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Entertainment, Inc.","extra_info":""}],"entries":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/476103397/","id":476103397,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/491656370/","id":491656370,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/47/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-08-27T18:01:15.008081-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-28T05:42:59.556497-07:00","sha1":"c86c86238191ed49465b6a7c29fafd876c4c4cfc","page_count":22,"file_size":321143,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.47.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 1 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n 2 anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com\n 2400 Hanover Street\n 3 Palo Alto, California 94304-1113\n Telephone: 650.233.4500\n 4 Facsimile: 650.233.4545\n\n 5 LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com\n 6 KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n kayvan.ghaffari@pillsburylaw.com\n 7 Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor\n San Francisco, CA 94111-5998\n 8 Telephone: 415.983.1000\n Facsimile: 415.983.1200\n 9\n Attorneys for Defendant\n10 BYTEDANCE INC.\n\n11\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n12\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n13\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n14\n\n15\n TED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n16 FISHER, and GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\n individually and on behalf of all other similarly DEFENDANT BYTEDANCE, INC.\u2019S\n17 situated, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO\n DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FIRST\n18 Plaintiffs, AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\n19 v. Hearing Date: Sept. 24, 2026\n Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.\n20 BYTEDANCE INC., Judge: Jacqueline Scott Corley\n FAC Filed: Apr. 13, 2026\n21 Defendant.\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC,\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 2 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n 2 Page\n 3 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1\n ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 2\n 4\n I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING .................................................................. 2\n 5 II. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE STATUTORY STANDING FOR A DMCA\n CLAIM .................................................................................................................................... 6\n 6\n III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE CIRCUMVENTION OF ACCESS CONTROLS\n 7 UNDER SECTION 1201(A) .................................................................................................. 8\n A. Plaintiffs Still Have Not Alleged TPMs That, in the Ordinary Course of\n 8 Operation, Control Access to the Works .......................................................................... 8\n 9 B. Plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cInitial Viewing\u201d Theory Conflates Playback Delivery with Access\n Control ............................................................................................................................ 10\n10 C. Plaintiffs\u2019 Dictionary Definition Collapses Access to a Work With Subsequently\n Obtaining a Downloadable File ...................................................................................... 11\n11\n D. The \u201cMerged\u201d TPM Theory Cannot Substitute for Statutory Showing of Access\n12 Controls ........................................................................................................................... 11\n E. VidAngel and Subsequent Cases Do Not Save the FAC ................................................. 12\n13\n IV. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND................................ 15\n14 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 15\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n i\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 3 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n 2 Page(s)\n 3 Cases\n 4\n Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n 5 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................................................................ 15\n\n 6 Ma v. Ashcroft,\n 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................... 7\n 7\n CDK Global, LLC v. Tekion Corp.,\n 8 No. 25-cv-01394-JSC, 2025 WL 1939951 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025) .................................... 15\n 9 Coal. of Clergy, Laws., & Professors v. Bush,\n10 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002)................................................................................................... 7\n\n11 Cordova v. Huneault,\n 817 F.Supp.3d 819 (N.D. Cal. 2026) ...................................................................................... 15\n12\n DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,\n13 547 U.S. 332 (2006) .................................................................................................................. 2\n14 Disney Enterprises v. VidAngel, Inc.,\n15 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017)............................................................................................. 12, 13\n\n16 Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc.,\n 543 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2008) ................................................................................. 7, 8\n17\n Hattler v. Ashton,\n18 2017 WL 11634742 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2017) .................................................................. 8, 15\n19 Justice v. Suno, Inc.,\n No. 25-11739-FDS, 2026 WL 2445362 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 2026) ........................................ 13\n20\n\n21 Justice v. Uncharted Labs, Inc.,\n 2026 WL 1430232 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2026)......................................................................... 15\n22\n Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,\n23 2025 WL 744032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025) .............................................................................. 5\n24 Lasica v. America Online, Inc.,\n 2015 WL 12791495 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015)........................................................................ 15\n25\n Lexmark Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,\n26\n 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................... 9\n27\n MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc.,\n28 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010)............................................................................................ passim\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n ii\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 4 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc.,\n 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010)............................................................................................. 1, 3, 5\n 2\n N.Y. Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,\n 3\n 777 F.Supp.3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) ......................................................................................... 5\n 4\n Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG,\n 5 765 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 4\n\n 6 Post University Inc. v. Learneo, Inc.,\n 2025 WL 2702043 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2025) .......................................................................... 5\n 7\n Reddit, Inc. v. SerpApi LLC,\n 8 2026 WL 2210094 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026) ..................................................................... 5, 15\n 9\n Schneider v. Cal. Dep\u2019t of Corr.,\n10 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)................................................................................................... 4\n\n11 Sony Music Entertainment v. Uncharted Labs Inc.,\n 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026) ......................................................................... 15\n12\n Tanzer v. Adobe Inc.,\n13 2026 WL 2446787 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2026).......................................................................... 3\n14\n Ted Entertainment, Inc. v. Snap, Inc.,\n15 2026 WL 2435349 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2026) ...................................................... 12, 13, 14, 15\n\n16 The Intercept Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, Inc.,\n 767 F.Supp.3d 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) ........................................................................................... 5\n17\n Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc.,\n18 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007)..................................................................................... 9\n19 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Suno Inc.,\n20 2026 WL 2410184 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2026)....................................................... 11, 13, 14, 15\n\n21 VidAngel LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,\n 703 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (D. Utah 2023) ....................................................................... 7, 8, 12, 13\n22\n Wash. Env\u2019t Council v. Bellon,\n23 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013)............................................................................................... 4, 5\n24 Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara,\n 894 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2018)................................................................................................. 15\n25\n\n26 Constitutions\n\n27 United States Constitution\n Article III................................................................................................................................... 4\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n iii\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 5 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 Statutes and Codes\n 2 United States Code\n Title 17, Section 411(a) ............................................................................................................. 3\n 3\n Title 17, Section 412 ................................................................................................................. 3\n 4 Title 17, Section 1201 ............................................................................................... 3, 6, 14, 15\n Title 17, Section 1201(a) .................................................................................................. passim\n 5 Title 17, Section 1201(a)(1) ............................................................................................. passim\n Title 17, Section 1201(b)..................................................................................................... 8, 11\n 6 Title 17, Section 1201(b)(1) .................................................................................................... 11\n Title 17, Section 1202(b)........................................................................................................... 5\n 7\n Title 17, Section 1203 ........................................................................................................... 6, 7\n 8 Title 17, Section 1203(a) ................................................................................................... 1, 6, 8\n Title 17, Section 1203(c)(2) .................................................................................................. 3, 6\n 9 Title 17, Section 1203(c)(3) ...................................................................................................... 6\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n iv\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 6 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 INTRODUCTION\n 2 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition does not cure the central problems with their sole claim. Two\n 3 threshold standing defects require dismissal even before this Court reaches the parties\u2019 dispute over\n 4 the scope of Section 1201(a).\n 5 First, Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they have not alleged that they themselves\n 6 suffered any injury fairly traceable to Section 1201(a) circumvention, as opposed to copyright\n 7 injuries related to alleged downloading, retention, and downstream use of their videos. Section\n 8 1201(a), the basis for Plaintiffs\u2019 sole claim, creates an \u201canticircumvention right distinct from\n 9 copyright infringement,\u201d MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir. 2010),\n10 and \u201cdoes not apply to the use of copyrighted works after the technological measure has been\n11 circumvented.\u201d MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir.\n12 2010) (emphasis in original). But the FAC and Opposition attribute every asserted injury\u2014lost\n13 advertising and licensing revenue, diminished monetization, market harm, and loss of control\u2014to\n14 BDI\u2019s alleged acquisition and use of their videos. The FAC does not allege any facts showing that\n15 circumvention, as opposed to the alleged copying and use, caused those injuries. Plaintiffs do not\n16 allege an injury traceable to the challenged conduct.\n17 Second, Plaintiffs cannot establish statutory standing merely by invoking Section 1203(a)\u2019s\n18 reference to \u201c[a]ny person injured.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a). Section 1203(a) requires more than injury\n19 alone; Plaintiffs must be \u201cinjured by a violation of section 1201.\u201d Id. Here, the alleged violation is\n20 circumvention of a TPM owned, deployed, and controlled by YouTube, not Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do\n21 not allege that they own, operate, deploy, maintain, configure, or control any of the alleged TPMs.\n22 Instead, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they \u201cdelegated technical implementation of access controls to\n23 YouTube.\u201d FAC \u00b6 158. Plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation of Section 1203(a) would transform every creator\n24 who posts content on a protected platform into a private enforcer of that platform\u2019s security\n25 systems, even where the creator has no role in or control over those protections. Neither Section\n26 1203(a) nor Plaintiffs\u2019 authorities support that extraordinary result.\n27 Third, on the merits, Plaintiffs still have not plausibly alleged circumvention of a measure\n28 that \u201ceffectively controls access\u201d to their works, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(A), as opposed to measures\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 1\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 7 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 that either control access to a platform or protect against copying Plaintiffs\u2019 works. The statutory\n 2 question is whether each measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, controls access to\n 3 Plaintiffs\u2019 copyrighted works\u2014not whether it can restrict copying, or in certain circumstances a\n 4 requester\u2019s access to YouTube\u2019s platform. Plaintiffs chose to make their videos available for\n 5 anyone to watch for free on YouTube. See FAC \u00b6 33. They do not allege that BDI bypassed a\n 6 password, paywall, or encryption that rendered their works inaccessible. And the measures they do\n 7 allege\u2014YouTube\u2019s rolling cipher, proof-of-origin tokens, session-bound URLs, IP blocking, and\n 8 CAPTCHA challenges\u2014only regulate file retrieval, request volume, automation, and downloading\n 9 outside YouTube\u2019s platform. Expanding Section 1201(a) to encompass those extrinsic measures\n10 would effectively treat every technological restriction on obtaining a copy as an access control and\n11 erase the distinction Congress drew between the two. Applying Section 1201(a) to episodic controls\n12 or controls that regulate access after the fact would also ignore the statutory text. The statute\n13 provides that \u201ca technological measure \u2018effectively controls access to a work\u2019 if the measure, in the\n14 ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment,\n15 with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B)\n16 (emphases added).\n17 Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts necessary to connect BDI itself to circumvention.\n18 The FAC does not identify which supposed TPM protected which Plaintiff\u2019s video at the relevant\n19 time, which tool BDI purportedly used to circumvent it, or how BDI allegedly circumvented any\n20 particular measure. See FAC \u00b6\u00b6 96, 99, 101-09 (alleging largely on \u201cinformation and belief\u201d). This\n21 failure of pleading separately warrants dismissal.\n22 This Court should grant BDI\u2019s motion for any or all of these reasons. Moreover, because\n23 Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once after BDI identified the same, central\n24 deficiencies in their claim, the Court should dismiss the FAC with prejudice.\n25 ARGUMENT\n26 I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING\n27 Article III standing must be established by each plaintiff, for each claim, as to each form of\n28 relief. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations do not\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 2\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 8 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 satisfy that exacting standard.\n 2 Section 1203(c)(2) permits recovery only of \u201cactual damages suffered by the party as a\n 3 result of the violation.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(c)(2). Here, the alleged violation of Section 1201 is\n 4 circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a protected work. But\n 5 Section 1201(a) \u201ccreates a new anticircumvention right distinct from copyright infringement,\u201d\n 6 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 948, and \u201cdoes not apply to the use of copyrighted works after the\n 7 technological measure has been circumvented.\u201d MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 366 (emphasis added).\n 8 Plaintiffs therefore must plausibly connect each claimed loss to the alleged circumvention itself,\n 9 not merely label the purported consequences of downstream copying and use as DMCA damages.\n10 This Court recently emphasized that allegations necessary to establish Article III standing must be\n11 supported by facts making the required inference \u201cplausible rather than merely possible.\u201d Tanzer\n12 v. Adobe Inc., 2026 WL 2446787, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2026). In Tanzer, the Court dismissed\n13 for lack of standing and failure to state a copyright infringement claim because the complaint failed\n14 to allege facts supporting the necessary inference that plaintiffs\u2019 copyrighted works were used to\n15 train the AI model at issue. Id. at *3-4. Here, Plaintiffs fail to connect their alleged injuries to\n16 circumvention because those injuries arise from what BDI allegedly did after any claimed\n17 circumvention\u2014acquiring copies and using them to train AI models. See, e.g., FAC \u00b6\u00b6 122-28.\n18 Plaintiffs cannot avoid that distinction by invoking harms traditionally associated with\n19 copyright. Unregistered works may be protected by Section 1201, but Section 1201\u2019s independent\n20 cause of action does not authorize Plaintiffs to repackage alleged infringement losses as\n21 circumvention damages in order to sidestep the statutory prerequisites and defenses governing\n22 infringement claims. Congress separately required registration or preregistration before a civil\n23 infringement action concerning a United States work may be instituted, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 411(a), limited\n24 statutory damages and fees for untimely registration, id. \u00a7 412, and left infringement claims subject\n25 to fair use and other defenses. Here, Plaintiffs pleaded no infringement claim, do not identify a\n26 single registered work, and emphasize that most YouTube videos are unregistered. FAC \u00b6 13.\n27 Further, by asserting a non-copyright circumvention cause of action alone, Plaintiffs would seek to\n28 deny BDI the opportunity to raise a fair use defense\u2014which is critical in AI copyright litigation.\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 3\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 9 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 Plaintiffs therefore cannot establish standing simply by pointing to injuries allegedly caused by\n 2 copying, AI training, alleged lost licensing value, and loss of control. They must plausibly allege\n 3 that those injuries resulted from the conduct actually prohibited by Section 1201(a).\n 4 Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion that their injuries would not have occurred but for circumvention does\n 5 not establish otherwise. See ECF No. 42 (\u201cOpp.\u201d) at 7. To satisfy Article III, the links in any alleged\n 6 causal chain must \u201cremain plausible\u201d rather than \u201chypothetical or tenuous.\u201d Wash. Env\u2019t Council\n 7 v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations fail that\n 8 test.\n 9 The FAC identifies six injury theories. FAC \u00b6 121. The first four\u2014lost advertising revenue,\n10 Premium revenue, progress toward Partner Program eligibility, and algorithmic amplification\u2014are\n11 all view-based. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 122\u201325. But the FAC\u2019s own theory is that BDI retrieved files at machine\n12 scale for ingestion into AI models, not that BDI or any human watched them. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 75\u201388,\n13 104. Machine ingestion produces no viewer, advertising impression, Premium watch time,\n14 engagement signal, subscriber, or audience growth. Nor does the FAC allege that BDI\u2019s\n15 downloading prevented anyone from watching the same videos on YouTube. And it does not\n16 plausibly allege that, absent circumvention, BDI would instead have played more than 100 million\n17 clips through YouTube\u2019s monetized player. Id. \u00b6 86. The only objective the FAC attributes to BDI\n18 was obtaining machine-readable training data. On those allegations, each retrieval cannot plausibly\n19 be treated as a lost human view or advertising impression.\n20 The fifth and sixth theories\u2014market harm and \u201closs of control\u201d\u2014fare no better. As to\n21 market harm, the FAC alleges only that BDI downloaded files rather than \u201cpurchase a copy.\u201d FAC\n22 \u00b6 126. While the Opposition recasts that allegation as a lost negotiated license, Opp. at 7, the FAC\n23 itself invokes licensing only generally; it alleges no market for licensing these videos for AI\n24 training, no prior comparable licenses, and no offered price, negotiation, or lost transaction. FAC\n25 \u00b6\u00b6 19, 22, 24, 122. Even hypothetical-license damages must rest on objective, non-speculative\n26 evidence of market value, Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2014), and the\n27 Opposition cannot fill in the gaps in the FAC\u2019s allegations, Schneider v. Cal. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 151\n28 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). And Plaintiffs\u2019 sixth theory, \u201closs of control,\u201d does not plead\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 4\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 10 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 an independent economic loss. The FAC defines it as uncertainty about uncompensated exploitation\n 2 and inability to ensure compensation, FAC \u00b6 127\u2014the same unpleaded licensing and downstream-\n 3 use theory. It does not allege that BDI removed the works from YouTube, reduced their availability,\n 4 interfered with an existing license, or prevented Plaintiffs from exploiting them.\n 5 Reddit, Inc. v. SerpApi LLC, 2026 WL 2210094 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026), see Opp. at 7-8,\n 6 is inapposite. That nonbinding decision found Article III standing based on the particular injuries\n 7 and causal allegations before it. Reddit, 2026 WL 2210094, at *6-11. But Reddit did not address\n 8 the Ninth Circuit\u2019s requirement that causal links not be \u201chypothetical or tenuous and remain\n 9 plausible.\u201d Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1141-42 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations do not satisfy that\n10 requirement. Plaintiffs\u2019 claims simply assume that, absent the alleged circumvention, BDI probably\n11 would have generated monetized human views or purchased licenses rather than forgoing the\n12 content. That is overly speculative and insufficiently pleaded to establish standing.\n13 Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2025 WL 744032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025), see Opp. at 8,\n14 is even further afield. Kadrey involved claims under Section 1202(b) (removal of copyright-\n15 management information (\u201cCMI\u201d)), not Section 1201(a) (circumvention of access controls).\n16 Section 1202(b)(1)-(3) expressly requires a connection between the prohibited conduct related to\n17 CMI and infringement. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1202(b)(1)-(3) (\u201cNo person shall, without the authority of the\n18 copyright owner or the law\u2014(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright management\n19 information . . . knowing, or . . . having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable,\n20 facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any right under this title.\u201d). It makes sense that infringement\n21 may constitute an \u201cinjury that is traceable to the CMI removal.\u201d Kadrey, 2025 WL 744032, at *1.\n22 But that does not make Plaintiffs\u2019 asserted copyright injuries here traceable to either the distinct\n23 right protected by Section 1201(a) or the different conduct it prohibits\u2014circumventing an access\n24 control. 1\n25\n 1\n Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on The Intercept Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, Inc., 767 F.Supp.3d 18 (S.D.N.Y.\n26 2025), N.Y. Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 777 F.Supp.3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), and Post University\n Inc. v. Learneo, Inc., 2025 WL 2702043, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2025) is misplaced. Opp. at 8-\n27 9. Each involved Section 1202(b), which prohibits removal of CMI\u2014conduct that itself facilitates\n the infringement alleged as the injury. Section 1201(a)(1), by contrast, prohibits circumvention\n28 and \u201cdoes not apply to the use of copyrighted works after the technological measure has been\n circumvented.\u201d MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 366 (emphasis in original). The question is not whether\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 5\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 11 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 If there were any question about what type of injury Plaintiffs actually allege, Plaintiffs\u2019\n 2 Prayer for Relief answers it. It asks the Court \u201cto prevent or restrain infringement of [their]\n 3 copyright-protected content,\u201d including through an injunction requiring BDI to \u201ccease infringing\u201d\n 4 their \u201cexclusive rights.\u201d FAC, Prayer for Relief \u00b6 D. The requested relief targets BDI\u2019s alleged\n 5 downstream use and infringement, not any separate injury caused by purportedly defeating\n 6 YouTube\u2019s technological measures. But Plaintiffs cannot use Section 1201 to obtain relief for\n 7 alleged copyright infringement while avoiding the statutory prerequisites and defenses that would\n 8 govern an infringement claim. And although Section 1203(c)(2) permits actual damages only when\n 9 those damages are suffered \u201cas a result of\u201d the alleged violation, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(c)(2), the FAC\n10 does not plausibly allege that Plaintiffs\u2019 asserted injuries resulted from circumvention rather than\n11 BDI\u2019s alleged downstream acquisition and use of their works.\n12 Finally, Plaintiffs\u2019 request for statutory damages under Section 1203(c)(3) does not cure\n13 that defect. See FAC, Prayer for Relief \u00b6 C. Statutory damages are a remedy available under Section\n14 1203; they do not eliminate Section 1203(a)\u2019s threshold requirement that the plaintiff actually be\n15 \u201cinjured by a violation of section 1201.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a).\n16 II. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE STATUTORY STANDING FOR A DMCA CLAIM\n17 Section 1203(a) authorizes suit by \u201c[a]ny person injured by a violation of section 1201 or\n18 1202.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a). Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory standing argument turns on \u201cany person,\u201d\n19 reasoning that because they are persons who suffered any injury, they may sue. Opp. at 10. But that\n20 reading reads out of the statute the words \u201cinjured by a violation\u201d (here, of Section 1201(a)). It is\n21 not enough that Plaintiffs own copyrighted works and allege some economic injury; they must\n22 plausibly allege that they were injured by the alleged circumvention itself. Here, Plaintiffs allege\n23 the circumvention of TPMs owned, deployed, and controlled by YouTube. Plaintiffs do not allege\n24 any circumvention impaired any TPM they owned or controlled, required them to repair or restore\n25 any technological measure, or otherwise injured an interest they held in those measures. Instead, as\n26 shown above, the harms they assert arise from BDI\u2019s alleged downloading and downstream use of\n27\n\n28 Plaintiffs\u2019 asserted harms resemble copyright harms in the abstract; but whether they are fairly\n traceable to circumvention of access controls. They are not.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 6\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 12 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 their works. But that is a copyright claim, and copyright ownership alone does not establish that\n 2 Plaintiffs were \u201cinjured by\u201d circumvention of YouTube\u2019s access controls.\n 3 Plaintiffs\u2019 reading of Section 1203 has no meaningful limiting principle and would produce\n 4 absurd results. See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (\u201c[S]tatutory\n 5 interpretations which would produce absurd results are to be avoided.\u201d). Under their theory, every\n 6 content creator whose work appears on any platform with technological protections would become\n 7 a private enforcer of the platform\u2019s security infrastructure. A blogger on Medium, an artist on\n 8 Instagram, or a musician on Spotify would all have standing to sue anyone who scraped the\n 9 platform, regardless of whether the creator had any role in deploying, controlling, or even\n10 understanding the platform\u2019s TPMs. Nothing in Section 1203\u2019s text or structure supports\n11 conscripting millions of platform users as private attorneys general to enforce platform-owned\n12 technological restrictions. Coal. of Clergy, Laws., & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th\n13 Cir. 2002) (\u201c[A] litigant may assert only his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest a claim\n14 to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.