TL;DR · 30-second read

The Short Version

The world’s biggest maker of computer chips, the company that builds many of the processors behind artificial intelligence, appears to be scouting Sherman, a small city in north Texas, for two new factories worth about $45 billion.

The company hasn’t confirmed it. But Texas officials flagged Sherman as an ideal spot, largely because the city spent years buying water rights and is now building a 27-mile water pipe. Chip factories use enormous amounts of water, so the town that planned ahead is now first in line.

The Real Deal reported on October 30, 2026 that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) appears to be the company behind a search for sites for two chip plants and a $45 billion investment in Texas. Texas state documents obtained by Bloomberg describe the search, and a state note identifies Sherman, a North Texas city about 15 miles from the Red River, as an ideal candidate. The documents do not name the company. TSMC CEO C.C. Wei said in early October that a Texas location was under consideration, according to the Dallas Business Journal.

Sites in Central Texas are also being evaluated, but the preference appears to be shifting toward North Texas. Sherman already hosts major semiconductor plants from Texas Instruments and GlobalWafers.

Executive Summary

A $45 billion, two-plant expansion would be TSMC’s largest move in the United States beyond its first fabrication plant in Phoenix, Arizona. TSMC has not confirmed that it is the company behind the Texas site search, and its most recent monthly filing with US market regulators shows no board-approved capital spending for September 2026. The project is best understood as an advanced site search, not a commitment.

What makes the story significant is why Sherman leads. The city did not wait for a chipmaker to arrive before solving the hardest siting problem. It bought water rights, draws from the large Lake Texoma reservoir, and is preparing an 84-inch pipeline running 27 miles from the lake to a separate reservoir. That pre-built capacity, plus an existing chip cluster anchored by Texas Instruments, is what a state note points to in calling Sherman ideal.

For the AI hardware supply chain, which depends heavily on TSMC’s factories, the question is less whether Texas has land than whether it has the utilities a two-fab campus needs. On water, Sherman has an unusually concrete answer. On electricity, nobody has said anything yet.

Why Sherman Leads: The Water Was Secured Before the Fab

A semiconductor fab, the factory where circuits are printed onto silicon wafers, needs a large and dependable supply of water, much of it purified to extreme standards for rinsing wafers between manufacturing steps. That requirement has made water one of the most common objections to new chip plants. In Sherman’s case, the city has worked to take the objection off the table. Its supply comes from Lake Texoma, which is described as having the volume to absorb a fab’s demand, and the city has paid for additional water rights and is gearing up to build an 84-inch pipeline running 27 miles from the lake to a separate reservoir.

The mechanism matters for anyone siting heavy industrial load, including data center developers. Water rights and large-diameter pipelines take years to secure and permit. A city that has already done that work can offer a chipmaker a shorter, less risky path to operation than a site that would have to start from zero. The Texas state note calling Sherman an ideal candidate, set against competing Central Texas sites, is consistent with that logic: the community that invested ahead of demand is the one at the top of the list.

This reframes the usual worry. Water is often cast as the constraint that will limit US chip expansion. Here it is presented as Sherman’s competitive advantage. That claim rests on the city’s own investments and the lake’s described volume. Neither the city nor the prospective tenant has published how much water two fabs would draw against how much capacity Sherman holds, so the advantage is plausible but not yet quantified.

A Second Chip Cluster, Not a Lone Bet

Sherman would not be a pioneer site. Texas Instruments is building out a 1,200-acre complex there, with one plant complete and plans for four totaling 4.2 million square feet, supported by a $46 billion North Texas investment. GlobalWafers, which makes the silicon wafers that chips are built on, also operates a major plant in the city. A third major operator would deepen an existing cluster rather than create a new one.

Clusters lower costs that never appear in a headline price tag: specialized construction crews already on site, suppliers of industrial gases and chemicals with established logistics, a local workforce trained in clean-room operations, and utilities experienced with semiconductor-grade demand. For TSMC, whose US footprint so far centers on Phoenix, a Texas site with those features would diversify geography without starting a supply ecosystem from scratch.

