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Anderson","case_name_full":"","slug":"crenshaw-v-anderson","docket_number":"3:24-cv-00731","docket_number_core":"2400731","docket_number_raw":"3:24-cv-00731","docket_number_source":0,"federal_dn_office_code":"3","federal_dn_case_type":"cv","federal_dn_judge_initials_assigned":"L","federal_dn_judge_initials_referred":"","federal_defendant_number":null,"pacer_case_id":"388038","cause":"42:1983 Civil Rights Act","nature_of_suit":"440 Civil Rights: Other Civil Rights","jury_demand":"Plaintiff","jurisdiction_type":"Federal 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Robertson","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/14239359/","id":14239359,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596059/","attorney_id":9596059,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":1},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596059/","attorney_id":9596059,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":2}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"name":"Defendant","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.902888-07:00","date_modified":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.902898-07:00","name":"Leonard Anderson","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/14239358/","id":14239358,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596055/","attorney_id":9596055,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":1},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596055/","attorney_id":9596055,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596056/","attorney_id":9596056,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":1},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596056/","attorney_id":9596056,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596057/","attorney_id":9596057,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":1},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596057/","attorney_id":9596057,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9596058/","attorney_id":9596058,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"role":2}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","docket_id":68382840,"name":"Plaintiff","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.763756-07:00","date_modified":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.763770-07:00","name":"Tomyia Crenshaw","extra_info":""}],"entries":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/418770776/","id":418770776,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/432595912/","id":432595912,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/18/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2025-03-10T08:34:24.791467-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-13T01:50:45.813267-07:00","sha1":"abbef70fac2dd36ece5e999226d6c7223511f5dc","page_count":44,"file_size":317494,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.18.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.18.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 1 of 44 PageID 171\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nV. \u00a7 No. 3: 24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON, et al., \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION\n OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\n\n Before the Court are two motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the\n\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant City of Dallas (the \u201cCity\u201d) filed its\n\nmotion on April 30, 2024, (Dkt. No. 7) (\u201cCity Mot.\u201d), and Defendants Leonard\n\nAnderson and Darrien Robertson (together, \u201cOfficers\u201d) filed their motion on June 3,\n\n2024 (Dkt. No. 12) (\u201cOfficers Mot.\u201d).\n\n Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b), United States District Judge Sam Lindsay\n\nreferred both motions to the undersigned magistrate judge for hearing, if necessary,\n\nand for proposed findings and recommendations for disposition of the motions. (See\n\nDkt. Nos. 8, 14, 17.) Upon careful review of the complaint, the parties\u2019 briefing, and\n\nthe relevant case law, the undersigned finds that the City\u2019s Motion (Dkt. No. 7)\n\nshould be GRANTED, and the Officers\u2019 Motion (Dkt. No. 12) should be\n\nGRANTED.\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 2 of 44 PageID 172\n\n\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 27, 2024. (See Dkt. No. 1) (\u201cCompl.\u201d).)\n\nPlaintiff alleges that on May 13, 2022, 1 around 2:20 a.m., Dallas Police Department\n\n(\u201cDPD\u201d) officers Senior Corporal Anderson and Officer Trainee Robertson were\n\npatrolling South Dallas. (See Compl. \u00b6 24.) Anderson was training Robertson at the\n\ntime. (Id.) The Officers were stationed near a Chevron gas station when they saw a\n\nred vehicle driven by Plaintiff, leave the gas station and turn down Martin Luther\n\nKing, Jr. Boulevard without its headlights on. (Id.)\n\n The Officers attempted to stop Plaintiff, and a high-speed chase ensued. (See\n\nCompl. \u00b6\u00b6 2, 25.) Plaintiff alleges he was concerned because \u201ca random vehicle\n\n[began] to chase him.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 2.) Plaintiff alleges that the lights and sirens were\n\nactivated \u201ceventually\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 2), but the City maintains that the lights and sirens\n\nwere activated \u201c[a]t the pursuit\u2019s inception\u201d (City Mot. at 2). According to Plaintiff,\n\nthe Officers deactivated the lights and siren toward the end of the pursuit \u201cbut\n\ncontinued to follow Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle at high speeds as if the pursuit was ongoing.\u201d\n\n(Compl. \u00b6 25.) Plaintiff also alleges that engaging in a high-speed pursuit was a\n\ndirect violation of DPD policy, since Plaintiff had not committed any crimes and\n\nwas not wanted for a felony or in the process of a felony. (Id.)\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Defendants point out (and the Court acknowledges) that the complaint recites the\ndate of the incident as both May 13, 2020 (see Compl. \u00b6 1) and May 13, 2022 (see id. \u00b6 24).\nMay 13, 2022, however, appears to be the correct date. (See Dkt. No. 11 at 2; Dkt. No. 15\nat 2.)\n 2\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 3 of 44 PageID 173\n\n\n\n Plaintiff alleges that after the Officers deactivated lights and sirens, dashboard\n\ncamera (\u201cdashcam\u201d) footage from the Officers\u2019 vehicle showed that Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle\n\n\u201cjumped a curb,\u201d \u201ccrashed at a high rate of speed,\u201d and \u201cimmediately burst into\n\nflames.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 26.) The Officers allegedly saw the crash but did not stop,\n\n\u201ccontinuing their way without checking on the driver.\u201d (Id. at \u00b6 27.) Plaintiff avers\n\n\nthat dashcam footage showed the Officers driving by the wreckage, and Anderson\n\nstated, \u201cThat\u2019s his fault.\u201d (Id.) Bystanders pulled Plaintiff from the car and carried\n\nhim away \u201cas flames began to consume the vehicle.\u201d (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 28, 30.) The Officers\n\nlater returned to the scene after hearing on the police radio that a vehicle was in\n\nflames. (Id. \u00b6 28.) When the Officers returned to the scene, body camera video\n\nshowed paramedics tending to Plaintiff \u201cas other police officers face[d] off against\n\nangry onlookers who had seen Anderson and Robertson drive off.\u201d (Id.)\n\n Plaintiff alleges that DPD Chief Eddie Garcia \u201csaid he [was] appalled and\n\nembarrassed by the incident.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 34.) Plaintiff further alleges that the\n\nOfficers \u201cviolated numerous policies and procedures by improperly engaging in a\n\nhigh-speed vehicle chase and failing to stop and render aid.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 35.)\n\n Plaintiff alleges that he suffered third degree burns over 50 percent of his body,\n\nsome \u201cto the bone,\u201d as well as a broken arm, leg, collar bone, hip, and ribs. (Compl.\n\n\u00b6 31.) Due to his extensive injuries, Plaintiff was hospitalized from the date of the\n\nincident, May 13, 2022, through September 3, 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that\n\nhe is still receiving outpatient treatment due to his injuries; he is unable to stand or\n\n\n\n 3\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 4 of 44 PageID 174\n\n\n\nwalk for any length of time; and he must now use a wheelchair or a walker to\n\nperform many activities of daily living. (Id. at \u00b6 32.)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges six causes of action:\n\n 1. Excessive Deadly Force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (Against\n Defendants Anderson and Robertson);\n\n 2. Failure To Render Medical Aid, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983\n (Against All Defendants);\n\n 3. Municipal Liability, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (Against the\n City);\n\n 4. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code \u00a7 101.021, also known\n as the Texas Tort Claims Act (\u201cTTCA\u201d) (Against the City);\n\n 5. Respondeat Superior (Against the City); and\n\n 6. Exemplary Damages.\n\n(Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 45-62.)\n\n On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response to the City\u2019s motion (Dkt. No. 11)\n\n(\u201cResp. City\u201d), and the City filed a reply on June 4, 2024 (Dkt. No. 13) (\u201cCity\n\nRepl.\u201d). On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response to the Officers\u2019 motion (Dkt.\n\nNo. 15) (\u201cResp. Officers\u201d), and the Officers filed a reply on July 5, 2024 (Dkt. No.\n\n16) (\u201cOfficers Repl.\u201d). Accordingly, the motions are ripe for determination.\n\n II. LEGAL STANDARDS\n\nA. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss\n\n To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\n\nProcedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead \u201cenough facts to state a claim to relief that\n\nis plausible on its face.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable\n\n\n 4\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 5 of 44 PageID 175\n\n\n\nConsultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008). To meet this \u201cfacial\n\nplausibility\u201d standard, a plaintiff must \u201cplead[ ] factual content that allows the court\n\nto draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\n\nalleged.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must accept well-\n\npleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.\n\nSonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the\n\ncourt does not accept as true \u201cconclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences,\n\nor legal conclusions.\u201d Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007)\n\n(citation omitted). A plaintiff must provide \u201cmore than labels and conclusions, and a\n\nformulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\u201d Twombly, 550\n\nU.S. at 555 (citation omitted). \u201cFactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to\n\nrelief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the\n\ncomplaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\u201d Id. (citations omitted).\n\n \u201cA claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that\n\nallows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the\n\nmisconduct alleged.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). \u201cThe plausibility\n\nstandard is not akin to a \u2018probability requirement,\u2019 but it asks for more than a sheer\n\npossibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\u201d Id. And \u201c[a] claim for relief is\n\nimplausible on its face when \u2018the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer\n\nmore than the mere possibility of misconduct.\u2019\u201d Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v.\n\nFNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also\n\n\n\n 5\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 6 of 44 PageID 176\n\n\n\nInclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir.\n\n2019) (\u201cWhere the well-pleaded facts of a complaint do not permit a court to infer\n\nmore than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged \u2013 but it has\n\nnot \u2018show[n]\u2019 \u2013 \u2018that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u2019\u201d (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678\n\n(quoting, in turn, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)))).\n\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed factual\n\nallegations, but it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and\n\nconclusions. And, while a court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, it\n\nis \u201cnot bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.\u201d\n\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).\n\n In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court limits its review to the face of\n\nthe pleadings. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The\n\npleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan\n\nStanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). The ultimate question is\n\nwhether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to\n\nthe plaintiff. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,\n\n312 (5th Cir. 2002). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court does not evaluate the\n\nplaintiff's likelihood of success. It only determines whether the plaintiff has stated a\n\nclaim upon which relief can be granted. Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293\n\n(5th Cir. 1977).\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 7 of 44 PageID 177\n\n\n\nC. Municipal Liability\n\n The above general pleading standards also apply to a claim against a\n\nmunicipality. See Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., Tex., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021)\n\n(\u201cThere is no heightened pleading standard for [42 U.S.C.] \u00a7 1983 claims against\n\nmunicipalities. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint need not contain\n\ndetailed factual allegations but still must state sufficient facts to establish a plausible\n\nclaim on its face.\u201d (citing Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir.\n\n2018))).\n\n Because \u201c[a] person may sue a municipality that violates his or her\n\nconstitutional rights [only] \u2018under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,\n\ncustom, or usage,\u2019\u201d id. (quoting Section 1983; citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436\n\nU.S. 658, 690 (1978)), a plaintiff alleging a Monell claim \u201chas two burdens: to\n\n[plausibly allege] (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that a municipal\n\npolicy was the moving force behind the violation,\u201d Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Tex., 956\n\nF.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). \u201cIn municipal-liability\n\ncases,\u201d therefore, the threshold question \u201cis whether the complained-of \u2018act may\n\nfairly be said to represent official policy.\u2019\u201d Id. at 792-93 (cleaned up; quoting Monell,\n\n436 U.S. at 694); see also Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 483 (rejecting the argument that a\n\ndistrict court errs by dismissing a Monell claim without first analyzing the underlying\n\nconstitutional violation).\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 8 of 44 PageID 178\n\n\n\n Accordingly, a plaintiff may proceed on a Monell claim only by identify[ing]\n\n\u201c(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with\n\nactual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose moving\n\nforce is that policy (or custom).\u201d Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.\n\n2002) (cleaned up). Municipalities are not liable \u201con the theory of respondeat\n\nsuperior\u201d and are \u201calmost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part\n\nof an employee.\u201d Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009); see\n\nalso Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482; Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 497 &\n\nn.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that where a plaintiff's claim fails as to one prong, a\n\ncourt \u201cneed not consider whether [his] claim also fails the other two Monell prongs\u201d\n\n(citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2010))).\n\n \u201cOfficial policy can arise in various forms. It usually exists in the form of\n\nwritten policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form\n\nof a widespread practice that is \u2018so common and well-settled as to constitute a\n\ncustom that fairly represents municipal policy.\u2019\u201d James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612,\n\n617 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir.\n\n2001) (quoting, in turn, Webster v. City of Hous., 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en\n\nbanc))); see also Brown, 985 F.3d at 497 (\u201cAn \u2018official policy\u2019 may take two forms \u2013\n\neither a \u2018policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker\u2019 or a\n\n\u2018persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not\n\nauthorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well\n\n\n\n 8\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 9 of 44 PageID 179\n\n\n\nsettled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.\u2019\u201d (quoting\n\nZarnow, 614 F.3d at 168-69)).\n\n \u201cTo proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint\u2019s \u2018description of a policy\n\nor custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot\n\nbe conclusory; it must contain specific facts.\u2019\u201d Pe\u00f1a, 879 F.3d at 622 (quoting Spiller\n\nv. City of Tex. City, Police Dep\u2019t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997); footnote omitted);\n\nsee also Pinedo, 2015 WL 5021393, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) (\u201cTo establish a\n\ncustom, a plaintiff must demonstrate (and, at the pleading stage, must plausibly\n\nplead) \u2018a pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case.\u2019\u201d (quoting\n\nPiotrowski, 237 F.3d at 582)).\n\nC. Qualified Immunity\n\n Under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, private citizens may sue public officials for violations\n\nof their federal statutory or constitutional rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,\n\n171 (1961). Section 1983, however, shields public officials from civil liability under\n\nthe doctrine of qualified immunity \u201cso long as their conduct \u2018does not violate clearly\n\nestablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would\n\nhave known.\u2019\u201d Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,\n\n555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)); see also Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995).\n\n\u201c[T]he immunity issue must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation\n\nsince it entails an entitlement to immunity from suit and not merely a defense to\n\nliability.\u201d Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277 (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991)).\n\n\n\n 9\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 10 of 44 PageID 180\n\n\n\nSince the motion to dismiss stage is the earliest possible stage of litigation, the issue\n\nof qualified immunity must be decided then if properly raised. See Carswell v. Camp,\n\n37 F.4th 1062, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 2022).\n\n \u201cA public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff\n\ndemonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and\n\n(2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly\n\nestablished law at the time of the violation.\u201d Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th\n\nCir. 2011). To be \u201c\u2018clearly established,\u2019 the contours of the right must be sufficiently\n\nclear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the\n\nright.\u201d Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). \u201cBoth steps in the qualified\n\nimmunity analysis are questions of law.\u201d Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th\n\nCir. 2013). A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual burden of\n\nproof, \u201cshifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.\u201d Ratliff v.\n\nAransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020). An officer is entitled to qualified\n\nimmunity \u201cif there is no violation, or if the conduct did not violate law clearly\n\nestablished at the time.\u201d Bailey v. Iles, No. 22-30509, 2023 WL 8062239 at *2 (5th\n\nCir. Nov. 21, 2023). Courts have the discretion to decide \u201cwhich of the two prongs\n\nof the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the\n\ncircumstances in the particular case at hand.\u201d Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 11 of 44 PageID 181\n\n\n\n III. ANALYSIS\n\n Plaintiff alleges that the Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth\n\nAmendment rights to be free from excessive force and unreasonable searches and\n\nseizures. (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 45-50.) Plaintiff does not allege that the Officers physically\n\nstruck, detained, or arrested him. (See generally Compl.) Rather, Plaintiff alleges that\n\n(1) the Officers\u2019 improper high-speed pursuit created a dangerous situation that\n\nresulted in the car crash; and then (2) the Officers failed to render aid. (See Compl.\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 3, 4.)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s municipal liability claims against the City amount to allegations that\n\nthe City\u2019s policies caused the alleged bad acts of the Officers because DPD failed to\n\nproperly train and discipline the Officers and failed to \u201cimplement policies and/or\n\ncreate an atmosphere that that prohibited the very destructive, biased, and reckless\n\nconduct of Officers Anderson and Robertson.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 35; see also \u00b6\u00b6 60-61.)\n\nPlaintiff also alleges that \u201cDPD has failed to enact proper policies and procedures\n\nconcerning rendering emergency medical treatment and has failed to properly train\n\nits officers with respect to providing emergency medical treatment. DPD has been\n\nmade aware of its failures several times.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 37.)\n\nA. Preliminary Matters\n\n 1. Plaintiff objects the Court finding guidance from cases deciding\n summary judgment motions.\n\n Plaintiff contends that Defendants are \u201csubject[ing] [him] to a higher standard\n\nthan is required or permitted under Rule 12(b)(6)\u201d because they cite cases decided on\n\n\n 11\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 12 of 44 PageID 182\n\n\n\nappeal from summary judgment. (See Resp. City at 5; Resp. Officers at 9.) Without\n\nciting any authority, Plaintiff claims that Defendants\u2019 reliance on cases at the\n\nsummary-judgment stage is \u201cimproper, because it is well established that \u2018the\n\nevidentiary burden on the non-movant in a summary judgment motion is\n\nsignificantly greater than in a motion to dismiss.\u201d (Id. (citing Reese v. Anderson, 926\n\nF.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991).) While this is a true statement about the differing\n\nburdens, it does not mean that the substantive legal principles expressed in these\n\ncases are irrelevant in the context of a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Rogers v. Home\n\nShopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 984 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining that\n\nwhile the standards by which a court decides a question of law are significant, \u201cthe\n\nissue of who bears the \u2018burden of proof\u2019 regarding those standards cannot affect the\n\nlegal question\u201d that such a motion would present).\n\n And even if the procedural posture of the cases cited by Defendants occurred\n\nat the summary-judgment stage, because \u201cmore general\u201d allegations are permitted at\n\nthe motion-to-dismiss stage, \u201cthe Court must only evaluate whether Plaintiffs pled\n\nsufficient facts that would allow it to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants\n\nare liable for the alleged misconduct.\u201d Oporto v. City of El Paso, No. EP-10-CV-110,\n\n2010 WL 3503457, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2010) (cleaned up). Contrary to\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s contentions, the fact that questions of law may be decided at this phase by\n\nrelying on cases deciding those questions at the summary-judgment phase does not\n\nmean that Plaintiff is held to the higher summary-judgment standard.\n\n\n\n 12\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 13 of 44 PageID 183\n\n\n\n In addition, recent cases on Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the \u00a7 1983 context from\n\nthe Fifth Circuit, as well as this Court, reveal that a decision\u2019s procedural posture\n\ndoes not preclude the application of its legal holdings in a dismissal context. See, e.g.,\n\nMoore v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 23-10566, 2024 WL 913368, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 4,\n\n2024) (unpublished) (upholding rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of common law tort claims\n\nagainst officer (citing Shinn on Behalf of Shinn v. Coll. Station Indep. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d\n\n783, 785 (5th Cir. 1996) (appeal from summary judgment); Monacelli v. City of Dallas,\n\nNo. 3:21-CV-2649-L, 2023 WL 6370753, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2023) (granting\n\nrule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Monell claims (citing Monell v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs. of City of\n\nNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978) (appeal from \u201ccross-motions for summary\n\njudgment\u201d); Rusanowsky v. City of Dallas, No. 3:22-CV-01132-K, 2023 WL 2728722,\n\nat *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2023) (granting rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Monell claims\n\n(citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 381 (1989) (appeal from \u201c[a] jury\n\ntrial.\u201d); and Vess v. City of Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-1764-D, 2022 WL 625080, at *7 (N.D.\n\nTex. Mar. 3, 2022) (granting rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Monell claims (citing Piotrowski\n\nv. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001), appeal from jury trial).\n\n Therefore, Plaintiff\u2019s concern that the Court might be \u201cswayed by\n\nDefendant[s\u2019] attempt to raise the pleading standard\u201d (see Resp. City at 5; Resp.\n\nOfficers at 10) is unfounded. The Court will apply relevant case law for the purposes\n\nof determining questions of law using the applicable legal standard. See Oporto, 2010\n\nWL 3503457, at *6.\n\n\n 13\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 14 of 44 PageID 184\n\n\n\n 2. Plaintiff disclaims any reliance on a state-created danger theory of\n liability.\n\n The Officers and the City argue in their motions that Plaintiff\u2019s allegations\n\nmost resemble \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theories of liability and that dismissal is\n\nwarranted because this theory is not recognized by the Fifth Circuit. 2 (See Officers\n\nMot. at 5; City Mot. at 8.) Although Defendants are correct that this theory is not\n\nrecognized by the Fifth Circuit, Plaintiff avers that he is not claiming a \u201cstate-created\n\ndanger\u201d theory of liability. (See Resp. Officers at 11; Resp. City at 13.) Accordingly,\n\nthe undersigned will not consider Defendants\u2019 state-created danger liability\n\narguments as grounds for dismissal.\n\nB. Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claims against the Officers\n\n Plaintiff seeks to hold the Officers liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which makes\n\nliable \u201c[e]very person\u201d who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional\n\nrights. (See, e.g., Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 19-20.) The Officers move for dismissal under both\n\ngeneral Rule 12(b)(6) standards and based on qualified immunity. (See generally\n\nOfficers Mot.) The Officers argues that Plaintiff\u2019s claims fail because they do not\n\nstate any constitutional violations or any cognizable claims under state law.\n\n\n\n 2\n The state-created danger doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a state has\nno duty to protect one private citizen from another. See, e.g., Cano v. Garcia, No. SA-20-CV-\n01331-OLG, 2021 WL 2582581, at *5 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL\n8444847 (W.D. Tex. July 13, 2021), aff'd as modified, 2022 WL 1548671 (5th Cir. May 16,\n2022) (citing Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 865 (5th\nCir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly declined to recognize this exception. Id.\n(internal citations omitted); see also Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 372 & n.13 (5th Cir. 2023))\n(collecting cases).\n\n 14\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 15 of 44 PageID 185\n\n\n\nAdditionally, they argue they are entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity\n\nbecause there was no \u201cclearly established\u201d law at the time of the incident prohibiting\n\nthe Officers\u2019 actions.\n\n For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has\n\nnot alleged facts supporting a to reasonable inference that the Officers violated\n\nPlaintiff's constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a\n\nconstitutional violation occurred, there is no need to consider whether the Officers\u2019\n\nactions are entitled to qualified immunity.\n\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not constitute a seizure under the Fourth\n Amendment.\n\n Plaintiff alleges that the Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth\n\nAmendment rights to be free from excessive force and unreasonable searches and\n\nseizures, by \u201cinitiating pursuit of Plaintiff despite Plaintiff having never been charged\n\nwith a crime.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 45-50.) Plaintiff summarizes his Fourth Amendment\n\nclaim as follows:\n\n In the present case, Plaintiff was seized when the Defendants caused his\n vehicle to crash by initiating their high-speed pursuit. When Plaintiff\u2019s\n vehicle crashed, it was set ablaze, trapping Plaintiff inside and completely\n curtailing Plaintiff\u2019s ability and freedom to exit his vehicle and walk\n away. Trapping Plaintiff inside a burning vehicle certainly constitutes a\n seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.\n\n(Resp. Officers at 13-14 (emphasis in original) (citing Dkt. No. 1.\u201d); see also Resp.\n\nCity at 13-15.) Plaintiff thus contends that these actions by the Officers plausibly\n\nstate a claim that he was \u201cseized\u201d because \u201c[w]henever an officer restrains the\n\n\n\n 15\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 16 of 44 PageID 186\n\n\n\nfreedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person,\u201d Tennessee v. Garner,\n\n471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). (See id.)\n\n The Fourth Amendment confers the right to be free from \u201cunreasonable\n\nsearches and seizures[.]\u201d U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure is unreasonable under\n\nthe Fourth Amendment if it involves excessive force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.\n\n386, 394\u201395 (1989). To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a\n\nplaintiff must prove he suffered: (1) an injury, (2) resulting directly and only from,\n\n(3) an officer\u2019s use of objectively unreasonable force. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430,\n\n433\u201334 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Only if a seizure has occurred does the\n\nCourt ask \u201cwhether the officer's actions [were] \u2018objectively reasonable\u2019 in light of the\n\nfacts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent\n\nor motivation.\u201d Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Thus, the threshold\n\nquestion is whether a seizure has occurred. See id. at 396. A seizure of the person\n\noccurs if there is actual physical restraint by an officer or a citizen submission to a\n\ngovernmental show of authority. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624\u201326\n\n(1991).\n\n Upon review of the allegations in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint and the relevant case\n\nlaw, the undersigned concludes that the facts as alleged do not constitute a seizure\n\nunder the Fourth Amendment. Even if believed, Plaintiff\u2019s allegations fail to\n\nplausibly state any sort of unconstitutional seizure. Without a constitutional\n\nviolation, a plaintiff may not maintain a \u00a7 1983 claim against any person or\n\ngovernmental entity. See Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464-66 (5th Cir.\n 16\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 17 of 44 PageID 187\n\n\n\n2010) (dismissing a complaint for failure to plead off-duty officers\u2019 alleged excessive\n\nforce \u201cwas a misuse of their power as state officers\u201d).\n\n As an initial matter, Plaintiff failed to cite any authority that supports his\n\ncontention that the Officers\u2019 alleged actions constitute a violation of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nFourth Amendment rights and failed to cite any case illustrating that a law\n\nenforcement officer\u2019s initiation of a similar vehicle pursuit scenario could potentially\n\nlead to constitutional liability. As previously stated, the threshold question is\n\nwhether a seizure has occurred. See Graham , 490 U.S. at 396. A seizure of the\n\nperson occurs if there is actual physical restraint by an officer or a citizen submission\n\nto a governmental show of authority. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624\u201326. But\n\nPlaintiff does not allege any physical restraint by police, and the facts he alleges show\n\nhe was actively evading\u2014and did not submit to\u2014a show of authority.\n\n In Brower v. County of Inyo, the Supreme Court analyzed a \u00a71983 claim in\n\nwhich a man driving a stolen car led police on a high-speed chase for about 20 miles\n\nbefore crashing into a police roadblock, resulting in his death. 489 U.S. 593, 594\n\n(1989). The Ninth Circuit found that no seizure occurred because police did not\n\nrestrain the decedent prior to his failure to stop voluntarily at the roadblock, despite\n\nopportunities to do so prior to the impact. Id. at 595. The Supreme Court, however,\n\nconcluded that the decedent\u2019s \u201cindependent decision to continue the chase\u201d did not\n\neliminate the responsibility of the police for \u201cthe termination of his movement effected\n\nby the roadblock.\u201d Id. at 594 (emphasis added).\n\n\n\n 17\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 18 of 44 PageID 188\n\n\n\n Plaintiff contends that Defendants \u201cmisstate[d] the holding in Brower\u201d because\n\nthe Supreme Court found that the suspect in Brower had been \u201cseized\u201d unlike here\n\nwhere Defendants contend that \u201cPlaintiff was not \u2018stopped\u2019 or \u2018seized.\u2019\u201d (See Resp.\n\nOfficers at 12 (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 599).) But Plaintiff is only partially\n\ncorrect\u2014the Supreme Court in Brower held that the plaintiff was seized, but it was\n\npolice\u2019s use of the roadblock that stated a constitutional deprivation, not the pursuit\n\nalone. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 595-97. In fact, the Court contrasted that plaintiff\u2019s\n\nseizure with a situation similar to the instant case in which a suspect loses control of\n\nhis vehicle while attempting to elude police during a chase. Id. at 595 (\u201cThe Court of\n\nAppeals impelled to its result by consideration of what it described as the \u2018analogous\n\nsituation\u2019 of a police chase in which the suspect unexpectedly loses control of his car\n\nand crashes. We agree that no unconstitutional seizure occurs there[.]\u201d (citation\n\nomitted)). Explaining the difference, the Court stated:\n\n The pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of\n authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit; and\n though he was in fact stopped, he was stopped by a different means - his\n loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent crash. If, instead of\n that, the police cruiser had pulled alongside the fleeing car and\n sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the termination of the suspect's\n freedom of movement would have been a seizure.\n\nId. at 597. This contrasting scenario described by the Supreme court mirrors the facts\n\nof the instant case. Officers Anderson and Robertson sought to stop Plaintiff by\n\npursuing him using their lights and sirens, and Plaintiff was in fact stopped, not by\n\nthe Officers, but by a different means\u2014Plaintiff\u2019s loss of control of his vehicle and\n\n\n\n 18\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 19 of 44 PageID 189\n\n\n\nthe subsequent crash. (See Compl. \u00b6 3.) As the Supreme Court explained, such a\n\nscenario is not a seizure. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.\n\n Therefore, \u201ca Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur . . . even whenever\n\nthere is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an\n\nindividual\u2019s freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a\n\ngovernmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally\n\napplied.\u201d See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97 (emphasis in original).\n\n Here, like the alternate scenario described in Brower, Plaintiff was not\n\n\u201cstopped\u201d or \u201cseized\u201d by the Officers\u2019 pursuit, even when they activated their lights\n\nand sirens as a command to stop. The pursuit did not curtail Plaintiff\u2019s freedom of\n\nmovement; in fact, Plaintiff does not assert that he stopped his vehicle or complied\n\nwith the Officers\u2019 show of authority. Consequently, the fact that Plaintiff eventually\n\nlost control of his vehicle and crashed does not constitute a Fourth Amendment\n\nseizure. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628 (applying Brower and noting that in Brower\n\n\u201c[w]e did not even consider the possibility that a seizure could have occurred during\n\nthe course of the chase because, as we explained, that \u2018show of authority did not\n\nproduce his stop\u2019\u201d); see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 844 (1998) (finding\n\nno Fourth Amendment seizure even where a pursuing police car accidentally\n\nstopped the suspect by crashing into him (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 and\n\ncollecting cases)).\n\n But even if Plaintiff had alleged that the Officers sideswiped him,\n\n\u201caccidentally stopped\u201d him \u201cby crashing into him,\u201d or ran him off the road, it would\n 19\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 20 of 44 PageID 190\n\n\n\nnot have been a violation under the Fourth Amendment. As explained by the Fifth\n\nCircuit, \u201cthe Supreme Court has never found the use of deadly force in connection\n\nwith a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a basis\n\nfor denying qualified immunity.\u201d Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 878 (5th Cir.\n\n2019) (noting that the only question before the Supreme Court in Brower was whether\n\na police roadblock constituted a seizure) (internal citations omitted).\n\n Plaintiff alleges that the Officers observed and ignored Plaintiff\u2019s crash (see\n\nCompl. \u00b6\u00b6 4-5), but nothing in the complaint can plausibly be interpreted to allege\n\nthat the Officers intended to cause harm to Plaintiff, much less the harm that\n\nallegedly befell him. (See generally Compl.) Even assuming arguendo that the\n\nOfficers\u2019 attempts to stop Plaintiff were negligent, under Supreme Court and Fifth\n\nCircuit precedent, attempting a seizure that accidentally or even negligently results in\n\nharm is not a Fourth Amendment violation. See Gorman v. Sharp, 892 F.3d 172, 175\n\n(5th Cir. 2018) (\u201cBrower and subsequent precedents foreclose liability under the\n\nFourth Amendment in the absence of intentional conduct.\u201d); Watson v. Bryant, 532 F.\n\nApp\u2019x 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (\u201cThe Supreme Court [in Brower] held that Fourth\n\nAmendment violations occur only through intentional conduct[.] In the absence of\n\nevidence showing that [the officer] intended to use deadly force, we must conclude\n\nthat the negligent shooting here did not itself violate [the suspect\u2019s] Fourth\n\nAmendment rights.\u201d) (citations omitted); Baskin v. City of Houston, Miss., 378 F.\n\nApp\u2019x 417, 418 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (\u201cTo the extent that a Fourth Amendment claim\n\nwas raised, any attempt to allege excessive use of force in the course of a negligent\n 20\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 21 of 44 PageID 191\n\n\n\nseizure is foreclosed by the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Brower . . . .\u201d). Accordingly,\n\nnothing about Plaintiff\u2019s allegations plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment claim.\n\n Plaintiff avers that because he \u201chad not committed any crimes,\u201d the Officers\u2019\n\npursuit was \u201cin direct violation of DPD policy stating that unless a suspect is wanted\n\nfor a felony or in the process of a felony, DPD should not pursue and/or engage in a\n\nhigh-speed chase for safety reasons.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 25.) Even assuming that such a\n\npolicy exists, the complaint admits that Plaintiff turned down Martin Luther King,\n\nJr. Boulevard at around 2:20 a.m. \u201cwithout headlights on\u201d (id. at \u00b6 24), which is a\n\nviolation of traffic laws. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 547.302(a) (\u201cA vehicle shall\n\ndisplay each lighted lamp and illuminating device required by this chapter to be on\n\nthe vehicle: (1) at nighttime; and (2) when light is insufficient or atmospheric\n\nconditions are unfavorable so that a person or vehicle on the highway is not clearly\n\ndiscernible at a distance of 1,000 feet ahead.\u201d) Thus, Plaintiff had committed a\n\ncrime (albeit a misdemeanor), id. at \u00a7 547.004(a)(2), in plain view of the Officers.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983 action also cannot be founded upon an alleged violation of\n\ndue process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at\n\n849. In Lewis, the Supreme Court set out to resolve the circuit conflict \u201cover the\n\nstandard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating\n\nsubstantive due process in a pursuit case.\u201d The Lewis court ultimately held that\n\n\u201chigh-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal\n\nplight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by\n\nan action under \u00a7 1983.\u201d Id. at 854. As noted previously, nothing alleged in\n 21\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 22 of 44 PageID 192\n\n\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint plausibly alleges that the Officers intended to cause Plaintiff\n\nharm. Therefore, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the Officers\u2019 conduct\n\ndeprived him of his due process rights.\n\n 2. Officers had no Fourteenth Amendment constitutional duty to stop\n and render aid.\n\n Plaintiff also alleges that the Officers\u2019 failure to render first aid is a Fourteenth\n\nAmendment violation. (See Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 7, 55-56.) But the Due Process Clause of the\n\nFourteenth Amendment only protects an individual's life, liberty, and property from\n\ngovernment action. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep\u2019t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196\n\n(1989) (holding that the \u201cDue Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right\n\nto governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or\n\nproperty interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual\u201d)\n\n(collecting cases); see also Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 2010).\n\n \u201cThe Due Process Clause does, however, require the responsible government\n\nor governmental agency to provide medical care to persons . . . who have been\n\ninjured while being apprehended by the police.\u201d City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,\n\n463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); see also Kovacic, 628 F.3d at 213 (explaining that a \u201cspecial\n\nrelationship\u201d \u201cis formed \u2018[w]hen the state, through the affirmative exercise of its\n\npowers, acts to restrain an individual's freedom to act on his own behalf \u201cthrough\n\nincarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty\u2019\u201d\n\n(citing McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting\n\nDeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198, 200))). In this case, however, Plaintiff was not\n\n\n 22\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 23 of 44 PageID 193\n\n\n\napprehended when he alleges that officers owed him a duty. Despite the Officers\u2019\n\n\u201cshow of authority\u201d by way of flashing lights and sirens as an indication for Plaintiff\n\nto stop, Plaintiff did not stop. See United States v. Morris, 40 F.4th 323, 328 (5th Cir.\n\n2022) (\u201cAn officer\u2019s visual signal for a motorist to stop\u2014whether made by hand or\n\nlights and sirens\u2014is such a show of authority.\u201d); see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628\n\n(Under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court \u201cdid not even consider the\n\npossibility that a seizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because [\n\n] that \u2018show of authority did not produce [a] stop.\u201d)\n\n Here, the complaint does not allege that the Officers physically touched\n\nPlaintiff, nor was Plaintiff detained, arrested, or taken to jail. As such, there was no\n\nseizure. Rather, Plaintiff successfully evaded seizure notwithstanding the Officers\u2019\n\n\u201cshow of authority\u201d indicating that Plaintiff should stop. However uncaring or\n\nobjectionable the Officers\u2019 alleged actions after seeing Plaintiff\u2019s car crash (see Compl.\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 26-27), they did not have a constitutional duty to render aid to Plaintiff. Based on\n\nthe foregoing, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Officers\n\ndeprived Plaintiff of his due process rights.\n\n As noted above, courts must first determine whether the factual allegations,\n\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff reveal a constitutional violation.\n\nSee Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. If the facts alleged do not reveal such a violation,\n\nthere is no need for the court to proceed to the next step in the qualified immunity\n\nanalysis. Id. Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional\n\n\n\n 23\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 24 of 44 PageID 194\n\n\n\nviolation, his \u00a7 1983 claims against Officers Anderson and Robertson fail as a matter\n\nof law, and there is no need to conduct further analysis.\n\nC. Plaintiff's \u00a7 1983 claims against the City\n\n To state a \u00a7 1983 claim against the City, the complaint must allege sufficient\n\nfacts to permit the reasonable inference that a constitutional violation occurred, and\n\nan \u201cofficial policy\u201d attributable to the City \u201cwas the moving force\u201d behind it. Littell,\n\n894 F.3d at 622\u201323; Pe\u00f1a, 879 F.3d at 621; Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280,\n\n283\u201385 (5th Cir. 2016).\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges a myriad of Monell theories, such as failure to train\n\nand supervise, failure to implement appropriate recruitment, hiring, and candidate\n\nselection methods; and failure to implement appropriate retention efforts. (See\n\nCompl. \u00b6 35.) Plaintiff also alleges that \u201cDPD has failed to enact proper policies and\n\nprocedures concerning rendering emergency medical treatment and has failed to\n\nproperly train its officers with respect to providing emergency medical treatment\n\n[asserting that] DPD has been made aware of its failures several times.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 37.)\n\n Yet, for the reasons explained above, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his \u00a7 1983\n\nclaims because he has failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation upon which\n\nthe City\u2019s municipal liability could be based. See Bustos, 599 F.3d at 467; see also\n\nWhitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648-49 (5th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[I]nadequate supervision,\n\nfailure to train, and policy, practice or custom claims fail without an underlying\n\nconstitutional violation.\u201d). Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff plausibly alleged\n\n\n\n 24\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 25 of 44 PageID 195\n\n\n\nthat an unconstitutional act caused him injury, his claims against the City still fail for\n\nthe reasons set forth below.\n\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint does not plausibly allege that the City\n maintained unconstitutional policies.\n\n A municipality can only be liable under \u00a71983 where the \u201cthe action that is\n\nalleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,\n\nregulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body\u2019s officers.\u201d\n\nMonell, 436 U.S. at 690. An \u201cofficial policy\u201d is:\n\n 1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially\n adopted and promulgated by the municipality\u2019s lawmaking officers or by\n an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making\n authority; or\n\n 2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,\n although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so\n common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents\n municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must\n be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to\n whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.\n\nBennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). When relying on\n\nprior unconstitutional incidents to show a widespread practice, the incidents \u201cmust\n\nhave occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the\n\nattribution to the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the\n\nexpected, accepted practice of city employees.