Hayes v. City of Dallas — Entry #52: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 30 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Case: Hayes v. City of Dallas txnd · 3:23-cv-02271
filed October 16, 2023
What this document is
Docket entry #52 · filed April 25, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 30 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is DISMSISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 4/25/2025) (axm)
Who is involved
- City of Dallas
- Dallas Police Officers
- Holly Harris
- Silvester Hayes
- Walter Paul Guab
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Applied Digital: its name “Applied Digital Corporation” appears in a filing in this case.
…LLC 90 3:23-cv-01805-E McConnell v. Applied Digital Corporation et al 91 3:23-cv-01832-8 Doe v. Dallas…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved October 23, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
20 page(s), 58,233 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
Full text
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 1 of 20 PageID 617
United States District Court
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
S I LV E S T E R H AY E S §
§
V . §
§ C I V I L A C T I O N N O . 3 : 2 3 - C V- 2 2 7 1 - S
CITY OF DALLAS, HOLLY HARRIS, §
WALTER PAUL GUAB, and DALLAS §
POLICE OFFICERS DOES 1 §
THROUGH 10 §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Defendants Holly Harris, Walter Guab,
and the City of Dallas’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) [ECF No. 30]. The Court has
reviewed the Motion, Defendants’ Brief in Support of the Motion (“Defendants’ Brief’) [ECF
No. 31], Plaintiff Silvester Hayes’s Response in Opposition to the Motion (“Response”) [ECF
No. 39], Plaintiffs Brief in Support of the Response (“Plaintiffs Brief’) [ECF No. 40],
Defendants’ Reply in Support of the Motion [ECF No. 49], the summary judgment evidence, and
the applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This 42 U.S.C. §1983 case arises from aconfrontation between Plaintiff Silvester Hayes
and Dallas police of cers. On October 16, 2021, Defendants Walter Guab and Holly Harris ran a
registration check on avehicle while on patrol. Defs.’ App. in Supp. of the Mot. (“Defendants’
Appendix”) [ECF No. 17] 7. They cross-referenced the owner’s name with another system and
'observed aperson with the name ‘Sylvester Hayes’ who had afelony warrant for family
violence.” Id.-, see also PL’s First Am. Compl. (“Complainf’) [ECF No. 27] f21. Subsequently,
Plaintiff, who was driving the car, failed to signal before turning left. Defs.’ App. 7; see also PL’s
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 2 of 20 PageID 618
App. in Supp. of His Resp. (“Plaintiffs Appendix”) [ECF No. 41], Ex. 1[ECF No. 41-1] 3. Guab
and Harris initiated atraf c stop based on this traf c violation. Defs.’ App. 7.
From this point forward, various body-worn cameras and dash cameras captured the
ensuing events. After pulling Plaintiff over, Guab gets out of the car, walks to the driver’s side
window of Plaintiff svehicle, and begins speaking with Plaintiff. Defs.’ App., Ex. 21, at 00:20-46;
Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 00:14-24. Harris walks up and joins him. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 00:14-20;
Defs.’ App., Ex. 21, at 00:47-01:00. After complaining about being pulled over, Defs.’ App., Ex. 1,
at 00:24-36, Plaintiff hands Guab his driver’s license, id. at 00:37-38. Guab hands the license to
Harris and returns to Plaintiffs window. Id. at 00:39-46. Harris appears to con rm that Plaintiff
is the person subject to the felony warrant. Id. at 00:44-45. Guab then directs Plaintiff to step out
of the car and attempts, unsuccessfully, to open Plaintiffs door via the outside handle. Id.
at 00:46-49. Guab reaches in through the open window, unlocks the car door, and again tells
Plaintiff to step out. Id. at 00:50-56. Plaintiff does not do so, and Guab opens the now-unlocked
d o o r. I d . a t 0 0 : 5 6 - 5 8 .
Through the open door, Guab informs Plaintiff that he is being detained and directs him
again to step out. Id. at 00:59-01:09. Guab repeats the command to step out several more times
and warns Plaintiff that he will be tased if he does not comply. Id. at 01:10-26. Plaintiff continues
to refuse, and Guab reaches into the car to grab him, all the while repeatedly telling Plaintiff to
step out of the car. Id. at 01:27-33. Other police of cers join Guab and Harris outside the car door
and assist Guab in attempting to pull Plaintiff out of the car by his left arm. Id. at 01:33-46.
