Sheresky v. United States of America — Entry #80: NOTICE of Filing of Administrative Record
Case: Sheresky v. United States of America nysd · 1:25-cv-08935
filed October 28, 2025
What this document is
Docket entry #80 · filed September 18, 2026
NOTICE of Filing of Administrative Record. Document filed by Daniel Aronowitz, Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Janet Dhillon, United States of America. (Attachments: (1) Exhibit Certification of Administrative Record, (2) Exhibit Index to Administrative Record, (3) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 1, (4) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 2, (5) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.1, (6) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.2, (7) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.3, (8) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.4, (9) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.5, (10) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.6, (11) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 3.7, (12) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 4, (13) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 5.1, (14) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 5.2, (15) Exhibit Administrative Record Vol. 6).(Yalen, Robert)
Who is involved
- Daniel Aronowitz
- Janet Dhillon
- Jeffrey Samsen
- Lori Chavez-DeRemer
- Nicholas Sutro
- Steve Sheresky
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Riot: its former name “Riot Blockchain, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
…Lead counsel in Takata v. Riot Blockchain, Inc., et al., No. 3:18- CONSUMER PROTECTION…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 14, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
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164 page(s), 765,199 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
Full text
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 1 of 164
4.1 Club Memb ership s for 2022
dingperforma11ce by Advisors. In addition
The Finn's Iecognition progrnms are designed to recognize outstan
ment, the Firm's recognition Club Members
to demonstrated leadership in the best practices of wealth manage
the Firm's performance, conduct and compliance
must be in good standing and satisfy other aspects of
standards and expectations, as determi ned by the Firm.
rships will be assigned based on 2021
Subject to the foregoing, at the beginning of 2022, Club Membe
calenda r year Total Revenu e Premium, as welt as LOE and Assets
calendar year Gross Revenue OR 2021
:
Under Management ("AUM") for Pacesetter's Club only, as follows
Club Memberships
Club Type Qualifying Criteria
among the top 225 in Total
Rank among the top 225 Advisors in Gross Revenue for 2021 QB.
Chairman's Club Revenue Premium for 2021
n's Club) in Gross Revenue
Rank among the next 575 of the Advisor population (after Chairma
President's Club the next 575 in Total Revenue Premium for 2021
for 2021 QB among
t's Club) In Gross
Rank among the next 1,150 of the Advisor population (after Presiden for 2021
Master's Club Revenue for 2021 OR among the next 1,150 in Total Revenue Premium
in Gross Revenue for
Rank In the next 1,150 of the Advisor population (after Master's Club)
Century Club 2021 OR among the next 1,150 in Total Revenue Premium for 2021
Revenue Premium of
Achieve minimum Gross Revenue of $100,000 QB minimum Total
LOE of O, 1
$140,000 AND minimum AUM of $8,000,000 for Advisors with an
Revenue Premium of
Achieve minimum Gross Revenue of $200,000 OR minimum Tota!
of $15,000,000 for Advisors with an LOE of 2
Pacesetter's Club $280,000 AND minimum AUM
Revenue Premium of
(Only Advisors with Achieve minimum Gross Revenue of $250,000 OR minimum Total
an LOE of 5 or below ,000 for Advisors with an LOE of 3
will be eligible for this
$350,000 ~ minimum AUM of $20,000
~-- ~-- --- --
Revenue Premium of
Club) Achieve minimum Gross Revenue of $300,000 QB minimum Total
AUM of $25,000 ,000 for Advisors with an LOE of 4
$420,000 8.t!Q minimum
Revenue Premium of
Achieve minimum Gross Revenue of $350,000 OR minimum Total 5
minimum AUM of $30,000 ,000 for Advisors with an LOE of
$490,000 AND
Club Memberships may be withdrawn by the Firm, at any time,
in its sole discretion, This includes, without
t, and all Gross Revenue, Total Revenue
limitation, the Fim1's sole discretion to review all Advisor conduc
r such activity is appropriate for inclusion. For purposes of
Premium and AUM activity and determine whethe
that the Firm deems to be inconsistent with
Club Membet"Ships, the Fhm may exclude any Advisor or revenue
s of the Fh-m or clients. For example, Gross
the spit-it of Club Membership or inconsistent with the interest
attribut able to manipulation of JPN(s), without a business
Revenue, Total Revenue Premium and/or AUM
in evaluating eligibility.
explanation the Fi.rm finds satisfacto1y, may be omitted or reduced
ATION PLAN AND RECOGNITION PROGRAM S
26 • 202 l FINANCl/\ L ADVISOR / PRIVATE WEALTH ADVISOR COMPENS
PUBLIC.
ONLY. NOT TO BE DISPLAYED OR DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL
FOR INTERNAL MORGAN STANLEY WEALTH MANAGEMENT USE
§ 70.26
CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT TO 5 U.S.C. § 552 & 29 C.F.R.
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 2 of 164
4.2 Titles
In addition to specific recognition clubs, the Firm also grants titles to recogniz
e the outstanding performance
of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management Advisors. Titles are awarded based
on achievement of specific Gross
Revenue or Total Revenue Premium levels and the maintenance of high
standards of the Firm, including
being in good standing and satisfying the Firm's expectations for excellen
ce in all areas, including, but not
limited to, guardianship, personal conduct, and adherence to regulatory
and compliance requirements.
Titles may be denied, changed or withdrawn at any time by the Firm, in
its sole discretion.
Managi11g Directo r, Wealth Manage ment
Eligibility:
• Minimum cumulative Gross Revenue of$8,800,000 OR Total Revenue
Premium of$12,3 00,000 over
the last three years; OR
• Minimum cumulative Gross Revenue of $25,000,000 over the last ten
years AND 30 or more years of
LOS
Advisors who meet either criteria are eligible for selection by the Fh-m
for the Managing Director, Wealth
Management title.
Additional criteria for Managing Director, Wealth Management includes
:
• Exhibiting leadership both externally and internally
• Being an ambassador and role model of Morgan Stanley Wealth Manage
ment's vision and business
principles
• Pursuing excellence and holding self and others to the hig!iest standard
s
• Consistently exemplifying high standards of corporate guardianship
Executive Dil'ector
Eligibility: Minimum cumulative Gross Revenue of$4,400,000 OR Total
Revenue Premium of$6,150,000
over the last two years. •
Advisors who meet the 2-year Gross Revenue OR Total Revenue PJemium
requirement are eligible for
selection by the Firm for the Executive Director title.
Senior Vice Preside nt
Eligibility: Minimum Prior Year Gross Revenue of $1,100,000 OR Total
Revenue Premium of $1,550,000
First Vice Preside nt
Eligibility: Minimum Prior Year Gross Revenue of$825,000 OR Total
Revenue Premium of$1,150,000
Vice Preside nt
Eligibility: Minimum Prior Year Gross Revenue of $550,000 OR Total
Revenue Premium of $770,000
Associate Vice Preside nt
Eligibility: Minimum Prior Year Gross Revenue of$440,000 OR Total
Revenue Premium of$615,000
27 • 2021 FINANCIAL ADVlSOR / PRIVATE WEALTH ADVISOR COMPENSATION PLAN
ANO RECOGNITION PROGRAMS
FOR INTERNAL MORGAN STANLEY WEALTH ~lANAGEMENT USE ONLY.
NOTTO BE DISPLAYED OR DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.
CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT TO 5 U.S.C. § 552 & 29 C.F.R. § 70.26
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 3 of 164
5.1 Summary and Additional Information
Morgan Stanley Wealth Management provides one of the most comprehensive Advisor Compensation Plan,
Growth Award and Recognition Programs in the securities industry.
This brochure summarizes the Morgan Stanley Wealth Management Advisor Compensation Plan, Growth
Award and Recognition Prngrams in effect for 2021 unless otherwise noted. Morgan Stanley Wealth
Maiiagement reserves the right to amend, modify, interpret or terminate all or any part of the Program for
any year and at any time. Nothing in this brochme is a guarantee of continued employment or of any pmiicular
benefits or level of remuneration.
This Compensation Plan and the additional product guidelines and policies referenced in this Compensation
Plan set forth guidelines only. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Compensation Plan
or elsewhere, Morgan Stanley Wealth Management has the sole discretion to determine whether to allocate
Credit to an Advisor's Gross Revenue (or to provide compensation in any form) for any particular business
and, if so, the amount of Credit to be allocated or the amount of compensation to be awarded, and further
Morgan Stanley Wealth Management may adjust and/or decline to award future Credits towards Incentive
Compensation where an Advisor has an unsatisfied obligation to the Firm. Under no circumstances is an
Advisor eligible to receive any Credit to Gross Revenue or any compensation for any pmiicular business
unless and until Morgan Stanley Wealth Management receives the revenue associated with that business.
Fmihermore, if an Advisor is detenuined to have engaged in activity that is inconsistent with Morgan
Stanley's expectations f01• good guardianship, or not in line with any policy, regulation or otherwise counter
to the best interests of om clients, then such Advisor may be deemed, in Morgan Stanley's sole discretion,
not to have qualified for compensation, growth awards or any bonus program listed herein. If an Advisor's
employment terminates for any reason before Morgan Stanley Wealth Management receives the revenue for
any particular business, the Advisor will not be eligible for any Credit to Gross Revenue or any compensation
associated with that business and, in the event Morgan Stanley Wealth Management ultimately refunds all or
a portion of such revenue for any reason, any associated Incentive Compensation paid on the basis of such
revenue shall be deemed an overpayment to the Advisor. Additionally, an Advisor must be employed in good
standing at the time that Morgan Stanley Wealth Management receives the revenue to be eligible for any
Credit to Gross Revenue or flny compensation associated with that business.
In the event that Morgan Stanley Wealth Management determines that any payment or award under this
Compensation Plan or any other compensation plan or program would violate any legal, regulatory or
contractual obligation, or create undue risk of such violation, such payment or award will not be made,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Compensation Plan. Morgan Stanley Wealth Management
retains the sole discretion and authority to interpret, modify, and/or terminate the Compensation Plan, or any
of the individual guidelines described in the Compensation Plan, at any time, with or without notice, and to
resolve any dispute arising out of or in any way related to the Compensation Plan. Given the dynamic and
complex nature of the business, calculations under this plan may rely on data that could be revised, improved,
modified or otherwise interpreted differently. Nevertheless, Morgan Stanley Wealth Management's
interpretations and decisions shall be final and binding on all parties.