\u201d). That is particularly true where, as here,\n15 Plaintiffs assert a DMCA claim to pursue classic copyright injuries for which, for a host of reasons\n16 (including fair use), they have no remedy under copyright law.\n17 Plaintiffs\u2019 attempts to distinguish VidAngel LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 3d 1329\n18 (D. Utah 2023), and Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (S.D. Cal.\n19 2008), which BDI cited in its Motion, are unavailing. Neither holds that copyright ownership alone\n20 is sufficient to enforce technological measures independently owned and controlled by a third-party\n21 plaintiff. Contrary to Plaintiffs\u2019 characterization of these cases, they are not just about whether\n22 copyright owners have standing. Opp. at 10-11. While Plaintiffs try to distinguish ClearPlay by\n23 emphasizing copyright ownership, that ignores the court\u2019s express reliance on the plaintiff\u2019s lack\n24 of a relationship to the TPM itself. 703 F. Supp. 3d at 1336. Echostar, by contrast, found standing\n25 because (unlike here) it was \u201creasonable to infer that [the plaintiff] also has the authority to control\n26 the measures protecting the programming.\u201d 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. And MDY Industries involved\n27 Blizzard, a company that both owned the copyrighted works (World of Warcraft) and designed,\n28 deployed, and controlled the TPM (Warden) that protected access to them. 629 F.3d at 935-36, 954.\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 7\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 13 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs concede that YouTube\u2014not Plaintiffs\u2014implements and controls the\n 2 TPMs. Indeed, the FAC alleges that Plaintiffs \u201cdelegated technical implementation of access\n 3 controls to YouTube.\u201d FAC \u00b6 158. ClearPlay, Echostar, and MDY do not hold that a copyright\n 4 owner with no ownership, control, or operational role in a third party\u2019s TPMs is \u201cinjured by a\n 5 violation\u201d of those measures under Section 1203(a). Plaintiffs\u2019 contrary reading would convert\n 6 every creator who posts content on a protected platform into a private enforcer of the platform\u2019s\n 7 technological restrictions. Section 1203(a) does not compel that result.\n 8 III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE CIRCUMVENTION OF ACCESS CONTROLS\n 9 UNDER SECTION 1201(A)\n10 Section 1201(a)(1) applies to technological measures that, \u201cin the ordinary course of [their]\n11 operation\u201d control access to a copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B). Plaintiffs chose to\n12 make their videos freely available for anyone to watch on YouTube. FAC \u00b6 33. The measures they\n13 identify do not prevent the public from watching those videos. Instead, they regulate the\n14 downloading of video files and automated activity on YouTube. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 33, 50-62.\n15 The TPMs Plaintiffs identify govern things like locating the underlying media file, limiting\n16 automated requests, expiring file URLs (i.e., temporary download links that automatically\n17 deactivate after a specific condition like a time limit or download count), and verifying that file\n18 requests originate from YouTube\u2019s player. See FAC \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201362. Those mechanisms may make it\n19 more difficult to obtain a separate copy of a video or retrieve files outside YouTube\u2019s ordinary\n20 playback environment. But that does not establish that they control access to the audiovisual work\n21 itself. Section 1201(a) and (b) draw a line between the two, and consistent with that distinction,\n22 Section 1201(a)(1) \u201cshould be interpreted narrowly to exclude technologies that permit access to\n23 copyrighted work, but restrict copying.\u201d Hattler v. Ashton, 2017 WL 11634742, at *6, *8 (C.D.\n24 Cal. Apr. 20, 2017). Plaintiffs\u2019 theory erases that distinction.\n25 A. Plaintiffs Still Have Not Alleged TPMs That, in the Ordinary Course of\n26 Operation, Control Access to the Works\n27 Under the DMCA, a measure \u201ceffectively controls access\u201d only if, \u201cin the ordinary course\n28 of its operation,\u201d it requires the user to apply information or a process \u201cto gain access to the work.\u201d\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 8\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 14 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B). That inquiry is work- and measure-specific, but the FAC fails to satisfy\n 2 this requirement for any of the alleged TPMs. The TPM\u2019s conditional architecture underscores the\n 3 statutory defect: Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that each measure, \u201cin the ordinary course of\n 4 its operation,\u201d requires an authorized process \u201cto gain access to the work,\u201d rather than regulating\n 5 file retrieval or platform behavior in particular circumstances. Id.; see also Lexmark Int\u2019l, Inc. v.\n 6 Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004) (measure did not effectively\n 7 control access where users could access the work without encountering it). Instead, the FAC\n 8 describes measures regulating file retrieval while acknowledging that users \u201ccan watch and listen\n 9 to videos for free\u201d through YouTube. FAC \u00b6 33. As an analysis of the TPMs demonstrates, that is\n10 fatal to Plaintiffs\u2019 Section 1201(a) claim.\n11 Rolling cipher: Rolling ciphers prevent users from obtaining a \u201cusable file location\u201d unless\n12 certain information is processed to generate a \u201cvalid media request URL,\u201d and function to inhibit\n13 access to the underlying media files for \u201cdownloading, copying or distribution.\u201d FAC \u00b6\u00b6 50-51. As\n14 the FAC itself makes clear, it restricts direct retrieval of the media file, not whether a viewer can\n15 access the work in the first instance.\n16 IP blocking and rate limiting: This alleged TPM is triggered only by abnormal activity on\n17 the YouTube website, particularly a high volume of requests for a specific IP address. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 53-\n18 54. As alleged, it is a conditional, platform-level response to a particular requester\u2019s traffic\n19 pattern\u2014not a measure that must be satisfied to access any particular copyrighted work.\n20 CAPTCHA challenges: CAPTCHA challenges are only triggered \u201c[w]hen traffic patterns\n21 indicate automated or suspicious activity.\u201d FAC \u00b6 57. A CAPTCHA may qualify where it stands\n22 between all requesters and access to the copyrighted work. See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs.,\n23 Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2007). But the FAC alleges a conditional challenge\n24 triggered by a particular requester\u2019s traffic pattern. As a result, two automated requesters can seek\n25 the same video but only one encounters a CAPTCHA. The CAPTCHA therefore does not operate,\n26 in the ordinary course, as a condition on access to the copyrighted work; it is triggered, if at all, by\n27 how a particular requester uses YouTube.\n28 Session-bound URLs: This alleged TPM involves the expiration of URLs after a limited\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 9\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 15 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 period of time. FAC \u00b6 55-56. They are tied to a specific transaction or user session so it cannot be\n 2 freely replayed elsewhere. But an ordinary viewer streaming a video on YouTube is unaffected by\n 3 URL expiration because the player handles session continuity automatically and transparently.\n 4 Proof-of-origin tokens: Finally, YouTube allegedly requires these tokens be sent with\n 5 requests to attest that they are coming from a genuine client. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 61-62. Like the other alleged\n 6 TPMs, this concerns retrieval of the media files, not whether the public can access Plaintiffs\u2019 works\n 7 through YouTube.\n 8 B. Plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cInitial Viewing\u201d Theory Conflates Playback Delivery with Access\n 9 Control\n10 Plaintiffs now contend in their Opposition that these TPMs control \u201cinitial access\u201d because\n11 YouTube\u2019s player performs certain processes before or during playback. Opp. at 14. But that\n12 characterization conflicts with the FAC\u2019s specific allegations about what the TPMs actually do.\n13 The FAC alleges that users \u201ccan watch and listen to videos for free\u201d while YouTube \u201clocks users\n14 from downloading copies,\u201d and that YouTube uses technological tools to detect and block \u201caccess\n15 to files for unauthorized downloading.\u201d FAC \u00b6\u00b6 33\u201334 (emphasis added). The rolling-cipher\n16 allegations explain that it inhibits \u201cdownloading, copying or distribution\u201d and \u201cpermanent,\n17 unrestricted download.\u201d Id. \u00b6 51 (emphases added). Helping deliver a video, though, does not make\n18 a process an access control.\n19 Plaintiffs\u2019 generalized allegation that playback involves a \u201csequence of authorized\n20 processes\u201d does not establish that any alleged TPM controls access to the works. Id. \u00b6 44. The FAC\n21 alleges what the individual TPMs do: the rolling cipher, temporary URLs, and origin tokens,\n22 according to Plaintiffs, regulate retrieval of the media files, while rate limits, IP blocking, and\n23 CAPTCHAs respond to high-volume or suspicious activity. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 44, 50\u201362. In other words, the\n24 first group governs how files are retrieved, while the second is triggered only by particular patterns\n25 of activity. Indeed, the FAC alleges that IP blocking and rate limits are triggered only after\n26 abnormal request volume; CAPTCHAs are triggered only by \u201cautomated or suspicious activity\u201d;\n27 session-bound URLs expire after access is granted; and tokens and the rolling cipher govern\n28 requests for underlying media data. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201362. Those allegations do not establish that any\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 10\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 16 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 measure, in the ordinary course of its operations, controls access to Plaintiffs\u2019 works or that an\n 2 ordinary viewer must overcome one to watch a video. Plaintiffs cannot transform the functions they\n 3 plead into access controls through generalized labels. MDY requires a work- and measure-specific\n 4 inquiry, not a conclusion that every component of a platform\u2019s playback architecture controls\n 5 access to every work. 629 F.3d at 952\u201354. That distinction matters for conditional anti-bot controls:\n 6 a CAPTCHA may qualify where it stands between a requester and the work; it does not become an\n 7 access control to every copyrighted work on a platform merely because a certain requester triggers\n 8 it. FAC \u00b6 57 (alleging CAPTCHA is triggered only \u201c[w]hen traffic patterns indicate automated or\n 9 suspicious activity\u201d and prevents the requesting client from proceeding).\n10 C. Plaintiffs\u2019 Dictionary Definition Collapses Access to a Work With\n11 Subsequently Obtaining a Downloadable File\n12 To get around these facts, Plaintiffs argue that \u201caccess\u201d includes the ability to \u201cobtain\u201d\n13 something and thus necessarily the ability to obtain a downloadable file. Opp. at 18. But Section\n14 1201(a) asks whether a measure controls access \u201cto the work.\u201d It does not say access to a particular\n15 file location, server path, or mode of delivery.\n16 The distinction is structural, not semantic. Section 1201(a) prohibits circumvention of an\n17 access control. Section 1201(b), by contrast, addresses technologies that protect the copyright\n18 owner\u2019s exclusive rights\u2014including reproduction\u2014but does not prohibit circumventing a copy\n19 control. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1201(a)(1), (b)(1); see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Suno Inc., 2026 WL\n20 2410184, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2026). If an anti-ripping or anti-download measure becomes\n21 an access control whenever it limits a user\u2019s ability to obtain the underlying file, there is no\n22 meaningful class of streaming copy controls left for Section 1201(b) to govern. That is precisely\n23 the redundancy MDY instructs courts to avoid. 629 F.3d at 946 (\u201cNonetheless, we read the\n24 differences in structure between \u00a7 1201(a) and (b) as reflecting Congress\u2019s intent to address distinct\n25 concerns by creating different rights with different elements.\u201d).\n26 D. The \u201cMerged\u201d TPM Theory Cannot Substitute for Statutory Showing of\n27 Access Controls\n28 Plaintiffs alternatively argue the five TPMs \u201cmay\u201d operate as merged access and copy\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 11\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 17 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 controls. Opp. at 19-23. A single measure may, of course, serve both access- and copy-control\n 2 functions. VidAngel, 869 F.3d at 864. But the possibility of dual function is not proof of dual\n 3 function. To qualify under Section 1201(a), the measure must independently satisfy Section\n 4 1201(a)(3)(B) by effectively controlling access to the copyrighted work. But \u201cmerged\u201d is a\n 5 description, not a substitute for the statutory showing.\n 6 The FAC\u2019s own allegations do not establish that here. They describe the rolling cipher as\n 7 obscuring the media-file URL; IP blocking and rate limiting as responding to abnormal traffic;\n 8 session-bound URLs as expiring after a limited period; CAPTCHAs as challenging suspected\n 9 automated activity; and proof-of-origin tokens as validating requests from YouTube\u2019s player. FAC\n10 \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201362. Those measures may impede downloading, automated extraction, or direct retrieval of\n11 media files. But that does not establish that they also control whether a user can access the\n12 audiovisual work itself, and the observation in Ted Entertainment, Inc. v. Snap, Inc., 2026 WL\n13 2435349, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2026) that the rolling cipher may also restrict downloading\n14 therefore does not answer the antecedent question whether it controls access to the work.\n15 The Copyright Office\u2019s recognition of \u201cmerged access and copy controls\u201d does not change\n16 the analysis. Opp. at 20. It recognizes that a single technology may perform both functions; it does\n17 not collapse them, let alone conclude that they necessarily do. Encryption that must be decrypted\n18 to view a work, for example, may restrict both access and copying. But a measure limiting or\n19 restricting copying, downloading, or automated use of the platform does not become an access\n20 control merely because it operates as part of the platform\u2019s delivery architecture.\n21 E. VidAngel and Subsequent Cases Do Not Save the FAC\n22 Plaintiffs rely on Disney Enterprises v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017), for the\n23 proposition that a work may be protected by an access control even when an authorized means of\n24 access exists. Opp. at 13-14. If Plaintiffs\u2019 reading of VidAngel were correct, a lock on a movie\n25 theater\u2019s projection booth would \u201ccontrol access\u201d to the movie simply because patrons can only\n26 watch the film in the theater screen, rather than enter the booth and take the film reel home. But the\n27 lock controls access to the copy and means of delivery, not the movie itself.\n28 The technological difference is straightforward. In VidAngel, the encryption operated on the\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 12\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 18 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 copyrighted content: without decryption, there was no intelligible movie to watch. 869 F.3d at 853.\n 2 Here, the alleged rolling cipher operates on the address used to retrieve the underlying file: without\n 3 bypassing it, the user still has an intelligible movie to watch through YouTube, but may not obtain\n 4 the file in the manner Plaintiffs say BDI did.\n 5 Suno\u2019s DVD-player hypothetical misses that distinction. Suno reasoned that disc encryption\n 6 would remain an access control even if studios gave every purchaser a licensed player for free.\n 7 2026 WL 2410184, at *6. True\u2014but only because the disc remained unintelligible unless the player\n 8 decrypted the copyrighted content. Here, the pleaded measure protects the route for directly\n 9 retrieving a file while YouTube makes the complete expression perceptible through the public\n10 player. The relevant distinction is not free versus paid access, or authorized versus unauthorized\n11 access. It is access to the work versus subsequent acquisition and copying of a file.\n12 Plaintiffs contend that post-VidAngel decisions addressing Section 1201(a) claims involving\n13 YouTube\u2019s TPMs dispose of all of BDI\u2019s arguments here. Opp. at 23-24. But while Snap and Suno\n14 have addressed similar access-control theories, neither resolved all of the defects here. Both are\n15 wrongly decided, in part because both disregard the technological mechanisms (and functionality)\n16 of the alleged TPMs. And none of the other cases on which Plaintiffs rely save their claims either.\n17 Suno does not cure Plaintiffs\u2019 pleading defects. It addressed only the rolling cipher and\n18 acknowledged the proposed complaint \u201cdoes not explain how [the playback] process works.\u201d 2026\n19 WL 2410184, at *6. The court supplied the missing link, inferring that the YouTube player \u201cmust\n20 decrypt or descramble the file URL,\u201d and left the issue for discovery. 2 Id. But Plaintiffs, not the\n21 Court, must plead facts showing that each TPM controls access. A complaint is not plausible simply\n22 because the mechanics are unknown and discovery might later establish the missing element.\n23 Worse yet, Plaintiffs not only fail to adequately plead how the alleged circumvention was\n24 done, but whether it was done at all. In Suno, discovery established that Suno had downloaded\n25 audio files from YouTube using yt-dl and yt-dlp. Id. at *1. Even on that record, the court declined\n26 to determine whether those tools circumvented the rolling cipher, recognizing they might use\n27\n 2\n Justice v. Suno, Inc., No. 2026 WL 2445362, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 2026), likewise denied\n28 dismissal but simply followed Suno \u201c[f]or the reasons stated\u201d there and left the rolling-cipher issues\n for factual development.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 13\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 19 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 authorized means, bypass the measure altogether, or \u201cfall in a gray area in between.\u201d Id. at *6. Here,\n 2 Plaintiffs do not even allege which tool BDI used, offering yt-dlp only as an \u201cexample\u201d of what\n 3 BDI might have used. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 102-03.\n 4 Suno identifies the questions Plaintiffs fail to answer here. A measure does not effectively\n 5 control access where another route to the work remains readily open, and a defendant does not\n 6 \u201ccircumvent\u201d merely by using a technological process without permission; it must avoid, bypass,\n 7 remove, deactivate, or impair the measure itself. Id. at *4-5. And that measure must apply \u201cin the\n 8 ordinary course of its operation\u201d for someone to gain access to the work. Plaintiffs therefore must\n 9 allege what access each TPM gates and what BDI allegedly did to bypass it. General allegations\n10 that BDI must have used downloading tools are not enough.\n11 Snap is equally inapplicable. Snap treated a restriction to YouTube\u2019s \u201cauthorized streaming\n12 architecture\u201d as equivalent to restricting access to the copyrighted work. 2026 WL 2435349, at *4-\n13 5. That collapses Section 1201\u2019s distinction between controlling access to a work on the one hand\n14 and controlling the manner in which an already-accessible work is delivered, retrieved, or copied\n15 on the other. The statutory question is not whether YouTube prefers users to receive content through\n16 its player; but whether the particular TPM requires an authorized process \u201cto gain access to the\n17 work.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B). Snap cites MDY for the proposition that an access control may\n18 operate after access is initially granted. 2026 WL 2435349, at *6-7. But MDY did not hold that\n19 every secondary restriction is an access control. The court still asked whether Warden actually\n20 controlled access to the particular copyrighted work\u2014and held that it did not as to works that\n21 remained accessible without Warden. 629 F.3d at 952\u201354.\n22 Nor can Snap\u2019s generalized treatment of YouTube\u2019s architecture substitute for a TPM-by-\n23 TPM analysis. Section 1201 asks whether, in the ordinary course of operation, \u201cthe measure\u201d\n24 controls access to \u201cthe work.\u201d Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that each TPM does so. But the FAC\n25 alleges materially different functions: the rolling cipher obscures a media-file URL; session-bound\n26 URLs expire; tokens authenticate requests; and rate limits, IP blocking, and CAPTCHAs respond\n27 to certain traffic patterns. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201362. Those measures do not perform the same function just\n28 because they operate in the same platform. A generalized reference to a \u201csequence of authorized\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 14\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 20 of 22\n\n\n\n 1 processes,\u201d see id. \u00b6 44, cannot transform five distinct mechanisms directed at file retrieval and\n 2 automated conduct into access controls. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\n 3 The remaining decisions do not compel a different result. Hattler and Lasica v. America\n 4 Online, Inc., 2015 WL 12791495 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015), recognize that Section 1201 does not\n 5 convert restrictions on use or copying of publicly accessible works into access controls. Sony Music\n 6 Entertainment v. Uncharted Labs Inc., 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026), Justice v.\n 7 Uncharted Labs, Inc., 2026 WL 1430232 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2026), and Cordova v. Huneault, 817\n 8 F.Supp.3d 819 (N.D. Cal. 2026), like Snap and Suno, incorrectly decided the access/copy\n 9 classification despite allegations focused on unauthorized downloading. And Reddit is\n10 distinguishable because the CAPTCHA there allegedly erected an actual gate that prevented\n11 automated users from accessing the protected search results; the content was not otherwise \u201cfreely\n12 readable\u201d because the TPM, which was triggered by unrecognized users, blocked access to the\n13 results pages unless the user satisfied the CAPTCHA. 2026 WL 2210094, at *16-17. Here, by\n14 contrast, Plaintiffs\u2019 videos remain freely viewable without encountering or overcoming the alleged\n15 TPMs, and Plaintiffs allege that CAPTCHAs are not a systematic measure, but rather are triggered\n16 only by particular behavior. 3 See FAC \u00b6 57. Reddit thus confirms that a measure that gates access\n17 to a work is different than one that regulates how an already-accessible work may be retrieved or\n18 copied.\n19 IV. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND\n20 Plaintiffs already amended their complaint after BDI identified these defects. They offer no\n21 basis to believe another amendment would cure them. Opp. at 25; Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara,\n22 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Plaintiffs should not be granted leave to amend.\n23 CONCLUSION\n24 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant dismissal with prejudice.\n25\n\n26\n 3\n27 Plaintiffs also misconstrue BDI\u2019s citation to CDK Global, LLC v. Tekion Corp., 2025 WL\n 1939951 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025). Opp. at 17 n.4. CDK\u2019s software system was not publicly\n28 accessible, but was protected by private networks, firewalls, and access restrictions that defendant\n allegedly bypassed. Id. at *9. By contrast, Plaintiffs\u2019 works are freely viewable.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 15\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 21 of 22\n\n\n Dated: August 27, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n 1\n\n 2 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n\n 3 /s/ Anne M. Voigts\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n 4 LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n 5 KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n\n 6\n Attorneys for Defendant,\n 7 BYTEDANCE INC.\n 8\n\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 16\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 47 Filed 08/27/26 Page 22 of 22\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n 1\n\n 2 I hereby certify that on August 27, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk\n 3 of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of\n 4 record.\n 5 /s/ Anne M. Voigts\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n 6\n Attorneys for Defendant,\n 7 BYTEDANCE INC.\n 8\n\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC\n CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 17\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-08-28T05:42:59.552005-07:00","document_number":"47","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"035027569062","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply to Opposition/Response","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-08-27T18:01:14.981531-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-27T18:01:14.990530-07:00","date_filed":"2026-08-27","time_filed":"17:54:21","entry_number":47,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-08-27.001","pacer_sequence_number":154,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/475637746/","id":475637746,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/491176707/","id":491176707,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/46/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-08-24T19:32:01.632702-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-25T15:50:58.651287-07:00","sha1":"1d372139d883a25ca43396a29477cc097a581400","page_count":4,"file_size":142576,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.46.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 46 Filed 08/24/26 Page 1 of 4\n\n\n\nRom Bar-Nissim (SBN 293356) Rohit D. Nath (SBN 316062)\nRom@HeahBarNissim.com Michael Gervais (SBN 330731)\nHEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\nLos Angeles, CA 90067 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2906\nTelephone: (310) 432-2836 Telephone: (310) 789-3100\n RNath@susmangodfrey.com\nJarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro Hac Vice) MGervais@susmangodfrey.com\nTom Kherkher (Pro Hac Vice)\nELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD Max L. Tribble, Jr. (SBN 326851)\nMONTGOMERY LLP Justin A. Nelson (Pro Hac Vice admission\n4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200 pending)\nHouston, TX 77006 SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\nJEllzey@EKSM.com 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100\nTKherkher@EKSM.com Houston, TX 77002-5096\n Telephone: (713) 651-9366\nAttorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class MTribble@susmangodfrey.com\n[additional attorneys in signature] JNelson@susmangodfrey.com\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n\nTED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\nFISHER, GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\nindividually and on behalf of all others Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley\nsimilarly situated,\n\n Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS\u2019 STATEMENT OF RECENT\nvs. DECISION\n\nBYTEDANCE INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Statement of Recent Decision\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 46 Filed 08/24/26 Page 2 of 4\n\n\n\n Plaintiffs Ted Entertainment, Inc., Matt Fisher, and Golfholics, Inc., (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d)\n\nrespectfully submit this Statement of Recent Decision to bring the Court\u2019s attention to a decision\n\nissued on August 20, 2026, in Justice v. Suno, Inc., 1:25-cv-11739-FDS (D. Mass), Doc. No. 71. A\n\ncopy of the decision is attached as Exhibit A.\n\n\n Dated: August 24, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n\n By: /s/ Rohit D. Nath\n SUSMAN GODFREY LLP\n Rohit D. Nath (SBN 316062)\n Michael Gervais (SBN 330731)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\n Los Angeles, CA 90067-2906\n Telephone: (310) 789-3100\n RNath@susmangodfrey.com\n MGervais@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Max L. Tribble, Jr. (SBN 326851)\n Justin A. Nelson (Pro Hac Vice admission\n pending)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100\n Houston, TX 77002-5096\n Telephone: (713) 651-9366\n MTribble@susmangodfrey.com\n JNelson@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Morgan McCollum (Pro Hac Vice)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.\n One Manhattan West, Fl. 50\n New York, NY 10001\n Telephone: (212) 336-8330\n mmccollum@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Rom Bar-Nissim (SBN 293356)\n Rom@HeahBarNissim.com\n HEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP\n 1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400\n Los Angeles, CA 90067\n Telephone: (310) 432-2836\n\n Jarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro Hac Vice)\n Tom Kherkher (Pro Hac Vice)\n\n 1\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Statement of Recent Decision\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 46 Filed 08/24/26 Page 3 of 4\n\n\n\n ELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD\n MONTGOMERY LLP\n 4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200\n Houston, TX 77006\n JEllzey@EKSM.com\n TKherkher@EKSM.com\n\n\n Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the\n Proposed Class\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Statement of Recent Decision\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 46 Filed 08/24/26 Page 4 of 4\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify this 24th day of August, 2026, I caused a true and correct copy of the\n\nforegoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which\n\nwill send notification to the attorneys of record, and is available for viewing and downloading.\n\n /s/ Rohit D. 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(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Related document(s) 42 ) (Nath, Rohit) (Filed on 8/24/2026) (Entered: 08/24/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/475209081/","id":475209081,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/490733675/","id":490733675,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/45/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-08-20T10:34:52.312729-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-25T15:56:05.375229-07:00","sha1":"93cbd213bf0773d93d3611c6fc390bbe6b84aede","page_count":4,"file_size":181687,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.45.