\u201d Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint does not allege that the City had an unconstitutional\n\nwritten policy that caused the Officers\u2019 alleged bad acts, but rather Plaintiff alleges\n\nthat DPD:\n\n\n 25\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 26 of 44 PageID 196\n\n\n\n violated established training protocols; failed to conduct appropriate\n performance review procedures; failed to implement appropriate\n recruitment, hiring, and candidate selection methods; failed to\n implement appropriate retention efforts; and failed to train, implement\n policies, and/or create an atmosphere that prohibited the very\n destructive, biased, and reckless conduct of Officers Anderson and\n Robertson.\n\n(Compl. \u00b6 35.)\n\n In addition to alleging a general failure to train on the part of DPD (see\n\nCompl. \u00b6 35), Plaintiff alleges that \u201cDPD has failed to enact proper policies and\n\nprocedures concerning rendering emergency medical treatment and has failed to\n\nproperly train its officers with respect to providing emergency medical treatment.\u201d\n\n(Id. \u00b6 37.) He further alleges that \u201cDPD has been made aware of its failures several\n\ntimes\u201d and cites several incidents as evidence that DPD\u2019s policies concerning the\n\nduty to intervene and the duty to render aid were inadequate. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 37-38.)\n\n \u201cA failure-to-train action is a type of Monell claim.\u201d Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at\n\n482. Although Plaintiff appears to also assert separate claims for failure to discipline,\n\n\u201cthe elements required to prove a claim under either theory are the same.\u201d Jean v.\n\nCity of Dallas, Texas, No. 3:18-CV-2862-M, 2019 WL 7195308, at *5 n.6 (N.D. Tex.\n\nAug. 12, 2019) (\u201cAlthough Plaintiffs separately assert claims for failure to train and\n\nfailure to supervise or discipline, the elements required to prove a claim under either\n\ntheory are the same.\u201d (citation omitted)), adopted, 2019 WL 7187104 (N.D. Tex.\n\nDec. 23, 2019); see also Monacelli, 2023 WL 6563410, at *9 n.1 (considering failure-to-\n\ntrain and failure-to-discipline claims together). \u201cThe \u2018failure to train can amount to a\n\npolicy if there is deliberate indifference to an obvious need for training where citizens\n 26\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 27 of 44 PageID 197\n\n\n\nare likely to lose their constitutional rights on account of novices in law\n\nenforcement.\u2019\u201d Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482 (quoting Peterson, 588 F.3d at 849).\n\n For a failure-to-train or a failure-to-discipline claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)\n\nmotion, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead \u201cthat (1) the city failed to train or\n\n[discipline] the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged\n\nfailure to [discipline] or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3)\n\nthe failure to train or [discipline] constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's\n\nconstitutional rights.\u201d Id. (quoting Pe\u00f1a v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623\n\n(5th Cir. 2018)). \u201cA pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained [or\n\nundisciplined] employees is \u2018ordinarily necessary\u2019 to demonstrate deliberate\n\nindifference for purposes of failure to train [or discipline].\u201d Connick v. Thompson, 563\n\nU.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520\n\nU.S. 397, 409 (1997)). However, \u201cin certain extreme circumstances, a single act by a\n\nmunicipal employee [may] form the basis of municipal liability apart from a pattern\n\nof unconstitutional activity.\u201d Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir.\n\n2005). But \u201c[t]he \u2018single incident exception\u2019 is extremely narrow,\u201d Valle v. City of\n\nHouston, 613 F.3d 536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010), and \u201cis generally reserved for those cases\n\nin which the government actor was provided no training whatsoever.\u201d Pe\u00f1a, 879\n\nF.3d at 624.\n\n Plaintiff alleges that \u201cDPD was aware that its lack of a policy and lack of\n\ntraining with respect to providing emergency medical aid was inadequate, as there\n\nhave been several reports of DPD officers either failing or refusing to provide aid to\n 27\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 28 of 44 PageID 198\n\n\n\nthose in need.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 38.) Plaintiff also alleges \u201creports\u201d and \u201callegations\u201d of\n\nsupposedly similar behavior in June and July 2020. (See id.) In one example,\n\nPlaintiff alleges that \u201ca woman reported to the Board that several DPD officers sped\n\npast her on the freeway, nearly tearing the front bumper of her vehicle off and failing\n\nto stop to render aid.\u201d (Id.) Another woman complained to the Board that she was\n\ninjured following an interaction with a DPD officer and when she explained to the\n\nofficer that she was injured, the officer had no concern for her health or well-being\n\nand simply \u201cwaved her off \u2018like a fly or dog\u2019 and yelled for her to get out of his way.\u201d\n\n(Id.) In the final example, an officer detained a man \u201cin a car with no air for over\n\nthirty minutes, causing him to have an asthma attack,\u201d but \u201c[i]nstead of providing\n\nfirst aid to the man, the officers completely ignored him.\u201d (Id.) None of these\n\nexamples are substantially similar to the circumstances here, where Plaintiff alleges\n\nthat after a high-speed pursuit by the Officers, Plaintiff\u2019s car \u201cimmediately burst into\n\nflames,\u201d and \u201cthe officers did not stop, continuing their way without checking on the\n\ndriver.\u201d (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 26-27).\n\n Plaintiff also cites the 2018 arrest of a woman, who is alleged to have been\n\nplaced in a holding cell unconscious and subsequently died (id. \u00b6 39) and an incident\n\nthat occurred in September 2022 (after the incident in this litigation), where a man\n\nwith a mental health disorder was taken to jail instead of to the hospital and died\n\nsoon after (id. \u00b6 40). These two incidents are dissimilar from Plaintiff\u2019s case for\n\nseveral reasons, most notably that the individuals were arrested and in police custody\n\nwhen the incidents occurred. (Id.) Here, Plaintiff was never arrested or in police\n 28\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 29 of 44 PageID 199\n\n\n\ncustody. Therefore, these handful of examples lack common characteristics with the\n\ninstant case, nor are they sufficiently numerous to establish a pattern.\n\n A pattern of similar prior incidents \u201crequires similarity and specificity; \u2018[p]rior\n\nindications cannot simply be for any and all bad or unwise acts, but rather must\n\npoint to the specific violation in question.\u2019\u201d Fuentes v. Nueces Cty., Tex., 689 F. App\u2019x\n\n775, 778 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851 (alteration in original)).\n\n\u201cIn addition to similarity and specificity, a pattern must be comprised of \u2018sufficiently\n\nnumerous prior incidents\u2019 rather than merely isolated instances.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting\n\nMcConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)); see Peterson, 588\n\nF.3d at 851 (noting that 27 incidents of excessive force over a period of four years did\n\nnot \u201creflect a pattern that can be said to represent official policy of condoning\n\nexcessive force so as to hold the city liable for the acts of its employees\u2019\n\nunconstitutional conduct\u201d); Pineda, 291 F.3d at 329 (holding that 11 incidents of\n\nwarrantless entry did not support a pattern of unconstitutional warrantless entry);\n\nMoreno v. City of Dallas, No. 3:13-CV-4106-B, 2015 WL 3890467, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex.\n\nJune 18, 2015) (allegations of eight prior incidents in which police officers used\n\nexcessive force were not sufficient to indicate a pattern); see also Monacelli v. City of\n\nDallas, No. 3:21-CV-02649-L (BT), 2023 WL 6563410, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1,\n\n2023) (explaining that alleging only two prior instances of similar constitutional\n\nviolations failed to plausibly state a claim for failure to discipline or failure to train),\n\nadopted, 2023 WL 6370753 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2023); Jean, 2019 WL 7195308, at\n\n\n\n 29\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 30 of 44 PageID 200\n\n\n\n*6 (alleging three specific instances where officers were not disciplined for similar\n\nmisconduct was insufficient).\n\n Based on the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint, Plaintiff has failed to\n\nplausibly show a pattern of similar constitutional violations that reveals the City\u2019s\n\nfailure to train was the result of deliberate indifference.\n\n 2. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint does not plausibly allege that any City policies\n were the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind Plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\n\n Even if Plaintiff plausibly alleged that a constitutional violation caused his\n\ninjury and plausibly alleged the existence of a City policy or pattern demonstrating\n\ndeliberate indifference, his allegations still fall short of constituting \u201cmoving force\u201d\n\nunder \u00a7 1983. To show \u201cmoving force causation,\u201d Plaintiff must demonstrate a\n\n\u201cdirect causal link\u201d between the municipality\u2019s policy and the deprivation of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s federal rights. Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (citing Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.\n\nat 404). \u201c[T]he connection must be more than a mere \u2018but for\u2019 coupling between\n\ncause and effect. The deficiency in training, hiring, or supervision must be the actual\n\ncause of the constitutional violation.\u201d Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 300 (5th\n\nCir. 2009) (cleaned up), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).\n\n Thus, to adequately allege causation at the pleading stage, Plaintiff\u2019s pleadings\n\nmust be able to plausibly answer: \u201cWould the injury have been avoided had the\n\nemployee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified\n\nrespect?\u201d City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). Here, Plaintiff\u2019s\n\ncomplaint repeatedly alleges that the Officers\u2019 high-speed pursuit of Plaintiff was\n\n\n 30\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 31 of 44 PageID 201\n\n\n\nagainst explicit \u201cDPD policy.\u201d (See, e.g., Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 6, 25.) These conclusory\n\nallegations alone are insufficient to plausibly allege that the City failed to train or\n\nsupervise its officers. Plaintiff does not plausibly plead that a failure to train or\n\nsupervise the Officers was the moving force in causing his constitutional injury; and\n\nhe does not allege, other than in conclusory terms, that any policymaker acted with\n\ndeliberate indifference to the allegedly inadequate training or supervision of DPD\n\nofficers. Therefore, in addition to reasons discussed above, Plaintiff\u2019s claim fails for\n\nlack of causation.\n\n As the Fifth Circuit has held, \u201cabsent specific allegations supporting a\n\nplausible causation inference, this legal conclusion does not state a claim for relief\n\nand warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).\u201d Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281,\n\n285 (5th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983\n\nclaims against the City should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.\n\nD. Plaintiff\u2019s claims under the Texas Torts Claims Act\n\n Plaintiff asserts a claim against the City under the Texas Torts Claims Act\n\n(\u201cTTCA\u201d), because the Officers were acting within the scope of their employment\n\nwhen they negligently used tangible property (their DPD vehicle) \u201cto engage in a\n\nreckless pursuit of Plaintiff which proximately caused Plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\u201d (Compl.\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 64-65.) \u201cThe TTCA does not create a cause of action but, instead, waives\n\nimmunity for certain suits against Texas governmental entities.\u201d Campbell v. Pena,\n\nNo. 3:23-CV-2232-B, 2024 WL 3841517, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2024) (quoting\n\nJohnson v. MHMR Auth. of Brazos Valley, No. CV H-23-3448, 2023 WL 8630064, at *5\n\n 31\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 32 of 44 PageID 202\n\n\n\n(S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2023)). Plaintiff alleges that governmental/sovereign immunity\n\nhas been waived and no exception applies to his claim. (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 63, 67.)\n\n In its motion to dismiss, the City argues that Texas law does not provide a\n\nwaiver of sovereign/ governmental immunity under the circumstances alleged in\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint. (See City Mot. at 20-23.) The City also argues that Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nclaims fall within the TTCA\u2019s emergency exception, and therefore, the City\u2019s\n\nimmunity from Plaintiff\u2019s claims is not waived regardless of whether his claims\n\nwould otherwise fall within the scope of that waiver. (See id. at 24-25 (citing Tex.\n\nCiv. Prac. & Rem. Code \u00a7 101.055(2)).)\n\n \u201cThe [\u201cTTCA\u201d] provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain suits\n\nagainst governmental entities and caps recoverable damages.\u201d Mission Consol. Indep.\n\nSch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.\n\nCode \u00a7 101.023). Because the TTCA \u201cis the only, albeit limited, avenue for\n\ncommon-law recovery against the government,\u201d all tort claims alleged against a\n\ngovernmental entity alone or with its employee are brought under the TTCA for\n\npurposes of \u00a7 101.106(f), even if immunity is not waived under the TTCA. Id. at\n\n659; accord Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. 2014); see also Rivera v.\n\nGarcia, 589 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. App.\u2014San Antonio, 2019, no pet.) (explaining\n\nthat the phrase \u201c[c]ould have been brought\u201d applies to all tort claims even where the\n\nTTCA does not waive immunity).\n\n The TTCA provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity from suit\n\nagainst a government unit if its employee, while negligently operating a motor-driven\n 32\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 33 of 44 PageID 203\n\n\n\nvehicle within the scope of his employment, proximately causes personal injuries or\n\ndeath. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. \u00a7 101.021(1)(A) (\u201cA governmental\n\nunit in the state is liable for: property damage, personal injury, and death\n\nproximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an\n\nemployee acting within his scope of employment if: the property damage, personal\n\ninjury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-\n\ndriven equipment[.]\u201d); see also Tex. Dep\u2019t of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587\n\n(Tex. 2001) (\u201cThe Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign\n\nimmunity[.]\u201d).\n\n To demonstrate a waiver under this provision, a plaintiff must show a nexus\n\nbetween the employee\u2019s use of the vehicle and the injuries sustained. Dall. Area Rapid\n\nTransit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542-43 (Tex. 2003). A causal nexus means that\n\n\u201cthe [vehicle]\u2019s use must have actually caused the injury.\u201d Id. at 543 (quoting Tex.\n\nNat. Res. Conservation Comm\u2019n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex. 2001)). The\n\noperation or use of a motor vehicle \u201cdoes not cause injury if it does no more than\n\nfurnish the condition that makes the injury possible.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, even\n\nwhere the plaintiff has alleged a tort on the part of a government driver, there is no\n\nimmunity waiver absent the negligent or otherwise improper use of a motor-driven\n\nvehicle.\u201d Ryder Integrated Logistics v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. 2015).\n\n\n\n\n 33\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 34 of 44 PageID 204\n\n\n\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s injuries did not result from the Officers\u2019 \u201cuse\u201d of a vehicle\n as defined by the TTCA.\n\n The City argues that multiple Texas appellate courts have examined similar,\n\nor essentially identical, fact patterns and declined to find a sufficient nexus between\n\nthe use of a government vehicle and a plaintiff\u2019s injuries for a waiver of immunity.\n\n(See City Mot. at 20-24.) According to the City, it is well-settled under Texas law\n\nthat a fugitive\u2019s injuries resulting from a chase are not the result of any act for which\n\nimmunity is waived. (See City Repl. at 4.) Plaintiff argues in response that he has\n\nshown the requisite \u201cnexus\u201d as defined under the TTCA between the Officers\u2019 use of\n\nthe police vehicle and his injuries. (See Resp. City at 15-17.)\n\n Instead of pointing to any authority under Texas law to support his claim,\n\nPlaintiff maintains that the procedural posture of this case renders the authority cited\n\nby the City inapplicable in the context of a rule 12(b)(6) motion. (See Resp. City at\n\n15-17.) Plaintiff does not cite any authority for this proposition, nor is the Court\n\naware of any federal authority holding that a state court\u2019s decisions explaining state\n\nlaw are not controlling because of this\u2014or any\u2014procedural posture. As explained\n\nabove, there is no blanket rule stating that questions of law in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion\n\nmay not be decided using applicable case law articulated in cases decided at the\n\nsummary-judgment phase. See supra Section III.A.\n\n Contrary to Plaintiff\u2019s arguments regarding a causal link between the Officers\u2019\n\nuse of the police vehicle and his injuries (see Resp. City at 15-16), numerous Texas\n\ncourts of appeal have declined to find waivers of sovereign immunity under the\n\n\n 34\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 35 of 44 PageID 205\n\n\n\nTTCA in cases where the government vehicle was not involved in causing the\n\ninjuries made the basis of the suit. See, e.g., Teague v. City of Dallas, 344 S.W.3d 434\n\n(Tex. App.\u2014Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate causal nexus\n\nbetween attempted detention and chase and crash because suspect driver\u2019s decision\n\nto cross the median caused the collision and police vehicle was not involved in\n\ncrash); Williams v. City of Baytown, 467 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st\n\nDist.] 2015, no pet.) (no waiver where \u201cno police car was directly involved in the\n\ncollision\u2014no officer blinded oncoming traffic or entered a freeway access road the\n\nwrong way during the chase\u201d); City of Dallas v. Hillis, 308 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.\u2014\n\nDallas 2010, pet. denied) (finding that \u201c[t]he causal nexus is not satisfied by the mere\n\ninvolvement of a vehicle, nor by an operation or use that \u2018does no more than furnish\n\nthe condition that makes the injury possible\u2019\u201d) (quoting Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543);\n\nbut see Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 928-30 (police officer driver, by blinding oncoming\n\ntraffic, did more than furnish a condition that later caused an accident; instead, he\n\nwas alleged to be a cotortfeasor); Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 96, 99\n\n(Tex. 1992) (holding summary-judgment evidence was sufficient to raise fact issue as\n\nto causation where suspect driver and chasing police entered one-way access road in\n\nthe wrong direction and suspect crashed head-on into plaintiffs\u2019 car).\n\n Here, Plaintiff alleges he \u201clost control of [his] vehicle,\u201d his car \u201cjumped a\n\ncurb\u201d along the public street, and his car struck a tree (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 1-3), but the\n\nOfficers\u2019 vehicle made no contact with Plaintiff\u2019s car. These facts are analogous to\n\nTeague, Williams, and Hillis, where the police vehicle was not involved in the collision\n 35\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 36 of 44 PageID 206\n\n\n\nthat caused the plaintiff\u2019s injuries, but distinguishable from Ryder and Travis, where\n\nthe police officer\u2019s faulty driving was arguably a direct cause of the accident.\n\nConsidering Texas law requiring a close nexus between the alleged injury and the\n\ngovernment vehicle, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff\u2019s complaint has not\n\nstated facts from which this Court can reasonably infer that the City\u2019s governmental\n\nimmunity is waived. Therefore, Plaintiff\u2019s state law tort claims should be dismissed.\n\n 2. The facts alleged in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint fall within the TTCA\u2019s\n \u201cemergency exception.\u201d\n\n The City also contends that Plaintiff\u2019s claim falls within the TTCA\u2019s\n\n\u201cemergency exception\u201d provision. (See City Mot. at 24.) The TTCA \u201cdoes not\n\napply to a claim arising . . . from the action of an employee while responding to an\n\nemergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance\n\nwith the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of\n\nsuch a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or\n\nreckless disregard for the safety of others.\u201d Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code\n\n\u00a7 101.055(2). The plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish that the emergency\n\nexception does not apply. See Barbour v. City of Forney, No. 3:15-CV-90-B, 2015 WL\n\n4094005, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2015) (citing Quested v. City of Houston, 440\n\nS.W.3d 275, 284 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, aff\u2019d), adopted, 2015 WL\n\n4113571 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2015).\n\n First, nothing in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint indicates that the Officers violated\n\nemergency \u201claws and ordinances.\u201d Plaintiff alleges that the Officers violated City\n\n\n 36\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 37 of 44 PageID 207\n\n\n\npolicies (see, e.g., Compl. \u00b6 6), but according to the Texas Supreme Court, \u201ca police\n\ndepartment\u2019s internal policies, in and of themselves, are not \u2018laws\u2019 or \u2018ordinances\u2019\u201d\n\nfor purposes of the Act. City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 530 (Tex.\n\n2022). Further, nothing in the complaint meets the standard of the Transportation\n\nCode, which holds that \u201creckless driving consists of driving a vehicle in \u2018willful or\n\nwanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u2019\u201d Id. at 531 (quoting Tex.\n\nTransp. Code \u00a7 545.401(a)). \u201c[T]his standard requires \u2018conscious indifference,\u2019 or\n\n\u2018subjective awareness of an extreme risk.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Tarrant County v. Bonner, 574\n\nS.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. 2019)).\n\n Here, Plaintiff\u2019s complaint acknowledges that he violated a traffic law, refused\n\nto stop in response to the Officers\u2019 lawful show of authority, ran off the road and\n\ncrashed his vehicle. Because Plaintiff has not shown that the emergency exception\n\nwas inapplicable here, his state law tort claim fails for this additional and\n\nindependent reason.\n\nE. Plaintiff's miscellaneous causes of action\n\n Plaintiff also lists Counts for \u201crespondeat superior\u201d (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 58-60) and\n\n\u201cexemplary damages\u201d (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 61-62), neither of which merit extensive analysis.\n\nAs previously discussed, a governmental entity cannot be held liable under a theory\n\nof respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.\n\n With respect to damages, first, the TTCA \u201cdoes not authorize exemplary\n\ndamages.\u201d Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. \u00a7 101.024. Second, under Texas law,\n\n\u201can award of punitive damages is not a separate cause of action,\u201d Sulzer Carbomedics,\n\n 37\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 38 of 44 PageID 208\n\n\n\nInc. v. Or. Cardio\u2013Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir. 2001), such that a demand\n\nfor punitive damages is not \u201cseparate and distinct from the underlying claim for\n\ncompensatory damages,\u201d where \u201cTexas, like the majority of states, limits punitive\n\ndamages to cases in which actual compensatory damages are found,\u201d Lanier v. Salas,\n\n777 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1985). The same is true for demands for punitive\n\ndamages sounding in federal law. See, e.g., Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d\n\n597, 604 (5th Cir. 1988) (addressing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim) (\u201cPunitive damages are\n\nnot an independent claim or cause of action, but are a remedy available in various\n\ncauses of action.\u201d). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff brings these two Counts as\n\nseparate causes of action, they should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.\n\nE. Leave to Amend Complaint\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s responses to both motions conclude with a request, in the\n\nalternative, to amend his complaint should the Court find his pleading insufficient.\n\n(See Resp. City at 19; Resp. Officers at 16.) Under Rule 15(a)(1), \u201c[a] party may\n\namend its pleading once as a matter of course within\u201d 21 days of service of (1) a\n\nresponsive pleading, or (2) a Rule 12(b) motion, \u201cwhichever is earlier.\u201d Fed. R. Civ.\n\nP. 15(a)(1)(B). The City filed its 12(b) motion on April 30, 2024 (City Mot.), and the\n\nOfficers filed their motion on June 3, 2024 (Officers Mot.). Plaintiff filed a response\n\nto the City\u2019s motion on May 21, 2024 (Resp. City), and as to the Officers\u2019 motion on\n\nJune 24, 2024 (Resp. Officers).\n\n As noted above, both responses embed a request for Plaintiff to amend his\n\ncomplaint (see Resp. City at 19; Resp. Officers at 16), which is within the 21-day\n\n 38\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 39 of 44 PageID 209\n\n\n\ndeadline for amendment as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).\n\nHowever, Plaintiff has not included a proposed amended pleading as required under\n\nthis Court\u2019s local rules. See N.D. Tex. L.R. 15.1(b) (stating that when \u201ca party files\n\nby electronic means a motion for leave to file an amended pleading, the party must\n\nattach the proposed amended pleading to the motion as an exhibit\u201d).\n\n Rule 15(a)(2) provides that leave to amend should be \u201cfreely given when\n\njustice so requires.\u201d Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th\n\nCir. 1991); see Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that Rule\n\n15(a)\u2019s language \u201cevinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend\u201d (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted)). \u201cAlthough leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is to be\n\nfreely given, that generous standard is tempered by the necessary power of a district\n\ncourt to manage a case.\u201d Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th\n\nCir. 2003). Thus, leave to amend is not automatic, and decisions concerning\n\nmotions to amend are left to the sound discretion of the court. See Avatar Expl., 933\n\nF.2d at 320; Guerrero ex rel. Jr. v. Taylor Cnty., No. 1:17-CV-050-C-BL, 2018 WL\n\n1033261, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2018).\n\n When considering whether to grant leave under Rule 15(a)(2), courts assess\n\n\u201cundue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated\n\nfailures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to\n\nthe opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the\n\namendment.\u201d Whitmire v. Victus Ltd., 212 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting\n\nFoman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted). \u201cThe liberal\n 39\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 40 of 44 PageID 210\n\n\n\namendment rules of F. R. Civ. P. 15(a) do not require that courts indulge in futile\n\ngestures [and] [w]here a complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, leave\n\nto amend need not be granted.\u201d DeLoach v. Woodley, 405 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968)\n\n(citing Foman, 371 U.S. 178; see also Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat\u2019l Collegiate Athletic\n\nAss\u2019n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (\u201cDenying a motion to amend is not an\n\nabuse of discretion if allowing an amendment would be futile.\u201d).\n\n Notwithstanding a plaintiff's failure to plead any set of facts or any possible\n\ntheory that they could prove consistent with the allegations in their complaints,\n\n\u201cdistrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading\n\ndeficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are incurable,\n\nor the plaintiffs advise the court that they are willing or unable to amend in a manner\n\nthat will avoid dismissal.\u201d In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp.2d 552,\n\n567\u201368 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Witter & Co.,\n\n313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)). \u201cNevertheless, courts may appropriately dismiss\n\nan action with prejudice if a court finds that the plaintiff has alleged his or her best\n\ncase.\u201d Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). \u201cA plaintiff has pleaded\n\n[his] best case after [he] is apprised of the insufficiency of her complaint.\u201d Wiggins v.\n\nLouisiana State Univ.-Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App\u2019x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017)\n\n(citing Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768 (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th\n\nCir. 1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted))).\n\n \u201cAn amendment is futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.\u201d\n\nMarucci at 378 (citing Briggs v. Miss., 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)). In addition\n 40\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 41 of 44 PageID 211\n\n\n\nto testing the factual sufficiency of a claim, Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to\n\ndismiss claims that have no basis, arguable or otherwise, in the law. Neitzke v.\n\nWilliams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir.\n\n1992). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law when it is \u201cbased on an\n\nindisputably meritless legal theory.\u201d Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326\u201327; Berry v. Brady, 192\n\nF.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).\n\n The Fifth Circuit has affirmed denials of leave to amend where it determined\n\nthat the proposed amendment would be futile after analyzing the claims. See Edoinwe\n\nv. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2017) (proposed amended complaint failed to\n\nstate a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983). \u201c[A] bare request in an opposition to a\n\nmotion to dismiss\u2014without any indication of the particular grounds on which the\n\namendment is sought, cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)\u2014does not constitute a motion within\n\nthe contemplation of Rule 15(a).\u201d Confederate Mem\u2019l Assn, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295,\n\n299 (D.C. Cir. 1993). If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended\n\ncomplaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court may deny\n\nleave. Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised\n\n(Nov. 26, 2021) (citing McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir.\n\n2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs \u201cfailed to amend their\n\ncomplaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district court with a proposed\n\namended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the defendants to the\n\nsubstance of their proposed amendment\u201d)).\n\n\n\n 41\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 42 of 44 PageID 212\n\n\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s request for leave states: \u201cAlternatively, should this Court determine\n\nthat Defendant is entitled to dismissal on any of Plaintiff\u2019s claims, Plaintiff\n\nrespectfully asks that this Court allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend its\n\nComplaint.\u201d (See Resp. City at 19; Resp. Officers at 16 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.\n\n15(a)(2)).) This \u201cdoes not provide any indication of the grounds on which such an\n\namendment should be permitted.\u201d Willard, 336 F.3d at 387. Plaintiff attached no\n\namended pleading to his request for leave as required by the Court\u2019s local rules (see\n\nN.D. Tex. L.R. 15.1(b)) and offers no discussion of factual allegation(s) that he\n\nintends to add or revise in any further amended pleading. (See City Mot. at 19;\n\nOfficers Mot. at 16.)\n\n Further, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff\u2019s amendment would be futile.\n\nPlaintiff has pleaded his best case. (See Compl., Resp. City, Resp. Officers). No\n\ngood-faith amendment could plead new factual content sufficient to allow the Court\n\nto reasonably infer that Defendants are liable. The central facts are undisputed: The\n\nOfficers observed Plaintiff leave a gas station and turn down the street without\n\nheadlights on; the Officers pursued Plaintiff using their lights and sirens as a\n\ncommand to stop; Plaintiff did not stop; he eventually crashed his vehicle into a tree\n\nwhich caused his vehicle to burst into flames; Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a\n\nresult. (See generally Compl.) The only disputed fact is whether the Officers observed\n\nthe crash or learned about it later, but this disputed fact is irrelevant for purposes of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims.\n\n\n\n 42\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 43 of 44 PageID 213\n\n\n\n The Officers were not involved in the crash. Plaintiff does not allege that the\n\nOfficers caused the accident by sideswiping him, \u201caccidentally\u201d crashing into him,\n\nrunning him off the road, using lights to blind oncoming traffic, entering a freeway\n\naccess road the wrong way, or otherwise furnishing a condition that caused him to\n\nlose control of his vehicle. Even if the Officers observed and ignored Plaintiff\u2019s\n\ncrash, as Plaintiff alleges, this only demonstrates actions that were arguably uncaring\n\nand thoughtless, not a legally cognizable claim. There is no Supreme Court or Fifth\n\nCircuit authority that recognizes a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claim under\n\nthis scenario. See, e.g., Brower, 489 U.S. 593; Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621; Lewis, 523 U.S.\n\n844; Graham, 490 U.S. 386; Morrow, 917 F.3d 870. Similarly, there is no authority\n\nunder Texas state law holding that a municipality\u2019s governmental immunity is\n\nwaived under these facts. See, e.g., Williams, 467 S.W.3d 566; City of Dallas v. Hillis,\n\n308 S.W.3d 526; Ryder, 453 S.W.3d 922; Travis, 830 S.W.2d 94. Accordingly, there\n\nis no factual content Plaintiff could plead that would allow the Court to reasonably\n\ninfer that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See Martinez v. Nueces\n\nCnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023).\n\n For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that amendment would be futile,\n\nand Plaintiff\u2019s request for leave to amend his complaint embedded in his responses to\n\nDefendants\u2019 motions to dismiss should be denied. See Wiggins, 710 F. App\u2019x at 627;\n\nHarris v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. of Texas, No. 3:23-CV-02486-E; 2024 WL 2734974\n\n(N.D. Tex. May 28, 2024) (denying motion for leave to amend complaint). For those\n\nreasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to Amend.\n 43\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 18 Filed 02/13/25 Page 44 of 44 PageID 214\n\n\n\n RECOMMENDATION\n\n For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the City\u2019s motion (Dkt.\n\nNo. 7) and the Officers\u2019 motion (Dkt. No. 12) be GRANTED pursuant to Rule\n\n12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.\n\n SO RECOMMENDED on February 13, 2025.\n\n\n\n\n BRIAN McKAY\n UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND\n NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT\n\nA copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner\nprovided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation\nmust file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See\n28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify\nthe finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the\nobjection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge\u2019s report and recommendation\nwhere the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by\nreference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to\nfile specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual\nfindings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by\nthe district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services\nAutomobile Ass\u2019n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds,\n28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).\n\n\n\n\n 44\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-03-10T08:34:55.643723-07:00","document_number":"18","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017465382","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Findings and Recommendations","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-03-10T08:34:24.774049-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-13T01:50:45.798623-07:00","date_filed":"2025-02-13","time_filed":null,"entry_number":18,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-02-13.001","pacer_sequence_number":56,"description":" FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE. It is RECOMMENDED that the City's motion (Dkt. No. 7 ) and the Officers' motion (Dkt. No. 12 ) be GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that Plaintiffs claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Ordered by US Magistrate Judge Brian McKay on 2/13/2025) (cfk)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/418521280/","id":418521280,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/432327634/","id":432327634,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/19/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2025-03-06T14:18:35.646852-08:00","date_modified":"2025-04-06T01:54:07.610037-07:00","sha1":"133536952e40740691aaa0ea54d11a936ae90c77","page_count":3,"file_size":207218,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.19.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.19.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":"recap-thumbnails/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/432327634.thumb.1068.png","thumbnail_status":1,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 19 Filed 03/06/25 Page 1 of 3 PageID 215\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nv. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON; DARRIEN \u00a7\nROBERTSON; and CITY OF DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n ORDER\n\n The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge\n\n(\u201cReport\u201d) (Doc. 18) was entered on February 13, 2025, recommending that the court grant the\n\npending Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 12) and dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of\n\nCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) the following claims, theories, and requests for relief by Plaintiff Tomyia\n\nCrenshaw (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) against Defendants Leonard Anderson, Darrien Robertson, and the City of\n\nDallas (\u201cDefendants\u201d) because they fail as a matter of law:\n\n 1. Excessive Deadly Force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (Against Defendants\n Anderson and Robertson);\n\n 2. Failure To Render Medical Aid, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (Against All\n Defendants);\n\n 3. Municipal Liability, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (Against the City);\n\n 4. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code \u00a7 101.021, also known as the Texas\n Tort Claims Act (\u201cTTCA\u201d) (Against the City);\n\n 5. Respondeat Superior (Against the City); and\n\n 6. Exemplary Damages.\n\nReport 4 (citing Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 45-62.).\n\n\n\nOrder \u2013 Page 1\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 19 Filed 03/06/25 Page 2 of 3 PageID 216\n\n\n\n Specifically, the magistrate determined that Plaintiff\u2019s claims brought pursuant to \u00a7 1983\u2014\n\nagainst Officers Anderson and Robertson based on excessive force and failure to render aid\u2014fail\n\nbecause Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a reasonable inference that the\n\nOfficers violated Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights, as his allegations do not constitute a seizure under\n\nthe Fourth Amendment, and the Officers had no duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to stop\n\nand render aid. The magistrate determined that Plaintiff\u2019s myriad claims of municipal liability\n\nagainst the City of Dallas similarly fail because he has not alleged a plausible constitutional\n\nviolation upon which the City\u2019s municipal liability can be based, that is, Plaintiff does not plausibly\n\nallege that the City of Dallas maintained any unconstitutional policies or that such policies were\n\nthe moving force behind his injuries. The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff\u2019s TTCA claim\n\nagainst the City of Dallas fails because Texas law does not provide a waiver of sovereign or\n\ngovernmental immunity under the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff. Finally, the magistrate judge\n\ndetermined that Plaintiff\u2019s remaining Counts for \u201crespondeat superior\u201d and \u201cexemplary damages\u201d\n\nfail because a governmental entity cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior;\n\npunitive damages are not an independent claim; and Texas, like most states, limits punitive\n\ndamages to cases in which actual damages are found. *\n\n The magistrate judge further recommends that the court deny Plaintiff leave to amend his\n\npleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) as futile because there is no Supreme\n\nCourt or Fifth Circuit authority that recognizes a Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim in the scenario\n\nthat forms the basis for Plaintiff\u2019s claims, the essential facts are undisputed, and there are no facts\n\nthat Plaintiff could plead that would allow the court to reasonably infer that Defendants are liable\n\n\n*\n The court further notes that, even if Plaintiff could establish municipal liability against the City of Dallas, he could\nnot recover exemplary or punitive damages against the City of Dallas in a \u00a7 1983 case against a municipality. See City\nof Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).\n\n\nOrder \u2013 Page 2\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 19 Filed 03/06/25 Page 3 of 3 PageID 217\n\n\n\nfor the conduct alleged. Additionally, the magistrate notes that Plaintiff could have amended his\n\npleadings as a matter of course but chose not to do so, and he has not offered any explanation or\n\nprovided a proposed amended complaint to demonstrate how he would cure the pleading\n\ndeficiencies identified by Defendants\u2019 Motion and detailed in the Report.\n\n No objections to the Report were received as of the date of this order, and the deadline for\n\nfiling objections has expired. The 14-day period to object served as an opportunity for Plaintiff to\n\nobject and inform the court how he intended to replead his case. Plaintiff, however, did neither.\n\nThe court, therefore, agrees with the magistrate judge\u2019s determination that Plaintiff, who is\n\nrepresented by counsel, has pleaded his best case such that amendment would be futile. Moreover,\n\npermitting further amendment does nothing but unnecessarily delay resolution of this action.\n\nAccordingly, the court denies Plaintiff\u2019s request to amend his pleadings.\n\n Having considered Defendants\u2019 Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 12), the pleadings, the file,\n\nrecord in this case, and Report, the court determines that the findings and conclusions of the\n\nmagistrate judge are correct, and accepts them as those of the court. Thus, the court grants\n\nDefendants\u2019 Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 7, 12) and dismisses with prejudice all federal and states\n\nclaims by Plaintiff against Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon\n\nwhich relief can be granted.\n\n It is so ordered this 6th day of March, 2025.\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n Sam A. Lindsay\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\nOrder \u2013 Page 3\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-03-07T01:54:00.641029-08:00","document_number":"19","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017518364","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Findings and Recommendations on Case","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-03-06T14:18:35.575905-08:00","date_modified":"2025-04-06T01:54:07.603158-07:00","date_filed":"2025-03-06","time_filed":"15:57:01","entry_number":19,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-03-06.001","pacer_sequence_number":60,"description":" ORDER accepting 18 Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the court grants [7, 12] Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and dismisses with prejudice all federal and states claims by Plaintiff against Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court also denies Plaintiff's request to amend his pleadings. (Ordered by Judge Sam A. Lindsay on 3/6/2025) (chmb)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/418521276/","id":418521276,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/432327631/","id":432327631,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/20/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2025-03-06T14:18:35.248307-08:00","date_modified":"2025-03-11T02:40:25.989936-07:00","sha1":"b0c0fcc1d65aeb956037f9ac6bd25e71bbb44db7","page_count":1,"file_size":151064,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.20.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.20.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 20 Filed 03/06/25 Page 1 of 1 PageID 218\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nv. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON; DARRIEN \u00a7\nROBERTSON; and CITY OF DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n JUDGMENT\n\n This judgment is issued pursuant to the court\u2019s order dated March 6, 2025. It is, therefore,\n\nordered, adjudged, and decreed that this action and all claims by Plaintiff Tomyia Crenshaw\n\n(\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) against Defendants Leonard Anderson, Darrien Robertson, and the City of Dallas\n\n(\u201cDefendants\u201d) are dismissed with prejudice; that Plaintiff take nothing against Defendants; that\n\nall relief not granted is denied unless applicable law allows a party to seek some type of\n\npostjudgment relief; and that all allowable and reasonable costs are taxed against Plaintiff.\n\n Signed this 6th day of March, 2025.\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n Sam A. Lindsay\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\nJudgment \u2013 Solo Page\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-03-10T08:37:32.892673-07:00","document_number":"20","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017518384","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Judgment","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-03-06T14:18:35.154232-08:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.630717-07:00","date_filed":"2025-03-06","time_filed":"15:59:12","entry_number":20,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-03-06.002","pacer_sequence_number":62,"description":"JUDGMENT (Ordered by Judge Sam A. Lindsay on 3/6/2025) (chmb)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/402080697/","id":402080697,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/411747702/","id":411747702,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/16/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-09-12T09:59:31.138459-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.779031-07:00","sha1":"08c4cd126c0855ebfcc602e54da8e2f91f37ed88","page_count":7,"file_size":198022,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.16.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.16.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 1 of 7 PageID 150\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nv. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON et al., \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n DEFENDANTS LEONARD ANDERSON AND DARRIEN ROBERTSON\u2019S REPLY IN\n SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF\u2019S COMPLAINT\n\nTO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:\n\n Defendants Leonard Anderson and Darrien Robertson (\u201cDefendants\u201d), pursuant to Rule\n\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Tex. LR 7.1(f), file this Reply in Support\n\nof their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (ECF No. 12, \u201cMotion\u201d), and respectfully show\n\nthe Court as follows:\n\n I. SUMMARY OF REPLY\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Response (ECF No. 15) fails to point to sufficient factual matter that, when\n\naccepted as true, plausibly supports a legally recognizable federal claim. Indeed, Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nResponse cites no case law\u2014from any jurisdiction\u2014that holds (or even suggests) the Defendants\u2019\n\nactions for which he sues were unconstitutional. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim upon\n\nwhich relief can be granted on any of the federal claims alleged against Defendants. Accordingly,\n\nDefendants\u2019 Motion should be granted, and this lawsuit dismissed.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 2 of 7 PageID 151\n\n\n\n II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES\n\n a. Nothing in the Response points to case law and facts alleged in the Complaint\n from which this Court can infer Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights were violated.\n\n The Response dedicates roughly one page to the central question of whether Plaintiff\n\nsuffered a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and summarizes his claim as follows:\n\n In the present case, Plaintiff was seized when the Defendants caused his\n vehicle to crash by initiating their high-speed pursuit. Defendants\u2019 assertion in their\n Motion that \u201c[t]he pursuit did not curtail Plaintiff\u2019s freedom of movement,\u201d is\n completely false. Indeed, when Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle crashed, it was set ablaze,\n trapping Plaintiff inside and completely curtailing Plaintiff\u2019s ability and freedom to\n exit his vehicle and walk away. Trapping Plaintiff inside a burning vehicle certainly\n constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.\n\nResp. at 13-14 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).\n\n While Plaintiff\u2019s Response cites thirty-three cases (id. at 4-5), it does not cite a single state\n\nor federal court decision finding these alleged actions amount to a violation of an individual\u2019s\n\nFourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, or excessive force.\n\nIndeed, the Response fails to cite a case where a law enforcement officer\u2019s actions in a car chase\n\nscenario were deemed unconstitutional absent actual physical contact with either the suspect\u2019s\n\nperson or vehicle. The reason is because Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit Fourth Amendment case\n\nlaw squarely forecloses any such claim.1\n\n Similarly, the roughly single page that the Response devotes to Plaintiff\u2019s Fourteenth\n\nAmendment claim cites no case law indicating that an officer has a duty under the Fourteenth\n\nAmendment to render aid when a fugitive is subsequently injured while fleeing from law\n\n\n1\n As one professor explained the state of the law,\n [e]ven after police have issued a command to stop that would otherwise qualify as the initiation of\n a seizure, no doctrinally recognized seizure begins until the individual has submitted or the police\n have made intentional physical contact. . . . Thus, an individual who runs after a command to stop\n has not been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\nAlice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 1182, 1197 (2017) (citations omitted)\n(emphasis added).\n\n 2\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 3 of 7 PageID 152\n\n\n\nenforcement during an attempted seizure. Resp. at 13-14. Neither does the Response address\n\nCounty of Sacramento v. Lewis, cited in the Motion, where the Supreme Court addressed \u201cwhether\n\na police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s guarantee of substantive due process by\n\ncausing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase\n\naimed at apprehending a suspected offender\u201d and \u201canswer[ed] no . . . .\u201d 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).\n\n Rather than considering established legal precedent from the Supreme Court and Fifth\n\nCircuit, Plaintiff claims Defendants are \u201csubject[ing] Plaintiff to a higher standard than is required\n\nor permitted under Rule 12(b)(6).\u201d Resp. at 9. Plaintiff seems to contend, without any citation, that\n\nbecause many of the cases Defendants cite involve summary judgment, the established legal\n\nprinciples they reference are irrelevant in the context of a motion to dismiss. However, a cursory\n\nexamination of recent Fifth Circuit and this Court\u2019s jurisprudence on Rule 12(b)(6) reveals that a\n\ndecision\u2019s procedural posture does not preclude the application of its legal holdings in a dismissal\n\ncontext. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 23-10566, 2024 WL 913368, at *3 (5th Cir.\n\nMar. 4, 2024) (upholding rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of common law tort claims against officer, citing\n\nShinn on Behalf of Shinn v. Coll. Station Indep. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 1996), an\n\nappeal from summary judgment); Monacelli v. City of Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-2649-L, 2023 WL\n\n6370753, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2023) (granting rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Monell claims,\n\nciting Monell v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978), an appeal\n\nfrom \u201ccross-motions for summary judgment.\u201d); Rusanowsky v. City of Dallas, No. 3:22-CV-\n\n01132-K, 2023 WL 2728722, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2023) (granting rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of\n\nMonell claims citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 381 (1989), an appeal from\n\n\u201c[a] jury trial.\u201d); and Vess v. City of Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-1764-D, 2022 WL 625080, at *7 (N.D.\n\nTex. Mar. 3, 2022) (granting rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Monell claims, citing Piotrowski v. City of\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 4 of 7 PageID 153\n\n\n\nHouston, 237 F.3d 567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001), an appeal from a jury trial). Defendants\u2019 Motion\n\nlikewise cites Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit case law for purposes of determining applicable\n\nprinciples of law, not to \u201cattempt to raise the pleading standard that Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint is subject\n\nto.\u201d Resp. at 10.\n\n Lastly, despite Plaintiff\u2019s efforts to distinguish the case law cited in the Motion, their\n\nargument fails. First, the Response contends that Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989)\n\nis inapplicable because the Supreme Court held that the suspect had been \u201cseized.\u201d Resp. at 12\n\n(citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 599). However, as the Motion makes clear, the Supreme Court\n\nsubsequently clarified its holding in Brower, explaining: \u201cWe did not even consider the possibility\n\nthat a seizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because [. . .] that \u2018show of\n\nauthority did not produce his stop.\u2019\u201d California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (cleaned\n\nup). Second, the Response argues that Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) is inapposite because\n\n\u201cthere was not a dispute that a seizure had occurred.\u201d Resp. at 12. However, Defendants cited Scott\n\nas \u201cinstructive,\u201d emphasizing the Supreme Court\u2019s holding \u201cthat it was the fleeing suspect who\n\nintentionally placed himself and others in danger by ignoring warnings to stop and engaging in a\n\nreckless, high-speed flight that ultimately forced the officer to act.\u201d Mot. at 9 (emphasis in\n\noriginal). Further, the Motion distinguished Scott: \u201cHere, unlike Scott, the Officers are not alleged\n\nto have ever touched Plaintiff, much less run him off the road.\u201d Id.\n\n Because Plaintiff has failed to cite any case law that holds law enforcement officers who\n\nmerely pursue a fleeing suspect effect a Fourth Amendment seizure during a vehicular pursuit or\n\nthat officers have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to render aid to a fleeing suspect, he has failed to\n\nallege a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourth or Fourteenth\n\nAmendment. Therefore, his section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 5 of 7 PageID 154\n\n\n\n b. Plaintiff\u2019s Response fails to point to any \u201cclearly-established\u201d case law that\n Defendants\u2019 actions could subject them to liability.\n\n The Fifth Circuit places a significant burden on plaintiffs to survive a rule 12(b)(6) based\n\non qualified immunity:\n\n When a defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense in a motion to\n dismiss, the court has an obligation to carefully scrutinize the complaint before\n subjecting public officials to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. A plaintiff\n seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow\n the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm\n he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.\n Courts are obligated to implement a qualified immunity defense at the earliest\n possible stage of litigation, because qualified immunity means immunity from\n having to stand trial, not simply immunity from monetary liability.\n\n The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil\n damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be\n legal. When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff\n to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. The plaintiff must show (1) that\n the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was\n \u201cclearly established\u201d at the time of the challenged conduct.\n\nKelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).\n\n The Defendants\u2019 Motion makes clear that there is no case law supporting Plaintiff\u2019s claims\n\nthat: (1) a car chase where the suspect does not yield constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure; and\n\n(2) law enforcement officers have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to render aid to a fleeing suspect\n\nwho is later injured. The Response cites no case law to the contrary. Therefore, the alleged rights\n\nunderlying Plaintiff\u2019s claims cannot be reasonably described as \u201cclearly established.\u201d\n\n A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every\n reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.\n We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed\n the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Put simply, qualified\n immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate\n the law.\n\nMullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11\u201312 (2015) (cleaned up).\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 6 of 7 PageID 155\n\n\n\n Based on clearly established law, no reasonable officer at the time of the incident could\n\nhave believed he had a constitutional duty to continue pursuing a fleeing suspect and ensure his\n\nsafety in the event of a crash.\n\n c. Plaintiff has not properly moved this Court to amend his Complaint.\n\n At his Response\u2019s conclusion, should this Court find his pleading to be insufficient,\n\n\u201cPlaintiff respectfully asks that this Court allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend its [sic]\n\nComplaint.\u201d Resp. at 16 (citation omitted). However, under this Court\u2019s local rules, when \u201ca party\n\nfiles by electronic means a motion for leave to file an amended pleading, the party must attach the\n\nproposed amended pleading to the motion as an exhibit.\u201d N.D. Tex. L.R. 15.1(b). Plaintiff has not\n\nincluded a proposed amended pleading.\n\n Regardless, rule 15(a) requires that leave to amend be granted freely \u201cwhen justice so\n\nrequires.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). So, because this rule provides a \u201cstrong presumption in favor\n\nof granting leave to amend,\u201d Fin. Acquisition Partners, LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th\n\nCir. 2006), the Court must do so \u201cunless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend,\u201d\n\nDussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981). One such reason, salient\n\nhere, is futility: \u201cIf the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is\n\nfutile and the district court [is] within its discretion to deny leave to amend.\u201d Martinez v. Nueces\n\nCnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New\n\nOrleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2022)).\n\n No good-faith amendment could change the central facts of this case: Plaintiff ran away\n\nfrom police, crashed his car, and suffered injuries as a result. No case law exists that would permit\n\nrecovery under section 1983 or Texas state law for such an occurrence. As such, amendment would\n\nbe futile. Martinez, 71 F.4th at 391 (affirming denial of amendment, stating \u201c[w]e therefore ask\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 16 Filed 07/05/24 Page 7 of 7 PageID 156\n\n\n\nwhether, in his proposed amended complaint, [plaintiff\u2019] has pleaded factual content that allows\n\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d)\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Response points to no facts or case law that permit a reasonable inference that\n\nDefendants are liable for an alleged deprivation of Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights under the Fourth\n\nor Fourteenth Amendments. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against the\n\nDefendants upon which relief can be granted, his Complaint must be dismissed.\n\n Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Defendants\u2019 Motion and this reply, Defendants pray\n\nthe Court grant their motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), deny Plaintiff leave to replead, and\n\ndismiss this case against him with prejudice.\n\n CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n TAMMY L. PALOMINO\n City Attorney\n\n /s/ J. Cheves Ligon .\n\n\n\n\n J. Cheves Ligon\n Senior Assistant City Attorney\n Texas State Bar No. 24070147\n john.ligon@dallas.gov\n 7DN Dallas City Hall\n 1500 Marilla Street\n Dallas, Texas 75201\n Telephone: 214-670-1236\n Facsimile: 214-670-0622\n Attorneys for Defendants\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-09-12T10:02:44.501999-07:00","document_number":"16","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016963650","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-09-12T09:59:31.122473-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.759219-07:00","date_filed":"2024-07-05","time_filed":null,"entry_number":16,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-07-05.001","pacer_sequence_number":50,"description":"REPLY filed by Leonard Anderson, Darrien Robertson re: [12] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Ligon, John)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/402080696/","id":402080696,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/411747701/","id":411747701,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/15/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-09-12T09:59:31.102307-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.823664-07:00","sha1":"4d624d9769009d7660dbb1cfdc52a9fb630a4bf6","page_count":17,"file_size":282492,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.15.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":3,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 1 of 17 PageID 133\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMIYA CRENSHAW \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nvs. \u00a7\n \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON, \u00a7\nDARRIEN ROBERTSON, \u00a7\nAND THE CITY OF DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n \u00a7\n\n\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS LEONARD\n ANDERSON AND DARRIEN ROBERTSON\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\n\nTO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:\n\n Plaintiff Tomiya Crenshaw files this, his Response to Defendants Leonard Anderson and\n\nDarrien Robertson\u2019s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (Dkt. No. 12, \u201cMotion\u201d), and in\n\nsupport thereof would respectfully show the Court as follows:\n\n MCCATHERN, PLLC\n\n /s/Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n State Bar No. 24056989\n cevans@mccathernlaw.com\n Alizabeth A. Guillot\n State Bar No. 24138578\n aguillot@mccathernlaw.com\n Stephen Bergren\n State Bar No. 24134428\n sbergren@mccathernlaw.com\n 3710 Rawlins Street, Suite 1600\n Dallas, Texas 75219\n (214) 741-2662 Telephone\n\n\n 1\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 2 of 17 PageID 134\n\n\n\n\n BEN CRUMP LAW, PLLC\n Paul A. Grinke\n State Bar No. 24032255\n paul@bencrump.com\n Aaron Dekle\n State Bar No. 24100961\n aaron@bencrump.com\n 5 Cowboys Way, Suite 300\n Frisco, Texas 75034\n (972) 942-0494 Telephone\n\n COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 3 of 17 PageID 135\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 6\nII. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ........................................................ 7\nIII. RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD ............................................................................................... 8\nIV. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES.............................................................................. 10\n A. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly States a Section 1983 Claim ...................................... 10\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Facts From Which the Court May\n Plausibly Infer That His Constitutional Rights Were Violated ...................................... 11\n i. Defendants\u2019 \u201cState-Created Danger\u201d Argument Fails ............................................ 11\n ii. Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts From Which the Court May Plausibly Infer His Fourth\n Amendment Rights Were Violated.................................................................................... 12\n iii. Plaintiff Had a Fourteenth Amendment Right to Receive Emergency Medical\n Aid from Defendants........................................................................................................... 13\n B. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Alleges Sufficient Facts to Overcome Defendants\u2019 Qualified\n Immunity Defense ................................................................................................................... 14\nV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 16\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 4 of 17 PageID 136\n\n\n\nCases\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 9\nBaskin v. City of Houston, Mississippi, 378 Fed. Appx. 417 (5th Cir. 2010) ................................. 9\nBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 9\nBeltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2004) ............................................................... 9\nBrower v. Cnty. of Inyo,\n 489 U.S. 593 (1989) .................................................................................................................. 12\nBush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 15\nButtross v. Great Lakes Ins. SE,\n No. 1:22-CV-00086-BU, 2022 WL 16749045 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2022) ................................. 8\nCnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) ....................................................................... 9\nDeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ................................. 9\nDoe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 615 F. Supp. 3d 471 (E.D. Tex. 2022) ................................... 9\nFirefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P.,\n 894 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................... 9\nFisher v. Moore,\n 73 F.4th 367 (5th Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................................... 11\nFlores v. City of Palacios,\n 381 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 12\nHarper v. McAndrews,\n 499 F. Supp. 3d 312 (E.D. Tex. 2020) ...................................................................................... 13\nHope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002) .................................................................................... 14\nIkerd v. Blair,\n 101 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... 12\nIn re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc.,\n 468 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................... 9\nKinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 349\u201350 (5th Cir. 2004) ............................................................ 14\nLeatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,\n 07 U.S. 163 (1993) .................................................................................................................... 10\nMason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) ................................. 10\nMorgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011)............................................................... 14\nMorrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................... 10\nNerren v. Livingston Police Dep\u2019t, 86 F.3d at 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996) ....................................... 15\nR. & R. adopted, No. 1:22-CV-086-H-BU, 2022 WL 16752849 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2022).......... 8\n\n\n 4\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 5 of 17 PageID 137\n\n\n\nReese v. Anderson,\n 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991) ..................................................................................................... 10\nRice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 1122 (5th Cir. 2014)..................................................... 10\nScott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) ...................................................................................... 10, 12\nSosa v. Coleman,\n 646 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1981) ....................................................................................................... 8\nTanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,\n 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................... 8\nTennessee v. Garner,\n 471 U.S. 1 (1985) ...................................................................................................................... 12\nTerwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 284 (5th Cir. 2021)................................................................. 14\nTorres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) ........................................................................................ 10\nWatson v. Bryant, 532 Fed. Appx. 453 (5th Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 10\nStatutes\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 ........................................................................................................... 6, 10, 11, 12\nTEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7\u00a7 547.302, 547.004 .................................................................................... 15\nRules\nFED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ......................................................................................................... passim\nFED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) ................................................................................................................. 16\nFED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) ................................................................................................................... 8, 10\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 6 of 17 PageID 138\n\n\n\n I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT\n\n \u201cThat\u2019s his fault.\u201d This is the statement by senior police officer Leonard Anderson to\n\ntrainee Darrien Robertson as they looked at Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle burning after it had crashed. Instead\n\nof accepting the responsibility that they had caused this crash to occur after engaging in a needless\n\nand reckless high-speed chase, these officers acted with utter indifference to Plaintiff\u2019s life and\n\ndrove in the opposite direction instead of rushing to help Plaintiff. This vile action deprived\n\nPlaintiff of his constitutional rights and caused him to be seized and then left for dead despite the\n\nfact that the officers caused this collision to occur. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that\n\nofficers for the Dallas Police Department have turned a blind eye to injuries and needs of those\n\nthat they have in their custody or care. Defendants must be held accountable for this deliberately\n\nindifferent behavior to Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights.\n\n Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss is mainly composed of smoke screens and red herring\n\narguments that have no relevant connection to Plaintiff\u2019s pleadings, which must be the main focus\n\nin a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry. Motions to dismiss are rarely granted, as the only requirement is that\n\nthe complaint states a plausible claim. When read in the proper light, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint sets\n\nforth more than sufficient grounds to assert \u00a7 1983 claims against Defendants.\n\n When construed liberally, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint paints a more than sufficient picture of the\n\negregious actions by Defendants which give rise to a plausible claim for relief. Our Courts and our\n\ncities should be encouraging officers such as Defendants to run to render aid to those in need,\n\nespecially where, as here, Defendants\u2019 actions caused the need for such aid in the first place. For\n\nthese reasons and those more fully explained below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court\n\ndeny Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 7 of 17 PageID 139\n\n\n\n II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n\n This case stems from the reprehensible and unlawful actions of Defendant City of Dallas,\n\nDefendant Leonard Anderson (\u201cAnderson\u201d), Defendant Darrien Robertson (\u201cRobertson\u201d, and\n\ntogether with Anderson, collectively the \u201cDefendants\u201d) that occurred on May 13, 2022. On that\n\ndate, Defendants Anderson and Robertson were engaged in a routine patrolling assignment when\n\nthey noticed a red car, driven by Plaintiff Tomiya Crenshaw (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) pass by without a\n\nheadlight on. Defendants Anderson and Robertson then pulled out behind Plaintiff\u2019s car and\n\nactivated their emergency lights and sirens, ultimately engaging in a high-speed pursuit of Plaintiff.\n\n Defendants Anderson and Robertson pursued Plaintiff for several blocks before eventually\n\nturning off their emergency lights and sirens. Although their emergency lights and sirens were no\n\nlonger on, Defendants Anderson and Robertson continued to pursue Crenshaw. Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson did not stop pursuing Plaintiff until they caused his car to crash. Indeed,\n\nit was only once Plaintiff\u2019s car had crashed and was engulfed in flames did the pursuit stop.\n\nHowever, instead of stopping to assess and help remedy the fiery situation which they had created,\n\nDefendants Anderson and Robertson brushed off the incident by saying, \u201cThat\u2019s his fault,\u201d and\n\nthen simply turned onto a different street and drove away, leaving Plaintiff to nearly die inside of\n\nhis burning vehicle.\n\n As a result of Defendant\u2019s heinous conduct, Plaintiff has suffered third-degree burns on\n\nover fifty percent (50%) of his body. Some of Plaintiff\u2019s burns go all the way down to his bones\u2014\n\nparticularly those sustained from his waist down. Additionally, Plaintiff has suffered a broken arm,\n\nleg, collar bone, hip, and several ribs. As a result of such injuries, Plaintiff had to be hospitalized\n\nfrom May 13, 2022, to September 3, 2022. Since the incident, Plaintiff has undergone over twenty\n\n(20) different surgeries and is still receiving outpatient treatment for his injuries. Additionally,\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 8 of 17 PageID 140\n\n\n\nPlaintiff\u2014a once healthy 23-year-old\u2014must now use a wheelchair and/or walker to perform many\n\ndaily activities he previously had no problem with. Plaintiff anticipates past and future medical\n\nbills and expenses, past and future disfigurement, past and future physical limitations and/or\n\nincapacity, and past and future pain and suffering and mental anguish.\n\n Accordingly, Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint (\u201cComplaint\u201d) against Defendant City\n\nof Dallas, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant Robertson on March 27, 2024. On June 3, 2024,\n\nDefendants Anderson and Robertson filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint under\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Plaintiff files this Response in Opposition to\n\nDefendants Leonard Anderson and Darrien Robertson\u2019s Motion to Dismiss (\u201cResponse\u201d).\n\n III. RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD\n\n \u201cA motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim \u2018is viewed with disfavor, and is rarely\n\ngranted.\u2019\u201d Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir.\n\n1988) (quoting Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1981)). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6)\n\nmotion to dismiss is to test the formal sufficiency of a complaint, not to decide the merits of the\n\ncase. See Buttross v. Great Lakes Ins. SE, No. 1:22-CV-00086-BU, 2022 WL 16749045, at *3\n\n(N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2022), R. & R. adopted, No. 1:22-CV-086-H-BU, 2022 WL 16752849 (N.D.\n\nTex. Nov. 7, 2022) (stating that the motion is not to be used as \u201ca procedure for resolving a contest\n\nbetween the parties about the facts or the substantive merits of the plaintiff\u2019s case\u201d). To be granted,\n\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must establish that the complaint fails to meet the liberal\n\nnotice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) , which merely requires, \u201ca short and plain statement of\n\nthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The 12(b)(6) \u201cpleading\n\nstandard should not be robotically applied, however, so as to overwhelm a plaintiff\u2019s right to\n\nadjudicate her claim on the merits.\u201d Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 615 F. Supp. 3d 471, 486\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 9 of 17 PageID 141\n\n\n\n(E.D. Tex. 2022). As such, in reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts have \u201can affirmative\n\nduty to ask whether it \u2018appears certain\u2019 that plaintiff \u2018cannot prove any set of facts\u2019 that would\n\nentitle her to legal relief.\u201d Id. (quoting In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 251 (5th\n\nCir. 2006) (emphasis in original).\n\n In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-\n\npleaded facts alleged in a plaintiff\u2019s complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of\n\nthe plaintiff. See Firefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir.\n\n2018). When the factual matter contained within the complaint, accepted as true, states a claim for\n\nrelief that is plausible on its face, a Court must deny a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint has facial plausibility when it allows the\n\nCourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See\n\nId. The allegations need not contain detailed, factual allegations, and the right to relief need not be\n\nprobable. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead, the \u201callegations must\n\nbe enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level\u2026on the assumption that all the\n\nallegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\u201d Id.\n\n Defendants attempt to subject Plaintiff to a higher standard than is required or permitted\n\nunder Rule 12(b)(6). Indeed, ten of the thirty cases that Defendants cite in support of their\n\narguments that Plaintiff\u2019s claims should be dismissed involve an appeal of a trial court\u2019s decision\n\non a motion for summary judgment. See Baskin v. City of Houston, Mississippi, 378 Fed. Appx.\n\n417 (5th Cir. 2010) (appeal from summary judgment); Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299\n\n(5th Cir. 2004) (appeal from summary judgment); Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833\n\n(1998) (appeal from summary judgment); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Services,\n\n489 U.S. 189 (1989) (appeal from summary judgment); Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 10 of 17 PageID 142\n\n\n\nGov't, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (appeal from summary judgment); Morrow v. Meachum, 917\n\nF.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2019) (appeal from summary judgment); Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 770\n\nF.3d 1122 (5th Cir. 2014) (appeal from summary judgment); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)\n\n(appeal from summary judgment); Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) (appeal from summary\n\njudgment); Watson v. Bryant, 532 Fed. Appx. 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (appeal from summary\n\njudgment)\n\n Reliance on such cases is improper, because it is well established that \u201cthe evidentiary\n\nburden on the non-movant in a summary judgment motion is significantly greater than in a motion\n\nto dismiss.\u201d Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991). As such, these cases do not\n\nsupport dismissal at the pleading stage; if anything, they show that the Fifth Circuit and its district\n\ncourts routinely allow Section 1983 claims to proceed to discovery. Additionally, it is well\n\nestablished that Section 1983 claims are not subjected to a higher pleading standard. See\n\nLeatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)\n\n(holding that, \u201c[a] federal court may not apply a \u2018heightened pleading standard\u2019\u2014more stringent\n\nthan the usual pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)\u2014in civil rights cases\n\nalleging municipal liability under \u00a7 1983\u201d).\n\n This Court should not be swayed by Defendant\u2019s attempt to raise the pleading standard that\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s Complaint is subject to. Instead, this Court should simply apply the well-settled standard\n\nset forth above in determining the Complaint\u2019s sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n IV. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES\n\nA. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly States a Section 1983 Claim\n\n Under Section 1983, every person who, acting under color of state law, \u201csubjects, or causes\n\nto be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 11 of 17 PageID 143\n\n\n\nthe deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall\n\nbe liable to the party injured.\u201d See 42. U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. As demonstrated below, Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nComplaint has plausibly alleged facts from which this Court may infer that Defendants caused\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights to be violated. As such, Defendants\u2019 Motion should be denied.\n\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Facts From Which the Court May\n Plausibly Infer That His Constitutional Rights Were Violated\n\n Defendant alleges that Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint fails to \u201callege facts from which this Court\n\nmay plausibly infer that a constitutional violation occurred.\u201d See Dkt. No. 12 at 5. However, as\n\ndemonstrated below and as evidenced by simply reading Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint, Plaintiff has\n\nplausibly alleged that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.\n\n i. Defendants\u2019 \u201cState-Created Danger\u201d Argument Fails\n\n Defendants allege that, because the facts and allegations set forth in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint\n\n\u201cresemble\u201d a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory of liability, Plaintiff\u2019s claims should be dismissed. See\n\nDkt. No. 12 at 6. However, Defendants\u2019 argument is nothing more than a smoke screen and does\n\nnot support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n Plaintiff does not contend\u2014either in his Complaint or in this Response\u2014that he is\n\nproceeding under a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory to impose liability against Defendants. Contrary\n\nto Defendants\u2019 assertion, Plaintiff\u2019s claims do not even remotely \u201cresemble\u201d those brought under\n\nthat theory, because the \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory is \u201can exception to the general rule that the\n\ngovernment has no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect people from privately inflicted\n\nharms.\u201d Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 368\u201369 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 569, 217\n\nL. Ed. 2d 303 (2024) (emphasis added). Clearly, Plaintiff does not allege in his Petition that his\n\ninjuries were inflicted by some private, third-party. Instead, Plaintiff is claiming that Defendants\n\ndirectly injured Plaintiff themselves and violated his constitutional rights.\n\n\n\n 11\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 12 of 17 PageID 144\n\n\n\n ii. Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts From Which the Court May Plausibly Infer\n His Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated\n\n The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches\n\nand seizures, including the right to be free from the use of excessive force by law enforcement.\n\nSee Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433\u201334 (5th Cir. 1996). To bring a claim under Section 1983 for\n\nexcessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a Plaintiff must show that he was seized.\n\nSee Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004). \u201cWhenever an officer restrains\n\nthe freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person.\u201d Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.\n\n1, 7 (1985). Additionally, the termination of freedom of movement must be accomplished \u201cthrough\n\nmeans intentionally applied.\u201d See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596\u201397 (1989).\n\n In the present case, Plaintiff was seized when the Defendants caused his vehicle to crash\n\nby initiating their high-speed pursuit. Defendants\u2019 assertion in their Motion that, \u201c[t]he pursuit did\n\nnot curtail Plaintiff\u2019s freedom of movement,\u201d is completely false. Dkt. No. 12 at 7. Indeed, when\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s vehicle crashed, it was set ablaze, trapping Plaintiff inside and completely curtailing\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s ability and freedom to exit his vehicle and walk away. Dkt. No. 1. Trapping Plaintiff\n\ninside a burning vehicle certainly constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.\n\n In their Motion, Defendants say that in Brower v. County of Inyo, the United States\n\nSupreme Court addressed a \u201cstrikingly similar situation.\u201d Dkt. No. 12 at 7. However, the Supreme\n\nCourt in Brower held that the plaintiff was seized. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 599. In further support\n\nof their argument that Plaintiff was not seized, Defendants cite Scott v. Harris. Dkt. No. 12 at 9.\n\nHowever, in that case\u2014which was decided at the summary judgment stage\u2014there was no dispute\n\nthat a seizure had occurred. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (\u201c[petitioner] does not\n\ncontest that his decision to terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent\u2019s\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 13 of 17 PageID 145\n\n\n\nvehicle constituted a \u2018seizure\u2019\u201d). Thus, Defendants have not shown that the Complaint does not\n\nput forth a plausible claim to overcome the motion to dismiss.\n\n Additionally, Plaintiff' has plausibly pled facts from which this Court may infer that the\n\nDefendants\u2019 conduct was intentional. That Defendants left the scene of the fiery accident which\n\nthey caused, coupled with their callous comments following the accident, demonstrate Defendants\u2019\n\nintent. Dkt. No. 1 \u204b 27. The means intentionally employed by Defendants\u2014namely, chasing after\n\nPlaintiff to the point where his car crashed\u2014are the exact means which caused Plaintiff\u2019s\n\ntermination of his freedom of movement. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint plausibly pleads that\n\nhe was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\n\n iii. Plaintiff Had a Fourteenth Amendment Right to Receive Emergency\n Medical Aid from Defendants\n\n Defendants\u2019 next argument is that Plaintiff had no right to receive, and Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson had no duty to provide, emergency medical aid, because Plaintiff was\n\nnever seized. Dkt. No. 12 at 11. As explained above, however, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint has alleged\n\nenough facts for this Court to reasonably infer that Plaintiff was seized.\n\n Even if Plaintiff was not seized under the Fourth Amendment, the caselaw discussing the\n\nright to receive medical treatment does not explicitly provide that the right to such treatment is\n\nlimited to persons who have been subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Harper v.\n\nMcAndrews, 499 F. Supp. 3d 312, 328 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (\u201cAn actionable failure to render medical\n\naid requires (1) deliberate indifference; (2) which results in substantial harm.\u201d). No doubt under\n\nthese standards, Plaintiff can more than show a failure to render aid arising to the level of a\n\nconstitutional violation. Defendants knew that their reckless and baseless chase caused Plaintiff to\n\ncrash and be engulfed in the flames. They also knew that this crash and the ongoing flames posed\n\nmore than a substantial degree of risk of harm but actually were harming Plaintiff at the time. Yet,\n\n\n\n 13\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 14 of 17 PageID 146\n\n\n\nthese officers deliberately chose to ignore the pain and suffering Plaintiff was experiencing and\n\ndecided to look at Plaintiff, state that it was \u201chis fault,\u201d and drive off without rendering any aid\n\nwhatsoever. See Dkt. No. 1 \u204b 5. The Chief of Police even admitted that the officers should have\n\nrendered aid. See Dkt. No. 1 \u204b 29. These facts and allegations more than sufficiently state a\n\nconstitutional violation.\n\nB. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Alleges Sufficient Facts to Overcome Defendants\u2019 Qualified\n Immunity Defense\n\n To overcome the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff need only allege that Defendants\n\n\u201cviolated a statutory or constitutional right, and \u2026 that the right was \u2018clearly established\u2019 at the\n\ntime of the challenged conduct.\u201d Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 284 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting\n\nMorgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted). To be\n\nconsidered \u201cclearly established,\u201d \u201cthe contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a\n\nreasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.\u201d See id. (quoting\n\nKinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 349\u201350 (5th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, \u201cdespite notable factual\n\ndistinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court,\u201d the \u201cclearly\n\nestablished\u201d prong is still satisfied, \u201cso long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that\n\nthe conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.\u201d See id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.\n\n730, 740 (2002)). As demonstrated above, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants\n\nviolated Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights. [supra cite]. As such, the first prong is satisfied.\n\n Additionally, Plaintiff satisfies the second prong, because the rights which Defendants\n\nviolated were clearly established at the time of the accident. Defendants\u2019 contention in their Motion\n\nthat, \u201c[e]ven if the Complaint sufficiently alleges the Officers committed constitutional\n\nviolations\u2026none of the rights were \u2018clearly established\u2019 at the time of the incident,\u201d is ludicrous\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 15 of 17 PageID 147\n\n\n\nat best, because Plaintiff\u2019s right to receive medical care and right to be free from Defendants\u2019 use\n\nof excessive force were clearly established at the time of the accident. See Dkt. No. 12 at 13.\n\n For example, in Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep\u2019t, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiff had\n\nalleged a \u201cviolation of a clearly established right\u201d when plaintiff alleged that \u201chis face and chest\n\nwere married with abrasions, he was in pain, and he informed the [defendant officers] that he\n\nneeded medical attention.\u201d Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep\u2019t, 86 F.3d at 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996).\n\nAdditionally, the Court stated that \u201cthe police had subjective knowledge that [Plaintiff] had\n\nrecently been involved in a multiple vehicle injury accident,\u201d but still denied the plaintiff medical\n\ncare. See id. Here, the Defendants witnessed Plaintiff\u2019s car crash and catch fire and thus, they\n\nknew\u2014or at the very least, should have known\u2014that Plaintiff, who was then trapped in a burning\n\ncar, needed medical attention. Nevertheless, the Defendants chose to simply turn a blind eye to\n\nPlaintiff and drive away.\n\n Generally, \u201cthe right to be free from excessive force is clearly established.\u201d See Bush v.\n\nStrain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008). However, Courts \u201cjudge the reasonableness of an\n\nofficer\u2019s conduct by taking into account the \u2018tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving\u2019 circumstances\n\nin which officers quickly determine the amount of force necessary in a particular situation. See id.\n\nThe permissible degree of force depends on, among other things, the severity of the crime at issue\n\nand whether the suspect threatened the officer\u2019s safety. See id. Here, the \u201ccrime\u201d at issue as a\n\nheadlight violation, a minor traffic offense not deserving of even a fraction of the degree of force\n\nemployed by Defendants. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7\u00a7 547.302, 547.004. Additionally, it can hardly\n\nbe said that Plaintiff posed any threat to Defendants\u2019 safety\u2014in fact, it was the Defendants who\n\nposed a threat to Plaintiff\u2019s safety by speeding after him in their patrol car at nighttime. See Dkt.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 16 of 17 PageID 148\n\n\n\nNo. 1 \u204b\u204b 3, 25. Under these circumstances, the use of force used by the Defendants was not\n\nreasonable in any sense.\n\n For these reasons, Plaintiff satisfies both prongs of the qualified immunity test.\n\nAccordingly, Defendants\u2019 Motion should be denied.\n\n V. CONCLUSION\n\n As demonstrated above, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint is more than sufficient to survive dismissal\n\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendants\u2019\n\nMotion to Dismiss in its entirety.\n\n Alternatively, should this Court determine that Defendants are entitled to dismissal on any\n\nof Plaintiff\u2019s claims, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court allow Plaintiff the opportunity to\n\namend its Complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (\u201cThe court should freely give leave [to amend\n\na pleading] when justice so requires.\u201d).\n\n Respectfully submitted,\n\n MCCATHERN, PLLC\n\n /s/Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n State Bar No. 24056989\n cevans@mccathernlaw.com\n Alizabeth A. Guillot\n State Bar No. 24138578\n aguillot@mccathernlaw.com\n Stephen Bergren\n State Bar No. 24134428\n sbergren@mccathernlaw.com\n 3710 Rawlins Street, Suite 1600\n Dallas, Texas 75219\n (214) 741-2662 Telephone\n\n BEN CRUMP LAW, PLLC\n Paul A. Grinke\n State Bar No. 24032255\n paul@bencrump.com\n\n\n\n 16\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 15 Filed 06/24/24 Page 17 of 17 PageID 149\n\n\n\n Aaron Dekle\n State Bar No. 24100961\n aaron@bencrump.com\n 5 Cowboys Way, Suite 300\n Frisco, Texas 75034\n (972) 942-0494 Telephone\n\n COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that on June 24, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed\nwith the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of this filing to all\ncounsel of record.\n\n\n /s/ Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-11-15T12:03:56.846588-08:00","document_number":"15","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016938029","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Response/Objection","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-09-12T09:59:31.087076-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.802526-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-24","time_filed":null,"entry_number":15,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-24.001","pacer_sequence_number":47,"description":"RESPONSE filed by Tomyia Crenshaw re: [12] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Evans, Carl)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/400331764/","id":400331764,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/409561891/","id":409561891,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/17/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-08-23T15:05:32.383321-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.737779-07:00","sha1":"bef5c763c0cad577705059510519cf2a70ac8b6c","page_count":14,"file_size":775565,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.17.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.17.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":"recap-thumbnails/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/409561891.thumb.1068.png","thumbnail_status":1,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 1 of La wRadgelD 157! < ees\n\n| -\u2014\n| | AUG 23 2024\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |\nFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS |\nDALLAS DIVISION\n\nCLERK,\n\nSPECIAL ORDER NO. 3-354\n\nEffective August 23, 2024, the cases listed on Exhibit A to this order are transferred to\nMagistrate Judge Brian McKay and shall henceforth carry the suffix letters \u201cBW.