WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited — Entry #886

Case: WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited cand · 4:19-cv-07123

filed October 29, 2019

What this document is

Docket entry #886 · filed October 30, 2026

Who is involved

Bill Marczak
Francisco Partners LP
Josh Shaner
King & Spalding LLP
Meta Platforms, Inc.
NSO Group Technologies Limited
Q Cyber Technologies Limited
Terry Divittorio
The Citizen Lab
United States Department of Justice
Westbridge Technologies, Inc.
WhatsApp Inc.

Why we have it

We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:

Nebius: its former name “Yandex N.V.” appears in a filing in this case.
….8 11 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., No. C 12-1521-WHA,…

A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 11, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.

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Case 4:19-cv-07123-PJH Document 886 Filed 10/30/26 Page 1 of 27 PageID
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1 Juan O. Perla (appearance pro hac vice)
Turner Smith (appearance pro hac vice)
2 David V. Holmes (appearance pro hac vice)
CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,
3 COLT & MOSLE LLP
4 101 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10178
5 Tel: (212) 696-6084
jperla@curtis.com
6 tsmith@curtis.com
dholmes@curtis.com
7

8
Jerrold L. Bregman (SBN 149896)
9 BG LAW LLP
21650 Oxnard Street, Suite 500
10 Woodland Hills, CA 91367
Tel: (818) 827-9101
11
Fax: (818) 827-9099
12 jbregman@bg.law

13 Attorneys for Defendants
NSO Group Technologies Limited
14 and Q Cyber Technologies Limited
15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
17 OAKLAND DIVISION
18
19 WHATSAPP LLC and Case No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH
META PLATFORMS, INC.,
20 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
Plaintiffs, ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER
21

22 v.

23 NSO GROUP TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED Judge: Hon. Phyllis J. Hamilton
and Q CYBER TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED, Action Filed: October 29, 2019
24
Defendants.
25

28
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER CASE NO. 4:19-CV-07123-PJH

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
3

4 NOTICE OF MOTION ....................................................................................................................1

5 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND RELIEF SOUGHT ............................................................1

6 STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ........................................................................................2

7 A. Plaintiffs’ Expansive Post-Judgment Discovery Requests Into
Worldwide Assets of Non-Debtors and Defendants’ Efforts to
8 Reach a Negotiated Resolution of those Requests .......................................2
9 B. Plaintiffs’ Sudden Refusal to Narrow their Requests and Further
10 Attempts to Expand Post-Judgment Discovery Beyond the Scope
of Rule 69 Through Corporate Depositions .................................................4
11
C. Plaintiffs Issue a Subpoena to a Non-Debtor Before the Court Has
12 Resolved the Pending Discovery Issues ......................................................8
13 LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................................9
14 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................10
15
I. Plaintiffs’ Requests Must Be Reasonably Limited under Federal Rules 69
16 and 26 .....................................................................................................................11

17 A. Discovery of Assets and Financial Affairs of Non-debtors Is
Improper Absent a Heightened Showing of Relevance .............................11
18
B. The Requests Lack Any Reasonable Geographic Scope ...........................14
19
C. The Requests Lack a Reasonable Threshold Amount ...............................16
20
D. The Relevant Time Period Extends Too Far Back ....................................16
21

22 II. Any Deposition Must Be Similarly Limited Whether Under Rule 30(b)(6)
or 30(b)(1) ..............................................................................................................17
23
A. Plaintiffs May Not Reach a Foreign Deponent’s Knowledge of
24 Their Personal Affairs or the Affairs of Other Non-Parties Without
Serving Them Under the Hague Convention .............................................17
25
B. Plaintiffs May Not Inquire Into Injunction-Related Topics under
26 Rule 69 or Based on a Failed Contempt Motion........................................19
27
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CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................21
1

18
19

27
ii
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
2
Beautyko LLC v. Amazon Fulfillment Servs.,
3
Case No. C16-355 RSM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64746
4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 2018) ............................................................................................... 12, 13

5 Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Spain,
Civil Action No. 20-817 (JDB), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137920 (D.D.C. June 22, 2026) ...... 10
6
Crews v. Sun Sols. AZ LLC,
7 No. CV-23-01589-PHX-DWL, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161328 (D. Ariz. Sep. 9, 2024) ........ 10
8 Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp.,
9 C18-1360 TSZ, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154109 (W. D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2021) ...................... 16

10 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc.,
286 F.R.D. 288 (E.D. Va. 2012) ............................................................................................... 10
11
EM Ltd. v. Argentina,
12 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................... 15
13 GMA Acc. v. Elec. Wonderland, Inc.,
14 07 Civ. 3219 (PKC) (DF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72897 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) .............. 12

15 Gubarev v. BuzzFeed, Inc.,
No. 17-cv-60426, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216713 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2017) .......................... 18
16
In re 3M Combat Arms Earplug Prod. Liab. Litig.,
17 No. 3:19-md-2885, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173730 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2020) ....................... 17
18 In re Baycol Prods. Litig.,
348 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Minn. 2004) ..................................................................................... 18
19

20 In re Uber Techs., Inc.,
Case No. 23-md-03084, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123530 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2024) .......... 10, 14
21
InfusAID LLC v. InfuSystem Inc.,
22 Case No. 17-2243-CM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17051 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2018) ......................... 5
23 Insulet Corp. v. Eoflow Co., Ltd.,
Civil Action No. 23-11780-FDS, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87095
24 (D. Mass. May 6, 2025)............................................................................................................. 20
25
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways,
26 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................. 10

27
iii
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McCarthy v. Johnson,
1 Case No. 21-mc-4 (GMH), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139094 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2022) ............ 17
2
Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., LLC,
3 3:06-CV-0056-PMP (VPC), 2009 LX 91811 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2009) ................................ 5, 10

4 Nichols v. Credit Union 1,
Case No. 2:17-cv-02337-APG-GWF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241626 (. Nev. July 26, 2019) 10
5
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
6 No. C 12-80185 JSW (MEJ), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24010
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013) .......................................................................................................... 12
7

8 Reebok Int’l v. McLaughlin,
49 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) ..................................................................................................... 15
9
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,
10 573 U.S. 134 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 10, 15
11 Trendsettah U.S. v. Swisher Int’l,
SA CV 14-01664-JVS (DFMx), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239951
12
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021) ......................................................................................................... 12
13
Tulip Computs. Int’l B.V. v. Dell Comput. Corp.,
14 254 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Del. 2003) .......................................................................................... 17

