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Hurley                        Sarah Link Schultz\nOf Counsel (pro hac vice pending)          Attorney in Charge (State Bar No.\nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER                    24033047; S.D. Tex. 30555)\n & FELD LLP                               Elizabeth D. Scott\nOne Bryant Park                            Of Counsel (State Bar No. 24059699;\nNew York, NY 10036                         S.D. Tex. 2255287)\nTelephone: (212) 872-1000                 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER\nEmail: mhurley@akingump.com                & FELD LLP\n                                          2300 North Field Street, Suite 1800\nZ.W. Julius Chen                          Dallas, TX 75201\n  Of Counsel (pro hac vice pending)       Telephone: (214) 969-2800\nKristen E. Loveland                       Email: sschultz@akingump.com\n  Of Counsel (pro hac vice pending)       Email: edscott@akingump.com\nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER\n & FELD LLP\n2001 K Street, NW\nWashington, DC 20006\nTelephone: (202) 887-4000\nEmail: chenj@akingump.com\nEmail: kloveland@akingump.com\n                 Counsel to The Ad Hoc Group of SAFE Parties\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 2 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT\n\n      Pursuant to Rule 8012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, The Ad\n\nHoc Group of SAFE Parties (the \u201cAd Hoc Group\u201d) hereby states: The Ad Hoc Group\n\nis a group of parties-in-interest with claims against the Debtors. As such, the Ad\n\nHoc Group has no parent corporation or stock.\n\n      All the Debtors except for the Wind Down Debtor Rhodium Enterprises, Inc.\n\n(the \u201cWind Down Debtor\u201d) were dissolved or merged into the Wind Down Debtor\n\non the Effective Date of the Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation\n\nfor Rhodium Encore LLC and Its Affiliated Debtors. The Wind Down Debtor has\n\nno parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of\n\nRhodium Enterprises, Inc.\u2019s equity interests.\n\n\n\n\n                                          i\n\f      Case 4:26-cv-00235             Document 8            Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD                Page 3 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS\nJURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................................................... 1\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ...................................................................... 1\nINTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 2\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... 4\n        A.       Statutory Background ................................................................. 4\n        B.       Factual Background.................................................................... 5\n                 1.       Rhodium files for bankruptcy and seeks to retain\n                          LKC as special litigation counsel. ................................... 5\n                 2.       After virtually all LKC work was completed, LKC\n                          and Rhodium seek approval of a reverse-engineered\n                          contingent fee that fits the precise terms of\n                          Rhodium\u2019s bespoke settlement with Whinstone. .............. 7\n                 3.       The Bankruptcy Court approves LKC\u2019s reverse-\n                          engineered contingent fee. ............................................. 11\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................... 13\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................... 14\nARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 15\nTHE BANKRUPTCY COURT\u2019S MODIFICATION OF THE TERMS\n     UNDER WHICH LKC WAS RETAINED CONTRAVENES\n     SECTION 328(a) ................................................................................ 15\n        A.       The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s Approval Of The Modified\n                 Contingent Fee Cannot Rest On The Supposed Approval\n                 Of The Original Contingent Fee .............................................. 17\n                 1.       The Bankruptcy Court could not have authorized the\n                          original contingent fee as \u201creasonable\u201d when its\n                          terms were concealed. .................................................... 17\n                 2.       The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s justifications for approving\n                          a contingent fee arrangement do not satisfy section\n                          328(a). ............................................................................ 21\n        B.       The Bankruptcy Court Erred In Permitting LKC To Tailor\n                 Its Compensation Arrangement To Foreseeable\n                 Developments ........................................................................... 24\n\n\n                                                          ii\n\f      Case 4:26-cv-00235             Document 8          Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD             Page 4 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                 1.       A bankruptcy court cannot modify a section 328(a)\n                          fee arrangement absent developments \u201cincapable of\n                          being anticipated.\u201d ........................................................ 25\n                 2.       The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s justifications for approving\n                          the modified fee arrangement do not satisfy section\n                          328(a)\u2019s requirements. ................................................... 29\nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 32\n\n\n\n\n                                                        iii\n\f      Case 4:26-cv-00235            Document 8          Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD            Page 5 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                                    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCASES:\n\nDuke v. Walker & Patterson, P.C.,\n  608 B.R. 499 (S.D. Tex. 2019) ............................................................................. 1\n\nIn re ASARCO, L.L.C.,\n    702 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................passim\n\nIn re Assadi,\n    No. 24-50268, 2025 WL 1576801 (5th Cir. June 4, 2025) ................................ 28\n\nIn re Barron,\n    225 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 26\n    325 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................25, 26\n\nIn re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc.,\n    272 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001)................................................................. 19\n\nIn re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.,\n    785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) ................................................................17, 22, 30\n\nIn re Delta Servs. Indus.,\n    782 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1986) .............................................................................. 1\n\nIn re Energy Partners, Ltd.,\n    409 B.R. 211 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) .........................................................17, 20\n\nIn re Evangeline Refin. Co.,\n    890 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................... 18, 22\n\nIn re Frontier Commc\u2019ns Corp.,\n    623 B.R. 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) ................................................................ 17\n\nIn re High Voltage Eng\u2019g Corp.,\n    311 B.R. 320 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) ................................................................ 19\n\nIn re Insilco Techs., Inc.,\n    291 B.R. 628 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) ................................................................... 18\n\nIn re MMA L. Firm, PLLC,\n    661 B.R. 548 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2024) ...................................................17, 18, 19\n\n\n                                                       iv\n\f       Case 4:26-cv-00235                Document 8            Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD                Page 6 of 40\n\n\n\n\nIn re Nucentrix Broadband Networks, Inc.,\n    314 B.R. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) ........................................................16, 26\n\nState v. Biden,\n   10 F.4th 538 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................... 22\n\nUnited Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton,\n  315 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2003) ............................................................................... 14\n\nUnited States v. Valdez,\n  548 F. App\u2019x 995 (5th Cir. 2013) ....................................................................... 14\n\nSTATUTES:\n\n11 U.S.C.\n   \u00a7 327(e) ................................................................................................................. 