What TSMC’s Filings Do and Do Not Show

TSMC’s monthly 6-K filed October 22, covering September 2026, reported no capital appropriations approved by its board and no acquisitions or dispositions of assets. That does not rule out a Texas project. It does mean that, as of September, TSMC’s board had not formally committed money to one, and the company had not bought land through any reported transaction.

The public record therefore consists of three pieces: Wei’s early-October remark that a Texas spot was under consideration, Bloomberg’s reporting on a Dallas-Fort Worth area search, and state documents describing an unnamed company’s $45 billion, two-plant plan. Together they make TSMC the most likely searcher. Investors should treat the $45 billion figure as a scale indicator from a site-selection process, not as a capital budget.

Power Is the Variable Nobody Has Priced

The siting conversation so far has centered on water. Electricity has not been addressed by TSMC, the State of Texas or the City of Sherman. A two-fab campus is a large, continuous electrical load, and it would sit in a region where Texas Instruments is already expanding. How the power would be supplied, what grid upgrades would be required, and on what schedule are open questions.

For AI infrastructure, this is the question to watch. TSMC manufactures many of the advanced processors used to train and run AI models, and more US fab capacity could shorten supply chains for that hardware. Whether a Texas campus would produce leading-edge AI chips at all has not been disclosed. If it does, its timeline will depend as much on electricity as on the water Sherman has already lined up.

Background

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is the world’s largest contract chipmaker: it manufactures chips designed by other companies, including many of the processors used in AI systems, smartphones and computers. Its first US fabrication plant is in Phoenix, Arizona, and the company has been evaluating further American expansion.

Sherman is a North Texas city about 15 miles from the Red River border with Oklahoma. It has become a semiconductor hub, with Texas Instruments building a multi-plant complex and GlobalWafers operating a wafer plant there. The city draws water from Lake Texoma and has invested in water rights and pipelines to compete for large industrial projects.

Sources

Source: TSMC’s eyes Sherman for $45B Texas expansion, potentially adding to North Texas semiconductor hub (The Real Deal) on state documents describing a $45 billion, two-plant chip site search pointing to Sherman, Texas.

Primary sources: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Form 6-K filed October 22, 2026 (monthly report for September 2026).

TL;DR · 30-second read

The Short Version

Amkor, a company that does the final assembly turning bare silicon into finished chips, has tripled its planned spending on a factory in Gwangju, South Korea, to about $2.1 billion.

The bigger factory will send out about 9,000 tons of used water every day, more than three and a half Olympic swimming pools. The city is racing to connect two treatment plants to handle it, aiming to finish by June 2028.

The lesson: the chips behind artificial intelligence depend on ordinary pipes and water treatment, just like the data centers that run them.

Seoul Economic Daily reported on October 20, 2026 that Jeonnam-Gwangju Special Metropolitan City is accelerating an expansion of its wastewater treatment infrastructure to coincide with the groundbreaking of Amkor Technology Korea’s new advanced semiconductor manufacturing line at its Gwangju plant in the Bukgu advanced industrial complex. Amkor’s investment has been scaled up from an initial 1 trillion won to 3 trillion won ($2.1 billion).

With the larger investment, the plant’s expected daily wastewater output rises to 9,000 tons from 6,000 tons. The city, working with Jangseong County, plans a treatment system linking the Gwangju sewage treatment plant and the Jangseong public wastewater treatment facility, targeting completion in June 2028.

Executive Summary

Amkor Technology, one of the world’s largest providers of outsourced chip assembly and test, has tripled its planned investment in a new production line at its Gwangju plant in South Korea, from 1 trillion won to 3 trillion won. The local government’s response is as telling as the investment itself: rather than issuing permits and stepping back, it is re-plumbing the region, connecting two municipal treatment systems so the plant’s projected 9,000 tons a day of wastewater has somewhere to go.

