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Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton — Entry #109: MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses by Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC

Case: Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton txwd · 1:25-cv-01153

filed July 24, 2025

What this document is

Docket entry #109 · filed October 19, 2026

MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses by Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Jared LeBrun, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Proposed Order)(Callahan, Bryce) (Entered: 10/19/2026)

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Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA     Document 109     Filed 10/19/26    Page 1 of 13


                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                 AUSTIN DIVISION

GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC,                  )
                                          )
             Plaintiff,                   )
                                          )
v.                                        )
                                          )
KEN PAXTON, in his Official Capacity as   )
Attorney General of Texas,                )
                                          )
                                          )     Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01153-ADA
             Defendant,                   )
                                          )
THE TEXAS STOCK EXCHANGE LLC              )
and THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF              )
BUSINESS,                                 )
             Intervenor-Defendants.       )


     PLAINTIFF GLASS LEWIS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA          Document 109        Filed 10/19/26      Page 2 of 13


       This motion presents a simple question: is discovery a one-way proposition? Defendants

wrongly think so. When Defendants sought Rule 56(d) discovery to test whether Glass Lewis

supposedly misleads its clients, Glass Lewis provided documents in good faith. But when Glass

Lewis asked for evidentiary support for Defendants’ defenses, Defendants refused to answer 64 of

66 requests. The result is below: Glass Lewis has produced 4,135 documents; the Attorney General

39. LeBrun Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Intervenors have produced zero documents in response to 25 requests.


       Such lopsided participation flouts the rule that discovery “must be a two-way street.”

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973). And Defendants’ wholesale refusal to participate

in written discovery has no basis. Their responses ignore the Rules by rattling off boilerplate

objections and refusing to state the basis for their withholding. They explain only two objections:

relevance and privilege, and neither survives scrutiny. Defendants put consumer deception at issue,

which is the entire reason for the Rule 56(d) discovery. And their privilege objections fare no

better: the Attorney General improperly withholds his entire investigative file on a blanket

privilege claim, while the Texas Association of Business (“TAB”) uses associational privilege to

hide the purported member harm it explicitly invoked to intervene.

       The Court should find Defendants’ boilerplate objections waived, order compliant

responses under Rules 33 and 34, overrule the relevance objection, reject the Attorney General’s

blanket privilege claim, and overrule TAB’s associational privilege objection.


                                               -1-


       Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA                Document 109           Filed 10/19/26   Page 3 of 13


                                              BACKGROUND

        Since this case began, Defendants have insisted that the Court must allow full discovery.

Intervenors told the Court that “TAB’s members are the same Texas public companies who are

the subject of the proxy advisors’ misleading statements” and were “in a unique position to assist

the Court . . . in discovering the facts required to defend against Plaintiff’s claims.” Dkt. 22 at 17.

        So after Glass Lewis moved for summary judgment, Defendants moved to defer ruling

under Rule 56(d). Intervenors argued that consumer deception was critical to the case because “[i]f

Glass Lewis is misleading its clients, . . . that false commercial speech would not receive First

Amendment protection.” Dkt. 69 at 14. The Attorney General joined that motion in full. Dkt. 70

at 2. The Court granted the motions, allowing discovery into Defendants’ claims that Glass Lewis

had engaged in supposedly “deceptive” speech. Dkt. 90. On August 11, 2026, the Court clarified

that “[a]ll parties reserve rights to make further discovery requests and objections.” Ex. 1 at 1.

        Following that Order, Glass Lewis sought discovery to uncover the basis for Defendants’

far-fetched claim that Glass Lewis deceives its clients. It served a second set of interrogatories and

requests for production and noticed Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. See Exs. 2-8; LeBrun Decl. ¶ 2-3.

Of these sixty-six requests, Defendants substantively answered only two:


Red marks a substantive refusal; dashed red boxes were ignored entirely.