4\n   \u00a7 328(a) ........................................................................................................passim\n   \u00a7 330(a) ....................................................................................................... 4, 5, 15\n   \u00a7 365(a) ................................................................................................................. 6\n\n28 U.S.C.\n   \u00a7 157(a) ................................................................................................................. 1\n   \u00a7 157(b) ................................................................................................................. 1\n   \u00a7 158(a)(1) ............................................................................................................ 1\n   \u00a7 158(c)(2) ............................................................................................................ 1\n   \u00a7 1334(a) ............................................................................................................... 1\n\nOther Authorities\n\n3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY \u00a7 328.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.\n   Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009) .............................................................................. 26\n\nFED. R. BANKR. P.\n  2014(a) .......................................................................................................... 17, 21\n  8002(a)(1) ............................................................................................................. 1\n\n\n\n\n                                                              v\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 7 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                       JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT\n\n      The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the jointly administered chapter\n\n11 bankruptcy case of the Debtors. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 157(a)-(b), 1334(a). This Court\n\nhas jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the bankruptcy court\u2019s Final Order Allowing\n\nCompensation and Reimbursement of Expenses to Lehotsky Keller Cohn LLP (the\n\n\u201cFinal Order\u201d), A741; see 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(a)(1), as well as the underlying Order\n\nGranting Debtors\u2019 Application for an Updated Order Authorizing the Retention and\n\nEmployment of Lehotsky Keller Cohn LLP as Special Litigation Counsel (the\n\n\u201cModified Retention Order\u201d), which authorized the retention of Lehotsky Keller\n\nCohn LLP and purported to set forth the terms of the fee award in the Final Order,\n\nA479; see In re Delta Servs. Indus., 782 F.2d 1267, 1272 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding\n\nthat bankruptcy court\u2019s retention orders are interlocutory); Duke v. Walker &\n\nPatterson, P.C., 608 B.R. 499, 504 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (\u201cA bankruptcy court\u2019s order\n\ngranting a final fee application is an appealable order.\u201d). The Final Order was issued\n\non December 24, 2025, and Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on January 7,\n\n2026. A741; Dkt. No. 1; see 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(c)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002(a)(1).\n\n                          STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE\n\n      Whether the bankruptcy court erred in approving a Modified Retention Order\n\nthat resulted in a nearly $9 million contingent fee to Lehotsky Keller Cohn LLP,\n\n\n\n\n                                          1\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 8 of 40\n\n\n\n\nwhen 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a) requires an ex ante assessment of the fee\u2019s reasonableness\n\nand precludes any modification of its terms in light of foreseeable circumstances.\n\n                                INTRODUCTION\n\n      The bankruptcy court\u2019s award of a contingent fee of nearly $9 million to\n\nLehotsky Keller Cohn LLP (\u201cLKC\u201d), based on a Modified Retention Order that\n\namended the terms of engagement as LKC was finishing its work, contravenes\n\nsettled bankruptcy law. Under section 328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy\n\ncourt may authorize debtors to retain and compensate attorneys who are paid out of\n\nthe bankruptcy estates, to the extent the proposed terms are identified at the outset\n\nof the engagement and are reasonable. To secure the certainty of payment provided\n\nby a section 328(a) retention, applicants must disclose the specifics of the fee\n\narrangement in their application, so the proposed terms can be evaluated by the\n\nbankruptcy court and all creditors and other parties-in-interest. Once approved, the\n\nterms of engagement may be altered only if subsequent developments were\n\nincapable of being anticipated at the time the engagement was authorized.\n\n      In this case, Rhodium Encore LLC and its affiliates (collectively, \u201cRhodium\u201d\n\nor the \u201cDebtors\u201d) sought to retain LKC as special litigation counsel in their\n\nbankruptcy proceedings.     In an original application for LKC\u2019s retention, filed\n\npursuant to section 328(a), Rhodium disclosed the details of hourly rates for LKC\u2019s\n\nservices and noted, without any detail, a contingent fee. The bankruptcy court\n\n\n                                         2\n\f     Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 9 of 40\n\n\n\n\napproved the application without mentioning the contingent fee at all. The debtor\n\nthen proceeded to pursue the claims that were the subject of the LKC retention and\n\nlater agreed to a settlement. At that point, when the terms of the settlement became\n\nclear, Rhodium filed a new application that, for the first time, sought the bankruptcy\n\ncourt\u2019s approval of specified terms for a contingent fee that closely tracked the\n\nstructure of the settlement. Those new terms ultimately would take nearly $9 million\n\nfrom the Debtors\u2019 estate and award it to LKC. The bankruptcy court awarded the\n\nfee to LKC as a modification of the contingent fee it had purportedly approved as\n\npart of the original application.\n\n      In approving that modified contingent fee, the bankruptcy court erred twice.\n\nAs a threshold matter, the bankruptcy court was wrong to find that the fee was\n\nappropriate in light of its approval of the original application. That approval did not\n\ncontain section 328(a)\u2019s requisite reasonableness determination with respect to any\n\ncontingent fee. Nor could it have, for Rhodium failed to disclose any details of the\n\nfee, such as its size and triggers. In addition, by the bankruptcy court\u2019s own\n\nadmission, the litigation settlement that the modifications were intended to capture\n\nwas \u201cforeseeable,\u201d not incapable of anticipation. And to the extent the bankruptcy\n\ncourt believed that the modifications were mere clarifications instead of substantive\n\nchanges, that distinction is not relevant under section 328(a)\u2019s exacting standard.\n\nMoreover, any such belief would be clearly erroneous: The changes effectively\n\n\n                                          3\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8       Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 10 of 40\n\n\n\n\nallowed LKC to swap at most a $600,000 flat fee, the terms of which were not\n\ndisclosed until after their purported approval, for a percentage-based fee of nearly\n\n$9 million for achieving the same result.\n\n      This Court should not permit the debtors and LKC to award LKC a windfall\n\nby tailoring the terms of a modified contingent fee with the benefit of hindsight, to\n\nthe detriment of creditors\u2019 recoveries. That is precisely the result that section 328(a)\n\neschews.\n\n                          STATEMENT OF THE CASE\n\n      A.     Statutory Background\n\n      Under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee or debtor may employ an attorney,\n\nfinancial advisor, or other professional \u201cfor a specified special purpose.\u201d 11 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7 327(e). Such professionals \u201chave the option of being compensated under either\n\n[section] 328(a) or [section] 330(a)\u201d of the Bankruptcy Code. In re ASARCO,\n\nL.L.C., 702 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2012).\n\n      Section 328(a)\u2014the section at issue here\u2014\u201capplies when the bankruptcy\n\ncourt approves a particular rate or means of payment [at the outset of the\n\nengagement].\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 260 (alteration in original) (emphasis\n\nadded); see 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a) (permitting retention on \u201creasonable terms and\n\nconditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or\n\npercentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis\u201d). By contrast, section 330(a)\n\n\n                                            4\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 11 of 40\n\n\n\n\napplies at the end of the engagement and gives the bankruptcy court \u201cbroad\n\ndiscretion\u201d to determine the amount professionals should be paid. In re ASARCO,\n\n702 F.3d at 260; see 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 330(a) (providing for \u201creasonable compensation\n\nfor actual, necessary services rendered\u201d and \u201creimbursement for actual, necessary\n\nexpenses\u201d).    