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(SBN 301533)\n 2 nkumar@taulersmith.com\n TAULER SMITH LLP\n 3 626 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 550\n Los Angeles, California 90017\n 4 Tel: (213) 927-9270\n 5\n Attorneys for Plaintiff\n 6 Carol Price\n 7\n 8\n 9\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n10\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n11\n12 CAROL PRICE, an individual and on Case No.: 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n13 behalf of all others similarly situated,\n PLAINTIFF CAROL PRICE\u2019S\n14 Plaintiff, SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO\n15 vs. DEFENDANT CONVERSE, INC.\u2019S\n MOTION TO COMPEL\n16 CONVERSE, INC., a Massachusetts DISCLOSURES AND PRODUCTION\n17 company; DOES 1 through 25, OF DOCUMENTS FROM\n inclusive, PLAINTIFF CAROL PRICE\n18\n19 Hearing\n Defendants. Date: December 19, 2025\n20 Time: 9:30 am\n21 Courtroom: 750, 7th Floor\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 61 Filed 12/08/25 Page 2 of 7 Page ID\n #:1953\n\n\n\n 1 I. INTRODUCTION\n 2 Defendant\u2019s Motion and Supplement Memo go through a wide variety of unrelated\n 3 and insubstantial complaints unrelated to any substantive or meaningful discovery dispute\n 4 because fundamentally Defendant just doesn\u2019t like what wasn\u2019t produced because it either\n 5 doesn\u2019t exist or is obviously privileged. Joint Stip. at 57 (\u201cIt is simply not possible that\n 6 there are no non-privileged documents responsive to these requests.\u201d). This entire Motion\n 7 is yet another obvious tactic to harass and attempt to intimidate Plaintiff with ridiculous\n 8 discovery demands primarily aimed at Plaintiff\u2019s counsel.\n 9 A very important piece of context for Defendant\u2019s Motion is that Defendant\u2019s\n10 portion of the Joint Stipulation was finalized on September 19 and Plaintiff\u2019s on\n11 September 26, but Defendant took until October 7 to send the compiled document back\n12 for final signoff. The Court then issued its ruling granting Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n13 and Defendant chose to shelve the Joint Stipulation for another month and only filed it on\n14 November 12, a week after its MTD, three weeks after the SAC was filed, and almost six\n15 and a half weeks after it could and should have been filed on September 27. At the hearing\n16 on December 19 the Court will be reviewing a Joint Stipulation drafted almost three\n17 months earlier that is now hopelessly out of date and irrelevant because it was drafted\n18 prior to Plaintiff\u2019s deposition, SAC, and the attached expert report. But instead of dropping\n19 the motion or re-writing it Defendant asks the Court to enforce its requests despite seeking\n20 information that is entirely irrelevant, privileged, or moot.\n21 II. PLAINTIFF\u2019S PRIVILEGE LOG PROVIDES MORE THAN SUFFICIENT\n22 INFORMATION AND SHOWS DEFENDANT SEEKS OBVIOUSLY\n23 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS\n24 The first major issue Defendant complains about is the \u201ccategorical\u201d privilege log\n25 which Defendant falsely asserts is \u201cimpermissible\u201d despite having been repeatedly told\n26 that it was highly inappropriate for Defendant to be demanding an itemized list of the\n27 emails between Plaintiff and the law firm representing her, or, even more egregiously,\n28 demanding an itemized list individually identifying every notation or message on an\n 2\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 61 Filed 12/08/25 Page 3 of 7 Page ID\n #:1954\n\n\n\n 1 internal Tauler Smith database. That\u2019s what Defendant demands in its Motion. Yet\n 2 Plaintiff\u2019s log provided Defendant with all the information it needed to assess her privilege\n 3 claims and this is all that is required of a privilege log. Tellingly, Defendant never even\n 4 cites to it in its arguments for any of its requests clearly seeking privileged documents.\n 5 The issue of the categorical privilege log is best summarized in an August 14 email\n 6 from Plaintiff\u2019s counsel explain to Defendant\u2019s counsel why its demand for a privilege\n 7 log identifying each and every document separately was, frankly, absurd.\n 8 We will provide an amended response to RFP 14 to remove the\n assertion of attorney client privilege. That was done by accident as you\n 9 may have noticed because we never identified any such documents in\n10 the privilege log. The privilege log we provided also fully complies\n with our obligations and provides you with all of the information\n11 necessary to assess our privilege claims. We provided a categorical\n12 privilege log because we chose not to separately identify every\n email between Plaintiff and employees of our firm and every\n13 message or notation in an internal firm database. Those two are the\n14 categorical entries in our privilege log you are saying it was\n \"particularly inappropriately\" not to log individually. Please let me\n15 know why you want those documents individually identified because\n16 you haven't provided any reasons for your demand and I can't think of\n any legitimate ones.\n17\n Kumar Decl., Ex. B (emphasis added). Plaintiff never received a response to this.\n18\n Tracking Defendant\u2019s complaints about the lack of documents against the actual\n19\n requests and the items in Plaintiff\u2019s privilege log makes it clear that none of Defendant\u2019s\n20\n complaints are because of documents being withheld on the basis of privilege, otherwise\n21\n Defendant would be pointing to specific items in the privilege log and asking the Court to\n22\n review them ex parte. Yet in the entire Joint Stipulation Defendant cites to Plaintiff\u2019s\n23\n privilege log just once. As Plaintiff\u2019s counsel explained in that same email:\n24 If you're upset with the number of RFPs where privilege was one of the\n25 reasons we withheld documents then you shouldn't have sent so many\n RFPs demanding obviously privileged documents. You sent RFPs\n26 which demanded, among other things, all documents and\n27 communications about this lawsuit, documents relied on in\n drafting the complaint, documents concerning all other litigation\n28 involving Plaintiff, as well as multiple other RFPs specifically\n 3\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 61 Filed 12/08/25 Page 4 of 7 Page ID\n #:1955\n\n\n\n 1 seeking documents related to litigation. You even demanded all\n engagement agreements between Plaintiff and our firm even\n 2 though they are categorically covered by attorney client privilege\n 3 in California, meaning every responsive document is by definition also\n privileged. I just don't want there to be confusion about why we asserted\n 4 privilege so many times.\n 5 Kumar Decl., Ex. A (emphasis added).\n 6 III. DEFENDANT HAS NO CONSENT DEFENSE\n 7 Defendant asserts that its affirmative defense of \u201cimplied consent\u201d justifies its\n 8 compelling responses about other unrelated litigation, other websites visited by Plaintiff\n 9 and other Tauler Smith clients, and Plaintiff\u2019s personal knowledge about the screenshot of\n10 Defendant\u2019s publicly available code in the complaint. Defendant is simply wrong, and its\n11 requests go well beyond Defendant\u2019s own arguments on their relevance.\n12 Legally, there is no meaningful dispute that Defendant cannot assert a defense of\n13 consent to Plaintiff\u2019s claim under Penal Code \u00a7 638.51(a), and Defendant completely\n14 ignores and never even cites to actual statutory consent defense, found in Penal Code \u00a7\n15 638.51(b)(5). It unambiguously provides that consent can only be provided to a \u201cprovider\n16 of electronic or wire communication service.\u201d But Converse is not a provider of an\n17 electronic communication service and never asserts that it is. Defendant nonetheless falsely\n18 asserts in this Motion that \u201cconsent is a complete defense to Plaintiff\u2019s sole remaining\n19 claim.\u201d Joint Stip. at 42; see also id. at 2 (arguing that discovery into Plaintiff\u2019s motives\n20 and \u201csuspicions\u201d for visiting Defendant\u2019s websites are relevant to whether \u201cshe impliedly\n21 consented to the disclosure of her information, which is a complete defense to a CIPA\n22 claim.\u201d). Defendant instead cites to cases where consent was relevant, like Gutierrez v.\n23 Converse, 2:23-cv-06547-KK-MAR (cited over a dozen times), even though none of those\n24 cases involved Section 638.51, which all address consent under Section 631(a) or similar\n25 CIPA provisions which criminalize wiretapping and interception communications\n26 \u201cwithout the consent of all parties to the communication.\u201d\n27 If Defendant had genuinely sought relevant documents, then, at minimum, it would\n28 have agreed during the meet and confers to limit its requests based on \u201cimplied consent\u201d\n 4\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 61 Filed 12/08/25 Page 5 of 7 Page ID\n #:1956\n\n\n\n 1 to before Plaintiff\u2019s visit to the website because (as Defendant knows full well) the Ninth\n 2 Circuit held that CIPA does not permit retroactive or post-violation consent. See, e.g.,\n 3 Javier v. Assurance IQ, LLC, No. 21-16351, 2022 WL 1744107, at *2 (9th Cir. May 31,\n 4 2022). Defendant bringing this Motion based on its requests as written proves this is yet\n 5 another attempt to harass and intimidate Plaintiff\u2019s counsel, just as in Gutierrez v. Converse\n 6 where Defendant demanded \u201cessential\u201d documents about consent only to never assert and\n 7 effectively abandon any consent defense in the briefing on class certification, summary\n 8 judgment, and before the Ninth Circuit.\n 9 Finally, Defendant cannot assert consent as a basis for its requests because, as\n10 explained in the Joint Stipulation, Joint Stip. at 32-38, Plaintiff sent Defendant an RFP\n11 asking for documents supporting any consent defense and received nothing. Even after\n12 being ordered to produce such documents by this Court, Defendant simply refused. See\n13 Shapiro Decl. Ex. C (Converse\u2019s Supp. Resp. to Plaintiff\u2019s Requests for Production to\n14 Converse (Set One) dated June 11, 2025), at 11:5-16. Defendant cannot seek the Court\u2019s\n15 aid in support of a legally non-existent affirmative defense while simultaneously refusing\n16 to follow the Court\u2019s orders on discovery about that same topic.\n17 IV. RFPs 12-14 & ROG 13\n18 Defendant demands documents about entirely unrelated litigation involving entirely\n19 unrelated defendants and websites to try to harass and embarrass Plaintiff\u2019s counsel for\n20 daring to hold it accountable for illegally violating the privacy of millions of Californians.\n21 This is why Defendant insisted on a definition of \u201cYOU\u201d that expressly includes Plaintiff\u2019s\n22 attorneys, and why these requests explicitly seek information and documents about other\n23 Tauler Smith litigation unrelated to Plaintiff, Defendant, or its website. For example, RFP\n24 14 expressly seeks all demand letters regarding CIPA violations sent throughout history on\n25 behalf of Plaintiff or her attorneys and is just another example of Defendant going after\n26 Plaintiff\u2019s attorneys. Defendant argues that Plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony shows that\n27 Plaintiff\u2019s objections were meritless because she testified about her litigation history. But\n28 this just proves Plaintiff point which was always that she would provide specific\n 5\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 61 Filed 12/08/25 Page 6 of 7 Page ID\n #:1957\n\n\n\n 1 information about her own litigation history but objected to RFPs 12-14 and ROG 13 as\n 2 written because they expressly sought exponentially more information almost entirely\n 3 about unrelated litigation involving Tauler Smith or its other clients.\n 4 V. ROG 7\n 5 This is yet another of Defendant\u2019s bizarre discovery fights that only make sense\n 6 when understood as part of Defendant\u2019s attempt to go after Plaintiff\u2019s counsel instead of\n 7 the merits of her claim, particularly because Defendant\u2019s only justification for this request\n 8 was a consent defense which by statute Defendant cannot assert, as explained supra.\n 9 Defendant demands to know when YOU, which it defined as Plaintiff and her counsel, first\n10 copied the code included as a screenshot in the complaint. It was told that Plaintiff herself\n11 never copied the code and her response stated that \u201cscreenshot reproduced in paragraph 12\n12 of the COMPLAINT was taken on February 28, 2024, at approximately 4:11 p.m.\u201d This\n13 completely and fully answers ROG 7 as written, and Defendant has not explained what\n14 else it could possibly be seeking or given besides privileged information.\n15 VI. RFPs 1, 2, 5 & 8\n16 Defendant demands documents that either don\u2019t exist or are privileged. Its entire\n17 argument is only that \u201cPlaintiff has asserted that the only responsive documents are\n18 privileged. This is not credible. These Requests seek documents that reflect facts that are\n19 highly relevant to Plaintiff\u2019s trap and trace claim.\u201d Joint Stip. at 56. Defendant notes that\n20 facts are not privileged, but documents can be privileged and the only responsive\n21 documents that exist are privileged. Defendant does not point to any of the entries on\n22 Plaintiff\u2019s privilege log that are insufficient to establish Plaintiff\u2019s privilege claims, and\n23 it\u2019s unsurprising that privileged communications between a party and her counsel contain\n24 information related to the litigation.\n25 VII. CONCLUSION\n26 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny the\n27 Motion to Compel.\n28\n 6\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 61 Filed 12/08/25 Page 7 of 7 Page ID\n #:1958\n\n\n\n 1 DATED: December 5, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n\n 2\n 3\n By: /s/ Narain Kumar\n 4 Narain Kumar, Esq.\n 5 Attorney for Plaintiff\n Carol Price\n 6\n 7\n 8\n 9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 7\n PTF\u2019S SUPP. OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-16T00:41:28.105180-07:00","document_number":"61","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031046492049","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Supplement (Motion related)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-12-08T09:34:45.449151-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:11.661074-08:00","date_filed":"2025-12-08","time_filed":"09:20:10","entry_number":61,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-12-08.001","pacer_sequence_number":171,"description":"SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Compel Disclosures and Production of Documents from Plaintiff Carol Price 56 filed by Plaintiff Carol Price. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit)(Kumar, Narain) (Entered: 12/08/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/446351833/","id":446351833,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/461071844/","id":461071844,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/60/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-12-05T15:03:49.242000-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-20T02:38:20.166375-07:00","sha1":"5aea86c2ab7fcaae5c1ac97575682912b078738e","page_count":6,"file_size":184883,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.60.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.60.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 60 Filed 12/05/25 Page 1 of 6 Page ID\n #:1892\n\n\n\n1 LIVIA M. KISER (SBN 285411)\n lkiser@kslaw.com\n2 MICHAEL D. ROTH (SBN 217464)\n mroth@kslaw.com\n3 LENNETTE W. LEE (SBN 263023)\n kperigoe@kslaw.com\n4 SAMUEL C. CORTINA (SBN 310778)\n scortina@kslaw.com\n5 KING & SPALDING LLP\n 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1600\n6 Los Angeles, CA 90071\n Telephone: (213) 443-4355\n7 Facsimile: (213) 443-4310\n8 Attorneys for Defendant\n CONVERSE INC.\n9\n10\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12\n13 CAROL PRICE, an individual and Case No. 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n14 on behalf of all others similarly\n situated, DISCOVERY MATTER\n15 [Assigned to the Honorable Magistrate\n Plaintiff, Judge Charles F. Eick]\n16\n v. DEFENDANT CONVERSE INC.\u2019S\n17\n SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM\n CONVERSE INC., a IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO\n18 Massachusetts company; DOES 1 COMPEL PURSUANT TO LOCAL\n19 through 25, inclusive, RULE 37-2.3\n20 Defendant.\n21 Date: December 19, 2025\n Time: 9:30 a.m.\n22 Location: Courtroom 759, 7th Floor\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 60 Filed 12/05/25 Page 2 of 6 Page ID\n #:1893\n\n\n\n1 I. Plaintiff\u2019s Deposition Testimony Shows Her Objections Lack Merit\n2 After the parties had prepared the Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 56), Converse took\n3 Plaintiff\u2019s deposition. (See Supplemental Declaration of Samuel C. Cortina, Ex. N\n4 (\u201cPrice Depo.\u201d).) Plaintiff\u2019s testimony contradicted representations she made in the\n5 Joint Stipulation and confirmed that her objections and arguments in response to\n6 Converse\u2019s discovery requests have never had merit and that the Court should impose\n7 sanctions on her and her counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5).\n8 A. ROG No. 3 \u2013 Access to Plaintiff\u2019s Device By Other People\n9 Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she is the only person to have ever used\n10 her desktop computer that she alleges she used to access the Converse website. (Price\n11 Depo. at 68:2-4.) To obtain that information only required one question and a few\n12 seconds of time at her deposition. (Id.) But throughout months of meeting and\n13 conferring, and across pages of argument in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff refused to\n14 respond to Converse\u2019s coextensive interrogatory\u2014implying that there were other\n15 users of Plaintiff\u2019s device that Plaintiff was refusing to disclose.\n16 Specifically, Interrogatory No. 3 requested Plaintiff to identify \u201call other\n17 persons who have ever used the device [that Plaintiff used to access the Converse\n18 website] other than yourself.\u201d Plaintiff lodged and stood on her objections that this\n19 Request was \u201cimpermissibly compound,\u201d \u201cunduly burdensome,\u201d \u201cseeks information\n20 protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege and/or the attorney work\n21 product doctrine,\u201d and \u201cwould violate Plaintiff\u2019s right to privacy under Art. I \u00a7 1 of\n22 California\u2019s Constitution, and federal law.\u201d Dkt. 56-1 at 10-11. Plaintiff doubled\n23 down on her objections in the Joint Stipulation, asserting that none of them were\n24 \u201cboilerplate\u201d or \u201cinterposed in bad faith.\u201d Id. at 12. She argued across multiple pages\n25 that \u201cInterrogatory No. 3 imposes an undue burden on Plaintiff\u201d by requiring her to\n26 investigate who else used her device, and that her \u201cprivacy-based objection to\n27 Interrogatory No. 3 is also well-founded\u201d because the Request \u201cpries into Plaintiff\u2019s\n28 family life, social associations and home activities[.]\u201d Id. at 15-16.\n 2\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 60 Filed 12/05/25 Page 3 of 6 Page ID\n #:1894\n\n\n\n1 As it turns out, that hyperbole has no basis in fact. During her deposition,\n2 Plaintiff confirmed, in a single-word response to a single question, that nobody else\n3 has ever used the computer that she claims to have used to access the Converse\n4 website: \u201cQ: And in the time that you\u2019ve owned it, has anybody else ever used it? A:\n5 No.\u201d (Price Depo. at 68:2-4.) Plaintiff was not required to undertake any\n6 investigation to respond to this question\u2014to prepare for her deposition, Plaintiff did\n7 not review any documents and she only \u201cmet with [her] counsel to discuss [the\n8 deposition] briefly\u201d a single time. (Id. at 19:10-15, 20:12-22.) Nor did this Request\n9 invade any of her personal affairs or privileged communications. Her objections and\n10 arguments on overbreadth, undue burden, privilege, and her right to privacy are\n11 sanctionable fabrications.\n12 B. RFP Nos. 12-14 and ROG No. 13 \u2013 Plaintiff\u2019s Litigation History\n13 Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that she has never been a party to any\n14 lawsuits other than the CIPA claims pursued by her counsel at Tauler Smith and she\n15 has never been named a class representative. (Price Depo. at 17:12-24, 121:23-25.)\n16 Yet, at her deposition, she was unable to identify the CIPA cases and demand letters\n17 that were filed and sent on her behalf. (Id. at 15:1-25, 46:3-48:25, 87:2-22, 112:4-24,\n18 155:22-25.) Plaintiff should be compelled to provide that information.\n19 Indeed, Plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony confirmed that her discovery\n20 objections were frivolous. Plaintiff provided her litigation history in response to four\n21 simple questions, culminating in: \u201cQ: So is it fair to say that, other than the case where\n22 you were a witness, you haven\u2019t been involved in any lawsuit that didn\u2019t involve\n23 CIPA? A: Correct.\u201d (Id. at 17:21-24.) But over months of conferring in relation to\n24 Converse\u2019s discovery requests that asked her to disclose this same information,\n25 Plaintiff stood on her objections of privilege, overbreadth, and undue burden. Dkt.\n26 56-1 (Joint Stip.) at 25:11-14, 26:20-23, 27:17-20, 30:18-31:7. She cautioned in the\n27 Joint Stipulation that these Requests would require her to \u201cdivulge [privileged]\n28 information about other class actions in which Plaintiff is a class representative\u201d and\n 3\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 60 Filed 12/05/25 Page 4 of 6 Page ID\n #:1895\n\n\n\n1 \u201cfamily-related or relationship-related litigation, or litigation involving a medical\n2 condition or the life, in which Plaintiff is a party.\u201d Id. at 39. But those risks are also\n3 non-existent. Plaintiff has never been a class representative so these Requests could\n4 not invade any privileges regarding her status as a class representative: \u201cQ: Have you\n5 ever been approved as a class representative in a class action? A: No.\u201d (Price Depo.\n6 at 121:23-25.) And Plaintiff has no litigation history relating to her personal life, so\n7 these Requests could not have probed into a \u201cmedical condition\u201d or personal matter.\n8 Yet again, Plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony unearthed her bad-faith objections.\n9 C. Plaintiff Fails to Justify Her Use of a Categorical Privilege Log\n10 Notably absent from Plaintiff\u2019s portion of the Joint Stipulation is any\n11 explanation why she chose to use a categorical privilege log for just a \u201cfew\u201d\n12 documents\u2014she only argues that her categorical privilege log provides all of the\n13 required information. Her log does not detail the information needed to sustain her\n14 claim of privilege, Dkt. 56-1 at 56-58, a point that was made even clearer during her\n15 deposition. Plaintiff spent significant time giving inconsistent and confusing\n16 testimony about which documents she created in connection with her single visit to\n17 the Converse website and that she was claiming are privileged (Price Depo. at 173:3-\n18 22, 175:15-176:1, 176:22-183:18), and she later served an \u201cerrata\u201d to her transcript\n19 that fully re-wrote her testimony on this point. (Cortina Decl., Exs. N & M.) Had\n20 Plaintiff served a document-by-document privilege log, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.\n21 26, then this confusion could have been avoided. The confusion, however, is a feature\n22 and not a bug of Plaintiff\u2019s categorical privilege log. By design, her categorical log\n23 assisted Plaintiff in concealing her specific and dubious claims of privilege. Converse\n24 is entitled to a clear privilege log to understand Plaintiff\u2019s claim of privilege\u2014\n25 Converse is not required to rely on confusing and contradictory deposition testimony.\n26 II. Plaintiff\u2019s Improper Expansion of the Term \u201cYOU\u201d\n27 Plaintiff also unilaterally re-writes the defined term \u201cYOU\u201d in Converse\u2019s\n28 Requests to reach her counsel\u2019s independent conduct. See e.g., Dkt. 56-1 at 40:4-5\n 4\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 60 Filed 12/05/25 Page 5 of 6 Page ID\n #:1896\n\n\n\n1 (\u201cThus Converse is seeking all demand letters sent by the law firm representing\n2 Plaintiff, Tauler Smith LLP, relating to CIPA claims asserted by anybody, for all\n3 time.\u201d). The defined term Converse provided, however, is limited to individuals\n4 \u201cacting in or on Plaintiff\u2019s behalf,\u201d and thus, it only extends to her counsel to the\n5 extent that they are acting in or on Plaintiff\u2019s behalf. Dkt. 56-1 at 20:10-12 (\u201cThe\n6 terms \u2018YOU and \u2018YOUR\u2019 mean Plaintiff Carol Price, as well as Plaintiff\u2019s agents,\n7 representatives, attorneys, and/or any other PERSON acting in or on Plaintiff\u2019s\n8 behalf.