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(ddm) (Entered: 12/30/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/451954441/","id":451954441,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72087328/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/466811241/","id":466811241,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72087328/2/hisense-usa-corporation-v-cogent-insights-licensing-inc/","date_created":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.201834-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.212526-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"2","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055017923611","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.132458-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.139248-08:00","date_filed":"2025-12-29","time_filed":null,"entry_number":2,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-12-29.002","pacer_sequence_number":15,"description":"Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement by Hisense USA Corporation identifying Hisense Co. Ltd. for Hisense USA Corporation. (ddm) (Entered: 12/30/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/451954439/","id":451954439,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/72087328/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/466811239/","id":466811239,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72087328/1/hisense-usa-corporation-v-cogent-insights-licensing-inc/","date_created":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.095338-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-31T07:25:40.351112-08:00","sha1":"115b95552ba4881aced759ad3d9c4d7de00e4af1","page_count":9,"file_size":390426,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 1 of 9\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n GAINESVILLE DIVISION\n\nHISENSE USA CORPORATION,\n\n Plaintiff,\n CIVIL ACTION NO.\nv.\n\nCOGENT INSIGHTS LICENSING INC., ____________________\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF\n PATENT NON-INFRINGEMENT\n\n Plaintiff Hisense USA Corporation (\u201cHisense\u201d) files this Complaint for\n\nDeclaratory Judgment of Non-Infringement against Defendant Cogent Insights\n\nLicensing Inc. (\u201cCogent\u201d) and in support of its Complaint alleges as follows:\n\n NATURE OF THE ACTION\n\n 1. This is an action for declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and\n\n2202, that Hisense\u2019s products do not infringe any claims of U.S. Patent No.\n\n9,794,797 (\u201cthe \u2019797 patent,\u201d Exhibit 1), which Cogent contends it owns.\n\n 2. On December 8, 2025, Cogent, through its counsel, sent a Notice of\n\nInfringement (the \u201cNotice Letter,\u201d Exhibit 2) to Hisense.\n\n 3. The Notice Letter explicitly accused Hisense of infringing the \u2019797\n\npatent by \u201cmaking, using, selling, importing, and/or offering for sale\u201d products that\n\ncomply with the IEEE 802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6) standard.\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 2 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 4. Cogent\u2019s Notice Letter specifically identified the \u201cHisense 110 UX\n\nSeries Championship Edition TV\u201d as an \u201cAccused Product\u201d and implied other\n\nHisense Wi-Fi 6-enabled devices also infringe.\n\n 5. Hisense believes that it does not infringe and has not infringed any\n\nclaims of the \u2019797 patent.\n\n 6. Cogent\u2019s actions, including the provision of a detailed claim chart and\n\nexplicit accusations of infringement, have created a real and immediate controversy\n\nbetween Cogent and Hisense as to whether Hisense\u2019s products infringe any claims\n\nof the \u2019797 patent.\n\n 7. On December 18, 2025, Cogent filed several patent infringement suits\n\nasserting the \u2019797 patent against several different defendants.\n\n 8. The facts and allegations recited herein show that there is a real,\n\nimmediate, and justiciable controversy between Hisense and Cogent as to whether\n\nthe \u2019797 patent has been infringed by Hisense.\n\n PARTIES\n\n 9. Plaintiff Hisense is a corporation organized and existing under the laws\n\nof the State of Georgia with its principal place of business at 7310 McGinnis Ferry\n\nRoad, Suwanee, Georgia 30024. In or about January 2026, Hisense\u2019s principal place\n\nof business will move to 5995 Windward Parkway, Suite 500-A, Alpharetta, Georgia\n\n30005.\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 3 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 10. Upon information and belief, Defendant Cogent is a corporation\n\norganized and existing under the laws of Canada, with its principal place of business\n\nat 471 Baker Street, Nelson, BC V1L 4H7.\n\n JURISDICTION AND VENUE\n\n 11. This action arises under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7\u00a7 2201 et seq., and the Patent Laws of the United States, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 et seq.\n\n 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged in\n\nthis action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1331, 1338(a), and 2201 because this action\n\ninvolves claims arising under the patent laws of the United States, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 et\n\nseq., and under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202.\n\nJurisdiction is also proper because Hisense is a citizen of this State and Cogent is a\n\nCanadian corporation and the value of the controversy exceeds $75,000.\n\n 13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Cogent by virtue of its\n\nsufficient minimum contacts with this forum and the United States as a whole.\n\n 14. Cogent has purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting\n\nbusiness in the United States by acquiring U.S. patent rights and directing\n\nenforcement activities at Plaintiff Hisense, a resident of this District. Specifically,\n\nCogent sent a Notice of Infringement dated December 8, 2025, to Hisense\u2019s\n\nheadquarters in Suwanee, Georgia, explicitly accusing Hisense of infringing the \u2019797\n\npatent and demanding licensing negotiations.\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 4 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 15. Alternatively, because Cogent is a foreign entity not subject to\n\njurisdiction in any other state\u2019s courts of general jurisdiction, and because the\n\nexercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws,\n\npersonal jurisdiction over Cogent is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\n\n4(k)(2).\n\n 16. Venue is proper within this Judicial District under 28 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7\u00a7 1391(c)(3) because Cogent is a foreign entity not resident in the United States\n\nand may therefore be sued in any judicial district. Additionally, Plaintiff Hisense\n\nresides in this District.\n\n FACTS\n\n 17. On December 8, 2025, Cogent sent the Notice Letter to Hisense via\n\nFederal Express and email.\n\n 18. The Notice Letter asserts that Hisense infringes the \u2019797 patent.\n\n 19. The Notice Letter included a claim chart purporting to map Claim 1 of\n\nthe \u2019797 patent to the IEEE 802.11ax (i.e., Wi-Fi 6) standard.\n\n 20. Cogent alleged that specific features of the IEEE 802.11ax standard,\n\nsuch as \u201cspatial reuse\u201d and \u201cbeamforming,\u201d satisfy the specific limitations of the\n\n\u2019797 patent claims.\n\n 21. Hisense believes and asserts that it does not infringe and has not\n\ninfringed any claims of the \u2019797 patent.\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 5 of 9\n\n\n\n\n COUNT ONE\n Declaratory Judgment of Non-Infringement of the \u2019797 Patent\n\n 22. Hisense has not infringed and does not infringe any claims of the \u2019797\n\npatent either directly or indirectly (contributorily or by inducement), literally or\n\nunder the doctrine of equivalents, including by making, using, importing into the\n\nUnited States, selling, and/or offering for sale any Hisense-branded products.\n\n 23. Cogent accuses Hisense of infringing claim 1 of the \u2019797 patent which\n\nrecites the following:\n\n 1. A wireless network node of a wireless network, comprising:\n (a) an antenna system, configured to: communicate through a\n communication channel, having a directional radiation\n pattern with an alterable directional vector having at least a\n first state and a second state which differ in at least the\n alterable directional vector and corresponding spatial\n characteristics, and\n (b) an automated controller, configured to:\n (i) conduct an automated negotiation with a remote wireless\n communication device, which employs game theoretic\n decision-making to self-organize the wireless network, by\n communications through the antenna system, relating to a\n conduct of communications which have a first potential\n interference with respect to the communication channel\n when the alterable directional vector is in the first state\n and a second potential interference when the alterable\n directional vector is in the second state, the first potential\n interference being different from the second potential\n interference, to select one of the first state and the second\n state in dependence on the automated negotiation;\n (ii) define the alterable directional vector of the antenna\n system to selectively assume the directional radiation\n pattern having selected one of the first state and the\n second state; and\n (iii) control a communication through the communication\n\n 5\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 6 of 9\n\n\n\n\n channel with the alterable directional vector in the\n assumed directional radiation pattern having the selected\n one of the first state and the second state.\n\n 24. Contrary to Cogent\u2019s allegations, Hisense\u2019s products do not infringe\n\nclaim 1 of the \u2019797 patent at least because the Hisense products do not include an\n\nautomated controller configured to \u201cconduct an automated negotiation with a remote\n\nwireless communication device, which employs game theoretic decision-making to\n\nself-organize the wireless network, by communications through the antenna system,\n\nrelating to a conduct of communications which have a first potential interference\n\nwith respect to the communication channel when the alterable directional vector is\n\nin the first state and a second potential interference when the alterable directional\n\nvector is in the second state,\u201d or configured to \u201cself-organize the wireless network\u201d\n\nvia game theoretic decision-making, or to \u201cselect one of the first state and the second\n\nstate in dependence on the automated negotiation,\u201d as required by claim 1.\n\n 25. Accordingly, at least for the above reasons, Hisense\u2019s products do not\n\ninfringe the asserted claims of the \u2019797 patent either literally or under the doctrine\n\nof equivalents.\n\n 26. Hisense also has not and does not induce infringement of the \u2019797\n\npatent because there is no underlying direct infringement of the asserted claims for\n\nat least the reasons stated above, and also because Hisense has not acted with specific\n\nintent necessary for induced infringement.\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 7 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 27. Hisense also does not contributorily infringe the \u2019797 patent because\n\nthere is no underlying direct infringement of the asserted claims for at least the\n\nreasons stated above, and also because Hisense did not sell or offer to sell any\n\nproducts \u201cknowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in\n\nan infringement of [the \u2019797] patent.\u201d 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(c).\n\n 28. As set forth above, there exists an actual controversy between Hisense\n\nand Cogent with respect to alleged infringement of the \u2019797 patent of sufficient\n\nimmediacy and reality to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment as to whether\n\nHisense infringes the \u2019797 patent. Accordingly, Hisense desires a judicial\n\ndetermination and declaration of the respective rights and duties of the Parties with\n\nrespect to the \u2019797 patent.\n\n 29. Hisense is entitled to a judicial determination that Hisense does not\n\ndirectly infringe, induce others to infringe, or contribute to the infringement of any\n\nasserted claims of the \u2019797 patent. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate\n\nso that Hisense may ascertain its rights regarding the claims of the \u2019797 patent.\n\n PRAYER FOR RELIEF\n\n Hisense respectfully requests the following relief:\n\n A. That the Court enter a judgment declaring that Hisense has not infringed\n\nand does not infringe any asserted claim of the \u2019797 patent either directly or\n\nindirectly;\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 8 of 9\n\n\n\n\n B. That the Court declare that this case is exceptional under 35 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7 285 and award Hisense its attorneys\u2019 fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this\n\naction;\n\n C. That the Court award Hisense any and all other relief to which Hisense\n\nmay show itself to be entitled; and\n\n D. That the Court award Hisense any other relief as the Court may deem\n\njust, equitable, and proper.\n\n JURY DEMAND\n\n Hisense demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable.\n\n Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December 2025.\n\n BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN,\n CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC\n\n /s/ Gavin M. Childers\n Linda A. Klein\n Georgia Bar No. 425069\n lklein@bakerdonelson.com\n Gavin M. Childers\n Georgia Bar No. 234747\n gchilders@bakerdonelson.com\n 3414 Peachtree Rd, NE, Suite 1500\n Atlanta, Georgia 30326\n Telephone: (404) 577-6000\n\n PERKINS COIE LLP\n\n Patrick McKeever (Pro hac vice forthcoming)\n PMcKeever@perkinscoie.com\n Wei Yuan (Pro hac vice forthcoming)\n WYuan@perkinscoie.com\n\n 8\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 9 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 11452 El Camino Real, Suite 300\n San Diego, CA 92130-2080\n Telephone: (858) 720-5700\n Facsimile: (858) 720-5799\n Attorneys for Plaintiff Hisense USA Corporation\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-01-28T21:44:17.853371-08:00","document_number":"1","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055017923577","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/466811376/","id":466811376,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72087328/1/1/hisense-usa-corporation-v-cogent-insights-licensing-inc/","date_created":"2026-01-28T21:43:35.873001-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-31T07:06:13.394681-08:00","sha1":"8050b9ed93fb47dde1c7394fbd192a17b1db86db","page_count":81,"file_size":17202601,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-1 Filed 12/29/25 Page1of81\n\nEXHIBIT 1\n\fILS TTT\n\na2) United States Patent\n\nHoffberg\n\ni\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\nOct. 17, 2017\n\nit\n\nUS009794797B2\n\n(0) Patent No.:\n(45) Date of Patent:\n\n(54)\n\n(71)\n\n(72)\n\n(*)\n\n(21)\n(22)\n\n(65)\n\n(63)\n\n(51)\n\n(52)\n\n(58)\n\nMULTIFACTORIAL OPTIMIZATION\nSYSTEM AND METHOD\n\nApplicant: Steven M. Hoffberg, West Harrison,\n\nNY (US)\n\nInventor: Steven M. Hoffberg, West Harrison,\nNY (US)\n\nNotice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this\n\npatent is extended or adjusted under 35\nU.S.C. 154(b) by 126 days.\n\nAppl. No.: 14/526,117\nFiled: Oct. 28, 2014\n\nPrior Publication Data\n\nUS 2015/0111591 Al Apr. 23, 2015\n\nRelated U.S. Application Data\n\nContinuation of application No. 11/467,931, filed on\nAug. 29, 2006, now Pat. No. 8,874,477.\n\n(Continued)\nInt. Cl.\nHO4W 24/02 (2009.01)\nHO4W 72/08 (2009.01)\n(Continued)\nUS. Cl\nCPC ........ HO04W 16/28 (2013.01); G06Q 10/0631\n\n(2013.01); G06Q 10/0635 (2013.01);\n(Continued)\nField of Classification Search\nCPC HO4W 16/14; HO4W 24/02; HO4W 28/06;\nHO4W 72/042; HO4W 52/241;\n(Continued)\n\nLIDAR 19)\nmT erin\nsu +\n\nCamera 26\n\nSS RF 12\nOptical 13\nCellular 14\nAcoustic 16\n\na\na\n\nti \u201c\n\nAudio |:\n\nee\n\nGPS\nreceiver 2\n\nCommunications\nsubsystem 5\n\nprocessor\n\n\u2014_\n\ndio tower 10' Radio tower 10\"\n\n(56) References Cited\nU.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS\n\n4,200,770 A\n4,218,582 A\n\n4/1980 Hellman et al.\n8/1980 Hellman et al.\n\n(Continued)\n\nFOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS\n\nCA\nWO\nWO\n\nWO 2006039803 Al *\nW00077539\nWO 2004018158 A2 *\n\n4/2006\n12/2000\n3/2004\n\nHO4L 5/0037\n\nF41H 13/00\n\nOTHER PUBLICATIONS\n\nNoori, N., and N. Nouri. \u201cDirectional relays for multi-hop coop-\nerative cognitive radio networks.\u201d Radioengineering (2013).\n\n(Continued)\n\nPrimary Examiner \u2014 Wutchung Chu\n(74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm \u2014 Steven M. Hoftberg,\nEsq.; Ostrolenk Faber LLP\n\n(57) ABSTRACT\n\nA method for providing unequal allocation of rights among\nagents while operating according to fair principles, com-\nprising assigning a hierarchal rank to each agent; providing\na synthetic economic value to a first set of agents at the a\nhigh level of the hierarchy; allocating portions of the syn-\nthetic economic value by the first set of agents to a second\nset of agents at respectively different hierarchal rank than the\nfirst set of agents; and conducting an auction amongst agents\nusing the synthetic economic value as the currency. A\nmethod for allocation among agents, comprising assigning a\nwealth generation function for generating future wealth to\neach of a plurality of agents, communicating subjective\nmarket information between agents, and transferring wealth\ngenerated by the secure wealth generation function between\nagents in consideration of a market transaction. The method\nmay further comprise the step of transferring at least a\nportion of the wealth generation function between agents.\n\n20 Claims, 6 Drawing Sheets\n\nie\n\ney\n\u2014\u2014\n\nSatellite 16\n=} Satellite dish 17\n\nNetwork\ncommunication\ncloud 24\n\nDatabase server 25\n\nal\n\naa] 10) Cc\ngo? Processor 11' Processor 11\" Database\n: Ll 20\nI :\nMobite Communications Device 1 : vie\ncer\n\nAcoustic coupler 22\nDatabase bh\nmemory 4 RJ 11.23\n\nModer 21\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 3of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\nPage 2\nRelated U.S. Application Data 4,582,389 A 4/1986 Wood et al.\n4,590,470 A \u20185/1986. Koenig\nws as 4,595,950 A 6/1986 Lofberg\n(60) Provisional application No. 60/723,339, filed on Oct. 4'625.076 A 11/1986 Okamoto et al.\n4, 2005. 4,633,036 A 12/1986 Hellman et al.\n5 5 ura et al.\n4,636,782 A 1/1987 Nakam al\n(51) Int. Cl. 4,653,003 A 3/1987 Kirstein\nHOW 36/20 (2009.01) 4,704,610 A 11/1987 Smith et al.\nHOAW 72/04 (2009.01) 4,706,086 A 11/1987 Panizza\nHOAW 52/24 2009.01 4,707,788 A 11/1987 Tashiro et al.\n( 01) 4,731,769 A 3/1988 Schaefer et al.\nHO4W 16/28 (2009.01) 4,731,841 A 3/1988 Rosen et al.\nG060 10/06 (2012.01) 4.736.203 A 4/1988. Sidlauskas\nG06Q 10/10 (2012.01) 4,740,779 A 4/1988 Cleary et al.\n4,752,676 A 6/1988 Leonard et al.\nG06Q 30/08 (2012.01) 4,752,824 A 6/1988 Moore\nG06Q 40/04 (2012.01) 4,787,039 A 11/1988 Murata\nG06Q 50/18 (2012.01) 4,795,223 A 1/1989 Moss\nG06Q 20/22 (2012.01) ee one A those Saitoh\nG06Q 40/00 (2012.01) 4819267 A 4/1989 Cargile et al.\nHO4W 64/00 (2009.01) 4,827,518 A 5/1989 Feustel et al.\nHO4W 84/18 (2009.01) 4,827,520 A 5/1989 Zeinstra\n(52) U.S. Cl. 4,837,551 A eos Iino I\nCPC ..... G06Q_ 10/06375 (2013.01); G06Q 10/103 Teeeoie & Siloso linseamayer\n(2013.01); G06Q 20/22 (2013.01), G06Q 4.868.376 A _ 9/1989 Lessin et al.\n30/0201 (2013.01); G06Q 30/08 (2013.01); 4,876,594 A 10/1989 Schiffman\nG06Q 40/00 (2013.01); G06Q 40/04 4,890,323 A 12/1989 Beker et al.\n(2013.01); G06 50/188 (2013.01); HO4W reese \u2018 iioot Ny et al.\n64/003 (2013.01); H04W 72/082 (2013.01); 4996480 A 5/1990 Clam _\nHO4W 84/18 (2013.01) 4,941,173 A 7/1990 Boule et al.\n(58) Field of Classification Search 4,952,928 A 8/1990 Carroll et al.\nCPC ... H04W 72/082; HO4W 84/18; HO4W 16/28; ocr Las \u2018 IovLoop eyo et al\nHO4W 64/003; HO4W 4/028; Ho4w TO ANE A 11/1900 Muthasg\n12/02; HO1Q 3/24 4,977,595 A 12/1990 Ohta et al.\nUSPC coeeccccccecesescsseceeceseeeees 455/41.2, 63.4, 277.1 4,988,976 A 1/1991 Lu\nSee application file for complete search history. 4,993,068 A 2/1991 Piosenka et al.\n4,995,258 A 2/1991 Frank\n. 4,996,959 A 3/1991 Akimoto\n(56) References Cited 5,006,829 A 4/1991 Miyamoto et al.\n5,020,105 A 5/1991 Rosen et al.\nU.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 5,036,461 A 7/1991 Elliott et al.\n4.064.782 A 4/81. Konheim 5,043,736 A 8/1991 Darnell et al.\n4.291.749 A 9/1981 Ootsuka et al. aoe lal o/lool be\n4,306,111 A 12/198! Lu et al. 5,056,147 A 10/1991 Turner et al.\n4,337,821 A 7/1982 Saito 5,070,931 A 12/1991 Kalthoff et al.\n4,351,982 A 9/1982 Miller et al. 5,073,950 A 12/1991 Colbert et al.\n4,365,110 A 12/1982 Lee et al. 5,119,504 A \u20186/1992. Durboraw, IIT\n4,386,233 A 5/1983 Smid et al. 5,131,020 A 7/1992 Liebesny et al.\n4,393,269 A ios, Konheim et al. 5,131,038 A 7/1992 Puhl et al.\n4,399,323 A 8/1983. Henry 5,155,680 A 10/1992. Wiedemer\n4,401,848 A 8/1983 Tsunoda 5,163,094 A 11/1992 Prokoski et al.\ntae ed \u2018 loos, ae et al. 5,164,904 A 11/1992 Sumner\nA07, 5,191,611 A 3/1993 L\n4,419,730 A 12/1983. Ito et al. 5198797 A 3/1993 Daidoji\n4,441,405 A 4/1984. Takeuchi 5204670 A 4/1993. Stinton\n4,451,887 A 5/1984 Harada et al. 5,208,858 A 5/1993. Vollert et al.\na aes e00 A elon router ht 5,214,413 A 5/1993 Okabayashi et al.\nF198, / Ueher-oc oer 5,214,707 A 5/1993 Fujimoto et al.\n4,471,164 A Oy Lond Henry al 5.224.162 A 6/1993. Okamoto et al.\naorta A yes Rn 5,224,173 A 6/1993 Kuhns et al.\n4.514.592 A 4/1985. Miyaguchi 5,228,094 A 7/1993 Villa\n4328888 A 7/1983. Lofbers 5,229,764 A 7/1993. Matchett et al.\n4.529 870 A 7/1985 Chaum 5,235,633 A 8/1993 Dennison et al.\n4,536,739 A 8/1985 Nobuta 5,237,159 A 8/1993 Stephens et al.\n4,558,176 A 12/1985 Arnold et al. 5,245,329 A 9/1993 Gokcebay\n4,564,018 A 1/1986 Hutchison et al. 5,257,190 A 10/1993 Crane\n4,567,600 A 1/1986 Massey et al. 5,272,754 A 12/1993 Boerbert\n4,575,621 A 3/1986 Dreifus 5,274,560 A 12/1993 LaRue\n4,578,531 A 3/1986 Everhart et al. 5,278,532 A 1/1994 Hegg et al.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-1 Filed 12/29/25 Page4of81\nUS 9,794,797 B2\nPage 3\n(56) References Cited 5,553,155 A 9/1996 Kuhns et al.\n5,553,661 A 9/1996 Beyerlein et al.\nU.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 5,555,172 A 9/1996 Potter\n5,555,286 A 9/1996 Tendler\n5,280,527 A 1/1994 Gullman et al. 5,555,502 A 9/1996 Opel\n5,283,431 A 2/1994 Rhine 5,557,765 A 9/1996 Lipner et al.\n5,291,560 A 3/1994 Daugman 5,559,520 A 9/1996 Barzegar et al.\n5.293.115 A 3/1994 Swanson 5,559,885 A 9/1996 Drexler et al.\n5.299.132 A 3/1994 Wortham 5,561,718 A 10/1996 Trew et al.\n5,302,955 A 4/1994 Schutte et al. 5,572,204 A 11/1996 Timm et al.\n5,334,974 A 8/1994 Simms et al. 5,572,596 A 11/1996 Wildes et al.\n5,335,276 A 8/1994 Thompson et al. 5,576,724 A 11/1996 Fukatsu et al.\n5,335,288 A 8/1994 Faulkner 5,578,808 A 11/1996 Taylor\n5,335,743 A 8/1994 Gillbrand et al. 5,579,535 A 11/1996 Orlen et al.\n5,341,428 A 8/1994 Schatz 5,583,933 A 12/1996 Mark\n5,345,549 A 9/1994 Appel et al. 5,583,950 A 12/1996 Prokoski\n5.345.817 A 9/1994 Grenn et al. 5,586,171 A 12/1996 McAllister et al.\n5.347.580 A 9/1994 Molva et al. 5,588,059 A 12/1996 Chandos et al.\n5,351,041 A 9/1994 Ikata et al. 5,592,408 A 1/1997 Keskin et al.\n5,361,165 A 11/1994 Stringfellow et al. 5,594,779 A 1/1997 Goodman\n5,363,453 A 11/1994 Gagne et al. 5,594,806 A 1/1997 Colbert\n5,371,510 A 12/1994 Miyauchi et al. 5,608,387 A 3/1997 Davies\n5,392,353 A 2/1995 Morales 5,613,012 A 3/1997 Hoffman et al.\n5.400.045 A 3/1995 Aoki 5,615,277 A 3/1997 Hoffman\n5.404.443 A 4/1995. Hirata 5,621,201 A 4/1997 Langhans et al.\n5,412,727 A 5/1995 Drexler et al. 5,623,547 A 4/1997 Jones et al.\n5,414,439 A 5/1995 Groves et al. 5,627,547 A 5/1997 Ramaswamy et al.\n5,414,755 A 5/1995 Bahler et al. 5,629,980 A 5/1997 Stefik et al.\n5,416,318 A 5/1995 Hegyi 5,633,932 A 5/1997 Davis et al.\n5.422.565 A 6/1995 Swanson 5,634,012 A 5/1997 Stefik et al.\n5.428.544 A 6/1995 Shyu 5,636,282 A 6/1997 Holmquist et al.\n5.432.864 A 7/1995 Lu etal. 5,638,305 A 6/1997 Kobayashi et al.\n5.432.904 A 7/1995 Wong 5,638,443 A 6/1997 Stefik et al.\n5,440,428 A 8/1995 Hegg et al. 5,646,839 A T1997 Katz\n5,442,553 A 8/1995 Parrillo 5,647,017 A 7/1997 Smithies et al.\n5.448.045 A 9/1995 Clark 5,647,364 A 7/1997 Schneider et al.\n5450321 A 9/1995 Crane 5,648,769 A 7/1997 Sato et al.\n5.450.329 A 9/1995 Tanner 5,650,770 A 7/1997 Schlager et al.\n5'450.613 A 9/1995 Takahara et al. 5,650,929 A 7/1997 Potter et al.\n5 453 601 A 9/1995 Rosen 5,653,386 A 8/1997 Hennessee et al.\n5.455.407 A 10/1995 Rosen 5,654,715 A 8/1997 Hayashikura et al.\n5,457,747 A 10/1995 Drexler et al. 5,659,616 A 8/1997 Sudia\n5,469,506 A 11/1995 Berson et al. 5,666,102 A 9/1997 Lahift\n5,475,399 A 12/1995 Borsuk 5,666,400 A 9/1997 McAllister et al.\n5,475,839 A 12/1995 Watson et al. 5,666,416 A 9/1997 Micali\n5,478,993 A 12/1995 Derksen 5,668,878 A 9/1997 Brands\n5.479.482 A 12/1995 Grimes 5,670,953 A 9/1997 Satoh et al.\n5,483,601 A 1/1996 Faulkner 5,677,955 A 10/1997 Doggett et al.\n5,483,632 A 1/1996 Kuwamoto et al. 5,679,940 A 10/1997 Templeton et al.\n5,485,161 A 1/1996 Vaughn 5,680,460 A 10/1997 Tomko et al.\n5,485,312 A 1/1996 Horner et al. 5,682,032 A 10/1997 Philipp\n5,485,519 A 1/1996 Weiss 5,682,142 A 10/1997 Loosmore et al.\n5,486,840 A 1/1996 Borrego et al. 5,687,215 A 11/1997 Timm et al.\n5,493,658 A 2/1996 Chiang et al. 5,689,252 A 11/1997 Ayanoglu et al.\n5,494,097 A 2/1996 Straub et al. 5,691,695 A 11/1997 Lahiff\n5,497,271 A 3/1996 Mulvanny et al. 5,696,827 A 12/1997 Brands\n5,497,339 A 3/1996 Bernard 5,696,908 A 12/1997 Muehlberger et al.\n5,497,430 A 3/1996 Sadovnik et al. 5,699,056 A 12/1997 Yoshida\n5.504.482 A 4/1996 Schreder 5,702,165 A 12/1997 Koibuchi\n5.504.491 A 4/1996 Chapman 5,703,562 A 12/1997 Nilsen\n5,504,622 A 4/1996 Oikawa et al. 5,706,427 A 1/1998 Tabuki\n5,506,595 A 4/1996 Fukano et al. 5,712,625 A 1/1998 Murphy\n5,511,121 A 4/1996 Yacobi 5,712,632 A 1/1998 Nishimura et al.\n5,511,724 A 4/1996 Freiberger et al. 5,712,640 A 1/1998 Andou et al.\n5,519,403 A 5/1996 Bickley et al. 5,712,912 A 1/1998 Tomko et al.\n5.519.410 A 5/1996 Smalanskas et al. 5,712,914 A 1/1998 Aucsmith et al.\n5,523,559 A 6/1996 Swanson 5,714,852 A 2/1998 Enderich\n5,523,739 A 6/1996 Manneschi 5,715,403 A 2/1998 Stefik\n5,525,977 A 6/1996 Suman 5,717,387 A 2/1998 Suman et al.\n5,526,428 A 6/1996 Arnold 5,717,757 A 2/1998 Micali\n5,528,248 A 6/1996 Steiner et al. 5,719,950 A 2/1998 Osten et al.\n5,528,496 A 6/1996 Brauer et al. 5,720,770 A 2/1998 Nappholz et al.\n5,533,123 A 7/1996 Force et al. 5,732,368 A 3/1998 Knoll et al.\n5,534,855 A 7/1996 Shockley et al. 5,734,154 A 3/1998 Jachimowicz et al.\n5,534,888 A 7/1996 Lebby et al. 5,734,973 A 3/1998 Honda\n5,539,645 A 7/1996 Mandhyan et al. 5,737,420 A 4/1998 Tomko et al.\n5,539,869 A 7/1996 Spoto et al. 5,742,226 A 4/1998 Szabo et al.\n5,544,255 A 8/1996 Smithies et al. 5,742,683 A 4/1998 Lee et al.\n5,547,125 A 8/1996 Hennessee et al. 5,742,685 A 4/1998 Berson et al.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS\n\nDocument 1-1\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\nPage 4\n\nFiled 12/29/25\n\nPage 5 of 81\n\n(56)\n\n5,745,555\n5,745,573\n5,748,103\n5,748,738\n5,751,809\n5,751,836\n5,752,754\n5,752,976\n5,754,939\n5,757,431\n5,757,916\n5,758,311\n5,761,298\n5,763,862\n5,764,789\n5,767,496\n5,768,382\n5,768,385\n5,770,849\n5,771,071\n5,774,073\n5,774,357\n5,774,551\n5,777,394\n5,781,872\n5,784,461\n5,784,566\n5,787,187\n5,789,733\n5,790,668\n5,790,674\n5,793,868\n5,799,083\n5,799,086\n5,799,087\n5,799,088\n5,802,199\n5,805,055\n5,805,719\n5,809,437\n5,812,668\n5,815,252\n5,815,577\n5,815,657\n5,825,871\n5,825,880\n5,828,751\n5,828,840\n5,832,089\n5,832,119\n5,832,464\n5,835,881\n5,835,896\n5,838,237\n5,838,812\n5,839,119\n5,841,122\n5,841,865\n5,841,886\n5,841,907\n5,844,244\n5,848,231\n5,850,442\n5,850,446\n5,850,451\n5,857,022\n5,857,023\n5,862,223\n5,862,246\n5,862,260\n5,864,305\n5,867,386\n5,867,578\n5,867,795\n5,867,802\n\nReferences Cited\n\nU.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS\n\nPPP PSS PEPE EEE PEEPS ESP ELSE PEE SESE E EPL PEEPS EEE SEP EPS EEE EEE EP EES PEE ESP EP SEPP eer PPS\n\n4/1998\n4/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n5/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n6/1998\n7/1998\n7/1998\n7/1998\n7/1998\n7/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n8/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n9/1998\n10/1998\n10/1998\n10/1998\n10/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n11/1998\n12/1998\n12/1998\n12/1998\n12/1998\n12/1998\n1/1999\n1/1999\n1/1999\n1/1999\n1/1999\n1/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n\nMark\n\nLipner et al.\nFlach et al.\nBisbee et al.\nDavis et al.\nWildes et al.\nAmitani et al.\nDuffin et al.\nHerz et al.\nBradley et al.\nMacDoran et al.\nTsuji et al.\nDavis et al.\n\nJachimowicz et al.\n\nPare, Jr. et al.\nSwartz et al.\nSchneier et al.\nSimon\n\nNovis et al.\nBradley et al.\nMaekawa et al.\nHoffberg et al.\nWt et al.\nArold\n\nKonishi et al.\nShaffer et al.\nViavant et al.\nBouchard et al.\n\nJachimowicz et al.\n\nTomko\nHouvener et al.\nMicali\nBrothers et al.\nSudia\n\nRosen\n\nRaike\n\nPare, Jr. et al.\nColizza\n\nPare, Jr. et al.\nBreed\n\nWeber\nPrice-Francis\nClark\nWilliams et al.\nMark\n\nSudia et al.\nWalker et al.\nCowan et al.\nKravitz et al.\nRhoads\nHouvener et al.\nTrovato et al.\nFisher et al.\nRevell et al.\nPare, Jr. et al.\nKrsul et al.\nKirchhoff\nSudia\n\nRhoads\n\nJavidi et al.\nGraf et al.\nTeitelbaum et al.\nMuftic\n\nBerger et al.\nSudia\n\nSudia\n\nDemers et al.\nWalker et al.\nColbert\nRhoads\nRosenquist\nHoffberg et al.\nBrickell et al.\nNovis et al.\nBorza\n\n5,869,822\n5,870,723\n5,872,834\n5,872,848\n5,872,849\n5,875,108\n5,876,926\n5,878,144\n5,881,225\n5,881,226\n5,884,277\n5,889,473\n5,889,474\n5,889,862\n5,889,863\n5,890,138\n5,890,152\n5,892,824\n5,892,838\n5,892,900\n5,892,902\n5,897,616\n5,898,154\n5,901,229\n5,901,246\n5,903,454\n5,903,651\n5,903,880\n5,905,975\n5,907,149\n5,910,988\n5,912,818\n5,912,974\n5,913,025\n5,913,196\n5,915,018\n5,915,093\n5,915,973\n5,919,239\n5,919,246\n5,920,058\n5,920,384\n5,920,477\n5,920,629\n5,923,763\n5,924,406\n5,926,548\n5,929,753\n5,930,777\n5,930,804\n5,931,890\n5,933,498\n5,933,515\n5,935,071\n5,937,068\n5,937,394\n5,938,707\n5,943,423\n5,943,424\n5,946,669\n5,948,136\n5,949,045\n5,949,046\n5,949,876\n5,949,879\n5,949,881\n5,949,882\n5,951,055\n5,952,638\n5,952,641\n5,953,419\n5,954,583\n5,956,400\n5,956,408\n5,958,050\n5,959,529\n5,960,083\n5,963,648\n5,963,657\n\nPPP Pr SEE ESSE PEPE EPP ESE PEEPS ESE EEE EPS EPP EEE SPE ESE SEE EEE PE ESE PEEP PEE EES EEE Er PEEPS\n\n2/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n2/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n3/1999\n4/1999\n4/1999\n4/1999\n4/1999\n4/1999\n4/1999\n5/1999\n5/1999\n5/1999\n5/1999\n5/1999\n5/1999\n5/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n6/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n7/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n8/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n9/1999\n10/1999\n10/1999\n\nMeadows, II et al.\nPare, Jr. et al.\nTeitelbaum\nRomney et al.\nSudia\nHoffberg et al.\nBeecham\nAucsmith et al.\nWorth\nVeneklase\nKhosla\n\nWicks\n\nLaDue\n\nOhta et al.\nWeber\n\nGodin et al.\nRapaport et al.\nBeatson et al.\nBrady\n\nGinter et al.\nClark\nKanevsky et al.\nRosen\n\nFujisaki et al.\nHoffberg et al.\nHoffberg et al.\nKocher\n\nBiffar\n\nAusubel\nMarckini\nBallard\nMcGrady et al.\nHolloway et al.\nHigley et al.\nTalmor et al.\nAucsmith\nBerlin et al.\nHoehn-Saric et al.\nFraker et al.\nWaizmann et al.\nWeber et al.\nBorza\nHoffberg et al.\nRosen\n\nWalker et al.\nKinugasa et al.\nOkamoto\nMontague\nBarber\n\nYu et al.\n\nSuwa et al.\nSchneck et al.\nPu et al.\nSchneider et al.\nAudebert\nWong et al.\nUehara\n\nMuftic\n\nBerger et al.\nPolk\n\nSmyers\n\nEzawa et al.\nKenneth et al.\nGinter et al.\nBerson et al.\nDavis\n\nAngelo\nMowry, Jr.\nDemers et al.\nKorshun\nLohstroh et al.\nGreen\n\nChaum et al.\nArnold.\n\nGriffin et al.\nKail, IV\nMicali\n\nRosen\n\nBowker et al.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 6of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\nPage 5\n(56) References Cited 6,028,933 A 2/2000 Heer et al.\n6,028,936 A 2/2000 Hillis\nU.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 6,028,937 A 2/2000 \u2018Tatebayashi et al.\n6,028,939 A 2/2000 Yin\n5,963,908 A 10/1999 Chadha 6,029,067 A 2/2000 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IEEE, 2005.\n\nLeino, Juha. \u201cApplications of game theory in ad hoc networks.\u201d\nUNe 100 (2003): 5-2.\n\n* cited by examiner\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nU.S. Patent\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 9 of 81\n\nOct. 17, 2017 Sheet 1 of 6 US 9,794,797 B2\n\nQ1\n\none\n\neee\n\nMG ~\n\neT\n\n\u201c ~s\n\n< x\n\n\u00e9 \u2018\n\n; \u2019\n\nA P h\n, ass\nwen is\n, \u2018 7 .\n\\ \u00e9 ~\n\u201d ~ e ~\n\nQ1\n\n\u00ae\n~~~ ~~~ ~~\nys\u2019\n\ney\n\nMeee\n\nwm\n~s o \u201cs wo ~s\nx x x\n\u2018 \u2018 ;\nx a x\n# \u00a2 \u2018\n\u2018 \u2018 \u2018\n\u2019 \u2019 '\n' \u2018 ' \\ t \u2018\n4 1 '\n! \u2018 ! i ! i\n1 ' \u2018 ' \u2018 i\n\u2018 \u2019 v \u2018 \\ \u2018\n\\ \u2019 \\ \u2019 yw s\n. a . a 7 ~\nsell * @---\u00b0 - wet -\n-\n, -\n~e \\ \u2019 \u201c7\n~ ? o*\n~ \u00bb. = , \u201d\n~ . one -\n\u00ab wer a? -\n~e v w a\u201c?\n~ S -\n~ \u00a2 . \u201c\nsy \u2019 \u2018 \"\nws. Uf et\nswt\n~ \u201c\n+ P3 +t\n\u2018 !\n\\ \u00e9\n\u2018, ,\nNX t\n. \u2019\n\n\u201ceo\u201d\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti-1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 10 of 81\n\nU.S. Patent Oct. 17, 2017 Sheet 2 of 6 US 9,794,797 B2\nal + Q2\nM1 M2\n\u00a5 v.\nY1 Y2\n\nHMM with mixture of Gaussians output\n\nFig. 3\nA1 >\u00bb A2 Al >\u00bb A2\nQ1 Q2 B1 HP B2 B1 >\u00bb B2\nInput-output HMM Factorial HMM Coupled HMM\n\nFig. 4A Fig. 4B Fig. 4C\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti-1 Filed 12/29/25 Page 11 of 81\n\nU.S. Patent Oct. 17, 2017 Sheet 3 of 6 US 9,794,797 B2\n\na\n\nTime Update Measurement Update\n(\u201cPredict\u201d) (\u201cCorrect\u201d)\nFig. 5\nTime Update (\u201cPredict\u201d) Measurement Update (\u201cCorrect\u201d)\n(1) Project the state ahead (1) Compute the Kalman Gain\nXR, = AX + Bug K, = Py H'(HP;,H' +R)\"\n(2) Project the error covariance ahead (2) Update estimate with\n\nP, = APp, AT+Q measurement /,\nRy = x, + Kx (Ik _ HX\u2019;\n(3) Update the error covariance\n\nP, = (l\u2014K,H) P.\n\nInitial estimates Ne\n\nRut and Pr\n\nFig. 6\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-1_ Filed 12/29/25 Page 12 of 81\n\nU.S. Patent Oct. 17, 2017 Sheet 4 of 6 US 9,794,797 B2\n\naN\n\nTime Update (\u201cPredict\u201d) Measurement Update (\u201cCorrect\u201d)\n\n(1) Project the state ahead (1) Compute the Kalman Gain\n\n. \u2018 Ky = PH, (HP Hq + V\u00abRKVi)\n& = As, ux, 0) k k Hox (AYP Hox KR\u00abV x)\n\n(2) Update estimate with\n\n(2) Project the error covariance ahead\nmeasurement /,\n\nPp = At Pr. A\" +W,Q.41W\"\nk Kk Ak KAEKTVY k Xe = K+ Ky (Ik \u2014 h(&\u00ae,, 0))\n\n(3) Update the error covariance\n\nPx = (l \u2014 K,H) Py,\n\nInitial estimates NO\n\nRit and Py4\n\nFig. 7\n\fPage 13 of 81\n\nFiled 12/29/25\n\nCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\nSheet 5 of 6\n\nOct. 17, 2017\n\nU.S. Patent\n\n9 \u201cbig\n\n02\neseqeleq\n\nGz Joes aseqeieq\n\ni i\n\n- TON\n7 | AM\n\nL\u00e9 Wapoy|\n\nse\nve Pnojo\n\nuolediuNWWwo0o\n\nYIOMJON\n\nZL USIP o}]E}eS\n\nwr \\z\n\nQL SHIBIeES\n\np AJOWOWU\neseqejeq\n\n: | Q01A8Q SUONRIIUNWWOD sIIGO/\\|\n\na5 of tL}\n\n-\n\nwO | JOMO}] OIPEY 0} JMO} O1IPEY\n\nL QS\n\noe\n\nQ\n\np\n\n9\nJosssooid\n\nG/L oijsnooy\n\nPL JBIN|9D\n\nEL jeondo\n\n\u00e9l dudSss\n\nGg welsAsqns\nsuo}eolunWWOD\n\nZ JOAIGOOI\nSd5\n\nQZ Bae)\n\n6) Yvdl\n\nBL JepeYy\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nU.S. Patent\n\nOct. 17, 2017\n\n101\n\nProximity\n\nSheet 6 of 6\n\n102\n\nProspective\nConjunction\n\n103\n\nType of event\n\n104\n\nType of event and\nsensed condition\n\nFig. 9\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 14 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\nUnit ID\n201\n\nLocation\n202\n\nCodes\n203\n\nHigh\npriority\nmessages\n204\n\nItinerary\n205\n\nMemory dump\nstring\n206\n\nJ\n\nEvent 301\n\nLocation 302\n\nTime 303\n\nSource 304\n\nExpiration 305\n\nReliability 306\n\nMessage 307\n\nFig. 10\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 15 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n1\nMULTIFACTORIAL OPTIMIZATION\nSYSTEM AND METHOD\n\nCROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED\nAPPLICATIONS\n\nThe present application is Division of U.S. patent appli-\ncation Ser. No. 11/467,931, filed Aug. 29, 2006, now U.S.\nPat. No. 8,874,477, issued Oct. 28, 2014, which is a Non-\nProvisional application of 60/723,339 filed Oct. 4, 2005,\neach of which is expressly incorporated herein by reference\nin its entirety.\n\nFIELD OF THE INVENTION\n\nThe present invention relates to the field of multifactoral\neconomic optimization, and more generally to optimization\nof communities of elements having conflicting requirements\nand overlapping resources.\n\nBACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION\n\nAnumber of fields of endeavor are relevant to the present\ninvention, and exemplary prior art, each of which is\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference, are disclosed\nbelow. The references disclosed provide a skilled artisan\nwith disclosure of embodiments of various elements of the\npresent invention, and the teachings therein may be com-\nbined and subcombined in various manners in accordance\nwith the present teachings. Therefore, the identified prior art\nprovides a point of reference and set of tools which are\nexpressly available, both as a part of the invention, and to\nimplement the invention.\n\nThe topical headings are advisory only, and are not\nintended to limit the applicability of any reference. While\nsome embodiments are discussed as being preferred, it\nshould be understood that all embodiments discussed, in any\nportion of this documents, whether stated as having advan-\ntages or not, form a part of the invention and may be\ncombined and/or subcombined in a consistent manner in\naccordance with the teachings hereof. Likewise, the disclo-\nsure herein is intended to disclose permissive combinations,\nsubcombinations, and attributes, and any language which\nappears to limit the scope of applicant\u2019s invention is\nintended to apply to the particular embodiment referenced,\nor as a permissive suggestion for implementation of other\nembodiments which with it may be consistently applied. The\npresent disclosure includes details of a number of aspects,\nwhich may find independent utility, and therefore the present\nspecifications are not intended to be construed as being\nlimited to the conjunction of the elements of the disclosure.\n\nINTERNET\u2014The Internet is structured such various net-\nworks are interconnected, with communications effected by\naddressed packets conforming to a common protocol. Based\non the packet addressing, information is routed from source\nto destination, often through a set of networks having\nmultiple potential pathways. The communications medium\nis shared between all users. Statistically, some proportion of\nthe packets are extraordinarily delayed, or simply lost.\nTherefore, protocols involving communications using these\npackets include error detection schemes that request a\nretransmit of required data not received within a time\nwindow. In the event that the network nears capacity or is\notherwise subject to limiting constraint, the incidence of\ndelayed or lost packets increases, thereby increasing\nrequests for retransmission and retransmission. Therefore, as\nthe network approaches available bandwidth, the load\n\n15\n\n20\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n2\n\nincreases, ultimately leading to failure. In instances where a\nminimum quality of service must be guaranteed, special\nInternet technologies are required, to reserve bandwidth or\nto specify network pathways. End-to-end quality of service\nguarantees, however, may exceed the cost of circuit\nswitched technologies, such as ISDN, especially where the\nhigh quality needs are intermittent.\n\nInternet usage typically involves an Internet server, an\nautomated system capable of responding to communications\nreceived through the Internet, and often communicating with\nother systems not directly connected to the Internet. The\nserver typically has relatively large bandwidth to the Inter-\nnet, allowing multiple simultaneous communications ses-\nsions, and usually supports the hypertext transport protocol\n(HTTP), which provides, in conjunction with a so-called\nweb browser on a remote client system, a human readable\ninterface which facilitates navigation of various resources\navailable in the Internet. The client systems are typically\nhuman user interfaces, which employ a browser to display\nHTTP \u201cweb pages\u2019. The browser typically does not provide\nintelligence, although so-called applets or local servers may\nprovide programmable intelligence or processing capability\nproximate to the user. Bandwidth between the client and\nInternet is typically relatively small, and various communi-\ncations and display rendering considered normal. Typically,\nboth client and server are connected to the Internet through\nInternet service providers, each having its own router. It is\nalso known to provide so-called proxy servers and firewalls,\nwhich are automated systems that insulate the client system\nfrom the remote server or Internet in general. These local\nservers, applications and applets may be non-standard, and\nthus require special software to be available locally for\nexecution.\n\nThus, the Internet poses a number of advantages for\ncommercial use, including low cost and ubiquitous connec-\ntivity. Therefore, it is desirable to employ standard Internet\ntechnologies while achieving sufficient quality communica-\ntions to effect an efficient transaction.\n\nA widely dispersed network of access points may imple-\nment a mobile telecommunications protocol, such as IETF\nRFC 3344 (Mobile IP, IPv4), or various mobile ad hoc\nnetwork (MANET) protocols, 2.5G, 3G, 4G cellular, WiMax\n(802.16), or other types of protocols. Preferably, the protocol\nallows the client to maintain communications between a\nsource and destination while the network topology or rout-\ning path changes, such as in a mobile multihop ad hoc\nnetwork or mobile node within a cellular or hotspot network.\nSee, U.S. Pub. App. No. 20040073642, expressly incorpo-\nrated herein by reference.\n\nMobile Internet Protocol (Mobile IP or MIP, in this case,\nv4) is an Internet Engineering Task Force (ETF) network\nlayer protocol, specified in RFC-3344. It is designed to\nallow seamless connectivity session maintenance under TCP\n(Transmission Control Protocol) or other connection ori-\nented transport protocols when a mobile node moves from\none IP subnet to another. MIPv4 uses two network infra-\nstructure entities, a Home Agent (HA) and an optional\nForeign Agent (FA), to deliver packets to the mobile node\nwhen it has left its home network. MIPv4 also supports\npoint-of-attachment Care-of Addresses (CoA) if a FA is\nunavailable. Mobile IP is increasingly being deployed for\n2.5/3 G (2.5 or third generation wireless) provider networks\nand may be deployed in medium and large Enterprise IEEE\n802.11-based LANs (Local Area Networks) with multiple\nsubnets. MIPv4 relies on the use of permanently assigned\n\u201chome\u201d IP addresses to help maintain connectivity when a\nmobile device connects to a foreign network. On the other\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 16 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n3\n\nhand, IPsec-based (Internet Protocol Security, a security\nprotocol from IETF) VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) use a\ntunneling scheme in which the outer source IP address is\nbased on a CoA at the point-of-attachment and an inner\nsource IP address assigned for the \u201chome\u201d domain. In\ngeneral if either address is changed, such as when the mobile\nnode switches IP subnets, then a new tunnel is negotiated\nwith new keys and several round trip message exchanges.\nThe renegotiation of the tunnel interferes with seamless\nmobility across wired and wireless IP networks spanning\nmultiple IP subnets.\n\nClearly, newer technologies, such as IP v6, and deriva-\ntives thereof, are known, and may be applied in conjunction\nwith the present invention.\n\nMARKET ECONOMY SYSTEMS\u2014In modern retail\ntransactions, predetermined price transactions are common,\nwith market transactions, i.e., commerce conducted in a\nsetting which allows the transaction price to float based on\nthe respective valuation allocated by the buyer(s) and\nseller(s), often left to specialized fields. While interpersonal\nnegotiation is often used to set a transfer price, this price is\noften different from a transfer price that might result from a\nbest-efforts attempt at establishing a market price. Assuming\nthat the market price is optimal, it is therefore assumed that\nalternatives are sub-optimal. Therefore, the establishment of\na market price is desirable over simple negotiations.\n\nOne particular problem with market-based commerce is\nthat both seller optimization and market efficiency depend\non the fact that representative participants of a preselected\nclass are invited to participate, and are able to promptly\ncommunicate, on a relevant timescale, in order to accurately\nvalue the goods or services and make an offer. Thus, in\ntraditional market-based system, all participants are in the\nsame room, or connected by a high quality (low latency, low\nerror) telecommunications link. Alternately, the market\nvaluation process is prolonged over an extended period,\nallowing non-real time communications of market informa-\ntion and bids. Thus, attempts at ascertaining a market price\nfor non-commodity goods can be subject to substantial\ninefficiencies, which reduce any potential gains by market\npricing. Further, while market pricing might be considered\n\u201cfair\u201d, it also imposes an element of risk, reducing the ability\nof parties to predict future pricing and revenues. Addressing\nthis risk may also improve efficiency of a market-based\nsystem, that is, increase the overall surplus in the market.\n\nAUCTION SYSTEMS\u2014When a single party seeks to sell\ngoods to the highest valued purchaser(s), to establish a\nmarket price, the rules of conduct typically define an auc-\ntion. Typically, known auctions provide an ascending price\nor descending price over time, with bidders making offers or\nceasing to make offers, in the descending price or ascending\nprice models, respectively, to define the market price. After\ndetermining the winner of the auction, typically a bidder\nwho establishes a largest economic surplus, the pricing rules\ndefine the payment, which may be in accordance with a\nuniform price auction, wherein all successful bidders pay the\nlowest successful bid, a second price auction wherein the\nwinning bidder pays the amount bid by the next highest\nbidder, and pay-what-you-bid (first price) auctions. The\npay-what-you-bid auction is also known as a discriminative\nauction while the uniform price auction is known as a\nnon-discriminative auction. In a second-price auction, also\nknown as a Vickrey auction, the policy seeks to create a\ndisincentive for speculation and to encourage bidders to\nsubmit bids reflecting their true value for the good, rather\nthan \u201cshaving\u201d the bid to achieve a lower cost. In the\nuniform price and second price schemes, the bidder is\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n55\n\n4\n\nencourages to disclose the actual private value to the bidder\nof the good or service, since at any price below this amount,\nthere is an excess gain to the buyer, whereas by withholding\nthis amount the bid may be unsuccessful, resulting in a loss\nof the presumably desirable opportunity. In the pay-what-\nyou-bid auction, on the other hand, the buyer need not\ndisclose the maximum private valuation, and those bidders\nwith lower risk tolerance will bid higher prices. See, www.i-\nsoc.org/inet98/proceedings/3b/3b_3-html; www.ibm.com/\niac/reports-technical/reports-bus-neg-internet.html.\n\nTwo common types of auction are the English auction,\nwhich sells a single good to the highest bidder in an\nascending price auction, and the Dutch auction, in which\nmultiple units are available for sale, and in which a starting\nprice is selected by the auctioneer, which is successively\nreduced, until the supply is exhausted by bidders (or the\nminimum price/final time is reached), with the buyer(s)\npaying the lowest successful bid. The term Dutch auction is\nalso applied to a type of sealed bid auction. In a multi-unit\nlive Dutch auction, each participant is provided with the\ncurrent price, the quantity on hand and the time remaining\nin the auction. This type of auction, typically takes place\nover a very short period of time and there is a flurry of\nactivity in the last portion of the auction process. The actual\nauction terminates when there is no more product to be sold\nor the time period expires.\n\nIn selecting the optimal type of auction, a number of\nfactors are considered. In order to sell large quantities of a\nperishable commodity in a short period of time, the descend-\ning price auctions are often preferred. For example, the\nproduce and flower markets in Holland routinely use the\nDutch auction (hence the derivation of the name), while the\nU.S. Government uses this form to sell its financial instru-\nments. The format of a traditional Dutch auction encourages\nearly bidders to bid up to their \u201cprivate value\u201d, hoping to pay\nsome price below the \u201cprivate value\u201d. In making a bid, the\n\u201cprivate value\u201d becomes known, helping to establish a\npublished market value and demand curve for the goods,\nthus allowing both buyers and sellers to define strategies for\nfuture auctions.\n\nIn an auction, typically a seller retains an auctioneer to\nconduct an auction with multiple buyers. (In a reverse\nauction, a buyer solicits the lowest price from multiple\ncompeting vendors for a desired purchase). Since the seller\nretains the auctioneer, the seller essentially defines the rules\nof the auction. These rules are typically defined to maximize\nthe revenues or profit to the seller, while providing an\ninviting forum to encourage a maximum number of high\nvalued buyers. If the rules discourage high valuations of the\ngoods or services, or discourage participation by an impor-\ntant set of potential bidders, then the rules are not optimum.\nRules may also be imposed to discourage bidders who are\nunlikely to submit winning bids from consuming resources.\nA rule may also be imposed to account for the valuation of\nthe good or service applied by the seller, in the form of a\nreserve price. It is noted that these rules typically seek to\nallocate to the seller a portion of the economic benefit that\nwould normally inure to the buyer (in a perfectly efficient\nauction), creating an economic inefficiency. However, since\nthe auction is to benefit the seller, not society as a whole, this\npotential inefficiency is tolerated. An optimum auction thus\nseeks to produce a maximum profit (or net revenues) for the\nseller. An efficient auction, on the other hand, maximizes the\nsum of the utilities for the buyer and seller. It remains a\nsubject of academic debate as to which auction rules are\nmost optimum in given circumstances; however, in practice,\nsimplicity of implementation may be a paramount concern,\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 17 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n5\n\nand simple auctions may result in highest revenues; complex\nauctions, while theoretically more optimal, may discourage\nbidders from participating or from applying their true and\nfull private valuation in the auction process.\n\nTypically, the rules of the auction are predefined and\ninvariant. Further, for a number of reasons, auctions typi-\ncally apply the same rules to all bidders, even though, with\na priori knowledge of the private values assigned by each\nbidder to the goods, or a prediction of the private value, an\noptimization rule may be applied to extract the full value\nassigned by each bidder, while selling above the seller\u2019s\nreserve.\n\nIn a known ascending price auction, each participant must\nbe made aware of the status of the auction, e.g., open, closed,\nand the contemporaneous price. A bid is indicated by the\nidentification of the bidder at the contemporaneous price, or\noccasionally at any price above the minimum bid increment\nplus the previous price. The bids are asynchronous, and\ntherefore each bidder must be immediately informed of the\nparticulars of each bid by other bidders.\n\nIn a known descending price auction, the process tradi-\ntionally entails a common clock, which corresponds to a\ndecrementing price at each decrement interval, with an\nending time (and price). Therefore, once each participant is\nmade aware of the auction parameters, e.g., starting price,\nprice decrement, ending price/time, before the start of the\nauction, the only information that must be transmitted is\nauction status (e.g., inventory remaining).\n\nAs stated above, an auction is traditionally considered an\nefficient manner of liquidating goods at a market price. The\ntheory of an auction is that either the buyer will not resell,\nand thus has an internal or private valuation of the goods\nregardless of other\u2019s perceived values, or that the winner\nwill resell, either to gain economic efficiency or as a part of\nthe buyer\u2019s regular business. In the later case, it is a general\npresumption that the resale buyers are not in attendance at\nthe auction or are otherwise precluded from bidding, and\ntherefore that, after the auction, there will remain demand\nfor the goods at a price in excess of the price paid during the\nauction. Extinction of this residual demand results in the\nso-called \u201cwinner\u2019s curse\u2019, in which the buyer can make no\nprofit from the transaction during the auction. Since this\ndetracts from the value of the auction as a means of\nconducting profitable commerce, it is of concern to both\nbuyer and seller. In fact, experience with initial public\nofferings (IPOs) of stock through various means has dem-\nonstrated that by making stock available directly to all\nclasses of potential purchasers, latent demand for a new\nissue is extinguished, and the stock price is likely to decline\nafter issuance, resulting in an IPO which is characterized as\n\u201cunsuccessful\u201d. This potential for post IPO decline tempers\neven initial interest in the issue, resulting in a paradoxical\ndecline in revenues from the vehicle. In other words, the\n\u201cmoney on the table\u201d resulting from immediate retrading of\nIPO shares is deemed a required aspect of the IPO process.\nThus, methods that retain latent demand after IPO shares\nresult in post IPO increases, and therefore a \u201csuccessful\u201d\nIPO. Therefore, where the transaction scheme anticipates\ndemand for resale after the initial distribution, it is often\nimportant to assure a reasonable margin for resellers and\nlimitations on direct sale to ultimate consumers.\n\nResearch into auction theory (game theory) shows that in\nan auction, the goal of the seller is to optimize the auction\nby allocating the goods inefficiently, if possible, and thus to\nappropriate to himself an excess gain. This inefliciency\nmanifests itself by either withholding goods from the market\nor placing the goods in the wrong hands. In order to assure\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n6\n\nfor the seller a maximum gain from a misallocation of the\ngoods, restrictions on resale are imposed; otherwise, post\nauction trading will tend to undue the misallocation, and the\nanticipation of this trading will tend to control the auction\npricing. The misallocation of goods imposed by the seller\nthrough restrictions allows the seller to achieve greater\nrevenues than if free resale were permitted. It is believed that\nin an auction followed by perfect resale, that any mis-\nassignment of the goods lowers the seller\u2019s revenues below\nthe optimum and likewise, in an auction market followed by\nperfect resale, it is optimal for the seller to allocate the goods\nto those with the highest value. Therefore, if post-auction\ntrading is permitted, the seller will not benefit from these\nlater gains, and the seller will obtain sub optimal revenues.\n\nThese studies, however, typically do not consider trans-\naction costs and internal inefficiencies of the resellers, as\nwell as the possibility of multiple classes of purchasers, or\neven multiple channels of distribution, which may be subject\nto varying controls or restrictions, and thus in a real market,\nsuch theoretical optimal allocation is unlikely. In fact, in real\nmarkets the transaction costs involved in transfer of own-\nership are often critical in determining a method of sale and\ndistribution of goods. For example, it is the efficiency of sale\nthat motivates the auction in the first place. Yet, the auction\nprocess itself may consume a substantial margin, for\nexample 1-15% of the transaction value. To presume, even\nwithout externally imposed restrictions on resale, that all of\nthe efficiencies of the market may be extracted by free\nreallocation, ignores that the motivation of the buyer is a\nprofitable transaction, and the buyer may have fixed and\nvariable costs on the order of magnitude of the margin. Thus,\nthere are substantial opportunities for the seller to gain\nenhanced revenues by defining rules of the auction, strate-\ngically allocating inventory amount and setting reserve\npricing.\n\nTherefore, perfect resale is but a fiction created in auction\n(game) theory. Given this deviation from the ideal presump-\ntions, auction theory may be interpreted to provide the seller\nwith a motivation to misallocate or withhold based on the\ndeviation of practice from theory, likely based on the respec-\ntive transaction costs, seller\u2019s utility of the goods, and other\nfactors not considered by the simple analyses.\n\nA number of proposals have been made for effecting\nauction systems using the Internet. These systems include\nconsumer-to-consumer, business-to-consumer, and busi-\nness-to-business types. Generally, these auctions, of various\ntypes and implementations discussed further below, are\nconducted through Internet browsers using hypertext\nmarkup language (HTML) \u201cweb pages\u201d, using HTTP. In\nsome instances, such as BIDWATCH, discussed further\nbelow, an application with associated applets is provided to\ndefine a user interface instead of HTML.\n\nAs stated above, the information packets from the trans-\naction server to client systems associated with respective\nbidders communicate various information regarding the\nstatus of an interactive auction during the progress thereof.\nThe network traffic from the client systems to the transaction\nserver is often limited to the placement of bids; however, the\namount of information required to be transmitted can vary\ngreatly, and may involve a complex dialogue of communi-\ncations to complete the auction offer. Typically, Internet\nbased auction systems have scalability issues, wherein\neconomies of scale are not completely apparent, leading to\nimplementation of relatively large transaction server sys-\ntems to handle peak loads. When the processing power of the\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 18 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n7\n\ntransaction server system is exceeded, entire system outages\nmay occur, resulting in lost sales or diminished profits, and\ndiminished goodwill.\n\nIn most Internet auction system implementations, there\nare large quantities of simultaneous auctions, with each\nauction accepting tens or hundreds of bids over a timescale\nof hours to days. In systems where the transaction volume\nexceeds these scales, for example in stock and commodity\nexchanges, which can accommodate large numbers of trans-\nactions per second involving the same issue, a private\nnetwork, or even a local area network, is employed, and the\npublic Internet is not used as a direct communications\nsystem with the transaction server. Thus, while infrastruc-\ntures are available to allow successful handling of massive\ntransaction per second volumes, these systems typically\navoid direct public Internet communications or use of some\nof its limiting technologies. The transaction processing\nlimitations are often due to the finite time required to handle,\n\u20ac.g., open, update, and close, database records.\n\nIn business-to-business auctions, buyers seek to ensure\nthat the population of ultimate consumers for the good or\nservices are not present at the auction, in order to avoid the\n\u201cwinner\u2019s curse\u201d, where the highest bidder in the auction\ncannot liquidate or work the asset at a profit. Thus, business-\nto-business auctions are distinct from business-to-consumer\nauctions. In the former, the optimization by the seller must\naccount for the desire or directive of the seller to avoid direct\nretail distribution, and instead to rely on a distribution tier\nrepresented in the auction. In the latter, the seller seeks\nmaximum revenues and to exhaust the possibilities for\ndownstream trade in the goods or services. In fact, these\ntypes of auctions may be distinguished by various imple-\nmenting rules, such as requiring sales tax resale certificates,\nminimum lot size quantities, preregistration or qualification,\nsupport or associated services, or limitations on the title to\nthe goods themselves. The conduct of these auctions may\nalso differ, in that consumer involvement typically is per-\nmissive of mistake or indecision, while in a pure business\nenvironment professionalism and decisiveness are man-\ndated.\n\nIn many instances, psychology plays an important role in\nthe conduct of the auction. In a live auction, bidders can see\neach other, and judge the tempo of the auction. In addition,\nmultiple auctions are often conducted sequentially, so that\neach bidder can begin to understand the other bidder\u2019s\npatterns, including hesitation, bluffing, facial gestures or\nmannerisms. Thus, bidders often prefer live auctions to\nremote or automated auctions if the bidding is to be con-\nducted strategically.\n\nInternet auctions are quite different from live auctions\nwith respect to psychological factors. Live auctions are often\nmonitored closely by bidders, who strategically make bids,\nbased not only on the \u201cvalue\u201d of the goods, but also on an\nassessment of the competition, timing, psychology, and\nprogress of the auction. It is for this reason that so-called\nproxy bidding, wherein the bidder creates a preprogrammed\n\u201cstrategy\u201d, usually limited to a maximum price, are disfa-\nvored as a means to minimize purchase price, and offered as\na service by auctioneers who stand to make a profit based on\nthe transaction price. A maximum price proxy bidding\nsystem is somewhat inefficient, in that other bidders may test\nthe proxy, seeking to increase the bid price, without actually\nintending to purchase, or contrarily, after testing the proxy,\na bidder might give up, even below a price he might have\nbeen willing to pay. Thus, the proxy imposes inefficiency in\nthe system that effectively increases the transaction cost.\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n8\n\nIn order to address a flurry of activity that often occurs at\nthe end of an auction, an auction may be held open until no\nfurther bids are cleared for a period of time, even if\nadvertised to end at a certain time. This is common to both\nlive and automated auctions. However, this lack of deter-\nminism may upset coordinated schedules, thus impairing\nefficient business use of the auction system.\n\nIn order to facilitate management of bids and bidding,\nsome of the Internet auction sites have provided non-\nHypertext Markup Language (HTML) browser based soft-\nware \u201capplet\u201d to track auctions. For example, ONSALE-\n.COM has made available a Marimba Castanet\u00ae applet\ncalled Bidwatch to track auction progress for particular\nitems or classes of items, and to facilitate bidding thereon.\nThis system, however, lacks real-time performance under\nmany circumstances, having a stated refresh period of 10\nseconds, with a long latency for confirmation of a bid, due\nto constraints on software execution, quality of service in\ncommunications streams, and bid confirmation dialogue.\nThus, it is possible to lose a bid even if an attempt was made\nprior to another bidder. The need to quickly enter the bid, at\nrisk of being too late, makes the process potentially error\nprone.\n\nProxy bidding, as discussed above, is a known technique\nfor overcoming the constraints of Internet communications\nand client processing limitations, since it bypasses the client\nand telecommunications links and may execute solely on the\nhost system or local thereto. However, proxy bidding under-\nmines some of the efficiencies gained by a live market.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 5,890,138 to Godin, et al. (Mar. 30, 1999),\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference in its entirety,\nrelates to an Internet auction system. The system implements\na declining price auction process, removing a user from the\nauction process once an indication to purchase has been\nreceived. See, Rockoff, T. E., Groves, M.; \u201cDesign of an\nInternet-based System for Remote Dutch Auctions\u201d, Internet\nResearch, v 5,n 4, pp. 10-16, MCB University Press, Jan. 1,\n1995.\n\nA known computer site for auctioning a product on-line\ncomprises at least one web server computer designed for\nserving a host of computer browsers and providing the\nbrowsers with the capability to participate in various auc-\ntions, where each auction is of a single product, at a specified\ntime, with a specified number of the product available for\nsale. The web server cooperates with a separate database\ncomputer, separated from the web server computer by a\nfirewall. The database computer is accessible to the web\ncomputer server computer to allow selective retrieval of\nproduct information, which includes a product description,\nthe quantity of the product to be auctioned, a start price of\nthe product, and an image of the product. The web server\ncomputer displays, updated during an auction, the current\nprice of the product, the quantity of the product remaining\navailable for purchase and the measure of the time remain-\ning in the auction. The current price is decreased in a\npredetermined manner during the auction. Each user is\nprovided with an input instructing the system to purchase the\nproduct at a displayed current price, transmitting an identi-\nfication and required financial authorization for the purchase\nof the product, which must be confirmed within a predeter-\nmined time. In the known system, a certain fall-out rate in\nthe actual purchase confirmation may be assumed, and\ntherefore some overselling allowed. Further, after a purchase\nis indicated, the user\u2019s screen is not updated, obscuring the\nultimate lowest selling price from the user. However, if the\nuser maintains a second browser, he can continue to monitor\nthe auction to determine whether the product could have\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 19 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n9\n\nbeen purchased at a lower price, and if so, fail to confirm the\ncommitted purchase and purchase the same goods at a lower\nprice while reserving the goods to avoid risk of loss. Thus,\nthe system is flawed, and may fail to produce an efficient\ntransaction or optimal price.\n\nAn Internet declining price auction system may provide\nthe ability to track the price demand curve, providing\nvaluable marketing information. For example, in trying to\ndetermine the response at different prices, companies nor-\nmally have to conduct market surveys. In contrast, with a\ndeclining price auction, substantial information regarding\nprice and demand is immediately known. The relationship\nbetween participating bidders and average purchasers can\nthen be applied to provide a conventional price demand\ncurve for the particular product.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 5,835,896, Fisher, et al., issued Nov. 10,\n1998, expressly incorporated herein by reference in its\nentirety, provides method and system for processing and\ntransmitting electronic auction information over the Internet,\nbetween a central transaction server system and remote\nbidder terminals. Those bids are recorded by the system and\nthe bidders are updated with the current auction status\ninformation. When appropriate, the system closes the auc-\ntion from further bidding and notifies the winning bidders\nand losers as to the auction outcome. The transaction server\nposts information from a database describing a lot available\nfor purchase, receives a plurality of bids, stored in a bid\ndatabase, in response to the information, and automatically\ncategorizes the bids as successful or unsuccessful. Each bid\nis validated, and an electronic mail message is sent inform-\ning the bidder of the bid status. This system employs HTTP,\nand thus does not automatically update remote terminal\nscreens, requiring the e-mail notification feature.\n\nThe auction rules may be flexible, for example including\nDutch-type auctions, for example by implementing a price\nmarkdown feature with scheduled price adjustments, and\nEnglish-type (progressive) auctions, with price increases\ncorresponding to successively higher bids. In the Dutch type\nauction, the price markdown feature may be responsive to\nbidding activity over time, amount of bids received, and\nnumber of items bid for. Likewise, in the progressive\nauction, the award price may be dependent on the quantity\ndesired, and typically implements a lowest successful bid\nprice rule. Bids that are below a preset maximum posted\nselling price are maintained in reserve by the system. If a\ncertain sales volume is not achieved in a specified period of\ntime, the price is reduced to liquidate demand above the\nprice point, with the new price becoming the posted price.\nOn the other hand, if a certain sales volume is exceeded in\na specified period of time, the system may automatically\nincrease the price. These automatic price changes allow the\nseller to respond quickly to market conditions while keeping\nthe price of the merchandise as high as possible, to the\nseller\u2019s benefit. A \u201cProxy Bidding\u201d feature allows a bidder\nto place a bid for the maximum amount they are willing to\npay, keeping this value a secret, displaying only the amount\nnecessary to win the item up to the amount of the currently\nhigh bids or proxy bids of other bidders. This feature allows\nbidders to participate in the electronic auction without\nrevealing to the other bidders the extent to which they are\nwilling to increase their bids, while maintaining control of\ntheir maximum bid without closely monitoring the bidding.\nThe feature assures proxy bidders the lowest possible price\nup to a specified maximum without requiring frequent\ninquiries as to the state of the bidding.\n\nA \u201cFloating Closing Time\u201d feature may also be imple-\nmented whereby the auction for a particular item is auto-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n10\n\nmatically closed if no new bids are received within a\npredetermined time interval, assuming an increasing price\nauction. Bidders thus have an incentive to place bids expe-\nditiously, rather than waiting until near the anticipated close\nof the auction.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 5,905,975, Ausubel, issued May 18, 1999,\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference in its entirety,\nrelates to computer implemented methods and apparatus for\nauctions. The proposed system provides intelligent systems\nfor the auctioneer and for the user. The auctioneer\u2019s system\ncontains information from a user system based on bid\ninformation entered by the user. With this information, the\nauctioneer\u2019s system determines whether the auction can be\nconcluded or not and appropriate messages are transmitted.\nAt any point in the auction, bidders are provided the\nopportunity to submit not only their current bids, but also to\nenter future bids, or bidding rules which may have the\nopportunity to become relevant at future times or prices, into\nthe auction system\u2019s database. Participants may revise their\nexecutory bids, by entering updated bids. Thus, at one\nextreme, a bidder who wishes to economize on his time may\nchoose to enter his entire set of bidding rules into the\ncomputerized system at the start of the auction, effectively\ntreating this as a sealed-bid auction. At the opposite extreme,\na bidder who wishes to closely participate in the auction may\nchoose to constantly monitor the auction\u2019s progress and to\nsubmit all of his bids in real time. See also, U.S. patent\napplication Ser. No. 08/582,901 filed Jan. 4, 1996, which\nprovides a method for auctioning multiple, identical objects\nand close substitutes.\n\nCRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY\u2014USS. Pat. No.\n5,956,408 (Arnold, Sep. 21, 1999), expressly incorporated\nherein by reference, relates to an apparatus and method for\nsecure distribution of data. Data, including program and\nsoftware updates, is encrypted by a public key encryption\nsystem using the private key of the data sender. The sender\nalso digitally signs the data. The receiver decrypts the\nencrypted data, using the public key of the sender, and\nverifies the digital signature on the transmitted data. The\nprogram interacts with basic information stored within the\nconfines of the receiver. As result of the interaction, the\nsoftware updates are installed within the confines of the user,\nand the basic information stored within the confines of the\nuser is changed.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 5,982,891 (Ginter, et al., Nov. 9, 1999); U.S.\nPat. No. 5,949,876 (Ginter, et al., Sep. 7, 1999); and U.S.\nPat. No. 5,892,900 (Ginter, et al., Apr. 6, 1999), expressly\nincorporated herein by reference, relate to systems and\nmethods for secure transaction management and electronic\nrights protection. Electronic appliances, such as computers,\nhelp to ensure that information is accessed and used only in\nauthorized ways, and maintain the integrity, availability,\nand/or confidentiality of the information. Such electronic\nappliances provide a distributed virtual distribution environ-\nment (VDE) that may enforce a secure chain of handling and\ncontrol, for example, to control and/or meter or otherwise\nmonitor use of electronically stored or disseminated infor-\nmation. Such a virtual distribution environment may be used\nto protect rights of various participants in electronic com-\nmerce and other electronic or electronic-facilitated transac-\ntions. Distributed and other operating systems, environ-\nments and architectures, such as, for example, those using\ntamper-resistant hardware-based processors, may establish\nsecurity at each node. These techniques may be used to\nsupport an all-electronic information distribution, for\nexample, utilizing the \u201celectronic highway.