                                                       -2-


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA              Document 109          Filed 10/19/26        Page 4 of 13


        TAB answered zero interrogatories. The Texas Stock Exchange LLC (“TXSE”) answered

only two. 1 They produced no documents in response to any of Glass Lewis’ 25 second requests

for production, without identifying why they were withholding documents or the basis for doing

so. LeBrun Decl. ¶ 6; Exs. 3-6. TXSE skipped Requests 36 and 37 entirely (which sought

communications with listees). Compare Ex. 8 at 7 (RFP Nos. 36-39), with Ex. 5 at 7-8. And TAB

refused to designate a witness on four of nine 30(b)(6) topics. Ex. 7.

        The Attorney General substantively answered none of his twelve interrogatories. Ex. 2 at

4-9. Many of his responses say “Defendant will not disclose,” “Defendant will not provide,” or

(without explaining why) that he “withholds responsive information.” Id. at 4, 7, 9. On October

16, he served 34 documents, but the majority of them were Glass Lewis and ISS’s own documents.

LeBrun Decl. ¶ 5. Symbolic of this lopsided discovery, the Attorney General’s four internal

documents redact every word written by his staff except the portion of his email written by Glass

Lewis. Id.

                                         LEGAL STANDARD

        Discovery reaches “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the scope of discovery is broad. Crosby v. La.

Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011). A party resisting discovery “must

show specifically how each [request] is not relevant or how each question is overly broad,

burdensome or oppressive.” McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482,

1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted).


1
  TXSE’s two answers (1) identify its public listees and (2) admit that it “has not communicated with listees
about its decision to intervene.” Ex. 6 at 4-5. Yet TXSE’s entire basis for intervening was that its “listees
will be harmed if [Glass Lewis] obtains its requested relief.” Dkt. 22-1 at 2. In other words, TXSE’s answer
to Interrogatory No. 18 confirms its justification for intervention was invented out of whole cloth.


                                                    -3-


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 109         Filed 10/19/26       Page 5 of 13


                                            ARGUMENT

I.     Defendants must answer Glass Lewis’ requests as the Rules require.

       Defendants’ wholesale objections violate the plain language of the Federal Rules. An

interrogatory “must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing

under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). “The person who makes the answers must sign them.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). Objections must be stated “with specificity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4),

34(b)(2)(B). Objections to document requests “must state whether any responsive materials are

being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). And an “evasive or

incomplete” answer “must be treated as a failure to . . . answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

        Defendants ignore these requirements. Nine of Intervenors’ twelve unanswered

interrogatories list objections and nothing else. Ex. 4 at 4-6; Ex. 6 at 4-6. There is no answer, no

explanation of which objection applies, no statement that nothing responsive exists, and no

verification. On the requests for production, 18 of their 23 document responses say only that they

“will not produce,” without saying whether responsive documents exist or the reason for the

withholding. Exs. 3, 5. The responses raise a blanket relevance objection each time, stating merely

the request is “not relevant to the claims and defenses in this action[.]” E.g., Ex. 4 at 4-6; Heller v.

City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 483-84 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (boilerplate objections are “improper and

ineffective”). TXSE does not respond at all to two requests. Exs. 5, 8. See In re United States, 864

F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[W]hen a party fails to object timely to interrogatories,

production requests, or other discovery efforts, objections thereto are waived.”).

        The Attorney General’s responses are no better. He objects that many requests are outside

the “scope” of this case and that he “will not disclose,” “will not provide,” or “otherwise withholds

responsive information.” Ex. 2 at 4, 7, 9. For most document requests, he says only that “any

responsive document will be produced” somewhere in his October 16 production, without saying


                                                 -4-


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 109         Filed 10/19/26       Page 6 of 13


what he withheld or why. Id. at 10-15. He withholds his investigative file wholesale and does not

list it on his privilege log, apparently because he has unilaterally decided it is irrelevant. Ex. 9.

        These objections are improper. “In the face of such objections, it is impossible to know

whether information has been withheld and, if so, why.” Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 483 (quotation

omitted). In LUPE, the intervenors “had not produced a single document . . . or substantively

answered a single interrogatory.” La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 2022 WL 17574079, at

*3 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (“LUPE”). The Court held that their “boilerplate, and unsupported

objections” were “improper and result in waiver of those objections,” and it ordered them to

produce documents, supplement their answers, and log what they withheld. Id. at *4, *10

(quotation omitted); see also Ambler v. Nissen, 2023 WL 443806, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2023)

(Hightower, M.J.) (ordering amended responses stating “whether any responsive materials are

being withheld on the basis of each” objection).