The information contained in this brochure briefly describes certain employee compensation programs and
defc11"ed incentive compensation awards and other arrangements. It is important to note that this brochure
merely summarizes the provisions of those programs, awards and plans, and does not address all of their
terms, conditions and restrictions. Advisors should consult the pertinent compensation program, plan
document or award certificate for a full explanation of their provisions. If there is a conflict between this
brochure and any formal compensation program, deferred compensation plan, plan document or award
certificate, then the formal program, plan document or award certificate will control. All compensation and
recognition plans are subject to changes due to tax laws and other legal requirements or at the sole discretion
of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management.
28 • 2021 FINANCIALADVlSO RI PRIVATE WEALTH ADVISOR COMPENSATION PLAN AND RECOGNITION PROGRAMS
PUBLIC.
FOR INTERNAL MORGAN STANLEY WEALTH MANAGEMENT USE ONLY. NOTTO 6E DISPLAYED OR DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT TO 5 U.S.C. § 552 & 29 C.F.R. § 70.26
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 4 of 164
5.2 Version History
This section tracks change~ made to the 2021 Advisor Compensation Plan and Recognition Programs during
2021. The table below documents the date, page number and a brief description of the change for easy
reference.
Date Page Number Oescrfptlon
December 8'h, 2020 Initial publication
December 16th , 2020 21 Capital Accumulation Program
January 5th , 2021 17 Inherited Accounts
March 18 th, 2021 12 MSAW -10b5-1 Transactional Revenue
March 181h, 2021 15 MSAW-10b5-1 Transactional Revenue
---------~-- ·~ __ _
,
29 • 2<}21 FINANCIAL ADI/ISOR I PRIVATE WEALTH ADVJSOR COMPENSATION PlAN AND RECOGNITION PROGRAMS
FOR INTERNAL MORGAN STANLEY WEALTH MANAGEMENT USE ONl Y. NOT TO BE DISPLAYED OR DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.
CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT TO 5 U.S.C. § 552 & 29 C.F.R. § 70.26
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 5 of 164
~ / I
Co1y,8ential
Figure 1
EICP Conversions to Current Employees Versus Former Employees by Year (Percentage of Shares)
Plan Years 2009 to 2019
-=0== Percentage of Conversions to Current Employees · Percentage of Conversions to Former Employees
100% 95.1% 94.2%
90.8% 90.6% 89.9% 89.7% 90.4%
90%
' i
il, I!! ;i @ Iii
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
9.9% 9.2% 9.4% 10.1% 10.3% 9.6%
6.9% 7.4% 5.8%
10% 4.8% 4.9%
0% ...._______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ __
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Plan Year of Award
Notes:
in
[l] Percentage of Conversions to Current (Former) Employees for each Plan Year is calculated based on the sum of the values in the "num_unts_conv_for_event'' field
being "A'' ("T") and the sum of all values in the same field. The converted units do not account for certain de minimis
MS-Rude-029295 for events with "IF for Active/Term"
payments, including to beneficiaries of deceased employees.
[2] Smith Barney Replacement Awards are not included in this Figure.
[3] All EICP awards are in units. One unit converts to one share. Conversions are in shares.
Sources:
[A] MS-Rude-029295.
[B] See, e.g., 2015 Discretionary Retention Awards, Award Certificate for Stock Units, MS-McC-0000001--020.
Page 1 of6
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 552 AND C.F.R § 70.26
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 6 of 164
Confidential
Figure2
Total EICP Conversions to Current Employees Versus Former Employees
Plan Years 2009 to 2019
11 Conversions to Current Employees · Conversions to Former Employees
~
[1] Percentage of Conversions to Current (Former) Employees is calculated based on the sum of the values in the "num_unts_conv_for_event"
field in MS-Rude-029295 for events
with "IF for Active/Term" being "A" ("T") and the sum of all values in the same field. The converted units do not account for certain
de minimis payments, including to beneficiaries
• of deceased employees.
[2] Smith Barney Replacement Awards are not included in this Figure.
[3] All EICP awards are in units. One unit converts to one share. Conversions are in shares.
Sources:
[A] MS-Rude-029295.
[B] See, e.g., 2015 Discretionary Retention Awards, Award Certificate for Stock Units, MS-McC-0000001--020.
Page2 of6
\JFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 552 At- .E'.R. § 70.26
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 7 of 164
I
!
Cory,dential
Figu re3
Total EICP Conversions to Curr ent Employees Versus Former Employees
Plan Years 2015 to 2019
iii Conversions to Current Employees Conversions to Former Employees
event" field in MS-Rude-029295 for events
Notes:
oyees is calcul ated based on the sum of the values in the "num_ unts_conv_for_ iciaries
[l] Percentage of Conversions to Curre nt (Form er) Empl nt for certain de minimis payments, including to benef
e/Tenn" being "A" ("T") and the sum of all value s in the same field. The converted units do not accou
with "IF for Activ
of deceased employees.
to one share. Conversions are in shares.
[2] A11 EICP awards are in units. One unit converts
Sources:
[A] MS-Rude-029295. -020.
Award Certificate for Stock Units, MS-McC-0000001
[B] See, e.g., 2015 Discretionary Retention Awards,
Page 3 of6
UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 552 AND C.F.R. § 70.26
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 8 of 164
Confidential
Figure 4
l\1SCIP Distributions to Current Employees Vers
us Former Employees by Year (Percentage of Tota
Plan Years 2009 to 2017 l Distributions)
..,.._Percentage of Distributions to Current Emp
100% loyees "" - Percentage of Distributions to Farm er Emp
loyees
91.1% 92.6%
90.0%
90% @ $
l' 84.4%
82.4% 85.2% 85.4%
80% i 80.1% 815%
a ! .I)
Ill &I
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
8.9%
10% 7.4%
0% ..,___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_________________
_________________
_ _ _ _ _ _ __
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
~ Plan Year of Award
[l] Percentage of Distributions to Cwre nt Employees
for each Plan Year ls calculated based on the
the sum of the values ln the "EVENT AMOUNT sum ofthe values in the "Total Distributed Amou
" field in MS-Rude-029294. Percentage of Distri nt" field in MS-Rude-029296 and
Employees for each Plan Year. The distributed butions to Former Employees is 100% minus
amounts reflect changes in value due to appre Percentage ofDistributions to Current
Employees may be earlier than that for Curre ciation or reduction of notional investments.
nt Employees. The distributed amounts do not The date of distribution for Former
employees. account for certain de minimis payments, includ
ing to beneficiaries of deceased
[2] Smith Barney Replacement Awards are not
included in this Figure.
[3] The vesting period decreased from eight years
to six years starting with the Plan Year 2016
amounts for the Plan Years 2018 and 2019 Awar Awards. Therefore, there is no current balance
ds are not included in this Figure because they for the Plan Year 2017 Awards. The
have current balances.
Sources:
[A] MS-Rude-029294; MS-Rude-029296.
[B] See, e.g., 2015 Discretionary Retention A
wards, A ward Certificate, MS-McC-0001007-023
; 2016 Discretionary Retention Awards, Award
Certificate, MS-McC-000 I 024-040.
Page 4 of6
\JFIOENTJAL TREATMENT REQUESTED
UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 552 N F.,B. § 70.26
DOLAR0584
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 9 of 164
'-.,-,,•
Cm'.l.dential
Figure 5
Total MSCIP Distributions to Current Employees Versus Former Employees
Plan Years 2009 to 2017
m Distributions to Current Employees Distributions to Former Employees
~ "Total Distributed Amount" field in MS-Rude-029296 and the sum of the
[l] Percentage of Distributions to Current Employees is calculated based on the sum of the values in the
s to Former Employees is 100% minus Percentage of Distributions to Current Employees.
values in the "EVENT AMOUNT" field in MS-Rude-029294. Percentage of Distribution
appreciation or reduction of notional investments . The date of distribution for Farmer Employees may be earlier than that for
The distributed amounts reflect changes in value due to
to beneficiaries of deceased employees.
Current Employees. The distributed amounts do not account for certain de minimis payments, including
[2] Smith Barney Replacement Awards are not included in this Figure.
Therefore, there is no current balance for the Plan Year 2017 Awards. The
[3] The vesting period decreased from eight years to six years starting with the Plan Year 2016 Awards.
balances.
amounts for the Plan Years 2018 and 2019 Awards are not included in this Figure because they have current
Sources:
[A] MS-Rude-029294; MS-Rude-029296.
y Retention Awards, Award Certificate, MS-McC-0001024--040.
[BJ See, e.g., 2015 Discretionary Retention Awards, Award Certificate, MS-McC-0001007--023; 2016 Discretionar
Page 5 of6
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 552 AND C.F.R. § 70.26
DOLAR0585
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 10 of 164
Confidential
Figure 6
Total MSCIPDistributions to Current Employees Versus Former Employees
Plan Years 2015 to 2017
11 Distributions to Current Employees - Distributions to Former Employees
Notes:
[1] Percentage of Distributions to Current Employees is calculated based on the sum of the values in the "Total
Distributed Amount" field in MS-Rude-029296 and the sum of the
values in the ''EVENT AMOUNT" field in MS-Rude-029294. Percentage ofDistributions to Former Employees
is 100% minus Percentage of Distributions to Current Employees.
The distributed amounts reflect changes in value due to appreciation or reduction of notional investments. The
date of distribution for Former Employees may be earlier than that for
Current Employees. The distributed amounts do not account for certain de minimis payments, including to
beneficiaries of deceased employees.
[2] The vesting period decreased from eight years to six years starting with the Plan Year 2016 Awards. Therefore,
there is no current balance for the Plan Year 2017 Awards. The
amounts for the Plan Years 2018 and 2019 Awards are not included in this Figure because they have current
balances.
Sources:
[A] MS-Rude-029294; MS-Rude-029296.