As the of cers are trying to remove Plaintiff from the car, non-party Of cer Whitman
opens the passenger door and orders Plaintiff to get out of the car. Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 00:47-52.
Whitman sees that Plaintiff has agun in his right pocket and alerts the other of cers at the scene.
2
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 3 of 20 PageID 619
Id. at 1:01-05; Defs.’ App, Ex. 1, at 01:47-51. Plaintiff yells that it is his gun. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1,
at 01:50-53. Whitman takes the gun from Plaintiff, stating that he “got it.” Defs.’ App., Ex. 2,
at 01:13-15. The of cers on the driver’s side of the car manage to pull Plaintiff out of the car, and
he falls to the ground. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 01:54-02:02; PL’s App., Ex. 1, at 4. Ahandcuff dangles
from his left wrist, and Harris brie y grabs his left hand. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 01:52-02:00.
Of cers, including Guab, hold Plaintiff down on the ground and tell him to stop resisting.
Id. at 02:00-20. Harris and Guab grab Plaintiffs left wrist and try to hold it behind his back, while
another of cer does the same with Plaintiffs right wrist. Id. During this time. Plaintiff is
squirming, appears to be trying to stand up, and accuses one of the of cers of putting his or her
foot on Plaintiffs neck. Id. However, the body camera footage shows that the of cer has his foot
on the ground and his knee on the top part of Plaintiff sback. Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 01:29-35.
Plaintiff ips over onto his back, and Harris holds down his right leg with both hands.
Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 02:46-51. Plaintiff pulls his other leg toward Harris and ips back onto his
stomach. Id. at 02:52-55. Harris holds his right leg down with both hands. Id. at 02:55-03:12.
Another of cer intermittently holds Plaintiffs head down so that his cheek is against the ground.
Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 02:07-28. The same of cer also has his hand on the back or side of Plaintiff s
neck twice—once for approximately three seconds and the second time for approximately eight
seconds. Defs.’ App., Ex. 4, at 00:10-13, 00:18-26.
The of cers stand Plaintiff up. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 03:23. He continues to resist them
and yell loudly. Id. at 03:23-27. Harris brie y puts her hands on Plaintiffs chest before moving
some distance away, and Guab is standing nearby. Id. at 03:26-30. Guab assists the other of cers
in facing Plaintiff toward apolice vehicle and holding him against it. Id. at 03:24-35.
3
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fl
fi
fl
fi
fl
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 4 of 20 PageID 620
As Harris walks around, talking to someone on the radio, agroup of of cers, including
Guab, attempt to walk Plaintiff to apolice vehicle. Id. at 03:41-57. Plaintiff continues to yell and
physically resist. Id. As the of cers attempt to push Plaintiff into the police car, one unidenti ed
of cer—neither Guab nor Harris—wraps his ngers around Plaintiffs throat. Id. at 03:59-04:03.
The same of cer appears to brie y raise his knee to Plaintiffs stomach and then pushes down on
the baek of Plaintiff shead in an apparent effort to make him duck and get inside the vehicle. Id.
at 04:04-11. Plaintiff continues strenuously resisting. Id.
As the of cers are trying to get Plaintiff into the car despite his resistance. Plaintiff falls to
the ground. Id. at 04:15-24. Guab calls for leg restraints. Id. at 04:26-27. While waiting on the leg
restraints, agroup of of cers not including Guab or Harris holds Plaintiff down on the ground. Id.
at 04:34-45. One of cer has his knee on the ground near Plaintiffs neck and intermittently holds
Plaintiffs arm and the side of Plaintiff sface down with his hand. Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 03:40-
04:30; Defs.’ App., Ex. 5, at 00:44-01:00, 01:13-41, 2:10-11; Defs.’ App., Ex. 7, at 00:43-50.
Non-party Of cer Grajeda runs over with zip tie-like restraints. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 04:41-44;
Defs.’ App., Ex. 6, at 00:42-50. Guab runs off toward Plaintiffs car. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1,
at 04:42-51. As the of cers continue struggling to restrain Plaintiffs legs, Guab and Harris are
walking around and standing some distance away and not touching Plaintiff. Id. at 04:52-05:53.
Plaintiff accuses an of cer of pressing on his pressure points, and the of cer acknowledges that
he is doing so. Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 04:16-22.