\u201d) (emphasis added). Plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony confirmed the need for\n9 that inclusion, as Plaintiff was unaware of and had not reviewed complaints and\n10 demand letters that Tauler Smith filed or sent on her behalf. (Price Depo. at 79:17-\n11 80:3; 84:5-20; 87:2-22; 118:22-119:19; 120:15-121:8; 127:3-16; 156:1-4.)\n12 III. Plaintiff\u2019s Relevance Arguments Misunderstand Rule 26\n13 Plaintiff attacks each of Converse\u2019s Requests as irrelevant because she suggests\n14 that implied consent is not a defense to her lone CIPA claim. She is wrong about this\n15 defense, as explained throughout the Joint Stipulation; she is also wrong on the\n16 discovery relevance standard. \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s arguments go beyond the issue of relevance\n17 and discoverability and largely go toward contesting the merits of Defendant\u2019s\n18 theories. In order to show that the documents are relevant under Rule 26\u2019s standard,\n19 Defendant need not show, and this Court need not determine, that the district court\n20 will find the documents persuasive or determinative or that Defendant\u2019s arguments\n21 will ultimately be successful.\u201d Gutierrez v. Converse Inc., 2024 WL 2106952, at *6\n22 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (citation omitted). The Court should disregard Plaintiff\u2019s\n23 misdirected relevance objections that challenge the merits of Converse\u2019s defenses.\n24 IV. The Motion to Compel Remains Ripe\n25 Although Plaintiff incidentally responded to some of Converse\u2019s Requests\n26 during her deposition, the Motion to Compel remains ripe and should be adjudicated.\n27 First, Plaintiff was unable to provide complete responses during her deposition,\n28 as she invoked the phrase \u201cI don\u2019t recall\u201d fifty-eight separate times: \u201cQ: Do you know\n 5\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 60 Filed 12/05/25 Page 6 of 6 Page ID\n #:1897\n\n\n\n1 what the last CIPA case that you filed was? A: I don\u2019t recall. Q: Do you know what\n2 the first CIPA case you filed was? A: I don\u2019t recall. Q: Did you file any CIPA cases\n3 in 2023? A: I don\u2019t recall. You don\u2019t have any estimate at all? A: It would be \u2013 it\n4 would be a wild guess, so I don\u2019t recall.\u201d (Price Depo. at 48:9-25.) Converse is\n5 entitled to the full scope of Plaintiff\u2019s CIPA litigation history and complete responses\n6 to its other Requests\u2014it should not be saddled with the scant information Plaintiff\n7 could recall at the time of her deposition.\n8 Second, Plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony is unreliable. Plaintiff served an\n9 \u201cerrata\u201d that treated her deposition as a take-home test and re-wrote her answers, like\n10 changing one answer from \u201cYes\u201d to \u201cNo, ...\u201d (Ex. P at 4); Hambleton Bros. Lumber\n11 Co. v. Balkin Enterprises, Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1224\u201325 (9th Cir. 2005) (\u201cRule\n12 30(e) is to be used for corrective, and not contradictory, changes.\u201d).\n13 Finally, Plaintiff has forced Converse to engage in discovery backwards.\n14 \u201cParties are ordinarily entitled to test interrogatory responses and document\n15 production through depositions.\u201d Doe v. Trump, 329 F.R.D. 262, 274 (W.D. Wash.\n16 2018). Instead, Converse had to start getting discovery responses with Plaintiff\u2019s\n17 deposition, because Plaintiff would not first respond to its written discovery requests\n18 it served in April 2025. Plaintiff\u2019s evasiveness is both prejudicial and inexcusable\u2014\n19 and regardless of whether she later provided some of the requested information during\n20 her deposition\u2014she should be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5) for asserting\n21 frivolous objections, and doubling-down on those objections in the Joint Stipulation.\n22 See Lateral Link Group, LLC v. Springut Group, LLC, 2017 WL 11634389, at *1-*2\n23 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (sanctioning same plaintiff\u2019s counsel for discovery abuse).\n24\n Dated: December 5, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n25\n KING & SPALDING LLP\n26\n By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n27\n28 Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE INC\n 6\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-16T00:41:23.509174-07:00","document_number":"60","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031046484765","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Supplement (Motion related)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-12-05T15:03:49.220046-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:11.607742-08:00","date_filed":"2025-12-05","time_filed":"14:48:18","entry_number":60,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-12-05.001","pacer_sequence_number":168,"description":"SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Compel Disclosures and Production of Documents from Plaintiff Carol Price 56 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Pursuant to Local Rule 37-2.3 filed by Defendant Converse, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration (Supplemental) of Samuel C. Cortina in Support of Defendant Converse Inc.'s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Pursuant to Local Rule 37-2.3, # 2 Exhibit N - Excerpts of Plaintiff's Deposition Transcript, # 3 Exhibit O - October 2, 2025 Email, # 4 Exhibit P - Errata Sheet)(Roth, Michael) (Entered: 12/05/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/446184928/","id":446184928,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/460901651/","id":460901651,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2025-12-04T12:35:10.327753-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-04T12:35:10.343289-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Text Only Scheduling Notice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-12-04T12:35:10.285474-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-04T12:35:10.285494-08:00","date_filed":"2025-12-04","time_filed":"12:24:08","entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-12-04.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/445052253/","id":445052253,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/459735459/","id":459735459,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/58/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-11-21T17:35:46.721189-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T15:01:24.984829-07:00","sha1":"25c94799670cb4c6610cd346fc7905fc716328d6","page_count":20,"file_size":320895,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.58.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.58.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 1 of 20 Page ID\n #:1872\n\n\n\n1 LIVIA M. KISER (SBN 285411)\n lkiser@kslaw.com\n2 MICHAEL D. ROTH (SBN 217464)\n mroth@kslaw.com\n3 LENNETTE W. LEE (SBN 263023)\n kperigoe@kslaw.com\n4 SAMUEL C. CORTINA (SBN 310778)\n scortina@kslaw.com\n5 KING & SPALDING LLP\n 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1600\n6 Los Angeles, CA 90071\n Telephone: (213) 443-4355\n7 Facsimile: (213) 443-4310\n8 Attorneys for Defendant\n CONVERSE INC.\n9\n10\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12\n13 CAROL PRICE, an individual and Case No. 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n14 on behalf of all others similarly\n situated, The Honorable Fernando L. Aenlle-\n15 Rocha\n Plaintiff,\n16 DEFENDANT CONVERSE INC.\u2019S\n v. REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION\n17\n TO DISMISS THE SECOND\n CONVERSE INC., a AMENDED COMPLAINT\n18 Massachusetts company; DOES 1\n19 through 25, inclusive,\n Defendant. Date: December 5, 2025\n20 Time: 1:30 p.m.\n21 Location: Courtroom 6B\n\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 2 of 20 Page ID\n #:1873\n\n\n\n1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 6\n2\n II. PLAINTIFF LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING ............................................ 7\n3 A. Plaintiff Fails to Rebut Converse\u2019s Factual Challenge to Standing............. 7\n4 B. Plaintiff Fails to Rebut Converse\u2019s Facial Challenge to Standing............... 9\n5 i. As a Matter of Controlling Law, Collection of Device and\n6 Browser Information Does Not Amount to a Concrete Injury ..... 9\n ii. Plaintiff Has Not Suffered an Economic Injury ......................... 12\n7\n iii. Future Theoretical Harms by a Non-Party Cannot Establish\n8 Article III Standing ..................................................................... 13\n9 iv. Plaintiff\u2019s Bald Reference to the First Amendment Fails to\n10 Create a Concrete Injury ............................................................. 13\n11 III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CIPA CLAIM ......................................... 14\n A. Plaintiff\u2019s Allegations of Extraterritorial Conduct Precludes a CIPA Claim\n12\n ................................................................................................................. 14\n13\n B. CIPA\u2019s Trap-and-Trace Provision Does Not Apply to the Internet .......... 16\n14 IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO\n15 AMEND .......................................................................................................... 18\n16 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 18\n\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 2\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 3 of 20 Page ID\n #:1874\n\n\n\n1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\n2 Page(s)\n3 Cases\n4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n5 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................................... 15\n6 Bowen v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.,\n7 118 F.4th 1134 (9th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................. 8\n\n8 Bradshaw v. Lowe\u2019s,\n 2025 WL 3171740 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025).................................................... 11\n9\n10 Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc.,\n 2024 WL 4873370 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles County Sept. 09,\n11 2024) ................................................................................................................... 17\n12 Christian Legal Soc. v. Wu,\n13 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 17\n14 Dalfio v. Orlansky-Wax, LLC,\n15 2022 WL 3083323 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2022)........................................................ 7\n\n16 DellaSala v. Samba TV, Inc.,\n 2025 WL 3034069 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) ................................................ 6, 15\n17\n18 In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation,\n 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................ 10, 12\n19\n Frasco v. Flo Health, Inc.,\n20\n 349 F.R.D. 557 (N.D. Cal. 2025) ....................................................................... 11\n21\n In re: Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.,\n22 934 F.3d 316 (3rd Cir. 2019) .............................................................................. 12\n23\n Gutierrez v. Converse, Inc.,\n24 2025 WL 1895315 (9th Cir. 2025) (Bybee, J., concurring) ............................... 18\n25 Heeger v. Facebook, Inc.,\n26 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (N.D. Cal., 2020)............................................................. 12\n27 James v. Walt Disney Co.,\n 701 F. Supp. 3d 942 (N.D. Cal. 2023)................................................................ 12\n28\n 3\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 4 of 20 Page ID\n #:1875\n\n\n\n1 Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer,\n 42 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 18\n2\n Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,\n3 39 Cal. 4th 95 (2006) .......................................................................................... 15\n4\n Khamooshi v. Politico LLC,\n5 2025 WL 2822879 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2025) .................................................. 6, 11\n6 Licea v. Hickory Farms LLC,\n7 2024 WL 1698147 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles County March 13,\n 2024) ................................................................................................................... 16\n8\n9 Lineberry v. AddShopper, Inc.\n 2025 WL 551864, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2025) ............................................ 15\n10\n Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc.,\n11 684 Fed. Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2017) ...................................................................... 12\n12\n Oganyan v. Biolife Plasma Services L.P.,\n13 2025 WL 2979619 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) .................................................... 11\n14\n People v. Blair,\n15 25 Cal. 3d 640 (1979) ......................................................................................... 18\n16 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n17 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 16\n\n18 Popa v. Microsoft Corp.,\n 153 F.4th 784 (9th Cir. 2025) ..................................................................... 6, 9, 10\n19\n20 Rodriguez v. Culligan Int\u2019l Co.,\n 2025 WL 3064113 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025)...................................................... 11\n21\n Rodriguez v. Plivo Inc.,\n22\n 2024 WL 5184413 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles County Oct. 02, 2024) .............. 17\n23\n Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,\n24 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 8\n25\n Savage v. Glendale Union High School, Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty.,\n26 343 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 8\n27 Smith v. Maryland,\n28 442 U.S. 735 (1979) ........................................................................................... 13\n 4\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 5 of 20 Page ID\n #:1876\n\n\n\n1 Somers v. Apple, Inc.,\n 729 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 15\n2\n TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n3 594 U.S. 413 (2021) ......................................................................................... 7, 8\n4\n Zarif v. Hwareh.com, Inc.,\n5 789 F. Supp. 3d 880 (S.D. Cal. 2025) ................................................................ 15\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 5\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 6 of 20 Page ID\n #:1877\n\n\n\n1 I. INTRODUCTION\n2 Defendant Converse Inc.\u2019s motion to dismiss explained that Plaintiff\u2019s Second\n3 Amended Complaint (\u201cSAC\u201d), like her First Amended Complaint, should be\n4 dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing, as well as under Rule\n5 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff\u2019s Opposition cannot refute these\n6 arguments, and the case should be dismissed.\n7 First, Converse presented both a factual and a facial challenge to Plaintiff\u2019s\n8 Article III standing under Rule 12(b)(1). As a factual matter, discovery has confirmed\n9 that Converse collected no information in which Plaintiff has a privacy interest.\n10 Plaintiff submits no evidence to dispute that fact, which ends the inquiry. The case\n11 should be dismissed.\n12 Should the Court go beyond Plaintiff\u2019s complete failure to confront the factual\n13 challenge, as a pleading matter, Plaintiff\u2019s SAC merely reiterates the allegations the\n14 Court already held were insufficient to plausibly allege a concrete injury under Popa\n15 v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784 (9th Cir. 2025). The only allegations Plaintiff added\n16 allege that the data collected could be sold for money\u2014but not that Plaintiff was\n17 injured as a result. Plaintiff\u2019s opposition instead argues that the Court, in previously\n18 analyzing Popa \u201csua sponte,\u201d got its analysis wrong. But while Plaintiff relies only\n19 on pre-Popa cases, the vast majority of courts to apply Popa have done so in the exact\n20 same way. See, e.g., Khamooshi v. Politico LLC, 2025 WL 2822879, at *3 (N.D. Cal.\n21 Oct. 2, 2025).\n22 Second, although the Court need not reach Converse\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6)\n23 arguments, they too require dismissal. CIPA does not apply extraterritorially,\n24 DellaSala v. Samba TV, Inc., 2025 WL 3034069, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025), and\n25 Plaintiff does not attempt to meet her burden to allege conduct occurring in California.\n26 The plain language of CIPA\u2019s trap-and-trace provision makes clear that it does not\n27 apply to the Internet, but to the extent there was any ambiguity in that regard, the rule\n28 of lenity compels that interpretation.\n 6\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 7 of 20 Page ID\n #:1878\n\n\n\n1 Plaintiff has had the opportunity to conduct discovery and to file three iterations\n2 of her baseless claim. Her repeated inability to satisfy Article III and her failure to\n3 state a claim both dictate that the SAC should be dismissed without leave to amend.\n4 II. PLAINTIFF LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING\n5 Plaintiff acknowledges that to establish standing under Article III, she must\n6 show: (1) a \u201cconcrete, particularized, and actual or imminent\u201d injury; (2) caused by\n7 Converse\u2019s challenged conduct; (3) that could be redressed through her trap-and-trace\n8 claim against Converse. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021).\n9 Merely alleging a statutory violation is insufficient to satisfy Article III. Id. at 430-\n10 31.\n11 Following this Court\u2019s determination that Plaintiff\u2019s FAC failed to establish\n12 standing, Plaintiff amended a third time, simply regurgitating the same theories she\n13 previously alleged\u2014i.e., that (i) the TikTok Pixel collects a visitor\u2019s device and\n14 browsing information, see, e.g., SAC \u00b6\u00b6 11, 13; and (ii) TikTok is capable of digital\n15 fingerprinting from data amassed across numerous websites, id. \u00b6\u00b6 9-13, 17, 22-26.\n16 Compare ECF No. 53 (noting Plaintiff alleged that \u201cthe TikTok Software gathers data\n17 including device and browser information, geographic information, and referral\n18 tracking,\u201d and that \u201cDefendant used this information to fingerprint the data and\n19 deanonymize Plaintiff by matching it \u2018with existing data TikTok has acquired and\n20 accumulated about hundreds of millions of Americans[.]\u201d) (citation omitted). As\n21 explained in Converse\u2019s Motion\u2014which Plaintiff\u2019s Opposition fails to refute\u2014the\n22 evidence and allegations still fail to establish Article III standing.\n23 A. Plaintiff Fails to Rebut Converse\u2019s Factual Challenge to Standing\n24 Converse showed that regardless of whether Plaintiff pled facts sufficient to\n25 establish Article III standing, ample evidence wholly negates such jurisdictional\n26 allegations. (Mot. at 12-14, 19-20.) Converse therefore properly raised a factual Rule\n27 12(b)(1) challenge, submitting undisputed evidence that the Court may consider. See\n28 Dalfio v. Orlansky-Wax, LLC, 2022 WL 3083323, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2022).\n 7\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 8 of 20 Page ID\n #:1879\n\n\n\n1 Converse\u2019s evidence\u2014including the sworn testimony of Plaintiff and\n2 Converse\u2014establishes that Plaintiff did not disclose and Converse did not collect any\n3 of Plaintiff\u2019s personal information through its implementation of the TikTok Pixel on\n4 the Converse website. (Mot. at 12-14.) Indeed, a year into this case and after deposing\n5 Converse, Plaintiff conceded she has no basis to believe that the TikTok Pixel\n6 collected any of her information and has not been contacted by Converse at all since\n7 her website visit. (Id.) Further negating any of Plaintiff\u2019s supposed \u201cprivacy\u201d\n8 concerns, she admits that she willingly and independently provided numerous pieces\n9 of personal information\u2014including her contact information and birth date\u2014to\n10 TikTok when she created a public TikTok account. (Id.) Put simply, the evidence\n11 confirms that Plaintiff suffered no \u201cconcrete, particularized, and actual or imminent\u201d\n12 injury that is necessary for Article III standing. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423.\n13 Plaintiff offers no evidence at all to meet her burden to show an injury in fact.\n14 Savage v. Glendale Union High School, Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty., 343 F.3d 1036,\n15 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (\u201cOnce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss\n16 into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought\n17 before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other\n18 evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d).\n19 The facts confirming that Plaintiff suffered no injury in fact are thus undisputed.\n20 Instead, Plaintiff asserts\u2014without support\u2014that the Court cannot consider\n21 Converse\u2019s evidence. (Opp. at 8-10). That is wrong. The Court can consider\n22 undisputed evidence under Rule 12(b)(1)\u2014regardless of whether it is intertwined\n23 with the merits. Cf. Bowen v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 118 F.4th 1134, 1145 (9th\n24 Cir. 2024) (\u201cBecause the standing issue and substantive issues are so intertwined,\n25 resolution of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate.\u201d) (emphasis added) (cleaned\n26 up); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding it\n27 is improper to make a \u201cjurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts \u2026 when the\n28 jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of\n 8\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 9 of 20 Page ID\n #:1880\n\n\n\n1 jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an\n2 action.\u201d) (emphasis added) (cleaned up).\n3 Plaintiff\u2019s complete failure to rebut the overwhelming evidence confirming she\n4 suffered no injury ends the inquiry. The Court should dismiss the SAC without leave\n5 to amend.\n6 B. Plaintiff Fails to Rebut Converse\u2019s Facial Challenge to Standing\n7 Although the Court needs to go no further than the factual challenge, Plaintiff\u2019s\n8 attempts at disputing Converse\u2019s facial challenge to her standing are wholly\n9 insufficient. Plaintiff has no authority for her (incorrect) argument that this Court\u2019s\n10 straightforward application of Popa was incorrect. (Opp. at 11-13). Nor do her\n11 arguments\u2014i.e., that her personal information has \u201cquantifiable market value\u201d (id. at\n12 16); that there is privacy harm \u201cfrom combining lots of \u2018less personalized\u2019 data\u201d (id.\n13 at 13); and that there is privacy harm for \u201cforc[ing] Plaintiff to unknowingly give her\n14 personal information to TikTok\u201d (id. at 15)\u2014plausibly allege Article III injury under\n15 Popa.\n16 i. As a Matter of Controlling Law, Collection of Device and\n17 Browser Information Does Not Amount to a Concrete Injury\n18 As this Court already held, the Ninth Circuit\u2019s Popa decision compels the\n19 conclusion that allegations that the TikTok Pixel on Converse\u2019s website gathers\n20 device and browser information that is then used by TikTok to fingerprint and\n21 deanonymize Plaintiff\u2019s data \u201care insufficient to establish a \u2018concrete injury\u2019 as\n22 required to establish standing.\u201d (ECF No. 53 at 5 (emphasis added).) Because\n23 Plaintiff\u2019s SAC only recycles these already-rejected theories, it likewise fails to allege\n24 a concrete injury. (Mot. at 15-19.) Under Popa, there is no generalized right to\n25 privacy in visiting Converse\u2019s website, and Converse did not collect or disclose any\n26 of Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cembarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private information.\u201d Popa v.\n27 Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2025). Converse\u2019s alleged conduct did\n28 not cause Plaintiff \u201cto experience any kind of harm that is remotely similar to the\n 9\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 10 of 20 Page ID\n #:1881\n\n\n\n1 \u2018highly offensive\u2019 interference or disclosures that were actionable at common law.\u201d\n2 Id.\n3 Notwithstanding the direct applicability of Popa to this case, Plaintiff contends\n4 that the alleged invasion of privacy is \u201cexactly\u201d the same as in In re Facebook, and\n5 that this Court erred in applying Popa and TransUnion to dismiss the FAC. (Opp. at\n6 11-12.) She is wrong.