[BJ See, e.g., 2015 Discretionary Retention Awards, Award Certificate, MS-McC-0001007-023; 2016 Discretionar
y Retention Awards, Award Certificate, MS-McC-0001024-040.
Page 6 of6
\JFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 552 At'I ...-.R. § 70.26
DOLAR0586
-'I-A--- -·-- _.,, --- If t -- _ _ . . _ . _ 1 , , - , 1~ --- J . , ...... _ ----·---·-- • -:::r- -. -· - -
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 11 of 164
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MATTHEWT. SHAFER, SHERI
HAUGABOOK, PETER HEIDT, JEFFREY
SHOVER, MACE TAMSE, GEORGE
LIVANOS, MARI( LOFTUS, JEFFREY
SAMSEN, JEFFREY SHERESKY, STEVE MEMORANDUM
SHERESKY, STEVE NADLER, and OPINION & ORDER
SANDY JUKEL, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, 20 Civ. 11047 (PGG)
Plaintiffs,
- against -
MORGANSTANL EY,MORGAN
STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC,
MORGAN STANLEY COMPENSATION
MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AND
SUCCESSION COMMITTEE, and
John/Jane Does 1-20,
Defendants.
PAULG. GARDEPHE, U.S.D,J.:
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs Matthew Shafer, Sheri Haugabook, Peter
Heidt, Jeffrey Shover, Mace Tamse, George Livanos, Mark Loftus, Jeffrey Samsen, Jeffrey
Sheresky, Steve Sheresky, Steve Nadler, and Sandy Jukel asse11 that Defendants Morgan
Stanley, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Morgan Stanley Compensation Management
Development and Succession Committee (the "Compensation Committee't and ce11ain
unnamed members of the Compensation Committee (together, "Morgan Stanley" or the "Bank"),
violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("BRISA") by not paying
Plaintiffs all of their deferred compensation when they left their financial advisor positions at
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Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 12 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 2 of 56
Morgan Stanley. Defendants have moved to compel arbitration and for a stay of these
proceedings, (Dkt. No. 65) For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiffs are former financial advisors at Morgan Stanley Smith Barney. 2 They
reside throughout the country and worked for the Bank at various times between 1994 and 2020.
(Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 58) ,r,r 11-22; Krentzman Deel. (Dkt. No. 68) ,r,r 5-16)
"Defendant Morgan Stanley is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of
business in New York, New York. Morgan Stanley is a global financial services firm that,
through its subsidiades and affiliates, including [Defendant Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York, New
York] provides financial advisory services to clients. Defendant Compensation Committee is a
committee of Morgan Stanley's Board of Directors formed to discharge the Board's
responsibilities related to compensation.. , . The Compensation Committee is an unincorporated
1
In resolving a motion to compel arbitration, courts consider '"flll relevant, admissible evidence
submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with . , . affidavits,' , .. and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party." Nicosia v. Amazon.com. Inc., 834 F.3d 220,229 (2d Cir. 2016) (first
omission in original) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir.
2002)),
The facts discussed below are drawn from (1) the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 58); (2) the
alleged "Plan Documents" cited in the Amended Complaint, which have been docketed as
exhibits to Plaintiffs September 15, 2023 letter (Dkt. No. 83); and (3) the declarations and
accompanying exhibits submitted by the patties (Porco Deel. (Dkt. No. 67); Krentzman Deel.
(Dkt. No. 68); Jasinski Deel. (Dkt. No. 72-1)),
2
Morgan Stanley describes the financial advisor's role as ''help[ing] [clients] create a wealth
plan that takes [their] specific goals and circumstances into account," including providing advice
on "retirement income. , , , asset allocation ... , and changes in tax policy," Morgan Stanley
Wealth Mgmt., Why Advice Matters (May 31, 2023), available at
https://www.morganstanley.com/articles/advice-matters.
2
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Document Filed
86 Filed 09/18/26
11/21 Page
/23 Page 3 of 5613 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-P
John and Jane Does 1-20 are the
association with its principal place of business in New York.
individual members of the Compensation Committee." (M.
1-if 23-26)
an Stanley financial
Plaintiffs purpo1t to bring this action on behal f of all Morg
ving their Morgan Stanley
advisors who forfeited deferred compensation as a result oflea
(hl., 90)
employment between December 29, 2014 and the present.
ant to 28 U,S.C.
Plaintiffs assert general federal question jurisdiction pursu
e), Qd. iP)
§ 1331 and BRISA jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § ll32(
I. FACTS
A, Financial Advisors' Compensation at Morgan Stanley
advisors during the
Morgan Stanley's "compensation program[]" for financial
and incentive compensation.3
relevant time period largely consists of two components: salary
at 2)4
(2018 Financial Advisor Compensation Plan (Dkt, No. 83-2)
compensation in
"All Advisors, .. receive a guaranteed monthly salruy. Total
by state." (Id. § 1.1) As of
any month will not be lower than the applicable monthly salary
$4,225 per month, or $50,700 per
2018, the salaiy for New York-based financial advisors was
year. (Id, § 1.1)
a financial advisor is
Incentive compensation is based on the "Total Credits" that
ts for each month [are] determined
awarded monthly. (Id,.§ 1.2.1) "The Advisor's Total Credi
en 28% and 55.5% that increases with
based on the applicable Credit Rate" - a percentage betwe
3 Morgan Stanley also offers ce1tain income and savings programs that are not at issue
here,
accumulatio n program.!' (See
including a "lending growth award program" and a "capital
Comp ensation Plan (Dkt. No, 83-2))
generally 2018 Financial Advisor
4 The page numbers of documents referenced in this opinion correspond to the page
numbers
system.
designated by this District's Electronic Case Files ("ECF")
3
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''(1) the Advisor's trailing 12-month Gross Revenue and (2) his/her Length of Service" -
"multiplied by the Creditable Revenue generated [by the Advisor] in such month." (Id, § 1.2.1)
Incentive compensation is further divided between (1) "Cash Credits," which are
"calculated monthly and [result in cash compensation] paid in arrears on a monthly basis,"
and
(2) "Deferred Credits," which result in deferred compensation paid out years later. (Id. §§ 1.2.2-
1,2. 3) The percentage of Total Credits allotted to "Deferred Credits" is "based on a Deferral
Ratio determined by the Advisor's Trailing 12-month Gross Revenue," which varies from 1.5%
(for the $0 to $239,999 revenue band) to 15% (for the $5 million+ revenue band) as such revenue
increases. (Id. §§ 1.2.2-1.2.3)
The parties' dispute here involves the "Defene d Credits" that result in deferred
compensation paid out years after it is earned.
The 2018 Financial Advisor Compensation Plan provides the following example
of incentive compensation:
An Advisor with a Length of Service (0 LOS") of l S years produces $800,000 in Trailing 12-rnonth Gross
Revenue as of May 3 l, 2018, The Advisor's Creditable Revenue for June 2018 is $70,000.
o Credit Rate is 44,0%
• Monthly Total Credits are $30 1800 [$70,000 x 44.0%"" $30,800}
• Monthly Deferred Credits are $2,002 [$30,800 x 6.5% = $2,002]
• Monthly Cash Credits are $28,798 [$30,800-$2,002 "'$28,798]
(Id. § 1.2.3)
"Twenty-five percent of the cumulative monthly Deferred Credits [are] granted in
the form of a restricted stock unit [('RSU')J award that is scheduled to convert to shares of
Morgan Stanley common stock approximately four years from the grant date" (the "Equity
Incentive Plan"). (Id. § 1.2.2) "[SJeventy-five percent of the cumulative monthly Deferred
Credits [areJgranted in the fmm of a cash-based deferred compensation award scheduled to
be
paid approximately six years from the grant date" (the "Compensation Incentive Plan"). (Id.
§
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83-4); Equity Incentive
1.2.2; see Compensation Incentive Plan Document (Dkt. No.
ensation Committee administers both
Compensation Plan Document (Dkt. No. 83-8)) The Comp
83-4) § 2(a)(i); Equity Incentive
plans. (Compensation Incentive Plan Document (Dkt. No,
Compensation Plan Document (Dkt. No, 83-8) § S(a))
the [Compensation
"[Financial advisors] have individual, notional accounts in
an account for each year's deferred
Incentive Plan] for each award they receive, i.e., they have
in notional investments, like in a
compensation, [Financial advisors] can invest their accounts
mance of the selected
40l(k) plan, with the value of their accounts tracking the perfor
Compensation Incentive Plan Award
investments." (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 58) 138 (citing 2017
y Incentive Plan, "a Stock Unit
Certificate (0kt, No. 83-5) § 1)) As to vesting under the Equit
ittee, in Stock or in cash equal to
will be payable, at the· discretion of the [Compensation] Comm
(Equity Incentive Compensation Plan
the Fair Market Value on the payment date ofone Share."
