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Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton — Entry #111

Case: Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton txwd · 1:25-cv-01153

filed July 24, 2025

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Docket entry #111 · filed October 26, 2026

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Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA         Document 111          Filed 10/26/26     Page 1 of 12


                     IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                               AUSTIN DIVISION
GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC                        §
     Plaintiff,                                §
                                               §
v.                                             §
                                               §
KEN PAXTON, in his Official Capacity as        §
                                                              Civil Action No.
Attorney General of Texas                      §
                                                            1:25-cv-01153-ADA
       Defendant,                              §
                                               §
THE TEXAS STOCK EXCHANGE LLC                   §
and THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF                   §
BUSINESS,                                      §
      Intervenor-Defendants.                   §


ATTORNEY GENERAL’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF GLASS LEWIS’ MOTION TO
                COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES


KEN PAXTON                                         KIMBERLY GDULA
Attorney General of Texas                          Chief, General Litigation Division

BRENT WEBSTER                                      JOE NWAOKORO
First Assistant Attorney General                   Attorney-in-Charge
                                                   Texas Bar No. 24032916
RALPH MOLINA                                       Assistant Attorney General
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General            P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
                                                   Austin, Texas 78711-2548
WILLIAM D. WASSDORF                                (512) 979-5382 | FAX: (512) 320-0667
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation       Joe.Nwaokoro@oag.texas.gov


DEFENDANT KEN PAXTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL
                             OF TEXAS


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 111        Filed 10/26/26      Page 2 of 12


TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

       Defendant, Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas (“Defendant”

or the “Attorney General”), files this Response to Plaintiff Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC’s (“Glass

Lewis”) Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Dkt. 109) (the “Motion”) and respectfully shows

the Court as follows:

                                        INTRODUCTION

       Glass Lewis stated that its motion for summary judgment “turns on the statutory text and

legislative history of the Act,” Dkt. 60 at 1, and that “[f]urther discovery is not needed to resolve

this case,” Dkt. 74 at 1. Yet, it moves to compel the one thing its lawsuit does not reach: the

Attorney General’s law-enforcement investigative and charging file from a separate Deceptive

Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) enforcement action against it. The as-applied First Amendment

challenge turns on how S.B. 2337 operates against Glass Lewis’s speech, not the Attorney

General’s enforcement motive or investigative methods in a separate DTPA matter. The Court

should deny the Motion because Glass Lewis (1) ignored Section IV of the Court’s discovery-

dispute procedure; (2) moved against responses the Attorney General has since superseded,

rendering the Motion premature; and (3) seeks a file that is irrelevant, disproportionate, and

protected by multiple privileges.

                                        BACKGROUND

       The Attorney General incorporates the Nwaokoro Declarations filed with his Reply (Dkt.

110-1) (“Nwaokoro Reply Decl.”), his Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 101-1) (“Nwaokoro

Decl.”), and this Response (“Nwaokoro Resp. Decl.”), and the Declaration of Division Chief

Johnathan Stone (Dkt. 101-2) (“Stone Decl.”).


                                                 1


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA         Document 111        Filed 10/26/26     Page 3 of 12


       On August 22, 2025, before S.B. 2337’s effective date, the Attorney General’s Consumer

Protection Division (“Division”) issued a Civil Investigative Demand (the “CID”) to Glass Lewis

under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.61, and later filed State v. Glass, Lewis & Co., No. 471-04895-

2026 (471st Dist. Ct., Collin County) (the “State DTPA Action”). The State DTPA Action does

not assert an S.B. 2337 claim. Nwaokoro Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5. This Court held that the preliminary

injunction bars enforcement of S.B. 2337 only, not “other provisions of the law against [Glass

Lewis] at this time.” May 15, 2026 Text Order, quoted in Dkt. 107 at 2.

       The Attorney General served amended responses, produced documents, and an itemized

privilege log on October 16, 2026; served his Second Amended Objections and Responses (the

“Second Amended Responses”), a supplemental production, and a supplemental log on October

20; and a further supplement on October 23. Nwaokoro Reply Decl. (Dkt. 110-1) ¶ 7 & Exs. B, C,

E; Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. ¶¶ 5–7 & Exs. A–B. Those responses name the Alliance for Corporate

Excellence as the sole source of information about Glass Lewis’s statements, state that no known

Texas-based client complained, and confirm no S.B. 2337 enforcement since the injunction.