\u201d\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 20 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n11\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 6,009,177 (Sudia, Dec. 28, 1999), expressly\nincorporated herein by reference, relates to a cryptographic\nsystem and method with a key escrow feature that uses a\nmethod for verifiably splitting users\u2019 private encryption keys\ninto components and for sending those components to\ntrusted agents chosen by the particular users, and provides a\nsystem that uses modern public key certificate management,\nenforced by a chip device that also self-certifies. The meth-\nods for key escrow and receiving an escrow certificate are\nalso applied herein to a more generalized case of registering\na trusted device with a trusted third party and receiving\nauthorization from that party enabling the device to com-\nmunicate with other trusted devices. Further preferred\nembodiments provide for rekeying and upgrading of device\nfirmware using a certificate system, and encryption of\nstream-oriented data.\n\nU.S. Pat. No. 6,052,467 (Brands, Apr. 18, 2000),\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference, relates to a\nsystem for ensuring that the blinding of secret-key certifi-\ncates is restricted, even if the issuing protocol is performed\nin parallel mode. A cryptographic method is disclosed that\nenables the issuer in a secret-key certificate issuing protocol\nto issue triples consisting of a secret key, a corresponding\npublic key, and a secret-key certificate of the issuer on the\npublic key, in such a way that receiving parties can blind the\npublic key and the certificate, but cannot blind a predeter-\nmined non-trivial predicate of the secret key even when\nexecutions of the issuing protocol are performed in parallel.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 6,052,780 (Glover, Apr. 18, 2000), expressly\nincorporated herein by reference, relates to a computer\nsystem and process for accessing an encrypted and self-\ndecrypting digital information product while restricting\naccess to decrypted digital information. Some of these\nproblems with digital information protection systems may\nbe overcome by providing a mechanism that allows a\ncontent provider to encrypt digital information without\nrequiring either a hardware or platform manufacturer or a\ncontent consumer to provide support for the specific form of\ncorresponding decryption. This mechanism can be provided\nin a manner that allows the digital information to be copied\neasily for back-up purposes and to be transferred easily for\ndistribution, but which should not permit copying of the\ndigital information in decrypted form. In particular, the\nencrypted digital information is stored as an executable\ncomputer program that includes a decryption program that\ndecrypts the encrypted information to provide the desired\ndigital information, upon successful completion of an autho-\nrization procedure by the user. In combination with other\nmechanisms that track distribution, enforce royalty pay-\nments and control access to decryption keys, an improved\nmethod is provided for identifying and detecting sources of\nunauthorized copies. Suitable authorization procedures also\nenable the digital information to be distributed for a limited\nnumber of uses and/or users, thus enabling per-use fees to be\ncharged for the digital information.\n\nA patent application entitled \u201cThree Party Authorization\nSystem\u201d, (Robert Nagel, David Felsher, and Steven Hoff-\nberg, inventors, 2001) provides a three party authorization\nencryption technique. This technique has the significant\nadvantage of being more secure than a Public Key system\nbecause it requires the agreement of all three parties\u2014the\ncreator of the secure record, the party that the secure record\nis about, and the database repository\u2014on a case by case\nbasis, in order to release secure records. Then and only then\ncan a released secure record be decrypted and accessed by\nthe requesting party alone. Each access generates an entry\ninto a log file with automatic security alerts for any unusual\n\n10\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n12\n\nactivity. A component of this system is that each party\nwishing to secure records enters into a contract with a\n\u201cvirtual trust agency\u201d to represent that party in all matters\nwhere privacy is an issue. The virtual trust agency never has\naccess to the data contained in the secured records and yet\nacts on behalf of the party whose information is contained in\nthe secure records to control data access to authorized\nrequesting parties. To enable this privacy, the virtual trust\nagency issues a public-private key pair and maintains the\nparty\u2019s private key. The private key is only used in calcu-\nlations to generate an intermediate key that is passed on to\nthe data repository and used to re-encrypt the data for the\nrequesting party\u2019s view. A unique aspect of this patent\npending technique is the fact that the party\u2019s records are\nactually protected from unauthorized use at all times inside\nthe organization that holds the database repository or by the\noriginal record\u2019s creator, not simply in transmission from the\ndatabase repository or the individual or organization that\ncreated the record in the first place, to outside requesting\nparties. This system requires consent of all three parties to\ndecrypt secured information. Its virtual trust component\ntakes the place of the trusted individual or organization in\nprotecting the party whose record contains information that\nhas legal mandates to rights of privacy.\n\nE-COMMERCE SYSTEMS\u2014USS. Pat. No. 5,946,669\n(Polk, Aug. 31, 1999), expressly incorporated herein by\nreference, relates to a method and apparatus for payment\nprocessing using debit-based electronic funds transfer and\ndisbursement processing using addendum-based electronic\ndata interchange. This disclosure describes a payment and\ndisbursement system, wherein an initiator authorizes a pay-\nment and disbursement to a collector and the collector\nprocesses the payment and disbursement through an accu-\nmulator agency. The accumulator agency processes the\npayment as a debit-based transaction and processes the\ndisbursement as an addendum-based transaction. The pro-\ncessing of a debit-based transaction generally occurs by\nelectronic funds transfer (EFT) or by financial electronic\ndata interchange (FEDI). The processing of an addendum-\nbased transaction generally occurs by electronic data inter-\nchange (EDI).\n\nU.S. Pat. No. 6,005,939 (Fortenberry, et al., Dec. 21,\n1999), expressly incorporated herein by reference, relates to\na method and apparatus for storing an Internet user\u2019s identity\nand access rights to World Wide Web resources. A method\nand apparatus for obtaining user information to conduct\nsecure transactions on the Internet without having to re-enter\nthe information multiple times is described. The method and\napparatus can also provide a technique by which secured\naccess to the data can be achieved over the Internet. A\npassport containing user-defined information at various\nsecurity levels is stored in a secure server apparatus, or\npassport agent, connected to computer network. A user\nprocess instructs the passport agent to release all or portions\nof the passport to a recipient node and forwards a key to the\nrecipient node to unlock the passport information.\n\nU.S. Pat. No. 6,016,484 (Williams, et al., Jan. 18, 2000),\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference, relates to a\nsystem, method and apparatus for network electronic pay-\nment instrument and certification of payment and credit\ncollection utilizing a payment. An electronic monetary sys-\ntem provides for transactions utilizing an electronic-mon-\netary system that emulates a wallet or a purse that is\ncustomarily used for keeping money, credit cards and other\nforms of payment organized. Access to the instruments in\nthe wallet or purse is restricted by a password to avoid\nunauthorized payments. A certificate form must be com-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 21 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n13\n\npleted in order to obtain an instrument. The certificate form\nobtains the information necessary for creating a certificate\ngranting authority to utilize an instrument, a payment holder\nand a complete electronic wallet. Electronic approval results\nin the generation of an electronic transaction to complete the\norder. If a user selects a particular certificate, a particular\npayment instrument holder will be generated based on the\nselected certificate. In addition, the issuing agent for the\ncertificate defines a default bitmap for the instrument asso-\nciated with a particular certificate, and the default bitmap\nwill be displayed when the certificate definition is com-\npleted. Finally, the number associated with a particular\ncertificate will be utilized to determine if a particular party\ncan issue a certificate.\n\nU.S. Pat. No. 6,029,150 (Kravitz, Feb. 22, 2000),\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference, relates to a\nsystem and method of payment in an electronic payment\nsystem wherein a plurality of customers have accounts with\nan agent. A customer obtains an authenticated quote from a\nspecific merchant, the quote including a specification of\ngoods and a payment amount for those goods. The customer\nsends to the agent a single communication including a\nrequest for payment of the payment amount to the specific\nmerchant and a unique identification of the customer. The\nagent issues to the customer an authenticated payment\nadvice based only on the single communication and secret\nshared between the customer and the agent and status\ninformation, which the agent knows about the merchant,\nand/or the customer. The customer forwards a portion of the\npayment advice to the specific merchant. The specific mer-\nchant provides the goods to the customer in response to\nreceiving the portion of the payment advice.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 6,047,269 (Biffar, Apr. 4, 2000), expressly\nincorporated herein by reference, relates to a self-contained\npayment system with creating and facilitating transfer of\ncirculating digital vouchers representing value. A digital\nvoucher has an identifying element and a dynamic log. The\nidentifying element includes information such as the trans-\nferable value, a serial number and a digital signature. The\ndynamic log records the movement of the voucher through\nthe system and accordingly grows over time. This allows the\nsystem operator not only to reconcile the vouchers before\nredeeming them, but also to recreate the history of move-\nment of a voucher should an irregularity like a duplicate\nvoucher be detected. These vouchers are used within a\nself-contained system including a large number of remote\ndevices that are linked to a central system. The central\nsystem can be linked to an external system. The external\nsystem, as well as the remote devices, is connected to the\ncentral system by any one or a combination of networks. The\nnetworks must be able to transport digital information, for\nexample the Internet, cellular networks, telecommunication\nnetworks, cable networks or proprietary networks. Vouchers\ncan also be transferred from one remote device to another\nremote device. These remote devices can communicate\nthrough a number of methods with each other. For example,\nfor a non-face-to-face transaction the Internet is a choice, for\na face-to-face or close proximity transactions tone signals or\nlight signals are likely methods. In addition, at the time of a\ntransaction a digital receipt can be created which will\nfacilitate a fast replacement of vouchers stored in a lost\nremote device.\n\nMICROPAYMENTS\u2014US. Pat. No. 5,999,919 (Jarecki,\net al., Dec. 7, 1999), expressly incorporated herein by\nreference, relates to an efficient micropayment system.\nExisting software proposals for electronic payments can be\ndivided into \u201con-line\u201d schemes which require participation\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n65\n\n14\n\nof a trusted party (the bank) in every transaction and are\nsecure against overspending, and \u201coff-line\u201d schemes which\ndo not require a third party and guarantee only that over-\nspending is detected when vendors submit their transaction\nrecords to the bank (usually at the end of the day). A new\n\u201chybrid\u201d scheme is proposed which combines the advan-\ntages of both \u201con-line\u201d and \u201coff-line\u201d electronic payment\nschemes. It allows for control of overspending at a cost of\nonly a modest increase in communication compared to the\noff-line schemes. The protocol is based on probabilistic\npolling. During each transaction, with some small probabil-\nity, the vendor forwards information about this transaction to\nthe bank. This enables the bank to maintain an accurate\napproximation of a customer\u2019s spending. The frequency of\npolling messages is related to the monetary value of trans-\nactions and the amount of overspending the bank is willing\nto risk. For transactions of high monetary value, the cost of\npolling approaches that of the on-line schemes, but for\nmicropayments, the cost of polling is a small increase over\nthe traffic incurred by the off-line schemes.\n\nMicropayments are often preferred where the amount of\nthe transaction does not justify the costs of complete finan-\ncial security. In the micropayment scheme, typically a direct\ncommunication between creditor and debtor is not required;\nrather, the transaction produces a result which eventually\nresults in an economic transfer, but which may remain\noutstanding subsequent to transfer of the underlying goods\nor services. The theory underlying this micropayment\nscheme is that the monetary units are small enough such that\nrisks of failure in transaction closure is relatively insignifi-\ncant for both parties, but that a user gets few chances to\ndefault before credit is withdrawn. On the other hand, the\ntransaction costs of a non-real time transactions of small\nmonetary units are substantially less than those of secure,\nunlimited or potentially high value, real time verified trans-\nactions, allowing and facilitating such types of commerce.\nThus, the rights management system may employ applets\nlocal to the client system, which communicate with other\napplets and/or the server and/or a vendor/rights-holder to\nvalidate a transaction, at low transactional costs.\n\nNEURAL NETWORKS\u2014The resources relating to Neu-\nral Networks, listed in the Neural Networks References\nAppendix, each of which is expressly incorporated herein by\nreference, provides a sound basis for understanding the field\nof neural networks (and the subset called artificial neural\nnetworks, which distinguish biological systems) and how\nthese might be used to solve problems. A review of these\nreferences will provide a state of knowledge appropriate for\nan understanding of aspects of the invention which rely on\nNeural Networks, and to avoid a prolix discussion of no\nbenefit to those already possessing an appropriate state of\nknowledge.\n\nTELEMATICS\u2014The resources relating to telematics\nlisted in the Telematics Appendix, each of which is expressly\nincorporated herein by reference, provides a background in\nthe theory and practice of telematics, as well as some of the\nunderlying technologies. A review of these references is\ntherefore useful in understanding practical issues and the\ncontext of functions and technologies which may be used in\nconjunction with the advances set forth herein.\n\nBRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS\n\nThe drawings show:\nFIG. 1 shows a Bayesian Network;\nFIG. 2 shows a Markov chain;\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 22 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n15\n\nFIG. 3 shows a model of the output of a Markov chain as\na mixture of Gaussians;\n\nFIGS. 4A-4C show an input-output, a factorial, and a\ncoupled Hidden Markov Model (HMM), respectively;\n\nFIG. 5 shows a predictor corrector algorithm of the\ndiscrete Kalman filter cycle;\n\nFIG. 6 shows aspects of the discrete Kalman filter cycle\nalgorithm;\n\nFIG. 7 shows aspects of the extended Kalman filter cycle;\n\nFIG. 8 shows a block diagram of a preferred embodiment\nof a communications system according to the present inven-\ntion;\n\nFIG. 9 is a schematic diagram showing the prioritization\nscheme; and\n\nFIG. 10 is a block diagram representing a message format.\n\nDESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION\n\nThe present invention seeks, among other aspects, to\napply aspects of optimization theory to the control and\narbitration of communities of resources, that is, elements or\nagents which operate independently and therefore cannot be\ndirectly controlled without compromise. Rather, the system\nis controlled by providing incentives and disincentives for\nvarious behaviors and actions seeking to promote an effi-\ncient outcome for the system as a whole, given the external\nconstraints. Each agent then maximizes its own state based\non its own value function, in light of the incentives and\ndisincentives, resulting in an optimal network.\n\nThis optimization employs elements of game theory, and\nthe present invention therefore invokes all those elements\nencompassed within its scope as applied to the problems and\nsystems presented. The ad hoc network of elements typically\nreside within \u201ccommunities\u201d, that is, the present invention\ndoes not particularly seek to apply principles to trivial\nnetworks which can be optimized without compromise or\narbitration, although its principles may be applicable. The\npresent invention therefore applies to the enhancement or\noptimization of communities. These communities may\nthemselves have various rules, reputation hierarchies,\narrangements or cultures, which can be respected or pro-\ngrammed as a part of the system operation, or merely\noperate as constraints on optimization. Thus, in accordance\nwith a game theoretic analysis, various rules and perceived\nbenefits may be applied to appropriately model the real\nsystem, or may be imposed to control behavior.\n\nThese communities may be formed or employed for\nvarious purposes, and typically interoperate in a \u201ccommons\u201d\nor economy, in which all relevant actions of each member of\nthe community have an effect on others, and this effect can\nbe quantified or normalized into \u201ceconomic\u201d terms. For\nexample, a typical application of this technology would be\nto arbitrate access to a common or mutually interfering\nmedium, such as a communications network. By optimizing\ncommunications, the greatest aggregate value of communi-\ncations will generally be achieved, which may or may not\ncorrespond to a greatest aggregate communications band-\nwidth. For example, both quantity and quality of service\nmay be independent (or semi-independent) parameters.\nThus, the system tends to promote a high quality of service\n(or at least as high a quality as is required) over a bulk\nvolume of service. This, in turn, permits new applications\nwhich depend on reliable communications.\n\nA general type of economic optimization is a market\neconomy, in which independent agents each act to maximize\ntheir respective interests. A subset of a market is an auction,\nin which a resource is allocated to a highest valued user or\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n16\n\nconsumer, or a user or consumer acquires a resource at a\nlowest cost, in a single process. In a market economy, agents\nmay act as peers, and each agent may act as a source of\nsupply or assert a demand. That is, at some market price, a\nconsumer may relinquish assets to others and become a\nsupplier. Generally, a consumer has a higher private value\nfor a resource than a supplier. The suppler, for example, may\nhave a lower cost to obtain the resource, or a lower value for\nconsumption of the resource, or both. Peers that both buy\nand sell a resource may seek to arbitrage, that is, seek to\nestablish a committed source of supply at a lower cost than\na committed purchaser, thus assuring a profit. In order to be\neffective, arbitrage requires that the intermediary have an\nadvantage, or else the ultimate buyer would transact directly\nwith the ultimate seller. The advantage(s) may be, for\nexample, information, proprietary elements or methods,\nlocation, lower transactional costs, available capital, risk\ntolerance, storage facility, or the like.\n\nSo long as the advantage does not derive from an eco-\nnomically inefficient monopoly or other structure that arti-\nficially and/or \u201cillegally\u201d limits the efficiency of other\nagents, the arbitrage agent increases net efficiency of the\nnetwork. That is, the presence and action of the arbitrage\nagent increases the economic surplus of the transaction and\nthe market in general.\n\nAn object of the present invention therefore seeks to\novercome the inefficiency of seeking to solve a complex\nNP-complete optimization problem by providing arbitrage\nopportunities that allow a market solution to the optimiza-\ntion which balances optimization cost with intermediary\nprofits. Accordingly, while the net result may deviate from\nan abstract optimum condition, when one considers the cost\nof achieving this abstract optimum, the arbitrage-mediated\nresult is superior in terms of market surplus. The availability\nof arbitrage and intermediaries therefore allows a particular\nagent to balance its own optimization costs against overall\ngains.\n\nThe subject of complexity theory, including combinatorial\noptimization, and solution of approximation of NP-complete\nproblems, has been extensively studied. See, e.g., the refer-\nences set forth in the combinatorial optimization and auction\nappendix, which are expressly incorporated herein by ref-\nerence.\n\nAssuming a set of rational agents, each agent will seek to\nlocally optimize its state to achieve the greatest gains and\nincur the lowest net costs. Thus, in a system which seeks to\noptimize a network of such agents, by permitting each agent\nto optimize its local environment state, the network may\nthen be approximated by a network of local, environments,\neach typically comprising a plurality of agents. Thus, in the\nsame way as the complexity of an NP-complete problem\ngrows in polynomial space, the simplification of an NP\ncomplete problem will also be polynomial. While this sim-\nplification incurs an inefficiency, each agent models a proxi-\nmate region in the space of interest, which tends to be linear\n(i.e., superposable) in a preferred embodiment. Agents com-\npete with each other, and therefore the incentive to distort is\nlimited. Likewise, since the preferred simplification of the\nproblem does not impose a heuristic (i.e., a substitution of a\nfirst relatively simpler or more readily analytic algorithm for\na second more intractable algorithm), it does not accordingly\ndistort the incentives from those inherent in the basic\noptimization.\n\nIn a simple auction, a role is imposed on an agent, while\nin a market an agent can choose its own role dynamically, in\naseries of transactions, dependent on its own value function.\nIn a market, a set of agents having a resource or requiring a\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 23 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n17\n\nresource seek to interact to reallocate the resource, such that\nthe needs are generally satisfied, up to a \u201cmarket clearing\nprice\u201d. That is, individual agents transact to transfer the\nresource from those with supply to those with demand, at a\nprice between the private values of the two agents, which\nreallocation occurs until the demand ask price is higher than\nthe supply bid price. An auction is designed to maximize the\neconomic surplus, which is then typically allocated to the\nmore restrictive of the source of supply or consumer or the\nsponsor. A market, on the other hand, generally operates to\nminimize the gap between bids and asks over an extended\nperiod, and thus the economic surplus tends to proportionate\nbased on the balance of supply and demand at the clearing\nprice. The particular reallocation also depends on the state of\ninformation of each agent, inefficiencies in transfer, and the\nlike.\n\nWhere a need or supply is not unitary, one possible means\nfor achieving an optimal solution is a combinatorial auction,\nin which multiple suppliers, or multiple consumers, or both,\nreallocate the resource or portions thereof. Thus, a single\nneed is not met by a single supplier, but rather there are at\nleast three parties to a transaction. The net result is a\ncompetition between parties that raises the potential for a\nholdout. In fact, one way to circumvent this issue (a \u201chold-\nout\u201d problem) is to have direct or indirect (bypass) compe-\ntition for each element. In such a circumstance, no agent can\neffectively demand more than the least cost alternate(s).\n\nAcombinatorial auction (multifactorial optimization, also\nknown as a Vickrey Clarke Grove [VCG] Auction) seeks to\nmatch, for the entire network of possibilities, the highest\nvalued users with the lowest cost suppliers. This leads,\nhowever, to a surplus between the two, which must be\nallocated. In a one-to-many auction, the surplus is generally\nallocated to the restricted agent, i.e., the agent(s) with\n\u201cmarket power\u201d. On the other hand, in an optimal market,\nthe surplus will tend toward zero. That is, the profit to each\nparty will tend toward a competitive mean, with higher\nprofits only gained by undertaking higher risk. In imperfect\nmarkets, arbitrage opportunities exist, where profits can be\nmade by trading the same resource.\n\nTn a multihop ad hoc network, a path between source and\ndestination consists of a number of legs, with alternate paths\navailable for selection of an optimum. If each node has its\nown distinct destination, there will likely be competing\ndemands for each intermediate communication node.\n\nOne way to promote revealing a private value is if the end\nresult of the process does not penalize those with aberrantly\nhigh or low values. One known method is to compute the\nresult of the process as if the bidder or askor was not\ninvolved, leading to a so-called second price. Thus, the\nhighest bidder wins, at a price established by a second\nhighest bid. A lowest askor wins, at a price established by the\nsecond lowest askor. In a market, the highest bidder and\nlowest askor win, with a second price dependant on a more\nrestrictive of supply and demand. In a combinatorial auction,\nthis may be extended to price each component as if the\nhighest bidder was uninvolved. In one embodiment of the\ninvention, the second price applies to both buyer and seller,\nrespectively, with the economic surplus allocated to other\npurposes. Thus, in this case, neither party gains the particu-\nlar benefit of an imbalance of supply and demand. In fact,\nthis perturbs the traditional market somewhat, in that an\nimbalance in supply and demand does not particularly\nrecruit new market entrants in the same manner as an\nallocation of the surplus.\n\n20\n\n25\n\n40\n\n45\n\n18\n\nArbritage\n\nThe present invention seeks to model, within a micro-\neconomy, the elements of the real economy which tend to\nimprove efficiency toward \u201cperfection\u201d, that is, a perfect\nuniversal balance of supply and demand, for which no\nstrategy (other than bidding a true private value) will pro-\nduce a superior result.\n\nThese efficiency producing elements, paradoxically, are\nthe parasitic elements which thrive off of predictable inef-\nficiencies. That is, by promoting competition among the\nparasitic elements, an efficient balance of optimization of the\ndirect market and optimization of the derivative markets will\nproduce an overall superior result to an optimization of the\ndirect market alone.\n\nWhile the use of derivative markets in real economies is\nwell known, the implementation of these as aspects of\nmicroeconomies and isolated markets is not well known,\nand a part of an embodiment of the present invention. For\nexample, in a corporate bankruptcy auction, there are often\nresellers present who seek to purchase assets cheaply at a\n\u201cwholesale\u201d price, and to redistribute them on a less urgent\nbasis or in smaller quantities, or at a different location, or\notherwise transformed, and to sell them at a higher \u201cretail\u201d\nprice. The auction price is determined by the number and\nconstitution of bidders, as well as the possibility of proxy or\nabsentee bidding. In fact, we presume that the auctioneers\nthemselves are efficient, and that significantly higher bid\nprices are not available in a modified process without\nincurring substantial investment, risk, or delay. Indeed, these\npremises in a narrow sense might be false, i.e., a rational\nauctioneer might indeed make greater investment, undertake\nhigher risk, or incur greater delay. However, this possible\ninefficiency merely shifts the allocation of the surplus, and\nto the extent there is a substantial gain to be made, encour-\nages arbitrage, which in turn encourages competition at\nsubsequent auctions, leading to at least a partial remediation\nof the allocation \u201cerror\u201d in the long term, over a series of\nauctions.\n\nTherefore, the market system, with derivative and arbi-\ntrage possibilities, and deviations from optimal performance\nis at least partially self-correcting over the long term.\n\nLikewise, because the system has mechanisms for reduc-\ning the effects of imperfections in the presumptions and/or\nthe conformance of a real system to the stated mechanisms\nand applicable rules, particular aspects of the system which\nimpose administrative or overhead burdens may be circum-\nvented by imposing less restrictive criteria and allowing a\n\u201cself correcting\u201d mechanism to remediate. Thus, for\nexample, if a theoretically ideal mechanism imposes a 15%\nburden due to overhead, thus achieving an 85% overall\nefficiency (100-15=85), while a simplifying presumption\nachieves a result which imposes a 20% efficiency impair-\nment but only a 2% overhead factor (100-20-2=78), and an\narbitrage mechanism is available to correct the simplified\nmodel to gain 12% efficiency with another 2% overhead\n(78+12-2), the net result is 88% efficiency, above that of the\ntheoretically ideal mechanism.\n\nAn arbitrage mechanism seeks to identify inefficiency\nbased on superior information or mechanism, and a pricing\nor value disparity, and conduct a countertrade seeking to\nexploit the disparity while undertaking relatively low risk, to\nincrease overall market efficiency. (That is, to ultimately\nreallocate resources from a lower valued holder to a higher\nvalued holder).\n\nAn ad hoc network generally presents a case where\nindividual nodes have imperfect information, and efforts to\ngain better information invariably lead to increased over-\nhead. Therefore, by intentionally truncating the information\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 24 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n19\n\ngathering and discovery aspect of the ad hoc network, a\nresidual arbitrage opportunity will remain, but the inherent\ninefficiency of the arbitrage may be less than the correspond-\ning overhead involved in providing more perfect informa-\ntion to the individual nodes (i.e., overall arbitrage cost is less\nthan efficiency gain).\n\nAs such, a design feature of an embodiment of the\ninvention is to provide or even encourage arbitrage mecha-\nnisms and arbitrage opportunities, in an effort to improve\noverall system efficiency. In fact, an embodiment of the\nsystem is preferably constructed to regularly provide arbi-\ntrage opportunities which can be conducted with low risk\nand with substantial market efficiency gains, and these\narbitrage opportunities may be an important part of the\noperation of the embodiment.\n\nA second opportunity provides risk transference, such as\ndebt transactions, insurance, and market-making, and/or the\nlike. In such transactions, a market risk is apparent. Each\nnode, on the other and, has its own subjective risk tolerance.\nLikewise, the market risk provides an opportunity for nodes\nhaving a high risk tolerance to improve yield, by trading risk\nfor return. Those nodes which have generally greater liquid\nresources, which inherently have no return while uninvested,\nand may permit other nodes having lesser resources to\nborrow, at interest. Because there is a risk of non-payment,\nnodes may have different credit ratings, and this creates an\nopportunity for credit rating \u201cagencies\u201d and/or guarantors.\nIn an ad hoc network, there is also a possibility for delivery\nfailure, which, in turn, provides an opportunity for insur-\nance.\n\nFair Allocation Perturbed by Hierarchal Considerations\n\nIn a typical auction, each player is treated fairly; that is,\nthe same rules apply to each player, and therefore a single\neconomy describes the process. The fair auction therefore\nposes challenges for an inherently hierarchal set of users,\nsuch as a military organization, where rank is accompanied\nby privilege. The net result, however, is a decided disad-\nvantage to lower ranking agents, at least when viewed in\nlight of constricted self-interest. The issues that arise are\nsimilar to the relating to \u201caltruism\u201d, although not identical,\nand thus the game theoretic analysis of altruistic behavior\nmay be imported for consideration as appropriate.\n\nIn a mobile ad hoc communications network, a real issue\nis user defection or non-compliance. For example, where a\ncost is imposed on a user for participating in the ad hoc\nnetwork, e.g., battery power consumption, if the anticipated\nbenefit does not exceed the cost, the user will simply turn off\nthe device until actually needed. The result of mass defec-\ntion will, of course, be the instability and failure of the ad\nhoc network itself, leading to decreased utility, even for\nthose who gain an unfair or undue advantage under the\nsystem. Thus, perceived fairness and net benefit is required\nto network success, assuming that defection and/or non-\ncompliance are possible.\n\nOn the other hand, in military systems, the assertion of\nrank as a basis for priority is not itself arbitrary and\ncapricious. Orders and communications from a central com-\nmand are critical for the organization itself, and thus the\nlower ranking agents gain at least a peripheral benefit as\ntheir own chain of command employs their resources. There-\nfore, the difficulty in analyzing the application of a fair game\nto a hierarchal organization is principally a result of con-\nceptualizing and aligning the individual incentives with\nthose of the organization as a whole and the relationship\nbetween branches. Thus, in contradistinction to typical self-\norganizing peer-to-peer networks, a hierarchal network is\n\n25\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n20\n\nnot seen as self-organizing, at least in terms of the hierarchy,\nwhich is extrinsic to the formation of the communications\nnetwork under consideration.\n\nAs discussed below, the \u201cdistortions\u201d of the network\nimposed by the external hierarchy can be analyzed and\naccounted for by, for example, the concepts of inheritance\nand delegation. Thus, each branch of a hierarchy tree may be\nconsidered an object, which receives a set of characteristics\nfrom its root, and from which each sub-branch inherits the\ncharacteristics and adds subcharacteristics of, for example,\nspecialization. It is noted that the hierarchy need not follow\nnon-ambiguous or perfect rules, and thus there is no par-\nticular limit imposed that the hierarchy necessarily follow\nthese formalisms. Rather, by analyzing those aspects of the\nhierarchy which comply with these formalisms in accor-\ndance therewith, efficiency is facilitated.\n\nIn establishing an economic system, a preliminary ques-\ntion is whether the system is microeconomic or macroeco-\nnomic; that is, whether the economy is linked to a real\neconomy or insulated from it. One disadvantage of a real\neconomy with respect to a peer relationship is that external\nwealth can override internal dynamics, thus diminishing the\nadvantages to be gained by optimization, and potentially\ncreating a perception of unfairness for externally less\nwealthy agents, at least unless and until the system accom-\nplishes a wealth redistribution. An artificial economy pro-\nvides a solution for a peer network in which each node has\nan equal opportunity to gain control over the ad hoc net-\nwork, independent of outside influences. On the other hand,\nby insulating the network from external wealth redistribu-\ntion, real efficiency gains may be unavailable. Therefore,\nboth types of economies, as well as hybrids, are available.\nThus, as discussed in more detail below, a \u201cfair\u201d initial (or\nrecurring) wealth distribution may be applied, which may be\nsupplemented with, and/or provide an output of, external\nwealth. The rules or proportion of external influence may be\npredetermined, adaptive, or otherwise.\n\nIn accordance with the proposed artificial economy, each\nnode has a generator function for generating economic units,\nwhich are then used in an auction with other nodes to create\na market economy, that is, each node has a supply and\ndemand function, and acts as a source or sink for a limited\nresource. In some cases, nodes may have only supply or\ndemand functions, or a degree of asymmetry, but in this\ncase, these are typically subject to an external economic\nconsideration, and the artificial economy will be less effec-\ntive in providing appropriate incentives. According to this\nembodiment, the artificial economic units have a temporally\nand spatially declining value, so that wealth does not accu-\nmulate over long periods and cannot be transferred over\nlarge distances. The decline may be linear, exponential, or\nbased on some other function. This creates a set of micro-\neconomies insulated from each other. Where distant micro-\neconomies must deal with each other, there is a discount.\nThis architecture provides a number of advantages, for\nexample, by decreasing the influence of more spatially and\ntemporally distant effects, the scope of an optimization\nanalysis may be relatively constrained, while reducing the\namount of information which must be stored over time\nand/or carried over distance in order to permit an optimiza-\ntion. Likewise, since the economy is artificial, the discount\nneed not be recouped within the scope of the system. In the\nsame manner, a somewhat different incentive structure may\nbe provided; that is, economic units generated at one loca-\ntion and at one time may have a higher value at a different\nlocation and time; this may encourage reduced immediate\nuse of the system, and relocation to higher valued locations.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 25 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n21\n\nAs discussed below, one embodiment of the invention\npermits trading of credits, and thus, for example, a user may\nestablish a repeater site at an underserved location to gain\ncredits for use elsewhere. Preferably, beyond a \u201cnear field\u201d\neffect, the value does not continue to increase, since this may\nresult in inflationary pressures, and undermine the utility of\nthe system in optimally balancing immediate supply and\ndemand at a particular location.\n\nAs can be seen, through modifications of the governing\nrules and formulae, the system can be incentivized to behave\nin certain ways, but care should be exercised since a too\nnarrow analysis of the incentive might result in unintended\neffects. To the extent that human behavior is involved, care\nshould also be exercised in applying a rationality assump-\ntion, since this is not always true. Rather, there may be\napplicable models for human irrational behavior that are\nbetter suited to an understanding of the network behavior in\nresponse to a perturbation.\n\nThe typical peer-to-peer ad hoc network may be extended\nto the hierarchal case by treating each branch (including\nsub-branches) within the chain of command as an economic\nunit with respect to the generator function. At any level of\nthe hierarchy, the commander retains a portion of the wealth\ngeneration capacity, and delegates the remainder to its\nsubordinates. Therefore, the rank and hierarchal consider-\nations are translated to an economic wealth (or wealth\ngeneration) distribution. One aspect of this system allows\nwealth transfer or redistribution, although in a real system,\na time delay is imposed, and in the event of a temporally\nand/or spatially declining value, the transfer will impose a\ncost. Thus, an initial misallocation is undesired, and there\nwill be an incentive to optimally distribute the wealth\ninitially. Of course, if centralized control with low penalty is\ndesired, it is possible to limit the penalty, of any, for wealth\nredistribution through appropriate rules, although the time\nfor propagation through the network remains an issue, and\nblind nodes (i.e., those which do not have an efficient\ncommunication path, or have insufficient resources to utilize\notherwise available paths through the hierarchy) may also\nlead to limitations on system performance.\n\nIn this system, there may be an economic competitive\ndistortion, under which a node\u2019s subjective value of a\nresource is influenced by its then subjective wealth. If a node\nis supplied with wealth beyond its needs, the wealth is\nwasted, since it declines in value and cannot be hoarded\nindefinitely. (In a network wealth model in which wealth\ncould be hoarded indefinitely, small deviations from opti-\nmality and arbitrage opportunities may be exploited to create\na perception of unfairness, thus, this is not preferred.) If a\nnode is supplied with insufficient wealth, economic surplus\nthrough transactional gains are lost. Thus, each node must\nanalyze its expected circumstances to retain or delegate the\ngenerator function, and to optimally allocate wealth between\ncompeting subordinates. Likewise, there may be a plurality\nof quasi-optimal states.\n\nIn any economic transaction, there is an amount that a\nseller requires to part with the resource, a price a buyer is\nwilling to pay, and a surplus between them. Typically, in a\ntwo party transaction, the surplus is allocated to the party\ninitiating the transaction, that is, the party initiating the\ntransaction uses some discovery mechanism to find the\nminimum price acceptable by the buyer. In brokered or\nagent-mediated transactions, a portion of the surplus is\nallocated to a facilitator. In accordance with this aspect of\nthe present invention, compliance with the community rules,\nas well as an incentive to bid or ask a true private value is\nencouraged by distributing a portion of the transaction\n\n20\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n22\n\nsurplus to competitive bidders in accordance with their\nreported valuations. In particular, the competitive bidders\nseeking to allocate a scarce resource for themselves receive\ncompensation for deferring to the winning bidder in an\namount commensurate with their reported value. Thus,\nsellers receive their minimum acceptable value, buyers pay\ntheir maximum valuation, the surplus is distributed to the\ncommunity in a manner tending to promote the highest bids,\nthat is, the true bidder value (or even possibly slightly\nhigher). In a corresponding manner, the auction rules can be\nestablished to incentivized sellers to ask the minimum\npossible amount. For example, a portion of the surplus may\nbe allocated to bidders in accordance with how close they\ncome to the winning ask. Therefore, both incentives may be\napplied, for example with the surplus split in two, and half\nallocated to the bidder pool and half allocated to the seller\npool. Clearly, other allocations are possible.\n\nThe winning bidder and/or seller may be included within\nthe rebate pool. This is particularly advantageous where for\nvarious reasons, the winning bidder is not selected. Thus,\nthis process potentially decouples the bidding (auction)\nprocess and the resulting commercial transaction. It may\nalso be useful to apply Vickrey (second price) rules to the\nauction, that is, the winning bidder pays the second bid\nprice, and/or the winning seller pays the second ask price.\n\nBecause of transactional inefficiencies, human behavioral\naspects, and a desire to avoid increased network overhead by\n\u201cfalse\u201d bidders seeking a share of the allocation pool without\nintending to win the auction, it may be useful to limit the\nallocation of the surplus pool to a subset of the bidders\nand/or sellers, for example the top three of one or both. This\ntherefore encourages bidders and/or sellers to seek to be in\nthe limited group splitting the pool, and thus incentivizes\nhigher bids and lower asks. Of course, a party will have a\nmuch stronger incentive to avoid bidding outside its valu-\nation bounds, so the risk of this type of inefficiency is small.\n\nAs discussed above, one embodiment of the invention\nprovides a possible redistribution or wealth among nodes\nwithin a hierarchal chain. This redistribution may be of\naccumulated wealth, or of the generation function portion.\nTrading among hierarchally related parties is preferred,\nsince the perceived cost is low, and the wealth can be\nrepeatedly redistributed. In fact, it is because of the possi-\nbility of wealth oscillation and teaming that the declining\nwealth function is preferred, since this will tend to defeat\nclosely related party control over the network for extended\nperiods.\n\nIt is noted that, in a multihop mobile ad hoc network, if\na communication path fails, no further transfers are possible,\npotentially resulting in stalled or corrupt system configura-\ntion. It is possible to transfer an expiring or declining portion\nof the generating function; however, this might lead a node\nwhich is out of range to have no ability to rejoin the network\nupon return, and thus act as an impediment to efficient\nnetwork operation. Therefore, it is preferred that, in an\nartificial economy, each node has some intrinsic wealth\ngenerator function, so an extended period of inactivity, a\nnode gains wealth likely sufficient to rejoin the network as\na full participant.\n\nIn practice, in a typical military-type hierarchy, the bulk\nof the wealth generating function will be distributed to the\nlowest ranks with the highest numbers. Thus, under normal\ncircumstances, the network will appear to operate according\nto a non-hierarchal (i.e., peer-to-peer) model, with the dis-\ntortion that not all nodes have a common generator function.\nOn the other hand, hierarchically superior nodes either\nretain, or more likely, can quickly recruit surrounding sub-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 26 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n23\n\nordinates to allocate their wealth generating function and\naccumulated wealth to pass urgent or valuable messages.\nThus, if 85% of the wealth and network resources are\ndistributed to the lowest-ranking members, then the maxi-\nmum distortion due to hierarchal modifications is 15%.\n\nOne way that this allocation of wealth may be apparent is\nwith respect to the use of expensive assets. Thus, a high level\nnode might have access to a high power broadcast system or\nlicensed spectrum, while low level nodes might ordinarily\nbe limited to lower power transmission and/or unlicensed\nspectrum or cellular wireless communications. For a low\nlevel node to generate a broadcast using an expensive asset\n(or to allocate a massive amount of space*bandwidth prod-\nuct), it must pass the request up through the chain of\ncommand, until sufficient wealth (i.e., authority) is available\nto implement the broadcast.\n\nIn fact, such communications and authorizations are quite\nconsistent with the expectations within a hierarchal organi-\nzation, and this construct is likely to be accepted within a\nmilitary-type hierarchal organization.\n\nUnder normal circumstances, a superior would have an\nincentive to assure that each subordinate node possesses\nsufficient wealth to carry out its function and be incentivized\nto participate in the network. Ifa subordinate has insufficient\ninitial wealth (or wealth generating function) allocation, it\nmay still participate, but it must expend its internal resources\nto obtain wealth for participation in its own benefit. This, in\nturn, leads to a potential exhaustion of resources, and the\nunavailability of the node for ad hoc intermediary use, even\nfor the benefit of the hierarchy. An initial surplus allocation\nwill lead to overbidding for resources, and thus inefficient\nresource allocation, potential waste of allocation, and a\ndisincentive to act as an intermediary in the ad hoc network.\nWhile in a traditional military hierarchy, cooperation can be\nmandated, in systems where cooperation is perceived as\ncontrary to the net personal interests of the actor, network\nstability may be poor, and defection in spite of mandate.\n\nIn a military system, it is thus possible to formulate an\n\u201cengineered\u201d solution which forces participation and elimi-\nnates defection; however, it is clear that such solutions\nforfeit the potential gains of optimality, and incentivizes\ncircumvention and non-compliance. Further, because such a\nsystem is not \u201ccost sensitive\u201d (however the appropriate cost\nfunction might be expressed), it fails to respond to \u201cmarket\u201d\nforces.\n\nAccordingly, a peer to peer mobile ad hoc network\nsuitable for respecting hierarchal organization structures is\ndelegation is provided. In this hierarchal system, the hier-\narchy is represented by an initial wealth or wealth generation\nfunction distribution, and the hierarchally higher nodes can\nreallocate wealth of nodes beneath themselves, exercising\ntheir higher authority. This wealth redistribution can be overt\nor covert, and if overt, the hierarchal orders can be imposed\nwithout nodal assent. In a covert redistribution, trust may be\nrequired to assure redistribution by a node to a grandchild\nnode. The wealth and its distribution can be implemented\nusing modified micropayment techniques and other verifi-\nable cryptographic techniques. This wealth can be applied to\nauctions and markets, to allocate resources. Various aspects\nof this system are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this\nspecification.\n\nManet System\n\nMultihop Ad Hoc Networks require cooperation of nodes\nwhich are relatively disinterested in the content being con-\nveyed. Typically, such disinterested intermediaries incur a\ncost for participation, for example, power consumption or\nopportunity cost. Economic incentives may be used to\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n24\n\npromote cooperation of disinterested intermediaries, also\nknown as recruitment. An economic optimization may be\nachieved using a market-finding process, such as an auction.\nIn many scenarios, the desire for the fairness of an auction\nis tempered by other concerns, i.e., there are constraints on\nthe optimization which influence price and parties of a\ntransaction. For example, in military communication sys-\ntems, rank may be deemed an important factor in access to,\nand control over, the communications medium. A simple\nprocess of rank-based preemption, without regard for sub-\njective or objective importance, will result in an ineflicient\neconomic distortion. In order to normalize the application of\nrank, one is presented with two options: imposing a nor-\nmalization scheme with respect to rank to create a unified\neconomy, or providing considering rank using a set of rules\noutside of the economy. One way to normalize rank, and the\nimplicit hierarchy underlying the rank, is by treating the\neconomy as an object-oriented hierarchy, in which each\nindividual inherits or is allocated a subset of the rights of a\nparent, with peers within the hierarchy operating in a purely\neconomic manner. The extrinsic consideration of rank, out-\nside of an economy, can be denominated \u201crespect\u201d, which\ncorresponds to the societal treatment of the issue, rather than\nnormalizing this factor within the economy, in order to avoid\nunintended secondary economic distortion. Each system has\nits merits and limitations.\n\nAn economic optimization is one involving a transaction\nin which all benefits and detriments can be expressed in\nnormalized terms, and therefore by balancing all factors,\nincluding supply and demand, at a price, an optimum is\nachieved. Auctions are well known means to achieve an\neconomic optimization between distinct interests, to transfer\na good or right in exchange for a market price. While there\nare different types of auctions, each having their limitations\nand attributes, as a class these are well accepted as a means\nfor transfer of goods or rights at an optimum price. Where\nmultiple goods or rights are required in a sufficient combi-\nnation to achieve a requirement, a so-called Vickrey-Clarke-\nGroves (VCG) auction may be employed. In such an auc-\ntion, each supplier asserts a desired price for his component.\nThe various combinations which meet the requirement are\nthen compared, and the lowest selected. In a combinatorial\nsupply auction, a plurality of buyers each seek a divisible\ncommodity, and each bids its best price. The bidders with the\ncombination of prices which is maximum are selected. In a\ncommodity market, there are a plurality of buyers and\nsellers, so the auction is more complex. In a market\neconomy, the redistribution of goods or services is typically\ntransferred between those who value them least to those who\nvalue them most. The transaction price depends on the\nbalance between supply and demand; with the surplus being\nallocated to the limiting factor.\n\nDerivatives, Hedges, Futures and Insurance\n\nIn a market economy, the liquidity of the commodity is\ntypically such that the gap between bid and ask is small\nenough that the gap between them is small enough that it is\ninsignificant in terms of preventing a transaction. In a\ntraditional market, the allocation of the surplus oscillates in\ndependence on whether it is a buyer\u2019s or seller\u2019s market. Of\ncourse, the quantum of liquidity necessary to assure an\nacceptably low gap is subjective, but typically, if the size of\nthe market is sufficient, there will be low opportunity for\narbitrage, or at least a competitive market for arbitrage. The\narbitrage may be either in the commodity, or options,\nderivatives, futures, or the like.\n\nIn a market for communications resources, derivatives\nmay provide significant advantages over a simple unitary\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 27 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n25\n\nmarket for direct transactions. For example, a node may\nwish to procure a reliable communications pathway (high\nquality of service or QoS) for an extended period. Thus, it\nmay seek to commit resources into the future, and not be\nsubject to future competition for or price fluctuation of those\nresources, especially being subject to a prior broadcast of its\nown private valuation and a potential understanding by\ncompetitors of the presumed need for continued allocation\nof the resources. Thus, for similar reasons for the existence\nof derivative, options, futures, etc. markets in the real\neconomy, their analogy may be provided within a commu-\nnications resource market.\n\nIn a futures market analogy, an agent seeks to procure its\nlong-term or bulk requirements, or seeks to dispose of its\nassets in advance of their availability. In this way, there is\nincreased predictability, and less possibility of self-compe-\ntition. It also allows transfer of assets in bulk to meet an\nentire requirement or production lot capability, thus increas-\ning efficiency and avoiding partial availability or disposal.\n\nOne issue in mobile ad hoc networks is accounting for\nmobility of nodes and unreliability of communications. In\ncommodities markets, one option is insurance of the under-\nlying commodity and its production. The analogy in com-\nmunications resource markets focuses on communications\nreliability, since one aspect of reliability, nodal mobility is\n\u201cvoluntary\u201d and not typically associated with an insurable\nrisk. On the other hand, the mobility risk may be mitigated\nby an indemnification. In combination, these, and other risk\ntransfer techniques, may provide means for a party engaged\nin a communications market transaction to monetarily com-\npensate for risk tolerance factors. An agent in the market\nhaving a low risk tolerance can undertake risk transference,\nat some additional but predetermined transaction costs,\nwhile one with a high risk tolerance can \u201cgo bare\u201d and obtain\na lower transaction cost, or undertake third party risk for\nprofit.\n\nInsurance may be provided in various manners. For\nexample, some potential market participants may reserve\nwealth, capacity or demand for a fee, subject to claim in the\nevent of a risk event. In other cases, a separate system may\nbe employed, such as a cellular carrier, to step in, in the\nevent that a lower cost resource is unavailable (typically for\nbandwidth supply only). A service provider may provide\nrisk-related allocations to network members in an effort to\nincrease perceived network stability; likewise, if the net-\nwork is externally controlled, each node can be subject to a\nreserve requirements which is centrally (or hierarchally)\nallocated.\n\nIf an agent promises to deliver a resource, and ultimately\nfails to deliver, it may undertake an indemnification, paying\nthe buyer an amount representing \u201cdamages\u201d, the transac-\ntion cost of buyer, e.g., the cost of re-procurement plus lost\nproductivity. Likewise, if an agent fails to consume\nresources committed to it, it owes the promised payment,\nless the resale value of the remaining resources. An indem-\nnification insurer/guarantor can undertake to pay the gap on\nbehalf of the defaulting party. Typically, the insurer is not a\nnormal agent peer, but can be.\n\nHedge strategies may also be employed in known manner.\n\nIn order for markets to be efficient, there must be a\npossibility of beneficial use or resale of future assets. This\nimposes some complexity, since the assets are neither physi-\ncal nor possessed by the intermediary. However, crypto-\ngraphic authentication of transactions may provide some\nremedy. On the other hand, by increasing liquidity and\nproviding market-makers, the transaction surplus may be\nminimized, and thus the reallocation of the surplus as\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n26\n\ndiscussed above minimized. Likewise, in a market generally\ncomposed of agents within close proximity, the interposition\nof intermediaries may result in inefficiencies rather than\nefficiencies, and the utility of such complexity may better\ncome from the facilitation of distant transactions. Thus, if\none presumes slow, random nodal mobility, little advantage\nis seen from liquid resource and demand reallocation. On the\nother hand, if an agent has a predefined itinerary for rapidly\nrelocating, it can efficiently conduct transactions over its\npath, prearranging communication paths, and thus providing\ntrunk services. Thus, over a short term, direct multihop\ncommunications provide long-distance communications of\nboth administrative and content data. On the other hand,\nover a longer term, relocation of agents may provide greater\nefficiency for transport of administrative information,\nincreasing the efficiency of content data communications\nover the limited communications resources, especially if a\nstore-and-forward paradigm is acceptable.\n\nIt is noted that in an economy having persistent and deep\nuse of financial derivatives, a stable currency is preferred,\nand the declining value credit discussed above would pro-\nvide a disincentive to agents who might otherwise take risks\nover a long time-frame. It is possible, however, to distin-\nguish between credits held by \u201cconsumers\u201d and those held\nby \u201carbitrageurs\u201d or institutions, with the former having a\ndeclining value but can be spent, and those which have a\nstable value but must be first converted (at some possible\nadministrative cost) for consumer use.\n\nBandwidth Auction\n\nA previous scheme proposes the application of game\ntheory in the control of multihop mobile ad hoc networks\naccording to \u201cfair\u201d principles. In this prior scheme, nodes\nseeking to control the network (i.e., are \u201cbuyers\u201d of band-\nwidth), conduct an auction for the resources desired. Like-\nwise, potential intermediate nodes conduct an auction to\nsupply the resources. The set of winning bidders and win-\nning sellers is optimized to achieve the maximum economic\nsurplus. Winning bidders pay the maximum bid price or\nsecond price, while winning sellers receive their winning\nask or second price. The remaining surplus is redistributed\namong the winners and losing bidders, whose cooperation\nand non-interference with the winning bidders is required\nfor network operation. The allocation of the portion to losing\nbidders is, for example, in accordance with their proportion-\nate bid for contested resources, and for example, limited to\nthe few (e.g., 3) highest bidders or lowest offers. The\nwinning bids are determined by a VCG combinatorial pro-\ncess. The result is an optimum network topology with a\nreasonable, but by no means the only, fairness criterion,\nwhile promoting network stability and utility.\n\nThe purpose of rewarding losers is to encourage recruit-\nment, and therefore market liquidity. In order to discourage\nstrategic losing bids, one possible option is to impose a\nstatistical noise on the process to increase the risk that a\nstrategically losing bid will be a winning bid. Another way\nis to allocate the available surplus corresponding to the\ncloseness of the losing bid to the winning bid, not merely on\nits magnitude. Alternately, a \u201chistorical\u201d value for the\nresource may be established, and an allocation made only if\nthe bid is at or above the trailing mean value. Further, the\nloser\u2019s allocation may be dependent on a future bid with\nrespect to a corresponding resource at or above the prior\nvalue. In similar manner, various algorithms for surplus\nallocation may be designed to encourage recruitment of\nagents seeking to win, while possibly discouraging bidders\nwho have little realistic possibility of winning. Bidders who\ndo not seek to win impose an inefliciency on the network, for\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 28 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n27\n\nexample requiring other agents to communicate, evaluate,\nacknowledge, and defer to these bids. Therefore, a relatively\nsmall bidding fee may be imposed in order to assert a bid,\nwhich may be used to increase the available surplus to be\nallocated between the winning and top losing bidders.\n\nAs discussed above, risk may be a factor in valuing a\nresource. The auction optimization may therefore be nor-\nmalized or perturbed in dependence on an economic assess-\nment of a risk tolerance, either based on a personal valua-\ntion, or based on a third party valuation (insurance/\nindemnification). Likewise, the optimization may also be\nmodified to account for other factors.\n\nThus, one issue with such a traditional scheme for fair\nallocation of resources is that it does not readily permit\nintentional distortions, that is, the system is \u201cfair\u201d. However,\nin some instances, a relatively extrinsic consideration to\nsupply and subjective demand may be a core requirement of\na system. For example, in military systems, it is traditional\nand expected that higher military rank will provide access to\nand control over resources on a favored basis. (Note that, in\ncontrast to an example discussed elsewhere herein, this\nfavoritism is not enforced by a hierarchal wealth generation\ndistribution). In civilian systems, emergency and police use\nmay also be considered privileged. However, by seeking to\napply economic rules to this access, a number of issues arise.\nMost significantly, as a privileged user disburses currency,\nthis is distributed to unprivileged users, leading to an infla-\ntionary effect and comparative dilution of the intended\nprivilege. If the economy is real, that is the currency is\nlinked to a real economy, this grant of privilege will incur\nreal costs, which is also not always an intended effect. If the\neconomy is synthetic, that is, it is unlinked to external\neconomies, then the redistribution of wealth within the\nsystem can grant dramatic and potentially undesired control\nto a few nodes, potentially conveying the privilege to those\nundeserving, except perhaps due to fortuitous circumstances\nsuch as being in a critical location or being capable of\ninterfering with a crucial communication.\n\nTwo different schemes may be used to address this desire\nfor both economic optimality and hierarchal considerations.\nOne scheme maintains optimality and fairness within the\neconomic structure, but applies a generally orthogonal con-\nsideration of \u201crespect\u201d as a separate factor within the opera-\ntion of the protocol. Respect is a subjective factor, and thus\npermits each bidder to weight its own considerations. It is\nfurther noted that Buttyan et al. have discussed this factor as\na part of an automated means for ensuring compliance with\nnetwork rules, in the absence of a hierarchy. Levente\nButtyan and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Nuglets: a Virtual Cur-\nrency to Stimulate Cooperation in Self-Organized Mobile\nAd Hoc Networks, Technical Report DSC/2001/004, EPFL-\nDI-ICA, January 2001, incorporated herein by reference.\nSee, P. Michiardi and R. Molva, CORE: A collaborative\nreputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile\nad hoc networks, In B. Jerman-Blazic and T. Klobucar,\neditors, Communications and Multimedia Security, IFIP\nTC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communi-\ncations and Multimedia Security, Sep. 26-27, 2002, Por-\ntoroz, Slovenia, volume 228 of IFIP Conference Proceed-\nings, pages 107-121. Kluwer Academic, 2002; Sonja\nBuchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec, A Robust Reputation\nSystem for P2P and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, Second\nWorkshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, June\n2004; Po-Wah Yau and Chris J. Mitchell, Reputation Meth-\nods for Routing Security for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks;\nFrank Kargl, Andreas Klenk, Stefan Schlott, and Micheal\nWeber. Advanced Detection of Selfish or Malicious Nodes in\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n28\nAd Hoc Network. The 1st European Workshop on Security\nin Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks (ESAS 2004); He, Qi, et al.,\nSORI: A Secure and Objective Reputation-based Incentive\nScheme for Ad-Hoc Networks, IEEE Wireless Communi-\ncations and Networking Conference 2004, each of which is\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference.\n\nThe bias introduced in the system operation is created by\nan assertion by one claiming privilege, and deference by one\nrespecting privilege. One way to avoid substantial economic\ndistortions is to require that the payment made be based on\na purely economic optimization, while selecting the winner\nbased on other factors. In this way, the perturbations of the\nauction process itself is subtle, that is, since bidders realize\nthat the winning bid may not result in the corresponding\nbenefit, but incurs the publication of private values and\npotential bidding costs, there may be perturbation of the\nbidding strategy from optimal. Likewise, since the privilege\nis itself unfair and predictable, those with lower privilege\nratings will have greater incentive to defect from, or act\nagainst, the network. Therefore, it is important that either the\nassertion of privilege be subjectively reasonable to those\nwho must defer to it, or the incidence or impact of the\nassertions be uncommon or have low anticipated impact on\nthe whole. On the other hand, the perturbation is only\none-sided, since the payment is defined by the network\nabsent the assertion of privilege.\n\nIn the extreme case, the assertion of privilege will com-\npletely undermine the auction optimization, and the system\nwill be prioritized on purely hierarchal grounds, and the\npricing non-optimal or unpredictable. This condition may be\nacceptable or even efficient in military systems, but may be\nunacceptable where the deference is voluntary and choice of\nnetwork protocol is available, 1.e., defection from the net-\nwork policies is an available choice.\n\nIt is noted that those seeking access based on respect,\nmust still make an economic bid. This bid, for example,\nshould be sufficient in the case that respect is not afforded,\nfor example, from those of equal rank or above, or those who\nfor various reasons have other factors that override the\nassertion of respect. Therefore, one way to determine the\namount of respect to be afforded is the self-worth advertised\nfor the resources requested. This process therefore may\nminimize the deviation from optimal and therefore promotes\nstability of the network. It is further noted that those who\nassert respect based on hierarchy typically have available\nsubstantial economic resources, and therefore it is largely a\ndesire to avoid economic redistribution rather than an inabil-\nity to effect such a redistribution, that compels a consider-\nation of respect.\n\nIn a combinatorial auction, each leg of a multihop link is\nseparately acquired and accounted. Therefore, administra-\ntion of the process is quite involved. That is, each bidder\nbroadcasts a set of bids for the resources required, and an\noptimal network with maximum surplus is defined. Each leg\nof each path is therefore allocated a value. In this case, it is\nthe winning bidder who defers based on respect, since the\nother resources are compensated equally and therefore\nagnostic.\n\nThus, if pricing is defined by the economic optimization,\nthen the respect consideration requires that a subsidy be\napplied, either as an excess payment up to the amount of the\nwinning bid, or as a discount provided by the sellers, down\nto the actually bid value.\n\nSince the pricing is dependent on the network absent the\nrespect consideration, there is an economic deficit or\nrequired subsidy. In some cases, the respected bidder simply\npays the amount required, in excess of its actual bid. If we\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 29 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n29\n\npresume that the respected bidder could have or would have\noutbid the winning bidder, it then pays the third price, rather\nthan the second price. If the respected bidder does not have,\nor will not allocate the resources, then the subsidy must\ncome from the others involved. On one hand, since the\nrespect in this case may be defined by the otherwise winning\nbidder, this bidder, as an element of its respect, may pay the\ndifference. However, this cost (both the lost economic gains\nof the transaction and the subsidy) will quickly disincentiv-\nize any sort of grant of respect. The recipients could also\nprovide a discount, however this would require consent of\nboth the winning bidder and the recipients, making conclud-\ning the transaction more difficult. One other possibility is to\nrequest \u201cdonations\u201d from nearby nodes to meet the subsidy,\na failure of which undermines the assertion of respect.\n\nAnother alternate is to assume that there is a surplus\nbetween the aggregate winning bid and the aggregate cost,\nand so long as the bidder claiming respect pays the minimum\ncost, then the system remains operable, although the benefits\nof surplus allocation are lost, and all affected nodes must\ndefer to this respect mechanism. In this case, it is more\ndifficult to arbitrate between competing demands for respect,\nunless a common value function is available, which in this\ncase we presume is not available.\n\nThe node demanding respect may have an impact on path\nsegments outside its required route and the otherwise opti-\nmal interfering routes; and thus the required payment to\nmeet the differential between the optimum network and the\nresulting network may thus be significant.\n\nTt is noted that, in the real economy, where the U.S.\nGovernment allocates private resources, it is required to pay\ntheir full value. This model appears rational, and therefore a\npreferred system requires a node claiming privilege and\ngaining a resulting benefit to pay the winning bid value (as\nan expression of market value), and perhaps in addition pay\nthe winning bidder who is usurped its anticipated benefit,\nthat is, the difference in value between the second price and\nits published private valuation, this having an economically\nneutral affect, but also requiring a respected node to poten-\ntially possess substantial wealth.\n\nA further possible resolution of this issue provides for an\nassessment of an assertion of respect by each involved node.\nSince the allocation of respect is subjective, each bidder\nsupplies a bid, as well as an assertion of respect. Each other\nnode receives the bids and assertions, and applies a weight-\ning or discount based on its subjective analysis of the respect\nassertion. In this case, the same bid is interpreted differently\nby each supplier, and the subjective analysis must be per-\nformed by or for each supplier. By converting the respect\nassertion into a subjective weighting or discount, a pure\neconomic optimization may then be performed, with the\nsubjectively perturbed result by each node reported and used\nto compute the global optimization.\n\nAn alternate scheme for hierarchal deference is to orga-\nnize the economy itself into a hierarchy, as discussed in the\nfirst example. In a hierarchy, a node has one parent and\npossibly multiple children. At each level, a node receives an\nallocation of wealth from its parent, and distributes all or a\nportion of its wealth to children. A parent is presumed to\ncontrol its children, and therefore can allocate their wealth\nor subjective valuations to its own ends. When nodes\nrepresenting different lineages must be reconciled, one may\nrefer to the common ancestor for arbitration, or a set of\ninherited rules to define the hierarchal relationships.\n\nIn this system, the resources available for reallocation\nbetween branches of the hierarchy depend on the allocation\nby the common grandparent, as well as competing alloca-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n30\n\ntions within the branch. This system presumes that children\ncommunicate with their parents and are obedient. In fact, if\nthe communication presumption is violated, one must then\nrely on a priori instructions, which may not be sufliciently\nadaptive to achieve an optimal result. If the obedience\npresumption is violated, then the hierarchal deference\nrequires an enforcement mechanism within the hierarchy. If\nboth presumptions are simultaneously violated, then the\nsystem will likely fail, except on a voluntary basis, with\nresults similar to the \u201creputation\u201d scheme described herein.\n\nThus, it is possible to include hierarchal deference as a\nfactor in optimization of a multihop mobile ad hoc network,\nleading to compatibility with tiered organizations, as well as\nwith shared resources.\n\nGame Theory\n\nUse of Game Theory to control arbitration of ad hoc\nnetworks is well known. F. P. Kelly, A. Maulloo, and D. Tan.