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HOUCK v. EOS ENERGY ENTERPRISES, INC. — Entry #38: OPINION

Case: HOUCK v. EOS ENERGY ENTERPRISES, INC. njd · 2:23-cv-04113

filed August 01, 2023

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Docket entry #38 · filed November 08, 2024

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jamel K. Semper on 11/8/2024. (sm) Modified on 11/22/2024 (sm). (Entered: 11/08/2024)

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Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH          Document 38       Filed 11/08/24      Page 1 of 13 PageID: 713


  NOT FOR PUBLICATION

                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY


   WILLIAM HOUCK, Individually and On
   Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,                   Case No. 23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH

                Plaintiff,
   v.                                                                     OPINION

   EOS ENERGY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
   JOSEPH MASTRANGELO, and NATHAN                                     November 8, 2024
   KROEKER,

               Defendants.

  SEMPER, District Judge.

         Before the Court is Defendants Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. (“Eos” or the “Company”),

  Joseph Mastrangelo, and Nathan Kroeker’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff

  William Houck’s (“Plaintiff” or “Houck”) Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

  of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF 26, “Def. Br.”) Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. (ECF 27,

  “Opp.”) Defendants filed a brief in reply. (ECF 32, “Reply.”) The Court reviewed Plaintiff’s

  Second Amended Complaint (ECF 25, “SAC”) and the parties’ submissions and decided the

  motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule

  78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

  I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff William Houck brings this putative class action on behalf of persons and entities

  that purchased or otherwise acquired Eos securities between May 9, 2023 and July 27, 2023,

  inclusive (the “Class Period”). (SAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff pursues claims against the Defendants under

  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). (Id.)


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH            Document 38        Filed 11/08/24      Page 2 of 13 PageID: 714


         A. Eos and the Individual Defendants

         Founded in 2008, Eos designs, develops, manufactures, and markets zinc-based energy

  storage solutions for utility-scale, microgrid, and commercial & industrial (“C&I”) applications.

  (Id. ¶ 21.) Eos is incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal executive offices in

  Edison, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 17.) Eos’ common stock trades on the NASDAQ Stock Market

  (“NASDAQ”) under the symbol “EOSE.” (Id.) It warrants trade under the symbol “EOSEW.” (Id.)

  Defendant Joseph Mastrangelo was Eos’ chief executive officer at all relevant times. (Id. ¶ 18.)

  Defendant Nathan Kroeker has been Eos’ chief financial officer since January 23, 2023. (Id. ¶ 19.)

         Plaintiff asserts that because Eos was not profitable, the Company touted its booked orders

  to the market. (Id. ¶ 23.) Eos would announce each newly booked order. (Id.) In its quarterly

  financial highlights, Eos included booked orders and order backlog information. (Id.) Eos’ order

  backlog was vital to the Company’s future because it demonstrated market interest in the

  Company’s products. (Id. ¶ 24.) Eos executives would routinely discuss order backlog in earnings

  calls and would specifically respond to analyst questions about the backlog. (Id. ¶ 23.) The

  Company’s backlog was used by Defendants to raise funds and increase stock value. (Id. ¶ 24.)

         B. Bridgelink Commodities

         On March 9, 2022, Eos announced the largest deal in the Company’s history. (Id. ¶ 30.) As

  Eos stated in a press release that day, Eos had entered a deal with Bridgelink Commodities for a

  total order value of up to $150 million, or nearly 75% of Eos’ backlog. (Id.) On July 6, 2022, Eos

  announced another deal with Bridgelink Commodities that increased its order value to $181

  million. (Id. ¶ 35.) As a result, the order backlog increased in value to over $460 million. (Id.)


                                                    2


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            C. Allegations of Materially False and Misleading Statements

            On May 9, 2023, the Company issued a press release titled “Eos Energy Enterprises

  Reports First Quarter 2023 Financial Results.” (Id. ¶ 62.) Therein, the Company, in relevant part,

  stated:

                  Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. (NASDAQ: EOSE) (“Eos” or the
                  “Company”), a leading provider of safe, scalable, efficient, and
                  sustainable zinc-based long duration energy storage systems, today
                  announced financial results for the first quarter ended March 31,
                  2023.

