jain.com
Public record. We host this document directly; the copy served here does not depend on any third party. Retrieved November 15, 2026.
Read the documentAlso at archive.org ↗

Sun v. Bloomberg, L.P. — Entry #42: ANSWERING BRIEF in Opposition re 40 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT] filed by…

Case: Sun v. Bloomberg, L.P. ded · 1:25-cv-01007

filed August 11, 2025

What this document is

Docket entry #42 · filed October 23, 2025

ANSWERING BRIEF in Opposition re 40 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT] filed by Yuchen Justin Sun.Reply Brief due date per Local Rules is 10/30/2025. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Compliance)(Lyons, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/23/2025)

Who is involved

Why we have it

We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:

A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 15, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.

URL
https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.ded.90290/gov.uscourts.ded.90290.42.0.pdf
Kind
court_filing
Publisher
RECAP
Published
2025-10-23 00:00:00-04:00
Retrieved
2026-11-15 07:41:39.322721-05:00
HTTP status
200
MIME
application/pdf
Bytes
380074
SHA-256
ab3efccc9f5b9f8560b82f916e3105ab4be314fcfb624b5735d9edd6ad95e93a

Document text

26 page(s), 45,170 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.

Full text
Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42   Filed 10/23/25   Page 1 of 26 PageID #: 525


                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                     FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

 SUN, YUCHEN JUSTIN,                     )
                                         )
             Plaintiff,                  )
                                         )   C.A. No. 25-1007 (CFC)
       v.                                )
                                         )
 BLOOMBERG, L.P., &                      )
 BLOOMBERG, INC.,                        )
                                         )
             Defendants.                 )

                 PLAINTIFF’S ANSWERING BRIEF
        IN OPPOSITION TO DEFEDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

 Dated: October 23, 2025             BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
                                     Jeffrey J. Lyons (#6437)
                                     1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1407
                                     Wilmington, DE 19801
                                     (302) 407-4222
                                     jjlyons@bakerlaw.com

                                     Teresa Goody Guillén
                                     Katherine L. McKnight
                                     1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1100
                                     Washington, D.C. 20036
                                     (202) 861-1630
                                     tgoodyguillen@bakerlaw.com
                                     kmcknight@bakerlaw.com

                                     Isabelle Corbett Sterling
                                     600 Montgomery Street, Suite 3100
                                     San Francisco, CA 94111
                                     (415) 659-2606
                                     isterling@bakerlaw.com
                                     Attorneys for Plaintiff Yuchen Justin Sun


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC              Document 42           Filed 10/23/25          Page 2 of 26 PageID #: 526


                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS

 I.     INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................1

 II.    STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................2

 III.   ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................3

        A.       Standard of review.................................................................................3

        B.       Choice of Law .......................................................................................4

        C.       Mr. Sun States a Claim for Public Disclosure of Private Facts ..........11

                 1.       It is uncontested that Mr. Sun’s allegations satisfy the first two
                          elements of his claim. ...............................................................11

                 2.       Mr. Sun satisfies the third prong of his claim by alleging facts
                          demonstrating that Bloomberg’s disclosure would be offensive
                          and objectionable to a reasonable person. ................................12

                 3.       Mr. Sun’s Complaint alleges facts establishing the final element
                          of his claim, that the information Bloomberg disclosed is not of
                          legitimate public concern. .........................................................15

        D.       Mr. Sun States a Claim for Promissory Estoppel................................17

 IV.    CONCLUSION..............................................................................................21


                                                          i


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC               Document 42           Filed 10/23/25         Page 3 of 26 PageID #: 527


                                     TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Cases                                                                                                   Page(s)

 Barrera v. Monsanto Co.,
   2016 WL 4938876 (Del. Super. Sept. 13, 2016) ................................................ 10
 Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp.,
    435 F.3d 455 (3d Cir. 2006) ................................................................................. 5

 Chiaravallo v. Middletown Transit Dist.,
   561 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D. Conn. 2021)................................................................. 15

 Chrysler Corp. (Delaware) v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd.,
   822 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2003) ................................................................................. 17
 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
   501 U.S. 663 (1991) ......................................................................................17, 18

 Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,
   809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 20
 Focus Financial Partners, LLC v. Holsopple,
   241 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2020) .............................................................................. 8
 Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. The New York Times Co.,
    267 F. Supp. 2d 425 (E.D. Pa. 2003) .................................................................. 10
 Frey v. Minter,
    829 F. App’x 432 (11th Cir. 2020) ................................................................. 9, 10
 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
   418 U.S. 323 (1974) ............................................................................................ 17
 Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
   438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971) ............................................................................... 15