Second Am. Resp., Interrog. Nos. 14, 17, 20.

       Glass Lewis moved to compel anyway, and against the wrong record. After the Attorney

General proposed conferring by October 19, Glass Lewis filed its Motion that day and has never

conferred on the October 20 or October 23 responses, though he remained available to confer.

Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. C.

                                         ARGUMENT

I.     Glass Lewis Ignored the Discovery-Dispute Procedure and Failed to Confer in Good
       Faith.

       On August 3, 2026, the Court directed that any dispute proceed “through the discovery

dispute process outlined in Section IV” of Judge Albright’s Standing Order (the “OGP”). Dkt. 109-


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      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA             Document 111     Filed 10/26/26      Page 4 of 12


2 at 3–4. Section IV bars a motion to compel “unless” lead counsel have met and conferred in good

faith and the movant has contacted the law clerk; a meet and confer requires a personal conference,

as “[c]orrespondence, such as e-mail, is insufficient.” OGP § IV & n.5. Glass Lewis’s own counsel

invoked Section IV in August, Dkt. 109-2, yet its Certificate of Conference shows no personal

conference on the written discovery, no Section IV summary, and no contact with the law clerk,

only a September 29 discussion of “upcoming depositions” and emails. Dkt. 109, Certificate of

Conference. The Federal and Local Rules impose the same requirement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1);

W.D. Tex. Local R. CV-7(g). A letter listing deficiencies and threatening a motion “does not meet

the conference requirement,” Ramsey v. Sheet Pile, LLC, 2021 WL 9870366, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct.

14, 2021). That alone warrants denial.

II.    The Motion Attacks Superseded Responses, Is Moot in Part, and Is Premature.

       A motion to compel lies only for a failure to answer or respond, Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(3)(B)(iii)–(iv). Here, there was no such failure. The Attorney General served his original

responses on October 8 (Dkt. 107-7; Dkt. 109-3 ¶ 6), amended them on October 16, superseded

them with his Second Amended Responses on October 20, and supplemented them again on

October 23. Nwaokoro Reply Decl. (Dkt. 110-1) ¶ 7 & Ex. E; Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. ¶¶ 5–7 &

Exs. A–B. Glass Lewis moved on October 19 against the October 16 responses and has never

addressed the responses that supplanted them. A motion filed “without the benefit of the amended

responses … which supplant the initial responses” tests the wrong record and is premature.

Rodriguez-Meza v. Venegas, 2020 WL 14100944, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2020).

       Glass Lewis, which has the current responses, production, and October 23 log, shows no

prejudice. Its October 22 log complaints, which it raised only after moving to compel, constitute

a new dispute that requires its own Section IV conference. Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. C. Many of


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Glass Lewis’s requests also merely duplicate its own first-set discovery, which the Attorney

General answered on October 31, 2025, so the Court “must limit” them as “unreasonably

cumulative or duplicative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). The enclosed chart pairs each duplicative

request with the first-set request it restates. See Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. F.

III.    The Attorney General’s Objections Are Specific, Not Waived Boilerplate.

        Glass Lewis’s cited authority refutes its boilerplate charge. The objections condemned in

McLeod were identical one-line recitations, “Overbroad; irrelevant; privileged,” that were repeated

across every request. McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1484–

85 (5th Cir. 1990). Not so here. Each objection by the Attorney General states why the material

is outside the as-applied inquiry, identifies the privilege, and directs Glass Lewis to the October

16 production at Bates AG 002090–AG 003289. Dkt. 109-3 (Ex. 2); Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex.

G. The claim that the Attorney General “substantively answered none” of the interrogatories is

negated by the Motion’s own Exhibit 2, which answers Interrogatory No. 17 with thirteen quoted

Glass Lewis statements and substantively answers Interrogatories 14–16 and 20–23. Dkt. 109-3 at

5–9. In any event, Rule 33(b)(4) excuses an unstated ground “for good cause,” and a defensible

objection is “substantially justified.” Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 474, 477 (N.D. Tex.