\u201d Magistrate\nJudge McKay shall seek consent of the parties in these cases to conduct all further proceedings\nand order the entry of final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c). Ifall parties do not\nconsent, Magistrate Judge McKay shall, unless the assigned district judge otherwise orders,\n\nexercise all powers permitted by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b).\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nAugust 23, 2024\n\nDet (_ wes\n\nDAVID C. GODBEY\nCHIEF JUDGE\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 2of14 PagelD 158\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n1 2:24-CV-0142-BK Hasan v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n2 3:18-CV-1933-N Lexor Manufacturing LLC v. Luraco Ine, et al.\n\n3 3:19-CV-2204-X Retail Ready Career Center inc v. United States of America, et al.\n\n4 3:19-CV-2218-E Southwest Airlines Co v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc\n\n5 3:19-CV-2281-K FTC v. Match Group\n\n6 3:20-CV-0656-K-BK Buzz Photo, et al. v. People's Republic of China, et al.\n\n7 3:20-CV-2935-N Carswell v. Hunt County Texas, et al.\n\n8 3:20-CV-3718-D Samurai Global LLC v. Landmark American Insurance Company\n3:21-CV-0116-B Rainier Arms LLC, et al. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and\n\n9 Explosives, et al.\n\n10 3:21-CV-0840-E TNT Quadrangle Partner, LP, et al. v. SRPF B/Quadrangle Property, LLC, et al.\n\n11 3:21-CV-1764-D Vess v. City of Dallas, et al.\n\n412 3:21-CV-2429-L Raskin, et al. v. Dallas Independent Schoo! District, et al.\n\n13 3:22-CV-0654-N Salt and Light Energy Equipment LLC v. Crigin Bancorp\n\n14 3:22-CV-0663-E United States of America v. All Funds in 199 Bank Accounts Located in India\n\n15 3:22-CV-0780-M State of Texas, et al. v. Biden, et al.\n\n16 3:22-CV-0907-5 Hilltop Holdings Inc v. AlG Specialty Insurance Company\n\n17 3:22-CV-1185-X Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company v. Morgan\n\n18 3:22-CV-1869-E Walsh v. Peterson\n\n19 3:22-CV-2118-X Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton, et al.\n\n20 3:22-CV-2272-S Thomas v. McDonough, et al.\n\n21 3:22-CV-2597-K Pearson, et al. v. Gage\n\n22 3:22-CV-2624-B Iske v. Precision Dynamics International LLC\n\n23 3:22-CV-2763-E Boy Scouts of America v. Touch A Life Foundation Inc\n\n24 3:22-MC-0079-X-BK NiRB v. LM Carpet\n\n25 3:23-CV-0037-5 Young v. Baylor Scott & White Health\n\n26 3:23-CV-0133-B Endurance American Insurance Company v. Lloyd's Syndicate 3624\n\n27 3:23-CV-0313-S G Thomas Air LLC v. Pratt & Whitney Engine Services Inc\n\n28 3:23-CV-0342-M Ariat International Inc v. Khemchand Handicrafts Limited, et ai.\n\n29 3:23-CV-0464-D Alford v. Wonderland Montessori Academy LLC\n\n30 3:23-CV-0584-G Lee Ir v. United States\n3:23-CV-0640-D M Central Residences Condominium Association Inc v. Technology\n\n31 Insurance Company Inc\n\n32 3:23-CV-0641-L Securities and Exchange Commission v. McKnight\n\n33 3:23-CV-0811-E Alawei v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service\n\n34 3:23-CV-0881-X GS Holistic LCC v. Sri Manakamana Inc\n\n35 3:23-CV-0910-B Brandon Architects Inc v. Olerio Home LLC\n\n36 3:23-CV-0954-X Lopez v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.\n\n37 3:23-CV-0965-X Wilcox v. Equifax Information Services LLC\n\n38 3:23-CV-1171-K Modern Vascular of Southaven LLC, et al. v. Qlarant Integrity Solutions LLC\n\n39 3:23-CV-1198-G White v. American Economy Insurance Company\n\n40 3:23-CV-1351-X $2 Brothers LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company\n\n41 3:23-CV-1399-G Dill v. Experian Information Solutions Inc\n\n1\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 3of14 PagelD 159\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n42 3:23-CV-1457-5 Denison Glass & Mirror Ine v. EFCO LLC\n\n43 3:23-CV-1559-B Fitton v. Pinnacle Propane LLC\n\n44 3:23-CV-1574-E Johnson, et al. v. Dallas County Hospital District, et al.\n\n45 3:23-CV-1583-E Hernandez v. Brown\n\n46 3:23-CV-1663-D-BK Hill v. Norman, et ai.\n\n47 3:23-CV-1698-L-BK Jaffari v. Garland, et al.\n\n48 3:23-CV-1772-B Uliman v. OBM Miami\n\n49 3:23-CV-1915-B-BK Pinson v. Dallas Cnty. Sherriff\u2019s Office, et al.\n\n50 3:23-CV-1918-N Martinez v. Kroger\n3:23-CV-1945-D-BK Thornton v. Dallas County d/b/a Dallas County District Attorney's Office, et\n\n51 al.\n\n52 3:23-CV-2088-L-BK Gordon v. Kellam\n\n53 3:23-CV-2090-N-BK Tyson v. Commissioner of Social Security\n\n54 3:23-CV-2094-N-BK Humble v. Enge, et al.\n\n55 3:23-CV-2112-D King v. SeaHarbor Insurance Agency LLC\n\n56 3:23-CV-2162-5 Sealed v. Sealed\n\n57 3:23-CV-2195-X-BK Ashley v. DOL\n\n58 3:23-CV-2212-B Hunter v. Procollect Inc\n\n59 3:23-CV-2231-5 82 Glenwood Avenue LLC v. Schutze, et al.\n\n60 3:23-CV-2385-BK Fernandez v. Social Security Administration\n\n61 3:23-CV-2412-D Beasley v. Castle Credit Co Holdings LLC\n\n62 3:23-CV-2438-N-BK Blanks v, Federal Correctional Institution Seagoville, et al.\n\n63 3:23-CV-2493-K-BK Dickerson v. Conduent Commercial! Solutions LLC\n\n64 3:23-CV-2656-K-BK United States of America v. Rehab 4 Work Services LLC, et al.\n\n65 3:23-CV-2728-B Factor Mutual Insurance Company v. Southwest Pumps LLC, et al.\n\n66 3:24-CV-0013-B SW Marine v. Valentine\n\n67 3:24-CV-0072-E Katz v. Gruenberg, et al.\n\n68 3:24-CV-0104-E Tupac v. Asbury Automotive Group Inc, et al.\n\n69 3:24-CV-0112-E-BK Keys v. Connors et al.\n\n70 3:24-CV-0113-K-BK Smith v. Federai Bureau of Prisons, et al.\n\n71 3:24-CV-0148-B Samiappan v. Su\n\n72 3:24-CV-0244-N Sukin v. Experian Information Soiutions Inc, et al.\n\n73 3:24-CV-0298-G Liu v. U.S. Department of State, et ai.\n\n74 3:24-CV-0376-X Colonna, et al. v. LoanDepot.com LLC\n\n75 3:24-CV-0626-S-BK Alfano v. Allred Unit Mailroom\n\n76 3:24-CV-1060-L-BK Butler v. Lee at al\n\n77 3:24-CV-1063-D Rodriguez v. ALDI Inc\n\n78 3:24-CV-1083-K G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Frida's Tacos LLC, et al.\n\n79 3:24-CV-1089-X Feit Electric Company Inc v. Elong international USA Inc, et al.\n\n80 3:24-CV-1117-K Umoru v. Walmart Stores Texas LLC\n\n81 3:24-CV-1149-X-BK Central States Health and Welfare Fund v. Contreras\n3:24-CV-1151-X Dallas Food & Beverage LLC, et al. v. United States Smail Business\n\n82 Administration, et al.\n\n83 3:24-CV-1245-B Sealed v. Sealed\n\n84 3:24-CV-1367-S Jain, et al. v. Jaddou\n\n85 3:24-CV-1416-G-BK Henderson v. Trump\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page4of14 PagelD 160\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n86 3:24-CV-1422-5 Kearney v. Equifax Information Services LLC\n\n87 3:24-CV-1551-B Zachary v. Environmental Protection Agency\n\n88 3:24-CV-1587-S-BK Henderson v. Trump\n\n89 3:24-CV-1621-G Hamilton v. Walmart Inc\n\n90 3:24-CV-1677-X EYM Pizza of Georgia LLC, et al. v. Pizza Hut LLC, et al.\n\n91 3:24-CV-1705-D Ogboru v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company\n92 3:24-MC-0017-E NFinity IP v. Varsity Spirit\n\n93 4:24-CV-0592-BK Johnson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n94 5:23-CV-0259-BK Arguello v. Social Security Administration\n\n95 5:23-CV-0281-BK Murphy v. Social Security Administration\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page5of14 PagelD 161\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n1 3:16-cv-00764-N VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc\nCapio Funding LLC v. Rural/Metro Operating\n2 3:17-cv-02713-X Company LLC et al\n3 3:19-cv-01067-K Von Colditz v. Woods et af\n4 3:20-cv-00045-D Rodriguez v. Southern Health Partners Inc et al\n5 3:20-cv-00313-N Hamilton et al v. Dallas County\n6 3:20-cv-01358-E Coleman et al v. Brozen et al\n7 3:20-cv-03636-K Blue Yonder Group inc v. Kinaxis inc et al\n8 3:21-cv-01498-B Halperin et al v. Wills et al\n9 3:22-cv-00034-X McClung et al v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC et al\n10 3:22-cv-00141-N-BN Bell v. Moore\nit 3:22-cv-00525-X Fiberco, Inc. v. Acadia Insurance Company\nHighland Capital Management LP et al v. Highland Capital Management Fund\n12 3:22-cv-00789-X Advisors LP\n13 3:22-cv-00794-$ Legacy Exploration LLC v. Optimum Energy Partners LLC et al\n14 3:22-cv-01498-G-BN Timmons v. Director\n45 3:22-cy-01581-G-BN Sharper v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n416 3:22-cv-01600-G-BN Matthews v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n17 3:22-cv-01871-G-BN Turner v. O'Daniel\n18 3:22-cv-02062-X Shuler Drilling Company Inc v. Disiere Partners LLC, et al\n19 3:22-cv-02312-G-BN Mornes v, Director, TDCJ-CID\n20 3:22-cv-02403-N-BN Carey v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n21 3:22-cv-02410-G Castillo v. Walmart Inc et ai\n22 3:22-cv-02589-S-BN Minze v. Director, TOCJ-CID\n23 3:22-cv-02600-X Venzant v. Bigelow Arizona TX-282 LP et al\n24 3:22-cv-02891-N-BN Carcamo v. Director, FDCJ-CID\n25 3:23-cv-00057-K-BN Turner v. Wellpath Med Co\n26 3:23-cv-00066-B-BN Hernandez v. Director, TDCJ-CID\nTrustees of the IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health and Benefit Fund et al v. Rockey\n27 3:23-cv-00224-B Electric Inc\n28 3:23-cv-00280-K Mercury Associates Inc v. Primoris Services Corporation\n29 3:23-cv-00303-N Paige v. State Farm Lloyds\n30 3:23-cv-00337-X-BN Roccaforte v. Transunion\n31 3:23-cv-00338-N-BN Roccaforte v. Experian information Solutions Inc\n32 3:23-cv-00339-E-BN Roccaforte v. Equifax Inc\n33 3:23-cv-00355-X EDN Global Inc et al v. AT&T Mobility Services LUC et al\n34 3:23-cv-G0391-D Walker v. Hoffman et al\n35 3:23-cv-00410-E-BN Lewis v. Equifax\n36 3:23-cv-00435-B-BN Lewis v. Experian\n37 3:23-cv-00508-N Doe v. Backpage.com LLC et al\n38 3:23-cv-00547-K Bilbo v. Central Transport LLC\n39 3:23-cv-00568-B Cunningham v. State Farm Lloyds\n40 3:23-cv-00574-B Martin v. Penske Logistics LLC\n41 3:23-cv-80603-E Bridging Biosciences LLC v, Esch et al\n42 3:23-cv-00668-E-BN Spillman Jr v. Director, TDCI-CID\n43 3:23-cv-00706-E Arka Mesquite Investments LLC et al v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company\n44 3:23-cv-00736-M Powell v. Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana\n45 3:23-cv-00755-M-BN Toliver v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n46 3:23-cv-00772-E-BN Cloninger v. Director, TDC)-CID\n47 3:23-cv-00819-G White v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page6of14 PagelD 162\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n4g 3:23-cv-00844-M Bellinger v. CureWave Lasers LLC et al\n49 3:23-cv-00852-G New York inn Inc et al v, Associated Industries Insurance Company Inc\n50 3:23-cv-00882-L GS Holistic LLC v. B Over 21 Inc et al\n51 3:23-cv-00915-B SMA v. Salesforce et al\n52 3:23-cv-00948-K Eder v. City of Burleson\n53 3:23-cv-00977-5 Brown v. Sarn\u2019s East Inc\n54 3:23-cv-01016-D Johnson v. Epsilon Data Management LLC\n55 3:23-cv-01018-X Licht v. Ling et al\n56 3:23-cv-01024-L GS Holistic LLC v. OMS Investment LLC et al\n57 3:23-cv-01039-B Jone Doe AS v. Salesforce Inc et a!\n58 3:23-cv-01089-N-BN Rountree v, FedEx Ground Package System Inc\n59 3:23-cv-01228-G Garcia v. Fiesta Mart LLC et al\n60 3:23-cv-01230-B Horton et al v. Heppner et al\n61 3:23-cv-01286-E Warner v. Equifax information Services LLC et ai\n62 3:23-cv-01301-X Dheera Limited Company v. Johnson Controls Inc et ai\n63 3:23-cv-01320-N-BN Silvers v. Director, TOCJ-CIB\n64 3:23-cv-01339-E Terri E Newkirk IRA v. Kelly e\u00a2 al\n65 3:23-cv-01345-L Russell v. Kroger Texas, LP\n66 3:23-cv-01356-L-BN Perez v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC et al\n6&7 3:23-cv-01366-N Husinger v. Smart Start Real estate Corporation\n68 3:23-cv-01376-X Harris v. Papa Texas LLC\n69 3:23-cv-01468-D Nieves v. Uber Technologies Inc et al\n70 3:23-cv-01484-L Red Barn Candle Company ELC v. Bath & Body Works Brand Management Inc\n7t 3:23-cv-01497-L Rittman v. Amguard Insurance Company\n72 3:23-cv-01502-G-BN Cook v. Costco Wholesale Corporation\n73 3:23-cv-01503-B Charitable DAF Fund LP et al v. Highland Capital Management LP\n74 3:23-cv-01517-N Bahamas Laguna Azure LLC v. City of Royse City, Texas\n75 3:23-cv-01525-X Biovant LLC v. BTEAG LLC et al\n76 3:23-cv-01548-5 Cobbs v. Baylor Scott & White\n77 3:23-cv-01557-D Clark v. Wyndham Worldwide, Inc\n78 3:23-cv-01561-K Erwin et al v. Metalcraft of Mayville Inc\n79 3:23-cv-01565-S-BN Fields v. Kelley\n80 3:23-cv-01617-X Holmes v. Equifax information Services LLC et al\n81 3:23-cv-01621-5 Niter et al v. Brown et al\n82 3:23-cv-01669-B Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n83 3:23-cv-01674-B Brookfield Property Retail Holdings LLC et ai v. Dillard Texas Central LLC\n84 3:23-cv-01675-L Van-Zandt Reiss et al v. The Bank of New York Melon\n&5 3:23-cv-01679-E Harris v. HireRight LLC\n86 3:23-cv-01775-X Palmer v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc\n87 3:23-cv-01791-L SPBL-1119 LLC v. Arciterra Strategic Retail Advisor LLC et al\n8&8 3:23-cv-01793-L LSM Blue Sky LLC v. AT Olathe Outlot 5 LLC et al\n89 3:23-cv-01802-E Megehee v. Pallida LLC\n90 3:23-cv-01805-E McConnell v. Applied Digital Corporation et al\n91 3:23-cv-01832-8 Doe v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit et al\n92 3:23-cv-01870-K GS Holistic LLC v. GNS Sons Inc\n93 3:23-cv-01889-S Velis v. Bangert et al\n94 3:23-cv-01910-E Hagans v. Child Care Group\n95 3:23-cv-01912-S Lessig v. Fiesta Mart LLC\n96 3:23-cv-01937-N Kustom Signals Inc v. Applied Concepts Inc\n97 3:23-cv-01972-L Owens v. Dallas Country Club\n98 3:23-cv-01973-K-BN Bohemond v. City of Dallas TX\n99 3:23-cv-01998-B Harland v. Workforce outsource Services Inc\n\n5\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 7of14 PagelD 163\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n\n100 3:23-cv-02009-G-BN Hunsinger v. Atmos Energy Corporation\n\n101 3:23-cv-02010-B Johnson et al v. Crosby Elementary School et al\n3:23-cv-02011-B\n\n102 Sample v. SLI Enterprises Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02023-B\n\n103 Promed LLC v, Quintairos Prieto Wood & Boyer PA\n3:23-cv-02050-X\n\n104 Taste of Chengdu LLC v. Feng\n3:23-cv-G2070-G6\n\n105 Summers v. Longbrake et al\n3:23-cv-02071-E\n\n106 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:23-cv-02097-X\n\n107 Holcamb v. Monitronics International\n3:23-cv-02110-B\n\n108 Consumer Data Partners, LP et al v. Agentra LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02126-5\n\n109 Mosure et al. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.\n3:23-cv-02143-N\n\n110 Dillard v. Gaines Investment Trust et al\n3:23-cv-02148-K-BN\n\n411 Booth v. US Bank Trust NA\n3:23-ev-02155-L\n\n412 cici Enterprises LP v. HSB Specialty Insurance Company\n3:23-cv-02158-D\n\n113 Wilson v. Korth Direct Mortgage et al\n3:23-cv-02203-E\n\n114 Warehouse Solutions Inc v. Plus Veterans, LLC\n3:23-cv-02214-$\n\n115 Big Games Management LLC v. Bespoke Piush LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02232-B\n\n116 Campbell v. Methodist Hospitais of Dallas et al\n3:23-cv-02238-E\n\n117 Cameron v. QT South LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02243-E\n\n118 Paez v. Childrens Health System of Texas\n3:23-cv-02284-G\n\n119 Stanley v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC\n3:23-cv-02286-X\n\n120 Brandon Wade Photography LLC v. Killian Design LLC\n3:23-cv-02292-L\n\n121 Lloyd v. Athena Condominiums Co-Owners Association\n3:23-cv-02294-B-BN\n\n422 Andrews v. York et af\n3:23-cv-02307-G\n\n123 Lee v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02367-K\n\n124 City of Dallas v. Triple D Gear, LLC\n3:23-cv-02387-L\n\n125 Nasrallah v. Scottsdale Insurance Company\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 8of14 PagelD 164\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:23-cv-02404-L\n126 Lilium GVP LLC v. Transportation Insurance Company et al\n3:23-cv-02421-X\n127 Principal Life Insurance Company v. Roque et al\n3:23-cv-02457-B-BN\n428 Young v. United Parcel Service Inc (Ohio)\n3:23-cv-02494-\u00a7\n4129 Hossain v. The Boeing Company\n3:23-cv-02504-K\n130 DAV Sub Inc v. QligSOFT Inc\n3:23-cv-02531-E\n131 Dawson v. Union Pacific Railroad\n3:23-cv-02532-E-BN\n132 Randle v. Brown et al\n3:23-cv-02539-X\n133 Bowers v. Uplift Education\n3:23-cv-02547-E\n134 Session v. Sanofi US Services Inc. et al\n3:23-cv-02594-E\n135 Verna IP Holdings LLC v. Dais Inc\n\n3:23-cv-02624-N\n\n136 Doe v. International Association of Eating Disorder Professionals Foundation Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02633-S\n137 Motton v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC\n3:23-cv-02670-E\n138 Samadian v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company\n3:23-cv-02671-X\n139 APOD Group ELC v. Glen Lakes Homeowners Association Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02673-G\n140 Elliott v. Gonzalez et al\n3:23-cv-02708-B\n144 Dishmon v. Newkirk Logistics Inc\n3:23-cv-02725-D\n142 Pradia v. The City of Rhome et al\n3:23-cv-02737-N\n143 Rollins-Booker v. Senture LLC\n3:23-cv-02770-S\n144 Camacho v. Sajeda Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02795-E\n145 Coil v. Experian Information Solutions Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02807-K\n146 Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Williams et al\n3:23-cv-02827-G-BN\n447 Moka v. Huntex Properties LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02830-X\n148 Mesa Digital LLC v. One Plus USA Corp\n3:23-cv-02834-E\n149 Canada, Jr. et al v. Sherman\n3:23-cv-02839-E\n150 Accurate Metal Stamping LLC v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company et al\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page9of14 PagelD 165\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:24-cv-00002-L\n\n151 McLaughlin et al v. Family Assets Management LLC\n3:24-cv-00004-N\n\n152 Hill v. Garcia et af\n3:24-cv-00631-L\n\n153 Great American Insurance v, Truckmax Inc\n3:24-cv-00098-L\n\nLeon Capital Group LEC et al v. Princeton Excess & Surplus Lines Insurance Company\n\n154 et al\n3:24-cv-00122-B\n\n455 Slate/Sefect Inc v. Martin Marietta Materials Inc et al\n3:24-cv-00191-E\n\n156 Crum & Forster Insurance Company v. Shreno Limited\n3:24-cv-00255-E\n\n157 Blacknall v. Allata LLC et al\n3:24-cv-00285-G-BN\n\n158 Davis et al v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et ai\n3:24-cv-00331-5\n\n159 Tafolla v. Wacker et al\n3:24-cv-00341-S\n\n160 Forsythe et al v. Equifax Information Services LLC et ai\n3:24-cv-00347-K\n\n161 Homesteaders Life Company v. Williams\n3:24-cv-00361-E\n\n162 Kendrick v. QuickTrip Corporation\n3:24-cv-00382-B\n\n463 US Bank National Association v. Malloy\n3:24-cv-00388-E\n\n164 Elioznde v. Randalls Food and Drug LP\n3:24-cv-00417-X\n\n165 Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe\n3:24-cv-00434-L\n\n166 G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Aguifar\n3:24-cv-00498-K\n\n167 Highland Employee Retention Assets LLC v. Dondero et al\n3:24-cv-00528-B\n\n168 Texas State Board of Dental Examiners v. Doe\n3:24-cv-00544-D-BN\n\n169 Rector v. Director, TDC)-CID\n3:24-cv-00568-N\n\n170 Strong v. Bank of America Corporation et al\n3:24-cv-00569-5\n\ni71 Haag Engineering Co v. Ellis et al\n3:24-cv-00647-L\n\n172 Languasco et al v. Blair Logistics LLC\n3:24-cv-00658-5\n\n173 Gardner v. The Lincoin National Life Insurance Company\n3:24-cv-00691-D\n\n174 Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP\n3:24-ev-00702-L\n\n175 Birrueta v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 10o0f14 PagelD 166\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:24-cv-00728-X-BN\n\n176 Said v. EAN Holdings LLC et al\n3:24-cv-00791-E\n\n177 Wilson v. British Airways PLC\n3:24-cv-00796-L\n\n178 Sanchez v. Caliber Holdings LLC\n\n179 3:24-cv-00798-E King v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC\n3:24-cv-00809-S\n\n180 Kenney et al v. Dallas County Texas\n3:24-cv-00817-B\n\n181 Children's Health System of Texas v. UnitedHeaithcare Insurance Company\n3:24-cv-00892-B\n\n182 Toombs et al v. Kaufman County, Texas et al\n3:24-cv-00905-E-BN\n\n183 Rass v. Texas Instruments\n3:24-cv-00909-K-BN\n\n184 Bryant v. EverBank NA\n3:24-cv-00971-X\n\n185 Morgan v. Fundamental Clinical And Operational Services LLC\n3:24-cv-01020-X\n\n186 The Shore Firm LLP v. Videoshare LLC\n\n187 3:24-cv-01051-5 Gilliard v. Southwest Airlines Federal Credit Union\n3:24-ev-01075-N\n\n188 Ayangbile et al v. Children's Health Services of Texas\n3:24-cyv-011329-X\n\n189 Ray v. Experian Information Solutions Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01175-S-BN\n\n190 Romero et al v. US Bank National Association\n3:24-cv-01198-L\n\n191 Nautilus Hyosung America Inc v. BMO Bank NA et al\n3:24-cv-01209-D\n\n192 American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Southwest Airlines Co\n3:24-cv-01233-5\n\n193 Smith v. Montez et al\n3:24-cv-01262-D\n\n194 Brandon Wade Photography, LLC v. OTC Bar LLC\n3:24-cv-01288-D-BN\n\n195 Williams v. Richardson Independent School District\n3:24-cv-01319-G\n\n196 Daniels-Mock v. Taxir Logistics Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01326-K-BN\n\n197 Wickman v. Navarro County Jail\n3:24-cv-01339-B\n\n198 Travers v. Allstate Vehicle and Property insurance Company\n3:24-cv-01358-E\n\n199 Joe Hand Promotions inc v. Carbajal et at\n3:24-cv-01370-D-BN\n\n200 Council v. Draftkings et al\n3:24-cv-01397-K\n\n201 PacSec3 LLC v. RSA Federal LLC\n3:24-cv-01413-X\n\n202 Guillen et al v. U-Haul Company of Texas et al\n\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 11of14 PagelD 167\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n203 3:24-cv-01418-L Wilson v. Frontier Communications Parent, Inc.\n3:24-cv-O1447-E\n204 Akhmedov v. TA Operating LLC\n3:24-cv-01461-K\n205 Moreno et al v. Alan Halperin, In his capacity as Trustee of the GFES Liquidation Trust\n3:24-cv-01479-$\n206 NexPoint Real Estate Partners LLC et al v. Highland Capital Management LP\n3:24-cv-01483-G\n207 Amazon.com Inc et al v. Baik et al\n3:24-cv-01519-B-BN\n208 Robinson-Durham v. Navarro County Jail\n3:24-cv-01531-X\n209 Dugaboy Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:24-cv-01541-B\n210 Sanchez et al v. Schneider National Carriers Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01554-D\n211 Hernandez v. Bishop Cider Company LLC et al\n3:24-cv-01563-D\nWLands Limited Partnership LP et al v. Founders Plaza Nursing & Rehabilitation\n212 Partners LLC et al\n213 3:24-cv-01603-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n214 3:24-cv-01610-E Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n215 3:24-cv-01641-D Elizondo v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n2156 3:24-cv-01642-K Aurzada et af v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al\n217 3:24-cv-01646-G-BN Sharman v. H&R Block et al\n218 3:24-cv-01647-N Rodriguez v. Home Depot USA inc\n219 3:24-cv-01684-L Criss v. Grocery Delivery E-Services USA Inc\n220 3:24-cv-01685-G Harris v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n221 3:24-cv-01692-N Ricker v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n222 3:24-cv-01711-D Mitchel v, Pitre et al\n223 3:24-cv-01717-K Ayala v. Chedraui USA Inc\n224 3:24-cv-01716-L Hutchinson v. Sunrun Inc\n225 3:24-cv-01720-K Miller v. Xpress Global Systems LLC\ngag \u00ab| 3:44-cv-01743-L Collier v. Carter\n227 3:24-Cv-01768-S Bosman v. Amazon.com inc et al\n3:24-cv-01786-L\n228 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:24-cv-01787-L\n229 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n230 3:24-cv-01796-8 Larsen v. Apt All Points Transportation LLC et al\n231 3:24-cv-01811-D McAfee v. Lear Corporation\n232 3:24-cv-01821-K Ryan LLC v, Radin\n233 3:24-cv-01839-E Forstey v. Jordan et al\n234 3:24-cv-01873-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n235 3:24-cv-01882-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n236 3:24-cv-01908-D Hibdon v. Atrium Hospitality LP\n3:24-cv-01912-L\n237 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n\n10\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 12o0f14 PagelD 168\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n238 3:24-cv-01949-X Alentisar Trading Company v. Eyondi et al\n239 3:24-cv-01967-S-BN Willtams v. Richardson ISD\n\n41\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 17 Filed 08/23/24 Page 13o0f14 PagelD 169\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE REBECCA RUTHERFORD\nTO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n1 3:22-cv-02887-L-BT Murphy v. Director\n\n2 3:23-cv-00316-B-BT Marcus v. Director\n\n3 3:23-cv-00978-D-BT Walton v. USA\n\n4 3:23-cv-02449-D-BT Manzo v. Federal Bureau of Prisons\n\n5 3:23-cv-2677-S-BT Jackson v. Smali Business Administration et al\n\n6 3:24-cv-00175-S-BT Gonzales v. Collier\n\n7 3:24-cv-00661-B-BT Hammons v. Tradeline Motorcars et al\n\n8 3:24-cv-00637-S-BT Humes v. McDonald's Walmart #5416-945\n\n9 3:24-cv-01708-X-BT Traeger v. Jones et al\n\n10 3:23-cv-00315-X-BT Duhon v. Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company et al\n\n11 3:23-cv-02194-8-BT Walters v. Garland\n\n12 3:23-cv-02157-L-BT United States of America v. Morgan et al\n3:24-cv-00277-L National Association of Blind Merchants et al v. The Army & Air Force Exchange\n\n13 Service et al\n\n14 3:24-cv-00273-N-BT De Pute v. United States of America et al\n\n15 3:24-cv-00703-B-BT Freeman v. USA et al\n\n16 3:23-cv-01994-S-BT Davis v. City of Mclendon Chisholm et al\n\n17 3:24-cv-00731-L Crenshaw v. Anderson et al\n\n18 3:24-mc-00034-B-BT Calhoun v. United States\n\n19 3:23-cv-02682-5-BT Phoenix Bulk Carriers LLC v. CAL-IXA Aggregates LLC\n\n20 3:24-cv-01590-N-BT Jackson v. United States Postal Service et al\n\n27 3:24-cv-01759-B-BT Woods v. Delta Air Lines inc\n\n22 2:23-cv-00171-BT Row v. Commissioner\n\n23 1:24-cv-00083-BT Gonzales v. Commissioner\n\n24 5:23-cv-00293-BT Mims v. Commissioner\n\n25 3:14-cv-02970-X Clapper et al v. American Realty Investors Inc et al\n\n26 3:20-cv-01276-N Kunze et al v. Baylor Scott & White Health et al\n\n27 3:20-cv-01364-E Malbrew et al v. A+ Charter Schools\n\n28 3:21-cv-02131-K Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services Inc\n\n29 3:22-cv-00876-N Grimmett et al v. Coleman et al\n\n30 3:22-cv-02116-X Black v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America\n\n31 3:22-cv-02182-M Range! de Oliveira v. Bierman\n\n32 3:22-cv-02184-B Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Vibrant Builders et ai\n\n33 3:23-cv-00271-K Green v. USA\n\n34 3:23-cv-01340-L Perez v. Experian Information Solutions Inc\n\n35 3:23-cv-01412-N Aravamuthan v. US Citizenship & immigration Service et al\n\n36 3:23-cv-01416-B8 Landmark American Insurance Company v. Richland Trace Owners Association Inc\n\n37 3:23-cv-01441-N Thompson v. McGehee et al\n\n38 3:23-cv-01490-S Norwood v. Dallas County Hospital District\n\n39 3:23-cv-01494-N Mathew v. Santander Consumer USA Inc\n\n40 3:23-cv-02051-N Shrestha et al v. USCIS et al\n\n41 3:23-cv-02089-E Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. ACI Payments Inc et al\n\n42 3:22-cv-01529-N Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC et al\n\n12\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document17 Filed 08/23/24 Page14o0f14 PagelD 170\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE REBECCA RUTHERFORD\nTO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n43 3:23-cv-00045-E Mauricio et al v. US Postal Service\n\n44 3:23-cv-01168-N-BT United States of America v. $39,900 in US Currency\n45 3:23-cv-02146-D Securities and Exchange Commission v. Verges et al\n\n46 3:23-cv-02222-K Heard et al v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n47 3:23-cv-02591-D Oldham v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n48 3:23-cv-02621-8 Sealed v. Sealed\n\n49 3:23-cv-02701-\u00a3 Pertrorock Mineral Holdings, LLC et al v. Minerva Resources, LLC et al\n50 3:23-cv-02271-S Hayes v. City of Dallas et al\n\n51 3:23-cv-02338-K Smith v. USA\n\n52 3:23-cv-02462-D Botone et al v. Unitrin Safeguard Insurance Company\n\n53 3:24-cv-00014-D Hardrick v. Wells Fargo Bank National Association et al\n54 3:24-cv-00201-K Ware et al v. Meridian Security Insurance Company\n\n55 3:24-cv-00204-X United States of America v. $45,000.00 in US Currency\n56 3:24-cv-00220-B Bayazeed v. Robinson et al\n\n57 3:24-cv-00664-X VDPP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC\n\n58 3:24-cv-00700-X-BT Garrison v. John Doe et al\n\n59 3:24-cv-00943-E M&H Metal Specialties Inc v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fd\n60 3:24-cv-00944-5 USA v. Various Amounts of Funds Seized\n\n61 3:24-cv-01169-B Nieto v. USA\n\n62 3:24-cv-01484-S5 Antunez-Martinez v. Mayorkas\n\n63 3:24-cv-01525-K Gonzales Miranda et al v. Jaddou\n\n64 3:24-cv-01674-E-BT Turner v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm et al\n65 3:24-cv-01676-S Bibars v. Jaddou et al\n\n66 3:24-cv-01795-S Valtrus Innovations Ltd et al v. Google LLC\n\n67 3:24-cv-01902-K-BT Allen-Straight v. Director-TBC)\n\n68 3:24-cv-02028-X-BT Lockwood v. Chilcoat et al\n\n69 3:24-cv-02114-K-BT Santana v. Cantu et al\n\n70 3:24-cv-02127-X-BT Stancu v. Equal Employment Cppertunity Commission\n71 3:24-cy-02132-S-BT Damm v. Dallas County Jail\n\n72 3:24-cv-02143-B-BT Jalloul v. USA\n\n73 3:24-cv-02144-5-BT Jeffery v. NLN\n\n74 4:24-cv-00678-B8T Bolden v. Commissioner\n\n13\n","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2024-09-12T09:59:50.635511-07:00","document_number":"17","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017081945","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order Reassigning Case","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-08-23T15:05:32.350503-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.717407-07:00","date_filed":"2024-08-23","time_filed":"16:55:29","entry_number":17,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-08-23.001","pacer_sequence_number":53,"description":"Special Order No. 3-354: Effective August 23, 2024, the cases listed on Exhibit A to this order are transferred to Magistrate Judge Brian McKay and shall henceforth carry the suffix letters BW. This case has been reassigned pursuant to Special Order No. 3-354. (The clerk has mailed a copy to all non-ECF users.) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Brian W McKay on 8/23/2024) (rekc)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/393455486/","id":393455486,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/402525072/","id":402525072,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/14/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-06-12T08:08:55.135441-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.880925-07:00","sha1":"81d919606ec18c97f51b0a97873aa86170390ba7","page_count":2,"file_size":126020,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.14.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":3,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 14 Filed 06/11/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID 131\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\n TOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n v. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\n LEONARD ANDERSON; DARRIEN \u00a7\n ROBERTSON; and THE CITY OF \u00a7\n DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n ORDER OF REFERENCE\n\n Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b), Defendants Leonard Anderson and Darrien Robertson\u2019s\n\nMotion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint, and Brief in Support (\u201cMotion\u201d) (Doc. 12), filed June\n\n3, 2024, is hereby referred to United States Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford for hearing, if\n\nnecessary, and for the United States Magistrate Judge to submit to the court proposed findings and\n\nrecommendations for disposition of the Motion. This order of reference also prospectively refers\n\nall procedural motions that are related to the referred Motion to the United States Magistrate Judge\n\nfor resolution. All future filings regarding the referred Motion shall be addressed \u201cTo the\n\nHonorable United States Magistrate Judge\u201d\u2014not to the district judge or court\u2014so that filings will\n\nreach her without delay.\n\n Local Civil Rules 72.1 and 72.2 provide that, unless otherwise directed by the presiding\n\ndistrict judge, a party who files objections under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(a) and (b)(2)\n\nto magistrate judge orders regarding pretrial nondispositive matters, or findings and\n\nrecommendations on dispositive motions, may file a reply brief within 14 days from the date the\n\nresponse to the objections or response brief is filed. The court does not allow parties to file a reply\n\nOrder of Reference \u2013 Page 1\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 14 Filed 06/11/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID 132\n\n\n\nbrief with respect to magistrate judge orders or findings and recommendations, unless leave is\n\ngranted to file the reply brief. The court will strike or disregard any reply brief filed in violation\n\nof this order.\n\n It is so ordered this 11th day of June, 2024.\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n Sam A. Lindsay\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\nOrder of Reference \u2013 Page 2\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-10-10T11:52:37.048194-07:00","document_number":"14","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016909503","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order Referring Motion","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-06-12T08:08:55.120671-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.853692-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-11","time_filed":null,"entry_number":14,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-11.001","pacer_sequence_number":44,"description":"ORDER OF REFERENCE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b), Defendants Leonard Anderson and Darrien Robertson's [12] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, and Brief in Support, is hereby referred to United States Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford for hearing, if necessary, and for the United States Magistrate Judge to submit to the court proposed findings and recommendations for disposition of the Motion. (Ordered by Judge Sam A. Lindsay on 6/11/2024) (ykp)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392692733/","id":392692733,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/401742947/","id":401742947,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/13/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.739594-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.938420-07:00","sha1":"0465a95e532bb4b5aab0a5a6253caafbbdec8c9e","page_count":8,"file_size":192246,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.13.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.13.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 1 of 8 PageID 123\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nv. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-0731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON et al., \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO\n DISMISS PLAINTIFF\u2019S COMPLAINT\n\nTO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:\n\n Defendant City of Dallas (\u201cCity\u201d), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil\n\nProcedure, files this Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (ECF No. 7,\n\n\u201cMotion\u201d), and respectfully shows the Court as follows:\n\n I. SUMMARY OF REPLY\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Response (ECF No. 11) to the City\u2019s Motion cites no Supreme Court or Fifth\n\nCircuit authority\u2014or case law from any jurisdiction\u2014that even suggests the City\u2019s employees\u2019\n\nactions for which he sues were unconstitutional. Moreover, the Response fails to point to any acts\n\nor omissions that affirmatively demonstrate a waiver of the City\u2019s governmental immunity under\n\nthe Texas Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain any claims against the City under\n\nfederal or state law.\n\n Regardless, even had Plaintiff plausibly alleged a constitutional violation, the Response\n\npoints only to conclusory statements in his Complaint about the City\u2019s record, which is insufficient\n\nto plausibly state a Monell claim.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims against the City must be dismissed.\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 2 of 8 PageID 124\n\n\n\n II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES\n\n a. Nothing in the Response points to case law and facts alleged in the Complaint\n from which this Court can infer Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights were violated.\n\n No plaintiff may maintain a section 1983 claim against any person or governmental entity\n\nwithout a constitutional violation. See Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464-66 (5th Cir.\n\n2010). The Response dedicates roughly a page to the central question of whether Plaintiff suffered\n\na violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and summarizes his claim as follows:\n\n In the present case, Plaintiff was seized when the Defendants caused his\n vehicle to crash by initiating their high-speed pursuit. When Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle\n crashed, it was set ablaze, trapping Plaintiff inside and completely curtailing\n Plaintiff\u2019s ability and freedom to exit his vehicle and walk away. Trapping Plaintiff\n inside a burning vehicle certainly constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment\n purposes.\n\nResp. at 13-14 (citing \u201cDkt. No. 1.\u201d).\n\n While Plaintiff\u2019s Response cites forty-two cases (id. at iii-v.), it fails to reference a single\n\ndecision by either a federal or state court that supports the contention that the alleged actions giving\n\nrise to Plaintiff\u2019s claims constitute a violation of Plaintiff\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights\u2014\n\nspecifically, the right to be free from unreasonable seizures, including the use of excessive force.\n\nIndeed, the Response does not cite any case where a law enforcement officer\u2019s involvement in a\n\ncar chase scenario could potentially lead to liability. This lack of citation is no surprise, considering\n\nthe clear precedent set by both the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit in Fourth Amendment case\n\nlaw, which squarely rejects such claim.\n\n Similarly, the Response fails to cite any legal precedent indicating that a law enforcement\n\nofficer has a duty under the Fourth of Fourteenth Amendment to render aid when a fleeing fugitive\n\nis subsequently injured during an attempt to apprehend them. Resp. at 14-15. Indeed, the Response\n\ndoes not even address the Motion\u2019s reference to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in County of\n\nSacramento v. Lewis, where the Court addressed \u201cwhether a police officer violates the Fourteenth\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 3 of 8 PageID 125\n\n\n\nAmendment\u2019s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless\n\nindifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender\u201d\n\nand \u201canswer[ed] no . . .\u201d 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).\n\n As demonstrated in the Motion, Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claims falter at the outset because of the\n\nlack of plausible allegations that any City employee violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nResponse fails to point to any facts in the Complaint to overcome Plaintiff\u2019s burden and his Monell\n\nclaims against the City must be dismissed.\n\n b. Plaintiff\u2019s Response fails to point to any facts in the Complaint from which\n this Court can reasonably infer the City maintained a pattern or practice of\n the alleged unconstitutional acts.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint alleges, without citing either a written policy or a widespread pattern\n\nor practice, a myriad of Monell theories, from the common failure-to-train allegations to a claim\n\nfor something called \u201cfail[ure] to implement appropriate retention efforts.\u201d See Resp. at 6-7 (citing\n\nCompl.). Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff alleged that an unconstitutional act caused him\n\ninjury, which the City denies, his claims nevertheless fail. Here, Plaintiff attempts to establish\n\nmunicipal liability under \u00a7 1983 by showing a City custom. However, Plaintiff\u2019s Response fails to\n\npoint to facts in the Complaint to meet Monell\u2019s prerequisite of a pattern or facts from which the\n\nCourt can reasonably infer a widespread practice of unconstitutional behavior sufficient to\n\nconstitute a municipal policy. To establish a custom, the alleged \u201cpattern requires similarity and\n\nspecificity; prior indications cannot simply be for any and all \u2018bad\u2019 or unwise acts, but rather must\n\npoint to the specific violation in question.\u201d Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 851\n\n(5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). The Response fails to cite any prior instance of a remotely similar\n\nscenario, where a City employee pursued a fleeing fugitive but did not apprehend them, resulting\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 4 of 8 PageID 126\n\n\n\nin injuries after the fugitive lost control of their vehicle and crashed. As such, Plaintiff\u2019s Monell\n\nclaims additionally fail for a lack of an unconstitutional City policy.\n\n c. Plaintiff\u2019s Response fails to point to facts in the Complaint from which this\n Court can reasonably infer the City was the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind Plaintiff\u2019s\n injuries.\n\n As demonstrated in the Motion, Plaintiff failed to plausibly plead that a municipal policy\n\nwas the moving force behind his injuries. Plaintiff\u2019s Response merely points to conclusory\n\nstatements in the Complaint alleging that City policies caused his injuries. As the Court has\n\nexplained, \u201callegations in support of \u2018moving force\u2019 [that] consist of mere legal conclusions . . .\n\ndo not satisfy the pleading requirements discussed in Iqbal and Twombly.\u201d Monacelli v. City of\n\nDallas, No. 3:21-CV-02649-L (BT), 2023 WL 6563410, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2023), report\n\nand recommendation adopted, No. 3:21-CV-2649-L, 2023 WL 6370753 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29,\n\n2023). For this reason, Plaintiff\u2019s claims similarly fail.\n\n d. Plaintiff\u2019s Response fails to point to facts in the Complaint from which this\n Court can reasonably infer the City could be liable for any state law claims.\n\n The Response does not point this Court to any authority that contravenes the well-settled\n\nauthority under Texas law cited in the City\u2019s Motion that a fugitive\u2019s injuries resulting from a\n\nchase are not the result of any act for which immunity is waived. See Mot. at 20-24. Instead, the\n\nResponse avers that the procedural posture of these claims renders the cited authority inapplicable\n\nin the context of a rule 12(b)(6) motion. Resp. at 15-17. Plaintiff does not cite any authority for\n\nthis proposition, and the City is unaware of any federal authority holding that a state court\u2019s\n\ndecisions are not controlling because of this\u2014or any\u2014procedural posture.\n\n In Texas, \u201can assertion of governmental immunity from suit challenges the trial court\u2019s\n\nexercise of subject matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Whether\n\na trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .\u201d Teague v. City of Dallas, 344\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 5 of 8 PageID 127\n\n\n\nS.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App. 2011) (cleaned up). Each of the cases cited in the City\u2019s Motion turn\n\non whether Texas law has waived a municipality\u2019s immunity under the facts claimed. See, e.g.\n\nCity of Dallas v. Hillis, 308 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.\u2014Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (citing Texas law\n\nand holding that \u201c[t]he causal nexus is not satisfied by the mere involvement of a vehicle, nor by\n\nan operation or use that \u2018does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible.\u2019\u201d\n\nId. at 532 (citation omitted).\n\n The Response provides no substantive explanation for why these opinions\u2014all of which\n\nhold to the same principles that injuries like Plaintiff\u2019s are not the result of violations of state law\u2014\n\nare not applicable. For the reasons stated in the City\u2019s Motion, the City is entitled to governmental\n\nimmunity and Plaintiff\u2019s state law claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\n\n e. Plaintiff has not properly moved this Court to amend his Complaint.\n\n Plaintiff concludes his Response with a request to amend his complaint should this Court\n\nfind his pleading insufficient, specifically, \u201cPlaintiff respectfully asks that this Court allow\n\nPlaintiff the opportunity to amend its [sic] Complaint.\u201d Resp. at 19 (citation omitted). However,\n\nunder this Court\u2019s local civil rules, when \u201ca party files by electronic means a motion for leave to\n\nfile an amended pleading, the party must attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion as\n\nan exhibit.\u201d Local Civ. R. LR 15.1(b). Plaintiff has not included a proposed amended pleading.\n\n Regardless, rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to freely\n\ngrant leave to amend \u201cwhen justice so requires.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Because this rule\n\nprovides a \u201cstrong presumption in favor of granting leave to amend,\u201d Fin. Acquisition Partners,\n\nLP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2006), the Court must do so \u201cunless there is a\n\nsubstantial reason to deny leave to amend,\u201d Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598\n\n(5th Cir. Nov. 1981). One such reason, salient here, is futility: \u201cIf the complaint, as amended,\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 6 of 8 PageID 128\n\n\n\nwould be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile and the district court [is] within its\n\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend.\u201d Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir.\n\n2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir.\n\n2022)).\n\n The City urges the Court to deny amendment here because no good-faith amendment could\n\nplead factual content sufficient to allow the court to reasonably infer the City is liable. The central\n\nfacts of this case are as follows: Plaintiff ran away from police, crashed his car, and suffered\n\ninjuries as a result. There is no Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit authority that recognizes a Fourth\n\nor Fourteenth Amendment claim under this scenario. Similarly, there is no authority under Texas\n\nstate law holding that a municipality\u2019s governmental immunity is waived under these facts. As\n\nsuch, amendment would be futile. Martinez, 71 F.4th at 391 (affirming denial of amendment,\n\nstating: \u201cWe therefore ask whether, in his proposed amended complaint, [plaintiff\u2019] has pleaded\n\nfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable\n\nfor the misconduct alleged.\u201d).\n\n IV. CONCLUSION\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Response points to no factual allegations in the Complaint or legal authority to\n\nstate a plausible claim against the City. Plaintiff has not alleged facts which show, or from which\n\nthis Court can reasonably infer, that a City employee violated his constitutional rights, or that a\n\nCity policy was the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind his injuries. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege\n\nfacts to show a waiver of governmental immunity under Texas state law. Therefore, for the reasons\n\nstated in the City\u2019s Motion and this reply, the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff\u2019s claims against\n\nthe City with prejudice.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 7 of 8 PageID 129\n\n\n\n CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n TAMMY L. PALOMINO\n City Attorney\n\n /s/ J. Cheves Ligon .\n\n\n\n\n J. Cheves Ligon\n Senior Assistant City Attorney\n Texas State Bar No. 24070147\n john.ligon@dallas.gov\n\n 7DN Dallas City Hall\n 1500 Marilla Street\n Dallas, Texas 75201\n Telephone: 214-670-1236\n Facsimile: 214-670-0622\n Attorneys for Defendant City of Dallas\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 13 Filed 06/04/24 Page 8 of 8 PageID 130\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that on June 4, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the clerk\nof court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF electronic case\nfiling system of the court. The electronic case filing system will send a \u201cNotice of Electronic\nFiling\u201d notification to all case participants registered for electronic notice, including all pro se\nparties and/or attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service\nof this document by electronic means.\n\n s/ J. Cheves Ligon\n J. Cheves Ligon\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-06-04T10:20:53.652366-07:00","document_number":"13","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016888711","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.725430-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.907731-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-04","time_filed":null,"entry_number":13,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-04.001","pacer_sequence_number":41,"description":"REPLY filed by City of Dallas re: [7] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Ligon, John)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392692732/","id":392692732,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/401742946/","id":401742946,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/12/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.709253-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:24.345066-07:00","sha1":"d7a8809c89761e0875a0be2c702cd18685c88567","page_count":20,"file_size":336853,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.12.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":3,"thumbnail":"recap-thumbnails/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/401742946.thumb.1068.png","thumbnail_status":1,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 1 of 20 PageID 103\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nv. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-0731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON et al., \u00a7\n \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n DEFENDANTS LEONARD ANDERSON AND DARRIEN ROBERTSON\u2019S\n MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF\u2019S COMPLAINT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT\n\n\n CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n TAMMY L. PALOMINO\n City Attorney\n\n /s/ J. Cheves Ligon .