\n7 As an initial matter, as this Court previously observed, the Ninth Circuit noted\n8 in Popa that In re Facebook predated TransUnion and \u201cthe question of concreteness\n9 under TransUnion was not clearly presented in that case.\u201d 153 F.4th 793. The Ninth\n10 Circuit explained that the court \u201cmight analyze [the statute at issue] differently today,\n11 especially after the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in TransUnion.\u201d Id. at 794. The Ninth\n12 Circuit then distinguished In re Facebook, in the same ways that this case is\n13 distinguishable. Unlike here and in Popa, the platform in In re Facebook allegedly\n14 installed a plug-in on user\u2019s browsers that followed users long after they logged off\n15 of Facebook; Facebook also correlated users\u2019 full browsing history with their\n16 Facebook profiles that included their personal employment history and political and\n17 religious affiliations; and Facebook created a \u201ccradle-to-grave profile\u201d of the users.\n18 In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589, 598-99 (9th Cir.\n19 2020). As Popa noted, Facebook\u2019s pervasive tracking \u201coccurred \u2018no matter how\n20 sensitive\u2019 or personal users\u2019 browsing histories were.\u201d Id. at 599. Plaintiff makes no\n21 effort to explain how her allegations that Converse\u2019s use of the TikTok Pixel captures\n22 certain (non-personal) device and browser-level information, SAC \u00b6 10\u2014 information\n23 in which Plaintiff has no protected privacy interests\u2014are remotely similar to those in\n24 In re Facebook. They are not. Indeed, the device and browser-level data allegedly\n25 collected by Converse\u2019s implementation of the TikTok Pixel is even narrower than\n26 the type of data Popa found insufficient to demonstrate a concrete injury. Mot. at 16-\n27 17.\n28 Since Popa issued, courts repeatedly have distinguished In re Facebook on the\n 10\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 11 of 20 Page ID\n #:1882\n\n\n\n1 same grounds, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 trap-and-trace claims for lack of standing. See\n2 Bradshaw v. Lowe\u2019s, 2025 WL 3171740, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (holding\n3 there was no concrete injury from defendants\u2019 alleged installation and use of the\n4 TikTok Pixel on their own websites and rejecting plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on In re\n5 Facebook because defendants \u201conly collect[ed] information from Defendants\u2019\n6 website, \u2026 not other websites\u201d and only collected metadata and browsing\n7 information); Rodriguez v. Culligan Int\u2019l Co., 2025 WL 3064113, at *3 (S.D. Cal.\n8 Nov. 3, 2025) (\u201cRodriguez lacks a privacy interest in the data at issue,\u201d which\n9 included \u201cIP address, \u2026 operating system name, operating system version number,\n10 browser name, browser version number, bowser language, screen resolution,\n11 geolocation data, email address, mobile ad IDs, embedded social media identities,\n12 customer and/or loyalty IDs, cookies and device signature \u2013 as well as the connections\n13 between them.\u201d) (quotation marks omitted); Oganyan v. Biolife Plasma Services L.P.,\n14 2025 WL 2979619, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (\u201cPlaintiffs have failed to establish\n15 that defendants\u2019 one-time collection and dissemination of plaintiffs\u2019 IP and email\n16 addresses, through the third-party trackers, sufficiently impacts plaintiffs\u2019 privacy\n17 interests to give rise to a concrete injury.\u201d); Khamooshi, 2025 WL 2822879, at *3\n18 (\u201cPopa controls the analysis in this case\u201d). As in Popa, Plaintiff identifies \u2018no\n19 embarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private information collected.\u2019 Plaintiffs\u2019\n20 allegations regarding device type, browser type, and \u2018device fingerprints\u2019 are even\n21 less specific that the 30 different categories of information alleged in Popa\u00b8 which\n22 also included the device type, browser type, and metadata akin to fingerprinting.\u201d)\n23 (citation omitted).\n24 Not only does Plaintiff ignore this overwhelming authority, but all of the cases\n25 on which Plaintiff relies pre-date Popa. 1\n26\n27 1\n Moreover, they allege different privacy claims on materially different facts. See\n Frasco v. Flo Health, Inc., 349 F.R.D. 557, 568-70 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (involving the\n28\n 11\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 12 of 20 Page ID\n #:1883\n\n\n\n1 As it did with the First Amended Complaint, pursuant to Popa, the Court should\n2 dismiss the SAC for lack of Article III injury. (See ECF No. 53 at 5 & n.3).\n3 ii. Plaintiff Has Not Suffered an Economic Injury\n4 Plaintiff has not successfully pled an Article III injury based on the conclusory\n5 allegation that Converse \u201cstole\u201d a \u201cdetailed digital profile \u2026 that possesses a\n6 quantifiable market value.\u201d (SAC \u00b6 38.) As set forth in the Motion, Plaintiff\u2019s cursory\n7 theory fails because she (i) does not identify what particular information or data forms\n8 the \u201cdetailed digital profile,\u201d as she must under Twombly and Iqbal; and (ii) does not\n9 plead that she lost any personal financial interest in that data. (Mot. at 18-19.)\n10 Plaintiff fails to address, much less refute, either point.\n11 Instead, Plaintiff again resorts to In re Facebook, arguing that the plaintiffs\n12 there had Article III standing because they alleged their entitlement to unjustly earned\n13 profits from the defendant\u2019s wrongful conduct. 956 F.3d at 599-600. That holding\n14 has no relevance here. Plaintiff does not assert the causes of action at issue in the\n15 analysis, all of which permitted disgorgement of profits as a remedy, nor does she\n16 plead any facts that support a claim that Converse unjustly profited from her single\n17 visit to the Converse website (it did not). Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d\n18 1182, 1191 (N.D. Cal., 2020) (\u201cArticle III standing for this claim is also undercut by\n19 the scarcity of facts plausibly demonstrating how Facebook\u2019s profits were unjustly\n20\n21\n collection of women\u2019s health information, such as the timing of menstrual cycles,\n22 preferred birth control methods, and details about users\u2019 sexual activity); James v.\n23 Walt Disney Co., 701 F. Supp. 3d 942, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (wiretapping claim\n involving the collection of communications and \u201cpersonal information\u201d such as\n24 \u201csearch terms entered, and purchase behavior\u201d); In re: Google Inc. Cookie Placement\n25 Consumer Privacy Litig., 934 F.3d 316, 320, 325 (3rd Cir. 2019) (pre-TransUnion\n case involving installation of cookies that \u201ctrack[] an internet user\u2019s data (think\n26 following the trail of cookie crumbs) \u2026 in violation of the third party\u2019s promises not\n27 to do so\u201d); Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc., 684 Fed. Appx. 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2017) (pre-\n TransUnion case involving installation of \u201ctracking cookies on plaintiffs\u2019 computers\u201d\n28 in \u201ccircumvention of web-browser privacy features\u201d).\n 12\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 13 of 20 Page ID\n #:1884\n\n\n\n1 earned, [citation], given that the only factual allegations are that Facebook collected,\n2 stored, and used plaintiffs\u2019 IP address information, as to which they had no legally\n3 protected privacy interest.\u201d).\n4 Plaintiff\u2019s cursory allusion to economic injury falls woefully short of plausibly\n5 alleging Article III standing.\n6 iii. Future Theoretical Harms by a Non-Party Cannot Establish\n7 Article III Standing\n8 Plaintiff next relies on the dissent in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)\u2014\n9 a case that predated the existence of the Internet by several decades\u2014to argue that\n10 \u201cprivacy harms from combining lots of \u2018less personalized\u2019 data\u201d suffices to establish\n11 an Article III injury. (Opp. at 13.) Converse is unaware of any authority that suggests,\n12 much less stands for such a principle\u2014especially in light of Popa\u2019s controlling\n13 holding\u2014and Plaintiff identifies none.\n14 Regardless, the argument would still fall short of plausibly alleging an Article\n15 III injury here. The supposed \u201ccombining\u201d of data to create a digital \u201cfingerprint\u201d\n16 that Plaintiff alleges would be performed by TikTok\u2014a nonparty\u2014not Converse.\n17 (SAC \u00b6\u00b6 9-13.) And nowhere does the SAC allege that TikTok created a fingerprint\n18 for Plaintiff. Plaintiff merely speculates that TikTok can create a digital fingerprint\n19 if an individual visits enough different websites that each implement the TikTok Pixel.\n20 (See id. at \u00b6\u00b6 9-13, 17, 22-26.) Furthermore, even if the device-level data she alleges\n21 Converse collected were sufficient for concrete injury, it would not satisfy Article III\n22 causation or be redressable by Converse. (Mot. at 17-18.)\n23 Plaintiff\u2019s wholly unsupported theory does not pertain to her actual experience\n24 on the Converse website and is irrelevant to establishing an actual injury necessary to\n25 confer Article III standing to sue Converse.\n26 iv. Plaintiff\u2019s Bald Reference to the First Amendment Fails to\n27 Create a Concrete Injury\n28 Even more absurd is Plaintiff\u2019s assertion that \u201cDefendant caused a separate\n 13\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 14 of 20 Page ID\n #:1885\n\n\n\n1 Article III injury\u201d because it \u201ctook away Plaintiff\u2019s right to choose for herself whether\n2 to do business or share her personal information with TikTok.\u201d (Opp. at 15.)\n3 Plaintiff\u2019s cursory reference to the First Amendment misses the mark badly, as\n4 Plaintiff does not even explain its relevance to Article III standing\u2014a distinctly\n5 separate provision of the Constitution. Plaintiff points to no authority from any\n6 jurisdiction recognizing this manufactured \u201cinjury.\u201d\n7 In any event, nowhere does the SAC allege that Plaintiff was injured because\n8 she was deprived of any subjective right to do business and share information with\n9 TikTok. Nor could Plaintiff make any such allegations without violating Rule 11; her\n10 sworn testimony is that she freely chose to share her personal information with\n11 TikTok shortly after she visited the Converse website. (Mot. at 20.)\n12 Plaintiff\u2019s unrecognized, unpled, and counterfactual theory of \u201cinjury\u201d arising\n13 from a supposed deprivation of a right to do business with TikTok should be swiftly\n14 rejected. Plaintiff lacks standing and the case should be dismissed.\n15 III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CIPA CLAIM\n16 Plaintiff\u2019s CIPA claim also fails as a matter of law because (i) the SAC does\n17 not and cannot allege that Converse\u2019s allegedly violative conduct occurred in\n18 California; and (ii) CIPA\u2019s trap-and-trace prohibition does not apply to the Internet.\n19 (Mot. at 20-27.) The SAC must be dismissed without leave to amend.\n20 A. Plaintiff\u2019s Allegations of Extraterritorial Conduct Precludes a\n21 CIPA Claim\n22 To state a claim under CIPA\u2019s trap-and-trace provision, Plaintiff had to allege\n23 that Converse\u2019s alleged wrongful conduct\u2014i.e., its installation or use of a trap-and-\n24 trace device on its own website, SAC \u00b6\u00b6 8, 10-16, 34(a)\u2014took place in California.\n25 (Mot. at 24-27.) There are no such allegations in the SAC and no such argument in\n26 her Opposition. Plaintiff\u2019s continued silence on a critical element of her CIPA claim\n27 requires dismissal.\n28 Multiple courts have dismissed CIPA claims on this very basis. In DellaSala\n 14\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 15 of 20 Page ID\n #:1886\n\n\n\n1 v. Samba TV, Inc., the court found that CIPA does not apply extraterritorially because\n2 section 630 \u201ccontains language demonstrating the legislature\u2019s intent for the statute[]\n3 not to apply outside of California.\u201d 2025 WL 3034069, at *3. The court dismissed\n4 plaintiffs\u2019 CIPA claims because the allegedly violative interception of the plaintiffs\u2019\n5 data occurred outside of California. Id. Likewise, in Lineberry v. AddShopper, Inc.,\n6 the court dismissed the CIPA claim because the \u201ccomplaint contain[ed] no allegations\n7 that any of the unlawful conduct occurred in California.\u201d 2025 WL 551864, at *3\n8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2025). The same is true of Plaintiff\u2019s SAC, which also fails to\n9 allege that Converse\u2019s alleged conduct occurred in California.\n10 Unable to credibly make this allegation, Plaintiff offers meritless rationales for\n11 her failure to do so.\n12 First, neither Zarif v. Hwareh.com, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 3d 880, 898 (S.D. Cal.\n13 2025), nor Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 104-05 (2006),\n14 addressed CIPA\u2019s trap-and-trace provision, much less held that it applies to\n15 extraterritorial conduct. Rather, they involved claims for wiretapping under CIPA\n16 section 631 (Zarif) and eavesdropping under section 632 (Kearney). The courts\n17 unsurprisingly observed that CIPA\u2019s wiretapping and eavesdropping prohibitions\n18 expressly \u201cprotect against the secret recording of any confidential communication that\n19 is sent from or received at any place within California.\u201d Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 119;\n20 Zarif, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 898. That irrelevant observation does nothing to establish\n21 that CIPA\u2019s wholly separate trap-and-trace provision applies extraterritorially.\n22 Second, Plaintiff\u2019s unsupported contention that it is not her burden to \u201cdisprove\n23 extraterritoriality\u201d is incorrect. (Opp. at 20.) It is axiomatic that Plaintiff bears the\n24 burden of alleging facts sufficient to state a viable claim\u2014including the statute\u2019s\n25 applicability to the defendant\u2019s conduct. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.\n26 544, 555 (2007) (pleadings must \u201cprovide the grounds of . . . entitlement to relief\u201d).\n27 And it is not \u201cenough that the complaint is \u2018factually neutral\u2019\u2019; it must be \u2018factually\n28 suggestive.\u2019\u201d Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting\n 15\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 16 of 20 Page ID\n #:1887\n\n\n\n1 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5). Plaintiff\u2019s continued silence on this indispensable\n2 component of her claim mandates dismissal. (See Mot. at 28.)\n3 Third, Plaintiff objects that Converse\u2019s extraterritoriality argument is based on\n4 \u201ccounsel\u2019s unsworn factual representations about the location of its servers, none of\n5 which is in the complaint.\u201d (Opp. at 18.) But this is a red herring. The burden is\n6 Plaintiff\u2019s\u2014not Converse\u2019s\u2014to plausibly allege that Converse\u2019s unlawful conduct\n7 occurred within California. Moreover, Converse\u2019s explanation that its website and\n8 host servers are not located in California (which the evidence in this case has\n9 indisputably proven) is entirely consistent with Plaintiff\u2019s admission that Converse is\n10 a Massachusetts-based company. (SAC \u00b6 5.)\n11 Fourth, Plaintiff\u2019s mere disagreement with the principle that a website\u2019s\n12 location is determined by the location of the host servers is negated by controlling\n13 law. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. applied this very \u201cserver test\u201d to determine\n14 the location of alleged copyright infringement for jurisdictional purposes. 508 F.3d\n15 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). In any event, Plaintiff offers no alternative standards for\n16 determining a website\u2019s location. Under any conceivable test\u2014the location of the\n17 server, Converse\u2019s principal place of business, or Converse\u2019s place of incorporation\u2014\n18 none of the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred in California.\n19 Because Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of alleging that Converse\u2019s\n20 installation and use of the TikTok Pixel on its website occurred in California, her\n21 claim must be dismissed.\n22 B. CIPA\u2019s Trap-and-Trace Provision Does Not Apply to the Internet\n23 Plaintiff\u2019s allegations also fail to state a claim because the statute\u2019s plain\n24 language, legislative history, and courts\u2019 interpretation of identical language in\n25 CIPA\u2019s federal counterpart make clear that it only applies to telephone surveillance,\n26 not Internet or website activities. (Mot. at 20-24.) To find otherwise\u2014i.e., to expand\n27 the trap-and-trace provision to criminalize the identification of IP addresses\u2014would\n28 outlaw operation of the Internet at large, Licea v. Hickory Farms LLC, 2024 WL\n 16\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 17 of 20 Page ID\n #:1888\n\n\n\n1 1698147, at *4 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles County March 13, 2024) (\u201c[s]uch a broad\n2 based interpretation would potentially disrupt a large swath of internet commerce\n3 without further refinement as the precise basis of liability\u201d), and would create the\n4 absurdity of criminalizing the use of trap-and-trace devices on the Internet with no\n5 available avenue for law enforcement to obtain a court order. (Mot. at 20-24); see\n6 also Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc., 2024 WL 4873370, at *4 (Cal. Super., Los\n7 Angeles County Sept. 09, 2024) (\u201cThe pen register statute did not, and does not,\n8 criminalize the process by which all websites communicate with all users who choose\n9 to access them.\u201d); Rodriguez v. Plivo Inc., 2024 WL 5184413, at *2 (Cal. Super., Los\n10 Angeles County Oct. 02, 2024) (dismissing trap-and-trace claim applied to Internet\n11 communications).\n12 Instead of responding to Converse\u2019s arguments or authority, Plaintiff relies on\n13 section 638.50(a)\u2019s definition of \u201celectronic communication,\u201d to conclude \u201c[t]here is\n14 simply no way to read the expansive language of the statutory definition of trap-and-\n15 trace devices and conclude that the California Legislature meant to cover telephone\n16 communications and nothing else.\u201d (Opp. at 18.) But the term \u201celectronic\n17 communication\u201d merely describes the type of signals that may be sent to a trap-and-\n18 trace device (i.e., those sent over a wire or electronically), Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(2);\n19 it does not modify the definition of what constitutes a trap-and-trace device.\n20 Similarly lacking in analysis is Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on a string cite of district\n21 court cases in a footnote. (Opp. at n.3.) As a threshold matter, the Court need not\n22 perform Plaintiff\u2019s work for her and hunt for unarticulated arguments within these\n23 cases. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010)\n24 (\u201cJudges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.\u201d). In any event, these\n25 cases\u2014none of which control\u2014only prove Converse\u2019s argument. As the district\n26 court in Doe v. Eating Recovery Center LLC explained:\n27\n The state of affairs with CIPA is untenable. Courts are issuing\n28 conflicting rulings, and companies have no way of telling whether their\n 17\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 18 of 20 Page ID\n #:1889\n\n\n\n1 online business activities will subject them to liability. . . . But CIPA\n imposes criminal liability and punitive civil penalties. Under these\n2 circumstances, it is imperative for the Legislature to bring CIPA into the\n3 modern age and to speak clearly about how the kinds of activities at issue\n in this case should be treated. Until that happens, courts should generally\n4 resolve CIPA\u2019s many ambiguities in favor of the narrower interpretation.\n5 -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 2971090, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); cf Gutierrez v.\n6 Converse, Inc., 2025 WL 1895315, at *1 (9th Cir. 2025) (Bybee, J., concurring)\n7 (explaining in another CIPA case brought by Plaintiff\u2019s counsel against Converse that\n8 a different provision of CIPA \u201cdoes not apply to internet communications\u201d). That\n9 reasoning, though made in the context of a wiretapping claim, should apply equally\u2014\n10 if not more forcefully\u2014to the trap-and-trace provision, which has historically and\n11 generally been understood to apply to the collection of telephone numbers. E.g.,\n12 People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 654 n.11 (1979) (describing a pen register as \u201ca\n13 mechanical device which records the numbers dialed from a telephone\u201d).\n14 The Court should not expand the application of CIPA, particularly here, where\n15 Plaintiff seeks to criminalize a ubiquitous online practice that caused no injury.\n16 IV. PLAINTIFF\u2019S CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE\n17 TO AMEND\n18 Plaintiff has now attempted three times to articulate Article III standing and\n19 state a viable claim. After nearly a year to conduct discovery, she has failed on every\n20 attempt\u2014an unsurprising outcome given that: (i) Converse collected no personal\n21 information of hers through the TikTok Pixel; (ii) Converse\u2019s alleged conduct\n22 occurred outside of California; and (iii) CIPA\u2019s trap-and-trace provision does not\n23 apply to the Internet. Giving Plaintiff a fourth bite at the apple would be wasteful and\n24 futile. See Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994).\n25 V. CONCLUSION\n26 For the foregoing reasons, Converse respectfully requests that this Court grant\n27 its motion without leave to amend and enter judgment in Converse\u2019s favor.\n28\n 18\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 19 of 20 Page ID\n #:1890\n\n\n\n1 Dated: November 21, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n2\n KING & SPALDING LLP\n3\n4 By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n LIVIA KISER\n5 MICHAEL D. ROTH\n6 LENNETTE W. LEE\n SAMUEL C. CORTINA\n7\n8 Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE\n INC.\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 19\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 58 Filed 11/21/25 Page 20 of 20 Page ID\n #:1891\n\n\n\n1 LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Converse Inc., certifies that this brief\n3 contains 4,120 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.2.\n4\n5 Dated: November 21, 2025 KING & SPALDING LLP\n6\n7 By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n8 MICHAEL D. ROTH\n9 Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE\n10 INC.\n\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SAC\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:07:17.546149-07:00","document_number":"58","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031046393934","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply (Motion related)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-11-21T17:35:46.663017-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:11.505333-08:00","date_filed":"2025-11-21","time_filed":"17:18:44","entry_number":58,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-11-21.001","pacer_sequence_number":163,"description":"REPLY in Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 55 filed by Defendant Converse, Inc.. (Roth, Michael) (Entered: 11/21/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/444232290/","id":444232290,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/458895297/","id":458895297,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/57/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-11-15T01:04:57.356258-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T14:36:41.114507-07:00","sha1":"27631affdca3bfc891c2e4f0cf8e4316237da20b","page_count":22,"file_size":324764,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.57.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.57.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 1 of 22 Page ID\n #:1850\n\n\n 1 Robert Tauler (SBN 241964)\n robert@taulersmith.com\n Narain Kumar, Esq. (SBN 301533)\n 2 nkumar@taulersmith.com\n TAULER SMITH LLP\n 3 626 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 550\n Los Angeles, California 90017\n Tel: (213) 927-9270\n 4\n Attorneys for Plaintiff\n 5 Carol Price\n\n 6\n\n 7\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 8\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 9\n CAROL PRICE, an individual and on Case No.: 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n10 behalf of all others similarly situated,\n11 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF CAROL PRICE\u2019S\n vs. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT\n12 CONVERSE, INC.