The significance for infrastructure watchers is the mismatch in clocks. A corporate investment decision can triple in a single announcement; the supporting treatment capacity has to move through plan revisions, design, a funding consultation with the national environment ministry, tendering, construction and trial operation before it reaches full service, with a June 2028 target. Advanced packaging, the stage of chipmaking that has become central to AI hardware, turns out to share a constraint with the data centers it ultimately supplies: it grows only as fast as the water infrastructure around it.

Three Times the Money, One and a Half Times the Water

The core numbers are straightforward. Amkor’s commitment rose threefold, from 1 trillion won to 3 trillion won, and the plant’s expected wastewater rose by half, from 6,000 to 9,000 tons a day (a ton of water is roughly one cubic meter, or 1,000 liters). That extra 3,000 tons a day was enough to require a new piece of regional infrastructure: a system linking the Gwangju sewage treatment plant with the Jangseong public wastewater treatment facility, which sits in a neighboring county. The fact that water rises more slowly than capital is itself informative: spending on a chip line is dominated by equipment and cleanrooms, while discharge depends on which wet processes are installed. But even a 50% increase in effluent pushed the region beyond what its existing arrangements could absorb.

The mechanism that makes water the pacing item is the sequence the city has laid out. First come revisions to the industrial complex management plan and the master plan for the wastewater facility. Then basic and detailed design. Only after that does the city consult the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment on funding, followed by construction management, tendering, construction, completion and trial operation. Each step is a dependency for the next, and the funding consultation sits in the middle of the chain rather than at the start. The target for the whole sequence is June 2028.

Who is affected: Amkor, whose production ramp is linked to treatment capacity that will not be complete for roughly a year and a half after the city’s announcement; Jangseong County, which is taking on part of the treatment load; and the regional and national budgets that will fund the expansion. The city itself frames the infrastructure as the condition for the investment to turn into “expanded production lines and jobs,” which is a direct statement that output and utility capacity move together.

Packaging Is Where AI Chips Become Products, and It Is Wet Industrial Work

Advanced packaging is the step where finished silicon dies are mounted, connected and protected, and in modern AI accelerators it is the step that places processors alongside stacks of high-bandwidth memory. Across the industry, that capacity has become a priority as AI hardware demand has grown. Amkor’s Gwangju line is described as an advanced semiconductor manufacturing line, and packaging and test are Amkor’s core business, though the company has not specified the products or customers the new line will serve.

Packaging is often viewed as the lighter, “back-end” counterpart to wafer fabrication. Gwangju shows its utility needs are substantial. Processes such as cleaning, plating and wafer sawing use water and produce industrial wastewater that must be treated before discharge. A 9,000-ton daily load is a municipal-scale planning issue, not a plant-level detail.

The parallel with data centers is direct. Operators of AI data centers have learned that sites are constrained by power interconnection and water for cooling as much as by land or capital. Gwangju suggests the same logic extends upstream into the supply chain that produces the chips: the location of new packaging capacity depends on which governments can deliver treatment infrastructure on schedule.

A Municipal Bet, and a Claim to Weigh

The city has positioned itself as an active partner. It formed a dedicated corporate support team to review water supply, sewage and electricity plans, coordinated permits with other agencies, and on September 18 signed an agreement with Jangseong County on a semiconductor wastewater treatment support project aimed at the Amkor plant. The current expansion is described as a follow-up to that agreement.

Mayor Min Hyung-bae credited the outcome to the merger that created the Jeonnam-Gwangju Integrated Special City, calling Amkor’s additional investment “a prime example of the power generated by the Jeonnam-Gwangju merger” and saying that designing industrial and environmental infrastructure together “is now producing tangible outcomes.” The cross-jurisdiction water agreement is evidence that regional coordination is happening. Whether that coordination drove Amkor’s decision to triple its commitment is a separate question, and Amkor has not publicly explained the reasons for the increase. Customer demand, Amkor’s existing footprint in Korea and other factors could all contribute.

