. 101-1 (“Nwaokoro Decl.”) ¶ 2, where the court ordered
jurisdictional discovery of Glass Lewis and, as Plaintiff itself represents, “merits discovery ‘is not
open’ and would effectively be stayed pending disposition of Glass Lewis’ special appearance.”
Dkt. 109-1 ¶ 7; Reply Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. D. Plaintiff seeks to circumvent that order by demanding
Defendant’s investigative file, deliberations, coordination, and motive in enforcing a different law
in that separate suit. The Motion should be granted.
ARGUMENT
I. Rule 26(c) authorizes topic-specific relief.
1
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 3 of 7
Plaintiff invokes the “extraordinary circumstances” standard for “prohibit[ing] the taking
of a deposition altogether.” Dkt. 107 at 3 (citing Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.
1979)). But Defendant’s Motion asks the Court to bar inquiry into specific, identified topics, and
limit Topic 6 to authentication. Dkt. 101 at 10. He will designate a witness on any topic the Court
permits. Rule 26(c)(1)(D) authorizes “forbidding inquiry into certain matters,” and Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires the Court to limit discovery “outside the scope permitted by Rule
26(b)(1).” Salter concerned barring a deponent with relevant information, not irrelevant and
privileged inquiry.
II. Topics 4, 5, 6, and 8 seek the Attorney General’s file, deliberations, coordination, and
motive, which are irrelevant to the as-applied question.
Discovery must relate to a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff fails to
identify any count in its Second Amended Complaint for which motive is an element; its “pretext”
theory is an unpleaded retaliation claim. Dkt. 107 at 5. Defendant’s Motion addressed the pretext
theory with United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), Frederick Douglass Foundation, Inc.
v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2023), and Penthouse International, Ltd. v. Meese,
939 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1991), all First Amendment cases. Dkt. 101 at 5. Penthouse permits
motive discovery only when the violation “turns on an unconstitutional motive.” Id. at 1020.
Plaintiff ignores all three. Its footnote distinguishes Morgan, F.D.I.C., and Inspector General as
non-First Amendment cases, Dkt. 107 at 6 n.1, but the bar on probing executive decision-makers’
mental processes absent “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” does not depend on
the right asserted. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
Plaintiff makes no such showing. Nor does it answer La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 68
F.4th 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2023) (legislative purpose is off limits “even when constitutional rights
are at stake”). Defendant did not enact S.B. 2337, so its legislative purpose is not his to explain. In
2
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 4 of 7
any event, the merits are not motive-dependent: “Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of
a violation of the First Amendment,” Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. Hudson, 667 F.3d 630, 640 n.15
(5th Cir. 2012).
The preliminary injunction bars enforcement of S.B. 2337 only, and the Court has
confirmed that it does not bar the Attorney General “from enforcing other provisions of the law.”
Dkt. 107 at 2. The DTPA petition asserts no claim under S.B. 2337. Nwaokoro Decl. ¶ 2.
Whether that petition is baseless or retaliatory is for the state court to decide, and Plaintiff has
agreed there that merits discovery would wait. Dkt. 109-1 ¶ 7; Reply Decl. Ex. D. As Plaintiff
concedes, the Rule 56(d) deferral reaches “issues that are covered by the summary judgment
motions,” not the State DTPA Action. Dkt. 107 at 1.
Plaintiff does not address the legislative privilege, the common-interest privilege, or
Topic 5’s cumulative nature, Dkt. 101 at 6–7, 9, or dispute that Defendant has no non-privileged
Topic 5 witness who is not also counsel. Nwaokoro Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff disclaims any deposition
of the Attorney General, Dkt. 107 at 9, yet its Request No. 29 seeks his campaign-contribution
and legal-defense-fund records. Dkt. 109-3 at 13–14. An official-capacity suit is “not a suit
against the official personally.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Topics 4, 5, 6,
and 8 fare no better, because a designee could answer them only by reporting what the Attorney
General and his closest advisers weighed and decided. In re F.D.I.C., 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th
Cir. 1995).
III. Topics 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9 seek work product, protected sources, and information that
Plaintiff already has.
Under Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993), the burden to show real harm is on
the State, so Plaintiff needs nothing from the investigative file to argue the State has not carried it.