15 Uniden Corp. of Am. v. Duce Trading Co.,
89-CV-0878E, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10441 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 1993) ............................... 12
16
Statutes
17
28 U.S.C. § 1963 ........................................................................................................................... 15
18
19 Rules

20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 .......................................................................................................................... 10

21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)........................................................................................................... 11, 16

22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) ................................................................................................................... 9
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1)............................................................................................................. 8, 18
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)............................................................................................................. 6, 18
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a) ..................................................................................................................... 16
26
Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 ................................................................................................................... passim
27
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Treaties
1
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
2
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (entered into force Oct.
3 7, 1972).................................................................................................................................. 1, 20

4 Other Authorities

5 Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law (Isr. 1958) ........................................................................ 15
6 Protection of Privacy Law 5741 (Isr. 1981).................................................................................... 5
7

18
19

27
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1 NOTICE OF MOTION
2 TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants NSO Group Technologies Limited (“NSO”)
4 and Q Cyber Technologies Limited (“Q Cyber” and, collectively with NSO, “Defendants”) hereby
5 move for entry of a protective order (the “Motion”) in the form filed concurrently herewith (the
6 “Proposed Protective Order”). The Motion is based on the below Points and Authorities; the
7 Declaration of Juan O. Perla and exhibits; and the records on file in this case.
8 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND RELIEF SOUGHT
9 Plaintiffs seek to engage in an unjustified and disproportional examination of the
10 worldwide assets and financial affairs of countless non-debtors going back years before any
11 judgment was entered, without even attempting to satisfy the requisite heightened showing of
12 relevance that this information is likely to lead to executable assets of Defendants, the only
13 judgment debtors in this case, as required under Federal Rules 69 and 26. Even the requests for
14 information regarding Defendants’ assets lack any appropriate geographic, amount or time period
15 limitations, reaching further than is reasonably, relevant and proportional for the needs of the case.
16 Despite Defendants’ good faith efforts to provide more documents and information than is
17 warranted to meet the needs of the case, Plaintiffs continue to press ahead with more post-judgment
18 discovery demands including two deposition notices directed to Defendants, seeking to cover
19 topics that suffer from the same over-breadth, irrelevance and disproportionality. The same
20 limitations should apply to those depositions. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have issued and served the
21 notices only on Defendants, naming a specific corporate witness that resides abroad and is not a
22 party in this action. Accordingly, any deposition of a foreign corporate witness may not properly
23 reach knowledge of personal affairs or the affairs of other non-parties without first complying with
24 the compulsory procedures under the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
25 Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
26 7444 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1972).
27

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER CASE NO. 4:19-CV-07123-PJH

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1 Given Plaintiffs’ insistence on enforcing their overly broad, disproportional requests as

2 written, Defendants need this Court to set the proper boundaries of post-judgment discovery.

3 Accordingly, Defendants ask the Court to enter the Proposed Protective Order.

4 STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

5 On November 12, 2025, this Court entered judgment for Plaintiffs in the amount of

6 $4,447,190, Dkt. No. 810, as well as a permanent injunction, Dkt No. 809. On January 30, 2026,

7 the Court awarded Plaintiffs $15,914,095 in attorneys’ fees. Dkt. No. 835. Defendants timely

8 appealed the judgment, the injunction and award of attorneys’ fees to the U.S. Court of Appeals

9 for the Ninth Circuit. Those appeals have been fully briefed and are currently being considered

10 for oral arguments as early as February 2027. Plaintiffs have not requested leave for good cause

11 to register and enforce any judgment outside the Northern District of California, as would be

12 required under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 pending appeal.

13 A. Plaintiffs’ Expansive Post-Judgment Discovery Requests Into Worldwide Assets

14 of Non-Debtors and Defendants’ Efforts to Reach a Negotiated Resolution of those

15 Requests

16 On March 4, 2026, Plaintiffs served their First Set of Requests for Production of

17 Documents in Aid of Judgment (the “RFPs,” Dkt. No. 870-1) and Plaintiffs’ First Set of

18 Interrogatories in Aid of Judgment (the “Interrogatories,” Dkt. No. 870-2, collectively with the

19 RFPs, the “Requests”). The Requests sought expansive discovery far beyond any executable assets

20 of the judgment debtors, sweeping back three years before entry of judgment and reaching deep

21 into the worldwide assets and finances (above $5,000) of countless entities and individuals—from

22 ultimate beneficial owners down to the clerical staff—none of whom are judgment debtors.1

23 1
See, e.g., “You” and “Your,” Dkt. Nos. 870-1—870-2 at 2 (defining “You,” and “Your” to mean
24 “NSO Group Technologies Limited and Q Cyber Technologies Limited, as well as their affiliates,
predecessors, parents, subsidiaries, divisions, officers, employees, agents, principals, beneficial
25 owners, and attorneys, and each Person acting or purporting to act on their behalf or under their
control” (emphasis added)); “Affiliate,” Dkt. No. 870-1 at 1 (defining “Affiliate” to mean “with
26
respect to any person or entity, any other person that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled
27 by, or is under common control with such person or entity” and defining “control” as “the power
28
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1 After an agreed-upon 30-day extension, on May 4, 2026, Defendants timely served their

2 responses and objections (“Responses”) to the Requests. Dkt. Nos. 870-3—870-4. Defendants’

3 Responses set forth general and specific objections, and subject to those objections, also provided

4 substantive answers with respect to Defendants’ assets in the United States as of December 12,

5 2025, the date any judgment first became enforceable.

6 Within days, at Plaintiffs’ request, counsel for the parties met and conferred. From the

7 start, Plaintiffs stated their desire to go directly to the Court with what they viewed as three

8 “threshold issues”: (i) geographic scope; (ii) temporal scope; and (iii) Interrogatory No. 10 and

9 RFP No. 7. See Dkt. No. 870-8 at 1-2. Although Plaintiffs took the position that nothing less than

10 what they asked for in the Requests would be sufficient without first bringing the supposed

11 “threshold issues” to the Court, Defendants developed a proposal in an effort to avoid burdening

12 the Court unnecessarily. And their efforts proved fruitful. Based on Defendants’ proposal,

13 Plaintiffs agreed that a response to Interrogatory No. 10 would eliminate the need to respond to

14 RFP No. 7—resolving one of the “threshold issues.” Specifically, Defendants agreed to identify

15 any person(s) with authority to transfer funds or sign checks on behalf of, or contractually bind,

16 Defendants, excluding anyone with authority to do those things in the ordinary course of business

17 not exceeding $150,000 annually, starting as of May 6, 2025, i.e., the date the jury returned its

18 damages verdict. See Dkt. No. 870-6 at 6. Defendants promptly provided that information.