Document (Dkt, No. 83-8) § 8)
gent upon the
As to both plans, "[d]eferred compensation awards are contin
dates of the award." (2018 Financial
Advisor remaining employed through the grant and vesting
iffs refer to this policy as the
Advisor Compensation Plan (Dkt. No. 83-2) § 1,2,2) Plaint
"Cancellation Rule." (Aru. Cmplt. (Dlct. No. 58) passim)
red cash
There are several exceptions to the Cancellation Rule. Defer
after employment if the financial
compensation and deferred equity compensation both vest
career retirement" -i.e.,
advisor's employment ends because of (1) disability; (2) "full
than under circumstances involving
"te1mination of ... [e]mployment .. , for any reason other
or's] death or [departure for]
any Prohibited Activity, and other than due to [a financial advis
ed a contractually specified
[g]overnmental [s]ervice," after a financial advisor has achiev
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combination of age and years of service; (3) "[i]nvoluntaiy termination by [Morgan Stanley]" -
i.e., layoffs; or (4) depa1ture for governmental service. (2017 Compensation Incentive Plan
Award Certificate (Dkt. No. 83-5) §§ 3(c)-(d), 4-5, 16G); Equity Incentive Compensation Plan
Award Certificate (Dkt. No. 83-9) §§ 5(c), 6-7, 22(n))
"[E]nter[ing] into an employment or consulting relationship with a firm offering
Competitive Services" constitutes "Prohibited Activity.'' Accordingly, a long-tenured financial
advisor who, after leaving Morgan Stanley, accepts a position at another bank or brokerage firm
is not eligible for the "full career retirement" exception to the Cancellation Rule. (2017
Compensation Incentive Plan Award Certificate (Dkt. No. 83-5) § 16(p)(3)-(4); Equity Incentive
Compensation Plan Award Certificate (Dkt. No. 83-9) §§ I0(c)(l), 22(:f)(l), 22(n))
B. The Arbitration Agreements
In moving to compel arbitration, M9rgan Stanley cites arbitration clauses in three
types of Morgan Stanley employment agreements: the "Bonus Agreement"; the "Employment
Agreement"; and the "CARE Program,"
1. The Bonus Agreement's Arbitration Provision
The Bonus Agreement's arbitration provision provides as follows:
7. Resolution of Disputes
(a) Any controversy or claim arising out of or in any way relating to this
Agreement or any benefits or payments available and/or due under this
Agreement, as well as any controversy or claim arising out of or in any way
relating to Employee's employment with Morgan Stanley or termination thereof,
including, but not limited to common law claims for breach of contract or t01i,
wage and hour claims, and/or statutory discrimination claims (individually and
collectively referred to herein as "Covered Claims"), will be resolved by final and
binding arbitration before the Financial lndushy Regulat01y Authority ("FINRA")
in accordance with the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industly
Disputes, Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Covered Claim that has been
initiated or is being maintained on a class, collective, or representative action
basis, or is otherwise brought on behalf of others, may not be submitted to
arbitration before FINRA. Also, notwithstanding the foregoing, any Covered
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Claim that al'ises in connection with an employee benefit plan subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ('~BRISA"), will
be subject to the dispute resolution procedures set forth in the applicable BRISA
plan document and paragraphs 7(c) through 7(e) below.
(b) If a Covered Claim may not be arbitrated before FINRA or is otherwise
excluded from or not subject to arbitration before FINRA, then such Covered
Claim, other than claims that arise under BRISA, will be resolved by final and
binding arbitration pursuant to a single arbitrator before the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"). Such arbitration, except as provided othe1wise in this
paragraph 7, will be carried out in accordance with the AAA Employment
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures. Any judgment or award issued by
the arbitrator may be entered in any cou1t having jurisdiction.
(c) Employee and Morgan Stanley agree to waive, and hereby waive, any right to
a jwy trial with respect to any Covered Claims. Employee and Morgan Stanley
further agree that no Covered Claims may be initiated or maintained on a class
action, collective action, or representative action basis either in court Ol' in
arbitration and any such Covered Claim will be decided as an individual claim
only. With respect to any Covered Claim, Employee may not participate as a
class or collective action representative or a class, collective, or representative
action member, or be entitled to a Tecovery from a class, collective, or
representative action. An arbitrator appointed under this paragraph 7 shall not
conduct a class, collective, or representative action arbitration and shall not allow
a person to serve as a representative of others in an arbitration conducted pursuant
to this paragraph 7. Nothing in this paragraph 7 shall preclude Employee from
pursuing or paiticipating in a class action in comt where the Employee's claim is
based on Employee's status as a customer or investor.
(d) This paragraph 7 will not be deemed a waiver of Employee's or Morgan
Stanley's right to seek injunctive or other provisional relief from any coutt in aid
of arbitration or to maintain the status quo pending ITTbitration. In the event that
any portion of this paragraph 7 is held to be in conflict with a mandatory
provision of applicable law, the remainder of this paragraph 7 shall not be
affected to the extent permitted by law. For example, if a comt determines that a
particular provision of this paragraph 7 is in conflict with a mandatory provision
of applicable law in that jurisdiction, such provision(s) will not be enforced in that
jurisdiction, but the exclusivity of the Agreement and its arbitration as the sole
and exclusive forum for all Covered Claims within its scope shall not be affected.
Any dispute as to the arbitrability of a particular issue or claim pursuant to this
arbitration provision is to be resolved in arbitration. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, any issue concerning the validity of the class action, collective action,
or representative action waiver must be decided by a court, and an arbitrator does
not have authmity to consider the issue of the validity of the waiver. If for any
reason the class action, collective action, or representative action waiver is found
to be unenforceable, the class action, collective action, or representative action
may only be heard in comt and may not be arbitrated under this paragraph 7,
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(e) Employee and Morgan Stanley agree that this paragraph 7 constitutes the entire
agreement regarding the resolution of Covered Claims, superseding all prior written
and oral agreements regarding the resolution of Covered Claims ....
(2014 Tamse Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-3) § 7; see also 2014 Loftus Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-
4) § 7) (same); Shafer 2015 Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-2) § 7) (similar)) 5
2. The Employment Agreement's Arbitration Provision
The Employment Agreement contains the following arbitration provision:
7. ARBITRATION
7.1 Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to (i) your employment by
Morgan Stanley (excluding statutory employment claims and other claims
covered by Paragraph 7.2), or (ii) this Agreement (or its breach), will be settled by
arbih'ation before the Financial Industly Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") in
accordance with their respective rnles, and judgment upon an award issued by the
arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. Except as otherwise
expressly agreed, any dispute as to the arbitrability of a particular issue Ol' claim
pursuant to this arbih·ation provision is to be resolved in arbitration. This
Paragraph will not be deemed a waiver of Morgan Stanley's right to injunctive or
provision[al] relief from any comi, as provided for in this agreement.
7.2 Notwithstanding the arbitration requirement of paragraph 7 .1 above, you
agree that ce1iain other claims (including, but not limited to, statutory
discrimination and other statutory employment claims) must be submitted to
Morgan Stanley's Alternate Dispute Resolution Program, "Convenient Access to
Resolutions for Employees'' ("CARE"). Claims required to be submitted to
CARE are recited in the CARE Guidebook maintained by the CARE
Administrator's Office and in the CARE Program explanatory brochme.
(2008 Nadler Employment Agmt. (Dkt. No. 68-1) § 7)
3. The CARE Program
"For more than ten years, Morgan Stanley has administered an alternative dispute
resolution program called (CARE,' short for Convenient Access to Resolution for Employees.
5
The cited 2014 and 2015 bonus agreements contain substantially similar- albeit not identical -
language addressing the arbitration of claims. The patties have not argued that language
differences in the relevant sections of the 2014 and 2015 bonus agreements are material.
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CARE applies to all U.S. Morgan Stanley employees, and a CARE guidebook explaining the
program is available to employees on Morgan Stanley's intranet site.... In 2015, Morgan
Stanley announced an expansion of the CARE [P]rogram. Morgan Stanley notified all U.S.
employees of the expansion via their individualized Morgan Stanley email accounts. These
es
communications were sent in waves .... [and] describ[ed] the process tlll'ough which employe
could opt out of participating." (.Krentzrnan Deel, (Dkt. No. 68) 1~ 20, 22)
The 2015 email regarding the CARE Program expansion and opt-out reads as
follows:
Morgan Stanley is announcing the expansion of CARE and modifications to
related Firm policies and programs to extend arbitration obligations for all US
employees - registered and non-registered. Effective October 2, 2015, arbitration
under the CARE Arbitration Program will be mandatory for all employees in the
U.S., and all covered claims between the Firm and employees will be resolved
through final and binding arbitration on a nonclass, non-collective and non-·
representative action basis as more fully described in the Arbitration Agreement
and CARE Guidebook. . , .
By continuing your employment with Morgan Stanley, you accept and agree to,
and will be covered and bound by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and the
arbitration provisions of the CARE Guidebook, unless you elect to opt out of the
CARE Arbitration Program by completing, signing and submitting an effective
CARE Arbitration Program Opt-Out Form by October 2, 2015.
(Sept 2, 2015 Morgan Stanley Human Resources email (0kt. No. 68-3) at 2)
The 2015 email contains hyperlinks to the "Arbitration Agreement" (the "CARE
Program Arbitration Agreement") and the "CARE Guidebook." (Id.)
The CARE Program Arbitration Agreement provides as follows:
Binding Mutual Arbitration. You and Morgan Stanley agree that any Covered
Claims (defined below) will be resolved by final and binding arbitration as set
forth in this Arbitration Agreement and in the arbitration provisions of the CARE
Guidebook, a copy of which is annexed hereto. Thls Arbitration Agreement,
including the Waivers set forth in paragraph 4 of this Arbitration Agreement, shall
be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). This Arbitration Agreement applies with respect to all Covered Claims,
whether initiated by you or Morgan Stanley, and makes arbitration the required
9
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and exclusive forum for the resolution of all Covered _Claims. By entering into
this Arbitration Agreement, you and Morgan Stanley each acknowledge and agree
that, to the fullest extent permitted by law, you and Morgan Stanley are giving up
your and its right to a jury trial in any forum.
Covered Claims. Except for the Excluded Claims (defined below), and to the
fullest extent permitted by law, Covered Claims include any and all claims or
disputes between you and Morgan Stanley or any of its cunent, former, and future
directors, officers, employees, agents, managers, shareholders, based on, arising
out of, or which arose out of or in any way relate to your employment,
compensation, and terms and conditions of employment with Morgan Stanley
anywhere in the world, or the termination thereof, and claims based on, arising
out of, or which arose out of or in any way relate to your recruitment or
application for employment and hiring. Covered Claims include but are not
limited to contract, tort, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty and other common
law claims, wage and hour claims, statuto1y discrimination, harassment and
retaliation claims, and claims under, based on, or relating to any federal, state or
local constitution, statute or regulation of any countly, state or municipality,
including, without limitation, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA''), the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act ("WARN"), the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), the Americans With Disabilities Act
('"ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and any other federal,
state or local wage and hour, discrimination or employment law, and any and all
other federal, state, or local constitutional, statutory, regulato1y, or common law
claims or causes of action now or hereafter recognized. This Arbitration
Agreement applies to all Covered Claims, including any Covered Claims
based on, arising out of, or which arose out of or in any way 1·elatc to acts
and omissions that occurred before you and Morgan Stanley entered into this
Arbitution Agreement.