 Grubbs v. Univ. of Del. Police Dep’t,
   174 F. Supp. 3d 839 (D. Del. 2016).................................................................... 11

 King v. Hildebrandt,
    331 F.2d 476 (2d Cir.1964) .................................................................................. 9


                                                          ii


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC              Document 42           Filed 10/23/25         Page 4 of 26 PageID #: 528


 Kinsey v. New York Times Co.,
    991 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2021) ................................................................................. 9
 Kruzits v. Okuma Mach. Tool, Inc.,
   40 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994) ................................................................................. 4, 5

 Levin v. McPhee,
    917 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 119 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1997) .............. 9

 Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co.,
    788 A.2d 134 (Del. Super. 2001) ...................................................................... 7, 8

 Miller v. Monsanto Co.,
    2025 WL 2614048 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2025) ......................................................... 4

 N. Am. Phillips Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
    1991 WL 190305 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1991)............................................. 11
 Powell v. Subaru of Am., Inc.,
   502 F. Supp. 3d 856 (D.N.J. 2020) ..................................................................... 11

 Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc.,
   999 F.2d 1319 (1993).......................................................................................... 18
 Sisler v. Gannett Co.,
    516 A.2d 1083 (N.J. 1986) ................................................................................. 16
 State Cap. Title & Abstract Co. v. Pappas Bus. Servs., LLC,
    646 F. Supp. 2d 668 (D.N.J. 2009) ..................................................................... 21

 Smith v. Citizen Bank,
   2025 WL 2676697 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2025) ..................................................... 3, 4
 Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc.
    583 F. Supp. 2d 521 ( D. Del. 2008)................................................................... 21
 Triestman v. Slate Grp., LLC,
    2020 WL 1450562 (D. Del. Mar. 25, 2020) ....................................................... 10

 Turner v. Lipschultz,
    619 A.2d 912 (Del. 1992) ................................................................................. 6, 7


                                                         iii


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC              Document 42           Filed 10/23/25        Page 5 of 26 PageID #: 529


 Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V.,
    85 A.3d 725 (Del. Ch. 2014) ................................................................................ 5
 Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc.,
   643 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2011) ................................................................................... 3

 Other Authorities
 Christina Koningisor, The De Facto Reporter’s Privilege,
   127 Yale L.J. 1176 (2018) .................................................................................. 16

 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ............................................................ 1, 9

 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) .................................................... 6


                                                        iv


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 6 of 26 PageID #: 530


       Plaintiff Yuchen Justin Sun (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Sun”), through his

 undersigned counsel, hereby submits this brief in opposition to the Motion to

 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

 Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”) filed by Defendants Bloomberg, L.P. and

 Bloomberg, Inc. (together, “Bloomberg” or “Defendants”).

 I.    INTRODUCTION
       Mr. Sun initiated this action against Bloomberg for public disclosure of

 private facts and promissory estoppel, pleading facts in his First Amended

 Complaint (“FAC”) that establish the liability of Defendants. Bloomberg now moves

 to dismiss Mr. Sun’s claims on three grounds, each of which require factual

 development before this Court will be in a position to rule dispositively.

       First, Defendants conclude that New York law applies to this dispute without

 engaging the fact-intensive standard this Court is obligated to apply when faced with

 a choice of law. The FAC includes well-pleaded facts indicating three different

 options for a choice of law: Delaware, Hong Kong and New York.

       Second, for Mr. Sun’s public disclosure of private facts claim, Defendants

 assume an agreement of confidentiality did not exist at the time Mr. Sun shared his

 private and sensitive information, but that is not what is pleaded in the FAC.

 Nowhere does Bloomberg cite a case for the proposition that a journalist may


                                           1


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC      Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 7 of 26 PageID #: 531


 promise confidentiality in order to access private and sensitive information and then

 use “public interest” as a shield against liability for breaching that agreement.

       Third, whether an agreement exists will require a weighing of factual

 assertions, including allegations in the FAC that an agreement existed and caused

 reliance. This Court already has acknowledged this point in its denial of Mr. Sun’s

 motion for temporary restraining order. See D.I. 39 at 4–5. Each of these bases for

 Defendants’ Motion are not yet ripe because discovery and factual development

 have not yet occurred, let alone concluded. Defendants’ Motion should therefore be

 denied.

 II.   STATEMENT OF FACTS

       The assertions in Mr. Sun’s FAC (D.I. 30) form the basis for assessing

 Defendants’ Motions. Below is a brief overview of the relevant facts.

       Mr. Sun resides in Hong Kong. D.I. 30 ¶6. He is a successful entrepreneur in

 the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry Id. ¶2. He has accumulated a sizable

 portfolio of various cryptocurrencies and other valuable assets. Id. Earlier this year,

 employees of Defendants approached Mr. Sun about listing him in Bloomberg’s

 online “Billionaire Index,” which is a ranked list of the world’s richest people. Id.