\nRate control in communication networks: shadow prices,\nproportional fairness and stability. Journal of the Opera-\ntional Research Society, 49, 1998. citeseer.ist.psu.edu/\nkelly98rate.html; J. MacKie-Mason and H. Varian. Pricing\ncongestible network resources. IEEE Journal on Selected\nAreas in Communications, 13(7):1141-1149, 1995. Some\nprior studies have focused on the incremental cost to each\nnode for participation in the network, without addressing the\nopportunity cost of a node foregoing control over the\ncommunication medium. Courcoubetis, C., Siris, V. A. and\nStamoulis, G. D. Integration of pricing and flow control for\navailable bit rate services in ATM networks. In Proceedings\nIEEE Globecom \u2019\u00b096, pp. 644-648. London, UK. citese-\ner.ist.psu.edu/courcoubetis96integration.html.\n\nA game theoretic approach addresses the situation where\nthe operation of an agent which has freedom of choice,\nallowing optimization on a high level, considering the\npossibility of alternatives to a well designed system. Accord-\ning to game theory, the best way to ensure that a system\nretains compliant agents, is to provide the greatest antici-\npated benefit, at the least anticipated cost, compared to the\nalternates.\n\nGame Theory provides a basis for understanding the\nactions of Ad hoc network nodes. A multihop ad hoc\nnetwork requires a communication to be passed through a\ndisinterested node. The disinterested node incurs some cost,\nthus leading to a disincentive to cooperate. Meanwhile,\nbystander nodes must defer their own communications in\norder to avoid interference, especially in highly loaded\nnetworks. By understanding the decision analysis of the\nvarious nodes in a network, it is possible to optimize a\nsystem which, in accordance with game theory, provides\nbenefits or incentives, to promote network reliability and\nstability. The incentive, in economic form, may be charged\nto those benefiting from the communication, and is prefer-\nably related to the value of the benefit received. The pro-\nposed network optimization scheme employs a modified\ncombinatorial (VCG) auction, which optimally compensates\nthose involved in the communication, with the benefiting\nparty paying the second highest bid price (second price). The\nsurplus between the second price and VCG price is distrib-\nuted among those who defer to the winning bidder according\nto respective bid value. Equilibrium usage and headroom\nmay be influenced by deviating from a zero-sum condition.\nThe mechanism seeks to define fairness in terms of market\nvalue, providing probable participation benefit for all nodes,\nleading to network stability.\n\nAd Hoc Networks\n\nAn ad hoc network is a wireless network which does not\nrequire fixed infrastructure or centralized control. The ter-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 30 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n31\n\nminals in the network cooperate and communicate with each\nother, in a self organizing network. In a multihop network,\ncommunications can extend beyond the scope of a single\nnode, employing neighboring nodes to forward messages to\ntheir destination. In a mobile ad hoc network, constraints are\nnot placed on the mobility of nodes, that is, they can relocate\nwithin a time scale which is short with respect to the\ncommunications, thus requiring consideration of dynamic\nchanges in network architecture.\n\nAd hoe networks pose control issues with respect to\ncontention, routing and information conveyance. There are\ntypically tradeoffs involving equipment size, cost and com-\nplexity, protocol complexity, throughput efficiency, energy\nconsumption, and \u201cfairness\u201d of access arbitration. Other\nfactors may also come into play. L. Buttyan and J.-P.\nHubaux. Rational exchange\u2014a formal model based on\ngame theory. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Work-\nshop on Electronic Commerce (WELCOM), November\n2001. citeseer.ist-psu.edu/anO1rational-html; P. Michiardi\nand R. Molva. Game theoretic analysis of security in mobile\nad hoc networks. Technical Report RR-02-070, Institut\nEurecom, 2002; P. Michiardi and R. Molva. A game theo-\nretical approach to evaluate cooperation enforcement\nmechanisms in mobile ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of\nWiOpt\u2019 03, March 2003; Michiardi, P., Molva, R.: Making\ngreed work in mobile ad hoc networks. Technical report,\nInstitut Eurecom (2002) citeseer.ist-_psu.edu/\nmichiardi02making-html; S. Shenker. Making greed work in\nnetworks: A game-theoretic analysis of switch service dis-\nciplines. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 3(6):819-\n831, December 1995; A. B. MacKenzie and S. B. Wicker.\nSelfish users in aloha: A game-theoretic approach. In\nVehicular Technology Conference, 2001. VTC 2001 Fall.\nIEEE VTS 54th, volume 3, October 2001; J. Crowcroft, R.\nGibbens, F. Kelly, and S. Ostring. Modelling incentives for\ncollaboration in mobile ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of\nWiOpt\u201903, 2003.\n\nGame theory studies the interactions of multiple indepen-\ndent decision makers, each seeking to fulfill their own\nobjectives. Game theory encompasses, for example, auction\ntheory and strategic decision-making. By providing appro-\npriate incentives, a group of independent actors may be\npersuaded, according to self-interest, to act toward the\nbenefit of the group. That is, the selfish individual interests\nare aligned with the community interests. In this way, the\ncommunity will be both efficient and the network of actors\nstable and predictable. Of course, any systems wherein the\n\u201cincentives\u201d impose too high a cost, themselves encourage\ncircumvention. In this case, game theory also addresses this\nissue.\n\nIn computer networks, issues arise as the demand for\ncommunications bandwidth approaches the theoretical limit.\nUnder such circumstances, the behavior of nodes will affect\nhow close to the theoretical limit the system comes, and also\nwhich communications are permitted. The well known col-\nlision sense, multiple access (CSMA) protocol allows each\nnode to request access to the network, essentially without\ncost or penalty, and regardless of the importance of the\ncommunication. While the protocol incurs relatively low\noverhead and may provide fully decentralized control, under\ncongested network conditions, the system may exhibit insta-\nbility, that is, a decline in throughput as demand increases,\nresulting in ever increasing demand on the system resources\nand decreasing throughput. Durga P. Satapathy and Jon M.\nPeha, Performance of Unlicensed Devices With a Spectrum\nEtiquette,\u201d Proceedings of IEEE Globecom, November\n1997, pp. 414-418. citeseer.ist.psu.edu/\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n32\n\nsatapathy97performance.html. According to game theory,\nthe deficit of the CSMA protocol is that it is a dominant\nstrategy to be selfish and hog resources, regardless of the\ncost to society, resulting in \u201cthe tragedy of the commons.\u201d\nGarrett Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science,\n162:1243-1248, 1968. Alternate Location: dieoff.com/\npage95 htm.\n\nIn an ad hoc network used for conveying real-time\ninformation, as might be the case in a telematics system,\nthere are potentially unlimited data communication require-\nments (e.g., video data), and network congestion is almost\nguaranteed. Therefore, using a CSMA protocol as the para-\ndigm for basic information conveyance is destined for\nfailure, unless there is a disincentive to network use. (In\npower constrained circumstances, this cost may itself pro-\nvide such a disincentive). On the other hand, a system which\nprovides more graceful degradation under high load, sensi-\ntivity to the importance of information to be communicated,\nand efficient utilization of the communications medium\nwould appear more optimal.\n\nOne way to impose a cost which varies in dependence on\nthe societal value of the good or service, is to conduct an\nauction, which is a mechanism to determine the market\nvalue of the good or service, at least between the auction\nparticipants. Walsh, W. and M. Wellman (1998). A market\nprotocol for decentralized task allocation, in \u201cProceedings of\nthe Third International Conference on Multi-Agent Sys-\ntems,\u201d pp. 325-332, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los\nAlamitos. In an auction, the bidder seeks to bid the lowest\nvalue, up to a value less than or equal to his own private\nvalue (the actual value which the bidder appraises the good\nor service, and above which there is no surplus), that will\nwin the auction. Since competitive bidders can minimize the\ngains of another bidder by exploiting knowledge of the\nprivate value attached to the good or service by the bidder,\nit is generally a dominant strategy for the bidder to attempt\nto keep its private value a secret, at least until the auction is\nconcluded, thus yielding strategies that result in the largest\npotential gain. On the other hand, in certain situations,\nrelease or publication of the private value is a dominant\nstrategy, and can result in substantial efficiency, that is,\nhonesty in reporting the private value results in the maxi-\nmum likelihood of prospective gain.\n\nApplication of Game Theory to Ad Hoc Networks\n\nThere are a number of aspects of ad hoc network control\nwhich may be adjusted in accordance with game theoretic\napproaches. An example of the application of game theory\nto influence system architecture arises when communica-\ntions latency is an issue. A significant factor in latency is the\nnode hop count. Therefore, a system may seek to reduce\nnode hop count by using an algorithm other than a nearest\nneighbor algorithm, bypassing some nodes with longer\ndistance communications. In analyzing this possibility, one\nmust not only look at the cost to the nodes involved in the\ncommunication, but also the cost to nodes which are pre-\nvented from simultaneously accessing the network dude to\ninterfering uses of network resources. As a general propo-\nsition, the analysis of the network must include the impact\nof each action, or network state, on every node in the system,\nalthough simplifying presumptions may be appropriate\nwhere information is unavailable, or the anticipated impact\nis trivial.\n\nGame theory is readily applied in the optimization of\ncommunications routes through a defined network, to\nachieve the best economic surplus allocation. In addition,\nthe problem of determining the network topology, and the\ncommunications themselves, are ancillary, though real,\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 31 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n33\n\napplications of game theory. Since the communications\nincidental to the arbitration require consideration of some of\nthe same issues as the underlying communications, corre-\nsponding elements of game theory may apply at both levels\nof analysis. Due to various uncertainties, the operation of the\nsystem is stochastic. This presumption, in turn, allows\nestimation of optimality within a margin of error, simplify-\ning implementation as compared to a rigorous analysis\nwithout regard to statistical significance.\n\nThere are a number of known and proven routing models\nproposed for forwarding of packets in ad hoc networks.\nThese include Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector\n(AODV) Routing, Optimized Link State Routing Protocol\n(OLSR), Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR), and\nTopology Dissemination Based on Reverse-Path Forward-\ning (TBRPF). M. Mauve, J. Widmer, and H. Hartenstein. A\nsurvey on position-based routing in mobile ad hoc networks.\nIEEE Network Magazine, 15(6):30-39, November 2001.\nciteseer.ist.psu.edu/article/mauve01survey.html; Z. Haas. A\nnew routing protocol for reconfigurable wireless networks.\nIn IEEE 6th International Conference on Universal Com-\nmunications Record, volume 2, pages 562-566, October\n1997; X. Hong, K. Xu, and M. Gerla. Scalable routing\nprotocols for mobile ad hoc networks. IEEE Networks,\n16(4):11-21, July 2002; D. Johnson, D. Maltz, and Y.-C. Hu.\nThe dynamic source routing protocol for mobile ad hoc\nnetworks, April 2003. www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-\nietf-manet-dsr-09.txt; S.-J. Lee, W. Su, J. Hsu, M. Gerla, and\nR. Bagrodia. A performance comparison study of ad hoc\nwireless multicast protocols. In Proceedings of IEEE INFO-\nCOM 2000, pages 565-574, March 2000; K. Mase, Y. Wada,\nN. Mori, K. Nakano, M. Sengoku, and S. Shinoda. Flooding\nschemes for a universal ad hoc network. In Industrial\nElectronics Society, 2000. IECON 2000, v. 2, pp. 1129-\n1134, 2000; R. Ogier, F. Templin, and M. Lewis. Topology\ndissemination based on reversepath forwarding, October\n2003. vesuvio.ipv6.cseltit/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-manet-\ntbrpf-11.txt; A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin. Competitive\nrouting in multi-user communication networks. IEEE/ACM\nTransactions on Networking, 1(5):510-521, October 1993;\nC. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer, and S. Das. Ad hoc on-\ndemand distance vector (AODV) routing. Request for com-\nments 3561, Internet Engineering Task Force, 2003; C. E.\nPerkins, editor. Ad Hoc Networking. Addison-Wesley, Bos-\nton, 2001; E. Royer and C.-K. Toh. A review of current\nrouting protocols for ad hoc mobile wireless networks. IEEE\nPersonal Communications, 6(2):46-55, April 1999; Holger\nFiler, Hannes Hartenstein, Dieter Vollmer, Martin Mauve,\nMichael Kasemann, Location-Based Routing for Vehicular\nAd-Hoc Networks, Reihe Informatik March 2002, citese-\nerist.psu.edu/560036.html; J. Broch, D. A. Maltz, D. B.\nJohnson, Y. C. Hu, and J. Jetcheva. A Performance Com-\nparison of Multi-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Network Routing\nProtocols. In Proc. of the ACM/IEEE MobiCom, October\n1998, citeseer.ist.psu.edu/broch98performance.html.\n\nIn most systems analyzed to date, the performance met-\nrics studied were power consumption, end-to-end data\nthroughput and delay, route acquisition time, percentage\nout-of-order delivery, and efficiency. A critical variable\nconsidered in many prior studies is power cost, presuming a\nbattery operated transceiver with limited power availability.\nJuha Leino, \u201cApplications of Game Theory in Ad Hoc\nNetwork\u201d, Master\u2019s Thesis, Helsinki University Of Tech-\nnology (2003); J. Shneidman and D. Parkes, \u201cRationality\nand Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks\u201d, In Proc. 2nd Int.\nWorkshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS\u201903), 2003, cite-\nseer.nj.nec.com/shneidman03rationality.html; V. Rodoplu\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n34\n\nand H.-Y. Meng. Minimum energy mobile wireless net-\nworks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,\n17(8):1333-1344, August 1999; S. Singh, M. Woo, and C. S.\nRaghavendra. Power-aware routing in mobile ad hoc net-\nworks. In Proceeding of MOBICOM 1998, pages 181-190,\n1998; A. Urpi, M. Bonuccelli, and S. Giordano. Modelling\ncooperation in mobile ad hoc networks: a formal description\nof selfishness. In Proceedings of WiOpt'03, March 2003; A.\nvan den Nouweland, P. Borm, W. van Golstein Brouwers, R.\nGroot Bruinderink, and S. Tijs. A game theoretic approach\nto problems in telecommunication. Management Science,\n42(2):294-303, February 1996.\n\nThere can be significant differences in optimum routing\ndepending on whether a node can modulate its transmit\npower, which in turn controls range, and provides a further\ncontrol over network topology. Likewise, steerable anten-\nnas, antenna arrays, and other forms of multiplexing provide\nfurther degrees of control over network topology. Note that\nthe protocol-level communications are preferably broad-\ncasts, while information conveyance communications are\ntypically point-to-point. Prior studies typically presume a\nsingle transceiver, with a single omnidirectional antenna,\noperating according to in-band protocol data, for all com-\nmunications. The tradeoff made in limiting system designs\naccording to these presumptions should be clear.\n\nIt is the general self-interest of a node to conserve its own\nresources, maintain an opportunity to access network\nresources, while consuming whatever resource of other\nnodes as it desires. Clearly, this presents a significant risk of\nthe \u201ctragedy of the commons\u201d, in which selfish individuals\nfail to respect the very basis for the community they enjoy,\nand a network of rational nodes operating without significant\nincentives to cooperate would likely fail. On the other hand,\nif donating a node\u2019s resources generated a sufficient asso-\nciated benefit to that node, while consuming network\nresources imposed a sufficient cost, stability and reliability\ncan be achieved. So long as the functionality is sufficient to\nmeet the need, and the economic surplus is \u201cfairly\u201d allo-\ncated, that is, the cost incurred is less than the private value\nof the benefit, and that cost is transferred as compensation to\nthose burdened in an amount in excess of their incremental\ncost, adoption of the system should increase stability. In fact,\neven outside of these bounds, the system may be more stable\nthan one which neither taxes system use nor rewards altru-\nistic behavior. While the basic system may be a zero sum\nsystem, and over time, the economic effects will likely\naverage out (assuming symmetric nodes), in any particular\ninstance, the incentive for selfish behavior by a node will be\ndiminished.\n\nOne way to remedy selfish behavior is to increase the cost\nof acting this way, that is, to impose a cost or tax for access\nto the network. In a practical implementation, however, this\nis problematic, since under lightly loaded conditions, the\n\u201cvalue\u201d of the communications may not justify a fixed cost\nwhich might be reasonable under other conditions, and\nlikewise, under heavier loads, critical communications may\nstill be delayed or impeded. A variable cost, dependent on\nrelative \u201cimportance\u201d, may be imposed, and indeed, as\nalluded to above, this cost may be market based, in the\nmanner of an auction. In a multihop network, such an\nauction is complicated by the requirement for a distribution\nof payments within the chain of nodes, with each node\nhaving potential alternate demands for its cooperation. The\nmarket-based price-finding mechanism excludes nodes\nwhich ask a price not supported by its market position, and\nthe auction itself may comprise a value function encom-\npassing reliability, latency, quality of service, or other non-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 32 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n35\n\neconomic parameters, expressed in economic terms. The\nnetwork may further require compensation to nodes which\nmust defer communications because of inconsistent states,\nsuch as in order to avoid interference or duplicative use of\nan intermediary node, and which take no direct part in the\ncommunication. It is noted that the concept of the winner of\nan auction paying the losers is not generally known, and\nindeed somewhat counterintuitive. Indeed, the effect of this\nrule perturbs the traditional analysis framework, since the\npossibility of a payment from the winner to the loser alters\nthe allocation of economic surplus between the bidder,\nseller, and others. Likewise, while the cost to the involved\nnodes may be real, the cost to the uninvolved nodes may be\nsubjective. While it would appear that involved nodes would\ngenerally be better compensated than uninvolved nodes, the\nactual allocation or reallocation of wealth according to the\noptimization may result in a different outcome.\n\nThe network provides competitive access to the physical\ntransport medium, and cooperation with the protocol pro-\nvides significant advantages over competition with it. Under\nnormal circumstances, a well developed ad hoc network\nsystem can present as a formidable coordinated competitor\nfor access to contested bandwidth by other systems, while\nwithin the network, economic surplus is optimized. Thus, a\nnode presented with a communications requirement is pre-\nsented not with the simple choice to participate or abstain,\nbut rather whether to participate in an ad hoc network with\npredicted stability and mutual benefit, or one with the\npossibility of failure due to selfish behavior, and non-\ncooperation. Even in the absence of a present communica-\ntion requirement, a network which rewards cooperative\nbehavior may be preferable to one which simply expects\naltruism without rewarding it.\n\nThe protocol may also encompass the concept of node\nreputation, that is, a positive or negative statement by others\nregarding the node in question. P. Michiardi and R. Molva.\nCore: A collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node\ncooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. In Communication\nand Multimedia Security 2002 Conference, 2002. This repu-\ntation may be evaluated as a parameter in an economic\nanalysis, or applied separately, and may be anecdotal or\nstatistical. In any case, if access to resources and payments\nare made dependent on reputation, nodes will be incentiv-\nized to maintain a good reputation, and avoid generating a\nbad reputation. Therefore, by maintaining and applying the\nreputation in a manner consistent with the community goals,\nthe nodes are compelled to advance those goals in order to\nbenefit from the community. Game theory distinguishes\nbetween good reputation and bad reputation. Nodes may\nhave a selfish motivation to assert that another node has a\nbad reputation, while it would have little selfish motivation,\nabsent collusion, for undeservedly asserting a good reputa-\ntion. On the other hand, a node may have a selfish motiva-\ntion in failing to reward behavior with a good reputation.\n\nEconomics and reputation may be maintained as orthogo-\nnal considerations, since the status of a node\u2019s currency\naccount provides no information about the status of its\nreputation.\n\nThis reputation parameter may be extended to encompass\nrespect, that is, a subjective deference to another based on an\nasserted or imputed entitlement. While the prior system uses\nreputation as a factor to ensure compliance with system\nrules, this can be extended to provided deferential prefer-\nences either within or extrinsic to an economy. Thus, in a\nmilitary hierarchy, a relatively higher ranking official can\nassert rank, and if accepted, override a relatively lower\nranking bidder at the same economic bid. For each node, an\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n36\n\nalgorithm is provided to translate a particular assertion of\nrespect (1.e., rank and chain of command) into an economic\nperturbation. For example, in the same chain of command,\neach difference in rank might be associated with a 25%\ncompounded discount, when compared with other bids, i.e.\n\nB,=Bx10(1+0.25xAR),\n\nWherein B1 is the attributed bid, BO is the actual bid, and\nAR is the difference in rank, positive or negative.\n\nOutside the chain of command, a different, generally\nlower, discount (ANCOC) may be applied, possibly with a\nbase discount as compared to all bids within the chain of\ncommand (dCOC), 1.e.,\n\nB,=Bx10(1+dCOC+dNCOCxAR).\n\nThe discount is applied so that higher ranking officers pay\nless, while lower ranking officers pay more. Clearly, there is\na high incentive for each bid to originate from the highest\navailable commander within the chain of command, and\ngiven the effect of the perturbation, for ranking officers to\n\u201cpull rank\u201d judiciously.\n\nThe Modified VCG Auction\n\nAso-called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, or VCG, auction, is a\ntype of auction suitable for bidding, in a single auction, for\nthe goods or services of a plurality of offers, as a unit.\nVickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and com-\npetitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16, 8-37; Clarke,\nE. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods, Public\nChoice 11, 17-33; Felix Brandt and Gerhard Wei Antisocial\nAgents and Vickrey Auctions. In Pre-proceedings of the\nEighth International Workshop on Agent Theories, Archi-\ntectures, and Languages (ATAL-2001), pages 120-132,\n2001; Tuomas Sandholm. Limitations of the Vickrey Auc-\ntion in Computational Multiagent Systems. In Proceedings\nof the 2nd International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems\n(ICMAS). AAAT Press, 1996. Menlo Park, Calif.; Ron Lavi,\nAhuva Mu\u2019alem, and Noam Nisan, \u201cTowards a Character-\nization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions\u201d, citeseerist.ps-\nu.edu/lavi03towards.html; Moulin, H. (1999). Incremental\ncost sharing; characterization by strategyproofness, Social\nChoice and Welfare 16, 279-320; Moulin, H. and S. Shenker\n(1997). Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget\nBalance Versus Efficiency, to appear in Economic Theory.\nwww.aciri.org/shenker/cost.ps; Moulin, Herve, and Scott\nShenker (2001). \u201cStrategyproof Sharing of Submodular\nCosts: Budget Balance versus Efficiency.\u201d Economic Theory\n18, 511-533; Feigenbaum, Joan, Christos Papadimitriou,\nRahul Sami, and Scott Shenker (2002). \u201cA BGP-based\nMechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing.\u201d In Proc. 21st Sym-\nposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, ACM\nPress, 173-182; J. Feigenbaum and S. Shenker. Distributed\nalgorithmic mechanism design: Recent results and future\ndirections. In Proc. 6th Intl Workshop on Discrete Algo-\nrithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communi-\ncations, pages 1-13, Atlanta, Ga., September 2002; Nisan, N.\nand A. Ronen (2000). Computationally Feasible VCG\nMechanisms, to be presented at \u201cGames 2000.\u201d http:/ww-\nw.cs.huji.ac.il/~noam/vegbased.ps; Tuomas Sandholm.\nLimitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Mul-\ntiagent Systems. In Proceedings of the 2nd International\nConference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS). AAAI\nPress, 1996. Menlo Park, Calif.; C. Jason Woodard and\nDavid C. Parkes, 1st Workshop on the Economics of P2P\nsystems, Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network\nFormation, 2003, www.sims.berkeley.edukesearch/confer-\nences/p2pecon/papers/s6-woodard.pdf; D. C. Parkes. Itera-\ntive Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 33 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n37\nComputational Efficiency (Chapter 2). PhD thesis, Univer-\nsity of Pennsylvania, May 2001. www.eecs.harvard.\nedu/~parkes/pubs/ch2.ps.\n\nIn the classic case, each bidder bids a value vector for\neach available combination of goods or services. The vari-\nous components and associated ask price are evaluated\ncombinatorially to achieve the minimum sum to meet the\nrequirement. The winning bid set is that which produces the\nmaximum value of the accepted bids, although the second\n(Vickrey) price is paid. In theory, the Vickrey price repre-\nsents the maximum state of the network absent the highest\nbidder, so that each bidder is incentivized to bit its private\nvalue, knowing that its pricing will be dependent not on its\nown value, but the subjective value applied by others. In the\npresent context, each offer submits an ask price (reserve) or\nevaluatable value function for a component of the combi-\nnation. If the minimum aggregate to meet the bid require-\nment is not met, the auction fails. If the auction is successful,\nthen the set of offers selected is that with the lowest\naggregate bid, and they are compensated that amount.\n\nThe VCG auction is postulated as being optimal for\nallocation of multiple resources between agents. It is \u201cstrat-\negyproof\u2019 and efficient, meaning that it is a dominant\nstrategy for agents to report their true valuation for a\nresource, and the result of the optimization is a network\nwhich maximizes the value of the system to the agents.\nGame theory also allows an allocation of cost between\nvarious recipients of a broadcast or multicast. That is, the\ncommunication is of value to a plurality of nodes, and a large\nset of recipient nodes may efficiently receive the same\ninformation. This allocation from multiple bidders to mul-\ntiple sellers is a direct extension of VCG theory, and a\nsimilar algorithm may be used to optimize allocation of\ncosts and benefit.\n\nThe principal issue involved in VCG auctions is that the\ncomputational complexity of the optimization grows with\nthe number of buyers and their different value functions and\nallocations. While various simplifying presumptions may be\napplied, studies reveal that these simplifications may under-\nmine the VCG premise, and therefore do not promote\nhonesty in reporting the buyer\u2019s valuation, and thus are not\n\u201cstrategyproof\u201d, which is a principal advantage of the VCG\nprocess.\n\nThe surplus, i.e, gap between bid and ask, is then\navailable to compensate the deferred bidders. This surplus\nmay be, for example, distributed proportionately to the\noriginal bid value of the bidder, thus further encouraging an\nhonest valuation of control over the resource. Thus, if we\npresume that a bidder may have an incentive to adopt a\nstrategy in which it shaves its bid to lower values, an\nadditional payoff dependent on a higher value bid will\npromote higher bides and disincentivize shaving. On the\nother hand, it would be inefficient to promote bidding above\na bidder\u2019s private value, and therefore care must be exer-\ncised to generally avoid this circumstance. In similar man-\nner, potential offers may be compensated for low bids, to\npromote availability of supply. It is noted that, by broad-\ncasting supply and demand, fault tolerance of the network is\nimproved, since in the event that an involved node becomes\nunavailable, a competing node or set of nodes for that role\nmay be quickly enlisted.\n\nThe optimization is such that, if any offer asks an amount\nthat is too high, it will be bypassed in favor of more\n\u201creasonable\u201d offers. Since the bidder pays the second highest\nprice, honesty in bidding the full private value is encour-\naged. The distribution of the surplus to losing bidders, which\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n38\n\nexercise deference to the winner, is proportional to the\namount bid, that is, the reported value.\n\nIn a scenario involving a request for information meeting\nspecified criteria, the auction is complicated by the fact that\nthe information resource content is unknown to the recipi-\nent, and therefore the bid is blind, that is, the value of the\ninformation to the recipient is indeterminate. However,\ngame theory supports the communication of a value function\nor utility function, which can then be evaluated at each node\npossessing information to be communicated, to normalize its\nvalue to the requestor. Fortunately, it is a dominant strategy\nin a VCG auction to communicate a truthful value, and\ntherefore broadcasting the private value function, to be\nevaluated by a recipient, is not untenable. In a mere request\nfor information conveyance, such as the intermediate trans-\nport nodes in a multihop network, or in a cellular network\ninfrastructure extension model, the bid may be a true (re-\nsolved) value, since the information content is not the\nsubject of the bidding; rather it is the value of the commu-\nnications per se, and the bidding node can reasonably value\nits bid.\n\nGame theory also allows an allocation of cost between\nvarious recipients of a broadcast or multicast. That is, in\nmany instances, information which is of value to a plurality\nof nodes, and a large set of recipient nodes may efficiently\nreceive the same information. This allocation is a direct\nextension of VCG theory.\n\nOperation of Protocol\n\nThe preferred method for acquiring an estimate of the\nstate of the network is through use of a proactive routing\nprotocol. Thus, in order to determine the network architec-\nture state, each node must broadcast its existence, and, for\nexample, a payload of information including its identity,\nlocation, itinerary (navigation vector) and \u201cinformation\nvalue function\u201d. Typically, the system operates in a continu-\nous set of states, so that it is reasonable to commence the\nprocess with an estimate of the state based on prior infor-\nmation. Using an in-band or out-of-band propagation\nmechanism, this information must propagate to a network\nedge, which may be physically or artificially defined. If all\nnodes operate with a substantially common estimation of\nnetwork topology, only deviations from previously propa-\ngated information need be propagated. On the other hand,\nvarious nodes may have different estimates of the network\nstate, allowing efficiency gains through exploitation of supe-\nrior knowledge as compared with seeking to convey full\nnetwork state information to each node.\n\nA CSMA scheme may be used for the protocol-related\ncommunications because it is relatively simple and robust,\nand well suited for ad hoc communications in lightly loaded\nnetworks. We presume that the network is willing to tolerate\na protocol related inefficiency, and therefore that protocol\ncommunications can occur in a lightly loaded network even\nif the content communications are saturated. An initial node\ntransmits using an adaptive power protocol, to achieve an\neffective transmit range, for example, of greater than an\naverage internodal distance, but not encompassing the entire\nnetwork. This distance therefore promotes propagation to a\nset of nearby nodes, without unnecessarily interfering with\ncommunications of distance nodes and therefore allowing\nthis task to be performed in parallel in different regions.\nNeighboring nodes also transmit in succession, providing\nsequential and complete protocol information propagation\nover a relevance range, for example 3-10 maximum range\nhops.\n\nIf we presume that there is a spatial limit to relevance, for\nexample, 5 miles or 10 hops, then the network state propa-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 34 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n39\n\ngation may be so limited. Extending the network to encom-\npass a large number of nodes will necessarily reduce the\ntractability of the optimization, and incur an overhead which\nmay be inefficient. Each node preferably maintains a local\nestimate of relevance. This consideration is accommodated,\nalong with a desire to prevent exponential growth in proto-\ncol-related data traffic, by receiving an update from all nodes\nwithin a node\u2019s network relevance boundary, and a state\nvariable which represents an estimate of relevant status\nbeyond the arbitrarily defined boundary. The propagation of\nnetwork state may thus conveniently occur over a finite\nnumber of hops, for example 3-10. In a dense population of\nnodes, such as in a city, even a single maximum range\ncommunication may result in a large number of encom-\npassed nodes. On the other hand, in a deserted environment,\nthere may be few or no communications partners, at any\ntime.\n\nUnder conditions of relatively high nodal densities, the\nsystem may employ a zone strategy, that is, proximate\ngroups of nodes are is treated as an entity or cluster for\npurposes of external state estimation, especially with respect\nto distant nodes or zones. In fact, a supernode may be\nnominated within a cluster to control external communica-\ntions for that cluster. Such a presumption is realistic, since\nat extended distances, geographically proximate nodes may\nbe modeled as being similar or inter-related, while at close\ndistances, and particularly within a zone in which all nodes\nare in direct communication, inter-node communications\nmay be subject to mutual interference, and can occur without\nsubstantial external influence. Alternately, it is clear that to\nlimit latencies and communication risks, it may be prudent\nto bypass nearby and neighboring nodes, thus trading\nlatency for power consumption and overall network capac-\nity. Therefore, a hierarchal scheme may be implemented to\ngeographically organize the network at higher analytical\nlevels, and geographic cells may cooperate to appear exter-\nnally as a single coordinated entity.\n\nIn order to estimate a network edge condition, a number\nof presumptions must be made. The effect of an inaccurate\nestimate of the network edge condition typically leads to\ninefficiency, while inordinate efforts to accurately estimate\nthe network edge condition may also lead to inefficiency.\nPerhaps the best way to achieve compromise is to have a set\nof adaptive presumptions or rules, with a reasonable starting\npoint. For example, in a multihop network, one might\narbitrarily set a network edge the maximum range of five\nhops of administrative data using a 95% reliable transmis-\nsion capability. Beyond this range, a set of state estimators\nis provided by each node for its surroundings, which are then\ncommunicated up to five hops (or the maximum range\nrepresented by five hops). This state estimator is at least one\ncycle old, and by the time it is transferred five hops away, it\nis at least six cycles old. Meanwhile, in a market economy,\neach node may respond to perceived opportunities, leading\nto a potential for oscillations if a time-element is not also\ncommunicated. Thus, it is preferred that the network edge\nstate estimators represent a time-prediction of network\nbehavior under various conditions, rather than a simple\nscalar value or instantaneous function.\n\nFor example, each node may estimate a network supply\nfunction and a network demand function, liquidity estimate\nand bid-ask gap for its environment, and its own subjective\nrisk tolerance, if separately reported; the impact of nodes\ncloser than five hops may then be subtracted from this\nestimate to compensate for redundant data. Further, if traffic\nroutes are identifiable, which would correspond in a physical\nsetting of highways, fixed infrastructure access points, etc.,\n\n25\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n40\n\na state estimator for these may be provided as well. As\ndiscussed above, nodes may bid not only for their own needs\nor resources, but also to act as market-makers or merchants,\nand may obtain long term commitments (futures and/or\noptions) and employ risk reduction techniques (insurance\nand/or indemnification), and thus may provide not only an\nestimate of network conditions, but also \u201cguaranty\u201d this\nstate.\n\nAnode seeking to communicate within the five hop range\nneeds to consider the edge state estimate only when calcu-\nlating its own supply and demand functions, bearing in mind\ncompetitive pressures from outside. On the other hand,\nnodes seeking resources outside the five hop range must rely\non the estimate, because a direct measurement or acquisition\nof information would require excess administrative commu-\nnications, and incur an inefficient administrative transaction.\nThus, a degree of trust and reliance on the estimate may\nensue, wherein a node at the arbitrary network edge is\ndesignated as an agent for the principal in procuring or\nselling the resource beyond its own sphere of influence,\nbased on the provided parameters. The incentive for a node\nto provide misinformation is limited, since nodes with too\nhigh a reported estimate value lose gains from competitive\nsale transactions, and indeed may be requested to be buyers,\nand vice versa. While this model may compel trading by\nintermediary nodes, if the information communicated accu-\nrately represents the network state, an economic advantage\nwill accrue to the intermediary participating, especially in a\nnon-power constrained, unlicensed spectrum node configu-\nration.\n\nIt should be borne in mind that the intended administra-\ntion of the communications is an automated process, with\nlittle human involvement, other than setting goals, risk\ntolerance, cost constraints, etc. In a purely virtual economy\nwith temporally declining currency value, the detriment of\ninaccurate optimizations is limited to reduced nodal effi-\nciency, and with appropriate adaptivity, the system can learn\nfrom its \u201cmistakes\u201d. (A defined decline in currency value\ntends to define the cost constraints for that node, since\nwealth cannot be accumulated nor overspent).\n\nA supermnode within a zone may be selected for its superior\ncapability, or perhaps a central location. The zone is defined\nby a communication range of the basic data interface for\ncommunications, with the control channel preferably having\na longer range, for example at least double the normal data\ncommunications range. Communications control channel\ntransmitters operate on a number of channels, for example at\nleast 7, allowing neighboring zones in a hexagonal tiled\narray to communicate simultaneously without interference.\nIn a geographic zone system, alternate zones which would\notherwise be interfering may use an adaptive multiplexing\nscheme to avoid interference. All nodes may listen on all\ncontrol channels, permitting rapid analysis and propagation\nof control information. As discussed elsewhere herein, direc-\ntional antennas of various types may be employed, although\nit is preferred that out-of-band control channels employ\nomnidirectional antennas, having a generally longer range\n(and lower data bandwidth) than the normal data commu-\nnications channels, in order to have a better chance to\ndisseminate the control information to potentially interfering\nsources, and to allow coordination of nodes more globally.\n\nIn order to effectively provide decentralized control,\neither each node must have a common set of information to\nallow execution of an identical control algorithm, or nodes\ndefer to the control signals of other nodes without internal\nanalysis for optimality. A model of semi-decentralized con-\ntrol is also known, in which dispersed supernodes are\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 35 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n41\n\nnominated as master, with other topologically nearby nodes\nremaining as slave nodes. In the pure peer network, rela-\ntively complete information conveyance to each node is\nrequired, imposing a relatively high overhead. In a master-\nslave (or supernode) architecture, increased reliance on a\nsingle node trades-off reliability and robustness (and other\nadvantages of pure peer-to-peer networks) for efficiency. A\nsupernode within a cellular zone may be selected for its\nsuperior capability, or perhaps is at a central location or is\nimmobile.\n\nOnce each control node (node or supernode) has an\nestimate of network topology, the next step is to optimize\nnetwork channels. According to VCG theory, each agent has\nan incentive to broadcast its truthful value or value function\nfor the scarce resource, which in this case, is control over\ncommunications physical layer, and or access to informa-\ntion. This communication can be consolidated with the\nnetwork discovery transmission. Each control node then\nperforms a combinatorial solution to select the optimum\nnetwork configuration from the potentially large number of\npossibilities, which may include issues of transmit power,\ndata rate, path, timing, reliability and risk criteria, economic\nand virtual economic costs, multipath and redundancy, etc.,\nfor the set of simultaneous equations according to VCG\ntheory (or extensions thereof). This solution should be\nconsistent between all nodes, and the effects of inconsistent\nsolutions may be resolved by collision sensing, and possibly\nan error/inconsistency detection and correction algorithm\nspecifically applied to this type of information. Thus, if each\nnode has relatively complete information, or accurate esti-\nmates for incomplete information, then each node can per-\nform the calculation and derive a closely corresponding\nsolution, and verify that solutions reported by others are\nreasonably consistent to allow or promote reliance thereon.\n\nAs part of the network mapping, communications impair-\nment and interference sources are also mapped. GPS assis-\ntance may be particularly useful in this aspect. Where\nnetwork limitations are caused by interfering communica-\ntions, the issue is a determination of a strategy of deference\nor competition. If the interfering communication is continu-\nous or unresponsive, then the only available strategy is\ncompetition. On the other hand, when the competing system\nuses, for example, a CSMA system, such as 802.11, com-\npetition with such a communication simply leads to retrans-\nmission, and therefore ultimately increased network load,\nand a deference strategy may be more optimal, at least and\nuntil it is determined that the competing communication is\nincessant. Other communications protocols, however may\nhave a more or less aggressive strategy. By observation of a\nsystem over time, its strategies may be revealed, and game\ntheory permits composition of an optimal strategy to deal\nwith interference or coexistence. It is noted that this strategy\nmay be adopted adaptively by the entire ad hoc network,\nwhich may coordinate deference or competition as deter-\nmined optimal.\n\nThe optimization process produces a representation of\noptimal network architecture during the succeeding period.\nThat is, value functions representing bids are broadcast, with\nthe system then being permitted to determine an optimal real\nvaluation and distribution of that value. Thus, prior to\ncompletion of the optimization, potentially inconsistent allo-\ncations must be prevented, and each node must communi-\ncate its evaluation of other node\u2019s value functions, so that\nthe optimization is performed on a normalized economic\nbasis. This step may substantially increase the system over-\nhead, and is generally required for completion of the auc-\ntion. This valuation may be inferred, however, for interme-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n42\n\ndiate nodes in a multihop network path, since there is little\nsubjectivity for nodes solely in this role, and the respective\nvalue functions may be persistent. For example, the valua-\ntion applied by a node to forward information is generally\nindependent of content and involved party.\n\nA particular complication of a traffic information system\nis that the nature of the information held by any node is\nprivate to that node (before transmission), and therefore the\nvaluation is not known until after all bids are evaluated.\nThus, prior to completion of optimization, each node must\ncommunicate its evaluation of other nodes\u2019 value functions,\nso that the optimization is performed on an economic basis.\nThis required step substantially increases the system over-\nhead. This valuation may be inferred, however, for transit\nnodes in a multihop network path.\n\nAs discussed above, may of the strategies for making the\neconomic markets more efficient may be employed either\ndirectly, or analogy, to the virtual economy of the ad hoc\nnetwork. The ability of nodes to act as market maker and\nderivative market agents facilitates the optimization, since a\nnode may elect to undertake a responsibility (e.g., transac-\ntion risk), rather than relay to others, and therefore the\ncontrol/administrative channel chain may be truncated at\nthat point. If the network is dense, then a node which acts\nselfishly will be bypassed, and if the network is sparse, the\nnode may well be entitled to gain transactional profit by\nacting as a principal and trader, subject to the fact that profits\nwill generally be suboptimal if pricing is too high or too low.\n\nAfter the network architecture is defined, compensation is\npaid to those nodes providing value or subjected to a burden\n(including foregoing communication opportunity) by those\ngaining a benefit. The payment may be a virtual currency,\nwith no specific true value, and the virtual currency system\nprovides a convenient method to flexibly tax, subsidize, or\ncontrol the system, and thus steer the virtual currency to a\nnormalized extrinsic value. In a real currency system, exter-\nnal controls are more difficult, and may have unintended\nconsequences. A hybrid economy may be provided, linking\nboth the virtual and real currencies, to some degree. This is\nespecially useful if the network itself interfaces with an\noutside economy, such as the cellular telephony infrastruc-\nture (e.g., 2G, 2.5G, 3G, 4G, proposals for 5G, WiFi\n(802.11x) hotspots, WiMax (802.16x), etc.)\n\nUsing the protocol communication system, each node\ntransmits its value function (or change thereof), passes\nthrough communications from neighboring nodes, and may,\nfor example transmit payment information for the immedi-\nate-past bid for incoming communications.\n\nMessages are forwarded outward (avoiding redundant\npropagation back to the source), with messages appended\nfrom the series of nodes. Propagation continues for a finite\nnumber of hops, until the entire community has an estimate\nof the state and value function of each node in the commu-\nnity. Advantageously, the network beyond a respective com-\nmunity may be modeled in simplified form, to provide a\nbetter estimate of the network as a whole. If the propagation\nwere not reasonably limited, the information would be stale\nby the time it is employed, and the system latency would be\ninordinate. Of course, in networks where a large number of\nhops are realistic, the limit may be time, distance, a counter\nor value decrement, or other variable, rather than hops.\nLikewise, the range may be adaptively determined, rather\nthan predetermined, based on some criteria.\n\nAfter propagation, each node evaluates the set of value\nfunctions for its community, with respect to its own infor-\nmation and ability to forward packets. Each node may then\nmake an offer to supply or forward information, based on the\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 36 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n43\n\nprovided information. In the case of multihop communica-\ntions, the offers are propagated to the remainder of the\ncommunity, for the maximum number of hops, including the\noriginating node. At this point, each node has a representa-\ntion of the state of its community, with community edge\nestimates providing consistency for nodes with differing\ncommunity scopes, the valuation function each node assigns\nto control over portions of the network, as well as a resolved\nvaluation of each node for supplying the need. Under these\ncircumstances, each node may then evaluate an optimization\nfor the network architecture, and come to a conclusion\nconsistent with that of other members of its community. If\nsupported, node reputation may be updated based on past\nperformance, and the reputation applied as a factor in the\noptimization and/or externally to the optimization. As dis-\ncussed above, a VCG-type auction is employed as a basis for\noptimization. Since each node receives bid information from\nall other nodes within the maximum node count, the VCG\nauction produces an optimized result.\n\nAs discussed above, by permitting futures, options,\nderivatives, insurance/indemnification/guaranties, long and\nshort sales, etc., the markets may be relatively stabilized as\ncompared to a simple set of independent and sequential\nauctions, which may show increased volatility, oscillations,\nchaotic behavior, and other features which may be ineffi-\ncient.\n\nTransmissions are preferably made in frames, with a\nsingle bidding process controlling multiple frames, for\nexample a multiple of the maximum number of hops.\nTherefore, the bid encompasses a frame\u2019s-worth of control\nover the modalities. In the event that the simultaneous use\nof, or control over, a modality by various nodes is not\ninconsistent, then the value of the respective nodes may be\nsummed, with the resulting allocation based on, for\nexample, a ratio of the respective value functions. As a part\nof the optimization, nodes are rewarded not only for sup-\nporting the communication, but also for deferring their own\nrespective communications needs. As a result, after control-\nling the resources, a node will be relatively less wealthy and\nless able to subsequently control the resources, while other\nnodes will be more able to control the resources. The\ndistribution to deferred nodes also serves to prevent pure\nreciprocal communications, since the proposed mechanism\ndistributes and dilutes the wealth to deferring nodes.\n\nAnother possible transaction between nodes is a loan, that\nis, instead of providing bandwidth per se, one node may loan\na portion of its generator function or accumulated wealth to\nanother node. Presumably, there will be an associated inter-\nest payment. Since the currency in the preferred embodiment\nis itself defined by an algorithm, the loan transaction may\nalso be defined by an algorithm. While this concept is\nsomewhat inconsistent with a virtual currency which\ndeclines in value over time and/or space, it is not completely\ninconsistent, and, in fact, the exchange may arbitrage these\nfactors, especially location-based issues.\n\nBecause each node in the model presented above has\ncomplete information, for a range up to the maximum node\ncount, the wealth of each node can be estimated by its\nneighbors, and payment inferred even if not actually con-\nsummated. (Failure of payment can occur for a number of\nreasons, including both malicious and accidental). Because\neach hop adds significant cost, the fact that nodes beyond the\nmaximum hop distance are essentially incommunicado is\ntypically of little consequence; since it is very unlikely that\na node more than 5 or 10 hops away will be efficiently\ndirectly included in any communication, due to the increas-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n44\n\ning cost with distance, as well as reduction in reliability and\nincrease in latency. Thus, large area and scalable networks\nmay exist.\n\nCommunications are generally of unencrypted data.\nAssuming the network is highly loaded, this may allow a\nnode to incidentally fulfill its data requirements as a\nbystander, and thus at low cost meet its needs, allowing\nnodes with more urgent or directed needs to both control and\ncompensate the network. While this may reduce compensa-\ntion to intermediaries and data sources, the improvements in\nefficiency will likely benefit the network as a whole in\nincrease stability, since we assume that peak load conditions\nwill occur frequently.\n\nEnforcement of responsibility may be provided by a\ncentralized system which assures that the transactions for\neach node are properly cleared, and that non-compliant\nnodes are either excluded from the network or at least\nlabeled. While an automated clearinghouse which periodi-\ncally ensures nodal compliance is preferred, a human dis-\ncretion clearinghouse, for example presented as an arbitrator\nor tribunal, may be employed.\n\nThe Synthetic Economy\n\nExerting external economic influences on the system may\nhave various effects on the optimization, and may exacerbate\ndifferences in subjective valuations. The application of a\nmonetary value to the virtual currency substantially also\nincreases the possibility of misbehavior and external attacks.\nOn the other hand, a virtual currency with no assessed real\nvalue is self-normalizing, while monetization leads to exter-\nnal and generally irrelevant influences as well as possible\nexternal arbitrage (with potential positive and negative\neffects). External economic influences may also lead to\nbenefits, which are discussed in various publications on\nnon-zero sum games.\n\nIn order to provide fairness, the virtual currency (similar\nto the so-called \u201cnuglets\u201d or \u201cnuggets\u201d proposed for use in\nthe Terminodes project) is self-generated at each node\naccording to a schedule, and itself may have a time depen-\ndent value. L. Blazevic, L. Buttyan, S. Capkun, S. Giord-\niano, J.-P. Hubaux, and J.-Y. Le Boudec. Self-organization in\nmobile ad-hoc networks: the approach of terminodes. IEEE\nCommunications Magazine, 39(6):166-174, June 2001; M.\nJakobsson, J. P. Hubaux, and L. Buttyan. A micro-payment\nscheme encouraging collaboration in multi-hop cellular net-\nworks. In Proceedings of Financial Crypto 2003, January\n2003; J. P. Hubaux, et al., \u201cToward Self-Organized Mobile\nAd Hoc Networks: The Terminodes Project\u201d, IEEE Com-\nmunications, 39(1), 2001. citeseer.ist.psu.edu/\nhubaux01]toward.-html; Buttyan, L., and Hubaux, J.-P.\nStimulating Cooperation in Self-Organizing Mobile Ad Hoc\nNetworks. Tech. Rep. DSC/citeseer.ist.psu.edu/\nbuttyan01 stimulating html; Levente Buttyan and Jean-Pierre\nHubaux, \u201cEnforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc\nWANs\u201d, Ist IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc\nNetworking and Computing (MobiHOC citeseerist.psu.edu/\nbuttyan00enforcing-html; L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Nug-\nlets: a virtual currency to stimulate cooperation in self-\norganized ad hoc networks. Technical Report DSC/2001,\nciteseer.ist.psu.edu/article/buttyanOlnuglets html; = Mario\nCagalj, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, and Christian Enz. Minimum-\nenergy broadcast in all-wireless networks: NP-completeness\nand distribution issues. In The Eighth ACM International\nConference on Mobile Computing and Networking (Mobi-\nCom 2002), citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cagaljO2minimumenergy.\nhtml; N. Ben Salem, L. Buttyan, J. P. Hubaux, and Jakob-\nsson M. A charging and rewarding scheme for packet\nforwarding. In Proceedings of MobiHOC, June 2003. For\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 37 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n45\n\nexample, the virtual currency may have a half-life or tem-\nporally declining value. On the other hand, the value may\npeak at a time after generation, which would encourage\ndeference and short term savings, rather than immediate\nspending, and would allow a recipient node to benefit from\nvirtual currency transferred before its peak value. This also\nmeans that long term hoarding of the currency is of little\nvalue, since it will eventually decay in value, while the\nsystem presupposes a nominal rate of spending, which is\nnormalized among nodes. The variation function may also\nbe adaptive, but this poses a synchronization issue for the\nnetwork. An external estimate of node wealth may be used\nto infer counterfeiting, theft and failure to pay debts, and to\nfurther effect remediation.\n\nThe currency is generated and verified in accordance with\nmicropayment theory. Rivest, R. L., A. Shamir, PayWord\nand MicroMint: Two simple micropayment schemes, also\npresented at the RSA \u00b096 conference, http//theory.lcs.\nmit.edu/rivest/RivestShamirmpay.ps, _citeseer.ist.psu.edu/\nrivest96payword.html; Silvio Micali and Ronald Rivest.\nMicropayments revisited. In Bart Preneel, editor, Progress in\nCryptology\u2014CT-RSA 2002, volume 2271 of Lecture Notes\nin Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, Feb. 18-22 2002.\nciteseer.ist.psu.edu/micali02micropayments.html.\n\nMicropayment theory generally encompasses the transfer\nof secure tokens (e.g., cryptographically endorsed informa-\ntion) having presumed value, which are intended for veri-\nfication, if at all, in a non-real time transaction, after the\ntransfer to the recipient. The currency is circulated (until\nexpiration) as a token, and therefore may not be subject to\nimmediate definitive authentication by source. Since these\ntokens may be communicated through an insecure network,\nthe issue of forcing allocation of payment to particular nodes\nmay be dealt with by cryptographic techniques, in particular\npublic key cryptography, in which the currency is placed in\na cryptographic \u201cenvelope\u201d (cryptolope) addressed to the\nintended recipient, e.g., is encrypted with the recipient\u2019s\npublic key, which must be broadcast and used as, or in\nconjunction with, a node identifier. This makes the payment\nunavailable to other than the intended recipient. The issue of\nholding the encrypted token hostage and extorting a portion\nof the value to forward the packet can be dealt with by\ncommunity pressure, that is, any node presenting this (or\nother undesirable) behavior might be ostracized. The like-\nlihood of this type of misbehavior is also diminished by\navoiding monetization of the virtual currency. Further,\nredundant routing of such information may prevent single-\nnode control over such communications.\n\nThis currency generation and allocation mechanism gen-\nerally encourages equal consumption by the various nodes\nover the long term. In order to discourage excess consump-\ntion of bandwidth, an external tax may be imposed on the\nsystem, that is, withdrawing value from the system based on\nusage. Clearly, the effects of such a tax must be carefully\nweighed, since this will also impose an impediment to\nadoption as compared to an untaxed system. On the other\nhand, a similar effect use-disincentive may be obtained by\nrewarding low consumption, for example by allocating an\nadvertising subsidy between nodes, or in reward of defer-\nence. The external tax, if associated with efficiency-promot-\ning regulation, may have a neutral or even beneficial effect.\n\nEach node computes a value function, based on its own\nknowledge state, risk profile and risk tolerance, and wealth,\ndescribing the value to it of additional information, as well\nas its own value for participating in the communications of\nothers. The value function typically includes a past travel\nhistory, future travel itinerary, present location, recent com-\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n46\n\nmunication partners, and an estimator of information\nstrength and weakness with respect to the future itinerary. It\nmay be presumed that each node has a standard complement\nof sensors, and accurately acquired descriptive data for its\npast travel path. Otherwise, a description of the available\ninformation is required. One advantage of a value function\nis that it changes little over time, unless a need is satisfied\nor circumstances change, and therefore may be a persistent\nattribute.\n\nUsing the protocol communication system, each node\ntransmits its value function (or change thereof), passes\nthrough communications from neighboring nodes, and may,\nfor example transmit payment information for the immedi-\nate-past bid for incoming communications.\n\nMessages are forwarded outward (avoiding redundant\npropagation back to the source), with messages appended\nfrom the series of nodes. Propagation continues for a finite\nnumber of hops, until the entire community has an estimate\nof the state and value function of each node in the commu-\nnity. Advantageously, the network beyond a respective com-\nmunity may be modeled in simplified form, to provide a\nbetter estimate of the network as a whole.\n\nAfter propagation, each node evaluates the set of value\nfunctions for its community, with respect to its own infor-\nmation and ability to forward packets. Each node may then\nmake an offer to supply or forward information, based on the\nprovided information. In the case of multihop communica-\ntions, the offers are propagated to the remainder of the\ncommunity, for the maximum number of hops, including the\noriginating node. At this point, each node has a representa-\ntion of the state of its community, with community edge\nestimates providing consistency for nodes with differing\ncommunity scopes, the valuation function each node assigns\nto control over portions of the network, as well as a resolved\nvaluation of each node for supplying the need. Under these\ncircumstances, each node may then evaluate an optimization\nfor the network architecture, and come to a conclusion\nconsistent with that of other members of its community. If\nsupported, node reputation may be updated based on past\nperformance, and the reputation applied as a factor in the\noptimization and/or externally to the optimization. As dis-\ncussed above, a VCG-type auction is employed as a basis for\noptimization. Since each node receives bid information from\nall other nodes within the maximum node count, the VCG\nauction produces an optimized result.\n\nTransmissions are made in frames, with a single bidding\nprocess controlling multiple frames, for example a multiple\nof the maximum number of hops. Therefore, the bid encom-\npasses a frame\u2019s-worth of control over the modalities. In the\nevent that the simultaneous use of, or control over, a\nmodality by various nodes is not inconsistent, then the value\nof the respective nodes may be summed, with the resulting\nallocation based on, for example, a ratio of the respective\nvalue functions. As a part of the optimization, nodes are\nrewarded not only for supporting the communication, but\nalso for deferring their own respective needs. As a result,\nafter controlling the resources, a node will be relatively less\nwealthy and less able to subsequently control the resources,\nwhile other nodes will be more able to control the resources.\nThe distribution to deferred nodes also serves to prevent\npure reciprocal communications, since the proposed mecha-\nnism distributes and dilutes the wealth to deferring nodes.\n\nBecause each node in the model presented above has\ncomplete information, for a range up to the maximum node\ncount, the wealth of each node can be estimated by its\nneighbors, and payment inferred even if not actually con-\nsummated. (Failure of payment can occur for a number of\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 38 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n47\n\nreasons, including both malicious and accidental). Because\neach hop adds significant cost, the fact that nodes beyond the\nmaximum hop distance are essentially incommunicado is\ntypically of little consequence; since it is very unlikely that\na node more than 5 or 10 hops away will be efficiently\nincluded in any communication, due to the increasing cost\nwith distance, as well as reduction in reliability and increase\nin latency. Thus, large area and scalable networks may exist.\n\nTypically, cryptography is employed for both authentica-\ntion and to preserve privacy. External regulation, in a legal\nsense at least, is typically imposed by restrictions on hard-\nware and software design, as well as voluntary compliance\nat risk of detection and legal sanction.\n\nA synthetic economy affords the opportunity to provide\nparticular control over the generator function, which in turn\nsupports a hierarchy. In this scheme, each node controls the\ngenerator function at respectively lower nodes, and thus can\nallocate wealth among subordinates. If one assumes real\ntime communications, then it is clear that the superordinate\nnode can directly place bids on behalf of subordinates, thus\neffectively controlling its entire branch. In the absence of\nreal time communications, the superordinate node must\ndefer to the discretion of the subordinate, subject to reallo-\ncation later if the subordinate defects. If communications are\nimpaired, and a set of a priori instructions are insufficient,\nthen it is up to the subjective response of a node to provide\ndeference.\n\nTt is noted that when sets of nodes \u201cplay favorites\u201d, the\nVCG auction will no longer be considered \u201cstrategyproof\u201d.\nThe result is that bidders will assume bidding strategies that\ndo not express their secret valuation, with the result being\nlikely suboptimal market finding during the auction. This\nfactor can be avoided if hierarchal overrides and group\nbidding play only a small role in the economy, and thus the\nexpected benefits from shaded bidding are outweighed by\nthe normal operation of the system. For example, by taxing\ntransactions, over-valued bidding will be disincentivized,\nand by redistributing economic surplus to bystanders, the\naggregate wealth of the controlling group will be mitigated.\n\nA synthetic economy affords the opportunity to provide\nparticular control over the generator function, which in turn\nprovides particular advantages with respect to a hierarchal\norganization. In this scheme, each node has the ability to\ncontrol the generator function at respectively lower nodes,\nand thus can allocate wealth among subordinates. If one\nassumes real time communications, then it is clear that the\nsuperordinate node can directly place bids on behalf of\nsubordinates, thus effectively controlling its entire branch. In\nthe absence of real time communications, the superordinate\nnode must defer to the discretion of the subordinate, subject\nto reallocation later if the subordinate defects. If communi-\ncations are impaired, and a set of a priori instructions are\ninsufficient, then it is up to the subjective response of a node\nto provide deference. Thus, a node may transfer all or a\nportion of its generator function, either for a limited time or\npermanently, using feed-forward or feedback control. In this\nsense, the hierarchal and financial derivatives, options,\nfutures, loans, etc. embodiments of the invention share a\ncommon theme.\n\nTt is noted that when sets of nodes \u201cplay favorites\u201d, the\nVCG auction will no longer be considered \u201cstrategyproof\u201d.\nThe result is that bidders will assume bidding strategies that\ndo not express their secret valuation, with the result being\nlikely suboptimal market price finding during the auction.\nThis factor can be avoided if hierarchal overrides and group\nbidding play only a small role in the economy, and thus the\nexpected benefits from shaded bidding are outweighed by\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n48\n\nthe normal operation of the system. On the other hand, the\npresent invention potentially promotes competition within\nbranches of a hierarchy, to the extent the hierarchy does not\nprohibit this. Between different branches of a hierarchy,\nthere will generally be full competition, while within com-\nmonly controlled branches of a hierarchy, cooperation will\nbe expected. Since the competitive result is generally more\nefficient, there will be incentive for the hierarchal control to\npermit competition as a default state, asserting control only\nwhere required for the hierarchal purpose.\n\nMilitary Hierarchy\n\nIn a typical auction, each player is treated fairly; that is,\nthe same rules apply to each player, and therefore a single\neconomy describes the process. The fair auction therefore\nposes challenges for an inherently hierarchal set of users,\nsuch as a military organization. In the military, there is\ntypically an expectation that \u201crank has its privileges\u201d. The\nnet result, however, is a decided subjective unfairness to\nlower ranking nodes. In a mobile ad hoc network, a real\nissue is user defection or non-compliance. For example,\nwhere a cost is imposed on a user for participating in the ad\nhoc network, e.g., battery power consumption, if the antici-\npated benefit does not exceed the cost, the user will simply\nturn off the device until actually needed, to conserve battery\npower outside the control of the network. The result of mass\ndefection will of course be the instability and failure of the\nad hoc network itself. Thus, perceived fairness and net\nbenefit is required to important for network success, assum-\ning that defection or non-compliance remain possible.\n\nOn the other hand, in military systems, the assertion of\nrank as a basis for priority is not necessarily perceived as\narbitrary and capricious, and is generally not perceived\nsubjectively as such. Orders and communications from a\ncentral command are critical for the organization itself.\nTherefore, the difficulty in analyzing the application of a fair\ngame to a hierarchal organization is principally a result of\nconceptualizing and aligning the individual incentives with\nthose of the organization as a whole. Since the organization\nexists outside of the ad hoc network, it is generally not\nunrealistic to expect compliance with the hierarchal attri-\nbutes both within and outside of the network.\n\nAn artificial economy provides a basis for an economi-\ncally efficient solution. In this economy, each node has a\ngenerator function for generating economic units which are\nused in a combinatorial auction with other nodes. The\neconomic units may have a declining value, so that wealth\ndoes not accumulate over long periods, and by implication,\nwealth accumulated in one region is not available for\ntransfer in a distant region, since the transfer may be subject\nto latency and/or cost. Even if a low latency system is\nemployed to transfer the value, an express spatially declin-\ning value function may also be imposed. The geographic\ndecline may also be explicit, for example based on a GPS or\nnavigational system. In other cases, nodal motility is valu-\nable, and mobile nodes are to be rewarded over those which\nare stationary. Therefore, the value or a portion thereof, or\nthe generator function, may increase with respect to reloca-\ntions.\n\nThis scheme may be extended to the hierarchal case by\ntreating each chain of command as an economic unit with\nrespect to the generator function. At any level of the hier-\narchy, the commander retains a portion of the wealth gen-\neration capacity, and delegates the remainder to its subor-\ndinates. In the case of real-time communications, a\ncommander may directly control allocation of the generator\nfunction at each time period. Typically, there is no real-time\ncommunications capability, and the wealth generator func-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 39 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n49\n\ntion must be allocated a priori. Likewise, wealth may also be\nreallocated, although a penalty is incurred in the event of an\ninitial misallocation since the transfer itself incurs a cost,\nand there will be an economic competitive distortion, under\nwhich a node\u2019s subjective value of a resource is influenced\nby its subjective wealth. If a node is supplied with wealth\nbeyond its needs, the wealth is wasted, since it declines in\nvalue and cannot be hoarded indefinitely. If a node is\nsupplied with insufficient wealth, economic surplus through\ntransactional gains are lost. Thus, each node must analyze its\nexpected circumstances to retain or delegate the generator\nfunction, and to optimally allocate wealth between compet-\ning subordinates.\n\nIn any transaction, there will be a component which\nrepresents the competitive \u201ccost\u201d, and a possible redistribu-\ntion among nodes within a hierarchal chain. This redistri-\nbution may be of accumulated wealth, or of the generation\nfunction portion. In the former case, if the communication\npath fails, no further transfers are possible, while in the later\ncase, the result is persistent until the transfer function\nallocation is reversed. It is also possible to transfer an\nexpiring or declining portion of the generating function;\nhowever, this might lead a node which is out of range to have\nno ability to rejoin the network upon return, and thus act as\nan impediment to efficient network operation. As discussed\nabove, one possibility is for nodes to borrow or load\ncurrency. In this case, a node deemed credit-worthy may\nblunt the impact of initially having insufficient wealth by\nmerely incurring a transaction cost (including interest, if\napplied).