Weston v. DocuSign, Inc. — Entry #318: Order by Judge Vince Chhabria granting 279 Motion to Dismiss
Case: Weston v. DocuSign, Inc. cand · 3:22-cv-00824
filed February 08, 2022
What this document is
Docket entry #318 · filed January 26, 2026
Order by Judge Vince Chhabria granting 279 Motion to Dismiss. (vclc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/26/2026) (Entered: 01/26/2026)
Who is involved
- Advanced Series Trust
- Confidential Witness 1
- Confidential Witness 2
- Confidential Witness 3
- Confidential Witness 4
- Cynthia Gaylor
- Daniel D. Springer
- Deka International S.A. Luxembourg
- Dennis Richerson
- DocuSign, Inc.
- Harbor Capital Appreciation CIT
- Harbor Capital Appreciation Fund
- Loren Alhadeff
- Michael J. Sheridan
- Peregrine Capital Management, LLC
- Peter Votto
- Prudential Investment Portfolios 12
- Prudential Investment Portfolios 18
- Prudential Investment Portfolios 3
- Prudential Investment Portfolios 5
- Prudential Investment Portfolios, Inc.
- Prudential World Fund, Inc.
- Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho
- Richard R. Weston
- Steven Truong
- The Prudential Series Fund
- TIAA-CREF Investment Management, LLC
Why we have it
We follow this case because it names a company we track, although that company is not a party:
- Marathon Digital: its former name “Marathon Patent Group, Inc.” appears in a filing in this case.
…not currently possess them. See Ho v. Marathon Patent Group, Inc.,…
A free copy from the RECAP archive of federal court filings (mirrored at the Internet Archive), retrieved November 02, 2026. Federal court filings are public records.
Document text
5 page(s), 11,419 characters, converted from the PDF's text layer · plain text.
Full text
Case 3:22-cv-00824-VC Document 318 Filed 01/26/26 Page 1 of 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RICHARD R. WESTON, et al., Case No. 22-cv-00824-VC
Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION
v. TO DISMISS
DOCUSIGN, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 279
Defendants.
The motion to dismiss is granted. This order assumes that the reader is familiar with the
allegations in the complaint, the documents relied on by the complaint, the applicable legal
standards, and the arguments made by both parties.
This case was filed in 2022, and an earlier motion to dismiss was already adjudicated and
denied. Dkt. No. 88. The case proceeded to discovery, and the previously assigned judge
certified a class. Dkt. No. 158. Subsequently, the defendants sent a Rule 11 letter to the plaintiffs
asserting that the complaint’s description of the allegations of two confidential witnesses was not
accurate. Dkt. No. 230 at 2. It’s not clear whether the confidential witnesses recanted their
allegations or whether the complaint misrepresented what the witnesses said in the first place,
but at any rate, the parties agreed that class counsel would file an amended complaint that would
exclude any description of the allegations of those two confidential witnesses, and that the
defendants could move to dismiss it. Dkt. 230 at 4. The plaintiffs then filed a 401-page amended
complaint, but after the Court encouraged them to streamline it, they filed the amended
complaint that is now the subject of this motion to dismiss. The amended complaint removes all
reference to confidential witness allegations and adds a lot of new factual allegations based on
Case 3:22-cv-00824-VC Document 318 Filed 01/26/26 Page 2 of 5
internal documents that the plaintiffs obtained in discovery. The defendants’ motion to dismiss
contends that the complaint misrepresents many of those internal documents. In light of the
earlier issues relating to confidential witnesses and indications that at least some of the internal
documents are misrepresented in the amended complaint, the Court invited the parties to file
supplemental briefs to address and produce certain internal documents cited in the complaint that
appear most relevant to the plaintiffs’ allegations of falsity. This ruling on the motion to dismiss
follows the Court’s review of the supplemental briefs and the accompanying internal
documents.1
eSignature Demand Statements. The complaint alleges, in essence, that the defendants
made a series of public statements that the success of Docusign’s eSignature product was not
limited to the COVID era because customers had discovered how useful the product was and
were renewing and expanding their Docusign contracts instead of returning to pen and paper
signatures. But internally, the complaint alleges, people were raising alarms that demand was
slowing down and customers were increasingly failing to renew their contracts. The complaint is
written in a way that makes it difficult to link the public statements to allegations about what was
happening internally that would allow a reader to conclude that the statements were false. And a
review of the internal documents makes clear that many of those documents are described in a
misleading way in the complaint. To give just a couple examples, Paragraph 136 alleges that in
May and June 2021, senior Docusign leaders were talking about the need to “level set on the new
reality” and “‘tighten up the story’ on churn.” But the referenced documents were talking about
problems moving people from free trials to actually buying the product, not about problems with
customer churn. Paragraph 155 alleges that in June 2021 Smith was talking about raising
1
The Court takes judicial notice of the internal documents and public statement documents filed
by the defendants and plaintiffs only to the extent that they were incorporated into the complaint
by reference. The Court takes judicial notice of those documents only for purposes of
determining whether the plaintiffs adequately alleged falsity and scienter. To the extent the
defendants submitted documents to dispute the factual allegations in the complaint, the Court did
not consider any documents for that purpose. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d
988, 1002-03 (2018).
