Tag: El Paso

  • Meta Hands 80% of a $14B AI Campus to BlackRock, Turning Capex Into Rent

    Meta Hands 80% of a $14B AI Campus to BlackRock, Turning Capex Into Rent

    TL;DR · 30-second read

    The Short Version

    Meta, the company behind Facebook and Instagram, is building a huge computer complex in El Paso, Texas, to run its artificial intelligence products. It will draw about as much electricity as a large nuclear reactor produces.

    The twist is that Meta is not paying for most of it. Funds run by BlackRock, the world’s biggest investment manager, will own 80% of the roughly $14 billion project, and Meta will rent the space back.

    It is like building a house, selling most of it, and signing a long lease to keep living there. That shows how expensive the artificial intelligence race has become.

    Meta Platforms and BlackRock announced on July 28, 2026 a joint venture to develop and operate a data center campus in El Paso, Texas, with development costs of about $14 billion, Reuters reported in a story carried by The Journal Record. BlackRock-managed funds will own 80% of the venture and Meta 20%. Meta is contributing land and in-progress construction valued at about $2.3 billion, BlackRock about $4.9 billion in cash, and part of BlackRock’s investment will be financed with $12.5 billion of debt. Meta will also receive a $1 billion distribution to align ownership.

    The campus, already under construction near the Texas-New Mexico border, is designed for 1 gigawatt of compute capacity, with operations expected to begin in 2028. Meta will sign lease agreements with the venture, securing the capacity without funding or owning the campus outright.

    Executive Summary

    Meta has taken one of its largest AI construction projects and moved most of the ownership, and most of the funding burden, to an outside investor. Rather than paying for a 1-gigawatt campus upfront, Meta will hold a minority stake and pay rent for the capacity it uses. The deal lands as AI-related bond issuance has reached $270 billion by early July, according to BofA Global Research, nearly double all of 2025, and as Meta’s shares had fallen about 10% this year on concerns about AI spending.

    The significance is structural. Hyperscalers, the handful of companies that run cloud and internet services at global scale, have mostly funded their own data centers. This venture shows a different model: an asset manager owns the building, the power and the land, lenders finance much of it, and the tech company becomes an anchor tenant. For investors watching Meta’s $600 billion U.S. infrastructure plan, it is a signal that not all of that money has to come from Meta’s own cash flow.

    From Owner to Tenant: The Math Behind the 80/20 Split

    The disclosed figures show how the ownership split was engineered. Meta contributes land and construction already underway, valued at about $2.3 billion. BlackRock-managed funds put in about $4.9 billion in cash. Meta then receives a $1 billion distribution to align ownership, which leaves its net contribution at roughly $1.3 billion. Against BlackRock’s $4.9 billion, that is about 21% of the combined equity, consistent with the stated 20% stake. In effect, Meta recovers a meaningful slice of money it had already spent on the site and hands the remaining funding burden to its partner.

    The second half of the structure is the lease. Capital expenditure, or capex, is spending on long-lived assets such as buildings and equipment, paid upfront. Rent is paid over time. By signing lease agreements with the venture, Meta converts much of the cost of a gigawatt-scale campus from the first kind of obligation into the second. The $12.5 billion of debt that finances part of BlackRock’s investment means lenders to the venture, rather than Meta’s own bond investors, carry a large share of construction financing.

    This is not money that disappears. Long-term leases are commitments, and under U.S. accounting rules they generally appear on a company’s balance sheet as liabilities. What changes is the shape of the obligation: spread over the lease term, paired with an outside owner that bears the long-term value risk of the asset, and freeing Meta’s cash for chips, other campuses or shareholders. The people most affected are Meta shareholders, who see lower near-term spending on this site; BlackRock’s fund investors, who take on a long-dated, single-tenant asset; and the venture’s lenders, who take construction and tenant risk.

    Why Meta Wants Rent Instead of Receipts

    The timing explains the appeal. Meta has said it plans to invest $600 billion in U.S. AI infrastructure, data centers and jobs by 2028, and is building several gigawatt-scale campuses, including a Louisiana site it expects to expand to 5 gigawatts with investment above $50 billion. At that scale, even a company with Meta’s cash flow runs into limits on how much it can spend or borrow directly without unsettling investors.

    Matt Britzman, senior equity analyst at Hargreaves Lansdown, put the concern plainly: the scale of spending raises questions about cash flow, operating costs and returns, particularly because Meta does not yet have a large cloud business selling spare capacity to outside customers. Amazon, Microsoft and Google can rent surplus computing to others; Meta has mostly built for its own use. Reported talks to lease computing power to Anthropic, in a potential deal worth up to $10 billion over two years, suggest Meta is exploring that route, but no such deal had been announced.

    Against that backdrop, a structure that trims upfront spending while keeping full access to the capacity is a direct answer to the question investors are asking. Whether it improves Meta’s economics depends on the lease rate, which has not been disclosed.