19 Defendants also proposed to supplement their responses to the Interrogatories and, to the

20 extent applicable, the RFPs with respect to any jurisdictions outside of Israel and Luxembourg

21 where assets owned by defendants—exceeding a total of $150,000—are located, as of May 6,

22 2025. This proposal should have resolved the threshold issues because it was undisputed that

23 execution of a foreign judgment is not permitted in Israel or Luxembourg pending appeal.

24 Plaintiffs initially rejected that proposal, without offering any alternatives, but after further

25
to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of such person or entity, directly or
26 indirectly, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise”
27 (emphasis added)).

28
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1 outreach by Defendants, Plaintiffs finally proposed a narrower set of requests focusing on four

2 specific categories of production in line with what Defendants had originally suggested. On May

3 22, the parties conferred again. Dkt No. 853 at 1. In a spirit of cooperation and to avoid burdening

4 the Court unnecessarily, Defendants agreed to provide the information for Plaintiffs’ four specific

5 categories. To implement that agreement, the parties entered into a stipulation on June 4 providing

6 for the production of numerous documents and supplemental responses (Dkt. Nos. 870-5—870-

7 6), while “negotiations continue as to the remaining scope of the Post-Judgment Discovery.” Dkt.

8 No. 853.

9 Pursuant to that stipulation, Defendants produced significant documents including (i) their

10 audited financial statements for 2023 and 2024, (ii) an organizational chart showing the ownership

11 chain of all subsidiaries and affiliates of Defendants, and (iii) information about financial accounts

12 worldwide, in addition to certified disclosures about (a) outgoing transfers of assets above

13 $100,000 since January 9, 2023, and (b) authorized signatories. Dkt. Nos. 853; 870-5—870-6.

14 Defendants also agreed to produce their audited financial statements for 2025 once finalized on a

15 reasonable schedule. Dkt. No. 853 ¶ 2. The June 4 Stipulation showed that the parties were

16 capable of narrowing the Requests to achieve a reasonable compromise through the meet and

17 confer process.

18 B. Plaintiffs’ Sudden Refusal to Narrow their Requests and Further Attempts to

19 Expand Post-Judgment Discovery Beyond the Scope of Rule 69 Through

20 Corporate Depositions

21 On June 5, Plaintiffs sent Defendants an “agenda” for a “meet and confer on the balance

22 of Plaintiffs’ March 4 requests.” Dkt. No. 870-9. On June 8, Plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt

23 for alleged violations of the injunction. Dkt. No. 854.

24 At a meet and confer on June 16, Plaintiffs expressed willingness to consider a written

25 response to their agenda regarding asset discovery on the premise that the parties could reach

26 agreement on eliminating or narrowing specific requests (as had been done with Interrogatory No.

27 10 and RFP No. 7, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 870-8 at 1). Dkt. No. 870-10. Defendants sent a proposal

28
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1 on June 23. The proposal included an offer to produce (i) Defendants’ corporate formation

2 documents and any shareholder agreements that are or were in effect as of January 9, 2023; (ii)

3 documents sufficient to show any liens or other security interests on Defendants’ assets; (iii)

4 Defendants’ corporate income tax returns for 2023 and 2024; (iv) documents sufficient to show

5 payments, distributions and other compensation to officers and equity holders, such as members,

6 starting as of May 6, 2025, on an anonymous basis in accordance with Israel’s Protection of Privacy

7 Law 5741 (1981); and (v) board minutes, or written offers or presentations to third parties,

8 indicating a valuation of Defendants’ total enterprise value or any of their assets above $150,000

9 starting as of May 6, 2025, to the extent any exist. Dkt. No. 870-7. In addition to protecting the

10 identity of non-party officers and equity holders through redactions in accordance with the Israeli

11 privacy law, Defendants’ proposal maintained its objection that information about the assets and

12 financial affairs of non-debtors, such as loan and credit agreements, was not relevant and was

13 disproportional to the needs of the case given that Plaintiffs had not even attempted to make the

14 requisite heightened showing of relevance for why they needed that information.

15 Defendants expected to negotiate that proposal during a videoconference on June 26, but

16 Defendants were surprised to learn, however, that Plaintiffs were no longer willing to engage in

17 any discussion about narrowing the scope of their Requests. Dkt. No. 870-10. Plaintiffs, in fact,

18 rejected the very idea of compromise, insisting that Defendants make a series of concessions

19 (steadily eroding their valid objections), while Plaintiffs refused to narrow their existing requests

20 as would be expected of any requesting party in the meet-and-confer process. Dkt. No. 870 at n.3.2

23 2
See, e.g., InfusAID LLC v. InfuSystem Inc., Case No. 17-2243-CM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17051,
at *4-14 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2018) (ordering parties “to meaningfully confer to narrow the scope of
24
these discovery requests” before documents were produced where “plaintiff did little more than
25 demand full compliance”); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., LLC, 3:06-CV-0056-PMP (VPC),
2009 LX 91811, at *5-6, *9 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2009) (narrowing requested discovery at the “initial”
26 stage of post-judgment proceedings without prejudice to plaintiffs’ ability to “renew his request”
27 later if warranted).

28
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1 By June 29, the motion for contempt was fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 863-64. The Court

2 ordered that a hearing on the motion for contempt would take place on August 20. Dkt. No. 865.

3 On July 23, Plaintiffs served Defendants with a notice of deposition under Federal Rule

4 30(b)(6) (the “30(b)(6) Notice”). Dkt. No. 881-1. The notice included broad topics seeking

5 information covered by Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ Requests including further intrusive

6 discovery into the assets and financial affairs of non-debtors, for instance, information regarding

7 (i) receivables or other debts owed to entities in and outside of Defendants’ corporate group and;

8 (ii) transactions between other entities that would not necessarily include Defendants.3 Id. The

9 notice also included topics that fall outside the plain terms of Federal Rule 69, namely topics

10 relating to the injunction and Plaintiffs’ then pending contempt motion.