        As in LUPE, the Court should hold that Defendants have waived their boilerplate

objections. It should then order each Defendant to serve responses that comply with Rules 33 and

34: answer each interrogatory fully and under oath, state for each request whether responsive

documents are being withheld and why, and log any document withheld as privileged.

II.     Defendants’ relevance and privilege objections fail.

        Beyond boilerplate, Defendants make only two objections: relevance and privilege. Both

fail. Unless the Court overrules them, Defendants’ amended responses will simply repeat them.

        A.      The requests test the deception theory Defendants used to obtain discovery.

        Start with relevance. Glass Lewis’ requests seek information on whether anyone was

actually deceived by Glass Lewis’ statements and Defendants’ basis for claiming Glass Lewis has

engaged in deceptive speech. Resp., Dkt. 107, at 5. That is exactly the issue presented in Rule

56(d) discovery. Intervenors told the Court that “outstanding discovery will indicate whether Glass


                                                 -5-


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA          Document 109        Filed 10/19/26      Page 7 of 13


Lewis makes false or misleading representations in the context of a commercial transaction,” and

“discovery will confirm that Glass Lewis is misleading customers.” Dkt. 79 at 7; Dkt. 69 at 15.

Just as Defendants obtained discovery testing whether Glass Lewis’ speech is deceptive, Glass

Lewis can seek discovery showing that their allegations of deception are specious and pretextual.

       In its supplement to its motion for summary judgment, Glass Lewis intends to show that

neither the Attorney General nor Intervenors can identify Glass Lewis clients who have been

deceived. Such an omission would be critical, because a government restriction on speech “must

demonstrate that the harms it recites are real.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). By

withholding discovery, Defendants make it impossible to know whether such documents do not

exist or are simply being withheld. The record so far shows the Attorney General sued for

deceptive trade practices without contacting a single Glass Lewis client. It also suggests that

TAB’s members are not Glass Lewis’ clients at all, but companies that dislike its

recommendations. Either fact would show that the recited harms are not real. Indeed, such facts

show that the interventions themselves were based on false pretenses.

       The Attorney General’s claim that such discovery belongs in state court is confused on

multiple levels. At the request of the Attorney General, merits discovery in state court “is not

open,” and will not be for several months, if ever. Ex. 10; LeBrun Decl. ¶ 7. The possibility that

Glass Lewis might one day obtain similar discovery in a different case has zero bearing on whether

it is relevant to this case now. And the Attorney General must have thought state investigations

are relevant, having sought and obtained the documents Glass Lewis produced to the Missouri and

Florida Attorneys General. Ex. 11 at 7 (RFP No. 23); LeBrun Decl. ¶ 8; see Resp., Dkt. 107, at 7.

Defendants apparently contend that Missouri’s investigation is relevant, but the Texas Attorney


                                               -6-


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA          Document 109        Filed 10/19/26      Page 8 of 13


General’s own investigation is not. That is implausible, and the Court should overrule the

relevance objection.

       B.       The Attorney General’s blanket privilege claim fails.

       The Attorney General’s blanket privilege assertions also fail. He bears the burden of

proving each privilege he asserts, and “[a]mbiguities as to whether the elements of a privilege

claim have been met are construed against the proponent.” EEOC v. BDO USA, 876 F.3d 690, 695

(5th Cir. 2017).

       There are multiple problems with his approach. First, a “blanket assertion of the privilege”

is “simply inadequate.” United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir. 1982). Yet he

has done just that—asserting that the investigative file is both blanket privileged and blanket

irrelevant. Ex. 2. Second, he does not log a single document from the investigative file, as Rule

26(b)(5)(A) requires. Ex. 9. Third, the facts Glass Lewis seeks—who was deceived, who

complained, and what the investigators did—are not privileged. Work product, if it applies,

“protects only the documents themselves and not the underlying facts.” In re Int’l Sys. & Controls

Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982). The identities of any Glass Lewis clients

who complained have nothing to do with attorney impressions. They are facts, and those facts are

discoverable.