\n\nIn practice, the bulk of the wealth generating function will\nbe widely distributed, and not concentrated at the top of the\nhierarchy. If this is true, under most circumstances, the\nnetwork will appear to operate according to a non-hierarchal\nor fair VCG model, but in some circumstances, normal\noperation may be usurped by nodes which have apparent\nexcess wealth resulting from a superior wealth generator\nfunction. Typically, hierarchically superior nodes will use\ntheir ability to transfer wealth to themselves, or to recruit\nsubordinates to cooperate, in order to directly or indirectly\ncontrol the network resources. It is possible, however, for\nnodes within one branch of a hierarchy to conspire against\nnodes outside that branch, resulting in a different type of\ndistortion. Since the ad hoc network typically gains by\nhaving a larger number of participating nodes, this type of\nbehavior may naturally be discouraged. On the other hand,\nhierarchically superior nodes either retain, or more likely,\ncan quickly recruit surrounding subordinates to allocate their\nwealth generating function and accumulated wealth to pass\nurgent or valuable messages.\n\nWhere expensive assets are employed, an actual transfer\nof wealth or the generator function to a single entity may be\nrequired. For example, a high level node might have access\nto a high power broadcast system, which interferes with\nother communications, or simply incurs a high cost to\noperate. Low level nodes might ordinarily be limited to\ncellular (i.e., short range, low power radio) wireless com-\nmunications. In order for a low level node to control an\nexpensive asset, the assent or cooperation of others may be\nrequired, for example by hierarchal superiors.\n\nSince the network should be stable in the absence of\ncommand and control communications, a hierarchal superior\nshould assure that subordinate nodes possess sufficient\nwealth and motivation to maintain ad hoc network opera-\ntion. Insufficient wealth will tend to eliminate the advantage\nto nodal participation (and therefore encourage defection),\nunless payments from acting as intermediary are significant.\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n60\n\n50\n\nThus, a node with insufficient wealth generation function\nmay potentially exhaust its resources, and be unavailable for\nad hoc intermediary use, even for the benefit of the hierar-\nchy. On the other hand, an initial allocation of too much\nwealth will encourage high spending and less active partici-\npation as an intermediary. While it is possible in a military\nsystem to formulate an \u201cengineered\u201d solution which forces\nparticipation and eliminates defection, this solution does not\ngain the benefit of economic optimization and may have\nlimited application outside of mandatory hierarchies.\n\nCellular Network Extension\n\nCellular Networks provide efficient coverage of large\nportions of the inhabited landmass. On the other hand,\nachieving complete coverage, including relatively uninhab-\nited areas, may be cost inefficient or infeasible. On the other\nhand, there remains significant unmet demand for coverage\nof certain areas.\n\nGenerally, it is likely that a need for service arises within\na few miles from the edge of a cellular network. That is, the\nfixed infrastructure is almost in reach. On the other hand, the\ninfrastructure costs required to fill in gaps or marginally\nextend the network may be inordinately high, for the direct\neconomic benefits achieved. At present, there is no effective\nmeans for remediating these gaps.\n\nOne problem arises in that the present networks generally\nhave a threshold usage plan. All territory encompassed by a\nnetwork is treated as fungible, and incurs the same cost.\nLikewise, usage of partner networks is also treated as\nfungible. Therefore, the incentive to extend network reach\nfor any company is limited to the overall incentive for\ncustomers to defect to different networks, balanced against\nthe increased cost of extending the network. It is in the\ncontext of this economic problem that a solution is proposed.\nQuite simply, in the same areas where the cellular infra-\nstructure is insufficient and there is demand for service, it\nmay be possible to implement a peer-to-peer network or\nmultihop network to extend a cellular network system. In\nfact, if we presume that the coverage is absent, the network\nextension function may make use of the licensed cellular\nspectrum, thus making the ad hoc-cellular transceiver design\nmore efficient, and eliminating extrinsic competing uses for\nthe bandwidth. Likewise, this may be implemented in or as\npart of existing cellular network handsets, using common\nprotocols. On the other hand, different spectrum and/or\nprotocols may be employed, which may be licensed or\nunlicensed.\n\nVarious studies have shown that modeled multihop\nmobile ad hoc network architectures tend to have low\nefficiency in excess of three to five hops. This is due to node\nmobility and the probability of finding an end-to-end con-\nnection, mutual interference and competition for bandwidth\nin shared channel protocols, and the overhead of maintain-\ning useful routing tables. If we take five hops as a reasonable\nmaximum, and each transceiver has a 1000 meter range,\nthen a 5 km maximum range extension is possible. It is\nbelieved that by extending the fringe of cellular networks by\n3-5 km, a significant portion of the unmet demand for\ncellular service will be satisfied.\n\nIf we assume that a significant portion of the mobile nodes\nare power constrained (e.g., battery operated), that is,\nretransmission of packets imposes a power cost, then the\nstability of the mobile ad hoc network and cooperation with\nits requirements will depend on properly incentivizing inter-\nmediary nodes to allocate their resources to the network.\nSince this incentive is provided in a commercial context, that\nis, the cellular service is a commercial enterprise with\nsubstantial cash flow, a real economy with monetary incen-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 40 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n51\n\ntives may be provided. Under such circumstances, it is\nrelatively straightforward to allocate costs and benefits\nbetween the competing interests to achieve consistent and\napparent incentives. On the other hand, the cost of this\nadditional process must be commensurate with the benefits\nprovided, or else the ad hoc network will become unreliable.\n\nWhile the true economics of the costs and value functions\nfor the participants are not defined, some estimates are\navailable. The issue is: are users willing to pay for extended\ncellular reach? If so, do they value the benefits commensu-\nrate with the overall costs, including service fees, hardware,\nand ad hoc cooperative burdens? As such, care must be\nexercised to define competitive compensation or the busi-\nness will be inefficient. Since this extension is driven by the\ncellular network operator, a suitable return on investment is\nmandated.\n\nMany analyses and studies have concluded that voluntary\nad hoc networks are efficient when the incentives to coop-\nerate with the network goals are aligned and sufficient to\nincentivize users accordingly. If the reward for cooperation\nis near optimum, then the network will benefit by increased\ncoverage and reliability, each node will benefit from\nincreased utility, and intermediary nodes will specifically\nbenefit through compensation. Due to the technical possi-\nbility for potential intermediaries to fail to either participate\nin network administration or operation, while taking advan-\ntage of the network as a beneficiary, the promotion of\nnetwork availability as an incentive for cooperation is typi-\ncally itself insufficient incentive to assure cooperation. The\nparticular cost of the limited power resource for potential\nintermediaries makes non-cooperation a particularly impor-\ntant factor. On the other hand, the presumption of power cost\nas a critical factor may be accurate only in some circum-\nstances: In many cases, a cheap power source is available,\nsuch as in a home or office, or in a vehicle, making other\nfactors more important.\n\nTt is noted that, in a cellular telephone system, the rea-\nsonable acts of a user which might undermine the network\nare limited. Clearly, the user can choose a different network\nor provider. The user may turn off his phone or make it\nunavailable. The user may abuse the service contract, taking\nadvantage of promotions or \u201cfree\u201d access to the detriment of\nothers. Notably, the user typically has no reasonable ability\nto reprogram the phone or alter its operation in accordance\nwith the protocol, unless granted this option by the network\noperator. The user cannot reasonably compete or interfere\nwith the licensed spectrum. While older analog cellular\nphones provided the user with an option to install power\namplifiers and vehicle mount antennas, few current users\nemploy these options.\n\nIf one limits the present system to a five hop distance from\nfixed cellular infrastructure (or more accurately, permits the\nsystem to deny service to nodes more than five hops away)\nthen the routing requirements and node complexity may be\nsubstantially simplified. We also presume that each node has\ngeolocation capability, and therefore can provide both its\nlocation and velocity vector. This is reasonable, since the\nFCC E911 mandate provides for geolocation of handsets\nwithin range of the cellular infrastructure, and GPS is a one\nsignificant and readily available option to provide this\nfeature, independent of the cellular infrastructure.\n\nThe ad hoc communications can occur using a licensed or\nunlicensed band. For example, since we presume that nodes\nare beyond range of a fixed cellular tower (except the closest\nnode), the ad hoc network may reuse licensed bandwidth in\nthe uncovered region. The ad hoc communications may also\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n55\n\n52\noccur in unlicensed spectrum, such as the 2.4 GHz ISM\nband, 5.8 GHz ISM band, DSRC band, or 900 MHz band.\n\nIn order to provide optimum compensation, two issues are\nconfronted. First, the total compensation paid; and second,\nthe distribution of payments between the intermediaries. The\nVCG auction is a known means for optimizing a payment\nwhich must be distributed between a number of participants.\nIn this case, each potential intermediary places a \u201cbid\u201d. A\nmulti-factorial optimization is performed to determine the\nlowest cost set which provides sufficient services.\n\nIn a cellular system, each subscriber typically purchases\na number of minute units on a monthly recurring charge\nbasis. Compensation might therefore be based on minutes or\nmoney. Since there is a substantial disincentive to exceed the\nnumber of committed minutes, providing a surplus of min-\nutes may not provide a significant incentive, because the\nuser will rarely exceed the committed amount. Monetary\nincentives, on the other hand, must be coupled to a higher\nmonthly recurring fee, since the proposal would by unprof-\nitable otherwise.\n\nAmore direct scheme provides an economy for multihop\nnetworks somewhat independent from the cellular system\neconomy. That is, nodes that participate as intermediary,\nmay also participate as a principal to the information com-\nmunication, while those who abstain from intermediary\nactivities are denied access to the network extension as a\nprincipal.\n\nWhile, on a theoretical basis, optimization of both price\nand distribution would be considered useful, in a practical\nsystem, it may be useful to make simplifying presumptions\nand simplifications. For example, while a VCG auction may\nprovide an optimal cost and distribution of compensation, in\na commercial network, a degree of certainty may actually\nprove advantageous. For example, a fixed compensation per\nhop or per milliWatt-second may prove both fair and rea-\nsonable.\n\nLikewise, a degree of certainty over cost would be ben-\neficial over an \u201coptimal\u201d cost. On the other hand, fixed cost\nand fixed compensation are inconsistent in a revenue neutral\nsystem. Even if the cellular carrier subsidizes the extension\noperation, there is little rationale for making the usage at the\nfringe insensitive to cost, other than the relief from uncer-\ntainty, which will tend to increase fringe usage, and the\nscope of the subsidy cost.\n\nAs discussed above, there are methods drawn from finan-\ncial models which may also serve to improve certainty and\nreduce perceived risk.\n\nTherefore, it is realistic for a node requesting extension\nservice to apply a value function to define a maximum\npayment for service. The payment is therefore dependent on\nsystem cost, alleviating the requirement for subsidy, but also\ndependent on need.\n\nIn the typical case, the load on the extension network will\nbe low, since if demand were high, the fixed infrastructure\nwould likely be extended to this region. On the other hand,\nthere may be cases where demand is high, and therefore\nthere is some competition for access to the network, leading\nto a need to arbitrate access.\n\nIn general, where economic demand is high, there is a\ntendency to recruit new sources of supply. That is, the\nsystem may operate in two modes. In a first, low demand\nmode, costs are based on a relatively simple algorithm, with\na monetary cap. In a second mode, costs are competitive\n(and in excess of the algorithmic level), with compensation\nalso being competitive. The surplus, in this case, would\ngenerally be allocated to the cellular carrier, since this\nrepresents the commercial profit of the enterprise. The first\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 41 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n53\n\nmode also serves another purpose; under lightly loaded\nconditions, the market may be thin, and therefore pricing\nunstable. Therefore, the imposition of fixed pricing leads to\nreduced pricing risk.\n\nTn the second mode, an intended user specifies his demand\nas a maximum price and demand function, that is, a bid\nbased on, for example, a value of the communication.\nGenerally, this would be set by the user in advance as a static\nvalue or relatively simple function representing the contex-\ntual value of the communication. The actual price may be,\nfor example, the bid price less otherwise attributable dis-\ncount under the first mode based on the maximum number\nof hops, etc. The intermediate nodes set forth their bids in the\nmanner of a VCG auction, with each bid presumably\nexceeding the first mode compensation. The VCG optimi-\nzation may be corrected for quality of service factors and\nanticipated network stability.\n\nIt is noted, as elsewhere herein, that the preferred bidding\nand optimization is performed automatically as a part of the\nprotocol, and not under direct human control and supervi-\nsion. Therefore, the automated processes may be defined to\npromote stability and cooperation by both the device and its\nowner with the network. In other cases, human involvement\nmay be used, although thus will typically be quite inefficient\nand impose transactional expenses (opportunity costs) in\nexcess of the underlying transaction value. The use therefore\nprovides a set of explicit or implicit subjective criteria as a\nbasis for the agent to act accordingly. An intermediary\nchooses its bid for providing packet forwarding services\nbased on a number of factors, such as anticipated power cost,\nopportunity cost, etc.\n\nClearly, the economics of the system are substantially\nunder the control of the cellular carrier, who may offer\n\u201cplans\u201d and \u201cservices\u201d for their customers, thus providing an\nalternative to the usage-based bidding process, at least for\nsome users. The VCG process, however, remains useful for\ncompensating intermediaries.\n\nThe intermediary chooses its bid for providing packet\nforwarding services based on a number of factors, such as\nanticipated power cost, opportunity cost, etc. These bids are\ndetermined automatically, and therefore do not consume\nsubstantial human efforts.\n\nSUMMARY\n\nGame theory is a useful basis for analyzing ad hoc\nnetworks, and understanding the behavior of complex net-\nworks of independent nodes. By presuming a degree of\nchoice and decision-making by nodes, we obtain an analysis\nthat is robust with respect to such considerations. The\nprincipal issues impeding deployment are the inherent com-\nplexity of the system, as well as the overhead required to\ncontinuously optimize the system. Determination of a set of\nsimplifying presumptions to reduce protocol overhead and\nreduce complexity may improve performance. Hierarchal\nconsiderations can be imposed to alter the optimization of\nthe system, which would be expected to provide only a small\nperturbation to the efficient and optimal operation of the\nsystem according to a pure VCG protocol. A marketplace\nauction with competition between potential buyers and\npotential sellers, and with the economic surplus distributed\nbetween parties which must defer to active participants,\nprovides incentive to all affected parties, and therefore may\nprovide a better result than a simple transfer between supply\nand demand elements only.\n\nThe ad hoc network does not exist in a vacuum. There are\nvarious competing interests seeking to use the same band-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n54\n\nwidth, and technological superiority alone does not assure\ndominance and commercial success. Game theory may also\nbe used as a tool to analyze the entities which seek to deploy\nad hoc networks, especially where they compete.\n\nFirst Embodiment\n\nIn a typical auction, each player is treated fairly; that is,\nthe same rules apply to each player, and therefore a single\neconomy describes the process. The fair auction therefore\nposes challenges for an inherently hierarchal set of users,\nsuch as a military organization, where rank is accompanied\nby privilege. The net result, however, is a decided apparent\ndisadvantage to lower ranking agents, at least when viewed\nin light of constricted self-interest. The issues that arise are\nsimilar to the relating to \u201caltruism\u201d, although not identical,\nand thus the game theoretic analysis of altruistic behavior\nmay be imported for consideration, as appropriate.\n\nIn a mobile ad hoc communications network, a real issue\nis user defection or non-compliance. For example, where a\ncost is imposed on a user for participating in the ad hoc\nnetwork, e.g., battery power consumption in a mesh radio\nnetwork, if the anticipated benefit does not exceed the cost,\nthe user will simply turn off or disable the device until\nactually needed. The result of mass defection will, of course,\nbe the instability and failure of the ad hoc network itself,\nleading to decreased utility, even for those who gain an\nunfair or undue advantage under the system. Thus, perceived\nfairness and net benefit is required for network success,\nassuming that defection and/or non-compliance are possible.\n\nOn the other hand, in military systems, the assertion of\nrank as a basis for priority is not itself necessarily arbitrary\nor capricious. Orders and communications from a central\ncommand are critical for the organization itself, and thus the\nlower ranking agents gain at least a peripheral, if not direct\nbenefit as their own chain of command employs their\nresources. Therefore, the difficulty in analyzing the appli-\ncation of a fair game paradigm to a hierarchal organization\nis principally a result of conceptualizing and aligning the\nindividual incentives with those of the organization as a\nwhole and the relationship between branches. Thus, in\ncontradistinction to typical self-organizing peer-to-peer net-\nworks, a hierarchal network is not seen as self-organizing, at\nleast in terms of the hierarchy, which is extrinsic to the\nformation of the communications network under consider-\nation.\n\nAs discussed below, the \u201cdistortions\u201d of the network\nimposed by the external hierarchy can be analyzed and\naccounted for by, for example, the concepts of inheritance\nand delegation. Thus, each branch of a hierarchy tree may be\nconsidered an object, which receives a set of characteristics\nfrom its root, and from which each sub-branch inherits the\ncharacteristics and adds subcharacteristics of, for example,\nspecialization. It is noted that the hierarchy need not follow\nnon-ambiguous or perfect rules, and thus there is no par-\nticular limit imposed that the hierarchy necessarily follow\nthese formalisms. Rather, by analyzing those aspects of the\nhierarchy which comply with these formalisms in accor-\ndance therewith, efficiency is facilitated.\n\nIn establishing an economic system, a preliminary ques-\ntion is whether the system is microeconomic or macroeco-\nnomic; that is, whether the economy is linked to a real\neconomy or insulated from it. One disadvantage of a real\neconomy with respect to a peer relationship is that external\nwealth can override internal dynamics, thus diminishing the\nadvantages to be gained by optimization, and potentially\ncreating a perception of unfairness for externally less\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 42 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n55\n\nwealthy agents, at least unless and until the system accom-\nplishes a wealth redistribution. An artificial economy pro-\nvides a solution for a peer network in which each node has\nan equal opportunity to gain control over the ad hoc net-\nwork, independent of outside influences and constraints. On\nthe other hand, by insulating the network from external\nwealth redistribution, real efficiency gains may be unavail-\nable. Therefore, both types of economies, as well as hybrids,\nare available. Thus, as discussed in more detail below, a\n\u201cfair\u201d initial (or recurring) wealth distribution may be\napplied, which may be supplemented with, and/or provide\nan output of, external wealth. The rules or proportion of\nexternal influence may be predetermined, adaptive, or oth-\nerwise.\n\nTn accordance with the proposed artificial economy, each\nnode has a generator function for generating economic units,\nwhich are then used in a transaction (e.g., an auction) with\nother nodes to create a market economy, that is, each node\nhas a supply and demand function, and acts as a source or\nsink for a limited resource. In some cases, nodes may have\nonly supply or demand functions, or a degree of asymmetry,\nbut in this case, these are typically subject to an external\neconomic consideration, and the artificial economy will be\nless effective in providing appropriate incentives. According\nto one implementation of this embodiment, the artificial\neconomic units have a temporally and/or spatially declining\nvalue, so that wealth does not accumulate over long periods\nand/or cannot be transferred over large distances. The\ndecline may be linear, exponential, or based on some other\nfunction. This creates a set of microeconomies insulated\nfrom each other. Where distant microeconomies must deal\nwith each other, there is a discount. This architecture pro-\nvides a number of advantages, for example, by decreasing\nthe influence of more spatially and temporally distant\neffects, the scope of an optimization analysis may be rela-\ntively constrained, while reducing the amount of informa-\ntion which must be stored over time and/or carried over\ndistance in order to permit an optimization. Likewise, since\nthe economy is artificial, the discount need not be recouped\nwithin the scope of the system; that is, conservation of\ncapital is not required. In the same manner, a somewhat\ndifferent incentive structure may be provided; that is, eco-\nnomic units generated at one location and at one time may\nhave a higher value at a different location and time; this may\nencourage reduced immediate use of the system resources,\nand relocation to higher valued locations. As discussed\nbelow, one embodiment of the invention permits trading of\ncredits, and thus, for example, a user may establish a\nrepeater site at an under-served location to gain credits for\nuse elsewhere. Preferably, beyond a \u201cnear field\u201d effect, the\nvalue does not continue to increase, since this may result in\ninflationary pressures, and undermine the utility of the\nsystem in optimally balancing immediate supply and\ndemand at a particular location.\n\nAs can be seen, through modifications of the governing\nrules and formulae, the system can be incentivized to behave\nin certain ways, but care should be exercised since a too\nnarrow analysis of the incentive might result in unintended\nlong term or distant effects. To the extent that human\nbehavior and subjective analysis is involved, care should\nalso be exercised in applying a rationality assumption, since\nthis is not always true. Rather, there may be applicable\nmodels for human irrational behavior that are better suited to\nan understanding of the network behavior in response to a\nperturbation.\n\nThe typical peer-to-peer ad hoc network may be extended\nto the hierarchal case by treating each branch (including\n\n20\n\n40\n\n45\n\n65\n\n56\n\nsub-branches) within the chain of command as an economic\nunit with respect to the generator function. At any level of\nthe hierarchy, the commander optionally retains a portion of\nthe wealth generation capacity, and delegates the remainder\nto its subordinates. Therefore, the rank and hierarchal con-\nsiderations are translated to an economic wealth (or wealth\ngeneration) distribution. One aspect of this system allows\nwealth transfer or redistribution, although in a real system,\na time delay is imposed, and in the event of a temporally\nand/or spatially declining value, the transfer will impose a\ncost. Thus, an initial misallocation is undesired, and there\nwill be an incentive to optimally distribute the wealth\ninitially. Of course, if centralized control with low penalty is\ndesired, it is possible to limit the penalty, if any, for wealth\nredistribution through appropriate rules, although the time\nfor propagation through the network remains an issue, and\nblind nodes (.e., those which do not have an efficient\ncommunication path, or have insufficient resources to utilize\notherwise available paths through the hierarchy) may also\nlead to limitations on system performance.\n\nIn this system, there may be an economic competitive\ndistortion, under which a node\u2019s subjective value of a\nresource is influenced by its then subjective wealth. If a node\nis supplied with wealth beyond its needs, the wealth is\nwasted, since it may decline in value and cannot be hoarded\nindefinitely. (In a network wealth model in which wealth\ncould be hoarded indefinitely, small deviations from opti-\nmality and arbitrage opportunities may be exploited to create\na perception of unfairness, thus, this is not preferred.) If a\nnode is supplied with insufficient wealth, economic surplus\nthrough transactional gains are lost. Thus, each node must\nanalyze its expected circumstances to retain or delegate the\ngenerator function, and to optimally allocate wealth between\ncompeting subordinates. Likewise, there may be a plurality\nof quasi-optimal states.\n\nIn any economic transaction, there is an amount that a\nseller requires to part with the resource, a price a buyer is\nwilling to pay, and a surplus between them. Typically, in a\ntwo party transaction, the surplus is allocated to the party\ninitiating the transaction, that is, the party initiating the\ntransaction uses some discovery mechanism to find the\nminimum price acceptable by the buyer. In brokered or\nagent-mediated transactions, a portion of the surplus is\nallocated to a facilitator.\n\nIn accordance with one aspect of the present invention,\ncompliance with the community rules, as well as an incen-\ntive to bid or ask a true private value is encouraged by\ndistributing a portion of the transaction surplus to losing\ncompetitive bidders. While according to one proposal, this\nportion is allocated in accordance with their reported valu-\nations, this creates a potential incentive for bidders who\nknow they will not be winning bidders to overbid, and\nthereby gain an increased portion of the surplus. In order to\nreward honest reporting of private values, the reward func-\ntion must penalize both overreporting and underreporting of\nprivate values. This circumstance occurs if, at each bid, there\nis arisk of winning commensurate with the bid, and thus the\nsystem is strategy proof. In order to achieve this circum-\nstance, for example, a statistical noise or probability distri-\nbution may be added to the system, with an acceptance of a\nbid made a statistical process. This results in a \u201cfuzzy\u201d\nboundary on the bid value, although it may impose an\ninefliciency on the market since any deviation from the\noptimal market price represents a loss.\n\nAnother approach to minimizing strategic bidding is to\nimpose a bid fee. That is, each bidder must offer a prepay-\nment corresponding to a small portion of its bid, thereby\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 43 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n57\n\ndisincentivizing bidding to lose. The winning bidder will\nthen pay a second price plus the deposit bid. The sellers will\nreceive their own lowest cost (or second cost) bid. Losing\nbidders will receive a payment in accordance with the value\nof their bid, less the bid deposit. In order to disincentivize\nstrategic bidding, the average return to a bidder is less than\nthe bid cost. In fact, a good target for the bidder deposit is\nthe administrative cost of transacting the bidding negotia-\ntions. This, in turn, provides an incentive to keep the\nadministrative overhead low, thus improving overall system\nperformance, especially where the administrative commu-\nnications compete with normal communications for band-\nwidth. In this circumstance, those bidding to win receive\neither the benefit of the transaction or a payment for defer-\nence, less the transactional fee. Those who are bidding\nstrategically, in manner seeking to acquire the deference\npayment, must risk the transactional cost, and to gain\nsubstantially, must submit a relatively high bid. When the\nbids are \u201ccompetitive\u201d, there is a substantial risk that the bid\nwill be a winning bid, and thus incur the full bid cost. Thus,\nthere is a disincentive to bidding a high value, but without\nan intent to win. Of course, the bid deposit may be a flat fee,\nor subject to a mathematical or adaptive function, rather than\ndirectly related to administrative cost.\n\nThe aggregated bid deposits may, for example, be\nawarded to a class who are optimally incentivized by the\nnature of this payment. For example, it may be awarded to\nthose selling bandwidth, in a manner generally inversely\nproportional to the value of their ask, or, for example, based\non allocations during the combinatorial (VCG) auction. This\npayment would then incentivize sellers to offer services at a\nlow price, improving network availability.\n\nOf course, there may be other classes within the auction\npopulation who may be taxed or subsidized, using value\nderived from the auction process.\n\nIn a strategyless auction, automated bidding is quite\nfeasible, since the optimal bid is the computed value. For\nauctions in which a bidder does not have an incentive to bid\nits true private value, and thus must assume a strategic play,\nautomated bidding becomes more of a challenge, but may\nalso be automated.\n\nIn a strategy-less auction, a bidder cannot gain by bidding\nover or under its private value. If a bidder bids below its\nprivate value, it has a reduced chance of gaining the benefit\nof the transaction.\n\nIn an auction which is subject to strategic bidding, the\nstrategy may be mitigated by imposing commensurate risks\nand costs to balance the perceived advantage toward zero.\n\nIn particular, the competitive bidders seeking to allocate\na scarce resource for themselves receive compensation for\ndeferring to the winning bidder in an amount commensurate\nwith their reported value. Thus, sellers receive their mini-\nmum acceptable value, buyers pay their maximum valua-\ntion, the surplus is distributed to the community in a manner\ntending to promote the highest bids within the private value\nof the bidder. In a corresponding manner, the auction rules\ncan be established to incentivized sellers to ask the mini-\nmum possible amount, above their reserve. For example, a\nportion of the surplus may be allocated to bidders in accor-\ndance with how close they come to the winning ask.\nTherefore, both incentives may be applied, for example with\nthe surplus split in two, and half allocated to the bidder pool\nand half allocated to the seller pool. Clearly, other alloca-\ntions or proportionations are possible.\n\nThe winning bidder and/or seller may be included within\nthe rebate pool. This is particularly advantageous where for\nvarious reasons, the winning bidder is not selected. Thus,\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n58\n\nthis process potentially decouples the bidding (auction)\nprocess and the resulting commercial transaction.\n\nBecause of transactional inefficiencies, human behavioral\naspects, and a desire to avoid increased network overhead by\n\u201cfalse\u201d bidders seeking a share of the allocation pool without\nintending to win the auction, it may be useful to limit the\nallocation of the surplus pool to a subset of the bidders\nand/or sellers, for example the top three of one or both. This\ntherefore encourages bidders and/or sellers to seek to be in\nthe limited group splitting the pool, and thus incentives\nhigher bids and lower asks. Of course, a party will have a\nmuch stronger incentive to avoid bidding outside its valu-\nation bounds, so the risk of this type of inefficiency is small.\n\nAs discussed above, one embodiment of the invention\nprovides a possible redistribution or wealth among nodes\nwithin a hierarchal chain. This redistribution may be of\naccumulated wealth, or of the generation function portion.\nTrading among hierarchically related parties is preferred,\nsince the perceived cost is low, and the wealth can be\nrepeatedly redistributed. In fact, it is because of the possi-\nbility of wealth oscillation and teaming that the declining\nwealth function is preferred, since this will tend to defeat\nclosely related party control over the network for extended\nperiods.\n\nIt is noted that, in a multihop mobile ad hoc network, if\na communication path fails, no further transfers are possible,\npotentially resulting in stalled or corrupt system configura-\ntion. It is possible to transfer an expiring or declining portion\nof the generating function; however, this might lead a node\nwhich is out of range to have no ability to rejoin the network\nupon return, and thus act as an impediment to efficient\nnetwork operation. Therefore, it is preferred that, in an\nartificial economy, each node has some intrinsic wealth\ngenerator function, so an extended period of inactivity, a\nnode gains wealth likely sufficient to rejoin the network as\na full participant.\n\nIn practice, in a typical military-type hierarchy, the bulk\nof the wealth generating function will be distributed to the\nlowest ranks with the highest numbers. Thus, under normal\ncircumstances, the network will appear to operate according\nto anon-hierarchal (i.e., peer) model, with the distortion that\nnot all nodes have a common generator function. On the\nother hand, hierarchically superior nodes either retain, or\nmore likely, can quickly recruit surrounding subordinates to\nallocate their wealth generating function and accumulated\nwealth to pass urgent or valuable messages. Thus, if 85% of\nthe wealth and network resources are distributed to the\nlowest-ranking members, then the maximum distortion due\nto hierarchal modifications is 15%.\n\nOne way that this allocation of wealth may be apparent is\nwith respect to the use of expensive assets. Thus, a high level\nnode might have access to a high power broadcast system or\nlicensed spectrum, while low level nodes might ordinarily\nbe limited to lower power transmission and/or unlicensed\nspectrum or cellular wireless communications. For a low\nlevel node to generate a broadcast using an expensive asset\n(or to allocate a massive amount of space*bandwidth prod-\nuct), it must pass the request up through the chain of\ncommand, until sufficient wealth (i.e., authority) is available\nto implement the broadcast.\n\nIn fact, such communications and authorizations are quite\nconsistent with the expectations within a hierarchal organi-\nzation, and this construct is likely to be accepted within a\nmilitary-type hierarchal organization.\n\nUnder normal circumstances, a superior would have an\nincentive to assure that each subordinate node possesses\nsufficient wealth to carry out its function and be incentivized\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 44 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n59\n\nto participate in the network. Ifa subordinate has insufficient\ninitial wealth (or wealth generating function) allocation, it\nmay still participate, but it must expend its internal resources\nto obtain wealth for participation toward its own benefit.\nThis, in turn, leads to a potential exhaustion of resources,\nand the unavailability of the node for ad hoc intermediary\nuse, even for the benefit of the hierarchy. An initial surplus\nallocation will lead to overbidding for resources, and thus\ninefficient resource allocation, potential waste of allocation,\nand a disincentive to act as an intermediary in the ad hoc\nnetwork. While in a traditional military hierarchy, coopera-\ntion can be mandated, in systems where cooperation is\nperceived as contrary to the net personal interests of the\nactor, network stability may be poor, and defection in spite\nof mandate.\n\nIn a military system, it is thus possible to formulate an\n\u201cengineered\u201d solution which forces participation and elimi-\nnates defection; however, it is clear that such solutions\nforfeit the potential gains of optimality, and incentivizes\ncircumvention and non-compliance. Further, because such a\nsystem is not \u201ccost sensitive\u201d (however the appropriate cost\nfunction might be expressed), it fails to respond to \u201cmarket\u201d\nforces.\n\nAccordingly, a peer to peer mobile ad hoc network\nsuitable for respecting hierarchal organization structures is\nprovided. In this hierarchal system, the hierarchy is repre-\nsented by an initial wealth or wealth generation function\ndistribution, and the hierarchally higher nodes can reallocate\nwealth of nodes beneath themselves, exercising their higher\nauthority. This wealth redistribution can be overt or covert,\nand if overt, the hierarchal orders can be imposed without\nnodal assent. In a covert redistribution, trust may be required\nto assure redistribution by a node to a grandchild node.\n\nThe wealth and its distribution can be implemented using\nmodified micropayment techniques and other verifiable\ncryptographic techniques. This wealth can be applied to\nauctions and markets, to allocate resources. Various aspects\nof this system are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this\nspecification.\n\nIn accordance with aspects of this embodiment, an\nexample is provided. In this scenario, a vehicle traveling\nalong a highway seeks traffic information 10-20 miles ahead\non the road. The transceiver in the vehicle has a range of\nabout 0.5 miles, meaning that, assuming maximum hop\nrange, 20-40 hope would be necessary in each direction in\norder to fulfill a response to a request for information. If we\nfurther assume that the traffic density allows an average\ndensity of compatible transceivers of 1 per 0.05 miles\u201d, then\nit would appear that for each hop, a number of intermedi-\naries would be possible. We further assume that each vehicle\nhas a pair of antennas (which may operate on different\nfrequencies), forward and backward looking, so that forward\n\nAnd backward communications are non-interfering. It is\nnoted that, in operation, it is not a single vehicle that seeks\ninformation responding to a request; rather, it is likely that\n2-25% of vehicles will seek information within a short\nperiod, especially of the cost of fulfilling a request is\nrelatively low. We also assume that there is no common\ntrigger event, such as an accident, which would provoke\nessentially all vehicles to request the same information, a\ncircumstances that could be addressed through a multicast or\nbroadcast.\n\nIf the vehicle sought to arrange a communication over the\nentire 10-20 miles in advance of communicating, this would\nrequire a multifactoral optimization likely involving over\n100 transceivers, and if even one of the 20-40 intermediates\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n60\n\nfails, the entire communication fails. The administrative\noverhead for this process may not outweigh its advantages.\n\nOn the other hand, if we instead presume that the vehicle\nonly optimize a path over a limited range or number of hops,\ne.g., 1 mile or 5 hops, then the optimization is facilitated and\nthe administrative overhead reduced. On the other hand, this\nrequires that vehicles or nodes at the fringe arrange for\ncompletion of the communication. It is here that the statis-\ntical aspects of the network architecture may be exploited to\nachieve efficiencies. Thus, in observing or participating in\nthe network activities over a period of time, a node can\nmodel the behavior of nearby nodes, and determine a degree\nof risk with respect to the model. That node may then\nundertake the risk associated with its assessment of its\nenvironment, and communicate an offer to act as agent for\ncompletion of the communication, without explicitly com-\nmunicating the details of the communication. Therefore, the\noriginating node optimizes a local region ad hoc network,\nand then adopts an estimate of the network state beyond the\nedge of the local region.\n\nEconomically, the vehicle seeking the information broad-\ncasts a bid or value function of its valuation of the resources\nit requires. This bid is propagated to the local region or\nbeyond, and compared with the bids or value functions of\nother vehicles or nodes. A winning vehicle or node then\nassumes control over the minimum temporal-spatial-fre-\nquency channel required. As stated above, at the edge of the\nlocal region, nodes may act as proxies or agents, and\nundertake the risk of the more distant communication,\nadding a risk premium to their ask. The node with the lowest\nask is selected as the agent or proxy. It is noted that the role\nof communication intermediary and proxy or agent is dis-\ncrete, and therefore need not be a single element, though\ncertain efficiencies are gained if this is the case. The agent\nor proxy must also conduct an auction for the next stage of\nthe communication, in a process which is repeated until the\ndestination node is included within the local region.\n\nThe proxy or agent undertakes the risk of the cost of the\ndownstream communications, as well as the risk of non-\npayment, and thus may well charge a substantial premium\nover its actual risk-free cost. Therefore, the efficiency gained\nthrough the use of the agent or proxy derives from the\nadministrative efficiencies gained, as well as comprehension\nthat the risks are inherent, and must generally be undertaken\nby some element of the network. The incrementally added\nrisks may be small, but are transferred. A node which\npromotes itself for acting as agent or proxy may do so\nbecause it has lower risks, costs or otherwise unproductive\nassets. For example, a cellular telephone carrier may choose\nto participate in the network, using its fixed infrastructure as\na backup, or bypass. In that case, if the network fails, or is\nless efficient, it has the option of using its own facilities.\n\nThe agent or proxy therefore arbitrages the risk, based on\nits own knowledge of its local region which is different from\nthe local region of the originator of the communication.\nThere may be less competition for the role of arbitrageur,\nallowing it to claim a larger portion of the economic surplus.\nIn fact, an arbitrageur may pre-acquire resources at a defined\nprice, and resell them later at a profit. Thus, it is seen that\neconomic efficiencies and increased profits for intermediar-\nies are not inconsistent, where opportunities for reduction in\ninefficiencies exist.\n\nAdding hierarchal element to this example, it is noted that\ncertain risks are reduced when transactions are conducted\nbetween related entities. For example, if their respective\nwealth is interlinked, over the long term, the risk of non-\npayment is abated. Likewise, the risk of defection or non-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 45 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n61\n\ncompliance is reduced. Further, since it is presumed that the\nbenefit function of related nodes is intertwined, actual costs\nmay be reduced, since the communication itself is a coun-\ntervailing benefit to the cost of a related node conveying the\nmessage or packet. Thus, there will likely be a preference for\ncommunications between more closely related nodes than\nbetween more distantly related or unrelated nodes. On the\nother hand, since wealth (virtual or real) itself is desirable,\nand inter-party transactions limit wealth gain opportunities,\nthere will also be an incentive to conduct transactions with\nunrelated nodes for full value. As discussed above, in a\nhierarchy, a top level node is initially allocated the entire\nwealth and/or wealth generation function for its subordi-\nnates, which is then redistributed as appropriate or desired.\nThe top level node will generally not maintain more wealth\nthan required, since this is inefficient, and redistributions\nincur their own inefficiencies.\n\nThe economy is preferably virtual, employing arbitrary\nvalue credits generated using a cryptographic function. One\npossible exception is where external elements, such as\ncellular telephone carriers, are integrated into the system.\nSince these are real economy agents, there must be some\ninterchange in value between credits and cash, unless the\ncellular carrier gains a benefit from the ad hoc network. One\nsuch possible benefit is extension of its fixed infrastructure\nto serve under-covered areas. Another possible benefit is the\nability to provide information from the ad hoc network to\nmore remote areas. A further benefit is the ability to use\nunlicensed spectrum for its activities in a standard and\nnon-interfering manner.\n\nIn the virtual economy, each node has a physically and/or\nlogically secure cryptographic module, which sequentially\ngenerates values which have a unique index number, and\nmay be verified as to node and time of origin, and possibly\nchain of owners. A node receiving this value can therefore\nverify that it is authentic, its time of creation (and therefore\namortization schedule), and as an audit trail, the chain of\nownership. Each bid is also cryptographically secure and\nsigned, so that if a node places a bid, and later fails to pay,\na later investigation can be conducted to correctly account\nfor the transaction, and possibly penalize wrongdoing. The\npayments for a communication are communicated after the\ntransaction, in a cryptographic wrapper (cryptolope) des-\ntined for a target node. Since these are secure, the opportu-\nnity for theft is low, and there is little incentive for inten-\ntional delay of transmission by any intermediate. Further,\nthese packets may be transmitted along redundant paths, to\nlimit the ability of any one node to disrupt communications.\n\nThe ability of a node to spend the same value packet twice\nis limited by a number of factors. First, since each node has\na defined generator function, if its spending exceeds its\ngeneration capacity, this will be apparent to nearby nodes.\nSecond, since each packet has an index value, the other\nnodes may compare these values to make sure that they are\nnot used more than once by any node, before they are\ntransferred to another node. Since the value of the credit\ndeclines in value over time, indefinite period monitoring is\nnot required.\n\nIn some instances, saving value may be an eflicient\nstrategy. In order to take advantage of these gains, special\nbank nodes may be established which have the ability to\nhoard credits and then reissue new credits when required.\nTypically, there will be no interest, and in fact there may be\ndiscount and delay. The net result of promoting savings will\ntypically be a reduction in demand with respect to supply,\nthus increasing availability of resources. By allowing with-\ndrawal of savings, periods of inflation and high peak demand\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n55\n\n62\n\nis possible. Further, if the withdrawn wealth has the same\namortization schedule as newly generated credits, an event\nwhich provokes a \u201crun on the bank\u201d may result in a rapid\ndiminution of saved wealth, unless the immediate recipients\nbank the newly transferred wealth.\n\nAs is seen, many of the economic institutions of the real\neconomy have equivalents in the virtual economy, and\ntherefore may be employed in their traditional and known\nroles to improve efficiency where the self-organizing fea-\ntures of the network alone incur corresponding inefficien-\ncies, thus creating opportunities. Where necessary, links to a\nreal economy, in order to pay for capital investment, efforts,\nor compensate for risks, may be employed, however it is\npreferred that these links be attenuated in order to isolate the\nbulk of the ad hoc network from the influence of real-\neconomy node wealth, and therefore to promote defection of\nthose nodes who are disadvantaged thereby.\n\nSecond Embodiment\n\nMultihop Ad Hoc Networks require cooperation of nodes\nwhich are relatively disinterested in the content being con-\nveyed. Typically, such disinterested intermediaries incur a\ncost for participation, for example, power consumption or\nopportunity cost. Economic incentives may be used to\npromote cooperation of disinterested intermediaries. An\neconomic optimization may be achieved using a market\nprice-finding process, such as an auction. In many scenarios,\nthe desire for the fairness of an auction is tempered by other\nconcerns, i.e., there are constraints on the optimization\nwhich influence price and parties of a transaction. For\nexample, in military communication systems, rank may be\ndeemed an important factor in access to, and control over,\nthe communications medium. A simple process of rank-\nbased preemption, without regard for subjective or objective\nimportance, will result in an inefficient economic distortion.\nIn order to normalize the application of rank, one is pre-\nsented with two options: imposing a normalization scheme\nwith respect to rank to create a unified economy, or consid-\nering rank using a set of rules outside of the economy. One\nway to normalize rank, and the implicit hierarchy underlying\nthe rank, is by treating the economy as an object-oriented\nhierarchy, in which each individual inherits or is allocated a\nsubset of the rights of a parent, with peers within the\nhierarchy operating in a purely economic manner. The\nextrinsic consideration of rank, outside of an economy, can\nbe denominated \u201crespect\u201d, which corresponds to the societal\ntreatment of the issue, rather than normalizing this factor\nwithin the economy, in order to avoid unintended secondary\neconomic distortion. Each system has its merits and limita-\ntions.\n\nAn economic optimization is one involving a transaction\nin which all benefits and detriments can be expressed in\nnormalized terms, and therefore by balancing all factors,\nincluding supply and demand, at a price, an optimum is\nachieved. Auctions are well known means to achieve an\neconomic optimization between distinct interests, to transfer\na good or right in exchange for a market price. While there\nare different types of auctions, each having their limitations\nand attributes, as a class these are well accepted as a means\nfor transfer of goods or rights at an optimum price. Where\nmultiple goods or rights are required in a sufficient combi-\nnation to achieve a requirement, a so-called Vickrey-Clarke-\nGroves (VCG) auction may be employed. In such an auc-\ntion, each supplier asserts a desired price for his component.\nThe various combinations which meet the requirement are\nthen compared, and the lowest cost combination selected. In\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 46 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n63\n\na combinatorial supply auction, a plurality of buyers each\nseek a divisible commodity, and each bids its best price. The\nbidders with the combination of prices which is maximum is\nselected. In a commodity market, there are a plurality of\nbuyers and sellers, so the auction is more complex. In a\nmarket economy, the redistribution of goods or services are\ntypically transferred between those who value them least to\nthose who value them most. The transaction price depends\non the balance between supply and demand; with the surplus\nbeing allocated to the limiting factor.\n\nThird Embodiment\n\nA third embodiment of the invention, described below,\nrepresents a system which may employ a self-organizing\nnetwork to convey information between mobile nodes. It is\nexpressly understood that the concepts set forth above in the\nfirst and second embodiments are directly applicable, and\neach aspect of the third embodiment may be extended using\nthe hierarchal principles and modifications, in a consistent\nmanner, to achieve the advantages described herein. That is,\nwhile the third embodiment generally describes peer nodes,\nthe extension of the systems and methods to non-peer nodes\nis specifically envisioned and encompassed.\n\nThis patent builds upon and extends aspects of U.S. Pat.\nNo. 6,252,544 (Hoffberg), Jun. 26, 2001, and U.S. Pat. No.\n6,429,812, Aug. 6, 2002, which are expressly incorporated\nherein by reference in its entirety. See, also, U.S. Pat. No.\n6,397,141 (Binnig, May 28, 2002, Method and device for\nsignaling local traffic delays), expressly incorporated herein\nby reference, which relates to a method and an apparatus for\nsignaling local traffic disturbances wherein a decentralized\ncommunication between vehicles, which is performed by\nexchanging their respective vehicle data. Through repeated\nevaluation of these individual vehicle data, each reference\nvehicle may determine a group of vehicles having relevance\nfor itself from within a maximum group of vehicles and\ncompare the group behavior of the relevant group with its\nown behavior. The results of this comparison are indicated\nin the reference vehicle, whereby a homogeneous flow of\ntraffic may be generated, and the occurrence of accidents is\nreduced.\n\nOne aspect of the invention provides a communications\nsystem, method and infrastructure. According to one pre-\nferred embodiment, an ad hoc, self organizing, cellular radio\nsystem (sometimes known as a \u201cmesh network\u2019) is pro-\nvided. Advantageously, high gain antennas are employed,\npreferably electronically steerable or phased array antennas,\nto provide efficient communications and to increase spatial\ncommunications bandwidth, both between nodes and for the\nsystem comprising a plurality of nodes communicating with\neach other. See, U.S. Pat. No. 6,507,739 (Gross, et al., Jan.\n14, 2003), expressly incorporated herein by reference.\n\nIn general, time-critical, e.g., voice communications\nrequire tight routing to control communications latency. On\nthe other hand, non-time critical communications generally\nare afforded more leeway in terms of communications\npathways, including a number of \u201chops\u201d, retransmission\nlatency, and out-of-order packet communication tolerance,\nbetween the source and destination or fixed infrastructure,\nand quality of communication pathway. Further, it is pos-\nsible to establish redundant pathways, especially where\ncommunications bandwidth is available, multiple paths pos-\nsible, and no single available path meets the entire commu-\nnications requirements or preferences.\n\nTechnologies for determining a position of a mobile\ndevice are also well known. Most popular are radio trian-\n\n5\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n64\n\ngulation techniques, including artificial satellite and terres-\ntrial transmitters or receivers, dead reckoning and inertial\ntechniques. Advantageously, a satellite-based or augmented\nsatellite system, although other suitable geolocation systems\nare applicable.\n\nNavigation systems are also well known. These systems\ngenerally combine a position sensing technology with a\ngeographic information system (GIS), e.g., a mapping data-\nbase, to assist navigation functions. Systems which integrate\nGPS, GLONASS, LORAN or other positioning systems into\nvehicular guidance systems are well known, and indeed\nnavigational purposes were prime motivators for the cre-\nation of these systems.\n\nEnvironmental sensors are well known. For example,\nsensing technologies for temperature, weather, object prox-\nimity, location and identification, vehicular traffic and the\nlike are well developed. In particular, known systems for\nanalyzing vehicular traffic patterns include both stationary\nand mobile sensors, and networks thereof. Most often, such\nnetworks provide a stationary or centralized system for\nanalyzing traffic information, which is then broadcast to\nvehicles.\n\nEncryption technologies are well known and highly\ndeveloped. These are generally classified as being symmet-\nric key, for example the Data Encryption Standard (DES),\nand the more recent Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),\nin which the same key is used for encryption as decryption,\nand asymmetric key cryptography, in which different and\ncomplementary keys are used to encrypt and decrypt, in\nwhich the former and the latter are not derivable from each\nother (or one from the other) and therefore can be used for\nauthentication and digital signatures. The use of asymmetric\nkeys allows a so-called public key infrastructure, in which\none of the keys is published, to allow communications to be\ndirected to a possessor of a complementary key, and/or the\nidentity of the sender of a message to be verified. Typical\nasymmetric encryption systems include the Rivest-Shamir-\nAdelman algorithm (RSA), the Diffie-Hellman algorithm\n(DH), elliptic curve encryption algorithms, and the so-called\nPretty Good Privacy (PGP) algorithm.\n\nOne embodiment of the invention provides a system that\nanalyzes both a risk and an associated reliability. Another\nembodiment of the invention communicates the risk and\nassociated reliability in a manner for efficient human com-\nprehension, especially in a distracting environment. See,\nUS. Pat. Nos. 6,201,493; 5,977,884; 6,118,403; 5,982,325;\n5,485,161; WO0077539, each of which is expressly incor-\nporated herein by reference, and the Uniden GPSRD (see\nUniden GPSRD User\u2019s Manual, expressly incorporated\nherein by reference). See, also U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,650,770;\n5,450,329; 5,504,482; 5,504,491; 5,539,645; 5,929,753;\n5,983,161; 6,084,510; 6,255,942; 6,225,901; 5,959,529;\n5,752,976; 5,748,103; 5,720,770; 6,005,517; 5,805,055;\n6,147,598; 5,687,215; 5,838,237; 6,044,257; 6,144,336;\n6,285,867; 6,340,928; 6,356,822; 6,353,679 each of which\nis expressly incorporated herein by reference.\n\nAccording to this embodiment, a vehicle equipped with\nsensors, or acting as a probe, acquires information from its\nsurroundings, and communicates them to other vehicles,\neither directly or through a number of hops. By advanta-\ngeously employing advanced radio and communication\ntechnologies, efficient and reliable transfer video data over\nunlicensed spectrum may be supported, even multiple real-\ntime streams over potentially conflicting channels.\n\nStatistical Analysis\n\nIt is understood that the below analysis and analytical\ntools, as well as those known in the art, may be used\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 47 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n65\n\nindividually, in sub-combination, or in appropriate combi-\nnation, to achieve the goals of the invention. These tech-\nniques may be implemented in dedicated or reprogram-\nmable/general purpose hardware, and may be employed for\nlow level processing of signals, such as in digital signal\nprocessors, within an operating system or dynamic linked\nlibraries, or within application software. Likewise, these\ntechniques may be applicable, for example, to low level data\nprocessing, system-level data processing, or user interface\ndata processing.\n\nA risk and reliability communication system may be\nuseful, for example, to allow a user to evaluate a set of\nevents in statistical context. Most indicators present data by\nmeans of a logical indicator or magnitude, as a single value.\nScientific displays may provide a two-dimensional display\nof a distribution, but these typically require significant user\nfocus to comprehend, especially where a multimodal distri-\nbution is represented. Typically, the human visual input can\nbest accommodate a three dimensional color input repre-\nsenting a set of bounded objects which change partially over\ntime, and it is ergonomically difficult to present more\ndegrees of freedom of information simultaneously. That is,\nthe spatial image is not arbitrary, but represents bounded\nobjects (or possibly fuzzy edges), and the sequence over\ntime should provide transitions. User displays of a magni-\ntude or binary value typically do not provide any informa-\ntion about a likelihood of error. Thus, while a recent positive\nwarning of the existence of an event may be a reliable\nindicator of the actual existence of the event, the failure to\nwarn of an event does not necessarily mean that the event\ndoes not exist. Further, as events age, their reliability often\ndecreases.\n\nThe present invention therefore seeks to provide addi-\ntional information which may be of use in decision-making,\nincluding a reliability of the information presented, and/or\nrisk associated with that information, if true. These types of\ninformation are typically distinct from the objects them-\nselves. In order to present these additional degrees of\nfreedom of information within the confines of efficient\nhuman cognition, a new paradigm is provided. Essentially,\nthe objects presented (which may be, for example, identifiers\nof events), are mapped or ranked by a joint function of risk\nand reliability. Typically, the joint function will adopt eco-\nnomic theory to provide a normalized cost function. Of\ncourse, the risk and reliability need not be jointly consid-\nered, and these may remain independent considerations for\nmapping purposes. Because of human subjective perception\nof risk and reliability, it may be useful to tune the economic\nnormalized cost function for subjective considerations,\nalthough in other instances, an objective evaluation is appro-\npriate and efficient.\n\nIn analyzing a complex data set for both time and space\npatterns, wavelets may be useful. While the discrete wavelet\ntransform (DWT), an analogy of the discrete Fourier trans-\nform (DFT) may be employed, it is perhaps more general to\napply arbitrary wavelet functions to the data set, and adopt-\ning mathematical efficiencies as these present themselves,\nrather than mandating that an efficient and predefined trans-\nform necessarily be employed.\n\nSee references listed in Transforms Appendix, each of\nwhich is expressly incorporated herein by reference.\n\nOne embodiment of the present invention thus advances\nthe art by explicitly communicating reliability or risk infor-\nmation to the user. Therefore, in addition to communicating\nan event or predicted event, the system also computes or\ndetermines a reliability of the information and outputs this\ninformation. The reliability referred to herein generally is\n\n10\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n66\n\nunavailable to the original detection device, though such\ndevice may generate its own reliability information for a\nsensor reading.\n\nTherefore, one user interface embodiment according to\nthis embodiment is improved by outputting information\nrelating to both the event and a reliability or risk with respect\nto that information.\n\nAccording to a preferred embodiment of the invention, a\nvehicle travel information system is provided, for example\nintegrated with a vehicular navigation system. In a symmet-\nric peer-to-peer model, each vehicle includes both environ-\nmental event sensors and a user interface, but the present\ninvention is not dependent on both aspects being present in\na device. As the vehicle travels, and as time advances, its\ncontext sphere is altered. For any context sphere, certain\nevents or sensed conditions will be most relevant. These\nmost relevant events or sensed, to the extent known by the\nsystem, are then output through a user interface. However,\noften, the nature or existence of relevant or potentially\nrelevant event is unreliable, or reliance thereon entails risk.\n\nIn the case of a vehicle traveling along a roadway, there\nare two particular risks to analyze: first, that the recorded\nevent may not exist (false positive), and second, that an\nabsence of indication of an event is in error (false negative).\nFor example, the degree of risk may be indicated by an\nindication of color (e.g., red, yellow green) or magnitude\n(e.g., a bar graph or dial).\n\nIn many cases, the degree of risk is calculable, and thus\nmay be readily available. For example, if the event sensor is\na detection of police radar, reliability may be inferred from\na time since last recording of an event. If a car is traveling\nalong a highway, and receives a warning of traffic enforce-\nment radar from a car one mile ahead, there is a high degree\nof certainty that the traffic enforcement radar will actually\nexist as the vehicle proceeds along the highway. Further, if\nthe traffic radar is in fixed location, there is a high degree of\ncertainty that there is no traffic enforcement radar closer than\none mile. On the other hand, if a warning of traflic radar at\na given location is two hours old, then the risk of reliance on\nthis information is high, and the warning should be deemed\ngeneral and advisory of the nature of risks in the region.\nPreferably, as such a warning ages, the temporal proximity\nof the warning is spread from its original focus.\n\nOn the contrary, if the warning relates to a pothole in a\ncertain lane on the highway, the temporal range of risk is\nmuch broader: even a week later, the reliability of the\ncontinued existence at that location remains high. However,\nover the course of a year, the reliability wanes. On the other\nhand, while there may be a risk of other potholes nearby, the\nparticular detected pothole would not normally move.\n\nThe algorithm may also be more complex. For example,\nif a traffic accident occurs at a particular location, there are\ngenerally acceptable predictions of the effect of the accident\non road traffic for many hours thereafter. These include\nrubbernecking, migrations of the traffic pattern, and second-\nary accidents. These considerations may be programmed,\nand the set of events and datapoints used to predict spatial\nand temporal effects, as well as the reliability of the exis-\ntence of such effects. This, in turn, may be used to advise a\ntraveler to take a certain route to a destination.\n\nEventually, the reliability of the information is inferred to\nbe so low as to cause an expiration of the event, although\npreferably a statistical database is maintained to indicate\ngeographic regional issues broadly.\n\nTherefore, the system and method according to the pres-\nent invention provides an output that can be considered \u201ctwo\ndimensional\u201d (or higher dimensional); the nature of the\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 48 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n67\n\nwarning, and the reliability of the warning. In conjunction,\nthe system may therefore output a reliability of an absence\nof warning. In order to conserve communications band-\nwidth, it is preferred that an absence of warning is inferred\nfrom the existence of a communications channel with a\ncounterpart, along with a failure of a detection of an event\ntriggering a warning. Alternately, such communications may\nbe explicit.\n\nThe present invention can provide a mobile warning\nsystem having a user interface for conveying an event\nwarning and an associated reliability or risk of reliance on\nthe warning.\n\nPreferably, the reliability or risk of reliance is assessed\nbased on a time between original sensing and proximity. The\nreliability may also be based on the nature of the event or\nsensed condition. An intrinsic reliability of the original\nsensed event or condition may also be relayed, as distinct\nfrom the reliability or risk of reliance assuming the event or\ncondition to have been accurately sensed.\n\nIn order to determine risk, often statistical and probabi-\nlistic techniques may be used. Alternately, non-linear tech-\nniques, such as neural networks, may be employed. In\nemploying a probabilistic scheme, a sensor reading at time\nzero, and the associated intrinsic probability of error are\nstored. A model is associated with the sensor reading to\ndetermine a decay pattern. Thus, in the case of traflic\nenforcement radar, the half-life for a \u201cradar trap\u201d for K band\nradar being fixed in one location is, for example, about 5\nminutes. Thereafter, the enforcement officer may give a\nticket, and proceed up the road. Thus, for times less than\nthree minutes, the probability of the traffic enforcement\nradar remaining in fixed position is high. For this same\ntime-period, the probability that the trafic enforcement\nofficer has moved up the road against the direction of traflic\nflow is low. A car following 3 miles behind a reliable sensor\nat 60 mph would therefore have a highly reliable indication\nof prospective conditions. As the time increases, so does the\nrisk; a car following ten miles behind a sensor would only\nhave a general warning of hazards, and a general indication\nof the lack thereof. However, over time, a general (and\npossibly diurnal or other cyclic time-sensitive variation) risk\nof travel within a region may be established, to provide a\nbaseline.\n\nIt is noted that the risks are not limited to traffic enforce-\nment radar or laser. Rather, the scheme according to the\npresent invention is generalized to all sorts of risks. For\nexample, a sensor may detect or predict sun glare. In this\ncase, a model would be quite accurate for determining\nchanges over time, and assuming a reliable model is\nemployed, this condition could generally be accurately\npredicted.\n\nAnother example is road flooding. This may be detected,\nfor example, through the use of optical sensors, tire drag\nsensors, \u201csplash\u201d sensors, or other known sensors. In this\ncase, the relevant time-constant for onset and decay will be\nvariable, although for a given location, the dynamics may be\nmodeled with some accuracy, based on sensed actual con-\nditions, regional rainfall, ground saturation, and particular\nstorm pattern. Therefore, a puddle or hydroplaning risk may\nbe communicated to the driver in terms of location, likely\nmagnitude, and confidence.\n\nTt is noted that these three independent parameters need\nnot all be conveyed to the user. For example, the geographic\nproximity to an event location may be used to trigger an\noutput. Therefore, no independent output of location may be\nnecessary in this case. In some cases, the magnitude of the\nthreat is relevant, in other cases it is not. In many present\n\n10\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n68\n\nsystems (e.g., radar detection), threat magnitude is used as a\nsurrogate for risk. However, it is well understood that there\nare high magnitude artifacts, and low magnitude true threats,\nand thus this paradigm has limited basis for use. The use of\nrisk or confidence as an independent factor may be express\nor intermediate. Thus, a confidence threshold may be inter-\nnally applied before communicating an event to the user. In\ndetermining or predicting risk or confidence, it may be\npreferred to provide a central database. Therefore, generally\nmore complex models may be employed, supported by a\nricher data set derived from many measurements over an\nextended period of time. The central database may either\ndirectly perform the necessary computations, or convey an\nappropriate model, preferably limited to the context (e.g.,\ngeography, time, general environmental conditions), for\nlocal calculation of risk.\n\nThe incorporated references relate, for example, to meth-\nods and apparatus which may be used as part of, or in\nconjunction with the present invention. Therefore, it is\nunderstood that the present invention may integrate other\nsystems, or be integrated in other systems, having comple-\nmentary, synergistic or related in some way. For example,\ncommon sensors, antennas, processors, memory, communi-\ncations hardware, subsystems and the like may provide a\nbasis for combination, even if the functions are separate.\n\nThe techniques according to the present invention may be\napplied to other circumstances. Therefore, it is understood\nthat the present invention has, as an object to provide a user\ninterface harnessing the power of statistical methods. There-\nfore, it is seen that, as an aspect of the present invention, a\nuser interface, a method of providing a user interface,\ncomputer software for generating a human-computer inter-\nface, and a system providing such a user interface, presents\na prediction of a state as well as an indication of a statistical\nreliability of the prediction.\n\nWithin a vehicular environment, the statistical analysis\naccording to the present invention may also be used to\nimprove performance and the user interface of other sys-\ntems. In particular, modern vehicles have a number of\nindicators and warnings. In most known systems, warnings\nare provided at pre-established thresholds. According to the\npresent invention, a risk analysis may be performed on\nsensor and other data to provide further information for the\nuser, e.g., an indication of the reliability of the sensor data,\nor the reliability under the circumstances of the sensor data\nas basis for decision. (For example, a temperature sensor\nalone does not indicate whether an engine is operating\nnormally.)\n\nFourth Embodiment\n\nThe present example provides a mobile telecommunica-\ntions device having a position detector, which may be\nabsolute, relative, hybrid, or other type, and preferably a\ncommunications device for communicating information,\ntypically location relevant information. The device may\nserve as a transmitter, transmitting information relevant to\nthe location (or prior locations) of the device, a receiver,\nreceiving information relevant to the location (or prospec-\ntive location) of the device, or a composite.\n\nIn the case of a transmitter device or stand-alone device,\na sensor is provided to determine a condition of or about the\ndevice or its context. This sensor may populate a map or\nmapping system with historical map data.\n\nDuring use, a receiving device seeks to output location\ncontext-relevant information to the user, and therefore in this\nembodiment includes a human user interface. Typically, in a\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 49 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n69\n\nvehicle having a general linear or highly constrained type\npath, a position output is not a critical feature, and may be\nsuppressed in order to simplify the interface. On the other\nhand, there are a number of navigation system user inter-\nfaces suitable for this application, which may be employed\nas necessary.\n\nA relative position output, however, may be more appro-\npriate, indicating a relative position (distance, time, etc.)