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 45 Filed 08/20/26 Page 1 of 4\n\n\n\nRom Bar-Nissim (SBN 293356) Rohit D. Nath (SBN 316062)\nRom@HeahBarNissim.com Michael Gervais (SBN 330731)\nHEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\nLos Angeles, CA 90067 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2906\nTelephone: (310) 432-2836 Telephone: (310) 789-3100\n RNath@susmangodfrey.com\nJarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro Hac Vice) MGervais@susmangodfrey.com\nTom Kherkher (Pro Hac Vice)\nELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD Max L. Tribble, Jr. (SBN 326851)\nMONTGOMERY LLP Justin A. Nelson (Pro Hac Vice\n4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200 admission pending)\nHouston, TX 77006 SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\nJEllzey@EKSM.com 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100\nTKherkher@EKSM.com Houston, TX 77002-5096\n Telephone: (713) 651-9366\nAttorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class MTribble@susmangodfrey.com\n[additional attorneys in signature] JNelson@susmangodfrey.com\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n\nTED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\nFISHER, GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\nindividually and on behalf of all others Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley\nsimilarly situated,\n\n Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS\u2019 STATEMENT OF RECENT\nvs. DECISION\n\nBYTEDANCE INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Statement of Recent Decision\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 45 Filed 08/20/26 Page 2 of 4\n\n\n\n Plaintiffs Ted Entertainment, Inc., Matt Fisher, and Golfholics, Inc., (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d)\n\nrespectfully submit this Statement of Recent Decision to bring the Court\u2019s attention to two\n\ndecisions.\n\n The first is a decision issued on August 19, 2026, in Ted Entertainment, Inc., et al. v. Snap,\n\nInc., Case No. 2:26-cv-00754-AB-MBK (C.D. Cal.), Doc. No. 70. A copy of the decision is\n\nattached as Exhibit A.\n\n The second is a decision issued on August 18, 2026, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Suno Inc.,\n\nCase No. 1:24-cv-11611-FDS (D. Mass.), Doc. No. 272. A copy of the decision is attached as\n\nExhibit B.\n\n\n Dated: August 20, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n\n By: /s/ Rohit D. Nath\n SUSMAN GODFREY LLP\n Rohit D. Nath (SBN 316062)\n Michael Gervais (SBN 330731)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\n Los Angeles, CA 90067-2906\n Telephone: (310) 789-3100\n RNath@susmangodfrey.com\n MGervais@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Max L. Tribble, Jr. (SBN 326851)\n Justin A. Nelson (Pro Hac Vice admission\n pending)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100\n Houston, TX 77002-5096\n Telephone: (713) 651-9366\n MTribble@susmangodfrey.com\n JNelson@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Morgan McCollum (Pro Hac Vice)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.\n One Manhattan West, Fl. 50\n New York, NY 10001\n Telephone: (212) 336-8330\n mmccollum@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Rom Bar-Nissim (SBN 293356)\n 1\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Statement of Recent Decision\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 45 Filed 08/20/26 Page 3 of 4\n\n\n\n Rom@HeahBarNissim.com\n HEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP\n 1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400\n Los Angeles, CA 90067\n Telephone: (310) 432-2836\n\n Jarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro Hac Vice)\n Tom Kherkher (Pro Hac Vice)\n ELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD\n MONTGOMERY LLP\n 4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200\n Houston, TX 77006\n JEllzey@EKSM.com\n TKherkher@EKSM.com\n LMontgomery@EKSM.com\n\n\n Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed\n Class\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Statement of Recent Decision\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 45 Filed 08/20/26 Page 4 of 4\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify this 20th day of August, 2026, I caused a true and correct copy of the\n\nforegoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which\n\nwill send notification to the attorneys of record, and is available for viewing and downloading.\n\n /s/ Rohit D. 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Nath (SBN 316062)\nRom@HeahBarNissim.com Michael Gervais (SBN 330731)\nHEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\nLos Angeles, CA 90067 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2906\nTelephone: (310) 432-2836 Telephone: (310) 789-3100\n RNath@susmangodfrey.com\nJarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro Hac Vice) MGervais@susmangodfrey.com\nTom Kherkher (Pro Hac Vice) SFrazier@susmangodfrey.com\nLeigh S. Montgomery (Pro Hac Vice)\nELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD Max L. Tribble, Jr. (SBN 326851)\nMONTGOMERY LLP Justin A. Nelson (Pro Hac Vice\n4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200 forthcoming)\nHouston, TX 77006 SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\nJEllzey@EKSM.com 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100\nTKherkher@EKSM.com Houston, TX 77002-5096\nLMontgomery@EKSM.com Telephone: (713) 651-9366\n MTribble@susmangodfrey.com\nAttorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class JNelson@susmangodfrey.com\n[Additional Names in Signature Block]\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n\nTED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\nFISHER, GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\nindividually and on behalf of all others Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley\nsimilarly situated,\n PLAINTIFFS\u2019 OPPOSITION TO\n Plaintiffs, BYTEDANCE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO\nvs. DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 AMENDED\n COMPLAINT\nBYTEDANCE INC.,\n Date: September 24, 2026\n Defendant. Time: 10:00 AM\n Place: Courtroom 8, 19th Floor\n\n DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\n\n Complaint Filed: April 13, 2026\n\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 2 of 33\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nINTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1\n\nBACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 4\n\n I. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Section 1201(a) .................................. 4\n\n II. YouTube and Access Restrictions ........................................................................... 5\n\n III. ByteDance\u2019s Circumvention of YouTube\u2019s Access Restrictions ............................ 5\n\nLEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................................................... 6\n\nARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 6\n\n I. Plaintiffs Have Alleged Concrete Injuries Sufficient for Article III\n Standing ................................................................................................................... 6\n\n II. The Plain Text of the DMCA Squarely Forecloses ByteDance\u2019s\n Statutory Standing Argument................................................................................. 10\n\n III. Plaintiffs Have Alleged Circumvention of Access Controls Under\n Section 1201(a) ...................................................................................................... 11\n\n a. Plaintiffs Have Alleged TPMs that Effectively Control Access\n to Their Works ........................................................................................... 11\n\n b. YouTube\u2019s TPMs Are Access Controls Even If They Do Not\n Prevent Users from Viewing the Works on YouTube\u2019s Platform ............. 17\n\n c. YouTube\u2019s TPMs Can Be Both Access and Copy Controls ...................... 19\n\n d. ByteDance Cannot Overcome the Unbroken Line of Post-\n VidAngel Decisions Denying Motions to Dismiss on YouTube\u2019s\n TPMs .......................................................................................................... 23\n\n IV. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged the Timing and Nature of\n YouTube\u2019s Technological Protections and ByteDance\u2019s Large-Scale\n Scraping Operation................................................................................................. 24\n\nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 25\n\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 3 of 33\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCASES\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................................ 6\n\nAss\u2019n for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif.,\n No. 2:10-cv-09378, 2012 WL 7683452 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) ................................. 22\n\nAvaya, Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc.,\n No. 06-2490, 2012 WL 13035096 (D.N.J. May 1, 2012) ................................................. 19\n\nCallahan v. Ancestry.com, Inc.,\n No. 20-cv-08437, 2021 WL 2433893 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2021) ....................................... 9\n\nCDK Global, LLC v. Tekion Corp.,\n No. 25-cv-01394, 2025 WL 1939951 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025).................................. 1, 17\n\nCordova v. Huneault,\n 817 F. Supp. 3d 819 (N.D. Cal. 2026) .................................................................... 3, 10, 24\n\nCouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc.,\n No. 2:14-cv-39, 2016 WL 3181826 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016) .................................... 16, 17\n\nCraigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc.,\n 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................................................ 16\n\nDigital Drilling Data Sys., L.L.C. v. Petrolink Servs., Inc.,\n 965 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2020)............................................................................................. 19\n\nDisney Enterprises v. VidAngel, Inc.,\n 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017)...................................................................................... passim\n\nDoe 1 v. GitHub, Inc.,\n 672 F. Supp. 3d 837 (N.D. Cal. 2023) ................................................................................ 9\n\nEchostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc.,\n 543 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2008) ....................................................................... 10, 11\n\nEdland v. Basin Elec. Power Coop.,\n No. 21-cv-04008, 2021 WL 3080225 (D.S.D. July 21, 2021) ............................................ 3\n\nFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Sys. (TOC), Inc.,\n 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................................................................................................ 6\n\nGreen v. United States Dep\u2019t of Just.,\n 111 F.4th 81 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ......................................................................................... 1, 4\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 4 of 33\n\n\n\nHattler v. Ashton,\n No. 16-cv-04099, 2017 WL 11634742 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2017) ................................... 20\n\nJacob v. Biden,\n 542 F.Supp.3d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .................................................................................. 7\n\nJimenez v. Quarterman,\n 555 U.S. 113 (2009) .......................................................................................................... 10\n\nJustice v. Uncharted Labs, Inc.,\n 2026 WL 1430232 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2026)............................................................... 3, 23\n\nKadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,\n 2025 WL 744032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025) ........................................................................ 8\n\nKoala v. Khosla,\n 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019)............................................................................................... 6\n\nLanger v. HV Global Grp., Inc.,\n No. 2:21-cv-00328, 2021 WL 4777092 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2021) ..................................... 6\n\nLasica v. America Online, Inc.,\n No. 15-cv-4230, 2015 WL 12791495 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015) ................................ 21, 22\n\nLexmark Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,\n 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)............................................................................................. 14\n\nLujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,\n 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................................................................................ 7\n\nMaya v. Centex Corp.,\n 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011)............................................................................................. 6\n\nMDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc.,\n 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010)...................................................................................... passim\n\nMontes v. Capital One, N.A.,\n No. 23-cv-04052, 2024 WL 1643698 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2024) ....................................... 6\n\nN.Y. Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,\n 777 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) ................................................................................. 8\n\nPost University Inc. v. Learneo, Inc.,\n No. 21-cv-1242, 2025 WL 2702043 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2025) ......................................... 8\n\nRaw Story Media, Inc. v. OpenAI,\n 756 F. Supp. 3d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) ..................................................................................... 9\n\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 5 of 33\n\n\n\nReddit, Inc. v. SerpApi LLC,\n No. 25-cv-8736, 2026 WL 2210094 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026) ............................ 1, 7, 8, 16\n\nSony Music Ent. v. Uncharted Labs, Inc.,\n No. 24-cv-4777, 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026) ............................. 3, 23, 23\n\nSoo Park v. Thompson,\n 851 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2017)............................................................................................. 25\n\nThe Intercept Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, Inc.,\n 767 F.Supp.3d 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) ................................................................................. 8, 9\n\nTicketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entertainment, Inc.,\n 306 F.Supp.3d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2018) .......................................................................... 6, 16\n\nTicketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc.,\n 507 F.Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007) .............................................................................. 16\n\nTransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n 594 U.S. 413 (2021) ............................................................................................................ 8\n\nVidAngel LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,\n 703 F.Supp.3d 1329 (D. Utah 2023) ........................................................................... 10, 11\n\nWash. Env\u2019t Council v. Bellon,\n 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013)............................................................................................. 7\n\nY.H. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,\n No. 8:22-cv-00998, 2024 WL 5431490 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2024) ................................... 9\n\nYout, LLC v. Recording Indus. Ass\u2019n of Am., Inc.,\n 633 F.Supp.3d 650 (D. Conn. 2022) ................................................................... 3, 4, 18, 24\n\nSTATUTES AND REGULATIONS\n\n17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201 ................................................................................................................... 1, 4, 11\n\n17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a) .................................................................................................................. 3, 10\n\n37 C.F.R. \u00a7 201.40(b)(1)(i)(A)........................................................................................................ 4\n\nFEDERAL RULES\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ................................................................................................................... 6\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................................................... 6\n\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 6 of 33\n\n\n\n\u201cAccess,\u201d https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/access (last visited Aug. 5,\n 2026) ................................................................................................................................. 18\n\nU.S. Copyright Office, 1201 Rulemaking: Ninth Triennial Proceeding\n Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights (Oct. 2024) ............................................ 16\n\nU.S. Copyright Office, Section 1201 of Title 17: A Report of the Register of\n Copyrights (June 2017) ..................................................................................................... 20\n\n\n\n\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 7 of 33\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n As this Court has recognized, \u201cCongress enacted the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act],\n\n17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201, to \u2018mitigate the problems presented by copyright enforcement in the digital age.\u2019\u201d\n\nCDK Global, LLC v. Tekion Corp., 2025 WL 1939951, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025) (citation\n\nomitted). Congress was particularly concerned that \u201ccopyright owners [would] hesitate to make\n\ntheir works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they [would] be\n\nprotected against massive piracy.\u201d S. Rep. No. 105-90 at 8. The DMCA was thus born out of a\n\ndesire to \u201cfacilitate making available quickly and conveniently via the Internet the movies, music,\n\nsoftware, and literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius.\u201d Id. The DMCA\u2019s\n\n\u201canticircumvention provision\u201d\u2014which \u201coperate[s] as a prohibition against digital trespass\u201d by\n\nprohibiting any person from \u201ccircumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls\n\naccess to a work\u201d\u2014is critical to Congress\u2019s mission. Green v. United States Dep\u2019t of Just., 111\n\nF.4th 81, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(A)).\n\n YouTube is proof that Congress\u2019s vision has been a resounding success. YouTube is\n\nperhaps the emblematic example of an online streaming platform that allows copyright owners to\n\nmake their works \u201creadily accessible\u201d and \u201cavailable quickly and conveniently via the Internet\u201d to\n\nmillions of viewers with the peace of mind that their works will be \u201cprotected against massive\n\npiracy.\u201d To guard against digital trespassers, YouTube employs at least five technological\n\nprotection measures (\u201cTPMs\u201d) that individually, and collectively, control access to copyright\n\nowners\u2019 works by allowing users to stream content only from YouTube\u2019s website or through the\n\nYouTube app, where their views generate revenue for both YouTube and content creators, and\n\npreventing users from accessing and downloading the underlying video file for use outside of\n\nYouTube\u2019s streaming environment. Amended Complaint (\u201cAC\u201d) \u00b6\u00b6 33\u201346 (Dkt. 27).\n\n ByteDance circumvented each of YouTube\u2019s protective measures to digitally trespass and\n\ngain unauthorized access to the video files of tens of thousands of creators, including Plaintiffs. AC\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 102\u201318, 159\u201360. That is exactly the conduct that Section 1201(a)(1)(A) was designed to prohibit.\n\nSee Reddit, Inc. v. SerpApi LLC, 2026 WL 2210094, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026) (\u201cCongress\n\nsought to protect against mass piracy by making it unlawful to circumvent, or create products that\n 1\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 8 of 33\n\n\n\ncircumvent, technological measures implemented to prevent unauthorized access to and\n\ninfringement of such works\u201d).1 ByteDance then used its unauthorized access to download millions\n\nof video files to train its AI model, \u201cMagicVideo.\u201d AC \u00b6\u00b6 75\u201384. Put simply, rather than pay\n\nPlaintiffs and other creators for their work, ByteDance broke through YouTube\u2019s access protections\n\nto steal the underlying files needed to create the massive dataset necessary to fuel MagicVideo.\n\nAnd because ByteDance accessed those files by circumventing YouTube\u2019s protections rather than\n\nthrough YouTube\u2019s authorized player, YouTube, Plaintiffs, and other creators never saw the ad\n\nrevenue they otherwise would have earned. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 122\u201324.\n\n ByteDance offers three arguments for why it should escape liability for its conduct: first,\n\nPlaintiffs lack Article III standing; second, Plaintiffs lack statutory standing; and, third, YouTube\u2019s\n\nTPMs are not \u201caccess controls\u201d to begin with, but merely \u201ccopy controls.\u201d None of these arguments\n\nhold water.\n\n To start, ByteDance wrongly claims that Plaintiffs have not \u201callege[d] an injury traceable\n\nto the alleged circumvention of an access control\u201d for purposes of Article III standing. MTD at 6.\n\nNot so. Plaintiffs allege that they lost their ability to control, license, or exclude others from using\n\ntheir works, and lost any ad-generated revenue or other monetary value that Plaintiffs would have\n\nearned had ByteDance watched Plaintiffs\u2019 works through YouTube\u2019s authorized player or\n\nnegotiated a license instead. See AC \u00b6\u00b6 121\u201328. Each of Plaintiffs\u2019 injuries is directly traceable to\n\nByteDance\u2019s circumvention of YouTube\u2019s access controls, without which ByteDance would never\n\nhave been able to access the downloadable video files used to train its AI model.\n\n ByteDance\u2019s statutory standing argument fares no better. ByteDance argues that only the\n\npurveyor of a technological protection measure may bring a Section 1201(a) claim. But not a single\n\ncase that ByteDance cites stands for that proposition. If anything, they all confirm that copyright\n\nowners can bring Section 1201(a) claims and are typically the default plaintiff for asserting such\n\nclaims. That should come as no surprise because the statute clearly states that \u201cany person injured\n\nby a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States\n\n\n1\n Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis in this brief has been added.\n 2\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 9 of 33\n\n\n\ndistrict court for such violation.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a). That plainly includes rightsholders like\n\nPlaintiffs.\n\n ByteDance\u2019s third argument is different, and more ambitious. ByteDance claims that\n\nYouTube\u2019s TPMs are \u201ccopy controls,\u201d protected by a different statutory provision (Section\n\n1201(b)), and not \u201caccess controls\u201d protected by Section 1201(a). Because users can view videos\n\nfor free on YouTube, ByteDance\u2019s theory goes, they already have \u201caccess\u201d to the videos and\n\ntherefore any controls restricting access to the underlying digital files are outside the bounds of\n\nSection 1201(a) altogether.\n\n The Ninth Circuit has already squarely rejected ByteDance\u2019s theory in Disney Enterprises\n\nv. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). VidAngel involved the same kind of \u201cconditional\u201d\n\naccess ByteDance claims is categorically excluded from Section 1201(a) protection\u2014a system that\n\nallows users to view works through a controlled mechanism, but prevents the user from accessing\n\nand copying the underlying digital file. Id. at 864. The VidAngel decision addressed whether a\n\npurchaser of DVDs\u2014who, like YouTube users, could watch material through authorized means\n\n(i.e., widely available DVD players)\u2014violated Section 1201(a)(1) by decrypting the DVD\u2019s\n\ntechnological measures that controlled access to the DVD\u2019s underlying files. Id. at 862. The Ninth\n\nCircuit held that \u201cus[ing] . . . software to decrypt the TPMs to obtain a digital copy\u201d of the\n\nunderlying video file \u201cis exactly like \u2018breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a\n\n[movie]\u2019\u201d and violated Section 1201(a). Id. at 864\u201385 (citation omitted). It made no difference that\n\nthe DVD purchaser already could watch the films at issue. It should make no difference here\n\neither\u2014especially on a motion to dismiss.\n\n VidAngel is not an outlier. Every district court to consider the issue after VidAngel has\n\nrefused to hold, as a matter of law, that YouTube\u2019s TPMs fall outside Section 1201(a). See Sony\n\nMusic Entertainment v. Uncharted Labs Inc., d/b/a Udio.com, 2026 WL 1019199, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.\n\nApr. 15, 2026); Justice v. Uncharted Labs, Inc. d/b/a Udio.com, 2026 WL 1430232, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.\n\nMay 21, 2026); Cordova v. Huneault, 817 F.Supp.3d 819, 833\u201335 (N.D. Cal. 2026); Edland v.\n\nBasin Elec. Power Coop., 2021 WL 3080225, at *6 (D.S.D. July 21, 2021); Yout, LLC v. Recording\n\nIndus. Ass\u2019n of Am., Inc., 633 F.Supp.3d 650, 676 (D. Conn. 2022). ByteDance asks for an\n 3\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 10 of 33\n\n\n\nextraordinary departure from settled law to resolve this case on the pleadings alone, without any\n\nfactual record or discovery. The Court should decline.\n\n At this stage, Plaintiffs need only plausibly allege that their works are protected by a\n\n\u201ctechnological measure\u201d that \u201ceffectively controls access,\u201d and that ByteDance circumvented that\n\nmeasure to reach Plaintiffs\u2019 works. They have done both. ByteDance\u2019s motion should be denied.\n\n BACKGROUND\n\nI. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Section 1201(a)\n\n The DMCA was a response to the Internet\u2019s rapid growth. Congress enacted the DMCA to\n\n\u201ccreate[] the legal platform for launching the global digital on-line marketplace for copyrighted\n\nworks,\u201d S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8, and to \u201censure a thriving electronic marketplace for copyrighted\n\nworks on the Internet,\u201d H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at 9\u201310; see also id. at 10 (\u201cWhen copyrighted\n\nmaterial is adequately protected in the digital environment, a plethora of works will be distributed\n\nand performed over the Internet.\u201d).\n\n Thus, Section 1201 was born. It \u201c\u2018backed with legal sanctions\u2019 copyright owners\u2019 use of\n\n\u2018digital walls\u2019 to protect their copyrighted works from piracy.\u201d Green, 111 F.4th at 89 (citation\n\nomitted). Those walls, called technological protection measures, or \u201cTPMs,\u201d limit both the use of\n\ncopyrighted works and access to them. Id.\n\n Congress understood that Section 1201(a) could sweep in some noninfringing fair uses\n\nalong with the piracy it targeted. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 (II), at 36. For this reason, Congress built\n\nin statutory and regulatory exemptions. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(d). And Congress created a\n\nrulemaking process to keep pace with the ever-changing nature of technology. \u201cUnder Section\n\n1201(a)(1)(C), the Librarian of Congress conducts a triennial rulemaking proceeding to grant new\n\nexemptions to people who are likely to be \u2018adversely affected\u2019 by the anticircumvention provision\n\nin their ability to make noninfringing fair uses of copyrighted materials.\u201d Green, 111 F.4th at 90.2\n\n\n2\n Notable exemptions include, for example, an exemption that allows the circumvention of TPMs\nfor the purpose of excerpting \u201cshort portions of . . . motion pictures . . . [f]or the purpose of criticism\nor comment . . . [f]or use in documentary filmmaking, or other films where the motion picture clip\nis used in parody or for its biographical or historically significant nature\u201d (codified at 37 C.F.R.\n201.40(b)(1)(i)(A)).\n 4\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 11 of 33\n\n\n\n No exemption covers what happened here: mass circumvention to download millions of\n\nYouTube videos for commercial use. ByteDance has not sought such an exemption, and it has not\n\nreceived one.\n\nII. YouTube and Access Restrictions\n\n YouTube is perhaps the most potent example of how the careful balance struck by Section\n\n1201(a) has helped foster the \u201cthriving electronic marketplace\u201d that Congress intended.\n\nRightsholders\u2014from major studios to independent creators like Plaintiffs\u2014upload their content\n\nfor streaming and rely on YouTube\u2019s ad-supported model for revenue. AC \u00b6\u00b6 122\u201324.\n\n What makes YouTube attractive to rightsholders is the control they retain through the\n\nplatform\u2019s content-sharing process. A creator can upload content for streaming through YouTube\u2019s\n\nauthorized, ad-supported player while still controlling how their content is viewed and used. AC \u00b6\u00b6\n\n9, 36, 120. YouTube\u2019s Terms of Service expressly prohibit users from \u201caccess[ing], reproduc[ing],\n\ndownload[ing], distribut[ing], transmit[ting], broadcast[ing], display[ing], sell[ing], licens[ing],\n\nalter[ing], modify[ing] or otherwise us[ing] any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as\n\nexpressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if\n\napplicable, the respective rights holders.\u201d Id. \u00b6 70 n.3.\n\n The Complaint alleges that YouTube employs at least five TPMs\u2014the rolling cipher, IP-\n\nbased blocking and rate limiting, session-bound, short-lived URLs, CAPTCHA challenges, and\n\nproof-of-origin tokens\u2014that enforce its Terms of Service and are intended to protect the video files\n\nunderlying its streaming content. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 40\u201345, 50\u201364. These TPMs are described in detail below.\n\nSee infra at 11\u201317.\n\nIII. ByteDance\u2019s Circumvention of YouTube\u2019s Access Restrictions\n\n Plaintiffs allege that ByteDance deliberately circumvented YouTube\u2019s TPMs to gain\n\nunauthorized access to the underlying data files that are otherwise inaccessible to the public. AC\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 4\u20137, 47\u201349, 99\u2013115. ByteDance scraped millions of copyrighted videos from YouTube to feed,\n\ntrain, improve, and commercialize its generative AI model, \u201cMagicVideo,\u201d and later, \u201cSeedance,\u201d\n\nwhich allow users generate videos from text and image prompts. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1\u20133. On information and\n\nbelief, ByteDance used several tools and methods to do so, such as yt-dlp and IP rotation. Id. \u00b6\u00b6\n 5\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 12 of 33\n\n\n\n58\u201360, 63, 102\u201305. Descrambling tools like yt-dlp automate stream ripping\u2014a process that\n\ninvolves automatically accessing audio and video files directly from a website\u2019s servers rather than\n\nviewing content through the site\u2019s authorized player\u2014by deciphering YouTube\u2019s rolling cipher\n\nand extracting the underlying files from YouTube\u2019s servers. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 63, 97\u201398, 102\u201305. IP rotation\n\nuses virtual machines to cycle through IP addresses and dodge YouTube\u2019s blocking and monitoring\n\nsystems. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 58\u201359. Through measures like these, ByteDance circumvented YouTube\u2019s TPMs\n\nand gained unauthorized access to Plaintiffs\u2019 and the putative Class\u2019s content. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 97\u2013115.\n\n LEGAL STANDARD\n\n On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must \u201caccept the complaint\u2019s well-\n\npleaded factual allegations as true, and construe all inferences in the plaintiff\u2019s favor[.]\u201d Koala v.\n\nKhosla, 931 F.3d 887, 894 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). \u201c[T]here are no heightened pleading\n\nrequirements for a DMCA circumvention claim. [A plaintiff] only needs to allege facts that,\n\naccepted as true, \u2018state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\u2019\u201d Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige\n\nEnt., Inc., 306 F.Supp.3d 1164, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,\n\n678 (2009)).\n\n \u201cA motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing arises under Rule 12(b)(1).\u201d Montes v.\n\nCapital One, N.A., 2024 WL 1643698, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2024) (citing Maya v. Centex\n\nCorp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011)). When a defendant \u201cargues that [a] Plaintiff failed to\n\nassert allegations sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction,\u201d the \u201cCourt \u2018must assume\n\nthe allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff\u2019s favor.\u2019\u201d\n\nLanger v. HV Global Grp., Inc., 2021 WL 4777092, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2021) (citation\n\nomitted).\n\n ARGUMENT\n\nI. Plaintiffs Have Alleged Concrete Injuries Sufficient for Article III Standing\n\n To establish Article III standing, \u201ca plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an \u2018injury in fact\u2019\n\nthat is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;\n\n(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as\n\nopposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.\u201d Friends\n 6\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 13 of 33\n\n\n\nof the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180\u201381 (2000).\n\n ByteDance argues that Plaintiffs have not met the second prong of this inquiry. MTD at 6.\n\nBut the \u201cfairly traceable\u201d component of the Article III inquiry requires only that a plaintiff\n\ndemonstrate a \u201ccausal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.\u201d Jacob v.\n\nBiden, 542 F. Supp. 3d 938, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,\n\n560\u201361 (1992)). That connection is easy to draw here. ByteDance\u2019s circumvention of YouTube\u2019s\n\naccess controls caused Plaintiffs to lose their ability to control, license, or exclude others from using\n\ntheir works and caused Plaintiffs to lose any ad-generated revenue or other monetary value they\n\nwould have earned had ByteDance either licensed their works or viewed them through YouTube\u2019s\n\nauthorized player. See AC \u00b6\u00b6 121\u201328. ByteDance could not have used Plaintiffs\u2019 works to train its\n\nAI model without first getting around YouTube\u2019s file-level access restrictions. All of Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nharms are fairly traced to ByteDance\u2019s circumvention of YouTube\u2019s access controls, satisfying the\n\ncausality element for Article III standing. See Wash. Env\u2019t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141\u2013\n\n42 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A] \u2018causal chain does not fail simply because it has several links, provided\n\nthose links are not hypothetical or tenuous and remain plausible.\u2019\u201d (citation omitted)).\n\n ByteDance further argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because Plaintiffs\u2019 alleged\n\nharms \u201care classic copyright injuries\u201d rather than \u201cinjuries from circumvention of an access\n\ncontrol.\u201d MTD at 6. That argument is flawed for reasons already explained: Plaintiffs have alleged\n\ninjuries that stem directly from ByteDance\u2019s circumvention of YouTube\u2019s access controls. Further,\n\ncourts have repeatedly held in the DMCA context that injuries traditionally actionable in\n\ncopyright\u2014such as the loss of control of a plaintiff\u2019s works\u2014are sufficient to establish standing.\n\n Reddit, Inc. v. SerpApi LLC, 2026 WL 2210094 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026) is illustrative.\n\nThere, the plaintiff, Reddit, claimed that the defendants had violated Section 1201(a) by\n\ncircumventing a technological measure employed by Google called \u201cSearchGuard\u201d to access and\n\nscrape Reddit-authored content from Google\u2019s search engine results pages. Id. at *7. The court\n\nfound Reddit had \u201cplausibly allege[d] an injury \u2018similar to the harm traditionally actionable in\n\ncopyright,\u2019\u201d because the defendants\u2019 conduct \u201cresembles the unauthorized copying and\n\nreproduction that copyright has centrally historically guarded against.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\n 7\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 14 of 33\n\n\n\n\u201cAccordingly,\u201d the court concluded, \u201cReddit ha[d] plausibly alleged an injury in fact based on\n\ndefendants\u2019 circumvention and scraping of Reddit\u2019s own copyrighted works.\u201d Id. at *8.\n\n Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2025 WL 744032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025) is also\n\ninstructive. There, the plaintiffs alleged that Meta violated Section 1202(b) of the DMCA by\n\nstripping copyright-management information (\u201cCMI\u201d) from their works, making it easier to\n\n\u201cconceal[] actual infringement of their copyrights.\u201d Id. at *1. Meta argued, as ByteDance does here,\n\nthat the plaintiffs\u2019 alleged injury\u2014copyright infringement\u2014did not \u201csuffice for standing because\n\nthe DMCA protects different \u2018interests\u2019 than traditional copyright law, and standing requires an\n\ninjury that is closely related to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit.\u201d\n\nId. The court rejected this argument. As Judge Chhabria explained, \u201cwhether the DMCA seeks to\n\nprevent the exact injuries the plaintiffs allege is a separate question from whether the plaintiffs have\n\nbeen concretely injured by [defendant\u2019s conduct]. Article III standing requires that the injury to the\n\nplaintiff\u2014not their cause of action or the statute under which it arises\u2014have a close relationship\n\nto a traditional harm.\u201d Id. at *1 (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021)); see\n\nalso N.Y. Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 777 F.Supp.3d 283, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (\u201cThe \u2018inquiry\n\nasks whether plaintiffs have identified a close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted\n\ninjury,\u2019 not the asserted cause of action\u201d (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417)).\n\n Kadrey involved a different provision of the DMCA, but its logic applies here. As in\n\nKadrey, Plaintiffs\u2019 alleged harms\u2014lost control over their works and lost compensation for them\u2014\n\nclosely resemble the traditional property-based harms recognized in copyright law. Several courts,\n\nincluding Kadrey, have found that this harm suffices for Article III standing in the DMCA context.\n\nSee, e.g., The Intercept Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, Inc., 767 F.Supp.3d 18, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (noting\n\nthat the plaintiff\u2019s \u201cclaims [under Section 1202(b) of the DMCA] implicate the same kind of\n\nproperty-based harms traditionally actionable in copyright,\u201d and that \u201c[t]he DMCA adds another\n\nstick to the bundle of property rights already guaranteed to an author in her work under traditional\n\ncopyright law\u201d); N.Y. Times, 777 F.Supp.3d at 312 (explaining that \u201c[f]or both DMCA and\n\ntraditional copyright claims, the harm involves an injury to \u2018an author\u2019s property right in his original\n\nwork of authorship,\u2019\u201d which is a concrete injury for Article III standing); Post University Inc. v.\n 8\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 15 of 33\n\n\n\nLearneo, Inc., 2025 WL 2702043, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2025) (same).\n\n ByteDance relies on Raw Story Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, 756 F.Supp.3d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2024),\n\na case solely about \u00a7 1202 claims that is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit, and which\n\nreached a conclusion opposite to Kadrey, the Intercept Media, N.Y. Times, and Learneo. Id. at *4.\n\nBut even if Raw Story were good law, none of its reasoning has any relevance here. The court held\n\nthat the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a Section 1202 claim because it was \u201cnot convinced that\n\nthe mere removal of identifying information from a copyrighted work\u2014absent dissemination\u2014\n\nha[d] any historical or common-law analogue.\u201d Id. at 6. This is not a case about mere removal of\n\nidentifying information. As Plaintiffs allege, ByteDance accessed millions of video files and\n\n\u201cinitiate[d] millions of individual downloads of protected YouTube content, all without\n\nauthorization or compensation, all in violation of YouTube\u2019s TPMs, and all for the commercial\n\npurpose of building its foundational video models.\u201d AC \u00b6 95. Plaintiffs\u2019 alleged harms\u2014stemming\n\nfrom the unauthorized and uncompensated use of their licensable works\u2014are textbook injuries\n\n\u201ctraditionally actionable in copyright.\u201d Intercept Media, 767 F.Supp.3d at 27.\n\n In fact, none of the other cases ByteDance cites supports its sweeping assertion that\n\n\u201c[c]ourts addressing DMCA claims have . . . rejected attempts to establish standing through injuries\n\nuntethered from the specific alleged statutory violation.\u201d MTD at 5\u20136. Two cases do not even\n\ninvolve a DMCA claim. See Callahan v. Ancestry.com, Inc., 2021 WL 2433893 (N.D. Cal. June\n\n15, 2021) (no DMCA claim); Y.H. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 2024 WL 5431490 (C.D. Cal.\n\nAug. 14, 2024) (no DMCA claim). And the only other case, Doe 1 v. GitHub, Inc., 672 F.Supp.3d\n\n837, 850 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (also currently on appeal), is inapposite. In GitHub, the court held that\n\nthe plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a claim for retrospective damages (but held that they did\n\nhave standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief) because the plaintiffs did \u201cnot allege that they\n\nthemselves have suffered the injury they describe,\u201d and had only alleged a risk of potential \u201cfuture\n\nharm,\u201d which \u201calone [was] not sufficiently concrete to confer standing for damages.\u201d Id. at 850\u2013\n\n51. Here, by contrast, the Plaintiffs allege that they themselves suffered the alleged injuries. AC \u00b6\u00b6\n\n118\u201328.\n\n Because Plaintiffs have alleged concrete harms traceable to ByteDance\u2019s alleged DMCA\n 9\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 16 of 33\n\n\n\nviolation, Plaintiffs have Article III standing.\n\nII. The Plain Text of the DMCA Squarely Forecloses ByteDance\u2019s Statutory Standing\n\n Argument\n\n ByteDance argues that Plaintiffs lack statutory standing because, in its view, \u201cstatutory\n\nstanding flows from ownership or control of the technological measure allegedly circumvented\u2014\n\nnot merely ownership of protected content hosted on a third-party platform.\u201d MTD at 7. In other\n\nwords, while YouTube could sue, Plaintiffs cannot.\n\n The statute\u2019s plain language forecloses that argument. The DMCA provides that \u201cany\n\nperson injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an appropriate\n\nUnited States district court for such violation.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a). That plainly includes\n\nrightsholders like Plaintiffs, regardless of whether they own or control the technological measures\n\nthat ByteDance circumvented. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 944 (9th\n\nCir. 2010), as amended on denial of reh\u2019g (Feb. 17, 2011) (\u201c1201(a) prohibits the circumvention\n\nof any technological measure that effectively controls access to a protected work and grants\n\ncopyright owners the right to enforce that prohibition\u201d). Plaintiffs are persons injured by\n\nByteDance\u2019s violation of Section 1201(a)(1)\u2014they lost their ability to control the use of their works\n\nand they lost the ad-generated revenue and other monetary value they would have earned had\n\nByteDance either licensed their works or viewed them through YouTube\u2019s authorized player. AC\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 122\u201328. The Court need not, and should not, go beyond the statute\u2019s plain text. See Jimenez v.\n\nQuarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (\u201cIt is well established that, when the statutory language is\n\nplain, we must enforce it according to its terms.\u201d); see also Cordova v. Huneault, 817 F.Supp.3d\n\n819, 833 (N.D. Cal. 2026) (rejecting argument that the owner of the copyrighted works lacked\n\nstatutory standing to bring a Section 1201(a) claim).\n\n Neither of the two cases Bytedance cites stands for the proposition that \u201c[d]ecisions\n\ninterpreting Section 1201 support the conclusion that statutory standing flows from ownership or\n\ncontrol of the technological measure allegedly circumvented.\u201d MTD at 7. In both VidAngel LLC v.\n\nClearPlay, Inc., 703 F.Supp.3d 1329 (D. Utah 2023) and Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech,\n\nInc., 543 F.Supp.2d 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2008), the defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked standing\n 10\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 17 of 33\n\n\n\nbecause they were not the copyright owners\u2014the exact opposite of what ByteDance argues here.\n\nSee ClearPlay, 703 F.Supp.3d at 1334 (\u201cVidAngel argues that the DMCA does not extend a private\n\ncause of action to ClearPlay because ClearPlay is not the copyright owner . . . .); Echostar Satellite,\n\n543 F.Supp.2d at 1205 (\u201cViewtech argues in its moving papers that EchoStar is not the copyright\n\nowner, and thus lacks standing . . . .\u201d). Both courts held that standing is not limited to copyright\n\nowners alone. See ClearPlay, 703 F. Supp. 3d at 1335; Echostar Satellite, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1205\u2013\n\n06. Neither case says copyright owners are excluded if they do not own the TPMs at issue.\n\n Permitting ByteDance to escape liability under Section 1201 simply because Plaintiffs and\n\nother content creators delegated technical implementation of access controls to YouTube would gut\n\nthe statute\u2019s protections for every creator who relies on a third-party platform to safeguard their\n\nwork. The text of Section 1201 does not support that result. Because Plaintiffs are \u201cperson[s]\u201d\n\n\u201cinjured by\u201d Bytedance\u2019s alleged violation of Section 1201(a), Plaintiffs have statutory standing.\n\nIII. Plaintiffs Have Alleged Circumvention of Access Controls Under Section 1201(a)\n\n ByteDance\u2019s core theory is that access controls are limited to measures that \u201cprevent[] a\n\nuser from viewing or opening the work at all,\u201d like passwords or paywalls. MTD at 9. Because\n\nanyone can watch Plaintiffs\u2019 videos on YouTube, ByteDance concludes that Plaintiffs have no\n\nSection 1201(a) claim because the TPMs at issue are only copy controls. That theory has no\n\nfoundation in the statutory text or the legislative history and has been squarely rejected by numerous\n\ncourts, including the Ninth Circuit. It is also wrong on the facts Plaintiffs allege: even watching a\n\nvideo on YouTube requires satisfying technological measures.\n\n a. Plaintiffs Have Alleged TPMs that Effectively Control Access to Their Works\n\n It\u2019s important to understand at the outset how Plaintiffs allege the TPMs at issue function,\n\nparticularly because ByteDance\u2019s motion repeatedly mischaracterizes Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations about\n\nthe TPMs.\n\n The DMCA provides that \u201ca technological measure \u2018effectively controls access to a work\u2019\n\nif the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a\n\nprocess or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.\u201d 17\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B). That is precisely how Plaintiffs allege YouTube\u2019s TPMs work. Before\n 11\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 18 of 33\n\n\n\nanyone can reach Plaintiffs\u2019 works\u2014whether to view those works on YouTube\u2019s streaming\n\nplatform or to reach the underlying video file, users first encounter a variety of gatekeeping\n\nmechanisms that they must satisfy through the application of information. Those TPMs are the\n\n\u201crolling cipher,\u201d the \u201cproof-of-origin\u201d tokens, and the short-lived, session-bound URLs. AC \u00b6\u00b6 52\u2013\n\n64. YouTube also employs TPMs that can revoke access to YouTube if it suspects suspicious\n\nactivity\u2014like Bytedance\u2019s \u201c[l]arge-scale scraping operations.\u201d Id. \u00b6 58. Those TPMs are called \u201cIP\n\nblocking\u201d and \u201cCAPTCHA challenges.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 53\u201354, 57\u201360.\n\n Start with the \u201crolling cipher.\u201d The \u201crolling cipher\u201d is, in effect, a digital lock that constantly\n\nchanges its combination. As Plaintiffs allege, YouTube maintains two different URLs for any given\n\nvideo: the page URL is the webpage where the video streaming occurs, and the file URL is for the\n\nunderlying video file itself. AC \u00b6 51. The file URL is encrypted using a complex and periodically\n\nchanging algorithm called the rolling cipher. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201351. Users who wish to play a video must\n\nfirst receive what is called a \u201cclient,\u201d i.e. YouTube\u2019s player software. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 45, 50. That software,\n\nwhich is sent to the user\u2019s browser, uses a decryption routine to authenticate requests and deliver\n\ncontent only through YouTube\u2019s streaming environment. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201351. In other words, the player\n\nsoftware decrypts the rolling cipher so the video can stream, but it does so only for playback, not\n\nfor downloading. The underlying video file remains under lock and key. Users\u2019 access to Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nworks is thus controlled: the rolling cipher only authorizes users to view Plaintiffs\u2019 works from the\n\nYouTube streaming platform.\n\n Proof-of-origin tokens similarly control access to Plaintiffs\u2019 works. YouTube\u2019s official\n\nplayer software generates tokens which are, in effect, keys tied to the requesting session that\n\naccompany the request for the video file. YouTube\u2019s servers validate these tokens before delivering\n\nthe video stream. AC \u00b6\u00b6 61\u201364. Because proof-of-origin tokens are generated exclusively within\n\nYouTube\u2019s authorized player environment, software operating outside that environment cannot\n\nobtain valid tokens through ordinary means. Id. \u00b6 62. To retrieve audiovisual files at scale,\n\nautomated scraping tools must therefore extract, replicate, or spoof the token parameters required\n\nfor server authentication. Id. \u00b6 63. Proof-of-origin tokens thus effectively control access by\n\nconditioning delivery of copyrighted works on proof that the requester is operating within\n 12\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 19 of 33\n\n\n\nYouTube\u2019s authorized playback environment. Id. \u00b6 64.\n\n YouTube further controls access by issuing only session-bound, short-lived URLs. These\n\nURLs include authorization parameters that expire, after which the server refuses to honor them.\n\nIn simple terms, YouTube does not just deliver the full video to every user seeking to view content.\n\nIt sends the video through temporary links, and only lets it be played using its own system, while\n\nchecking each step along the way. AC \u00b6\u00b6 55\u201356. To stream the full video, a user therefore must\n\ncontinuously apply the processes described above\u2014executing YouTube\u2019s proprietary decryption\n\ncode to \u201cunlock\u201d the rolling cipher and sending back proof-of-origin tokens\u2014which the user can\n\nonly do if they are trying to view the video in an authorized manner on YouTube\u2019s platform.\n\nAnyone who wants to access the underlying video file itself so that they can download and view\n\nthe file outside of YouTube must circumvent these measures. Id. \u00b6 56.\n\n These TPMs are access controls akin to those at issue in Disney Enterprises v. VidAngel,\n\nInc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). In VidAngel, the plaintiffs had made their works available on\n\nDVDs and Blu-ray discs which contained encryption measures called \u201cCSS\u201d and \u201cAACS.\u201d 869\n\nF.3d at 853. To access the disc\u2019s contents, those encryption measures had to first be decrypted.\n\nOnly a DVD player from a licensed manufacturer could \u201clawfully decrypt [the] disc\u2019s content, and\n\nthen only for playback, not for copying.\u201d Id. The defendant, VidAngel, circumvented the DVD\u2019s\n\nencryption measures to access and copy the discs\u2019 contents without using an authorized player. The\n\nNinth Circuit held that the DVD\u2019s encryption measures were access controls. Id. at 865.\n\n YouTube\u2019s TPMs operate similar to the encryption measures on DVDs. To stream a\n\nYouTube video, the rolling cipher must first be decrypted and YouTube\u2019s servers must receive a\n\nvalid token. Only YouTube\u2019s player software contains the keys to descramble the rolling cipher\n\nand to provide the proof-of-origin tokens, just as only an authorized DVD player contained the keys\n\nto decrypt the DVD\u2019s encryption measures. But even then, the ordinary user has only gained access\n\nto the webpage where the video playback occurs, not to download the underlying video file, just as\n\nthe ordinary user in VidAngel only gained access to the DVD\u2019s contents for playback, not for\n\ncopying. To gain access to the underlying video file, ByteDance, like VidAngel, had to circumvent\n\nYouTube\u2019s TPMs. Had ByteDance proceeded through the authorized path of access, they would\n 13\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 20 of 33\n\n\n\nhave only ever been able to view the video from YouTube\u2019s streaming environment, just as had\n\nVidAngel proceeded through the authorized path of access, it would have only been able to view\n\nthe DVD\u2019s contents with an authorized DVD player.\n\n ByteDance claims that none of these measures are \u201caccess measures\u201d because they do not\n\nregulate \u201cthreshold access to the videos themselves\u201d and are not \u201cencountered by every viewer or\n\nin the ordinary course of viewing a YouTube video.\u201d MTD at 14, 17. But that is, at best, a disputed\n\nquestion of fact, as Plaintiffs do allege that users encounter YouTube\u2019s TPMs in the ordinary course\n\nof watching a video. Plaintiffs allege that \u201c[v]iewing a work on YouTube . . . requires the\n\napplication of a sequence of authorized processes, including the issuance and validation of session-\n\nspecific tokens, execution of player-side instructions, and reconstruction of segmented media\n\nstreams into a continuous audiovisual experience.\u201d AC \u00b6 44. While this may occur behind the\n\nscenes\u2014just like the DVD player\u2019s authorized decryption of the video file in VidAngel\u2014an\n\nordinary user nevertheless must, as alleged in the complaint, satisfy the technological protection\n\nmeasure in order to watch a video. Each \u201ccontrols a user\u2019s initial access to a YouTube video,\u201d\n\ncontra MTD at 17, by limiting the user\u2019s access to streaming the video on YouTube\u2019s platform,\n\nwhere YouTube and content creators like Plaintiffs can generate revenue from clicks and views. If\n\na user wishes to access the underlying video file, she must circumvent these measures.\n\n YouTube\u2019s TPMs are thus different from those at issue in Lexmark Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Static\n\nControl Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). See MTD at 15. Lexmark made printers\n\nand toner cartridges. Id. at 530. The question in Lexmark was whether an authentication sequence\n\nwas a technological measure that effectively controlled access to a Lexmark printer\u2019s software,\n\ncalled the Printer Engine Program Code. Id. at 546\u201347. The Sixth Circuit said no, because a user\n\ndid not need to encounter the authentication code to access the Printer Engine Program Code;\n\nanyone could \u201cread the literal code of the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory,\n\nwith or without the benefit of the authentication sequence.\u201d Id. at 546. \u201cNo security device, in other\n\nwords, protect[ed] access to the Printer Engine Program Code and no security device accordingly\n\nmust be circumvented to obtain access to that program code.\u201d Id. at 547.\n\n That is nothing like this case. Here, there is no way for the ordinary user to access Plaintiffs\u2019\n 14\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 21 of 33\n\n\n\nworks\u2014whether to view on YouTube\u2019s platform or to access the underlying video file\u2014without\n\nencountering TPMs like the rolling cipher and proof-of-origin tokens. As VidAngel makes clear,\n\nthe fact that YouTube offers an authorized way to view Plaintiffs\u2019 works does not mean that\n\nByteDance did not circumvent an access control when it circumvented YouTube\u2019s TPMs to gain\n\naccess to the underlying video file. See 869 F.3d at 865.\n\n In addition to the rolling cipher, proof-of-origin tokens, and short-lived, session-bound\n\nURLs, YouTube also employs two measures\u2014IP blocking and CAPTCHA challenges\u2014that can\n\nrevoke access to YouTube\u2019s platform. As Plaintiffs allege, YouTube monitors network behavior\n\nand blocks IP addresses that exhibit patterns consistent with abusive behavior, so that the IP\n\naddresses lose access to the entire YouTube platform. AC \u00b6\u00b6 53\u201354. YouTube also deploys\n\nCAPTCHA challenges (tests \u201coften requiring identification of objects with grainy images\u201d) when\n\nautomated or suspicious activity is detected. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 57\u201360. These challenges \u201cperform a gatekeeping\n\nfunction by prohibiting a certain type of user (a bot) from accessing the platform and the audiovisual\n\nworks hosted on it.\u201d Id. \u00b6 57.\n\n ByteDance argues that neither CAPTCHA nor IP blocking counts as access controls\n\nbecause they only \u201cregulate continue[d] platform use after YouTube detects abnormal activity.\u201d\n\nMTD at 14; see also id. at 15. But the Ninth Circuit, in MDY, made clear that measures that revoke\n\naccess can also be access controls under Section 1201(a). MDY, 629 F.3d at 943 (\u201c[I]n our view,\n\nan access control measure can both (1) attempt to block initial access and (2) revoke access if a\n\nsecondary check determines that access was unauthorized.\u201d). MDY involved a TPM called\n\n\u201cWarden,\u201d which was designed to keep bots off World of Warcraft servers. 629 F.3d at 942.\n\nWarden functioned by first \u201cscan[ning] a [player\u2019s] computer\u2019s RAM prior to allowing the player\n\nto connect to [World of Warcraft\u2019s] servers.\u201d Id. If the Warden software detected a bot through that\n\nscan, it would not allow the player to connect and play. But if the bot was able to get through and\n\naccess, Warden had a secondary component that ran \u201cperiodically in the background on a player\u2019s\n\ncomputer when it is [was] connect to WOW\u2019s servers\u201d which \u201clook[ed] for patterns of code\n\nassociated with known bots or cheats.\u201d Id. If Warden \u201cdetect[ed] a bot or cheat,\u201d it would \u201cboot[]\n\nthe player from the game.\u201d Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Warden was \u201can effective access control\n 15\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 22 of 33\n\n\n\nmeasure\u201d with respect to certain copyrighted work. Id. at 954.\n\n YouTube, like Warden, monitors network behavior and employs TPMs, like IP blocking\n\nand CAPTCHA challenges that monitor behavior and will boot unauthorized users from the\n\nYouTube platform.\n\n Indeed, Courts regularly recognize TPMs like CAPTCHA as access measures. See, e.g.,\n\nTicketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (\u201c[B]ecause\n\nCAPTCHA \u2018in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information . . . to\n\ngain access to the work,\u2019 it is a technological measure that regulates access to a copyrighted\n\nwork.\u201d); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Ent., Inc., 306 F.Supp.3d 1164, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2018)\n\n(same); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same).\n\nJudge Engelmayer\u2019s recent decision in Reddit v. SerpApi is particularly on point. There, the court\n\nconsidered whether \u201cSearchGuard,\u201d a TPM used by Google, was an access control. SearchGuard\n\nworks by \u201cexamin[ing] each [Google] search query to determine whether it is coming from a\n\nrecognized or unrecognized source,\u201d and \u201c[i]f the source is unrecognized, SearchGuard sends a\n\nchallenge or CAPTCHA that requires the browser to return information about the user generating\n\nthe inquiry.\u201d 2026 WL 2210094, at *3, *16. The court concluded that SearchGuard was \u201ca \u2018process\u2019\n\nrequired \u2018to gain access to the work,\u2019\u201d because \u201c[i]t erects a gate between users and Google [search\n\nengine results pages], which in the ordinary course, can be opened only by human users but which\n\nkeeps out automated users,\u201d and \u201cthereby controls access . . . [by] restricting such access to human\n\nusers who cannot engage in mass scraping of data.\u201d Id. at *16 (citing MDY, 629 F.3d at 954). The\n\nvery same is true of YouTube\u2019s CAPTCHA and IP blocking measures.