       Nor does the investigative/law-enforcement privilege apply. See Resp., Dkt. 107, at 9-10.

That qualified privilege protects “investigative files in an ongoing criminal investigation.” In re

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 459 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted); SEC

v. Cuban, 2013 WL 1091233, at *8 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (the privilege “does not extend to . . . civil

investigations”). The Attorney General’s investigation is neither criminal nor ongoing.

       Finally, the deliberative process privilege and Section 17.61(f) have no application. The

deliberative process privilege applies only to policymaking decisions, not investigations. Resp.,


                                               -7-


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 109         Filed 10/19/26      Page 9 of 13


Dkt. 107, at 9; La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 2023 WL 4923947, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 2023)

(state failed to show investigative documents were “inextricably intertwined with agency decision-

making”); Cuban, 2013 WL 1091233, at *9 (deliberative process privilege “does not protect pure

facts”). As to Section 17.61(f), the only party to receive a Civil Investigative Demand is Glass

Lewis and, as this Court has recognized, state laws restricting the disclosure of investigative

material “do[] not apply in federal court.” Ambler, 2023 WL 443806, at *2; Resp., Dkt. 107, at 8.

The Court should therefore reject the Attorney General’s blanket assertion and order him to answer

the interrogatories and either produce the investigative file or log each withheld document.

       C.      TAB cannot use associational privilege to hide the member harm it invoked to
               intervene.

               1.      TAB put its members’ harm at issue.

       TAB’s privilege assertion is even more speculative, claiming “associational privilege” over

the very claims it used to intervene in this case. TAB is a party precisely because it told the Court

that its members were harmed. It moved “on behalf of its Texas public-company members,” and

said those members “will continue to be harmed by false and misleading proxy advice.” Dkt. 22

at 1, 10. When Intervenors later sought Rule 56(d) discovery, they argued that Glass Lewis’ claims

should face “the crucible of meaningful discovery.” Dkt. 69 at 12. TAB’s own claims deserve that

same test. So, Glass Lewis asked TAB to identify the members it contends were deceived and the

members that asked it to intervene, and to produce documents reflecting the harm. Ex. 3 at 5-6, 8-

9 (RFP Nos. 29-30, 37-38); Ex. 4 at 4 (Interrogatory Nos. 14-15). TAB refused every request and

invoked associational privilege to avoid naming any member. See Ex. 3 at 8-9; Ex. 4 at 4.

       Having intervened based on harm to their members, Intervenors cannot now claim that

information is off-limits. Once it joins, a party “cannot realistically hope to pursue [the] suit in a

risk-free atmosphere.” Nat’l Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272, 275 (D. Conn.


                                                -8-


     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 109       Filed 10/19/26      Page 10 of 13


1980). A plaintiff is “plainly entitled to discovery as to the Defendant Intervenors’ defenses.”

LUPE, 2022 WL 17574079, at *5. Intervenors used their membership as a sword to thrust

themselves into the case; they cannot use that same membership as a shield to resist discovery.

       The need for discovery is greatest when, as here, the party claiming the privilege “has

placed certain information into issue.” Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th Cir.

1987); see In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1162 (D. Kan.

2010) (factor “weighs strongly in favor of disclosure”). So when an association sues on behalf of

its members, courts may properly order it to identify those members and answer interrogatories

about their harm. NIACCF, Inc. v. Cold Stone Creamery, Inc., 2014 WL 4545918, at *4-5 (S.D.

Fla. Sept. 12, 2014). Such information goes “to the heart of this case” and parties have “a right to

investigate the factual assertions made.” Id. at *4.

       TAB claimed its members were “harmed by false and misleading proxy advice.” Dkt. 22

at 1. TAB cannot make that claim and then refuse to say who was harmed, when, and how. By

TAB’s own account, its members are “the subjects and recipients” of the proxy advice at issue.

Dkt. 22-2 ¶ 7. If they cannot identify a single misleading statement or resulting harm, then the

harms Defendants recite are not “real,” and their deception theory fails. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at

770-71. Glass Lewis cannot test that question while TAB withholds even the identities of the

members it says were injured.