Plaintiff asks to get in the car and repeatedly states that he will get in. Id. at 04:29-37. As
Grajeda is trying to restrain Plaintiffs legs. Plaintiff kicks one of his legs away from Grajeda.
Defs.’ App., Ex. 6, at 01:27-29. The of eers then nish restraining Plaintiffs legs by putting
restraints around his ankles and stand him up. Id. at 01:45-2:07; Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 05:12-21.
4
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 5 of 20 PageID 621
Plaintiff continues to argue with the of cers. Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 05:23-28. The of cers nally
manage to get Plaintiff into the vehicle. Id. at 05:29-40.
As of cers were getting Plaintiff into the car, Harris checked Plaintiffs driver’s license
against the system. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 05:58-06:28. Although the video footage is not entirely
clear, it appears to be at that point that Harris realized that Plaintiff—Silvester Hayes—was not
the same as the person with the felony warrant—Sylvester Hayes. See id.', see also Defs.’ App.,
Ex. 11, at 03:23-33 (Of cer Harris stating that Plaintiff had an outstanding “tickef’); Defs.’ App. 7
(indicating that Plaintiff only had awarrant for speeding). As aresult of his encounter with the
of cers. Plaintiff suffered atom rotator cuff, post-traumatic stress disorder, and mild insomnia.
PL’s App., Ex. 2[EOF No. 41-1] 8-9.
Two years after the incident. Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Compl. 1.
Plaintiff brings causes of action for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment*
and unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Guab and Harris. Id. 77-126.
Plaintiff also brings aFourth Amendment claim against Defendant City of Dallas under a
municipal liability theory. Id. 127-37. Plaintiff names Dallas Police Of cers Does 1Through 10
(“Doe Defendants”) as defendants in the Complaint, but he does not expressly bring any causes of
action against them. See id. 6.
II. LEGAL S TA N D A R D
Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as amatter of law.” Fed. R. CiV.
P. 56(a)', Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,247 (1986). In making this determination.
If, as here, an excessive force claim “arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of afree citizen,
it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); also Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted). Therefore, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs claim under Fourth Amendment standards.
5
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 6 of 20 PageID 622
courts must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving
party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its belief that there is no genuine
issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
When aparty bears the burden of proof on an issue, he “must establish beyond peradventure
all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190,1194 (5th Cir. 1986). When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof.
the movant may demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment either hy (1) submitting evidence
that negates the existence of an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or af rmative defense.
or (2) showing that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim
or af rmative defense. Celotex, All U.S. at 322-25. Once the movant has made this showing, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish that there is agenuine issue of material fact so that a
reasonable jury might return averdict in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). “[Cjonclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated
assertions” will not suf ce to satisfy the nonmovanf sburden. RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d
851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party
only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521,525 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Wash. Cap. Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1995)).
III. A N A LY S I S
Section 1983 provides afederal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
acitizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured hy the Constitution and laws’ of the United
States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (citation omitted). To state aclaim under
Section 1983, aplaintiff must allege facts showing (1) adeprivation of aright secured by the
6
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 7 of 20 PageID 623
Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation occurred under color
of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs.
Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “Claims under §1983 may be brought
against persons in their individual or of cial capacity, or against agovernmental entity.” Goodman
V. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty.
V. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).
Here, Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims against Guab and Harris in their individual
capacities and against the City of Dallas under atheory of municipal liability. Guab and Harris
argue that they are entitled to summary judgment based on quali ed immunity. Defs.’ Br. 16-28.
The City of Dallas contends that Plaintiff has not pleaded an underlying constitutional violation
and thus cannot hold it liable under Section 1983. Id. at 28-29.
A. Quali ed Immunity
'Quali ed immunity protects of cers from suit unless their conduct violates aclearly
established statutory or constitutional right.” Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 558 (5th Cir.
2023) (cleaned up), cert, denied sub nom. Crandel v. Hall, 144 S. Ct. 1002 (2024). When an of cial
asserts quali ed immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant is not
entitled to quali ed immunity. Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329-30
(5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must show (1) that the of cial violated astatutory
or constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct. Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
7
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 8 of 20 PageID 624
i. Violation of Constitutional Right
a. Excessive Force
Plaintiff contends that Guab and Harris used excessive force in effectuating his arrest. See,
c.g., PL’s Br. f105. To establish an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must establish (1) an injury,
(2) that resulted directly and only from ause of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable. Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281, 287
(5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “Our precedents recognize that inquiries regarding whether a
use of force was ‘clearly excessive’ or ‘clearly unreasonable ... are often intertwined,’ and we
consider those questions together ... .” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir.