\u2019S MOTION TO\n CONVERSE, INC., a Massachusetts DISMISS SECOND AMENDED\n13 company; DOES 1 through 25, COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF\n inclusive, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES\n14\n Hearing\n15 Defendants. Date: December 5, 2025\n Time: 1:30 pm\n16 Courtroom: 6B\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SAC 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 2 of 22 Page ID\n #:1851\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 6\n 2\n\n 3 II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................. 7\n\n 4 III. ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................. 8\n\n 5\n A. THE COURT MUST STRIKE AND IGNORE DEFENDANT\u2019S FACTS FROM OUTSIDE THE\n 6\n SAC .................................................................................................................................. 8\n 7\n B. PLAINTIFF HAS ARTICLE III STANDING..................................................................... 10\n 8\n 1. The SAC\u2019s Allegations establish Article III Standing from Defendant\u2019s Privacy\n 9\n Violation ..................................................................................................................... 11\n10\n 2. Forcing Plaintiff to Share Information with TikTok Caused an Article III Injury\n11\n 14\n12\n 3. Defendant Profiting by Stealing an Asset From Plaintiff Caused an Article III\n13\n Injury .......................................................................................................................... 15\n14\n C. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE UNIFORMLY REJECTED DEFENDANT\u2019S ARGUMENTS ON THE\n15\n MERITS OF THE CIPA CLAIM .......................................................................................... 16\n16\n D. THERE ARE NO EXTRATERRITORIALITY CONCERNS ................................................. 18\n17\n IV. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 20\n18\n LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................... 22\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 2\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 3 of 22 Page ID\n #:1852\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\n 2 Page(s)\n Cases\n 3\n 2025 WL 1430663 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2025) .............................................................12, 13\n 4 Bowen v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.,\n 118 F.4th 1134 (9th Cir. 2024) .......................................................................................14\n 5\n Conohan v. Rad Power Bikes Inc.,\n 6\n No. CV 25-0106 PVC, 2025 WL 1111246 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2025) ............................16\n 7 Deivaprakash v. Conde Nast Digital,\n No. 25-CV-04021-RFL, 2025 WL 2541952 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025) .........................16\n 8\n E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,\n 9\n 932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................16\n10 Frasco v. Flo Health, Inc.,\n No. 21-CV-00757-JD, 2025 WL 1433825 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2025) .....................13, 14\n11\n Gabrelli v. Haleon US Inc.,\n12\n No. 25-CV-02555-WHO, 2025 WL 2494368 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025) .....................16\n13 Gabrielli v. Motorola Mobility LLC,\n No. 24-CV-09533-JST, 2025 WL 1939957 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025)..........................16\n14\n Garon v. Keleops USA Inc.,\n15\n No. 25-CV-02124-DMR, 2025 WL 2522374 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025) .......................16\n16 Greenley v. Kochava, Inc.,\n 684 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (S.D. Cal. July 2023) ...................................................................16\n17\n Heeger v. Facebook, Inc.,\n18\n 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ..........................................................................11\n19 Heiting v. FKA Distrib. Co.,\n 2025 WL 736594 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2025) ....................................................................12\n20\n In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.,\n21\n 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) ..............................................................................11, 12, 16\n\n 3\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 4 of 22 Page ID\n #:1853\n\n\n\n 1 In re iPhone Application Litig.,\n 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ..........................................................................11\n 2\n In re: Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation,\n 3\n 934 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2019) ...........................................................................................14\n 4 James v. Walt Disney Co.,\n 701 F. Supp. 3d 942 (N.D. Cal. 2023) ............................................................................13\n 5\n Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,\n 6\n 39 Cal. 4th 95 (2006) ......................................................................................................19\n 7 Keskinen,\n 2025 WL 851074 (collecting cases) ...............................................................................12\n 8\n Licea v. Cinmar, LLC,\n 9\n 659 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2023) ..........................................................................12\n10 Mirmalek v. Los Angeles Times Commc'ns LLC,\n No. 24-CV-01797-CRB, 2024 WL 5102709 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2024) .........................6\n11\n Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc.,\n12\n No. 2:24-CV-04249-RGK-SK, 2024 WL 3561367 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) ..........6, 16\n13 Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc.,\n 684 F. App'x 32 (2d Cir. 2017) ......................................................................................14\n14\n NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta,\n15\n 113 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2024) .......................................................................................15\n16 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................18\n17\n Popa v. Microsoft,\n18\n 2025 WL 2448824 (9th Cir. 2025) .................................................................................11\n19 Raffin v. Medicredit, Inc.,\n No. CV154912GHKPJWX, 2016 WL 7743504 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016) ..................12\n20\n Riganian v. LiveRamp Holdings, Inc.,\n21\n No. 25-CV-00824-JST, 2025 WL 2021802 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2025)..........................16\n\n 4\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 5 of 22 Page ID\n #:1854\n\n\n\n 1 Safe Air for Everyone,\n 373 F.3d ..........................................................................................................................14\n 2\n Shah v. Fandom, Inc.,\n 3\n No. 24-CV-01062-RFL, 2024 WL 4539577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) ....................6, 16\n 4 Smith v. Maryland,\n 442 U.S. 735 (1979) .......................................................................................................13\n 5\n Wooley v. Maynard,\n 6\n 430 U.S. 705 (1977) .......................................................................................................15\n 7 Zarif v. Hwareh.com, Inc.,\n No. 23-CV-0565-BAS-DEB, 2025 WL 486317 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025) .............17, 19\n 8\n\n 9 Statutes\n California Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 ..........................................................................6, 7, 17, 19\n10\n Rules\n11\n Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(d) ...................................................................................................8\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 5\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 6 of 22 Page ID\n #:1855\n\n\n\n 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES\n\n 2 I. INTRODUCTION\n\n 3 Defendant collects data on unsuspecting visitors to its website using sophisticated\n\n 4 technology so that it can identify and track Californians with the assistance of TikTok.\n\n 5 Defendant, like other Defendants before it, seek the Court\u2019s assistance to bail them out of\n\n 6 their privacy collection practices in this state. E.g., Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., No. 2:24-\n\n 7 CV-04249-RGK-SK, 2024 WL 3561367, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) (concluding that\n\n 8 defendant could be held liable for violating California\u2019s prohibition on trap and trace\n\n 9 devices over the internet) (\u201cC2\u201d); Shah v. Fandom, Inc., No. 24-CV-01062-RFL, 2024\n\n10 WL 4539577, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (same); Mirmalek v. Los Angeles Times\n\n11 Commc'ns LLC, No. 24-CV-01797-CRB, 2024 WL 5102709, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12,\n\n12 2024) (same). However, virtually every court who has assessed the TikTok Software at\n\n13 the pleading stage has come to the same conclusion \u2013 that the TikTok Software fits within\n\n14 the definition of a prohibited \u201cTrap and Trace\u201d device in California Penal Code \u00a7 638.51\n\n15 because of the way it is designed to collect information from Californians without their\n\n16 consent.\n\n17 Defendant\u2019s arguments on Article III standing have also been fully addressed by\n\n18 the allegations in the SAC and its attached expert report which describe in detail all of the\n\n19 information that was extracted from Plaintiff\u2019s device and how that can be used to\n\n20 personally de-anonymize and personally identify Plaintiff\u2019s browsing activities across the\n\n21\n\n 6\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 7 of 22 Page ID\n #:1856\n\n\n\n 1 internet. Defendant\u2019s conclusion that federal courts are powerless to stop the pervasive\n\n 2 tracking of everything someone does on the internet simply cannot be accepted.\n\n 3 II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\n 4 Defendant is a well-known footwear brand that operates a website at converse.com.\n\n 5 (\u201cWebsite\u201d). SAC \u00b6 8. On that website Defendant installed code written and controlled by\n\n 6 TikTok, a California company, that violates California law and invades the privacy of\n\n 7 every person that visits its website, including Plaintiff, without their consent. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 8, 19-\n\n 8 21, 27-29. This was because the code acted as an illegal \u201cTrap and Trace\u201d device, in\n\n 9 violation of California Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 (California\u2019s \u201cTrap and Trace Law), part of\n\n10 the California Invasion of Privacy Act, \u00a7 630 et seq. Defendant\u2019s purpose in violating the\n\n11 privacy rights of Plaintiff and countless others was because data is valuable, and data\n\n12 about specific individuals is more valuable than anonymous or aggregated data. E.g., SAC\n\n13 \u00b6\u00b6 9-10, 16, 35. By operating an illegal trap and trace device Defendant could turn\n\n14 anonymous data in personalized data about specific individuals through de-anonymizing\n\n15 the data or \u201cfingerprinting.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9. Fingerprinting can only happen because companies\n\n16 like TikTok have collected vast troves of personal data which it then uses build up enough\n\n17 of a profile on an individual so it can identify the source and origin of otherwise\n\n18 anonymous website visits and interactions. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 11-13. And in exchange for contributing\n\n19 to TikTok\u2019s massive database by installing its code Defendant gets to enjoy the benefits\n\n20 that come when an online retailer has removed visitors\u2019 privacy thereby turning the\n\n21 anonymous website visitor into the specifically identifiable recipient of highly\n\n 7\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 8 of 22 Page ID\n #:1857\n\n\n\n 1 personalized and universally unwanted marketing efforts. E.g., SAC \u00b6\u00b6 9, 29, 33-35. If\n\n 2 people like Plaintiff actually wanted Defendant\u2019s marketing and advertising to be more\n\n 3 aggressive, personalized, and tailored, companies like Defendant have a lot of options and\n\n 4 make it very easy to do just that, from email-signups to expressly asking customers for\n\n 5 their preferences or countless other options. Companies like Defendant choose to use an\n\n 6 illegal Trap and Trace device because clearly many people do not want to give up their\n\n 7 anonymity and privacy to every company whose website they visit, that is why the TikTok\n\n 8 Software was designed to meet this sole objective. SAC \u00b6 21.\n\n 9\n III. ARGUMENT\n10\n A. The Court Must Strike and Ignore Defendant\u2019s Facts from Outside the\n11\n SAC\n12\n Defendant\u2019s Motion relies on a myriad of facts entirely absent from the SAC. See\n13\n Roth Decl. \u00b6\u00b6 1-5. None of these documents or the facts therein can be considered in\n14\n relation to a motion dismiss unless the Court chooses to convert it to a motion for summary\n15\n judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(d). Defendant asserts that it can introduce these facts\n16\n as part of a factual challenge to the Court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction, but Defendant does\n17\n not make a factual challenge. The Court should therefore strike and ignore both of the\n18\n declarations attached to the Motion.1\n19\n\n20 Defendant\u2019s Cortina Declaration contains many facts and assertions which are\n 1\n\n misleading and bordering on outright false. The entire declaration is only relevant to a\n21 single issue \u2013 whether Defendant\u2019s failure to meet and confer on this Motion to Dismiss\n five days before it was filed instead of seven justifies denying it under Local Rule 7-3.\n 8\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 9 of 22 Page ID\n #:1858\n\n\n\n 1 Defendant instead attacks the allegations as insufficient and then misleadingly\n\n 2 describes irrelevant evidence obtained through discovery in this case as insufficient to\n\n 3 satisfy a standard it just made up. That simply is not a factual challenge, it\u2019s a motion for\n\n 4 summary judgment masquerading as a motion to dismiss that Defendant hopes will\n\n 5 mislead and confuse the Court to Defendant\u2019s attempt to bypass the rules of civil\n\n 6 procedure which Defendant finds too inconvenient to follow. As an example of the\n\n 7 fabricated and made-up argument Defendant treats as a \u201cfactual\u201d challenge to subject\n\n 8 matter jurisdiction, Defendant relies on three key facts:\n\n 9 (i) she did not provide Converse any of her personal information\n or input any information during her visit to the website;\n10 (ii) she has no knowledge of any data that was collected from her\n visit; and\n11 (iii) she has not received any communications from Converse\n since her visit to its website.\n12 Mot. at 19. None of these facts are relevant to Plaintiff\u2019s claim or Article III standing, and\n\n13 it\u2019s obvious that Defendant is just making up and misstating the facts and law because\n\n14 Defendant does not cite a single case in support of the relevance of any of these facts to\n\n15 the merits of the claim or Article III standing.\n\n16 By definition a trap and trace claim will not involve information Plaintiff input into\n\n17 the Website, and the FAC doesn\u2019t allege that she did. Similarly, Plaintiff\u2019s knowledge of\n\n18 how Defendant secretly and illegally violated her privacy is entirely irrelevant to Article\n\n19\n Should the Court conclude such action is unnecessary then the Declaration can and\n20 should be struck from the docket and removed in its entirety. Plaintiff however declines\n to follow Defendant\u2019s lead and proactively disparage Defendant\u2019s counsel in public court\n21 filings on a wide number of entirely unrelated topics, but Plaintiff will have no difficulty\n in doing providing ample factual details should the Court request such information.\n 9\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 10 of 22 Page ID\n #:1859\n\n\n\n 1 III standing or the merits of the claim. And the fact that Defendant has not received any\n\n 2 communications from Converse after visiting the Website has no connection to anything\n\n 3 at issue. Defendant\u2019s argument may as well be that someone who stole your medical\n\n 4 records hasn\u2019t violated your privacy or caused you an injury because you didn\u2019t type the\n\n 5 information in yourself, you never knew it happened, and they didn\u2019t use it to send you an\n\n 6 email trying to sell you Viagra or something similar. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff\n\n 7 later voluntarily gave information to TikTok but that does not excuse Defendant\u2019s own\n\n 8 illegal violations of her privacy, nor is it relevant to the fact that Defendant\u2019s illegal\n\n 9 activities gave TikTok more information than Plaintiff did, including the fact that she\n\n10 visited the Converse Website months prior.\n\n11 Simply put, none of the facts Defendant relies on from outside the SAC have any\n\n12 relevance to the merits of the claim or Article III standing, Defendant introduces them\n\n13 solely to try to bias the Court against Plaintiff\u2019s legitimate and meritorious grievance. The\n\n14 Court must therefore strike and ignore them.\n\n15 B. Plaintiff has Article III Standing\n\n16 Defendant starts its Article III arguments asserting that \u201cneither that report nor\n\n17 Plaintiff\u2019s SAC states that the TikTok Pixel as implemented on Converse\u2019s website\n\n18 collected any private information from Plaintiff during her single visit to the Converse\n\n19 website.\u201d Mot. at 12 (emphasis in original). This is simply incorrect. Plaintiff\u2019s expert\n\n20 report and the SAC unequivocally describe what Converse\u2019s website collected from every\n\n21 single visitor while the pixel was installed. SAC \u00b6 10 (\u201cThe TikTok Software on\n\n 10\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 11 of 22 Page ID\n #:1860\n\n\n\n 1 Defendant\u2019s Website collects, tracks, or uses the following information below collected\n\n 2 from the device of each visitor to the Website, including Plaintiff.\u201d). The SAC then spends\n\n 3 a page and a half listing an extensive number of pieces of personal information related to\n\n 4 Plaintiff that were collected. SAC \u00b6\u00b6 10-14. This is exactly what the Court required in its\n\n 5 previous ruling.\n\n 6 1. The SAC\u2019s Allegations establish Article III Standing from\n\n 7 Defendant\u2019s Privacy Violation\n\n 8 These additional facts demonstrate what specific pieces information was extracted\n\n 9 from Plaintiff and how they allow for the pervasive tracking of all of Plaintiff\u2019s browsing\n\n10 history across the internet. That alone makes Defendant\u2019s conduct highly offensive. See\n\n11 e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2012)\n\n12 (concluding Article III standing existing for tracking of \u201cPlaintiffs' home and workplace\n\n13 locations, gender, age, zip code, terms searched, Plaintiff's app ID and password for\n\n14 specific app accounts, etc., through each of the downloaded apps.\u201d); Heeger v. Facebook,\n\n15 Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (collection of geographic location\n\n16 sufficient for Article III standing where it exceeded mere collection of an IP address).\n\n17 This must be sufficient to establish an Article III injury because that\u2019s exactly what\n\n18 the Ninth Circuit held in In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598-\n\n19 99 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that \u201ctracking of browsing activities, including an individual\u2019s\n\n20 likes, dislikes, interests, and habits over a significant amount of time\u201d sufficient to establish\n\n21 an Article III injury\u201d). The Court\u2019s previous order distinguished In re Facebook based on\n\n 11\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 12 of 22 Page ID\n #:1861\n\n\n\n 1 Popa v. Microsoft, 2025 WL 2448824, at *3 (9th Cir. 2025) (Order at 2, 5-6 n.3) but its\n\n 2 reading of the case was entirely sua sponte and made without the benefit of any briefing\n\n 3 by the parties. Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s additional allegations very clearly establish the\n\n 4 concreteness and injury required for Article III standing under any standard that may be\n\n 5 required by Poppas because the relevant portion of the decision in Poppas relied on by the\n\n 6 Court was addressing the argument adopted by many other courts that simply alleging a\n\n 7 violation of CIPA was itself sufficient to establish an Article III injury.2 And most\n\n 8 importantly, Poppas expressly held that the conclusions Plaintiff relies on from In re\n\n 9 Facebook are still good law (and Poppas could not have changed that because one panel\n\n10 of the Ninth Circuit cannot overrule a prior panel\u2019s decision).\n\n11 When faced with allegations quite similar to the FAC, Judge Vera also ruled that the\n\n12 plaintiff had not alleged facts sufficient to establish an Article III injury. Heiting v. FKA\n\n13 Distrib. Co., 2025 WL 736594, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2025). Defendant even cites to that\n\n14 opinion in its brief. Mot. at 10. Defendant however failed to recognize that decision gave\n\n15 leave to amend and that upon review of the additional allegations in the SAC Judge Vera\n\n16 concluded that plaintiff had established Article III standing. Id., 2025 WL 1430663, at *2\n\n17\n 2 Such decisions held that \u201cviolations of plaintiffs\u2019 statutory rights under CIPA, even\n18 without more, constitute injury in fact because instead of a bare technical violation of a\n statute, a CIPA violation involves a violation of privacy rights.\u201d Licea v. Cinmar, LLC,\n19 659 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (citation omitted); accord Keskinen, 2025\n WL 851074, at *5 (collecting cases). Raffin v. Medicredit, Inc., No.\n20 CV154912GHKPJWX, 2016 WL 7743504, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016) (\u201c[D]istrict\n courts in the Ninth Circuit consistently have concluded that, to satisfy injury in fact, a\n21 plaintiff in a CIPA action need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of the private\n right conferred by the statute.\u201d).\n 12\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 13 of 22 Page ID\n #:1862\n\n\n\n 1 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2025). He explained that \u201cPlaintiff's SAC now alleges that the software\n\n 2 effectively de-anonymizes the website user and has collected tracking information on her\n\n 3 irrespective of her lack of a TikTok account. Accepting Plaintiff's plausible allegations as\n\n 4 true\u2014as the Court must at this stage\u2014Plaintiff's allegations suffice to establish a concrete\n\n 5 injury.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Substantially similar factual allegations were also added to\n\n 6 the SAC in this case, and so the Court should reach the same conclusion.\n\n 7 Plaintiff\u2019s argument that the privacy harms from combining lots of \u201cless\n\n 8 personalized\u201d data are the exact privacy harm that motivated the creation of trap and trace\n\n 9 laws, as Justice Stewart presciently noted in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735\n\n10 (1979). He noted that most people had no problem sharing their own phone number in the\n\n11 phone book, \u201cbut I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world\n\n12 a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called\u201d because even though it\n\n13 wouldn\u2019t be incriminating \u201cit easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places\n\n14 called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J.,\n\n15 dissenting).\n\n16 Defendant\u2019s focus on individual pieces of information collected has been repeatedly\n\n17 rejected by courts as necessary for Article III standing. James v. Walt Disney Co., 701 F.\n\n18 Supp. 3d 942, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (\u201cthe Court rejects Disney's argument that Plaintiffs\n\n19 must show that any interception of information was highly offensive in order to have\n\n20 standing.\u201d); Frasco v. Flo Health, Inc., No. 21-CV-00757-JD, 2025 WL 1433825, at *11\n\n21 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2025) (concluding theft of anonymized data is just as much an Article\n\n 13\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 14 of 22 Page ID\n #:1863\n\n\n\n 1 III injury for intruding upon seclusion because \u201c[t]he fact that misappropriated information\n\n 2 might be laundered in some way to hide the owner's identity is of no moment to the\n\n 3 commission of the tort.