Southwest Marine and General Insurance Company v. Valentine — Entry #16: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE: The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Southwest Marine's motion for default judgment…

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                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                            DALLAS DIVISION

  SOUTHWEST MARINE &                        §
  GENERAL INSURANCE                         §
  COMPANY, as assignee and                  §
  subrogee of My Community Credit           §
  Union,                                    §
                   Plaintiff,               §          No. 3:24-CV-013-B-BW
                                            §
  V.                                        §
                                            §
  TAMMION VALENTINE, ET AL.,                §
              Defendants.                   §

           FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
              OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

       Before the Court are a motion for default judgment against Defendant

 Tammion Valentine (Dkt. No. 11), filed by Plaintiff Southwest Marine & General

 Insurance Company (“Southwest Marine”), as assignee and subrogee of My

 Community Credit Union, on March 19, 2024, and a motion to dismiss Defendant

 Valentine Travel Express LLC (“VTE”) (Dkt. No. 13), filed by Southwest Marine on

 July 7, 2024.

       United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred the case to United States

 Magistrate Judge Renée Harris Toliver for pretrial management and

 recommendation on case-dispositive motions, but the case was transferred and

 reassigned to the undersigned magistrate judge on August 23, 2024, by Special Order

 3-354. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 14.) The undersigned enters the following findings of fact,

 conclusions of law, and recommendation that Southwest Marine’s motion for default


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 judgement against Defendant Valentine (Dkt. No. 11) be GRANTED, and its

 motion to dismiss Defendant VTE without prejudice (Dkt. No. 13) be GRANTED.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

       Southwest Marine filed suit against Valentine and VTE on January 3, 2024.

 (See Dkt. No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”).) Southwest Marine asserts subject matter

 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because Southwest Marine and Defendants

 (including the member(s) of VTE) are citizens of different states, and the amount in

 controversy when accounting for both compensatory damages and punitive damages

 exceeds $75,000.00.

       According to the Complaint, Valentine is the owner and operator of VTE.

 (Compl. ¶ 4.) Southwest Marine’s insured, My Community Credit Union (“My

 Community”), issued Valentine a credit card (the “Credit Card”) with a credit limit

 of $3,400. (Id. ¶ 8.) Southwest Marine alleges that, from February to September

 2022, Valentine operated a fraudulent kiting scheme whereby she repeatedly charged

 expenses to the Credit Card and then arranged sham payment transactions that

 would temporarily credit the account long enough to enable more charges. (Id. ¶¶ 8-

 12.) Valentine would then make new charges to the Credit Card before the payments

 were returned for insufficient funds. (Id. ¶ 11.) Southwest Marine alleges that My

 Community discovered the fraudulent activity on January 3, 2023, after Valentine

 had amassed an unpaid balance due of almost $60,000. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Southwest

 Marine further alleges that Valentine ignored My Community’s demands for


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 repayment and refused to communicate with My Community regarding the debt.

 (Id. ¶ 16.)

        Southwest Marine subsequently paid an insurance claim to My Community

 due to loss sustained from commercial crime or fraud. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-20.)

 Southwest Marine asserts standing as both the subrogee and assignee of My

 Community. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Southwest Marine filed the instant suit asserting claims

 of fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment. (Compl. at 4-5.) Southwest Marine

 alleges compensatory damages in the principal amount of $59,228.69, plus punitive

 damages, interest, costs of suit, and attorneys’ fees, an amount in controversy that

 exceeds $75,000.00. (Id. at 6.)

        On January 23, 2024, Southwest Marine filed a return of service establishing

 that on January 8, 2024, a copy of the Complaint and Summons were “personally

 deliver[ed] to DEVIN VALENTINE, a co-resident over the age of 16” at Valentine’s

 residential address in Balch Springs. (Dkt. No. 5.) There having been no appearance

 or answer filed by Valentine, Southwest Marine requested entry of default on

 January 31, 2024, which the Clerk of Court entered that same day. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7.)

 On the following day, District Judge Boyle entered an Order to Show Cause

 directing Valentine to explain in writing why she failed to file an answer and warning

 her that failure to comply may result in a default judgment against her. (Dkt. No. 8.)

        Less than one week later, on February 7, 2024, Valentine filed a response to

 Judge Boyle’s order. The response states in full:


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             I was advised by a co-worker that a[n] email was sent to her with
       some court Papers[.] I’m not even aware of what’s going on and I’m
       having to answer by February the 7[.] I had to email this to my oldest
       daughter because I am not in town. And don’t know who the papers
       were sent to[.] I called the Court office. And they said the papers
       w[ere] given to a minor.