As the Fifth Circuit has explained, section 328(a) provides the\n\n\u201ctradeoff\u201d of \u201ccertainty and predictability . . . at the expense of [section 330(a)\u2019s]\n\nflexibility,\u201d given that \u201cprofessionals would be underpaid [under section 328(a)] if\n\ntheir engagements should require more work than they had initially expected.\u201d In\n\nre ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 261.\n\n      By its terms, section 328(a) imposes two limitations, both of which are central\n\nto this appeal.    First, the \u201cterms and conditions of employment\u201d must be\n\n\u201creasonable.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a). Second, a bankruptcy court may modify a\n\nprofessional\u2019s approved compensation only if the original \u201cterms and conditions\n\nprove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being\n\nanticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.\u201d Id.\n\n      B.      Factual Background\n\n              1.   Rhodium files for bankruptcy and seeks to retain LKC as special\n                   litigation counsel.\n\n      In August 2024, Rhodium, a cryptocurrency miner, filed voluntary petitions\n\nin the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (the \u201cBankruptcy\n\nCourt\u201d) under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.             Rhodium\u2019s\n\n                                          5\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235      Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 12 of 40\n\n\n\n\nprincipal operations were conducted at a site owned by Whinstone U.S., Inc.\n\n(\u201cWhinstone\u201d) in Rockdale, Texas, where Rhodium had invested approximately\n\n$150 million to build out its infrastructure.       A013.    Although Rhodium and\n\nWhinstone worked cooperatively for over two years, things changed in May 2021\n\nwhen one of Rhodium\u2019s largest competitors strategically acquired Whinstone. A016.\n\nSoon after, Whinstone attempted to terminate its contracts with Rhodium and shut\n\noff power to the Rockdale site, which resulted in significant costs to Rhodium and\n\nextensive litigation that was not resolved by the time Rhodium filed for chapter 11.\n\nA019.\n\n        On the first day of the bankruptcy, Rhodium sought the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s\n\napproval to assume certain of Rhodium\u2019s contracts with Whinstone. A022; see 11\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 365(a) (a debtor in possession \u201csubject to the court\u2019s approval, may assume\n\nor reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor\u201d). In addition,\n\nRhodium sought the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s permission to retain LKC\u2014the law firm\n\nthat had represented Rhodium from the start of its disputes with Whinstone\u2014as its\n\nspecial litigation counsel. A479.\n\n        In its original application for an order authorizing LKC\u2019s retention as special\n\nlitigation counsel (the \u201cOriginal Application\u201d), which was submitted pursuant to\n\nsection 328(a), Rhodium explained that LKC would be paid \u201cprimarily on a hourly\n\nbasis . . . with an update to the Firm\u2019s 2024 standard rates.\u201d A480; see A048, \u00b6 26.\n\n\n                                           6\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235      Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 13 of 40\n\n\n\n\nThe Original Application also \u201cmentioned that LKC would be \u2018discount[ing] its rates\n\nin exchange for a contingent fee.\u2019\u201d A480 (alterations in original) (quoting A053,\n\n\u00b6 44). The Original Application did not, however, disclose any details about the\n\nputative contingent fee or describe any of the circumstances under which it would\n\nbe triggered.\n\n      In an October 14, 2024 order granting the Original Application (the \u201cOriginal\n\nRetention Order\u201d) under section 328(a), the Bankruptcy Court authorized LKC\u2019s\n\nretention \u201cin accordance with [LKC]\u2019s normal hourly rates and disbursement\n\npolicies, as contemplated by the [Original] Application.\u201d A082-A083. The Order\n\nmade no mention of a contingent fee and was entered before the Ad Hoc Group of\n\nSAFE Parties (the \u201cAd Hoc Group\u201d) was formed. See A085.\n\n                2.   After virtually all LKC work was completed, LKC and Rhodium\n                     seek approval of a reverse-engineered contingent fee that fits the\n                     precise terms of Rhodium\u2019s bespoke settlement with Whinstone.\n\n      LKC, along with two other law firms, represented Rhodium in connection\n\nwith a four-day evidentiary hearing in November 2024 concerning Rhodium\u2019s\n\nmotion to assume. A225. On December 16, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that\n\nRhodium could assume the Whinstone contracts, id., largely ending the primary\n\nlitigation work for which LKC had been retained by the bankruptcy estates.\n\n      During a February 19, 2025 in-person mediation at which LKC was present,\n\nthe main economic terms of a proposed settlement between Rhodium and Whinstone\n\n\n                                           7\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 14 of 40\n\n\n\n\nwere announced, which were later embodied in several related agreements between\n\nthe parties. See A115. The agreements provided that Whinstone would acquire all\n\nor substantially all of Rhodium\u2019s tangible assets \u201clocated at Rockdale\u201d and contracts\n\nfor consideration worth $185 million. See A115, A190. Rhodium\u2019s lead bankruptcy\n\ncounsel credited the February 19, 2025 mediation with getting the parties \u201cmost of\n\nthe way\u201d to the $185 million transaction. Tr. of Mar. 19, 2025 Hr\u2019g at 6, Whinstone\n\nUS, Inc. v. Imperium Inv. Holdings LLC, No. 24-03240 (ARP) (Bankr. S.D. Tex.\n\nMar. 31, 2025); see also A172.\n\n      Just two weeks after the February 19, 2025 mediation, LKC and Rhodium\n\nsigned a new engagement letter (the \u201cMarch 2025 Letter\u201d) that modified and\n\npurported to \u201csupersede[]\u201d the terms of the still-undisclosed original contingent fee\n\narrangement. A103. On March 6, 2025, Rhodium filed an application seeking the\n\nBankruptcy Court\u2019s approval of the modified arrangement (the \u201cModified\n\nApplication\u201d). For the first time, Rhodium and LKC disclosed the terms of the\n\noriginal contingent fee, which were outlined in an engagement letter from nearly two\n\nyears earlier (the \u201cMay 2023 Letter\u201d) that was now attached to the Modified\n\nApplication.\n\n      The May 2023 Letter established \u201cthree components\u201d for LKC\u2019s original\n\ncontingent fee: (a) \u201c$600,000 if\u201d Rhodium was \u201cacquired by Whinstone or an\n\naffiliate\u201d; (b) \u201c5% of any recovered energy credits up to $5 million, and 1% of any\n\n\n                                         8\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 15 of 40\n\n\n\n\nadditional recovered energy credits\u201d; and (c) \u201c10% of any additional amounts not\n\nattributable to energy credits that [Rhodium] recover[ed], including, but not limited\n\nto, compensatory damages, incidental or consequential damages, punitive or\n\nexemplary damages, civil fines, costs, and attorneys\u2019 fees.\u201d A100.\n\n        The March 2025 Letter established materially different terms for LKC\u2019s\n\nmodified contingent fee. Most significantly, the March 2025 Letter added a new\n\nparagraph (d) that created an additional trigger for a percentage-based success fee,\n\nbeyond those in paragraphs (b) and (c). While the May 2023 Letter triggered such\n\nfees only if Rhodium recovered \u201cenergy credits\u201d or \u201cdamages\u201d from the Whinstone\n\nlitigation, the March 2025 Letter triggered such fees if, in addition, \u201c[Rhodium] (or\n\nall or substantially all of the Rockdale assets) [was] acquired by Whinstone or an\n\naffiliate\u201d\u2014the scenario already covered by paragraph (a)\u2019s flat fee of $600,000.\n\nA104.\n\n        The Ad Hoc Group objected, arguing that Rhodium and LKC could not\n\nmodify the engagement terms sought by the Original Retention Application and\n\nembodied in the Original Retention Order. The Ad Hoc Group noted that LKC had\n\nfailed to disclose the terms of any putative contingent fee arrangement in its Original\n\nRetention Application, and that therefore the Original Retention Order did not, and\n\ncould not have, authorized a contingent fee. The Ad Hoc Group emphasized that\n\n\u201c[a] contingent fee arrangement cannot be approved without the terms and triggers\n\n\n                                          9\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8    Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 16 of 40\n\n\n\n\nfor the fee being disclosed in advance in connection with the professional\u2019s fee\n\napplication, including so the Court and stakeholders can consider whether those\n\nterms and triggers are reasonable.