11 Meanwhile, Defendants continued their good faith efforts to engage with Plaintiffs, and the

12 parties almost executed a second stipulation for a supplemental production based on Plaintiffs’

13 own “agenda” on “the balance of Plaintiffs’ March 4 requests,” but those efforts were inexplicably

14 scuttled when Plaintiffs forced the filing of a joint letter late on Friday, July 31—Shabbat in

15 Israel—without giving Defendants an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ last-minute demands.

16 Dkt. No. 870-13 at 2-4; see also Dkt. No. 870-12. In that letter, Defendants explained the need for

17 a heightened showing of relevance before Plaintiffs can obtain information regarding non-parties

18 and their assets. Dkt. No. 870 at 4. Plaintiffs argued that “[c]ourts only require a threshold showing

19 of necessity and relevance when post-judgment discovery is sought from a non-party,” not from

20 Defendants. Id. at 2.

22 3
See, e.g., “You” and “Yours,” Dkt. No. 881-1 at 2 (defining “You” and “Yours” to mean “NSO
23 Group Technologies Limited and Q Cyber Technologies Limited, as well as their predecessors,
parents, subsidiaries, divisions, officers, employees, agents, principals, beneficial owners, and
24
attorneys, and each Person acting or purporting to act on their behalf or under their control”
25 (emphasis added)); “Defendants,” Dkt. No. 881-1 at 2 (defining “Defendants” to mean “NSO
Group Technologies Limited and Q Cyber Technologies Limited, as well as their current and
26 former directors, employees, subsidiaries, corporate parents, affiliates, agents, representatives,
27 and all other persons acting or purporting to act on their behalf” (emphasis added)).

28
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1 Even so, in an effort to narrow the issues before the Court, Defendants voluntarily produced

2 categories of documents identified in the unexecuted stipulation, including (i) their corporate

3 formation documents and (ii) existing liens on their assets, in addition to certified disclosures about

4 (i) shareholder agreements and (ii) board minutes or written offers to third parties indicating a

5 valuation of Defendants’ total enterprise value starting as of January 9, 2023. Defendants filed a

6 supplemental letter advising the Court of that development. Dkt. No. 873.4 After Defendants’

7 production, Plaintiffs filed their own supplemental letter summarizing the remaining issues

8 without making any efforts to narrow them. Dkt. No. 874.

9 While that joint letter was pending before the Court, the parties met and conferred on

10 August 13 regarding the 30(b)(6) Notice. Defendants informed Plaintiffs of their objections to the

11 topics, including the fact that any ruling on the issues raised in the July 31 letter would likely

12 resolve most of the objections to the deposition topics. Defendants further objected to any

13 injunction-related topics. Nevertheless, Defendants noted that a witness could be generally

14 available for deposition after October 4 (after summer travel and Jewish holidays), subject to any

15 forthcoming rulings by the Court regarding the scope of post-judgment discovery. Dkt. No. 881

16 at 4 n.3.

17 At the August 20 hearing, which was calendared to address Plaintiffs’ pending contempt

18 motion, the Court raised the issue of Rule 69 discovery and offered guidance on the three remaining

19 document issues: (i) loan and credit agreements, (ii) distributions and payments to officers and

20 equity holders, and (iii) valuation and identification of assets. Consistent with Defendants’ request

21 in the July 31 letter, the Court ordered “one last meet-and-confer on these three issues alone,” and

22 if the issues could not be resolved, a joint statement with the parties’ positions on whether a motion

24
4
25 Additionally, Defendants are ready to produce their corporate income tax returns from 2023 and
2024, which are in Hebrew, once Plaintiffs follow through with their commitment from months
26 ago to submit a stipulated protective order governing generative AI use to translate and review
27 confidential documents. Dkt. No. 873-1.

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1 to compel or a motion for protective order would be better to address those issues. August 20,

2 2026 Hearing Transcript (“Tr.”), Dkt. No. 878, 49:2-4; 51:3-13.

3 At that hearing, Plaintiffs suggested that Defendants “should be subject to discovery” to

4 show compliance with the injunction. Tr. 42:20-21. However, despite the Court permitting

5 additional briefing regarding “a path forward towards additional [contempt] proceedings” (Tr.

6 52:11-15), Plaintiffs did not request the Court’s authorization to take any discovery in connection

7 with their contempt motion. Dkt. No. 879. Plaintiffs instead requested an order to show cause

8 requiring Defendants to detail why “[they] should not be held in contempt.” Id. at 2.

9 Just three business days after the August 20 hearing, Plaintiffs served Defendants with a

10 notice of deposition under Federal Rule 30(b)(1) naming Akiva Rosner, CEO of NSO, as the

11 corporate witness (the “30(b)(1) Notice”). Dkt. No. 881-2.

12 Pursuant to the Court’s directives at the August 20 hearing, Defendants attended the court-

13 ordered meet and confer on September 3 with a good faith global proposal to resolve the three

14 remaining issues. Perhaps unsurprisingly given Plaintiffs’ expressed position going into the meet

15 and confer, Dkt. No. 881-3 at 1-2, Plaintiffs rejected the very concept of a global resolution before

16 even hearing the full proposal and further rejected each item independently. Plaintiffs offered no

17 counterproposal. Instead, they reverted to their baseline position that nothing less than what they

18 requested in their Requests as written would suffice and were laser focused on discussing the

19 deposition notices—a topic outside the items identified by the Court for that meet and confer. Dkt.

20 No. 881 at 4. On September 10, pursuant to the Court’s directive, the parties submitted a joint

21 status statement with their respective positions on the need for further briefing. Dkt. No. 881.

22 C. Plaintiffs Issue a Subpoena to a Non-Debtor Before the Court Has Resolved the

23 Pending Discovery Issues

24 On September 23, while the parties’ joint statement was still pending before the Court,

25 Plaintiffs issued a subpoena to non-party Hippocrene Ventures LLC, a Delaware entity. See Perla

26 Decl., Exhibit B. The subpoena seeks, among other things, information about Hippocrene’s assets

27 and its relationship and business dealing with other non-debtor non-parties. Upon receiving

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1 Plaintiffs’ notice of the subpoena, Defendants informed Plaintiffs of their objections to the

2 subpoena and requested a meet and confer to discuss a path forward. On October 8, the parties

3 met and conferred but were unable to achieve any resolution regarding the subpoena at that time.