 ¶¶3, 13–15. Bloomberg told Mr. Sun that Bloomberg would need to verify his assets

 to confirm his net worth. Id. ¶¶3, 16. Prior to agreeing to participate, Mr. Sun

 received explicit assurances from Bloomberg “that his highly confidential, sensitive,


                                           2


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC       Document 42      Filed 10/23/25    Page 8 of 26 PageID #: 532


 private, and proprietary financial information, particularly related to his

 cryptocurrency holdings, would be held ‘strictly confidential’ and was provided to

 Bloomberg for the sole purpose of verifying his total net worth.” Id. ¶¶4, 17–19.

 Based on these express promises of confidentiality, as well as his own review of the

 profiles of others featured in the Billionaires Index to confirm the level of detail

 reported, Mr. Sun agreed to participate in the Billionaire Index and provide

 Bloomberg with his sensitive financial information. Id. ¶¶4, 20, 22–29. Despite its

 express promises of confidentiality, Bloomberg published Mr. Sun’s specific

 financial holdings—in granular detail—alongside material misstatements about Mr.

 Sun’s holdings. Id. ¶¶31–37, 54–58. These disclosures have caused harm to Mr. Sun,

 including but not limited to, an invasion of privacy, as well as subjecting Mr. Sun to

 a significant risk of theft, hacking, kidnapping, and bodily harm to him and his

 family. Id. ¶¶5, 39–42, 55, 58.

 III.   ARGUMENT

        A.    Standard of review

        “[A] motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded

 allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to

 the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen.

 Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Smith v. Citizen Bank,

 2025 WL 2676697, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2025 (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be


                                             3


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 9 of 26 PageID #: 533


 granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and

 viewing them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court concludes that

 those allegations ‘could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.’” (citation

 omitted)).

       B.     Choice of Law

       Defendants argue that a choice of law analysis is necessary in this action

 because “Delaware recognizes the claim of public disclosure of private facts, but no

 such claim exists under New York state law.” D.I. 41 at 6; see also D.I. 30 ¶¶61–68

 (Mr. Sun’s amended complaint, asserting a cause of action for “Public Disclosure of

 Private Facts”). Defendants’ arguments acknowledge that the jurisdiction with the

 “most significant relationship” to the dispute applies (D.I. 41 at 7), but Defendants

 take an overly narrow view of the facts as currently known to require that either

 Delaware or New York law applies. To the contrary, it is premature to determine

 which jurisdiction’s law applies, and fact discovery may well show that the law of

 Delaware or a foreign jurisdiction (Hong Kong) applies.

       A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum

 state in which it sits, including the forum state’s choice of law rules. Miller v.

 Monsanto Co., 2025 WL 2614048, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2025) (“Because this

 Court sits in diversity, it applies Delaware choice of law rules.”); Kruzits v. Okuma


                                          4


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC      Document 42       Filed 10/23/25   Page 10 of 26 PageID #: 534


 Mach. Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A federal court exercising diversity

 jurisdiction must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state.”).

        Delaware’s choice of law doctrine starts with a two-part inquiry. Vichi v.

 Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 85 A.3d 725, 772 (Del. Ch. 2014). “First, the Court

 must ‘compare the laws of the competing jurisdictions to determine whether the laws

 actually conflict on a relevant point.’” Id. at 773. If the competing laws would yield

 the same result, then there is no “genuine conflict” and a choice of law analysis is

 unnecessary. Id. Where there is an actual conflict, the court applies the “most

 significant relationship” test to determine which jurisdiction’s laws to apply. See id.;

 see also Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006)

 (“Because choice of law analysis is issue-specific, different states’ laws may apply

 to different issues in a single case[.]”).

        As to the first inquiry, although the laws of Delaware and New York may

 present an actual conflict, Bloomberg does not even argue that Hong Kong law does

 or does not apply, much less whether it presents an actual conflict with Delaware or

 New York law. Bloomberg instead assumes that there are just two candidate

 jurisdictions whose laws might govern—Delaware and New York.1 Bloomberg


 1
   Bloomberg wrongly claims that Mr. Sun “asserts that Delaware law, not Hong
 Kong law, applies.” D.I. 41 at 9 n.5. Mr. Sun has asserted no such thing. The
 arguments in Mr. Sun’s TRO motion analyzed his claim under Delaware law, but

                                              5


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25    Page 11 of 26 PageID #: 535


 concedes that Mr. Sun is a Hong Kong citizen (D.I. 41 at 11), and cites several cases

 reciting the Restatement factors (see id. at 7 (citing Turner v. Lipschultz, 619 A.2d

 912, 914-15 (Del. 1992)), but fails to address the possibility that Hong Kong law

 applies. Given Bloomberg’s failure to address whether Hong Kong law presents any

 conflict with Delaware (or New York) law, Bloomberg has failed to carry its burden

 of persuasion on this choice of law point and its motion should be denied.