2018) ( rst alteration in original) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017)).
As to the rst element. Plaintiff has demonstrated an injury. He submitted an af davit from
Dr. Adrienne Grant, D.O., averring that Plaintiff suffered atorn rotator cuff, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and insomnia. PL’s App., Ex. 2, at 8-9. But Plaintiff has not satis ed the second and third
elements because his injuries did not result directly and only from an unreasonable, excessive use
of force by Guab or Harris.
The Court’s inquiry into the excessiveness and reasonableness of the use of force depends
on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Darden, 880 F.3d at 728 (quoting Deville
V. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,167 (5th Cir. 2009)). “The ‘reasonableness’ of aparticular use of force
must be judged from the perspective of areasonable of cer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 729 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This analysis “must
embody allowance for the fact that police of cers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in aparticular situation.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159,
8
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 9 of 20 PageID 625
1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). “In making this determination, acourt
should consider the totality of the circumstances, ‘including [the following Graham factors:] the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
of cers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by ight.
Darden, 880 F.3d at 728-29 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Courts also consider “the
relationship between the need [for force] and the amount of force used.” Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th
577, 582 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court rst clari es the use
of force in this case before examining each of the Graham factors in turn.
The Court notes that much of the force identi ed by Plaintiff was used by other of cers,
not Guab or Harris. Ordinarily, “[t]he plaintiff’s factual assertions are taken as true to determine
whether they are legally suf cient to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” Craig
V. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But where
there is video and audio recording of the event,” the Court is “not required to accept factual
5 9 ?
allegations that are ‘blatantly contradicted by the record. Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d
165, 170 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Instead, the Court
view[s] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id.
In the videotape, Guab—after repeatedly asking Plaintiff to step out of the car—^pulled on
Plaintiffs arm and later his side or back to try to get him out of the car. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1,
at 01:34-02:00. Once Plaintiff was out of the car on the ground, Guab helped hold Plaintiffs arm
behind his back. Defs.’ App., Ex. 4, at 00:06-24. Guab then held onto Plaintiffs arm and shoulder
while of cers held him up against apolice car and while they attempted to walk him to another
police car. Id. at 00:38-01:35. Harris brie y grabbed Plaintiffs hand while other of cers were
pulling him out of the car, helped other of cers attempt to hold Plaintiffs hands behind his back.
9
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 10 of 20 PageID 626
held Plaintiffs legs down while of cers were attempting to restrain him, and put her hands on
Plaintiffs chest as of cers tried to get him to turn around and face the police car. See Defs.’ App.,
Ex. 1, at 01:48-03:28. Harris’s entire involvement in the physical struggle with Plaintiff lasted less
than two minutes. See id. Neither Guab nor Harris—^nor any of the other police of cers involved-
Eick[ed], punch[ed], [or]... use[d] their tasers on Plaintiff.” Compl. 39. They also did not “hog
tie[]” Plaintiff Id. ^45. Apparently recognizing the errors in his pleadings, Plaintiff dropped these
allegations from his Af davit. PL’s App., Ex. 1, at 3-5. In the Af davit, the only speci c assertions
with respect to Guab and Harris are that they “started pulling and pushing [Plaintiff] to the ground.
Id. at 3.
The Court will assume arguendo that the rst Graham factor, the severity of the crime at
issue, weighs against Guab and Harris’s use of force. Guab and Harris rst stopped Plaintiff for a
minor traf c violation—failing to signal before turning left. After the traf c stop, and after Guab
informed Plaintiff that he was being detained. Plaintiff resisted arrest by struggling against of cers
as they attempted to handcuff him and restrain his legs. Defendants concede that “resisting arrest
is aClass Amisdemeanor under Texas law.” Defs.’ Br. 19 (citing Tex. Penal Code §38.03). Minor
crimes like traf c violations and misdemeanors generally weigh against the use of force. See, e.g.,
Deville, 567 F.3d at 167 (concluding that “the need for force [was] substantially lower” where the
plaintiff “was stopped for aminor traf c violation”).
