<mark>MARA Holdings, Inc</mark>. v. Hood County, Texas — Entry #11

Case 4:25-cv-01202-O          Document 11         Filed 10/30/25    Page 1 of 10     PageID 448


                          IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
          FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

MARA HOLDINGS, INC.; DOES 1-8                            §
 Plaintiffs                                              §
                                                         §
v.                                                       § Civil No. 4:25-CV-1202
                                                         §
HOOD COUNTY, TEXAS; County Judge RON                     §
MASSINGILL, in his official capacity; County             §
Attorney, MATT MILLS, in his official capacity;          §
& Hood County Elections Administrator,                   §
STEPHANIE COOPER, in her official capacity,              §
  Defendants.                                            §

DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS’ ORIGINAL COMPLAINT SUBJECT TO
             DEFENDANTS’ PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

         NOW COMES Defendants HOOD COUNTY, TEXAS (“Hood County”), RON

 MASSINGILL (“Judge Massingill”), MATT MILLS (“Mills”) and STEPHANIE COOPER

 (“Cooper”) and files this, their Original Answer, subject to the preliminary determination of

 jurisdiction:

        Defendants generally denies that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, personal

jurisdiction and that venue is proper based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

        Subject to the determination of jurisdiction, Defendants submit the following answer to

Plaintiff’s complaint:

        Defendants deny that they have committed any illegal conduct, violation of state laws,

collusion, or any violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants further deny that

Plaintiffs are entitled to any injunctive or declaratory relief.

                                       DENIALS & ADMISSIONS

         1.      Defendants denies the allegation in paragraph 1 that any and all alleged acts of


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               unconstitutional use of local government to favor a small group of citizens or

               violate the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and any allegations of impropriety.


       2.      Defendants deny the facts and allegations set out in paragraphs 1, 3-8, 11-17, 20-

               22, 24-31, 33-47, 54, 61, 63, 65, 69-72, 74, 76, 80, 82-85, 89, 96-98, 103-104, 113,

               116-117, 120-125, 128, 133-134, 136-139, 143, 147-153, 161, 164, 167, 177, 181,

               184-185, 187-188, 199, 204, 210, 213, 215, 218, 220-221, 223-224, 228-231, 234-

               235, 237-243, 246-254.


       3.      Defendants admit the facts and/or allegations in paragraphs 2, 18-19, 23, 32, 48-

               50, 52-53, 55-59, 62, 66-68, 73, 75, 77-78, 81, 92-94, 99-102, 105-112, 114-115,

               118-119, 122-123, 126-127, 131, 135, 140-142, 144, 154-160, 162-163, 165-166,

               169-176, 178-180, 182-183, 186, 190-198, 200, 202-203, 205-207, 219, 226-227,

               233, & 252.


       4.      Defendants do not have sufficient knowledge to either admit or deny the facts

and/or allegations of paragraphs 9-10, 51, 60, 86-88, 90-91, 95, 132, 145, 168.


       5.      There is no need to admit or deny paragraphs 129, 208, 211-212, 214, 216-217,

225, 232, 236, 244-245, & 251. Defendants deny all requests for relief and all of the subparts.


                                     PECIFIC DENIALS

       6.      Defendants specifically deny the allegations of efforts to secrete their actions,

collude with residents, avoid public discussion or opposition as alleged in paragraphs 5, 13, 17,

28 & 43. Defendants took action openly and merely acted in their capacities to fulfill their

duties. Further, there is much evidence, some proffered by Plaintiffs in their own exhibits that


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Plaintiffs were fully aware of the events they complain were done in secret, as evidenced by

multiple instances of correspondence between Plaintiffs and all Defendants. Plaintiffs also

submitted an open records request to which Defendants responded with the utmost transparency,

diligence and produced all documents requested in a clear effort to provide transparency.

Defendants never “secretly colluded” with any residents, much less to “gain regulatory power

over Plaintiffs.” Any regulation that would result from the incorporation of Mitchell Bend

would rest with the newly incorporated city, not the County. Therefore, Defendants’ acts, which

were done openly, would not have deprived Plaintiffs of any rights or due process as alleged.

These allegations are simply put, fabricated as well as any resulting consequences to the

Plaintiffs caused by Defendants acting in their ministerial capacity as no power to regulate

Plaintiffs would pass to Defendants or change in any way as a result of incorporation.


        7.      Defendants specifically deny the allegations of violations of state law or statute

in any procedural defects or other actions taken to address Petitioners’ application for

incorporation, obtaining the order allowing the issue to be put to a vote and other allegations of

illegality as alleged in paragraphs 6,17, 86-95, 125, & 129-127. Plaintiffs make these allegations

based on vague unconfirmed facts, circumstantial hearsay, and unproven mischaracterizations

of the acts of individual actors for the County. First, Plaintiffs make vague and conclusory

illegality claims against the Defendants that they somehow acted intentionally and improper

when in fact Defendants were acting ministerially in their duty to their constituents and the state

as elected officials.