Whether a statement is misleading depends on the statement and its audience, not on who
3
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 5 of 7
complained. Topics 1 and 9 probe statements Defendant identifies as misleading, and he has
provided a written response. Reply Decl. Ex. E (Interrog. No. 17). Anything more is counsel’s
selection and opinion work product, which is not limited to documents. Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B). Topic 7 asks about Glass Lewis’s own Texas
contacts, the subject of the jurisdictional discovery ordered against it in Collin County. Dkt. 109-
1 ¶ 7; Reply Decl. Ex. D. Topics 2 and 3 seek the investigative-file and privileged material
addressed in the Motion. Dkt. 101 at 7–9.
IV. The privilege showing is specific, and Plaintiff responds with state-law authority.
The Stone Declaration is not a blanket assertion; it identifies the categories of material and
the basis for each privilege. 1 Stone Decl. ¶¶ 1–5. Privilege has been sustained over an agency’s
investigative file. De La Cruz v. Blinken, No. 2:19-CV-22-AM-CW, 2021 WL 2709679, at *2–3
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2021). The law-enforcement privilege’s purpose does not depend on whether
the pending action is civil or criminal. In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 941 (2d Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff’s state-law authorities do not control; federal common law governs privilege in this
federal-question case. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
Plaintiff’s “unlogged” charge fails. Defendant has provided a privilege log, as Plaintiff’s
own motion to compel acknowledges, Dkt. 109 at 7, along with 39 records, not the “only five
documents” Plaintiff claims. Id. at 1, 3; Dkt. 107 at 4. Moreover, Rule 26(b)(5)(A) reaches only
“otherwise discoverable” information, so the duty to log attaches to relevant material withheld as
privileged, not material outside the scope of the action. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEVA
Logistics Singapore, Ltd., 348 F.R.D. 54, 83 (E.D. La. 2024). Defendant’s investigative file is not
1
Plaintiff responds by citing state-law authority. See Dkt. 107 at 9, relying on Borden, Inc. v. Valdez, 773 S.W.2d
718, 720-21 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1989, no writ), West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1978),
City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Tex. 2000), and an Attorney General Opinion
applying the Texas Open Records Act – Att’y Gen. Op. Ord. 615, 1993 WL 720210, at *4 (June 29, 1993).
4
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 6 of 7
“otherwise discoverable.” Defendant nonetheless served an itemized log of its relevant
withholdings at 4:42 p.m. on October 16, ahead of the October 19 date Plaintiff accepted, and
supplemented it on October 20. Reply Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. B; Dkt. 107-6 at 2–3. Plaintiff filed its
Response, charging “unlogged” withholdings, at 6:28 p.m. that same day. Reply Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff
served its first log on October 19, after Defendant asked for one on October 15. Id. ¶ 8 & Ex. F.
Plaintiff’s accusation of bad faith, Dkt. 107 at 4, cannot be squared with that record.
V. The conferral record does not support denial.
Plaintiff’s September 30 email asked Defendant to identify a representative, or confirm it
would offer none, “no later than Friday, October 9.” Dkt. 101 at 12; Dkt. 107-6 at 3; Reply Decl.
¶ 2 & Ex. A. Defendant served objections on October 8 and proposed three resolutions and three
windows to confer. Dkt. 107-6 at 5–6; Reply Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C. Plaintiff’s October 9 reply
accepted none, did not offer to narrow the topics, and declared that Defendant had “already said
plainly” it would not produce a witness. Id. at 5. Rule 26(c)(1) requires only a certification that
the movant “conferred or attempted to confer,” and Defendant did both. Defendant also offered
to authenticate identified public statements by stipulation or declaration. Dkt. 101 at 11.
PRAYER
Defendant asks the Court to grant the Motion and enter the proposed order (Dkt. 101-3),
barring inquiry into Topics 1–5 and 7–9, confining Topic 6 to authentication. Alternatively,
Defendant asks the Court to limit any examination to non-privileged facts bearing on the as-applied
question and to a reasonable duration. Dkt. 101 at 10–11. Defendant asks that, if the Court denies
the Motion in any part, the stay remain in place briefly to permit objections under Rule 72(a).
5
Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA Document 110 Filed 10/21/26 Page 7 of 7
Dated: October 21, 2026. Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM D. WASSDORF
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
KIMBERLY GDULA
Chief, General Litigation Division
/s/ Joe Nwaokoro
JOE NWAOKORO
Attorney-in-Charge
Texas Bar No. 24032916
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 979-5382 | FAX: (512) 320-0667
Joe.Nwaokoro@oag.texas.gov
Defendant Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of Texas
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on October 21, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed
electronically through the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of electronic filing to
all counsel of record.
/s/ Joe Nwaokoro
JOE NWAOKORO
Assistant Attorney General
6