Excluded Claims. The following claims and disputes are not subject to this
Arbitration Agreement: (i) applications by any party for temporruy or preliminary
injunctive relief in aid of arbitration or for the maintenance of the status quo
pending arbitration, (ii) claims for workers' compensation benefits, but not
retaliation claims arising out of or relating to claims for workers' compensation
benefits, (iii) claims for unemployment compensation benefits, (iv) claims under
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended within the exclusive jmisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board, (v) any claim filed in comt in which you are
individually named as a plaintiff, opt-in plaintiff, defendant or other named party
before the date on which this Agreement was sent to you, and (vi) any claim that
is expressly precluded from arbitration by a federal statute, ...
Any issue concerning arbitrability of a particular issue or claim pursuant to this
Arbitrntion Agreement (except for issues concerning the validity or enforceability
of the class action, collective action, or representative action Waivers) must be
resolved by the arbitrator, not the court.
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Cas
E
68-5) §§ 1-4 (emphases in original)) The CAR
(CARE Program Arbitration Agmt. (Dkt. No,
RE Guidebook (Dkt, No. 68-4) at 4-6, 20)
Guidebook contains similar language. (CA
Plaintiffs
C. Applicability of Arbitration Provisions to
ntiffs are bound by the arbitration
Defendants have proffered evidence that Plai
nts:
provisions contained in the following agreeme
l. (Dkt. No. 67) 16 and Ex. B);
- Shafer: 2015 Bonus Agreement (Porco Dee
sen, Jeffrey Sheresk:y, Steve Sheresky,
- Haugabook, Heidt, Shover, Livanos, Sam
vhtu e of not having opted out
Jukel: 2015 CARE Program expansion, by
(Krentzman Deel. (Dkt. No. 68) ~ 31);
Deel. (Dkt. No, 67) 18 and Ex. C);
- Tamse: 2014 Bonus Agreement (Porco
Deel. (Dkt. No. 67) 110 and Ex. D); and
- Loftus: 2014 Bonus Agreement (Porco
(Krentzman Deel. (0kt . No. 68) ,r 18 and
- Nadler: 2008 Employment Agreement
Ex.A ).
TI. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2020, with Shafer as the sole plaintiff.
The Complaint was filed on December 30,
6
(Dkt. No. 1)
nded Complaint. (Dkt. No. 58) The
On March 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Ame
ERISA
declaratory and equitable relief pursuant to
Amended Complaint asserts claims for (1)
isor]
8-101); (2) "reformation of the [Financial Adv
§ 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (id,_ 119
SA §§
fits under the reformed plan," pursuant to ERI
Deferred Compensation Plan and [for] bene
ciaty
and (3) (i!1~[1102-07); and (3) "breach of fidu
502(a)(l) and (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ l 132(a)(l)
] and the
regarding the [Compensation Incentive Plan
duty against the Compensation Committee
(Dkt.
pel arbitration and for a stay of proceedings.
6On April S, 2021, Defendants moved to com plaintiffs
out prejudice on March 10, 2022, after new
No. 42) The Court denied that motion with plaint. (0kt . No, 57)
ded to file an Amended Com
moved for joinder and stated that they inten
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[Equity Incentive Plan]," pursuant to ERJSA §§ 502(a)(2) and (3),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and
(3). (Id. 1il 108-17 (capitalizatio,ialtered))
On June 29, 2022, Defendants moved to compel arbitration and for
a stay of
proceedings, (Dkt. No. 65)
DISCUSSION
I. LEGA L STANDARDS
A. Motion to Compel Arbitration
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), an arbitration agreem
ent "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA provides that
a party to an arbih·ation
agreement may petition a district court for "an order directing that
. , , arbitration proceed in the_
manner provided for in such [an] agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. The
FAA reflects ''a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolu
tion." Haiiford Accident &
lndem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am, Corp .. 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d
Cir. 2001). Given the
federal policy favoring arbitration, "doubts concerning the scope
of an arbitration clause should
be resolved in favor of arbitration." Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewO
ak Cap. Mkts .. LLC. 645
F.3d 522,5 26 (2d Cir, 2011). However, this "presumption [ofarb
itrabilityJ does not apply to
disputes concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made.
" Id.
"'In deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable, [a cou1i] must answe
r two questions:
( 1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether
the scope of that agreement
encompasses the claims at issue.'" Bolick v. Cellular Sales of New
York. LLC, 802 F.3d 391,
394 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Battle Julius Baer & Co, v. Waxfield
Ltd., 424 F.3d 278,281 (2d Cir.
2005), abrogated on other grounds hy Granite Rock Co. v, Int'l Bhd,
of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287
(2010)). ''When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbih·ate a
ce1iain matter (including
12
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state-law principles that govem the
arbitrability), courts generally , , . should apply ordinary
}
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,9 44 (1995). As
formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago. Inc.
parties' contract delegates the arbitrability
to the scope of the arbitration agreement, "[w]hen the
contract. In those circumstances, a court
question to an arbitrator, a cou1t may not override the
is true even if the court thinks that the
possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue. That
ular dispute is wholly groundless,"
argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a partic
S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019).
Herny Schein. Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139
consi dered "under a
Motions to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA are
motion." Kutluca v. PO N.Y. Inc., 266
standard similar to the standard for a summary judgment
n v. Jobe-Riat. 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d
F, Supp. 3d 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing Bensadou
ng of the agreement for arbitration, then a
Cir. 2003)). "If there is an issue of fact as to the maki
9 U.S.C. § 4). Where, however, "'the
trial is necessary." Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175 (citing
ability to be decided against one side or
undisputed facts in the tecord require the matter of arbitr
of that legal issue and "avoid the need
the other as a matter oflaw , [courts] may rnle on the basis
s .. Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017)
for ftuther court proceedings."'" Meyer v. Uber Tech
Opportunities Master Fund. Ltd., 661
(quoting Wachovia Bank. Nat'l Ass'n v. VCG Special
175).
F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 2011); Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at
ation, courts cons ider" ' all
As noted above, in resolving a motion to compel arbitr
and contained in 'pleadings, depositions,
relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the patties
her with , .. affidavits,' ... and draw[]
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, toget
." Id. (first omission in original)
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party
155 (2d Cfr. 2002); citing Nicosia v,
(quoting Chambers v. Time Warner. Inc., 282 F.3d 147,
However, "[a] party to an arbitration
Amazon.com. Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016)).
13
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agreement seeking to avoid arbitration generally bears the burden of showing the agreement to
be inapplicable or invalid." Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co,, Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir.
2010) (citing Green Tree Fin, Coi:p.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000)),
B. ERISA
"ERISA's comprehensive regulatory scheme governs most employee benefit
plans." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497,503 (2d Cir. 2014), affd sub nom.
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co,. 577 U.S. 312 (2016). "The statute ... seeks to make the
benefits promised by an employer more secure by mandating certain oversight systems and other
standard procedures." Gobeille, 577 U.S. at 320-21.
ERISA § 502(a), codified at 29 US.C. § 1132(a), provides that
[a] civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the te1ms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretmy, or by a participant, beneficiaiy or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title; [or]
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)-(3).
"To state a claim under ERISA, a plaintiff must allege and establish the existence
of an 'employee benefit plan' that is governed by ERISA." Albers v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No.
98 Civ. 6244, 1999 WL 228367, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999).
14
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benefit plans : "welfare plans" and
10
ERISA addresses two types of "employee
"pension plan" as follows:
''pension plans," BRISA § 3(2)(A) defines
SA], the terms "employee pension
(A) Except as provided [elsewhere in BRI
plan, fund, or program which was
benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any
ntained by an employer or by an
heretofore or is hereafter established or mai
extent that by its express terms or as a
employee organization, or by both, to the
plan, fund, or program -
result of surrounding circumstances such
es, or
(i) provides retirement income to employe
loyees for periods extending to
(ii) results in a deferral of income by emp
beyond ... ,
the termination of covered employment or
29 U.S.C, § 1002(2)(A).
that an employee's right to his normal
BRISA requires pension plans to "provide
at 29
t circumstances, BRI SA§ 203(a), codified
retirement benefit is nonforfeitable" in mos
fully vest
ual account plan," benefits must generally
7
U.S.C. § 1053(a). In the case of an "individ
ned schedule.
ually in accordance with a statutorily defi
(1) after three years of service, or (2) grad
Id. §§ 203(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),
II. ANALYSIS
A. Whether the Parties Agreed to Arbitrate
red evidence that Plaintiffs Shafer,
As discussed above, Defendants have offe
ses. As to the
ten agreements containing arbitration clau
Tamse, Loftus, and Nadler executed writ
at Morgan
red evidence that they continued to work
remaining Plaintiffs, Defendants have offe
binding
E Program expansion, which prnvides for
Stanley without opting out of the 2015 CAR
7 "The term 'individual account plan, or 'defined contribution
plan' means a pension plan which
upon the
pa1iicipant and for benefits based solely
provides for an individual account for each nses, gains and losses, and
unt, and any income, expe
amount contributed to the participant's acco part icip ant's
nts which may be allocated to such
any forfeitures of accounts of other pa1ticipa
U.S.C. § 1002(34).
account," BRI SA§ 3(34), codified at 29
15
DOLAR0601
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Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21
/23 Page 16 of 56
mutual arbitration. (See Porco Deel. (Dkt. No. 67) and accom
panying exhibits; Krentzman Deel.
(Dkt. No. 68) and accompanying exhibits) Plaintiffs do
not dispute the evidence showing their
agreement to the arbitration provisions at issue. Given this
record, the Court concludes that
Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiffs and Defendants
entered into agreements to
arbitrate. See Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft. 365
F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2004)
(empl oyee' s signed contract containing arbitration clause
sufficient to establish agreement to
arbitrate under New York law); Victorio v. Samm y's Fishb
ox Realty Co., LLC. No. 14 CIV.
8678 CM, 2015 WL 2152703, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 6,
2015) (same); Lockette v. Morgan
Stanley. No. 18-CV-876 (JGK), 2018 WL 4778920, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2018) (concluding
that plaint iff's continued work at Morg an Stanley after receiv
ing the 2015 CARE Program
expansion email and plaint iff's decision not to opt out were
sufficient to demonstrate an
agreement to arbitrate under New York law); Pelligrino
v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC,
No. 17-CV-7865 (RA), 2018 WL 2452768, at *3-5 (S.D.N
.Y. May 31, 2018) (same).