However, Guab and Harris thought Plaintiff’ was the subject of awarrant for felony
domestic violence. The severity of the crime evaluation must be “based upon the information the
of cers had when the conduct occurred.” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428
(2017) (citation omitted). Felony domestic violence is amore severe crime than atraf c violation
10
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 11 of 20 PageID 627
or misdemeanor. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision on severity would not change the outcome of
this case. So the Court will assume without deciding that this factor weighs against the use of force.
As to the second factor, Plaintiff posed some threat to Guab and Harris. As long as Plaintiff
remained in his vehicle, he posed apotential danger to the of cers. “A motor vehicle can be used
as adangerous weapon, even when blocked in by apolice cruiser.” Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513,
519 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Plumhoffv. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,776-77 (2014)). Areasonable of cer
could have feared that Plaintiff had aweapon in the car; in fact. Of cer Whitman later discovered
agun in Plaintiff’s pocket. See id. (citation omitted). And even when Plaintiff was pulled from the
vehicle, he continued to physically struggle while of cers attempted to restrain him. This factor
weighs in favor of Guab and Harris’s use of force.
The third Graham factor, whether Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by ight, also weighs in favor of nding that the force used by Guab and Harris was
not excessive. Guab attempted to negotiate with Plaintiff, telling him multiple times to step out of
the car before touching him. Guab did not grab Plaintiff’s arm until after he had failed to comply
with repeated, clear instructions. “Of cers may consider asuspect’s refusal to comply with
instructions during atraf c stop in assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the
suspect’s compliance.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 167 (citation omitted); see also Brothers, 837 F.3d
at 519-20 (concluding that of cers were entitled to quali ed immunity when they used their hands
to pull the plaintiff from his vehicle after he refused to comply with instructions to get out of the
vehicle). And Guab did not take Plaintiff to the ground until his efforts to handcuff Plaintiff and
pull Plaintiff from the car failed. Of cers are entitled to take suspects to the ground in response to
non-compliance. Priest v. Grazier, 860 F. App’x 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted)
(holding that of cers were entitled to quali ed immunity where they pulled the plaintiff out of the
11
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 12 of 20 PageID 628
car and forced him to the groimd when he “did not comply with their repeated instructions” to get
out of the car); see also Hutcheson v. Dallas County, 994 F.3d All, 480 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Resisting
while being handcuffed constitutes active resistance and justi es the use of at least some force.
(citation omitted)). After that point, Guab and Harris held onto Plaintiff’s limbs in an attempt to
restrain him. Throughout the encounter, the of cers were “[fjaced with an uncooperative arrestee'
and “properly use[d] ‘measured and ascending actions that correspond[ed] to [Plaintiff’s]
escalating verbal and physical resistance.’” Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted). In sum. Plaintiff’s active and prolonged resistance justi ed Guab’s and Harris’s
uses of force.
Finally, turning to the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used.
the Court notes that Guab and Harris were presented with an uncooperative arrestee who at rst
resisted passively by refusing to get out of the car and then resisted actively as of cers attempted
to restrain him. In response to this rapidly evolving situation, Guab and Harris used relatively
minor force. They pulled Plaintiff out of his car and occasionally helped hold him down as separate
of cers were attempting to restrain him, and they later helped move him into apolice vehicle. And
their use of force only escalated as Plaintiff’s noncompliance and resistance escalated, which, as
the Court noted above, is appropriate.
Having considered the totality of the circumstances, including the Graham factors, the
Court concludes that the force Guab and Harris employed was neither clearly excessive nor clearly
unreasonable.
b. False Arrest
Plaintiff argues that Guab and Harris falsely arrested him because they mistakenly
identi ed him as the Sylvester Hayes subject to an outstanding felony warrant. PL’s Br. 49-78.
12
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 13 of 20 PageID 629
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Arrests
are seizures of persons and, therefore, must be reasonable under the circumstances to comply with
the Fourth Amendment. See District of Columbia v. fVesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018) (citation
omitted). To prevail on aFourth Amendment false arrest claim, aplaintiff must prove (1) that he
was arrested, and (2) that the arrest was not supported by the requisite probable cause. Rhodes v.