\n\n In the face of this authority, ByteDance relies on a single out-of-circuit decision about\n\ngrocery store coupons, CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., 2016 WL 3181826, at *6 (N.D.\n\nInd. June 8, 2016).3 But that case does not stand for the proposition that \u201ctraffic-management and\n\n3\n ByteDance also cites in a footnote a report from the U.S. Copyright Office that it claims \u201crejected\nthe argument that rate-limit enforcement systems effectively control access to a work.\u201d MTD at 14\nn.13. But the Copyright Office repeatedly emphasized the limited amount of information it had\nbefore it to assess whether rate-limit enforcement systems effectively control access to a work. See,\ne.g., Section 1201 Rulemaking: Ninth Triennial Proceeding Recommendation of the Register of\nCopyrights, at 125 (Oct. 2024) (\u201cIP address rotation, based on the thin record before the Office,\n 16\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 23 of 33\n\n\n\nanti-abuse systems are not access controls under Section 1201(a),\u201d as ByteDance asserts. MTD at\n\n14. In CouponCabin, the plaintiff had discovered \u201ca marked increase in the amount of its unique\n\ncontent appearing on a number of competing websites,\u201d and hired a security provider to block\n\ntraffic \u201cfrom certain . . . service providers identified as being used particularly heavily by the\n\nDefendants to conduct scraping activities.\u201d Id. at *1. In response, the defendants simply switched\n\nto other servers that hadn\u2019t been blocked. Id. at *6. The court dismissed the Section 1201(a) claim\n\nbecause the plaintiff\u2019s TPM was plainly ineffective, not because IP blocking is per se not an access\n\ncontrol. Id. at *6. And even if Couponcabin could be read to stand for that proposition (it can\u2019t), it\n\nis neither binding on this court nor persuasive. The Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision in MDY is both.4\n\n Because YouTube\u2019s TPMs are precisely the type of measures that the Ninth Circuit already\n\nhas held are access controls under Section 1201(a), ByteDance\u2019s motion should be denied.\n\n b. YouTube\u2019s TPMs Are Access Controls Even If They Do Not Prevent Users\n\n from Viewing the Works on YouTube\u2019s Platform\n\n ByteDance argues that the aforementioned TPMs are not access controls because they do\n\nnot \u201cprevent[] users from accessing or perceiving the videos in the first instance.\u201d In other words,\n\nbecause Plaintiffs\u2019 works are viewable on YouTube\u2019s platform, users have \u201caccess to [the] work,\u201d\n\nand Section 1201(a) offers nothing more for the underlying video file. MTD at 11. As discussed,\n\nByteDance is wrong\u2014Plaintiffs have alleged that YouTube employs TPMs that require users to\n\napply a process to gain any access to the works, including to stream. Regardless, Plaintiffs do not\n\neven need to allege that YouTube\u2019s TPM \u201cprevent[] a user from viewing or opening the work at\n\nall\u201d to assert a Section 1201(a) claim. They need only allege that YouTube\u2019s TPMs effectively\n\ncontrol how the user accesses Plaintiffs\u2019 works.\n\n Start with the plain language of the statute. The statute says \u201caccess\u201d; not \u201cperceive,\u201d\n\n\ndoes not appear to involve circumvention of an effective control\u201d).\n4\n ByteDance also appears to assert that this Court\u2019s analysis in CDK Global, LLC v. Tekion Corp.,\n2025 WL 1939951 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025) supports the conclusion that YouTube\u2019s measures\n\u201care outside the scope of Section 1201(a)\u201d (although it does not further explain that assertion). See\nMTD at 2. But CDK involved an IP-access restriction, and this Court agreed that it was plausibly\nan access control. See id. at *6, 8\u20139.\n 17\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 24 of 33\n\n\n\n\u201cview,\u201d or \u201cwatch.\u201d \u201cAccess\u201d includes the \u201cfreedom or ability to obtain or make use of something.\u201d\n\nSee Access, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/access (last\n\nvisited Aug. 5, 2026); see also Yout, 633 F.Supp.3d at 664 (citing Merriam Webster and concluding\n\nthat TPMs \u201cthat restrain a YouTube user\u2019s freedom or ability to access the location where\n\ndownloadable files are stored and download them\u201d are plausibly access controls). That is exactly\n\nwhat Plaintiffs allege: that YouTube employed TPMs restricting users\u2019 \u201cfreedom or ability to\n\nobtain\u201d (i.e. \u201caccess\u201d) the underlying audiovisual files, and that ByteDance circumvented those\n\ncontrols to \u201cobtain[] millions of videos from YouTube\u2019s platform.\u201d AC \u00b6 160.\n\n Further, the plain text of the statute says \u201ceffectively controls access,\u201d not \u201ceffectively\n\nprevents access.\u201d As the Ninth Circuit explained, \u201c[t]he statutory definition of the phrase\n\n\u2018effectively control access to a work\u2019 does not require that an access control be strong or\n\ncircumvention-proof. Rather, it requires an access control measure to provide some degree of\n\ncontrol over access to a copyrighted work.\u201d MDY, 629 F.3d at 954 n.17 (citation omitted).\n\n VidAngel forecloses ByteDance\u2019s narrow interpretation of Section 1201(a). VidAngel made\n\nthe same exact argument that ByteDance makes here\u2014that because plaintiffs could view the works,\n\nthe DVD\u2019s TPMs were not access controls, but instead \u201cuse controls\u201d (i.e. \u201ccopy controls\u201d). The\n\nNinth Circuit disagreed: \u201c[n]othing in the legislative history [of the DMCA] suggests that VidAngel\n\ndid not circumvent an access control simply because there are authorized ways to access the\n\nStudios\u2019 works.\u201d 869 F.3d at 865. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff\u2019s TPMs\u2014which\n\nwere designed to prevent the user from accessing and copying the disc\u2019s contents\u2014were access\n\ncontrols governed by Section 1201(a). Id.\n\n The facts alleged here are materially similar. YouTube users can watch Plaintiffs\u2019 works,\n\nbut YouTube\u2019s TPMs limit their access: They can watch the videos only on YouTube\u2019s streaming\n\nplatform. Likewise, the DVD purchaser in VidAngel was authorized to watch the copyrighted movie\n\nas many times as she wanted, provided she used the authorized mechanism, a licensed DVD player.\n\n The legislative history of the DMCA also forecloses ByteDance\u2019s narrow interpretation of\n\nSection 1201(a). In enacting Section 1201(a), Congress \u201cwas particularly concerned with\n\nencouraging copyright owners to make their works available in digital formats such as \u2018on-demand\u2019\n 18\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 25 of 33\n\n\n\nor \u2018pay-per-view,\u2019 which allow consumers effectively to \u2018borrow\u2019 a copy of the work for a limited\n\ntime or a limited number of uses.\u201d MDY, 629 F.3d at 947. As the House Commerce Committee\n\nwarned, \u201c[t]o operate in this environment, content providers will need both the technology to make\n\nnew uses possible and the legal framework to ensure they can protect their work from piracy.\u201d Id.\n\n(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 23 (1998)). Congress clearly had in mind that Section\n\n1201(a) would not just encompass access controls that prevent users from viewing the works (such\n\nas paywall), but also those that protect streamers from piracy (by preventing users from accessing\n\nand downloading the underlying video file, even if they could otherwise view the work by streaming\n\nit). If Section 1201(a) did not extend to this latter type of \u201caccess control,\u201d then copyright owners\n\nlike Plaintiffs would never make their works available for on-demand streaming\u2014on YouTube or\n\nany streaming platform\u2014contrary to Congress\u2019s intent.\n\n Against the statutory language, the Ninth Circuit\u2019s controlling authority, and legislative\n\nhistory, ByteDance cites to two out-of-circuit cases for the premise that a \u201ctechnological measure,\n\nin order to be effective, must prevent all forms of access to a work.\u201d MTD at 17. But Digital\n\nDrilling Data Sys., L.L.C. v. Petrolink Servs., Inc., 965 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2020), stands simply for\n\nthe premise that a TPM is not an access control if it does not \u201ccontrol[] access to the [work] at all.\u201d\n\nId. at 377; see also id. at 376 (holding that the plaintiff\u2019s TPMs did not control access to the\n\nplaintiff\u2019s \u201cdatabase schema\u201d because the \u201cdata was stored in an open database file to allow users\n\nto query the database using off-the-shelf products.\u201d). And the same is true of Avaya, Inc. v. Telecom\n\nLabs, Inc., 2012 WL 13035096 (D.N.J. May 1, 2012), where there was no protection measure that\n\nguarded \u201caccess [to] the copyrighted aspect of the [plaintiff\u2019s] software,\u201d and so no violation of\n\nSection 1201(a). Id. at *8. Both cases state the unremarkable point that if Plaintiffs\u2019 video files sat\n\nin an open database for anyone to access and download, Plaintiffs would have no Section 1201(a)\n\nclaim. But that is not this case. Instead, the video files remain in \u201ca locked room,\u201d which ByteDance\n\nneeded to break into in order \u201cto obtain a copy of [the works].\u201d VidAngel, 869 F.3d at 865.\n\n c. YouTube\u2019s TPMs Can Be Both Access and Copy Controls\n\n ByteDance further argues that because the alleged TPMs restrict downloading, they are\n\ncopy controls, not access controls. See, e.g., MTD at 10. But this both mischaracterizes the\n 19\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 26 of 33\n\n\n\nallegations of the Complaint and is wrong on the law. First, the Complaint alleges that the TPMs at\n\nissue restrict all forms of access, not solely downloading. ByteDance would still be liable for a\n\nSection 1201(a) claim had it circumvented the rolling cipher, for example, to stream Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nvideos from YouTube\u2019s servers outside of the authorized playback environment, an act that would\n\nsimilarly deprive Plaintiffs of advertising revenue. That ByteDance chose to download videos\n\ninstead of watching them after it circumvented the TPMs makes no difference.\n\n Second, the Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected ByteDance\u2019s assertion that there is a rigid,\n\nunyielding, distinction between access controls governed by Section 1201(a) and use controls\n\ngoverned by Section 1201(b). In VidAngel, the Ninth Circuit explained that \u201cthe statute does not\n\nprovide that a TPM cannot serve as both an access control and a use control. . . . [W]hen a defendant\n\ndecrypts the TPMs and then also reproduces that work, it is liable for both circumvention in\n\nviolation of \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(A) and copyright infringement in violation of \u00a7 106(1).\u201d 869 F.3d at 864.\n\nSimilarly, in MDY, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a TPM could \u201cboth (1) control[] access\n\nand (2) protect[] against copyright infringement.\u201d 629 F.3d at 946. Indeed, even the Copyright\n\nOffice has its own term for TPMs that do both jobs at once: \u201cmerged access and copy controls.\u201d\n\nSee U.S. Copyright Office, Section 1201 of Title 17: A Report of the Register of Copyrights, at 126\n\n(June 2017).5\n Against this authority, ByteDance offers two unpublished decisions that pre-date VidAngel\n\nfor the proposition that \u201ccourts have repeatedly applied [the] distinction\u201d between access and copy\ncontrols. MTD at 11. Neither is persuasive or relevant here.\n\n Hattler v. Ashton, 2017 WL 11634742 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2017) recognized a sweeping\n\nrule that Section 1201(a) does not apply where the \u201c[w]orks are accessible to the public on many\n\n\n\n5\n In its report, the Copyright Office further wrote that \u201c[a] few commenters proposed that in the\nmany cases where access controls and copy controls are merged, the rulemaking should treat the\ninquiry into the adverse effects on noninfringing uses differently,\u201d such that \u201cobtaining an\nexemption\u201d under the DMCA \u201cshould be easier where the TPM at issue is merged.\u201d Id. The Office\nrejected this argument, noting that \u201c[t]he Office believes that section 1201(a)(1) is best read as\nprotecting the integrity of access controls even where prohibited conduct would not be infringing.\u201d\nId. at 126\u201327.\n\n 20\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 27 of 33\n\n\n\nwebsites.\u201d Id. at *8. But Hattler involved remarkably sparse (in fact, completely nonexistent)\n\nallegations about the technological measures at issue. While the plaintiff claimed that the\n\ndefendants \u201ccircumvented the technological measures on [Plaintiff\u2019s] sites,\u201d he did not allege\n\nanything about what those technological measures were, nor did he allege that users encountered\n\nthose measures before accessing and copying his works. See Second Amended Complaint, 2:16-\n\ncv-04099-GHK-KS (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (Doc. No. 26)).6\n\n More importantly, Hattler predates VidAngel (as does Lasica, addressed below) and to the\n\nextent Hattler is premised on the view that works that can be publicly viewed, but not copied or\n\ndownloaded, cannot be the subject of a Section 1201(a) circumvention claim, it does not survive\n\nVidAngel. In fact, the Hattler court acknowledged that the defendants did \u201cnot dispute that, in order\n\nto download the [plaintiff\u2019s] works for their use . . . they were required to circumvent technology\n\nexpressly designed to prevent that form of access.\u201d Id. at *6. Under VidAngel, this should have\n\ncompelled the conclusion that the TPMs at issue were access controls, as the defendants conceded\n\nthe TPMs controlled access to the plaintiff\u2019s works by providing a form of authorized access to\n\nplaintiff\u2019s works (viewing them from the streaming platforms) while preventing access to the works\n\nin a manner through which they could be downloaded.\n\n Lasica v. America Online, Inc., 2015 WL 12791495 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015)\u2014the other\n\ncase on which ByteDance relies\u2014is a tentative order involving a Section 1201(b) claim, not a\n\nSection 1201(a) claim. 7 Id. at *5. Regardless, Lasica is distinguishable. There, the defendant had\ncopied a photo from a photo-sharing website. Id. at *1. The plaintiff had not alleged that the website\n\nemployed any TPM to control access to the photograph; the plaintiff had only alleged that the\n\n6\n With this opposition brief, Plaintiffs have filed a request for judicial notice. See Dkt. 43. The\nHattler Complaint is attached as Exhibit A to that request.\n7\n ByteDance also mischaracterizes the case, stating that \u201c[t]he court made [its] finding in the context\nof a tentative ruling, following which the plaintiff withdrew its DMCA claims.\u201d MTD at 12 n.12.\nThis is false as it relates to the Section 1201(a) claims. The plaintiff withdrew his Section 1201(a)\nclaims before the court issued its tentative ruling; accordingly, nothing in the decision ByteDance\ncites addresses the merits of plaintiff\u2019s Section 1201(a) claims. Memorandum of Points and\nAuthorities in Support of Plaintiff\u2019s Opposition to Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, Lasica v. Am.\nOnline, Inc., No. CV-15-4230-GW (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) (Dkt. 24). A copy of the\nMemorandum is attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiffs\u2019 Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 43.\n\n 21\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 28 of 33\n\n\n\nphotograph was subject to a licensing agreement which \u201cexplicitly prohibited the use of the\n\n[photograph] for commercial purposes.\u201d Amended Compl. and Demand for Jury Trial, Lasica v.\n\nAm. Online, Inc., 2:15-cv-04230-GW, 2015 WL 6669503, at \u00b6\u00b6 8, 44 (July 14, 2015) (see Pls.\n\nRequest for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 43, Ex. C). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs allege that ByteDance\n\nwas not just prohibited from accessing creators\u2019 videos by YouTube\u2019s Terms of Service, but also\n\nthat YouTube employed TPMs designed to enforce its Terms of Service.8\n\n ByteDance also cites Lasica for the premise that \u201ca person who engages in prohibited usage\n\nof a copyrighted work to which he has lawful access does not fall afoul of any provision of Section\n\n1201.\u201d See MTD at 12 (quoting Lasica, 2015 WL 12791495, at *5). In other words, ByteDance\n\nargues that because it had one form of authorized access to Plaintiffs\u2019 works (the ability to view\n\nthem on YouTube), it could not run afoul of any provision of Section 1201. But Lasica relies on\n\nAss\u2019n for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 2012 WL 7683452, at *9 (C.D.\n\nCal. Nov. 20, 2012) for that premise, which is no longer good authority after VidAngel. There, the\n\ncourt held that the defendant did not violate Section 1201(a) when it circumvented technological\n\nmeasures on a DVD to copy its contents because the defendant already \u201chad lawful access to the\n\nDVDs.\u201d Id. at 9. VidAngel squarely rejected the argument that because a DVD-purchaser has\n\n\u201clawful access\u201d to the DVD, it is \u201cauthorized . . . to decrypt [technological measures] to view the\n\ndiscs\u2019 content.\u201d 869 F.3d at 863. Rather, the Ninth Circuit said, \u201clawful purchasers have permission\n\nonly to view their purchased discs with a DVD or Blu-Ray player licensed to decrypt the TPMs.\u201d\n\nId. at 863.\n\n The same logic applies here. The public has lawful access to view Plaintiffs\u2019 works from\n\nYouTube\u2019s streaming platform, but it does not have permission to access the underlying video files.\n\nJust as the TPMs in VidAngel were designed to prevent the DVD purchaser from both viewing the\n\nDVD through an unlicensed mechanism and from accessing and reproducing the underlying video\n\n8\n ByteDance frames Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations regarding YouTube\u2019s Terms of Service (\u201cTOS\u201d) as\nthough Plaintiffs rely on the TOS, standing alone, as a TPM. MTD at 16. Plaintiffs do not allege\nthe TOS is an independent TPM. Rather, the complaint alleges that the TOS \u201coperate together with\nYouTube\u2019s TPMs to prevent unlicensed access to creators\u2019 videos,\u201d and that \u201c[c]ontent creators,\nincluding Plaintiffs and Class Members, rely on the TPMs and YouTube\u2019s Terms of Service in\ndeciding to upload their audiovisual content to YouTube.\u201d AC \u00b6\u00b6 36, 65.\n 22\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 29 of 33\n\n\n\nfile saved on the DVD, here YouTube\u2019s TPMs are designed to prevent users from viewing the\n\nvideos outside of YouTube\u2019s streaming platform and from accessing and reproducing the\n\nunderlying video file. That YouTube\u2019s access controls may also be copy controls is no reason to\n\ndismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\n\n d. ByteDance Cannot Overcome the Unbroken Line of Post-VidAngel Decisions\n\n Denying Motions to Dismiss on YouTube\u2019s TPMs\n\n Finally, ByteDance tries to wave away what it calls a \u201chandful of district court decisions\n\n[that] have declined to dismiss Section 1201(a) claims premised on YouTube\u2019s TPMs.\u201d MTD at\n\n18. But this is not just a \u201chandful\u201d of cases; rather, every single case to consider the issue since\n\nVidAngel has declined to dismiss Section 1201(a) claims premised on YouTube\u2019s TPMs.\n\n In Sony Music Ent. v. Uncharted Labs, Inc., 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026),\n\nan AI developer that stream-ripped YouTube videos argued that YouTube\u2019s rolling cipher was a\n\ncopy control and that the plaintiffs had not pleaded circumvention of an access control\u2014same as\n\nByteDance here. The court denied dismissal. Id. at *3. The same court reached the same result in\n\nJustice v. Uncharted Labs, Inc., 2026 WL 1430232, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2026).\n\n ByteDance argues that the Sony and Justice court \u201cmisapplie[d] the pleading standard\u201d\n\nbecause the court wrote that \u201cthe Complaint does not establish how [YouTube\u2019s TPMs] function\n\nsufficiently to determine their legal classification,\u201d which should have meant that the plaintiffs\u2019\n\nanti-circumvention claims failed as a matter of law. MTD at 19 (quoting Sony, 2026 WL 1019199,\n\nat *3). ByteDance mischaracterizes the court\u2019s decisions. In both cases, the court held that the\n\nplaintiffs had \u201cplausibly allege[d] that YouTube employs technological measures that regulate\n\naccess to its content and that Defendant circumvented them under the pleading standard set by Rule\n\n8(a).\u201d Sony, 2026 WL 1019199, at *3; accord Justice, 2026 WL 1430232, at *3. The court was\n\nsimply acknowledging a proposition that is true in nearly all cases at this stage: that further factual\n\nfindings through discovery could ultimately refute the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations as a matter of law. See\n\nJustice, 2026 WL 1430232, at *3 (quoting Sony, 2026 WL 1019199 at *3). Just as in Sony and\n\nJustice, Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations readily satisfy Rule 8(a), and detailed inquiries into the mechanisms\n\nof YouTube\u2019s TPMs and ByteDance\u2019s act of circumvention are factual questions better left for\n 23\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 30 of 33\n\n\n\ndiscovery, summary judgment, and trial.\n\n ByteDance\u2019s attacks on Cordova v. Huneault, 817 F.Supp.3d 819 (N.D. Cal. 2026) fare no\n\nbetter. ByteDance mischaracterizes the Cordova court as treating \u201cany measure \u2018intended to\n\nprevent unauthorized downloading\u201d as an access control. MTD at 18. That is not what the court\n\nheld; rather, the court explained that \u201cmeasures that restrict access to downloadable files[] are\n\nsufficient for purposes of the second element of a \u00a7 1201(a)(1) claim.\u201d Id. ByteDance also claims\n\nthat \u201cif Cordova was right, MDY would have turned out differently because the court there found\n\nno access control where the measure was intended to prevent unauthorized game-playing.\u201d MTD\n\nat 18. That misconstrues MDY. The Ninth Circuit never held that a measure \u201cintended to prevent\n\nunauthorized game-playing\u201d cannot be an access control. The Ninth Circuit held that the\n\ntechnological measure\u2014which scanned a user\u2019s computer before allowing them to connect to the\n\ndefendant\u2019s servers to detect for bots\u2014was not an access control with respect to certain\n\ncopyrightable elements of the video game (the game\u2019s source code and certain \u201cvisual and audible\n\ncomponents of the game\u201d) because those elements were already stored on the players\u2019 hard drives.\n\nId. at 954. A user did not need to connect to the defendant\u2019s servers to access these elements and\n\nso never would have encountered Warden, the TPM. Here, by contrast, the measures are\n\nencountered by users. See supra at 11\u201317. Cordova\u2019s holding is perfectly consistent with MDY.\n\n Finally, ByteDance correctly notes that Yout, 633 F.Supp.3d 650 (D. Conn. 2022) was a\n\ndeclaratory judgment action. But that procedural posture does not mean that Yout is not persuasive.\n\nIn fact, the opposite. As Yout accurately explained: \u201cYouTube directs users to stream videos and,\n\nby not making a download option readily available on the player page, restrains users\u2019 ability to\n\naccess and copy audio and video files.\u201d Id. at 669. The court thus rejected the plaintiff\u2019s argument\n\nthat YouTube lacks any access control. Id. That reasoning applies with equal force here.\n\nIV. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged the Timing and Nature of YouTube\u2019s\n\n Technological Protections and ByteDance\u2019s Large-Scale Scraping Operation\n\n In a fleeting sentence in its \u201cfactual background\u201d section, ByteDance claims that \u201cPlaintiffs\n\ndo not allege when [YouTube\u2019s] TPMs applied, which TPMs applied to Plaintiffs\u2019 videos or what\n\ntool(s), if any, [ByteDance] in particular purportedly used to download the videos.\u201d MTD at 4. That\n 24\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 31 of 33\n\n\n\nargument is baseless. Plaintiffs allege that YouTube had five TPMs, and that ByteDance, in fact,\n\ncircumvented all of them. AC \u00b6\u00b6 97\u2013117. That is more than sufficient to plausibly allege that the\n\nTPMs were in existence at the time ByteDance circumvented them.\n\n Further, Plaintiffs allege that, on information and belief, ByteDance used descrambling\n\ntools, such as yt-dlp, and IP rotation to circumvent YouTube\u2019s TPMs. AC \u00b6\u00b6 6, 102\u201310. A plaintiff\n\nmay \u201cplead[] facts alleged upon information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the\n\npossession and control of the defendant or where the belief is based on factual information that\n\nmakes the [allegations] plausible.\u201d Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 928 (9th Cir. 2017)\n\n(citation omitted). Both are true here: Only ByteDance possesses information about the tools it used\n\nto circumvent YouTube\u2019s TPMs, and Plaintiffs\u2019 beliefs are based on factual information that makes\n\nthe allegations plausible. It would have been impossible for ByteDance to scrape hundreds of\n\nmillions of Plaintiffs\u2019 and putative Class members\u2019 works without circumventing YouTube\u2019s TPMs\n\nwhich\u2014at that volume\u2014necessarily required the use of descrambling tools and IP rotation. See,\n\ne.g., AC \u00b6\u00b6 60, 102, 108.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny ByteDance\u2019s motion to dismiss. If it\n\nconcludes that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims are insufficiently pleaded, Plaintiffs request leave to amend.\n\n\n Dated: August 6, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n By: /s/ Rohit D. Nath\n SUSMAN GODFREY LLP\n Rohit D. Nath (SBN 316062)\n Michael Gervais (SBN 330731)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\n Los Angeles, CA 90067-2906\n Telephone: (310) 789-3100\n RNath@susmangodfrey.com\n MGervais@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Max L. Tribble, Jr. (SBN 326851)\n Justin A. Nelson (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P\n 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100\n Houston, TX 77002-5096\n 25\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 32 of 33\n\n\n\n Telephone: (713) 651-9366\n MTribble@susmangodfrey.com\n JNelson@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Morgan McCollum (admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.\n One Manhattan West, Fl. 50\n New York, NY 10001\n Telephone: (212) 336-8330\n MmcCollum@susmangodfrey.com\n\n Rom Bar-Nissim (SBN 293356)\n Rom@HeahBarNissim.com\n HEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP\n 1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400\n Los Angeles, CA 90067\n Telephone: (310) 432-2836\n\n Jarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro Hac Vice)\n Tom Kherkher (Pro Hac Vice)\n Leigh S. Montgomery (Pro Hac Vice)\n ELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD\n MONTGOMERY LLP\n 4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200\n Houston, TX 77006\n JEllzey@EKSM.com\n TKherkher@EKSM.com\n LMontgomery@EKSM.com\n\n\n Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed\n Class\n\n\n\n\n 26\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\fCase 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 42 Filed 08/06/26 Page 33 of 33\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify this 6th day of August, 2026, I caused a true and correct copy of the\n\nforegoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which\n\nwill send notification to the attorneys of record, and is available for viewing and downloading.\n\n /s/ Rohit D. Nath\n\n\n\n\n 27\n Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC \u2013 Plaintiffs\u2019 Opposition to ByteDance\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-08-25T15:46:24.408072-07:00","document_number":"42","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"035027479353","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Opposition/Response to Motion","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/491324516/","id":491324516,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/42/1/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-08-25T15:49:43.786108-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-25T15:50:23.079703-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":2,"file_size":135526,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"42","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"035027479354","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-08-06T15:32:55.182318-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-12T13:59:10.419888-07:00","date_filed":"2026-08-06","time_filed":"15:24:40","entry_number":42,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-08-06.001","pacer_sequence_number":137,"description":"OPPOSITION/RESPONSE (re 40 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ) filed byMatt Fisher, Golfholics, Inc., Ted Entertainment, Inc.. 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Certification of Conflicts (Ellzey, Jarrett) (Filed on 7/7/2026) (Entered: 07/07/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/469907810/","id":469907810,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/485262391/","id":485262391,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/40/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-06T23:34:45.976693-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-17T10:56:26.573326-07:00","sha1":"1a095fbd9b7b666685a6c1d97f30c2d89662bb8f","page_count":28,"file_size":451364,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.40.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.40.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":"recap-thumbnails/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/485262391.thumb.1068.png","thumbnail_status":1,"plain_text":" Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 1 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n 2 anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com\n 2400 Hanover Street\n 3 Palo Alto, California 94304-1113\n Telephone: 650.233.4500\n 4 Facsimile: 650.233.4545\n\n 5 LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com\n 6 KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n kayvan.ghaffari@pillsburylaw.com\n 7 Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor\n San Francisco, CA 94111-5998\n 8 Telephone: 415.983.1000\n Facsimile: 415.983.1200\n 9\n Attorneys for Defendant\n10 BYTEDANCE INC.\n\n11\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n12\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n13\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n14\n\n15\n TED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n16 FISHER, and GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\n individually and on behalf of all other similarly DEFENDANT BYTEDANCE, INC.\u2019S\n17 situated, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION\n TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FIRST\n18 Plaintiffs, AMENDED COMPLAINT;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND\n19 v. AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT\n THEREOF\n20 BYTEDANCE INC.,\n Hearing Date: Sept. 24, 2026\n21 Defendant. Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.