It is likewise clear that the arbitration provisions at issue
unambiguously delegate
disputes as to arbitrability to the al'bitrator, except as to challe
nges to the provisions' class action
waivers. (2014 Tamse Bonu s Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-3) § 7(d)
("Any dispute as to the arbitrability
of a particular issue or claim pursuant to this arbitration
provision is to be resolved in arbitration.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, any issue concerning the
validity of the class action, collective
action, or representative action waiver must be decided by
a cou11, and an arbitrator does not
have authority to consider the issue of the validity of the
waiver."); Shafe r 2015 Bonus Agmt.
(Dkt. No, 67-2) § 7(d) ("Any issue concerning the arbitr
ability of a particulal' issue or claim
pursuant to this arbitration agreement (except for issues
concerning the validity or enforceability
of the class action, collective action, or representative action
Waivers) must be resolved by the
16
DOL AR06 02
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 27 of 164
-cv- 110 47-P GG Doc ume nt 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 17 of 56
Case 1:20
cept as
Emp loyment Agmt. (Dkt. No. 68-1) § 7.l ("Ex
arbitrator, not the court."); 2008 Nadler
m
as to the arbitrability of a particular issue or clai
othe1wise expressly agreed, any dispute
ram
to be resolved in arbitration."); CARE Prog
pursuant to this arbitration provision is
ny issue concerning arbitrability of a particular issue
Arbitration Agmt. (Dkt. No. 68-5) § 4 ("A
validity or
eement ( except for issues concerning the
or claim pursuant to this Arbitration Agr
) mus t be
e action, or representative action Waivers
enforceability of the class action, collectiv
CIV. 804
See Frazier v. Mol'gan Stanley, No. 16
resolved by the arbitrator, not the court."))
provision in
. Nov. 29, 2018) (holding that identical
(RJS), 2018 WL 11585450, at *8 (S.D.N.Y
questions
"clearly provide[d] for the arbitration of
Morgan Stanley employment agreements
8
ute arising out of or relating to those agreements").
concerning the arbitrability of any disp
to
signed agreements and Plaintiffs' failure
While Plaintiffs do not dispute that the
e that "[e] ven if
n signify consent to arbitration, they argu
opt out of the CAR E Program expansio
ntiffs' claims, they were superseded by
the
the arbitration agreements applied to Plai
about the plan
ent, which specifically requires disputes
[Compensation Incentive] [P]lan [D]ocum
is in original))
(Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 72) at 18-19 (emphas
to be resolved in court, not arbitration."
to the Compensation Incentive Plan
In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite
ve Jurisdiction" provision:
Doc ume nt's "Governing Law and Exclusi
Cir. 2014),
Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1031 ~32 (2d
8
Citing NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Cir. 201 9),
Schein. Inc., 935 F.3d 274 ,281 (5th
and Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry tion s about the
clearly and unmistakably commit ques
Plaintiffs contend that "the parties did not r," (Pltf. Opp.
esentative ERISA claims to an arbitrato
arbitrability of Plaintiffs' inherently repr they address
t. No. 72) at 15 n.11 ) The se case s are not persuasive here, however, because
(Dk above. In
the explicitly worded delegations quoted
arbitration provisions that do not contain as to who shou ld decide
agreement at issue was "silent
NASDAQ-OMX Grp .. for example the te Sale s. the Fifth
F.3d at 1031. And in Archer & Whi
arbitrability." NASDAQ OM X Grp .• 770 stio n [of who
e unambiguously delegated th[e] que
Circuit found that "[t]he paities could hav r agre eme nt."
and we are not empowered to re-wiite thei
decides arbitrability], but they did not,
Archer & White Sales, 935 F.3d at 282~
17
DOLAR0603
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 28 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21
/23 Page 18 of 56
[The Compensation Incentive Plan] and the related legal relatio
ns between a
Participant and the Firm shall be governed by, and construed
in accordance with,
the laws of the State of New York, without regard to any confli
cts or choice of
law rule or principle that might otherwise refer the interpretatio
n of the Award or
Account Value to the substantive law of another jurisdiction
. Following the
timely and proper exhaustion of applicable internal claims
and appeals
procedures, the courts of New York shall have exclusive jurisd
iction over the Plan
and any dispute arising in connection with the Plan, a Paiiic
ipant's participation
in the Plan or rights under the Plan.
(Compensation Incentive Plan Document (Dkt. No. 83-4)
§ 17) The Comp ensation Incentive
Plan Document - unlike the agreements containing arbitration
clauses discussed above - does
not contain a merger clause. 9
According to Plaintiffs, the "Governing Law and Exclusive
Jurisdiction"
prnvision in the Compensation Incentive Plan Document consti
tutes "'a subsequent contract
regarding the same matte r'" -i.e.. arbitration - that "'supe
rsede[s] the prior contract[s]. "' (Pltf.
Opp. (Dkt. No. 72) at 19 (quoting Applied Energetics, 645
F.3d at 526)) But the evidence before
the Court suggests that nearly all of the agreements at issue
containing the arbitration provisions
were executed after the Compensation Incentive Plan Docu
ment was issued.
9
The Bonus Agreement's arbitration provision states that "[e]m
ployee and Mol'gan Stanley
agree that this paragraph 7 constitutes the entire agreement
regarding the resolution of Covered
Claims, superseding all prior written and oral agreements regard
ing the resolution of Covered
Claims. , , ," (2015 Shafer Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-2) §
7(k); see also 2014 Tamse Bonus
Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-3) § 7(e) (same); 2014 Loftus Bonus Agmt
. (Dkt. No. 67-4) § 7(e) (same))
The Employment Agreement states that "[t]hls wdting consti
tutes the entire agreement of the
paiiies with respect to the subject matter recited in this Agree
ment. This Agreement may be
amended only by a writing signed by both you and Morgan
Stanley." (2008 Nadler Employment
Agm t (Dkt. No. 68-1) § 13)
The CARE Program Arbitration Agreement states that "[t]hi
s Arbitration Ag1·eement applies
to all Covered Claim s, including any Covered Claims
based on, arising out of, or which
arose out of or in any way relate to acts and omissions
that occurred before you and
Morgan Stanley entered into this Arbitration Agreement
." (CARE Program Arbitration
Agmt. (Dkt. No. 68-5) § 2 (emphasis in original))
18
DOL AR06 04
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page
-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 19
of 5629 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047
not dated, Plaintiffs assert
While the Compensation Incentive Plan Document is
)
been in effect since 2008 and [is] part of
"[u]pon information and belief, [that) this document has
s' deferred compensation is credited to
the 'applicable award documentation' when participant
72wl) 14) However, the record does not
their account each Janua1y.n (Jasinski Deel. (0kt. No.
Document has changed over time, or (2)
indicate whether (1) the Compensation Incentive Plan
entation" in a given year, it should be
if1 when issued as part of the "applicable award docum
alternative, merely a copy of a 2008
considered a document current as of that year or in the
Plaintiffs other than Nadler signed
document. These matters are material here, because all
t that the Compensation Incentive Plan
arbitration agreements after 2008, when Plaintiffs asser
1; Krentzman Deel. (Dkt. No. 68) 1~
Document was issued. (Porco Deel. (0kt. No. 67) ~16-1
agreements containing arbitration clauses,
23-30) And given the merger provisions found in the
ion Incentive Plan Document was issued,
if these agreements were executed after the Compensat
supersede the Compensation Incentive Plan
there is a compelling argument that these agreements
Document.
Morgan Stanley as a0
For example, Plaintiff Mark Tamse "was employed by
2015 ." (Krentzman Deel. (Dkt. No. 68)
[financial advisor] from March 7, 1994; until March 27,
arbitration
,r 9) On Febrnary 18, 2014, he entered into to a Bonus Agreement containing an
arising out of or in any way relating to
provision, which provides that "any controversy or claim
nation thereof .. , will be resolved by
Employee's employment with Morgan Stanley or termi
try Regulatory Authority." (2014 Tamse
final and binding arbitration before the Financial Indus
ement further provides that the
Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-3) §§ 7(a)) The Bonus Agre
regarding the resolution of Covered
arbitration provision "constitutes the entire agreement
s regarding the resolution of Covered
Claims, superseding all prior written and oral agreement
19
DOL AR0 605
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 30 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 20 of 56
Claims." iliL. § 7(e)) Based on the merger provision, it appears that the Bonus Agreement's
arbitration clause would supersede the Compensation Incentive Plan Document's Governin
g
Law and Exclusive Jurisdiction clause with respect to any deferred compensation that Tamse
received under the Compensation Incentive Plan.
In any event, even if - contrary to the record before the Court - the Compensation
Incentive Plan Document was issued after the agreements containing the arbitration provision
s,
the Governing Law and Exclusive Jurisdiction provisio~ would not vitiate the arbitration
provisions, because to the extent that the Compensation Incentive Plan is an BRISA plan -
as
Plaintiffs allege (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 58) ,r,r 56, 98-117) -the Governing Law and Exclusiv
e
Jurisdiction provision is null and void.
As discussed above, the Amended Complaint asserts that the defe11·ed
compensation programs at issue are BRISA plans, and all of the claims alleged in the Amende
d
Complaint are premised on BRISA. (See Arn, Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 58) ,r,r 56, 98-117) The
"exclusive jurisdiction" provision on which Plaintiffs rely, however, states that "[the
Compensation Incentive PlanJand the related legal relations between a Participant and the
Firm
shall be governed by, and constrned in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York,"
and
that disputes arising under the Compensation Incentive Plan must be resolved by the "comis
of
New York." (Id.§ 17)
Accepting Plaintiffs' argument that the deferred compensation programs at issue
are BRISA plans, the Compensation Incentive Plan Document's Governing Law and Exclusiv
e
Jurisdiction provision is null and void to the extent that it provides that all disputes arising
under
it are governed by New Yark law, and that all disputes arising under it must be heard by New
York courts. Claims under BRISA are governed by Federal Jaw and are heard by Federal comts.