\u201d A175. Certainly, the Ad Hoc Group argued,\n\nRhodium and LKC could not now reverse-engineer LKC\u2019s fee to fit the Whinstone\n\nsettlement, after LKC had completed virtually all of its substantive work for the\n\nDebtors and learned of the terms of the Whinstone settlement in connection with the\n\nFebruary 19, 2025 mediation. A170.\n\n        The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Modified Application on June 4,\n\n2025. Rhodium\u2019s general counsel, Charles Topping, testified that Rhodium had not\n\ndisclosed the details of the original contingent fee because they were \u201cnot something\n\nthat you would normally give to a litigation adversary,\u201d like Whinstone. A393. In\n\naddition, Topping provided his view that the fee had been \u201cadequately disclosed\u201d\n\nbecause its existence had been \u201cmentioned\u201d in the Original Application. A394-\n\nA395.\n\n        Topping also testified that he did not believe there were substantive\n\ndifferences between the original and modified arrangements.          He principally\n\nexplained that the modified arrangement \u201cprovide[d] clarity and transparency as to\n\nthe method\u201d of compensation in the case of \u201ca settlement that both resolved the\n\nlitigation and sold other Rhodium assets[.]\u201d A398-A399. Yet in contemporaneous\n\nemails sent to LKC soon after the terms of the settlement became clear\u2014emails that\n\n\n                                         10\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 17 of 40\n\n\n\n\nwere not produced and did not surface until after the Court issued the Modified\n\nRetention Order1\u2014Topping advised that his \u201creading of the present engagement\n\nletter is that in the event of an acquisition by Whinstone . . . the success fee would\n\nbe limited to [the] $600k.\u201d A731 (emphasis added); see also SA010, SA018.\n\nTopping assured LKC that he was \u201cattempting to solve for that problem.\u201d A731.\n\n             3.    The Bankruptcy Court approves LKC\u2019s reverse-engineered\n                   contingent fee.\n\n      The Bankruptcy Court denied the Ad Hoc Group\u2019s objection and approved\n\nthe requested modifications to the terms of LKC\u2019s retention. See A479.\n\n      The Bankruptcy Court first rejected the Ad Hoc Group\u2019s argument \u201cthat when\n\nRule 2014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy states than an application must include\n\n\u2018any proposed arrangement for compensation,\u2019 . . . the application must include more\n\ndetail on the contingent fee than was included in the Debtors\u2019 initial application.\u201d\n\n\n      1\n        In March 2025, prior to the filing of the Ad Hoc Group\u2019s objection to the\nModified Application, the Ad Hoc Group served Rhodium with discovery to which\nTopping\u2019s emails would have been responsive. Rhodium failed to produce them.\nRhodium later produced the emails in October 2025 in response to a discovery\nrequest from LKC, and (at the Ad Hoc Group\u2019s insistence) submitted the emails to\nthe Bankruptcy Court in connection with an Emergency Motion for Authority to Pay\nFees to Lehotsky Keller & Cohn LLP. See A725. Rhodium acknowledged that its\ngeneral counsel\u2019s emails \u201ccould be read as inconsistent with [his] testimony at the\nhearing on the objection to the revised engagement letter.\u201d A732. It nonetheless\nattempted to explain away the content of those emails based on the \u201ccontext\u201d that\nTopping was \u201cnegotiating a potential success fee.\u201d A733. Topping\u2019s quick\nprovision of a modified fee arrangement and reassurance that Rhodium was\n\u201cattempting to solve for th[e] problem\u201d of the $600,000 fee belies that explanation.\nSee A731.\n                                         11\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 18 of 40\n\n\n\n\nA492. Notably, the Bankruptcy Court did not suggest that it had ever assessed\n\nwhether the terms of the original contingent fee (or even the terms of the modified\n\ncontingent fee) were reasonable under section 328(a). Instead, it concluded that,\n\n\u201c[g]iven the contributions by LKC to the Whinstone matter, it would be\n\nunreasonable for th[e] Court to hold that LKC cannot receive a contingent fee,\n\nespecially when one considers that the initial application mentioned a contingency\n\nfee numerous times.\u201d A497.\n\n      In a similar vein, the Bankruptcy Court credited LKC\u2019s explanation that it had\n\n\u201crelied on the Debtors and Debtors\u2019 bankruptcy counsel regarding the amount of\n\ninformation to be included about the contingent fee,\u201d because the Debtors had\n\npurportedly been concerned about revealing the details of the contingent fee to\n\nWhinstone, their litigation adversary.        A493-A494.    The Bankruptcy Court\n\nacknowledged that the Debtors and LKC could have pursued \u201cavenues . . . that would\n\nallow for the protection of potentially privileged information while at the same time\n\nensuring that the parties have fulsome notice.\u201d A494. Yet the Bankruptcy Court\n\nconcluded that \u201cit would disrupt any notion of fairness to punish LKC for following\n\nthe direction and advice of the Debtors\u2019 general counsel and Debtors\u2019 experienced\n\nbankruptcy counsel.\u201d A494.\n\n      The Bankruptcy Court also did not analyze whether altering the terms of the\n\naward was justified by \u201cdevelopments not capable of being anticipated.\u201d 11 U.S.C.\n\n\n                                         12\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 19 of 40\n\n\n\n\n\u00a7 328(a). On the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court deemed the ultimate outcome to be\n\n\u201cforeseeable.\u201d A497. The Bankruptcy Court thus approved the modification as\n\nreflecting \u201cthe original intention of the agreement between the Debtors and LKC at\n\nthe time of initial application.\u201d A496.\n\n                       SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT\n\n      This Court should reverse the Final Order\u2019s award of a contingent fee to LKC\n\nunder the terms of the Modified Retention Order.\n\n      A. According to the Bankruptcy Court, the approval of the contingent fee\n\nproposed in the Modified Application was appropriate because the Original\n\nApplication had mentioned a contingent fee numerous times. Mere mentions of a\n\nfee are not enough. Section 328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires an assessment\n\nof reasonableness, which is possible only if the \u201cspecific facts\u201d of the arrangement\n\nrequired by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2014 are disclosed to the\n\nBankruptcy Court and creditors. Because the Original Application did not disclose\n\nthose facts, no original contingent fee could have been approved and no modification\n\ncan be based on such approval. It makes no difference under section 328(a) that\n\nRhodium and LKC withheld those details to avoid sharing them with a litigation\n\nadversary (i.e., Whinstone), particularly when the Bankruptcy Court itself\n\nrecognized that disclosure could have been possible under a protective order. Nor is\n\n\n\n\n                                          13\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD     Page 20 of 40\n\n\n\n\nit relevant to the statutory standard that LKC relied on the misguided advice of\n\nRhodium\u2019s experienced bankruptcy counsel.\n\n      B. The Bankruptcy Court also erred in approving the modifications to the\n\ncontingent fee.    Fifth Circuit precedent is crystal clear that an after-the-fact\n\nmodification of a section 328(a) fee arrangement is reversible error unless\n\nsubsequent developments were incapable of being anticipated at the time the\n\nengagement was approved. Here, the Bankruptcy Court concluded the opposite; it\n\nheld that the subsequent developments warranting the modifications were\n\n\u201cforeseeable.\u201d    Furthermore, the suggestion that the proposed modification\n\namounted to a clarification, as opposed to a substantive change, is both legally\n\nirrelevant and refuted by LKC\u2019s receipt of a $9 million percentage-based-fee\n\nwindfall instead of the $600,000 flat fee it originally agreed to receive.\n\n                            STANDARD OF REVIEW\n\n      Courts \u201canalyze the legal conclusions that guided [an] awarding court\u2019s\n\ndeterminations [of attorneys\u2019 fees] de novo and that court\u2019s findings of fact for clear\n\nerror.\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 257. They \u201calso review mixed questions of law\n\nand fact de novo.\u201d Id. A bankruptcy court\u2019s approval of a retention agreement under\n\nsection 328(a) must be consistent with the \u201ctenets . . . for determining\n\nreasonableness.\u201d United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 228-234 (3d\n\nCir. 2003); see also United States v. Valdez, 548 F. App\u2019x 995, 1003 (5th Cir. 2013)\n\n\n                                          14\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 21 of 40\n\n\n\n\n(\u201cCompliance with [a] statute is reviewed de novo.\u201d). \u201cIn the context of a [section]\n\n328(a) award, . . . the question whether subsequent developments were \u2018not capable\n\nof being anticipated\u2019 is, at the very least, a mixed question of law and fact, if not a\n\npure question of law, subject in either case to de novo review.