Crenshaw v. Anderson — Entry #13: REPLY filed by City of Dallas re: [7] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Ligon, John)

Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24               Page 1 of 8 PageID 123


                            IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                      DALLAS DIVISION

TOMYIA CRENSHAW,                                  §
                                                  §
               Plaintiff,                         §
                                                  §
v.                                                §       Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-0731-L
                                                  §
LEONARD ANDERSON et al.,                          §
                                                  §
               Defendants.                        §

     DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
                    DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

        Defendant City of Dallas (“City”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, files this Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 7,

“Motion”), and respectfully shows the Court as follows:

                                     I.   SUMMARY OF REPLY

        Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 11) to the City’s Motion cites no Supreme Court or Fifth

Circuit authority—or case law from any jurisdiction—that even suggests the City’s employees’

actions for which he sues were unconstitutional. Moreover, the Response fails to point to any acts

or omissions that affirmatively demonstrate a waiver of the City’s governmental immunity under

the Texas Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain any claims against the City under

federal or state law.

        Regardless, even had Plaintiff plausibly alleged a constitutional violation, the Response

points only to conclusory statements in his Complaint about the City’s record, which is insufficient

to plausibly state a Monell claim.

        Plaintiff’s claims against the City must be dismissed.


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                             II.     ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

            a. Nothing in the Response points to case law and facts alleged in the Complaint
            from which this Court can infer Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.

        No plaintiff may maintain a section 1983 claim against any person or governmental entity

without a constitutional violation. See Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464-66 (5th Cir.

2010). The Response dedicates roughly a page to the central question of whether Plaintiff suffered

a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and summarizes his claim as follows:

                In the present case, Plaintiff was seized when the Defendants caused his
        vehicle to crash by initiating their high-speed pursuit. When Plaintiff’s vehicle
        crashed, it was set ablaze, trapping Plaintiff inside and completely curtailing
        Plaintiff’s ability and freedom to exit his vehicle and walk away. Trapping Plaintiff
        inside a burning vehicle certainly constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment
        purposes.

Resp. at 13-14 (citing “Dkt. No. 1.”).

        While Plaintiff’s Response cites forty-two cases (id. at iii-v.), it fails to reference a single

decision by either a federal or state court that supports the contention that the alleged actions giving

rise to Plaintiff’s claims constitute a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights—

specifically, the right to be free from unreasonable seizures, including the use of excessive force.

Indeed, the Response does not cite any case where a law enforcement officer’s involvement in a

car chase scenario could potentially lead to liability. This lack of citation is no surprise, considering

the clear precedent set by both the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit in Fourth Amendment case

law, which squarely rejects such claim.

        Similarly, the Response fails to cite any legal precedent indicating that a law enforcement

officer has a duty under the Fourth of Fourteenth Amendment to render aid when a fleeing fugitive

is subsequently injured during an attempt to apprehend them. Resp. at 14-15. Indeed, the Response

does not even address the Motion’s reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, where the Court addressed “whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth


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Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless

indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender”

and “answer[ed] no . . .” 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).

       As demonstrated in the Motion, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims falter at the outset because of the

lack of plausible allegations that any City employee violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s

Response fails to point to any facts in the Complaint to overcome Plaintiff’s burden and his Monell

claims against the City must be dismissed.

           b. Plaintiff’s Response fails to point to any facts in the Complaint from which
              this Court can reasonably infer the City maintained a pattern or practice of
              the alleged unconstitutional acts.

       Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges, without citing either a written policy or a widespread pattern

or practice, a myriad of Monell theories, from the common failure-to-train allegations to a claim

for something called “fail[ure] to implement appropriate retention efforts.” See Resp. at 6-7 (citing

Compl.). Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff alleged that an unconstitutional act caused him

injury, which the City denies, his claims nevertheless fail. Here, Plaintiff attempts to establish

municipal liability under § 1983 by showing a City custom. However, Plaintiff’s Response fails to

point to facts in the Complaint to meet Monell’s prerequisite of a pattern or facts from which the

Court can reasonably infer a widespread practice of unconstitutional behavior sufficient to

constitute a municipal policy. To establish a custom, the alleged “pattern requires similarity and

specificity; prior indications cannot simply be for any and all ‘bad’ or unwise acts, but rather must

point to the specific violation in question.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 851

(5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). The Response fails to cite any prior instance of a remotely similar

scenario, where a City employee pursued a fleeing fugitive but did not apprehend them, resulting


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in injuries after the fugitive lost control of their vehicle and crashed. As such, Plaintiff’s Monell

claims additionally fail for a lack of an unconstitutional City policy.

           c. Plaintiff’s Response fails to point to facts in the Complaint from which this
              Court can reasonably infer the City was the “moving force” behind Plaintiff’s
              injuries.