2
Case 3:22-cv-00824-VC Document 318 Filed 01/26/26 Page 3 of 5
“sirens” on Commercial churn, but the full document shows that Smith was saying that he’d seen
data rebutting the churn sirens he’d previously raised. Frankly, these misrepresentations would
probably justify dismissal of the complaint without further analysis. But in any event, this ruling
will only discuss colorable allegations of falsity that do not involve the mischaracterization of
internal documents relied on in the complaint.
There is one public statement for which falsity is adequately pled: Springer’s statement
on the September 2, 2021, earnings call that “we’re not seeing any differences in churn rates in
any meaningful way.” ¶ 168. Paragraphs 156, 157, and 159 of the complaint allege that during
the summer of 2021, people were talking internally about evidence of increasing customer churn
(a metric that captures when customers downsize or don’t renew their existing contracts) in
certain portions of the business, including the Commercial segment and Financial Services and
Financial Technology customers. The internal documents cited by the complaint back this up. A
reader could conclude from those allegations that Springer’s statement that there were no
meaningful differences in churn was false.
But the complaint does not adequately allege that Springer acted with scienter. To plead
scienter, plaintiffs need to allege facts that allow the reader to infer that Springer knew about the
churn problems. And under the PSLRA, the allegations need to give rise to a “strong inference”
of scienter—in other words, the inference that Springer knew about the churn problems needs to
be at least as strong as an inference that he didn’t know about the problems. The strong inference
requirement can sometimes be satisfied by alleging information that is so important to a
company’s “core operations” that the company’s leadership can be assumed to have known
about it. Webb v. Solarcity Corp., 884 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2018); Hayden v. Portola
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2021 WL 3506614, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2021); Union Asset
Management Holding AG v. SanDisk LLC, 2017 WL 3097184, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2017).
But the information alleged here doesn’t rise to that level. The internal communications about
customer churn are about churn in specific business segments, and there is no indication that they
cover enough business segments to infer that customer churn had become a company-wide
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Case 3:22-cv-00824-VC Document 318 Filed 01/26/26 Page 4 of 5
problem that would be “absurd” for Springer not to know about. Berson v. Applied Signal
Technology, Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
Without being able to rely on the core operations inference, there is no “strong inference”
that Springer knew about the churn problems. The emails about churn referenced in paragraphs
156 and 157 were sent to Alhadeff (who reported to Springer) and Willis and Smith (who
reported to Alhadeff).2 But the reader can’t assume that Springer knew the information merely
because Alhadeff and Alhadeff’s reports knew it. Without any allegations that Springer had
access to or was exposed to the information in those emails, the most reasonable inference is that
he didn’t know about it and therefore didn’t know he was being misleading when he said they
weren’t seeing any meaningful differences in churn. See South Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542
F.3d 776, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2008).
The only other eSignature statement worth addressing is Gaylor’s September 8, 2021,
statement that customers who came to Docusign with a COVID-specific use case that they no
longer have are the “vast minority versus the majority of the motion.” ¶ 172. The complaint
alleges that an internal slide deck from May 2021 discussed the risks of customers with COVID-
specific use cases not renewing. ¶ 124. But there is nothing in those allegations, or in the
referenced slide deck, that would allow the reader to conclude that those risky one-time use
customers were not in the “vast minority.” Additionally, the slide deck was only discussing the
risk of losing customers in the future, and it also discussed Docusign’s strategies to identify
additional use cases for the risky customers. The complaint therefore does not adequately allege
that Gaylor’s statement was false.
Competition Statements. The complaint alleges that the defendants misleadingly stated
publicly that competition from Adobe wasn’t a threat, while people were talking internally about
losing their competitive edge due to Adobe’s price pressure. But in each of the public statements,
the defendants also acknowledged that Adobe tended to “compete on price” and argued that
2
The emails referenced in paragraph 59 only involved Customer Success employees who do not
seem to have reported directly to senior leadership.
4
Case 3:22-cv-00824-VC Document 318 Filed 01/26/26 Page 5 of 5
despite Adobe’s pricing pressure, Docusign retained its edge by selling a “premium” product.
Dkt. Nos. 279-23, 279-11, 279-12, 279-19. The complaint does not plead facts that would make
those statements untrue or misleading.
CLM Statements. Finally, the complaint alleges that the defendants misleadingly touted
their CLM product as a key growth driver despite poor CLM sales. But the statements about
CLM were forward-looking and accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A). For example, Springer stated on the December 3, 2020, earnings call
that he thought they were going to see customers ready to “reaccelerate with CLM” in the next
few quarters, but he also stated on that same call that they had seen a slowing of CLM
transactions during COVID. Dkt. No. 279-14. Nothing in the pleadings indicates that those
statements were false or misleading.
Given the history of this case and all the problems with the current complaint that make it
misleading and confusing, the Court concludes that further amendment would be futile.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 26, 2026
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge
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