                  First Quarter Financial Highlights
                  • $8.8 million revenue, compared to $3.3 million in 1Q 2022, a
                     168% increase year-over-year.
                  • Cost of Goods Sold of $26.9 million, a decrease of 24%
                     compared to 1Q 2022, representing a 25% reduction in product
                     unit cost year-over-year.
                  • Operating expenses of $19.4 million remained flat year-over
                     year.
                  • $16.1 million cash balance on March 31, 2023, compared to
                     $17.1 million on December 31, 2022.
                  • Booked $86.3 million in orders, resulting in an order backlog
                     of $535.1 million as of March 31, 2023, an increase of more
                     than 2.5x versus 1Q 2022.

  (Id.) Then, on May 10, 2023, the Company held an earnings call to discuss Eos’ 2023 fiscal first

  quarter results. (Id. ¶ 63.) Therein, Defendant Mastrangelo, in relevant part, stated:

                  Moving on to Page 4 on the operating highlights. You continue to
                  see good progress. Commercially, I’ll go through some more details
                  on the pipeline in a future slide, but we continue to see the
                  opportunity pipeline increase. We booked a large order for $87
                  million, nearly $87 million, and that brought our backlog up to
                  $535 million with – representing 2.2 gigawatt hours of power.
                                                    ...
                  When you look at our current pipeline, current pipeline is up in Q2,
                  and we signed over $500 million of LOIs. Now think again about
                  how we think about the movement through our pipeline. We don't
                  call it current pipeline unless we have a technical use case where we
                  can provide a technical proposal to the customer, which then leads
                  us to giving them a nonbinding financial quote, which that stands at
                  $6 billion in and of itself. Our goal with that combined $7 billion is


                                                    3


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH            Document 38         Filed 11/08/24      Page 4 of 13 PageID: 716


                 to then get customers to sign an LOI with us. So we get on the same
                 side of the table with them and close the project out to allow them
                 to generate revenue and allow us to put product out in the field. That
                 stands now at $1.5 billion with 7 gigawatt hours of potential.

                 We work through those. And when you think about the timing of
                 LOI to firm commitment, you're working through various
                 different aspects on commercial terms, permitting, land rights and
                 interconnections to be able to get to a firm commitment that then
                 goes into our backlog, which, as I stated earlier, stands at $535
                 million, up $71 million versus fourth quarter.

  (Id.) Plaintiff asserts the statements relating to the backlog were materially false and misleading

  because they failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company’s business, operations,

  and prospects. (Id. ¶ 64.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to disclose (1) that Bridgelink

  Power, the parent company of Eos’ largest customer, Bridgelink Commodities, defaulted on a

  secured loan facility and was embroiled in litigation with the lender to seize the parent’s assets; (2)

  that the foregoing threatened Bridgelink Commodities’ commitment and ability to purchase Eos

  products; (3) that, as a result, there was a material risk to Eos’ backlog; and (4) that, as such, there

  was a material undisclosed risk to Eos’ business, operations, and prospects. (Id.)

         D. The Iceberg Report

         On July 27, 2023, during market hours, non-party Iceberg Research (“Iceberg”) published

  a report entitled “62% Of $Eose’s Backlog Is With Financially Distressed Bridgelink Whose

  Renewable Energy Assets Were Foreclosed And Auctioned Off In May.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Therein,

  Iceberg explained that Bridgelink Power, the parent company of Bridgelink Commodities, had

  defaulted on a secured loan facility approximately two months after Bridgelink Commodities had

  signed the first order with Eos and was embroiled in litigation with the lender to seize its assets.

  (Id.) Eos had not disclosed the information about Bridgelink Power’s financial issues. (Id. ¶ 49.)


                                                     4


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  On this news, Eos’ stock price fell $0.83 per share, or 23.9%, to close at $2.65 per share on July

  27, 2023, on unusually heavy trading volume. (Id. ¶ 50.)

          That same day, after market hours, Eos issued a press release entitled “Eos Energy

  Enterprises Provides Preliminary Results & Issues Statement Regarding Its Customer

  Commitments and Backlog.” (Id. ¶ 51.) In relevant part, the press release stated:

                 The Company also issues the following response to statements made
                 about its customer backlog in external reports, republished and
                 amplified on social media, regarding two of the Company’s
                 customers:
                                                   ...
                 The report also referred to legal proceedings involving multiple
                 Bridgelink legal entities. The Company believes that its customer,
                 Bridgelink Commodities, LLC, is a separate legal entity which is
                 not implicated in the legal matters highlighted in today’s statements.
                 This customer, representing 45% of the Company's backlog,
                 reconfirmed today that it continues to build pipeline and is actively
                 seeking financing for energy storage projects covered by Eos’s
                 multi-year Master Supply Agreement.