For buyers of packaging capacity and for investors, the practical signal is timing. A 3 trillion won commitment represents intent; the June 2028 treatment target, with funding still to be settled, shows when the full-scale water capacity behind that intent is scheduled to exist.

Background

Amkor Technology is one of the world’s largest outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) providers. These companies take finished silicon from chip designers and foundries and package, connect and test it so it can be built into products. Amkor, headquartered in the United States, has deep roots and a large manufacturing presence in South Korea. Advanced packaging has gained strategic importance as AI accelerators increasingly rely on tightly integrated processor and memory assemblies.

Gwangju, in South Korea’s southwest, is now governed as part of the Jeonnam-Gwangju Integrated Special City following a regional merger. Its leaders have pursued large industrial investment, and the Amkor project is being supported through a dedicated corporate support team and coordination with neighboring Jangseong County on shared wastewater infrastructure.

Sources

Source: Jeonnam-Gwangju Speeds Up Wastewater Expansion for Amkor’s 3 Trillion Won Chip Plant (Seoul Economic Daily): The city is fast-tracking a Gwangju–Jangseong wastewater link as Amkor triples its Gwangju chip line investment.

TL;DR · 30-second read

The Short Version

A coordinated cyberattack hit more than 30 local public water systems in Minnesota this week. Federal investigators are now involved.

The damage was small. One city’s well and treatment plant briefly shut down, and there are no signs the tap water became unsafe. Officials say early clues point to hackers linked to Iran, but that is not confirmed.

Why it matters beyond Minnesota: the giant computer buildings behind apps and artificial intelligence often cool their machines with water from these same local utilities. A hack at the water plant is a risk to them too.

A coordinated cyberattack affected more than 30 community water systems in Minnesota in the week of July 27, according to Minnesota IT Services, the state’s technology agency, Al Jazeera and Reuters reported on July 30. Local officials said the well and treatment plant in at least one city temporarily went offline, but the attack appears to have had minimal impact, and there are no indications the water supply became unsafe to drink. The FBI said on Wednesday that it was “actively engaged with victims.”

State officials said the incidents resemble activity attributed to hackers aligned with Iran’s government, and cautioned that the assessment is preliminary. The New York Times, citing unnamed state and federal officials, reported that Iranian hackers were the likely culprits, while noting that attribution is not definitive and that the attackers may have posed as Tehran-aligned actors. The attack comes amid renewed US–Iran hostilities after a June memorandum of understanding that paused the fighting broke down this month.

Executive Summary

More than 30 local water systems in a single US state were hit in what state officials called a “coordinated cyberattack.” The physical consequences were limited: one city’s well and treatment plant briefly went offline, and drinking water was not reported unsafe. But the breadth of the event and the FBI’s involvement put the security of utilities’ operational technology (OT) — the industrial control systems that run pumps, wells and treatment processes — back at the top of the critical-infrastructure agenda.

For the data center industry, the relevance is indirect but concrete. Many facilities that use evaporative cooling draw their water from municipal systems like these. The Minnesota incident is a reminder that a data center’s cooling supply depends not only on its own cybersecurity but on the cybersecurity of utilities it neither owns nor controls, and whose security resources are set by local public budgets rather than by the data center.

No data center has been reported as affected, and attribution of the attack remains preliminary. The episode’s value for operators is as a live test of a common assumption: that water outages are local, physical events rather than coordinated ones spanning many utilities at once.

The Cooling Risk Sits Outside the Fence

Data centers that use cooling towers or other evaporative systems reject heat by evaporating water, which has to be continuously replaced — industry shorthand calls this “makeup water.” Where a campus draws that water from a municipal utility, the utility’s wells, pumps and treatment plant become part of the data center’s cooling chain. Those assets are run by OT: programmable controllers and supervisory software that start pumps, open valves and dose chemicals. An intrusion that reaches them is, for every large water customer downstream, a cooling-supply risk.