\u201d In re ASARCO, 702\n\nF.3d at 263.\n\n                                   ARGUMENT\n\nTHE BANKRUPTCY COURT\u2019S MODIFICATION OF THE TERMS UNDER\nWHICH LKC WAS RETAINED CONTRAVENES SECTION 328(a)\n\n      Professionals who seek compensation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a) \u201cmust\n\naccept [a] tradeoff.\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 261. \u201c[B]y obtaining prior approval\n\nof their fee arrangements under [section] 328(a),\u201d such professionals \u201cavoid\n\nsubjecting their fees to the inherent uncertainty\u201d that comes with the \u201cbroad\n\ndiscretion\u201d bankruptcy courts exercise under section 330(a) after professional\n\nservices have been rendered. Id. at 260-261. But to gain the \u201ccertainty and\n\npredictability\u201d that section 328(a) affords, the proponent of the retention bears the\n\nburden to demonstrate, and a bankruptcy court must in turn ensure, that the proposed\n\nterms of engagement are \u201creasonable.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a). When terms have been\n\napproved under section 328(a), moreover, \u201cthe court may not stray from\n\nthem . . . unless developments subsequent to the original approval that were\n\n\n\n\n                                          15\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 22 of 40\n\n\n\n\nincapable of being anticipated render the terms improvident.\u201d In re ASARCO, 702\n\nF.3d at 257 (emphasis added).\n\n      The Fifth Circuit has not hesitated to find \u201creversible error when a bankruptcy\n\ncourt has deviated from\u201d those requirements, as the Bankruptcy Court did here. In\n\nre Nucentrix Broadband Networks, Inc., 314 B.R. 574, 580 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).\n\nIn the Modified Retention Order, the Bankruptcy Court approved Rhodium and\n\nLKC\u2019s modified contingent fee arrangement on the grounds that (i) it had\n\nappropriately approved the parties\u2019 original contingent fee and (ii) the modified\n\narrangement did not include \u201csignificant substantive changes.\u201d A492-A497. The\n\nBankruptcy Court, however, could not have concluded (and did not conclude) that\n\nthe previously undisclosed terms of the original contingent fee were \u201creasonable,\u201d\n\nand so it could not have based its approval of the modified contingent fee on any\n\napproval of an original fee.     It also did not analyze whether the requested\n\nmodifications to that purported arrangement\u2014which were plainly significant and\n\nindisputably foreseeable\u2014met section 328(a)\u2019s demanding standard for after-the-\n\nfact adjustment. This Court should reverse the award of a contingent fee to LKC.\n\n\n\n\n                                        16\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 23 of 40\n\n\n\n\n      A.     The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s Approval Of The Modified Contingent\n             Fee Cannot Rest On The Supposed Approval Of The Original\n             Contingent Fee\n\n             1.     The Bankruptcy Court could not have authorized the original\n                    contingent fee as \u201creasonable\u201d when its terms were concealed.\n\n      a.   A bankruptcy court that fails to evaluate whether a professional\u2019s\n\ncompensation is \u201creasonable\u201d under section 328(a) abdicates its \u201cbroad supervisory\n\npowers over professional persons who render services for the estate.\u201d          In re\n\nConsolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir. 1986). \u201c[I]n light of\n\nthe limited review that can be rendered after the fact\u201d to terms approved under\n\nsection 328(a), \u201cstrong attention must be given to whether or not the terms are truly\n\nreasonable\u201d at the outset. In re MMA L. Firm, PLLC, 661 B.R. 548, 555 (Bankr.\n\nS.D. Tex. 2024). The burden of showing reasonableness falls on the party \u201cseeking\n\nthe employment of professionals under [section] 328(a),\u201d and must be made based\n\non \u201cevidence, not conclusory statements.\u201d In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R.\n\n211, 226 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (some emphasis omitted); see also In re Frontier\n\nCommc\u2019ns Corp., 623 B.R. 358, 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (\u201c[T]he burden of\n\nproof to establish that the proposed compensation terms are reasonable rests with the\n\napplicant.\u201d). Indeed, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are explicit that an\n\napplication for professional employment \u201cmust state specific facts showing . . . any\n\nproposed arrangement for compensation.\u201d         FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a)(2)(E)\n\n(emphasis added).\n\n                                         17\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235      Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD     Page 24 of 40\n\n\n\n\n      In the absence of such disclosure, bankruptcy courts have no ability to\n\ndetermine \u201cwhether the retention, as proposed, is in the best interests of the estate.\u201d\n\nIn re MMA L. Firm, 661 B.R. at 555; see In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 291 B.R. 628,\n\n634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (section 328(a)\u2019s \u201cinquiry about what is \u2018reasonable\u2019 must\n\nbe tailored to Bankruptcy Code requirements, including . . . the interests of the\n\nvarious constituents\u201d). Doing so is essential because \u201cevery dollar received by the\n\napplicant results in one dollar less for creditors.\u201d In re Evangeline Refin. Co., 890\n\nF.2d 1312, 1326 (5th Cir. 1989); see A053, \u00b6 43 (acknowledging LKC\u2019s fees \u201care to\n\nbe paid out of Debtors\u2019 estates\u201d). That means a fee arrangement is not a \u201csimple\u201d\n\nagreement \u201cbetween . . . two parties.\u201d A753, Tr. of Hr\u2019g at 109:5-7, In re Loral\n\nSpace & Commc\u2019ns Ltd., No. 03-41710 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2006), Dkt.\n\nNo. 2769 (hereinafter \u201cLoral Tr.\u201d). Rather, \u201cthe entire creditor body and other\n\nparties in interest are, in essence, parties to the agreement\u201d and must be apprised of\n\nits particulars. A753 at 109:11-14; see A752 at 108:16-19 (requiring \u201cthat a\n\nsection 328(a) retention [request] . . . must go out on an extremely wide notice to\n\nessentially all known parties in interest before it is finally approved\u201d); see also In re\n\nMMA L. Firm, 661 B.R. at 555 (acknowledging that bankruptcy courts must take\n\ninto account \u201cwhether there is creditor opposition to the retention and retainer\n\nprovisions\u201d).\n\n\n\n\n                                           18\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 25 of 40\n\n\n\n\n      Equally important, without knowing the details of a proposed fee arrangement\n\na bankruptcy court cannot assess \u201cwhether, given the size, circumstances and posture\n\nof the case, the amount of the retainer is itself reasonable.\u201d In re MMA L. Firm, 661\n\nB.R. at 555. That is especially imperative where, as here, a contingent fee is\n\nproposed because such fees are \u201cnot appropriate in every case.\u201d In re Computer\n\nLearning Ctrs., Inc., 272 B.R. 897, 906 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001).                  Their\n\nreasonableness depends on a comparison with the \u201cpotential legal fees under a\n\ntraditional hourly fee agreement, the likelihood of prevailing, and the magnitude of\n\nthe recovery,\u201d id., as well as \u201cthe prevailing [contingent] fees in the industry for\n\ncomparable engagements,\u201d In re High Voltage Eng\u2019g Corp., 311 B.R. 320, 335\n\n(Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).\n\n      Courts have not hesitated to reject contingent fees where applicants have\n\nfailed to satisfy those criteria. See, e.g., In re Computer Learning Ctrs., 272 B.R. at\n\n906 (rejecting \u201ccontingent fee proposal\u201d where \u201crecord [wa]s devoid of any\n\ninformation that would permit an informed evaluation [of the fee]\u201d); In re High\n\nVoltage Eng\u2019g, 311 B.R. at 335 (denying section 328(a) application for contingent\n\nfee where court was given no information about comparable fees \u201cin bankruptcy\n\ncases or other insolvency or workout situations\u201d).\n\n      b. In this case, the Bankruptcy Court could not have authorized a contingent\n\nfee through its Original Retention Order. The Bankruptcy Court could not have\n\n\n                                          19\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 26 of 40\n\n\n\n\nmade the requisite determination that the original fee was \u201creasonable\u201d\u2014and that\n\nthe modified fee was likewise reasonable based on its purported connection to the\n\noriginal\u2014because neither Rhodium nor LKC provided any details about that original\n\nfee. See In re Energy Partners, 409 B.R. at 226-227 (denying retention application\n\nin part because \u201cwholly insufficient record\u201d made it impossible to determine whether\n\n\u201cterms of an engagement agreement reflect normal business terms in the\n\nmarketplace\u201d). The Original Application stated only that LKC had agreed to \u201ca\n\ncontingent fee depending on the outcome of litigation.