\nwith respect to a potential contextually relevant position. In\naddition, especially in systems where a plurality of different\ntypes of sensors or sensed parameters are available, the\nnature of the relevant context is also output. Further, as a\nparticular feature of the present invention, a risk or reliabil-\nity assessment is indicated to the user. This risk or reliability\nassessment is preferably statistically derived, although it\nmay be derived through other known means, for example\nBoolean analysis, fuzzy logic, or neural networks.\n\nIn this case, risk indicates a parameter of an event, if it\noccurs, relating to a cost or impairment. Reliability relates to\nthe probability that the event will occur, separate from the\nrisk incurred if it did occur. While it is often possible to\nproduct a composite parameter resulting from a reduction in\na perceived cost of the risk based on its reliability or\nprobability of occurrence, this composite eliminates useful\nor critical information.\n\nFor example, the device may provide weather information\nto the user. Through one or more of meteorological data\nfrom standard reporting infrastructure (e.g., NOAA, Accu-\nweather\u00ae, etc.), mobile reporting nodes (e.g., mobiles\ndevices having weather sensors), satellite data, and other\nweather data sources, a local weather map is created, pref-\nerably limited to contextual relevance. In most cases, this\nweather map is stored locally; however, if the quality of\nservice for a communications link may be assured, a remote\ndatabase system serving one or more devices may be pro-\nvided. For example, a cellular data communications system\nmay be used to communicate with the Internet or a service\nprovider.\n\nThe mobile unit, in operation, determines its position,\nand, though explicit user input and/or inferential analysis,\ndetermines the itinerary or expected path of the device and\ntime sequence. The device (or associated systems) then\ndetermines the available weather information for the route\nand anticipated itinerary (which may itself be dependent on\nthe weather information and/or reaction thereto). This avail-\nable information is then modeled, for example using a\nstatistical model as described hereinabove, to predict the\nforthcoming weather conditions for the device or transport-\ning vehicle.\n\nThe device then determines the anticipated conditions and\nrelevance sorts them. In this case, both positive and negative\ninformation may be useful, ic., a warming about bad\nweather, ice, freezing road surfaces, fog, sand-storms, rain,\nsnow, sleet, hail, sun glare, etc., and an indication of dry,\nwarm, well-illuminated road surfaces may both be useful\ninformation.\n\nTn addition, through the analysis, a number of presump-\ntions and predictions are made, for example using a Markov\nchain. Therefore, while the system may predict a most likely\nstate of affairs, this alone does not provide sufficient infor-\nmation for full reliance thereon. For example, the present\nroad surface freezing conditions thirty miles ahead on a road\nmay be a poor indicator of the road conditions when the\ndevice is at that position. In addition to changes in the\nweather, human action may be taken, such as road salt, sand,\ntraffic, etc., which would alter the conditions, especially in\nresponse to a warning. On the other hand, a report of\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n70\n\nfreezing road conditions one mile ahead would generally\nhave high predictive value for the actual road conditions\nwhen the device is at that location, assuming that the vehicle\nis traveling in that direction. In each case, the risk is similar,\nbut the reliability is different; a composite indication would\npossibly reduce the 30 mile warning below a noise thresh-\nold, even though it may be anticipated that this event would\nproduce substantial traffic and residual delays, even of the\nevent abated before the vehicle approached the respective\nzone of interest.\n\nIn many cases, there is too much raw information to\neffectively display to the user all relevant factors in making\na reliability or risk determination. Thus, the device outputs\na composite estimation of the reliability or risk, which may\nbe a numeric or nonparametric value. This is output in\nconjunction with the nature of the alert and its contextual\nproximity. Likewise, a threshold function may be applied to\nsquelch notifications of events with low probability, or of\nlow risk, or both.\n\nAs stated above, there will generally be a plurality of\nevents, each with an associated risk and/or reliability and\nrespective location. The relevance of an event may be\npredicted based on the dynamics of the vehicle in which the\ndevice is transported and the nature of the event. Thus, if the\nvehicle requires 170 feet to stop from a speed of 60 MPH,\na warning which might trigger a panic stop should be issued\nbetween 170-500 feet in advance. If the warning is triggered\ncloser than 170 feet, preferably the warning indicates that\nthe evasive maneuver will be necessary, rather than a panic\nstop. If the warning is given too far in advance, the trigger-\ning event may not even exist as the vehicle approaches,\nleading to a false alert. In that case, it is better to present an\nadvisory rather than an action item.\n\nIn this case, the indication is dependent on a number of\nfactors. First, there is the reliability of the data upon which\nthe warning is based. Second, there is the reliability of the\npredictive model which extrapolates from, the time the raw\ndata is acquired to the conjunction of the device and the\nlocation of the event. Third, there is an assessment of the\nrelative risks of, responding to a false positive versus failing\nto respond to a false negative. Other risks may also be\nincluded in the analysis. Together, the composite risk is\noutput, for example as a color indicator. Using, for example,\na tricolor (red-green-blue) light emitting diode (LED) or\nbicolor LED (red-green), a range of colors may be presented\nto the user. Likewise, in an audio alert, the loudness or\nharmonic composition (e.g., harmonic distortion) of a tone\nor alert signal may indicate the risk or reliability. (In the case\nof loudness, preferably a microphone measures ambient\nnoise to determine a minimum loudness necessary to indi-\ncate an alert).\n\nThe position detector is preferably a GPS or combined\nGPS-GLONASS receiver, although a network position\ndetection system (e.g., Enhanced 911 type system) may also\nbe employed. Preferably, the position detector typically\nachieves an accuracy of +10 meters, and preferably provides\nredundant sensors, e.g., GPS and inertial sensors, in case of\nfailure or error of one of the systems. However, for such\npurposes as pothole reporting, positional accuracies of 1 to\n3 meters are preferred. These may be obtained through a\ncombination of techniques, and therefore the inherent accu-\nracy of any one technique need not meet the overall system\nrequirement.\n\nThe position detector may also be linked to a mapping\nand/or navigation system and possibly a dead reckoning\nsystem, in order to pinpoint a position with a geographic\nlandmark. Thus, while precise absolute coordinate measure-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 50 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n71\n\nments of position may be used, it may also be possible to\nobtain useful data at reduced cost by applying certain\npresumptions to available data. In an automotive system,\nsteering angle, compass direction, and wheel revolution\ninformation may be available, thereby giving a rough indi-\ncation of position from a known starting point. When this\ninformation is applied to a mapping system, a relatively\nprecise position may be estimated. Therefore, the required\nprecision of another positioning system used in conjunction\nneed not be high, in order to provide high reliability position\ninformation. For example, where it is desired to map pot-\nholes, positional accuracy of 10 cm may be desired, far more\nprecise than might be available from a normal GPS receiver\nmounted in a moving automobile. Systems having such\naccuracy may then be used as part of an automated repair\nsystem. However, when combined with other data, location\nand identification of such events is possible. Further, while\nthe system may include or tolerate inaccuracies, it is gen-\nerally desired that the system have high precision, as com-\npensation for inaccuracies may be applied.\n\nA typical implementation of the device provides a\nmemory for storing events and respective locations. Prefer-\nably, further information is also stored, such as a time of the\nevent, its character or nature, and other quantitative or\nqualitative aspects of the information or its source and/or\nconditions of acquisition. This memory may be a solid state\nmemory or module (e.g., Flash memory), rotating magnetic\nand/or optical memory devices, or other known types of\nmemory.\n\nThe events to be stored may be detected locally, such as\nthrough a detector for radar and/or laser emission source,\nradio scanner, traffic or road conditions (mechanical vehicle\nsensors, visual and/or infrared imaging, radar or LIDAR\nanalysis, acoustic sensors, or the like), places of interest\nwhich may be selectively identified, itinerary stops, and/or\nfixed locations. The events may also be provided by a remote\ntransmitter, with no local event detection. Therefore, while\nmeans for identifying events having associated locations is\na part of the system as a whole, such means need not be\nincluded in every apparatus embodying the invention.\n\nRadar detectors typically are employed to detect operating\nemitters of X (10.5 GHz), K (25 GHz) and Ka (35 GHz)\nradar emissions from traflic control devices or law enforce-\nment personnel for detecting vehicle speed by the Doppler\neffect. These systems typically operate as superheterodyne\nreceivers which sweep one or more bands, and detect a wave\nhaving an energy significantly above background. As such,\nthese types of devices are subject to numerous sources of\ninterference, accidental, intentional, and incidental. A\nknown system, Safety Warning System (SWS) licensed by\nSafety Warning System L.C., Englewood Fla., makes use of\nsuch radar detectors to specifically warn motorists of iden-\ntified road hazards. In this case, one of a set of particular\nsignals is modulated within a radar band by a transmitter\noperated near the roadway. The receiver decodes the trans-\nmission and warns the driver of the hazard.\n\nLIDAR devices emit an infrared laser signal, which is\nthen reflected off a moving vehicle and analyzed for delay,\nwhich relates to distance. Through successive measure-\nments, a sped can be calculated. A LIDAR detector therefore\nseeks to detect the characteristic pulsatile infrared energy.\n\nPolice radios employ certain restricted frequencies, and in\nsome cases, police vehicles continuously transmit a signal.\nWhile certain laws restrict interception of messages sent on\npolice bands, it is believed that the mere detection and\nlocalization of a carrier wave is not and may not be legally\n\n20\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n72\n\nrestricted. These radios tend to operate below 800 MHz, and\nthus a receiver may employ standard radio technologies.\n\nPotholes and other road obstructions and defects have two\ncharacteristics. First, they adversely affect vehicles which\nencounter them. Second, they often cause a secondary effect\nof motorists seeking to avoid a direct encounter or damage,\nby slowing or executing an evasive maneuver. These\nobstructions may therefore be detected in three ways; first,\nby analyzing the suspension of the vehicle for unusual\nshocks indicative of such vents; second, by analyzing speed\nand steering patterns of the subject vehicle and possibly\nsurrounding vehicles; and third, by a visual, ultrasonic, or\nother direct sensor for detecting the pothole or other obstruc-\ntion. Such direct sensors are known; however, their effec-\ntiveness is limited, and therefore an advance mapping of\nsuch potholes and other road obstructions greatly facilitates\navoiding vehicle damage and executing unsafe or emer-\ngency evasive maneuvers. An advance mapping may also be\nuseful in remediation of such road hazards, as well.\n\nTraffic jams occur for a variety of reasons. Typically, the\nroad carries traffic above a threshold, and for some reason\nthe normal traffic flow patterns are disrupted. Therefore,\nthere is a dramatic slowdown in the average vehicle speed,\nand a reduced throughput. Because of the reduced through-\nput, even after the cause of the disruption has abated, the\nroadways may take minutes to hours to return to normal.\nTherefore, it is typically desired to have advance warnings\nof disruptions, which include accidents, icing, rain, sun\nglare, lane closures, road debris, police action, exits and\nentrances, and the like, in order to allow the driver to avoid\nthe involved region or plan accordingly. Abnormal traffic\npatterns may be detected by comparing a vehicle speed to\nthe speed limit or a historical average speed, by a visual\nevaluation of traffic conditions, or by broadcast road advi-\nsories. High traflic conditions are associated with braking of\ntraffic, which in turn results in deceleration and the illumi-\nnation of brake lights. Brake lights may be determined by\nboth the specific level of illumination and the center brake\nlight, which is not normally illuminated. Deceleration may\nbe detected by an optical, radar or LIDAR sensor for\ndetecting the speed and/or acceleration state of nearby\nvehicles.\n\nWhile a preferred embodiment of the present invention\nemploys one or more sensors, broadcast advisories, includ-\ning those from systems according to or compatible with the\npresent invention, provide a valuable source of information\nrelating to road conditions and information of interest at a\nparticular location. Therefore, the sensors need not form a\npart of the core system. Further, some or all of the required\nsensors may be integrated with the vehicle electronics\n(\u201cvetronics\u201d), and therefore the sensors may be provided\nseparately or as options. It is therefore an aspect of an\nembodiment of the invention to integrate the transceiver, and\nevent database into a vetronics system, preferably using a\ndigital vetronics data bus to communicate with existing\nsystems, such as speed sensors, antilock brake sensors,\ncruise control, automatic traction system, suspension,\nengine, transmission, and other vehicle systems.\n\nAccording to one aspect of the invention, an adaptive\ncruise control system is provided which, in at least one mode\nof operation, seeks to optimize various factors of vehicle\noperation, such as fuel efficiency, acceleration, comfort, tire\nwear, etc. For example, an automatic acceleration feature is\nprovided which determines and/or implements a most fuel-\nefficient acceleration for a vehicle, for example by control-\nling throttle and transmission. Too slow an acceleration will\nresult in increased time at suboptimal gear ratios, while too\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 51 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n73\n\nfast acceleration will waste considerable fuel. In addition, it\nis sometimes more efficient to vary operating speed than to\nmaintain a constant speed, even if time is considered a cost\nfactor. Actual operating efficiency may be measured during\nvehicle use, allowing an accurate prediction of fuel effi-\nciency under dynamically changing conditions, such as\nacceleration. Vehicle sensors may assist in making a deter-\nmination that optimum acceleration is safe; objects both in\nfront and behind the vehicle may be sensed. If an object is\nin front of the vehicle, and the closing speed would predict\na collision, then the acceleration is decreased, or even brakes\napplied. If an object is rapidly advancing from the rear, the\nacceleration may be increased in order to avoid impact or\nreduce speed differential. See, U.S. Pat. No. 6,445,308\n(Koike, Sep. 3, 2002, Positional data utilizing inter-vehicle\ncommunication method and traveling control apparatus),\nUSS. Pat. No. 6,436,005 (Bellinger, Aug. 20, 2002, System\nfor controlling drivetrain components to achieve fuel efli-\nciency goals), U.S. Pat. No. 6,418,367 (Toukura, et al., Jul.\n9, 2002, Engine transmission control system), expressly\nincorporated herein by reference.\n\nLikewise, the operation of a vehicle may be optimized\napproaching a stop, such as a stop sign, red light, or the like.\nIn this case, the system optimization may be more complex.\nIn addition to fuel economy, wear on brakes, engine (espe-\ncially if engine drag braking is employed), transmission,\ntires, suspension, time, accident-related risks, and the like,\nmay also be included. In the case of a stop sign, the issue\nalso arises with respect to a so-called \u201crolling stop\u201d. Such a\npractice provides that the vehicle does not actually stop, but\nreaches a sufficiently low speed that the driver could stop if\nrequired by circumstances. While this practice is technically\nconsidered a traffic violation, in many instances, it is both\nefficient and useful. For example, a stop line is often located\nbehind an intersection, with impaired visibility. Thus, the\nvehicle might come to a complete stop, begin to accelerate,\nand then find that the intersection is not clear, and be forced\nto stop again. One particular reason for a rolling stop is the\nstorage of energy in the vehicular suspension during accel-\neration and deceleration. As the vehicle comes to a stop, the\nsprings and shock absorbers of the suspension undergo a\ndamped oscillation, which is relatively comfortable, and\ndestabilizes the vehicle and its contents. To the extent that a\nrolling stop is safe, efficient and illegal, a change in law is\nadvocate\n\nAccording to one aspect of the present invention, the\ndriver may locate a deceleration target and/or a target speed.\nThe vehicle navigation system may assist, recording an\nexact location of a stop line, geographic (hills, curves, lane\nmarker locations, etc.), weather conditions (ice, sand,\npuddles, etc.) and other circumstances surrounding the\nvehicle. Other vehicles and obstructions or pedestrians, etc.\nmay also be identified and modeled. Using models of the\nvarious components, as well as cost functions associated\nwith each, as well as subjective factors, which may include\nvehicle occupant time-cost and comfort functions, an opti-\nmal acceleration or deceleration profile may be calculated.\nThe system may therefore express control over throttle,\nbrakes, transmission shifts, clutch, valve timing, suspension\ncontrols, etc., in order to optimize vehicle performance. Of\ncourse, a fail-safe and dead-man override would generally\nbe provided to ensure that the vehicle operator endorses the\nautomated control operation.\n\nSee US patent Nos. (expressly incorporated herein by\nreference): U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,503,170; 6,470,265; 6,445,308;\n6,292,743; 6,292,736; 6,233,520; 6,230,098; 6,220,986;\n6,202,022; 6,199,001; 6,182,000; 6,178,377; 6,174,262;\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n74\n6,098,016; 6,092,014; 6,092,005; 6,091,956; 6,070,118;\n6,061,003; 6,052,645; 6,034,626; 6,014,605; 5,990,825;\n5,983,154; 5,938,707; 5,931,890; 5,924,406; 5,835,881;\n5,774,073; 6,442,473; 4,704,610; 5,712,632; 5,973,616; and\n6,008,741.\n\nThe radio used for the communications subsystem can be\nradio frequency AM, FM, spread spectrum, microwave, light\n(infrared, visible, UV) or laser or maser beam (millimeter\nwave, infrared, visible), or for short distance communica-\ntions, acoustic or other communications may be employed.\nThe system preferably employs an intelligent transportation\nsystem (ITS) or Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM)\nallocated band, such as the 915 MHz, 2.4 MHz, 5.8 GHz or\nDSRC band. (The 2.350-2.450 GHz band corresponds to the\nemission of microwave ovens, and thus the band suffers\nfrom potentially significant interference). The 24.125 GHz\nband, corresponding to K-band police radar, may also be\navailable; however, transmit power in this band is restricted,\ne.g., less than about 9 mW. The signal may be transmitted\nthrough free space or in paths including fiber optics, wave-\nguides, cables or the like. The communication may be short\nor medium range omnidirectional, line of sight, reflected\n(optical, radio frequency, retroreflector designs), satellite,\nsecure or non-secure, or other modes of communications\nbetween two points, that the application or state-of-the-art\nmay allow. The particular communications methodology is\nnot critical to the invention, although a preferred embodi-\nment employs a spread spectrum microwave transmission.\n\nAparticularly preferred communications scheme employs\nsteerable high gain antennas, for example a phased array or\nmechanically steered directional antenna, which allows a\nhigher spatial reuse of communications bands and higher\nsignal to noise ratio that an omnidirectional antenna.\n\nA number of Dedicated Short Range Communications\n(DSRC) systems have been proposed or implemented in\norder to provide communications between vehicles and\nroadside systems. These DSRC systems traditionally operate\nin the 900 MHz band for toll collection, while the FCC has\nrecently made available 75 MHz in the 5.850-5.925 GHz\nrange for such purposes, on a co-primary basis with micro-\nwave communications, satellite uplinks, government radar,\nand other uses. However, spectrum is also available in the\nso-called U-NII band, which encompasses 5.15-5.25 GHz\n(indoors, 50 mW) and 5.25-5.35 (outdoors, 250 mW). A\nJapanese ITS (\u201cETC\u201d) proposal provides a 5.8 GHz full\nduplex interrogation system with a half duplex transponder,\noperating at about 1 megabit per second transmission rates.\n\nIn August 2001, the DSRC standards committee (ASTM\n17.51) selected 802.11a as the underlying radio technology\nfor DSRC applications within the 5.850 to 5.925 GHz band.\nThe IEEE 802.11a standard was modified, in a new standard\nreferred to as 802.11a R/A (roadside applications) to meet\nDSRC deployment requirements, and includes OFDM\nmodulation with a lower data rate, 27 MBS for DSRC\ninstead of 54 MBS for 802.11a.\n\nProposed DSRC applications include:\n\nEmergency Vehicle Warning\u2014Currently, emergency\nvehicles only have sirens and lights to notify of their\napproach. With DSRC, the emergency vehicle can have the\ntraffic system change traffic lights to clear traffic along its\nintended route. Also, this route information can be broadcast\nto other cars to provide user/vehicle specific directions to\nreduce collisions.\n\nTraffic congestion data can be exchanged between\nvehicles. On-coming traffic exchanges information on traffic\nstatus ahead so that vehicle navigation systems can dynami-\ncally provide the best route to a destination.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 52 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n75\n\nAn industry standard interoperable tolling platform could\nexpand the use of toll systems or processing payments at\nparking lots, drive-through establishments (food, gas), etc.\n\nSafety applications could benefit from use of DSRC. The\nDSRC automaker consortium (DaimlerChrysler, GM, Ford,\nToyota, Nissan, & VW) are seeking ways to enhance pas-\nsenger safety with DSRC communications. For example, in\na typical collision, a car has only 10 milliseconds to tighten\nseatbelts, deploy airbags, etc. If an additional advance\nwarning of 5 milliseconds was provided, one could tighten\nseatbelts, warm-up the airbags, etc. to prepare the car for\ncollision. Using radar, GPS data, etc. a car can determine\nthat a collision is imminent, and it can then notify the car\nabout to be hit to prepare for collision.\n\nIt is noted that the present technology has the capability\nfor streamlining transportation systems, by communicating\ntraffic conditions almost immediately and quickly allowing\ndecisions to be made by drivers to minimize congestion and\navoid unnecessary slowdowns. A particular result of the\nimplementation of this technology will be a reduction in\nvehicular air pollution, as a result of reduced traffic jams and\nother inefficient driving patterns. To further the environmen-\ntal protection aspect of the invention, integration of the\ndatabase with cruise control and driver information systems\nmay reduce inefficient vehicle speed fluctuations, by com-\nmunicating to the driver or controlling the vehicle at an\nefficient speed. As a part of this system, therefore, adaptive\nspeed limits and intelligent traffic flow control devices may\nbe provided. For example, there is no need for fixed time\ntraffic lights if the intersection is monitored for actual traffic\nconditions. By providing intervehicle communications and\nidentification, such an intelligent system is easier to imple-\nment. Likewise, static speed limits may be eliminated in\nfavor of a system which employs intelligence to optimize the\ntraffic flow patterns based on actual existing conditions and\nsafe and reasonable limits, rather than a static set of rules\nwhich are applied universally and without intelligence. See:\n\nASTM E2213-02\u2014Standard Specification for Telecom-\nmunications and Information Exchange Between Roadside\nand Vehicle Systems\u20145 GHz Band Dedicated Short Range\nCommunications (DSRC) Medium Access Control (MAC)\nand Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications (This standard,\nASTM E2213-02\u2014Standard Specification for Telecommu-\nnications and Information Exchange Between Roadside and\nVehicle Systems\u20145 GHz Band Dedicated Short Range\nCommunications (DSRC) Medium Access Control (MAC)\nand Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, describes a\nmedium access control layer (MAC) and physical layer\n(PHY) specification for wireless connectivity using dedi-\ncated short-range communications (DSRC) services. This\nstandard is based on and refers to the Institute of Electrical\nand Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 802.11 (Wireless\nLAN Medium Access Control and Physical Layer specifi-\ncations), and standard 802.11la (Wireless LAN Medium\nAccess Control and Physical Layer specifications High-\nSpeed Physical Layer in the 5 GHz band). This standard is\nan extension of IEEE 802.11 technology into the high-speed\nvehicle environment. It contains the information necessary\nto explain the difference between IEEE 802.11 and IEEE\n802.1la operating parameters required to implement a\nmostly high-speed data transfer service in the 5.9-GHz\nIntelligent Transportation Systems Radio Service (ITS-RS)\nband or the Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure\n(UNI) band, as appropriate).\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n76\n\nANSI X3.38-1988 (R1994)\u2014Codes\u2014lIdentification of\nStates, the District of Columbia, and the Outlying and\nAssociated Areas of the United States for Information Inter-\nchange\n\nASTM. PS111-98\u2014Specification for Dedicated Short\nRange Communication (DSRC) Physical Layer Using\nMicrowave in the 902 to 928 MHz Band\n\nASTM. PS105-99\u2014Specification for Dedicated Short\nRange Communication (DSRC) Data Link Layer: Medium\nAccess and Logical Link Control\n\nCEN Draft Document: prENV278/9/#65 Dedicated Short\nRange Communication (DSRC)\u2014Application Layer (Layer\n7)\n\nIEEE Std 1489-1999\u2014Standard for Data Dictionaries for\nIntelligent Transportation Systems\u2014Part 1: Functional Area\nData Dictionaries\n\nGSS Global Specification for Short Range Communica-\ntion. The platform for Interoperable Electronic Toll Collec-\ntion and Access Control\n\nISO 3166-1:1997\u2014Codes for the representation of names\nof countries and their subdivisions\u2014Part 1: Country codes\n\nISO 3779:1983\u2014Road vehicles\u2014Vehicle identification\nnumbering (VIN)\u2014Content and structure\n\nISOAEC 7498-1:1994\u2014Information technology\u2014Open\nSystems Interconnection\u2014Basic Reference Model: The\nBasic Model\n\nISO 7498-2:1989\u2014Information processing systems\u2014\nOpen Systems Interconnection\u2014Basic Reference Model\u2014\nPart 2: Security Architecture\n\nISOAEC 7498-3:1997\u2014Information technology\u2014Open\nSystems Interconnection\u2014Basic Reference Model: Naming\nand addressing\n\nISOAEC 7498-4:1989\u2014Information processing sys-\ntems\u2014Open Systems Interconnection\u2014Basic Reference\nModel\u2014Part 4: Management framework\n\nISO 3780:1983\u2014Road vehicles\u2014World manufacturer\nidentifier (WMI) code\n\nISOAEC 8824-1:1995\u2014Information technology\u2014Ab-\nstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic\nnotation\n\nISO/IEC 8825-2:1996\u2014Information technology\u2014ASN.1\nencoding rules: Specification of Packed Encoding Rules\n(PER)\n\nISO TC204 WG15 Committee Of Japan TICS/DSRC\u2014\nDSRC Application Layer High Data Rate mobile environ-\nment\n\nASTM E2158-01\u2014Standard Specification for Dedicated\nShort Range Communication (DSRC) Physical Layer Using\nMicrowave in the 902-928 MHz Band\n\nASTM PS 105-99\u2014Standard Provisional Specification\nfor Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) Data\nLink Layer\n\nIEEE Std 1455-1999\u2014Standard for Message Sets for\nVehicle/Roadside Communications\n\nJEFE Std 802.11-1999\u2014Information Technology\u2014Tele-\ncommunications and information exchange between sys-\ntems\u2014Local and metropolitan area networks\u2014Specitic\nrequirements\u2014Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Con-\ntrol and Physical Layer specifications\n\nIEEE Std 802.11a-1999\u2014Information Technology\u2014\nTelecommunications and information exchange between\nsystems\u2014Local and metropolitan area networks\u2014Specific\nrequirements\u2014Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Con-\ntrol and Physical Layer specifications: High Speed Physical\nLayer in the 5 GHz band\n\nEach of which is expressly incorporated herein in its\nentirety.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 53 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n77\n\nIt is noted that the present technology has the capability\nfor streamlining transportation systems, by communicating\ntraffic conditions almost immediately and quickly allowing\ndecisions to be made by drivers to minimize congestion and\navoid unnecessary slowdowns. A particular result of the\nimplementation of this technology will be a reduction in\nvehicular air pollution, as a result of reduced traffic jams and\nother inefficient driving patterns. To further the environmen-\ntal protection aspect of the invention, integration of the\ndatabase with cruise control and driver information systems\nmay reduce inefficient vehicle speed fluctuations, by com-\nmunicating to the driver or controlling the vehicle at an\nefficient speed. As a part of this system, therefore, adaptive\nspeed limits and intelligent traffic flow control devices may\nbe provided. For example, there is no need for fixed time\ntraffic lights if the intersection is monitored for actual traffic\nconditions. By providing intervehicle communications and\nidentification, such an intelligent system is easier to imple-\nment. Likewise, the 55 miles per hour speed limit that was\ninitially presented in light of the \u201coil crisis\u201d in the 1970's,\nand parts of which persist today even in light of relatively\nlow petroleum pricing and evidence that the alleged sec-\nondary health and safety benefit is marginal or non-existent,\nmay be eliminated in favor of a system which employs\nintelligence to optimize the traffic flow patterns based on\nactual existing conditions, rather than a static set of rules\nwhich are applied universally and without intelligence.\n\nThe communications device may be a transmitter,\nreceiver or transceiver, transmitting event information, stor-\ning received event information, or exchanging event infor-\nmation, respectively. Thus, while the system as a whole\ntypically involves a propagation of event information\nbetween remote databases, each system embodying the\ninvention need not perform all functions.\n\nIn a retroreflector system design, signal to noise ratio is\nimproved by spatial specificity, and typically coherent detec-\ntion. An interrogation signal is emitted, which is modulated\nand redirected back toward its source, within a relatively\nwide range, by a receiver. Thus, while the receiver may be\n\u201cpassive\u201d, the return signal has a relatively high amplitude\n(as compared to nonretroreflective designs under compa-\nrable conditions) and the interrogator can spatially discrimi-\nnate and coherently detect the return signal. Both optical and\nRF retroreflector systems exist. This technique may also be\nused to augment active communications schemes, for\nexample allowing a scanning or array antenna to determine\nan optimal position or spatial sensitivity or gain, or a phase\narray or synthetic aperture array to define an optimal spatial\ntransfer function, even in the presence of multipath and other\ntypes of signal distortion and/or interference.\n\nAccording to one embodiment of the invention, a plurality\nof antenna elements are provided. These may be, for\nexample, a set of high gain antennas oriented in different\ndirections, or an array of antennas, acting together. Accord-\ningly, the antenna structure permits a spatial division mul-\ntiplexing to separate channels, even for signals which are\notherwise indistinguishable or overlapping. For example,\nthis permits a single antenna system to communicate with a\nplurality of other antenna systems at the same time, with\nreduced mutual interference. Of course, these communica-\ntions channels may be coordinated to further avoid overlap.\nFor example, the communications band may be subdivided\ninto multiple channels, with respective communications\nsessions occurring on different channels. Likewise, a plu-\nrality of different bands may be simultaneously employed,\nfor example 802.11g (2.4 GHz), 802.1la (5.4 GHz), and\n802.11a R/A (5.9 GHz). In another embodiment, a mechani-\n\n5\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n78\n\ncally scanning high gain antenna may provide directional\ndiscrimination. Such an antenna may be, for example, a\ncylindrical waveguide electromagnetically reflective at one\nend, having a diameter corresponding to the wavelength of\nthe band, and with a probe extending about half-way into the\ncylinder perpendicularly to its axis, at about a quarter\nwavelength from the reflective end. Likewise, a so-called\n\u201cPringles Can Antenna\u201d, which has been termed a Yagi\ndesign, and known modifications thereof, have been deemed\nuseful for extending the range of 802.11b communications.\n\nAccording to one embodiment, a radome may be provided\non the roof of a vehicle, having therein an antenna array\nwith, for example, 4-64 separate elements. These elements,\nare, for example, simple omnidirectional dipole antennas.\nThe size and spacing of the antenna elements is generally\ndetermined by the wavelength of the radiation. However,\nthis distance may be reduced by using a different dielectric\nthan air. For example, see U.S. Pat. No. 6,452,565, expressly\nincorporated herein by reference. See, also antenova.com\n(Antenova Ltd., Stow-cum-Quy, Cambridge, UK).\n\nA preferred radome also includes GPS antenna, as well as\ncellular radio antenna (IS-95, PCS, GSM, etc.).\n\nIn a preferred embodiment, the communications device\nemploys an unlicensed band, such as 900 MHz (902-928\nMHz), FRS, 49 MHz, 27 MHz, 2.4-2.5 GHz, 5.4 GHz, 5.8\nGHz, etc. Further, in order to provide noise immunity and\nband capacity, spread spectrum RF techniques are preferred.\n\nAs appropriate, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)\nantenna radio technologies may be employed to increase\nchannel bandwidth, though in a mobile system the benefits\nof this technology may be limited.\n\nIn one embodiment, communications devices are installed\nin automobiles. Mobile GPS receivers in the vehicles pro-\nvide location information to the communications devices.\nThese GPS receivers may be integral or separate from the\ncommunications devices. Event detectors, such as police\nradar and laser (LIDAR) speed detectors, traffic and weather\ncondition detectors, road hazard detectors (pot holes, debris,\naccidents, ice, mud and rock slides, drunk drivers, etc.),\ntraffic speed detectors (speedometer reading, sensors for\ndetecting speed of other vehicles), speed limits, checkpoints,\ntoll booths, etc., may be provided as inputs to the system, or\nappropriate sensors integrated therein. The system may also\nserve as a beacon to good Samaritans, emergency workers\nand other motorists in the event of accident, disablement, or\nother status of the host vehicle.\n\nIt is noted that at frequencies above about 800 MHz, the\ntransmitter signal may be used as a part of a traffic radar\nsystem. Therefore, the transmitted signal may serve both as\na communications stream and a sensor emission. Advanta-\ngeously, an electronically steerable signal is emitted from an\narray. Reflections of the signal are then received and ana-\nlyzed for both reflection time coefficients and Doppler shifts.\nOf course, a radar may use static antennas and/or mechani-\ncally scanning antennas, and need not completely analyze\nthe return signals.\n\nFunctions similar to those of the Cadillac (GM) On-Star\nsystem may also be implemented, as well as alarm and\nsecurity systems, garage door opening and \u201csmart home\u201d\nintegration. Likewise, the system may also integrate with\nmedia and entertainment systems. See, U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,418,\n424; 6,400,996; 6,081,750; 5,920,477; 5,903,454; 5,901,\n246; 5,875,108; 5,867,386; 5,774,357, expressly incorpo-\nrated herein by reference. These systems may reside in a\nfixed location, within the vehicle, or distributed between\nfixed and mobile locations. The system may also integrate\nwith a satellite radio system, and, for example, the satellite\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 54 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n79\n\nradio antenna may be included in the antenna system for\nother communication systems within the vehicle.\n\nThe memory stores information describing the event as\nwell as the location of the event. Preferably, the memory is\nnot organized as a matrix of memory addresses correspond-\ning to locations, e.g., a \u201cmap\u201d, but rather in a record format\nhaving explicitly describing the event and location, making\nstorage of the sparse matrix more efficient and facilitating\nindexing and sorting on various aspects of each data record.\nAdditional information, such as the time of the event,\nimportance and nature of the event, expiration time of the\nevent, source and reliability of the event information, and\ncommercial and/or advertising information associated with\nthe event may be stored. The information in the memory is\nprocessed to provide a useful output, which may be a simple\nalphanumeric, voice (audible) or graphic output of the\ntelecommunications system. In any case, the output is pref-\nerably presented in a sorted order according to pertinence,\nwhich is a combination of the abstract importance of the\nevent and proximity, with \u201cproximity\u201d weighted higher than\n\u201cimportance\u201d. Once a communication or output cycle is\ninitiated, it may continue until the entire memory is output,\nor include merely output a portion of the contents, for\nexample the contextually relevant portion having a risk\nand/or reliability exceeding a threshold.\n\nTypically, a navigation system includes a raster \u201cmap\u201d of\ngeographic regions, which is further linked to a database of\nfeatures, geocoded to the map. Alternately, the map may\nitself be a set of geocoded features, without a raster repre-\nsentation. Various events and features defined by the sensors\nprovided by the present system, or received through a\ncommunications link, may therefore be overlaid or inte-\ngrated into the geocoded features. Advantageously, all of the\ngeocoded features are separately defined from the static\ngeography, and therefore may be separately managed and\nprocessed. For example, geologic features are persistent, and\nabsent substantial human activity or natural disaster, are\npersistent. Other features, such as roads, attractions, and\nother conditions, are subject to change periodically. Each\ngeocoded feature (or indeed, any feature or event, whether\ngeocoded or not) may be associated with a timeconstant\nrepresenting an estimated life; as the time since last verifi-\ncation increases, the probability of change also increases.\nThis may be used to provide a user with an estimation of the\nreliability of the navigation system, or indeed any output\nproduced by the system. It is noted that the timeconstant\nmay also be replaced with an expression or analysis which\nis a function of time, that is, to account for diurnal, weekly,\nseasonal, annual, etc. changes. Such expression or analysis\nneed not be repetitive; for example, after an abnormality in\ntraffic flow, traffic patterns tend to remain distorted for a long\nperiod (e.g., hours) after the abnormality is corrected, or\nafter a driver passes the abnormality; this distortion is both\ntemporally and spatially related to the original abnormality,\nand may be statistically estimated. Chaos, fractal and/or\nwavelet theories may be particularly relevant to this analy-\nsis, and employed as desired to analyze or present the data.\n\nTn outputting information directly to a human user, thresh-\nolds are preferably applied to limit output to events which\nare of immediate consequence and apparent importance. For\nexample, if the communications device is installed in a\nvehicle, and the information in the memory indicates that a\npothole, highway obstruction, or police radar \u201ctrap\u201d is\nahead, the user is informed. Events in the opposite direction\n(as determined by a path or velocity record extracted from\nthe position detector) are not output, nor are such events far\naway. On the other hand, events such as road icing, flooding,\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n55\n\n80\n\nor the like, are often applicable to all nearby motorists, and\nare output regardless of direction of travel, unless another\ncommunications device with event detector indicates that\nthe event would not affect the local communications device\nor the vehicle in which it is installed.\n\nAccording to one embodiment of the invention, relevance\nof information and information reliability are represented as\northogonal axes. For each set of facts or interpretation\n(hypothesis) thereof, a representation is projected on the\nplane defined by these two axes. This representation for each\nevent generally takes the form of a bell curve, although the\nstatistics for each curve need not be Gaussian. The area\nunder the superposed curves, representing the constellation\nof possible risks or relevances, are then integrated, starting\nwith relevance=1.00 (100%), proceeding toward rel-\nevance=0.00 (0%). As the area under a given peak exceeds\na threshold, which need not be constant, and indeed may be\na function of relevance or reliability, and/or subjective\nfactors, the event is presented as a warning output to the\nuser. This method ensures that the output includes the most\nrelevant events before less relevant events, but excluding\nthose events with low reliability. Using a dynamic threshold,\nhighly relevant events of low reliability are presented, while\nlow relevance events of even modest reliability are sup-\npressed. It is possible for the threshold to exceed 1.0, that is,\na complete suppression of irrelevant events, regardless of\nreliability.\n\nAlternately, the event projection into the relevance-reli-\nability plane may be normalized by a function which\naccounts for the desired response function, with a static\nthreshold applied.\n\nThe reason why the determination employs an integration\nof a stochastic distribution, rather than a simple scalar\nrepresentation of events, is that this allows certain events\nwith broad distributions, but a mean value below than of\nanother event with a narrower distribution, to be ranked\nahead, as being more significant. This has potentially greater\nimpact for events having decidedly non-normal distribu-\ntions, for example with significant kurtosis, skew, multimo-\ndality, etc., and in which a mean value has no readily\ninterpretable meaning.\n\nThe present invention therefore provides a method, com-\nprising receiving a set of facts or predicates, analyzing the\nset of facts or predicates to determine possible events,\ndetermining, from the possible events, a relevance to a user\nand associated statistical distribution thereof, and presenting\na ranked set of events, wherein said ranking is dependent on\nboth relevance and associated statistical distribution. The\nassociated statistical distribution, for example, describes a\nprobability of existence of an associated event, and the\nrelevance comprises a value function associated with that\nevent if it exists, wherein said ranking comprises an analysis\nof probability-weighted benefits from each event to an\noverall utility function for the user. The ranking may com-\nprises a combinatorial analysis of competing sets of rank-\nings.\n\nIt is therefore apparent that each set of events, that is, a set\nof facts or factual predicates, or conclusions drawn there-\nfrom, are represented as a distribution projected into a\nrelevance-reliability plane. On the abscissa, relevance has a\nscale of 0 to 1. At zero relevance, the information is\nconsidered not useful, whereas at a relevance value\napproaching 1, the information is considered very relevant.\nSince the determination of relevance is generally neither\nexact nor precise, there is an associated reliability, that is,\nthere is a range of possibilities and their likelihoods relating\nto a set of presumed facts. The various possibilities sum to\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 55 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n81\n\nthe whole, which means that the area under the curve\n(integral from 0 to 1 of the distribution curve) should sum to\n1, although various mathematical simplifications and inten-\ntional or unintentional perturbations may alter this integrated\narea. Relevance requires a determination of context, which\nmay include both objective and subjective aspects. Commu-\nnicated relevance information typically should be deter-\nmined with respect to the requestor, not the requestee,\nalthough in certain circumstances, the requestee (possibly\nwith adjustments) may serve as a proxy for the requestor.\nThere are a number of methods for weighting higher rel-\nevances above lower relevances. One way is to determine a\ntransfer function which masks the normalized distribution\nwith a weighting function. This may be a simple linear ramp,\nor a more complex function. As discussed above, a numeric\nintegration from 1 to 0, with a respective decision made\nwhen the integral of a \u201ccurve\u201d representing an event exceeds\na threshold, allowing multiple decisions to be ranked, is\nanother possibility.\n\nUsing a hierarchal analysis, this process may occur at\nmultiple levels, until each significant hypothesis is analyzed,\nleaving only putative hypothesis which are insignificant, that\nis, with sufficient external information to distinguish\nbetween the respective possibilities. In order to simplify the\noutput set, redundancy is resolved in favor of the most\nspecific significant hypothesis, while insignificant hypoth-\neses are truncated (not presented). As the number of signifi-\ncant hypotheses becomes in excess of a reasonable number\n(which may be an adaptive or subjective determination),\nrelated hypotheses (either by the nature of the events or the\nnature of an anticipated responses) may be grouped. Relat-\nedness of hypotheses may be determined based on common-\nality of factual predicates, resulting user action, or other\ncommonality. That is, the grouping may be the same as, or\ndifferent from, the hierarchy of the analysis.\n\nTt is also noted that the projection need not be in the\nrelevance-reliability plane. Rather, the analysis is intended\nto present useful information: that which represents infor-\nmation having a potential materiality to the user, and which\nhas significance in a statistical sense. Therefore, a data\nanalysis which does not purely separate relevance and\nreliability, but nevertheless allows a general balancing of\nthese issues, may nevertheless be suitable.\n\nReferring now to the aforementioned auction for control\nof bandwidth, in which a bidder communicates a value\nfunction which must be resolved by the recipient, this type\nof relevance-reliability analysis may be used to normalize\nutility functions between respective bidders. To determine a\ncost, a local set of events or factual predicates are analyzed\nwith respect to a received context. The various hypotheses\nare projected onto a relevance-reliability plane. With respect\nto each bidder, the projection of each event is normalized by\nthat bidder\u2019s conveyed utility or valuation function. It is\nuseful to maintain the stochastic distribution representation\nfor each event, since this facilitates application of the bidder\nvaluation utility function. The winning bidder is the bidder\nwith the highest normalized integration of the event repre-\nsentation in the relevance-reliability projection plane.\n\nAdvantageously, according to an embodiment of the pres-\nent invention, output information is presented to the user\nusing a statistical and/or probabilistic analysis of both risk\nand reliability. Risk is, for example, the estimated quantita-\ntive advantage or disadvantage of an event. In the case of\ncompeting risks, a cost function may be employed to provide\na normalized basis for representation and analysis. While the\nrisk is generally thought of as a scalar value, there is no\nparticular reason why this cannot itself be a vector or\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n82\n\nmultiparameter function, such as a mean and standard devia-\ntion or confidence interval. Reliability is, for example, the\nprobability that the risk is as estimated. Likewise, the\nreliability may also be a scalar value, but may also be a\ncomplex variable, vector or multiparameter function.\n\nSince a preferred use of the risk and reliability estimates\nis as part of a user interface, these are preferably represented\nin their simplest forms, which will typically take a scalar\nform, such as by projection from a high dimensionality\nspace to a low dimensionality space, or an elimination or\ntruncation of information which is predicted to be of low\nusefulness in a decision-making process. However, where\nthe risk, or risk profile, cannot be simply represented, or\nsuch representation loses significant meaning, a higher\ndimensionality representation may be employed. For human\nuser interfaces, graphic displays are common, which gener-\nally support two-dimensional graphics, representing three\ndimensional distributions, for example, x, y, and brightness\nor color. Using a time sequence of graphic elements, one or\nmore additional dimensions may be represented. Likewise,\nsome graphic displays are capable of representing depth, and\nthus support an additional degree of freedom. Therefore, it\ncan be seen that the risk and reliability are not intrinsically\nlimited to scalar representations, and where the quantity and\nquality of the information to be presented warrants, a higher\ndimensionality or additional degrees of freedom may be\npresented.\n\nIn a voice output system, a sequence of information may\nbe output, trading immediacy and semantic complexity for\ninformation content. Complex sounds or other grammars\nmay also be employed, especially where the relevance has a\nshort time-constant.\n\nAccording to one embodiment of the invention, risk and\nreliability are separately output to the user. It is understood\nthat both risk and reliability may be output in an integral or\ninterrelated form as well. For example, a driver might wish\nto employ a radar detector. A traditional radar detector emits\na signal indicative of signal type and signal strength. Based\non these emissions, the driver decides on a course of action.\nIdeally, the driver responds immediately (if necessary) to the\nfirst detected signal, even if this is of low signal strength or\npotentially an artifact. On the other hand, the system accord-\ning to the present invention may analyze the reliability of the\ndetected signal as an indicator of risk. For example, on a\nhighway, an X band radar signal directed from in front of the\nvehicle, which commences at relatively high signal strength,\nand which occurs in a location having a past history of use\nas a location for monitoring traffic speeds for enforcement\npurposes, and which was recently confirmed (e.g., within the\npast 5 minutes) as being an active traflic enforcement site,\nwould be deemed a high reliability signal. On the other hand,\non the same highway, if a continuously emitted (or half-\nwave 60 Hz emission from a microwave oven) X band signal\nis detected, in a location where such a signal is consistently\ndetected by other drivers, and none is cited for violation of\ntraffic laws, then this detection would be considered a low\nreliability detection of a risk or traflic enforcement radar.\nWhile a threshold of reliability may be applied, and thus a\n\u201csquelch\u201d applied to the risk output, preferably, the reliabil-\nity signal is presented separately. When risk and reliability\nare both high, for example, an enhanced alert may be\npresented. When risk is high but reliability low, an indication\nmay be nevertheless presented to the user for his analysis.\nThis scheme would assist the user in dealing with statistical\naberrations, as well as intentional masking of conditions. For\nexample, a traflic enforcement radar system may be inten-\ntionally used in an area of normal interference with radar\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 56 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n83\n\ndetectors; the system according to the present invention\nwould present an alert to the user of this possibility.\n\nSuch analysis is not limited to radar detectors. For\nexample, a bridge may be likely to freeze (.e., become\nslippery) under certain conditions. Some of these conditions\nmay be detected, such as local weather, past precipitation,\nand the like. Indeed, recent road sand and salt may also be\naccounted for. However, uncertainty remains as to the actual\nroad surface conditions, which may change over the course\nof a few minutes. Therefore, the system according to the\npresent invention may determine the risk, 1.e., slippery road\nconditions, and the reliability of its determination. This\nreliability may be estimated from actual past experience of\nthe system in question, as well as from other systems\nincluding appropriate sensors, for which data is available.\n\nAccording to the present invention, to risk tolerance, or\nmore properly stated, the reliability-adjusted risk tolerance\nof a user may be used to \u201cnormalize\u201d or otherwise adjust the\noutputs of the system. Thus, for example, an emergency\nvehicle may take higher risks than would normally be\nacceptable. Clearly, if there is a 100% probability that the\nvehicle will skid on black ice on the road ahead, this risk\nwould be unacceptable for any rational driver seeking to\ncontinue driving. On the other hand, an ambulance driver on\nan urgent call may be willing to undertake a 5% risk that the\nroad is slippery, while a normal driver might be willing to\naccept only a 1% risk. The ambulance driver, in the above\nexample, generally takes a number of risks, and caution\nmust be balanced to assure that the goals are met, and indeed\nthat risks are not increased as a result of undue caution. For\nexample, driving at a slow speed increases the risk that the\nvehicle will be rear-ended, or that the driver will fall asleep\nduring the trip. Even pulling over the side of the road does\nnot eliminate risk to zero, so it is important to do a\ncomparative risk analysis.\n\nThe risk/reliability analysis is not limited to driving\ncondition alerts. For example, the system may be used to\nadvise the user regarding the need for preventive mainte-\nnance or repair. The system may also be used as part of an\nentertainment system: What is the likelihood that a channel\nwill broadcast an undesired commercial within the next\nminute? Should a recording stored in memory be purged in\nfavor of a new recording? What radio station will be most\nacceptable to the set of occupants of the vehicle?\n\nIn some cases, therefore, the risk/reliability analysis may\nbe used by an automated system, and need not be presented\ndirectly to the user; in other instances, the set of information\nis for presentation to the user.\n\nAnother aspect of the invention involves a method for\npresentation of a multidimensional risk profile to a user.\nAccording to prior systems, a \u201crisk\u201d is presented to a user as\na binary signal, modulated binary signal, and/or a scalar\nvalue. A signal type (e.g., band, SWS code, etc. for a radar\ndetector, temperature, wind speed, wind direction, baromet-\nric pressure and trend, for a weather gauge) may also be\nexpressed. Accordingly, as set of orthogonal scalar values is\npresented representing different parameters. Certainly,\ngraphic representations of mean and standard deviation are\nwell known; however, the reliability aspect of the present\ninvention is not analogous to a simple standard deviation\u2014it\ntypically represents something qualitatively different. For\nexample, a determination of the magnitude of the risk\nvariable carries its own standard deviation, which, though a\npossible element of a reliability determination, does not\naddress the issue of how the measured parameter (with its\nown statistical parameters of measurement) relates to the\nunderlying issue, or the impact of the underlying issue on the\n\n20\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n84\n\nrecipient. In some cases, there with be a direct relationship\nand near 100% correlation between the measured parameter\nand risk variable; in other cases, the measured parameter has\npoor correlation with the risk variable, and further analysis\nis necessary.\n\nThe system preferably ages event data intelligently,\nallowing certain types of events to expire or decrease in\nimportance. A traffic accident event more than 12 hours old\nis likely stale, and therefore would not be output, and\npreferably is purged; however, locations which are the site\nof multiple accidents may be tagged as hazardous, and the\nhazard event output to the user as appropriate.\n\nA temporal analysis may also be applied to the event data,\nand therefore diurnal variations and the like accounted for.\nExamples of this type of data include rush hour traffic, sun\nglare (adjusted for season, etc.), vacation routes, and the\nlike.\n\nThus, user outputs may be provided based on proximity,\nimportance, and optionally other factors, such as direction,\nspeed (over or under speed limit), time-of-day, date or\nseason (e.g., sun glare), freshness of event recordation, and\nthe like.\n\nAccording to the present invention, a stored event may be\nanalyzed for reliability. Such reliability may be determined\nby express rules or algorithms, statistically, or otherwise,\ngenerally in accordance with particular characteristics of the\ntype of event. Thus, even where a detected value, at the time\nof measurement, has a high reliability for indicating an event\nor condition, over time the reliability may change.\n\nUSS. Pat. No. 6,175,803 (Chowanic, et al., Ford Global\nTechnologies, Inc.), expressly incorporated herein by refer-\nence in its entirety, relates to a telematics system which\nemploys routing criteria which include a statistical risk\nindex. The route and associated risks may be output\ntogether, and a risk-minimized route may be automatically\nselected.\n\nAccording to a preferred embodiment, audio and/or visual\nwarnings are selectively provided. In this case, a warning of\nonly a single event is provided at any given time. Typically,\na visual alert indicator illuminates, and an initial tone alert\nindicates the nature of an urgent warning. The visual indi-\ncator also outputs a strength or proximity of the alert.\nTypically, these basic indicators are illuminated red, because\nthis color is societally associated with alerts, and this causes\nless constriction of the iris of the eye at night. A separate\nvisual indicator, such as a bar graph, meter, or color coded\nindicator (e.g., bicolor or tricolor light emitting diode)\nprovides a separate reliability or risk of reliance indication.\nAfter acoustically indicating the nature and strength or\nproximity of the warning, an acoustic indication of reliabil-\nity or risk of reliance may be enunciated. The visual reli-\nability or risk of reliance indicator may be constantly active,\nwhile the warning indicator is preferably selectively active\nwhen an alert is present.\n\nTypically, alerts will be classified by category, and a\nseparate algorithm applied to determine the appropriate\nreliability factor, for example an exponential decay. As\nupdated information is received or becomes available, this\nreplaces presumably less reliable older data as a basis for a\nreliability determination. The system may also anticipate a\ngeographic change in location of the event, for example a\ntraffic enforcement officer in motion, or a traffic jam, along\nwith reliability information for the prediction.\n\nWhen multiple alerts are simultaneously active, low pri-\nority alerts are suppressed, and the active higher-priority\nalerts alternate. Priority of alerts, in this case, may be\ndetermined based on the nature of the alert, contextual\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 57 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n85\n\nproximity, the reliability of the measurement of the alert, the\nreliability of reliance on the recorded information, and a\ncomparison of the respective alerts and potential interaction.\n\nAt any time, there will likely be a number \u201cissues\u201d to be\nanalyzed. In order to provide an efficient user interface, these\nissues are analyzed to determine urgency or importance, and\nonly those which meet criteria are particularly presented. For\nexample, the fact that the fuel gauge reads half-full is not\nnormally a cause for particular alert. However, if the vehicle\nis passing a gas station which has a relatively low price, the\nalert may be welcome. Without further information, these\nfacts together reach a sufficient importance to produce an\nalert. See, U.S. Pat. No. 6,484,088 (Reimer, Nov. 19, 2002,\nFuel optimization system with improved fuel level sensor),\nexpressly incorporated herein by reference. That is, the risk\n(need for fuel; capacity to purchase additional fuel; distance\nto next gas station and margin of safety given present fuel\nsupply; etc.), ands the reliability (fuel price predicted to be\ncheaper than other fuel along predicted vehicle path before\nurgent need for fuel; etc.), together meet a \u201cthreshold\u201d\n(which, of course, may be particularly dynamic in nature).\nAdditional information, however, may reduce the impor-\ntance of this information below a threshold level; for\nexample, the present trip is time critical; the same gas station\nis predicted to be passed a number of times before the fuel\ntank is empty; other stations predicted to be passed have\nlower prices; pricing is anticipated to be more advantageous\nat a later time (e.g., gas sale on Monday; anticipated trip to\nanother locale with lower gas prices; etc.), etc. Thus, the set\nof facts including available information is analyzed, for\nexample using Bayesian techniques, Hierarchal Markov\nModels or other techniques, to predict the importance to the\nuser. Each of these facts or predicates, or sets of facts and/or\npredicates, of course, has its own estimated reliability, and\nthus the overall conclusion is thereby limited. Accordingly,\nthis reliability of the logical conclusion is output along with\nthe conclusion itself.\n\nWith sufficient facts or predicates available, there may be\ncompeting outputs, both relating to fuel use, conservation,\nand refill strategies and otherwise. Thus, the system must\ncompare the competing prospective outputs to determine\nwhich are actually presented. It may be useful in such\ncircumstances to compute a cost function for presenting this\ndata. In this way, for example, an advertiser or other external\ninfluence maybe permitted to impact the overall analysis,\ne.g., presentation of data though the user interface. This cost\nfunction may also balance driving conditions: for example,\nwhen stopped at a traffic light, less urgent messages may be\npresented with lower risk of driver distraction. The user\ninterface typically supports only a limited amount of infor-\nmation to be conveyed, and ergonomics may further limit\nthe amount of information. Thus, the issue of screening\ninformation for presentation to the user typically arises.\n\nThe cost function is analogous to a utility function, which\nmay be perturbed or modified based on subjective factors.\nAs such, automated negotiations are possible based on\nbidder and auctioneer contexts, and predetermined and/or\nadaptive parameters. By communicating complex, non-nor-\nmalized information, and allowing an ex post facto reduc-\ntion in dimensionality or degrees of freedom, greater effi-\nciency may be obtained.\n\nIn choosing which information to present, a preferred\nembodiment according to the present invention analyzes the\nrisk and reliability, to produce a composite weight or cost,\nwhich may then be compared with other weights or costs, as\nwell as a dynamic threshold, which may be separately\nanalyzed or implemented as a part of a cost function. Taking\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n86\n\na simple case first, information which is immediately appli-\ncable, represents a high degree of risk, and which is reliable,\nis presented with a highest weighting. If the same indication\nis unreliable, then the presentation 1s deweighted. A high risk\nwith a low reliability would compete with a low risk with\nhigh reliability for presentation through the user interface.\nAs previously discussed, a cost function may be used to\nfactor in external or artificial considerations as well.\n\nIf the risk or reliability changes as a function of time, and\nthis is the significant temporal relationship, then these fac-\ntors may be changed updated, and the user interface modi-\nfied according to a present condition. In some cases, the\npresentation relating to an event need not be continuous.\nThat is, as a result of presentation to the user, the cost\nfunction is dynamically modified, and the event is not again\nrepresented until the cost function exceeds the presentation\nthreshold. The change in cost function may indeed be purely\na function of time, or take into consideration dynamically\nchanging variables. For example, if a traffic jam is ten\nminutes ahead on the road (using predicted travel speeds),\nand there are a number of opportunities within the path\nleading toward the traffic to circumvent it, the urgency of\ntaking a detour is low. As the time until the traflic decreases,\nor as the last opportunities for detour are approaching, any\ndecision by the user become critical. This required decision\nis, in this case, the risk. On the other hand, the traflic may\nbe caused by a traffic light or other temporary obstruction.\nTherefore, the reliability of the risk indication will depend\non an analysis of the surrounding circumstances and the\nlikelihood that the predicted risk will be the actual risk.\nTime, in this case, is not clearly independent of the other\nfactors, and therefore need not represent an independent\noutput to the user. It is noted that such analysis of risk and\nreliability may be facilitated by a wavelet domain transform,\nwhich need not be a discrete wavelet transform (DWT),\nalthough the binary decomposition properties of this trans-\nform may prove convenient or advantageous in various\ncircumstances. In particular, the purpose of the transform is\nnot necessarily a storage or computation-eflicient represen-\ntation; rather, the purpose is to significantly separate degrees\nof freedom to simplify the statistical and probabilistic analy-\nsis. It is also noted that the particular wavelets may be\ncomplex, high dimensionality, asymmetric functions, and\nneed not be wavelets of a traditional kind used in image or\ngeneric data compression.\n\nIt may also be useful to transform the data into various\ndomains, such as time, frequency, wavelet, alternate iterated\nfunction system, or the like, for filtering and denoising.\nPreferably, adaptive thresholds are employed, although in\nmany instances the filtering may be performed in a context-\nindependent manner. On the other hand, where appropriate,\nthe filtering may be context sensitive, that is, the modifica-\ntions of the data set during the filtering are dependent on a\ncalculated risk, reliability, or relevance, or other parameter.\nFurther analysis may be performed either in the transform\ndomain, inverse transform to the original representation, or\nusing a different transform.\n\nIt is also possible to employ a fractal (iterated function\nsystem) analysis and/or transform of the data. In this case, a\nfunction within a space, of any dimensional order, is decom-\nposed into a representation of a set of components, which\nmay include continuous functions (wavelet) or discontinu-\nous functions (geometric shape), each of which may be\ntranslated, scaled only any axis, and amplitude scaled.\nIndeed, where convenient, the function within a space may\nbe decomposed into a plurality of separate representations.\nThus, according to one example, a number of feature-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 58 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n87\n\nspecific decompositions may be applied where appropriate.\nIn the case of non-linear functions, it may be possible to\ndecompose the function into a linear component and a\nnon-linear component, wherein a relatively simplified non-\nlinear component may be subjected to a type-specific analy-\nsis. Thus, it is understood that even relatively complex and\nseemingly intractable problems may be addressed. It is\nfurther noted that incalculable aspects of a fact or predicate\nnet may be represented within the context of a reliability\nvariable. As such, a network is analyzed, and to the extent\npossible, numeric analysis applied to reduce the result to\nlow-dimensionality terms. The predicted magnitude or\npotential magnitude of the residual function or the uncer-\ntainty bounds may then be estimated, resulting in a contri-\nbution to the reliability output. Of course, the reliability\nestimate need be limited to unknowns, and may also repre-\nsent a contribution from an analytical technique which\nproduces a calculated uncertainty.\n\nIn a typical process, a data set, which may include a\nplurality of dimensions, is first processed to reduce noise.\nFor example, error correction and detection algorithms may\nbe applied to eliminate spurious data or correct data which\nhas been corrupted. This process may also include a sub-\nprocess for eliminating intentional spurious data, for\nexample, data communicated by a malfeasant, or data gen-\nerated automatically in a random or pseudorandom manner\nto make the entire dataset unavailable as a source of forensic\nevidence. This is discussed in more detail, below. The data\nmay also be filtered or denoised using one or more various\nalgorithms, especially where the data is obtained continu-\nously from local sensors. Preferably, one or more model-\nbased or content relevant algorithms are employed to opti-\nmally process data or portions of data. This later function\nmay be consolidated with a feature extractor to correlate\ndata with patterns which likely indicate a known event, to\nclassify the signal.\n\nA multidimensional hidden Markov tree (HMT) analysis\nmay be used to process the data. A known principal com-\nponent analysis (PCA) may, for example, precede the HMT,\nto reduce the dimensionality of the data matrix by extracting\nthe linear relationship between the variables and decorrelat-\ning the cross correlation in the data matrix. The hidden\nMarkov tree is a statistical model governing the wavelet\ncoefficients, and exploiting its tree structure in the time-\nfrequency domain. Each wavelet coefficient is modeled as a\nGaussian mixture with a hidden state variable. See, Detec-\ntion and Classification of Abnormal Process Situations\nUsing Multi-dimensional Wavelet Domain Hidden Markov\nTrees (Nov. 9, 2000), Amid Bakhtazad, www.chem.en-\ng.usyd.edu.au/events/poster_2000/present6/ppframe.htm\n\nIn order to prevent a data transmission from being used as\nself-incriminating evidence, steps may be taken to under-\nmine the reliability of any single piece of data within a data\nset. According to one possibility, a random or pseudorandom\nprocess may be used to corrupt the database. This may take\nthe form of modifications of existing records and/or genera-\ntion of phantom or spurious records. Typically, such cor-\nruptions are made in such manner that a corresponding filter\nin a receiving unit, with high reliability, will be able to\nnearly, but not absolutely, \u201cuncorrupt\u201d the data. However,\nwithout knowledge of the actual corruption parameters,\nwhich are not transmitted, the reconstruction is statistical\nand not lossless. Therefore, with high reliability, the content\nof the database is communicated, but not in such manner that\nanyone could opine that individual data within the database\nis real. For example, a database with GPS and chronology\nwill necessarily include data which may be used to derive\n\n5\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n88\n\nthe speed of the vehicle. When that speed is in excess of the\nspeed limit, a transmission or retention of the data may be\nused as an admission of transgression of speed limit laws.\nUsing a known filter scheme implemented at the receiver, an\nalgorithm at the transmitter may operate on the data to\ncorrupt that data in such manner that the receiver will likely\ncorrect the data. By applying a parameter at the transmitter,\nthe reliability of the received data can be controlled. The\ntransmitter may, for example, determine that 25% of the data\nis to be corrupted, and 1% corrupted in such manner that the\nreceive filter does not accurately reconstruct the data. How-\never, the corrupt 1% may be distributed such that 99% is\nflagged as spurious, based on, for example, excess or nega-\ntive speeds, non-monotonic travel, etc. Thus, 0.01% of the\ncorrupt data is conveyed without being caught, a statistic\nwhich is likely less than other, non-intentional corrupting\ninfluences. Each of these parameters may be independently\ncontrolled at the transmitter. Likewise, itis even possible for\nthese corrupting parameters to be transmitted, alerting the\nreceiver that the data may be suspect. Again, since these are\nstatistical processes, no single data point would have evi-\ndentiary reliability.\n\nUsing various cryptographic techniques, such as public\nkey infrastructure (PKI), it may also be possible to secretly\nsynchronize the internal filters of the communicating\ndevices, to maintain high reliability of user alerts, while\nmasking the data itself. Thus, using secure hardware and\nappropriate software techniques, all or most of the corrup-\ntions may be corrected or eliminated. For example, the\ntransmitter uses a pseudorandom noise generator to control\na corruption of data to be transmitted. Information related to\nthe cryptographic key used to initialize the pseudorandom\nnoise generator is securely conveyed to the receiver, for\nexample using a Kerberos, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, El\nGamal key exchange, or other type of cryptographic key\nnegotiation. The receiver then initializes its own correspond-\ning pseudorandom noise generator to generate a synchro-\nnized stream, allowing it to decorrupt the data. Clearly,\nvarious techniques, including those known in the art, may be\ncombined to remedy weaknesses of any given scheme.