2014). The relief Glass Lewis’s own authority supports, amended responses stating, “whether any

responsive materials are being withheld,” Ambler v. Nissen, 2023 WL 443806, at *7 (W.D. Tex.

Jan. 26, 2023), is already in hand. And its lead case, LUPE, undermines its claim. There, the

intervenors produced no document “in response to Private Plaintiffs’ twenty outstanding RFPs”

and answered no interrogatory, a qualifier Glass Lewis omits by ellipsis to misleadingly suggest a

categorical rule. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 2022 WL 17574079, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec.

9, 2022); see Dkt. 109 at 5. The Attorney General did the opposite. Nonetheless, waiver is a


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      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 111         Filed 10/26/26      Page 6 of 12


“serious sanction,” “not automatic,” reserved for “bad faith[] or other flagrant violations,” not the

shortcomings alleged here; the remedy is an amended response, not forfeiture. Oklahoma Hosp.

Med. Physicians, LLC v. Gottlieb LLC, 2025 WL 3539162, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025); see

EEOC v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 697 (5th Cir. 2017).

IV.    The Attorney General’s Investigative File Is Irrelevant and Disproportionate.

       As a threshold matter, Glass Lewis must establish relevance, a burden it cannot carry.

Enforcement motive is not an element of the as-applied inquiry, and Glass Lewis’s pretext framing

cannot convert this challenge into a motive case. Nor is S.B. 2337 enforcement investigation

ongoing; the preliminary injunction bars it. Glass Lewis’s position is also internally inconsistent.

If S.B. 2337 is facially viewpoint-based “as a matter of law,” as it contends, then motive is

unnecessary, and the file it seeks proves nothing. If it is not, the Court “will not strike down an

otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” United States

v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165–66 (2015).

Further, the Court’s Rule 56(d) Order is the Attorney General’s remedy, limited to the summary-

judgment issue it identified (whether Glass Lewis’s speech is deceptive) and not a license for a

counter-investigation into a separate enforcement file. Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412,

422–23 (5th Cir. 2016). The deception question bears on the Attorney General’s defense, not Glass

Lewis’s affirmative claim, and the Court granted that Rule 56(d) discovery on Defendants’ motion.

Glass Lewis has sworn that whether its advice is “solely in the financial interest” of shareholders

“is a matter of judgment and opinion,” and that its “reports and recommendations are viewpoints”

that “reflect the opinions” of the firm; its counsel conceded at the preliminary-injunction hearing

that Glass Lewis provides “opinions and advice and recommendations” that are “not purely

factual,” and that its viewpoint-discrimination theory rests on “the text of the statute and … the


                                                  5


      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA            Document 111       Filed 10/26/26      Page 7 of 12


legislative history.” Decl. of John Wieck ¶¶ 12, 14, 26 (Dkt. 5); Aug. 29, 2025 Prelim. Inj. Hr’g

Tr. 34:10–18, 16:4–7.

       Glass Lewis’s deception theory does not change the analysis, because the burden it invokes

is the State’s own. A government defending a commercial-speech restriction “must demonstrate

that the harms it recites are real,” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993), and carries that

burden from its own record; whether a statement misleads turns on the statement and its audience,

not on who complained. Moreover, the State has pleaded its deception case in the State DTPA

Action in detail in its verified Second Amended Petition, based on Glass Lewis’s own public

statements and admissions, including its January 2023 written admission to the Attorneys General

that “a significant majority of our clients have elected to simply not follow any Glass Lewis

policy,” thereby confirming that Glass Lewis does not need anything from the Attorney General’s

privileged file to test the deception theory. Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. H. That the Attorney General

can prove deception from Glass Lewis’s own public statements is all the more reason why the

privileged file is unnecessary. He has relied on Glass Lewis’s public, non-privileged admissions

and has not placed the file’s contents at issue.