Minnesota shows what that looks like in practice. More than 30 community water systems were affected in a single coordinated event, and in at least one city the well and treatment plant went temporarily offline — precisely the kind of interruption that stops water flowing to a large commercial customer. Water resilience planning has traditionally centered on familiar, local failures: a main break, a drought restriction, a fault at one plant. A coordinated intrusion is different in kind, because it can reach many independent systems at once, which may also affect neighboring utilities or backup supplies an operator expected to lean on.

The exposure is not uniform. AI training and inference hardware concentrates far more heat per rack than conventional servers, pushing operators toward liquid cooling and larger heat-rejection systems. Closed-loop liquid cooling and air-cooled chillers consume little water; evaporative designs trade lower electricity use for continuous water dependence. The operators most exposed to an event like Minnesota’s are water-reliant sites on a single municipal feed with limited on-site storage. Nothing reported so far indicates that any data center served by the affected systems saw an interruption, and the outage that did occur was brief.

Minimal Impact Is the Good News, Not the Whole Story

The most important outcome is that drinking water was not reported unsafe and service disruption appears to have been limited. That is a credit to the utilities and responders involved, and it should temper any alarm.

But officials’ own description points to a campaign rather than a one-off. Minnesota IT Services spokesperson Emily Zimmer said “the timing, methods of access, and targeted infrastructure share characteristics with other coordinated cyber incidents our federal partners have observed involving critical infrastructure.” Community water systems often run lean, with limited dedicated security staff, which makes a campaign that sweeps many of them at once hard to defend against one utility at a time.

The number that matters for infrastructure planners is therefore the 30-plus, not the single outage. Breadth indicates that access was obtainable across many separate operators simultaneously. A contained result this time says more about where the attackers stopped than about how far they could have gone.

Attribution Is Unsettled; the Threat Picture Is Not

State officials said the incidents resemble those attributed to Iran-aligned hackers but called that assessment preliminary. Officials cited by The New York Times said Iranian hackers were the likely culprits, while acknowledging the conclusion could change and that the attackers may have impersonated Tehran-aligned groups to raise tensions. Former intelligence officials told the paper a false-flag operation was less likely. The fair reading is that the available indications point one way but are not conclusive, and no technical evidence has yet been published that would let outside analysts test either view.

For defenders, final attribution matters less than the context. Water infrastructure has become a target across the current conflict: reported US strikes have hit Iranian water plants, and Iran has targeted desalination plants in neighboring Gulf states. Whoever is ultimately responsible for Minnesota, that backdrop raises the baseline risk to water-sector OT, and to every large customer that depends on it.

What Operators Can Ask Their Water Utility

Data center operators cannot secure a municipal utility’s control systems, but they can reduce how much a compromise of them would cost. Practical steps include confirming how and how quickly the utility will notify large customers of a cyber incident, knowing how many hours of cooling the site’s on-site water storage actually covers, qualifying alternative supplies such as reclaimed water or trucked delivery, and weighing low-water cooling designs for new builds.

The relationship can run both ways. Large water customers have a direct stake in their utility’s security posture, and utilities facing coordinated campaigns have an interest in knowing which customers carry the highest consequences from an outage. Minnesota makes that conversation easier to start.

Background

Water utilities are among the more exposed parts of US critical infrastructure: many are small, locally run and operate industrial control systems designed for reliability rather than security. US agencies have previously linked attacks on water-sector equipment to Iran: in late 2023, intrusions into industrial controllers at several US water utilities, including the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in Pennsylvania, were attributed to a group affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Data centers become significant water users when they rely on evaporative cooling, which trades lower electricity use for continuous water consumption. As AI workloads raise heat density, cooling design, and the water supply behind it, has become a central siting and permitting question. The Minnesota incident arrives amid renewed US–Iran hostilities: the US joined Israel in a war against Iran on February 28, and a June memorandum of understanding that paused the fighting broke down in July.

Sources

Source: US authorities probe cyberattack on water systems in Minnesota – Al Jazeera — Al Jazeera and Reuters on a coordinated cyberattack affecting more than 30 Minnesota community water systems and the federal response.