Prince, 360 F. App’x 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
'Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within apolice
of cer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are suf cient for areasonable person to conclude that
the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269
(5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Apolice of cer who has probable cause to believe that aperson
committed even aminor offense may arrest that person without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Plaintiff gave Guab and Harris probable
cause for his arrest when he failed to use his turn signal before making aleft turn, in violation of
Texas Transportation Code Sections 545.104(a) and (b). Under Texas law, “[a]ny peace of cer
may arrest without warrant aperson found committing aviolation of the subtitle.” Tex. Transp.
Code. §543.001. Sections 545.104(a) and (b) “fall under Section 543’s purview”; therefore, they
granted Harris and Guab arrest authority for the violation. United States v. Allam,
No. U23-CR-00010-MAC, 2023 WL 3398594, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2023) (citation omitted);
see alsoCurleyv. Gonzalez,lAo. 3;15-CV-1341-L, 2017 WL 4351073, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
2017) (concluding that probable cause for arrest existed where the defendant-of cer observed the
plaintiff turn right without signaling).
13
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 14 of 20 PageID 630
a. Clearly Established Right
Although Plaintiffs case fails because he has not shown aconstitutional violation, the
Court considers the seeond prong of the quali ed immunity analysis for the sake of eompleteness.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to identify any controlling precedent that would put
Guab and Harris on notiee that their actions violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See Joseph,
981 F.3d at 336 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001)). Under this second prong of the
quali ed immunity analysis, courts “determine whether the defendant’s actions violated elearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which areasonable person would have known.
Griggs V. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Mullenix v.
Luna, 511 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (“A clearly established right is one that is suf eiently clear that every
reasonable of cial would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” (cleaned up)).
And adefendant eannot be said to have violated aclearly established right unless the right’s
contours were suf ciently de nite that any reasonable of cial in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778-79 (citation omitted). Accordingly,
[a plaintiff] must identify acase that put [the defendant] on notiee that his speci c conduct was
unlawful.” Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6(2021)).
As to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Plaintiff does not identify any cases that clearly
establish the law. This failure is unsurprising given that, as set forth at length above, Guab and
Harris’s actions did not rise to the level of uneonstitutional excessive foree.
In support of his false arrest claim, Plaintiff points to several eases. He acknowledges that
the facts of all of the cases are distinguishable but contends that they stand for the proposition that
the determinative factor of whether an of cer is entitled to quali ed immunity in amistaken
14
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 15 of 20 PageID 631
identity case is whether that of cer made reasonable efforts to ensure that the warrant he is
executing on aperson or place is the correct person or place.” PL’s Br. 91, 96.
First, Plaintiff relies on Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987). See PL’s Br. 85-88.
Garrison, unlike this case, involved of cers misidentifying an apartment that was subject to a
search warrant. 480 U.S. at 80. Second, Plaintiff cites Rogers v. Hooper, 271 F. App’x 431 (5th Cir.
2008). See PL’s Br. ]f 89. Rogers is unpublished and thus “cannot be the source of clearly
established law for quali ed immunity analysis.” Jimerson v. Lewis, 94 F.4th 423,429 n.2 (5th Cir.
2024) (citation omitted). Further, Rogers involved awarrant to search ahouse, not awarrant for a
person’s arrest. 271 F. App’x at 431-32. Third, Plaintiff cites Jimerson, 94 F.4th 423. See PL’s Br.
T| 90. Jimerson was decided after the incident at issue and thus could not clearly establish the law.
And Jimerson involved police of cers executing asearch warrant at an incorrect house. 94 F.4th
at 425. Plaintiff also points to an Eleventh Circuit case, Harts eld v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950
(11th Cir. 1995). PL’s Br.^^ 92-96. This case is nonprecedential in the Fifth Circuit. Moreover,
like the other cases cited by Plaintiff, Harts eld dealt with awarrant to search aresidence, not a
warrant to arrest an individual. 50 F.3d at 955-56.
Even setting aside the factual and other issues with the cases cited by Plaintiff, they all
share one fatal aw. Each case, in Plaintiff’s own words, deals with mistaken identity and the
question of whether an of cer “made reasonable efforts to ensure that the warrant he is executing
on aperson or place is the correct person or place.” PL’s Br. ^91. But here, as set forth above, the
mistaken identity issue became irrelevant as soon as Guab and Harris witnessed Plaintiff commit
atraf c violation. That traf c violation—not the of cers’ mistake in searching in the system for
“Sylvester Hayes” instead of “Silvester Hayes”—^provided probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest.