                 Eos’ commercial pipeline remains strong and continues to grow in
                 line with independent third party market forecasts. The Company
                 believes its long-term business fundamentals are strongly supported
                 by the secular shift occurring in the energy industry requiring long
                 duration energy storage.

  (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the May 9, 2023 and May 10, 2023 statements regarding the Company’s

  backlog were materially false and misleading because Defendants failed to disclose—as

  highlighted in the Iceberg Report—that Bridgelink Commodities’ parent company defaulted on a

  secured loan facility and was embroiled in litigation with a lender to seize the parent’s assets,

  which could impact Bridgelink Commodities’ ability to fulfill its contractual obligations to Eos.

  (Id. ¶ 64.)


                                                   5


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  II.     LEGAL STANDARD

               a. Rule 12(b)(6)

          Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for “failure to state a

  claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” For a complaint to survive dismissal under the Rule, it

  must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

  556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

  is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

  reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

  678. Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement, it does require

  a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly

  v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations

  omitted). As a result, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that

  discovery will uncover proof of [his] claims.” Id. at 789.

               b. Rule 9(b)

          Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) imposes additional pleading requirements.

  “Independent of the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened

  pleading requirement of factual particularity with respect to allegations of fraud.” In re Rockefeller

  Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, pursuant to Rule 9(b), when

  “alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

  fraud or mistake . . . [m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be

  alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A party alleging fraud must therefore support its allegations

  with factual details such as “the who, what, when, where and how of the events at issue.” U.S. ex

  rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016).


                                                     6


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  Accordingly, “[t]o satisfy the particularity standard, ‘the plaintiff must plead or allege the date,

  time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of substantiation

  into a fraud allegation.’” Feingold v. Graff, 516 F. App'x 223, 226 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Frederico

  v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007)). This heightened standard is designed to “ensure

  that defendants are placed on notice of the precise misconduct with which they are charged, and

  to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of fraud.” Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890

  F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               c. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) Pleading Requirements

          “To state a claim for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule

  10b-5, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a

  connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4)

  reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Ortiz

  v. Canopy Growth Corp., 537 F. Supp. 3d 621, 639 (D.N.J. 2021) (citing City of Edinburgh Council

  v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2014)).

          For plaintiffs asserting securities-fraud claims, the PSLRA imposes additional pleading

  requirements. “The PSLRA established heightened pleading requirements for a plaintiff to meet in

  order to plead a cause of action successfully in class actions alleging securities fraud.” Rahman v.

  Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2013). The PSLRA “requires that a complaint state

  with particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing scienter,

  i.e., the defendant’s intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Id. at 241-42 (quoting Tellabs,

  Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). In

  other words, plaintiffs bringing a claim involving an allegedly false or misleading statement must

  “(1) ‘specify each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why the


                                                     7


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH                 Document 38           Filed 11/08/24          Page 8 of 13 PageID: 720


  statement is misleading,’ 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), and (2) ‘state with particularity facts giving rise

  to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind,’ § 78u-4(b)(2).”

  Rahman, 736 F.3d at 242 (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 321).

           Both provisions of the PSLRA pleading standard require that facts be pled “with

  particularity,” echoing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s requirements. 1 Id. at 241 n.3.

  Although the “PSLRA replaced Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) as the applicable pleading standard in private

  securities class actions,” Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement “is comparable to and effectively

  subsumed by the requirements” of the PSLRA. Id. This standard “requires plaintiffs to plead the

  who, what, when, where and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story.” Institutional Inv’rs

  Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2009). Section 78u-4(b)(1) also adds the requirement

  that where “an allegation regarding [a defendant’s] statement or omission is made on information

  [or] belief,” plaintiffs must “state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed”—that

  is, they must describe the sources of information with particularity, including “the who, what,

  when, where and how of the sources, as well as the who, what, when, where and how of the

  information those sources convey.” Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).