       As demonstrated in the Motion, Plaintiff failed to plausibly plead that a municipal policy

was the moving force behind his injuries. Plaintiff’s Response merely points to conclusory

statements in the Complaint alleging that City policies caused his injuries. As the Court has

explained, “allegations in support of ‘moving force’ [that] consist of mere legal conclusions . . .

do not satisfy the pleading requirements discussed in Iqbal and Twombly.” Monacelli v. City of

Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-02649-L (BT), 2023 WL 6563410, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2023), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 3:21-CV-2649-L, 2023 WL 6370753 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29,

2023). For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims similarly fail.

           d. Plaintiff’s Response fails to point to facts in the Complaint from which this
              Court can reasonably infer the City could be liable for any state law claims.

       The Response does not point this Court to any authority that contravenes the well-settled

authority under Texas law cited in the City’s Motion that a fugitive’s injuries resulting from a

chase are not the result of any act for which immunity is waived. See Mot. at 20-24. Instead, the

Response avers that the procedural posture of these claims renders the cited authority inapplicable

in the context of a rule 12(b)(6) motion. Resp. at 15-17. Plaintiff does not cite any authority for

this proposition, and the City is unaware of any federal authority holding that a state court’s

decisions are not controlling because of this—or any—procedural posture.

       In Texas, “an assertion of governmental immunity from suit challenges the trial court’s

exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Whether

a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .” Teague v. City of Dallas, 344


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S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App. 2011) (cleaned up). Each of the cases cited in the City’s Motion turn

on whether Texas law has waived a municipality’s immunity under the facts claimed. See, e.g.

City of Dallas v. Hillis, 308 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (citing Texas law

and holding that “[t]he causal nexus is not satisfied by the mere involvement of a vehicle, nor by

an operation or use that ‘does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible.’”

Id. at 532 (citation omitted).

        The Response provides no substantive explanation for why these opinions—all of which

hold to the same principles that injuries like Plaintiff’s are not the result of violations of state law—

are not applicable. For the reasons stated in the City’s Motion, the City is entitled to governmental

immunity and Plaintiff’s state law claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

            e. Plaintiff has not properly moved this Court to amend his Complaint.

        Plaintiff concludes his Response with a request to amend his complaint should this Court

find his pleading insufficient, specifically, “Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court allow

Plaintiff the opportunity to amend its [sic] Complaint.” Resp. at 19 (citation omitted). However,

under this Court’s local civil rules, when “a party files by electronic means a motion for leave to

file an amended pleading, the party must attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion as

an exhibit.” Local Civ. R. LR 15.1(b). Plaintiff has not included a proposed amended pleading.

        Regardless, rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to freely

grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Because this rule

provides a “strong presumption in favor of granting leave to amend,” Fin. Acquisition Partners,

LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2006), the Court must do so “unless there is a

substantial reason to deny leave to amend,” Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598

(5th Cir. Nov. 1981). One such reason, salient here, is futility: “If the complaint, as amended,


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would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile and the district court [is] within its

discretion to deny leave to amend.” Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir.

2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir.

2022)).

          The City urges the Court to deny amendment here because no good-faith amendment could

plead factual content sufficient to allow the court to reasonably infer the City is liable. The central

facts of this case are as follows: Plaintiff ran away from police, crashed his car, and suffered

injuries as a result. There is no Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit authority that recognizes a Fourth

or Fourteenth Amendment claim under this scenario. Similarly, there is no authority under Texas

state law holding that a municipality’s governmental immunity is waived under these facts. As

such, amendment would be futile. Martinez, 71 F.4th at 391 (affirming denial of amendment,

stating: “We therefore ask whether, in his proposed amended complaint, [plaintiff’] has pleaded

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.”).

                                       IV.     CONCLUSION

          Plaintiff’s Response points to no factual allegations in the Complaint or legal authority to

state a plausible claim against the City. Plaintiff has not alleged facts which show, or from which

this Court can reasonably infer, that a City employee violated his constitutional rights, or that a

City policy was the “moving force” behind his injuries. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege

facts to show a waiver of governmental immunity under Texas state law. Therefore, for the reasons

stated in the City’s Motion and this reply, the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against

the City with prejudice.


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Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24     Page 7 of 8 PageID 129


                                CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS

                                TAMMY L. PALOMINO
                                City Attorney

                                /s/ J. Cheves Ligon          .


                                J. Cheves Ligon
                                Senior Assistant City Attorney
                                Texas State Bar No. 24070147
                                john.ligon@dallas.gov

                                7DN Dallas City Hall
                                1500 Marilla Street
                                Dallas, Texas 75201
                                Telephone: 214-670-1236
                                Facsimile: 214-670-0622
                                Attorneys for Defendant City of Dallas


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                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        I certify that on June 4, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the clerk
of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF electronic case
filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system will send a “Notice of Electronic
Filing” notification to all case participants registered for electronic notice, including all pro se
parties and/or attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service
of this document by electronic means.

                                              s/ J. Cheves Ligon
                                              J. Cheves Ligon


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