\n Judge: Jacqueline Scott Corley\n22 FAC Filed: Apr. 13, 2026\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT , CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 2 of 28\n\n\n\n 1\n NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION\n 2\n TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:\n 3\n PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 24, 2026 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter\n 4\n as the matter may be heard, in Courtroom 8 of the United States District Court located at 450\n 5\n Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102 before the Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley,\n 6\n Defendant Bytedance Inc. (\u201cBDI\u201d), by and through its counsel of record, hereby moves this Court\n 7\n to dismiss with prejudice the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) (\u201cFAC\u201d) filed by Plaintiffs\n 8\n Ted Entertainment, Inc., Matt Fisher and Golfholics, Inc. (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d).\n 9\n BDI brings this motion under (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6)\n10\n because Plaintiffs lack both Article III and statutory standing to pursue their only cause of action,\n11\n asserting a violation of 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a), the anti-circumvention provision of the Digital\n12\n Millennium Copyright Act (\u201cDMCA\u201d); and (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because\n13\n Plaintiffs still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\n14\n This motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the following Memorandum of Points and\n15\n Authorities, all pleadings and papers on file in this action, and such other matters as may be\n16\n presented to the Court at the hearing.\n17\n\n18 Dated: July 6, 2026 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n19\n\n20 By: /s/ Anne M. Voigts\n21 ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n22 KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n\n23 Attorneys for Defendant,\n BYTEDANCE INC.\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n i\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 3 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n Page\n 2 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1\n 3 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................. 2\n A. Statutory Background........................................................................................................... 2\n 4\n B. Factual Background ............................................................................................................. 3\n 5 LEGAL STANDARD ...................................................................................................................... 5\n ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 5\n 6\n I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING ..................................................................... 5\n 7 II. PLAINTIFFS LACK STATUTORY STANDING ................................................................... 6\n 8 III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE CIRCUMVENTION OF ACCESS CONTROLS UNDER\n SECTION 1201(A) .................................................................................................................... 8\n 9 A. Section 1201(a) Applies Only to Technological Measures That Effectively Control Access\n to Protected Works ............................................................................................................... 8\n10\n B. Plaintiffs Allege Nonactionable Copy Controls, Not Access Controls ............................. 10\n11 C. None of the Specific TPMs Alleged Control Access ......................................................... 13\n D. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged TPMs that Users Must Ordinarily Overcome ...................... 16\n12\n E. Several Non-binding Cases Reaching a Contrary Result Misinterpret Section 1201(a) ... 18\n13 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 20\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n ii\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 4 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n 2 Page(s)\n 3 Cases\n 4\n Avaya, Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc.,\n 5 2012 WL 13035096 (D.N.J. May 1, 2012) ............................................................................. 25\n\n 6 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep\u2019t,\n 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988)................................................................................................... 12\n 7\n Barnum Timber Co. v. U.S. Env\u2019tl. Prot. Agency,\n 8 633 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2011)................................................................................................... 12\n 9 Callahan v. Ancestry.com Inc.,\n10 2021 WL 2433893 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2021) ........................................................................ 13\n\n11 CDK Glob., LLC v. Tekion Corp.,\n 2025 WL 1939951 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025) ................................................................... 16, 17\n12\n Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung,\n13 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013)........................................................................................... 20, 29\n14 Cordova v. Huneault,\n15 817 F. Supp. 3d 819 (N.D. Cal. 2026) .............................................................................. 26, 27\n\n16 CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc.,\n 2016 WL 3181826 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016) .......................................................................... 22\n17\n Digital Drilling Data Sys., LLC v. Petrolink Servs., Inc.,\n18 965 F3d 365 (5th Cir. 2020).................................................................................................... 25\n19 Dish Network L.L.C. v. World Cable Inc.,\n 893 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) .................................................................................... 24\n20\n\n21 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,\n 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017)............................................................................................. 16, 23\n22\n Doe 1 v. GitHub, Inc.,\n23 672 F. Supp. 3d 837 (N.D. Cal. 2023) .................................................................................... 13\n24 Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc.,\n 543 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2008) ................................................................................... 14\n25\n United States v. Elcom Ltd.,\n26\n 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ............................................................................ 10, 16\n27\n FMHUB, LLC v. MuniPlatform, LLC,\n28 2021 WL 1422873 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2021) ............................................................................. 24\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n iii\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 5 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.,\n 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)................................................................................................. 12\n 2\n Hattler v. Ashton,\n 3\n 2017 WL 11634742 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2017) ............................................................... passim\n 4\n Justice v. Uncharted Labs, Inc.,\n 5 2026 WL 1430232 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2026)................................................................... 26, 27\n\n 6 Lasica v. Am. Online, Inc.,\n 2015 WL 12791494 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) ......................................................................... 19\n 7\n Lexmark Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,\n 8 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)....................................................................................... 23, 26, 27\n 9\n LivePerson, Inc. v. 24/7 Customer, Inc.,\n10 83 F. Supp. 3d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ....................................................................................... 24\n\n11 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,\n 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......................................................................................................... 12, 13\n12\n Maya v. Centex Corp.,\n13 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011)................................................................................................. 12\n14\n MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc.,\n15 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010)............................................................................................ passim\n\n16 MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc.,\n 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010)....................................................................................... 13, 20, 28\n17\n Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Chan,\n18 No. CV 09-4203, 2009 WL 2190186 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2009) ............................................ 17\n19 In re OpenAI, Inc. Copyright Infringement Litig.,\n20 2025 WL 3635559 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) ........................................................................ 24\n\n21 Papasan v. Allain,\n 478 U.S. 265 (1986) ................................................................................................................ 12\n22\n Raw Story Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, Inc.,\n23 756 F. Supp. 3d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) ......................................................................................... 13\n24 RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC,\n 100 F.4th 659 (6th Cir. 2024).................................................................................................. 23\n25\n\n26 Sony Music Ent. v. Uncharted Labs, Inc.,\n No. 24-cv-7367, 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026) ....................................... 26, 27\n27\n Synopsys, Inc. v. InnoGrit, Corp.,\n28 2019 WL 4848387 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) ..................................................................... 16, 17\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n iv\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 6 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 Ted Entertainment, et al., v. Amazon,\n No. 26-cv-1134 (W.D. Wash.) .................................................................................................. 8\n 2\n Ted Entertainment, et al., v. Apple,\n 3\n No. 26-cv-2936 (N.D. Cal) ....................................................................................................... 8\n 4\n Ted Entertainment, et al., v. OpenAI,\n 5 No. 26-cv-2935 (N.D. Cal.) ...................................................................................................... 8\n\n 6 Ted Entertainment, et al., v. Runway AI,\n No. 26-1362 (S.D.N.Y.) ............................................................................................................ 8\n 7\n Ted Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,\n 8 No. 25-cv-10931 (N.D. Cal.) .................................................................................................... 8\n 9\n Ted Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. Nvidia Corporation,\n10 N No. 25-cv-10287 (N.D. Cal.)................................................................................................. 8\n\n11 Ted Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. Snap Inc.,\n No. 26-cv-00754 (C.D. Cal.)..................................................................................................... 8\n12\n TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n13 594 U.S. 413 (2021) ................................................................................................................ 13\n14\n Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,\n15 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................. 13, 17\n\n16 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,\n 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ..................................................................................... 17\n17\n VidAngel LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,\n18 703 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (D. Utah 2023) ............................................................................... 14, 23\n19 Warth v. Seldin,\n20 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ................................................................................................................ 14\n\n21 Y.H. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc.,\n 2024 WL 5431490 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2024) ........................................................................ 13\n22\n Yout, LLC v. RIAA,\n23 633 F. Supp. 3d 650 (D. Conn. 2022) ............................................................................... 26, 27\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n v\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 7 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 Statutes and Codes\n 2 United States Code\n Title 17 Section 106 .................................................................................................... 17, 20, 29\n 3\n Title 17 Section 1201 ....................................................................................................... passim\n 4 Title 17 Section 1201(a) .................................................................................................. passim\n Title 17 Section 1201(b)................................................................................................... passim\n 5 Title 17 Section 1203 .................................................................................................. 14, 15, 28\n 6 Rules\n 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\n 8 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................................................... 8, 12\n 12(b)(6) ............................................................................................................................... 8, 12\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n vi\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 8 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED\n 2 1. Whether this Court should dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack of Article\n 3 III and statutory standing under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6).\n 4 2. Whether this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 sole cause of action alleging a\n 5 violation of the DMCA\u2019s anti-circumvention provision, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a), for failure to state a\n 6 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\n 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES\n 8 INTRODUCTION\n 9 After ByteDance Inc. (\u201cBDI\u201d) moved to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 original complaint, Plaintiffs\n10 filed an amended complaint that suffers from the same flaws as their first. As BDI explained in\n11 that motion (which the Court did not rule on because Plaintiffs filed the FAC), Plaintiffs Ted\n12 Entertainment, Inc., Matt Fisher, and Golfholics, Inc. have filed a series of similar complaints\n13 against developers of artificial-intelligence video-generation models. 1 They allege that defendants\n14 trained their models on Plaintiffs\u2019 publicly accessible YouTube videos. And they contend that this\n15 violated Section 1201(a) because defendants (including BDI here) allegedly bypassed YouTube\u2019s\n16 platform controls to download videos that were otherwise freely viewable through YouTube.\n17 Because any copyright claim would face steep hurdles\u2014including the absence of copyright\n18 registrations and a fair-use defense, Plaintiffs instead invoke the DMCA\u2019s anti-circumvention\n19 provision, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a). But that theory cannot be squared with the DMCA\u2019s language,\n20 purpose, or Plaintiffs\u2019 own admission that their videos are free for anyone to watch on YouTube,\n21 without a password, paywall, or any other barrier to viewing.\n22 This Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 FAC for three independent reasons.\n23 First, Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Because the DMCA\u2019s anti-circumvention right is\n24 distinct from copyright infringement, Plaintiffs must plead an injury that is fairly traceable to the\n25\n 1\n26 E.g., Ted Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. Nvidia Corporation, N No. 25-cv-10287 (N.D. Cal.); Ted\n Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-cv-10931 (N.D. Cal.); Ted\n27 Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. Snap Inc., No. 26-cv-00754 (C.D. Cal.); Ted Entertainment, et al.,\n v. OpenAI, No. 26-cv-2935 (N.D. Cal.); Ted Entertainment, et al., v. Apple, No. 26-cv-2936 (N.D.\n28 Cal); Ted Entertainment, et al., v. Amazon, No. 26-cv-1134 (W.D. Wash.); Ted Entertainment, et\n al., v. Runway AI, No. 26-1362 (S.D.N.Y.).\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 1\n 110439930\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 9 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 circumvention of an access control, not the copying, retention, or downstream use of their videos.\n 2 But every injury the FAC identifies flows from BDI\u2019s alleged use of publicly viewable YouTube\n 3 content, not any act of circumvention. Those are alleged copyright injuries, and they cannot support\n 4 a claim under Section 1201(a). FAC \u00b6\u00b6 118-128.\n 5 Second, Plaintiffs lack statutory standing because they do not own, operate, deploy, or\n 6 control any of the alleged technological protection measures (\u201cTPMs\u201d) they seek to enforce. Those\n 7 measures\u2014the \u201crolling cipher,\u201d IP-blocking infrastructure, session-bound URLs, CAPTCHA\n 8 systems, and proof-of-origin tokens\u2014are designed, implemented, and maintained exclusively by\n 9 YouTube, not Plaintiffs. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 45, 50-64. Section 1201\u2019s private right of action runs to the\n10 owner of the circumvented measure, not every creator who posts content on a platform that deploys\n11 its own controls.\n12 Third, Plaintiffs fail to allege the circumvention of any access control. Section 1201(a) only\n13 reaches measures that control access to a work, not those that regulate copying, downloading, or\n14 retention after access has been granted. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(A). Plaintiffs concede that their\n15 videos are free to watch on YouTube. By posting those videos on YouTube, Plaintiffs grant all\n16 YouTube users a worldwide license to access their works. The measures Plaintiffs identify, which\n17 govern only downloading and automated retrieval of copies, do not \u201cin the ordinary course of [their]\n18 operation,\u201d require the application of information or a process to gain access to a work, as the\n19 DMCA requires. While district courts have divided over whether YouTube-style measures such as\n20 these are access controls or copy controls, the better-reasoned decisions\u2014consistent with the text\n21 and structure of the DMCA and this Court\u2019s own analysis in CDK Global\u2014hold that such measures\n22 regulate copying and therefore are outside the scope of Section 1201(a).\n23 In sum, the FAC asserts injuries sounding in copyright rather than anti-circumvention, relies\n24 on TPMs belonging to a third party, and incorrectly treats anti-downloading measures as access\n25 controls, for content that is freely accessible to anyone. This Court should dismiss it with prejudice.\n26 BACKGROUND\n27 A. Statutory Background\n28 In enacting the DMCA, Congress sought to support copyright owners\u2019 use of TPMs while\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 2\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 10 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 recognizing that individuals may have legitimate reasons to bypass those measures for a wide range\n 2 of lawful purposes. See 17 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1201(a)(1)(B)\u2013(D). As part of that balancing, Section 1201\n 3 of the DMCA distinguishes between measures that prevent unauthorized access to a work and\n 4 measures that prevent unauthorized copying. 1998 USCO DMCA Summary at 3\u20134; S. Rep. No.\n 5 105-190, at 11-12 (1998); H.R. Rep. 105\u2013551, pt. 1, at 18\u201319 (1998). see also United States v.\n 6 Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Thus, Section 1201(a), on which\n 7 Plaintiffs rely here, prohibits circumvention of measures that \u201ceffectively control access\u201d to a\n 8 protected work. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(A). It applies only when, in the ordinary course, a measure\n 9 requires an authorized process, treatment, or information to gain access to the work. Id. \u00a7\n10 1201(a)(3)(B). By contrast, Section 1201(b) addresses measures that protect a copyright owner\u2019s\n11 rights after access has been obtained and does not prohibit circumvention itself. Id. \u00a7 1201(b)(1).\n12 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, that structural divide reflects Congress\u2019s intent to create\n13 \u201cdifferent rights with different elements.\u201d MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928,\n14 946 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Hattler v. Ashton, 2017 WL 11634742, at *6\u20138 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20,\n15 2017).\n16 B. Factual Background\n17 Plaintiffs are YouTube content creators who allege their videos appeared in publicly\n18 referenced AI datasets including HD-VILA-100M, Panda-70M, and HowTo100M. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 18-24,\n19 85. Defendant BDI is a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Jose, California. Id. at \u00b6 25.\n20 Plaintiffs do not claim copyright infringement based on any alleged AI training itself\u2014nor\n21 could they due, among other issues, to an admitted lack of copyright registrations and the fair use\n22 doctrine. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that BDI unlawfully downloaded YouTube videos, purportedly\n23 to train AI video-generation models.. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1-3, 76-77. Plaintiffs suggest that BDI must have\n24 downloaded the videos from YouTube because the datasets themselves do not contain copies of\n25 YouTube videos. 2 According to Plaintiffs, the datasets enable users to locate specific videos on\n26 YouTube for retrieval. Thus, Plaintiffs allege, \u201cany user of the dataset\u201d\u2014including BDI\u2014\u201cmust\n27\n 2\n28 Plaintiffs allege that the datasets contain only information identifying where the videos can be\n found on YouTube, such as URLs and timestamps.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 3\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 11 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 retrieve the referenced content from YouTube itself.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 86, 88, 91, 95.\n 2 As to the allegedly illicit downloading, Plaintiffs concede that the YouTube videos are\n 3 publicly viewable, free of charge, without a password, paywall, license key, decryption, or any\n 4 other barrier to viewing. 3 Id. \u00b6 33. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs identify five categories of alleged TPMs\n 5 that YouTube purportedly deploys and were allegedly circumvented here: (1) rolling ciphers; (2)\n 6 IP blocking and rate limiting; (3) session-bound URLs; (4) CAPTCHA challenges; and (5) proof-\n 7 of-origin tokens. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 45, 50-64. Plaintiffs concede that these mechanisms, to the extent they\n 8 qualify as TPMs at all, restrict downloading rather than YouTube users\u2019 ability to access and view\n 9 their videos in the first instance. Plaintiffs also concede that these TPMs do not apply in every\n10 instance where a user tries to access content; instead, they have specific triggers. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 107, 113-\n11 14. Plaintiffs further acknowledge that these measures are designed, implemented, maintained,\n12 modified, and controlled exclusively by YouTube\u2019s \u201cproprietary\u201d logic. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 37, 50, 52, 102, 116,\n13 157. YouTube\u2019s Terms of Service reserve to YouTube the right to \u201cadd[] or remov[e] features and\n14 functionalities,\u201d \u201calter or discontinue the Service,\u201d and make changes to \u201cprevent illegal activities\n15 on or abuse of [YouTube\u2019s] systems.\u201d 4\n16 Plaintiffs do not allege when these TPM applied, which TPMs applied to Plaintiffs\u2019 videos\n17 or what tool(s), if any, BDI in particular purportedly used to download the videos. Instead,\n18 Plaintiffs, who have filed a slew of similar suits against other companies: (1) plead largely \u201cupon\n19 information and belief\u201d that BDI used \u201cone or more\u201d tools, \u201cfor example\u201d a \u201cdescrambling tool\n20 such as yt-dlp\u201d 5 or \u201ca substantially similar\u201d technology; (2) describe how YouTube content could\n21 be retrieved at scale; and (3) ask the Court to infer that BDI must have done so. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 101-115.\n22 They promise, however, that \u201c[t]he full details of the specific infrastructure Defendant used to\n23 execute this scheme will be the subject of discovery.\u201d FAC \u00b6 109.\n24 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs filed this putative nationwide class action on\n25 December 23, 2025, asserting a single cause of action for violation of the DMCA\u2019s anti-\n26 3\n Plaintiffs also allege that \u201c[m]ost YouTube videos are not registered with the U.S. Copyright\n27 Office.\u201d Id. \u00b6 13.\n 4\n YouTube Terms of Service, https://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited July 6, 2026).\n 5\n28 \u201cyt-dlp\u201d is a free, open-source command-line program used to download video and audio files\n from YouTube and other online platforms. See FAC \u00b6 102.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 4\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 12 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 circumvention provision. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a). Following BDI \u2019s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs\n 2 amended their complaint on April 13, 2026, maintaining only the single claim.\n 3 LEGAL STANDARD\n 4 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing subject matter\n 5 jurisdiction, including Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).\n 6 Accordingly, at the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs must allege \u201cspecific facts plausibly\n 7 explaining\u201d why the standing requirements are met. Barnum Timber Co. v. U.S. Env\u2019tl. Prot.\n 8 Agency, 633 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2011). Lack of Article III standing requires dismissal under\n 9 Rule 12(b)(1), lack of statutory standing requires dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state\n10 a claim. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).\n11 Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes \u201c[d]ismissal \u2026based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or\n12 the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.\u201d Balistreri v. Pacifica Police\n13 Dep\u2019t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In evaluating a complaint\u2019s sufficiency, the Court must\n14 disregard any \u201clegal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,\u201d Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,\n15 286 (1986), as well as any \u201callegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,\n16 or unreasonable inferences.\u201d In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)\n17 (citation omitted).\n18 ARGUMENT\n19 I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING\n20 Article III standing requires Plaintiffs to plausibly allege that: (i) they \u201csuffered an injury in\n21 fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;\u201d (ii) the injury was likely caused by\n22 BDI; and (iii) that judicial relief would likely redress it. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S.\n23 413, 423 (2021). Plaintiffs, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bear the burden of alleging\n24 and ultimately establishing each element of Article III standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.\n25 Plaintiffs have not met that burden here.\n26 The DMCA creates \u201ca new anticircumvention right distinct from copyright infringement.\u201d\n27 MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 948. Courts addressing DMCA claims have therefore rejected\n28 attempts to establish standing through injuries untethered from the specific alleged statutory\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 5\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 13 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 violation. See Raw Story Media, Inc. v. OpenAI, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 2024);\n 2 Callahan v. Ancestry.com Inc., 2021 WL 2433893, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2021); Y.H. v. Blizzard\n 3 Ent., Inc., 2024 WL 5431490, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2024); Doe 1 v. GitHub, Inc., 672 F. Supp.\n 4 3d 837, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2023). In particular, Section 1201(a) \u201cis targeted at circumvention, it does\n 5 not apply to the use of copyrighted works after the technological measure has been circumvented.\u201d\n 6 MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010); accord\n 7 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Plaintiffs\n 8 asserting a Section 1201(a) claim must plausibly allege an injury traceable to the alleged\n 9 circumvention of an access control, not just downstream use of their videos. See Lujan, 504 U.S.\n10 at 560-61.\n11 Plaintiffs have not done so here. The FAC alleges a series of purported economic injuries\u2014\n12 lost advertising revenue, lost YouTube Premium revenue, diminished monetization eligibility,\n13 reduced algorithmic amplification, market harm, and \u201closs of control\u201d over copyrighted works.\n14 FAC \u00b6\u00b6 121-128. 6 Those injuries stem from the alleged copying, training, and other downstream\n15 exploitation of the videos\u2014not the act of circumvention itself. That matters because those alleged\n16 harms are classic copyright injuries, not injuries from circumvention of an access control. See MDY\n17 Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 948. Indeed, the FAC\u2019s prayer for relief likewise seeks an injunction\n18 requiring BDI to \u201ccease infringing\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cexclusive rights\u201d in \u201ccopyright-protected content.\u201d\n19 FAC, Prayer for Relief \u00b6\u00b6 B, D. Because Plaintiffs only identify harms allegedly resulting from\n20 downstream use after access had already been obtained, they lack standing to bring the only claim\n21 they have asserted.