           As to the second element, the PSLRA’s approach for pleading scienter sharply deviates

  from Rule 9(b), which allows plaintiffs to plead the scienter element generally. Avaya, 564 F.3d at

  253. Under the PSLRA, the court must evaluate whether all the facts in the complaint as alleged,

  taken collectively, give rise to a “strong inference of scienter” – not whether any individual

  allegation viewed in isolation meets that standard. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323. In determining whether

  the pleaded facts give rise to a strong inference of scienter, the court must “take into account


           1
             Rule 9(b) provides that when “alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
  circumstances constituting fraud or mistake . . . [m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind
  may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Defendants do not separately move pursuant to Rule 9(b).


                                                            8


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH            Document 38        Filed 11/08/24      Page 9 of 13 PageID: 721


  plausible opposing inferences.” Id. This involves a comparative inquiry that evaluates how likely

  one conclusion is as compared to others, in light of the pleaded facts. Id. Thus, the court must

  consider plausible, nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct as well as inferences

  favoring the plaintiff. Id. at 324. Although the inference that the defendant acted with scienter need

  not be irrefutable, the inference must be more than merely “reasonable” or “permissible.” Id. A

  complaint will survive only if a reasonable person would “deem the inference of scienter cogent

  and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” Id.

  III.   ANALYSIS

         A. Count 1: Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5

             Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

         In Count 1, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. (SAC ¶¶

  89-99.) “The private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . creates liability for

  false or misleading statements or omissions of material fact that affect trading on the secondary

  market.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1417. To state a securities fraud

  claim pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff “must allege (1) a material

  misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or

  omission and the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or

  omission, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.” City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754

  F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2014).

         Defendants’ first argument for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim is failure to plead a false or

  misleading statement. (Def. Br. at 14-19.) Plaintiff has identified the following statements, as

  originally bolded and italicized in the Second Amended Complaint, as false or misleading:

                 •   In Eos’ May 9, 2023 press release, the Company stated it
                     “[b]ooked $86.3 million in orders, resulting in an order backlog


                                                    9


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH             Document 38        Filed 11/08/24      Page 10 of 13 PageID:
                                              722


                    of $535.1 million as of March 31, 2023, an increase of more
                    than 2.5x versus 1Q 2022.” (SAC ¶ 62.)

                •   During Eos’ May 10, 2023 earnings call discussing the
                    Company’s fiscal first quarter results, Defendant Mastrangelo
                    stated that “We booked a large order for $87 million, nearly $87
                    million, and that brought our backlog up to $535 million with
                    – representing 2.2 gigawatt hours of power.” (Id. ¶ 63.)

                •   During that same call, Defendant Mastrangelo also stated “We
                    work through those. And when you think about the timing of
                    LOI to firm commitment, you're working through various
                    different aspects on commercial terms, permitting, land rights
                    and interconnections to be able to get to a firm commitment
                    that then goes into our backlog, which, as I stated earlier,
                    stands at $535 million, up $71 million versus fourth quarter.”
                    (Id.)

 Each of these statements relates to the Company’s backlog. Plaintiff asserts that these statements

 were materially false or misleading because Defendants failed to disclose (1) that Bridgelink

 Power, Bridgelink Commodities’ parent company, defaulted on a secured loan facility and was

 embroiled in litigation with the lender to seize the parent’s assets; (2) that the foregoing threatened

 Bridgelink Commodities’ commitment and ability to purchase Eos products; (3) that, as a result,

 there was a material risk to Eos’ backlog; and (4) that, as such, there was a material undisclosed

 risk to Eos’ business, operations, and prospects. (Id. ¶ 64.) Defendants argue that Eos was not

 required to comment on its counterparty’s financial status, pending legal proceedings, or likelihood

 of honoring future contractual commitments. (Def. Br. at 16.) Defendants assert that making such

 disclosures would amount to speculation about future performance that would run afoul of the

 premise that there is no duty to speculate. (Id.)

        Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not create an affirmative duty to disclose all material

 information. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44 (2011). However, disclosure

 may be required in certain circumstances. “A duty to disclose under federal securities laws


                                                     10


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH                  Document 38           Filed 11/08/24          Page 11 of 13 PageID:
                                                   723


 may arise when a statute requires disclosure, insider trading occurs, or there is an inaccurate,

 incomplete, or misleading prior disclosure.” City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d

 159, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2000)).