       Assuming for the sake of argument that Bloomberg has satisfied the first

 inquiry, as for the second inquiry, Delaware courts apply the “most significant

 relationship” test for claims in tort from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of

 Laws (1971) (the “Restatement”). See Turner, 619 A.2d at 914–15. Under the

 Restatement’s “most significant relationship” test, a court must undertake a factual

 and legal analysis involving numerous factors, including:

       (a) the place where the injury occurred,

       (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

       (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place

       of business of the parties, and

       (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is

       centered.


 did not address whether Hong Kong law would apply if it were to have the “most
 significant relationship” to the underlying dispute. D.I. 19 at 12–16.


                                           6


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC    Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 12 of 26 PageID #: 536


 Id. at 915 (quoting the Restatement).

       At this preliminary stage of the litigation, there has been no factual

 development for the Court to analyze. Instead, there are only the well-pleaded

 allegations set forth in Mr. Sun’s FAC, which the Court is required to accept as true

 and viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Sun. Those allegations include that

 Mr. Sun is a resident of Hong Kong (D.I. 30 ¶6) and that Bloomberg (both entities)

 are Delaware companies (id. ¶¶7–8). Notably absent from the discussion are any

 allegations that Mr. Sun met with Bloomberg in New York or that the individuals at

 Bloomberg that communicated with Mr. Sun were located in New York (something

 Mr. Sun cannot know without discovery).

       Bloomberg’s fact-based analysis is inappropriate at this stage because it

 ignores well-pleaded factual allegations to the contrary and concludes that New

 York law must apply. D.I. 41 at 7–11. A motion to dismiss is not the appropriate

 vehicle to determine the choice of law, especially where, as here, the “most

 significant relationship” inquiry depends on an analysis of specific facts and the

 plaintiff has not had the opportunity to develop facts supporting one jurisdiction or

 another through discovery. See Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 788 A.2d


                                          7


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25    Page 13 of 26 PageID #: 537


 134, 137 (Del. Super. 2001) (finding choice of law dispute “ripe for determination”

 after fact discovery was complete).2

       Although Bloomberg argues that its “strong New York connections outweigh

 its formation in Delaware” and cites the Restatement comment about a corporation

 that does “little, or no business” in the place of incorporation (D.I. 41 at 10), there

 are no facts of record that support that argument. Importantly, there are no facts

 relating to the scope of Bloomberg’s operations in New York, Delaware, and/or

 Hong Kong such as could relate to the Restatement factors, including how such

 “strong New York connections,” whatever those may be, somehow outweigh the

 choice to organize entities in Delaware under Delaware law. Mr. Sun is entitled to

 discovery to determine the scope of Bloomberg’s business and connections in

 Delaware, New York, and Hong Kong, and how that conduct relates to its formation

 in Delaware and the conduct giving rise to the claims asserted in this action.

       Mr. Sun and this court cannot know—without discovery—all of the facts

 relevant to the choice of law analysis with respect to his claims. Thus, in order to


 2
   In Focus Financial Partners, LLC v. Holsopple, 241 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2020), the
 court found the choice of law analysis appropriate at the pleadings stage, but only
 because it highlighted an important public policy contained in a California law that
 aimed to prevent individual employees from taking on the burden of litigating in
 another state needlessly. Id. at 813–14. No such public policy imperative is present
 in this case and, in any event, the facts underpinning the “most significant
 relationship” are disputed.


                                           8


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42      Filed 10/23/25   Page 14 of 26 PageID #: 538


 determine which jurisdiction’s law applies, discovery is needed. And that means

 dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is inappropriate.

       Bloomberg’s citations to Kinsey, Levin, and Frey are distinguishable. All three

 cases discuss defamation claims—not public disclosure of private fact claims.

 Further, in Kinsey, the court acknowledged that “there is only a presumptive rule

 that the law of [the] plaintiff’s domicile applies.” Kinsey v. New York Times Co., 991

 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2021). When faced with applying New York or D.C. law, the

 Kinsey court chose New York because neither party was domiciled in D.C. and the

 conduct primarily occurred in New York. Here, Bloomberg is incorporated—and

 therefore domiciled—in Delaware, and Plaintiff is domiciled in Hong Kong, both of

 which would have a more significant interest than New York.