\nPreferably, a plurality of different algorithms are available,\nshould one or more prove broken.\n\nSee, Matthew Crouse and Robert Nowak and Richard\nBaraniuk, \u201cWavelet-Based Statistical Signal Processing\nUsing Hidden Markov Models\u201d, Proceedings ICASSP-97\n(IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and\nSignal Processing), IEEE Transactions on Signal Process-\ning, 1997, and cited references, expressly incorporated\nherein by reference. See, also, B. Vidakovic, Wavelet-based\nnonparametric Bayes methods, Technical Report, ISDS,\nDuke University., Merlise Clyde, and Heather Desimone\nand Giovanni Parmigiani, Prediction Via Orthogonalized\nModel Mixing, Journal of the American Statistical Associa-\ntion, 91(435):1197 (1996); Katrin Keller, Souheil Ben-\nYacoub, and Chafic Mokbel, Combining Wavelet-domain\nHidden Markov Trees with Hidden Markov Models, IDIAP-\nRR 99-14 (1999), expressly incorporated herein by refer-\nence. See, also, Attoor Sanju Nair, Jyh-Charn Liu, Laurence\nRilett and Saurabh Gupta, \u201cNon-Linear Analysis of Traflic\nFlow,\u201d the 4th International IEEE conference on Intelligent\nTransportation systems, Oakland Calif., Aug. 25-29, 2001,\n(accepted), expressly incorporated herein by reference.\n\nIn like manner, additional dimensions of analysis may be\nadded, resulting in further modifications of a cost function.\n\nUrgency is a subset of relevance. Relevance may also be\ntreated as an independent factor; that is, not included within\nrisk or reliability. For example, a fact representing a risk may\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 59 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n89\n\nbe known with high certainty, for example, a weather\ncondition on a road: this fact, however, has low relevance if\nthe car is parked in a covered garage. Thus, according to an\naspect of the invention, the relevance may be considered an\nindependent variable. Typically, in this case, the risk and\nreliability are together analyzed to determine a cost function;\nthe cost function is then filtered using a relevance criteria\n(which, for example, produces a modified cost function),\nand typically sorted or ranked by weight. This relevance\ntherefore replaces a simple threshold with respect to making\nultimate decisions regarding information presentation to the\nuser. Relevancy may be determined by explicit input from\nthe user, implicit user input, collaborative processes, statis-\ntical analysis of other user under like circumstances, or the\nlike. Itis noted that the cost function may be personalized for\neach user.\n\nIn some cases, a dimensionless cost function is too\nsimplistic, and leads to results which fail to convey useful\ninformation to the user; in those cases, sets of outputs may\nbe presented based on one or more criteria, or an estimated\ncomposite function. Therefore, it is understood that a com-\nplex \u201ccost function\u201d or utility function, resulting in an output\nhaving various degrees of freedom, may be employed.\n\nPreferably, the system according to the present invention\nis integrated with a vehicular telematics system, thus pro-\nviding access to various vehicle data, in addition to envi-\nronmental data. However, it is not so limited, and may be\nused in any type of man-machine interface wherein complex\ndata is to be presented to a user for human consideration.\n\nTt is noted that, in some instances, a fact or predicate set\nmay possibly represent a plurality of different events. In this\ncase, it may sometimes be useful to group these events\ntogether. This is particularly the case if the nature of the alert\nand likely response to the alert by the user is similar,\nregardless of the particular event giving rise to the sensor\nreadings. In that case, the risks, reliabilities, and relevance\nare aggregated in an appropriate fashion, for example vector\nsummed or composite magnitude, and an aggregate cost\nfunction output, along with a generic alert. This generic alert\nmay then be subdivided into its components, for example in\na lower-hierarchal level user interface output. In this man-\nner, a set of possible events, none of which would exceed an\nalert threshold individually, may together exceed the thresh-\nold and indeed receive a high ranking.\n\nAnother way of analyzing this situation is that the system\nmay analyze the available data at a number of hierarchal\nlevels. At each level, the risk, reliability and optionally\nrelevance is determined, and the result stored. The user\ninterface may then select events based on redundancy and\ngeneric alerts, superseding the particular ranking of events at\na homogeneous level of analysis. For example, data indi-\ncating stopped traffic ahead may be consistent with an\naccident, stop light, or construction. These may be divided\ninto normal events (with low risk) (traffic light) and abnor-\nmal events (with high risk)(accident or construction). The\nformer would not generally issue an alert, unless a suitable\nbypass is available that would be efficient. The later, on the\nother hand, would likely generate an alert. The available\ninformation may not be able to distinguish between an\naccident and construction, and indeed, the individual prob-\nabilities of these may be insignificant. However, together,\nthe probabilities may be significant. Likewise, since these\nare two alternative, generally inconsistent possibilities, the\nreliability of each will be greatly reduced. Grouped together,\nhowever, their joint reliability is estimated to be about the\nremaining likelihood after the traffic light is accounted for,\nwith high reliability. With respect to relevance, each of these\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n90\n\nevents would have similar relevance, which would be high,\nassuming the stopped traffic is along the itinerary of the\nvehicle. Thus, a composite alert of \u201cabnormal stopped traffic\n1 mile ahead; reliability 33%\u201d would be a useful compro-\nmise to maintain an efficient user interface while conveying\nthe useful information. Of course, the underlying system\nshould generally still compute the probabilities, reliability\nand relevance for each possibility, since this analysis may\nyield more useful information and provide better guidance to\nthe user.\n\nThe ranking may, for example, employ a combinatorial\nanalysis of a set of rankings based on a self-consistent\nprobability-weighted utility of each event within a ranked\nset. That is, if various events are mutually inconsistent, then\na ranking is limited by a presumption of the existence of one\nevent, and competing hypotheses are established as different\nrankings. In a rigorous sense, the utility may be determined\nby a mathematical integration of the appropriate function,\nalthough in many instances either the data will be repre-\nsented as a field which can be simply summed, or simpli-\nfying presumptions may be applied to make the evaluation\ntractable.\n\nAccording to an aspect of the invention, a user transmits\na relevance or cost function to corresponding other users,\nwhich then calculate the most useful information to transmit\nbased on the circumstances of the intended recipient. Like-\nwise, a plurality of users may exchange their respective\nrelevance or cost functions. This relevance or cost function\nis, for example, a current position, immediate itinerary, and\nany other particular relevance factors. Such other factors\nmight include heavy load, urgent transit, travel preferences,\nor the like. Upon receipt, the device of the other correspond-\ning user then calculates relevance and/or cost functions\nusing its local data set based on the received parameters.\nThis calculation is then used as a filter to determine a priority\nof data to be transmitted. As the time available for trans-\nmission grows, the amount of information transmitted may\nbe complete. For example, two cars traveling adjacent on a\nhighway or parked near each other may conduct a complete\ndata exchange. When optimizing the broadcast of data based\non a plurality of user\u2019s relevance or cost functions, a\nweighting may be applied which balances the maximum\ngood for the many with the urgent needs of the few.\nLikewise, accommodations may be made for anticipated\nduration of communication for the respective users, and the\navailability of packet forwarding and secondary retransmis-\nsion.\n\nSince all devices share a common transmission medium,\nit is generally useful to compute a cost function for use of the\nshared medium as well, allowing peers access to the medium\nafter the marginal utility for the current user has declined.\nAccess to the shared medium may also be allocated on a\nround robin or other \u201cfair\u201d basis, especially when demand is\nhighest. Each device preferably monitors all local transmis-\nsions, since these will likely include data of some relevance\nto each device. Likewise, by monitoring such transmissions,\none device may make presumptions as to the state of the\nlocal database of another device (especially given a knowl-\nedge of its present position and path), and therefore avoid\nredundant transmissions of data. Likewise, in such a peer to\npeer network, a voting scheme may be instituted, allowing\nthe peer with the \u201cbest\u201d data, i.e., the data which is most\nreliable, most accurate, most recent, most detail, or other\ncriteria to transmit with higher priority.\n\nKnown packet data broadcast protocols may be used to\nconvey the information. Likewise, known peer-to-peer tech-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 60 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n91\n\nniques and protocols may be used to communicate, or\ncontrol communications, between peers.\n\nAccording to another aspect of the invention, a user may\nbroadcast or transmit a specific query for information, using\nas at least a part of the query a relevance or cost function.\nRecipients of the broadcast or transmission then execute a\nsearch of their database based on the received query, and\nrespond accordingly. This query may be a broad or narrow\nrequest for information, and thus need not result in a\ncomplete exchange of data.\n\nIn order to optimally allocate communications bandwidth,\nusers within an area may engage in a local auction, that is,\neach user bids for use of the shared medium, with those\ndeferred and the supplier of information receiving credits.\nAn accounting for these credits may, for example, take place\neach time a device connects with a central database, for\nexample, using a \u201chotspot\u201d or other access to the Internet.\nThese credits may, for example, be converted into economic\nvalues. In like manner, advertisers may also bid for access to\nusers, with users, for example, receiving credit for receipt of\nadvertising. Such bidding may be on an individual or group\nbasis. Typically, advertising will be relevant, for example as\na location-based output, but need not be.\n\nTt is also possible to conduct auctions or otherwise\naccount for control of the communications medium using a\nzero-sum temporal averaging. That is, each user has an a\npriori equal right to access. As a user takes advantage of that\naccess, its rights decrease, until exhausted. Over time, rights\nare added, and accrued rights expire. For example, rights\nmay have a half-life of 5 minutes, with a regression to a\npredetermined value. As more users compete for control\nover the medium, cost increases. Suppliers of information\nmay receive partial credits from the consumer. Value trans-\nmission may take place using a modified micropayment\nscheme, for example a variant of Agora Micropayment\nProtocol, \u201cAgora: A Minimal Distributed Protocol for Elec-\ntronic Commerce\u201d, Eran Gabber and Abraham Silberschatz,\nBell Laboratories or MPTP, Micro Payment Transfer Pro-\ntocol (MPTP) Version 0.1, W3C Working Draft 22 Nov. 95,\nwww.w3.org/pub/W W W/TR/WD-mptp-951122.\n\nThus, within a cell, each user is a primary recipient, a\nsecondary recipient, a supplier, or undefined. A primary\nrecipient bids for access and control of the medium, i.e., the\ncommunications band. This bid takes the form of a cell\nidentification (i.e., the controlling user\u2019s location and itin-\nerary), as well as an economic function representing the\nrequired information and valuation thereof by the user. The\nbids are broadcast and each recipient calculates an actual\nvalue for the bid using its own database and the relevance\nfunction. The calculated economic values, filtered by the\nrecipient databases, are then broadcast, and the highest\nactual valuation is deemed winner. A negotiation then occurs\nbetween the bidder and the holder of the valued information,\nfor payment for the transmission, and other bidders receive\na lesser value as a concession. Secondary recipients of the\ninformation also pay for the information, based on their\nrespective bids, with a redistribution to the other bidders as\na concession. Devices which are not active bidders have no\neconomic effect, although these may accumulate and use\ntransmitted information from others. Thus, an economic\nredistribution occurs efficiently, while optimally allocating\nscarce bandwidth.\n\nTn general, the auction parameters may be too complex for\ninteractive user entry. Rather, the user cost function itself\nrepresents the user valuation, and therefore is usable as a\nbidding function. In the cost function, both subjective and\nobjective values are observed. With respect to objective\n\n10\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n92\n\nvalues, the relationship of a user context and an event known\nby the recipient provides a relevance, and therefore the\nobjective valuation. This objective valuation is then warped\nby user subjective factors. Some users may be quite willing\nto pay more for a better quality of service. At least a portion\nof this value is distributed to other users; this system allows\neven those with low valuation to access the network, since\nthese deferred users will accumulate credits. In some cases,\nthe credits may be provided with cash value (i.e., an ability\nof a user to extract cash proceeds from the system), while in\nother cases, these credits are limited to use with the system,\nwith no redemption rights. The use of a central authority for\nthe purchase of usage credits therefore allows a profit\nincentive for the authority responsible for the system. A user\nmay therefore express a higher valuation by purchasing units\nfrom an authority, or by providing value to other users of the\nsystem, which may, for example, require enhanced hardware\npurchases to include more and/or better sensors of various\nconditions.\n\nA negotiation or auction may also include external ele-\nments, such as fixed infrastructure. In this case, the scarce\nresource is, for example, the right of way. Elements of the\nfixed infrastructure which are subject to negotiation include\ntraffic lights, draw bridges, railroad crossings, etc. Typically,\nsuch infrastructure systems have low intelligence. By\nemploying communications with interested parties, a more\nefficient outcome may be predicted as compared to \u201cfair\u201d,\nthough unintelligent decisions. Thus, competing drivers may\nbid for a right of way or green light. The traffic signal may\nbe arbiter of the negotiation, or merely recipient of the\ndefined result. In some instances, the negotiation is free of\ncost, for example, a traffic light with but one car approaching\nand no hazards surrounding. In this case, the signal allows\nthe driver to pass, unobstructed. In another instance, a large\namount of traffic may be present, seeking to pass through an\nintersection. All of the vehicles seeking to pass present\n\u201cbids\u201d for the right, with bids representing common interests\nor outcomes pooled. The aggregate bids are then compared\nfor action. In this case, the transaction may have no eco-\nnomic impact, but rather the utility functions may be rela-\ntively non-subjective. For example, emergency vehicles\nmay have a non-subjectively determined high valuation, cars\ndriving toward the intersection with a present state of traflic\nflow control in their favor at a medium valuation, and\nstopped traffic with a low valuation. As the duration of the\nstop increases, a delay factor increases the valuation for the\nstopped traffic to compensate, allowing or forcing the signal\nto change. The objective criteria used in this circumstance\n(which may, for example, be defined by a municipality or\ntraffic engineer) may include optimization of pollution,\nenergy efficiency, effects of traffic flow on other intersec-\ntions, speed control, and other considerations.\n\nIt is noted that, since external elements communicate\nusing the same communications system, and indeed various\ncommunications systems may share the same band, the\nconcept of bidding for use of the shared or scarce resource\nmay transcend a given communications purpose, and, other\nthan communicating using a common protocol for the bid-\nding and auction process, other users of the band need not\ncommunicate public information.\n\nAuser may also provide a subjective element to a context,\nfor example, a driver may be in a rush or be late for a\nmeeting. This may be explicitly input by the user, as a factor\nwhich adjusts the cost function higher, or may be derived\nimplicitly from observation of user behavior. Likewise, a\ndriver may be in no particular rush, and therefore place a low\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 61 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n93\n\nrelevance to information which might be of particular ben-\nefit to allow him to travel faster.\n\nThus, in a purely fair system, each user is allocated a\n\u201cfair\u201d chance for access to the scarce bandwidth resource,\nand bids using equally distributed credits to compensate\nthose users deferred, and particularly those users who pro-\nvide useful information. A user bids using a cost function,\nrepresenting the maximum value of the resource to that user.\nUsing known auction theory, for example, the cost to the\nwinning bidder may be the price bid by the second-highest\nbidder. Of course, other known auction types may be\nemployed. The cost function may be automatically gener-\nated by a user based on available funds, likely future\nrequired use of the funds, a relevance or context which\nallows for adaptive bidding based on the value of the\ninformation to be provided, and user-subjective factors. The\nactual normalized bid is resolved by the respective recipi-\nents, which then broadcast the results. The maximum value\nbidder then controls the scarce bandwidth resource until the\nbid-for communication is completed or exhausted. In order\nto avoid inefficient reauction overhead, a periodic auction\nmay be conducted, with all bidders placed in a queue.\n\nClearly, in real world situations, a number of additional\ndistortions will take place. Bidders may become unavailable\nprior to completion of a communication. Interference may\nrequire retransmission.\n\nAs discussed above, each \u201climited resource\u201d may be\nsubject to auction. Preferably, a spatial division multiplexing\nscheme is employed, wherein each band has one or more\nfrequency channels. High gain, directional antennas are\nemployed, such that there is a high degree of frequency\nreuse within a local area. However, there will be a statistical\ndegree of competition for the frequencies. In addition, there\nwill be competition from other competing uses for the band,\nwhich may also engage in an auction scheme for access.\nTypically, by efficiently negotiating an auction between all\nusers of the resource (i.e., the overhead for negotiation is\nnegligible as compared to the actual usage), overall through-\nput and capacity will be increased.\n\nFor example, each system may include 8-16 transceivers\nor the ability to conduct 8-16 communication sessions\nsimultaneously. In the former case, 8-16 directional antennas\nhaving relatively low overlap are arrayed in different direc-\ntions, providing a physical separation. In the later case, a\nphased array or synthetic aperture antenna system electroni-\ncally defines 8-16 independent apertures, also with low\noverlap. Each spatial domain aperture and its associated\ncoverage area represents a different resource which may be\nallocated. Therefore, multiple simultaneous negotiations\nmay occur simultaneously. Each aperture may be a separate\nradio, with packets routed there-between, or the radios may\nbe coordinated.\n\nIt is also noted that the communications system may be\nused not only for packet data communications between\npeers, but also as a real time communication system for data\nstreams, such as voice communications. In this case, hand-\noffs may be necessary between various nodes in order to\nassure continuous end-to-end communications. Such hand-\noffs and multiple hop communications may be predicted in\nadvance and pre-negotiated. Such communications predic-\ntions may, indeed, involve multiple systems, such as various\ncellular carriers and protocols, 802.11 hot spots, and a\nmobile ad-hoc network with sporadic links to fixed infra-\nstructure. This, in turn, allows a balancing of competitive\nuses for the resources, quality of service, cost, and reliability.\nFor example, by providing a mobile ad-hoc supplementation\nfor a fixed cellular infrastructure, the incidence of dropped\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n94\n\ncalls and service unavailability may be reduced. Likewise,\ncellular carriers may allocate their infrastructure build-outs\nand capital investments where the return on investment will\nbe maximum. On the other hand, cellular users in such\nregions may employ other users to act as repeaters for\nextending the effective range of their equipment. In this case,\nthe compensation and/or negotiation therefore for use of the\nsystem may come, in whole, or in part, from the fixed\ninfrastructure provider. On the other hand, if the system is\nsponsored by the fixed infrastructure carrier, then the\nrepeater services hosted by each node may be at no incre-\nmental cost to the fixed service provider.\n\nThis later possibility provides an interesting opportunity.\nSince the fixed cellular infrastructure providers generally\nown licensed spectrum, the implementation of repeater or ad\nhoc services between mobile units may be coordinated\ncentrally, with mobile-to-mobile communications using cel-\nlular channels, which may be time domain (TDMA), fre-\nquency domain (FDMA), code division (CDMA and related\nsystems), or other type of band-sharing scheme in accor-\ndance with the more global standards generally established\nfor these services. Typically, mobile-to-mobile communica-\ntions use omnidirectional antennas, and packet data com-\nmunications may use excess system capacity, e.g., capacity\nnot presently being used for voice or other toll or real-time\nservice. The fixed infrastructure my also provide coordina-\ntion of information communication services, local buffering,\nad multicast f information of general interest.\n\nIt is therefore clear that the present invention may com-\nprise both disruptive and incremental technologies, and the\nunderlying business model may therefore be modified to\nsuit.\n\nA particular issue which is advantageously addressed\nduring the design phase is the security of the system against\n\u201chackers\u201d or malfeasants. This may be dealt with by pro-\nviding a central database of authorized users, with peer\nreporting of accounting and apparent abuse. If a user is\nsuspected of abuse, its access rights may be extinguished.\nThis, in turn, will at least prevent the user from engaging in\nauctions, and, if transmissions are encrypted or otherwise\nsecure, may prevent eavesdropping on normal communica-\ntions streams. This same result may be imposed on a user\nwho exhausts his credits, although it is preferred that a user\nwho is otherwise in compliance with normal regulations be\npermitted to recetve communications and indeed to gain new\ncredits by transmitting useful information.\n\nSince the system is a packet data system, similar to in\nmany respects, and possibly an extension of, the Internet,\nvarious known Internet security paradigms may be applied\nand employed.\n\nWhile it is often useful to engage in fair auctions or\ngames, it is also possible to engage in unfair auctions. For\nexample, since there may be external financial requirements\nfor maintenance of the system, these may be paid by\nsubscription fees, or subsidized by advertisers. The adver-\ntiser may transmit its own cost function, and bid for pre-\nsentation to given users, or engage in a broadcast for all\nusers. In this case, more valuable users will gain more\ncredits, and therefore have more control over the network.\nThis is not \u201cfair\u201d, but the distortions implicit in this tech-\nnique may be tolerable. Likewise, a bidder may purchase\ncredits, but typically this purchase will be consumed by the\nservice operator, and not paid to the users as a whole.\nHowever, presumably, this will on the whole reduce normal\nservice pricing for all users. Indeed, various promotional\ntechniques may be used to distort allocation of bandwidth,\nwithout departing from the general scope of the invention.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 62 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n95\n\nTt is noted that this implicit auction process, wherein a\nuser bids a utility function rather than a normalized eco-\nnomic value, is a distinct part of the invention, applicable to\na plurality of contexts and environments, well beyond tele-\nmatics. Likewise, the concept of bidding for quality of\nservice to control a shared resource, against competing\nusers, is also applicable to other contexts, notably peer-to-\npeer networks, other shared transmission medium networks,\nand queues.\n\nIn order to define a user\u2019s subjective preferences, value\nfunctions, and the like, a number of methods may be\nemployed. Certainly, express and explicit inputs may be\nreceived from a user. Likewise, a user model may be\nconstructed by observation of the user. A user may be\nclassified as a member of a group having common prefer-\nences, and then the preferences associated with the group\nmay serve as a proxy for the user himself. This is called a\ncollaborative profile, the basis for a collaborative filter. In\norder to classify a user into a group, personality tests and/or\ncommon attributes may be employed. According to a par-\nticular aspect of the invention, a user may be classified by\ngame play. By using game theory, irrational or subjective\nuser biases may be revealed. By using games, a user\u2019s utility\nfunction valuation may be assessed. Likewise, risk tolerance\nand demand for immediate gratification can be determined.\nFurther, game theory in the form of wagering may also assist\nin determining economic normalizations. Games, especially\nwith the results augmented by collaborative profiling, may\nthrough a limited number of iterations, elicit relatively\ndetailed information. Indeed, through inter-relation with\ncommercial sponsorship (or state associated lotteries), the\neconomic incentives and risks of the game may be made\nquite real.\n\nFifth Embodiment\n\nIn communicating data to another communications\ndevice, typically it is desired to transmit (or exchange) all of\nthe memory or all of a \u201cpublic\u201d portion of the memory, with\nthe received information sorted and processed by the receiv-\ning unit and relevant information persistently stored in the\nmemory. After exchange, conflicts may be resolved by a\nfurther exchange of information. An error detection and\ncorrection (EDC) protocol may be employed, to assure\naccurate data transmission.\n\nSince the communication bandwidth is necessarily lim-\nited, and the communications channels subject to noise and\ncrowding, it is often important to prioritize transmissions. It\nis noted that, without a complete communication of the\nmemory, it is difficult to determine which events a commu-\nnications partner is aware of, so that an initial communica-\ntion may include an identification of the partners as well as\nrecent encounters with other partners, to eliminate redundant\ncommunications, where possible. Vehicles traveling in the\nsame direction will often be in close proximity longer than\nvehicles traveling in opposite directions. Further, the infor-\nmation of relevance to a vehicle traveling in the same\ndirection will differ from the information of relevance to a\nvehicle traveling in the opposite direction. Thus, in addition\nto an identification of the communications device, the recent\npath and proposed path and velocity should also be\nexchanged. Based on this information, the data is prioritized\nand sorted, formatted and transmitted. Since the communi-\ncations channel will likely vary in dependence on distance\nbetween partners, the communications protocol may be\nadaptive, providing increased data rate with decreasing\ndistance, up to the channel capacity. Further, when the\n\n25\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n96\n\nvehicles are relatively close, a line-of-sight communications\nscheme may be implemented, such as infrared (e.g., IRdA),\nwhile at larger distances (and/or for all distances) a spread\nspectrum 915 MHz, 2.4 GHz or 5.825 GHz RF communi-\ncations scheme implemented.\n\nWhere multiple communications devices are present\nwithin a common communications region, these may be\npooled, allowing transmissions from one transmitter to\nmany receivers. In addition, within a band, multiple chan-\nnels may be allocated, allowing multiple communications\nsessions. In this case, a single arbitration and control channel\nis provided to identify communications devices and com-\nmunications parameters. Preferably, a communications\ndevice has the capability to monitor multiple channels\nsimultaneously, and optionally to transmit on multiple chan-\nnels simultaneously, where channel congestion is low. The\nchannels are typically frequency division. Where such fre-\nquency division channels are defined, communications may\nbe facilitated by so-called \u201crepeaters\u201d, which may itself be\na mobile transceiver according to the present invention.\nPreferably, such a repeater unit itself monitors the data\nstream, and may even process the data stream based on its\ninternal parameters before passing it on.\n\nIn order to assure data integrity and optimize data band-\nwidth, both forward and retrospective error correction are\napplied. Data is preferably packetized, with each packet\nincluding error detection and correction information. Suc-\ncessful receipt of each packet is acknowledged on a reverse\nchannel, optionally interspersed with corresponding data\npackets traveling in the reverse direction (e.g., full duplex\ncommunications). Where the data error rate (raw or cor-\nrected) is unacceptably high, one or more \u201cfallback\u201d modes\nmay be implemented, such as reduced data rates, more fault\ntolerant modulation schemes, and extended error correction\nand detection codes. Transmitter power may also be modu-\nlated within acceptable limits.\n\nA central repository of event data may be provided, such\nas on the Internet or an on-line database. In this case, event\ninformation may be administered remotely, and local storage\nminimized or eliminated.\n\nCommunications with the central database may be con-\nducted through cellular infrastructure, wired or wireless\nlocal area network hotspots, or in other communications\nbands and other communications schemes.\n\nWhere primary event information storage is remote from\nthe device, preferably local storage is based on an itinerary\n(route) and frequently traveled areas, with less frequently\ntraveled and not prospectively traveled routes stored\nremotely. This allows consolidated update of memory by a\nlarge number of sources, with statistical error detection and\ncorrection of errant event information. The itinerary infor-\nmation may be programmed in conjunction with a GPS\nsystem and mapping/navigation software.\n\nAccording to one embodiment of the invention, a plurality\nof functions are integrated into a single device, a sensor or\ndetector for sensor emissions, for example speed control\ndevices, a human computer interface, a computer system\nincluding processor, memory, and operating system, geo-\nspatial positioning device, and wireless communication sys-\ntem. Preferably, the system supports accessory inputs and\noutputs, which may be through wired or wireless means. The\nhuman computer interface preferably includes both a\ngraphic display and a natural language (e.g., voice) inter-\nface. The computer system preferably possesses sufficient\nmachine intelligence to filter outputs based on relevance and\ncontext, as well as interpret inputs as usable commands.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 63 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n97\n\nData communications over a wireless link, for commu-\nnicating between vehicles, preferably is highly compressed\nand fault tolerant. For digital data, this typically requires\nerror detection and correction codes, while for data repre-\nsenting analog information, the information may be encoded\nsuch that more important information is transmitted in a\nmore robust manner than less important information. For\nexample, image information may be communicated in a\nhierarchally compressed manner, with higher order infor-\nmation transmitted in a manner less susceptible to interfer-\nence and signal fading than lower order information.\n\nThe digital data may be compressed, for example, using\na dictionary lookup, run length encoding, and/or model-\nbased vector quantization method. Thus, since transceivers\nin accordance with this embodiment will typically be within\n2000 meters from each other, relative position may be\nrelayed in an offset format, with a grid size based on GPS\nprecision and required accuracy, e.g., about 50-100 meters.\nThe encoding may be adaptive, based, for example, on\nstored map information, with information representation\ndensity highest on traveled routes and lower in desolate\nareas. Thus, a sort of differential-corrected positional coding\nmay be established between units.\n\nBy integrating functions, efficiencies are achieved. Thus,\na single central processor, memory, program store and user\ninterface may suffice for all functions. Further, the power\nsupply and housing are also consolidated. While GPS and\ntelecommunication antennas may be maintained as distinct\nelements, other portions of the system may also be inte-\ngrated. In a device intended for vehicular applications, the\nGPS and other functions may be available to other vehicular\nsystems, or the required data received from other systems.\n\nCommunication between communications devices may\nemploy unlicensed spectrum or licensed spectrum, and may\ncommunicate between mobile units or between mobile and\nfixed resources. For example, excess capacity of a traditional\ncellular system may be used for inter-vehicle communica-\ntions. Thus, the system may include or encompass a typical\ncellular (AMPS, IS-136, IS-95, CDPD, PCS and/or GSM)\ntype telecommunications device, or link to an external\ntelecommunications device.\n\nEven where the cellular telephony infrastructure is not\ninvolved, mobile hardware may be reused for the present\ninvention. For example, digital or software defined cellular\ntelephone handsets may permit programmed use outside the\nnormal cellular system protocols.\n\nAccording to the present invention, messages may be\npassed between a network of free roving devices. In order to\nmaintain network integrity, spurious data should be\nexcluded. Thus, in order to prevent a \u201chacker\u201d or miscreant\n(e.g., overzealous police official) from intentionally con-\ntaminating the dispersed database, or an innocent person\nfrom transmitting corrupted data, the ultimate source of\nevent data is preferably recorded. When corrupt or erroneous\ndata is identified, the source may then also be identified. The\nidentity of the corrupting source is then transmitted or\nidentified, for example to other radios or to a central\ndatabase, whereupon, units in the field may be programmed\nto ignore the corrupt unit, or to identify its location as a\npossible event to be aware of. Further, assuming the hard-\nware of the corrupted unit remains operational, a code may\nbe transmitted to it deactivating it or resetting or reprogram-\nming it.\n\nPreferably, data is transmitted digitally, and may be\nencrypted. Encryption codes may be of a public-key/private\nkey variety, with key lookup and/or certificate verification,\neither before each data exchange, or on a global basis with\n\n25\n\n40\n\n45\n\n55\n\n98\n\npublished updates. In fact, corrupt or unauthorized units may\nbe deactivated by normal and authorized units within the\nnetwork, thus inhibiting \u201chacking\u201d of the network. Commu-\nnications may be metered or otherwise controlled externally,\nwith charges assessed based on usage factors. As discussed\nabove, units may bid for control over the transmission\nmedium, and an accounting may take place either between\ncorresponding units, with a central database, or both. Thus,\na subscription based system is supported.\n\nTechniques corresponding to the Firewire (EEE 1394)\ncopy protection scheme may be implemented, and indeed\nthe system according to the present invention may imple-\nment or incorporate the IEEE 1394 interface standard. The\nTEEE 1394 key management scheme may be useful for\nimplementing subscription schemes and for preventing tam-\npering.\n\nOne way to subsidize a subscription-based system is\nthrough advertising revenue. Therefore, the \u201cevents\u201d may\nalso include messages targeted to particular users, either by\nlocation, demographics, origin, time, or other factors. Thus,\na motel or restaurant might solicit customers who are close\nby (especially in the evening), or set up transponders along\nhighways at desired locations. Travelers would then receive\nmessages appropriate to time and place. While the user of\nthe system according to the present invention will typically\nbe a frequent motorist or affluent, the system may also\nprovide demographic codes, which allow a customized\nresponse to each unit. Since demographic information is\npersonal, and may indicate traveler vulnerability, this infor-\nmation is preferably not transmitted as an open message and\nis preferably not decodable by unauthorized persons. In fact,\nthe demographic codes may be employed to filter received\ninformation, rather than to broadcast interests.\n\nCommercial messages may be stored in memory, and\ntherefore need not be displayed immediately upon receipt.\nFurther, such information may be provided on a so-called\n\u201csmart card\u201d or PC Card device, with messages triggered by\nlocation, perceived events, time and/or other factors. In turn,\nthe presentation of commercial messages may be stored for\nverification by an auditing agency, thus allowing accounting\nfor advertising fees on an \u201cimpression\u201d basis.\n\nThe communications device may also receive data\nthrough broadcasts, such as using FM sidebands, paging\nchannels, satellite transmission and the like. Thus, location-\nally or temporally distant information need not be transmit-\nted between mobile units. Satellite radio systems may also\nbe integrated.\n\nWhile low power or micropower design is desirable, in an\nautomobile environment, typically sufficient power is con-\ntinuously available to support sophisticated and/or power\nhungry electronic devices; thus, significant design freedom\nis provided to implement the present invention using avail-\nable technologies.\n\nSixth Embodiment\n\nFIG. 8 shows a block diagram of a communications\ndevice embodiment of the present invention. The mobile\ncommunications device 1 includes a location sensing system\n2, producing a location output 3; a memory 4, for example\nstoring a set of locations and associated events; a telecom-\nmunications subsystem 5, for example communicating event\nand location information between a remote system and the\nmemory 4; and a processor 6, for example processing the\nlocation output in conjunction with the stored locations and\nassociated events in the memory 4, to determine a priority\nthereof.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 64 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n99\n\nThe location sensing system 2 may include a known GPS\nreceiver, which produces data that is analyzed by the pro-\ncessor 6. In an alternate embodiment, the GPS receiver\nincludes its own processor and outputs coordinate positions,\ne.g., Cartesian coordinates, latitude and longitude, to the\ncommunications device processor 6, e.g., through a serial\nport or data bus, such as PC card, Universal serial Bus\n(USB), Firewire (IEEE 1394), peripheral connect interface\n(PC]), or other bus, such as that present within an automo-\nbile for communication of signals between subsystems. The\nlocation sensing system may also determine a position based\non the GLONASS system, LORAN, inertial reference, cel-\nlular base stations 10', 10\", triangulation with fixed radio\nsources, such as FM radio and television stations, environ-\nmental markers and/or transponders, or the like. The loca-\ntion system may also be network based, for example relying\non a cellular network to produce georeferenced position\ninformation.\n\nThe communications subsystem 5 is, for example, an\n802.11g wireless Ethernet local area network system, having\na router and switch controlling communications between 8\nseparate spatially distinct channels, defined by a \u201csmart\nantenna\u201d. These spatially distinct channels are agile and\nhaving an aperture capable of being steered in real time to\nadjust for a change in relative position and orientation. The\nrouter and switch permit forwarding of packets received\nthrough one channel to another, as well as local communi-\ncations control. The radio transceiver 12, operates in the\nunlicensed 2.4 GHz band, according to FCC regulations for\nthis type of equipment. The system may alternately or\nadditionally communicate in other unlicensed bands, such as\n27 MHz, 49 MHz, FRS band, 900 MHz, 5.4 GHz, 5.8-5.9\nGHz using various known modulation schemes and data\ncommunication protocols. Further, licensed radio bands may\nalso be used, including FM radio sidebands (88-108 MHz),\ntelevision PRO channel, cellular telephony channels, DECT,\nPCS and GSM channels, and the like. Likewise, satellite\nsystems 16, 17 may be used to communicate with the mobile\ncommunications device 1. Thus, for example, instead of\ndirect communication between mobile units, the existing\ncellular telephony 10', 10\" infrastructure may be used to\nprovide intercell, local, and/or regional communications\nbetween units, controlled by cellular telephone switching\nprocessors 11', 11\". These communications may be given a\nlower priority than voice communications on the cellular\ntelephone network, and therefore may use otherwise excess\nbandwidth, thus allowing reduced costs and reduced user\nfees or subscription rates.\n\nThe memory 4 may be of any standard type, for example,\none or more of static random access memory, dynamic\nrandom access memory, ferroelectric memory, magnetic\ndomain memory (e.g., diskette, hard disk), non-volatile\nsemiconductor memory (e.g., UV-EPROM, EEPROM,\nFlash, non-standard electrically erasable programmable\nnon-volatile memory), optically readable memory (e.g.,\nR-CDROM, RW-CDROM, R-DVD, DVD-RAM, etc.),\nholographic memory, and the like. Preferably, common\nmemory devices, such as EDO, SDRAM, RIMM, DDR, are\nemployed, at least for a volatile portion of the memory,\nallowing simple upgrades and industry standard compatibil-\nity.\n\nWhile the preferred embodiment includes a radio fre-\nquency transceiver for transmitting event data and receiving\nevent data, embodiments are also possible which either\ntransmit or receive the relevant data, but not both. For\nexample, regulations may limit certain transmissions or\nrelevant event sensors, e.g., radar detectors in trucks. In\n\n20\n\n25\n\n40\n\n45\n\n100\n\nthese cases, a receive-only embodiment may be appropriate.\nFurther, while radio frequency communications are pre-\nferred, due to their range, data capacity and availability,\noptical communications systems 13, e.g., infrared LED\u2019s\nand laser diodes, acoustic communication 15, passive back-\nscatter communications (employing an RF transceiver such\nas the spread spectrum transceiver 12), and the like may also\nbe employed in conjunction or in substitution of a radio\nfrequency system. Optical communication systems 13 may\nemploy various detectors, including optical homodyne\ndetectors, or other coherent optical detectors, or other types\nof optical sensors, such as PIDs, CCDs, silicon photodiodes,\nand the like.\n\nUnder some circumstances, a wired or dedicated link\nbetween units may be appropriate. For example, a central\ndatabase 20 may provide consolidated and reliable data. The\nrelevant portion of the database 20 may be downloaded by\ntelephone through a modem 21, either through a physical\nconnection 23 (e.g., POTS or ISDN, line), through a broad-\nband Internet connect, or other network 24, to a database\nserver 25. The memory 4 of the mobile unit may also be\nuploaded to the central database 20, after processing by the\ndatabase server 25, during the same connection or session.\n\nThus, according to the present invention, the public\nswitched telephone network 24 may be involved both during\nintermittent mass data communications with a central data-\nbase 20, and also using, for example, cellular telephony 14,\nfor the normal operation of the system (e.g., communica-\ntions between mobile units).\n\nAs discussed above, general access to and control over the\ncommunications channel may be arbitrated on a bid and\nauction basis, as appropriate to avoid contention.\n\nThe processor 6 analyzes the information stored in\nmemory 4 to provide a prioritized output. Thus, the memory\nmay store information relating to a relatively large number\nof events, without overwhelming the capacity of a human\nuser or communications partner. Priority may be based on a\nnumber of factors, including proximity of a stored location\nto a sensed location or a spatial-temporal proximity of a\nstored location to a loci of an itinerary 101, a prospective\nconjunction 102 of a sensed location with a stored location,\na type of event 103, a type of event and a sensed condition\nassociated with the mobile communications device 104, or\nother factors or a combination of factors. Neural networks,\nfuzzy logic and/or traditional logic paradigms may also be\nemployed to prioritize the outputs. These logical paradigms\nare provided in known manner, and, especially in the case of\nneural network-based systems, a training aspect may be\nsupplied with the system to allow it to adapt to the prefer-\nences and capabilities of the user. Thus, for a human user,\nevents which are forthcoming and important are output,\nwhile past events and those in the distant future, if at all, are\nlow priority. On the other hand, for communications with\nother devices, the prioritization is primarily in consideration\nof the fact that the communication between units may be\nonly short lived; therefore, the data is communicated in\norder to priority, preferably of the recipient device. In an\nadaptive device, if the user believes that the information\nfrom the device is inappropriate, a simple input is provided,\nwhich is later analyzed to alter the information presentation\nalgorithm. Likewise, if an information alert retrospectively\nturns out to be erroneous is a predictable manner, 1.e.,\nrelating to a route not taken, the system may internally adjust\nthe algorithm without user input.\n\nIn order to sort the priorities, the intended recipient may,\nfor example, identify itself 201 and communicate its loca-\ntion 202 an itinerary or intended or prospective path 205.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 65 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n101\n\nHigh priority messages 204 and various codes 203 may be\ninterspersed through the communication string. The trans-\nmitting unit then outputs data 206 in order of the computed\nor predicted importance of the event and the time before the\nrecipient encounters the event. Static events, such as fixed\nlocation radar emission sources, which may, for example,\nindicate a source for interference with a radar detector, or a\nspeed detection/control device, may be transmitted as well.\nIn the case where there is contention for the band, the\ncommunications session is limited by the scope of the\nauthorization for use of the band. Where there is no con-\ntention, the duration of the communications channel will\ngenerally control the amount of information communicated.\n\nTherefore, it is noted that the present invention provides\na means for mapping events and for analyzing their signifi-\ncance. Thus, this embodiment does not merely rely on\nprocessed sensor outputs to supply information to the user;\nrather, sensor outputs may be filtered based on past experi-\nence with the particular location in question. If a particular\nuser does not have direct experience with a location, then the\nexperience of others at that location may be substituted or\ncombined to improve analysis of the sensor signal. There-\nfore, the signal analysis from the sensor need not be sub-\njected to a relatively high threshold to avoid false alarms. A\nlow threshold is acceptable because other information is\nemployed to determine the nature of the physical elements\nthat give rise to the event and sensor activation.\n\nIt is noted that, in the case of \u201cfalse alarms\u201d, the response\nof the unit is to detect the event, e.g., radar signal, correlate\nit with a stored \u201cfalse alarm\u201d event, and suppress an alarm\nor modify the alarm signal. Thus, information stored in\nmemory and/or transmitted between units, may signify an\nimportant alarm or a suppression of an erroneous alarm. In\nthis context is apparent that the integrity of the database\nstructure, especially from corruption by the very sources of\nalarms which are intended to be detected, is important. To\nthe extent that the environment responds to the existence and\ndeployment of the system according to the present inven-\ntion, for example by detecting transmissions between units\nto identify and locate units, and thereby alter the nature of\nan event to be detected, the present system may also be\nadaptive, in terms of its function and signature spectral\npatterns. In one aspect, the system may flash memory or\nflash memory modules, which controls system operation.\nTherefore, periodically, the system operation may be altered.\nThe communications may selectively occur on a plurality of\nbands, using a plurality of protocols. Thus, for example, the\nsystem may have tri-band capability, e.g., 900 MHz, 2.4\nGHz and 5.8-5.9 GHz. The mapping feature of the present\ninvention may also be used to identify the locations of such\nmonitoring sites. The system may also mask its transmis-\nsions as other, more common types of transmissions or\nenvironmental sources of emissions. A direct sequence\nspread spectrum technique maybe employed that is difficult\nto detect without knowing the spread spectrum sequence\nseed. Of course, an aspect of the present invention is open\ncommunications, which as a matter of course are not\nsecurely encrypted and which would identify the transpon-\nder and its location. This problem may be addressed, in part,\nrelying on laws which prevent unauthorized eavesdropping\nand unauthorized interception and decryption of communi-\ncations, unauthorized \u201ccopying\u201d of copyright works and\ndefeating of copy protection schemes thereof, control over\navailability of authorized transceivers, and patent protection\nof the design and implementation. According to one embodi-\nment of the invention, channel use and control is established\nover a first channel, which may be out of band with respect\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n102\n\nto the normal communications channel. Preferably, this\ncontrol channel is longer-range and more robust than the\ndata communications channel, permitting control to precede\nnormal communications capability, and providing enhanced\nrecover and network reconfiguration capabilities.\n\nAccording to one embodiment, all communications are\ndirect sequence spread spectrum over a wide band, with\nmedium to high security codes, e.g., 10 bits or greater length\nchip sequence and 12 bits or greater data encryption, and\nmore preferably 16 bit or greater chip sequence and 16 bit\nor greater data encryption. The chip sequence of the control\nand arbitration channel, which should be available to all\ncompatible units, may be adaptive or changing, for example\nfollowing a formula based on time, location, and/or an\narbitrary authorization code provided with a subscription\nupdate. Further, the chip sequence may vary based on\nselective availability (SA) deviancies in GPS data, or based\non the identity of satellites in view of the receiver. While\nsuch information might be available to \u201cpirates\u201d, miscreants,\nhackers and scofflaws, the algorithm for generating the chip\nsequence might be held as confidential, and thus the system\nunusable without specific authorization and incompatible\nwith equipment without such algorithm. Such systems\nemploying secure encryption with open access have been\nemployed in satellite television (General Instrument Video-\nCipher IJ) and the like. It is noted that, in order to mask a\nmessage in a spread spectrum signal, multiple active chan-\nnels may be employed, one or more of which transmits the\ndesired data and the remainder transmitting noise or mask-\ning data.\n\nEmploying 2.4 or 5.8-9 GHz communications bands, data\nrates of 54-108 megabits per second (MBPS) are possible,\nalthough lower rates, such as 0.5-1.0 MBPS may be pre-\nferred to gain range, reduce loss due to interference or\nadverse communications conditions and maintain availabil-\nity of simultaneous communications on multiple channels\nwithin the band in a small geographic area.\n\nWhere mobile devices are traveling parallel and at similar\nspeeds, or both are stopped, an extended communications\nsession may be initiated. In this case, the data prioritization\nwill be weighted to completely exchange a public portion of\nthe database, although emphasis will still be placed on\nimmediately forthcoming events, if anticipated. On the other\nhand, where computed or user-input trajectories indicate a\nlikely brief encounter, the immediate past events are\nweighted most heavily.\n\nIn order to analyze temporal or spatial relevance, the\nmemory 4 preferably stores an event identifier 301, a loca-\ntion 302, a time of detection of an event 303, a source of the\nevent information 304, an encoding for a likely expiration of\nthe event 305, a reliability indicator for the event 306, and\npossibly a message associated with the event 307 including\nother information. These data fields may each be transmitted\nor received to describe the event, or selectively transmitted\nbased on the nature of the event or an initial exchange\nbetween units specifying the information which will be\ncommunicated. Other types of relevance may also be\naccounted for, as discussed above.\n\nFor example, in a radar detector embodiment, mobile\npolice radar \u201ctraps\u201d are often relocated, so that a particular\nlocation of one event should not be perpetuated beyond its\nanticipated or actual relevance. In this case, expirations may\nbe stored, or calculated based on a \u201ctype\u201d of event according\nto a set of rules. False alarms, due to security systems, traffic\ncontrol and monitoring systems, and the like, may also be\nrecorded, to increase the reliability any warnings provided.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 66 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n103\n\nLikewise, traffic jams often resolve after minutes or hours,\nand, while certain road regions may be prone to traffic jams,\nespecially at certain hours of the day and/or days of the\nweek, abnormal condition information should not persist\nindefinitely.\n\nThe preferred embodiment according to the present inven-\ntion provides an event detector, which, in turn is preferably\na police radar 18 and LIDAR 19 detector. Other detected\nevents may include speed of vehicle, traffic conditions,\nweather conditions, road conditions, road debris or potholes,\nsite designation, sources of radio signals or interference or\nfalse alarms for other event detectors, and particular\nvehicles, such as drunk drivers or unmarked police cars\n(possibly by manual event input). The event detector may\ninclude, for example, a sensor, such as a camera 26, which\nmay analyze traffic control indicia (such as speed limits,\ncautions, traffic lights). The event may also include a com-\nmercial message or advertisement, received, for example\nfrom a fixed antenna beside a road, which, for example, is\nstored as the message 307. Such a commercial message 307\nmay be presented immediately or stored for future output.\nThe received message, whether commercial or not, may be\na static or motion graphic image, text or sound message. The\nuser output of the system 27 may thus be visual, such as a\ngraphic or alphanumeric (text) display, indicator lights or\nLED\u2019s 28, audible alerts or spoken voice through an audio\ntransducer 29.\n\nThe camera is, for example, a color or infrared charge\ncoupled device (CCD) or complementary metal oxide sili-\ncon field effect transistor (CMOS) imager, having resolution\nof 0.3 to 13 megapixels. Image communication may be, for\nexample H.261 or H.263+4, using H.323 or H.324 protocol,\nor MPEG-4. The imager may also be incorporated as part of\na mobile videoconferencing system, although a dual imager\nsystem (one for imaging persons and the other for imaging\nroad conditions) may be implemented. Other ITU standards,\ne.g., 1.120, may be employed for data communications,\nalthough the particular nature of the data communications\nchannel(s) may compel other communications protocols.\n\nTn order to maintain the integrity of the database stored in\nmemory 4, 20, it may be useful to store the originator of a\nrecord, i.e., its source 304. Thus, if event information from\nthat origin is deemed unreliable, all records from that source\nmay be purged, and future messages ignored or \u201cflagged\u201d.\nAs stated above, even the proximity of an unreliable or\nmodified unit may be detrimental to system operation.\nTherefore, where the location of such a unit is known, other\nunits in proximity may enter into a silent mode. Further,\nnormal units may transmit a \u201ckill\u201d message to the unreliable\nunit, causing it to cease functioning (at least in a transmit\nmode) until the problem is rectified or the unit reauthorized.\n\nThe unit is preferably tamper-proof, for example, codes\nnecessary for unit activation and operation are corrupted or\nerased if an enclosure to the unit is opened. Thus, techniques\nsuch as employed in the General Instrument VideoCipher II\nand disclosed in Kaish et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,494,114, may\nbe employed.\n\nThe communications subsystem preferably employs an\nerror correction/error detection protocol, with forward error\ncorrection and confirmation of received data packet. The\nscheme may be adaptive to the quality of the communication\nchannel(s), with the packet length, encoding scheme, trans-\nmit power, bandwidth allocation, data rate and modulation\nscheme varied in an adaptive scheme to optimize the com-\nmunication between units. In many cases, units engaged in\ncommunication will exchange information bidirectionally.\nIn that case, a full duplex communication protocol is pre-\n\n20\n\n40\n\n45\n\n104\n\nferred; on the other hand, where communication is unidi-\nrectional, greater data communication rates may be achieved\nemploying the available bandwidth and applying it to the\nsingle communication session.\n\nIn some instances, it may be desired to maintain privacy\nof communications. In that case, two possibilities are avail-\nable; spread spectrum communications, preferably direct\nsequence spread spectrum communications is employed, to\nlimit eavesdropping possibilities. Second, the data itself may\nbe encrypted, using, for example, a DES, PGP, elliptic keys,\nor RSA type encryption scheme. Keys may be supplied or\nexchanged in advance, negotiated between partners, or\ninvolve a public key-private key encryption algorithm. For\nexample, the spread spectrum communications chip\nsequence may be based on an encrypted code. Ultrawide-\nband (UWB) communications techniques may also be\nemployed.\n\nIn order to provide flexibility in financing the communi-\ncations devices, the commercial messages 307 discussed\nabove may be employed. Further, by circulating authoriza-\ntion tokens or codes 203, a subscription service may be\nprovided. Thus, in a simplest subscription scheme, the\ncommunications device has a timer function, which may be\na simple clock or GPS referenced. The user must input an\nauthorization code periodically in order for the device to\ncontinue operating. Thus, similarly to satellite television\nreceivers and some addressable cable television decoders,\nfailure to provide the authorization code, which may be\nentered, e.g., by telephone communication or through a\nkeypad 30, renders the device temporarily or permanently\ninoperative. In order to reduce the burden of reauthoriza-\ntions, the authorization codes or tokens may be passed\nthrough the communications \u201ccloud\u201d 24, so that devices 1,\nif used, will eventually receive the authorization data. Con-\nversely, a code 203 may be circulated which specifically\ndeactivates a certain device 1, for example for non-payment\nof the subscription fee or misuse of the device (e.g., in an\nattempt to corrupt other users databases). The authorization\nprocess is preferably integral to the core operation of the\nsystem, making bypassing authorization difficult.\n\nWhere a number of communications devices are in prox-\nimity, a multi-party communication session may be initiated.\nFor example, the communications subsystem may have\nsimultaneous multi-channel capability, allowing each unit to\ntransmit on a separate channel or use a shared channel.\nWhere the number of channels or channel capacity is\ninsufficient, units may take turns transmitting event infor-\nmation on the same channel (e.g., according to estimated\npriority), or time division multiplex (TDM) the channel(s).\nPreferably, the communication scheme involves a number of\nchannels within a band, e.g., 1 common control channel and\n24 data communications channels. Since some communica-\ntion sessions may be relatively short, e.g., limited to a few\nseconds, a data communications channel preferably has a\nmaximum capacity of tens of kilobits per second or higher.\nIn some cases, hundreds of kilobits, or megabit range\nbandwidths are achievable, especially with a small number\nof channels (e.g., one channel). For example, so-called third\ngeneration (3G) cellular communications protocols may be\nemployed.\n\nThus, for example, an 802.11g or 802.11n compatible\nspread spectrum transceiver operating in the 2.4 GHz band\nmight have a usable bandwidth of 10-108 megabits per\nsecond, even while sharing the same band with other trans-\nceivers in close proximity. Where necessary, directional\nantennas, or phased arrays may be employed to provide\nspatial discrimination.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 67 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n105\n\nThe system preferably has advanced ability to detect\nchannel conditions. Thus, where communications are inter-\nrupted by physical limitations in the channel, the impairment\nto the communications channel is detected and the commu-\nnications session paused until the impairment abates. This,\nin turn, will allow other units, which might not be subject to\nthe impairment, to use the same channel during this interval.\nThe channel impairment may be detected by a feedback\nprotocol between communications partners, or by means of\nsymmetric antennas and communications systems, by which\nan impairment of a received signal may be presumed to\naffect the transmitted signal as well. The latter requires a\nhigh degree of standardization of equipment design and\ninstallation for effectiveness.\n\nTt is particularly noted that, where the events to be\ndetected and the communications subsystem operate in the\nsame band, structures may be shared between the commu-\nnications and event detection systems, but this also increases\nthe possibilities for interference.\n\nAs one embodiment of the invention, the processor may\nbe provided as a standard personal digital assistant (PDA)\nwith a PC Card or PCMCIA slot for receiving a standard\nGPS receiver and another standard PC Card slot for receiv-\ning an 802.11b/g/a/R/A module. The PDA, in turn has\nmemory, which may include random access memory, flash\nmemory, and rotating magnetic memory (hard disk), for\nexample. The PDA has a processing system which is capable\nof running applications written in general purpose, high\nlevel languages such as C. The PDA may operate under a\nstandard operating system, such as Microsoft Windows CE,\nXP, Palm OS, Linux, or a proprietary operating system. A\nsoftware application written in a high level language can\nnormally be ported to run in the PDA processing system.\nThus, the basic elements of the hardware platform are all\navailable without customization. In a preferred embodiment,\nan event sensor is provided, such as a police radar and laser\nspeed detection equipment system (e.g., \u201cradar detector\u201d) is\nprovided. This may employ a modified commercially avail-\nable radar detector, to produce a serial data stream or parallel\nsignal set. For example, radar detectors providing an alpha-\nnumeric display often transmit data to the display controller\nby means of a serial data signal. This signal may be\nintercepted and interfaced with a serial port or custom port\nof the PDA.\n\nOptionally, the GPS Smart Antenna is \u201cdifferential-ready\u201d\nto apply differential GPS (DGPS) error correction informa-\ntion to improve accuracy of a GPS determined location. The\napplication program for the PDA may be provided in a\nsemiconductor memory cartridge or stored on hard disk.\n\nThe PDA 30 includes the processing system, including a\nmicroprocessor, memory, precoded program instructions\nand data stored in memory, a microprocessor bus for\naddresses, data, and control, an interrupt bus for interrupt\nsignals, and associated hardware, operates in a conventional\nmanner to receive digital signals, process information, and\nissue digital signals. A user interface in the PDA includes a\nvisual display or audible output to present signals received\nfrom the processing system to a user, a user entry system to\nissue signals from the user to the processing system. The\nuser interface may include one or more push keys, toggle\nswitches, proximity switches, trackballs, joysticks or pres-\nsure sensitive keys, a touch-sensitive display screen, micro-\nphones or a combination of any of the above used together\nor with other similar type user input methods. The PDA\nsends digital signals representing addresses, data, and com-\nmands to the memory device and receives digital signals\nrepresenting instructions and data from the memory. A PDA\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n106\n\ninterface electrically connects the processing system to a\nGPS Smart Antenna. If the PDA and GPS are not integrated,\na preferred interface comprises a computer standard low to\nmedium speed serial data interface, such as RS-232,\nRS-422, or USB (1.0, 1.1, 2.0), IEEE-1394, Bluetooth\n(especially if the communications system operates in\nanother band), through a cabled interface for connection to\nthe GPS Smart Antenna.\n\nThe GPS Smart Antenna system includes a GPS receiver\nantenna to receive GPS satellite signals from GPS satellite\ntransmitters, a GPS frequency downconverter to downcon-\nvert the approximately 1.575 GHz frequency of the L1 GPS\nsatellite signals to a lower frequency (LF) signal that is\nsuitable for digital processing, and to issue the LF to a GPS\nprocessor. The GPS processor demodulates and decodes the\nLF signal and provides location information for at least one\nof (4) location of the GPS antenna, (ii), GPS satellite\npseudoranges between the GPS satellites and the GPS\nantenna, (111) rate of change of location of the GPS antenna,\n(iv) heading of the GPS antenna, and (v) time to a GPS\ninterface. Optionally, the GPS Smart Antenna and GPS\nprocessor are differential-ready. An optional input select\nswitch, controlled by the GPS processor upon a request from\nthe PDA, allows a single serial interface to receive either a\ncontrol signal from the PDA or a DGPS error correction\nsignal from an optional DGPS radiowave receiver. Alter-\nnately, a DGPS-type system may be coordinated between\nmultiple mobile receivers, top provide high relative position\naccuracy, even where the absolute position accuracy is low.\nSince the event position calculations are based on the\nrelative position frame, the effect is to accurately position\nthe events with respect to the vehicle.\n\nThe user device may display, for example, map features\naccording to a coordinate system such as latitude and\nlongitude. The display may also include an indication of the\nlocation of the GPS receiver, an itinerary, proposed route,\nand indications of the location of various events. By corre-\nlating the GPS with a stored map, the absolute location of the\nvehicle may be determined by map matching techniques. In\naccordance with the present invention, these events are\nderived from the event detector or the memory. Other\ncommunications devices may also be located on the display.\n\nThe user entry system has both touchscreen keys and\npress keys in the present embodiment. With a touchscreen,\na user enters a request by touching a designated portion\noverlying a visual display with his finger (or soft pointer,\nsuch as a plastic pen). The touchscreen senses the touch and\ncauses a digital signal to be sent to the processing system\nindicating where the touch was made. Switches such as\nrotary switches, toggle switches, or other switches can\nequally well be applied. An advantage of the touchscreen is\nthat a label or a placement of the touchscreen, and a\ncorresponding function of the touchscreen, may be changed\nby the computer controlling the display any number of times\nwithout changing electrical or mechanical hardware. In the\npresent embodiment, zoom keys may be employed change\nscale and resolution of a map on the display. Zooming in\ndecreases the scale, so that the map is viewed with greater\nresolution over a lesser area of the map. Zooming out\nincreases the scale, so that a greater area of the map is\nviewed with lesser resolution. A map orientation key selects\nan orientation of a direction on the map with a direction on\nthe visual display, for example, orientations of north up or\ncurrent ground track up. It is noted that these map functions\nare generally known, and known techniques may be gener-\nally applied for such map functions. According to the present\ninvention, in addition to normal map functions, the event\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 68 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n107\n\ndata may be overlayed on the map to provide additional\ndimensions of display data. Further, by providing these data,\nwhich are dynamic, the map system becomes useful even to\ntravelers who are well aware of the geography and layout of\nthe region being traveled.\n\nOne communications scheme, a 900 MHz spread spec-\ntrum communications system, operates as follows. The RF\nreceiver demodulates the signal using known techniques,\nwhich may include superheterodyne and zero-IF techniques.\nThus, in a frequency hopping embodiment, the demodulator\ntracks the hop frequency sequence. In a direct sequence\nspread spectrum embodiment, the demodulator provides the\nappropriate pseudorandom code sequence to demodulate the\nreceived signal. Time synchronization may be effected by\nusing the timing functions of the GPS receiver. The demodu-\nlated signal is then decoded into messages, which are\ntypically digital bitstreams. The recetver may be process a\nplurality of signals simultaneously, allowing multiple sig-\nnals to be received simultaneously.\n\nSeventh Embodiment\n\nAd hoc networks are a good candidate for analysis and\noptimization according to game theory. A multihop ad hoc\nnetwork requires a communication to be passed through a\ndisinterested node. The disinterested node incurs a cost, thus\nleading to a disincentive to cooperate. Meanwhile, bystander\nnodes must defer their own communications. By under-\nstanding the decision analysis of the various nodes in a\nnetwork, it is possible to define a system which, in accor-\ndance with game theory, provides a benefit or incentive to\npromote cooperation and network reliability and stability.\nThe incentive, in economic form, may be charged to the\nnode(s) benefiting from the communication, and is prefer-\nably based on a value of the benefit received. This network\noptimization employs a modified combinatorial (VCG) auc-\ntion, which optimally compensates those burdened by the\ncommunication, while charging the benefiting participants.\nEquilibrium usage and headroom may be influenced by\ndeviating from a zero-sum condition. The mechanism seeks\nto define fairness in terms of market value, providing\nprobable participation benefit for all nodes, leading to net-\nwork stability.\n\nThe present example describes the application of game\ntheory concepts to the arbitration of access to bandwidth in\nan ad hoc communications network, more particularly to\nnetwork including mobile nodes. According to applicable\nelements of game theory, an agent makes a decision to\ncooperate with a system having established rules, or to\ncircumvent it. Likewise, cheating, i.e., adopting behavior\ncontrary to an expected nor, may be an option, and can be\nanalyzed in the context of a decision. Therefore, a game\ntheoretic approach addresses the situation where the opera-\ntion of an agent which has freedom of choice, allowing\noptimization on a high level, considering the possibility of\nalternatives to a well designed system. According to game\ntheory, the best way to ensure that a system retains compli-\nant agents, is to provide the greatest anticipated benefit, at\nthe least anticipated cost, compared to the alternates.\n\nMobile ad hoc networks encompass multihop networks,\nwhich, by their nature, require participation of disinterested\nnodes to operate. Technically, however, the multihop sce-\nnario is not intrinsic, since it is reasonable to presume that\nin some networks, all nodes are within range of each other.\nEach scenario poses a classic game theory issue to each\nnode: why defer to other nodes if no direct benefit is\nobtained? The multihop network adds the further issue of:\n\n20\n\n25\n\n40\n\n45\n\n55\n\n108\n\nwhy participate in communications between other nodes if\nno direct benefit is obtained? We discuss a set of mecha-\nnisms, incentives and rationales as a framework for analyz-\ning node behavior and optimization, and seeks to respond to\nthese issues by proposing appropriate incentives to promote\nnetwork efficiency and stability.