 Specifically, “[d]isclosure is required . . . only when necessary ‘to make . . . statements made, in

 the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.’” Matrixx, 563 U.S.

 at 44 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). 2 Plaintiff does not allege that Eos had a statutory duty to

 disclose or that insider trading occurred. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that the above statements

 regarding Eos’ backlog were misleading because Defendants failed to disclose that the parent

 company of its largest customer was embroiled in litigation and experienced financial woes. (SAC

 ¶ 64.) Plaintiff asserts that the parent company’s issues could affect the subsidiary, such that the

 subsidiary could be unable to fulfill its contractual obligations to Eos. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

 the subsidiary’s potential inability to fulfill its contractual obligations was a material risk to Eos’

 backlog that Eos should have disclosed. (Id.)

          When an outcome or risk is merely speculative, no duty to disclose arises. See, e.g.,

 Williams v. Globus Med, Inc., 869 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that a company did not

 have a duty to disclose a risk that had not “actually materialized” at the time of the allegedly

 misleading prior disclosure); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that

 when “threat of product liability exposure was purely speculative” there was no duty to disclose

 such exposure); Laasko v. Endo Int'l, PLC, No. 20-07536, 2022 WL 3444038, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug.

 17, 2022) (“Plaintiffs cannot claim that Defendants had a duty to disclose additional details

 associated with the risks of opioid-related litigation and liability where Defendants’ risks were


          2
            Indeed, “companies can control what they have to disclose under these provisions by controlling what they
 say to the market.” Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 45. “Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”
 City of Edinburgh Council, 754 F.3d at 174 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988)).


                                                          11


Case 2:23-cv-04113-JKS-MAH                  Document 38           Filed 11/08/24         Page 12 of 13 PageID:
                                                   724


 merely speculative.”); In re Express Scripts Holding Co. Sec. Litig., No. 16-3338, 2017 WL

 3278930, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2017) (“Where an outcome is merely speculative, the duty to

 disclose does not attach.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Bridgelink Commodities’ ability to purchase

 Eos products was threatened by the financial and legal issues of its parent company, rendering Eos’

 statements about its backlog misleading. (SAC ¶ 64.) However, Plaintiff has failed to establish that

 this alleged threat to Bridgelink Commodities’ ability to purchase Eos products materialized at the

 time the backlog-related statements were made on May 9, 2023 and May 10, 2023 such that the

 statements were misleading. 3 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish a material misstatement or

 omission, and Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice. 4

         B. Count 2: Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual

              Defendants

         In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges individual Defendants Joseph Mastrangelo and Nathan

 Kroeker violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. (SAC ¶¶ 100-03.) Section 20(a) of the

 Exchange Act provides:

                  Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
                  under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
                  thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
                  same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
                  controlled person is liable . . . unless the controlling person acted in
                  good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
                  constituting the violation or cause of action.
 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). Liability under Section 20(a) “is derivative of an underlying violation of

 Section 10(b) by the controlled person.” Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.


           3
              Plaintiff’s SAC likewise does not establish that Bridgelink Commodities, to date, has failed to meet its
 contractual obligations with Eos. And Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that at the time Defendants made the
 statements on May 9, 2023 and May 10, 2023, Defendants knew of Bridgelink Commodities’ potential inability to
 satisfy its contractual obligations as a result of its parent company’s legal and financial issues.
           4
             Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for failure to establish material misstatement or omission,
 the Court declines to address the other bases for dismissal proposed by Defendants.


                                                         12


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                                            725


 2013) (quoting Institutional Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009)). “Thus,

 for a controlling person to be liable, the person over whom control was exercised must have

 committed a primary violation of the securities laws.” In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp.

 2d 262, 280 (D.N.J. 2007) (citations omitted). Because the Section 10(b) claim is dismissed for

 failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s Section 20(a) claim (Count 2) is also dismissed without

 prejudice.

 IV.    CONCLUSION

        For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF 26) is GRANTED.

 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate order

 follows.


                                                                     /s/ Jamel K. Semper      .
                                                                     HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER
                                                                     United States District Judge

 Orig: Clerk
 cc:   Michael A. Hammer, U.S.M.J.
       Parties


                                                 13