              Tammion Valentine

 (Dkt. No. 9.) Valentine has not filed an answer or any other document since.

       Southwest Marine moved for default judgment on March 19, 2024. (Dkt. No.

 11.) On September 19, 2024, the undersigned again ordered Valentine to show cause

 for her failure to file an answer to the complaint and warned Valentine that failure to

 comply could result in default judgment. (Dkt. No. 15.) Valentine has not filed any

 response to the order.

                              II. LEGAL STANDARDS

       Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) governs the entry of a default judgment. A default

 judgment is available to a plaintiff who demonstrates the following: (1) the defendant

 was served with a summons and the complaint, and a default was entered because

 the defendant failed to appear; (2) the defendant is not a minor or an incompetent

 person; (3) the defendant is not in the military or subject to the Soldiers and Sailors

 Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 3931; and (4) if the defendant appeared in the case,

 the defendant was provided with notice of the default judgment application at least

 three days before the hearing. See Arch Ins. Co. v. WM Masters & Assocs., Inc., 3:12-CV-

 2092-M, 2013 WL 145502, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2013) (citing Twentieth Century

 Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (D. Ariz. 2006)). In addition,


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 the plaintiff “must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” TFHSP, LLC Series

 10147 v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 3:14-CV-2589-M-BN, 2016 WL 2856006, at *2 (N.D.

 Tex. Apr. 18, 2016) (citing Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242

 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2001)).

        The Fifth Circuit has set out a three-step process for a plaintiff seeking default

 judgment: (1) default by the defendant; (2) entry of default by the Clerk’s office; and

 (3) entry of a default judgment by the district court. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84

 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mex. Rest., Inc.,

 126 F. Supp. 3d 809, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A default occurs when a defendant has

 failed to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time required by the

 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); PharMerica Corp. v.

 Paragon Healthcare Group, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-196, 2021 WL 9274561, at *2 (N.D.

 Tex. Aug. 20, 2021).

        “‘Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules

 and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.’” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766,

 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874

 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Arch Ins. Co., 2013 WL 145502, at *2 (citing

 Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing

 the Fifth Circuit’s general disfavor of default judgments and preference to resolve

 cases on their merits). But this policy is “counterbalanced by considerations of social

 goals, justice, and expediency, a weighing process [that] lies largely within the


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 domain of the trial judge’s discretion.” Rogers, 167 F.3d at 936 (quoting Pelican Prod.

 Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted));

 see also Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 253 (7th Cir. 1990)

 (noting that default judgments allow courts to manage their dockets “efficiently and

 effectively”).

        Moreover, “a party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right,

 even where the defendant is technically in default.” Id. (quoting Ganther v. Ingle, 75

 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996)). “There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for

 the judgment entered.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,

 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). Only well-pleaded facts, not conclusions of law, are presumed

 to be true. Id. Default judgment “should not be granted on the claim, without more,

 that the defendant had failed to meet a procedural time requirement.” Mason &

 Hanger–Silas Mason Co., Inc. v. Metal Trades Council, 726 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1984).

        A defaulting defendant is deemed to admit all well-pleaded facts in the

 plaintiff's complaint, but not facts that are not well pled or conclusions of law.

 Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. Typically, damages are not awarded

 without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary

 facts. See United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). However,

 if the amount of damages can be determined with mathematical calculation by

 reference to the pleadings and supporting documents, a hearing is unnecessary.

 James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993).


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        Courts have developed a three-part analysis to determine whether to enter a

 default judgment against a defendant. United States v. 1998 Freightliner Vin #:

 1FUYCZYB3WP886986, 548 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (W.D. Tex. 2008). First, in

 assessing whether the entry of a default judgment is procedurally warranted, courts

 consider several factors, including: (1) whether material issues of fact are at issue;

 (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether the grounds for default

 are clearly established (4) whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or

 excusable neglect; (5) the harshness of a default judgment; and (6) whether the court

 would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion. Lindsey

 v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). Second, courts assess the

 substantive merit of the plaintiff’s pleadings to determine whether there is a sufficient

 factual basis for default judgment. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206

 (finding that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show it is entitled to relief).