    What BlackRock Is Actually Buying

    For BlackRock’s funds, the attraction is a long-term stream of lease payments from one of the world’s largest technology companies, secured by physical assets and, crucially, by access to power. A campus designed for 1 gigawatt, roughly the output of a large nuclear reactor, is hard to replicate quickly, which gives the site value beyond its current tenant.

    The risks are concentration and specialization. The venture has one disclosed tenant, and a building designed for dense AI computing is not easily repurposed. The asset’s long-term value depends heavily on Meta renewing its leases or on the venture finding other tenants willing to pay similar rates. Operations are not expected until 2028, so construction and schedule risk sit with the venture for the next two years.

    One Deal, Not Yet a Template

    Reuters framed the transaction within a broader pattern of tech companies turning to debt markets and fund managers for external capital. That pattern is visible in the bond figures, but one joint venture does not establish that Meta, or its peers, will finance every campus this way. The more telling test will be whether Meta applies the structure to Louisiana or other gigawatt-scale projects.

    What the ownership change does not alter is the local footprint. The campus still needs the same power, land and community acceptance whether Meta or BlackRock owns it, and AI data center expansion faced 142 protests across 42 states in July. For utilities, local governments and residents, the relevant questions about electricity, water and tax treatment remain the same regardless of whose balance sheet carries the building.

    Background

    Meta Platforms, the parent of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, has become one of the largest builders of AI data centers in the United States, with 28 sites in operation or under construction. It had earlier described El Paso as a more than $10 billion project and is also building a Louisiana campus it expects to grow to 5 gigawatts. Earlier in 2026 Meta appointed Dina Powell McCormick as president and vice chairman to drive partnerships with governments and investors for its AI projects.

    BlackRock is the world’s largest asset manager. Its role here reflects a wider shift in which pension funds, insurers and other long-term investors, reached through managers like BlackRock, finance the physical infrastructure behind AI, much as they have long financed toll roads, pipelines and power plants.

    Sources

    Source: Meta, BlackRock announce $14 billion AI data center project in Texas — Reuters report, via The Journal Record, on the El Paso joint venture’s ownership, financing and capacity.

  • Fort Bliss Data Center Could Outdraw All of El Paso

    Fort Bliss Data Center Could Outdraw All of El Paso

    El Paso Matters reported on May 1, 2026 that a proposed data center at Fort Bliss, the U.S. Army installation adjoining El Paso, Texas, could consume more electricity than the entire city of El Paso. The project is at the proposal stage.

    The comparison is the story’s core claim: a single campus on federal land whose electrical demand would rival or exceed that of the roughly 680-square-mile metropolitan area next door. Beyond that framing, the source material available to us does not carry a stated capacity figure, developer name, timeline, or power-supply arrangement.

    Executive Summary

    The news is a siting proposal, not a groundbreaking. What makes it notable is the combination of two ingredients that rarely appear together: a very large computing load and a U.S. Army installation as the host site. Federal land sidesteps some of the frictions that slow data center development — land assembly, municipal zoning fights, fragmented ownership — because a single federal landlord controls tens of thousands of contiguous acres behind an existing security perimeter.

    What federal land does not do is generate electricity. A load described as larger than a city of roughly 680,000 people has to be served by wires, generation, and firm capacity that either already exist or must be built. El Paso sits in an unusual position for a Texas city: its incumbent utility, El Paso Electric, operates within the Western Interconnection rather than ERCOT, the grid that covers most of the state. That means the fast, deregulated Texas interconnection dynamics that have absorbed much of the state’s data center boom are not directly available here.

    For infrastructure buyers, utilities, and investors, the useful question is not whether the headline comparison is dramatic — it is. The question is which of the four hard constraints (power, water, transmission, and mission compatibility with an active training installation) has an identified answer, and which are still open. On the evidence in this report, most remain open.

    Why Federal Land Is Suddenly Attractive to Data Center Developers

    Large computing campuses have become difficult to site in ordinary jurisdictions. Assembling several hundred acres from multiple private owners takes years; local zoning hearings have become genuine contests in Virginia, Georgia, and parts of Texas; and utility interconnection queues in popular markets stretch well past the point where a developer can promise a delivery date. Federal installations short-circuit several of those problems at once. One landlord controls the land, the parcels are already contiguous and large, physical security is a built-in feature rather than a capital line item, and the leasing path runs through federal real-property authorities rather than a city council.

    Fort Bliss is an especially plausible candidate for that logic. It is among the largest Army posts in the country by land area, extending from El Paso north into New Mexico, with vast stretches of desert range. Where a private developer would need to buy out dozens of owners, a federal lease covers the same footprint in a single instrument.

    The trade is that federal siting solves the land problem and leaves the harder problems untouched. Electricity, water, fiber routes, and construction labor all still have to come from the surrounding region. A campus on an Army post is not an island; it draws on the same regional grid and the same desert water system as the city beside it. The siting advantage is real, but it is narrower than the headline suggests.