4 In an effort to avoid burdening the Court with issues regarding the subpoena, Defendants

5 continued to engage with Plaintiffs to understand their reason for issuing the subpoena. In response

6 to Defendants’ inquiry, on October 23, Plaintiffs explained that, based on documents already

7 produced by Defendants, they understand that Hippocrene acquired certain secured creditor rights

8 in NSO-related entities and they believe a relationship may exist between Hippocrene and

9 Defendants. Plaintiffs wish to understand any flows of money between Hippocrene and

10 Defendants. While Defendants do not believe this is a sufficient heightened showing of relevance,

11 in a spirit of cooperation on October 28, Defendants committed to produce documents sufficient

12 to identify any notes issued to Hippocrene by or for the benefit of Defendants pursuant to which

13 any proceeds flow from Hippocrene directly to or for the benefit of Defendants in response to RFP

14 No. 6 in the March 4 Requests. Defendants made a production that same day.

15 Meanwhile, on October 16, the Court issued an order granting Defendants’ request for

16 further briefing on post-judgment discovery and setting a briefing schedule for “cross-motions” to

17 “resolve pending discovery issues.” Dkt. No. 885. The Court simultaneously denied Plaintiffs’

18 motion for contempt. Dkt. No. 884. The Court also denied Plaintiffs’ request for an order to show

19 cause, disposing of all pending proceedings regarding the contempt motion. Id. Pursuant to the

20 Court’s briefing order, Defendants now submit this motion for a protective order.

21 LEGAL STANDARD

22 The Court may issue a protective order under Rule 26(c) “to protect a party or person from

23 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

24 The Court may do so by, among other things, (1) “forbidding the disclosure or discovery”; (2)

25 “specifying terms . . . for the disclosure or discovery”; and (3) “forbidding inquiry into certain

26 matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

27 26(c)(1)(A)-(D). The Court may enter a protective order with respect to all forms of discovery,

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1 including depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, and subpoenas. See, e.g., Laker

2 Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (observing that a party

3 may challenge overly broad discovery requests through a motion for a protective order); Nichols

4 v. Credit Union 1, Case No. 2:17-cv-02337-APG-GWF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241626 at *6 (D.

5 Nev. July 26, 2019) (stating that an overly broad discovery request establishes good cause for a

6 protective order); see also In re Uber Techs., Inc., Case No. 23-md-03084-CRB (LJC), 2024 U.S.

7 Dist. LEXIS 123530, at *28-30 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2024) (granting defendant Uber’s motion for a

8 protective order from several subpoenas under Rule 26 on grounds that certain requests sought

9 confidential information and were overly broad, unnecessary, and disproportionate to the needs of

10 the case).

11 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

12 Discovery in aid of executing a money judgment under Federal Rule 69 has limitations

13 based on Federal Rule 26 and “other sources of law,” such as comity, that “bear on the propriety”

14 of “the nature and scope” of discovery requests. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573

15 U.S. 134, 146 n.6 (2014) (“NML Capital”). “[I]nformation that could not possibly lead to

16 executable assets is simply not ‘relevant’ to execution in the first place.” Id. at 144-45 (citing Fed.

17 R. Civ. P. 26). Courts thus properly require Rule 69 discovery to “be tailored to the specific

18 purpose of enabling a judgment creditor to discover assets upon which it can seek to execute. . . .”

19 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 286 F.R.D. 288, 292 (E.D. Va. 2012); see

20 also Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Spain, Civil Action No. 20-817 (JDB), 2026 U.S. Dist.

21 LEXIS 137920, at *4 (D.D.C. June 22, 2026) (Rule 69 discovery “must be capable of identifying

22 attachable assets”); Crews v. Sun Sols. AZ LLC, No. CV-23-01589-PHX-DWL, 2024 U.S. Dist.

23 LEXIS 161328, at *7-8 (D. Ariz. Sep. 9, 2024) (Rule 69 discovery may be “limit[ed] … on grounds

24 of relevance ... and proportionality”); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., LLC, 3:06-CV-0056-PMP

25 (VPC), 2009 LX 91811, at *5-6 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2009) (“The court has broad discretion to limit

26 [Rule 69] discovery.”).

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1 Plaintiffs seek discovery far beyond what is permissible or even contemplated under Rule

2 69. The Requests target information outside any relevant or reasonable scope based on entities

3 geography, amount, or time period. Despite Defendants’ good faith efforts in producing more

4 information than is necessary and accordingly narrowing the Requests based on “the needs of the

5 case,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), Plaintiffs keep returning with endless demands for more

6 information based on their overly broad, irrelevant and disproportional Requests as written.

7 Moreover, Plaintiffs have been insistent on obtaining information of non-debtor, non-parties

8 without even attempting to make the requisite heightened showing of relevance. Defendants thus

9 need a protective order not only with regards to the three categories of documents that are in

10 dispute, but globally across all of Plaintiffs’ Requests.

11 The protective order should also encompass the depositions noticed by Plaintiffs, which

12 seek equally overbroad and disproportionate information, including injunction-related topics that

13 are now foreclosed by this Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ contempt motion and that would in any case

14 fall outside the plain terms of Rule 69 itself.

15 I. Plaintiffs’ Requests Must Be Reasonably Limited under Federal Rules 69 and 26

16 A. Discovery of Assets and Financial Affairs of Non-debtors Is Improper Absent a

17 Heightened Showing of Relevance

18 Despite Plaintiffs’ contentions to the contrary, their Requests, and post-judgment discovery

19 efforts generally, clearly show that Plaintiffs are seeking unwarranted and improper discovery into

20 non-party assets. Defendants need a protective order that prevents Plaintiffs from engaging in a

21 broad and unreasonable fishing expedition into the assets of non-debtor non-parties, as this

22 amounts to undue burden and harassment of both Defendants and the non-parties.