\u201d). Moreover, two other federal circuits have also found Article III\n\n 4 standing where defendants installed trackers on plaintiffs' computers that allowed them to\n\n 5 monitor their web browsing across multiple websites and build detailed profiles based on\n\n 6 their internet activity. In re: Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation,\n\n 7 934 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2019); Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc., 684 F. App'x 32 (2d Cir. 2017).\n\n 8 Moreover, to the degree Defendant\u2019s arguments rely on the lack of personally\n\n 9 identifiable data this is the key merits question of the case \u2013 whether the collective\n\n10 information is \u201creasonably likely\u201d to identify an individual, and when \u201cthe [standing] issue\n\n11 and substantive issues are so intertwined,\u201d which makes the resolution of \u201cgenuinely\n\n12 disputed facts is inappropriate.\u201d See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039; Flo Health,\n\n13 2025 WL 1433825, at *11 (\u201cIf anything, this tactic simply underscored that defendants\u2019\n\n14 standing arguments are inextricably intertwined with the merits for determination later in\n\n15 the case.\u201d). But to obtain the judgement Defendant seeks based on the evidence it provides\n\n16 going to the merits of disputed factual issues the Court \u201cmust assess Defendants motion as\n\n17 we would a motion for summary judgment, and leave the resolution of material factual\n\n18 disputes regarding Article III standing to the trier of fact.\u201d Bowen v. Energizer Holdings,\n\n19 Inc., 118 F.4th 1134, 1145\u201346 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).\n\n20 2. Forcing Plaintiff to Share Information with TikTok Caused\n\n21 an Article III Injury\n\n 14\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 15 of 22 Page ID\n #:1864\n\n\n\n 1 Defendant caused a separate Article III injury when it effectively forced Plaintiff to\n\n 2 unknowingly give her personal information to TikTok without her consent because\n\n 3 Defendant took away Plaintiff\u2019s right to choose for herself whether to do business or share\n\n 4 her personal information with TikTok. In numerous analogous circumstances to the SAC\n\n 5 where individuals are prevented choosing for themselves who they will and will not do\n\n 6 business with or share their personal information undisputedly suffer a cognizable Article\n\n 7 III injury when the conduct is done by a government actor. For example, \u201c[i]t is also well-\n\n 8 established that the forced disclosure of information, even purely commercial information,\n\n 9 triggers First Amendment scrutiny.\u201d NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 113 F.4th 1101, 1117 (9th\n\n10 Cir. 2024). Similarly, \u201c[i]t is well-established that the First Amendment protects \u2018the right\n\n11 to refrain from speaking at all.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714\n\n12 (1977). It stands to reason that when a private business does the same thing that injury,\n\n13 while not a constitutional violation, is at least constitutionally cognizable. This is\n\n14 particularly true in the context of companies like TikTok and its perceived potential for\n\n15 collaboration with foreign governments, other highly controversial and very political social\n\n16 media companies like Truth Social or X, or boycotting a company for political reasons like\n\n17 the BDS movement or Target\u2019s rollback of DEI policies. The fact that Plaintiff may have\n\n18 later chosen to sign up with TikTok (a fact not alleged in the complaint) is irrelevant\n\n19 because Plaintiff hadn\u2019t made that choice when Defendant made it for her.\n\n20 3. Defendant Profiting by Stealing an Asset From Plaintiff\n\n21 Caused an Article III Injury\n\n 15\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 16 of 22 Page ID\n #:1865\n\n\n\n 1 The SAC also alleges that the personal information on her devices had \u201ca\n\n 2 quantifiable market value\u201d which Defendant stole when it secretly and illegally extracted\n\n 3 that data and shared it with TikTok. SAC \u00b6 29. \u201cThe detailed digital profile that Defendant\n\n 4 assembled possesses a quantifiable market value, with estimates ranging from $0.10 to\n\n 5 $0.50 for a basic consumer profile and exceeding $5.00 for a B2B prospect interested in\n\n 6 high-value professional services.\u201d SAC \u00b6 29. As the Ninth Circuit explained, \u201c[b]ecause\n\n 7 California law recognizes a legal interest in unjustly earned profits, Plaintiffs have\n\n 8 adequately pleaded an entitlement to Facebook's profits from users\u2019 personal data\n\n 9 sufficient to confer Article III standing. Plaintiffs allege that their browsing histories carry\n\n10 financial value.\u201d In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 600 (identifying studies and research panels\n\n11 paying for browsing history). These are detailed nonconclusory factual allegations\n\n12 establishing that the information taken from Plaintiff has a quantified and concrete\n\n13 monetary value that therefore must give rise to a cognizable Article III injury. \u201cFor\n\n14 standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an injury.\u201d E. Bay\n\n15 Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\n\n16 C. Federal Courts Have Uniformly Rejected Defendant\u2019s Arguments on the\n\n17 Merits of the CIPA Claim\n\n18 Defendant makes a hodgepodge of unrelated arguments on the merits of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\n19 CIPA claim which have no basis in the relevant statutory language and have been\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 16\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 17 of 22 Page ID\n #:1866\n\n\n\n 1 uniformly rejected by federal courts.3 The chorus of opinions rejecting Defendant\u2019s exact\n\n 2 arguments was overwhelming enough for one court to conclude that \u201cDefendant's\n\n 3 contention is not well-taken.\u201d Zarif v. Hwareh.com, Inc., No. 23-CV-0565-BAS-DEB,\n\n 4 2025 WL 486317, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025). Plaintiff is happy to go into further\n\n 5 detail on each of the arguments and provide even more authorities on Defendant\u2019s\n\n 6 arguments, but frankly after the first ten there seems to be little point beyond explaining\n\n 7 the legal analysis conclusively demonstrating that this provision of CIPA applies to the\n\n 8 internet.\n\n 9 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated California\u2019s Trap and Trace Law.\n\n10 California Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: \u201c(a) Except as\n\n11 provided in subdivision (b), a person may not install or use a pen register or a trap and\n\n12 trace device without first obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.52 or 638.53.\u201d\n\n13 Thus, to state a claim under \u00a7 638.51, a plaintiff must allege, at most, that a defendant\n\n14 installed and used a pen register or trap and trace device without first obtaining a court\n\n15 order. California law defines a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d as:\n\n16\n\n17\n 3\n E.g., Shah v. Fandom, Inc., 2024 WL 4539577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024); Moody v. C2\n18 Educ. Sys. Inc., 2024 WL 3561367 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024); Conohan v. Rad Power\n Bikes Inc., No. CV 25-0106 PVC, 2025 WL 1111246, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2025);\n19 Gabrielli v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 24-CV-09533-JST, 2025 WL 1939957, at *11\n (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025); Greenley v. Kochava, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1050-51\n (S.D. Cal. July 2023); Riganian v. LiveRamp Holdings, Inc., No. 25-CV-00824-JST,\n20 2025 WL 2021802, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2025); Deivaprakash v. Conde Nast\n Digital, No. 25-CV-04021-RFL, 2025 WL 2541952, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025);\n Gabrelli v. Haleon US Inc., No. 25-CV-02555-WHO, 2025 WL 2494368, at *1 (N.D.\n21 Cal. Aug. 29, 2025); Garon v. Keleops USA Inc., No. 25-CV-02124-DMR, 2025 WL\n 2522374, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025).\n 17\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 18 of 22 Page ID\n #:1867\n\n\n\n 1 a device or process that captures the incoming electronic or\n\n 2 other impulses that identify the originating number or other\n\n 3 dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information [\u201cDRAS\u201d]\n\n 4 reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic\n\n 5 communication, but not the contents of a communication.\n\n 6 Id. \u00a7 638.50(c). And \u00a7 638.50(a) instructs that the terms \u201c\u2018Wire communication\u2019 and\n\n 7 \u2018electronic communication\u2019 have the meanings set forth in subdivision (a) of Section\n\n 8 629.51\u201d where the definition for \u201celectronic communication\u201d in \u00a7 629.51(a)(2) is:\n\n 9 \u201cElectronic communication\u201d means \u201cany transfer of signs, signals, writings, images,\n\n10 sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio,\n\n11 electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.\u201d There is simply no way to read\n\n12 the expansive language of the statutory definition of trap and trace devices and conclude\n\n13 that the California Legislature meant to cover telephone communications and nothing\n\n14 else.\n\n15 D. There Are No Extraterritoriality Concerns\n\n16 Defendant\u2019s final arguments involving extraterritoriality similarly lack merit. As an\n\n17 initial matter it is based entirely on Defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s unsworn factual representations\n\n18 in its brief about the locations of its servers, none of which is in the complaint. Mot. at 29\n\n19 (\u201cthe servers hosting Converse\u2019s website are not located in California.\u201d It is also based on\n\n20 the unsupported assertion that for extraterritoriality purpose a website is \u201clocated\u201d\n\n21 wherever its servers are located. Defendant argues that \u201c[f]or purposes of determining\n\n 18\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 19 of 22 Page ID\n #:1868\n\n\n\n 1 where a website itself is located, courts thus look to where the servers hosting the website\n\n 2 are physically located\u201d and cites to the Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v.\n\n 3 Amazon.com, Inc., but Defendant cites to a page in the background section of the opinion\n\n 4 and nothing on that page supports Defendant\u2019s argument. Mot. at 28 (citing Perfect 10,\n\n 5 Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2007)). The suggestion that\n\n 6 Defendant can evade all liability from the laws of a state in which it conducts business and\n\n 7 causes injuries to consumers by invading their privacy merely by storing some code on a\n\n 8 server in a different state is ludicrous, particularly because even if Defendant\u2019s assertions\n\n 9 about server locations are true, those servers were actively communicating with Plaintiff\n\n10 in California.\n\n11 Similar extraterritoriality arguments for Section 631 of CIPA were rejected in Zarif\n\n12 v. Hwareh.com, Inc., 2025 WL 486317, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025). There the\n\n13 defendant argued CIPA does not apply to extraterritorial conduct, and Plaintiff \u201cfails to\n\n14 allege that the challenged conduct occurred in California.\u201d The court rejected the argument,\n\n15 concluding that any extraterritoriality concerns were not compelling because the plaintiff\n\n16 sufficiently alleged that the intercepted communications were sent from within the\n\n17 California. Although this concerned a different provision of CIPA, that provision had an\n\n18 explicit requirement for a geographic nexus to California meaning that the\n\n19 extraterritoriality arguments were stronger there than with Section 638.51 which the\n\n20 legislature chose to not expressly require such a nexus. These same concerns were also\n\n21 rejected by the California Supreme Court in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39\n\n 19\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 20 of 22 Page ID\n #:1869\n\n\n\n 1 Cal. 4th 95, 104\u201305 (2006). There it concluded that \u201cCalifornia clearly has an interest in\n\n 2 protecting the privacy of telephone conversations of California residents while they are in\n\n 3 California sufficient to permit this state, as a constitutional matter, to exercise legislative\n\n 4 jurisdiction over such activity.\u201d Id.\n\n 5 Defendant\u2019s suggestion that Plaintiff was obligated to plead the location of\n\n 6 Defendant\u2019s servers to avoid dismissal due to \u201cterritorial silence\u201d is similarly absurd and\n\n 7 has no basis in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, there is no way for Plaintiff\n\n 8 to obtain this information except through discovery, and such a requirement would make\n\n 9 it virtually impossible to file lawsuits over internet transactions. Mot. at 28. Defendant\n\n10 improperly seeks to conflate extraterritoriality, choice of law, and personal jurisdiction to\n\n11 justify its conclusion that it can only be held accountable for its online activities in the\n\n12 jurisdiction where its servers are physically located. Notably, at this stage there are no facts\n\n13 helpful to Defendant regarding extraterritoriality, and the only relevant location known to\n\n14 Plaintiff is their own location during the relevant events which is already clearly alleged.\n\n15 FAC \u00b6 4. Defendant is therefore not seeking dismissal because the cognizable facts before\n\n16 the Court establish there would be any extraterritorial application of California law.\n\n17 Defendant instead seeks dismissal because of Plaintiff\u2019s purported \u201cterritorial silence,\u201d that\n\n18 is, Plaintiff\u2019s failure to allege facts disproving extraterritoriality.\n\n19 IV. CONCLUSION\n\n20 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny the\n\n21 Motion to Dismiss. In the alternative, the Court should permit Plaintiff leave to amend to\n\n 20\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 21 of 22 Page ID\n #:1870\n\n\n\n 1 add more facts should the Court find the Complaint deficient because, unless the Court\n\n 2 rules that all trap and trace laws (including the federal version, which is identical in relevant\n\n 3 part) cannot cause an Article III injury, it is possible that Plaintiff can amend to add even\n\n 4 further factual details as required by the Court, just as Plaintiff submitted an entire expert\n\n 5 report with the SAC addressing the factual deficiencies identified by the Court.\n\n 6\n\n 7 DATED: November 14, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n\n 8\n\n 9 By: /s/ Narain Kumar\n Narain Kumar, Esq.\n10 Attorney for Plaintiff\n Carol Price\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 21\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 57 Filed 11/15/25 Page 22 of 22 Page ID\n #:1871\n\n\n\n 1 LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\n 2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Plaintiff Carol Price, certifies that this brief\n\n 3 contains 4,040 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.\n\n 4\n\n 5 DATED: November 14, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n\n 6\n\n 7 By: /s/ Narain Kumar\n Narain Kumar, Esq.\n 8 Attorney for Plaintiff\n Carol Price\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 22\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:06:50.800622-07:00","document_number":"57","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031046338649","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Memorandum in Opposition to Motion","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-11-15T01:04:57.267660-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:11.450486-08:00","date_filed":"2025-11-15","time_filed":"00:43:19","entry_number":57,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-11-15.001","pacer_sequence_number":160,"description":"MEMORANDUM in Opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 55 filed by Plaintiff Carol Price. (Kumar, Narain) (Entered: 11/15/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/443931396/","id":443931396,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/458586872/","id":458586872,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/56/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-11-12T20:32:55.622834-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-20T12:59:57.154176-07:00","sha1":"2dae7de8cfc9465c0cc3cc4c64ac2be9a390fc97","page_count":3,"file_size":172732,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.56.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.56.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 56 Filed 11/12/25 Page 1 of 3 Page ID\n #:1593\n\n\n\n1 Livia M. Kiser (SBN 285411)\n lkiser@kslaw.com\n2 Michael D. Roth (SBN 217464)\n mroth@kslaw.com\n3 Lennette W. Lee (SBN 263023)\n llee@kslaw.com\n4 Samuel C. Cortina (SBN 310778)\n scortina@kslaw.com\n5 KING & SPALDING LLP\n 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1600\n6 Los Angeles, CA 90071\n Telephone: (213) 443-4355\n7\n Attorneys for Defendant\n8 CONVERSE, INC.\n9\n10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12 CAROL PRICE, individually and Case No. 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n13 on behalf of all others similarly\n situated, DISCOVERY MATTER\n14 [Assigned to the Honorable Magistrate\n Plaintiff,\n15 Judge Charles F. Eick]\n v.\n16 DEFENDANT CONVERSE INC.\u2019S\n CONVERSE, INC., a\n17 Massachusetts company, DOES 1 MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURES\n through 25, inclusive, AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS\n18 FROM PLAINTIFF CAROL PRICE\n Defendants.\n19\n Date: December 19, 2025\n20\n Time: 9:30 a.m.\n21 Courtroom: 750, 7th Floor\n Discovery Cutoff: May 22, 2026\n22\n Pretrial Conference: Not Set\n23 Trial: Not Set\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n\n DEFENDANT CONVERSE\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 56 Filed 11/12/25 Page 2 of 3 Page ID\n #:1594\n\n\n\n 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:\n 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on Friday, December 19, 2025, at 9:30 a.m., or\n 3 on such other date and time convenient to (and ordered by) the Court, in Courtroom 750\n 4 of the Roybal Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 255 E. Temple Street, 7th\n 5 Floor, Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendant Converse Inc. (\u201cConverse\u201d) will, and\n 6 hereby does, move this Court for an order compelling Plaintiff Carol Price (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) to\n 7 produce documents and respond to interrogatories (the \u201cMotion\u201d) in response to\n 8 Converse\u2019s First Set of Requests for Production (\u201cRFPs\u201d) and First Set of Interrogatories\n 9 (\u201cROGs\u201d) (collectively \u201cRequests\u201d). Specifically, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 & 33\n10 and the authority set forth in the Joint Stipulation and any further memoranda or\n11 argument, Converse requests an Order that requires Plaintiff to complete each of the\n12 following within seven days of the Court\u2019s Order on the Motion:\n13 (1) Requiring Plaintiff to fully respond to Interrogatory Nos. 3, 7, and 13, and\n14 overruling Plaintiff\u2019s objections thereto.\n15 (2) Requiring Plaintiff to produce all documents responsive to RFP Nos. 1, 2, 5,\n16 8, 12, and 13 and serve supplemental written responses, and overruling\n17 Plaintiff\u2019s objections thereto.\n18 (3) Requiring Plaintiff to serve a document-by-document privilege log that\n19 discloses for each withheld document: (a) the attorney and client involved, (b)\n20 the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities shown on the document\n21 to have received or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities known to\n22 have been furnished the document or informed of its substance, (e) the date\n23 the document was generated, prepared, or dated, and (f) a narrative\n24 explanation for why the document is privileged.\n25 (4) Sanctioning Plaintiff and her counsel in an amount to be determined following\n26 submission of a declaration by Converse\u2019s counsel setting forth the amount\n27 and reasonableness of their fees incurred in bringing the Motion.\n28\n 1\n DEFENDANT CONVERSE\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 56 Filed 11/12/25 Page 3 of 3 Page ID\n #:1595\n\n\n\n1 This Motion is based upon the concurrently filed Joint Stipulation on Defendant\n2 Converse\u2019s Motion to Compel, as well as the pleadings, records, and files therein, any\n3 supplemental memoranda timely filed before the hearing, and on such other oral or\n4 documentary evidence of counsel.\n5\n6\n7 Dated: November 12, 2025 KING & SPALDING LLP\n8\n By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n9\n LIVIA KISER\n10 MICHAEL D. ROTH\n11 LENNETTE W. LEE\n SAMUEL C. CORTINA\n12\n Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE\n13 INC.\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 2\n DEFENDANT CONVERSE\u2019S MOTION TO COMPEL\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-16T00:41:18.697359-07:00","document_number":"56","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031046314509","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Compel","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-11-12T20:32:55.589447-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:11.391812-08:00","date_filed":"2025-11-12","time_filed":"20:03:14","entry_number":56,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-11-12.001","pacer_sequence_number":158,"description":"NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Compel Disclosures and Production of Documents from Plaintiff Carol Price filed by Defendant Converse, Inc.. Motion set for hearing on 12/19/2025 at 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. (Attachments: # 1 Joint Stipulation Re: Defendant Converse Inc.'s Motion to Compel Disclosures and Production of Documents from Plaintiff Carol Price, # 2 Declaration of Samuel C. Cortina in Support of Defendant Converse Inc.'s Motion to Compel, # 3 Exhibit A - Converse's First Set of RFPs to Plaintiff, # 4 Exhibit B - Converse's First Set of ROGs to Plaintiff, # 5 Exhibit C - Plaintiff's Responses to RFPs, # 6 Exhibit D - Plaintiffs' Responses to ROGs, # 7 Exhibit E - 6.13.25 Meet and Confer Letter to Plaintiff, # 8 Exhibit F - 7.14.25 Email, # 9 Exhibit G - 7.23.25 Plaintiff's Privilege Log, # 10 Exhibit H - Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to ROGs, # 11 Exhibit I - Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to RFPs, # 12 Exhibit J - 7.25.25 Meet and Confer Letter to Plaintiff, # 13 Exhibit K - 8.8.25 Plaintiff's Privilege Log, # 14 Exhibit L - Plaintiff's Amended Supplemental Responses to RFPs, # 15 Exhibit M - Plaintiff's Amended Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures, # 16 Declaration of J. Evan Shapiro in Support of Plaintiff Carol Price's Opposition to Defendant Converse Inc.'s Motion to Compel Disclosures and Production of Documents from Plaintiff Carol Price, # 17 Exhibit A - Converse Inc.'s Objections and Responses to Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Defendant Converse Inc., # 18 Exhibit B - Corp. Designee Deposition Transcript, # 19 Exhibit C - Converse's First Supplemental Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's RFP, # 20 Proposed Order Granting Defendant Converse Inc.'s Motion to Compel)(Roth, Michael) (Entered: 11/12/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/443148372/","id":443148372,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/457777899/","id":457777899,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/55/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-11-04T21:03:44.472329-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T13:57:49.039226-07:00","sha1":"53789f64e237a791089c9032a6de96fdc1de5f83","page_count":30,"file_size":471631,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.55.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686/gov.uscourts.cacd.941686.55.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 1 of 30 Page ID\n #:1410\n\n\n\n1 LIVIA M. KISER (SBN 285411)\n lkiser@kslaw.com\n2 MICHAEL D. ROTH (SBN 217464)\n mroth@kslaw.com\n3 LENNETTE W. LEE (SBN 263023)\n llee@kslaw.com\n4 SAMUEL C. CORTINA (SBN 310778)\n scortina@kslaw.com\n5 KING & SPALDING LLP\n 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1600\n6 Los Angeles, CA 90071\n Telephone: (213) 443-4355\n7 Facsimile: (213) 443-4310\n8 Attorneys for Defendant\n CONVERSE INC.\n9\n10\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12\n13 CAROL PRICE, an individual and Case No. 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E\n14 on behalf of all others similarly\n situated, The Honorable Fernando L. Aenlle-\n15 Rocha\n Plaintiff,\n16 DEFENDANT CONVERSE INC.\u2019S\n v. NOTICE OF MOTION AND\n17\n MOTION TO DISMISS THE\n CONVERSE INC., a SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n18 Massachusetts company; DOES 1\n19 through 25, inclusive, Date: December 5, 2025\n Defendant. Time: 1:30 p.m.