\n22 II. PLAINTIFFS LACK STATUTORY STANDING\n23 Plaintiffs also lack statutory standing. While Section 1203(a) provides that \u201c[a]ny person\n24 injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action,\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1203(a), the\n25 DMCA\u2019s anti-circumvention provisions are \u201cdirected at the circumvention of copyright owners\u2019\n26\n 6\n27 Plaintiffs further concede that most of the videos at issue are not registered with the U.S. Copyright\n Office, FAC \u00b6 84, and they accordingly cannot assert any claim under the Copyright Act. As set\n28 forth below, this makes any allegations regarding BDI\u2019s downstream use of the videos for AI\n training irrelevant to the only cause of action Plaintiffs have asserted against BDI.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 6\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 14 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 technological measures.\u201d MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 942. Here, however, Plaintiffs admittedly\n 2 do not own, operate, deploy, maintain, configure, or control any of the TPMs they seek to enforce.\n 3 Decisions interpreting Section 1201 support the conclusion that statutory standing flows\n 4 from ownership or control of the technological measure allegedly circumvented\u2014not merely\n 5 ownership of protected content hosted on a third-party platform. See VidAngel LLC v. ClearPlay,\n 6 Inc., 703 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1335-36 (D. Utah 2023); Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc.,\n 7 543 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205-06 (S.D. Cal. 2008). That is consistent with the broader principle that\n 8 a plaintiff \u201cmust assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the\n 9 legal rights or interests of third parties.\u201d Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).\n10 Here, Plaintiffs repeatedly acknowledge that the alleged TPMs\u2014including the \u201crolling\n11 cipher,\u201d IP-blocking infrastructure, session-bound URLs, CAPTCHA systems, and proof-of-origin\n12 tokens\u2014are designed and controlled exclusively by YouTube. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 37, 45-64, 102, 116\n13 (referring to TPMs as \u201cYouTube\u2019s TPMs\u201d and acknowledging that YouTube\u2019s controls are a\n14 product of YouTube\u2019s own \u201cproprietary\u201d logic). 7 And the same YouTube Terms of Service the\n15 FAC cites expressly provide that YouTube may \u201cadd[] or remov[e] features and functionalities,\u201d\n16 \u201calter or discontinue the Service,\u201d and make changes to \u201cprevent illegal activities on or abuse of\n17 [YouTube\u2019s] systems.\u201d Whether YouTube has elected to enforce, modify, or relax those measures\n18 (in whole or in part, for particular users, or at particular times) is a matter committed to YouTube\u2019s\n19 sole discretion under its Terms. To the extent Plaintiffs may benefit from YouTube\u2019s decisions\n20 regarding those measures (FAC \u00b6 157), that does not confer standing to enforce those restrictions\n21 under Section 1201(a). 8\n22 Accepting Plaintiffs\u2019 theory would radically expand Section 1203 by transforming every\n23 creator who uploads content to a third-party platform into a private enforcer of platform-owned\n24 technological restrictions. Nothing in the text or structure of Section 1201 supports such a result.\n25 Plaintiffs\u2019 claim should be dismissed for lack of statutory standing.\n26\n 7\n27 Indeed, Plaintiffs do not even allege that they know the exact nature of YouTube\u2019s controls.\n Instead, as they concede, those systems are \u201cproprietary\u201d to YouTube. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 50, 52, 102\n 8\n28 YouTube Terms of Service, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited July 6,\n 2026).\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 7\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 15 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE CIRCUMVENTION OF ACCESS CONTROLS\n 2 UNDER SECTION 1201(A)\n 3 Section 1201 draws a critical distinction between (a) TPMs that control access to a work in\n 4 the first instance and (b) those that regulate copying or use after access has been granted. Because\n 5 only the former are actionable under Section 1201(a)(1), Plaintiffs\u2019 claim critically depends on\n 6 whether YouTube\u2019s alleged TPMs are access controls. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1). Plaintiffs\u2019 own\n 7 allegations confirm that they are not. The measures on which the FAC relies regulate downloading,\n 8 automated retrieval, and retention of copies. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 33, 37. While district courts have reached\n 9 differing conclusions on whether measures of this kind qualify as access controls, the statute\u2019s text\n10 and structure, the better-reasoned authority, and Plaintiffs\u2019 own allegations all confirm that these\n11 are copy controls beyond the reach of Section 1201(a).\n12 A. Section 1201(a) Applies Only to Technological Measures That Effectively\n13 Control Access to Protected Works\n14 As explained above, Section 1201 establishes two separate types of technological measures:\n15 those that restrict unauthorized access to protected \u201cworks, and those that restrict unauthorized\n16 copying\u201d but only prohibits circumvention of the former. 1998 USCO DMCA Summary at 3-4;\n17 see also S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1112 (1998); H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18-19 (1998); Elcom\n18 Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. Congress prohibited circumvention of access controls because \u201cprior\n19 to this Act, the conduct of circumvention was never before made unlawful.\u201d 9 S. Rep. No. 105-190,\n20 at 12. But because \u201ccopyright law has long forbidden copyright infringements,\u201d \u201cno new\n21 prohibition was necessary\u201d for circumventing copy controls. Id.; see also U.S. Copyright Office,\n22 Section 1201 of Title 17: A Report of the Register of Copyrights, at 8-10 (June 2017) (\u201cUSCO\n23 Section 1201 Report\u201d).\n24 Access controls. Section 1201(a)(3)(B) defines a measure that \u201ceffectively controls access\u201d\n25 as one that, \u201cin the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a\n26 process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.\u201d 17\n27\n 9\n28 As defined in the DMCA, to \u201ccircumvent\u201d generally refers to acts such as avoiding, bypassing,\n removing, deactivating, or impairing a TPM. See 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(A), (b)(2)(A).\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 8\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 16 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B); Synopsys, Inc. v. InnoGrit, Corp., 2019 WL 4848387, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct.\n 2 1, 2019); CDK Glob., LLC v. Tekion Corp., 2025 WL 1939951, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2025);\n 3 USCO Section 1201 Report at 8-10. In construing that language, courts have held that Section\n 4 1201(a)(1) \u201cshould be interpreted narrowly to exclude technologies that permit access to\n 5 copyrighted work but restrict copying\u201d. Hattler, 2017 WL 11634742, at *8. Accordingly, courts\n 6 have held that circumvention of an access control typically requires the defeat of a genuine\n 7 technological gate that prevents a user from viewing or opening the work at all. Disney Enters.,\n 8 Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 852, 864\u201365 (9th Cir. 2017) (allegations regarding\n 9 circumvention of encryption-based TPMs governing access to motion pictures to \u201crip\u201d digital\n10 copies). Examples include bypassing encryption, defeating password authentication, cracking\n11 license-key systems, or circumventing software controls that must be satisfied before the work can\n12 be accessed. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Chan, 2009 WL 2190186 at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2009)\n13 (gaming console security system required to access copyrighted game code); Synopsys, Inc., 2019\n14 WL 4848387, at *7 (encrypted control code); CDK Glob., LLC v, 2025 WL 1939951, at *9\n15 (hardware and firewalls); USCO Section 1201 Report at 8-10.\n16 Put differently, an access control is the \u201celectronic equivalent of breaking into a locked\n17 room,\u201d not a mechanism that merely discourages or complicates copying after the work is already\n18 available for viewing. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 316\u201318\n19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998)); see also Universal City Studios,\n20 Inc., at 443 (analogizing to locks). In each case, the technological measure operated as a digital\n21 lock: absent circumvention, the user could not access the work. 10\n22 Copy controls. By contrast, Section 1201(b) addresses measures that \u201ceffectively protect[]\n23 a right of a copyright owner,\u201d such as reproduction or copying after a user has gained access. 11 17\n24\n 10\n Congress also recognized that the new anti-circumvention right required limits. Section\n25 1201(a)(1)(B)\u2013(D) authorizes the Library of Congress to exempt certain classes of works from the\n prohibition on circumvention where the public\u2019s right to access outweighs the owner\u2019s interest in\n26 restricting access. See 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(B)\u2013(D). This exemption mechanism underscores\n27 that Congress carefully calibrated Section 1201(a) to protect genuine access controls\u2014not to create\n a sweeping prohibition on all forms of copying or downloading.\n 11\n28 Those exclusive rights are reproduction, distribution, public performance, public display, and\n creation of derivative works. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 106. Historically speaking, preventing \u201caccess\u201d to a\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 9\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 17 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(b)(1)(A). These copy controls protect against unauthorized uses of a work once\n 2 access has been lawfully obtained. They include measures to prevent digital copying. Critically,\n 3 copy controls do \u201cnothing to prevent access to the plain text of the work.\u201d S. Rep. No. 105\u2010190, at\n 4 12 (1998). Accordingly, they can include technological measures that allow some forms of \u2018access\u2019\n 5 but restrict other uses of the copyrighted work,\u201d such as \u201cstreaming media, which permits users to\n 6 view or watch a copyrighted work but prevents them from downloading a permanent copy of the\n 7 work.\u201d Hattler, 2017 WL 11634742, at *6 (quoting Lexmark Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Static Control\n 8 Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by eBay Inc. v.\n 9 MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), as recognized by RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v.\n10 Multiject, LLC, 100 F.4th 659, 667 (6th Cir. 2024)). As noted above, it is undisputed that Section\n11 1201 does not prohibit circumvention of copy controls.\n12 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201 Circumvention Prohibition? Trafficking Prohibition?\n13 Access Controls Yes Yes\n14 \u00a7 1201(a)(1) \u00a7 1201(a)(2)\n15 Copy Controls No Yes\n16 \u00a7 1201(b)\n17 B. Plaintiffs Allege Nonactionable Copy Controls, Not Access Controls\n18 Plaintiffs\u2019 theory would erase the statutory distinction Congress deliberately created\n19 between access controls and copy controls. The FAC repeatedly labels YouTube\u2019s systems\n20 \u201caccess\u201d controls (using the phrase \u201caccess\u201d 125 times), but repetition is no substitute for substance.\n21 Looking at the actual substance of Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations, they describe restrictions on downloading,\n22 automated retrieval, retention of copies, and other post-access uses of content. Those are copy\n23 controls, not technological barriers controlling whether users may access the videos in the first\n24 instance.\n25 Plaintiffs never allege, however, that a typical user viewing any of YouTube\u2019s free-to-watch\n26 videos, let alone their own, must overcome a paywall, password, authentication gate, license key,\n27\n\n28 protected work in and of itself has not been a right arising from the Copyright Act. MDY Indus.,\n 629 F.3d at 944.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 10\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 18 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 encryption barrier, or any other technological restriction before perceiving the works themselves.\n 2 Indeed, the FAC openly concedes that users may freely view the videos at issue through YouTube\u2019s\n 3 ordinary streaming platform. FAC \u00b6 33 (noting that users \u201ccan watch and listen to videos for free\u201d\n 4 through YouTube\u2019s ad-supported service). And, by uploading their videos to YouTube, Plaintiffs\n 5 grant YouTube users a worldwide license to access and view those videos through the platform.\n 6 Plaintiffs try to get around these facts by arguing that a user who is authorized to watch a\n 7 video nevertheless lacks \u201caccess\u201d to that work unless the user can also retrieve the underlying media\n 8 file. Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that YouTube limits downloading, bulk extraction, retention of\n 9 copies, and what they repeatedly describe as \u201cfile-level access\u201d to video content. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 40-64,\n10 95, 141. Plaintiffs frequently refer to \u201cfile-level access,\u201d \u201cunderlying media files,\u201d \u201cunderlying\n11 audiovisual files,\u201d and the work\u2019s \u201cmachine-readable embodiment.\u201d See, e.g., FAC \u00b6\u00b6 44, 47, 50-\n12 52, 95, 141. In so doing, they seek to narrow the statutory meaning of access to a protected work\n13 to require access to a digital file in which that work is embodied. The statute imposes no such\n14 requirement. Section 1201(a) addresses access to protected works, not a particular file format.\n15 Otherwise, virtually every restriction on downloading could be recast as an access control, erasing\n16 the careful distinction Congress drew between access and copy controls.\n17 Courts have repeatedly applied that distinction. In Hattler, for example, the plaintiff alleged\n18 that defendants downloaded audiovisual works from publicly accessible streaming sites by\n19 \u201ccircumvent[ing] the controls intended to limit access.\u201d 2017 WL 11634742, at *3. The defendants\n20 did not dispute that downloading required them to circumvent technology designed to prevent that\n21 form of access. Id. at *6. Even so, the court dismissed the Section 1201(a)(1) claim because the\n22 works were publicly available for streaming and the alleged measures restricted copying, not\n23 access. Id. at *8. There, \u201cbecause it [was] uncontested that the Works are accessible to the public\n24 on many websites,\u201d the court held that amendment would be futile. Id.\n25 Likewise, in Lasica v. Am. Online, Inc., the plaintiff posted a photograph on Flickr.com\n26 \u201cpursuant to a restrictive license agreement with all users of Flickr.com\u201d that precluded commercial\n27 use. 2015 WL 12791495, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2015). Plaintiff claimed the defendant acted\n28 outside that license by using the photograph in an article published on its website. Id. The court\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 11\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 19 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 indicated that the Section 1201 claim was subject to dismissal with prejudice because the plaintiff\n 2 had already provided access to the photograph \u201cto Defendant as well as the general public\u2014through\n 3 Flickr.com.\u201d 12 Id. at *5. The alleged problem was therefore not access to the work, but the\n 4 allegedly improper use of a work to which access had been provided. As the court explained, \u201ca\n 5 person who engages in prohibited usage of a copyrighted work to which he has lawful access does\n 6 not fall afoul of any provision of Section 1201.\u201d Id. (quoting Ass\u2019n for Info. Media & Equip. v.\n 7 Regents of the Univ. of California, 2012 WL 7683452, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012)).\n 8 Here, as noted above, Plaintiffs concede the videos are publicly accessible for viewing.\n 9 Compare FAC \u00b6 33 (\u201cYouTube\u2019s \u2018users\u2019 . . . can watch and listen to videos for free on YouTube\u2019s\n10 ad-supported service . . . .\u201d) with Hattler, 2017 WL 11634742, at *6 (works at issue \u201cwere publicly\n11 available for streaming\u201d). And they allege that the purportedly circumvented TPMs controlled\n12 downloading\u2014not access. Compare FAC \u00b6 6 (alleging \u201cDefendant used a video-downloading\n13 program combined with virtual machines that rotated IP addresses to avoid detection and\n14 blocking\u201d) and FAC \u00b6 34 (alleging \u201c[t]o enforce its prohibitions on downloading content, YouTube\n15 uses technological processes and tools to detect and block access to files for unauthorized\n16 downloading\u201d) with Hattler, 2017 WL 11634742, at *5 (alleging defendants \u201cdownloaded the\n17 Works in a manner that circumvented the technological protections on the websites where the\n18 Works were available for streaming\u201d). The FAC alleges that these systems regulate how users\n19 \u201cretrieve\u201d content, how frequently they may make requests, whether requests originate from\n20 approved environments, and whether users may obtain persistent copies of the content. See, e.g.,\n21 FAC \u00b6\u00b6 45-64, 97, 102-106, 115, 122-123. Plaintiffs allege that these systems respond to\n22 downloading activity, repeated requests, automated traffic, or attempts to retain copies outside\n23 YouTube\u2019s preferred playback environment. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 34, 43-64. None of that describes a\n24 technological measure that prevents users from accessing or perceiving the videos in the first\n25 instance. A system reacting to user behavior after access has been granted is fundamentally\n26 different than a measure that controls access itself. Only the latter falls within the scope of Section\n27\n 12\n28 The court made this finding in the context of a tentative ruling, following which the plaintiff\n withdrew its DMCA claims. See Lasica., 2015 WL 12791494, at *1.\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 12\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 20 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 1201(a).\n 2 Plaintiffs try to get around this problem by shoehorning \u201cdownloading\u201d into \u201cunauthorized\n 3 access\u201d to data files. See, e.g., FAC \u00b6 48. That is unavailing because \u201cdownloading\u201d is a form of\n 4 \u201creproduction.\u201d Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2013). A\n 5 prohibition on downloading thus protects a copyright holder\u2019s exclusive right of reproduction under\n 6 Section 106\u2014not the right to control access to the work. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc., at 366. And\n 7 \u201c[b]ecause \u00a7 1201(a)(1) is targeted at circumvention, it does not apply to the use of copyrighted\n 8 works after the technological measure has been circumvented.\u201d Id. Such a complaint must be\n 9 brought, if at all, under the Copyright Act, not the DMCA\u2019s anti-circumvention provision.\n10 C. None of the Specific TPMs Alleged Control Access\n11 The FAC\u2019s new allegations underscore the fundamental problems with Plaintiffs\u2019 claim.\n12 The FAC identifies five categories of alleged TPMs: \u201c(1) an obfuscated signature system\n13 commonly referred to as a \u2018rolling cipher,\u2019 (2) IP-based blocking and rate limiting that restrict high-\n14 volume automated access, (3) short-lived, session-bound streaming URLs, (4) CAPTCHA human-\n15 verification challenges triggered by automated activity, and (5) proof-of-origin tokens that verify\n16 requests originating from authorized client environments.\u201d FAC \u00b6 45. As an initial matter, the fact\n17 that Plaintiffs label these measures \u201cdigital locks\u201d or \u201caccess controls\u201d does not change what they\n18 are or expand Section 1201(a)\u2019s scope to encompass them. See Hattler, 2017 WL 11634742, at *8.\n19 What matters is not the label Plaintiffs attach to those measures, but what they actually do. All of\n20 those measures regulate downloading, request volume, automation, playback conditions, and file\n21 retrieval. None of them restrict access in the first instance. As a result, none of them are access\n22 controls.\n23 Rolling cipher systems. Plaintiffs allege that YouTube\u2019s \u201crolling cipher\u201d controls access to\n24 the \u201cunderlying media file\u201d by withholding a \u201cusable file location\u201d unless the requesting client\n25 transforms an \u201cobfuscated signature parameter.\u201d FAC \u00b6 50. Plaintiffs do not allege that the rolling\n26 cipher prevents users from viewing the videos. To the contrary, they acknowledge that users may\n27 freely watch those videos through YouTube\u2019s platform. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 33, 37. They allege, however,\n28 that the cipher impedes \u201cexternal access to the underlying YouTube files\u201d and \u201cinhibits access to\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 13\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 21 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 the underlying audiovisual files for the purposes of any downloading, copying or distribution.\u201d\n 2 FAC \u00b6\u00b6 50-51. Those allegations describe measures that regulate how users obtain copies, not\n 3 threshold access to the videos themselves.\n 4 IP blocking and rate limiting. Plaintiffs also rely on YouTube\u2019s IP blocking and rate\n 5 limiting systems, which they allege monitor \u201cexcessive or abusive request patterns,\u201d detect\n 6 \u201cabnormal request volume,\u201d and block IP addresses that exceed defined thresholds. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 53-\n 7 54. By Plaintiffs\u2019 own description, these systems respond to high-volume or automated behavior.\n 8 They do not prevent users from viewing the works in the first instance; they regulate continued\n 9 platform use after YouTube detects abnormal activity. Courts have recognized that comparable\n10 traffic-management and anti-abuse systems are not access controls under Section 1201(a). 13 See\n11 CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., 2016 WL 3181826, at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016) (alleged\n12 technological \u201csafeguards,\u201d including IP monitoring blocks, did not plead an effective access\n13 control because site remained publicly accessible and no technological gate, such as a password\n14 restricted access).\n15 Session-bound URLs. Plaintiffs also point to YouTube\u2019s use of \u201csession-bound, short-lived\n16 media URLs\u201d that are \u201ctemporary,\u201d \u201ccryptographically signed,\u201d and tied to a \u201cparticular playback\n17 session and client context.\u201d FAC \u00b6 55. Plaintiffs allege that, when a URL expires, \u201cnew\n18 authorization must be obtained to retrieve\u201d the file, and that automated scraping tools can maintain\n19 access by \u201crepeatedly obtain[ing] fresh authorization parameters and regenerat[ing] valid media\n20 URLs.\u201d FAC \u00b6\u00b6 55-56. That is not an access control either. Those allegations confirm that the\n21 measures regulate how users retrieve media files and whether users can obtain downloadable copies\n22 outside YouTube\u2019s ordinary playback environment. They do not regulate whether users may access\n23 the works themselves, and indeed users may freely watch the videos notwithstanding the alleged\n24\n 13\n25 In fact, the Copyright Office has also rejected the argument that rate-limit enforcement systems\n effectively control access to a work. See U.S. Copyright Off., Section 1201 Rulemaking: Ninth\n26 Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition of Circumvention, at 125 (Oct.\n 2024) https://www.copyright.gov/\n27 1201/2024/2024_Section_1201_Registers_Recommendation.pdf; see also Exemption to\n Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies,\n28 89 Fed. Reg. 85437, 85437 (Oct. 28, 2024) (final rule adopting Copyright Office\u2019s\n recommendations).\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 14\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 22 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 URL restrictions, FAC \u00b6\u00b6 33, 37.\n 2 CAPTCHA challenges. Plaintiffs allege that CAPTCHA challenges \u201cperform a gatekeeping\n 3 function by prohibiting a certain type of user (a bot) from accessing the platform and the audiovisual\n 4 works.\u201d FAC \u00b6\u00b6 57. CAPTCHA challenges are triggered \u201c[w]hen traffic patterns indicate\n 5 automated or suspicious activity,\u201d and may temporarily stop the \u201crequesting client\u201d from making\n 6 additional requests. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 57-58. But the FAC does not allege that users must solve a CAPTCHA\n 7 challenge before viewing Plaintiffs\u2019 videos. Instead, CAPTCHA is allegedly triggered only by\n 8 suspicious traffic patterns. That makes it a traffic-management tool, not an access control.\n 9 Proof of Origin Tokens. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that YouTube uses proof-of-origin tokens\n10 to confirm that requests for video segments originate from an \u201cauthorized YouTube playback\n11 environment.\u201d and \u201ccondition[s] the delivery of audiovisual file data\u201d on those tokens. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 61,\n12 64. According to Plaintiffs, entities must use automated tools to \u201cextract, replicate, spoof, or\n13 systematically reuse token parameters generated within authorized sessions\u201d in order to retrieve\n14 audiovisual files at scale. FAC \u00b6 62. The tokens do not, however, prevent users from viewing the\n15 videos through YouTube\u2019s authorized player.\n16 As Plaintiffs\u2019 own allegations confirm, none of these measures are directed at threshold\n17 viewing access, which would be subject to Section 1201(a). Instead, they regulate downloading,\n18 automation, request validation, and file retrieval of copies. A measure that governs how users\n19 obtain copies of a work after access has been granted does not become an access control merely\n20 because it makes downloading more difficult. Put differently, a \u201clock on the back door\u201d does not\n21 \u201ccontrol[] access\u201d where the \u201cfront door\u201d remains open. Lexmark Int\u2019l, Inc., 387 F.3d at 547. Here,\n22 Plaintiffs concede that the front door is open because YouTube users may freely watch videos\n23 through YouTube\u2019s publicly available platform. FAC \u00b6 33.\n24 VidAngel clarifies the distinction. In VidAngel, the defendant used software to decrypt the\n25 TPMs on DVDs and Blu-ray discs containing copyrighted motion pictures. Id. at 853-54, 863-65.\n26 The TPMs at issue\u2014CSS, AACS, and BD+\u2014encrypted the copyrighted content itself so that\n27 consumers could access the movies only through licensed playback systems authorized to decrypt\n28 them. Id. at 853 & n.1, 863-65. The court held that VidAngel likely violated Section 1201(a)\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 15\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 23 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 because it defeated those encryption-based access controls and thereby obtained access to the\n 2 copyrighted content. Id. at 863-65.\n 3 By contrast here, Plaintiffs do not allege that users must decrypt content, obtain\n 4 cryptographic keys, or overcome any comparable technological gate before perceiving the works.\n 5 Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations go to whether YouTube regulates downloading, automated retrieval, request\n 6 validation, session management, and retention of copies outside YouTube\u2019s preferred playback\n 7 environment. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 33, 37, 45\u201364. Those measures may impose technical friction on\n 8 downloading or automated retrieval. But they do not prevent users viewing through YouTube\u2019s\n 9 authorized player from perceiving the works, and therefore do not \u201ceffectively control[]\u201d access\n10 within the meaning of Section 1201(a)(1). Cf. In re OpenAI, Inc. Copyright Infringement Litig.,\n11 2025 WL 3635559 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) (instructions that regulate automated web-crawler\n12 behavior do not \u201ceffectively control\u201d access to publicly available content merely because they tell\n13 bots where they may or may not go).\n14 Plaintiffs also allege that YouTube\u2019s Terms of Service prohibit \u201cscraping, unauthorized\n15 downloading, bulk extraction, or other forms of data mining.\u201d FAC \u00b6 65. But those Terms cannot\n16 fill the gap because contractual restrictions are not technological measures. Dish Network L.L.C.\n17 v. World Cable Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing Section 1201(a) theory\n18 where allegations suggested a contractual violation rather than avoidance of a \u201cdigital wall\u201d); In re\n19 Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., 2013 WL 12141373, at *19 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013) (requiring\n20 allegations of a \u201ctechnological measure to prevent access from occurring in the first place\u201d).\n21 Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to identify any technological protection measure under Section 1201(a) is\n22 dispositive and requires dismissal. See LivePerson, Inc. v. 24/7 Customer, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 501,\n23 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); FMHUB, LLC v. MuniPlatform, LLC, 2021 WL 1422873, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr.\n24 15, 2021) (dismissing DMCA claim where plaintiff failed to allege that the passwords protected\n25 the same copyrighted works that the defendant allegedly accessed).\n26 D. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged TPMs that Users Must Ordinarily Overcome\n27 Section 1201(a)(3)(B) applies only to technological measures that, \u201cin the ordinary course\n28 of [their] operation,\u201d require the application of information or a process to gain access to a\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 16\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 24 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 work. See MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 952 (\u201cSince a player need not encounter Warden to access\n 2 WoW\u2019s individual non-literal elements, Warden does not effectively control access to those\n 3 elements.\u201d). Thus, a technological measure, in order to be effective, must prevent all forms of\n 4 access to a work. See, e.g., Avaya, Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 2012 WL 13035096 (D.N.J. May 1,\n 5 2012); Digital Drilling Data Sys., LLC v. Petrolink Servs., Inc., 965 F3d 365, 376 (5th Cir. 2020)\n 6 (a measure that restricted certain unauthorized uses of software did not \u201ceffectively control[]\n 7 access\u201d where the protected data remained stored in an open database that could be accessed\n 8 without encountering that measure). That is not the case here.