\n\n\n\n\n J. Cheves Ligon\n Senior Assistant City Attorney\n Texas State Bar No. 24070147\n john.ligon@dallas.gov\n 7DN Dallas City Hall\n 1500 Marilla Street\n Dallas, Texas 75201\n Telephone: 214-670-1236\n Facsimile: 214-670-0622\n Attorneys for Defendants\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 2 of 20 PageID 104\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nI. SUMMARY OF MOTION ..................................................................................................1\n\nII. BRIEF FACTUAL SUMMARY .........................................................................................1\n\nIII. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 12(b)6 DISMISSAL....................................3\n\nIV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................5\n\na. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not state any section 1983 claims against the\n Officers. ...............................................................................................................................5\n\n1. Plaintiff essentially alleges a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory of liability, which\n the Fifth Circuit does not recognize. ....................................................................................5\n\n2. Plaintiff was never \u201cseized\u201d under the Fourth Amendment. ...............................................6\n\n3. The Officers had no Fourteenth Amendment constitutional duty to stop and\n render aid. ..........................................................................................................................11\n\n4. The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to overcome the Officers\u2019\n qualified immunity defense................................................................................................12\n\nV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................14\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................15\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 3 of 20 PageID 105\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCASES\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................................. 3, 4\n\nBaskin v. City of Houston, Mississippi,\n 378 F. App\u2019x 417 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................ 8\n\nBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................. 3, 4\n\nBeltran v. City of El Paso,\n 367 F.3d 299 (5th Cir.2004) ..................................................................................................... 6\n\nBrower v. Cnty. of Inyo,\n 489 U.S. 593 (1989) ................................................................................................................ 7\n\nCalifornia v. Hodari D.,\n 499 U.S. 621 (1991) .......................................................................................................... 7, 12\n\nCarney v. New Orleans City,\n 468 F. Supp. 3d 751 (E.D. La. 2020) ...................................................................................... 10\n\nCity of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,\n 463 U.S. 239 (1983) ............................................................................................................... 11\n\nCnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,\n 523 U.S. 833 (1998) .................................................................................................................. 8\n\nConley v. Gibson,\n 355 U.S. 41 (1957) .................................................................................................................... 4\n\nDeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs.,\n 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ............................................................................................................... 11\n\nDoe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys,\n 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 6\n\nFernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass\u2019n,\n 987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................... 3\n\nFisher v. Moore,\n 73 F.4th 367 (5th Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................................... 6\n\n\n\n\n iii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 4 of 20 PageID 106\n\n\n\nGorman v. Sharp,\n 892 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................... 8\n\nIn re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,\n 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................... 3\n\nJackson v. Procunier,\n 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................................... 3\n\nJohnson v. Dallas I.S.D.,\n 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir.1994) ....................................................................................................... 6\n\nKaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,\n 677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................. 3\n\nLeffall v. Dallas I.S.D.,\n 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir.1994) ....................................................................................................... 6\n\nMartin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit,\n 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 3\n\nMason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov\u2019t, 8\n 06 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................... 11\n\nMorrow v. Meachum,\n 917 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................... 8\n\nPapasan v. Allain,\n 478 U.S. 265 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 3\n\nRice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co.,\n 770 F.3d 1122 (5th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................... 10\n\nRios v. City of Del Rio, Tex.,\n 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................... 6\n\nScott v. Harris,\n 550 U.S. 372 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 9\n\nTorres v. Madrid,\n 592 U.S. 306 (2021) ............................................................................................................... 12\n\nUnited States v. Morris,\n 40 F.4th 323 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................... 11\n\nWatson v. Bryant,\n 532 F. App\u2019x 453 (5th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................. 8\n\n\n\n\n iv\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 5 of 20 PageID 107\n\n\n\nSTATUTES\n\nTex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 547.004(a)(2) ...................................................................................... 10\n\nTex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 547.302(a) .......................................................................................... 10\n\nRULES\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).................................................................................................................. 3\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 4\n\n\n\n\n v\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 6 of 20 PageID 108\n\n\n\nTO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:\n\n Defendants Sr. Cpl. Leonard Anderson and Officer Darrien Robertson (the \u201cOfficers\u201d),\n\npursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, file this Motion to Dismiss\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s Complaint (\u201cMotion\u201d). Specifically, the Officers move to dismiss all claims alleged\n\nagainst them in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (ECF No. 1) (the \u201cComplaint\u201d), and respectfully show the\n\nCourt as follows:\n\n I. SUMMARY OF MOTION\n\n Plaintiff Tomyia Crenshaw (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) maintains in the Complaint that two Dallas Police\n\nDepartment (\u201cDPD\u201d) officers instigated a car chase with an innocent, frightened citizen who\n\nsubsequently\u2014and consequently\u2014lost control of his car and suffered severe injuries. Plaintiff\n\nclaims the officers then ignored him and drove past his burning vehicle, ascribing Plaintiff\u2019s straits\n\nto his own bad decisions.\n\n In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege or provide sufficient factual content to allow the\n\ncourt to reasonably infer that either of the Officers arrested, detained, or even physically touched\n\nhim. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Because Plaintiff was never detained,\n\narrested, or \u201cseized\u201d according to Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit authority, the Officers owed no\n\nconstitutional duty to Plaintiff to render aid. Further, because no case law at the time of the incident\n\nclearly established that the Officers\u2019 actions violated Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights, the\n\nComplaint cannot overcome their entitlement to qualified immunity.\n\n Therefore, even assuming Plaintiff sustained injuries as alleged, the Complaint does not\n\nstate a plausible legal claim against the Officers upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nComplaint must be dismissed.\n\n II. BRIEF FACTUAL SUMMARY\n\n Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 27, 2024. Compl. Plaintiff claims that on May 13,\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 7 of 20 PageID 109\n\n\n\n2020, or alternatively, May 13, 2022, he was involved in a single-car automobile accident. Compl.\n\n\u204b\u204b 1; 24. 1 Plaintiff claims the Officers witnessed Plaintiff\u2019s car \u201cleave a gas station and turn down\n\nMartin Luther King, Jr. Blvd. without headlights on\u201d at around 2:20 a.m. Id. \u204b 24. Plaintiff claims\n\nthat while he allegedly \u201chad not committed any crimes and did not meet the requirements for\n\nengaging in a high-speed pursuit, a high-speed chase ensued.\u201d Id. \u204b 25. This pursuit, Plaintiff states,\n\nwas \u201cin direct violation of DPD policy . . .\u201d Id.\n\n At the pursuit\u2019s inception, the Officers activated their lights and sirens, but towards the end\n\nof the pursuit the Officers allegedly deactivated them. Id. After the lights were deactivated,\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s vehicle \u201cjumped a curb\u201d and \u201ccrashed at a high rate of speed.\u201d Id. \u204b 26. The Officers\n\npurportedly saw the incident but did not stop, and Anderson stated: \u201cThat\u2019s his fault.\u201d Id. \u204b 27.\n\nGood Samaritans pulled Plaintiff from the car \u201cas flames began to consume the vehicle.\u201d Id. \u204b\u204b\n\n28; 30. Plaintiff claims to have endured significant injuries, including burns, because of the crash.\n\nId. \u204b\n\n Plaintiff alleges that DPD Chief Eddie Garcia \u201csaid he is appalled and embarrassed by the\n\nincident.\u201d Id. \u204b 34. Plaintiff further alleges that the Officers \u201cviolated numerous policies and\n\nprocedures by improperly engaging in a high-speed vehicle chase and failing to stop and render\n\naid.\u201d Id. \u204b 35.\n\n Plaintiff lodges six \u201ccounts\u201d against Defendants:\n\n (1) Excessive Force \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (against the Officers);\n (2) Failure to Render Aid \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (against all Defendants);\n (3) Municipal Liability \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (against the City);\n (4) Texas Torts Claims Act (against the City);\n (5) Respondeat Superior (against the City); and\n (6) Exemplary Damages.\n\n\n\n\n1\n The accident appears to have occurred in 2022.\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 8 of 20 PageID 110\n\n\n\nId. \u204b\u204b 45-62.\n\n On April 30, 2024, the City filed its Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 7. This Motion seeks\n\ndismissal of all causes of action against the Officers.\n\n III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 12(b)6 DISMISSAL\n\n Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a claim if the complaint fails to state a claim upon\n\nwhich relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\n\ntests the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint and must be evaluated solely based\n\non the pleadings. Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1986). The allegations\n\ncontained in the complaint are to be construed in the plaintiff\u2019s favor and all well-pleaded facts are\n\nto be accepted as true. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)\n\n(quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.\n\n2004)). However, conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are\n\nnot to be accorded a presumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)\n\n(recognizing that \u201cthe tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a\n\ncomplaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions\u201d); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555\n\n(2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (emphasizing that on a motion to\n\ndismiss, courts \u201care not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual\n\nallegation\u201d)); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050\n\n(5th Cir. 1982) (\u201cAlthough we must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint . . .\n\nwe do not accept as true conclusory allegations in the complaint\u201d); see also Fernandez-Montes v.\n\nAllied Pilots Ass\u2019n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993) (legal conclusions masquerading as factual\n\nassertions are insufficient to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim). While the complaint\n\nneed not contain \u201cdetailed factual allegations,\u201d the plaintiff must plead \u201cmore than labels and\n\nconclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\u201d Twombly,\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 9 of 20 PageID 111\n\n\n\n550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, and critically, \u201c[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of\n\naction, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\u201d Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing\n\nTwombly, 550 U.S. at 555).\n\n Furthermore, the alleged facts must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative\n\nlevel. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). Thus, to\n\nsurvive a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12, a complaint must contain sufficient factual\n\nmatter, accepted as true, to \u201cstate a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.\u201d Id. at 570. \u201cA\n\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw\n\nthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n\nat 678 (citation omitted). \u201cThe plausibility standard is not akin to a \u2018probability requirement,\u2019 but\n\nit asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\u201d Id. (citation\n\nomitted). If a complaint pleads facts that are \u201cmerely consistent with\u201d a defendant\u2019s liability, it\n\nstops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id.. (internal\n\nquotation marks and citation omitted). \u201c[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to\n\ninfer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged\u2014but it has not\n\n\u2018show[n]\u2019\u2014\u2018that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u2019\u201d Id. at 679 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)\n\n(requiring \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief[]\u201d)).\n\n A plaintiff also must meet specific requirements to surmount the defense of qualified\n\nimmunity:\n\n To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, a plaintiff must first show a\n violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation was\n committed by someone acting under color of state law. The doctrine of qualified\n immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability when their\n actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal. When a defendant raises a\n qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the\n inapplicability of that defense. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show (1) that\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 10 of 20 PageID 112\n\n\n\n the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was\n \u201cclearly established\u201d at the time of the challenged conduct.\n\nTurner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 685 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 2\n\n IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims fail because they do not state claims for any cognizable constitutional or\n\nstate law causes of action. Additionally, because there was no \u201cclearly established\u201d law at the time\n\nof the incident prohibiting the Officers\u2019 actions, both Officers are entitled to dismissal based on\n\nqualified immunity. Therefore, the Officers move for dismissal under both general Twombly\n\nstandards and based on qualified immunity.\n\n a. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not state any section 1983 claims against the Officers.\n\n Plaintiff seeks to hold the Officers liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which makes liable\n\n\u201c[e]very person\u201d who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional rights. See, e.g.\n\nCompl. \u204b\u204b 19-20 (alleging \u201cTomyia Crenshaw was injured and denied medical attention by first\n\nresponders in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983\u201d and \u201cCrenshaw pursues this action pursuant to 42\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 1983\u201d).\n\n The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may reasonably infer that a\n\nconstitutional violation occurred, much less facts that can overcome the Officers\u2019 qualified\n\nimmunity defense. While the Complaint arguably alleges facts of moral failings on the Officers\u2019\n\npart, the allegations do not qualify as constitutional violations.\n\n 1. Plaintiff essentially alleges a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory of\n liability, which the Fifth Circuit does not recognize.\n\n Plaintiff does not allege the Officers physically struck, detained, or arrested him. Rather,\n\nthe gravamen of Plaintiff\u2019s allegations is that (1) the Officers\u2019 improper high-speed pursuit created\n\n\n2\n The Officers are specifically invoking their qualified immunity defenses. Nonetheless, the Officers maintain that no\nconstitutional violations occurred\u2014whether \u201cclearly established\u201d or not.\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 11 of 20 PageID 113\n\n\n\na dangerous situation that resulted in the car crash; and then (2) the Officers failed to render aid.\n\nSee Compl. \u204b\u204b 3 (\u201cThis chase lasted for several minutes, giving [the Officers] ample time to\n\ncontemplate their actions and understand the danger this high speed chase posed to [Plaintiff] and\n\nothers.\u201d), \u204b4 (\u201cThe officers made no attempt to stop and render aid.\u201d)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s crash-related allegations most resemble \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theories of\n\nliability. \u201cUnder the state-created danger theory, a state actor may be liable under \u00a7 1983 if the\n\nstate actor created or knew of a dangerous situation and affirmatively placed the plaintiff in that\n\nsituation.\u201d Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 864 (5th\n\nCir. 2012). However, \u201cthe Fifth Circuit has never recognized the \u2018state-created-danger\u2019 exception.\n\nIn [its] published, and thus binding, authority, [it has] repeatedly declined to recognize the state-\n\ncreated danger doctrine.\u201d Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up), cert.\n\ndenied, 144 S. Ct. 569 (2024). 3 Thus, at the outset, the Fifth Circuit does not recognize a\n\nconstitutional right to be free from \u201cthe danger this high speed chase posed to [Plaintiff] and\n\nothers,\u201d Compl. \u204b 3. As a result, Plaintiff\u2019s section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law and must be\n\ndismissed.\n\n 2. Plaintiff was never \u201cseized\u201d under the Fourth Amendment.\n\n Plaintiff alleges the Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be\n\nfree from excessive force and unreasonable searches and seizures. Compl. \u204b\u204b 45-50. The\n\n\n3\n The Fifth Circuit has eschewed the doctrine for decades. See, e.g. Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 422 (5th\nCir. 2006) (\u201c[T]his court has frequently spoken of the \u2018state-created danger\u2019 theory, and has discussed its various\npermutations and requirements as applied in other circuits, but neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever either\nadopted the state-created danger theory or sustained a recovery on the basis thereof.\u201d); Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367\nF.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir.2004) (\u201cThis court has consistently refused to recognize a \u2018state-created danger\u2019 theory of\n\u00a7 1983 liability . . . .\u201d); Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dis., 349 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 2003) (\u201cWe have never recognized\nstate-created danger as a trigger of State affirmative duties under the Due Process clause.\u201d); Johnson v. Dallas Indep.\nSch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994) (\u201c[N]o Fifth Circuit case has yet predicated relief on a state created danger\ntheory . . . .\u201d); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir.1994) (\u201cWe have found no cases in our\ncircuit permitting \u00a7 1983 recovery for a substantive due process violation predicated on a state-created danger theory\n. . . .\u201d).\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 12 of 20 PageID 114\n\n\n\nComplaint claims these violations stem from \u201cinitiating pursuit of Plaintiff despite Plaintiff having\n\nnever been charged with a crime.\u201d Id. \u204b 48. However, nothing about Plaintiff\u2019s allegations\n\nplausibly states any sort of unconstitutional seizure.\n\n In a case involving the use of roadblocks, the Supreme Court addressed a strikingly similar\n\nsituation:\n\n It is clear, in other words, that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur\n whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual\u2019s freedom\n of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally\n caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual\u2019s freedom of\n movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination\n of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. That is the reason\n there was no seizure in the hypothetical situation that concerned the Court of\n Appeals. The pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of\n authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit; and though he was\n in fact stopped, he was stopped by a different means\u2014his loss of control of his\n vehicle and the subsequent crash. If, instead of that, the police cruiser had pulled\n alongside the fleeing car and sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the\n termination of the suspect\u2019s freedom of movement would have been a seizure.\n\nBrower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596\u201397 (1989)\n\n Here, like in Brower, Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that he was \u201cstopped\u201d\n\nor \u201cseized\u201d by the Officers\u2019 pursuit, even after they activated their flashing \u201clights and sirens\u201d as\n\na command to stop. The pursuit did not curtail Plaintiff\u2019s freedom of movement; in fact, Plaintiff\n\nhas not asserted that he stopped his vehicle or complied with the Officers\u2019 show of authority.\n\nConsequently, neither the chase itself nor Plaintiff\u2019s eventual loss of control and crash constitutes\n\na Fourth Amendment seizure under Brower. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)\n\n(applying Brower and noting that in that case \u201c[w]e did not even consider the possibility that a\n\nseizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because, as we explained, that \u2018show\n\nof authority did not produce his stop\u2019\u201d). The Supreme Court again examined Brower later and\n\nsummarized as follows: \u201cWe illustrated the point by saying that no Fourth Amendment seizure\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 13 of 20 PageID 115\n\n\n\nwould take place where a \u2018pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of\n\nauthority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit,\u2019 but accidentally stopped the\n\nsuspect by crashing into him.\u201d County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (quoting\n\nBrower, 489 U.S. at 597). Here, the Complaint does not allege that the Officers even \u201caccidentally\n\nstopped\u201d Plaintiff \u201cby crashing into him\u201d; it alleges only that they observed\u2014and ignored\u2014\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s crash. 4\n\n Critically, nothing in the Complaint can plausibly be interpreted to indicate the Officers\n\nintended to cause harm to Plaintiff, much less the harm that allegedly befell him. Even assuming\n\narguendo that the Officers\u2019 attempts to stop Plaintiff were negligent, under Supreme Court and\n\nFifth Circuit precedent, attempting a seizure that accidentally or even negligently resulted in harm\n\nis not a Fourth Amendment violation. See Gorman v. Sharp, 892 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2018)\n\n(\u201cBrower and subsequent precedents foreclose liability under the Fourth Amendment in the\n\nabsence of intentional conduct.\u201d); Watson v. Bryant, 532 F. App\u2019x 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (\u201cThe\n\nSupreme Court [in Brower] held that Fourth Amendment violations occur only through intentional\n\nconduct . . . . In the absence of evidence showing that [the officer] intended to use deadly force,\n\nwe must conclude that the negligent shooting here did not itself violate [the suspect\u2019s] Fourth\n\nAmendment rights.\u201d) (citations omitted); Baskin v. City of Houston, Miss., 378 F. App\u2019x 417, 418\n\nn.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (\u201cTo the extent that a Fourth Amendment claim was raised, any attempt to\n\nallege excessive use of force in the course of a negligent seizure is foreclosed by the Supreme\n\nCourt\u2019s decision in Brower . . . .\u201d).\n\n\n4\n Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that the Officers ran Plaintiff off the road, sideswiped him, much less fired a deadly\nweapon. But even if Plaintiff had made such an allegation, such an act would not have been a violation under the\nFourth Amendment. In fact, Fifth Circuit authority has made clear that \u201cthe Supreme Court has never found the use\nof deadly force in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a basis for\ndenying qualified immunity. And it\u2019s why we previously refused to extend Garner to high-speed chases. We refuse\nagain today.\u201d Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 878 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 14 of 20 PageID 116\n\n\n\n Further, the decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), is instructive. The facts in\n\nScott involved a high-speed pursuit of a fleeing suspect by several police officers that spanned ten\n\nmiles at speeds exceeding eighty-five miles per hour. Id. at 375. Six minutes after the pursuit\n\nbegan, an officer maneuvered his car in such a way that caused the fleeing suspect to lose control\n\nof his car and ultimately crash down an embankment. Id. The man suffered injuries that resulted\n\nin quadriplegia. Id. The Court analyzed the facts against the backdrop of qualified immunity and\n\nconcluded at the first step of the analysis that the officer\u2019s actions did not violate the Constitution.\n\nId. at 377, 386. In reaching this conclusion, the Court described the scene as one involving\n\n\u201c[m]ultiple police cars with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring\u201d and a fleeing suspect who\n\nignored warnings to stop. Id. at 384. The Court further described the pursuit as one that posed\n\n\u201cextreme danger to human life\u201d and an \u201cactual and imminent threat\u201d to others, including the\n\nofficers involved in the pursuit. Id. at 383-84. Regarding the fleeing suspect, the Court\n\nacknowledged that the officer\u2019s actions posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to the\n\nsuspect. Id. at 384. The Court acknowledged, however, that it was the fleeing suspect who\n\nintentionally placed himself and others in danger by ignoring warnings to stop and engaging in a\n\nreckless, high-speed flight that ultimately forced the officer to act. Id. Given the facts of the case,\n\nthe Court determined that it was reasonable for the officer to take the steps that he took to end the\n\npursuit and ultimately held that an officer who takes action to terminate a dangerous high-speed\n\npursuit that threatens lives does not act unconstitutionally, even when the officer\u2019s actions place\n\nthe fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Id. at 386.\n\n Here, unlike Scott, the Officers are not alleged to have ever touched Plaintiff, much less\n\nrun him off the road. As such, nothing about Plaintiff\u2019s allegations plausibly state a Fourth\n\nAmendment claim. See also Carney v. New Orleans City, 468 F. Supp. 3d 751, 761-62 (E.D. La.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 15 of 20 PageID 117\n\n\n\n2020) (dismissing a claim of high-speed pursuit, finding that \u201c[t]he reason why a suspect\u2019s\n\naccidental crash in a police pursuit does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is\n\nthat \u2018[t]he pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of authority represented\n\nby flashing lights and continuing pursuit; and though he was in fact stopped, he was stopped by a\n\ndifferent means\u2014his loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent crash\u2019\u201d) (quoting Brower,\n\n489 U.S. at 596-97)).\n\n Notably, Plaintiff alleges the genesis of the pursuit was a direct violation of unnamed DPD\n\npolicies when they pursued him even though \u201c[Plaintiff] had not committed any crimes.\u201d Compl.\n\n\u204b 25. This is ill-informed. First, \u00a7 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations of \u201crights,\n\nprivileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Violating\n\ninternal rules, like the DPD \u201cpolicies\u201d Plaintiff claims were violated, cannot amount to\n\nconstitutional violations in and of themselves. See Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 1122,\n\n1133 (5th Cir. 2014) (\u201cBut officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified\n\nimmunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.\n\nViolating a departmental regulation, on its own, is not sufficient to deprive [the officer] of qualified\n\nimmunity.\u201d) (cleaned up). Second, the Officers did not violate the internal rules Plaintiff cites. The\n\nComplaint admits that at around 2:20 a.m., Plaintiff turned down a public road (Martin Luther\n\nKing, Jr. Boulevard) \u201cwithout headlights on.\u201d Id. The Texas Transportation Code requires that \u201c[a]\n\nvehicle shall display each lighted lamp and illuminating device required by this chapter to be on\n\nthe vehicle: (1) at nighttime; and (2) when light is insufficient or atmospheric conditions are\n\nunfavorable so that a person or vehicle on the highway is not clearly discernible at a distance of\n\n1,000 feet ahead.\u201d Tex. Transp. Code \u00a7 547.302(a). Violating this provision is a misdemeanor\n\noffense. Id. \u00a7 547.004(a)(2). At the nighttime hour of 2:20 a.m., Plaintiff failed to comply with this\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 16 of 20 PageID 118\n\n\n\nrequirement by law to have his headlights on. Thus, contrary to the Complaint, Plaintiff had\n\ncommitted a crime\u2014and one in the Officers\u2019 plain view.\n\n Lastly, the Supreme Court long ago explicitly found that the Fourteenth Amendment\n\ncannot provide any plaintiff a cause of action for the circumstances at bar:\n\n The issue in this case is whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth\n Amendment\u2019s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through\n deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed\n at apprehending a suspected offender. We answer no, and hold that in such\n circumstances only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of\n arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience,\n necessary for a due process violation.\n\nLewis, 523 U.S. at 836.\n\n Nothing alleged in the Complaint indicates the Officers intended to cause Plaintiff harm.\n\nTherefore, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged claims under either the Fourth or the Fourteenth\n\nAmendment, and both claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.\n\n 3. The Officers had no Fourteenth Amendment constitutional duty\n to stop and render aid.\n\n The Supreme Court has held that the \u201cDue Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative\n\nright to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property\n\ninterests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.\u201d DeShaney v. Winnebago\n\nCnty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (collecting cases). \u201cThe Due Process Clause\n\ndoes, however, require the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical\n\ncare to persons . . . who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.\u201d City of Revere\n\nv. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (emphasis added).\n\n Fatal to Plaintiff\u2019s failure to render aid claims is the fact that he was never apprehended.\n\n\u201cAn officer\u2019s visual signal for a motorist to stop\u2014whether made by hand or lights and sirens\u2014is\n\nsuch a show of authority.\u201d United States v. Morris, 40 F.4th 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2022). As noted\n\n\n\n 11\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 17 of 20 PageID 119\n\n\n\nabove, in similar circumstances, the Supreme Court \u201cdid not even consider the possibility that a\n\nseizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because, as we explained, that \u2018show\n\nof authority did not produce his stop.\u201d Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628. The end of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nabsconding from the Officers was not a yielding to a show of authority; instead, Plaintiff \u201cjumped\n\na curb [along a public street] and crashed at a high rate of speed.\u201d Compl. \u204b 26. This was not a\n\nseizure.\n\n Further, in Torres v. Madrid, the Supreme Court recently explored the edges of what\n\nconstitutes a \u201cseizure\u201d in a case involving the shooting of a suspect, ultimately finding that \u201cthe\n\napplication of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the\n\nperson does not submit and is not subdued.\u201d 592 U.S. 306, 325 (2021) (emphasis added). And,\n\neven if a suspect was \u201cseized\u201d but broke free, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does\n\nnot recognize any \u201c\u2018continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity.\u2019\u201d Id. at 318 (quoting Hodari\n\nD., 499 U.S. at 625). As previously noted, there are no allegations in the Complaint that even\n\nindicate the Officers physically touched Plaintiff, much less detained, arrested, or took him to jail.\n\n Plaintiff was not seized; he successfully evaded seizure notwithstanding police commands\n\nto stop. Therefore, however objectionable the Officers\u2019 alleged actions may have been, the Officers\n\ndid not have a constitutional duty to render Plaintiff aid. In sum, Plaintiff states no constitutional\n\ndeprivation.\n\n 4. The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to overcome the\n Officers\u2019 qualified immunity defense.\n\n The pleading standards remain \u201cthe same when a motion to dismiss is based on qualified\n\nimmunity,\u201d Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2021), but \u201c[t]he crucial question is\n\nwhether the complaint pleads facts that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants are\n\nliable under \u00a7 1983 and would overcome their qualified immunity defense,\u201d id. at 280 (cleaned\n\n\n 12\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 18 of 20 PageID 120\n\n\n\nup). At the motion to dismiss stage, \u201c[i]t is the plaintiff\u2019s burden to demonstrate that qualified\n\nimmunity is inappropriate.\u201d Id. at 280 (citing Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th\n\nCir. 2009)).\n\n Even if the Complaint sufficiently alleges the Officers committed constitutional\n\nviolations\u2014which it does not\u2014none of the rights alleged were \u201cclearly established\u201d at the time of\n\nthe incident. \u201c[A] clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable\n\nofficial would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.\u201d Melton v. Phillips, 875\n\nF.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The\n\nSupreme Court has\n\n repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of\n generality. The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular\n conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the\n specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.\n\nMullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\n\n The Officers are aware of no case law with facts even remotely similar to the case at bar to\n\nestablish that they violated Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights. Therefore, in addition to the lack of\n\nany cognizable constitutional violation in the first place, the Officers are entitled to dismissal based\n\non qualified immunity.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 19 of 20 PageID 121\n\n\n\n V. CONCLUSION\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint does not plausibly plead the Officers violated Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nconstitutional rights. 5 Absent a constitutional violation, Plaintiffs claims against the Officers\n\nnecessarily fail. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Officers\u2019 Motion and dismiss all claims\n\nasserted against them in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint.\n\n\n\n\n5\n Plaintiff lists several other \u201ccounts\u201d that do not merit extensive attention. \u201cCount VI\u201d is labeled as \u201cExemplary\nDamages.\u201d Compl. \u204b\u204b 61-62. First, the Texas Tort Claims Act \u201cdoes not authorize exemplary damages.\u201d Tex. Civ.\nPrac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 101.024. Second, under Texas law, \u201can award of punitive damages is not a separate cause\nof action,\u201d Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or. Cardio\u2013Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir. 2001), such that a\ndemand for punitive damages is not \u201cseparate and distinct from the underlying claim for compensatory damages,\u201d\nwhere \u201cTexas, like the majority of states, limits punitive damages to cases in which actual compensatory damages are\nfound,\u201d Lanier v. Salas, 777 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1985). The same is true for demands for punitive damages\nsounding in federal law. See, e.g., Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 604 (5th Cir. 1988) (addressing 42\nU.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim). \u201cPunitive damages are not an independent claim or cause of action, but are a remedy available\nin various causes of action.\u201d Id. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff brings these two Counts as separate causes of action,\nthey should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 12 Filed 06/03/24 Page 20 of 20 PageID 122\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that on June 3, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the clerk\nof court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF electronic case\nfiling system of the court. The electronic case filing system will send a \u201cNotice of Electronic\nFiling\u201d notification to all case participants registered for electronic notice, including all pro se\nparties and/or attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service\nof this document by electronic means.\n\n s/ J. Cheves Ligon\n J. Cheves Ligon\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-10-10T11:54:22.832340-07:00","document_number":"12","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016885795","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-06-04T10:20:02.696278-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:21:59.962706-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-03","time_filed":null,"entry_number":12,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-03.001","pacer_sequence_number":39,"description":"Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Leonard Anderson, Darrien Robertson with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Ligon, John)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392398027/","id":392398027,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/401426498/","id":401426498,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/11/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.662774-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.047315-07:00","sha1":"2b906955f2d969998efdacaa9c57bda49040acf9","page_count":25,"file_size":337639,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.11.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":3,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 1 of 25 PageID 78\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nvs. \u00a7\n \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON, \u00a7\nDARRIEN ROBERTSON, \u00a7\nAND THE CITY OF DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n \u00a7\n\n\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019\n MOTION TO DISMISS\n\n\nTO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:\n\n Plaintiff Tomyia Crenshaw files this, his Response to Defendant City of Dallas\u2019 Motion to\n\nDismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (Dkt. No. 7, \u201cMotion\u201d), and in support thereof would respectfully\n\nshow the Court as follows:\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS i\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 2 of 25 PageID 79\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 1\nII. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ........................................................ 2\nIII. RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD ............................................................................................... 3\nIV. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES................................................................................ 5\n A. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly States a Section 1983 Claim ........................................ 5\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly Alleges Facts From Which the Court May Plausibly\n Infer That a Policy or Practice exists .................................................................................. 6\n 2. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Plausibly Alleges that the Policies in Question Were the\n Moving Force Behind the Violation of Plaintiff\u2019s Constitutional Rights....................... 10\n 3. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Sufficiently Alleges That His Constitutional Rights Were\n Violated ................................................................................................................................ 12\n i. Defendant\u2019s \u201cState-Created Danger\u201d Argument Fails ....................................... 13\n ii. Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts From Which the Court May Plausibly Infer His\n Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated.......................................................... 13\n iii. Plaintiff Had a Fourteenth Amendment Right to Receive Emergency Medical\n Aid from Defendants.............................................................................................. 14\n B. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly States a Texas Tort Claims Act Against Defendant\n City of Dallas ........................................................................................................................... 15\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s Injuries Were the Result of Defendants\u2019 Use of the Vehicle ................. 15\n 2. The Texas Tort Claims Act Emergency Exception Is Not Applicable ................... 17\nV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 19\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS ii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 3 of 25 PageID 80\n\n\n\nCases\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 4\nBarr v. City of San Antonio,\n No. CIVASA-06-CA-0261-XR, 2006 WL 2322861 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2006) ..................... 10\nBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 4\nBland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,\n 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000)....................................................................................................... 16\nBrower v. Cnty. of Inyo,\n 489 U.S. 593 (1989) .................................................................................................................. 14\nButtross v. Great Lakes Ins. SE,\n No. 1:22-CV-00086-BU, 2022 WL 16749045 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2022) ................................. 4\nCity of Amarillo v. Martin,\n 971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998).................................................................................................... 19\nCity of San Antonio v. Maspero,\n 640 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2022).................................................................................................... 17\nDoe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist.,\n 615 F. Supp. 3d 471 (E.D. Tex. 2022) ........................................................................................ 4\nDoe v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist.,\n No. 1:20-CV-00408-LY, 2020 WL 13833132 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2020) ............................. 10\nEstate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills,\n 406 F.3d 375 (5th Cir.2005) ....................................................................................................... 9\nFirefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P.,\n 894 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................... 4\nFisher v. Moore,\n 73 F.4th 367 (5th Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................................... 13\nFlores v. City of Palacios,\n 381 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 13\nFuentes v. Nueces Cnty., Tex.,\n 689 Fed. Appx. 775 (5th Cir. 2017) .......................................................................................... 10\nGroden v. City of Dallas, Tex.,\n 826 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 6\nHarper v. McAndrews,\n 499 F. Supp. 3d 312 (E.D. Tex. 2020) ...................................................................................... 15\nHicks-Fields v. Harris Cty.,\n 860 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2017) ....................................................................................................... 6\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS iii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 4 of 25 PageID 81\n\n\n\nIkerd v. Blair,\n 101 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... 13\nIn re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc.,\n 468 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................... 4\nJackson v. City of Houston,\n No. 4:23-CV-00052, 2023 WL 7093031 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2023) ........................................ 18\nJackson v. Valdez,\n 852 Fed. Appx. 129 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................ 9\nKingsley v. Hendrickson,\n 576 U.S. 389 (2015) .................................................................................................................... 9\nKitchen v. Dallas Cnty.,\n 759 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................... 9\nLeatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,\n 07 U.S. 163 (1993) ...................................................................................................................... 5\nMay v. City of Arlington, Tex.,\n 398 F. Supp. 3d 68 (N.D. Tex. 2019) ......................................................................................... 6\nMoreno v. City of Dallas,\n No. 3:13-CV-4106-B, 2015 WL 3890467 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) ....................................... 9\nPe\u00f1a v. City of Rio Grande City,\n 879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................................... 6\nPeterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.,\n 588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 10\nPineda v. City of Houston,\n 291 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................... 10\nPiotrowski v. City of Houston,\n 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................... 8\nReese v. Anderson,\n 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991) ....................................................................................................... 5\nRico v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.,\n No. 3:10-CV-1643-L, 2011 WL 1792854 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2011) ..................................... 17\nRyder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cnty.,\n 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2015)............................................................................................... 15, 16\nSanchez v. Gomez,\n 283 F. Supp. 3d 524 (W.D. Tex. 2017) ................................................................................... 10\nSanders-Burns v. City of Plano,\n 594 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................... 9\nScott v. Harris,\n 550 U.S. 372 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 14\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS iv\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 5 of 25 PageID 82\n\n\n\nSosa v. Coleman,\n 646 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1981) ....................................................................................................... 3\nTanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,\n 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................... 