23 Information regarding non-debtors’ assets—such as information about payments or

24 distributions to officers or equity holders, or information regarding Defendants’ debts and

25 liabilities—is irrelevant to identifying executable assets of Defendants, the only judgment debtors,

26 absent a heightened showing of “relevance – i.e., at least some demonstration of concealed or

27 fraudulent transfers or alter ego.” Uniden Corp. of Am. v. Duce Trading Co., 89-CV-0878E, 1993

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1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10441, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 1993); GMA Acc. v. Elec. Wonderland, Inc., 07

2 Civ. 3219 (PKC) (DF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72897, at *14-15, *22-25 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012)

3 (denying non-party discovery where plaintiff provided no reason to diverge from the “usual rule”

4 that post-judgment discovery against a non-party is only permitted to search for the judgment

5 debtor’s hidden assets). Courts in the Ninth Circuit including the Northern District of California

6 have adopted the same standard. See, e.g., Trendsettah U.S. v. Swisher Int’l, SA CV 14-01664-

7 JVS (DFMx), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239951, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021) (“[I]nquiry into

8 the assets and finances of the [non-party] is not permitted” absent a showing that “the relationship

9 between the judgment debtor and the non-party is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the

10 bona fides of the transfer of assets between them.”); Beautyko LLC v. Amazon Fulfillment Servs.,

11 Case No. C16-355 RSM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64746, at *6-7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 2018)

12 (permitting post-judgment discovery of non-party only upon a sufficient showing of commingling

13 of assets); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. C 12-80185 JSW (MEJ), 2013 U.S.

14 Dist. LEXIS 24010, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013) (“NML Capital II”) (denying discovery of

15 non-party assets as irrelevant and unnecessary after concluding that plaintiff failed to make

16 requisite showing of alter ego or fraudulent transfer).

17 As the district court in NML Capital II explained, “disclosure concerning the assets of a

18 non-party is generally not contemplated by Rule 69(a), and such discovery should only be

19 permitted when the relationship between the judgment debtor and the non-party is sufficient to

20 raise a reasonable doubt about the bona fides of the transfer of assets between them.” 2013 U.S.

21 Dist. LEXIS 24010, at *4-5 (internal quotations omitted). There, the plaintiff sought information

22 regarding non-debtor Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales S.A. (“YPF”) and argued that an alter ego

23 relationship existed between YPF and the Republic of Argentina. The court held that “[plaintiff’s]

24 allegations regarding YPF’s relationship to the Republic are insufficient as a matter of law to

25 overcome the presumption that YPF is a separate juridical entity for purposes of asset discovery

26 on an alter-ego theory.” Id. at *5. Inversely, in Beautyko, the court granted post-judgment

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1 discovery of information about nondebtors only after a heightened showing was made, including

2 evidence suggesting commingling of funds. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64746, at *6-7.

3 After multiple meet-and-confers and letters to the Court, Plaintiffs have yet to even attempt

4 to make such a showing. Instead, they have erroneously argued that a heightened showing is not

5 necessary when seeking discovery of non-party assets directly from Defendants as opposed to

6 seeking information directly from the non-party. Dkt. No. 870 at 2. In fact, in the July 31 joint

7 letter, Plaintiffs conceded that “[c]ourts only require a threshold showing of necessity and

8 relevance when post-judgment discovery is sought from a non-party.” Id. While Plaintiffs are

9 correct that a heightened showing is necessary when seeking information from a non-party, that

10 requirement is not limited to discovery from non-parties. In Beautyko, the court required the

11 heightened showing even though that case concerned requests for “the Judgment Debtors to

12 produce personal financial information of nondebtor[s].” 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64746, at *5; see

13 also NML Capital II, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24010, at *4-6 (denying information about non-

14 parties upon debtor’s motion). The key question is whether the information is about non-party

15 assets, not who possesses that information or objects to its production.

16 Despite making no heightened showing, Plaintiffs have remained focused on obtaining

17 non-party information, even going so far as refusing to accept documents with non-party

18 information redacted in accordance with Israeli privacy protection laws.5 Plaintiffs have insisted

19 that they need the names of non-parties to identify targets for enforcement. That, of course, is why

20 a heightened showing for discovery of non-party assets is critical. Defendants object to exposing

21 their uninvolved counterparties and employees to harassing discovery demands into their own

22 assets and finances, without the requisite showing by Plaintiffs. See In re Uber, 2024 U.S. Dist.

24 5
The Israel Protection of Privacy Law 5741 (1981) prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of
25 “personal data,” such as a name, and “data of special sensitivity,” including information about “a
person’s salary and financial activity.” See Exhibit A appended to the Declaration of Juan O. Perla
26 (“Perla Decl.”) at Sec. 3 (defining personal data and data of special sensitivity, subsection 10-11);
27 see, also e.g., Ex. A at Sec. 1, 2(7)-(9).

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1 LEXIS 123530, at *8-9, *12-13 (granting Defendant Uber’s request for protective order to bar

2 enforcement of overly broad and irrelevant requests directed towards its’ third-party vendor).

3 This is not a hypothetical concern. While this Court was considering further briefing on

4 these issues, Plaintiffs proceeded with exactly this type of non-party discovery by issuing a

5 subpoena on Hippocrene, a non-debtor non-party. The subpoena calls for, among other things,

6 information about (i) all of the non-party’s transfers or loan transactions “of any kind” “during the

7 relevant period[, dating back to January 1, 2025]” with various other non-parties, (ii) the non-

8 party’s communications with other non-parties including both specified individuals and “any

9 Person” relating to Defendants or the judgment in this action, and (iii) the non-party’s sources of

10 funding. Ex. B at 5-10. By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this post-judgment discovery request to

11 Hippocrene is where “[c]ourts [have required] a threshold showing of necessity and relevance.”

12 Dkt. No. 870 at 2. And yet Plaintiffs have made no more showing of any basis under Rule 69 to

13 pursue information about the affairs of those various other non-debtors than it has regarding the

14 affairs of Hippocrene. It is precisely this type of overbroad, irrelevant and harassing non-party

15 discovery—and its potential to expand indefinitely to encompass an increasing number of

16 Defendant’s business relationships—that must be carefully constrained under Rule 69.

17 It is important that this Court draw a line in the sand regarding the requirement to make the

18 requisite showing of relevance to justify seeking information about the assets and financial affairs

19 of non-parties before being permitted to obtain that information from Defendants or others.

20 Otherwise, Plaintiffs will continue to utilize this post-judgment discovery process to unduly harass

21 uninvolved nonparties and embarrass Defendants. Therefore, this Court should limit the Requests

22 to assets of Defendants, not their liabilities or debts to non-parties or other information about non-

23 parties (including information protected under Israel’s Privacy Protection law), unless Plaintiffs

24 have first made the requisite heightened showing to establish the need for that information.