20
DOLAR 0606
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26
56
Page 31 of 164
ent 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 21 of
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Docum
SA] employee benefit pla n/ it is pre-
}
"If a state law 'relate[s] to ... [an BRI
SA § 514(a),
ted." Pilo t Life Ins, Co. v. Ded eau x, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (quoting ERI
emp
relevant here],
t as provided in [statuto1y exceptions not
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("Excep
may now or
de any and all State laws insofar as they
the provisions of [BRISA] shall superse
and not
r rela te to any emp loye e ben efit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title
hereafte
er, BRISA
].") (alterations in Dedeaux). Moreov
exempt under section 1003(b) of [BRISA
of the United
at issue here -th at "[t]he district courts
provides -wi th a narrow exception not
l(c), codified
l hav e exc lusi ve juri sdic tion of an action under [ERISA]." BR ISA § 430
States shal
CV 4268 (GBD),
v. Bank of New York Co., Inc., No. 06
at 29 U.S.C. § 1451(c); see Stevenson
rts have exclusive
. Mar. 30, 2007) ("Federal district cou
2007 WL 9815654, at *4 n.6 (S.D.N.Y
er
er BRISA except for those arising und
jurisdiction over all claims arising und
§ l 132(a)(l )(B ).'}
Exclusive Jurisdiction provision in the
Accordingly, the Governing Law and
e Plan]
nt - which states that "[the Compensation Incentiv
Compensation Incentive Plan Docume
erned by, and
a Participant and the Firm shall be gov
and the related legal relations between
courts of New
stru ed in acco rdan ce with, the laws of the State of New York," and that "the
con
connection with
over the Plan and any dispute arising in
York shall have exclusive jurisdiction
ms raised in the
and void with respect to the BRISA clai
the Plan" (Dkt. No. 83-4 § 17) - is null
F .3d 352, 367
ed Com plaint. See Ken tuck y Ass 'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227
Am end
to which the
.,. state law ... , there is no state law
(6th Cir, 2000) ("[I ]fE RIS A pre em pts
'n of Health Plans.
form."), affd sub nom. Kentucky Ass
administrator of the ... plan must con
513,521 (5th Cir.
v. Mil ler, 538 U.S . 329 (200 3); Mat ter ofH ECI Expl. Co., Inc., 862 F.2d
Inc.
ral law to a
en if a part y may , und er som e circumstances, waive the application of fede
1988) (''Ev
21
DO LA R06 07
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 32 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed
11/21/23 Page 22 of 56
federally preempted state law claim by failing to raise
federal law in a timely fashion, it would
go too far to hold that parties could agree to apply
state law to an ERISA claim.") (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted); Stevenson, 2007 WL
9815654, at *4 n.6.
Finally, where an agreement containing an exclusive
juris diction provision
overlaps with - but does not entirely displace - a relat
ed agreement containing an arbitration
provision, the issue of which provision applies prese
nts a question of scope, and is thus subject to
language in an arbitration provision delegating dispu
tes about arbitrability to an arbitrator. See
CleanSpark, Inc. v. Discover Growth Fund. LLC,
485 F. Supp. 3d 494, 504 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) ("where a later-in-time forum selection claus
e arguably wholly supersedes the earlier-in-
time arbitration agreement ... a cout1 must independe
ntly determine whether the agreement to
arbitrate is still enforceable"; where the later agree
ment does not entfrely displace the earlier
agreement and contains an exclusive jurisdiction prov
ision that applies only to disputes within
the scope of the later agreement, the arbitration prov
ision has not been "wholly displaced by the
forum selection clause, ... the Court need not paus
e on the threshold question [of whether there
has been an agreement to arbitrate]," because "'[w]
hether the forum-selection clause in the Iater-
in-time agreement supersedes the arbitrntion claus
es in the earlier agreement[] presents a
question of arbitrability"' that can be delegated to
the arbitrator) (quoting TAPCO Underwriters,
Inc. v. Catalina London Ltd., No. 14-CV-8434, 2014
WL 7228711, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8,
2014)) (alteration omitted); PB Life & Annuity Co.
v. Universal Life Ins. Co., No, 20-CV-2284
(LJL), 2020 WL 2476170, at *3, *6-11 (S.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2020) (reinsurer and insurer first
entered into reinsurance agreement containing an
arbitration provision, and then entered into
trust agreement containing a New York choice of
law and exclusive jurisdiction provision; the
court h~ld that, with respect to disputes implicatin
g both agreements, whether the arbitration
22
DOL AR0 608
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page
/23 Page 23 of 5633 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21
a question of arbitrability properly
provision or exclusive jurisdiction provision controlled was
delegated to the arbitrator).
Document is not
Here, the subject matter of the Compensation Incentive Plan
containing the arbitration
identical to the subject matter of the employment agreements
s Governing Law and Exclusive
provisions, and the Compensation Incentive Plan Document'
tive Plan. (Dkt. No. 83-4 § 17)
Jurisdiction pmvision applies only to the Compensation Incen
the Equity Incentive Plan. In these
The jurisdiction provision does not apply to claims regarding
the jurisdiction provision's
circumstances, as in CleanSpark and PB Life, disputes over
application are within the arbitrator's ambit.
764 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth.,
.. Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2014), Citigroup Glob. Markets Inc. v. All Children's Hosp
LLC, 645 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 2011),
2014), Applied Energetics. Inc. v. NewOak Cap. Markets.
WL 4601847 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
and Ruizv . New Avon LLC, No. 18-CV-9033 (VSB), 2019
at 19-20 )- are not to the contrary.
2019 )- all cited by Plaintiffs (see Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 72)
that broker-dealer
In Goldman and Citigroup Glob. Markets, courts concluded
ern District of New York, and
agreements that provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the South
d FINRA arbitration rule."
that contained merger provisions, superseded the ''backgroun
ets, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 539-40,
Goldman, 764 F.3d at 212, 216; ~ also Citigroup Glob. Mark
broker-dealer
In Applied Energetics, plaintiff manufacturer and defendant
disputes to be submitted to arbitration
"entered into a preliminary letter agreement" that required
A's predecessor. Applied
before the National Association of Securities Dealers, FINR
ted that the pruties would enter
Energetics, 645 FJd at 523. The letter agreement "contempla
s subsequently entered into the
into a subsequent, more formal agreement." Id. The partie
23
DOL AR06 09
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 34 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 24 of 56
contemplated more formal agreement, which (1) "expressly provided that the agreement would
be governed by New York law"; (2) provided that "[a]ny dispute arising out of this Agreement
shall be adjudicated in the Supreme Court, New York County or in the federal district court for
the Southern District of New York"; and (3) contained a merger clause, Id. The Second Circuit
concluded that the language in the later formal agreement superseded the arbitration provision in
the initial letter agreement because (1) "[the formal agreement's] language that 'any dispute'
between the parties 'shall be adjudicated' by specified courts stands in direct conflict with the
[letter agreement's] parallel language that 'any dispute shall be resolved through binding
arbitration"'; and (2) "[u]nder New York law, it is well established that a subsequent contract
regarding the same matter will supersede the priol' contract." Id. at 525-26 (quotation and
alterations omitted).
And in Ruiz, the plaintiff employee signed (1) a November 14, 2017 employment
agreement in which the patties "irrevocably consent and submit to the sole exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States District Court for New York, or the Courts of the State of New York," with
respect to "[a]ny and all actions arising out of the [employment agreement] or the termination
thereof''; (2) a November 27, 2017 "Employment Arbitration Agreement" containing an
ai·bitration provision for employment disputes; and (3) a revised December 19, 2017 employment
agreement with a later sta1t date, which contained the same exclusive jurisdiction clause as the
original agreement, as well as a merger clause, Ruiz, 2019 WL 4601847, at *2, *7. The cout1
concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the December employment agreement
displaced the arbitration agreement agreed to the previous month, because the "language [of the
December agreement] -which encompasses any dispute relating to Ruiz's employment by New
24
DOLAR0 610
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 35 of 164
11/21/23 Page 25 of 56
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed
reconciled with the parties' prior
Avo n- is both mandato1y and exclusive, and cannot be
se of the merger clause. Id. at *9.
agreement to arbitrate all disputes"; and (2) and becau
in the instant case are
These cases are not on point because the circumstances
not involve a situation in which - as here -
entirely different. As an initial matter, these cases do
s and then incongruously cited to a
Plaintiffs have brought exclusively federal ERJSA claim
by New York law and must be heard by
contract provision stating that any disputes are governed
tiffs' cases, the later-in-time agreement
"the coUtis of New York." Moreover, in all four of Plain
, and/or (2) contained a merger clause.
(1) had the same subject matter as the prior agreement
ensation Incentive Plan Document is the
Here, as discussed above, it is not clear that the Comp
tive Plan Document does not contain a
later document and, in any event, the Compensation Incen
is identical to the subject matter of the
merger clause and does not address subject matter that
CARE Program. See PB Life, 2020 WL
Employment Agreement, the Bonus Agreement, or the
not on point where the subject matter
2476170, at *9 (finding Goldman and Applied Energetics
of the contracts at issue overlapped only in part).
r via a signed writing or
In sum, in multiple documents, Plaintiffs agreed - eithe
to arbitrate disputes regarding their
by not opting out of the CARE Program expansion -
thus made a "prima facie showing" of "the
employment at Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley has
not met their "'hea vy burden ... to
agreements' contractual validity," and Plaintiffs have
[are] valid."' Chen~Oster v. Goldman.
disprove [the] presumption[]"' that the "'agreement[s]
) (quoting Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder System,
Sachs & Co., 449 F. Supp. 3d 216,241 (S.D.N.Y. 2020
ovenuled, No. 10 Civ. 6950 (AT)
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826,831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)), objections
.