3\nTennessee v. Garner,\n 471 U.S. 1 (1985) ...................................................................................................................... 13\nUtica Nat'l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co.,\n 141 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2004)..................................................................................................... 16\nWebster v. City of Houston,\n 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) ....................................................................................................... 8\nStatutes\nTEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE \u00a7 101.055 ..................................................................................... 17\nTEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 101.021. ...................................................................................... 15\nTEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.001. .................................................................................................... 18\nTEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.003 ..................................................................................................... 18\nTEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.005 ..................................................................................................... 18\nRules\nFED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................................................................................. 3, 4\nFED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) ................................................................................................................. 19\nFED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) ......................................................................................................................... 4\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS v\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 6 of 25 PageID 83\n\n\n\n\n I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT\n\n \u201cThat\u2019s his fault.\u201d This is the statement by senior police officer Leonard Anderson to\n\ntrainee Darrien Robertson as they looked at Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle burning after it had crashed. Instead\n\nof accepting the responsibility that they had caused this crash to occur after engaging in a needless\n\nand reckless high-speed chase, these officers acted with utter indifference to Plaintiffs\u2019 life and\n\ndrove in the opposite direction. Defendant Anderson was acting in accordance with the City\u2019s\n\npolicies and practices and was training Defendant Robertson in that manner when they determined\n\nto leave Plaintiff burning in his vehicle instead of getting out and rendering aid. This vile action\n\ndeprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and caused him to be seized and then left for dead\n\ndespite the fact that the officers caused this collision to occur. Unfortunately, this is not the first\n\ntime that officers for the Dallas Police Department have turned their blind eye to injuries and needs\n\nof those that they have in their custody or care. Defendants must be held accountable for this\n\ndeliberately indifferent behavior to Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights.\n\n Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss is mainly composed of smoke screens and red herring\n\narguments that have no relevant connection to Plaintiff\u2019s actual pleadings which must be the main\n\nfocus in a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry. A motion to dismiss at this stage must be rarely granted as the\n\nonly requirement is that the complaint states a plausible claim. When read in the proper light,\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s Complaint sets forth more than sufficient grounds to assert a \u00a7 1983 claim against the\n\nCity along with a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff has shown significant policies\n\nand procedures that were promulgated by the policymaker that were the moving force in Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nconstitutional violation. Additionally, Defendants\u2019 actions fall squarely within the waiver of\n\nimmunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act and the facts do not give rise to any exception.\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 1\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 7 of 25 PageID 84\n\n\n\n When construed liberally, Plaintiff\u2019s facts paint more than a sufficient picture of the\n\negregious actions by Defendants that would give rise to a plausible claim. Our Courts and our\n\ncities should be encouraging officers to run to render aid to those in need regardless of the\n\ncircumstances that got them there, but Defendants\u2019 actions show a policy that encourages officers\n\nto ignore the cries for help and act with deliberate indifference to the lives and safety of others\n\neven when those officers caused the danger. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the\n\nCourt deny Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss.\n\n II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n\n This case stems from the reprehensible and unlawful actions of Defendant City of Dallas\n\n(\u201cDefendant\u201d), Defendant Leonard Anderson (\u201cDefendant Anderson\u201d), Defendant Darrien\n\nRobertson (\u201cDefendant Robertson\u201d) that occurred on May 13, 2022. On that date, Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson were engaged in a routine patrolling assignment when they noticed a red\n\ncar, driven by Plaintiff Tomyia Crenshaw (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) pass by without a headlight on. Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson then pulled out behind Plaintiff\u2019s car and activated their emergency lights\n\nand sirens, ultimately engaging in a high-speed pursuit of Plaintiff.\n\n Defendants Anderson and Robertson pursued Plaintiff for several blocks before eventually\n\nturning off their emergency lights and sirens. Although their emergency lights and sirens were no\n\nlonger on, Defendants Anderson and Robertson continued to pursue Crenshaw. Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson did not stop pursuing Plaintiff until they caused his car to crash. Indeed,\n\nit was only once Plaintiff\u2019s car had crashed and was engulfed in flames did the pursuit stop.\n\nHowever, instead of stopping to assess and help remedy the fiery situation which they had created,\n\nDefendants Anderson and Robertson brushed off the incident by saying, \u201cThat\u2019s his fault,\u201d and\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 2\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 8 of 25 PageID 85\n\n\n\nthen simply turned onto a different street and drove away, leaving Plaintiff to nearly die inside of\n\nhis burning vehicle.\n\n As a result of Defendant\u2019s heinous conduct, Plaintiff has suffered third-degree burns on\n\nover fifty percent (50%) of his body. Some of Plaintiff\u2019s burns go all the way down to his bones\u2014\n\nparticularly those sustained from his waist down. Additionally, Plaintiff has suffered a broken arm,\n\nleg, collar bone, hip, and several ribs. As a result of such injuries, Plaintiff had to be hospitalized\n\nfrom May 13, 2022, to September 3, 2022. Since the incident, Plaintiff has undergone over twenty\n\n(20) different surgeries and is still receiving outpatient treatment for his injuries. Additionally,\n\nPlaintiff\u2014a once healthy 23-year-old\u2014must now use a wheelchair and/or walker to perform many\n\ndaily activities he previously had no problem with. Plaintiff anticipates past and future medical\n\nbills and expenses, past and future disfigurement, past and future physical limitations and/or\n\nincapacity, and past and future pain and suffering and mental anguish.\n\n Accordingly, Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint (\u201cComplaint\u201d) against Defendant City\n\nof Dallas, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant Robertson on March 27, 2024. On April 30, 2024,\n\nDefendant City of Dallas filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint under Federal Rule of\n\nCivil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Plaintiff filed its Response in Opposition to Defendant City of Dallas\n\nMotion to Dismiss (\u201cResponse\u201d) on May 21, 2024.\n\n III. RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD\n\n \u201cA motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim \u2018is viewed with disfavor, and is rarely\n\ngranted.\u2019\u201d Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir.\n\n1988) (quoting Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1981)). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6)\n\nmotion to dismiss is to test the formal sufficiency of a complaint, not to decide the merits of the\n\ncase. See Buttross v. Great Lakes Ins. SE, No. 1:22-CV-00086-BU, 2022 WL 16749045, at *3\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 3\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 9 of 25 PageID 86\n\n\n\n(N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2022), R. & R. adopted, No. 1:22-CV-086-H-BU, 2022 WL 16752849 (N.D.\n\nTex. Nov. 7, 2022) (stating that the motion is not to be used as \u201ca procedure for resolving a contest\n\nbetween the parties about the facts or the substantive merits of the plaintiff\u2019s case\u201d). To be granted,\n\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must establish that the complaint fails to meet the liberal\n\nnotice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which merely requires, \u201ca short and plain statement of\n\nthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The 12(b)(6) \u201cpleading\n\nstandard should not be robotically applied, however, so as to overwhelm a plaintiff\u2019s right to\n\nadjudicate her claim on the merits.\u201d Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 615 F. Supp. 3d 471, 486\n\n(E.D. Tex. 2022). As such, in reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts have \u201can affirmative\n\nduty to ask whether it \u2018appears certain\u2019 that plaintiff \u2018cannot prove any set of facts\u2019 that would\n\nentitle her to legal relief.\u201d Id. (quoting In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 251 (5th\n\nCir. 2006) (emphasis in original).\n\n In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all facts\n\nalleged in a plaintiff\u2019s complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.\n\nSee Firefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2018). When the\n\nfactual matter contained within the complaint, accepted as true, states a claim for relief that is\n\nplausible on its face, a Court must deny a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v.\n\nIqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint has facial plausibility when it allows the Court to\n\ndraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Id. The\n\nallegations need not contain detailed, factual allegations, and the right to relief need not be\n\nprobable. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead, the \u201callegations must\n\nbe enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level\u2026on the assumption that all the\n\nallegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\u201d Id.\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 4\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 10 of 25 PageID 87\n\n\n\n Defendant attempts to subject Plaintiff to a higher standard than is required or permitted\n\nunder Rule 12(b)(6). Indeed, a slew of the cases that Defendant cites in support of its argument\n\nthat Plaintiff\u2019s claims should be dismissed involve a trial court\u2019s decision on a motion for summary\n\njudgment, or an appeal of a trial court\u2019s decision on a motion for summary judgment. Reliance on\n\nsuch cases is improper, because it is well established that \u201cthe evidentiary burden on the non-\n\nmovant in a summary judgment motion is significantly greater than in a motion to dismiss.\u201d Reese\n\nv. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991). As such, these cases do not support dismissal at\n\nthe pleading stage; if anything, they show that the Fifth Circuit and its district courts routinely\n\nallow Section 1983 claims to proceed to discovery. Additionally, it is well established that Section\n\n1983 claims are not subjected to a higher pleading standard. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.\n\nNarcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that, \u201c[a] federal court\n\nmay not apply a \u2018heightened pleading standard\u2019\u2014more stringent than the usual pleading\n\nrequirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)\u2014in civil rights cases alleging municipal\n\nliability under \u00a7 1983\u201d).\n\n This Court should not be swayed by Defendant\u2019s attempt to raise the pleading standard that\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s Complaint is subject to. Instead, this Court should simply apply the well-settled standard\n\nset forth above in determining the Complaint\u2019s sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n IV. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES\n\nA. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly States a Section 1983 Claim\n\n To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a claim of municipal liability under Section 1983,\n\na plaintiff need only \u201cset forth facts, or those from which the court can reasonably infer, that: \u2018(1)\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 5\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 11 of 25 PageID 88\n\n\n\nan official policy; (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker 1; (3) was the moving force\n\nbehind the violation of a constitutional right.\u2019\u201d May v. City of Arlington, Tex., 398 F. Supp. 3d 68,\n\n78 (N.D. Tex. 2019), supplemented, No. 3:16-CV-1674-L, 2019 WL 1429662 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28,\n\n2019) (quoting Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff is not\n\nrequired to \u201coffer proof of his or her allegations at the pleading stage.\u201d Id. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint\n\nclearly meets this standard.\n\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly Alleges Facts From Which the Court May\n Plausibly Infer That a Policy or Practice exists\n\n It is worth noting that Defendant\u2019s Motion does not even attempt to address several of the\n\npolicies set forth in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint. See Dkt. No. 7 at 14\u201318. Instead, Defendant only attacks\n\nParagraph 35 of the Complaint, which Defendant characterizes as a policy of failing to train and\n\nfailing to discipline. See Dkt. No. 7 at 14. 2\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint meets the pleading standards with respect to the first element. See\n\nDkt. No. 1 at \u204b 27 (\u201c\u2026policies to not render aid despite seeing and causing what happened\u201d); \u204b 35\n\n(\u201cThe Dallas Police Department (DPD) violated established training protocols; failed to conduct\n\nappropriate performance review procedures; failed to implement appropriate recruitment, hiring,\n\nand candidate selection methods; failed to implement appropriate retention efforts; and failed to\n\ntrain, implement policies, and/or create an atmosphere that prohibited the very destructive, biased,\n\nand reckless conduct of Officers Anderson and Robertson\u201d); \u204b 37 (\u201cDPD has failed to enact proper\n\npolicies and procedures concerning rendering emergency medical treatment and has failed to\n\n\n1\n Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint with respect to the second element. In any event, \u201cthe specific\nidentity of the policymaker is a legal question that need not be pled.\u201d Groden v. City of Dallas, Tex., 826 F.3d 280,\n284 (5th Cir. 2016).\n2\n Defendant notes in its Motion that Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant had any unconstitutional written policies.\nTo the extent Defendant is alleging the other policies (which it does not address in its Motion) set forth in Plaintiff\u2019s\nComplaint are insufficient because they are unwritten, Defendant is wrong. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly stated that\na City can be held liable under Section 1983 for a written or unwritten policy or custom. See Pe\u00f1a v. City of Rio\nGrande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2018).\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 6\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 12 of 25 PageID 89\n\n\n\nproperly train its officers with respect to providing emergency medical treatment\u201d); \u204b 41 (\u201cDPD\n\nhas refused or otherwise failed to provide medical treatment in the face of an emergency. Such\n\nincidents are illustrative of the polic[i]es, practices, and procedures of DPD and the City of Dallas\n\nwere acting in accordance with and that were the driving force behind Defendants\u2019 violation of\n\nCrenshaw\u2019s clearly established constitutional rights\u201d); \u204b 44 (\u201cThe incident occurred as a result\n\nof\u2026the unlawful policies in place at the Dallas Police Department, and/or the failure to have\n\nappropriate policies in place, the failure to train and supervise the involved officer(s), and negligent\n\nhiring and retention of the involved officer(s)\u201d); \u204b 57 (stating that Defendant was \u201con notice of the\n\nConstitutional defects in the training of Dallas police officers, including, but not limited to failure\n\nto adopt proper policies requiring that officers render medical aid to civilians, and inadequate\n\ntraining of officers in rendering emergency medical aid\u201d); \u204b 60(c) (\u201cAs a matter of both policy and\n\npractice, the City of Dallas Police Department had a de facto or informal custom of allowing\n\nofficers to engage in a vehicular pursuit of potential suspects in the absence of a warrant for the\n\nsuspect[\u2018]s arrest, or without committing a felony\u201d); \u204b 60(d) (\u201cAs a matter of widespread custom\n\nand policy, the City of Dallas Police Department did not require police officers to either stop and\n\nrender aid to civilians suspected of committing violations of the law, or require officers to refrain\n\nfrom high-speed pursuit of individuals not convicted of a felony, in violation of Plaintiff\u2019s Fourth,\n\nand Fifth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments rights so as to constitute a deliberately indifferent failure\n\nto adopt policies necessary to prevent constitutional violations by the City of Dallas\u201d); \u204b 60(e)\n\n(\u201cAs a matter of both policy and practice, the City of Dallas encourages, and is thereby the moving\n\nforce behind, the very type of misconduct at issue in Counts I-II by failing to adequately train,\n\nsupervise, control and discipline its officers such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate\n\nindifference\u201d); \u204b 60(f) (\u201cAs a matter of both policy and practice, the City of Dallas failed to use\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 7\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 13 of 25 PageID 90\n\n\n\nappropriate and generally accepted law enforcement policies, procedures, and training in handling\n\ninjured, medically disabled, or wounded civilians\u201d); \u204b 60(g) (\u201cAs a matter of both policy and\n\npractice, the City of Dallas facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue in Counts I-II by failing\n\nto adequately investigate, punish, and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct, thereby\n\nleading Dallas police officers to believe their actions will never be meaningfully scrutinized.\n\nAccordingly, in that way, the City of Dallas directly encourages future uses of excessive deadly\n\nforce, unlawful detention, failures to intervene, such as those Plaintiff complains of\u201d); \u204b 60(h) (\u201cAs\n\na matter of both policy and practice, the City of Dallas encourages and is the moving force behind\n\nthe failure to render aid by promoting and encouraging a policy, practice, and procedure for police\n\nofficers not to render aid to individuals injured by the police officers\u2019 conduct\u201d).\n\n The policy or custom in a Section 1983 municipal liability claim may come in the form of\n\na common practice of city officials or employees that, although not officially adopted or\n\npromulgated, is common enough to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. See\n\nPiotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Webster v. City of Houston,\n\n735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)). Plaintiff has plausibly alleged facts sufficient to infer a pattern\n\nby Defendant and its employees of failing and/or refusing to render medical aid to those in need,\n\nfailing to adopt policies and procedures for Dallas Police Officers with respect to rendering\n\nmedical aid to those in need, and failing to properly train Dallas Police Officers on rendering\n\nmedical aid to those in need. Indeed, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint contains several, similar instances of\n\nconduct by the Dallas Police Department. See Dkt. No. 1 \u204b\u204b 38\u201340. In its Motion, Defendant claims\n\nthat these past incidents cited by Plaintiff fail to establish a pattern because they are not\n\n\u201csubstantially similar to the circumstances here,\u201d and because they do not meet \u201cthe Fifth Circuit\u2019s\n\nhigh bar for numerosity.\u201d See Dkt. No. 7 at 16\u201317. Defendant\u2019s arguments are unpersuasive.\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 8\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 14 of 25 PageID 91\n\n\n\n First, neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,\n\nrequire that the past instances of conduct a Plaintiff alleges to show a pattern for purposes of\n\nSection 1983 municipal liability be \u201csubstantially\u201d similar as Defendant alleges. See Dkt. No. 7 at\n\n16. Instead, all that is required is that they be \u201cfairly similar.\u201d See Kitchen v. Dallas Cnty., 759\n\nF.3d 468, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir.\n\n2010)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397\u201398\n\n(2015); Moreno v. City of Dallas, No. 3:13-CV-4106-B, 2015 WL 3890467, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June\n\n18, 2015) (\u201cWhile a pattern of similar violations is required, the Fifth Circuit has held that the\n\nspecificity required \u2018should not be exaggerated.\u2019\u201d) (emphasis in original) (quoting Estate of Davis\n\nex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir.2005)). Here, Plaintiff\u2014\n\nwho is without the benefits of discovery\u2014has alleged a total of eight (8) instances where Dallas\n\nPolice Officers either failed or refused to provide medical aid. See Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b\u204b 38\u201340. All of\n\nthese instances can\u2014at the very least\u2014be considered \u201cfairly similar\u201d to the facts and\n\ncircumstances of the present case. As such, dismissal on this ground is inappropriate.\n\n Second, Defendant\u2019s contention that Plaintiff does not meet \u201cthe Fifth Circuit\u2019s high bar\n\nfor numerosity\u201d is a complete red herring, because the Fifth Circuit has no \u201cbar for numerosity\u201d at\n\nall. See Dkt. No. 7 at \u204b 17. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has explicitly stated that, \u201cwe have no rigid\n\nrule regarding numerosity to prove a widespread pattern.\u201d See Jackson v. Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx.\n\n129, 135 (5th Cir. 2021). One of the cases that Defendant cites in support of its contention that the\n\nFifth Circuit has such a \u201chigh bar for numerosity\u201d even states that, \u201c[t]here is no bright line rule\n\nfor determining how many prior incidents are sufficient to establish a pattern.\u201d See Moreno, 2015\n\nWL 3890467, at *8. The remaining three cases Defendant cites to support its argument are\n\nirrelevant to determining whether Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 9\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 15 of 25 PageID 92\n\n\n\nmotion to dismiss, because none of those three cases involve a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See\n\nPeterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) (motion for summary judgment);\n\nPineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (motion for summary judgment); Fuentes\n\nv. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 689 Fed. Appx. 775 (5th Cir. 2017) (motion for summary judgment).\n\n Lastly, it is worth reiterating that no discovery has been conducted in this case, and \u201c[a]t\n\nthe motion to dismiss stage\u2026it is not appropriate to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim when\n\nevidence might be adduced showing that the City has constructively adopted such a policy or\n\ncustom as Plaintiff alleges.\u201d See Barr v. City of San Antonio, No. CIVASA-06-CA-0261-XR, 2006\n\nWL 2322861, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2006). Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendant\u2019s\n\nMotion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Section 1983 claim.\n\n 2. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Plausibly Alleges that the Policies in Question Were the\n Moving Force Behind the Violation of Plaintiff\u2019s Constitutional Rights\n\n To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiff need only allege that Defendant\u2019s\n\nhad the requisite degree of culpability and that there is a causal link between Defendant\u2019s actions\n\nand the deprivation of Plaintiff\u2019s rights. See Sanchez v. Gomez, 283 F. Supp. 3d 524, 539 (W.D.\n\nTex. 2017). A plaintiff plausibly alleges that a defendant acted with the requisite degree of\n\nculpability by alleging that Defendant\u2019s actions reflect deliberate indifference to the risk that a\n\nviolation of Plaintiff\u2019s rights may follow from such actions. See Id. To properly plead the existence\n\nof a \u201ccausal link\u201d, plaintiff \u201cneed only provide enough facts to allow the Court to make a plausible\n\ninference that the policy was the moving force behind the harm in this case.\u201d See Id.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint has plausibly pleaded that Defendant acted with deliberate\n\nindifference, especially at this stage in the proceedings where no discovery has taken place. See\n\nDoe v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:20-CV-00408-LY, 2020 WL 13833132, at *7 (W.D. Tex.\n\nDec. 22, 2020), R. & R. adopted, No. 1:20-CV-408-LY, 2021 WL 11670039 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8,\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 10\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 16 of 25 PageID 93\n\n\n\n2021) (stating that many of plaintiff\u2019s allegations did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference\n\nbut that \u201cothers \u2013 at this stage of the proceedings \u2013 allege something more than mere negligence\n\nor mere unreasonableness\u201d and that, \u201c[a]t this early stage of the proceedings, the culmination of\n\nthese allegations are sufficient enough to satisfy [p]laintiff\u2019s requirement of pleading deliberate\n\nindifference\u201d); Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b 27 (stating that when Defendants Robertson and Anderson chose to\n\ndrive away after the vehicle crashed, they were doing so in accordance with \u201cDPD policies to not\n\nrender aid despite seeing and causing what happened\u201d), \u204b 29 (stating that Defendant Robertson\n\nwas not fired, but was merely suspended, following the incident), \u204b 36 (stating that Defendants\n\ndisregarded several warnings, which \u201cled to the ill-fated high-speed chase and horrific vehicular\n\naccident\u201d), \u204b 37 (stating that several City officials were made aware of the failures associated with\n\nits policies (or lack thereof) concerning rendering emergency medical treatment and its failure to\n\ntrain officers in providing such treatment, but that suggestions to improve such policies were\n\n\u201cclearly ignored\u2026in deliberate indifference to the lives and safety of its citizens\u201d), \u204b 38 (stating\n\nthat the Dallas Police Department \u201cwas aware that its lack of policy and lack of training with\n\nrespect to providing emergency medical aid was inadequate\u201d), \u204b 57 (stating that Defendant was\n\n\u201con notice of the Constitutional defects in the training of Dallas police officers, including but not\n\nlimited to failure to adopt proper policies requiring that officers render medical aid to civilians,\n\nand inadequate training of officers in rendering emergency medical aid\u201d).\n\n The most notable showing of this deliberate indifference is Officer Anderson\u2019s statement\n\nto the trainee after seeing Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle engulfed in flames state \u201cThat\u2019s his fault.\u201d Dkt. No. 1\n\nat \u204b 27. This statement by an officer who is supposed to be training another officer on the proper\n\npolicies and procedures and as his supervisor shows the City\u2019s policies and the deliberate\n\nindifference to the life and rights of Plaintiff when they saw an accident that they caused and\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 11\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 17 of 25 PageID 94\n\n\n\ndeliberately chose to drive the opposite way. This egregious attitude and response arises well above\n\nthe standard needed to assert a \u00a7 1983 claim.\n\n Likewise, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint contains sufficient factual allegations from which the\n\nCourt may infer a causal link between Defendant\u2019s conduct and the deprivation of Plaintiff\u2019s rights.\n\nSee Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b 30 (stating that Plaintiff was trapped in a burning vehicle as a result of\n\nDefendants Robertson and Anderson\u2019s conduct), \u204b 41 (stating that Defendants Anderson and\n\nRobertson \u201cwere acting in accordance with\u201d Defendant\u2019s policies and procedures and that such\n\npolicies and procedures \u201cwere the driving force behind Defendants\u2019 violation of [Plaintiff]\u2019s\n\nclearly established constitutional rights\u201d), \u204b 44 (\u201c[t]he incident occurred as a result of\u2026the\n\nunlawful policies\u2026, the failures to have appropriate policies in place, the failure to train and\n\nsupervise the involved officer(s), and negligent hiring and retention of the involved officer(s)\u201d),\n\n\u204b 60 (stating that the Defendant officers\u2019 actions were undertaken in accordance to the policy and\n\npractice of Defendant), \u204b\u204b 60 \u2013 61 (describing the various policies and practices of Defendant and\n\nhow such policies and practices are the moving force behind constitutional violations).\n\n Because Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint contains sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that\n\nDefendant\u2019s policies were the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights,\n\nthis Court should deny Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s claim for municipal liability\n\nunder Section 1983.\n\n 3. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Sufficiently Alleges That His Constitutional Rights Were\n Violated\n\n Defendant alleges that Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint fails to \u201callege facts from which this Court\n\nmay plausibly infer that a constitutional violation occurred.\u201d See Dkt. No. 7 at 7. However, as\n\ndemonstrated below and as evidenced by simply reading Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint, Plaintiff has\n\nplausibly alleged that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 12\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 18 of 25 PageID 95\n\n\n\n i. Defendant\u2019s \u201cState-Created Danger\u201d Argument Fails\n\n Defendant alleges that, because the facts and allegations set forth in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint\n\n\u201cresemble\u201d a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory of liability, Plaintiff\u2019s claims should be dismissed. See\n\nDkt. No. 7 at 8. However, Defendant\u2019s argument is nothing more than a smoke screen and does\n\nnot support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n Plaintiff does not contend\u2014either in his Complaint or in this Response\u2014that he is\n\nproceeding under a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory to impose liability against Defendant. Contrary\n\nto Defendant\u2019s assertion, Plaintiff\u2019s claims do not even remotely \u201cresemble\u201d those brought under\n\nthat theory, because the \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory is \u201can exception to the general rule that the\n\ngovernment has no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect people from privately inflicted\n\nharms.\u201d Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 368\u201369 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 569, 217\n\nL. Ed. 2d 303 (2024) (emphasis added). Clearly, Plaintiff does not allege in his Petition that his\n\ninjuries were inflicted by some private, third-party. Instead, Plaintiff is claiming that Defendant\n\nCity of Dallas and certain Dallas Police Officers directly injured Plaintiff themselves.\n\n ii. Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts From Which the Court May Plausibly Infer\n His Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated\n\n The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches\n\nand seizures, including the right to be free from the use of excessive force by law enforcement.\n\nSee Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433\u201334 (5th Cir. 1996). To bring a claim under Section 1983 for\n\nexcessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a Plaintiff must show that he was seized.\n\nSee Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004). \u201cWhenever an officer restrains\n\nthe freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person.\u201d Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.\n\n1, 7 (1985).\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 13\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 19 of 25 PageID 96\n\n\n\n In the present case, Plaintiff was seized when the Defendants caused his vehicle to crash\n\nby initiating their high-speed pursuit. When Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle crashed, it was set ablaze, trapping\n\nPlaintiff inside and completely curtailing Plaintiff\u2019s ability and freedom to exit his vehicle and\n\nwalk away. Dkt. No. 1. Trapping Plaintiff inside a burning vehicle certainly constitutes a seizure\n\nfor Fourth Amendment purposes.\n\n In its Motion, Defendant says that in Brower v. County of Inyo, the United States Supreme\n\nCourt addressed a \u201cstrikingly similar situation.\u201d Dkt. No. 7 at 8. However, Defendant completely\n\nmisstates the holding in Brower, by stating that, \u201c[h]ere, like in Brower, Plaintiff was not \u2018stopped\u2019\n\nor \u2018seized.\u2019\u201d Dkt. No. 7 at 9. However, the Supreme Court in Brower held just the opposite: that\n\nthe plaintiff was seized. See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). In further support\n\nof its argument that Plaintiff was not seized, Defendant cites Scott v. Harris. Dkt. No. 7 at 10.\n\nHowever, in that case\u2014which was decided at the summary judgment stage\u2014there was no dispute\n\nthat a seizure had occurred. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (\u201c[petitioner] does not\n\ncontest that his decision to terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent\u2019s\n\nvehicle constituted a \u2018seizure\u2019\u201d). Thus, Defendant has not shown that the Complaint does not put\n\nforth a plausible claim to overcome the motion to dismiss.\n\n iii. Plaintiff Had a Fourteenth Amendment Right to Receive Emergency\n Medical Aid from Defendants\n\n Defendant\u2019s next argument is that Plaintiff had no right to receive, and Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson had no duty to provide, emergency medical aid, because Plaintiff was\n\nnever seized. Def.\u2019s Mot. to Dismiss at 13. As explained above, however, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint\n\nhas alleged enough facts for this Court to reasonably infer that Plaintiff was seized.\n\n Even if Plaintiff was not seized under the Fourth Amendment, the caselaw discussing the\n\nright to receive medical treatment does not explicitly provide that the right to such treatment is\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 14\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 20 of 25 PageID 97\n\n\n\nlimited to persons who have been subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Harper v.\n\nMcAndrews, 499 F. Supp. 3d 312, 328 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (\u201cAn actionable failure to render medical\n\naid requires (1) deliberate indifference; (2) which results in substantial harm.\u201d). No doubt under\n\nthese standards, Plaintiff can more than show a failure to render aid arising to the level of a\n\nconstitutional violation. Defendants knew that their reckless and baseless chase caused Plaintiff to\n\ncrash and be engulfed in the flames. They also knew that this crash and the ongoing flames posed\n\nmore than a substantial degree of risk of harm but actually were harming Plaintiff at the time. Yet,\n\nthese officers in accordance with the City of Dallas\u2019s policies and procedures deliberately chose\n\nto ignore the pain and suffering Plaintiff was experiencing and decide to look at Plaintiff, state that\n\nit was \u201chis fault\u201d by a trainer for the police department, and drive off without rendering any aid\n\nwhatsoever. The Chief of Police even admitted that the officers should have rendered aid. These\n\nfacts and allegations more than sufficiently state a constitutional violation.\n\nB. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint Properly States a Texas Tort Claims Act Against Defendant\n City of Dallas\n\n 1. Plaintiff\u2019s Injuries Were the Result of Defendants\u2019 Use of the Vehicle\n\n The Texas Tort Claims Act (\u201cTTCA\u201d) waives governmental immunity in certain\n\ncircumstances. For example, under the TTCA, local government entities, such as Defendant, may\n\nbe held liable in negligence for property damage, personal injury, and death arising from the\n\noperation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or equipment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE\n\n101.021. For a plaintiff\u2019s harm to arise from the \u201cuse\u201d of a vehicle, the \u201cgovernment employee\n\nmust have been actively operating the vehicle at the time of the incident,\u201d and \u201cthe vehicle must\n\nhave been used as a vehicle.\u201d Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cnty., 453 S.W.3d 922,\n\n927 (Tex. 2015). Additionally, plaintiff must allege \u201cnegligent or otherwise improper use of a\n\nmotor-driven vehicle.\u201d See Id. at 928. Lastly, to show that the harm \u201carises from\u201d such negligence,\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 15\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 21 of 25 PageID 98\n\n\n\nthere must be a \u201cnexus between the operation of use of the motor-driven vehicle or equipment and\n\na plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\u201d Id. (quoting Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex.\n\n2003)). The Texas Supreme Court has also described this standard as \u201csomething more than actual\n\ncause but less than proximate cause.\u201d See Id. at 929; Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co.,\n\n141 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. 2004) (\u201c\u2019[A]rise out of\u2019 means ... there is but[-]for causation, though\n\nnot necessarily direct or proximate causation.\u201d).\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint clearly alleges that the officers were driving the vehicle at the time\n\nof the incident and does not allege any facts which might suggest that the police vehicle was being\n\nused as anything other than a vehicle. See Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b\u204b 24\u201327. Additionally, Plaintiff has met\n\nthe \u201carises out of\u201d prong. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint contains several facts which would make it\n\nplausible to infer that there is a nexus between Defendants\u2019 negligent use of their police cruiser\n\nand Plaintiff\u2019s injuries. See Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b 27 (stating that Defendants \u201ccaus[ed] what happened\u201d),\n\n\u204b 30 (stating that, \u201c[a]s a result of\u201d Defendants conduct, Plaintiff was trapped in his burning\n\nvehicle), \u204b 42 (stating that the Defendant officers \u201ccause[d] the accident in question\u201d), \u204b 43 (stating\n\nthat Defendant officers \u201cdrove away from a horrific crash scene they helped cause\u201d), \u204b 64 (stating\n\nthat Defendant officers \u201cnegligently used\u2026Dallas Police Department patrol vehicles to engage in\n\na reckless pursuit of Plaintiff which proximately caused Plaintiff\u2019s injuries\u201d).\n\n None of the cases Defendant relies on in support of its argument are instructive, as all of\n\nthose cases were decided in response to a plea to the jurisdiction\u2014not a motion to dismiss under\n\nRule 12(b)(6). See Def.\u2019s Mot. to Dismiss at 21\u201323. \u201c[A] court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction\n\nis not required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so when\n\nnecessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.\u201d Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d\n\n547, 555 (Tex. 2000); See Rico v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., No. 3:10-CV-1643-L, 2011 WL\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 16\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 22 of 25 PageID 99\n\n\n\n1792854, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2011) (stating that in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule\n\n12(b)(6), \u201cthe court cannot look beyond the pleadings\u201d). Accordingly, this Court should deny\n\nDefendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s TTCA claim.\n\n 2. The Texas Tort Claims Act Emergency Exception Is Not Applicable\n\n Defendant contends that Plaintiff\u2019s claim falls within the TTCA\u2019s \u201cemergency exception.\u201d\n\nSee Dkt. No. 7 at 24; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE \u00a7 101.055(2). To show that the emergency\n\nexception does not apply, a plaintiff must plead facts from which the Court may reasonably infer\n\nthat (1) the officers were not responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency\n\nsituation, or (2) the response or reaction was not in compliance with the laws and ordinances\n\napplicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such law or ordinance, the action was taken\n\nwith conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &\n\nREM. CODE \u00a7 101.055(2); City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 529 (Tex. 2022).\n\n Here, there was no emergency call that Officers Anderson and Robertson were responding\n\nto at the time of the accident; instead, their pursuit was initiated based on their own observations\n\nof Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle. See Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b\u204b 1\u20132. Likewise, in initiating their pursuit, Officers\n\nAnderson and Robertson were reacting to a minor traffic violation for a broken headlight, which\n\ncan hardly be said to constitute an \u201cemergency situation.\u201d Id. The fact that Defendants Anderson\n\nand Robertson had already turned off their police lights and sirens before the accident occurred\n\nfurther demonstrates that they were not responding to an emergency at the time of the accident in\n\nquestion. See Id. at \u204b 3. Accordingly, the emergency exception does not apply.\n\n Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendants were responding to an emergency, their\n\nresponse was not in compliance with the laws and ordnances applicable to emergencies\u2014namely,\n\nSection 546.001 of the Texas Transportation Code. Under that section, police operating authorized\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 17\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 23 of 25 PageID 100\n\n\n\nemergency vehicles may, among other things, exceed the speed limit. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7\n\n546.001. However, the ability to exceed the speed limit is limited to situations in which exceeding\n\nthe speed limit will \u201cnot endanger life or property.\u201d See Id. Further, a person operating an\n\nemergency vehicle must use \u201caudible or visual signals,\u201d such as police lights and sirens. See TEX.\n\nTRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.003. Additionally, the Texas Transportation Code is clear that drivers of\n\nauthorized emergency vehicles are not relieved of their \u201cduty to operate the vehicle with\n\nappropriate regard for the safety of all persons,\u201d or from \u201cthe consequences of reckless disregard\n\nfor the safety of others.\u201d See TEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.005.\n\n It is clear that Defendants\u2019 conduct did in fact endanger both life and property, considering\n\nboth Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle and his person caught on fire as a result of Defendants\u2019 actions. See Jackson\n\nv. City of Houston, No. 4:23-CV-00052, 2023 WL 7093031, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2023)\n\n(denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on the emergency exception, because \u201c[t]here are\n\ntoo many factual uncertainties for the Court to determine, at this stage, that [defendant officer] did\n\nnot endanger life or property\u201d). Additionally, at the time of the accident, Defendants Robertson\n\nand Anderson were no longer using their lights and sirens. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.003.\n\n Even assuming further that Defendants Robertson and Anderson did not violate the Texas\n\nTransportation Code provisions applicable to emergency situations, or assuming that those\n\nprovisions do not apply, Plaintiff\u2019s TTCA claim still should not be dismissed because Defendants\n\nAnderson and Robertson acted with \u201c[C]onscious indifference or reckless disregard.\u201d TEX.\n\nTRANSP. CODE \u00a7 546.005.\n\n Because Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint pleads sufficient facts to plausibly allege that the emergency\n\nexception contained within the TTCA does not apply, Defendant\u2019s Motion should be denied with\n\nrespect to Plaintiff\u2019s TTCA claim. An operator of a motor vehicle acts recklessly if he commits an\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 18\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 24 of 25 PageID 101\n\n\n\nact that he either knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury. See\n\nCity of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1998). Here, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint contains\n\nsufficient factual matter from which this Court may reasonably infer Defendants Anderson and\n\nRobertson acted recklessly. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Anderson and Robertson had\n\n\u201cample time to contemplate their actions and understand the danger this high-speed chase posed\n\nto [Plaintiff] and others.\u201d Dkt. No. 1 at \u204b 3. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Anderson\n\nand Robertson refused to pull over and help Plaintiff even after causing and witnessing the fiery\n\ncrash, and instead merely quipped, \u201cThat\u2019s his fault,\u201d and drove away. Id. \u204b\u204b 4\u20135. Additionally,\n\nthe fact that Dallas Police Department has a policy against initiating a high-speed pursuit in cases\n\nnot involving a felony suggests that Defendants Anderson and Robertson were aware that such a\n\nhigh speed pursuit posed safety risks. See Pl.\u2019s Compl. \u204b 25.\n\n Accordingly, because Plaintiff had plead sufficient facts from which this Court can infer\n\nthat the emergency exception to the TTCA does not apply, this Court should deny Defendant\u2019s\n\nMotion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s TTCA claims.\n\n V. CONCLUSION\n\n As demonstrated above, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint is more than sufficient to survive dismissal\n\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendant\u2019s\n\nMotion to Dismiss in its entirety.\n\n Alternatively, should this Court determine that Defendant is entitled to dismissal on any of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court allow Plaintiff the opportunity to\n\namend its Complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (\u201cThe court should freely give leave [to amend\n\na pleading] when justice so requires.\u201d).\n\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 19\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 11 Filed 05/21/24 Page 25 of 25 PageID 102\n\n\n\n Respectfully submitted,\n\n BEN CRUMP LAW, PLLC\n\n /s/ Paul A. Grinke\n Paul A. Grinke\n State Bar No. 24032255\n paul@bencrump.com\n Aaron Dekle\n State Bar No. 24100961\n aaron@bencrump.com\n 5 Cowboys Way, Suite 300\n Frisco, Texas 75034\n (972) 942-0494 Telephone\n\n\n MCCATHERN, PLLC\n\n Carl L. Evans, Jr.\n State Bar No. 24056989\n cevans@mccathernlaw.com\n Alizabeth A. Guillot\n State Bar No. 24138578\n aguillot@mccathernlaw.com\n Stephen Bergren\n State Bar No. 24134428\n sbergren@mccathernlaw.com\n 3710 Rawlins Street, Suite 1600\n Dallas, Texas 75219\n (214) 741-2662 Telephone\n\n COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that on May 21, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing\nwas filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send\nnotice of this filing to all counsel of record.