        8.      Defendants specifically deny the allegations of statutory deficiencies in their

application. Plaintiffs’ allegations in paragraphs 107-115, 116, 118-120, 122-128 purport that


Case 4:25-cv-01202-O                      Document 11                Filed 10/30/25                Page 4 of 10              PageID 451


    Petitioners’ application should be declared ineligible because the area of proposed incorporation,

    Mitchell Bend, does not meet the criteria required by Section 7.001(1) of the Texas Local

    Government Code in that Mitchell Bend does not constitute an unincorporated town or village.

    Plaintiffs further state that “incorporation contemplates the existence of an actual village, town

    or city.” Plaintiffs contend that Mitchell Bend consists of nothing more than two subdivisions

    and a bitcoin mining facility and also that it is nothing more than a road. Not only are their

    statements about Mitchell Bend contradictory, but also patently untrue. Mitchell Bend is an

    unincorporated town/village founded in the 1860s. Plaintiffs could have discovered this by

    performing a simple web search for Mitchell Bend, Texas. The Hood County Historical Society

    website explains the origin of Mitchell Bend, Texas. It was established in the 1860’s by Nelson

    “Cooney” Mitchell, whose claim to fame is that he is the only man ever legally handed in Hood

    County. The community is named for Mitchell. 1                               The community has institutions like the

    Mitchell Bend Cemetery, which hold State Historical Marker No. 3421, that explains the origin

    of the community, the infamous Michell/Truett family feud of 1874 and famous persons buried

    in the cemetery. 2 The United States Geological Service maps show Mitchell Bend on its official

    map of Hood County, Texas, also showing not only Mitchell Bend, but also the Mitchell Bend

    Cemetery and streets such as Mitchell Bend Highway and Mitchell Bend Court. 3 The August

    11, 1966, edition of the Hood County News-Tablet has an article entitled “County Schools Had

    Humble Beginning” in which it discusses the founding the Mitchell Bend school in the

    1920s. 4 Today Mitchell Bend contains not only residential and community institutions, but

    local business like Mara Holdings, in direct opposition of Plaintiffs’ allegations to the contrary.


1
  See Exhibit 1 https://hctxhs.org/articles/feud.htm and https://www.granburydepot.org/z/biog/cooney.htm
2
  See Exhibit 2 from the Texas Historic Sites Atlas of the Texas Historical Commission https://atlas.thc.texas.gov/Details/5221003421
3
  Exhibit 3 - https://ngmdb.usgs.gov/topoview/viewer/#13/32.3229/-97.7015
4
  Exhibit 4 - https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark%3A/67531/metapth1283127/m1/16/


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              9.          Defendant specifically denies the Plaintiffs’ allegations in paragraphs 129-137 &

    148-153 that the Application for Incorporation at issue in this case failed on its face in that it did

    not comply with Section 7.002(b) of the Texas Local Government Code. The flimsy assertion

    that the Application proposed two town names instead of “a” town name is absurd. Any flaws

    in the Application or the corresponding Order granting the Application are clearly unintentional

    administrative errors. These paragraphs also contain allegations of the absence of boundaries

    as required by Section 7.008. Defendants are confused at this allegation as the Exhibit Plaintiffs’

    proffered to this court clearly has attachments outlining the boundaries and plat proposed as well

    as a map and a listing of addresses affected. Any insufficiencies alleged by the Plaintiffs fail as

    a proposed violation of statute. In fact, a request for investigation was made to the Secretary of

    State, and the Secretary of State issued a response that determined that any action that seeks to

    invalidate or cancel a scheduled incorporation election would be inconsistent with the Texas

    Election Code absent statutory authority. 5 Further, the Petitioners’ outlined the boundaries with

    sufficiency in accordance with the statute. The statute does not require an official survey or any

    other specific format for the proposed boundaries. In fact, the Application contains every address

    proposed as well as a visual map and property record plats.

              10.         Defendants specifically deny allegations contained in paragraphs 19, 107-108 &

    140-144 that Petitioners’ Application failed statutorily. Defendants admit the Petitioners erred

    in failure to update the Section of the Texas Local Government Code from Chapter 8 to Chapter

    7 in the application. However, the intentions of organizing a city under Local Government Code

    Chapter 7 are clear by the cover letter submitted to the County Court from Mr. Lakey on August

    12, 2025 that the Application was being submitted under Chapter 7 requesting incorporation as


5
    See Exhibit 5 – Letter from Secretary of State


Case 4:25-cv-01202-O                       Document 11                Filed 10/30/25           Page 6 of 10   PageID 453


    a Type B General Law Municipality. It is clear by the statements of requirements the application

    met that the intention for all purposes of the application was to effect a proposal to voters for a

    Type B General Law Municipality. 6

              11.        Defendants specifically deny the allegations of any impropriety or violation of

    the Texas Open Meetings Act. Defendants had no statutory duty or any duty otherwise to inform

    the public of the pending incorporation being put on the ballot and had no control over what

    private citizens spoke about in a meeting of the Commissioner’s Court as alleged. There never

    existed any duty to place the incorporation discussion on the agenda, therefore no violation can

    exist when no duty existed.

              12.        Defendants specifically deny allegations that they “willingly ignored the

    statutory prerequisites to consider an Application for Incorporation.” Notably, one of the

    leading Petitioners filed the complaint with the Texas Secretary of State against County Judge

    Ron Massingill even after Judge Massingill approved their second petition for incorporation.