25 B. The Requests Lack Any Reasonable Geographic Scope

26 Information regarding nonexecutable assets whether in or outside the United States is

27 simply irrelevant and disproportional. The Supreme Court in NML Capital made clear that “[i]f,

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1 . . ., [Plaintiffs’ Requests] had sought only ‘information that could not lead to executable assets in

2 the United States or abroad,’ then [Defendant] likely would be correct to say that the [Requests]

3 were unenforceable . . . because information that could not possibly lead to executable assets is

4 simply not ‘relevant’ to execution in the first place.” 573 U.S. at 144-145; see also EM Ltd. v.

5 Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting district court’s finding that

6 discovery into assets in Argentina would be “useless information” where “no Argentinian court”

7 would permit execution). Plaintiffs have yet to request this Court’s leave, let alone establish good

8 cause, to register and enforce the judgment outside of the Northern District of California pending

9 appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Nor could they. In a spirit of cooperation, Defendants voluntarily

10 disclosed that it has no assets in the United States other than two registered trademarks.

11 Plaintiffs now push for irrelevant discovery into jurisdictions where they could not enforce

12 this Court’s judgment pending appeal. It is undisputed that, under the laws of Israel, where

13 Defendants’ substantial assets are located, a foreign judgment is not enforceable until it “is no

14 longer appealable.” Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law, Section 3.2 (Isr. 1958).6 The laws of

15 Luxembourg, where Defendants’ ultimate parent is incorporated, are similar. See Reebok Int’l v.

16 McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that “[u]nless recognized by the

17 Luxembourg government, foreign judgments do not have any force in that country”). The appeals

18 in this case are still pending. The judgment is therefore unenforceable in either Israel or

19 Luxembourg and discovery into assets in those jurisdictions is irrelevant and disproportionate to

20 the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery… considering…

21 whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). Thus

22 discovery should be limited to assets in the United States, or, at the very least, to assets outside of

23 Israel or Luxembourg.

24 6
See also Enforcement of Judgments 2026: Israel, Chambers and Partners,
25 https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/enforcement-of-judgments-2026/israel (last
visited Oct. 30, 2026) (explaining that one of the conditions specified in the Enforcement of
26 Foreign Judgments Law for enforcing a foreign judgment in Israel is that “the judgment is
27 unappealable”).

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1 C. The Requests Lack a Reasonable Threshold Amount

2 None of Plaintiffs’ Requests, except Interrogatory No. 8, provides a threshold amount. This

3 is unreasonable. Given that this case involves a total judgment of more than $20 million, such

4 expansive Requests, which could capture large amounts of irrelevant information, is

5 disproportionate to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (proportionality should be

6 assessed in light of “the amount in controversy”). Even Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 8 sets an

7 absurdly low threshold amount of $5,000 for transfers of assets. Dkt. No. 870-2 at 5. Plaintiffs

8 already acknowledged that this threshold amount is far too low as they accepted a stipulated

9 production of information identifying “all transfers of assets . . . above $100,000.” See Dkt. No.

10 853 at 1. Plaintiffs also accepted the identification of authorized signatories for Interrogatory No.

11 10, excluding “anyone with authority to do those things in the ordinary course of business not

12 exceeding $150,000 annually.” See 870-6 at 6. Those higher threshold amounts are more

13 reasonable. This Court should therefore grant a protective order limiting Plaintiffs’ Requests to a

14 threshold amount of $150,000, or at the very least, any amounts exceeding $100,000.

15 D. The Relevant Time Period Extends Too Far Back

16 In addition to the overly broad geographic, amount, and entity-based scope of the Requests,

17 Plaintiffs also request discovery dating as far back as January 9, 2023, years before a judgment

18 was ever issued in this case. Information before an award of damages becomes enforceable is

19 irrelevant and disproportional. See Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., C18-1360 TSZ,

20 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154109, at *21 (W. D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2021) (setting the “date of the

21 [Arbitral] Award” as the start date for post-judgment discovery). Plaintiffs did not obtain a money

22 judgment until November 12, 2025, and the judgment was not enforceable until after the automatic

23 30-day stay provided for under Federal Rule 62(a). Therefore, a more reasonable time period for

24 post-judgment discovery should start December 12, 2025, or at the earliest on May 6, 2025, when

25 the jury returned a damages verdict.

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1 II. Any Deposition Must Be Similarly Limited Whether Under Rule 30(b)(6) or 30(b)(1)

2 Plaintiffs should not be permitted to inquire into deposition topics that are outside the scope

3 of permissible Rule 69 discovery as set forth above. Any narrowing of the scope of the Requests

4 should thus apply equally to the scope of any deposition.

5 Furthermore, given Plaintiffs demonstrated attempts to seek information about the assets

6 and financial affairs of non-debtors from Defendants or non-parties, the Court should make clear

7 that Plaintiffs are not permitted to reach a foreign deponent’s knowledge of personal affairs or the

8 corporate affairs of non-parties without first complying with the compulsory procedures for

9 obtaining testimony from a non-party under the Hague Convention. And given the Court’s denial

10 of Plaintiffs’ contempt motion, deposition topics related to the injunction should be prohibited.

11 A. Plaintiffs May Not Reach a Foreign Deponent’s Knowledge of Their Personal

12 Affairs or the Affairs of Other Non-Parties Without Serving Them Under the

13 Hague Convention

14 Plaintiffs may only reach a foreign corporate witness’ knowledge of Defendants’ assets,

15 not knowledge of personal affairs or the corporate affairs of other non-parties.

16 When discovery from a foreign non-party is requested, a party “must resort to the Hague

17 Evidence Convention’s discovery procedures (where available) if,” as in this case, “the Court does

18 not have personal jurisdiction over the nonparty.” In re 3M Combat Arms Earplug Prod. Liab.

19 Litig., Case No. 3:19-md-2885, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173730, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2020).

20 As another district court put it, “‘[w]hen discovery is sought from a non-party in a foreign

21 jurisdiction, application of the Hague [Evidence] Convention . . . is virtually compulsory.’” Tulip

22 Computs. Int’l B.V. v. Dell Comput. Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. Del. 2003) (emphasis

23 added); see also McCarthy v. Johnson, Case No. 21-mc-4 (GMH), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139094,

24 at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2022) (noting that “a chorus of federal courts have held that where, as

25 here, a party seeks discovery from a nonparty foreign national residing in a foreign country over

26 whom the court lacks jurisdiction, such discovery is governed by the Hague Convention.”);

27 Gubarev v. BuzzFeed, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-60426, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216713, at *4 (S.D.