\n\n\n /s/ Paul A. Grinke\n Paul A. Grinke\n\n\n\nPLAINTIFF\u2019S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS 20\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-11-15T12:29:59.877147-08:00","document_number":"11","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016858323","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Response/Objection","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.620419-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.015421-07:00","date_filed":"2024-05-21","time_filed":null,"entry_number":11,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-05-21.001","pacer_sequence_number":36,"description":"RESPONSE filed by Tomyia Crenshaw re: [7] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Grinke, Paul)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392398026/","id":392398026,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/401426497/","id":401426497,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/9/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.499131-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.164093-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"9","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016814180","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.451274-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.144347-07:00","date_filed":"2024-05-03","time_filed":null,"entry_number":9,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-05-03.001","pacer_sequence_number":30,"description":"Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer filed by Leonard Anderson, Darrien Robertson with Brief/Memorandum in Support. Attorney John Cheves Ligon added to party Leonard Anderson (pty:dft), Attorney John Cheves Ligon added to party Darrien Robertson(pty:dft) (Ligon, John)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392398025/","id":392398025,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/401426496/","id":401426496,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/7/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.366813-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.277346-07:00","sha1":"2c6eab417f56cfbaf3c3108c4f2c6654b2e0131a","page_count":34,"file_size":405237,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.7.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.7.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 1 of 34 PageID 38\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\nTOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\nv. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\nLEONARD ANDERSON, et al. \u00a7\n \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n DEFENDANT CITY OF DALLAS\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S COMPLAINT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT\n\n\n CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n TAMMY L. PALOMINO\n City Attorney\n\n /s/ J. Cheves Ligon .\n\n\n\n\n J. Cheves Ligon\n Senior Assistant City Attorney\n Texas State Bar No. 24070147\n John.Ligon@Dallas.gov\n 7DN Dallas City Hall\n 1500 Marilla Street\n Dallas, Texas 75201\n Telephone: 214-670-1236\n Facsimile: 214-670-0622\n Attorneys for Defendant City of Dallas\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 2 of 34 PageID 39\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nI. SUMMARY OF MOTION ..................................................................................................1\n\nII. BRIEF FACTUAL SUMMARY .........................................................................................2\n\nIII. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 12(b)6 DISMISSAL....................................4\n\nIV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................5\n\na. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not state any section 1983 claims against the City ......................5\n\ni. The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may plausibly\n infer that a constitutional violation occurred. ......................................................................7\n\n1. Plaintiff essentially alleges a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory of\n liability, which the Fifth Circuit does not recognize............................................................7\n\n2. Plaintiff was never \u201cseized\u201d under the Fourth Amendment,\n whether reasonably or not. ...................................................................................................8\n\n3. The Officers had no Fourteenth Amendment constitutional duty to\n stop and render aid. ............................................................................................................13\n\nii. The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may plausibly\n infer that the City maintained any unconstitutional policies. ............................................14\n\niii. The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may plausibly\n infer any City policies were the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind Plaintiff\u2019s injuries. ....................18\n\nb. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not state any Texas Torts Claims Act claims against\n the City ...............................................................................................................................20\n\ni. Under Texas law, Plaintiff\u2019s injuries were not the result of the Officers\u2019 \u201cuse\u201d\n of a vehicle as defined by the Texas Torts Claims Act......................................................21\n\nii. The Complaint does not negate the Texas Torts Claims Act\u2019s \u201cemergency\n exception.\u201d .........................................................................................................................24\n\nIV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................26\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................27\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 3 of 34 PageID 40\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCASES\n\nAlpha v. Hooper,\n 440 F. 3d 670 (5th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................. 14\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................................. 4, 5\n\nBarrios-Barrios v. Clipps,\n 825 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. La. 2011) ..................................................................................... 18\n\nBaskin v. City of Houston, Mississippi,\n 378 F. App\u2019x 417 (5th Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................... 11\n\nBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................. 4, 5\n\nBrower v. Cnty. of Inyo,\n 489 U.S. 593 (1989) .................................................................................................................. 9\n\nBrown v. Tarrant County,\n 985 F.3d 489, 497 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................................................................ 7\n\nBustos v. Martini Club Inc.,\n 599 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................... 8\n\nCalifornia v. Hodari D.\n 499 U.S. 621 (1991) ............................................................................................................ 9, 13\n\nCarney v. New Orleans City,\n 468 F. Supp. 3d 751 (E.D. La. 2020) ...................................................................................... 12\n\nCity of Austin v. Powell,\n 684 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App. 2022) .......................................................................................... 25\n\nCity of Dallas v. Hillis,\n 308 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App. 2010). ......................................................................................... 22\n\nCity of Los Angeles v. Heller,\n 475 U.S. 796 (1986) ................................................................................................................ 14\n\nCity of San Antonio v. Maspero,\n 640 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2022).................................................................................................. 25\n\n\n\n\n iii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 4 of 34 PageID 41\n\n\n\nCity of Sugarland v. Ballard,\n 174 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. App. 2005) .......................................................................................... 23\n\nCnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,\n 523 U.S. 833 (1998) .......................................................................................................... 10, 12\n\nConley v. Gibson,\n 355 U.S. 41 (1957) .................................................................................................................... 5\n\nConnick v. Thompson,\n 563 U.S. 51 (2011) ............................................................................................................ 16, 18\n\nDallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley,\n 104 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2003).................................................................................................. 20\n\nDarden v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.,\n 808 Fed. App\u2019x. 246 (5th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................... 19\n\nDavidson v. City of Stafford,\n 848 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................. 15\n\nDeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs.,\n 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ................................................................................................................ 13\n\nDoe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys,\n 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................... 8\n\nFernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass\u2019n,\n 987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................... 4\n\nFisher v. Moore,\n 73 F.4th 367 (5th Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................................... 9\n\nFuentes v. Nueces County,\n 689 F. App\u2019x 775 (5th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................... 17\n\nGorman v. Sharp,\n 892 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 10\n\nGroden v. City of Dallas,\n 826 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................... 6\n\nHarvey v. Montgomery Cty., Tex.,\n 881 F. Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Tex. 2012) .................................................................................... 18\n\nHutcheson v. Dallas County,\n 994 F.3d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 2021 .................................................................................... 6, 7, 15\n\n\n\n\n iv\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 5 of 34 PageID 42\n\n\n\nIn re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,\n 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................... 4\n\nJackson v. Procunier,\n 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................................... 4\n\nJames v. Harris County,\n 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................ 7\n\nKaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,\n 677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................. 4\n\nLittell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.,\n 894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................. 6, 19\n\nLoftin v. City of Prentiss, Miss.,\n 33 F.4th 774 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................... 14\n\nLopez v. Escobar,\n 2013 WL 4679062 (Tex. App. 2013)...................................................................................... 22\n\nMartin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit,\n 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 4\n\nMason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov\u2019t,\n 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 13\n\nMonacelli v. City of Dallas,\n 2023 WL 6563410 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2023)............................................................. 15, 18, 19\n\nMonell v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs.,\n 436 U.S. 658 (1978) .................................................................................................................. 6\n\nMoreno v. City of Dall.,\n 2015 WL 3890467 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) ....................................................................... 17\n\nMorrow v. Meachum,\n 917 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................. 10\n\nPapasan v. Allain,\n 478 U.S. 265 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 4\n\nPe\u00f1a v. City of Rio Grande,\n 879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................... 6, 7, 15, 17\n\nPeterson v. City of Fort Worth,\n 588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................ 15, 17\n\n\n\n\n v\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 6 of 34 PageID 43\n\n\n\nPinedo v. City of Dallas,\n 2015 WL 5021393 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) ......................................................................... 7\n\nRatliff v. Aransas Cty.,\n 948 F.3d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,\n 141 S. Ct. 376 L. Ed. 2d 97 (2020) ......................................................................................... 19\n\nRoss v. City of Dallas,\n 2022 WL 992593 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2022) ......................................................................... 17\n\nRoss v. City of Dallas,\n 2023 WL 8436060 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2023) ......................................................................... 16\n\nRyder Integrated Logistics v. Fayette Cnty.,\n 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex.2015).............................................................................................. 20, 23\n\nSanchez v. Young County,\n 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................... 6\n\nScott v. Harris,\n 550 U.S. 372 (2007) ................................................................................................................ 11\n\nSee City of San Antonio v. Hartman,\n 201 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. 2006).................................................................................................. 25\n\nSelf v. City of Mansfield, Tex.,\n 369 F. Supp. 3d 684 (N.D. Tex. 2019) ................................................................................... 17\n\nSnyder v. Trepagnier,\n 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................. 15\n\nSpiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep\u2019t,\n 130 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 7\n\nSt. Louis v. Praprotnik,\n 485 U.S. 112 (1988) ................................................................................................................ 15\n\nTarrant Cnty. v. Bonner,\n 574 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 2019)................................................................................................... 25\n\nTeague v. City of Dallas,\n 344 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App 2011) ........................................................................................... 21\n\nTex. Dep\u2019t of Crim. Justice v. Miller,\n 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.2001)...................................................................................................... 20\n\nTex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm\u2019n v. White,\n 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex.2001)...................................................................................................... 20\n\n\n\n vi\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 7 of 34 PageID 44\n\n\n\nTorres v. Madrid,\n 592 U.S. 306 (2021) ................................................................................................................ 13\n\nTownsend v. City of Alvin,\n 2006 WL 2345922 (Tex. App. 2006)...................................................................................... 23\n\nTravis v. City of Mesquite,\n 830 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex.1992)................................................................................................ 24\n\nUnited States v. Morris,\n 40 F.4th 323 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................... 13\n\nValle v. City of Houston,\n 613 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 18\n\nWatson v. Bryant,\n 532 F. App\u2019x 453 (5th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................... 10\n\nWilliams v. City of Baytown,\n 467 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. App. 2015). ................................................................................... 21, 22\n\nWorld Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v. Twn. of Columbia,\n 591 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................. 15\n\nZarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,\n 614 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................... 7\n\nSTATUTES\n\nTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code \u00a7 101.055(2) .................................................................................. 24\n\nTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 101.021(1)(A) .................................................................... 20\n\nTex. Transp. Code \u00a7 545.401(a) ................................................................................................... 25\n\nTex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 547.004(a)(2) ...................................................................................... 12\n\nTex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 547.302(a) .......................................................................................... 12\n\nRULES\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).................................................................................................................. 4\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 5\n\n\n\n\n vii\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 8 of 34 PageID 45\n\n\n\nTO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:\n\n Defendant City of Dallas (\u201cCity\u201d), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil\n\nProcedure, files this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (\u201cMotion\u201d). Specifically, the City\n\nmoves to dismiss all claims alleged against it in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint (ECF No. 1) (the\n\n\u201cComplaint\u201d), and respectfully shows the Court as follows:\n\n I. SUMMARY OF MOTION\n\n Plaintiff Tomyia Crenshaw (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) maintains in the Complaint that two Dallas Police\n\nDepartment (\u201cDPD\u201d) officers instigated a car chase with an innocent, frightened citizen who\n\nsubsequently\u2014and consequently\u2014lost control of his car and suffered severe injuries. Plaintiff\n\nclaims the officers then callously ignored him and drove past his burning vehicle, flippantly\n\nascribing Plaintiff\u2019s straits to his own bad decisions.\n\n In the Complaint, no City employee is cognizably alleged to have arrested, detained, or\n\neven physically touched Plaintiff, so the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Because Plaintiff\n\nwas never detained, arrested, or \u201cseized\u201d according to U.S. Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit\n\nauthority, the officers owed no constitutional duty to Plaintiff to render aid. The Complaint\u2019s\n\nhandful of dissimilar citizen complaints completely fails to establish any sort of pattern of\n\nunconstitutional acts that plausibly alleges municipal liability under even the most expansive\n\nunderstanding of Monell. And, according to the broad consensus of multiple Texas appellate\n\ncourts\u2019 interpretations of Texas law, no City vehicle was the actual cause of Plaintiff\u2019s accident\n\nand, therefore, there was no waiver of the City\u2019s immunity to state law claims.\n\n Therefore, even assuming Plaintiff received injuries in the manner he claims, the\n\nComplaint does not state a legal claim that the City was plausibly responsible. Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nComplaint must be dismissed.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 9 of 34 PageID 46\n\n\n\n II. BRIEF FACTUAL SUMMARY\n\n Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 27, 2024. Compl. Plaintiff claims that on May 13,\n\n2020, or alternatively, May 13, 2022, he was involved in a single-car automobile accident. Compl.\n\n\u204b\u204b 1; 24. 1 Plaintiff claims co-Defendant Senior Corporal Leonard Anderson (\u201cAnderson\u201d) and co-\n\nDefendant Police Officer Trainee Darrien Robertson (\u201cRobertson,\u201d collectively \u201cthe Officers\u201d)\n\nwitnessed Plaintiff\u2019s car \u201cleave a gas station and turn down Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd. without\n\nheadlights on\u201d at around 2:20 a.m. Id. \u204b 24. Plaintiff claims that while he allegedly \u201chad not\n\ncommitted any crimes and did not meet the requirements for engaging in a high-speed pursuit, a\n\nhigh-speed chase ensued.\u201d Id. \u204b 25. This pursuit, Plaintiff states, was \u201cin direct violation of DPD\n\npolicy . . .\u201d Id.\n\n At the pursuit\u2019s inception, the Officers activated their lights and sirens, but towards the end\n\nof the pursuit the Officers allegedly deactivated them. Id. After the lights were deactivated,\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s vehicle \u201cjumped a curb\u201d and \u201ccrashed at a high rate of speed.\u201d Id. \u204b 26. The Officers\n\npurportedly saw the incident but did not stop, and Anderson stated: \u201cThat\u2019s his fault.\u201d Id. \u204b 27.\n\nGood Samaritans pulled Plaintiff from the car \u201cas flames began to consume the vehicle.\u201d Id. \u204b\u204b\n\n28; 30. Plaintiff claims to have endured significant injuries, including burns, because of the crash.\n\nId. \u204b\n\n Plaintiff alleges that DPD Chief Eddie Garcia \u201csaid he is appalled and embarrassed by the\n\nincident.\u201d Id. \u204b 34. Plaintiff further alleges that the Officers \u201cviolated numerous policies and\n\nprocedures by improperly engaging in a high-speed vehicle chase and failing to stop and render\n\naid.\u201d Id. \u204b 35. He alleges that DPD, for its part,\n\n violated established training protocols; failed to conduct appropriate performance\n review procedures; failed to implement appropriate recruitment, hiring, and\n candidate selection methods; failed to implement appropriate retention efforts; and\n1\n The accident appears to have occurred in 2022.\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 10 of 34 PageID 47\n\n\n\n failed to train, implement policies, and/or create an atmosphere that prohibited the\n very destructive, biased, and reckless conduct of Officers Anderson and Robertson.\n\nId.\n Plaintiff also claims that \u201cDPD has failed to enact proper policies and procedures\n\nconcerning rendering emergency medical treatment and has failed to properly train its officers with\n\nrespect to providing emergency medical treatment. DPD has been made aware of its failures\n\nseveral times.\u201d Id. \u204b 37. He claims that in 2020, \u201ca group\u201d presented a document that \u201cmade several\n\nsuggestions for improvement\u201d to \u201cseveral city officials, including then Police Chief U. Renee Hall,\n\nDallas County Judge Clay Jenkins, and [the] Dallas City Manager,\u201d concerning duty-to-intervene\n\npolicies and the duty to render aid. Id. \u204b 37. DPD is alleged to have been \u201caware that its lack of a\n\npolicy and lack of training with respect to providing emergency medical aid was inadequate, as\n\nthere have been several reports of DPD officers either failing or refusing\u201d to render aid \u201cto those\n\nin need.\u201d Id. \u204b 38. The Complaint alleges the following events as evidence of same:\n\n \u2022 June 2020: a woman reported to a City board that several DPD officers sped past\n her on the freeway, nearly tearing the front bumper of her vehicle off and failing to\n stop to render aid;\n \u2022 July 2020: following \u201can interaction with a DPD Officer,\u201d a woman alleged that\n she was injured and the officer \u201chad no concern for her health . . .\u201d; and\n \u2022 July 2020: an officer detained a man \u201cin a car with no air for over thirty minutes,\n causing him to have an asthma attack,\u201d but \u201c[i]nstead of providing first aid to the\n man, the officers completely ignored him.\u201d\nId.\n\n The Complaint also cites the 2018 arrest of Diamond Ross, who is alleged to have been\n\nplaced in a holding cell unconscious and subsequently died. Id. \u204b 39. The Complaint alleges an\n\nevent to have occurred after the incident at issue in this litigation. Id. \u204b 40.\n\n Plaintiff lodges six \u201ccounts\u201d against Defendants:\n\n (1) Excessive Force \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (against the Officers);\n (2) Failure to Render Aid \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (against all Defendants);\n (3) Municipal Liability \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (against the City);\n (4) Texas Torts Claims Act (against the City);\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 11 of 34 PageID 48\n\n\n\n (5) Respondeat Superior (against the City); and\n (6) Exemplary Damages.\n\nId. \u204b\u204b 45-62.\n\n This Motion seeks dismissal of all causes of action against the City.\n\n III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 12(b)6 DISMISSAL\n\n Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a claim if the complaint fails to state a claim upon\n\nwhich relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\n\ntests the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint and must be evaluated solely based\n\non the pleadings. Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1986). The allegations\n\ncontained in the complaint are to be construed in the plaintiff\u2019s favor and all well-pleaded facts are\n\nto be accepted as true. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)\n\n(quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.\n\n2004)). However, conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are\n\nnot to be accorded a presumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)\n\n(recognizing that \u201cthe tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a\n\ncomplaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions\u201d); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555\n\n(2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (emphasizing that on a motion to\n\ndismiss, courts \u201care not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual\n\nallegation\u201d)); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050\n\n(5th Cir. 1982) (\u201cAlthough we must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint . . .\n\nwe do not accept as true conclusory allegations in the complaint\u201d); see also Fernandez-Montes v.\n\nAllied Pilots Ass\u2019n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993) (legal conclusions masquerading as factual\n\nassertions are insufficient to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim). While the complaint\n\nneed not contain \u201cdetailed factual allegations,\u201d the plaintiff must plead \u201cmore than labels and\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 12 of 34 PageID 49\n\n\n\nconclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\u201d Twombly,\n\n550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, and critically, \u201c[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of\n\naction, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\u201d Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing\n\nTwombly, 550 U.S. at 555).\n\n Furthermore, the alleged facts must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative\n\nlevel. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). Thus, to\n\nsurvive a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12, a complaint must contain sufficient factual\n\nmatter, accepted as true, to \u201cstate a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.\u201d Id. . at 570. \u201cA\n\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw\n\nthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n\nat 678 (citation omitted). \u201cThe plausibility standard is not akin to a \u2018probability requirement,\u2019 but\n\nit asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\u201d Id. (citation\n\nomitted). If a complaint pleads facts that are \u201cmerely consistent with\u201d a defendant\u2019s liability, it\n\nstops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id.. (internal\n\nquotation marks and citation omitted). \u201c[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to\n\ninfer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged\u2014but it has not\n\n\u2018show[n]\u2019\u2014\u2018that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u2019\u201d Id. at 679 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)\n\n(requiring \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief[]\u201d)).\n\n IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES\n\n a. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not state any section 1983 claims against the City.\n\n Plaintiff seeks to hold the City liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which makes liable \u201c[e]very\n\nperson\u201d who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional rights. For this purpose,\n\nmunicipal entities like the City qualify as \u201cpersons.\u201d Monell v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,\n\n690 (1978). But the City \u201ccannot be held liable under \u00a7 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.\u201d Id.\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 13 of 34 PageID 50\n\n\n\nIsolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger municipal\n\nliability. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).\n\nRather, to hold the City liable under \u00a7 1983, a plaintiff must establish that an \u201cofficial policy\u201d of\n\nthe City itself\u2014and not the policy of an individual city official\u2014was the \u201cmoving force\u201d and actual\n\ncause of the loss of constitutional rights and any resultant harm. Id.\n\n Thus, to state a \u00a7 1983 claim against the City, the Complaint must allege sufficient facts to\n\npermit the reasonable inference 1) that a constitutional violation occurred, and 2) an \u201cofficial\n\npolicy\u201d attributable to the City\u2019s policymakers that 3) \u201cwas the moving force\u201d behind it. Littell v.\n\nHous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622\u201323 (5th Cir. 2018); see Pe\u00f1a v. City of Rio Grande,\n\n879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018); Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 283\u201385 (5th Cir. 2016).\n\n At the pleading stage, a plaintiff alleging a Monell claim \u201chas two burdens: to [plausibly\n\nallege] (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that a municipal policy was the moving\n\nforce behind the violation.\u201d Sanchez v. Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing\n\nMonell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Hutcheson v. Dallas County, 994 F.3d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 2021)\n\n(rejecting the argument that a district court errs by dismissing a Monell claim without first\n\nanalyzing the underlying constitutional violation).\n\n As to alleging an official policy, \u201c[t]o proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint\u2019s\n\n\u2018description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation\n\n. . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.\u2019\u201d Pe\u00f1a, 879 F.3d at 622 (quoting Spiller\n\nv. City of Tex. City, Police Dep\u2019t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted). And, \u201c\u2018[t]o\n\nestablish a custom, a plaintiff must demonstrate (and, at the pleading stage, must plausibly plead)\n\n\u2018a pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case.\u2019\u201d Pinedo v. City of Dallas, No.\n\n3:14-cv-958-D, 2015 WL 5021393, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 14 of 34 PageID 51\n\n\n\nat 582); see also James v. Harris County, 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (\u201cOfficial policy can\n\narise in various forms. It usually exists in the form of written policy statements, ordinances, or\n\nregulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice that is \u2018so common and well-\n\nsettled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.\u2019\u201d) (citation omitted).\n\n As this Court has noted, whether claims are framed as failures to train, supervise, or\n\ndiscipline, they are all analyzed the same. Jean v. City of Dallas, Texas, No. 3:18-CV-2862-M,\n\n2019 WL 7195308, at *5 n.6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted,\n\n2019 WL 7187104 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2019) (\u201cAlthough Plaintiffs separately assert claims for\n\nfailure to train and failure to supervise or discipline, the elements required to prove a claim under\n\neither theory are the same.\u201d). Regardless, all of Plaintiff\u2019s theories fail for lack of a constitutional\n\nviolation, an unconstitutional policy, and causation.\n\n i. The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may\n plausibly infer that a constitutional violation occurred.\n\n Without a constitutional violation, a plaintiff may not maintain a \u00a7 1983 claim against any\n\nperson or governmental entity. See Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464-66 (5th Cir.\n\n2010) (dismissing a complaint for failure to plead off-duty officers\u2019 alleged excessive force \u201cwas\n\na misuse of their power as state officers\u201d). While the Complaint arguably alleges facts that\n\ndemonstrate moral failings on the Officers\u2019 part, the allegations do not qualify as constitutional\n\nviolations.\n\n 1. Plaintiff essentially alleges a \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theory of\n liability, which the Fifth Circuit does not recognize.\n\n Plaintiff does not allege that the Officers physically struck, detained, or arrested him.\n\nRather, the gravamen of Plaintiff\u2019s allegations is that (1) the Officers\u2019 improper high-speed pursuit\n\ncreated a dangerous situation that resulted in the car crash; and then (2) the Officers failed to render\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 15 of 34 PageID 52\n\n\n\naid. See Compl. \u204b\u204b 3 (\u201cThis chase lasted for several minutes, giving [the Officers] ample time to\n\ncontemplate their actions and understand the danger this high speed chase posed to [Plaintiff] and\n\nothers.\u201d); 4 (\u201cThe officers made no attempt to stop and render aid.\u201d)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s crash-related allegations most resemble \u201cstate-created danger\u201d theories of\n\nliability. \u201cUnder the state-created danger theory, a state actor may be liable under \u00a7 1983 if the\n\nstate actor created or knew of a dangerous situation and affirmatively placed the plaintiff in that\n\nsituation.\u201d Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 864 (5th\n\nCir. 2012) (citation omitted).\n\n However, \u201cthe Fifth Circuit has never recognized the \u2018state-created-danger\u2019 exception. In\n\n[its] published, and thus binding, caselaw, [it has] repeatedly declined to recognize the state-\n\ncreated danger doctrine.\u201d Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.\n\nCt. 569 (2024) (cleaned up). Thus, at the outset, the Fifth Circuit does not recognize a constitutional\n\nright to be free from \u201cthe danger this high speed chase posed to [Plaintiff] and others.\u201d Compl. \u204b\n\n3. As a result, Plaintiff\u2019s section 1983 claims must be dismissed.\n\n 2. Plaintiff was never \u201cseized\u201d under the Fourth Amendment.\n\n Plaintiff alleges the Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be\n\nfree from excessive force and unreasonable searches and seizures. Compl. \u204b\u204b 45-50. It appears that\n\nthe Complaint claims these violations stem from \u201cinitiating pursuit of Plaintiff despite Plaintiff\n\nhaving never been charged with a crime.\u201d Id. \u204b 48. However, nothing about Plaintiff\u2019s allegations\n\nplausibly states any sort of unconstitutional seizure.\n\n In a case involving the use of roadblocks, the Supreme Court addressed a strikingly similar\n\nsituation:\n\n It is clear, in other words, that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur\n whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual\u2019s freedom\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 16 of 34 PageID 53\n\n\n\n of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally\n caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual\u2019s freedom of\n movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination\n of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. That is the reason\n there was no seizure in the hypothetical situation that concerned the Court of\n Appeals. The pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of\n authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit; and though he was\n in fact stopped, he was stopped by a different means\u2014his loss of control of his\n vehicle and the subsequent crash. If, instead of that, the police cruiser had pulled\n alongside the fleeing car and sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the\n termination of the suspect\u2019s freedom of movement would have been a seizure.\n\nBrower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596\u201397 (1989) (emphasis in original).\n\n Here, like in Brower, Plaintiff was not \u201cstopped\u201d or \u201cseized\u201d by the Officers\u2019 pursuit, even\n\nwhen they activated their flashing \u201clights and sirens\u201d as a command to stop. The pursuit did not\n\ncurtail Plaintiff\u2019s freedom of movement; in fact, Plaintiff has not asserted that he stopped his\n\nvehicle or complied with the Officers\u2019 show of authority. Consequently, the chase itself does not\n\nconstitute a Fourth Amendment seizure under Brower, nor does the fact that Plaintiff eventually\n\nlost control of his vehicle and crashed. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)\n\n(applying Brower and noting that in that case \u201c[w]e did not even consider the possibility that a\n\nseizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because, as we explained, that \u2018show\n\nof authority did not produce his stop\u2019\u201d). The Supreme Court again examined Brower later and\n\nsummarized as follows: \u201cWe illustrated the point by saying that no Fourth Amendment seizure\n\nwould take place where a \u2018pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of\n\nauthority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit,\u2019 but accidentally stopped the\n\nsuspect by crashing into him.\u201d County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (quoting\n\nBrower, 489 U.S. at 597). Here, the Complaint does not allege that the Officers even \u201caccidentally\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 17 of 34 PageID 54\n\n\n\nstopped\u201d Plaintiff \u201cby crashing into him\u201d; only that they simply observed\u2014and allegedly\n\nignored\u2014Plaintiff\u2019s crash. 2\n\n Critically, nothing in the Complaint can plausibly be interpreted to indicate the Officers\n\nintended to cause harm to Plaintiff, much less the harm that allegedly befell him. Even assuming\n\narguendo that the Officers\u2019 attempts to stop Plaintiff were negligent, under Supreme Court and\n\nFifth Circuit precedent, simply attempting a seizure that accidentally or even negligently resulted\n\nin harm is not a Fourth Amendment violation. See Gorman v. Sharp, 892 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir.\n\n2018) (\u201cBrower and subsequent precedents foreclose liability under the Fourth Amendment in the\n\nabsence of intentional conduct.\u201d); Watson v. Bryant, 532 F. App\u2019x 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (\u201cThe\n\nSupreme Court [in Brower] held that Fourth Amendment violations occur only through intentional\n\nconduct . . . . In the absence of evidence showing that [the officer] intended to use deadly force,\n\nwe must conclude that the negligent shooting here did not itself violate [the suspect\u2019s] Fourth\n\nAmendment rights.\u201d) (citations omitted); Baskin v. City of Houston, Miss., 378 F. App\u2019x 417, 418\n\nn.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (\u201cTo the extent that a Fourth Amendment claim was raised, any attempt to\n\nallege excessive use of force in the course of a negligent seizure is foreclosed by the Supreme\n\nCourt\u2019s decision in Brower . . . .\u201d).\n\n Further, the decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), is instructive. The facts in\n\nScott involved a high-speed pursuit of a fleeing suspect by several police officers that spanned ten\n\nmiles at speeds exceeding eighty-five miles per hour. Id. at 375. Six minutes after the pursuit\n\nbegan, an officer maneuvered his car in such a way that caused the fleeing suspect to lose control\n\n\n2\n Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that the Officers ran Plaintiff off the road, sideswiped him, much less fired a deadly\nweapon. But even Plaintiff had made such an allegation, such an act would not have been a violation under the Fourth\nAmendment. In fact, Fifth Circuit case law has made clear that \u201cthe Supreme Court has never found the use of deadly\nforce in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a basis for denying\nqualified immunity. And it\u2019s why we previously refused to extend Garner to high-speed chases. We refuse again\ntoday.\u201d Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 878 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).\n\n\n 10\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 18 of 34 PageID 55\n\n\n\nof his car and ultimately crash down an embankment. Id. The man suffered injuries that resulted\n\nin quadriplegia. Id. The Court analyzed the facts against the backdrop of qualified immunity and\n\nconcluded at the first step of the analysis that the officer\u2019s actions did not violate the Constitution.\n\nId. at 377, 386. In reaching this conclusion, the Court described the scene as one involving\n\n\u201c[m]ultiple police cars with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring\u201d and a fleeing suspect who\n\nignored warnings to stop. Id. at 384. The Court further described the pursuit as one that posed\n\n\u201cextreme danger to human life\u201d and an \u201cactual and imminent threat\u201d to others, including the\n\nofficers involved in the pursuit. Id. at 383-84. Regarding the fleeing suspect, the Court\n\nacknowledged that the officer\u2019s actions posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to the\n\nsuspect. Id. at 384. The Court acknowledged, however, that it was the fleeing suspect who\n\nintentionally placed himself and others in danger by ignoring warnings to stop and engaging in a\n\nreckless, high-speed flight that ultimately forced the officer to act. Id. Given the facts of the case,\n\nthe Court determined that it was reasonable for the officer to take the steps that he took to end the\n\npursuit and ultimately held that an officer who takes action to terminate a dangerous high-speed\n\npursuit that threatens lives does not act unconstitutionally, even when the officer\u2019s actions place\n\nthe fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Id. at 386.\n\n Here, unlike Scott, the Officers are not alleged to have ever touched Plaintiff, much less\n\nrun him off the road. As such, nothing about Plaintiff\u2019s allegations plausibly state a Fourth\n\nAmendment claim. See also Carney v. New Orleans City, 468 F. Supp. 3d 751, 761\u201362 (E.D. La.\n\n2020) (dismissing a claim of high-speed pursuit, finding that \u201c[t]he reason why a suspect\u2019s\n\naccidental crash in a police pursuit does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is\n\nthat \u2018[t]he pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of authority represented\n\nby flashing lights and continuing pursuit; and though he was in fact stopped, he was stopped by a\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 19 of 34 PageID 56\n\n\n\ndifferent means\u2014his loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent crash\u2019\u201d) (quoting Brower,\n\n489 U.S. at 596-97)).\n\n Notably, Plaintiff alleges the genesis of the pursuit was a direct violation of unnamed DPD\n\npolicies when they pursued him even though \u201c[Plaintiff] had not committed any crimes.\u201d Compl.\n\n\u204b 25. This is ill-informed. The Complaint admits that at around 2:20 a.m., Plaintiff turned down a\n\npublic road (Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard) \u201cwithout headlights on.\u201d Id. The Texas\n\nTransportation Code requires that \u201c[a] vehicle shall display each lighted lamp and illuminating\n\ndevice required by this chapter to be on the vehicle: (1) at nighttime; and (2) when light is\n\ninsufficient or atmospheric conditions are unfavorable so that a person or vehicle on the highway\n\nis not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 feet ahead.\u201d Tex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 547.302(a).\n\nViolating this provision is a misdemeanor offense. Id. at \u00a7 547.004(a)(2). At the nighttime hour of\n\n2:20 a.m., Plaintiff failed to comply with this requirement by law to have his headlights on. Thus,\n\ncontrary to the Complaint, Plaintiff had committed a crime, and one in the Officers\u2019 plain view.\n\n Lastly, the Supreme Court long ago explicitly found that the Fourteenth Amendment\n\ncannot provide any plaintiff a cause of action for the circumstances at bar:\n\n The issue in this case is whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth\n Amendment\u2019s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through\n deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed\n at apprehending a suspected offender. We answer no, and hold that in such\n circumstances only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of\n arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience,\n necessary for a due process violation.\n\nLewis, 523 U.S. at 836.\n\n Nothing alleged in the Complaint remotely indicates the Officers intended to cause Plaintiff\n\nharm. Therefore, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims\n\nand they should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 20 of 34 PageID 57\n\n\n\n 3. The Officers had no Fourteenth Amendment constitutional duty\n to stop and render aid.\n\n In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that the \u201cDue Process Clauses generally confer no\n\naffirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty,\n\nor property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.\u201d DeShaney v.\n\nWinnebago Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (collecting cases). \u201cThe Due\n\nProcess Clause does, however, require the responsible government or governmental agency to\n\nprovide medical care to persons . . . who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.\u201d\n\nCity of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (emphasis added).\n\n Fatal to Plaintiff\u2019s failure to render aid claims: he was never apprehended. \u201cAn officer\u2019s\n\nvisual signal for a motorist to stop\u2014whether made by hand or lights and sirens\u2014is such a show\n\nof authority.\u201d United States v. Morris, 40 F.4th 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2022). As noted above, in similar\n\ncircumstances, the Supreme Court \u201cdid not even consider the possibility that a seizure could have\n\noccurred during the course of the chase because, as we explained, that \u2018show of authority did not\n\nproduce his stop.\u201d Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628. The end of Plaintiff\u2019s absconding from the Officers\n\nwas not a yielding to a show of authority, but instead, Plaintiff \u201cjumped a curb [along a public\n\nstreet] and crashed at a high rate of speed.\u201d Compl. \u204b 26. This was not a seizure.\n\n Further, the Supreme Court recently explored the edges of what constitutes a \u201cseizure\u201d in\n\na case involving the shooting of a suspect in Torres v. Madrid, and ultimately found that \u201cthe\n\napplication of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the\n\nperson does not submit and is not subdued.\u201d 592 U.S. 306, 325 (2021) (emphasis added). And,\n\neven if a suspect was \u201cseized\u201d but broke free, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does\n\nnot recognize any \u201c\u2018continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity.\u2019\u201d Id. at 318 (quoting Hodari\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 21 of 34 PageID 58\n\n\n\nD., 499 U.S. at 625). Nothing in the Complaint even indicates that the Officers physically touched\n\nPlaintiff, much less detained, arrested, or took him to jail.\n\n Plaintiff was not seized; he was successful in his attempt to evade seizure notwithstanding\n\npolice commands to stop. Therefore, however objectionable the Officers\u2019 alleged actions, they did\n\nnot have a constitutional duty to render Plaintiff aid.\n\n In sum, Plaintiff states no constitutional deprivation. Where there is a finding on the merits\n\nthat a plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated, there is no basis for liability on the part of\n\nthe municipality. Alpha v. Hooper, 440 F. 3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing City of Los Angeles\n\nv. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798-99 (1986)); see Loftin v. City of Prentiss, Miss., 33 F.4th 774, 783\n\n(5th Cir. 2022) (\u201cBut without a predicate constitutional violation, there can be no Monell\n\nliability.\u201d). Since there is no constitutional violation alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff\u2019s Monell\n\nclaims against the City must be dismissed.\n\n ii. The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may\n plausibly infer that the City maintained any unconstitutional policies.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint does not allege that the City had an unconstitutional written policy\n\nthat caused the Officers\u2019 alleged bad acts. Instead, the Complaint principally recites labels of\n\nMonell causes of action that sound in failure-to-train or failure-to-discipline theories of liability:\n\n The Dallas Police Department (DPD) violated established training\n protocols; failed to conduct appropriate performance review procedures; failed to\n implement appropriate recruitment, hiring, and candidate selection methods; failed\n to implement appropriate retention efforts; and failed to train, implement policies,\n and/or create an atmosphere that prohibited the very destructive, biased, and\n reckless conduct of Officers Anderson and Robertson.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 22 of 34 PageID 59\n\n\n\nCompl. \u204b 35; see also \u204b\u204b 60-61. 3\n\n \u201cA failure-to-train action is a type of Monell claim.\u201d Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482. Although\n\nPlaintiff appears to also assert separate claims for failure to discipline, \u201cthe elements required to\n\nprove a claim under either theory are the same.