    El Paso Is in Texas, But It Is Not on the Texas Grid

    This is the detail that most casual readers of the story will miss, and it matters more than any other technical point. The United States is divided into three major grids: ERCOT, which covers most of Texas and operates largely independently; the Eastern Interconnection; and the Western Interconnection, which runs from the Rockies to the Pacific. El Paso Electric, the incumbent utility serving El Paso and the surrounding area, sits in the Western Interconnection, not ERCOT. A very large load at Fort Bliss would therefore be interconnecting into a different market structure than a comparable load outside Dallas or Abilene.

    The practical consequences are substantial. ERCOT’s combination of a large generation fleet, a fast-moving queue, and light-touch retail structure is a significant part of why so much data center demand has landed in Texas over the past several years. El Paso Electric is a considerably smaller, vertically integrated utility operating under Western planning and reliability processes, with regulatory oversight in both Texas and New Mexico. Adding generation and transmission at the scale implied by “more power than all of El Paso” is a multi-year capital program under any framework, and it is not one a single utility of that size undertakes casually.

    None of this makes the proposal implausible. Behind-the-meter generation, phased buildout, on-site gas turbines, large-scale solar paired with storage, or a bespoke transmission arrangement are all mechanisms developers have used elsewhere. But each carries its own permitting path, its own capital requirement, and its own timeline — and the report as summarized does not identify which, if any, is on the table.

    What a “More Power Than the Whole City” Comparison Does and Doesn’t Prove

    City-scale comparisons are a legitimate way to convey magnitude to a general audience, and the figure deserves to be taken seriously rather than dismissed as alarmism. But readers evaluating it should know that such comparisons are sensitive to how both sides are measured. Peak demand in megawatts and annual energy consumption in megawatt-hours tell different stories, because a data center runs at a high, flat load factor around the clock while a city’s demand swings with weather and time of day. A campus that trails El Paso on peak summer demand could still exceed it on annual energy. “El Paso” itself can mean the municipality, the metropolitan area, or El Paso Electric’s full service territory, which reaches into southern New Mexico.

    Two further caveats apply to nearly every announcement in this category. Stated capacity is almost always the fully built figure, reached over many years and many phases, not day-one load. And proposed capacity is not contracted capacity: the distance between a developer’s stated ambition and a signed interconnection agreement with firm delivery dates is where a large share of announced projects quietly stall.

    The even-handed read, then: the comparison is a fair signal that the proposal is genuinely large and that the local grid implications warrant public scrutiny. It is not, on its own, evidence about what will be built, when, or on whose electrical system. Both the developer’s ambitions and the alarm the number generates should be measured against the same standard — a stated capacity figure, a defined phasing schedule, and an identified power supply.

    Who Carries the Cost, and Who Carries the Risk

    When a load of this size arrives in a mid-sized utility territory, the central regulatory question is cost allocation. Transmission upgrades, substation work, and any new generation built primarily to serve one customer represent capital that has to be recovered from someone. If those costs flow into general rates, every household and small business in the territory helps pay for them. If they are assigned to the customer through a large-load tariff, minimum-take commitments, or exit fees, the developer carries the risk that its own demand forecast proves optimistic. Utility commissions in several states have spent the past two years writing exactly these rules, and how Texas and New Mexico regulators would treat a Fort Bliss load is a live and unanswered question.

    Water is the second cost that tends to surface late. El Paso sits in the Chihuahuan Desert and has built a national reputation for water management precisely because supply is constrained. Cooling technology choice — evaporative cooling, which consumes water to save electricity, versus closed-loop or air-cooled designs, which use more power to save water — is therefore not a technical footnote here. It is a direct trade against the grid constraint discussed above, and the two cannot be optimized independently.

    There are plausible winners. Construction employment, a long-term property or lease revenue stream to the federal government, improved fiber routes, and potential grid investment that outlasts any single tenant are all genuine. But data centers are capital-dense and labor-light once operating, so permanent job counts are typically modest relative to investment, and on federal land the local property-tax treatment that usually anchors community benefit arguments works differently than it does for a private site. Those are the terms on which the community-benefit case should be argued, in either direction.

    Background

    El Paso is a metropolitan area of roughly 680,000 people in the city proper on the Texas–New Mexico–Mexico border, served electrically by El Paso Electric, a vertically integrated utility regulated in both Texas and New Mexico. Unlike most of the state, the region sits in the Western Interconnection rather than ERCOT, giving it a different set of grid neighbors, market rules, and planning processes than Dallas, Houston, or the Permian Basin. Fort Bliss, the adjoining Army installation, is among the largest in the country by land area and has long been a defining economic presence in the region.

    The broader context is a multi-year surge in demand for computing capacity, driven substantially by AI training and inference workloads, that has run into the physical limits of land, electricity, and water in established data center markets. That pressure has pushed developers toward less conventional sites — including federal property, where land is abundant and controlled by a single owner. The Fort Bliss proposal reflects that search, and it puts the resulting trade-offs in unusually sharp relief: abundant land next to a mid-sized utility, in a desert, on a working military installation.

    Source: Proposed Fort Bliss data center could use more power than all of El Paso — El Paso Matters reports that a data center proposed for the Army installation could draw more electricity than the neighboring city of El Paso.