 Third, courts determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. See

 1998 Freightliner, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 384.

                                      III. ANALYSIS

        As an initial matter, the undersigned must determine whether Southwest

 Marine properly served Valentine. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). Federal Rule of Civil

 Procedure 4(e)(1) describes the process for serving an individual. Unless federal law

 provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a

 person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a judicial district of the

 United States by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in
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 courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where

 service is made[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Thus, the Court looks to the Texas Rules

 of Civil Procedure to determine propriety of service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1).

       Here, the return of service documents establish that the summons and

 complaint were delivered on January 8, 2024, to “a co-resident over the age of 16” at

 Valentine’s Balch Springs address. (See Dkt. No. 5.) The return of service otherwise

 meets the requirements for effective service under Texas law. See Tex. R. Civ P. 106,

 107. Thus, Southwest Marine effectively served Valentine in accordance with both

 Federal and Texas law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b)(1). On the

 record before the Court, there is no evidence to rebut the recitations of service (Dkt.

 No. 5). See Primate Const., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994). Therefore,

 the undersigned finds that Southwest Marine properly served Valentine.

       Despite receiving proper service, the Court’s docket and record show that

 Valentine has not filed an answer or other responsive pleading “within 21 days after

 being served with the summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).

 Furthermore, Valentine’s only filing in this case constitutes neither an answer nor a

 responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Thus, the undersigned also

 finds that Valentine failed to timely plead or otherwise respond to the Complaint

 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Based

 on the foregoing, the Clerk’s entry of default against Valentine (Dkt. No. 7) was

 appropriate.


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 A. Default Judgment is Procedurally Warranted.

        Based on the Lindsey factors, Defendant's motion for default judgment is

 procedurally warranted. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. First, there are “no material

 issues of fact in dispute,” as Valentine failed to answer the Complaint or otherwise

 appear before the Court. Second, Valentine’s failure to respond threatens to

 prejudice Southwest Marine’s interests. Third, the grounds for default are clearly

 established given that Southwest Marine served Valentine with the Complaint, and

 Valentine has failed to answer or otherwise defend despite being given warnings

 from this Court that failure to respond could result in default judgment against her.

 Fourth, there is no evidence before the Court to indicate that Valentine’s silence is

 the result of a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” Fifth, entry of a default

 judgment against Valentine will not be unusually harsh as Southwest Marine only

 seeks the relief to which it is entitled for the losses incurred by its insured, My

 Community. Finally, the Court is not aware of any facts that would obligate the

 Court to set aside the default if challenged by Valentine. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at

 893.

 B. Default Judgment is Substantively Warranted.

        Where, as here, a default has been entered under Rule 55, “the factual

 allegations of the complaint are taken as true.” Pathway Senior Living LLC v. Pathways

 Senior Living LLC, No. 3:15-CV-02607-M, 2016 WL 1059536, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar.

 17, 2016). Valentine, by her default, is deemed to have admitted the well-pleaded

 allegations in Southwest Marine’s Complaint. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at

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 1206 (citing Ohio Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cent. Trust Co. of N.Y., 133 U.S. 83 (1889)). A

 default judgment is unassailable on the merits but only as to the well-pleaded

 allegations that are assumed to be true. Id. As such, the Court must review the

 pleadings to determine whether they provide a sufficient basis for Southwest

 Marine’s claims for relief. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.

        In conducting this analysis, courts look to the pleading requirements set out in

 Rule 8(a)(2). See Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 497 (5th Cir.

 2015). Factual allegations in the complaint need only “be enough to raise a right to

 relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the

 complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Wooten, 788 F.3d at 497 (quoting Bell

 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pleading must present “more

 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” but “detailed

 factual allegations” are not required. Wooten, 788 F.3d at 497 (quoting Ashcroft v.

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

        This “low threshold” is less rigorous than that under Rule 12(b)(6). Wooten,

 788 F.3d at 498. Recognizing that “a defendant must invoke Rule 12 in order to

 avail itself of that Rule's protections, [while] a default is the product of a defendant’s

 inaction,” the Fifth Circuit has “decline[d] to import Rule 12 standards into the

 default-judgment context.” Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498 n.3.

        1. Default judgment is appropriate for Southwest Marine’s fraud claim.

        For common law fraud, Plaintiff must show “(1) a material misrepresentation;

 (2) that is false; (3) made with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to its truth;
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 (4) made with the intention that it should be acted upon by another party; (5) relied

 upon by the other party; and (6) causing injury.” Flaherty & Crumrine Income Fund,

 Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 212-13 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (discussing

 Texas law). But “[i]n federal court, fraud claims must also satisfy the heightened

 pleading standard set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).” Edge Adhesives,

 Inc. v. Sharpe Concepts, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-405-O, 2015 WL 12743618, at *3-4 (N.D.