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1 Fla. Aug. 15, 2017) (“The court here has no personal jurisdiction over [the foreign, non-party

2 individual from whom discovery was sought], and thus the Hague [Evidence] Convention is the

3 only means by which to facilitate discovery.”); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1058,

4 1060 (D. Minn. 2004) (“It also appears that resort to the [Hague Evidence] Convention is the only

5 means available to obtain the requested discovery from [the individual from whom discovery was

6 sought], as he is a foreign person that is not a party to this case, and who is not otherwise subject

7 to the jurisdiction of this Court.”).

8 Here, both the 30(b)(6) Notice and the 30(b)(1) Notice were served only on Defendants as

9 corporate parties to this action, not on any other entity or individual personally. Plaintiffs have

10 requested Mr. Rosner, who resides in Isreal, as the corporate witness under Rule 30(b)(1), and

11 Defendants intend to designate Mr. Rosner as the corporate witness under Rule 30(b)(6). Mr.

12 Rosner is the CEO of NSO, but he is not individually a party to this action. Both the United States

13 and Israel are parties to the Hague Convention, and therefore, the Hague Convention would apply

14 to reach Mr. Rosner’s testimony in his personal capacity.7 Yet, Plaintiffs have chosen not to

15 proceed in that manner. Accordingly, Mr. Rosner’s non-corporate knowledge of his personal

16 affairs or his personal knowledge of the affairs of other non-parties is off limits as a matter of law

17 unless Plaintiffs comply with the Hague Convention. Requiring Mr. Rosner to testify in his

18 personal capacity would allow Plaintiffs impermissibly to circumvent the Hague Convention.

19 Authorizing a deposition that bypasses the Hague Convention would undermine basic

20 principles of comity. The Hague Convention was developed to ensure that global best practices

21 for the taking of evidence were used across jurisdictions in accordance with the local laws and

22 procedures of each jurisdiction. See 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 28.11

23 [1] (3d ed. 2026) (“The Hague Evidence Convention represents the international legal

24
7
25 See Status Table Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
26 https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=82 (last visited Oct. 30,
27 2026).

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1 community’s response to difficulties posed by differences among civil law and common law legal

2 systems…by providing alternative means of obtaining evidence in member nations, the Hague

3 Evidence Convention avoids potential intrusion on judicial sovereignty in nations with civil law

4 systems”). If U.S. courts permit parties to end run these requirements by stretching the Federal

5 Rules beyond their proper reach, courts in other jurisdictions may similarly disregard the Hague

6 Convention when taking evidence from Americans in the United States.

7 Compliance with the Hague Convention is especially important in the post-judgment

8 context. Unlike in the pre-trial context where procedures exist to exclude a corporate witness’

9 testimony based on personal knowledge or prevent it from binding the corporation at trial, where

10 the case is ultimately decided, in the post-judgment context, the primary objective of a deposition

11 is not to bind the company but to obtain information about its assets. A foreign witness who is

12 required to testify in their corporate role on behalf of a corporation is vulnerable to intrusive and

13 harassing inquiries into their own financial affairs or those of other non-parties. Since that

14 information cannot then be taken back once disclosed, such an expansive deposition could

15 undermine the effectiveness of Defendants’ entity-based objections. The least that could be

16 required in this context is compliance with the procedural safeguard for foreign deponents under

17 the Hague Convention whether the deposition is issued to Defendants under Rule 30(b)(6) or Rule

18 30(b)(1).

19 B. Plaintiffs May Not Inquire Into Injunction-Related Topics under Rule 69 or Based

20 on a Failed Contempt Motion

21 Given this Court’s October 16, 2026 Order denying Plaintiffs motion for contempt and

22 request for a show-cause order, Plaintiffs are foreclosed from requesting any discovery relating to

23 their failed contempt motion. See Dkt. No. 881-1 at 5 (Topics 17-20). The Court heard oral

24 arguments on Plaintiffs’ motion for contempt and even permitted post-hearing statements

25 regarding any further contempt proceedings. Tr. 51:23-53:21. Plaintiffs failed to request any

26 discovery and rested instead on their insufficient evidence. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to

27 seek discovery now after having failed to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(iii) (the court

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1 “must” limit the frequency and extent of discovery where it determines that “the party seeking

2 discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action”).

3 Moreover, any injunction-related discovery under the guise of post-judgment discovery is

4 improper as it goes far beyond the terms of Rule 69 itself. The text of Rule 69 makes clear that

5 any discovery must be in “[i]n aid of the judgment or execution.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2). The

6 text also makes clear that the “judgment” that the rule refers to is a “money judgment.” Fed. R.

7 Civ. P. 69(a)(1). An injunction is not a money judgment. As a result, courts have permitted post-

8 judgment discovery regarding an injunction under Rule 69 only where the requesting party shows

9 a connection between the requested discovery and enforcement of a money judgment. See, e.g.,

10 Insulet Corp. v. Eoflow Co., Ltd., Civil Action No. 23-11780-FDS, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87095,

11 at *9 (D. Mass. May 6, 2025). That is not the case here.

12 Since this Court has denied Plaintiffs’ motion for contempt, and Plaintiffs have not and

13 cannot establish any connection between the injunction-related topics and enforcement of the

14 money judgment, the protective order should prohibit any further attempts to misuse the post-

15 judgment discovery process under Rule 69 to obtain unwarranted discovery regarding the

16 injunction.

18
19

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1 CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter the

3 Proposed Protective Order.

4 Respectfully submitted,
5
CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,
6 COLT & MOSLE LLP

7 /s/ Juan O. Perla
Juan O. Perla
8 Turner Smith
9 David V. Holmes
(admitted pro hac vice)
10 CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST,
COLT & MOSLE LLP
11 101 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10178
12
Telephone: (212)-696-6084
13 Email: jperla@curtis.com
tsmith@curtis.com
14 dholmes@curtis.com

15 Jerrold L. Bregman (SBN 149896)
BG LAW LLP
16
21650 Oxnard Street, Suite 500
17 Woodland Hills, CA 91367
Telephone: (818)-827-9101
18 Facsimile: (818)-827-9099
Email: jbregman@bg.law
19
Attorneys for Defendants NSO Group
20
Technologies Ltd. And Q Cyber Technologies
21 Ltd.

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