\n20 Location: Courtroom 6B\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 1\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 2 of 30 Page ID\n #:1411\n\n\n\n1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:\n2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 5, 2025, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon\n3 thereafter as the matter may be heard before the Honorable Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha\n4 of the above-entitled Court, located at United States Courthouse, 350 W. 1st Street,\n5 Los Angeles, CA 90012, Courtroom 6B, Defendant Converse Inc. (\u201cConverse\u201d) will\n6 and hereby does move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Second Amended Complaint\n7 (the \u201cSAC\u201d), with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and\n8 12(b)(6) (the \u201cMotion\u201d).\n9 The grounds for the Motion are that Plaintiff\u2019s claim should be dismissed under\n10 Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff\u2019s SAC cannot survive a facial challenge to Article III\n11 standing, as the SAC adds no new allegations that would cure the pleading defects the\n12 Court identified in dismissing the FAC. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot survive a factual\n13 challenge because, now that the parties have conducted discovery, the evidence shows\n14 that she has not sustained Article III injury in fact.\n15 Plaintiff\u2019s claims should alternatively be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)\n16 because (1) the trap and trace provision of the California Invasion of Privacy Act\n17 (\u201cCIPA\u201d) only applies to telephones, not the Internet; and (2) under the\n18 extraterritoriality principle, Plaintiff cannot state a CIPA claim for conduct\n19 exclusively occurring outside of California.\n20 Because none of the deficiencies in the SAC can be cured, Converse moves for\n21 dismissal with prejudice.\n22 This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local\n23 Rule 7-3 on October 30, 2025. (Declaration of Samuel C. Cortina \u00b6 2.)\n24 ///\n25 ///\n26 ///\n27 ///\n28 ///\n 2\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 3 of 30 Page ID\n #:1412\n\n\n\n1 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying\n2 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Samuel C. Cortina and\n3 exhibits thereto, the pleadings and records on file in this case, all matters of which the\n4 Court may take judicial notice, and such other or further material as may be presented\n5 at or before the hearing on the Motion.\n6 KING & SPALDING LLP\n Dated: November 4, 2025\n7\n8 By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n LIVIA KISER\n9 MICHAEL D. ROTH\n10 LENNETTE W. LEE\n SAMUEL C. CORTINA\n11\n Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE\n12 INC.\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 3\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 4 of 30 Page ID\n #:1413\n\n\n\n1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n2 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 9\n3 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 10\n4 A. The Court Dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s First Amended Complaint for Lack of\n Subject Matter Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 10\n5\n B. Plaintiff Offers No New Allegations Explaining How She Was Injured as a\n6 Result of Her Visit to the Converse Website ............................................. 11\n7 C. Discovery Confirms that the TikTok Pixel on the Converse Website Did\n8 Not Identify Any of Plaintiff\u2019s Personal Information ................................ 12\n III. LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................... 14\n9\n IV. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING........................ 15\n10\n A. Plaintiff\u2019s SAC Fails to Cure the Pleading Deficiencies that Led the Court\n11 to Dismiss for Failure to Allege Injury In Fact .......................................... 15\n12 B. As a Matter of Fact, Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Concrete Injury Because\n13 the Evidence Shows None of Her Personally Identifiable Information Was\n Collected ..................................................................................................... 19\n14\n V. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CIPA CLAIM AGAINST CONVERSE\n15 FOR ITS WEBSITE PRACTICES ................................................................. 20\n16 VI. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CIPA CLAIM FOR CONDUCT\n EXCLUSIVELY OCCURRING OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA ................... 24\n17\n A. California Presumes its Laws Do Not Apply Extraterritorially ................. 24\n18\n B. CIPA\u2019s Trap and Trace Provision Does Not Apply Extraterritorially....... 25\n19\n C. Plaintiff Improperly Attempts to Extraterritorially Apply CIPA............... 26\n20\n 1. The Location of the Allegedly Offending Conduct Is the\n21 Converse Website Hosted Outside of California........................ 26\n22 2. Converse\u2019s Website Is Not Located in California ...................... 27\n23 VII. THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE SAC CANNOT BE CURED ........................ 29\n24 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 29\n\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 4\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 5 of 30 Page ID\n #:1414\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n1\n Page(s)\n2\n3 Cases\n\n4 Application of U.S. of Am. for an Ord. Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital\n Analyzer,\n5 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ................................................................................. 23\n6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................................... 14, 18\n7\n8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................... 14, 15, 18\n9\n Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc.,\n10 42 Cal. App. 4th 1850 (1996) .................................................................................................. 26\n\n11 Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset,\n 2009 WL 1664468 (D. Minn. June 11, 2009) ......................................................................... 21\n12\n Cody v. Ring LLC,\n13 718 F. Supp. 3d (N.D. Cal. 2024) ........................................................................................... 22\n14\n Dalfio v. Orlansky-Wax, LLC,\n15 2022 WL 3083323 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) ............................................................................. 14\n\n16 Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Super. Ct.,\n 19 Cal. 4th 1036 (1999)..................................................................................................... 26, 27\n17\n Earll v. eBay, Inc.,\n18 599 F. App\u2019x 695 (9th Cir. 2015)............................................................................................ 28\n19\n English v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc.,\n20 2019 WL 2619658 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2019), aff\u2019d, 808 F. App\u2019x 529 (9th Cir.\n 2020)........................................................................................................................................ 27\n21\n English v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc.,\n22 808 F. App\u2019x 529 (9th Cir. 2020)............................................................................................ 26\n23 In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.,\n24 140 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .................................................................................... 19\n\n25 In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation,\n 402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .................................................................................... 19\n26\n Gutierrez v. Converse, Inc.,\n27 2025 WL 1895315 (9th Cir. 2025) (Bybee, J., concurring) .................................................... 21\n28\n 5\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 6 of 30 Page ID\n #:1415\n\n\n\n Hanley v. Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,\n1 2022 WL 2117805 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2022)........................................................................... 27\n2\n Heiting v. FKA Distrib. Co.,\n3 2025 WL 736594 (C.D. Cal. 2025) ......................................................................................... 15\n\n4 Jane Doe v. Eating Recovery Ctr., LLC,\n 2025 WL 2971090 (N.D. Cal. 2025) ....................................................................................... 24\n5\n Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer,\n6 42 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1994) ..................................................................................................... 29\n7 Ji v. Naver Corp.,\n8 2022 WL 4624898 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2022)........................................................................ 18\n\n9 Khamooshi v. Politico LLC,\n 2025 WL 2822879 (N.D. Cal. 2025) ................................................................................... 9, 17\n10\n Kishnani v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.,\n11 2025 WL 1745726 (N.D. Cal. 2025) ........................................................................... 15, 17, 18\n12 Licea v. Hickory Farms LLC,\n13 2024 WL 1698147, No. 23STCV26148 (Cal. Super. Mar. 13, 2024) .................................... 21\n\n14 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,\n 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................................ 18\n15\n Mejia v. Reed,\n16 31 Cal. 4th 657 (2003)............................................................................................................. 22\n17 Mikulsky v. Noom, Inc.,\n 682 F. Supp. 3d 855 (S.D. Cal. 2023) ..................................................................................... 16\n18\n19 Mitchener v. CuriosityStream, Inc.,\n 2025 WL 2272413 (N.D. Cal. 2025) ....................................................................................... 17\n20\n Morrison v. Nat\u2019l Australia Bank,\n21 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) ............................................................................................................ 25\n22 N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. A.J Pillsbury, et al.,\n 174 Cal. 1 (1916) ..................................................................................................................... 24\n23\n24 Norwest Mortg., Inc. v. Super. Ct.,\n 72 Cal. App. 4th 214 (1999) .................................................................................................... 27\n25\n O\u2019Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.,\n26 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ...................................................................................... 24\n\n27 People v. Blair,\n 25 Cal. 3d 640 (1979) .............................................................................................................. 23\n28\n 6\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 7 of 30 Page ID\n #:1416\n\n\n\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n1 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................. 28\n2\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V.,\n3 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2013) .................................................................................. 28\n\n4 Popa v. Microsoft Corp.,\n 153 F.4th 784 (9th Cir. 2025) ........................................................................................... passim\n5\n Russo v. APL Marine Servs., Ltd.,\n6 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff\u2019d, 694 F. App\u2019x 585 (9th Cir. 2017).................. 25\n7 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,\n8 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................. 14\n\n9 Sanchez v. Cars.com Inc.,\n 2025 WL 487194 (Cal. Super. Jan. 27, 2025) ......................................................................... 21\n10\n Savage v. Glendale Union High School, Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty.,\n11 343 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................................................................... 9, 14, 19\n12 Sexton v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,\n13 2023 WL 1823487 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023) ..................................................................... 26, 28\n\n14 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,\n 578 U.S. 330 (2016) .............................................................................................. 14, 15, 16, 20\n15\n Steinmeyer v. Am. Assoc. of Blood Banks,\n16 715 F. Supp. 3d 1302 (S.D. Cal. 2024) ................................................................................... 18\n17 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,\n 51 Cal. 4th 1191 (2011)............................................................................................... 10, 24, 26\n18\n19 Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq,\n 694 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................. 14\n20\n TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n21 594 U.S. 413 (2021) .......................................................................................................... 15, 16\n22 Tumampos v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd.,\n 2017 WL 10446824 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) ...................................................................... 28\n23\n24 Vita v. New England Baptist Hospital,\n 494 Mass. 824 (Mass., 2024) .................................................................................................. 21\n25\n Wooten v. Biolife Plasma Services L.P.,\n26 2025 WL 2979619 (E.D. Cal. 2025) ....................................................................................... 18\n\n27 Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc.,\n 2012 WL 12942824 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) .................................................................. 24, 27\n28\n 7\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 8 of 30 Page ID\n #:1417\n\n\n\n Statutes\n1\n 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3123(b) ...................................................................................................................... 23\n2\n3 Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.100 ........................................................................................................ 9, 22\n\n4 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 630 ............................................................................................................ passim\n\n5 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 632.01 .............................................................................................................. 22\n\n6 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50 .............................................................................................................. 17\n7 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c).................................................................................................... 10, 22\n8 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 ....................................................................................................... passim\n9 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52 .............................................................................................................. 25\n10\n Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(b) ................................................................................................... 25, 26\n11\n Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(d)(3) ..................................................................................................... 23\n12\n Other Authorities\n13\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................................. 9, 14\n14\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ..................................................................................................... 10, 14, 20\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 8\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 9 of 30 Page ID\n #:1418\n\n\n\n1 I. INTRODUCTION\n2 Plaintiff Carol Price\u2019s Second Amended Complaint (\u201cSAC\u201d) should be\n3 dismissed for the same reason the Court dismissed her First Amended Complaint\n4 (\u201cFAC\u201d)\u2014she fails to plausibly allege Article III standing. (See ECF No. 53.) And\n5 because this is Plaintiff\u2019s third failed attempt to allege a claim against Converse, the\n6 SAC should be dismissed without leave to amend.\n7 In the SAC, Plaintiff continues to allege a single claim asserting that\n8 (a) Converse installed and used on its website certain TikTok software that operates\n9 as a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d in violation of California Penal Code Section 638.51, part\n10 of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (\u201cCIPA\u201d); and, (b) in turn, TikTok employs\n11 statistical and \u201cprobabilistic\u201d analysis to try to identify when the same device may\n12 visit different websites that also have the TikTok Pixel installed, which Plaintiff calls\n13 \u201cfingerprinting.\u201d But this is precisely the type of information that the Ninth Circuit\n14 held is insufficient to allege an Article III injury in Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th\n15 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2025), and the same information this Court previously found\n16 insufficient to confer standing (ECF No. 53). Because such practices do not involve\n17 the disclosure of \u201cembarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private information,\u201d they do\n18 not create a concrete injury and do not suffice under Article III. Khamooshi v. Politico\n19 LLC, 2025 WL 2822879, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2025).\n20 Moreover, now that the parties have conducted discovery, Converse mounts a\n21 factual challenge in addition to its facial challenge to Plaintiff\u2019s Article III standing.\n22 On a factual challenge, the court may go beyond the pleadings to weigh evidence.\n23 Savage v. Glendale Union High School, Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty., 343 F.3d 1036,\n24 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). The evidence here conclusively establishes that Converse\n25 collected no private information from Plaintiff (she did not even provide such\n26 information). This means Plaintiff cannot survive Converse\u2019s factual challenge and\n27 cannot in good faith amend to overcome Converse\u2019s facial challenge either. Her claim\n28 thus should be dismissed for lack of standing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).\n 9\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 10 of 30 Page ID\n #:1419\n\n\n\n1 Her claim should also be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because she\n2 cannot state a claim for relief: (1) the text and legislative history of CIPA make clear\n3 that the trap and trace provision is limited to devices or processes installed on\n4 telephones to capture incoming telephone numbers not at issue here; and (2) Plaintiff\n5 improperly asserts a CIPA claim against Converse for its out-of-state conduct in\n6 violation of the principle of extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51\n7 Cal. 4th 1191, 1209 (2011) (presumption against extraterritoriality prohibited\n8 application of California law to out-of-state conduct). Plaintiff has not attempted to\n9 cure either of these defects in the SAC; nor could she.\n10 Even after conducting months of discovery, this is Plaintiff\u2019s third failed\n11 attempt at pleading a claim against Converse. Respectfully, it must be her last.\n12 II. BACKGROUND\n13 Every iteration of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint has asserted a single claim against\n14 Converse for an alleged violation of CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provision. Typically, a\n15 trap and trace device is a device that law enforcement attaches to a telephone line to\n16 record the incoming \u201cimpulses\u201d or electronic signals sent to that phone, such as the\n17 incoming phone number, but not the contents of the communications like the words\n18 exchanged on the call as a tape recorder would. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c);\n19 Trap-and-Trace Device, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (\u201cAn electronic\n20 device that police sometimes use to record certain facts about wire and electronic\n21 communications, such as dialing, routing, and signaling information, but not the\n22 contents of the communications themselves.\u201d). CIPA prohibits the installation or use\n23 of trap and trace devices absent a court order or other enumerated exception. Cal.\n24 Penal Code \u00a7 638.51.\n25 A. The Court Dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s First Amended Complaint for\n26 Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction\n27 On September 30, 2025, the Court granted Converse\u2019s Motion to Dismiss the\n28 First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 53.) Relying on the Ninth Circuit\u2019s Popa\n 10\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 11 of 30 Page ID\n #:1420\n\n\n\n1 decision, the Court held that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege facts in the FAC\n2 \u201cestablish[ing] a \u2018concrete injury,\u2019 as required to establish standing.\u201d (Id. at 5.) The\n3 Court rejected as insufficient Plaintiff\u2019s allegations that the TikTok Pixel collects\n4 \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic information, and referral tracking,\u201d that\n5 Converse \u201cused this information to fingerprint the data and deanonymize Plaintiff by\n6 matching it \u2018with existing data TikTok has acquired and accumulated about hundreds\n7 of millions of Americans,\u2019\u201d and that this conduct violated \u201cvisitors\u2019 privacy by\n8 \u2018turning the anonymous website visitor into the specifically identifiable recipient of\n9 highly personalized and universally unwanted marketing efforts.\u2019\u201d (Id.) (quoting\n10 Plaintiff Opposition Br. at 8, 10.) The Court held that notwithstanding these\n11 allegations, Plaintiff had failed to plead that the TikTok Pixel \u201ccaused her to\n12 experience any kind of harm that is remotely similar to the \u2018highly offensive\u2019\n13 interferences or disclosures that were actionable at common law under the common-\n14 law privacy torts of intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, or\n15 identify otherwise how she suffered an injury with a \u2018close relationship\u2019 to a harm\n16 \u2018traditionally\u2019 recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.\u201d\n17 (ECF No. 53 at 5) (cleaned up). Plaintiff was given leave to amend to attempt to cure\n18 the absence of standing apparent in her FAC.\n19 B. Plaintiff Offers No New Allegations Explaining How She Was\n20 Injured as a Result of Her Visit to the Converse Website\n21 On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed the SAC. The SAC, however, alleges\n22 hardly any information about Plaintiff\u2019s single visit to the Converse website\u2014and\n23 certainly no cognizable injury that she personally suffered as a result of that visit.\n24 The only allegation in the SAC discussing the events giving rise to Plaintiff\u2019s\n25 action\u2014i.e., Plaintiff\u2019s visit to the Converse website\u2014is in paragraph 8: \u201cPlaintiff\n26 visited Defendant\u2019s Website using a desktop computer on February 7, 2024, which\n27 was after the TikTok Software was installed.\u201d (SAC \u00b6 8.) Plaintiff offers no other\n28 details about her single visit to Converse\u2019s website, such as what pages she visited,\n 11\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 12 of 30 Page ID\n #:1421\n\n\n\n1 what information of hers she disclosed, or what personal data the TikTok Pixel\n2 supposedly collected from her. Nor does Plaintiff specify any injury she allegedly\n3 suffered, such as whether her information was deanonymized, whether she received\n4 any marketing communications from Converse, or whether she lost any opportunities\n5 to monetize her data.