See supra §III.A.i.b. Therefore, whether Guab and Harris made reasonable efforts to ensure that
15
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 16 of 20 PageID 632
Plaintiff was in fact the subject of the outstanding warrant is legally irrelevant, and none of the
cases cited by Plaintiff show that Guab and Harris violated Plaintiff’s clearly established rights.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Guab and Harris are entitled to
quali ed immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and
false arrest.
B. Municipal Liability
The Court turns next to Plaintiffs claim against the City of Dallas. “[IJsolated
unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger [municipal] liability.
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). As such, “a
local government may not be sued under §1983 for an injury in icted solely by its employees or
agents. Instead, it is when execution of agovernment’s policy or custom ... in icts the injury that
the government as an entity is responsible under §1983.” Monell v. Dep’t ofSoc. Servs. of NY,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “The Fifth Circuit interprets Monell as requiring aplaintiff to identify
‘(1) an of cial policy (or custom), of which (2) apolicy maker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and (3) aconstitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy (or
custom).”’ Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 749 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston,
291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Acourt need not consider municipal liability if it does not nd an underlying constitutional
violation. Carvell ex rel. HA.A.W. v. Gibson, No. 23-30252, 2024 WL 4533312, at *4 (5th Cir.
Oct. 21, 2024) (citing Hicks-Fields v. Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). That is
so because every municipal liability claim requires “an underlying constitutional violation.” Hicks-
Fields, 860 F.3d at 808 (quoting Kitchen v. Dallas County, 759 F.3d 468,483 (5th Cir. 2014)). For
the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that Guab or
16
fi
fi
fi
fl
fl
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 17 of 20 PageID 633
Harris violated his constitutional rights. “That alone forecloses his claim,” at least with respect to
Guah and Harris’s conduct. Jackson v. City ofHearne, 959 F.3d 194, 204 (5th Cir. 2020).
But Plaintiff premises his municipal liahility claim on the actions of unnamed police
of cers as well. See, e.g., PL’s Br. 1167(h) (arguing that “none of the [Doe Defendants] were
disciplined for the excessive force that they used to arrest Plaintiff ...under an erroneous
warrant”). Plaintiffs municipal liability claims involving unnamed of cers are predicated on the
same two purported constitutional violations discussed above—false arrest and excessive force.
See id. 1167(c) (contending that the City of Dallas failed to train its of cers on verifying aperson’s
identity, proper arrest and confrontation techniques, excessive force, proper seizure, detention, and
arrest procedures, use of force against passively resisting individuals, less violent means to seize,
detain, or arrest aperson, and de-escalation methods). And amunicipality “may still be liable if
9 9 9
the alleged injuries are not ‘solely attributable to the actions of named individual defendants.
Bustos V. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458,467 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Curley v. Village ofSuffern,
268F.3d65,71 (2d Cir. 2001)).
For the reasons set forth above, the Court determines that Plaintiff has not established a
false arrest claim against any police of cer. Plaintiffs traf c violation provided probable cause
for his arrest. See supra §III.A.i.b.
As to excessive force, the Court, considering all the factors set forth previously, concludes
that no of cer on the scene used force that was clearly excessive and unreasonable. Again, the
Court nds it helpful to rst de ne the force used. Broadly, the of cers helped Guah pull Plaintiff
out of his car, assisted in holding Plaintiff down and trying to handcuff him and—later—restrain
his legs, and struggled to walk Plaintiff to apolice vehicle and to get Plaintiff into the vehicle.
Though Plaintiff claims that one or more of cers “can be seen dangerously pressing with his shin
17
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 18 of 20 PageID 634
on the back of [Plaintiff’s] neck” and using a“lateral vascular neck restraint” on Plaintiff, PL’s Br.
24-25, these assertions are belied by the video evidence. During the rst struggle on the ground.
an of cer has his foot on the ground and his knee on the top part of Plaintiff sback. Defs.’ App.,
Ex. 2, at 01:29-35. Later, an of cer holds Plaintiffs head down so that his cheek is against the
ground. Id. at 02:07-28. The same of cer also intermittently has his hand on the back or side of
Plaintiffs neck. Defs.’ App., Ex. 4, at 00:10-26. Later, as the of cers attempt to push Plaintiff into
the police car, an of cer wraps his ngers around Plaintiffs throat and appears to raise his knee
to Plaintiffs stomach. Defs.’ App., Ex. 1, at 03:59-04:03. The same of cer then pushes down on
the back of Plaintiff shead as he tries to get Plaintiff inside the vehicle. Id. at 04:04-11. Finally,
during the struggle with Plaintiff outside the police vehicle, one of cer has his knee on the ground
near Plaintiffs neck and intermittently holds the side of Plaintiff sface down with his hand. Defs.’