\u201d Jean, 2019 WL 7195308, at *5 n.6; see, e.g.,\n\nMonacelli v. City of Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-02649-L (BT), 2023 WL 6563410, at *9 n.1 (N.D. Tex.\n\nSept. 1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:21-CV-2649-L, 2023 WL 6370753\n\n(N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2023) (considering failure-to-train and failure-to-discipline claims together.)\n\n \u201cThe \u2018failure to train can amount to a policy if there is deliberate indifference to an obvious\n\nneed for training where citizens are likely to lose their constitutional rights on account of novices\n\nin law enforcement.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Peterson, 588 F.3d at 849). For a failure-to-train or a failure-\n\nto-discipline claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead \u201cthat (1)\n\nthe city failed to train or [discipline] the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection between\n\nthe alleged failure to [discipline] or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3)\n\nthe failure to train or [discipline] constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional\n\nrights.\u201d Id. (quoting Pe\u00f1a, 879 F.3d at 623). And \u201c[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations\n\nby untrained [or undisciplined] employees is \u2018ordinarily necessary\u2019 to demonstrate deliberate\n\nindifference for purposes of failure to train [or discipline].\u201d Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62\n\n\n\n\n3\n Plaintiff makes, in passing, an allegation that the City \u201cratified\u201d the Officers\u2019 action. Id. \u204b 60(b). However, the\nComplaint also notes that at least one top City official, the DPD Chief, publicly and forcefully disapproved of the\nOfficers\u2019 actions. Id. \u204b\u204b 29; 34. Even leaving aside that the DPD Chief is not a policymaker, this is not ratification.\nPeterson, 588 F.3d at 849 (holding that, \u201cif the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate\u2019s decision and the\nbasis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final\u201d (quoting St. Louis\nv. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (emphasis added)). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit \u201chas limited the theory of\nratification to \u2018extreme factual situations,\u2019\u201d id. (citing Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998)), such\nas officers\u2019 killing of the innocent occupant of a truck or their shooting of a fleeing suspect in the back, see id.; accord\nDavidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2017) (\u201cRatification . . . is limited to \u2018extreme factual\nsituations.\u2019\u201d) (quoting World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2009)\n[quoting Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848]). Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not meet the Fifth Circuit\u2019s \u201cratification\u201d requirements\nfor liability.\n\n\n 15\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 23 of 34 PageID 60\n\n\n\n(2011) (quoting Bryan Cty. Comm\u2019rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). Further, the Fifth\n\nCircuit has made clear that \u201c[t]o show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff normally must allege a\n\n\u2018pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.\u2019\u201d Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482\n\n(emphasis added) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint\n\nfails to plausibly alleges all three (3) elements of their Monell claims.\n\n Plaintiff does not allege facts remotely close to a \u201cpattern\u201d for Monell liability for a City\n\npolicy or for deliberate indifference.\n\n First, as noted above, the Complaint alleges \u201creports\u201d and \u201callegations\u201d (not proven\n\ninstances) of supposedly similar behavior in the summer of 2020. Compl. \u204b 38. None of these\n\ninstances are substantially similar to the circumstances here. Compare id. (placing a man \u201cin a car\n\nwith no air for over thirty minutes, causing him to have an asthma attack. Instead of providing first\n\naid to the man, the officers completely ignored him.\u201d), with \u204b\u204b 26-27 (alleging that Plaintiff\u2019s car\n\n\u201cimmediately burst into flames,\u201d and \u201cthe officers did not stop, continuing their way without\n\nchecking on the driver\u201d).\n\n Second, the Complaint cites the 2018 case of Diamond Ross, who is alleged to have been\n\nplaced in a holding cell while unconscious and subsequently died. Id. \u204b 39. This incident is\n\ninapposite and irrelevant for numerous reasons. Critically, Ms. Ross \u201cwas arrested in the early\n\nmorning hours of August 18, 2018. While in police custody, Ross was transported to the hospital\n\nand died the next day from the toxic effects of phencyclidine (PCP).\u201d Ross v. City of Dallas, No.\n\n3:20-CV-01690-E, 2023 WL 8436060, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2023) (emphasis added). Here,\n\nPlaintiff was never arrested or in police custody. Further, this Court ultimately granted summary\n\njudgment for Ms. Ross\u2019s arresting officers because plaintiffs in that case did \u201cnot me[e]t their\n\nheavy burden to show the officers\u2019 deliberate indifference\u201d and did not show \u201cthat any delay in\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 24 of 34 PageID 61\n\n\n\nmedical treatment resulted in substantial harm.\u201d Ross v. City of Dallas, No. 3:20-CV-1690-E, 2022\n\nWL 992593, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2022). A case where officers arrested an individual and\n\nwere later dismissed as defendants cannot provide notice to the City\u2019s policymaker that officers\n\nare allegedly not rendering adequate aid prior to arrest.\n\n Third, and fatally, such a small handful of events cannot meet the Fifth Circuit\u2019s high bar\n\nfor numerosity. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851 (noting that twenty-seven incidents of excessive\n\nforce over a period of four years did not \u201creflect a pattern that can be said to represent official\n\npolicy of condoning excessive force so as to hold the city liable for the acts of its employees\u2019\n\nunconstitutional conduct\u201d); Pineda, 291 F.3d at 329 (holding that eleven incidents of warrantless\n\nentry did not support a pattern of unconstitutional warrantless entry); Moreno v. City of Dallas,\n\nNo. 3:13-CV-4106-B, 2015 WL 3890467, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) (allegations of eight\n\nprior incidents in which police officers used excessive force were not sufficient to indicate a\n\npattern); see also Fuentes v. Nueces County, 689 F. App\u2019x 775, 778 (5th Cir. 2017) (\u201cAlthough\n\nthere is no rigid rule regarding numerosity, [the Fifth Circuit has found] that 27 prior incidents of\n\nexcessive force over a three-year period . . . and 11 incidents offering \u2018unequivocal evidence\u2019 of\n\nunconstitutional searches over a three-year period . . .were not sufficiently numerous to constitute\n\na pattern.\u201d). 4\n\n Courts routinely dismiss pleadings for such failures. See, e.g., Pe\u00f1a, 879 F.3d at 623\n\n(upholding dismissal of pleadings where plaintiff failed to identify pattern); Self v. City of\n\nMansfield, Tex., 369 F. Supp. 3d 684, 702-03 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint\n\nafter finding, among other things, no alleged \u201cpattern of repeated constitutional violations\u201d or\n\n\n4\n \u201c[T]he Fifth Circuit has been quite clear on the significant hurdle of proving a widespread unwritten policy or\ncustom. It is one thing for Plaintiffs to present a pattern that should move [the police chief]. It is quite another to find\na pattern that reflects the very nature and character of an entire police force.\u201d Sanchez v. Gomez, No. EP-17-CV-133-\nPRM, 2020 WL 1036046, at *38 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2020) (citations omitted).\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 25 of 34 PageID 62\n\n\n\n\u201cevidence of persistent, repeated, and constant violations of constitutional rights by virtue of this\n\nalleged failure to train\u201d); Harvey v. Montgomery County, Tex., 881 F. Supp. 2d 785, 798 (S.D.\n\nTex. 2012) (dismissing First Amendment claims for failure to allege a pattern of similar\n\nconstitutional violations); Monacelli, 2023 WL 6563410, at *10 (dismissing Monell claims for\n\nlack of pattern).\n\n Because Plaintiff has not alleged an unconstitutional written City policy or a pattern of\n\nsubstantially similar unconstitutional acts, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a City policy or the\n\nrequisite deliberate indifference to sustain his Monell claim even if he had alleged an\n\nunconstitutional act.\n\n iii. The Complaint does not allege facts from which this Court may\n plausibly infer any City policies were the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind\n Plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\n\n Plaintiff must allege facts which show \u201cmoving force\u201d causation to establish his \u00a7 1983\n\nclaims. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010). To show \u201cmoving force\n\ncausation,\u201d Plaintiff must demonstrate a \u201cdirect causal link\u201d between the municipality\u2019s policy and\n\nthe deprivation of Plaintiff\u2019s federal rights. Id. at 404). \u201c[T]he connection must be more than a\n\nmere \u2018but for\u2019 coupling between cause and effect. The deficiency in training, hiring, or supervision\n\nmust be the actual cause of the constitutional violation.\u201d Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 300\n\n(5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) . As one court in this\n\ncircuit explained, in the police training context,\n\n [e]ven showing the obviousness of a need for additional training regarding the\n constitutional obligations of police officers may not be enough to establish\n deliberate indifference because it does not necessarily mean that the officers will\n so obviously make wrong decisions that failing to train them amounts to a decision\n by the city itself to violate the Constitution.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 26 of 34 PageID 63\n\n\n\nBarrios-Barrios v. Clipps, 825 F. Supp. 2d 730, 746-47 (E.D. La. 2011) (citing Connick, 563 U.S.\n\nat 70) (quotation marks omitted).\n\n Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that \u201cabsent specific allegations supporting a plausible\n\ncausation inference, this legal conclusion does not state a claim for relief and warrants dismissal\n\nunder Rule 12(b)(6).\u201d Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020). Thus, to\n\nadequately allege causation at the pleading stage, Plaintiff\u2019s pleadings must be able to plausibly\n\nanswer: \u201cWould the injury have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that\n\nwas not deficient in the identified respect?\u201d City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391\n\n(1989), quoted in Littell, 894 F.3d at 629.\n\n The Complaint repeatedly alleges that the Officers\u2019 high-speed pursuit of Plaintiff was\n\nagainst explicit \u201cDPD policy.\u201d See, e.g., Compl. \u204b 6 (\u201c[b]efore [the Officers] pursued [Plaintiff],\n\nin violation of DPD policy\u201d); \u204b 25 (\u201cThis [high-speed pursuit] was in direct violation of DPD\n\npolicy stating that unless a suspect is wanted for a felony or in the process of a felony, DPD should\n\nnot pursue and/or engage in a high-speed chase for safety reasons.\u201d). To find plausible Monell\n\ncausation for an isolated act against an explicit departmental regulation would render the \u201cmoving\n\nforce\u201d pleading requirement a dead letter. See Monacelli, 2022 WL 4668054, at *10 (\u201cThe court\n\nagrees with the City that \u201c[i]f one non-deadly incident, which goes unratified, can suffice to\n\nconstitute sufficient municipal causation for an event two years later by different officers, then the\n\nwords \u2018actual cause\u2019 will fail to mean anything.\u201d).\n\n Local governments are only responsible for \u201ctheir own illegal acts.\u201d Darden v. City of Fort\n\nWorth, Tex., 808 F. App\u2019x. 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original). Because Plaintiff has\n\nnot alleged facts, nor does Fifth Circuit case law envision a scenario, in which the City\u2019s alleged\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 27 of 34 PageID 64\n\n\n\nfailures caused or even encouraged the Officers\u2019 supposed bad acts, Plaintiff fails to state a claim\n\nfor lack of causation.\n\n b. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations do not state any plausible tort claims against the City.\n\n Plaintiff alleges the City is liable under the Texas Torts Claims Act for the Officers\u2019\n\nactions. Compl. \u204b\u204b 62-67. Texas law, however, does not provide a waiver of\n\nsovereign/governmental immunity in the circumstances alleged in the Complaint.\n\n The Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity from suit against\n\na government unit if its employee, while negligently operating a motor-driven vehicle within the\n\nscope of his employment, proximately causes personal injuries or death. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &\n\nRem. Code Ann. \u00a7 101.021(1)(A) (\u201cA governmental unit in the state is liable for: property damage,\n\npersonal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence\n\nof an employee acting within his scope of employment if: the property damage, personal injury,\n\nor death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment\n\n. . . .\u201d) (emphasis added); see Tex. Dep\u2019t of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001)\n\n(\u201cThe Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity . . . .\u201d). To demonstrate a\n\nwaiver under this provision, a plaintiff must show a nexus between the employee\u2019s use of the\n\nvehicle and the injuries sustained. Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542-43\n\n(Tex. 2003). A causal nexus means that \u201cthe [vehicle]\u2019s use must have actually caused the injury.\u201d\n\nId. at 543 (quoting Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm\u2019n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex.\n\n2001)). The operation or use of a motor vehicle \u201cdoes not cause injury if it does no more than\n\nfurnish the condition that makes the injury possible.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, even where the plaintiff\n\nhas alleged a tort on the part of a government driver, there is no immunity waiver absent the\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 28 of 34 PageID 65\n\n\n\nnegligent or otherwise improper use of a motor-driven vehicle.\u201d Ryder Integrated Logistics v.\n\nFayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).\n\n i. Under Texas law, Plaintiff\u2019s injuries were not the result of the Officers\u2019\n \u201cuse\u201d of a vehicle as defined by the Texas Torts Claims Act.\n\n \u201cThe statute itself does not define \u2018arises from.\u2019\u201d Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 928. But \u201c[g]iven\n\nthe Legislature\u2019s preference for a limited immunity waiver,\u201d the Texas Supreme Court \u201cstrictly\n\nconstrue[s] section 101.021\u2019s vehicle-use requirement.\u201d Id. at 927.\n\n For this case, multiple Texas appellate courts have examined similar\u2014or essentially\n\nidentical\u2014fact patterns and declined to find a sufficient nexus between the use of a government\n\nvehicle and the injuries for a waiver of immunity.\n\n In a strikingly similar case, Teague v. City of Dallas, a court of appeals found no waiver of\n\nimmunity when a plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained in a crash that occurred after a\n\nsuspect refused to obey a police officer\u2019s directive to stop. 344 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.\u2014\n\nDallas 2011, pet. denied). During the subsequent police chase, the suspect crossed over a center\n\nisland curb and collided with a responding officer\u2019s patrol car. Id. The court of appeals held that\n\nthe undisputed facts did not demonstrate a causal nexus between the police\u2019s attempted detention\n\nand chase and the subsequent crash because the responding vehicle was not involved in the crash;\n\nit was the suspect driver\u2019s decision to cross the median that caused the collision. Id. at 439.\n\n In Williams v. City of Baytown, a court of appeals examined a case where a suspect, being\n\nchased by police, crashed his truck into a third party\u2019s car after the suspect\u2019s truck ran over a \u201cspike\n\nstrip\u201d the police had placed to stop the chase. 467 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st\n\nDist.] 2015, no pet.). The chase began when the suspect fled police on a public road, later reaching\n\nspeeds of ninety miles per hour, running red lights, and dangerously weaving in and out of traffic\u2014\n\nall with the officers in pursuit. Id. at 570. Another officer up the road placed the spike strip on the\n\n\n\n 21\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 29 of 34 PageID 66\n\n\n\nstreet. Id. After the suspect\u2019s truck ran over the strip, it rammed into a nearby car, setting it on fire\n\nand killing its driver. Id. The court of appeals found no waiver, because \u201cno police car was directly\n\ninvolved in the collision\u2014no officer blinded oncoming traffic or entered a freeway access road\n\nthe wrong way during the chase.\u201d Id. at 576.\n\n A court of appeals similarly rejected a Tort Claims Act waiver in City of Dallas v. Hillis,\n\n308 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.\u2014Dallas 2010, pet. denied). In Hillis, the plaintiffs contended that the\n\ncity\u2019s police officers were negligent in \u201cinitiating and continuing a high-speed chase contrary to\n\nthe no-chase policy of the Dallas Police Department.\u201d Id. at 532. The Hillis court rejected the\n\nnotion that immunity was waived simply because a collision took place in the context of a police\n\nchase because \u201c[t]he causal nexus is not satisfied by the mere involvement of a vehicle, nor by an\n\noperation or use that \u2018does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible.\u2019\u201d Id.\n\nat 532 (quoting Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543). The court of appeals observed: \u201cWhen an alleged\n\ncause is geographically, temporally, or causally attenuated from the alleged effect, that attenuation\n\nwill tend to show that the alleged cause did no more than furnish the condition that made the effect\n\npossible.\u201d Id.\n\n A court of appeals followed the Hillis court\u2019s reasoning in Lopez v. Escobar, No. 04-13-\n\n00151-CV, 2013 WL 4679062, at *5 (Tex. App.\u2014San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). In\n\nLopez, police officers signaled a truck to stop in a highway median, but the truck driver instead\n\ndarted into oncoming traffic and collided with Escobar, the plaintiff. Id. at *2. In holding that the\n\naccident did not arise from the officer\u2019s operation or use of a motor vehicle, the court of appeals\n\nheld that \u201cpursuing\u201d the truck driver into the median did not proximately cause Escobar\u2019s injuries.\n\nId. at *6. Rather, the suspect driver caused them. Id.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 30 of 34 PageID 67\n\n\n\n Other courts of appeal, as well, have declined to find waivers under the Tort Claims Act in\n\ncases in which the government vehicle was not involved in causing the injuries made the basis of\n\nthe suit. In Townsend v. City of Alvin, the court rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 contention that a police\n\nofficer exercised control over a speeding individual\u2019s vehicle when the officer instructed the\n\nindividual to drive straight home after a traffic stop, even though the officer knew the driver did\n\nnot possess a driver\u2019s license. No. 14-05-00915-CV, 2006 WL 2345922, at *1 (Tex. App.\u2014\n\nHouston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). In that case, the suspect driver ran a red light and\n\nkilled another driver on the road a few minutes after the police encounter. Id. The court observed\n\nthat the facts alleged did not establish a waiver of immunity because the police officer did not\n\ncontrol the suspect\u2019s car at the time of the accident. Id. at *3-4.\n\n Finally, in City of Sugarland v. Ballard, a court of appeals considered a wrongful death\n\ncase in which the plaintiffs alleged that the police failed to properly secure the decedent in a patrol\n\ncar. 174 S.W.3d 259, 262 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The decedent escaped\n\nthe car on foot and died in an auto-pedestrian accident with an oncoming car. Id. The court held\n\nthe death did not arise from the car\u2019s operation. Id. at 266. The court reasoned that the cause of the\n\ndeath was the decedent\u2019s \u201cdecision to flee into freeway traffic.\u201d Id. The failure to secure the\n\ndecedent merely furnished the condition that made it possible for him to escape. Id.\n\n In reviewing a number of these intermediate appellate cases, the Supreme Court of Texas\n\nrecently held that a plaintiff sufficiently alleged that an injury arose from an officer\u2019s use of a\n\nvehicle and that the vehicle\u2019s use was a proximate cause of an accident for the purposes of the Tort\n\nClaims Act when a police officer, who allegedly approached oncoming traffic using activated\n\noverhead lights, headlights, and a high-beam spotlight, blinded an oncoming driver. Ryder, 453\n\nS.W.3d at 926, 929, 931. In Ryder, the supreme court cited the Hillis decision with approval. Id.\n\n\n\n\n 23\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 31 of 34 PageID 68\n\n\n\nat 929-30. But in distinguishing that case, the Court reasoned that the police officer driver in Ryder,\n\nby blinding oncoming traffic, did more than furnish a condition that later caused an accident;\n\ninstead, he was alleged to be a cotortfeasor, whose faulty driving was directly implicated as a cause\n\nof the accident. Id. at 928-30; see Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 96, 99 (Tex. 1992)\n\n(holding that the summary-judgment evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue as to cause in fact\n\nwhere a suspect driver and chasing police officers all entered a one-way access road going the\n\nwrong direction and the suspect driver crashed head-on into the plaintiffs\u2019 car, and the defense\n\ncounsel had conceded that \u201cfact issues remain\u201d).\n\n Here, as examined above, the salient facts alleged are simply this: Plaintiff committed a\n\nroadway misdemeanor; the Officers attempted a stop him by using their lights and sirens; Plaintiff\n\ndid not stop because he allegedly found the Officers\u2019 lights and sirens \u201cfurther terrifying\u201d; the\n\nOfficers pursued Plaintiff with their lights and sirens activated; Plaintiff \u201clost control of [his]\n\nvehicle,\u201d his car \u201cjumped a curb\u201d along the public street, and his car struck a tree, Compl. \u204b\u204b 1-3;\n\nand the Officers\u2019 vehicle made no contact with Plaintiff\u2019s car. Considering Texas\u2019s strict laws on\n\nrequiring a close nexus between the alleged injury and the government vehicle, the Complaint has\n\nnot stated facts from which this Court can reasonably infer that the city\u2019s governmental immunity\n\nis waived. Therefore, Plaintiff\u2019s state law tort claims must be dismissed.\n\n ii. The Complaint does not negate the Texas Torts Claims Act\u2019s\n emergency exception.\n\n Lastly, Plaintiff\u2019s claims also fall within the Texas Tort Claims Act\u2019s emergency exception.\n\nTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code \u00a7 101.055(2). Because they do, the Act does not waive the City\u2019s\n\nimmunity from those claims regardless of whether they would otherwise fall within the scope of\n\nthat waiver. Under Section 101.055, the Act\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 32 of 34 PageID 69\n\n\n\n does not apply to a claim arising . . . from the action of an employee while\n responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action\n is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or\n in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious\n indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.\n\nId. \u00a7 101.055(2). 5\n\n The plaintiff bears the burden of negating Section 101.055\u2019s applicability. See City of San\n\nAntonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 672 (Tex. 2006). Nothing in the Complaint indicates the\n\nOfficers violated emergency \u201claws and ordinances.\u201d Plaintiff claims the Officers violated City\n\npolicies, but according to the Texas Supreme Court, \u201ca police department\u2019s internal policies, in\n\nand of themselves, are not \u2018laws\u2019 or \u2018ordinances\u2019\u201d for purposes of the Act. City of San Antonio v.\n\nMaspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 530 (Tex. 2022). Further, nothing in the Complaint meets the standard\n\nof \u201cthe Transportation Code,\u201d which holds that \u201creckless driving consists of driving a vehicle in\n\n\u2018willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u2019\u201d Id. at 531 (quoting Tex. Transp.\n\nCode \u00a7 545.401(a)). \u201c[T]his standard requires \u2018conscious indifference,\u2019 or \u2018subjective awareness\n\nof an extreme risk.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Tarrant County v. Bonner, 574 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. 2019)).\n\nHere, Plaintiff\u2019s complaint acknowledges that he violated a traffic law, refused to stop in response\n\nto the Officers\u2019 lawful show of authority, ran off the road and crashed his vehicle. Therefore, the\n\nOfficers\u2019 actions cannot create liability for the City.\n\n\n\n\n5\n The pursuit of a fleeing suspect is considered an \u201cemergency.\u201d City of Austin v. Powell, 684 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tex.\nApp.--Austin 2022, pet. granted) (\u201cThe Transportation Code permits operators of authorized emergency vehicles to\ndisregard certain rules of the road, such as speed limits, under certain circumstances, including when . . . pursuing a\nfleeing suspect.\u201d) (emphasis added).\n\n\n 25\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 33 of 34 PageID 70\n\n\n\n IV. CONCLUSION\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint offers no substantive allegations that the City itself caused his alleged\n\ninjuries and amounts to little more than respondeat superior liability. 6 Accordingly, the Court\n\nshould grant the City\u2019s Motion and dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s claims against the City.\n\n\n\n\n6\n Plaintiff lists several other \u201ccounts\u201d that do not merit extensive attention. \u201cCount V\u201d is labeled as \u201cRespondeat\nSuperior.\u201d Compl. \u204b\u204b 58-60. Under basic municipal liability law, outside of the already-discussed Torts Claims Act,\na governmental entity cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Monell, 436\nU.S. at 694. \u201cCount VI\u201d is labeled as \u201cExemplary Damages.\u201d Compl. \u204b\u204b 61-62. First, the Tort Claims Act \u201cdoes not\nauthorize exemplary damages.\u201d Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 101.024. Second, under Texas law, \u201can award of\npunitive damages is not a separate cause of action,\u201d Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or. Cardio\u2013Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d\n449, 461 (5th Cir. 2001), such that a demand for punitive damages is not \u201cseparate and distinct from the underlying\nclaim for compensatory damages,\u201d where \u201cTexas, like the majority of states, limits punitive damages to cases in which\nactual compensatory damages are found,\u201d Lanier v. Salas, 777 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1985). The same is true for\ndemands for punitive damages sounding in federal law. See, e.g., Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 604\n(5th Cir. 1988) (addressing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim). \u201cPunitive damages are not an independent claim or cause of\naction, but are a remedy available in various causes of action.\u201d Id. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff brings these two\nCounts as separate causes of action, they should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.\n\n\n 26\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 7 Filed 04/30/24 Page 34 of 34 PageID 71\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that on April 30, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the clerk\nof court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF electronic case\nfiling system of the court. The electronic case filing system will send a \u201cNotice of Electronic\nFiling\u201d notification to all case participants registered for electronic notice, including all pro se\nparties and/or attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service\nof this document by electronic means.\n\n s/ J. Cheves Ligon\n J. 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R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3) -- you must serve\non the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal\nRules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or the\nplaintiff\u2019s attorney, whose name and address are:\n\n Carl Evans\n 3710 Rawlins Street\n Suite 1600\n Dallas , TX 75219\n\n If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief\ndemanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.\n\n\n\n\n CLERK OF COURT\n\n\n\nDATE: 03/28/2024\n Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 3 Filed 03/28/24 Page 2 of 6 PageID 27\nAO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)\n\n Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00731-L\n\n\n PROOF OF SERVICE\n (This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))\n\n\n This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) _______________________________________________________\nwas received by me on (date) ______________________.\n\n\n I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) _____________________________________________\n __________________________________________________________ on (date) ___________________________; or\n\n\n I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) ___________________________\n ____________________________________________________, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,\n on (date) __________________________________________, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or\n\n\n I served the summons on (name of individual) __________________________________________, who is designated\n by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) _________________________________________\n _________________________________________________________ on (date) ______________________________ ; or\n\n\n I returned the summons unexecuted because ______________________________________________________ ; or\n\n\n other (specify) __________________________________________________________________________________\n __________________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\n\n\n My fees are $ _________________ for travel and $ __________________ for services, for a total of $ _____________\n\n\n I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.\n\n\n Date: ______________________ ______________________________________________________\n Server's signature\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n Printed name and title\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n Server's address\n\n\n\n Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 3 Filed 03/28/24 Page 3 of 6 PageID 28\n\n\nAO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n for the\n Northern District of Texas\n\n Crenshaw )\n Plaintiff )\n v. ) Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00731-L\n )\n )\n Anderson et al )\n Defendant )\n\n Summons in a Civil Action\n\nTO: City of Dallas\n\n\nA lawsuit has been filed against you.\n\n Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received\nit) -- or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or\nemployee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3) -- you must serve\non the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal\nRules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or the\nplaintiff\u2019s attorney, whose name and address are:\n\n Carl Evans\n 3710 Rawlins Street\n Suite 1600\n Dallas , TX 75219\n\n If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief\ndemanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.\n\n\n\n\n CLERK OF COURT\n\n\n\nDATE: 03/28/2024\n Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 3 Filed 03/28/24 Page 4 of 6 PageID 29\nAO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)\n\n Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00731-L\n\n\n PROOF OF SERVICE\n (This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))\n\n\n This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) _______________________________________________________\nwas received by me on (date) ______________________.\n\n\n I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) _____________________________________________\n __________________________________________________________ on (date) ___________________________; or\n\n\n I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) ___________________________\n ____________________________________________________, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,\n on (date) __________________________________________, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or\n\n\n I served the summons on (name of individual) __________________________________________, who is designated\n by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) _________________________________________\n _________________________________________________________ on (date) ______________________________ ; or\n\n\n I returned the summons unexecuted because ______________________________________________________ ; or\n\n\n other (specify) __________________________________________________________________________________\n __________________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\n\n\n My fees are $ _________________ for travel and $ __________________ for services, for a total of $ _____________\n\n\n I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.\n\n\n Date: ______________________ ______________________________________________________\n Server's signature\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n Printed name and title\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n Server's address\n\n\n\n Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 3 Filed 03/28/24 Page 5 of 6 PageID 30\n\n\nAO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n for the\n Northern District of Texas\n\n Crenshaw )\n Plaintiff )\n v. ) Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00731-L\n )\n )\n Anderson et al )\n Defendant )\n\n Summons in a Civil Action\n\nTO: Darrien Robertson\n\n\nA lawsuit has been filed against you.\n\n Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received\nit) -- or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or\nemployee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3) -- you must serve\non the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal\nRules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or the\nplaintiff\u2019s attorney, whose name and address are:\n\n Carl Evans\n 3710 Rawlins Street\n Suite 1600\n Dallas , TX 75219\n\n If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief\ndemanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.\n\n\n\n\n CLERK OF COURT\n\n\n\nDATE: 03/28/2024\n Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 3 Filed 03/28/24 Page 6 of 6 PageID 31\nAO 440 (Rev. 12/09) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)\n\n Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00731-L\n\n\n PROOF OF SERVICE\n (This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))\n\n\n This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) _______________________________________________________\nwas received by me on (date) ______________________.\n\n\n I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) _____________________________________________\n __________________________________________________________ on (date) ___________________________; or\n\n\n I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) ___________________________\n ____________________________________________________, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,\n on (date) __________________________________________, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or\n\n\n I served the summons on (name of individual) __________________________________________, who is designated\n by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) _________________________________________\n _________________________________________________________ on (date) ______________________________ ; or\n\n\n I returned the summons unexecuted because ______________________________________________________ ; or\n\n\n other (specify) __________________________________________________________________________________\n __________________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\n\n\n My fees are $ _________________ for travel and $ __________________ for services, for a total of $ _____________\n\n\n I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.\n\n\n Date: ______________________ ______________________________________________________\n Server's signature\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n Printed name and title\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n Server's address\n\n\n\n Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-09-12T10:05:14.562335-07:00","document_number":"3","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016727102","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Summons Issued","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.105457-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.449222-07:00","date_filed":"2024-03-28","time_filed":null,"entry_number":3,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-03-28.001","pacer_sequence_number":16,"description":"Summons Issued as to Leonard Anderson, City of Dallas, Darrien Robertson. (kcr)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392398020/","id":392398020,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/424497687/","id":424497687,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2024-12-18T11:50:57.864748-08:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.504396-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Cert. Of Interested Persons/Disclosure Statement","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:25.058373-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.487219-07:00","date_filed":"2024-03-27","time_filed":null,"entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-03-27.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Tomyia Crenshaw. (Clerk QC note: No affiliate entered in ECF). See document 1 for image. (kcr)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/392398018/","id":392398018,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/401426489/","id":401426489,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/2/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:24.938571-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.612801-07:00","sha1":"eb40c95d463bb99ccf1c66c4828a9faa26a63059","page_count":2,"file_size":19253,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.2.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.2.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 2 Filed 03/27/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID \n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n\n\n\n___________________________ \u00a7\n \u00a7\nPlaintiff \u00a7\n \u00a7\n \u00a7\n \u00a7 ___________________________\nv. \u00a7\n \u00a7 Case Number\n \u00a7\n___________________________ \u00a7\n \u00a7\nDefendant \u00a7\n\n\n NOTICE AND ELECTION REGARDING CONSENT TO PROCEED\n BEFORE A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\n\n\nIn accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c), the undersigned notifies the clerk that\n\n______________________________ ________________________________\n\nParty Name Party Role (Plaintiff or Defendant)\n\n\n_____ waives the right to proceed before a district judge of the United States District Court and consents to\n\nhave a United States magistrate judge conduct any and all further proceedings, including any trial, and\n\norder entry of a final judgment.\n\n_____ acknowledges the availability of a United States magistrate judge to try this case or rule on\n\ndispositive motions but chooses not to consent to proceed before the magistrate judge.\n\n Signature: _________________________________\nDate: ___________________________\n\n Bar Number (if attorney): _____________________\n\n\n Telephone Number: _________________________\n\n\n E\u2212mail Address: ____________________________\n\n\n\nNOTE: A district judge or a magistrate judge will not be informed of any party's election unless all parties\nhave consented to the reassignment of the matter to a magistrate judge.\n\fCase 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 2 Filed 03/27/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID \n\n TRIALS BY THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\n\nIn accordance with 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), upon consent of all parties in a civil\ncase, the district judge may enter an order reassigning the civil case to a magistrate judge. Miscellaneous\nOrder No. 6 of the Northern District of Texas provides that it is the plaintiff's obligation to attach a copy of\nthis notice to the complaint and summons, when served.\n\n\n\n NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CONSENT TO PROCEED BEFORE\n A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\n\nThe Court has experienced, competent, and hard\u2212working magistrate judges who are available to try jury\nand non\u2212jury civil cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c). Consent to proceedings before a magistrate judge\nmay allow you to expedite the handling of your case.\n\nYou may consent to the exercise of civil jurisdiction over your case by a magistrate judge. If all parties\ninvolved in your case consent, the presiding district judge may reassign your case to a magistrate judge.\n\nYour decision to consent to the reassignment of your case to a magistrate judge, or not to consent, is\nentirely voluntary and without any adverse consequences if you choose not to consent. Your decision\nshould be communicated to the clerk of the district court using Notice and Election Regarding Consent to\nProceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge form. A district judge or magistrate judge will not be\ninformed of any party's decision unless all parties have consented to the reassignment of the matter to a\nmagistrate judge.\n\nEven if all parties consent to the exercise of civil jurisdiction by a magistrate judge, the district judge may\nchoose not to enter an order reassigning the case to a magistrate judge. However, if the district judge\nreassigns your case to the magistrate judge, the magistrate judge is then authorized to conduct any or all\nproceedings in the case, including a jury or non\u2212jury trial, and order the entry of a final judgment. Upon\nentry of judgment by the magistrate judge in any case transferred under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c)(1), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\n636(c)(3) provides that \"an aggrieved party may appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of\nappeals from the judgment of the magistrate judge in the same manner as an appeal from any other\njudgment of a district court.\"\n\nIMPORTANT NOTE: This submission is not treated as a filing in ECF, so the consent form will not\nappear on the docket sheet.\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-09-12T10:05:57.363914-07:00","document_number":"2","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016727099","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Judge Lindsay","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-31T14:09:24.897562-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.588649-07:00","date_filed":"2024-03-27","time_filed":null,"entry_number":2,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-03-27.003","pacer_sequence_number":14,"description":"New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge (Judge Rutherford). Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. (kcr)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/389202934/","id":389202934,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/398125631/","id":398125631,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/10/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-05-08T07:22:14.643787-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.102683-07:00","sha1":"e87a44aeef8e29699569f7d3b36ecdff0e3551b3","page_count":1,"file_size":144336,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.10.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.10.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 10 Filed 05/07/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID 77\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\n TOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n v. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\n LEONARD ANDERSON; DARRIEN \u00a7\n ROBERTSON; and THE CITY OF \u00a7\n DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n ORDER\n\n Before the court is Defendants\u2019 Leonard Anderson and Darrien Robertson\u2019s Unopposed\n\nMotion to Extend Deadline for Responsive Pleading (\u201cMotion\u201d) (Doc. 9), filed May 3, 2024. The\n\ncourt determines that the Motion should be, and is hereby, granted. Accordingly, the deadline for\n\nDefendants to file their responsive pleadings is June 3, 2024. No further extensions will be\n\ngranted.\n\n It is so ordered this 7th day of May, 2024.\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n Sam A. Lindsay\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\nOrder \u2013 Solo Page\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-09-12T10:06:42.712736-07:00","document_number":"10","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016824740","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-08T07:22:14.567767-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.076501-07:00","date_filed":"2024-05-07","time_filed":null,"entry_number":10,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-05-07.001","pacer_sequence_number":34,"description":"ORDER granting [9] Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. Defendants Answer due by 6/3/2024. (Ordered by Judge Sam A. Lindsay on 5/7/2024) (agc)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/388185711/","id":388185711,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/68382840/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/397090196/","id":397090196,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/68382840/8/crenshaw-v-anderson/","date_created":"2024-05-03T08:15:34.368404-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.223369-07:00","sha1":"07bc8f1d1f173be655247e6bb84387563862f13a","page_count":2,"file_size":126762,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.8.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038/gov.uscourts.txnd.388038.8.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 8 Filed 05/02/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID 72\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n DALLAS DIVISION\n\n TOMYIA CRENSHAW, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Plaintiff, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n v. \u00a7 Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-731-L\n \u00a7\n LEONARD ANDERSON; DARRIEN \u00a7\n ROBERTSON; and THE CITY OF \u00a7\n DALLAS, \u00a7\n \u00a7\n Defendants. \u00a7\n\n ORDER OF REFERENCE\n\n Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b), Defendant City of Dallas\u2019s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nComplaint, and Brief in Support (\u201cMotion\u201d) (Doc. 7), filed April 30, 2024, is hereby referred to\n\nUnited States Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford for hearing, if necessary, and for the United\n\nStates Magistrate Judge to submit to the court proposed findings and recommendations for\n\ndisposition of the Motion. This order of reference also prospectively refers all procedural motions\n\nthat are related to the referred Motion to the United States Magistrate Judge for resolution. All\n\nfuture filings regarding the referred Motion shall be addressed \u201cTo the Honorable United States\n\nMagistrate Judge\u201d\u2014not to the district judge or court\u2014so that filings will reach her without delay.\n\n Local Civil Rules 72.1 and 72.2 provide that, unless otherwise directed by the presiding\n\ndistrict judge, a party who files objections under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(a) and (b)(2)\n\nto magistrate judge orders regarding pretrial nondispositive matters, or findings and\n\nrecommendations on dispositive motions, may file a reply brief within 14 days from the date the\n\nresponse to the objections or response brief is filed. The court does not allow parties to file a reply\n\nbrief with respect to magistrate judge orders or findings and recommendations, unless leave is\n\nOrder of Reference \u2013 Page 1\n\f Case 3:24-cv-00731-L Document 8 Filed 05/02/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID 73\n\n\n\ngranted to file the reply brief. The court will strike or disregard any reply brief filed in violation\n\nof this order.\n\n It is so ordered this 2nd day of May, 2024.\n\n\n\n _________________________________\n Sam A. Lindsay\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\nOrder of Reference \u2013 Page 2\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-09-12T10:04:03.513246-07:00","document_number":"8","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016814110","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order Referring Motion","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-05-03T08:15:34.353835-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-10T10:22:00.194302-07:00","date_filed":"2024-05-02","time_filed":null,"entry_number":8,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-05-02.001","pacer_sequence_number":27,"description":"Order Referring [7] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim to Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford. (Ordered by Judge Sam A. Lindsay on 5/2/2024) (cfk)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=68382840&page_size=40"}