       In Levin, the court simply stated that New York law applies without engaging

 in the analysis outlined in the Restatement. Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 230, 236

 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 119 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1997). In support of its conclusion, the

 Levin court cited King v. Hildebrandt for the proposition that D.C. law applied where

 all of the parties were domiciled there and the conduct occurred there. Id. Here, the

 parties do not share a domicile, and thus the analysis in Levin is irrelevant.

       In Frey v. Minter, the court explained that “the law of the plaintiff’s domicile

 will usually be applied.” 829 F. App’x 432, 435 (11th Cir. 2020). The Frey court

 expounded that there, unique circumstances altered the default rule because the


                                            9


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42      Filed 10/23/25   Page 15 of 26 PageID #: 539


 plaintiff suffered greater damage in Georgia, rather than plaintiff’s domicile, and the

 circulation primarily occurred in Georgia. Id. Factors warranting deviation from the

 default rule, however, do not exist in this case.

       Further, Bloomberg’s invocation of the free speech interests of New York

 may have application in cases alleging defamation, but they have no relevance in a

 case alleging promissory estoppel and public disclosure of private facts such as those

 pleaded here. Moreover, “[e]ven if the conduct causing injury occurred in [New

 York] where the author [purportedly] lives, [Bloomberg] cites no authority showing

 that this factor alone overcomes the presumption in favor of the Plaintiff’s domicile.”

 Triestman v. Slate Grp., LLC, 2020 WL 1450562, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 25, 2020); see

 also Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. The New York Times Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 425,

 432 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (applying law of the plaintiff’s domicile because it outweighs

 the interest that New York has in “protecting its media defendants and providing an

 environment for the free exchange of ideas”). Moreover, Delaware has a significant

 interest in this dispute. Bloomberg (both entities) are incorporated and organized

 under the laws of the State of Delaware, and Delaware has a significant interest in

 regulating Delaware entities. See, e.g., Barrera v. Monsanto Co., 2016 WL 4938876,

 at *8 (Del. Super. Sept. 13, 2016) (“Delaware does have an interest in regulating the

 conduct of entities incorporated under our State’s laws.”).


                                           10


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25    Page 16 of 26 PageID #: 540


       Making a determination on the choice of law is premature at this stage of the

 case. Mr. Sun is entitled to discovery to develop the facts necessary to present his

 case to the Court that Delaware or Hong Kong law should apply under the “most

 significant relationship” test. N. Am. Phillips Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 1991

 WL 190305, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 1991) (allowing parties to complete choice

 of law discovery); see also Powell v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 3d 856, 875

 (D.N.J. 2020) (“The Court notes that ‘it can be inappropriate or impossible for a

 court to conduct [a choice of law] analysis at the motion to dismiss stage when little

 or no discovery has taken place.’”). Therefore, Defendants’ Motion should be

 denied.

       C.     Mr. Sun States a Claim for Public Disclosure of Private Facts
       Mr. Sun has stated a claim for public disclosure of private facts because he

 has alleged the required elements: (1) public disclosure, (2) of a private fact,

 (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person, and (4)

 which is not of legitimate public concern. Grubbs v. Univ. of Del. Police Dep’t, 174

 F. Supp. 3d 839, 861 (D. Del. 2016).

       1.     It is uncontested that Mr. Sun’s allegations satisfy the first two
              elements of his claim.
       Bloomberg does not dispute that Mr. Sun has sufficiently alleged the first two

 elements—(1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact. Indeed, Mr. Sun alleges the

 public disclosure by virtue of his inclusion in Bloomberg’s Billionaires Index. D.I.


                                           11


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42      Filed 10/23/25   Page 17 of 26 PageID #: 541


 30 ¶36. He has also alleged the element of “a private fact”—that is, his holdings in

 Tronix, Bitcoin,3 Ether, and Tether were not publicly available. Id. ¶16 (alleging that

 “the value of specific assets and details related to his ownership of those assets” were

 “highly confidential, sensitive, private, and proprietary information.”).

       Bloomberg instead focuses on Mr. Sun’s alleged failure to sufficiently plead

 the third and fourth prongs of his cause of action—that the disclosure would be

 offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person, and that the disclosure is not

 of legitimate public concern. D.I. 41 at 12. As discussed below, Bloomberg is wrong.

       2.     Mr. Sun satisfies the third prong of his claim by alleging facts
              demonstrating that Bloomberg’s disclosure would be offensive and
              objectionable to a reasonable person.

       Mr. Sun has sufficiently alleged that disclosure by Bloomberg is offensive and

 objectionable to the reasonable person.