App., Ex. 2, at 03:40-04:30; Defs.’ App., Ex. 5, at 00:44-01:00, 01:13-41, 02:10-11; Defs.’ App.,
Ex. 7, at 00:43-50. Plaintiff accuses an of cer of pressing on his pressure points, and the of cer
con rms that he is doing so. Defs.’ App., Ex. 2, at 04:16-22. Throughout this time. Plaintiff is
actively struggling against the of cers as they attempt to restrain him.
Having reviewed the evidence, the Court concludes that none of the of cers used excessive
force. Instead, they “properly use[d] ‘measured and ascending actions that correspond[ed] to
[Plaintiff’s] escalating verbal and physical resistance.’” Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384 (citation omitted).
Outside of one of cer momentarily grabbing Plaintiff’s throat and possibly hitting Plaintiff in the
stomach with his knee, the of cers used relatively minor force, even as Plaintiff screamed, resisted
restraint, and refused to get in the police car. And as soon as Plaintiff’s wrists and ankles were
restrained, the of cers put Plaintiff in the police car and then ceased their use of force. The Court
nds the use of force neither clearly excessive nor clearly unreasonable; therefore, the of cers did
18
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 19 of 20 PageID 635
not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. And without aconstitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot
sustain his municipal liability claim against the City of Dallas.
C. Doe Defendants
Finally, Defendants ask the Court to sua sponte dismiss all claims against Doe Defendants.
Defs.’ Br. 6n.2. Plaintiff does not address this argument. Even if the Court nds that Plaintiff did
not abandon his claims against these Defendants by failing to respond to the Motion on this point.
see Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.l (5th Cir. 2006), the claims are barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against Doe Defendants, such claims would arise
under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Compl. 77-96 (asserting excessive force claim against Harris and
Guab under Section 1983 and mentioning Doe Defendants’ conduct). “Because there is no federal
statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [§ 1983], federal courts borrow the
forum state’s general personal injury limitations period. Beckwith v. City of Houston,
790 F. App’x 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Texas’s statute of limitations for personal
injury claims is two years. Id. at 572 (citation omitted). Federal law, however, governs when a
claim accrues. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (citation omitted). ASection 1983 claim accrues
when the plaintiff knows or has suf cient information to know that he has been injured by the
defendant’s actions. Id. (citations omitted). In this case. Plaintiffs claims accrued on October 16,
2021, the date of Plaintiff sarrest. Plaintiff brought suit within two years of October 16, 2021, but
he still has not identi ed Doe Defendants.
[A]n amended complaint to substitute an individual for aJohn Doe defendant does not
relate back to the date of the original complaint....” Bond v. Nueces County, No. 20-40050,2022
WL 4595000, at *2 n.2 (5th Cir. Sept. 30,2022) (citation omitted); see also Bade v. Nueces County,
952 F.3d 552, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding that an amended complaint does not relate back
19
fi
fi
fi
Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 52 Filed 04/25/25 Page 20 of 20 PageID 636
to the date of the original complaint where the plaintiff substitutes anamed individual for aJohn
Doe). The doctrine of equitable tolling is available to preserve Plaintiffs claims if “strict
application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.” Balle, 952 F.3d at 558 (citation
omitted). But Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion on this point, sought discovery, or
otherwise “diligently pursued [his] rights as required for equitable tolling of the limitations
period.” Bond, 2022 WL 4595000, at *2 n.2. Indeed, by ling this case on October 16, 2023, the
date the statute of limitations ran. Plaintiff all but ensured he would not be able to name Doe
Defendants in time. See Balle, 952 F.3d at 558. As such, the Court nds no basis for equitable
tolling and dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Doe Defendants.
I V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 30]. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED April 25, 2025.
IC\REN GREN SCHOLER
UNITED S TAT E S DISTRICT JUDGE
20
fi
fi