\n\nThe application of game theory to ad hoc networks has\nbeen addressed in various forms to date. In general, there is\na divergence between approaches which define a real-world\nsystem, with all of its complexity, and required functionality,\nand those which seek to mathematically tractable model\nhaving a definite set of rules and presumptions leading to a\ncomprehensible and useful result.\n\nAn ad hoc network is a wireless network which does not\nrequire fixed infrastructure or centralized control. The ter-\nminals in the network cooperate and communicate with each\nother, in a self organizing network. In a multihop network,\ncommunications can extend beyond the scope of a single\nnode, employing neighboring nodes within the scope, to\nforward messages. In a mobile ad hoc network, constraints\nare not placed on the mobility of nodes, that is, they can\nrelocate within a time scale which is short with respect to the\ncommunications, thus requiring consideration of dynamic\nchanges in network architecture.\n\nAd hoc networks pose control issues with respect to\ncontention, routing and information conveyance. There are\ntypically tradeoffs involving equipment size, cost and com-\nplexity, protocol complexity, throughput efficiency, energy\nconsumption, and \u201cfairness\u201d of access arbitration. Other\nfactors may also come into play.\n\nGame theory studies the interactions of multiple indepen-\ndent decision makers, each seeking to fulfill their own\nobjectives. Game theory encompasses, for example, auction\ntheory and strategic decision-making. By providing appro-\npriate incentives, a group of independent actors may be\npersuaded, according to self-interest, to act toward the\nbenefit of the group. That is, the selfish individual interests\nare aligned with the community interests. In this way, the\ncommunity will be both efficient and the network of actors\nstable and predictable. Of course, any system wherein the\n\u201cincentives\u201d impose too high a cost, themselves encourage\ncircumvention. In this case, game theory also addresses this\nissue.\n\nCooperative Problems in Ad Hoc Networks\n\nTo understand why game theory is applicable the control\nover ad hoc networks, consider the analogy of a classroom.\nThe teacher acts as a central authority and arbitrator to\nensure decorum. The teacher recognizes one student at a\ntime for public communication. This is an example of\ncentralized control. If there were no teacher to recognize a\nstudent, pandemonium would result, unless a suitable pro-\ncess of self-organization is established, which obtains coop-\neration dictating common rules, adopted according to\nmutual incentives.\n\nNow, suppose one student wishes to send a note across the\nroom. Presumably, there are multiple paths to the destina-\ntion. But how can the student be sure that the note will be\nforwarded? How does one know which neighbor to hand-off\nto? Suppose that forwarding the note imposes a burden, such\nas the risk of being caught and sanctioned? Consider the\npossibility, after conclusion of negotiations for forwarding,\na student fails to fulfill his assumed responsibility?\n\nIt is therefore clear that the issues of subjective and\nobjective costs and benefits, distance, complexity, and reli-\nability, are therefore interrelated, and there may be practical\nrestraints on achieving theoretical system capacity.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 69 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n109\n\nThe game theoretic solution is to link an incentive or\nbenefit to the desired behavior, to promote cooperation of\neach agent with note forwarding, on a rational basis. The\nultimate payoff should be borne by the student receiving the\nbenefit. Thus, by linking benefits to costs, a stable society is\nachieved, approaching a desirable equilibrium.\n\nIn order to incentivize the intermediaries, a student could\ncompensate them by taping dimes to the note, instructing\neach forwarding student to remove one dime (the packet\npurse model). Alternately, the recipient may be expected to\npay for the transmission through an acknowledgement mes-\nsage with attached value (the packet trade model). However,\nhow do we know that the first recipient will not remove all\nthe money and throw away the note? How can the interme-\ndiaries ensure, in the packet trade model, that the recipient\nwill eventually pay? How does the responsible party know\nhow much must be paid? These models also require stability\nof the route during the process, and imply a priori knowl-\nedge of the route. This approach does not permit variations\nin compensation, e.g., some students might accept a nickel,\nand others in a critical position, might require a quarter. In\ncases of unreliable routes, should the originator send two\nnotes by alternate paths, or attempt to pay more for a single\nreliable delivery?\n\nEven with imposition of a traffic sensitive cost, one node\nof the network may seek to send an inordinate number of\nmessages, resulting in congestion. A node in a critical\nlocation may become wealthy, and its fees rise, leading to\ninstability. Likewise, in a virtual construct, what does one\nuse as currency? We see that consideration must be given to\nkeeping traffic below capacity, since highly loaded networks\noften have decreased efficiency.\n\nGame Theory\n\nGame theory is the study of the interaction of independent\nagents, in an environment where there are rules, decisions,\nand outcomes. Game theory defines the theoretical basis for\nstrategy, as well as providing a framework for analyzing\nreal-world actors. Game theory may be applied to automated\nsystems, providing a basis for the analysis and optimization\nof such systems. Aspects of game theory have been applied\nto telecommunications, for example to optimize network\nrouting, and has quality of service implications. Communi-\ncations resources may be treated as utilities, and auctions\nhave been applied to the optimization of allocation of utility\nresources.\n\nEach game has a set of rules or constraints, under which\nthe agents operate. \u201cCheating\u201d, if permitted at all, is mod-\neled as an available decision of an agent to comply with\nother constraints. Therefore, the game is valid as a model\nonly for the rules and constraints considered. Each decision\nmaker pursues a goal, and may take into account their\nknowledge or expectations of the other decision makers\u2019\nbehavior. According to game theory, rationality leads to\noptimality, and therefore analyzing the game and acting\nlogically in accordance with the rules leads to the best\noutcome.\n\nIt is conceptually simple for an automated system to act\nrationally. That is, given a set of facts and circumstances, the\nrational analysis is fixed and obtainable. On the other hand,\nhumans acting on purely mental consideration may deviate\nfrom rationality. For example, humans exhibit a broad range\nof risk tolerance, which is not directly explained by rational\nanalysis. It is noted that risk tolerance, and other aspects of\nbehavior, have been modeled, and as such, can themselves\nbe treated scientifically and rationally. In fact, game theory\nexpressly recognizes that agents may express private values\nwhich are not rationally explained, and that by understand-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n110\n\ning these values, a strategic advantage is obtained. Thus,\nwhile rationality is assumed as an optimum strategy for each\nentity, real entities have imperfect estimates of payoff and\nrisk, and indeed may miscalculate or misconstrue the cir-\ncumstances. Such perturbations may be compensated, under\ncertain circumstances, by way of various parameters added\nto the modeling equation.\n\nGame theory is typically encompassed in the study of\neconomics, since a self-interested node will always try to\nincrease its wealth, and all other concepts may be considered\nin terms of their subjective economic costs and benefits.\nGame theory can be used not only to analyze a defined game,\nbut also to define a game having a desired outcome, i.e., to\noptimize a set of rules and constraints. The preferences of a\nnode can be expressed either with a utility function, or with\npreference relations, ranking various consequences.\n\nGames can be divided into noncooperative and coopera-\ntive games. In cooperative games, the joint actions of groups\nare analyzed, i.e. what is the outcome if a group of players\ncooperate. In noncooperative games, the actions of the\nsingle players are considered. The cooperative game model\nmay be used to analyze heterogeneous ad hoc networks. In\nstrategic games, decisions are made at the commencement of\nthe game. In extensive games, decisions may be made\ninteractively. The strategic game model is suitable for rep-\nresenting simple real life events such as a sealed bid auction.\nA progressive bid auction may be modeled as an extensive\ngame.\n\nGames can also be divided according to their payoff\nstructures. A game is called zero-sum game if the sum of the\nutilities is constant in every outcome. Zero-sum games are\nconsidered strictly competitive games. For example, an\nauction is a zero sum game, since the buyer pays the seller,\nwith no other gains or losses incurred. If the players are fully\ninformed about each other\u2019s moves, the game has perfect\ninformation. Only extensive games consider the issue of\nperfect information. In games with complete information the\nutility function of each player is known. In a game with\nincomplete information, the privacy of a player\u2019s utility\nfunction is held as a strategic advantage.\n\nPareto efficiency exists if there is no other outcome that\nwould make all players better off. An equilibrium is a result\nof the optimization of the individual players, but does not\nimply that the result is \u201cgood\u201d or globally optimum. The\nsolution of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. Every\nstrategic game with finite number of players, each with a\nfinite set of actions, has an equilibrium point. This Nash\nequilibrium is a point from which no single player wants to\ndeviate unilaterally. When a game is played, the rationality\nassumption will force the game into a Nash equilibrium\noutcome. If the outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, at least\none player would gain a higher payoff by choosing another\naction. If there are multiple equilibrrums, more information\non the behavior of the players is needed to determine the\noutcome of the game.\n\nIn the strategic and extensive games, the solution of a\ngame is a complete set of strategies that achieve a Nash\nequilibrium. In cooperative games, the solution comprises\nthe subsets of players or coalitions from which no member\nhas an incentive to break away. Cooperative games can be\ndivided between games in which the coalition is free to\ninternally distribute a payoff (transferable payoff), and those\nin which the payoff is personal to coalition members (non-\ntransferable payoff). A dominant strategy is one in which the\nsame decision 1s made based on the various different rational\nstrategies an agent may adopt.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 70 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n111\n\nTo better understand game theory, it is useful to consider\nsimple games. In one game, called the prisoner\u2019s dilemma,\ntwo criminals are arrested and charged with a crime. The\npolice do not have enough evidence to convict the suspects,\nunless at least one confesses. They are not able to commu-\nnicate. Ifneither confesses, they will be convicted of a minor\ncrime and sentenced for one month. If one confesses, and the\nother does not, the confessing one will be given immunity\nand released and the other will be sentenced for nine months.\nIf both confess, both will be sentenced for six months.\n\nAnother famous game is the battle of the sexes. A couple\nis going to spend an evening out. She wishes to attend the\nopera and he wishes to attend a hockey match, but each gains\na benefit of the other\u2019s company.\n\nIn the prisoner\u2019s dilemma, all the outcomes except (Con-\nfess; Confess) are Pareto efficient. In the battle of the sexes,\nan outcome in which husband and wife attend different\nevents are not Pareto efficient. The outcome (Confess;\nConfess) is the equilibrium, while outcome (Don\u2019t confess;\nDon\u2019t confess) results in higher payoff for both the crimi-\nnals, but it is not an equilibrium because both the players\nhave an incentive to deviate from it. In the battle of the\nsexes, the pure strategy equilibrium points are (Opera;\nOpera) and (Hockey; Hockey). There is also a third Nash\nequilibrium with mixed strategies, in which both choose\ntheir preferred option with probability 2:3. The prisoner\u2019s\ndilemma is a good example of a sub-optimal equilibrium.\nBoth players would gain a higher payoff by playing (Don\u2019t\nconfess; Don\u2019t confess).\n\nAnother example of game theory is the so-called tragedy\nof the commons. In this game, a set of farmers live in a\ncommunity with a grass-filled square. Each farmer is con-\nfronted with a decision as to whether to acquire another goat,\nwhich eats grass in the square. So long as the benefit of\nhaving the goat is in excess of the personal detriment of that\ngoat\u2019s grass consumption, it is a dominant strategy to\nacquire the goat, even though the necessary result of all\nfarmers acting rationally is the loss, to all, of the benefits of\nthe square.\n\nIn computer networks, issues arise as the demand for\ncommunications bandwidth approaches the theoretical limit.\nUnder such circumstances, the behavior of nodes will affect\nhow close to the theoretical limit the system comes, and also\nwhich communications are permitted. The well known col-\nlision sense, multiple access (CSMA) protocol allows each\nnode to request access to the network, essentially without\ncost or penalty, and regardless of the importance of the\ncommunication. While the protocol incurs relatively low\noverhead and may provide fully decentralized control, under\ncongested network conditions, the system may exhibit insta-\nbility, that is, a decline in throughput as demand increases,\nresulting in ever increasing demand on the system resources\nand decreasing throughput. According to game theory, the\ndeficit of the CSMA protocol is that it is a dominant strategy\nto be selfish and hog resources, regardless of the cost to\nsociety, resulting in \u201cthe tragedy of the commons.\u201d\n\nGame theory is most readily applied in the optimization of\ncommunications routes through a defined network, to\nachieve the best surplus allocation. The problems of deter-\nmining the network topology, and conducting the commu-\nnications themselves, are also applications of game theory.\nSince the communications incidental to the network access\narbitration require consideration of some of the same issues\nas the underlying communications, elements of game theory\napply correspondingly. Due to various uncertainties, the\noperation of the system is stochastic. This presumption, in\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n112\n\nturn, allows estimation of optimality within an acceptable\nmargin of error, permitting simplifying assumptions and\nfacilitating implementation.\n\nIn an ad hoc network used for conveying real-time\ninformation, as might be the case in a telematics system,\nthere are potentially unlimited data communication require-\nments, and network congestion is almost guaranteed. There-\nfore, using a CSMA protocol as the paradigm for basic\ninformation conveyance is destined for failure, unless there\nis a disincentive to network use. On the other hand, a system\nwhich provides more graceful degradation under high load,\nsensitivity to the importance of information to be commu-\nnicated, and efficient utilization of the communications\nmedium would appear more optimal.\n\nOne way to impose a cost which varies in dependence on\nthe societal value of the good or service, is to conduct an\nauction, which is a mechanism to determine the market\nvalue of the good or service, at least between the auction\nparticipants. In an auction, the bidder seeks to bid the lowest\nvalue, up to a value less than or equal to his own private\nvalue (the actual value which the bidder appraises the good\nor service, and above which there is no surplus), that will\nwin the auction. Since competitive bidders can minimize the\ngains of another bidder by exploiting knowledge of the\nprivate value attached to the good or service by the bidder,\nit is generally a dominant strategy for the bidder to attempt\nto keep its private value a secret, at least until the auction is\nconcluded, thus yielding strategies that result in the largest\npotential gain. Auction strategies become more complex\nwhen the bidder himself is not a consumer or collector, but\nrather a reseller. In this case, the private value of the bidder\nis influenced by the perception of the private value of other\nbidders, and thus may change over the course of the auction\nin a successive price auction. On the other hand, in certain\nsituations, release or publication of the private value is a\ndominant strategy, and can result in substantial efficiency,\nthat is, honesty in reporting the private value results in the\nmaximum likelihood of prospective gain.\n\nAso-called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, or VCG, auction, is a\ntype of auction suitable for bidding, in a single auction, for\nthe goods or services of a plurality of offers, as a unit. In the\nclassic case, each bidder bids a value vector for each\navailable combination of goods or services. The various\ncomponents and associated ask price are evaluated combi-\nnatorially to achieve the minimum sum to meet the require-\nment. The winning bid set is that which produces the\nmaximum value of the accepted bids, although the second\n(Vickrey) price is paid. In the present context, each offer\nsubmits an ask price (reserve) or evaluatable value function\nfor a component of the combination. If the minimum aggre-\ngate to meet the bid requirement is not met, the auction fails.\nIf the auction is successful, then the set of offers selected is\nthat with the lowest aggregate bid, and they are compensated\nthat amount.\n\nThe surplus, ie., gap between bid and ask, is then\navailable to compensate the deferred bidders. This surplus is\ndistributed proportionately to the original bid value for the\nbidder, thus further encouraging an honest valuation of\ncontrol over the resource.\n\nThe network is such that, if any offer asks an amount that\nis too high, it will be bypassed. Since the bidder pays the\nsecond highest price, honesty in bidding the full private\nvalue is encouraged. VCG auctions have found application\nin providing segment links to route goods, or information in\na network. In defining the goods and services that are the\nsubject of the auction, it is possible to value the non-\ninterference of a competitor; that is, a competitor is both a\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 71 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n113\n\nbuyer and seller in the sale multi-good auction, with the\npurchase and sale being inconsistent combinations.\n\nThe traditional VCG auction, is postulated as being opti-\nmal for allocation of multiple resources between agents. It is\n\u201cstrategyproof\u201d and efficient, meaning that it is a dominant\nstrategy for agents to report their true valuation for a\nresource, and the result of the optimization is a network\nwhich maximizes the value of the system to the agents.\nGame theory also allows an allocation of cost between\nvarious recipients of a broadcast or multicast. That is, the\ncommunication is of value to a plurality of nodes, and a large\nset of recipient nodes may efficiently receive the same\ninformation. This allocation from multiple bidders to mul-\ntiple sellers is a direct extension of VCG theory, and a\nsimilar algorithm may be used to optimize allocation of\ncosts and benefit.\n\nAd Hoc Networks\n\nIn an ad hoc network, there is no central authority\ncontrolling network operation, and there is typically a pre-\nsumption that some nodes cannot directly communicate with\nothers, leading to a requirement for communication inter-\nmediaries to forward packets, i.e., a multihop architecture. A\nmobile ad hoc network adds the further presumption that\nnodes are not stationary, and therefore a route discovery\nmechanism is required.\n\nIn order to determine the network architecture state, each\nnode must broadcast its existence, and, for example, a\npayload of information including its identity, location, itin-\nerary (navigation vector) and possibly an \u201cinformation value\nfunction\u201d and/or \u201cinformation availability function\u201d. Typi-\ncally, the system operates in a continuous state, so that, after\nstabilization, it is reasonable to estimate of the present state\nbased on the prior state information. In a system with mobile\nnodes, the mobility may be predicted, or updates provided as\nnecessary. Using an in-band or out-of-band propagation\nmechanism, this information must propagate through a\nsphere of influence or to a network edge, which may be\nphysically or artificially defined. Nodes may be presumed to\noperate with a substantially common estimation of network\ntopology, and therefore only deviations from previously\npropagated information need be propagated. Of course, a\nmechanism should be provided for initialization and in case\na new node joins the network. If such estimates were\naccurate, the network could then be modeled similarly to a\nnon-mobile network, with certain extensions. On the other\nhand, typical implementations will present substantial devia-\ntions between actual network architecture and predicted\nnetwork architecture, requiring substantial fault tolerance in\nthe fundamental operation of the protocol and system.\n\nIf we presume that there is a spatial or temporal limit to\nrelevance, for example, 5 miles or 10 hops, or 1 to 5 minutes,\nthen the network state propagation may be so limited.\nExtending the network to encompass a large number of\nnodes, will necessarily reduce the tractability of the optimi-\nzation, although this may also produce substantial benefits,\nespecially if the hop distance is relatively short with respect\nto the desired communication range. Each node may there-\nfore impose a local estimate of relevance as a filter on\ncommunications, especially arbitration communications.\nThis consideration is accommodated by communicating,\nfrom each node, an update to all other nodes within its\nnetwork relevance boundary, and a state variable which\nrepresents an estimate of relevant status beyond the arbi-\ntrarily defined boundary. The boundary estimate is advan-\ntageous in order to ensure long range consistency. On a\npractical note, assuming a cost is incurred by employing the\nad hoe network, which scales with the number of hops, then\n\n10\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n114\n\nat some point, especially considering the latency and reli-\nability issues of ad hoc networks with a large number of\nhops, it is more efficient to employ cellular communications\nor the like. On the other hand, making the ad hoc network\nsuitable and reliable for 100 hop communications will\nnecessarily impede communications over a much smaller\nnumber of hops, thus disincentivizing the more reasonable\nuses of the network.\n\nFor example, the propagation of network state and other\nprotocol-level information may conveniently occur over a\nfinite number of hops, for example 5-10, in an outward\ndirection, a condition which may be assessed by GPS\nassistance. For each hop, a relatively simple protocol, such\nas a collision sense-multiple access (CSMA) protocol, may\nbe employed, with each node propagating information\naccording to a set of rules. (It is noted that, since this\ncommunication is not \u201climitless\u201d in contrast to bulk or\nstreaming real-time sensor data, CSMA may be an appro-\npriate and efficient protocol).\n\nAn example of the application of game theory to influence\nsystem architecture arises when communications latency is\nan issue. A significant factor in latency is the node hop count.\nTherefore, a system may seek to reduce node hop count by\nusing an algorithm other than a nearest neighbor algorithm,\nbypassing some nodes with longer distance communica-\ntions. In analyzing this possibility, one must not only look at\nthe cost to the nodes involved in the communication, but\nalso the cost to nodes which are prevented from simultane-\nously accessing the network. As a general proposition, the\nanalysis of the network must include the impact of each\naction, or network state, on every node in the system,\nalthough simplifying presumptions may be appropriate\nwhere information is unavailable, or the anticipated impact\nis trivial.\n\nKnown and well analyzed routing models proposed for\nforwarding of packets in ad hoc networks. These include Ad\nHoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing, Opti-\nmized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR), Dynamic\nSource Routing Protocol (DSR), and Topology Dissemina-\ntion Based on Reverse-Path Forwarding (TBRPF). In most\nscenarios analyzed to date, the performance metrics studied\nwere power consumption, end-to-end data throughput and\ndelay, route acquisition time, percentage out-of-order deliv-\nery, and efficiency. A critical variable considered in many\nprior studies is power cost, presuming a battery operated\ntransceiver with finite available power. There can be sig-\nnificant differences in optimum routing depending on\nwhether node has a transmit power control, which in turn\ncontrols range, and provides a further control over network\ntopology. Likewise, steerable antennas, antenna arrays, and\nother forms of multiplexing provide further degrees of\ncontrol over network topology. Note that the protocol-level\ncommunications are preferably broadcasts, while informa-\ntion conveyance communications are typically point-to-\npoint. Prior analyses typically presume a single transceiver,\nwith a single antenna, and thus use an omni-directional\nantenna, with in-band protocol data, for all communications.\nThe tradeoff made in limiting system designs according to\nthese presumptions should be clear.\n\nRouting protocols in ad hoc networks typically employ\nthree strategies: flooding, proactive routing, and reactive\nrouting. Flooding protocols broadcast packets to all the\nnodes in the network, while the remaining protocols do not.\nIn proactive routing, the protocol maintains route informa-\ntion all the time, while in reactive routing, a route is\ndiscovered only when needed. All or some of these strategies\nmay be employed simultaneously. Flooding typically con-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 72 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n115\n\nsumes too much bandwidth and energy to be efficient, as\ncompared to more sophisticated strategies. However, in\ncases with very high mobility, the flooding protocols best\nensure that the transmission reaches its destination.\n\nIn proactive routing, each node stores and updates routing\ninformation constantly. The routing tables can be updated\nbased on perceived changes in the network topology. There-\nfore, a new transmission can start immediately without a\nroute discovery delay. However, the constant exchange of\nrouting information adds overhead to the protocol. OLSR\nand TBRPF protocols use proactive routing. The overhead\ntraffic of a proactive routing protocol increases as the\nmobility of the nodes increases, since the routing informa-\ntion needs to be updated in shorter intervals.\n\nIn reactive routing, when a node wishes to transmit, it\nstarts a route discovery process in order to find a path to the\nreceiver. The routes remain valid until the route is no longer\nneeded. AODV and DSR protocols use reactive routing. In\nthe AODV protocol, to find a route to a receiver, a terminal\nbroadcasts a route request message containing the address of\nthe receiver and the lifespan of the message. Terminals\nreceiving the message add their address to the packet and\nforward it if the lifespan is not exhausted. If a receiver or a\nterminal knowing the route to the receiver receives the route\nrequest message, it sends a route reply back to the requester.\nIf the sender does not receive a route reply before a timeout\noccurs, it sends another route request with a longer lifespan.\nThe use of sequential route requests with incremental\nincreases in timeout allows a mapping of the network by hop\ncount.\n\nIn order for an ad hoc network to be effective, the nodes\nneed to cooperate. This cooperation comes at a cost. In\npower constrained systems, for example, the cost is battery\nconsumption. In other scenarios, the network utilization is\nitself a burden. The various nodes must cooperate in both\narbitration and control, e.g., route discovery and optimiza-\ntion, and the information forwarding itself. In fact, partici-\npation in the route discovery, without notice that the node\nwill fail to forward information packets, has been shown in\nstudies to be more detrimental to the network than simply\nabstaining entirely.\n\nTt is the general self-interest of a node to conserve its own\nresources, maintain an opportunity to access resources,\nwhile consuming whatever resource of other nodes as it\ndesires. Clearly, this represents the \u201ctragedy of the com-\nmons\u201d, in which selfish individuals fail to respect the very\nbasis for the community they enjoy, and a network of\nrational nodes operating without significant incentives to\ncooperate would likely fail. On the other hand, if donating\na node\u2019s resources generated an associated benefit to that\nnode, while consuming network resources imposed a cost,\nstability and reliability can be achieved. So long as the\nfunctionality is sufficient to meet the need, and the economic\nsurplus is \u201cfairly\u201d allocated, that is, the cost incurred is less\nthan the private value of the benefit, and that cost is\ntransferred as compensation to those burdened in an amount\nin excess of their incremental cost, adoption of the system\nshould increase stability. In fact, even outside of these\nbounds, the system may be more stable than one which does\nnot tax system use nor reward altruistic behavior. While the\nsystem is a zero sum system, and over time, the economic\neffects will average out, in any particular instance, the\nincentive for selfish behavior by a node will be diminished.\n\nThe concepts of node misbehavior and maliciousness, and\ncompeting networks consuming the same resources, are also\naddressed by aspects of game theory. For example, an ad hoc\nnetwork may defer to or compete with an interfering net-\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n116\n\nwork, and the decision of which strategy to adopt is within\nthe province of game theory. The particularities of agent\nmisbehavior or hacking are also encompassed by Game\nTheory, and real implementations must necessarily consider\nthese issues. Sometimes, the solution to these issues is\ntechnological, but in others, the reaction of other nodes to\ndiscovery of misbehavior may be sufficient to discourage it.\nThe intent is to formulate a system which is sufficiently\nrobust and advantageous as to disincentivize non-compli-\nance and non-cooperation, that is, the inherent advantages of\ncompliance with the system architecture exceed the antici-\npated benefits of the alternative.\n\nOne way to remedy selfish behavior is to increase the cost\nof acting this way, that is, to impose a cost or tax for access\nto the network. In a practical implementation, however, this\nis problematic, since under lightly loaded conditions, the\n\u201cvalue\u201d of the communications may not justify a fixed cost\nwhich might be reasonable under other conditions, and\nlikewise, under heavier loads, critical communications may\nstill be delayed or impeded. Note that where the network\nincludes more nodes, the throughput may increase, since\nthere are more potential routes and overall reliability may be\nincreased, but the increased number of nodes will likely also\nincrease network demand. A variable cost, dependent on\nrelative \u201cimportance\u201d, may be provided, and indeed, as\nalluded to above, this cost may be market based, in the\nmanner of an auction. In a multihop network, such an\nauction is complicated by the requirement for a distribution\nof payments between the chain of nodes, with each node\nhaving potential alternate demands for its cooperation. The\nVCG auction mechanism excludes nodes which ask too high\na price, and the auction itself may comprise a value function\nencompassing reliability, latency, quality of service, or other\nnon-economic parameters, in economic terms.\n\nThe network may further require compensation to nodes\nwhich must defer communications because of inconsistent\nstates, such as in order to avoid interference or duplicative\nuse of an intermediary node, and which take no direct part\nin the communication. It is noted that the concept of the\nwinner of an auction paying the losers is at first difficult to\ncontemplate, but on further analysis quite logical. This\nupsets the normal analysis, since the possibility of a payment\nfrom the winner to the loser alters the allocation of economic\nsurplus between the bidder, seller, and others. Likewise,\nwhile the cost to the involved nodes may be real, the cost to\nthe uninvolved nodes may be subjective. Clearly, it would\nappear that involved nodes should generally be better com-\npensated than uninvolved nodes, although a formal analysis\nremains to be performed.\n\nIn a more general sense, the underlying presumption is\nthat the network provides competitive access to the physical\ntransport medium, and that cooperation with the protocol\nprovides significant advantages over competition with it.\nClearly, the issues of commercial success and market domi-\nnance are much more complex and not capable of being\naccurately modeled according to known paradigms; on the\nother hand, a system providing rational benefits will be more\nlikely to succeed than one with irrational benefits or ill\ndefined explicable benefits. Under normal circumstances, a\nwell developed ad hoc network system can present as a\nformidable coordinated competitor for access to contested\nbandwidth by other systems, while within the network, high\nvalued communications may receive priority. Thus, a node\npresented with a communications requirement is presented\nnot with the simple choice of participate or abstain, but\nrather whether to participate in an ad hoc network with\npredicted stability and mutual benefit, or one with the\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 73 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n117\n\npossibility of failure due to selfish behavior, and non-\ncooperation. Even in the absence of a present communica-\ntion requirement, a network which rewards cooperative\nbehavior may be preferable to one which simply expects\naltruism.\n\nAfter the network architecture is defined, compensation is\npaid to those nodes providing value or subjected to a burden\n(including foregoing communication opportunity) by those\ngaining a benefit. The payment may be a virtual currency,\nwith no specific true value, although the virtual currency\nsystem provides a convenient method to tax, subsidize, or\ncontrol the system, and thus apply a normalized extrinsic\nvalue.\n\nGame theory also encompasses the concept of that each\nnode may have an associated \u201creputation\u201d in the community.\nThis reputation may be evaluated as a parameter in an\neconomic analysis, or applied separately. This reputation\nmay be anecdotal or statistical. In either case, if access to\nresources and payments are made dependent on reputation,\nnodes will be incentivized to maintain a good reputation, and\navoid generating a bad reputation. Therefore, by maintaining\nand applying the reputation in a manner consistent with the\ncommunity goals, the nodes are compelled to advance those\ngoals in order to benefit from the community. Game theory\ndistinguishes between good reputation and bad reputation.\nNodes may have a selfish motivation to assert that another\nnode has a bad reputation, while it would have little selfish\nmotivation, absent collusion, for undeservedly asserting a\ngood reputation. On the other hand, a node may have a\nselfish motivation in failing to reward behavior with a good\nreputation.\n\nThe virtual currency and reputation may be considered\northogonal, since the status of a node\u2019s currency account\nprovides no information about the status of its reputation.\n\nPublished Ad Hoc Network Examples\n\nBy no way a comprehensive list of published applications\nof game theory to the control of ad hoc networks, below are\ndiscussed a number of prominent examples.\n\nThe Terminodes project includes many of the features\ndescribed above. This project proposes a method to encour-\nage cooperation in ad hoc networks that is based on a virtual\ncurrency called nuglets. Each node contains a tamper-proof\nhardware module which handles the nuglets. When a node\nforwards a packet it extracts nuglets from the payload. In\norder to make a transmission, the sender appends nuglets\nneeded to forward the packet through the network to its\ndestination. However, a central node probably likely accu-\nmulates excess nuglets, hence it has less value for additional\nnuglets, leading to lower incentive for network activity.\nPeripheral nodes may possess insufficient nuglets to support\ntheir needs. However, the system appears to achieve a\nbalance over time, assuming random node movement. The\nTerminodes project is notable for the depth and complete-\nness of its analysis, as well as the progress made toward\nimplementation.\n\nCrowcroft et al. present a traflic-sensitive pricing model.\nCompensation for packet forwarding is responsive to both\nrequired energy consumption and local congestion at a node.\nThis mechanism both enforces cooperation and balances\ntraffic loads to avoid congestion. Stabilization of price and\nnode wealth occurs in static networks.\n\nThe Confidant protocol detects node misbehavior and\nroutes traffic around the misbehaving nodes, to isolate them\nfrom the network. Misbehavior of neighboring nodes is\nbroadcast to the network by observing nodes. A trust record\nis used to evaluate the validity of a report, thus disincentiv-\nizing misbehavior in the reporting process. The reputation\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n118\n\ninformation is applied by a path manager define a route and\nrejects access requested by misbehaving nodes.\n\nThe Core protocol is similar to Confidant; each node\nmaintains reputation information, which is updated based on\nboth observation and third party report. A threshold function\nis applied to limit access by nodes based on their reputation,\nresulting in isolation.\n\nMichiardi et al. analyze whether it is optimal to join or\ndefect from an ad hoc network, based on node utility\nfunction, payoff share, cost of cooperation, number of coop-\nerating nodes, etc.\n\nSrinivasan et al. apply game theory to model an ad hoc\nnetwork at a connection level, providing a complicated\nextended game model. Before a user can transmit, all the\nnodes along the defined route must accept the relay request.\nEnergy consumption of terminals is restricted by an\nexpected lifetime of batteries, that is, the nodes are modeled\nas being power constrained. A normalized acceptance rate, a\nproportion of successful and attempted relays through a\nnode, as observed by neighboring nodes, is sought to be\nmaximized.\n\nUrpi et al. model an ad hoc network at packet level. The\nmodel is based on an estimate of neighboring nodes, the\nremaining energy of node, and various packet traffic metrics.\nThe payoff of the model is simply the access to packet\nforwarding, weighted by energy cost, provided to a node.\n\nNoncooperative game theory offers a basis for analyzing\nInternet traffic, wherein each user tries to independently\nmaximize its quality of service. The network operator\nfocuses on maximizing network performance as a whole.\nThus, in this case, different players adopt different roles,\nwith different value functions. Game theory may thus by\napplied to optimize routing, flow control, queuing disci-\nplines and traffic pricing. While ad hoc network routing is\nsimilar to the Internet, there are also significant differences.\nIn an ad hoc network, routes may be inconsistent.\n\nNagle studied the concept of fairness in queuing in packet\nswitches. In a first in-first out queue, a selfish node may\nsaturate the queue with requests. Nagle proposes, as a\nsolution, distinct queues for each source with a round-robin\nscheduler, providing a fair queuing scheme, which encour-\nages keeping the user\u2019s queue as short as possible.\n\nGame theory has also been applied on flow control. Each\nuser tries to maximize its utility, defined by the ratio of\naverage throughput and average delay. It has been shown\nthat a unique Nash equilibrium exists in such a system,\nwhich converges to an equilibrium point. The nodes seek to\nboth maximize their own quality of service, but also the\nfairness of resource allocation, resulting in a Pareto efficient\nsolution.\n\nALOHA is a wireless CSMA protocol using time division\nmultiplexing. Transmission probabilities are a design speci-\nfication of the system, but if a player uses a higher prob-\nability, his throughput will likely increase, leading to a\nmisbehavior incentive. The selfish system appears to per-\nform no better than a centrally controlled (non-CSMA)\nsystem, and performance typically drops by half. A pricing\nmechanism may be incorporated, thus taxing users for their\nbandwidth demands.\n\nAn extensive analysis of the subject of the application of\ngame theory to the control of ad hoc networks, including\nboth an extensive review of the literature, and new analysis,\nis provided in the master\u2019s Thesis of Juha Leino, entitled\n\u201cApplications of Game Theory in Ad Hoc Network\u201d, Hel-\nsinki University Of Technology (2003). Leino modeled the\ninteraction between one node and the rest of the network as\nan extensive game. The networks were presumed to be\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 74 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n119\n\nenergy constrained, and the nodes to be selfish, with the\nresult stated as the amount of contribution the network can\nrequest from a node. Leino modeled nodes with power\nconstrained, power adaptive, omnidirectional transceivers,\neach of which have a uniform communication demand on\nthe network.\n\nWhen a node connects to an ad hoc network, it gains both\nbenefits and obligations. The other nodes forward its traffic,\nhence it can save energy and reach nodes outside its own\ntransmission range, as compared to a single hop transmis-\nsion. Correspondingly, the node should participate in the\nnetwork functions like the route discovery and traffic for-\nwarding that consume the resources of the node, in addition\nto the basic communications themselves. In order to find\nparticipation in the network advantageous, the node has gain\ngreater benefits greater than the obligations imposed. This,\nof course, may be modeled as a game. The node seeks to\nminimize energy consumption, and the network seeks to\nensure its functionality. The decision of the node is to\ncooperate or to defect.\n\nIn one of Leino\u2019s models, he requires that reward of\nforwarding needs to be proportional to the energy consumed\nwhen the packet is forwarded. He analyzes the situation of\nboth a honest node and a cheating node, i.e., one that uses\nthe network\u2019s resources without full participation in the\nnetwork overhead. He concluded that if a node has an\nopportunity to cheat, it adversely affects the network far\nmore than mere defection. Leino also analyzed whether,\nunder his presumptions, a group of honest nodes will vol-\nuntarily aggregate as an ad hoc network, or would prefer to\nremain as a set of independent uncooperative actors, without\nbenefit of multihop transmissions. He concludes that under\nhis presumptions, in some networks, there are nodes which\nhave detrimental involvement in the ad hoc network, and if\nall such \u201closer\u201d nodes refuse to participate, the network may\ncollapse. The proportion of losers drops with minimum\nenergy routing, since the average cost is lowered, making\ngains from participation more likely. There are also net-\nworks with no losers, and these provide gains to all partici-\npants. Loser nodes tend to be in the center of the network,\nrather than the periphery.\n\nReal Time Telematics Information Communication\n\nMobile, self organizing, ad hoc communications networks\nhave been proposed for telematics systems, for cellular\nnetwork extension, long range (multihop) traffic information\ncommunication, and short range collision avoidance sys-\ntems.\n\nTelematics is a recently applied term that now encom-\npasses radio transmitters or receivers in vehicles. Three\nbasic schemes exist: wide area broadcast communication,\nwhere all relevant nodes are presumed to be within the same\ncommunication zone (e.g., satellite radio, RDDS receivers,\netc.); cellular communications, where an array of fixed-\nposition low power transceivers contiguously blanket a\nterritory, providing various zones which allow multiplexing\nwithin a band; and mesh network communications, which\nallow ad hoc formation of a communications infrastructure,\noptionally linking to various fixed infrastructure.\n\nTelematics systems may be used for many purposes, for\nexample, real time traffic information (RTT, which in an\nextreme case may involve communication of live video\nstreams. In a more modest system, various sensors may\nprovide road and traffic data, as well as weather and incident\ninformation. In other words, the appetite of such a system for\nbandwidth is potentially limitless, unless constraints are\nimposed. On the other hand, RTTI is typically not power\nconstrained, since it is vehicle based rather than hand-held,\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n120\n\nand therefore the cost of using the system will focus more on\ncompetition for bandwidth (the limited physical transport\nlayer (PHY) resource) than power consumed in communi-\ncations. Likewise, communications latency is not critical,\nunless full duplex voice communications are supported. It is\nnoted that parked vehicles may also be involved in network\ncommunications, and the frequency band may be shared\nwith portable communicators with self-contained power\nsources, making the economic cost of communications and\npower consumption a potential factor for some nodes, lead-\ning to split strategies.\n\nLikewise, especially for voice communications, interfac-\ning with the fixed infrastructure through cellular telephone\ntowers or 802.11 hotspots may impose additional economic\nconstraints on the system. Telematics systems typically\ninclude a GPS geolocation system, which may be of great\nuse in mapping nodes for routing navigation functions.\nIndeed, the telematics system may be integrated within a\nnavigation system and/or entertainment system. This is\nrelevant to the extent that one considers the incremental cost\nof the hardware and its market placement.\n\nThe system is designed to operate over a wide range of\nnode densities, from city rush hour traffic to rural highways.\nDue to a perceived incompatibility of a RTTI system with\ncellular infrastructure business models, as well as inconsis-\ntent availability of cellular coverage of roadways, the archi-\ntecture is designed as a decentralized control, with incidental\ninvolvement of the cellular networks, except for voice\ncommunications outside of the mobile ad hoc network. This\ndecentralized control introduces a substantial level of com-\nplexity, since it must account for rapidly changing network\narchitecture, various types of channel impairments, hidden\nnodes, and temporal and spatial distance issues, and inter-\nference.\n\nIn defining the system, both the available hardware, costs\nand purposes for use must be considered. Desirable charac-\nteristics of a telematics system include real time telematics\ninformation communication, multihop voice communication\nforwarding, decentralized control, and to the extent possible,\nuser privacy. The hardware may include multichannel direc-\ntional smart antennas, out-of-band signaling and control,\ncomplex and sophisticated computational resources, to pro-\nvide efficient utilization of an unlicensed or shared band.\n\nThat is, it is clear that a system that provides an omnidi-\nrectional antenna system with in band signaling and control,\nis inefficient as compared to a system which directs its\ntransmitted energy only in the direction of the intended\ntarget, and does not intrude on a high capacity physical\ntransport medium with relatively low information content\nsignaling packets.\n\nIn a real time telematics ad hoc network with potentially\nunlimited data communication requirements, network con-\ngestion is almost guaranteed, in a continuous network of\nmobile nodes. RF interference issues will likely prevent\nnetwork capacity from scaling with node density. Therefore,\nan alternate to CSMA was sought that provided more\ngraceful degradation under high load, sensitivity to the\nimportance of information to be communicated, and efficient\nutilization of the communications medium.\n\nIn order to optimize the network, additional information\nis employed, although this imposes a burden of increased\nprotocol overhead, complexity, and potential loss privacy.\nOne way to remedy selfish behavior is to increase the cost\nof acting this way, that is, to impose a cost for access to the\nnetwork. In a practical implementation, however, this is\nproblematic, since under lightly loaded conditions, the\n\u201cvalue\u201d of the communications may not justify a fixed cost\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 75 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n121\n\nwhich might be reasonable under other conditions, and\nlikewise, under heavier loads, critical communications may\nstill be delayed or impeded. Therefore, a variable cost,\ndependent on relative \u201cimportance\u201d, may be imposed. In\ndetermining this relative importance, a market evaluation,\nrequires a comparison, termed an auction, is employed. In a\nmultihop network, such an auction is complicated by the\nrequirement for distributing payments among the chain of\nnodes along the route, with each node having potential\nalternate demands for its cooperation and resources. Accord-\ning to a more sophisticated analysis, one must also com-\npensate nodes not directly involved in the communication\nfor their deference.\n\nIn a scenario involving a request for information, the\nauction is complicated by the fact that the information\nresource content is unknown to the recipient, and therefore\nthe bid is blind, that is, the value of the information to the\nrecipient is indeterminate. However, game theory supports\nthe communication of a value function or utility function,\nwhich can then be evaluated at each node possessing infor-\nmation to be communicated, to normalize its value. Fortu-\nnately, it is a dominant strategy in a VCG auction to\ncommunicate a truthful value. In this case, a value function\nmay instead be communicated, which can then be evaluated\nat each node possessing information to be communicated. In\na mere request for information conveyance, such as the\ntransport nodes in a multihop network, or in a cellular\nnetwork infrastructure extension model, the bid may be a\ntrue (resolved) value, since the information content is not the\nsubject of the bidding; rather it is the value of the commu-\nnications per se, and the bidding node can reasonably value\nits bid.\n\nIn a cellular network infrastructure extension model, the\nbid may represent a resolved value, since the information\ncontent is not the subject of the bidding; rather it is the value\nof the communications per se. In the case of voice, however,\nthe communications are bidirectional and enduring, thus\nraising quality of service and handoff issues.\n\nGame theory is most readily applied in the optimization of\ncommunications routes through a defined network, to\nachieve the best economic surplus allocation. That is, the\nproblem of determining the network topology, and the\ncommunications themselves, are ancillary, though real,\napplications of game theory. Since the communications\nincidental to the arbitration require consideration of some of\nthe same issues as the underlying communications, corre-\nsponding elements of game theory may apply at both levels\nof analysis. Due to various uncertainties, the operation of the\nsystem is stochastic. This presumption, in turn, allows\nestimation of optimality within a margin of error, simplify-\ning implementation as compared to a rigorous analysis\nwithout regard to statistical significance.\n\nThe VCG auction is postulated as being optimal for\nallocation of multiple resources between agents. It is \u201cstrat-\negyproof\u2019 and efficient, meaning that it is a dominant\nstrategy for agents to report their true valuation for a\nresource, and the result of the optimization is a network\nwhich maximizes the value of the system to the agents.\n\nGame theory also allows an allocation of cost between\nvarious recipients of a broadcast or multicast. That is, in\nmany instances, telematic information is of value to a\nplurality of nodes, and a large set of recipient nodes may\nefficiently receive the same information. This allocation is a\ndirect extension of VCG theory.\n\nThe preferred method for acquiring an estimate of the\nstate of the network is through use of a proactive routing\nprotocol. Thus, in order to determine the network architec-\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n122\n\nture state, each node must broadcast its existence, and, for\nexample, a payload of information including its identity,\nlocation, itinerary (navigation vector) and \u201cinformation\nvalue function\u201d. Typically, the system operates in a continu-\nous state, so that it is reasonable to commence the process\nwith an estimate of the state based on prior information.\nUsing an in-band or out-of-band propagation mechanism,\nthis information must propagate to a network edge, which\nmay be physically or artificially defined. If all nodes operate\nwith a substantially common estimation of network topol-\nogy, only deviations from previously propagated informa-\ntion need be propagated.\n\nCSMA is proposed for the protocol-related communica-\ntions because it is relatively simple and robust, and well\nsuited for ad hoc communications in lightly loaded net-\nworks. An initial node transmits using an adaptive power\nprotocol, to achieve an effective transmit range of somewhat\nless than about two times the estimated average inter-nodal\ndistance. This distance therefore promotes propagation to a\nset of neighboring nodes, without unnecessarily interfering\nwith communications of non-neighboring nodes and there-\nfore allowing this task to be performed in parallel. Neigh-\nboring nodes also transmit in succession, providing sequen-\ntial and complete protocol information propagation over a\nrelevance range.\n\nIf we presume that there is a spatial limit to relevance, for\nexample, 5 miles or 10 hops, then the network state propa-\ngation may be so limited. Extending the network to encom-\npass a large number of nodes will necessarily reduce the\ntractability of the optimization. Each node has a local\nestimate of relevance. This consideration is accommodated,\nalong with a desire to prevent exponential growth in proto-\ncol-related data traffic, by receiving an update from all nodes\nwithin a node\u2019s network relevance boundary, and a state\nvariable which represents an estimate of relevant status\nbeyond the arbitrarily defined boundary. The propagation of\nnetwork state may thus conveniently occur over a finite\nnumber of hops, for example 5-10.\n\nUnder conditions of relatively high nodal densities, the\nsystem may employ a zone strategy, that is, proximate\ngroups of nodes are is treated as an entity for purposes of\nexternal state estimation, especially with respect to distant\nnodes or zones. Such a presumption is realistic, since at\nextended distances, geographically proximate nodes may be\nmodeled as being similar or inter-related, while at close\ndistances, and particularly within a zone in which all nodes\nare in direct communication, internode communications\nmay be subject to mutual interference, and can occur without\nsubstantial external influence. Alternately, it is clear that to\nlimit latencies and communication risks, it may be prudent\nto bypass neighboring nodes, thus trading latency for power\nconsumption and overall network capacity. Therefore, a\nhierarchal scheme may be implemented to geographically\norganize the network at higher analytical levels, and geo-\ngraphic cells may cooperate to appear externally as a single\nentity.\n\nA supermnode within a zone may be selected for its superior\ncapability, or perhaps a central location. The zone is defined\nby a communication range of the basic data interface for\ncommunications, with the control channel having a longer\nrange, for example at least double the normal data commu-\nnications range. Communications control channel transmit-\nters operate on a number of channels, for example at least 7,\nallowing neighboring zones in a hexagonal tiled array to\ncommunicate simultaneously without interference. In a geo-\ngraphic zone system, alternate zones which would otherwise\nbe interfering may use an adaptive multiplexing scheme to\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 76 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n123\n\navoid interference. All nodes may listen on all control\nchannels, permitting rapid propagation of control informa-\ntion.\n\nIn order to effective provide decentralized control, either\neach node must have a common set of information to allow\nexecution of an identical control algorithm, or nodes defer to\nthe control signals of other nodes without internal analysis\nfor optimality. A model of semi-decentralized control is also\nknown, in which dispersed \u201csupernodes\u201d, are nominated as\nmaster, with other topologically nearby nodes remaining as\nslave nodes. In the pure peer network, complete information\nconveyance to each node is required, imposing a relatively\nhigh overhead. In a master-slave (or supernode) architecture,\nincreased reliance on a single node trades-off reliability and\nrobustness (and other advantages of pure peer-to-peer net-\nworks) for efficiency. A supernode within a cellular zone\nmay be selected for its superior capability, or perhaps is at\na central location or is immobile.\n\nOnce each control node (node or supernode) has an\nestimate of network topology, the next step is to optimize\nnetwork channels. According to VCG theory, each agent has\nan incentive to broadcast its truthful value or value function\nfor the scarce resource, which in this case, is control over\ncommunications physical layer, and or access to informa-\ntion. This communication can be consolidated with the\nnetwork discovery transmission. Each control node then\nperforms a combinatorial solution for the set of simultane-\nous equations according to VCG theory (or extensions\nthereof). This solution should be consistent between all\nnodes, and the effects of inconsistent solutions may be\nresolved by collision sensing, and possibly an error/incon-\nsistency detection and correction algorithm specifically\napplied to this type of information.\n\nAs part of the network mapping, communications impair-\nment and interference sources are also mapped. GPS assis-\ntance may be particularly useful in this aspect. Where\ninterference is caused by interfering communications, the\nissue is a determination of a strategy of deference or\ncompetition. If the interfering communication is continuous\nor unresponsive, then the only available strategy is compe-\ntition. On the other hand, when the competing system uses,\nfor example, a CSMA system, such as 802.11, competition\nwith such a communication simply leads to retransmission,\nand therefore ultimately increased network load, and defer-\nence strategy may be more optimal (dominant), at least and\nuntil it is determined that the competing communication is\nincessant. Other communications protocols, however may\nhave a more or less aggressive strategy. By observation of a\nsystem over time, its strategies may be revealed, and game\ntheory permits composition of an optimal strategy.\n\nThe optimization process produces a representation of an\noptimal network architecture during the succeeding period.\nThat is, value functions representing bids are broadcast, with\nthe system then being permitted to determine an optimal real\nvaluation and distribution of that value. Thus, prior to\ncompletion of the optimization, potentially inconsistent allo-\ncations must be prevented, and each node must communi-\ncate its evaluation of other node\u2019s value functions, so that\nthe optimization is performed on a normalized economic\nbasis. This step may substantially increase the system over-\nhead, and is generally required for completion of the auc-\ntion. This valuation may be inferred, however, for transit\nnodes in a multihop network path, since there is little\nsubjectivity for nodes solely in this role, and the respective\nvalue functions may be persistent. For example, the valua-\ntion applied by a node to forward information is generally\ncontent and involved party independent.\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n124\n\nA particular complication of a traffic information system\nis that the nature of the information held by any node is\nprivate to that node (before transmission), and therefore the\nvaluation is not known until after all bids are evaluated.\nThus, prior to completion of optimization, each node must\ncommunicate its evaluation of other nodes\u2019 value functions,\nso that the optimization is performed on an economic basis.\nThis required step substantially increases the system over-\nhead. This valuation may be inferred, however, for transit\nnodes in a multihop network path.\n\nAfter the network usage is defined, compensation is paid\nto those nodes providing value or subjected to a burden\n(including foregoing communication opportunity) by those\ngaining a benefit. The payment is generally of a virtual\ncurrency, with no specific true value, although the virtual\ncurrency system provides a convenient method to tax the\nsystem.\n\nExerting external economic influences on the system may\nhave various effects on the optimization, and may exacerbate\ndifferences in subjective valuations. The application of a\nmonetary value to the virtual currency substantially also\nincreases the possibility of misbehavior and external attacks.\nOn the other hand, a virtual currency with no assessed real\nvalue is self-normalizing, while monetization leads to exter-\nnal and generally irrelevant influences as well as possible\narbitrage. External economic influences may also lead to\nbenefits, which are discussed in various papers on non-zero\nsum games.\n\nIn order to provide fairness, the virtual currency (similar\nto the so-called \u201cnuglets\u201d or \u201cnuggets\u201d proposed for use in\nthe Terminodes project) is self-generated at each node\naccording to a schedule, and itself may have a time depen-\ndent value. For example, the virtual currency may have a\nhalf-life or temporally declining value. On the other hand,\nthe value may peak at a time after generation, which would\nencourage deference and short term savings, rather than\nimmediate spending, and would allow a recipient node to\nbenefit from virtual currency transferred before its peak\nvalue. This also means that long term hoarding of the\ncurrency is of little value, since it will eventually decay in\nvalue, while the system presupposes a nominal rate of\nspending, which is normalized among nodes. The variation\nfunction may also be adaptive, but this poses a synchroni-\nzation issue for the network. An external estimate of node\nwealth may be used to infer counterfeiting, theft and failure\nto pay debts, and to further effect remediation.\n\nThe currency is generated and verified in accordance with\nmicropayment theory. Micropayment theory generally\nencompasses the transfer of secure tokens (e.g., crypto-\ngraphically endorsed information) having presumed value,\nwhich are intended for verification, if at all, in a non-real\ntime transaction, after the transfer to the recipient. The\ncurrency is circulated (until expiration) as a token, and\ntherefore is not subject to immediate authentication by\nsource. Since these tokens may be communicated through an\ninsecure network, the issue of forcing allocation of payment\nto particular nodes may be dealt with by cryptographic\ntechniques, in particular public key cryptography, in which\nthe currency is placed in a cryptographic \u201cenvelope\u201d\naddressed to the intended recipient, e.g., is encrypted with\nthe recipient\u2019s public key, which must be broadcast and used\nas, or in conjunction with, a node identifier. This makes the\npayment unavailable to other than the intended recipient.\nThe issue of holding the encrypted token hostage and\nextorting a portion of the value to forward the packet can be\ndealt with by community pressure, that is, any node pre-\nsenting this (or other undesirable) behavior might be ostra-\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 77 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n125\n\ncized. The likelihood of this type of misbehavior is also\ndiminished by avoiding monetization of the virtual currency.\n\nThis currency generation and allocation mechanism gen-\nerally encourages equal consumption by the various nodes\nover the long term. In order to discourage consumption of\nbandwidth, an external tax may be imposed on the system,\nthat is, withdrawing value from the system base on usage.\nClearly, the effects of such a tax must be carefully weighed,\nsince this will also impose an impediment to adoption as\ncompared to an untaxed system. On the other hand, a similar\neffect use-disincentive may be obtained by rewarding low\nconsumption, for example by allocating an advertising sub-\nsidy between nodes, or in reward of deference. In a model\ntelematics system, an audio and/or visual display provides a\nuseful possibility for advertising and sponsorship; likewise,\nlocation based services may include commercial services.\n\nEach node computes a value function, based on its own\nknowledge state, risk profile and risk tolerance, and wealth,\ndescribing the value to it of additional information, as well\nas its own value for participating in the communications of\nothers. The value function typically includes a past travel\nhistory, future travel itinerary, present location, recent com-\nmunication partners, and an estimator of information\nstrength and weakness with respect to the future itinerary. It\nmay be presumed that each node has a standard complement\nof sensors, and accurately acquired descriptive data for its\npast travel path. Otherwise, a description of the available\ninformation is required. One advantage of a value function\nis that it changes little over time, unless a need is satisfied\nor circumstances change, and therefore may be a persistent\nattribute.\n\nUsing the protocol communication system, each node\ntransmits its value function (or change thereof), passes\nthrough communications from neighboring nodes, and may,\nfor example transmit payment information for the immedi-\nate-past bid for incoming communications.\n\nMessages are forwarded outward (avoiding redundant\npropagation back to the source), with messages appended\nfrom the series of nodes. Propagation continues for a finite\nnumber of hops, until the entire community has an estimate\nof the state and value function of each node in the commu-\nnity. Advantageously, the network beyond a respective com-\nmunity may be modeled in simplified form, to provide a\nbetter estimate of the network as a whole.\n\nAfter propagation, each node evaluates the set of value\nfunctions for its community, with respect to its own infor-\nmation and ability to forward packets. Each node may then\nmake an offer to supply or forward information, based on the\nprovided information. In the case of multihop communica-\ntions, the offers are propagated to the remainder of the\ncommunity, for the maximum number of hops, including the\noriginating node. At this point, each node has a representa-\ntion of the state of its community, with community edge\nestimates providing consistency for nodes with differing\ncommunity scopes, the valuation function each node assigns\nto control over portions of the network, as well as a resolved\nvaluation of each node for supplying the need. Under these\ncircumstances, each node may then evaluate an optimization\nfor the network architecture, and come to a conclusion\nconsistent with that of other members of its community. If\nsupported, node reputation may be updated based on past\nperformance, and the reputation applied as a factor in the\noptimization and/or externally to the optimization. As dis-\ncussed above, a VCG-type auction is employed as a basis for\noptimization. Since each node receives bid information from\nall other nodes within the maximum node count, the VCG\nauction produces an optimized result.\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n126\n\nTransmissions are made in frames, with a single bidding\nprocess controlling multiple frames, for example a multiple\nof the maximum number of hops. Therefore, the bid encom-\npasses a frame\u2019s-worth of control over the modalities. In the\nevent that the simultaneous use of, or control over, a\nmodality by various nodes is not inconsistent, then the value\nof the respective nodes may be summed, with the resulting\nallocation based on, for example, a ratio of the respective\nvalue functions. As a part of the optimization, nodes are\nrewarded not only for supporting the communication, but\nalso for deferring their own respective needs. As a result,\nafter controlling the resources, a node will be relatively less\nwealthy and less able to subsequently control the resources,\nwhile other nodes will be more able to control the resources.\nThe distribution to deferred nodes also serves to prevent\npure reciprocal communications, since the proposed mecha-\nnism distributes and dilutes the wealth to deferring nodes.\n\nBecause each node in the model presented above has\ncomplete information, for a range up to the maximum node\ncount, the wealth of each node can be estimated by its\nneighbors, and payment inferred even if not actually con-\nsummated. (Failure of payment can occur for a number of\nreasons, including both malicious and accidental). Because\neach hop adds significant cost, the fact that nodes beyond the\nmaximum hop distance are essentially incommunicado is\ntypically of little consequence; since it is very unlikely that\na node more than 5 or 10 hops away will be efficiently\nincluded in any communication, due to the increasing cost\nwith distance, as well as reduction in reliability and increase\nin latency. Thus, large area and scalable networks may exist.\n\nTypically, cryptography is employed for both authentica-\ntion and to preserve privacy. External regulation, in a legal\nsense at least, is typically imposed by restrictions on hard-\nware and software design, as well as voluntary compliance\nat risk of detection and legal sanction.\n\nConclusion\n\nThe use of game theory as a basis for analyzing ad hoc\nnetworks provides a basis for understanding the behavior of\ncomplex networks of independent nodes. By presuming a\ndegree of choice and decision-making by nodes, we obtain\nan analysis that is robust with respect to such considerations.\n\nThe principal issues impeding deployment are the inher-\nent complexity of the system, as well as the overhead\nrequired to continuously optimize the system. Further work\nwill allow a determination of a set of simplifying presump-\ntions to reduce protocol overhead and reduce complexity.\n\nThe ad hoc network does not exist in a vacuum. There are\nvarious competing interests seeking to use the same band-\nwidth, and technological superiority alone does not assure\ndominance and commercial success. Game theory may also\nbe used as a tool to analyze the entities which seek to deploy\nad hoc networks, especially where they compete.\n\nThe present invention therefore provides an automated\nnegotiation for control of a set of resources by competing\nbidders and offers, comprising receiving, from each of a\nplurality of bidders, a utility function representing a value to\nthe bidder to obtain of a set of resources; receiving, from\neach of a plurality of offers, a utility function representing a\nvalue to the offer to relinquish a set of resources; computing\na set of successful bids from the plurality of bidders and\nplurality of offers, a successful bid comprising a matching of\na maximum aggregate value of the sets of resources to the\nbidders and a minimum aggregate value of the sets of\nresources to the offers, wherein the maximum aggregate\nvalue of bids equals or exceeds the minimum aggregate\nvalue of offers; and receiving for each set of resources from\na bidder placing a respective successful bid a Vickrey price,\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 78 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n127\n\nand paying to for each set of resources to an offer of a\nrespective successful bid each its offer price, with any\nsurplus being allocated to bidders based on a value bid. The\nbidder utility function may be evaluated based on private\ninformation of an offer, and communicated as a normalized\nvalue.\n\nTt is noted that in an auction for a synthetic economic\nvalue generated by a generation function, the payment may\nbe by currency or the ability to generate currency. That is, an\nagent may transfer to another agent the micropayment or the\nability to generate a micropayment, both within the auction\nor outside of it. Normally, the valuation of the ability to\ngenerate synthetic currency would be discounted from the\nfuture value by a subjective discount rate dependent on the\nrecipient. In other cases, it may be expedient to apply an\nobjective discount rate which is calculable without requiring\nsubstantial communications (or even any communications)\nwith each agent. Thus, each agent can anticipate its future\ncommunication needs and target sufficient resources at the\nappropriate time to meet that need, while leaving for other\nagents the communication resources when these are not\nneeded.\n\nEighth Embodiment\n\nAccording to a further aspect of the invention, it is desired\nto understand the subjective risk aversion profile of a person.\nRisk-aversion is a significant deviation from rationality\nwhich can be quantified and understood, and further a\ncalculus is available for applying the risk aversion to nor-\nmalize systems in which rationality is presumed. Accord-\ningly, the method comprises presenting a game for play by\na person, wherein the payoff of the game is real and\nbeneficial to the person. That is, the incentive and risk must\nbe real, with some limits on the ability to extrapolate beyond\nthe scope of risk presented. The person is then sufficiently\nobserved during the game play to comprehend a risk aver-\nsion profile of the user. Typically, the game is automated, but\nthis is not required, and, in fact, a competition between two\nor more players is possible. This scenario is generally quite\nbeneficial where the stakes of the game are identical or\nsimilar to the risk aversion personality attribute sought to be\ndefined. The comprehended risk aversion profile may then\nbe used to modify a rationality expectation for the person.