(RWL), 2021 WL 4199912 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2021)
25
DOLAR0611
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 36 of 164
Case 1:20-cv-11047-PGG Document 86 Filed 11/21/23 Page 26 of
56
B. Whether the Agreements to Arbitrate
Encompass the Claims at Issue
The arbitration provisions at issue here encompass "any controversy or claim
arising out of or in any way relating to Employee's employment with Morgan
Stanley or
termination thereof '; "any controversy or claim between Employee and Morgan
Stanley ...
based on, arising out of, or which arose out of or in any way relate to Employee's
employment,
compensation, and terms and conditions of employment with Morgan Stanley'';
"[a]ny
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to ... employment by Morgan Stanley
"; and "any
and all claims or disputes between you and Morgan Stanley or any of its cull'ent,
former, and
future directors, officers, employees, agents, managers, shareholders, based on,
arising out of, or
which arose out of or in any way relate to your employment, compensation, and
terms and
conditions of employment with Morgan Stanley anywhere in the world, or the
termination
thereof ... includ[ingJ ... claims under, based on, or relating to any federal ..
, statute or
regulation." (2014 Tamse Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-3) § 7(a); 2015 Shafer Bonus
Agmt. (Dkt.
No, 67-2) § 7(a); 2008 Nadler Employment Agrnt. (Dkt. No. 68-1) § 7.1; CARE
Program
Arbitration Agmt. (Dkt. No. 68-5) § 2)
"Courts have typically found such language indicative of a broad agreement."
Cour Pharms, Dev. Co., Inc. v. Phosphorex, Inc., No. 20-CV-4417 (JPO), 2021
WL 1062568, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2021) (listing cases); see Sportvision, Inc. v. MLB Advanc
ed Media, LP,
No. 18 CN. 3025 (PGG), 2020 WL 1957450, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2020)
("A clause
'submitting to arbitration ''[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of or relating
to th[e]
26
DOLA R0612
I I I -- -----•t1-T1I,. -- 4 If_..._.. __ , __,__ I -~- .._ 1 -~ _._,,,
----- -•-- V'I' -..-..-
Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-11 Filed 09/18/26 Page 37 of 164
agreement" is the paradigm of a broad clause,"') (quoting Collins & Aikman Prod. Co. v. Bldg.
10
Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir, 1995); fwther citation omitted) (brackets in Sportvision).
° Citing Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., 990 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2021), Plaintiffs
1
contend that "Plaintiffs' claims do not 'arise from or relate to their employment' because they do
not involve facts particular to them." (Pltf, Opp. (Dkt. No. 72) at 12)
In Cooper, plaintiff employees, "[a]cting on behalf of a putative class of plan participants and an
employee benefit plan ... sued [an investment advisor] under§ 502(a)(2) of [BRISA], claiming
damages arising from [the advisor's] alleged breach of fiduciary duty and mismanagement of a
profit-sharing fund sponsored by [plaintiffs'] employer." Cooper, 990 F.3d at 175. In
particular, plaintiffs alleged that the investment advisor had breached its fiduciary duty by
investing "almost 30% of the Plan's total assets" in {<shares [of] Valeant Pharmaceuticals/' which
precipitously declined in value following a series of scandals involving Valeant's price-gouging
and fraud. Id. at 175, 177; see Katie Thomas, Battered Valeant Stock Drops a Further 50% After
Weak Guidance, N.Y Times (Mar. 15, 2016), available at
https ://www.nytimes.com/20l6/03/16/business/valeant~q4-financial-2016-
guidance.html ?smid=url-share.
Defendant moved to compel arbitration, citing employment agreements that "mandate[d]
arbitration of' all legal claims arising out of or relating to employment, application for
employment, or termination of employment, except for claims specifically excluded under the
terms' of the Agreement." Id. at 178. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision
granting the motion to compel arbitration, holding that plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim
did not ''relate to" their employment:
Cooper's claims hinge entirely on the investment decisions made by Ruane; the substance of
his claims has no connection to his own work petformance, his evaluations, his treatment by
supervisors, the amount of his compensation, the condition of his workplace, or any other
fact particular to Cooper's individual experience. Moreover, ... others who were never DST
employees could have brought claims identical to those stated by Cooper - for example, the
mismanagement claims could have been pursued by other Plan beneficiaries (such as
spouses, heirs, or designees of participants); by other Plan fiduciaries, including DST itself;
and by the Secretary of Labor, See ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § l l32(a)(2) (authorizing
plan pa1ticipants and beneficiaries and the Secreta1y of Labor to bring a civil action for
breach of fiduciary duties).
We therefore [conclude] , .. that in the context of an employment arbitration agreement, a
claim will "relate to,; employment only if the merits of that claim involve facts particular to
an individual plaintiffs own employment. Here, the merits of Cooper's claims do not
involve such facts,
Id. at 183~84 (citations omitted).
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Plaintiffs contend, however, that they have brought their claims in a
representative capacity on behalf ofERISA plans, and that as a result their claims are not
arbitrable. According to Plaintiffs, (1) "[t]he parties did not agree to arbitrate claims brought in
Plaintiffs' representative capaciti'; (2) "[t]he ERISA plan[s] did not agree to arbitrate Plaintiffs'
claims"; and (3) "[e]ven if the parties agreed to arbitrate Plaintiffs' claims in individual
Here, according to Plaintiffs,
the arbitration provisions, like the arbitration agreement in Cooper, pertain to Plaintiffs'
employment. But, as in Cooper, the merits of Plaintiffs' claims do not involve facts
particular to their employment. The claims do not concem Plaintiffs' work pe1formance;
evaluations, working conditions, amount of compensation, or any other fact paiticular to their
individual experiences at Morgan Stanley. Rather, Plaintiffs' claims concern whether the
[Compensation Incentive Plan] and [Equity Incentive Plan] are governed by ERISA and, if
so, whether the Cancellation Rule violates BRISA. Nothing about these claims "involve
facts particular to an individual plaintiffs own employment." To the contrary, the relevant
facts apply equally to every [financial advisor] who fmfeited deferred compensation, and
each such [financial advisor] can bring the same claims. Indeed, even the Secretary of Labor
could do so.
(Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 72) at 12-13 (quoting Cooper. 990 F.3d at 184) (emphasis in Pltf. Opp.))
Plaintiffs' "relate to employment" argument is not persuasive. Although both Cooper and the
instant case involve§ 502(a)(2) breach of fiducia1y duty claims, the similarities between the
cases end there. In Cooper, the alleged breach of fiducia1y duty was the mismanagement of fund
assets, an issue entirely umelated to plaintiffs' employment. Here, by contrast, the alleged
breach of fiducia1y duty is "selecting Scheduled Vesting Dates for the [Financial Advisor]
Deferred Compensation Program that violated ERISA's vesting requirements and then applying
the Cancellation Rule to deny the [financial advisors] who left Morgan Stanley their deferred
compensation that should have been vested under BRISA." (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 58) ,r 113)
These challenged actions "relate to" Plaintiffs' employment. because whether Plaintiffs' deferred
compensation vested depends on the timing and ch-cumstances of their separation from Morgan
Stanley, including whether they were fired, quit, or retired. Cooper's concern that
"[r]elatedness" ~'not encompass everything that touche[s] employment in any way," Cooper. 990
F.3d at 183, is thus not implicated here. See Duke v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp .. No. 21-CV-
06072 (JMA) (AYS), 2023 WL 6385389, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2023) (finding that Cooper
did not preclude plaintiff's "claims against her former employer directly. challenging her former
employer's calculation of her retirement benefits," because there was "a more substantial nexus
between Plaintiff's claims and her employment" than in Cooper).
In sum, Cooper's analysis of"relate to employmenf' does not suppmt Plaintiffs' position here.
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arbitrations, those arbitration agreements are unenforceable as 'prospective waiver[s] of a patty's
right to pursue statut01y remedies' under ERISA § 502." (Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 72) at 15, 18, 21
(quoting Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,235 (2013)) (brackets in Pltf. Opp.))
In considering Plaintiffs' arguments, this Court must first determine whether (1)
the Compensation Incentive Plan and the Equity Incentive Plan are BRISA plans; and (2) if so,
whether- as Plaintiffs contend- arbitration of their claims was not consented-to by each alleged
BRISA plan and/or would be contra1y to ERISA. ll
11
Defendants contend that "[b]ecause plaintiffs have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, the Court
need not - and should not- reach arbitrability itself. , .. [T]he validity of plaintiffs'
representative action waiver is not at issue, The parties do not dispute whether plaintiffs have
waived the right to bring a representative action - they dispute whether plaintiffs' claims seeking
individual benefits must be arbitrated. The agreements clearly and unmistakably commit such
questions to the arbitrator, and plaintiffs have identified no arbitrability issue reserved to the
comt that 'at least arguably covers the present dispute."' (Def. Reply Br. (Dkt. No. 69) at 7-8
(quoting NASDAQ OMX Grp., 770 F.3d at 1031))
By contrast, Plaintiffs contend that "[t]hree of the four arbitration provisions purport to waive the
right to pursue a Covered Claim 'on a class action, collective action, or representative action
basis,' To the extent that any such claim is allowed to proceed, it must do so in court.
Moreover, 'any issue concerning the validity or enforceability of any of the class action,
collective action, and representative action waivers shall be decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and not by an arbitrator.' Thus, contrary to Morgan Stanley's argument that any
disagreement about the arbitrability of Plaintiffs' claims is reserved for the ai-bitrator, the Court -
not an arbitrator - must decide whether Plaintiffs' claims must be allowed to proceed on a class-
action or representative-action basis, such that they are not subject to arbitration.'' (Pltf. Opp,
(Dkt. No. 72) at 15 (quoting 2015 Shafer Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-2) § 7(d); citing 2014
Tamse Bonus Agmt. (Dkt. No. 67-3) § 7(d), and CARE Program Arbitration Agmt. (Dkt. No.
68-5) § 4; alterations omitted); see also 2008 Nadler Employment Agmt. (Dkt, No. 68-1) § 7.1)
In sum, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable because (1) they
"prohibit[] Plaintiffs from bringing [their] claim[s] [on] a representative basis"; and (2) this
restriction violates ERISA. And they ftu1her contend that the validity of the class action waivers
must be determined by a court. (Id. at 15, 22) Because the arbitration provisions provide that
the validity of the class action waivers must be determined by a court, this Couit concludes that
this aspect of the parties' arbitrability dispute must be determined by the Court and not by an
arbitrator.
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