               2.      TAB has not shown that disclosure would chill anyone.

       Nor have Intervenors substantiated their associational privilege claim. Parties claiming the

privilege must make a prima facie showing of “an objectively reasonable probability of a chilling

effect.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 2016 WL 5922315, at *6

(W.D. Tex. 2016) (Austin, M.J.). That showing must rest on “objective and articulable facts.” In

re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 489 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation


                                                -9-


     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 109           Filed 10/19/26    Page 11 of 13


omitted). Intervenors offer a one-sentence objection and no evidence of chill. Ex. 4 at 4. Further,

confidentiality concerns can be addressed via the Court’s protective order. See Dkt. 56 ¶ 2(a). TAB

has not articulated any discrete harm to its members from public disclosure, much less an

attorneys’-eyes-only disclosure. A trade association that offers no evidence of “hostility related to

associating with” it cannot use the privilege to avoid identifying its members. ERISA Indus. Comm.

v. Asaro-Angelo, 2023 WL 2808105, at *7 (D.N.J. 2023). Indeed, TAB’s website publicly names

several members, including Texas Mutual, JPMorgan Chase, and Amazon. Ex. 12.

       Moreover, Glass Lewis’ requests are narrow. It asks TAB to identify only the members it

contends were deceived, harmed, or involved with S.B. 2337, and to produce documents reflecting

that harm. The disclosure of member identities extends only to those facts directly relevant to

TAB’s defense.

                                          *      *       *

       Intervenors joined the case promising to help in “discovering the facts required to defend

against Plaintiff’s claims.” Dkt. 22 at 17. The Court should hold Intervenors to that promise and

order them to produce the evidence of member harm they put at issue.

                                         CONCLUSION

       Defendants have wholesale refused to engage in Rule 56(d) discovery. The Court should

(1) order that Defendants’ boilerplate objections are waived; (2) order each Defendant to serve

responses that comply with Rules 33 and 34 within seven days; (3) overrule Defendants’ relevance

objections; (4) hold that the Attorney General may not withhold his investigative file on a blanket

privilege assertion; and (5) overrule TAB’s associational privilege objection and order TAB to

present a Rule 30(b)(6) designee on TAB’s members.


                                               - 10 -


     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA   Document 109     Filed 10/19/26     Page 12 of 13


Dated: October 19, 2026             Respectfully submitted,

                                    YETTER COLEMAN LLP

                                    /s/ Bryce L. Callahan
                                    Bryce L. Callahan
                                    State Bar No. 24055248
                                    bcallahan@yettercoleman.com
                                    Grant B. Martinez
                                    State Bar No. 24104118
                                    gmartinez@yettercoleman.com
                                    Lily E. Hann
                                    State Bar No. 24133836
                                    lhann@yettercoleman.com
                                    Jared LeBrun
                                    State Bar No. 24144647
                                    jlebrun@yettercoleman.com
                                    600 Travis Street, Suite 5400
                                    Houston, Texas 77002
                                    (713) 632-8000
                                    (713) 632-8002 (fax)

                                    Attorneys for Plaintiff Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC


                                    - 11 -


     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 109          Filed 10/19/26   Page 13 of 13


                                   Certificate of Conference

       The parties conferred on these requests several times and did not reach agreement. On

September 29, 2026, the parties conferred on upcoming depositions, where counsel for Glass

Lewis informed Defendants that it would likely need to move to compel if Defendants continued

to resist discovery. On October 8 and 9, counsel for Glass Lewis discussed the associational

privilege objections with counsel for Intervenors, who stated that they would not withdraw the

objection. Separately on October 8 and 9, counsel for Glass Lewis emailed the Attorney General

to confer on his privilege and relevance objections. On October 15 and 16, counsel for Glass Lewis

again emailed Defendants to ask if they would (1) withdraw their associational privilege assertions

and (2) respond in substance to Glass Lewis’ discovery requests. Defendants would not agree to

either request.

                                                       /s/ Jared LeBrun
                                                       Jared LeBrun


                                      Certificate of Service

       I certify that on October 19, 2026, a copy of this document was served on all counsel of

record using the Court’s e-filing system.


                                                       /s/ Jared LeBrun
                                                       Jared LeBrun


                                              - 12 -