\nThe modified rationality expectation may then be applied to\noptimize an interaction with the person outside of the game\nplay environment.\n\nThis process is particularly useful for creating a user-\nagent to act on behalf of the user, in a manner commensurate\nwith a subjective profile of the user, or to subjectivize a\npresentation of risk data to a user. For example, in the\nprobability based user interface discussed above, the event-\nprobability map may be analyzed based on the subjective\nrisk tolerance of the user, and the output optimized accord-\ningly. This method may also be applied for optimally pairing\na user with another person or process, based on compatibil-\nity.\n\nThere has thus been shown and described novel commu-\nnications devices and systems and methods which fulfill all\nthe objects and advantages sought therefor. Many changes,\nmodifications, variations, combinations, subcombinations\nand other uses and applications of the subject invention will,\nhowever, become apparent to those skilled in the art after\nconsidering this specification and the accompanying draw-\nings which disclose the preferred embodiments thereof. All\nsuch changes, modifications, variations and other uses and\napplications which do not depart from the spirit and scope of\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n40\n\n45\n\n128\n\nthe invention are deemed to be covered by the invention,\nwhich is to be limited only by the claims which follow.\n\nThe following resources, each of which is expressly\nincorporated herein by reference, provides a basis for under-\nstanding aspects of the invention and has implications for\nthe design, control, and analysis of systems and networks,\nand the method of operation thereof.\n\nOTHER PATENTS BY INVENTOR HEREOF\n\nThe following patents are expressly incorporated herein\nby reference: U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,865,825, 6,850,252, 6,791,\n472, 6,640,145, 6,429,812, 6,418,424, 6,400,996, 6,252,544,\n6,230,501, 6,081,750, 5,920,477, 5,903,454, 5,901,246,\n5,875,108, 5,867,386, and 5,774,357. See also, U.S. patent\nNos. (expressly incorporated herein by reference):\n\nUSS. Pat. Nos. 3,582,926; 4,291,749; 4,314,232;\n821; 4,401,848; 4,407,564; 4,419,730; 4,441,405;\n887; 4,477,874; 4,536,739; 4,582,389; 4,636,782;\n003; 4,707,788; 4,731,769; 4,740,779; 4,740,780;\n824; 4,787,039; 4,795,223; 4,809,180; 4,818,048;\n520; 4,837,551; 4,853,687; 4,876,594; 4,914,705;\n178; 4,988,976; 4,995,258; 4,996,959; 5,006,829;\n736; 5,051,735; 5,070,323; 5,070,931; 5,119,504;\n797; 5,203,499; 5,214,413; 5,214,707; 5,235,633;\n190; 5,274,560; 5,278,532; 5,293,115; 5,299,132;\n974; 5,335,276; 5,335,743; 5,345,817; 5,351,041;\n165; 5,371,510; 5,400,045; 5,404,443; 5,414,439;\n318; 5,422,565; 5,432,904; 5,440,428; 5,442,553;\n321; 5,450,329; 5,450,613; 5,475,399; 5,479,482;\n632; 5,486,840; 5,493,658; 5,494,097; 5,497,271;\n339; 5,504,622; 5,506,595; 5,511,724; 5,519,403;\n410; 5,523,559; 5,525,977; 5,528,248; 5,528,496;\n888; 5,539,869; 5,547,125; 5,553,661; 5,555,172;\n286; 5,555,502; 5,559,520; 5,572,204; 5,576,724;\n535; 5,627,547; 5,638,305; 5,648,769; 5,650,929;\n386; 5,654,715; 5,666,102; 5,670,953; 5,689,252;\n695; 5,702,165; 5,712,625; 5,712,640; 5,714,852;\n387; 5,732,368; 5,734,973; 5,742,226; 5,752,754;\n311; 5,777,394; 5,781,872; 5,919,239; 6,002,326;\n956; 6,078,853; 6,104,101; and 6,449,535.\n\nSECURE NETWORKS: A number of references relate to\nsecure networks, which are an aspect of various embodi-\nments of the present invention. These references are incor-\nporated herein by reference in their entirety, including U.S.\nPat. Nos. 5,933,498, 5,978,918, 6,005,943, 6,009,526,\n6,021,202, 6,021,491, 6,021,497, 6,023,762, 6,029,245,\n6,049,875, 6,055,508, 6,065,119, 6,073,240, 6,075,860,\n6,075,861.\n\nCRYPTOGRAPHIC REFERENCES: See also, U.S. Pat.\nNos. 4,200,770, 4,218,582, 4,264,782, 4,306,111, 4,309,\n569, 4,326,098, 4,351,982, 4,365,110, 4,386,233, 4,393,269,\n4,399,323, 4,405,829, 4,438,824, 4,453,074, 4,458,109,\n4,471,164, 4,514,592, 4,528,588, 4,529,870, 4,558,176,\n4,567,600, 4,575,621, 4,578,531, 4,590,470, 4,595,950,\n4,625,076, 4,633,036, 5,991,406, 6,026,379, 6,026,490,\n\n4,337,\n4,451,\n4,653,\n4,752,\n4,827,\n4,967,\n5,043,\n5,198,\n5,257,\n5,334,\n5,361,\n5,416,\n5,450,\n5,483,\n5,497,\n5,519,\n5,534,\n5,555,\n5,579,\n5,653,\n5,691,\n5,717,\n5,758,\n6,013,\n\n6,028,932,\n6,029,150,\n6,034,618,\n6,038,316,\n6,041,122,\n6,044,131,\n6,044,350,\n6,044,466,\n6,047,072,\n6,047,887,\n6,049,785,\n\n6,028,933,\n6,029,195,\n6,035,041,\n6,038,322,\n6,041,123,\n6,044,155,\n6,044,388,\n6,044,468,\n6,047,242,\n6,049,610,\n6,049,786,\n\n6,028,936,\n6,029,247,\n6,035,398,\n6,038,581,\n6,041,357,\n6,044,157,\n6,044,462,\n6,047,051,\n6,047,268,\n6,049,612,\n6,049,787,\n\n6,028,937,\n6,031,913,\n6,035,402,\n6,038,665,\n6,041,408,\n6,044,205,\n6,044,463,\n6,047,066,\n6,047,269,\n6,049,613,\n6,049,838,\n\n6,028,939,\n6,031,914,\n6,038,315,\n6,038,666,\n6,041,410,\n6,044,349,\n6,044,464,\n6,047,067,\n6,047,374,\n6,049,671,\n6,049,872,\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS\n\nDocument 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 79 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n129\n6,052,467,\n6,055,512,\n6,058,187,\n6,058,383,\n6,061,790,\n6,061,799,\n6,064,764,\n6,069,952,\n6,070,239,\n6,073,160,\n6,073,238,\n6,076,162,\n6,078,665,\n6,081,597,\n6,192,473,\n5,915,018,\n\n6,049,874,\n6,055,321,\n6,056,199,\n6,058,193,\n6,061,692,\n6,061,794,\n6,064,740,\n6,067,620,\n6,069,969,\n6,072,876,\n6,073,236,\n6,075,865,\n6,076,167,\n6,079,018,\n6,081,790, 6,081,893,\n5,991,399, 5,948,136,\n5,634,012, 5,629,980.\nCOMPUTER SECURITY AND DEVICES: A number of\nreferences relate to computer system security, which is a part\n\n6,052,466,\n6,055,508,\n6,057,872,\n6,058,381,\n6,061,789,\n6,061,796,\n6,064,741,\n6,069,647,\n6,069,970,\n6,073,125,\n6,073,237,\n6,076,078,\n6,078,663,\n6,079,047,\n\n6,052,469,\n6,055,636,\n6,058,188,\n6,061,448,\n6,061,791,\n6,064,723,\n6,064,878,\n6,069,954,\n6,072,870,\n6,073,172,\n6,073,242,\n6,076,163,\n6,078,667,\n6,081,598,\n6,026,167,\n5,715,403,\n\n6,055,314,\n6,055,639,\n6,058,189,\n6,061,454,\n6,061,792,\n6,064,738,\n6,065,008,\n6,069,955,\n6,072,874,\n6,073,234,\n6,075,864,\n6,076,164,\n6,078,909,\n6,081,610,\n6,009,171,\n5,638,443,\n\n130\n5,583,950,\n5,559,885,\n5,533,123,\n5,485,312,\n5,457,747,\n5,414,755,\n5,341,428,\n5,272,754,\n5,208,858,\n5,131,038,\n5,056,141,\n4,961,142,\n\n5,588,059,\n5,572,596,\n5,544,255,\n5,497,430,\n5,475,839,\n5,448,045,\n5,347,580,\n5,283,431,\n5,228,094,\n5,163,094,\n5,065,429,\n4,993,068,\n4,926,480, 4,896,363, 4,890,323, 4,868,376, 4,827,518,\n4,819,267, 4,752,676, 4,736,203, 4,731,841, 4,564,018,\neach of which is expressly incorporated herein by reference.\n\nMICROPAYMENTS REFERFENCES: The following\nUSS. patents, expressly incorporated herein by reference,\ndefine aspects of micropayment, digital certificate, and on-\nline payment systems: U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,930,777, 5,857,023,\n\n5,586,171,\n5,561,718,\n5,534,855,\n5,485,519,\n5,469,506,\n5,432,864,\n5,345,549,\n5,280,527,\n5,224,173,\n5,155,680,\n5,056,147,\n4,972,476,\n\n5,583,933,\n5,557,765,\n5,526,428,\n5,483,601,\n5,455,407,\n5,412,727,\n5,335,288,\n5,245,329,\n5,204,670,\n5,073,950,\n5,036,461,\n4,952,928,\n\n5,578,808,\n5,553,155,\n5,523,739,\n5,478,993,\n5,453,601,\n5,363,453,\n5,291,560,\n5,229,764,\n5,191,611,\n5,067,162,\n5,020,105,\n4,941,173,\n\nof various embodiment of the invention. The following 20\nreferences relevant to this issue are incorporated herein by\nreference: U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,881,225, 5,937,068, 5,949,882,\n5,953,419, 5,956,400, 5,958,050, 5,978,475, 5,991,878,\n6,070,239, 6,079,021, 5,982,520, 5,991,519, 5,999,629,\n\n6,034,618, 6,041,412, 6,061,451, 6,069,647.\n\nVIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK: A number of refer-\nences relate to virtual private networks, which is a part of\nvarious embodiment of the invention. The following refer-\nences relevant to this issue are incorporated herein by\nreference: U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,079,020, 6,081,900, 6,081,533, 30\n\n6,078,946,\n6,061,796,\n6,047,325,\n6,005,859,\n6,079,621,\n6,070,141,\n6,045,039,\n6,038,666,\n6,035,402,\n6,016,476,\n6,006,328,\n5,995,630,\n5,987,153,\n5,978,494,\n5,963,657,\n5,949,879,\n5,933,498,\n5,920,058,\n5,912,818,\n5,897,616,\n5,889,474,\n5,872,849,\n5,867,802,\n5,862,223,\n5,844,244,\n5,838,812,\n5,825,871,\n5,799,088,\n5,789,733,\n5,771,071,\n5,763,862,\n5,751,809,\n5,742,683,\n5,712,912,\n5,682,032,\n5,647,364,\n5,615,277,\n\n6,078,586,\n6,061,729,\n6,032,118,\n6,002,767,\n6,078,265,\n6,068,184,\n6,044,349,\n6,038,337,\n6,035,398,\n6,012,049,\n6,003,135,\n5,991,431,\n5,986,746,\n5,974,146,\n5,954,583,\n5,949,046,\n5,930,804,\n5,915,973,\n5,910,988,\n5,892,902,\n5,881,226,\n5,872,848,\n5,867,795,\n5,857,022,\n5,841,907,\n5,832,464,\n5,815,577,\n5,799,086,\n5,787,187,\n5,770,849,\n5,761,298,\n5,748,738,\n5,737,420,\n5,706,427,\n5,680,460,\n5,647,017,\n5,613,012,\n\n6,075,854,\n6,058,303,\n6,029,067,\n6,002,756,\n6,076,167,\n6,064,751,\n6,044,155,\n6,038,315,\n6,031,910,\n6,012,039,\n6,002,770,\n5,991,429,\n5,984,366,\n5,970,143,\n5,952,641,\n5,943,423,\n5,923,763,\n5,913,196,\n5,907,149,\n5,892,838,\n5,878,144,\n5,872,834,\n5,867,578,\n5,850,451,\n5,841,886,\n5,832,119,\n5,815,252,\n5,799,083,\n5,784,566,\n5,768,382,\n5,757,916,\n5,745,573,\n5,734,154,\n5,703,562,\n5,668,878,\n5,646,839,\n5,608,387,\n\n6,075,852,\n6,055,575,\n6,016,318,\n6,081,750,\n6,075,455,\n6,056,197,\n6,041,410,\n6,037,870,\n6,026,166,\n6,011,858,\n5,999,637,\n5,991,408,\n5,982,894,\n5,966,446,\n5,951,055,\n5,935,071,\n5,920,477,\n5,913,025,\n5,901,246,\n5,892,824,\n5,876,926,\n5,870,723,\n5,862,260,\n5,850,442,\n5,841,865,\n5,828,751,\n5,805,719,\n5,790,674,\n5,784,461,\n5,767,496,\n5,757,431,\n5,745,555,\n5,719,950,\n5,696,827,\n5,666,400,\n5,636,282,\n5,594,806,\n\n5,815,657, 5,793,868, 5,717,757, 5,666,416, 5,677,955,\n5,839,119, 5,915,093, 5,937,394, 5,933,498, 5,903,880,\n5,903,651, 5,884,277, 5,960,083, 5,963,924, 5,996,076,\n6,016,484, 6,018,724, 6,021,202, 6,035,402, 6,049,786,\n6,049,787, 6,058,381, 6,061,448, 5,987,132, 6,057,872,\n25 6,061,665, 4,977,595, 5,224,162, 5,237,159, 5,392,353,\n5,511,121, 5,621,201, 5,623,547, 5,679,940, 5,696,908,\n5,754,939, 5,768,385, 5,799,087, 5,812,668, 5,828,840,\n5,832,089, 5,850,446, 5,889,862, 5,889,863, 5,898,154,\n5,901,229, 5,920,629, 5,926,548, 5,943,424, 5,949,045,\n5,952,638, 5,963,648, 5,978,840, 5,983,208, 5,987,140,\n6,073,172, 6,002,767, 6,003,765, 6,021,399, 6,026,379, 6,029,150,\n6,052,788, 6,029,151, 6,047,067, 6,047,887, 6,055,508, 6,065,675,\n6,009,430, 6,072,870, each of which is expressly incorporated herein by\n6,081,199, reference.\n6,072,894, 35\n6,052,468, What is claimed is:\n6,040,783, 1. A wireless network node of a wireless network, com-\n6,035,406, prising:\n6,018,739, (a) an antenna system, configured to: communicate\n6,009,177, 40 through a communication channel, having a directional\n5,999,095, radiation pattern with an alterable directional vector\n5,987,155, having at least a first state and a second state which\n5,979,773, differ in at least the alterable directional vector and\n5,963,908, corresponding spatial characteristics, and\n5,949,881, 45 (b) an automated controller, configured to:\n5,933,515, (i) conduct an automated negotiation with a remote\n5,920,384, wireless communication device, which employs\n5,912,974, game theoretic decision-making to self-organize the\n5,898,154, wireless network, by communications through the\n5,890,152, 50 antenna system, relating to a conduct of communi-\n5,875,108, cations which have a first potential interference with\n5,869,822, respect to the communication channel when the\n5,862,246, alterable directional vector is in the first state and a\n5,848,231, second potential interference when the alterable\n5,841,122, 55 directional vector is in the second state, the first\n5,825,880, potential interference being different from the sec-\n5,802,199, ond potential interference, to select one of the first\n5,790,668, state and the second state in dependence on the\n5,774,551, automated negotiation;\n5,764,789, 60 (11) define the alterable directional vector of the antenna\n5,751,836, system to selectively assume the directional radia-\n5,742,685, tion pattern having selected one of the first state and\n5,712,914, the second state; and\n5,682,142, (111) control a communication through the communica-\n5,659,616, 65 tion channel with the alterable directional vector in\n5,633,932, the assumed directional radiation pattern having the\n5,592,408, selected one of the first state and the second state.\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-1\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 80 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n131\n\n2. The wireless network node according to claim 1,\nwherein the antenna system comprises an antenna array\nhaving the alterable directional vector.\n\n3. The wireless network node according to claim 1,\nwherein the automated controller is further configured to\nrespond to a quality of service parameter for communica-\ntions over the communication channel.\n\n4. The wireless network node according to claim 1,\nwherein the automated controller is further configured to\ndetermine a communication risk for communication over the\ncommunication channel and to selectively control commu-\nnication over the communication channel in dependence on\na relationship of a risk tolerance parameter and the deter-\nmined communication risk.\n\n5. The wireless network node according to claim 1, further\ncomprising a geolocation information input configured to\nreceive location information for determining a position of\nthe wireless network node, wherein the defined alterable\ndirectional vector further selectively assumes the assumed\ndirectional radiation pattern having the one of the first state\nand the second state based on at least the determined\nposition.\n\n6. The wireless network node according to claim 1,\nwherein the antenna system is further configured to com-\nmunicate through a second communication channel with the\nremote wireless communication device, the second commu-\nnication channel differing from the communication channel\nbased on at least one of a radio frequency modulation\npattern, and a frequency band of operation.\n\n7. The wireless network node according to claim 6,\nwherein the second communication channel has a respec-\ntively longer effective communication range and lower data\ncommunication bandwidth than the communication channel.\n\n8. The wireless network node according to claim 1,\nwherein the automated controller is further configured to\ncontrol communications over the communication channel\nthrough a wireless mesh network using a multihop mesh\nnetwork communication protocol, and wherein the antenna\nsystem assumes a first directional vector for receipt of a\ntransmission comprising a data packet and a second direc-\ntional vector for transmission of the data packet.\n\n9. The wireless network node according to claim 1,\nwherein the automated controller is further configured to:\n\nestimate a configuration of at least a portion of a wireless\ncommunication network comprising the wireless net-\nwork node, and a plurality of remote wireless commu-\nnication devices; and\n\ncontrol the communication through the communication\nchannel in dependence on the estimated configuration\nof the at least a portion of the wireless communication\nnetwork, and a risk tolerance parameter for a risk of\ndeviation of the estimated configuration of the at least\na portion of the wireless network from an actual\nconfiguration of the at least a portion of the wireless\nnetwork.\n\n10. A method of communicating through a wireless net-\n\nwork, comprising:\n\n(a) providing a mobile antenna system supporting com-\nmunications through a communication channel associ-\nated with a directional antenna pattern with a useful\naperture having an alterable directional vector,\n\n(b) automatically determining a location of the mobile\nantenna system;\n\n(c) automatically conducting a negotiation by an auto-\nmated controller, with at least one remote wireless\ncommunication device through the antenna system,\nrelating to communications which have a first potential\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n40\n\n45\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n132\n\nlocation-dependent interference with respect to the\ncommunication channel when the alterable directional\nvector is in a first state and a second location-dependent\npotential interference when the alterable directional\nvector is in the second state, the first location-depen-\ndent potential interference in the first state at the\ndetermined location being different from the second\nlocation-dependent potential interference in the second\nstate at the determined location, to select one of the first\nstate and the second state in dependence on the nego-\ntiation and the determined location, wherein said nego-\ntiation is conducted by an automated autonomous con-\ntrol which employs game theoretic decision-making to\nself-organize the wireless network;\n\n(d) automatically altering the alterable directional vector\nof the antenna system to selectively assume the selected\none of the first state and the second state, based on at\nleast the negotiation; and\n\n(e) automatically communicating through the antenna\nsystem over the communication channel with the alter-\nable directional vector in the selected one of the first\nstate and the second state, at the determined location.\n\n11. The method according to claim 10, wherein the\ncommunication through the communication channel is with\nanother mobile node of the wireless network, and the\ncommunications through the communication channel\nemploy an electronically controllable antenna array of the\nantenna system.\n\n12. The method according to claim 10, wherein said game\ntheoretic decision-making proceeds without a transfer of\nvalue.\n\n13. The method according to claim 10, wherein at least\none of said automatically conducting a negotiation and\nautomatically altering the alterable directional vector is\nresponsive to (i) impairments of the communication chan-\nnel, and (ii) at least one cost function.\n\n14. The method according to claim 10, wherein said\nautomatically conducting a negotiation is controlled by an\nautomated self-interested agent in accordance with a syn-\nthetic economy isolated from external macroeconomic influ-\nences, wherein the negotiation comprises at least one trans-\nfer of value in accordance with the synthetic economy.\n\n15. The method according to claim 10, wherein said\nautomatically conducted negotiation comprises an auto-\nmated auction to resolve competition of at least two wireless\nmobile network nodes for potentially interfering communi-\ncations through the communication channel.\n\n16. The method according to claim 10, further comprising\nautomatically controlling communication over the commu-\nnication channel in dependence on a relationship of a risk\ntolerance parameter and a risk of communication impair-\nment.\n\n17. The method according to claim 10, wherein the\ncommunication channel communicates according to a mul-\ntihop mesh network communication protocol, the protocol\nrouting communications in dependence on at least an esti-\nmate of a state of the wireless mesh network and a risk\ntolerance parameter for a risk of deviation of the wireless\nmesh network from the estimate of the state of the wireless\nmesh network.\n\n18. The method according to claim 10, further comprising\ndetermining a directional pattern of the antenna, receiving\ninformation defining respective positions of the at least one\nremote wireless mobile communication device through the\nantenna system, and defining the alterable directional vector\nfurther in dependence on at least the determined location of\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti-1_ Filed 12/29/25 Page 81 of 81\n\nUS 9,794,797 B2\n\n133\n\nthe antenna system and the determined position of at least\none of the at least one remote wireless mobile communica-\ntion device.\n\n19. A wireless network device for operation in a wireless\n\nnetwork, comprising:\n\n(a) an antenna system, configured to transduce radio\nfrequency waves, the antenna system having an alter-\nable directional radiation pattern having a first state\nassociated with a first directional vector and a different\nsecond state associated with a second directional vec-\ntor; and\n\n(b) an automated controller comprising a cooperative\nagent which operates according to a strategy, config-\nured to:\n\n(i) establish a communication with at least one other\nremote wireless communication device, having a\nrespective cooperative agent which operates accord-\ning to a respective strategy, through the antenna\nsystem;\n\n(11) conduct a negotiation employing game theoretic\ndecision-making with the respective cooperative\nagent of the at least one other remote wireless\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n134\n\ncommunication device, to define the alterable direc-\ntional radiation pattern to a selected one of the first\nstate and the second state to self-organize the wire-\nless network, wherein the negotiation is conducted\nwith respect to at least a potential interference with\nor by the transduced radio frequency waves, with\nrespect to communications of the at least one other\nremote wireless communication device, the negotia-\ntion seeking to increase a strategic value of the\ncooperative agent;\n\n(iii) controlling the antenna system to assume the\nselected one of the first state and the second state;\nand\n\n(iv) communicating information through the antenna\nsystem.\n\n20. The wireless network device according to claim 19,\nwherein the automated controller is further configured to\ntransfer at least one token having strategic value with the at\nleast one other remote wireless communication device as a\nresult of the negotiation, in exchange for assuming the\nselected one of the first state and the second state.\n\n* * * * *\n","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-01-28T21:45:20.359474-08:00","document_number":"1","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"055017923578","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Exhibit 1 - U.S. Patent No. 9,794,797","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/466811377/","id":466811377,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72087328/1/2/hisense-usa-corporation-v-cogent-insights-licensing-inc/","date_created":"2026-01-28T21:43:36.052702-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-31T06:46:15.779849-08:00","sha1":"f3dd240a43254e7730f301b0cef24741e2a2caf5","page_count":31,"file_size":4506859,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.2.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.2.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page1lof31\n\nEXHIBIT 2\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 2of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311N RAVENSWOCD AVE STE315 (773) 669 4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nDecember 8, 2025\n\nVia Federal Express\nHisense USA Corporation\nAttn: General Counsel\n7310 McGinnis Ferry Rd\nSuwanee, GA 30024\nUSA\n\nRe: Notice of Infringement of COGENT INSIGHTS LICENSING INC.\u2019s Patent\n\nDear Sir/Madam:\n\nThis firm represents COGENT INSIGHTS LICENSING INC, (\"Cogent\") with respect to its patent portfolio licensing and litigation. Cogent is the owner of\nthe entire right, title, and interest in and to United States Patent No. 9,794,797 (the '797 Patent\"), entitled \" Multifactorial optimization system and method,\u201d\nissued on October 17, 2017.\n\nThe inventions of the Patent were originally conccived and developed by Steven M. Hoffberg, who was a technical pioneer and a polymath. The Patent 1s\ndirected to kcy features pertaining to game theoretic decision-making approach in an antcnna system communicating through a communication channel\nhaving a directional radiation pattern with an alterable directional vector that allow present day wireless communication devices to be competitive in the\nmodern marketplace. Further, the Patent and its early priority date of Oct. 4, 2005 make it essential to ongoing operations in the space.\n\nBased on publicly available information, Hisense infringes the Patent by making, using, selling, importing, and/or offering for sale products and services that\npractice the claimed inventions of the Patent, inducing others to make and use such products in an infringing manner, and/or contributing to the making and\nuse of infringing products and services by others, including its customers, who directly infringe the Patent.\n\n\fRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\nCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 3of 31\n\n4311 NRAVENSWOOD AVESTE315 (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nProvided below is the infringement claim chart for your perusal:\n\nUS9794797\n\nHisense 110 UX Series Championship Edition TV (\u201cThe Accused Product\u201d)\n\n1. A wireless network\nnode of a wireless\nnetwork, comprising:\n\nThe standard discloses a wireless network node (e.g., 802.1 lax equipped station) of a wireless network (e.g.,\n802.11ax based network).\n\nAs shown below, the accused product is 802.1 lax (Wi-Fi 6/6E) equipped.\n\nlala a SET AAUb (0). 2 (08) 1 0810).s M1018), 6 MM Va 2a) 01S S| 0d 48 816 OLB) fore 1) (3: .e: 7. male 20) 2M OL Tt ke\n\nHisense 110\" UX Series\nChampionship Edition Mini-LED\nULED Googie TV\n\noN\n\nhttps://www.hisense-usa.com/product-page/televisions- |10-ux-series-mini-led-uled-goog/e-ty- | 10ux\n\n\fRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page4of31\n\n(773) 669 4590\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nhttps://(www.hisense-usa,com/product-page/televisions- | 10-ux-serics-mini-led-uled-zoogle-tv-110ux\n\n(a) an antenna system,\nconfigured to:\ncommunicate through a\ncommunication channel,\nhaving a directional\nradiation pattern with an\nalterable directional\nvector having at least a\nfirst state and a second\nstate which differ in at\nleast the alterable\n\nThe wireless network node (e.g., 802.1 lax equipped station) disclosed by the standard comprises an antenna\nsystem (e.g., an antenna array as mentioned in the standard as distinct Analog and RF Chains), configured to:\ncommunicate through a communication channel (e.g., a wireless communication channel with bandwidth 20MHz,\n40 MHz, 80 MHz, 160 MHz, or 80MHz+ 80MHz), having a directional radiation pattern (e.g., beamformed signal\npattern) with an alterable directional vector (e.g., vector associated with beamforming steering matrix & associated\ncoefficients)) having at least a first state (e.g., one of beamforming states with a beamforming steering matrix\ncomposed of a set of beamforming coefficients) and a second state (e.g., another beamforming state with a\nbeamforming matrix composed of a set of beamforming coefficients) which differ in at least the alterable\ndirectional vector (e.g., vector associated with beamforming steering matrix & associated coefficients) and\ncorresponding spatial characteristics (e.g., spatial direction of the lobe of radiation corresponding to beamforming\ncoefficients).\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page5of31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 669.4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\ndirectional vector and As shown below, the standard discloses an 802.11ax enabled device having more than one antenna (multiple RF\ncorresponding spatial chains) with the stcerable beamforming feature.\ncharacteristics, and\n\nf ~\n~ Ly Constelis ton LOPC tone | >| i :\n2 a Mapper __mapper [PA \"| seoment |\na a Deparser , ;\nae > z !\n; i 6\n| | i \u00a7 l,\n& o x ; 5 Le\nney & a us & i i z : (Bf\nLe @ e a a i 5 5 2 is 3\na o ue \u201c : } a : \\< :\n\u00a3 \u00b0 & at 5 i i a : lei \u00a2\na S & & i ; g ;\n5 i \u00b0 i \\\n5 :\nL i /\nbe : i\n9 : | f\nLy Constellation LDPC tone | | Fe : |\nmapper mapper Segment\nf\u2014\u2014>| OTS ,\n\\ cM jp ToPC Te || Oeparser per STS i\nmappes mapper |\n\nOFT\n\n1\n\na2\n&.\nl\n=.\n\n2 P|\n\nAnak le insert Gi\neee Meant ferret\nanas Window\n\nFigure 27-21\u2014Transmitter block diagram for the Data field\nof an HE SU PPDU in 160 MHz with LDPC encoding\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 6of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVESTE315_ (773) 669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\naa fae ey \u2014\u2014 )\nP71 PST Lg] Constenaton LDPC tone | \u00bb\ni % mapper mapper ce BS\nee oo =\na &\n; = >\n\u00bb 5 \u00bb + ; ae : ,&\nOs 2 c us \u00a3 i i & : sip i\nwt \u20ac ai 45 g \u2018 ; a i = :\nuo 8 a i g a : \u2019 ee 4 e i\na 3 & i ~ : & a\nB uv Go wo a ; = a\n* = a g i \u00a2 G\n- \u00e9 a\nQ }\nB\nConstellation LOPC tone\nmapper mapper 8TS\nNw _\u2014_ 1 a\nConstellation LOPC tone 2\nL__| mapper mapper | per STS\n[\u201ctasert GI)\nAnalog\n\u2014 = feo and be\u2014| (DFT\nand RF Window |\nanal Insert Gi]\nee I \u2014 and IDET be\nMinow |\n\nInsert tt \u2014\nand le IDFT\n\na\n+\nJ {Nidow\n/ Insert Gt\nand le (OFT pte\n\nWindow |\n\nFigure 27-22\u2014Transmitter block diagram for the Data fieid\nof an HE SU PPDU in 80+80 MHz with LDPC encoding\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 7 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 669.4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nThe HE PHY provides support for 20 MHz. 40 MHz. 80 MHz, and 160 MHz contiguous channel widths and\nSupport for $080 MHz noncontiguous channel w idth. depending on the frequency band and capability. For\nPPDU bandwidths greater than or equal to 80 Miz. the HE PHY supports preamble punctured HE M1\n\nPPDU transmissions where pre-HE modulated fields (see Figure 27-23 in 27.3.10) are not transmitted in one\nor more of the nonprunary 20 MHz channels. and RUs associated with those punctured 20 MHz channels as\ndefined in 27.3.11.8.3 are not allocated.\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\nHELIF, \u2014\u2014 < ---\u2014\n\nr\n\nALM 1.\n\nKOM / ioFT\n\nNeste |\nLURELTF fap ayy uot\n\nFigure 27-33\u2014-Generation of HE-LTF symbols per frequency segment in an HE TB PPDU\nfor user uon RUr\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 8of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE315_ (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nTruncate 4 of insert GI Analog\n\n\u00a2 \u00bb Be IOFT sine symbol wy and wl ond RE\ne Window\n2 2\n3 = py\n= | CSE per _ 8 . . _. | Truncate 14 of Insert Gl Ana\n2) 2 - STS \"| = IDET \"| time symbol and mand ee \u00bb\n2 @ a Window\n2s a\n2 wv\n3\n& a \u2018 Ingert Gi\n= CSD per . Truncate 4 of Analog\na ee! awe: > fn \u00e9\n\n~l osTs ~ em) IDET ! time symbol and land RE\n\nLd Window \"\n\nFigure 27-34\u2014Generation of 1x HE-LTF symbols per frequency segment\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\nThe main PHY features in an HE STA that are not present in VHT STA or HT STA are the following:\n\nMandatory support for DL and UL OFDMA\n\nMandatory support for DL MU-MIMO by an HE AP that supports 4 or more spatial streams when\nMU-MIMO is done on the entire PPDU bandwidth\n\nMandatory support for DL. MU-MIMO reception for a non-AP HE STA\n\nMandatory support for the HE sounding protocol to support beamforming for a non-AP STA\nbeamformee and optional otherwise\n\nOptional support for HE-MCSs 10 and 11\nOptional support for UL MU-MIMO\nOptional support for preamble puncturing\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 9of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 669 4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n26.7 HE sounding protocol\n\n26.7.1 General\n\nTransmit beamforming and DL MU-MIMO require knowledge of the channel state to compute a steering\nmatnx that is applied to the transmit signal to optimize reception at one or more receivers. HE STAs use the\nHE sounding protocol to determine the channel state information. The HE sounding protocol provides\nexplicit feedback mechanisms. defined as HE non-trigger-based (non-TB) sounding and HE trigger-based\n(TB) sounding, where the HE beamformee measures the channel using a training signal (1.c.. an HE\nsounding NDP) transmitted by the HE beamformer and sends back a transformed estimate of the channel\nstate. The HE beamformer uses this estimate to derive the steering matrix.\n\nSource: IEEE 802.11lax\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 10 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE315 (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\n27.3.16 SU-MIMO and DL MU-MIMO beamforming\n\n27.3.16.1 General\n\nSU-MIMO and DL MU-MIMO beamforming are techniques used by a STA with multiple antennas (the\nbeamformer) fo steer signals using knowledge of the channel to improve throughput. With SU-MIMO\nbeamformme. all space-tune streanis in the transmitted signal are intended for reception at a single STA in\nan KO. With DO MU-MIMO beamiorming. disjoint subsets of the space-time sueains are intended fOr\nreception at different STAs in an RU of size greater than or equal to 106 tones,\n\nFor SU-MIMO and DL MU-MIMO beamforming in RU 7, the receive signal vector in subcarrier # (where\nsubcarrier k is one of the subcarfiers in RU r. K, is the set of used subcarrier indices in RU rand & = K,) at\n\nbeamformee oo. oy, = [Veo-Pep eo \u00a5e Ne -i) . i shown in Equation (27-126). where\n\nT OT rT 7 oe ag . .\nNp = [Xp aXe Nex. 1] qdenotes the wansmit signal vector in subcarrier & for all N,\n\nBusan\u00bb Han\n\ni Tr : . : o \u201c\nbeamformees. with xy, = [Ya 3g ye Xeu.,,. 17] being the transmit signal for beamformee ui.\n> . am NS TA ni > =\n\nYew \u00a9 Fy [Oro Opa + Ce vue td METH (27-126)\n\n+ noe\n\nwhere\nHy, is the channel matrix from the beamformer fo beamfonuee x in subcarrier * with dimensions\nNay,\u201d Nrx\n\nNay is the number of receive antemmas at beansformee 1\n\nO,.,, 18 a steering matrix for beamformec uv in subcarrier k with dimensions Nyy = Nezs\nNysovp ts the number of HE MU PPDU recipients (see Table 27-15) in RU r\nwt is a vector of additive noise and may include interference\n\nSource: 802. 11lax-2021\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 11 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311 N RAVENSWOODAVESTE315_ (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nThe DL MU-MIMO steermg matmx O, = [O; 5.0. ,....Q,% _;] can be determined by the\n\nbeamformer using the beamforming feedback for subcarrier #& from beamformee uv. where\n\n#= O0.1...N od. The feedback report formal is described in 94.165 and 9.4.1.66. The steering\n\nmatrix that is computed (or updated) using new beamforming feedback from some or all of participating\nbeamformees might replace the existing steering matrix O, for the next DL MU-MIMO data transmission.\n\nFor SU-MIMO beamforming. the steermg matrix QO; can be determined from the beamforming feedback\n\nmatrix , that ts sent back to the beaniormer by the beamformee usme the compressed beamforming\nfeedback Matrix formal as defined il 10.2. 12.2-6, fhe feequack report Tormat 1s described in @ 4.1.65.\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n27.3.16.2 Beamforming feedback matrix V\n\nUpon receipt of an HE sounding NDP. the beamformee computes a set of matrices for feedback to the\nbeamformer as described in 21.3.11.2. The eligible beamformees shall remove the space-time stream CSD\nin Table 21-11 from the measured channel before computing a set of matrices for feedback to the\nbeamfonner,\n\nThe beamforming feedback matrix. \u00a5;,,. found by the beamformee \u00bb for subcarrier # in RU y shall be\ncompressed in the form of angles using the method described in 19.3.12.3.6. The angles. offi and wrk u).\nare quantized according to Table 9-74 with b, defined by the Codebook Information field of the HE MIMO\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n10\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 12 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311 NRAVENSWOODAVESTE 315 (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nControl field (see 9.4.1.64). The compressed beamforming feedback matrix as defined in 19.3.12.3.6 is the\nonly Clause 27 beamforming feedback matrix detined.\n\nThe beamformee shall generate the beamforming feedback matrices with the number of rows C\u00a5r) equal to\n2 es\nthe Moyo of the HE sounding NDP.\n\nAlter receiving the angle information. gf. and wiki. the beamformer reconstructs P,,, using\nEquation (19-79), For SU-MIMO beamforming. the beamformer uses the VP; , matrix to determine the\nsteering matrix Q, For DL MU-MIMO beamforming. the beamformer may calculate a steering matrix\n\nOP. = [Ono One Orn 1] using \u00a5,,, and ASNR, (02 = Nycop pL) in order to suppress crosstalk\n\n2 cer fo\n\nbetween participating beamfommees, The method used by the beamformer to calculate the steering matrix QO;\nis implementation specific.\n\nSource: 802.1 1lax-2021\n\n9.4.1.65 HE Compressed Beamforming Report field\n\nThe HE Compressed Beamforming Report field carries the average SNR of each space-time stream and\ncompressed beamforming feedback matrices V for use by a transmit beamformer te determine steenng\nmatrices C. as described m 10.34.38 and 19.3.1203,\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\nThe beamforming feedback matrix V is formed by the beamformee as follows. The beamformer transmits an\nHE sounding NDP with Ners app space-time streams. where Vors app takes a value between 2 and 8. Based\non this HE sounding NDP. the beamformee estimates the Npy pepe\u201d Nere app chamel. and based on that\n\nchannel it determines a Nr - Nc orthogonal matrix 7 where Ni and Ne satisfy Equation (9-1). Ney perp is\n\nthe number of receiver chains used to receive the HE sounding NDP at the beamforimee.\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\nil\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-2\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311 NRAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 13 of 31\n\n(773) 669 4590\nISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\n(b) an automated\ncontroller, configured to:\n(i) conduct an automated\nnegotiation with a\nremote wireless\ncommunication device,\nwhich employs game\ntheoretic decision-\nmaking to self-organize\n\n| the wireless network, by\ncommunications through\nthe antenna system,\nrelating to a conduct of\ncommunications which\nhave a first potential\ninterference with respect\nto the communication\nchannel when the\nalterable directional\nvector is in the first state\nand a second potential\ninterference when the\nalterable directional\nvector is in the second\nstate, the first potential\ninterference being\ndifferent from the second\npotential interference, to\n\nThe wireless network node disclosed by the standard practices using an automation controller (e.g., the\nprocessor/controller of the network node) conducting an automated negotiation (e.g., a negotiation without manual\nintervention by a user) with a remote wireless communication device (e.g., another 802.1 1ax device acting as\nbeamformee), which employs game theoretic decision-making to self-organize the wireless network, by\ncommunications through the antenna system (e.g., an antenna array as mentioned in the standard as distinct Analog\nand RF Chain), relating to a conduct of communications which have a first potential interference (e.z.,\nnoise/interreference associated with the first steering matrix) with respect to the communication channel (e.g., a\nwireless communication with bandwidth 20MHz, 40 MHz, 80 MHz, 160 MHz, or 80MHz+ 80MHz) when the\nalterable directional vector (e.g., vector associated with beamforming steering matrix & associated coefficients) is\nin the first state (e.g., one of beamforming states with a beamforming steering matrix composed of a set of\nbeamforming coefficients) and a second potential interference (e.g., noise/interreference associated with the first\nsteering matrix) when the alterable directional vector (e.g., vector associated with beamforming steering matrix &\nassociated coefficients) is in the second state, the first potential interference being different from the second\npotential interference, to select one of the first state (e.g., another beamforming state with a beamforming matrix\ncomposed of a set of beamforming coefficients) and the second state (e.g., another beamforming state with a\nbeamforming matrix composed of a set of beamforming coefficients) in dependence on the automated negotiation\n(e.g., sharing of NDP sounding packets, compressed feedback matrix, CQI, etc. and other negotiating parameters).\n\nAlso, as shown below, a stcering matrix is based on SNR (signal to noise ration) and factors in cross talk\nmitigation and therefore its associated with a corresponding potential interference.\n\n12\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 14 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\n4311 NRAVENSWOOD AVE STE315 = (773) 669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nsclect one of the first\nstate and the second state\nin dependence on the\nautomated negotiation;\n\n27.3.16 SU-MIMO and DL MU-MIMO beamforming\n\n27.3.16.1 General\n\nSU-MIMO and DL MU-MIMO beamforming are techniques used by a STA with multiple antennas (the\nbeamformer) to steer signals using knowledge of the channel to improve throughput. With SU-MIMO\nbeaniforming. all space-time streanis in the wansnutted signal are intended for reception at a single STA in\nan RU. With DL MC-MIMO beamforming. disjoint subsets of the space-time streams are intended for\nreception at diferent STAs in an RU of size greater than or equal fo 106 tones.\n\nFor SU-MIMO and DL MU-MIMO beamforming in RU). the receive signal vector in subcarrier & (where\nsubcarrier # is one of the subcarriers in RU r. K, is the set of used subcarrier indices in RU r. and k \u00a9 K,.)at\n\nT\n\nbeamformee oa. ory, = (eo Veeco Ven wc: is shown in Equation (27-126). where\n= [Xeon XE i T Waenotes the transmit signal vector in subearrier & for all\n= Dee kki New ,,-1) (denotes the tansmit signal vector in subcarries or all Nusery\nbeamformees. with 4, ,, = [Xyo%n ie vy, 1] being the transmit signal for beamformee 1.\n\nYeu \u00a9 Ae [Oho Orr + Cam Hl RTH (29-126)\nwhere\n\nHy, 1s the channel matrix from the beamformer to beamformee \u00bb in subcarrier & with dimensions\n\nNex, \u00b0 Nrv\n\nNay is the number of receive antennas at beamvformee u\n\n3\nO,,, isa steering matrix for beamfonnee 1 in subcarrier 4 with dimensions Np Nsre ,.,,\nMusery is the number of HE MU PPDU recipients (see Table 27-15) in RU\n\nn is a Vector of additive noise and may include interference\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n13\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 15 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311 NRAVENSWOODAVESTE 315 = (773)6694590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nThe DL MU-MIMO steering matrix QO, = [O; 9 O,4....0..% _,] can be determined by the\n\nbeamformer using the beamforming feedback for subcarrier & from beamformee #. where\n\nw= 0.1....,M,.,,.,~ 1. The teedback report format is described in 9.4,1.65 and 9.4.1.66. The steering\n\nmatrix that is computed (or updated) using new beamforming feedback from some or all of participating\nbeamformees might replace the existing steering matrix O, for the next DL MU-MIMO data transmission.\n2 1 \u00a3 2 Oy\n\nFor SU-MIMO beamforming. the steering matrix O, can be determined from the beamforming feedback\n\nmatrix ) that ts sent back to the beamformer by the beamformee usmeg the compressed beamforming\nfeedback matrix format as defined Mm 10.0-14.5.0, Tle feedback lepott lotmat is described in 0.4.1.0>.\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n27,3.16.2 Beamforming feedback matrix V\n\nUpon receipt of an HE sounding NDP. the beanvformee computes a set of matrices for feedback to the\nbeamformer as described in 21.3.11.2. The eligible beamformees shall remove the space-time streain CSD\nin Table 21-11 from the measured channel before computing a set of matrices for feedback to the\nbeamformer.\n\nThe beamfonning feedback matrix. V;,,,. found by the beamformee \u00bb for subcarrier * in RU 7 shall be\ncompressed in the form of angles using the method described in 19.3.12.3.6. The angles. dA and wikui.\nare quantized according to Table 9-74 with 5, defined by the Codebook Information field of the HE MIMO\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\n14\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 16 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 669 4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nControl field (see 9.4.1.64). The compressed beamforming feedback matrix as defined m1 19,3,12.3.6 is the\nonly Clause 27 beanwforming feedback matrix defined.\n\nThe beamformee shall generate the beamforming feedback matrices with the number of rows (Wi) equal to\nthe Nez, of the HE sounding NDP.\n\nAfter receiving the angle information. \u00e9/on) and ydkns. the beamformer reconstructs /,,, usa\nEquation (10-79). For SU-MIMO beamforming. the beamformer uses the F., matrix to determine the\nsteering matrix Q,. For DL MU-MIMO beamforming. the beamformer may calculate a steering matrix\n\nOG, = [Op Oe peo Oru _,] using %),, and ASNR,,, (O24 = Ny oop-b) in order to suppress crosstalk\n\nbetween participating beamformees. The method used by the beamformer to calculate the steering matrix GO,\n\nis implementation specific.\n\nSource: 802.1 Llax-2021\n\n27.3.16.3 CQI feedback\n\nIfthe HE NDP Announcement frame requests CQI feedback. then upon receipt of the HE sounding NDP.\nthe beamformee computes CQI feedback as described in 9.4.1.67. The CQI feedback. CQi,,.,,. for\nbeamformee vin RU 7 for space-time stream s shall be estimated using the method described in 9.4.1.67,\nThe COI values to be fed back are derived from quantized SNRs according to Table 9-91h. The beamformee\nshall transmit the CQI feedback for space-time stream 1. .... Ne for each of the RU indices for which the\nCQI report is being requested by the beamformer. The beamformer may use the CQI feedback to determine\nthe best range of RUs for a compressed beamforming\u2019\u2018CQI report or for RU assignment during a subsequent\nMU transmissions. The actual use is implementation specific.\n\nSource: 802.1 1lax-2021\n\n15\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 17 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVESTE315_ = (773) 669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nA game-theoretic decision making is the one in which a player makes decision which are dependent on other players\nas well. It means that the decisions of the players are interdependent and the gain for a player may be a loss for the\nother.\n\nThe accused product which is 802.1 lax enabled too takes decision in line with game-theoretic process. For example,\nsituationally, it doesn\u2019t use the medium when a STA of the same BSS is transmitting but when a STA of some\ndifferent BSS transmits and the power level of the transmission is below a threshold, the accused product moves\nahead with its decision of the transmission. Further, when the power level of the transmission from the other BSS is\nhigher than a threshold in that case also, the accused product doesn\u2019t transmit. In this scenario, the decision of the\naccused product is dependent upon the other STAs (whether from the same BSS or other BSS) and if a player has\nalready access to the medium, the other players may not transmit conditionally as the medium as a resource is used\nby all players competitively.\n\nThe accused product utilizes a game theoretic method of the self-organization of the wireless network by controlling\nthe wireless network to operate in a first mode (e.g., the mode when external interfering signal is from a BSS different\nthan that of the accused product and the received signal strength of the external interfering signal is less than\nOBSS_PD_level) in which it game theoretically competes (e.g, does not update the basic or inter-BSS NAV) and\ntransmit on a shared channel with an external interfering signal (e.g., PPDUs from other STAs). The accused product\nis further configured to operate in a second mode (e.g., the mode when external interfering signal belongs to same\nBSS as the accused product) in which it game-theoretically defers (e.g., update inter-BSS NAV) to the external\ninterfering signal (e.g., PPDUs from other STAs).\n\ngame theory, branch of applied mathematics that provides tools for analyzing situations in which parties,\n\ncalled players, make decisions that are interdependent. This interdependence causes each player to consider\n\nthe other player\u2019s possible decisions, or strategies, in formulating strategy. A solution to a game describes the\n\noptimal decisions of the players, who may have similar, opposed, or mixed interests, and the outcomes that\nmay result from these decisions.\n\nhttps://www.britannica.com/science/eame-theory\n\n16\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 18 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVESTE 315 (773) 669 4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\n26.10 Spatial reuse operation\n\n26.10.1 General\n\nThe objective of HE spatial reuse operation is to allow the medium to be rensed more often between OBSSs\nin dense deployment scenarios by the early identification of signals from overlapping basic service sets\n(OBSSs) and interference management.\n\nSource: L[EEE 802.1 lax\n\noverlapping basic service set (OBSS) packet detect (PD): A packet detection level used for spatial reuse\nprocedure.\n\nSource: IEEE 802.11lax\n\nMaintaining two NAVs ts beneficial in dense deployment scenarios in which a STA requires protection from\nframes transmitted by STAs within its BSS, 1.\u00a2., intra-BSS, and wants to avoid interference from frames\ntransmitted by STAs in a neighboring BSS, i.e., inter-BSS. For example, in a TXOP initiated by the AP with\n\nSource: [IEEE 802.1lax\n\nAs shown below, the standard discloses a first mode in which the BSS of the received PPDU (external interfering\nsignal) differs from that of the accused product. Specifically, the BSS color of the received PPDU is different from\nthat of the accused product, and the received signal strength of the PPDU is lower than the OBSS_PD level.\n\nIn the first mode, the accused product competes with the received PPDU by ignoring it and transmitting on the shared\nchannel with adjusted power. Furthermore, as shown below, the accused product does not update the basic NAV\n(Network Allocation Vector). This implies that the accused product does not wait for the device transmitting the\nreceived PPDU to complete its transmission but instead initiates its own transmission with adjusted power.\n\n17\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 19 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nA_STA shall classify a received PPDU as an inter-BSS PPDU if at least one of the following conditions is\ntrue:\n\n\u2014 The RXVECTOR parameter BSS COLOR is not 0 and is not the BSS color of the BSS of which the\nSTA is a member.\n\n\u2014 The PPDU is a VHT PPDU with RXVECTOR parameter PARTIAL _AID not equal to the\nBSSID[39:47] of the BSS in which the STA is associated or any of the other BSSs in the same\nmultiple BSSID set or co-hosted BSSID set to which its BSS belongs and the RXVECTOR\nparameter GROUP ID is 0.\n\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n\n26.10.2 OBSS PD-based spatial reuse operation\n\n26.10.2.1 General\n\nOBSS PD-based_ spatial reuse operation comprises two types of operation. The first type 1s defined\nin 26.10.2.2 and allows a STA, under specific conditions, to ignore an inter-BSS PPDU using a non-SRG\nOBSS PD level. The second type is defined in 26.10.2.3 and allows a STA, under specific conditions, to\n\nignore inter-BSS PPDUs that are identified as being SRG PPDUs, using an SRG OBSS PD level. In addition\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n\n18\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 20 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\n4311 NRAVENSWOODAVESTE 315 = (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\n26.10.2.3 General operation with SRG OBSS PD level\n\nIfthe PHY of a STA issues a PHY-CCA.indication( BUSY) followed by a PHY-RXSTART. indication due\nto a PPDU reception, then the STA\u2019s MAC sublayer\n\na) May issue a PHY-CCARESET. request primitive before the end of the PPDU and not update its\nbasic NAV timer based on the PPDU, or\nb) May not update its basic NAV timer based on the PPDU if all the following conditions are met:\n1) The received PPDU is an SRG PPDU (see 26.2.3)\n2) The received signal strength level, which is measured from the L-STF or L-LTF fields of the\nPPDU or the PHY SYNC field, shortSYNC field, or Long PHY SYNC field, whichever exists\nand is used to determine PHY-CCA indication, is be evel, The SRG\n\nOBSS PD level is defined in 26.10.2.4. If the STA has dot] IHEPSROptionImplemented set to\ntrue, it also follows the rules defined in 26.104 to determine SRG OBSS PD level.\n\n3) The PPDU is not one of the following:\n\ni) A non-HE PPDU that carries a frame where the RA field is equal to the STA MAC\naddress\n\nHn) A non-HE PPDU that carries a Public Action frame\n\nni) A non-HE PPDU that carries a VHT/HE NDP Announcement frame or Fine Timing\nMeasurement frame\n\niv) A non-HE NDP\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n\n19\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 21 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVESTE 315 (773)6694590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\n26.10.2.4 Adjustment of OBSS PD and transmit power\n\nusing OBSS PD-based spatial reuse, an HE STA shail maintain an OBSS PD level and may adjust. thi\n\n\u2018OBSS PD level in conjunction with its transmit power and a value, PPDU_ BW, derived from the received\nPPDU. The adjustment shall be made in accordance with Equation (26-5).\n\nOBSS_ PD, ye) < manOBSS_PD,,,,. mittOBSS PD yay OBSS_PDyjiy + (TX _ PWR, op ~ TX_PWR)))\n+ log 10(PPDU_BW/20 MHz)\n\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n\n(26-5)\n\nAs shown below, the standard discloses a second mode in which the BSS of the received PPDU (external interfering\n\nsignal) is same as that of the accused product. Specifically, the BSS color of the received PPDU is same as that of\nthe accused product.\n\nIn the second mode, the accused product updates its intra-BSS NAV and defer its own communication if the received\nPPDU has the same BSS color as that of the accused product.\n\nA STA shall classify the received PPDU as an intra-BSS PPDU if at least one of the following conditions is\ntrue:\n\nThe RXVECTOR parameter BSS COLOR of the PPDU carrying the frame is the BSS color of the\nBSS of which the STA is a member or the BSS color of any TDLS links to which the STA belon ngs\n\nif the STA is an HE STA associated with an anon-HE AP.\n\n-\u2014~ The PPDU is a VHT PPDU with RXVECTOR parameter PARTIAL_AID equal to the\nBSSID[39:47] of the BSS in which the STA is associated or any of the other BSSs in the same\n\nmultiple BSSID set or co-hosted BSSID set to which its BSS belongs and the RNVECTOR\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n\n20\n\n\fRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\nCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 22 of 31\n\n4311N RAVENSWOODAVESTE 315 (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nA STA shall update the intra-BSS NAV with the duration information indicated by the received frame in a\nPSDU if and only if all the following conditions are met:\n\n-- The frame is identified as intra-BSS according to the rule described in 26.2.2.\n\n\u2014 The indicated duration is greater than the current intra-BSS NAV value.\n\n\u2014 The RA of the received frame is not the STA's MAC address; or the STA is not a TXOP holder, and\nthe PPDU carrying the frame does not contain a frame that solicits an immediate response from the\nSTA, or the STA is not a TXOP holder, and the received frame 1s a Trigger frame.\nSource: IEEE 802.1 lax\n\nnetwork allocation vector (NAV): An indicator, maintained by each station (STA), of time periods when\ntransmission onto the wireless medium (WM) is not initiated by the STA regardless of whether the STA\u2019s\n\nclear channel assessment (CCA) function senses that the WM is busy.\nSource: IEEE 802.11-2020\n\n| (ii) define the alterable\ndirectional vector of the\n| antenna system to\nselectively assume the\ndirectional radiation\npattern having selected\none of the first state and\nthe second state; and\n\nThe wireless network node disclosed by the standard practices defining the alterable directional vector (e.g., vector\nassociated with beamforming steering matrix & associated coefficients) of the antenna system to sclectively\nassume the directional radiation pattern having selected one of the first state (e.g., one of beamforming states with\na beamforming steering matrix composed of a set of beamforming coefficients) and the second state (e.g., another\nbeamforming state with a beamforming matrix composed of a set of beamforming coefficients).\n\nThe wireless network node selects any specific steering matrix based on compressed feedback matrix, CQI, etc.\n\n21\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 23 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 6694590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nControl field (see 9.4.1.64). The compressed beamforming feedback matrix as defined in 19.3.12.3.6 is the\nonly Clause 27 beamforming feedback matrix defined.\n\nThe beamformee shall generate the beamforming feedback matrices with the number of rows (Vr) equal to\nthe Nor, of the HE sounding NDP.\n\nAfter receiving the angle imformation. dif. and wks. the beamformer reconstructs V,, using\nEquation (19-79). For SU-MIMO beamforming. the beamformer uses the V., matrix to determine the\nsteenmg matix Q, For DL MU-MIMO beamforming. the beamformer may calculate a steering matix\n\nG, = [O.5 Op y.--- Oey _;] use VY. and ASNVR,, (O22 N,_. 1) in order to suppress crosstalk\ni Oro Si Me! EV ky Kou user? PI\n\nbetween participating beamformees. The method used by the beamformer to calculate the steering matrix OQ,\n\nis implementation specific.\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\n9.4.1.65 HE Compressed Beamforming Report field\n\nThe HE Compressed Beamforming Report field carries the average SNR of each space-time stream and\ncompressed beamforming feedback matnces V for nse by a transmit beamformer to determine steering\nmatrices O. as Geseribed in 10.343 and 19.3.12.3.\n\nSource: 802.1 1lax-2021\n\nThe beamforming feedback matrix Vis formed by the beamformee as follows. The beamformer transmits an\n\u201cSpE A AS ss AARNE s SS ss ACRES ONAN\nHE sounding NDP with Nezs arp space-time streams. where Nore ypp takes a value between 2 and 8. Based\non this HE sounding NDP. the beamformee estimates the Ney prre = Nezs ypp channel. and based on that\nchannel it determines a Ni Ne orthogonal matrix V. where Nv and Nc satisfy Equation (9-1). Ney prrr 8\nthe number of receiver chains used to receive the HE sounding NDP at the beamformee.\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n22\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 24 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315 (773) 669 4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nThe DL MU-MIMO steering matrix QO, = [O, 5. Ox4..-..O0\u00a2% 1] can be determined by the\n\nSaeaits\n\nbeaniformer using the beamforming feedback for subcarrier & from beamformee 4. where\ny= O10 Ny,\n\nuser, 6\n\n1. the feedback report format is described in 9.4.1.65 and 9.4.1.66. The steermg\n\nmatrix that is computed (or updated) using new beamforming feedback trom some or all of participating\nbeamformees might replace the existing steering matrix Q, for the next DL MU-MIMO data transmission.\n\nFor SU-MIMO beamfonning. the steering matrix QO, can be determined from the beanforming feedback\nmatix \u00a5; That is sent back tO the beamformer by the beamforme\u00e9e using the compressed beamforming\nfeedback matrix format as Gefined in 19.3. 12.3.0, Tie leecback report format is described im 9.41.65,\n\nSource: 802.11lax-2021\n\n| Gii) control a The wireless network node disclosed by the standard practices controlling (e.g., controlling various parameters like\n| communication through | RU allocations, QoS control, TRS, link adaptation, UL powerhead room, etc.) a communication through the\nthe communication communication channel (e.g., a wireless communication with bandwidth 20MHz, 40 MHz, 80 MHz, 160 MHz, or\nchannel with the 80MHz+ 80MHz)) with the alterable directional vector (e.g., beamforming steering matrix & associated\nalterable directional coefficients) in the assumed directional radiation pattern having the selected one of the first state (e.g., one of\n\nbeamforming states with a beamforming steering matrix composed of a set of beamforming coefficients) and the\n\nvector in the assumed _ . oo. . : te\nsecond state(c.g., another beamforming state with a beamforming matrix composed of a set of beamforming\n\ndirectional radiation\n\npattern having the coefficicnts).\nselected one of the first\nstate and the second\nstate.\ni\n\n23\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-2\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311N RAVENSWOODAVESTE315 (773)6694590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nFiled 12/29/25 Page 25 of 31\n\n9. Frame formats\n\n9.2 MAC frame formats\n\n9.2.4 Frame fields\n\n9.2.4.1 Frame Control field\n\n9.2.4.1.3 Type and Subtype subfields\n\nChange Table 9-1 as follows (not ail rows are shown):\n\nTable 9-1\u2014Valid type and subtype combinations\n\nType value Type Subtype value < . ets\nB3 B2 description B7 B6 BS B4 Subtype description\no1 Control 0000-08450001 Reserved\nOL Control 0010 Tugger\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n24\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 26 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n\n4311N RAVENSWOODAVESTE315_ (773)669 4590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\n7\n\n9.2.4.5 QoS Control field\n\n9.2.4.5.2 TID subfield\nChange the first paragraph in 9.2.4.5,.2 as follows:\n\nThe TID subfield identifies the TC or TS to which the corresponding MSDU (or fragment thereof) or\nA-MSDU _jor fragment thereof) in the Frame Body field belongs. The TID subfield also identifies the TC or\nTS of watfiec for which a TXOP is being requested. through the setting of TSOP duration requested or queue\nsize. The encoding of the TID subfield depends on the access policy (see 9.4.2.29) and is shown in\nTable 9-12. Additional information on the interpretation of the contents of this field appears in 4.1.1.3.\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n25\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document1-2- Filed 12/29/25 Page 27 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311N RAVENSWOODAVESTE315 (773) 669 4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\n[ 9.2.4,6.3a HE variant ]\n\nThe format of the A-Control subfield of the HE variant HT Control field is shown in Figure 9-19a.\n\n| Cantrol List Padding\n\nBits: variable 0 or more\n\nFigure 9-19a\u2014A-Control subfield of the HE variant HT Control field format\n\nThe A-Control subfield is 30 bits in length.\n\nThe Control List subfield contains one or more Control subfields. The format of each Control subfield is\nshown ii Figure 9-19b,\n\nBo B3\n| Contra! ID | Control Information |\n\nBits: 4 variable\n\nFigure 9-19b\u2014Control subfield format\n\nThe Control ID subfield indicates the type of formation carried in the Control Information subfield. The\nlength of the Control Information subfield is fixed for each value of the Control ID subfield that is not\nreserved, The values of the Control ID subfield and the associated length of the Control Information subfield\nare defined in Table 9-22a,\n\nSource: 802.1 1ax-2021\n\n26\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-2\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\n(773) 669 4590\nISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nFiled 12/29/25\n\nPage 28 of 31\n\nTable 9-22a\u2014Control ID subfield vaiues\nControl ID Meaning eee ee ead Content of the Control\n\nvalue (bits) information subfield\na Triggered response scheduling (TRS) 26 | See 9.2 4.6a.1.\ni Operating mode (OM) i2 See 9.2.4.6a.2.\n2 HE link adaptation (HLA) 28 See 9.2 4.64.3.\n3 Buffer status report (BSR) 26 See 9.2 4 6a.4.\n4 UL powerheadroom UPE) dT 6 | See9246as |\n5 Bandwidth query report (BOR) 10 See 9.2 4.64.6.\n6 Command and status (CAS) 8 See 9.2 4.6a.7.\n\n7-14 Reserved\n15 Ones need expansion surely (ONES) 26 Set to all 1s.\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\n27\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 29 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n\n4311N RAVENSWOODAVESTE315 = (773)6694590\n\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\n27.3.2.6 Resource allocation for an HE TB PPDU\n\nUL MU transmissions are preceded by a triggering frame from the AP. The triggering frame indicates the\nparaineters. such as the duration of the HE TB PPDU. RU allocation. target RSSI. and HE-MCS\n(see 9.3.1.22.9.2.4.6a.1, and 26.5.2.3). required to transmit an HE TB PPDU.\n\nThe Trigger frame indicates whether the UL MU transmission following it uses HE single stream pilot HE-\nLTF mode or HE masked HE-LTF sequence mode tf the HE-LTF type of the HE TB PPDU is 2x HE-LTF or\n4s, HE-LTF. HE no pilot HE-LTF made is used if the HE-LTF type of the HE TB PPDU is 1x HE-LTF. If\nHE single stream pilot HE-LTF mode is used. no masking 1s applied to the HE-LTF. HE single stream pilot\nHE-LTF mode is used for any UL OFDMA transmission. including UL OFDMA with MU-MIMO\nTRANSMUSSIONS.\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\nAs CLE.\n\nB24-B25 | Bandwidth 2 Set to 6 for 20 MHz.\nSet to 1 for 40 MHz\nSet to 2 for SO MHz.\nSet to 3 for 160 MHz and 80+80 MHz.\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\n28\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Document 1-2\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLc\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE 315\nCHICAGO, IL 60613\n\n(773) 669 4590\nISAAC @ RABILAW.COM\n\nFiled 12/29/25\n\nPage 30 of 31\n\nTable 27.26--RU Allocation subfield\n\nRU Alloration\nrubfield . . . Nurnber of\n(BY B\u00e9RsBsB3 } wap sh [ox ef [as |e \u201cBf =e eutviet\nB21 BO\nzw Te fe Ts 5 6 | 3 | 6 | os 1\n% pow |} ow | ow) i\n2% [os [eK 5 1\nze | ow | ow | oe I\nx | ts s\n28 28\n6 [2K ?\nne | 6 2\n3 uw ] ts 1\nool 6 :\nTHA@EORIOLD 5 2 [os\nEL a 2 26 2g\ns x\nTR (OUBOLDLS 2\n14 (Ceo 1385 2\n: = z\n2 T\n6 | 25 5 | 6 oe\n1% | 8 33 6 C6 \u00a7\nzs | we fos 168 \u00a7\n3 2 % 108 8\n06 % [2 x | 36 | 2% 8\n{\u2014 \u2014f\n196 4 6 4 3\n196 ; we)\n38-9! 16 28 < 5\nELD remy end\n\nSource: 802.1 lax-2021\n\n29\n\n\fCase 2:25-cv-00414-RWS Documenti1-2 Filed 12/29/25 Page 31 of 31\n\nRABICOFF LAW LLC\n4311 N RAVENSWOOD AVE STE315_ (773) 669.4590\nCHICAGO, IL 60613 ISAAC @ RABILAWCOM\n\nIn particular, your product, the Hisense 110 UX Series Championship Edition TV (the \u201caccused product\u201d), and other Wi-Fi 6 certified devices such as the\nHisense U8 Series (65U8QG), U6 Series (65U65QF), and U7 Series (65U75QG), infringe at least claim | of the \u2019797 patent.\n\nIt is Cogent's hope that its patent infringement claims concerning your product can be resolved through good faith negotiations and, ultimately, a license. In\nthis regard, as Cogent\u2019s counsel I am willing and available to discuss with you the terms of a license agreement with respect to the Patent.\n\nPlease feel free to contact me by email at isaac@rabilaw.com if you would like to engage in licensing discussions or if you have any questions. I look forward\nto receiving your response.\n\nSincerely,\n\n/s/ Isaac Rabicoff\nIsaac Rabicoff\n\n30\n\n","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-01-28T21:45:46.552746-08:00","document_number":"1","attachment_number":2,"pacer_doc_id":"055017923579","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Exhibit 2 - Notice of Infringement","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/466811378/","id":466811378,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/72087328/1/3/hisense-usa-corporation-v-cogent-insights-licensing-inc/","date_created":"2026-01-28T21:43:36.080326-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-31T07:10:19.124660-08:00","sha1":"471768ec02e385057965a4e369b445a6d21a4e42","page_count":1,"file_size":250153,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.3.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.353711/gov.uscourts.gand.353711.1.3.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"JS 44 (Rev. 03/24) Case 2:25-cv-00414-RWS\n CIVILDocument\n COVER1-3 Filed 12/29/25\n SHEET Page 1 of 1\nThe JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as\nprovided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the\npurpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)\nI. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS\n Hisense USA Corporation Cogent Insights Licensing Inc.\n (b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Forsyth Co. County of Residence of First Listed Defendant\n (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)\n NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF\n THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.\n\n (c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)\n\n Gavin Childers, Baker Donelson, 3414 Peachtree Rd NE\n Ste 1500, Atlanta, GA 30326 (Ph: 404-577-6000)\nII. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an \u201cX\u201d in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an \u201cX\u201d in One Box for Plaintiff\n (For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)\n 1 U.S. Government 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF\n Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State 1 1 Incorporated or Principal Place 4 4\n of Business In This State\n\n 2 U.S. Government 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State 2 2 Incorporated and Principal Place 5 5\n Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State\n\n Citizen or Subject of a 3 3 Foreign Nation 6 6\n Foreign Country\nIV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an \u201cX\u201d in One Box Only) Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.\n CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES\n 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 625 Drug Related Seizure 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 375 False Claims Act\n 120 Marine 310 Airplane 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 423 Withdrawal 376 Qui Tam (31 USC\n 130 Miller Act 315 Airplane Product Product Liability 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))\n 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability 367 Health Care/ INTELLECTUAL 400 State Reapportionment\n 150 Recovery of Overpayment 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS 410 Antitrust\n & Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury 820 Copyrights 430 Banks and Banking\n 151 Medicare Act 330 Federal Employers\u2019 Product Liability 830 Patent 450 Commerce\n 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability 368 Asbestos Personal 835 Patent - Abbreviated 460 Deportation\n Student Loans 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application 470 Racketeer Influenced and\n (Excludes Veterans) 345 Marine Product Liability 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations\n 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY LABOR 880 Defend Trade Secrets 480 Consumer Credit\n of Veteran\u2019s Benefits 350 Motor Vehicle 370 Other Fraud 710 Fair Labor Standards Act of 2016 (15 USC 1681 or 1692)\n 160 Stockholders\u2019 Suits 355 Motor Vehicle 371 Truth in Lending Act 485 Telephone Consumer\n 190 Other Contract Product Liability 380 Other Personal 720 Labor/Management SOCIAL SECURITY Protection Act\n 195 Contract Product Liability 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations 861 HIA (1395ff) 490 Cable/Sat TV\n 196 Franchise Injury 385 Property Damage 740 Railway Labor Act 862 Black Lung (923) 850 Securities/Commodities/\n 362 Personal Injury - Product Liability 751 Family and Medical 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) Exchange\n Medical Malpractice Leave Act 864 SSID Title XVI 890 Other Statutory Actions\n REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS 790 Other Labor Litigation 865 RSI (405(g)) 891 Agricultural Acts\n 210 Land Condemnation 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: 791 Employee Retirement 893 Environmental Matters\n 220 Foreclosure 441 Voting 463 Alien Detainee Income Security Act FEDERAL TAX SUITS 895 Freedom of Information\n 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 442 Employment 510 Motions to Vacate 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff Act\n 240 Torts to Land 443 Housing/ Sentence or Defendant) 896 Arbitration\n 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations 530 General 871 IRS\u2014Third Party 899 Administrative Procedure\n 290 All Other Real Property 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION 26 USC 7609 Act/Review or Appeal of\n Employment Other: 462 Naturalization Application Agency Decision\n 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - 540 Mandamus & Other 465 Other Immigration 950 Constitutionality of\n Other 550 Civil Rights Actions State Statutes\n 448 Education 555 Prison Condition\n 560 Civil Detainee -\n Conditions of\n Confinement\nV. ORIGIN (Place an \u201cX\u201d in One Box Only)\n 1 Original 2 Removed from 3 Remanded from 4 Reinstated or 5 Transferred from 6 Multidistrict 8 Multidistrict\n Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation - Litigation -\n (specify) Transfer Direct File\n Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):\n 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2202, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 et seq.\nVI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:\n Declaratory judgment of patent non-infringement\nVII. REQUESTED IN CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:\n COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. JURY DEMAND: Yes No\nVIII. RELATED CASE(S)\n (See instructions):\n IF ANY JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER\nDATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD\n12/29/2025 /s/ Gavin M. Childers\nFOR OFFICE USE ONLY\n\n RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-01-28T21:46:08.564165-08:00","document_number":"1","attachment_number":3,"pacer_doc_id":"055017923580","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Civil Cover Sheet","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.060671-08:00","date_modified":"2026-01-28T21:41:45.070242-08:00","date_filed":"2025-12-29","time_filed":null,"entry_number":1,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-12-29.001","pacer_sequence_number":7,"description":"COMPLAINT, with Jury Demand, filed by Hisense USA Corporation. (Filing fee $405, receipt number AGANDC-14884823) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - U.S. Patent No. 9,794,797, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Notice of Infringement, # 3 Civil Cover Sheet)(ddm) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly-used-forms to obtain Pretrial Instructions and Pretrial Associated Forms which includes the Consent To Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form. (Entered: 12/30/2025)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=72087328&page_size=40"}