Crenshaw v. Anderson — Entry #19: ORDER accepting 18 Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:24-cv-00731-L         Document 19        Filed 03/06/25       Page 1 of 3     PageID 215


                        IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                  DALLAS DIVISION

TOMYIA CRENSHAW,                                §
                                                §
       Plaintiff,                               §
                                                §
v.                                              §    Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L
                                                §
LEONARD ANDERSON; DARRIEN                       §
ROBERTSON; and CITY OF DALLAS,                  §
                                                §
       Defendants.                              §

                                             ORDER

       The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge

(“Report”) (Doc. 18) was entered on February 13, 2025, recommending that the court grant the

pending Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 12) and dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the following claims, theories, and requests for relief by Plaintiff Tomyia

Crenshaw (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants Leonard Anderson, Darrien Robertson, and the City of

Dallas (“Defendants”) because they fail as a matter of law:

       1. Excessive Deadly Force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against Defendants
          Anderson and Robertson);

       2. Failure To Render Medical Aid, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against All
          Defendants);

       3. Municipal Liability, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Against the City);

       4. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.021, also known as the Texas
          Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) (Against the City);

       5. Respondeat Superior (Against the City); and

       6. Exemplary Damages.

Report 4 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 45-62.).


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    Case 3:24-cv-00731-L           Document 19            Filed 03/06/25           Page 2 of 3         PageID 216


         Specifically, the magistrate determined that Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to § 1983—

against Officers Anderson and Robertson based on excessive force and failure to render aid—fail

because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a reasonable inference that the

Officers violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as his allegations do not constitute a seizure under

the Fourth Amendment, and the Officers had no duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to stop

and render aid. The magistrate determined that Plaintiff’s myriad claims of municipal liability

against the City of Dallas similarly fail because he has not alleged a plausible constitutional

violation upon which the City’s municipal liability can be based, that is, Plaintiff does not plausibly

allege that the City of Dallas maintained any unconstitutional policies or that such policies were

the moving force behind his injuries. The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff’s TTCA claim

against the City of Dallas fails because Texas law does not provide a waiver of sovereign or

governmental immunity under the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff. Finally, the magistrate judge

determined that Plaintiff’s remaining Counts for “respondeat superior” and “exemplary damages”

fail because a governmental entity cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior;

punitive damages are not an independent claim; and Texas, like most states, limits punitive

damages to cases in which actual damages are found. *

         The magistrate judge further recommends that the court deny Plaintiff leave to amend his

pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) as futile because there is no Supreme

Court or Fifth Circuit authority that recognizes a Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim in the scenario

that forms the basis for Plaintiff’s claims, the essential facts are undisputed, and there are no facts

that Plaintiff could plead that would allow the court to reasonably infer that Defendants are liable


*
 The court further notes that, even if Plaintiff could establish municipal liability against the City of Dallas, he could
not recover exemplary or punitive damages against the City of Dallas in a § 1983 case against a municipality. See City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).


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for the conduct alleged. Additionally, the magistrate notes that Plaintiff could have amended his

pleadings as a matter of course but chose not to do so, and he has not offered any explanation or

provided a proposed amended complaint to demonstrate how he would cure the pleading

deficiencies identified by Defendants’ Motion and detailed in the Report.

       No objections to the Report were received as of the date of this order, and the deadline for

filing objections has expired. The 14-day period to object served as an opportunity for Plaintiff to

object and inform the court how he intended to replead his case. Plaintiff, however, did neither.

The court, therefore, agrees with the magistrate judge’s determination that Plaintiff, who is

represented by counsel, has pleaded his best case such that amendment would be futile. Moreover,

permitting further amendment does nothing but unnecessarily delay resolution of this action.

Accordingly, the court denies Plaintiff’s request to amend his pleadings.

       Having considered Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 12), the pleadings, the file,

record in this case, and Report, the court determines that the findings and conclusions of the

magistrate judge are correct, and accepts them as those of the court. Thus, the court grants

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 12) and dismisses with prejudice all federal and states

claims by Plaintiff against Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

       It is so ordered this 6th day of March, 2025.


                                                     _________________________________
                                                     Sam A. Lindsay
                                                     United States District Judge


Order – Page 3