 Tex. Aug. 31, 2015) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging

 fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

 fraud or mistake.”). The Fifth Circuit interprets Rule 9(b) to require, at minimum

 “specificity as to the statements (or omissions) considered to be fraudulent, the

 speaker, when and why the statements were made, and an explanation of why they

 were fraudulent.” Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005); see also

 Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 9(b) requires

 “‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ to be laid out”) (citations omitted).

       Southwest Marine’s Complaint alleges fraud and states that Valentine

 represented to My Community that the Credit Card charges, and the subsequent

 repayments were legitimate transactions, but her representations were false because

 she was operating a kiting scheme to misappropriate funds with no intention of

 repayment. (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 27.) The Complaint further alleges that Valentine’s

 misrepresentations regarding the legitimacy of the charges and the purported

 repayments returned due to insufficient funds were made with the intent to mislead

 My Community so that Valentine could continue to charge the Credit Card and
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 misappropriate additional funds from My Community. (Id. ¶ 28.) Finally, the

 Complaint alleges that My Community reasonably relied upon Valentine’s false

 representations to its detriment, suffering a loss in the principal amount of

 $59,228.69. (Id. ¶ 29, 31.)

       The Affidavit of Dawn Sedgwick (“Sedgwick Aff.”) (Dkt. No. 11-2), offered

 by Southwest Marine in support of the motion, provides additional factual support

 for Southwest Marine’s fraud claim. For example, Sedgewick, a Senior Examiner in

 the Subrogation Department for Southwest Marine, stated that she “personally

 investigated and confirmed the allegations” stated in the Complaint. (See Sedgwick

 Aff. ¶ 3.) Her affidavit further states that My Community, a financial institution

 existing under the laws of Texas, issued Valentine a credit card account ending in

 6869 with a $3,400.00 credit limit. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Sedgewick also outlined the

 particulars of the kiting scheme, explaining that, between February 7, 2022, and

 September 26, 2022, Valentine repeatedly made charges on the Credit Card to VTE

 and other companies and then purported to make payments through Venmo and

 other sources in order to permit new charges, but those payments eventually would

 be returned due to insufficient funds. (Id. ¶¶ 7-10.) According to Sedgewick,

 Valentine did this on 34 separate occasions until January 3, 2023, when her scheme

 was discovered during a review of delinquent accounts. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.)

       These allegations meet the requisite standard to plead a claim for fraud, as

 they detail “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraud. See Williams, 112


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 F.3d at 179. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Southwest Marine pleaded

 Valentine’s fraudulent representations with the requisite specificity.

        2. Default judgment is appropriate for Southwest Marine’s conversion
           claim.

        Southwest Marine’s conversion claim against Valentine is also adequately

 pleaded. Texas law defines conversion as the “unauthorized and wrongful

 assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of

 another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner's rights[.]” Hyde & Hyde,

 Inc. v. Mount Franklin Foods, L.L.C., 523 F. App’x 301, 304 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting

 Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. 1971)). “The plaintiff must

 prove that: (1) he legally possessed the property or was entitled to it; (2) the

 defendant wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the property, excluding

 the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff demanded the property’s return; and (4) the defendant

 refused.” Id. (quoting Arthur W. Tifford, PA v. Tandem Energy Corp., 562 F.3d 699,

 705 (5th Cir. 2009)). Those elements are established here.

        Southwest Marine alleges that: (1) My Community was the rightful possessor

 and owner of funds used by Valentine to make credit card purchases; (2) Valentine

 had no right to take or to possess My Community’s funds and deprived My

 Community of its rightful possession and ownership of its funds; (3) My Community

 demanded return of the funds; and (4) Valentine refused to return the funds to My

 Community or to Southwest Marine. (Compl. ¶¶ 33-36.) Valentine has not


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 appeared to dispute these elements. Therefore, Southwest Marine has stated a claim

 for conversion of funds belonging to My Community.