\u201d A052-A053, \u00b6 41.\n\n      That lack of elaboration stands in stark contrast to the Original Application\u2019s\n\njustification for the hourly rates that LKC intended to charge.        The Original\n\nApplication explained that LKC\u2019s \u201cstandard rates for 2024 are . . . $1400 per hour\n\nfor name partners, $1300 per hour for other partners, $1000 per hour for counsel,\n\n$850 per hour for associates, and $500 per hour for a staff attorney,\u201d and that such\n\nhourly rates were \u201cconsistent with rates that Lehotsky Keller Cohn LLP has charged\n\nin other comparable complex cases with no variation based upon the geographical\n\nlocation of a case.\u201d A052-A053, \u00b6\u00b6 41, 44. Rhodium\u2019s general counsel also\n\n\u201cconfirmed that the rates [LKC] will charge Debtors in the post-petition period will\n\nbe the same as the rates [LKC] charged Debtors in the period immediately preceding\n\nthe Petition Date\u201d and were \u201cconsistent with those of comparably skilled\n\n\n\n\n                                        20\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 27 of 40\n\n\n\n\nprofessionals in this market that Debtors have employed.\u201d A074, \u00b6\u00b6 10, 11. No such\n\nassurances were provided with respect to the contingent fee.\n\n      The Bankruptcy Court therefore had none of the details that would have\n\nallowed it to compare LKC\u2019s original contingent fee to fees under a traditional\n\nhourly arrangement or to prevailing fees in the industry for comparable\n\nengagements.      By the same token, because creditors likewise received no\n\ninformation about the original fee\u2019s terms, the Bankruptcy Court had no way of\n\nknowing their views. Without those \u201cspecific facts,\u201d the Bankruptcy Court could\n\nnot, and did not, assess whether the contingent fee was \u201creasonable\u201d in the context\n\nof this case. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a). And given that the Modified Retention\n\nOrder is predicated on the fiction that the original contingent fee was properly\n\napproved, the modified contingent fee cannot be \u201creasonable\u201d either.\n\n             2.     The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s justifications for approving a contingent\n                    fee arrangement do not satisfy section 328(a).\n\n      The Bankruptcy Court defended its purported approval of the original\n\ncontingent fee arrangement on three principal grounds.                None satisfies\n\nsection 328(a)\u2019s reasonableness requirement.\n\n      First, the Bankruptcy Court made much of the fact that the Original\n\nApplication \u201cmentioned\u201d the contingent fee. A492. But citing mere mentions of a\n\nfee\u2019s existence is no substitute for the evaluation of \u201cspecific facts,\u201d in the absence\n\nof which a reasonableness determination cannot be made. FED. R. BANKR. P.\n\n                                          21\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235      Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 28 of 40\n\n\n\n\n2014(a); cf. State v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 556 (5th Cir. 2021) (\u201cStating that a factor\n\nwas considered . . . is not a substitute for considering it.\u201d) (ellipsis in original).\n\nOtherwise, a bankruptcy court could conclude at the outset that a merely mentioned\n\ncontingent fee was \u201creasonable,\u201d only for the applicant to later reveal a 90% award\n\nthat stripped the estate of value. That is not the \u201cstrict standard[]\u201d section 328(a)\n\nimposes \u201cin light of the unique nature of the bankruptcy process,\u201d In re Consolidated\n\nBancshares, 785 F.2d at 1256 n.6, and the reality that \u201cevery dollar received by the\n\napplicant results in one dollar less for creditors,\u201d In re Evangeline Ref., 890 F.2d at\n\n1326.\n\n        In fact, it is difficult to see how the Original Retention Order could be deemed\n\nto have approved a contingent fee at all. The Bankruptcy Court had no contingent\n\nfee terms before it to approve. Contra A496. And the language in the Original\n\nRetention Order that the Bankruptcy Court later cited did not include the phrase\n\n\u201ccontingent fee,\u201d or any synonym. That language stated only that LKC would be\n\nemployed \u201cin accordance with [LKC]\u2019s normal hourly rates and disbursement\n\npolicies, as contemplated by the Application.\u201d A496 (quoting A082-A083). The\n\nphrase \u201cas contemplated by the Application\u201d is limited by the preceding clause,\n\nwhich discusses \u201chourly rates and disbursement policies\u201d\u2014not a contingent fee.\n\nRegardless, even if the Original Retention Order could be read to encompass a\n\n\n\n\n                                           22\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8    Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 29 of 40\n\n\n\n\ncontingent fee because it was mentioned in the Original Application, that would not\n\ncure the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s failure to determine its reasonableness.\n\n      Second, the Bankruptcy Court credited the Debtors and LKC\u2019s concern about\n\ndisclosing the contingent fee\u2019s terms to their litigation adversary, Whinstone. See\n\nA493. Yet nothing in section 328(a) permits applicants to keep the Bankruptcy\n\nCourt, creditors, and other stakeholders in the dark out of necessity. For good\n\nreason: There is no policy justification for allowing secretive arrangements, and\n\nevery reason to guard against abusive practices under section 328(a). Even assuming\n\nsuch an exception were available, it could hardly be invoked here. The Bankruptcy\n\nCourt itself recognized that the Debtors and LKC could have requested \u201ca protective\n\norder\u201d and pursued \u201cother avenues . . . that would allow for the protection of\n\npotentially privileged information while at the same time ensuring that the parties\n\nhave fulsome notice.\u201d A494.\n\n      Third, whether it would be \u201cfair[]\u201d to punish LKC for relying on the advice\n\nof Rhodium\u2019s bankruptcy counsel not to include any details of the contingent fee in\n\nits Original Application is likewise irrelevant under section 328(a). See A494\n\n(\u201cLKC relied on the Debtors and Debtors\u2019 bankruptcy counsel regarding the amount\n\nof information to be included about the contingent fee and it would disrupt any\n\nnotion of fairness to punish LKC for following the direction and advice of the\n\nDebtors\u2019 general counsel and Debtors\u2019 experienced bankruptcy counsel.\u201d). In\n\n\n                                        23\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 30 of 40\n\n\n\n\nsection 328(a), Congress established express textual requirements, not a free-ranging\n\nequitable inquiry. See pp. 4-5, supra. But even as a matter of equity, there was no\n\nunfairness. The requirements of section 328(a) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy\n\nProcedure 2014 are plain on their face and, as officers of the court, LKC attorneys\n\nwere required to understand and comply with the relevant rules. The same is true of\n\nthe \u201cDebtors\u2019 experienced bankruptcy counsel.\u201d A494.\n\n      B.     The Bankruptcy Court Erred In Permitting LKC To Tailor Its\n             Compensation Arrangement To Foreseeable Developments\n\n      Even if LKC\u2019s original contingent fee had been properly disclosed and found\n\nreasonable, the Bankruptcy Court committed an independent legal error when it\n\napproved LKC\u2019s request to modify an already approved fee based on developments\n\nthat the Bankruptcy Court concluded were \u201ccapable of being anticipated at the time\u201d\n\nthe original fee was approved. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a) (permitting modification only\n\nbased on \u201cdevelopments not capable of being anticipated at the time\u201d of the original\n\napplication) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit \u201cha[s] upheld a bankruptcy court\u2019s\n\nrevision of a fee arrangement pursuant to [section] 328(a)\u2019s improvidence exception\n\non only one occasion.\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 258-259 (emphasis added). This\n\ncase has no chance of being the second. The new fee arrangement assigned a\n\nsignificantly higher, percentage-based success fee to a circumstance that was already\n\nanticipated by the original arrangement\u2019s much more modest flat-fee award. Simply\n\n\n\n                                         24\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 31 of 40\n\n\n\n\nput, section 328(a) does not permit professionals to retroactively optimize their fees\n\nbased on outcomes they foresaw from the start.\n\n             1.    A bankruptcy court cannot modify a section 328(a) fee\n                   arrangement absent developments \u201cincapable of being\n                   anticipated.\u201d\n\n      a. A court may modify a compensation agreement it previously authorized\n\nunder section 328(a) only if the original arrangement \u201cprove[s] to have been\n\nimprovident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of\n\nthe fixing of such terms and conditions.