       Glass Lewis’s repeated “two-way street” refrain is inapplicable. Glass Lewis uses that

phrase from Wardius v. Oregon, a criminal notice-of-alibi case, while dropping the Supreme

Court’s express limitation: reciprocity applies only “in the absence of a strong showing of state

interests to the contrary,” a qualification the Attorney General’s privilege and pending-enforcement

interests satisfy. 412 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1973). Glass Lewis used the same “two-way street” in

opposing the Defendants’ motion to compel, using it to resist producing “years of sensitive

communications.” Dkt. 54 at 10. A party that invoked the two-way street to shield its own materials

cannot invoke it to open the State’s privileged enforcement file. That the Attorney General obtained


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      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 111        Filed 10/26/26      Page 8 of 12


Glass Lewis’s productions to the Missouri and Florida Attorneys General is immaterial. Obtaining

a party’s own documents from third parties is not equivalent to opening the State’s privileged file.

And in the State DTPA Action, Glass Lewis’s counsel agreed that “merits discovery should not be

open and is not open.” Dkt. 109-11 at 3.

       Discovery into the Attorney General’s motive is also barred because this is an official-

capacity suit, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), and the Fifth Circuit has already

quashed discovery aimed at this Attorney General, holding his “thoughts and statements … have

no bearing on his office’s legal authority to enforce” the law, In re Paxton, 60 F.4th 252, 258–59

(5th Cir. 2023); see In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995).

       Even if a thin sliver were relevant, compelling the entire investigative and charging file is

disproportionate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A “one-size-fits-all” demand for an entire file “is

insufficient” absent “an individualized showing of relevancy, proportionality, and particularity.”

In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 313 F.R.D. 32, 36–37 (E.D. Tex. 2016). The one

fact Glass Lewis claims it needs, whether any client was deceived or complained, has already been

answered. The rest of the DTPA file adds nothing and intrudes on a pending enforcement matter,

so the burden “outweighs its likely benefit.” Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d

258, 264 (5th Cir. 2011). As the movant, Glass Lewis bears the burden of showing the importance

of the discovery to resolving the case, Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun “Michael” Chung,

325 F.R.D. 578, 591–92 (N.D. Tex. 2017). Glass Lewis’s representations that further discovery

“is not needed,” Dkt. 74 at 1, defeat that showing, as does its insistence, when the Defendants

sought discovery, that this case “can and should be decided at summary judgment” and that

“extensive discovery is unnecessary and disproportionate,” Dkt. 54 at 2, 4. It cannot tell the Court

that no discovery is needed to win deferral and then demand sweeping discovery into the State’s


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      Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA          Document 111        Filed 10/26/26      Page 9 of 12


privileged file. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001); Occidental Petroleum

Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 117 F.4th 628, 639 (5th Cir. 2024).

V.     The Attorney General’s Investigative File Is Privileged, and the Logging Is Proper.

       The Attorney General’s privilege assertion is specific, not “blanket.” Based on Division

Chief Stone’s personal review, the Stone Declaration identifies the categories withheld—internal

investigative memoranda, attorney and investigator mental impressions, predecisional charging

deliberations, and informant information—and the basis for each privilege. Stone Decl. (Dkt. 101-

2) ¶¶ 1–5. The deliberative-process privilege protects the charging deliberations, extending to

“predecisional materials reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes,” including their

factual analysis, Skelton v. U.S. Postal Serv., 678 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir. 1982). The Stone

Declaration shows that the material is inextricably intertwined with the Division’s evaluation, and

cannot be segregated while enforcement is pending. Stone Decl. ¶¶ 3–5; see De La Cruz v. Blinken,

2021 WL 2709679, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2021). Section 17.61(f)’s bar on disclosing CID

material absent “good cause,” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.61(f); see Off. of Att’y Gen. v. PFLAG,

Inc., 731 S.W.3d 301, 318 (Tex. 2026), is persuasive authority that reinforces the Rule 26(b)(1)

balance. And Ambler is not to the contrary. It held only that Texas Local Government Code §

143.089 does not provide federal privilege but confirmed that federal courts may “consider state

policies in weighing the government’s interest in confidentiality.” Ambler, 2023 WL 443806, at

*2.

       The informer’s privilege protects the identity of those who provide information to law

enforcement. Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991). The Attorney General named

the Alliance for Corporate Excellence. Identifying one source did not waive protection over any

other source, or over the content and evaluative analysis of those communications, which remain


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     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA           Document 111        Filed 10/26/26       Page 10 of 12


protected as opinion work product and under the informer’s privilege. Stone Decl. (Dkt. 101-2) ¶

4. The Attorney General’s coordination with aligned defenders of S.B. 2337 is opinion work

product that is not waived by same-side sharing. The Attorney General invoked common interest

only to show non-waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947).