\n6 Instead, Plaintiff doubles down on the same theories this Court has already\n7 rejected as insufficient to establish Article III standing, adding more allegations of the\n8 TikTok Pixel\u2019s supposed collection of device and browser-level information, and how\n9 that information can theoretically be amassed over time across numerous Internet\n10 interactions to create a \u201cdigital fingerprint\u201d of a device. (See SAC \u00b6\u00b6 9-13, 17, 22-\n11 26.) Although Plaintiff attached an expert report to her Complaint (see SAC, Ex. A),\n12 neither that report nor Plaintiff\u2019s SAC states that the TikTok Pixel as implemented on\n13 Converse\u2019s website collected any private information from Plaintiff during her single\n14 visit to the Converse website. And Plaintiff offers no allegations explaining how she\n15 was injured as a result of her visit to the website.\n16 C. Discovery Confirms that the TikTok Pixel on the Converse Website\n17 Did Not Identify Any of Plaintiff\u2019s Personal Information\n18 No such allegations could be made in good faith here. Pursuant to this Court\u2019s\n19 Scheduling Order (ECF No. 33), discovery has proceeded in this case, including a\n20 deposition of Plaintiff on September 30, 2025. At her deposition, Plaintiff testified\n21 that:\n22 \u2022 As \u201ca tester,\u201d she visited the Converse website by typing\n23 www.converse.com into her Internet browser (as opposed to being\n24 directed to the Converse website from other websites) (Declaration of\n25 Michael D. Roth (\u201cRoth Decl.\u201d), Ex. 1 (\u201cPlaintiff Depo. Tr.\u201d) at 72:10-\n26 11; 73:2-17; 90:15-91:5.)\n27 \u2022 On that one visit to the Converse website, Plaintiff did not enter any text\n28 into any forms on the Converse website (id. at 74:23-25), attempt to\n 12\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 13 of 30 Page ID\n #:1422\n\n\n\n1 make a purchase (id. at 68:13:25), or provide Converse with her name,\n2 email address, phone number, physical address, credit card information,\n3 or any other personally identifiable information (id. at 74:23-75:13,\n4 102:16-103:10).\n5 \u2022 She does not know what information of hers was collected, if any, during\n6 that visit. (Id. at 26:3-24, 113:3-117:1.)\n7 \u2022 She did not see the Complaint in this case before it was filed (id. at 29:11-\n8 30:8, 109:24-110:7, 120:15-121:8; see also id. at 118:22-119:19), and\n9 does not understand and did not have any involvement in obtaining the\n10 graphic included in it, see FAC \u00b6 12; SAC \u00b6 16, which was not taken in\n11 connection with her single visit to the Converse website (Plaintiff Depo.\n12 Tr. at 51:10-52:25, 109:7-9).\n13 \u2022 Since then, Plaintiff has never received any ads or communications from\n14 Converse, and has had no further interactions with Converse, at all. (Id.\n15 at 75:14-25.)\n16 \u2022 A few months after her visit to the Converse website, Plaintiff created\n17 her own TikTok account so she could watch TikTok videos, and she\n18 voluntarily provided TikTok her full name, personal email address,\n19 profile picture of herself, a description of her work and hobbies, and her\n20 date of birth (which she considered more personal than her other\n21 information). 1 (Id. at 56:11-57:22; 157:9-166:23; 169:13-20.)\n22 When asked directly in written interrogatories to identify the information she\n23 claims Converse collected, Plaintiff was unable to do so. (Roth Decl., Ex. 3\n24 (Interrogatory Nos. 8 & 9), Ex. 4 (Interrogatory Nos. 16 & 17).) Instead, she claimed\n25 this would be the subject of \u201cexpert testimony\u201d (id. at Ex. 4 (Interrogatory Nos. 16 &\n26\n27\n 1\n Plaintiff disputed during her deposition that she provided her date of birth to\n TikTok. However, since April 2019, an FTC Consent Decree has required all\n28 TikTok account holders to provide their date of birth to TikTok to maintain an\n account. (Roth Decl. \u00b6 6.)\n 13\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 14 of 30 Page ID\n #:1423\n\n\n\n1 17), but her expert also did not identify any of Plaintiff\u2019s information that Converse\n2 collected (SAC, Ex. A).\n3 Furthermore, as Plaintiff knows from taking Converse\u2019s deposition in this case,\n4 Converse\u2019s implementation of the TikTok Pixel does not capture any personal\n5 information of any website visitor; Converse specifically configured the TikTok Pixel\n6 on its website not to collect any phone numbers, emails, addresses, locations, or any\n7 other information, personal or otherwise, that a visitor might provide to Converse\n8 during their visit. (Roth Decl., Ex. 2 (\u201cQ. Lam Depo. Tr.\u201d) at 203:12-204:18.). Thus,\n9 Converse\u2019s implementation of the TikTok Pixel could not (and did not) collect any\n10 information specific to Plaintiff or anyone else. (Id.)\n11 III. LEGAL STANDARD\n12 To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must establish all\n13 elements to support Article III standing, including injury in fact. Spokeo, Inc. v.\n14 Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenges can be\n15 facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).\n16 Where the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction\n17 pursuant to the pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal, a facial challenge of the\n18 pled allegations is appropriate. Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1131\n19 (9th Cir. 2012). If a complaint purports to allege Article III standing, but the evidence\n20 does not support those allegations, then the court may review extrinsic evidence and\n21 pierce the pleadings to evaluate the jurisdictional challenge. Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039\n22 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dalfio v. Orlansky-Wax, LLC, 2022 WL 3083323, at *1\n23 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (\u201cA district court may properly consider extrinsic evidence on\n24 a \u2018factual\u2019 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).\u201d). Converse moves to dismiss\n25 Plaintiff\u2019s single claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under each avenue: facial\n26 and factual.\n27 Converse also challenges Plaintiff\u2019s ability to state a claim for relief. Pursuant\n28 to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should dismiss a complaint that does not \u201ccontain\n 14\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 15 of 30 Page ID\n #:1424\n\n\n\n1 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on\n2 its face.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citation\n3 omitted). \u201c[L]abels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a\n4 cause of action will not\u201d survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550\n5 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).\n6 IV. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING\n7 To establish the constitutional minimum for Article III standing, \u201ca plaintiff\n8 must show (i) that [s]he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and\n9 actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and\n10 (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.\u201d Spokeo, 578 U.S. at\n11 338 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). It is the\n12 \u201cplaintiff[\u2019s] \u2026 burden of establishing these elements.\u201d Id. Injury in fact requires\n13 the plaintiff \u201cto show that he or she suffered \u2018an invasion of a legally protected\n14 interest\u2019 that is \u2018concrete and particularized\u2019 and \u2018actual or imminent, not conjectural\n15 or hypothetical.\u2019\u201d Id. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A particularized injury\n16 \u201cmust affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way\u201d and a concrete injury must\n17 be \u201creal\u201d\u2014not \u201cabstract\u201d\u2014and \u201cactually exist.\u201d Id. at 339-40. Statutory violations\n18 do not themselves create concrete injuries for purposes of Article III standing. See\n19 Popa, 153 F.4th at 792 (relying on TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 430\u2013\n20 31 (2021) and Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341).\n21 A. Plaintiff\u2019s SAC Fails to Cure the Pleading Deficiencies that Led the\n22 Court to Dismiss for Failure to Allege Injury In Fact\n23 Despite being given leave to amend for the purpose of asserting factual\n24 allegations sufficient to establish Article III standing, Plaintiff still fails to identify\n25 any specific information of hers that was collected or shared from her visit to the\n26 Converse website that could give rise to any injury. Her anemic pleading is reason to\n27 dismiss her claim outright. See Heiting v. FKA Distrib. Co., 2025 WL 736594, at *3\n28 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s bare allegation that she visited Defendant\u2019s website is\n 15\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 16 of 30 Page ID\n #:1425\n\n\n\n1 insufficient to establish injury in fact, and therefore insufficient to establish\n2 standing.\u201d); Kishnani v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 2025 WL 1745726, at *3\n3 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (dismissing CIPA claim for lack of standing where \u201cPlaintiff alleges\n4 only that Defendant invaded his privacy by impermissibly collecting Plaintiff\u2019s \u2018data\u2019\n5 and \u2018information.\u2019\u201d); Mikulsky v. Noom, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (S.D. Cal.\n6 2023) (dismissing a serial plaintiff\u2019s CIPA claim for lack of standing because the\n7 plaintiff\u2019s conclusory allegations failed to \u201cidentify the specific personal information\n8 she disclosed that implicates a protectable privacy interest.\u201d).\n9 Indeed, Plaintiff\u2019s standing allegations in her SAC are not meaningfully\n10 different from the ones the Court already held were insufficient in the FAC: (i) the\n11 TikTok Pixel collects a visitor\u2019s device and browsing information, SAC \u00b6\u00b6 11, 13; (ii)\n12 TikTok is capable of digital fingerprinting from data amassed across numerous\n13 websites, id. \u00b6\u00b6 9-13, 17, 22-26; and (iii) Plaintiff\u2019s data has economic value, id. \u00b6 38.\n14 Courts have squarely rejected that these types of allegations are sufficient to allege an\n15 Article III injury.\n16 First, controlling Ninth Circuit authority, Popa v. Microsoft Corporation, 153\n17 F.4th 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2025), has already conclusively rejected Plaintiff\u2019s theory\n18 that collection of her device, browser, and \u201cbehavioral\u201d information on the Converse\n19 website creates a cognizable injury.\n20 Indeed, based on the Supreme Court\u2019s guidance in Spokeo and TransUnion,\n21 Popa rejected even more robust allegations than Plaintiff includes here. In Popa, the\n22 plaintiff alleged that a website operator used Microsoft\u2019s tracking technology to\n23 \u201ccapture over 30 different categories\u201d of information of website visitors. Id. at 786.\n24 These included the date a user visited the website, the device the user accessed the\n25 website on, the type of browser the user accessed the website on, the operating system\n26 of the device used to access the website, and the country where the user accessed the\n27 website from. Id. The plaintiff also alleged the collection of information not at issue\n28 here: \u201ca user\u2019s mouse movements, a user\u2019s screen swipes, text inputted by the user on\n 16\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 17 of 30 Page ID\n #:1426\n\n\n\n1 the website, and how far down a webpage a user scrolls.\u201d Id. The Ninth Circuit\n2 affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s claim after finding that the collection and sharing\n3 of this information with a third party did not create a cognizable injury for purposes\n4 of Article III standing. Id. at 794.\n5 As a matter of controlling law, collection of browsing and device data is thus\n6 insufficient to establish an injury in fact. Id.; see also Byars, 2023 WL 2996686, at\n7 *3 (dismissing CIPA claim because \u201c[p]laintiff does not allege that she disclosed any\n8 sensitive information to Defendant, much less identify any specific personal\n9 information she disclosed that implicates a protectable privacy interest\u201d); Mitchener\n10 v. CuriosityStream, Inc., 2025 WL 2272413 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (same). District courts\n11 have followed Popa to dismiss trap and trace claims applied to website technology\n12 for failure to plead a concrete injury. See, e.g., Khamooshi, 2025 WL 2822879, at *3\n13 (relying on Popa to dismiss complaint because \u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 allegations regarding\n14 device type, browser type, and \u2018device fingerprints\u2019 are even less specific that the 30\n15 different categories of information alleged in Popa\u201d).\n16 Even before they were bound to do so by Popa, district courts were dismissing\n17 trap and trace claims for lack of Article III standing. See, e.g., Kishnani, 2025 WL\n18 1745726, at *3 (pre-Popa case (brought by Plaintiff\u2019s counsel) dismissing trap and\n19 trace claim because \u201cIf Defendant only collects information regarding the \u2018metadata\u2019\n20 of the communication, Plaintiff\u2019s right to privacy is not invaded because he has no\n21 expectation of privacy as to that type of data (e.g., his IP address or general geographic\n22 location). If Defendant instead collects content information from communication\n23 between the parties (e.g., information provided from Plaintiff to Defendant directly),\n24 then the TikTok software is not a trap and trace device and \u00a7 638.50 does not apply.\u201d)\n25 Second, Plaintiff\u2019s theory that TikTok can engage in \u201cprobabilistic matching\u201d\n26 of device and browser information across different websites necessarily fails because\n27 it only addresses the alleged independent acts of a third-party (TikTok). See, e.g.,\n28 SAC \u00b6 13 (tracking \u201callows TikTok to build detailed behavior profiles\u201d), \u00b6 24\n 17\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 18 of 30 Page ID\n #:1427\n\n\n\n1 (\u201cTikTok can retroactively link\u201d activity). That alleged conduct has nothing to do\n2 with Converse, and Plaintiff offers no allegations to demonstrate otherwise. \u201c[T]here\n3 must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of\u2014the\n4 injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the\n5 result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.\u201d Lujan, 504\n6 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).\n7 Moreover, to satisfy Article III\u2019s particularity requirement, \u201cthe injury must\n8 affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.\u201d Id. at 560 n. 1. Plaintiff notably\n9 does not allege that her device was fingerprinted, tracked across different websites,\n10 or that she received any targeted advertising. Absent any cognizable injury that she\n11 personally suffered, Plaintiff has no standing. See Wooten v. Biolife Plasma Services\n12 L.P., 2025 WL 2979619, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (\u201cPlaintiffs also do not sufficiently\n13 allege any actual injury. Rather, they allege that the third-party trackers have\n14 the capability to use these pieces of information to engage in ID bridging, which could\n15 then result in targeted advertising and could contribute to defendants\u2019 marketing,\n16 advertising, and data analytics efforts.\u201d) (emphasis in original); Ji v. Naver Corp.,\n17 2022 WL 4624898, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2022) (dismissing CIPA claim because\n18 \u201c[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant\u2019s statutory\n19 violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court\u201d).\n20 Finally, Plaintiff\u2019s allegation that Converse took her personal property\u2014a\n21 \u201cdetailed digital profile that Defendant assembled [that] possesses a quantifiable\n22 market value,\u201d (SAC \u00b6 38)\u2014fares no better. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not\n23 identify any particular information or data that forms the supposed \u201cdetailed digital\n24 profile.\u201d Her generalized description fails to satisfy basic pleading requirements\n25 under Twombly and Iqbal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Kishnani, 2025 WL\n26 1745726, at *3 (dismissing trap and trace claim for lack of standing where plaintiff\n27 relied on vague descriptions of the alleged collection of his \u201cdata\u201d and \u201cinformation\u201d);\n28 Steinmeyer v. Am. Assoc. of Blood Banks, 715 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Cal.\n 18\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 19 of 30 Page ID\n #:1428\n\n\n\n1 2024) (\u201ceven at the pleading stage, \u2026 conclusory and speculative allegations [of\n2 injury] are insufficient\u201d).\n3 Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that she lost the\n4 opportunity to monetize her non-descript data\u2014a failure that is fatal to her claim\n5 because \u201ccourts have found insufficient for standing purposes generalized assertions\n6 of economic harm based solely on the alleged value of personal information.\u201d In re\n7 Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In one\n8 case, the plaintiffs\u2019 claim was dismissed because they had not \u201cshown, for the\n9 purposes of Article III standing, that they personally lost the opportunity to sell their\n10 information or that the value of their information was somehow diminished after it\n11 was collected by [the defendant.]\u201d Id. (collecting cases). In another case with the\n12 same result, \u201c[t]he plaintiffs [did] not plausibly allege that they intended to sell their\n13 non-disclosed personal information to someone else. Nor, in any event, do they\n14 plausibly allege that someone else would have bought it as a stand-alone product. The\n15 plaintiffs\u2019 economic-loss theory is therefore purely hypothetical and does not give rise\n16 to standing.\u201d In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 402 F.\n17 Supp. 3d 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Plaintiff fails in this same regard.\n18 B. As a Matter of Fact, Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Concrete Injury\n19 Because the Evidence Shows None of Her Personally Identifiable\n20 Information Was Collected\n21 Even if the SAC sufficiently alleged Article III standing (and it does not), the\n22 evidence shows that Plaintiff actually has suffered no injury in fact. Savage, 343 F.3d\n23 at 1039 n. 2. Plaintiff\u2019s sworn testimony in this case is that: (i) she did not provide\n24 Converse any of her personal information or input any information during her visit to\n25 the website; (ii) she has no knowledge of any data that was collected from her visit;\n26 and (iii) she has not received any communications from Converse since her visit to its\n27 website. (Plaintiff Depo. Tr. at 26:3-24, 75:14-25, 113:3-117:1.). And Plaintiff\n28 knows from her deposition of Converse that Converse configured the TikTok Pixel to\n 19\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 20 of 30 Page ID\n #:1429\n\n\n\n1 not collect any personal information from any website visitors, and thus the TikTok\n2 Pixel collected no information specific to her. See Lam Depo. Tr. at 203:12-204:18.\n3 In any event, Plaintiff hardly considers her contact information (which\n4 Converse does not even collect) to be private or demonstrated an intent to monetize\n5 it\u2014just months after her visit to the Converse website, she voluntarily provided this\n6 information to TikTok without compensation to create a public TikTok account. See\n7 Plaintiff Depo. Tr. at 166:5-23. That voluntary disclosure to TikTok forecloses any\n8 possibility that Plaintiff will ever be able to prove that some unspecified (and\n9 unknown) injury \u201cwas likely caused by [Converse]\u201d as opposed to her own actions.\n10 Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. The undisputed evidence in this case, which the Court may\n11 consider to adjudicate Converse\u2019s factual challenge to Plaintiff\u2019s Article III standing,\n12 conclusively demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot establish an injury in fact required to\n13 proceed with this case.\n14 Because controlling law, Plaintiff\u2019s admissions, and other incontrovertible\n15 evidence in this case confirm that no allegations are available (and certainly none have\n16 been pled) to establish Plaintiff\u2019s Article III standing in this case, the SAC must be\n17 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend.\n18 V. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CIPA CLAIM AGAINST\n19 CONVERSE FOR ITS WEBSITE PRACTICES\n20 Even if Plaintiff could successfully establish her Article III standing (she\n21 cannot), her attempt to convert an everyday occurrence\u2014the use of a pixel on a\n22 commercial website\u2014into a CIPA claim necessarily fails as a matter of law and must\n23 be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The tactic of suing website owners under\n24 criminal wiretapping statutes has become a nationwide practice and Plaintiff has done\n25 it more than ten times. (Plaintiff\u2019s Depo. Tr. at 76:6-87:25, 127:3-155:25.) These\n26 decades-old statutes carry stiff statutory penalties\u2014not to mention criminal\n27 exposure\u2014so ambitious plaintiffs have weaponized them against ubiquitous Internet\n28 practices. The Court should faithfully interpret the language of CIPA\u2019s trap and trace\n 20\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 21 of 30 Page ID\n #:1430\n\n\n\n1 provision, as well as its legislative history, and find that it does not apply to the\n2 Internet-conduct at issue here.\n3 First, multiple courts have already rejected the attempt by serial plaintiffs to\n4 apply the trap and trace provision to website practices. In Licea v. Hickory Farms\n5 LLC, the Los Angeles Superior Court found that \u201c[s]uch a broad based interpretation\n6 would potentially disrupt a large swath of internet commerce without further\n7 refinement as the precise basis of liability, which the court declines to consider.\u201d 2024\n8 WL 1698147, at *4 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles County Mar. 13, 2024). In Sanchez v.\n9 Cars.com Inc., the Los Angeles Superior Court reviewed \u201cthe legislative history of\n10 the CIPA\u201d and determined that \u201c\u2018pen register\u2019 and \u2018track and trace devices\u2019 refer to\n11 devices or processes that are used to record or decode dialing, routing, addressing, or\n12 signaling information from telephone numbers, and not internet communications such\n13 as websites.\u201d 2025 WL 487194, at *3 (Cal. Super. Jan. 27, 2025). With respect to\n14 CIPA\u2019s federal counterpart, the Wiretap Act, another court observed that \u201c[i]f [the\n15 Wiretap Act] did apply in those cases, then the Internet could not function because\n16 standard computer operations require recording IP addresses so parties can\n17 communicate with one another over the Internet.\u201d Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-\n18 Rasset, 2009 WL 1664468, at *3 (D. Minn. June 11, 2009); see also Vita v. New\n19 England Baptist Hospital, 494 Mass. 824, 840 (Mass., 2024) (\u201c[W]e cannot conclude\n20 that the [Massachusetts] wiretap act unambiguously prohibits and, indeed,\n21 criminalizes the interception of web browsing activity, because there appears to be a\n22 difference in kind and not degree between interactions on a website available to the\n23 public and private conversations in your house or on your telephone.\u201d).\n24 Second, courts need not expand CIPA to regulate Internet conduct because\n25 another statute already does. See Gutierrez v. Converse, Inc., 2025 WL 1895315 (9th\n26 Cir. 2025) (Bybee, J., concurring) (explaining in another CIPA case brought by\n27 Plaintiff\u2019s counsel against Converse that a different provision of CIPA \u201cdoes not\n28 apply to internet communications\u201d and the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018\n 21\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 22 of 30 Page ID\n #:1431\n\n\n\n1 (the \u201cCCPA\u201d) provides recourse). The CCPA created a fulsome statutory framework\n2 setting forth how third parties may access or process online data, what disclosures to\n3 consumers are required, and what specific rights consumers have with respect to\n4 accessing and disclosing their online personal information. See Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7\u00a7\n5 1798.100 (obligations of businesses), 1798.135 (permissible uses of consumer\n6 information), 1798.105 (consumer right to delete), 1798.106 (consumer right to\n7 correct), 1798.110 (consumer right to know), 1798.120 (consumer right to opt out of\n8 sale or sharing of personal information), 1798.121 (consumer right to limit use and\n9 disclosure of personal information), 1798.125 (consumer right of no retaliation).\n10 Plaintiff\u2019s demand that this Court expand CIPA to the Internet and nullify the\n11 carefully crafted CCPA should be rejected.\n12 Third, the Legislature has amended CIPA multiple times, including since it\n13 enacted the CCPA, and has declined to expand CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provision to\n14 apply to the transmission of data between computers. Cody v. Ring LLC, 718 F. Supp.