\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 257 (quoting\n\n11 U.S.C. \u00a7 328(a)). That standard \u201ccreates a \u2018high hurdle\u2019 for a movant seeking to\n\nrevise the terms governing a professional\u2019s compensation ex post facto.\u201d Id. at 258.\n\n\u201cSuch a movant must show not merely that a compensation adjustment is appropriate\n\nin light of subsequent developments that were previously unforeseen or\n\nunanticipated by the parties; instead, the movant is tasked with the weightier burden\n\nof proving that the subsequent developments were incapable of being anticipated at\n\nthe time the engagement was approved.\u201d Id. (emphasis added); see In re Barron,\n\n325 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 2003) (\u201cBarron II\u201d) (\u201c[T]he intervening circumstances\n\nmust have been incapable of anticipation, not merely unanticipated.\u201d) (emphasis\n\n\n\n\n                                         25\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 32 of 40\n\n\n\n\nomitted); In re Barron, 225 F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2000) (\u201cBarron I\u201d) (\u201cIt is not\n\nenough that the developments were simply unforeseen.\u201d).\n\n      Accordingly, \u201cbefore a [bankruptcy] court may revise a compensation\n\nagreement, it must explain with specificity why the subsequent developments were\n\n\u2018incapable of being foreseen.\u2019\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 258 (quoting Barron II,\n\n325 F.3d at 693). \u201cA failure by the bankruptcy court to make a record establishing\n\nthat the approval was improvident and setting out with specificity (not conclusory\n\nstatements) the development that could not have been anticipated at the time of\n\napproval will be insufficient to comply with the requirements of section 328.\u201d Id.\n\n(emphasis omitted) (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY \u00a7 328.01 (Alan N. Resnick\n\n& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009)). Given that high bar, it is no surprise that\n\nmodifications to section 328(a) fee arrangements are routinely reversed, even where\n\nprofessionals will be \u201cunderpaid\u201d as a result. Id. at 261; see In re Nucentrix\n\nBroadband Networks, Inc., 314 B.R. at 580 (\u201cIn In re Barron, the Fifth Circuit twice\n\nreversed a very respected bankruptcy judge for altering a Section 328-approved\n\npayment scheme based upon only \u2018developments unfor[e]seen when originally\n\napproved.\u2019\u201d).\n\n      The Fifth Circuit\u2019s decision in In re ASARCO, is instructive. In that case, the\n\nbankruptcy court initially approved a section 328(a) fee arrangement for ASARCO\u2019s\n\nfinancial advisor, Barclays, when ASARCO\u2019s \u201crestructuring process was expected\n\n\n                                        26\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 33 of 40\n\n\n\n\nto take the form of a quick sale.\u201d 702 F.3d at 261-262. \u201cAfter being retained,\n\nhowever, Barclays became aware of numerous internal problems, which hindered\n\nASARCO\u2019s ability to effectuate a quick sale.\u201d Id. at 262. Because \u201cBarclays did\n\nnot know\u2014and was incapable of discovering\u2014how dysfunctional ASARCO truly\n\nwas at the time that it agreed to the terms of the Engagement Letter,\u201d the bankruptcy\n\ncourt reasoned that section 328\u2019s improvidence exception was satisfied and modified\n\nBarclays\u2019 fee to include a $975,000 fee enhancement. Id. at 264.\n\n      The Fifth Circuit reversed. It explained that Barclays \u201ccould have and should\n\nhave anticipated, within the meaning of [section] 328(a), that a company in need of\n\na Chapter 11 reorganization might have latent problems lurking under its hood\u201d and\n\n\u201cshould have accounted for it in the fee arrangement that was approved under\n\n[section] 328(a).\u201d In re ASARCO, 702 F.3d at 264-265. Even though Barclays had\n\nperformed \u201cadditional services\u201d and \u201cfill[ed] the gaps created by those who had left\u201d\n\nASARCO, the bankruptcy court unlawfully deviated from section 328(a)\u2019s pre-\n\napproved fee arrangement. Id. at 264. \u201cBarclays [had] enjoyed the benefits of this\n\nbargain by, for example, obtaining pre-approval of a $[5] million transaction fee,\u201d\n\nand so \u201cit must [also] bear [section] 328(a)\u2019s burdens.\u201d Id. at 265.\n\n      b. Far from assessing whether LKC\u2019s modified contingent fee was justified\n\nby \u201cdevelopments not capable of being anticipated,\u201d the Bankruptcy Court explained\n\nthat the modification \u201creflected the facts of the dispute between the Debtor and\n\n\n                                         27\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 34 of 40\n\n\n\n\nWhinstone at that time, as well as foreseeable outcomes.\u201d A496-A497 (emphasis\n\nadded). That finding\u2014the opposite of what justifies a section 328(a) modification\u2014\n\nalone requires reversal of the contingent fee award.\n\n      The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s concession is no surprise.            After all, as later\n\ndisclosed, paragraph (a) of the original contingent fee established a $600,000 award\n\nto LKC if Rhodium was \u201cacquired by Whinstone or an affiliate.\u201d A482. The\n\nproposed modification adds paragraph (d), which creates a percentage-based\n\nrecovery for the same event\u2014i.e., if \u201c[Rhodium] (or all or substantially all of the\n\nRockdale assets) [was] acquired by Whinstone or an affiliate.\u201d A484. Accordingly,\n\nthis case does not present any occasion to entertain Rhodium and LKC\u2019s complaint\n\nthat applicants should not be expected \u201cto identify every then-hypothetical scenario\n\nthat could theoretically arise.\u201d A236.\n\n      In any event, as In re ASARCO and other authorities make clear,\n\nsection 328(a)\u2019s improvidence standard puts applicants to the task of anticipating the\n\nunexpected. See 702 F.3d at 264. Rhodium and LKC\u2019s proposed rule, which would\n\nallow the tailoring of fee arrangements with the benefit of hindsight, is completely\n\nat odds with the \u201cextraordinarily rigid\u201d nature of \u201c[e]x ante approval.\u201d In re Assadi,\n\nNo. 24-50268, 2025 WL 1576801, at *2 (5th Cir. June 4, 2025).\n\n\n\n\n                                         28\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235     Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 35 of 40\n\n\n\n\n               2.   The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s justifications for approving the modified\n                    fee arrangement do not satisfy section 328(a)\u2019s requirements.\n\n      In approving the proposed contingent fee modification, the Bankruptcy Court\n\nasked whether there were any \u201csignificant substantive changes to the contingency\n\nfee from the time of the [Original Application] to the [Modified Application],\u201d and\n\nconcluded that \u201cthe updates to the contingency fee in the [March 2025 Letter]\n\nreflect[ed] the original intentions of LKC and the Debtors\u201d as reflected in the May\n\n2023 Letter. A496-A497 (emphasis added). That reasoning fails on both the facts\n\nand the law.\n\n      As an initial matter, neither the May 2023 Letter nor any of its terms were\n\ndisclosed in the Original Retention Application. As such, they could not have been\n\napproved by the Bankruptcy Court in connection with that Application. In actuality,\n\nthe appropriate comparison under section 328(a) would be between the terms of the\n\ndiscounted hourly rates approved in the Original Retention Order, which identified\n\nnone of the terms of a contingent fee, and the March 2025 Letter\u2019s contingent fee.\n\n      Even if the Original Retention Order somehow had authorized the\n\n(undisclosed) terms of the May 2023 Letter\u2019s contingent fee, the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s\n\nsubsequent modification still would not be justified. Section 328(a) contains no\n\nexception for small changes. Nor does it contemplate that a change is justifiable\n\nsimply because it aligns with the parties\u2019 purported expectations. See A753, Loral\n\nTr. 109:7-16 (rejecting interpretation consistent with apparent interpretation of \u201cthe\n\n                                         29\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD    Page 36 of 40\n\n\n\n\ntwo parties to the [fee] agreement,\u201d because \u201c[t]he problem is that essentially the\n\nentire creditor body and other parties in interest are, in essence, parties to the\n\nagreement, given the bankruptcy context . . . [a]nd consequently the agreement itself\n\nneeds to speak for itself\u201d). To hold otherwise would be to invite manipulation and\n\ngamesmanship, in circumvention of section 328(a)\u2019s \u201cstrict standards.\u201d         In re\n\nConsolidated Bancshares, 785 F.2d at 1256 n.6.\n\n      At any rate, the difference in compensation terms between the May 2023\n\nLetter and the March 2025 Letter is huge. As explained, even taking the undisclosed\n\nterms of the May 2023 Letter\u2019s contingent fee as the starting point, the March 2025\n\nLetter allowed Rhodium and LKC to calculate a larger, percentage-based fee in the\n\nevent \u201cWhinstone or an affiliate\u201d acquired \u201call or substantially all of [Rhodium\u2019s]\n\nRockdale assets.