Non-public communications with the bill’s sponsors, if implicated, fall within the legislative

privilege. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 68 F.4th 228, 238–39 (5th Cir. 2023) (recognizing

state legislative privilege). Glass Lewis’s demand for the “facts” fails too. Who the investigators

contacted and how they evaluated what they learned is itself protected work-product and

informer’s privilege, and the underlying facts have been answered by interrogatory. Second Am.

Resp., Interrog. Nos. 14, 17, 20. The work-product doctrine applies because the file is the

Division’s litigation work product in the pending State DTPA Action. Compelling it here would

hand Glass Lewis a roadmap to the Attorney General’s evidence, strategy, and attorney mental

impressions that it cannot obtain in that forum, where merits discovery is stayed. Dkt. 109-11 at 3;

Stone Decl. ¶¶ 2–5; see Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. H (verified Second Amended Petition).

       Finally, there is no logging violation. A privilege log is required only for relevant material

withheld as privileged, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEVA Logistics Singapore, Ltd., 348 F.R.D.

54, 83 (E.D. La. 2024), and voluminous privileged material may be described by category, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. A document-by-

document index of an active enforcement file would reveal its scope and sources. Nevertheless,

the Attorney General logged his S.B. 2337 withholdings and has twice supplemented them.

Nwaokoro Reply Decl. (Dkt. 110-1) ¶ 7 & Ex. B; Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. B. Waiver applies

only for “unjustified delay, inexcusable conduct, or bad faith,” and none is present here. BDO, 876

F.3d at 697. In any event, Glass Lewis is in no position to raise logging technicalities because the


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Attorney General has identified the deficiencies in Glass Lewis’s own October 19 log and served

them on Glass Lewis on October 23, Nwaokoro Resp. Decl. Ex. E. Glass Lewis’s own logging

deficiencies are even more pervasive, as the comprehensive catalogue in Exhibit D shows.

VI.    Any Relief Should Be Narrow and Preserve Privilege.

       The Attorney General should not be required to produce or log the investigative and

charging file, informant identities, predecisional deliberations, legislative communications, or

work product. If the Court grants any part of the Motion, any further response should be limited

to non-privileged facts relating to the as-applied operation of S.B. 2337, request by request. At

most, if the Court has doubt, it should permit in camera review of a representative sample rather

than order production. Because fact discovery closed on October 20, Dkt. 99, relief should not

reopen discovery or extend any deadline. And if the Motion is referred to and decided by a

magistrate judge, any portion granted over the Attorney General’s objection should be stayed to

allow him to seek review by the District Judge under Rule 72(a) before any production.

                                         CONCLUSION

       Glass Lewis ignored the Court’s discovery-dispute procedure, did not confer, and moves

against responses the Attorney General has since superseded and supplemented. On the merits,

Glass Lewis seeks a privileged investigative file that is irrelevant and disproportionate, as an end-

run around merits discovery it agreed to defer. Alternatively, the Court should deny the Motion or

enter the limits above and briefly stay any adverse portion under Rule 72(a).


Dated: October 26, 2026.                      Respectfully submitted,

                                              KEN PAXTON
                                              Attorney General of Texas

                                              BRENT WEBSTER
                                              First Assistant Attorney General


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     Case 1:25-cv-01153-ADA         Document 111        Filed 10/26/26     Page 12 of 12


                                            RALPH MOLINA
                                            Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

                                            WILLIAM D. WASSDORF
                                            Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

                                            KIMBERLY GDULA
                                            Chief, General Litigation Division

                                            /s/ Joe Nwaokoro
                                            JOE NWAOKORO
                                            Attorney-in-Charge
                                            Texas Bar No. 24032916
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
                                            Austin, Texas 78711-2548
                                            (512) 979-5382 | FAX: (512) 320-0667
                                            Joe.Nwaokoro@oag.texas.gov

                                            Defendant Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as
                                            Attorney General of Texas

                               CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I certify that on October 26, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed

electronically through the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of electronic filing to

all counsel of record.


                                            /s/ Joe Nwaokoro
                                            JOE NWAOKORO
                                            Assistant Attorney General


                                              11