    This undercuts the Plaintiffs’ theory that Defendants were working “feverously” with Petitioners

    to push a “sham” election.

                                               AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

13.          Defendants assert the following affirmative defenses:

             a.         Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state an actionable claim against it, upon which relief may

                        be granted;

             b.         Plaintiffs’ state that for the relevant time period in question and at all relevant times

                        – no official policy, practice or custom of the County and the other named

                        Defendants in their official capacities were the actual or proximate cause of the


6
    See Exhibit 6 – Letter and Application submitted to the County Court on August 12, 2025.


Case 4:25-cv-01202-O      Document 11            Filed 10/30/25    Page 7 of 10       PageID 454


            Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries;

      c.    Defendants state that the acts complained of by Plaintiffs were not proximately

            caused by any constitutionally defective police, practice or custom of the County;

      d.    Defendants state that the acts complained of by Plaintiffs were not proximately

            caused by any violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, nor the constitution

            or violation of state law;

      e.    Defendants state that for the relevant time period in question and at all relevant

            times – no official policy, practice or custom of the County and the other named

            Defendants in their official capacities were the moving force behind the alleged

            deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights;

      f.    Defendants deny that the County and any of the named Defendants in their official

            capacities deprived Plaintiffs of any constitutional rights as guaranteed by the

            Constitutional and/or statutory provisions occurred as a result of the admitted acts

            of Defendants;

      g.    Defendants deny all allegations that any violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act

            occurred;

      h.    Defendants state that for the relevant time period in question and at all relevant

            times, no official County policy or any wide-spread custom having the force of

            official policy, was the moving force behind the cause of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.

            Further, Defendants state that no deliberate or secretive actions created any

            circumstances of known risk of deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights as

            alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint;

      i.    Defendants state that Plaintiffs failed to mitigate any alleged damages by


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              intentionally delaying taking any actions to protect themselves from alleged

              damages, despite knowledge of the actions complained of months before the filing

              of Plaintiffs’ complaint and request for injunctive relief;

       j.     Plaintiffs have failed to meet conditions precedent to filing its Complaint and as a

              result of their own delay now request emergency injunctive relief that severely

              prejudices Defendants’ defense;

       k.     Defendants were acting in their ministerial duties and were obligated to act to

              satisfy their duties as duly elected officials for the County;

       l.     There is no legal or factual basis for recovery against this Defendants for any actual

              or statutory damages;

       m.     Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and

       n.     Plaintiffs have no standing to bring tort claims, to contest any procedural errors,

              to stop an election and there is no controversy that exists between the parties;

       o.     Plaintiffs have failed to meet the standard for injunctive relief; and

       p.     No statutory waiver of Defendants’ governmental immunity that would entitle

              Plaintiffs to injunctive or mandamus relief.

       q.     Plaintiffs failed to name any of the Petitioners in their lawsuit, which violates

              F.R.C.P. Rule 19(a). The disputes Plaintiffs have is with the Petitioners, not Hood

              County and County officials acting in their ministerial duties with regard to the

              application.


                                      ATTORNEYS’ FEES

       Defendants are requesting their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees as allowed by

law.


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                                              PRAYER

       WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants respectfully pray that the

Court deny all injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs, dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety

for lack of jurisdiction and standing, and award Defendants their reasonable and necessary

attorney’s fees and costs, and for such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which

Defendants may be justly entitled.


                                               Respectfully submitted,

                                               THE MARTINEZ DE VARA LAW FIRM, PLLC

                                               P.O. Box 377
                                               Von Ormy, Texas 78073
                                               Telephone: (210) 622-0323
                                               Facsimile: (210) 622-4021

                                           By: /s/ Art Martinez de Vara
                                              Art Martinez De Vara
                                              State Bar No. 24060230
                                              art@mdv-law.com
                                              Charles H. Sierra
                                              State Bar No. 18345300
                                              charles@sierraspears.com

                                               & LOCAL COUNSEL

                                               By: /s/ Matthew A. Mills
                                               Matthew A. Mills
                                               Hood County Attorney
                                               State Bar No.: 24060282
                                               mmills@hoodcounty.texas.gov
                                               Telephone: 817-579-3216
                                               Fax: 817-579-3218

                                               ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS


Case 4:25-cv-01202-O       Document 11       Filed 10/30/25      Page 10 of 10      PageID 457


                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was sent to opposing
counsel and all parties of interest on October 30, 2023.

Via Email Service
Robert E. Thackson
Paula D. Pendley
Emily K. Nguyen
Tanya B. Scarbrough
NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBROUGH, LLP
3333 Lee Parkway, Suite 750
Dallas, Texas 75219
469.484.6100 (Telephone)
469.828.7217 (Facsimile)
robert.thackson@nelsonmullins.com
paula.pendley@nelsonmullins.com
Emily.nguyen@nelsonmullins.com
Tanya.scarbrough@nelsonmullins.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

                                                     /s/ Art Martinez de Vara
                                                        Art Martinez de Vara