        3. Default judgment is appropriate for Southwest Marine’s unjust
           enrichment claim.

        “Under Texas law an unjust enrichment claim requires showing that one party

 ‘has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue

 advantage.’” Digital Drilling Data, Systems, L.L.C. v. Petrolink Services, Inc., 965 F.3d

 365, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832

 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)). Furthermore, “some observers . . . have suggested

 Texas law actually recognizes two theories or species of unjust enrichment: one for

 passive receipt of a benefit that would be unconscionable to retain, and another for

 wrongfully securing a benefit.” Advarra Tech. Sols., Inc. v. N. Tex. Clinical Trials, LLC,

 No. 4:22-CV-001049-O, 2023 WL 6219411, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2023), adopted,

 2023 WL 6217744 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2023) (quoting Digital Drilling Data, Systems,

 965 F.3d at 38); see also U.S. for Use of M-Co Constr., Inc. v. Shipco General, Inc., 814

 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987).

        Southwest Marine’s unjust enrichment pleadings satisfy Rule 8(a)’s pleading

 requirements. The Complaint alleges unjust enrichment and states facts showing

 that Valentine: (1) obtained a benefit from My Community in an amount no less

 than $59,228.69; (2) Valentine’s retention of such benefits without disgorgement

 violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience; (3)

 despite demand, Valentine has not returned the funds to My Community or


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 Southwest Marine; and (4) as a result of Valentine’s unjust enrichment, My

 Community, and thus Southwest Marine, suffered a loss in the principal amount of

 $59,228.69.

       The Affidavit of Ms. Sedgwick avers that Valentine repeatedly made charges

 to the Credit Card and initiated payments through Venmo and other sources to

 reduce or eliminate the credit card balance to once again permit new charges; but

 those payments were later returned due to insufficient funds. (See Sedgewick Aff. ¶¶

 7-10.) Further, Valentine did this on 34 separate occasions between February 7,

 2022, and September 26, 2022, until a review of delinquent accounts by My

 Community exposed her scheme on January 3, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 11, 12.)

 Therefore, Southwest Marine has sufficiently pleaded its unjust enrichment claim.

 C. Southwest Marine is entitled to $59,228.69 in damages.

       Having concluded default judgment is proper, the undersigned must now

 “determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive.” Morelia, 126 F.

 Supp. 3d at 814. This is the only step in the inquiry where the Court does not

 assume the pleadings’ truth. See, e.g., Advarra, 2023 WL 6219411, at *2; Shipco, 814

 F.2d at 1014 (“After a default judgment, the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual

 allegations are taken as true, except regarding damages.”). Thus, a plaintiff cannot

 summarily provide the Court with figures for damages or attorney's fees without

 explanation. Rather, it must “establish[ ] the necessary facts,” either through

 detailed affidavits or an evidentiary hearing, to make the amount “capable of

 mathematical calculation.” United Artists, 605 F.2d at 857. Although Southwest

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 Marine initially sought compensatory damages in the amount of $59,228.69, plus

 punitive damages, interest, costs of suit, and attorneys’ fees (Compl. at 6), it now

 seeks only the principal amount of $59,228.69 (Dkt. No. 11 at ¶ 15; Sedgewick Aff.

 at ¶ 25) and waives its request for punitive damages (Sedgewick Aff. at ¶ 26 (Dkt.

 No. 11 at ¶ 16). Moreover, no other costs, including attorneys’ fees are requested in

 the motion. (See Dkt. No. 11.)

       Accordingly, damages in this matter are mathematically ascertainable without

 a hearing, amounting to $59,228.69 plus post-judgment interest at the federal rate

 from the date of judgment until it is paid. This figure represents the principal due to

 Southwest Marine by Valentine. (Sedgewick Aff. at ¶ 25.)

       The Court also finds Valentine is neither an infant, incompetent, or entitled to

 relief under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 3901 (formerly

 cited as 50 App. U.S.C. § 501); Sedgewick Aff. at ¶ 26.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

       For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Southwest Marine’s

 motion for default judgment (Dkt. No. 11) be GRANTED, and DEFAULT

 JUDGMENT be ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff Southwest Marine & General

 Insurance Company (“Southwest Marine”), as assignee and subrogee of My

 Community Credit Union, against Defendant Tammion Valentine, consistent with

 these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation.


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       The undesigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Southwest Marine’s

 motion to dismiss Defendant Valentine Travel Express, LLC (Dkt. No. 13), be

 GRANTED, and Southwest Marine’s claims against Defendant Valentine Travel

 Express, LLC, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

       SO RECOMMENDED on October 4, 2024.


                                   __________________________________
                                   BRIAN McKAY
                                   UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


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