\u201d A484; see also A187 (redline showing addition of paragraph (d)\n\nwith new trigger). The added percentage-based success fee was worth nearly $9\n\nmillion beyond the original $600,000 flat fee for that scenario, a significant sum by\n\nany measure. See A501-A502. Common sense dictates that Rhodium and LKC\n\nwould not have gone to the trouble of revising their fee agreement were it otherwise.\n\n      Despite his contrary testimony before the Bankruptcy Court, not even\n\nRhodium\u2019s general counsel, Topping, believed that the Modified Application\n\npresented mere \u201cclarifying changes\u201d as opposed to \u201csubstantive differences.\u201d A494-\n\nA496. As plainly set forth in emails that surfaced after the Bankruptcy Court\n\n\n                                         30\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 37 of 40\n\n\n\n\napproved the modification but before the Final Order, Topping reacted to the Ad\n\nHoc Group\u2019s concern over the contingent fee arrangement in February 2025 by\n\ntelling LKC: \u201cMy reading of the present engagement letter is that in the event of an\n\nacquisition by Whinstone . . . the success fee would be limited to [the] $600k.\u201d\n\nA731; see also SA010, SA018. The creation of a percentage-based contingent fee\n\ntriggered by Whinstone\u2019s acquisition of Rhodium or its Rockdale assets was\n\nTopping\u2019s \u201cattempt[] to solve for that problem.\u201d A731.\n\n\n\n\n                                        31\n\f   Case 4:26-cv-00235   Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 38 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                               CONCLUSION\n\n     This Court should reverse the award of a contingent fee to LKC.\n\n\nDated: March 24, 2026                Respectfully submitted,\n\n                                     AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER\n                                      & FELD LLP\n\n                                     /s/ Sarah Link Schultz\n                                     Sarah Link Schultz\n                                       Attorney in Charge (State Bar No.\n                                       24033047; S.D. Tex. 30555)\n                                     Elizabeth D. Scott\n                                       Of Counsel (State Bar No. 24059699;\n                                       S.D. Tex. 2255287)\n                                     2300 North Field Street, Suite 1800\n                                     Dallas, TX 75201\n                                     Telephone: (214) 969-2800\n                                     Email: sschultz@akingump.com\n                                     Email: edscott@akingump.com\n\n                                     Mitchell P. Hurley\n                                      Of Counsel (pro hac vice pending)\n                                     One Bryant Park\n                                     New York, NY 10036\n                                     Telephone: (212) 872-1000\n                                     Email: mhurley@akingump.com\n\n                                     Z.W. Julius Chen\n                                       Of Counsel (pro hac vice pending)\n                                     Kristen E. Loveland\n                                       Of Counsel (pro hac vice pending)\n                                     2001 K Street, NW\n                                     Washington, DC 20006\n                                     Telephone: (202) 887-4000\n                                     Email: chenj@akingump.com\n                                     Email: kloveland@akingump.com\n\n                                     Counsel to The Ad Hoc Group of SAFE\n                                     Parties\n\n\n                                      32\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235    Document 8    Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 39 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n      I hereby certify that on March 24, 2026, a copy of the foregoing document\n\nwas filed electronically and served pursuant to this Court\u2019s ECF Filing System,\n\nupon counsel of record.\n\n                                       /s/ Sarah Link Schultz\n                                       Sarah Link Schultz\n                                         Attorney in Charge (State Bar No.\n                                         24033047; S.D. Tex. 30555)\n                                       AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\n                                       2300 North Field Street, Suite 1800\n                                       Dallas, TX 75201\n                                       Telephone: (214) 969-2800\n                                       Email: sschultz@akingump.com\n\n\n\n\n                                        33\n\f    Case 4:26-cv-00235   Document 8     Filed 03/24/26 in TXSD   Page 40 of 40\n\n\n\n\n                       CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\n      Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8015(h), the undersigned\n\ncertifies that this brief complies with the applicable type-volume limitation of\n\nFederal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8015(a)(7)(B) because, excluding the parts\n\nof the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8015(g), this brief\n\ncontains 7,063 words. This brief also complies with the typeface requirements of\n\nFederal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8015(a)(5) and type-style requirements of\n\nFederal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8015(a)(6) because this brief has been\n\nprepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times New\n\nRoman 14-point font.\n\n                                      /s/ Sarah Link Schultz\n                                      Sarah Link Schultz\n                                        Attorney in Charge (State Bar No.\n                                        24033047; S.D. 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On 02/23/2026, the appeal was transmitted to the U.S. District Court, assigned Judge George C Hanks, Jr, Civil Action 26cv0235. All appellate filings must now be made in the United States District Court with the civil action caption and case number. Parties notified, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Appellant Designation, # 2 Notice of Appeal) # 3 Docket sheet, docs 173 - 997-3, # 4 docs 998 - 1121-17, # 5 doc 1122 - 1122-2, # 6 doc 1122-3 - 1122-5, # 7 doc 1122-6 - 1122-34, # 8 docs 1123 - 1227, # 9 doc 1228 - 1228-11, # 10 docs 1230 - 1560-8, # 11 docs 1587 - 1784-8) # 12 docs 1785 - 1895-9, # 13 docs1897 - 2049, # 14 docs 2052 - 2151-4, # 15 doc 2152 - 2152-11, # 16 docs 2156 - 2271) # 17 sealed doc 1142 - 1142-3, # 18 sealed doc 1142-4-A, # 19 sealed doc 1142-4-B, # 20 sealed doc 1142-5-A, # 21 sealed doc 1142-5-B, # 22 sealed doc 1142-6 - 1142-8, # 23 sealed doc 1561 - 1561-8, # 24 sealed docs 1588 - 1885-3, # 25 sealed doc 1896 - 1896-5) # 26 sealed doc 1896-6-A, # 27 sealed doc 1896-6-B, # 28 sealed doc 1896-7 - 1896-28, # 29 sealed doc 1901 - 1901-10, # 30 sealed doc 1901-11-A, # 31 sealed doc 1901-11-B, # 32 sealed doc 1901-12 - 1901-14, # 33 sealed docs 1902 - 1912-8, # 34 sealed doc 1912-9, # 35 sealed doc 1912-10, # 36 sealed doc 1913 - 1913-9) # 37 sealed doc 1914 - 1914-3, # 38 sealed doc 1914-4, # 39 sealed doc 1914-5 - 1914-9, # 40 sealed doc 1915 - 1915-1, # 41 sealed doc 1915-2-A, # 42 sealed doc 1915-2-B, # 43 sealed doc 1915-3 - 1915-9, # 44 sealed doc 1916 - 1916-2-A, # 45 sealed doc 1916 - 1916-2-B, # 46 sealed doc 1916-3 - 1916-5, # 47 sealed doc 1916-6, # 48 sealed doc 1916-7 - 1916-9) # 49 sealed doc 1917 - 1917-8, # 50 sealed doc 1918 - 1918-9, # 51 sealed doc 1920 - 1920-5, # 52 sealed doc 1920-6-A, # 53 sealed doc 1920-6-B, # 54 sealed doc 1920-7 - 1920-9, # 55 sealed doc 1921 - 1921-9, # 56 sealed doc 1922 - 1922-9, # 57 sealed doc 1923 - 1923-6, # 58 sealed doc 1923-7, # 59 sealed doc 1923-8) # 60 sealed doc 1923-9, # 61 sealed doc 1923-10, # 62 sealed doc 1923-11, # 63 sealed doc 1923-12, # 64 sealed doc 1923-13, # 65 sealed doc 1923-14) # 66 sealed doc 1924, # 67 sealed doc 1924-1, # 68 sealed doc 1924-2, # 69 sealed doc 1924-3, # 70 sealed doc 1924-4, # 71 sealed doc 1924-5, # 72 sealed doc 1924-6, # 73 sealed doc 1924-7, # 74 sealed doc 1924-9, # 75 sealed doc 1924-9, # 76 sealed doc 1924-10, # 77 sealed doc 1924-11) # 78 sealed doc 1924-12 - 1924-15, # 79 sealed docs 1927 - 1943-3, # 80 sealed docs 1944 - 2164) (hl4). Modified on 2/23/2026 (hl4). (Entered: 02/23/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/453868811/","id":453868811,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72134478/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/468769269/","id":468769269,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2026-02-13T13:59:19.017781-08:00","date_modified":"2026-04-02T09:28:53.935600-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-02-13T13:59:18.999843-08:00","date_modified":"2026-04-02T09:28:53.897180-07:00","date_filed":"2026-01-12","time_filed":null,"entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-01-12.002","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"Referral Judge Selected: Magistrate Judge Peter Bray selected to receive referrals. 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