 3
   In the TRO proceedings, this Court and Bloomberg have noted Mr. Sun’s post on
 X dated February 27, 2024, supposedly disclosing his ownership of Bitcoin shares
 on the HTX platform. D.I. 39 at 8; D.I. 33 at 20. Putting aside that this post is dated
 a full 18 months prior to Bloomberg’s publication of Mr. Sun’s holdings, it also
 addresses only one of the four cryptocurrencies Bloomberg disclosed, and the
 number of Bitcoin shares is wildly divergent between the X post and the Bloomberg
 publication. In addition, Bloomberg’s publication of incorrect information regarding
 Mr. Sun’s status as a majority holder of Tronix presents new and distinct threats.
 D.I. 30 ¶¶54–58. The relevant timeframe to evaluate Mr. Sun’s claim that
 Bloomberg’s actions exposed him to “legal, financial, and physical threats, including
 theft, hacking, and kidnapping” is the time of publication, not a year and a half
 before.


                                           12


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25    Page 18 of 26 PageID #: 542


       A reasonable person would find the disclosure of their personal financial

 information in granular detail to be offensive and objectionable when, as alleged, it

 subjects an individual to “legal, financial, and physical threats, including theft,

 hacking, and kidnapping.” D.I. 30 ¶55. Even more offensive is disclosure of

 incorrect information. Mr. Sun’s FAC alleges that a key part of the Bloomberg

 profile is incorrect because it falsely attributes to him more Tronix tokens (“TRX”)

 than he actually owns. Id. ¶54. Mr. Sun asserts that a “substantial portion of the TRX

 Bloomberg mischaracterizes as his personal holdings is held in ecosystem-managed

 reserves and exchange custodial wallets—structures designed to support network

 stability and safeguard customer assets, rather than any individual’s personal

 wealth.” Id. Mr. Sun’s allegations that the “ecosystem-managed reserves and

 exchange custodial wallets” are not part of his individual “personal wealth” must be

 accepted as true for purposes evaluating the Motion. Mr. Sun thus sufficiently

 alleges facts establishing the third element of his claim for public disclosure of

 private facts.

       To be sure, Mr. Sun’s complaint elaborates on why this disclosure of incorrect

 information is specifically offensive and objectionable: (1) asserting that the

 disclosure of this incorrect information exposes him to “legal, financial, and physical

 threats, including theft, hacking, and kidnapping” (D.I. 30 ¶55); (2) asserting that

 disclosure of incorrect information “undermines trust in the TRON network by


                                           13


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 19 of 26 PageID #: 543


 falsely suggesting centralization of control of the blockchain, thereby eroding one

 of blockchain’s core principles: decentralization” (id. ¶56); (3) asserting that

 disclosure of incorrect information “creates the false impression that Mr. Sun can

 exert significant influence over the price of the cryptocurrency, including

 manufacturing swings” (id. ¶57); and (4) alleging that disclosure of incorrect

 information about Mr. Sun’s centralized control of TRON “erodes TRON users’

 trust in the blockchain and its native token TRX, discourages entrepreneurs and

 developers to build on TRON, depriving the network of new ideas and capital, and

 puts Mr. Sun at even greater risk for theft, hacking, kidnapping, and bodily injury,

 because bad actors are additionally incentivized to steal from individuals they

 believe have control over cryptocurrency markets and networks” (id. ¶58).

       Defendants’ attempt to discount the offensiveness of their publication by

 characterizing their disclosure as “high-level estimates.” D.I. 41 at 14. However, Mr.

 Sun makes specific allegations regarding the effect that Bloomberg’s incorrect

 assertion that he “owns more than 60 billion Tronix” has: regardless of the

 approximation of that number, the disclosure amounts to an assertion that he owns a

 majority of Tronix which, as detailed above, has exposed Mr. Sun to specific harms.

 And, critically, none of what Bloomberg describes as the “widely published more

 specific information about his cryptocurrency holdings” (D.I. 41 at 16 & n.8), negate

 the fact that Bloomberg made wildly incorrect assertions about Mr. Sun’s TRX


                                          14


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC        Document 42   Filed 10/23/25   Page 20 of 26 PageID #: 544


 holdings. In any event, whether the disclosure is offensive and objectionable to a

 reasonable person is a matter for the ultimate fact-finder. See Chiaravallo v.

 Middletown Transit Dist., 561 F. Supp. 3d 257, 292 (D. Conn. 2021) (“Generally,

 ‘[w]hether the matter communicated to the public would be highly offensive to a

 reasonable person sufficient to support a false light claim presents a question of fact

 for the trier of fact.’”).