\n15 3d, 993, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (finding \u201c[the plaintiff] fails to account for CIPA\u2019s\n16 multiple amendments\u201d when arguing \u201cthat CIPA should be interpreted to apply to\n17 new technologies\u201d). Indeed, other provisions of CIPA\u2019s statutory scheme do\n18 expressly address the Internet. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 632.01 (addressing disclosures\n19 and distributions \u201cin any forum, including, but not limited to, Internet Web sites and\n20 social media\u201d). The absence of similar specific language in Section 638.51 counsels\n21 in favor of construing \u201ctrap and trace\u201d devices in line with their traditional meaning:\n22 devices that are attached to a telephone line.\n23 Finally, the terms of CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provision, when \u201cconstrued with\n24 reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part,\u201d Mejia v. Reed, 31 Cal. 4th\n25 657, 663 (2003), shows it only applies to tracking telephone numbers.\n26 The definition of a \u201ctrap and trace\u201d device in Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c) refers to\n27 capturing \u201cthe originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling\n28 information.\u201d (emphasis added). The term \u201coriginating number\u201d both qualifies the\n 22\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 23 of 30 Page ID\n #:1432\n\n\n\n1 remainder of this clause and plainly refers to a telephone number. Indeed, the\n2 California Supreme Court defined the related pen register as follows: \u201cA pen register\n3 is a mechanical device which records the numbers dialed from a telephone, but it does\n4 not overhear oral communications or indicate whether the call was completed.\u201d\n5 People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 654 n. 11 (1979).\n6 As further evidence that the statute may only be read as extending to telephone\n7 surveillance, Section 638.52(d)(3) requires any court order authorizing the installation\n8 or use of a trap and trace device to \u201cspecify \u2026 [t]he number and, if known, physical\n9 location of the telephone line to which the \u2026 trap and trace device is to be attached[.]\u201d\n10 (emphasis added). This is a clear indication of the Legislature\u2019s view that trap and\n11 trace devices can only be attached to telephone lines\u2014i.e., lines or wires associated\n12 with telephone numbers\u2014and not to computers accessing the Internet.\n13 Plaintiff\u2019s reading of Sections 638.50, 638.51, and 638.52 creates an absurdity.\n14 Under her reading: (1) Section 638.50\u2019s statutory definition of a \u201ctrap and trace\u201d\n15 device applies to the Internet, even though it refers to \u201coriginating numbers\u201d; and (2)\n16 Section 638.52(a)(3) prohibits law enforcement from ever obtaining a warrant to use\n17 a trap and trace device on a website because law enforcement could never identify the\n18 \u201ctelephone line\u201d to which the device would be attached, a requirement to obtain a\n19 court order authorizing installation or use of a trap and trace device.\n20 The Central District of California long ago construed the substantively identical\n21 language of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3123(b)\u2014the federal \u201ctrap and trace\u201d law requiring that a\n22 court order specify \u201cthe number \u2026 and if known, the location of the telephone line to\n23 which the \u2026 trap and trace device is to be attached\u201d\u2014as limiting \u201ctrap and trace\u201d\n24 devices to \u201conly devices that are \u2018attached\u2019 to a telephone line,\u201d despite the absence\n25 of a specific limitation in the statutory definition of a \u201ctrap and trace device.\u201d\n26 Application of U.S. of Am. for an Ord. Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital\n27 Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995).\n28 CIPA\u2019s language, purpose, and legislative history are clear that Section 638.51\n 23\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 24 of 30 Page ID\n #:1433\n\n\n\n1 is limited to telephones. To the extent there is any ambiguity, the Court must apply\n2 the rule of lenity to resolve it in defendants\u2019 favor. See Jane Doe v. Eating Recovery\n3 Ctr., LLC, 2025 WL 2971090, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (applying the rule of lenity to a\n4 different provision of CIPA while remarking that \u201c[t]he language of CIPA is a total\n5 mess. It was a mess from the get-go, but the mess gets bigger and bigger as the world\n6 continues to change and as courts are called upon to apply CIPA\u2019s already-obtuse\n7 language to new technologies.\u201d).\n8 VI. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CIPA CLAIM FOR CONDUCT\n9 EXCLUSIVELY OCCURRING OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA\n10 Plaintiff also improperly attempts to apply CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provision to\n11 Converse\u2019s alleged out-of-state conduct.\n12 A. California Presumes its Laws Do Not Apply Extraterritorially\n13 California, like many other states, has a \u201cpresumption against extraterritorial\n14 application\u201d of its own laws that dates \u201cas far back as 1916.\u201d Wright v. Adventures\n15 Rolling Cross Country, Inc., 2012 WL 12942824, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012); see\n16 Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207 (stating presumption against extraterritoriality). To\n17 overcome this longstanding presumption, \u201c[t]he [California legislature\u2019s] intention to\n18 make [an] act operative with respect to occurrences outside the state\u201d must be \u201cclearly\n19 expressed or reasonably \u2026 inferred \u2018from the language of the act or from its purpose,\n20 subject-matter, or history.\u2019\u201d N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. A.J Pillsbury, et al., 174 Cal. 1,\n21 4 (1916) (citation omitted).\n22 Courts have applied this rule to hold that many California statutes do not reach\n23 extraterritorially. O\u2019Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1007 (N.D. Cal.\n24 2014) (the UCL does not apply extraterritorially); Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1209 (UCL\n25 \u201cdoes not apply to overtime work performed outside California for a California-based\n26 employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case\u201d); Wright, 2012\n27 WL 12942824, at *3\u20134; see O\u2019Connor, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1006-07 (collecting cases\n28 and concluding \u201cthe Labor Code violations upon which Plaintiffs rely do not apply\n 24\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 25 of 30 Page ID\n #:1434\n\n\n\n1 extraterritorially\u201d); Russo v. APL Marine Servs., Ltd., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1095\n2 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff\u2019d, 694 F. App\u2019x 585 (9th Cir. 2017) (the California Fair\n3 Employment and Housing does not apply extraterritorially).\n4 B. CIPA\u2019s Trap and Trace Provision Does Not Apply\n5 Extraterritorially\n6 The same rule applies to CIPA. Indeed, no court has concluded that CIPA\u2019s\n7 trap and trace provision applies extraterritorially, and there is no indication from either\n8 the statute\u2019s express language, or by implication, that the Legislature intended that\n9 provision to criminalize conduct occurring entirely outside the California border.\n10 There is no express language in CIPA stating the statute is meant to reach into\n11 other states. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51; see also Morrison v. Nat\u2019l Australia Bank,\n12 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010) (\u201cWhen a statute gives no clear indication of an\n13 extraterritorial application, it has none.\u201d).\n14 Nor is there anything in CIPA to indicate that the Legislature implicitly\n15 intended for it to reach extraterritorial conduct. Instead, the Legislature expressly\n16 stated that \u201cit is not the intent of the Legislature to place greater restraints on the use\n17 of listening devices and techniques by law enforcement agencies than existed prior to\n18 the effective date of this chapter.\u201d Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 630. Reading CIPA as having\n19 extraterritorial application would severely restrict law enforcement investigations\n20 occurring outside of California, in contravention of the Legislature\u2019s intent.\n21 More specifically, CIPA requires \u201cobtaining a court order pursuant to Section\n22 638.52 or 638.53\u201d to use or install a trap and trace device. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51.\n23 There is a specific list of offenses that can justify issuance of a court order, including\n24 enumerated provisions of California statutes like the California Fish and Game Code.\n25 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(b). But no other state\u2019s laws are listed. See id. Thus, if\n26 CIPA applied extraterritorially, then a Florida law enforcement officer could never\n27 obtain authorization from a court to install a trap and trace device to investigate a\n28 potential violation of Florida\u2019s Fish and Game Code because CIPA does not identify\n 25\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 26 of 30 Page ID\n #:1435\n\n\n\n1 Florida\u2019s Fish and Game Code as one of the laws justifying a court order. See Cal.\n2 Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(b) (no Florida laws listed). The California Legislature did not\n3 intend such an absurd result. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 630.\n4 Because \u201c[n]either the language of\u201d CIPA \u201cnor its legislative history provides\n5 any basis for concluding the Legislature intended\u201d CIPA \u201cto operate\n6 extraterritorially,\u201d the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to CIPA \u201cin full\n7 force.\u201d Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provision thus cannot be\n8 interpreted to criminalize the installation and use of trap and trace devices outside of\n9 California. As set forth below, that means CIPA cannot apply to Converse\u2019s website.\n10 C. Plaintiff Improperly Attempts to Extraterritorially Apply CIPA\n11 1. The Location of the Allegedly Offending Conduct Is the\n12 Converse Website Hosted Outside of California\n13 Plaintiff continues to allege that Converse\u2019s installation and/or use of the\n14 TikTok Pixel occurred on Converse\u2019s website. (See e.g., SAC \u00b6 8) (\u201cDefendant has\n15 installed on its Website software created by TikTok in order to identify website\n16 visitors.\u201d). Plaintiff does not plead that Converse\u2019s website is located in California\u2014\n17 nor could she, as discovery has confirmed that the servers hosting the website are\n18 located outside of California.\n19 An offense is committed in the location where \u201cthe conduct which gives rise to\n20 liability\u201d occurs. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 19 Cal. 4th 1036, 1059\n21 (1999); see also Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1850, 1852 (1996)\n22 (California statutes do not \u201capply to nonresidents where \u2026 the tortious conduct took\n23 place out of this state\u2019s territorial boundaries.\u201d). \u201cTo avoid an impermissible\n24 extraterritorial application of state law, a \u2018crucial element\u2019 of [the plaintiff\u2019s] claim\n25 must have occurred in California.\u201d English v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc., 808\n26 F. App\u2019x 529, 530 (9th Cir. 2020); Sexton v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 2023 WL 1823487,\n27 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023) (finding that \u201cmaterial elements of the cause of action\u201d\n28 must take place in California, and dismissing claim brought by California resident\n 26\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 27 of 30 Page ID\n #:1436\n\n\n\n1 where material conduct occurred outside of California).\n2 The crucial elements of Plaintiff\u2019s trap and trace claim are the installation or\n3 use of a trap and trace device. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51. Thus, the \u201cconduct\n4 which gives rise to liability\u201d is wherever Converse installed or used the alleged trap\n5 and trace device. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 19 Cal. 4th at 1059. Plaintiff alleges\n6 that Converse installed or used the TikTok Pixel \u201con\u201d its own website. SAC \u00b6\u00b6 8, 10,\n7 15, 16 (alleging that Converse installed and used the TikTok Pixel \u201con\u201d the Converse\n8 website). The location of the website is the only place that matters for purposes of\n9 considering whether CIPA can apply.\n10 To be clear, it is not enough that a plaintiff is in California during the offense.\n11 In Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc., the court dismissed the\n12 plaintiffs\u2019 California Labor Code claims as impermissibly attempting to reach\n13 extraterritorial conduct, even though the plaintiffs were \u201cCalifornia residents and the\n14 employer [was] based in California (such that presumably payments [were] made in\n15 California) but the work [was] performed principally outside of California.\u201d 2012\n16 WL 12942824, at *4. Despite these California connections, the extraterritoriality\n17 principle barred the claims because no crucial element of the claims occurred in\n18 California. See also English v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 2619658,\n19 at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2019), aff\u2019d, 808 F. App\u2019x 529 (9th Cir. 2020) (dismissing\n20 claims even though the plaintiff was a \u201cCalifornia resident, received her pay in\n21 California, paid California income taxes, performed a significant amount of her work\n22 assignments in California, was terminated in California, and her HR representative\n23 was based in California\u201d) (cleaned up); Norwest Mortg., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 72 Cal.\n24 App. 4th 214, 224\u201325 (1999) (same result); Hanley v. Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Machinists &\n25 Aerospace Workers, 2022 WL 2117805, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2022) (same result).\n26 2. Converse\u2019s Website Is Not Located in California\n27 A website is physically located where the servers that host it are located. \u201cThe\n28 Internet is a world-wide network of networks \u2026 all sharing a common\n 27\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 28 of 30 Page ID\n #:1437\n\n\n\n1 communications technology.\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,\n2 1155 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). Although they are accessible\n3 anywhere via a web browser, webpages are not themselves physical locations, Earll\n4 v. eBay, Inc., 599 F. App\u2019x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (web services are not \u201can actual\n5 physical place\u201d), and, as the Ninth Circuit explained, \u201c[n]o images are stored on a\n6 webpage; rather, the HTML instructions on the webpage provide an address for where\n7 the images are stored, whether in the webpage publisher\u2019s computer or some other\n8 computer.\u201d Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1155. The location of the computers that run the\n9 HTML instructions\u2014i.e., that \u201chost\u201d the website\u2014is where the website is. Id.\n10 For instance, with respect to the Copyright Act, courts have dismissed claims\n11 for improper extraterritorial application where the servers hosting the webpage\n12 displaying an infringing work were not located in the United States even though the\n13 infringing content on the webpage was displayed and viewed in the United States.\n14 E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2013),\n15 as amended (Sept. 6, 2013) (\u201cPerfect 10 does not demonstrate that Yandex in fact\n16 stored or displayed full-sized copies of the Perfect 10 images on Yandex\u2019s United\n17 States servers.\u201d) (emphasis added). The same is true here: Converse\u2019s website is\n18 hosted outside of California and all of the alleged conduct by Converse thus occurred\n19 outside of California.\n20 Even if the Court did not adopt, at this time, the view that a website is located\n21 where its servers are located, Plaintiff\u2019s claim must still be dismissed, because she\n22 fails to allege where any of Converse\u2019s supposedly offending conduct occurred. She\n23 cannot rely on her territorial silence to avoid dismissal. Sexton, 2023 WL 1823487,\n24 at *1 (noting \u201cvoid\u201d in plaintiff\u2019s allegations regarding the location of the alleged\n25 conduct and dismissing claims); Tumampos v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd., 2017 WL\n26 10446824, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (\u201cBecause Plaintiffs have not alleged facts\n27 sufficient to establish that they worked principally in California or that Defendant is\n28 a California employer, the Court finds that their claims for meal and rest period\n 28\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 29 of 30 Page ID\n #:1438\n\n\n\n1 violations fail as to the work performed outside of California.\u201d).\n2 VII. THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE SAC CANNOT BE CURED\n3 The Court should grant this motion and dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s claim without leave\n4 to amend because Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to cure these fatal\n5 deficiencies, failed to do so, and cannot cure them through further amendment.\n6 Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (leave to amend\n7 \u201cneed not be granted where the amendment of the complaint would \u2026 constitute[] an\n8 exercise in futility\u201d) (citation omitted). First, Plaintiff cannot cure her standing\n9 deficiency because she provided no personal information to Converse that could\n10 implicate any protected privacy interests. Second, Plaintiff cannot amend to state a\n11 claim because, as a matter of law, CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provision does not apply to\n12 the Internet. Third, Plaintiff\u2019s extraterritoriality problem cannot be cured because to\n13 the extent Converse installed or ran any software \u201con\u201d its website, the servers hosting\n14 Converse\u2019s website are not located in California.\n15 VIII. CONCLUSION\n16 For the foregoing reasons, Converse respectfully requests that this Court grant\n17 this motion without leave to amend, and enter judgment in Converse\u2019s favor.\n18 Dated: November 4, 2025 KING & SPALDING LLP\n19\n20 By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n21 LIVIA KISER\n MICHAEL D. ROTH\n22 LENNETTE W. LEE\n23 SAMUEL C. CORTINA\n24 Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE\n25 INC.\n\n26\n27\n28\n 29\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:24-cv-08091-FLA-E Document 55 Filed 11/04/25 Page 30 of 30 Page ID\n #:1439\n\n\n\n1 LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Converse Inc., certifies that this brief\n3 contains 6,987 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.2.\n4\n5 Dated: November 4, 2025 KING & SPALDING LLP\n6\n7 By: /s/ Michael D. Roth\n8 MICHAEL D. ROTH\n9 Attorneys for Defendant CONVERSE\n10 INC.\n\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n 30\n CONVERSE INC.\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:06:37.690157-07:00","document_number":"55","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031046257313","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss (cause or other)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-11-04T21:03:44.440509-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:11.328745-08:00","date_filed":"2025-11-04","time_filed":"20:45:23","entry_number":55,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-11-04.001","pacer_sequence_number":156,"description":"NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Converse, Inc.. Motion set for hearing on 12/5/2025 at 01:30 PM before Judge Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael D. Roth in Support of Converse Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Excerpts of Plaintiff Carol Price's Deposition, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Excerpts of Converse's Corp. Designee Deposition, # 4 Exhibit 3 - 06/06/25 Plaintiff's Responses and Objections to First Set of Interrogatories, # 5 Exhibit 4 - 10/27/25 Plaintiff's Responses and Objections to Second Set of Interrogatories, # 6 Declaration of Samuel C. Cortina in Support of Converse Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, # 7 Exhibit A - 11/02/25 Email, # 8 Exhibit B - S. Cortina Declaration in Gutierrez, # 9 Exhibit C - 09/05/25 Email, # 10 Proposed Order) (Roth, Michael) (Entered: 11/04/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/442178784/","id":442178784,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/456779651/","id":456779651,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/40/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-10-27T10:11:55.376924-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:10.440467-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"40","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Text Only Scheduling Notice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-10-27T10:11:55.333852-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:10.416662-08:00","date_filed":"2025-05-02","time_filed":null,"entry_number":40,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-05-02.002","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"SCHEDULING NOTICE by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick re: Plaintiff's First MOTION to Compel Productions, Supplemental and Compliant Discovery Responses. 38 The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel scheduled on May 23, 2025 at 9:30 AM will be held in Courtroom 750, Roybal Federal Building, 255 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA before Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (vmun) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 05/02/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/442178783/","id":442178783,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/456779650/","id":456779650,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/34/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-10-27T10:11:54.730756-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:10.085189-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"34","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Text Only Scheduling Notice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-10-27T10:11:54.684564-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:10.023063-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-29","time_filed":null,"entry_number":34,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-29.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TAKING MOTION OF DEFENDANT CONVERSE INC. TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (DKT. 22 UNDER SUBMISSION by Judge Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha: The court finds that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint currently scheduled for hearing on January 31, 2025 is appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. L.R. 7-15. Accordingly, this motion is taken UNDER SUBMISSION and the hearing is vacated. The court expects the parties to continue litigating this action diligently, while awaiting the court's ruling on this motion. No appearances are necessary. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (tf) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 01/29/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/442178782/","id":442178782,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69182293/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/456779649/","id":456779649,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69182293/31/carol-price-v-converse-inc/","date_created":"2025-10-27T10:11:54.642603-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:09.902193-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"31","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Text Only Scheduling Notice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-10-27T10:11:54.604165-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-28T03:56:09.879200-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-28","time_filed":null,"entry_number":31,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-28.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha: The court has reviewed the Joint Rule 26(f) Report submitted by the parties, and determines that an in-person Scheduling Conference is unnecessary. Accordingly, the court VACATES the January 31, 2025, Scheduling Conference. Order re Jury/Court Trial to issue. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (tf) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 01/28/2025)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=69182293&page_size=40"}