\n 9 Plaintiffs\u2019 own allegations establish that none of the alleged TPMs ordinarily controls a\n10 user\u2019s initial access to a YouTube video. They are conditional safeguards that apply only after\n11 access has already been obtained or when a user\u2019s subsequent conduct triggers them. As Plaintiffs\n12 acknowledge, users can \u201cwatch and listen to videos for free,\u201d but are \u201clock[ed] . . . from\n13 downloading copies of the work.\u201d FAC \u00b6 33; see also id. \u00b6 37 (\u201cYouTube permits members of the\n14 public to view audiovisual works through its platform . . . .\u201d). Moreover, none of the TPMs are\n15 encountered by every viewer or in the ordinary course of viewing a YouTube video. Each is\n16 triggered only after a user (1) has entered YouTube\u2019s authorized playback environment or (2)\n17 engages in activity beyond ordinary viewing. For example, the rolling cipher \u201cinhibits access to\n18 the underlying audiovisual files for the purposes of any downloading, copying or distribution\u201d but\n19 does not prevent ordinary viewing. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 50-52. IP blocking is triggered only in the event that\n20 YouTube detects \u201cabnormal request volume\u201d from a specific IP address, in which case it\n21 \u201cconditions continued access\u201d on compliance with YouTube\u2019s rules. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 53-54. Session-bound\n22 URLs do not determine whether a user may view a work in the first instance; they ensure that the\n23 underlying file remains available only through the authorized session and cannot be downloaded\n24 outside of it. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 55-56. CAPTCHA challenges, which are \u201cdesigned to separate human users\n25 from bots,\u201d arise only when traffic patterns indicate automated or suspicious activity, governing\n26 only \u201cfurther requests\u201d or \u201ccontinued platform access.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 57-60, 113. And proof-of-origin\n27 tokens, which are \u201cdesigned to separate human users from bots,\u201d are generated only during \u201cactive,\n28 authorized playback session[s],\u201d after the user has viewing access. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 61-64. In sum, because\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 17\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 25 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 users need not encounter any of the alleged TPMs to begin viewing the copyrighted work in the\n 2 ordinary course, the TPMs do not \u201ceffectively control[] access\u201d within the meaning of Section\n 3 1201(a).\n 4 E. Several Non-binding Cases Reaching a Contrary Result Misinterpret Section\n 5 1201(a)\n 6 A handful of district court decisions have declined to dismiss Section 1201(a) claims\n 7 premised on YouTube\u2019s TPMs. See Cordova v. Huneault, 817 F. Supp. 3d 819 (N.D. Cal. 2026);\n 8 Sony Music Ent. v. Uncharted Labs, Inc., No. 24-cv-4777-AKH, 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.\n 9 15, 2026); Justice v. Uncharted Labs, Inc., No. 25-cv-5029-AKH, 2026 WL 1430232 (S.D.N.Y.\n10 May 21, 2026); Yout, LLC v. RIAA, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 3d 650 (D. Conn. 2022). None is persuasive.\n11 Those decisions incorrectly erase the line Congress drew between access-control and copy-control\n12 circumvention. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 12; H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18; Hattler, 2017 WL\n13 11634742, at *6\u20138. They cannot be squared with appellate precedent that confirms that an access\n14 control must control access, not something else (like downloading or copying).\n15 First, Cordova incorrectly suggests that public viewability is \u201cimmaterial,\u201d 817 F. Supp. 3d\n16 at 834. In fact, it\u2019s dispositive. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(3)(B). The plain language of the statute makes\n17 it clear that liability turns on \u201caccess\u201d in the \u201cordinary course\u201d of operations. Thus, to be an access\n18 control, a measure must control whether users can gain access to a work. Controls over just some\n19 routes to that work, or controls that apply to just some users are not enough. Second, Cordova\u2019s\n20 treatment of any measure \u201cintended to prevent unauthorized downloading\u201d as an access control\n21 conflicts with MDY\u2019s instruction that for purposes of Section 1201(a), a measure must control\n22 access to the protected work. Cordova, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 834; MDY, 629 F.3d at 952\u201354. If\n23 Cordova was right, MDY would have turned out differently because the court there found no access\n24 control where a measure was intended to prevent unauthorized game-playing. But see MDY Indus.,\n25 LLC, 629 F.3d at 954 (alleged \u201caccess\u201d controls not \u201ceffective\u201d if they leave \u201copen the ability to\n26 access . . . [a protected work] directly\u2026.\u201d), see also Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 547 (TPM that blocks\n27 some access but leaves \u201cthe literal code or text of the computer program or data freely readable\u201d\n28 not an effective access control). Similarly, Lexmark would also have turned out differently. There,\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 18\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 26 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 the appellate court correctly held there was no access control where the measure was intended to\n 2 prevent unauthorized printing. Finally, Cordova based its conclusion on a string cite that included\n 3 cases addressing both Section 1201(a) and Section 1201(b). That conflation mistakenly treated\n 4 these provisions as interchangeable even though the Ninth Circuit has confirmed that they are not.\n 5 See MDY Indus. LLC, 629 F.3d at 946 (Sections 1201(a) and (b) are \u201cnot interchangeable\u201d);\n 6 Sony Music and Justice are also unpersuasive. In both Sony and Justice, the courts denied\n 7 a motion to dismiss because, as the Sony court explained, the amended complaint did \u201cnot establish\n 8 how [YouTube\u2019s TPMs] function sufficiently to determine their legal classification.\u201d See Sony\n 9 Music, 2026 WL 1019199, at *3; Justice, 2026 WL 1430232, at *3. That misapplies the pleading\n10 standard. Plaintiffs bear the burden of alleging every material element of a Section 1201(a) claim,\n11 including the existence of a \u201ctechnological measure that effectively controls access to a work.\u201d 17\n12 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(a)(1)(A). If the court cannot determine that a TPM is an access control, a plaintiff\u2019s\n13 anti-circumvention claim must fail as a matter of law. Moreover, as Hattler correctly noted, the\n14 DVD encryption cases on which the Uncharted Labs plaintiffs rely involve controls on initial\n15 access, not just copying.\n16 Finally, Yout, LLC, 633 F. Supp.3d 650, is not binding, is currently on appeal, and resolved\n17 a different question because of its procedural posture. In that case, where Yout sought declaratory\n18 judgment that Yout\u2019s software did not violate the DMCA, the question at the pleadings stage was\n19 whether the allegations fully negated any possible claim. Based on what Yout\u2019s \u201canemic\u201d showing,\n20 they did not. Id. at 667.\n21 In sum, none of those decisions grapple with the fact that, on the face of the FAC, Plaintiffs\n22 authorized worldwide viewing access through YouTube. And to the extent they treat a download-\n23 restricting measure as an access control because a file embodying the work is what gets copied,\n24 they erase the line Congress drew between access-control and copy-control circumvention. See S.\n25 Rep. No. 105-190, at 12; H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18; Hattler, 2017 WL 11634742, at *6\u20138.\n26 That distinction is Congress\u2019s to revisit\u2014not the courts.\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 19\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 27 of 28\n\n\n\n 1 CONCLUSION\n 2 This Court need not reach the central merits question if it concludes that Plaintiffs lack\n 3 Article III or statutory standing. If it does reach that question, it should dismiss the FAC for failure\n 4 to state a claim. Section 1201(a) targets circumvention of technological measures that effectively\n 5 control access to protected works\u2014not measures regulating copying, downloading, automated\n 6 retrieval, retention of copies, or other conduct after access has already been granted. Despite\n 7 Section 1201(a)\u2019s language and purpose, Plaintiffs seek to transform it from a narrow anti-\n 8 circumvention provision into a sweeping prohibition on downloading and downstream use of\n 9 publicly viewable internet content. But Congress drew a different line, and this Court is not free to\n10 erase it.\n11 This Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 FAC with prejudice. Despite substantially revising\n12 their pleading, Plaintiffs still have not alleged that any qualifying access control was circumvented.\n13 Plaintiffs\u2019 theory fails as a matter of law, they already amended once after BDI identified these\n14 deficiencies, and they still cannot state a claim under Section 1201(a). Because amendment would\n15 be futile, BDI respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the FAC in its entirety, with prejudice.\n16\n Dated: July 6, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n17\n\n18\n\n19 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n20 /s/ Anne M. Voigts\n21 ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n22 KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n\n23\n Attorneys for Defendant,\n24 BYTEDANCE INC.\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 20\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 40 Filed 07/06/26 Page 28 of 28\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n 1\n\n 2 I hereby certify that on July 6, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of\n 3 the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of\n 4 record.\n 5 /s/ Anne M. Voigts\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n 6\n Attorneys for Defendant,\n 7 BYTEDANCE INC.\n 8\n\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n DEFENDANT BDI\u2019S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS\u2019 FAC;\n MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, CASE NO. 3:25-CV-10933-JSC\n 21\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-07T09:30:23.400953-07:00","document_number":"40","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"035027345643","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/485309195/","id":485309195,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/40/1/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-07T09:30:13.168199-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-07T10:16:43.807424-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":2,"file_size":421031,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"40","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"035027345644","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-07-06T23:34:45.948220-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-15T15:16:48.210218-07:00","date_filed":"2026-07-06","time_filed":"23:22:19","entry_number":40,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-07-06.001","pacer_sequence_number":130,"description":"MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by ByteDance Inc. 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(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Voigts, Anne) (Filed on 7/6/2026) (Entered: 07/06/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/468097593/","id":468097593,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483379279/","id":483379279,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/37/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-18T17:04:32.540864-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.835018-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"37","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-18T17:04:32.501221-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.813121-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-02","time_filed":null,"entry_number":37,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-02.002","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"CLERK'S NOTICE SETTING ZOOM HEARING. The Initial Case Management Conference set for 10/21/2026 at 2:00 p.m. before Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley will be held via a Zoom webinar.Webinar Access: All counsel, members of the public, and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/jsc Court Appearances: Advanced notice is required of counsel or parties who wish to be identified by the court as making an appearance or will be participating in the argument at the hearing. A list of names must be sent to the CRD at jsccrd@cand.uscourts.gov no later than noon on 10/20/2026.Civ LR 77-3(d). Persons granted access to court proceedings held by telephone or videoconference are reminded that photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court proceedings, including screenshots or other visual copying of a hearing, is absolutely prohibited.Zoom Guidance and Setup: https://cand.uscourts.gov/zoom. (This is a text-only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) 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Initial Case Management Conference is reset for 10/7/2026 at 2:00 p.m. before Judge Jacquleine Scott Corley by a Zoom webinar.Webinar Access: All counsel, members of the public, and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/jsc Court Appearances: Advanced notice is required of counsel or parties who wish to be identified by the court as making an appearance or will be participating in the argument at the hearing. A list of names must be sent to the CRD at jsccrd@cand.uscourts.gov no later than noon on 10/6/2026.Civ LR 77-3(d). Persons granted access to court proceedings held by telephone or videoconference are reminded that photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court proceedings, including screenshots or other visual copying of a hearing, is absolutely prohibited.Zoom Guidance and Setup: https://cand.uscourts.gov/zoom. (This is a text-only entry generated by the court. There is no document associated with this entry.) (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/27/2026) (Entered: 04/27/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/466503772/","id":466503772,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/481743751/","id":481743751,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/39/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-05T14:04:15.705521-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.891631-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"39","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"035027220865","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion for Pro Hac Vice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-05T14:04:15.671928-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.876744-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-05","time_filed":"13:48:43","entry_number":39,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-05.002","pacer_sequence_number":128,"description":"ORDER by Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granting 38 Motion for Pro Hac Vice as to Morgan McCollum. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/5/2026) (Entered: 06/05/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/466464098/","id":466464098,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/481703467/","id":481703467,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/38/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-05T10:34:33.792196-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.862213-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"38","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"035027219066","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Pro Hac Vice","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483379410/","id":483379410,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/38/1/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-18T17:05:29.881710-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:29.881732-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":1,"file_size":174161,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"38","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"035027219067","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483379411/","id":483379411,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/38/2/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-18T17:05:29.904985-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:29.905006-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":1,"file_size":75210,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"38","attachment_number":2,"pacer_doc_id":"035027219068","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-05T10:34:33.768396-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.848240-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-05","time_filed":"10:15:29","entry_number":38,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-05.001","pacer_sequence_number":123,"description":"MOTION for leave to appear in Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 328, receipt number ACANDC-22066262.) Filing fee previously paid on June 4, 2026 filed by Matt Fisher, Golfholics, Inc., Ted Entertainment, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing)(McCollum, Morgan) (Filed on 6/5/2026) (Entered: 06/05/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/466010057/","id":466010057,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/481229934/","id":481229934,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/36/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-02T10:05:17.176239-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-01T05:51:32.310219-07:00","sha1":"c820839efc486c44d09c4fded591e5204756c083","page_count":2,"file_size":215191,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.36.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.36.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 36 Filed 06/02/26 Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n 1 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n 2 anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com\n 2400 Hanover Street\n 3\n Palo Alto, CA 94304-1115\n 4 Telephone: 650.233.4500\n Facsimile: 650.233.4545\n 5\n LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n 6 laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com\n 7 KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n kayvan.ghaffari@pillsburylaw.com\n 8 Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor\n San Francisco, CA 94111-5998\n 9 Telephone: 415.983.1000\n Facsimile: 415.983.1200\n10\n\n11 Attorneys for Defendant\n BYTEDANCE INC.\n12\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n13\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n14\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n15\n\n16 TED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 5:25-CV-10933-JSC\n FISHER, and GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\n17 individually and on behalf of all other similarly [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING\n situated, STIPULATION TO ENLARGE TIME TO\n18 RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n19 Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE\n MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND\n20 v. RELATED DEADLINES\n\n21 BYTEDANCE, INC.,\n\n22 Defendant.\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933-JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 36 Filed 06/02/26 Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n 1 Having read and considered the Stipulation to Enlarge Time to Respond to First Amended\n\n 2 Complaint and Continue Case Management Conference and Related Deadlines and supporting\n\n 3 declaration, it is approved. The following is adopted as the schedule for this case:\n\n 4\n Event Deadline\n 5\n\n 6 Deadline to respond to Amended Complaint / file motion to 7/6/26\n dismiss\n 7\n\n 8 Deadline to file opposition to motion to dismiss 8/6/26\n\n 9\n Deadline to file reply in support of motion to dismiss 8/27/26\n10\n\n11 Deadline to file ADR Certification 9/18/26\n12\n\n13 Deadline to meet and confer re: initial disclosures, early settlement, 9/18/26\n ADR process selection, and discovery plan\n14\n Deadline to make initial disclosures 10/2/26\n15\n\n16\n Deadline to file joint case management statement 10/13/26\n17\n\n18 Initial case management conference 10/21/26 at 2 p.m.\n19\n\n20 ISTRIC\n IT IS SO ORDERED. TES D TC\n21 TA\n O\n S\n\n\n\n\n U\n ED\n\n\n\n\n22\n RT\n\n\n\n\n D\n UNIT\n\n\n\n\n RANTE\n23 Dated: June 2, 2026\n G\n Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley\n R NIA\n\n\n\n\n24\n NO\n\n\n\n\n25 ley\n ne Sc ot t C o r\n FO\n\n\n\n\n J u d ge Jacqueli\n RT\n\n\n\n\n26\n LI\n\n\n\n\n ER\n H\n\n\n\n\n A\n\n\n\n\n27 N C\n F\n D IS T IC T O\n28 R\n -2-\n [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933 JSC\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-30T14:59:09.084014-07:00","document_number":"36","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"035027200734","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Stipulation","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-02T10:05:17.158422-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.780146-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-02","time_filed":"09:37:56","entry_number":36,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-02.001","pacer_sequence_number":119,"description":"ORDER by Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granting 35 Stipulation to Enlarge Time to Respond to First Amended Complaint and CMC. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/2/2026) (Entered: 06/02/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/466010018/","id":466010018,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/481229896/","id":481229896,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2026-06-02T10:05:16.195104-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-02T10:05:16.200175-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Clerk's Notice Setting Zoom Hearing","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-02T10:05:16.183332-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-02T10:05:16.183345-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-02","time_filed":"09:39:47","entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-02.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/465958277/","id":465958277,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72075006/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/481176867/","id":481176867,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72075006/35/ted-entertainment-inc-v-bytedance-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-02T00:03:28.444851-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T17:05:18.760040-07:00","sha1":"8f8edf5c0461f145301170ced4f865c42908da61","page_count":6,"file_size":189429,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.35.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cand.461722/gov.uscourts.cand.461722.35.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 35 Filed 06/01/26 Page 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n1 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n2 anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com\n 2400 Hanover Street\n3\n Palo Alto, CA 94304-1115\n4 Telephone: 650.233.4500\n Facsimile: 650.233.4545\n5\n LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n6 laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com\n KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n7\n kayvan.ghaffari@pillsburylaw.com\n8 Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor\n San Francisco, CA 94111-5998\n9 Telephone: 415.983.1000\n Facsimile: 415.983.1200\n10\n\n11 Attorneys for Defendant\n BYTEDANCE INC.\n12\n [Additional counsel listed on signature page]\n13\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n14\n NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n15\n SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION\n16\n\n17 TED ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MATT Case No. 5:25-CV-10933-JSC\n FISHER, and GOLFHOLICS, INC., each\n18 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER\n individually and on behalf of all other similarly\n19 situated TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND\n20 Plaintiffs, CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT\n CONFERENCE AND RELATED\n21 v. DEADLINES\n22 BYTEDANCE, INC.,\n Complaint Filed: December 23, 2025\n23 Defendant. First Amended Complaint Filed: April 13, 2026\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933-JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 35 Filed 06/01/26 Page 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\n1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rules 6-1, 6-2, and 7-12, Plaintiffs Ted Entertainment, Inc., Matt\n\n2 Fisher, and Golfholics, Inc. (collectively \u201cPlaintiffs\u201d) and defendant Bytedance Inc. (\u201cBytedance\u201d)\n\n3 (together, the \u201cParties\u201d), by and through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate to enlarge the time\n\n4 for Bytedance to respond to Plaintiffs\u2019 First Amended Complaint and continue the initial case\n\n5 management conference as follows:\n\n6 WHEREAS, on December 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Bytedance (ECF 1);\n\n7 WHEREAS, on December 23, 2025, the Court entered the Initial Case Management\n\n8 Scheduling Order with ADR Deadlines (ECF 4);\n\n9 WHEREAS, on December 26, 2025, Bytedance was served with the summons and a copy of\n\n10 the complaint (ECF 6);\n\n11 WHEREAS, on January 15, 2026, the Parties agreed to extend the deadline for Bytedance to\n\n12 respond to the complaint to March 17, 2026 (ECF 10);\n\n13 WHEREAS, on February 12, 2026, this case was reassigned to this Court (ECF 16);\n\n14 WHEREAS, on February 23, 2026, the Clerk\u2019s Notice Rescheduling Initial Case Management\n\n15 Conference issued;\n\n16 WHEREAS, on March 9, 2026, the parties filed a stipulation requesting an extension of the\n\n17 deadline for Bytedance to respond to the complaint; a modified briefing schedule for Bytedance\u2019s\n\n18 anticipated motion to dismiss; and a continuation of the initial case management conference and\n\n19 related deadlines (ECF 18);\n\n20 WHEREAS, on March 10, 2026, the Court granted the parties\u2019 stipulation to enlarge time to\n\n21 respond to the complaint and continue the case management conference (ECF 18);\n\n22 WHEREAS, on March 31, 2026, Bytedance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (ECF 25);\n\n23 WHEREAS, on April 13, 2026, Plaintiffs filed its First Amended Complaint (ECF 27);\n\n24 WHEREAS, on April 23, 2026, the Parties stipulated pursuant to Civil Local Rule 6-1(a) to\n\n25 extend the deadline for Bytedance to respond to the First Amended Complaint from April 27, 2026 to\n\n26 June 26, 2026; and the Parties further agreed to a modified briefing schedule for Bytedance\u2019s\n\n27 anticipated motion to dismiss (ECF 29);\n\n28 -2-\n STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933 JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 35 Filed 06/01/26 Page 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\n1 WHEREAS, on April 27, 2026, the Court granted as modified the Parties\u2019 stipulation (ECF\n\n2 30);\n\n3 WHEREAS, the Parties stipulated pursuant to Civil Local Rule 6-1(a) to extend the deadline\n\n4 for Bytedance to respond to the First Amended Complaint an additional ten days, from June 26, 2026\n\n5 to July 6, 2026, and the Parties further agreed to an extension of all other deadlines as set forth below;\n\n6 NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to Civil Local Rules 6-1, 6-2, and 7-12, the Parties stipulate\n\n7 and request that the deadlines and dates be modified as follows:\n\n8\n Event Deadline Proposed Deadline\n9\n\n10 Deadline to respond to first amended complaint / 6/26/26 7/6/26\n file motion to dismiss\n11\n Deadline to file opposition to motion to dismiss 7/27/26 8/6/26\n12\n\n13\n Deadline to file reply in support of motion to 8/17/26 8/27/26\n14 dismiss\n15 Deadline to file ADR Certification 9/8/26 9/18/26\n16\n\n17 Deadline to meet and confer re: initial 9/8/26 9/18/26\n disclosures, early settlement, ADR process\n18 selection, and discovery plan\n19 Deadline to make initial disclosures 9/22/26 10/2/26\n20\n\n21 Deadline to file joint case management statement 9/30/26 10/13/26\n\n22\n Initial case management conference 10/7/26 at 2 p.m. 10/21/26 at 2 p.m.\n23\n\n24\n\n25 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 6-2, this stipulation is accompanied by the Declaration of Kayvan\n\n26 M. Ghaffari setting forth (1) the reasons for the requested enlargement of time; (2) all previous\n\n27 modifications in this case; and (3) the effect of the requested enlargement of time.\n\n28 -3-\n STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933 JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 35 Filed 06/01/26 Page 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n1 IT IS SO STIPULATED.\n\n2\n Dated: June 1, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n3\n\n4 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n\n5 /s/ Kayvan M. Ghaffari\n ANNE M. VOIGTS (220783)\n6 anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com\n 2550 Hanover Street\n7\n Palo Alto, CA 94304-1115\n8 Telephone: 650.233.4500\n Facsimile: 650.233.4545\n9\n LAURA C. HURTADO (267044)\n10 laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com\n KAYVAN M. GHAFFARI (299152)\n11\n kayvan.ghaffari@pillsburylaw.com\n12 Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor\n San Francisco, CA 94111-5998\n13 Telephone: 415.983.1000\n Facsimile: 415.983.1200\n14\n Attorneys for Defendant,\n15\n BYTEDANCE INC.\n16\n\n17\n Dated: June 1, 2026 HEAH BAR-NISSIM LLP\n18\n /s/ Rom Bar-Nissim\n19\n Rom Bar-Nissim (293356)\n20 Rom@HeahBarNissim.com\n 1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400\n21 Los Angeles, CA 90067\n Telephone: (310) 432-90067\n22 Facsimile: (310) 785-4601\n23\n ELLZEY KHERKHER SANFORD MONTGOMERY\n24 LLP\n Jarrett Lee Ellzey (Pro hac vice forthcoming)\n25 JEllzey@EKSM.com\n Tom Kherkher (Pro hac vice forthcoming)\n26 TKherkher@EKSM.com\n27 Leigh S. Montgomery (Pro hac vice forthcoming)\n LMontgomery@EKSM.com\n28 -4-\n STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933 JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 35 Filed 06/01/26 Page 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\n1 Natischa Volpe (Pro hac vice forthcoming)\n NVolpe@EKSM.com\n2 4200 Montrose Street, Suite 200\n Houston, TX 77006\n3\n Telephone: (713) 244-6363\n4\n Attorneys for Plaintiffs,\n5 TED Entertainment, Inc., Matt Fisher, and Golfholics, Inc.,\n each individually and on behalf of all others similarly\n6 situated\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 -5-\n STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO FIRST AMENDED\n COMPLAINT AND CONTINUE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND RELATED DEADLINES\n Case No: 5:25-CV-10933 JSC\n\f Case 3:25-cv-10933-JSC Document 35 Filed 06/01/26 Page 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n1 ATTESTATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL L.R. 5-1\n\n2\n The filer attests that the other signatories listed, on whose behalf the filing is also submitted,\n3\n are registered CM/ECF filers and concur in the filing\u2019s content and have authorized the filing.\n4\n\n5 Dated: June 1, 2026 /s/ Kayvan M. 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