        For purposes of evaluating Bloomberg’s Motion, this Court must accept as

 true Mr. Sun’s allegations that Bloomberg’s portrayal of him as a majority owner of

 TRX is incorrect and false, and Bloomberg’s publication has subjected him to “legal,

 financial, and physical threats, including theft, hacking, and kidnapping.” D.I. 30

 ¶55. Accepted as true, these allegations support the third element of Mr. Sun’s claim

 for public disclosure or private facts.

        3.     Mr. Sun’s Complaint alleges facts establishing the final element of his
               claim, that the information Bloomberg disclosed is not of legitimate
               public concern.

        There is no clear public interest in Mr. Sun’s granular Confidential Financial

 Information. See Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 436 (3d Cir. 1971)

 (“We cannot accept the theory that plaintiff’s business or credit standing is a matter

 of ‘real public interest.’”). As the FAC makes clear, there is a difference between

 public interest in a person’s general financial standing as compared to granular

 details sufficient to allow bad actors to reverse engineer and access someone’s


                                            15


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC    Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 21 of 26 PageID #: 545


 private financial information. D.I. 30 ¶¶19–21, 35, 39, 42–48. This is particularly

 true here, where there is no argument by Defendants that Mr. Sun’s granular

 financial information is somehow relevant to any articulated public interest or

 alleged wrongdoing. Cf. Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083, 1089 (N.J. 1986)

 (finding the plaintiff’s “financial dealings with a company being investigated for

 questionable loans” was of legitimate public concern because of the “historic and

 governmental concern with the role and operation of banks, particularly their

 financial stability” and the information at issue concerned loans issued by a bank to

 its former president and founder).

       Further, there is no legitimate public concern for the media to publish

 information it obtained under false pretenses from sources after promising

 confidentiality. Christina Koningisor, The De Facto Reporter’s Privilege, 127 Yale

 L.J. 1176, 1180 (2018) (“[T]he most common justification for the reporter’s

 privilege today is that revealing confidential information would cause reporters’

 sources to dry up. This, in turn, would stem the flow of information to the press—

 and by extension—to the public.”). With respect to this Motion, the Court must

 credit Mr. Sun’s allegations that “Ms. Shen [the Bloomberg reporter] told Mr. Sun

 that any information Mr. Sun provided to Bloomberg for the purpose of verifying

 his personal wealth would be kept strictly confidential and would only be used to

 verify his personal assets for the Billionaires Index profile.” D.I. 30 ¶18. Ms. Shen


                                          16


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC       Document 42      Filed 10/23/25   Page 22 of 26 PageID #: 546


 then egregiously breached her assurance to Mr. Sun by publicizing detailed

 information regarding his cryptocurrency holdings, including incorrect information

 about the extent of his TRX holdings and that he owns the majority of its supply.

 Finally, there is no legitimate public concern in reports of incorrect and false

 information. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no

 constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the

 careless error materially advances society's interest . . .”). Bloomberg falsely claimed

 Mr. Sun “owns more than 60 billion Tronix” and that he “controls a majority of its

 supply” D.I. 30 ¶37.

          In sum, Mr. Sun’s allegations support his claim for public disclosure of private

 facts.

          D.    Mr. Sun States a Claim for Promissory Estoppel

          Mr. Sun and Bloomberg agree on the elements of a claim for promissory

 estoppel under Delaware law. See D.I. 41 at 16–17 (citing Chrysler Corp.

 (Delaware) v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1032 (Del. 2003)).

 Bloomberg does not dispute that Delaware law applies to Mr. Sun’s promissory

 estoppel claim. See D.I. 41 at 16–17.

          Courts have previously held publications liable for abandoning promises of

 confidentiality under theories of promissory estoppel. In Cohen v. Cowles Media

 Co., plaintiff approached reporters and offered to provide documents relating to a


                                             17


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 23 of 26 PageID #: 547


 candidate in an upcoming gubernatorial race on the condition that he remain

 anonymous. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991). The subsequent publications identified

 plaintiff as the source of the documents and plaintiff was fired by his employer. Id.

 The Court held that plaintiff could pursue his promissory estoppel cause of action,

 which was not barred by the First Amendment as the doctrine of promissory estoppel

 is a law of general applicability, and remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme

 Court. Id. at 670–71.

        Shortly thereafter, in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., the Court of

 Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that a plaintiff could recover compensatory

 damages where a publication broke its promise of confidentiality. 999 F.2d 1319,

 1323 (8th Cir. 1993). There, plaintiff agreed to participate in an interview only upon

 the assurance that she would not be identified. Id. Ultimately, the published article

 revealed several identifying facts about the plaintiff. Id. The Court of Appeals held

 that, “[w]here the press feels disclosure of identity of a confidential source is

 valuable to the story and thus disregards its promise, the payment of compensatory

 damages is . . . simply a cost of acquiring newsworthy material to be published at a

 profit.” Id.

        Mr. Sun’s FAC sufficiently asserts a claim for promissory estoppel. In

 particular, he asserts that Bloomberg promised to keep his Confidential Financial

 Information “strictly confidential and would be used to verify his personal assets for


                                          18


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC      Document 42     Filed 10/23/25    Page 24 of 26 PageID #: 548


 the Billionaires Index profile.” D.I. 30 ¶18. And Mr. Sun asserts that it was not a

 single promise to this effect, but a pattern of consistent, repeated, intentional

 assurances by Bloomberg, oral and written, to keep Mr. Sun on the path towards

 Bloomberg’s goal—access to Mr. Sun’s Confidential Financial Information.4 He

 also asserts that it was this promise that led him to disclose his Confidential Financial

 Information to Bloomberg. This claim, taken as true and in the light most favorable

 to Mr. Sun, sufficiently alleges the first element (the promise, reasonably expected

 to induce action) of promissory estoppel. Mr. Sun is entitled to develop a factual

 record to prove his case, including the discovery of documents within Bloomberg’s

 possession or control that relate to his allegations. This could include internal

 communications between reporters and editors or others within the Bloomberg

 entities’ ambit that have discussed Mr. Sun’s information and/or the normal course

 of conduct for the Billionaire Index. That this Court found Mr. Sun’s claims

 insufficient to support a TRO does not determine whether those claims are plausible

 and sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage, where the burden of persuasion and

 presumption of truth is no longer on Mr. Sun.


 4
   In its Memorandum Order denying Mr. Sun’s Motion for a TRO, this Court wrote
 that much of the communications between Mr. Sun’s team and Bloomberg “appear
 to concern data security; they do not show clearly that Bloomberg made a promise
 to refrain from publishing details about Sun’s cryptocurrency holdings.” D.I. 39 at
 6. Read in a light most favorable to Mr. Sun at this stage in the proceedings, those
 communications are sufficient to support his assertions.


                                            19


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 25 of 26 PageID #: 549


       Mr. Sun also sufficiently alleges the second element—that he actually took

 action in reliance on the promise. Bloomberg’s Motion asserts that Mr. Sun “merely

 recites the legal standard for promissory estoppel,” but this ignores the entirety of

 the FAC, which incorporates by reference, in paragraph 69, all of the pleaded facts

 into his Count II (Promissory Estoppel). Mr. Sun alleges that he took action in

 reliance on Bloomberg’s promises—he agreed to participate in Bloomberg’s

 Billionaire Index and he made his Confidential Financial Information available to

 Bloomberg. D.I. 30 ¶24. That is sufficient to show reliance.

       Mr. Sun also plausibly alleges the final element of his promissory estoppel

 claim, that “such promise is binding because injustice can be avoided only by

 enforcement of the promise.” Throughout his FAC, Mr. Sun alleges that a great

 injustice has been done to him by Bloomberg. In particular, he was lured into

 divulging to Bloomberg his Confidential Financial Information that was otherwise

 not publicly available. And he has articulated the personal risks Bloomberg’s actions

 have created—invasion of privacy, risk of theft, hacking, kidnapping, and bodily

 harm to him and his family. Id. ¶¶5, 42, 55, 58.

       Mr. Sun’s FAC alleges fact sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that

 discover will reveal evidence” to support his claim of promissory estoppel. See

 Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).

 At this early stage, the Court must accept all allegations in the FAC as true and draw


                                          20


Case 1:25-cv-01007-CFC     Document 42     Filed 10/23/25   Page 26 of 26 PageID #: 550


 all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Sun. When it does so, his

 allegations concerning promissory estoppel are sufficient to survive dismissal. See

 Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc. 583 F. Supp. 2d 521, 532-33 (D. Del. 2008).

 IV.   CONCLUSION
       For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Sun respectfully requests that the Court deny

 Bloomberg’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. To the extent

 this Court finds the allegations insufficient, it should allow Mr. Sun leave to amend.

 See State Cap. Title & Abstract Co. v. Pappas Bus. Servs., LLC, 646 F. Supp. 2d

 668, 681 (D.N.J. 2009) (“[L]eave to amend generally must be granted unless the

 amendment would not cure the deficiency.”).

 Dated: October 23, 2025                 BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP

                                         /s/ Jeffrey J. Lyons
                                         Jeffrey J. Lyons (#6437)
                                         1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1407
                                         Wilmington, DE 19801
                                         (302) 407-4222
                                         jjlyons@bakerlaw.com

                                         Attorney for Plaintiff Yuchen Justin Sun


                                          21