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3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD               Document 383           Filed 09/28/26        Page 1 of 39 PageID:\n                                               11731\nNOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                                  DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY\n\n\n    KIRSTEN SEIDLE, as Administratrix of the\n    Estate of Tamara Wilson-Seidle, et al.,\n\n          Plaintiffs,                                         Civil Action No. 17-4428 (RK) (JBD)\n\n                  v.                                                         OPINION\n\n    NEPTUNE TOWNSHIP et al.,\n\n          Defendants.\n\n\nKIRSCH, District Judge\n\n         THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Motion to Vacate, Modify, or\n\nReverse Interlocutory Order 1 (\u201cMotion\u201d) filed by Plaintiffs Kirsten Seidle, individually and as\n\nadministratrix of decedent\u2019s estate; T.S., M.S., and S.S., minors by their guardian Kirsten Seidle;\n\nand Philip Jr., John, Christopher, Monica, and Dorothy Seidle (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d). (\u201cMot.,\u201d ECF No.\n\n380-6.) Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the October 31, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order\n\n(\u201c2019 Opinion\u201d) issued by the Honorable Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J., dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nnegligence claims against Defendants the City of Asbury Park (the \u201cCity\u201d or \u201cAsbury Park\u201d) and\n\nAsbury Park police officers David Kelso, Anthony Salerno, Marshawn Love, Ahmed Lawson, and\n\nCarl Christie (together, the \u201cAsbury Park Defendant Officers,\u201d and collectively with Asbury Park,\n\nthe \u201cAsbury Park Defendants\u201d) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (\u201cRule\u201d) 12(b)(6).\n\n(\u201c2019 Op.,\u201d ECF No. 152.) Defendant Asbury Park opposed the Motion, (\u201cOpp.,\u201d ECF No. 381),\n\nand Plaintiffs replied, (\u201cReply,\u201d ECF No. 382). The Court has carefully considered the parties\u2019\n\n\n1\n  Plaintiffs appear to seek confusing, inconsistent relief, to the extent that their Notice of Motion includes a\nrequest to \u201cPermit Motion to File an Amended Complaint,\u201d which is absent from the caption of their brief.\n(ECF No. 380; Mot. at 1); see infra Section III.D.\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD                Document 383           Filed 09/28/26       Page 2 of 39 PageID:\n                                                11732\n\n\n\nsubmissions and resolves the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\n\nProcedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion is DENIED.\n\nI.        BACKGROUND\n\n          This case concerns the tragic killing in 2015 of Tamara Wilson-Seidle (\u201cTamara\u201d), a\n\nmother of nine children, by her ex-husband Philip Seidle (\u201cPhilip\u201d), a Neptune Township police\n\nofficer. Philip fatally shot Tamara 12 times, including in the head and chest, following a car chase\n\nand intense police standoff.2 Tamara\u2019s estate and survivors3 brought suit in 2017 against Neptune\n\nTownship, Asbury Park, the Monmouth County Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and employees and\n\nresponding officers from each. 4 (ECF No. 1; see \u201cTAC,\u201d ECF No. 110.) Following three\n\namendments of the initial Complaint, motion practice, numerous opinions by Judge Shipp, six\n\nyears of discovery, mediation, agreements between the parties, and a recent settlement resolving\n\n\n2\n  See State v. Seidle, No. A-1485-19, 2021 WL 3084908, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 22, 2021)\n(per curiam); (Medical Report, Ex. C to Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel\u2019s Certification (\u201cPls. Cert.\u201d), ECF No. 380-2,\n7\u201311).\n3\n  Plaintiffs are the nine children of Tamara and Philip: Kirsten Seidle, individually and as administratrix of\nTamara\u2019s estate; minors T.S., M.S., and S.S., by their guardian Kirsten; and Philip Seidle, Jr., John Seidle,\nChristopher Seidle, Monica Seidle, and Dorothy Seidle. (\u201cTAC,\u201d ECF No. 110 \u00b6\u00b6 1\u20133.)\n4\n    Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations and torts by the following groups of Defendants:\n    \u2022 The \u201cNeptune Defendants\u201d: Neptune Township, Neptune Township Police Department (together,\n      \u201cNeptune Township\u201d), Former Neptune Police Chiefs James M. Hunt, Jr., Howard O\u2019Neil, and Robert\n      Adams, and Former Neptune Police Director Michael Bascom (together, the \u201cIndividual Neptune\n      Defendants\u201d), (TAC \u00b6\u00b6 4\u20138);\n    \u2022 The \u201cMonmouth County Defendants\u201d: Monmouth County, the Monmouth County Prosecutor\u2019s Office\n      (the \u201cProsecutor\u2019s Office\u201d), Prosecutors Christopher Gramiccioni, Gregory J. Schweers, Jacquelyn F.\n      Seely, and Richard E. Incremona (together, the \u201cProsecutor Defendants\u201d), and Public Safety\n      Telecommunicators Karen Clayton, Kristin Aras, Stephanie Migliaccio, and Kurt Gibson (together, the\n      \u201cDispatcher Defendants\u201d), (id. \u00b6\u00b6 12\u201314, 20\u201322);\n \u2022 The \u201cAsbury Park Defendants\u201d: Asbury Park, Former Acting Police Chief Anthony Salerno, Former\n    Deputy Police Chief David Kelso, Sergeant Marshawn Love, and Police Officers Ahmed Lawson and\n    Carl Christie (together, the \u201cAsbury Park Defendant Officers\u201d), (id. \u00b6\u00b6 9\u201311, 16\u201317). Plaintiffs\n    additionally sued Asbury Park Police Officers James Crawford and Timothy Griswold, (id. \u00b6 16), but\n    Plaintiffs do not seek to disturb the dismissal of either officer, (Mot. at 16\u201326; Reply at 19).\nPlaintiffs also brought one count of assault and battery against Philip, but he has not appeared in this action.\n(See TAC \u00b6\u00b6 709\u201321; see also 2019 Op. at 6 n.5.)\n                                                        2\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD           Document 383        Filed 09/28/26      Page 3 of 39 PageID:\n                                           11733\n\n\n\ncertain claims, only Asbury Park remains a Defendant. (See ECF Nos. 25, 75, 76, 107, 110, 152,\n\n153, 185, 186, 215, 241, 242, 365.) Plaintiffs, some nine years after the commencement of this\n\naction, now seek reconsideration of Judge Shipp\u2019s 2019 dismissal of their negligence claims\n\nagainst Asbury Park and the Asbury Park Defendant Officers under Rule 12(b)(6). (See Mot.; 2019\n\nOp.) The Court begins with a summary of the relevant factual and procedural background.\n\n       A.      FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\n       The facts are well known, as the matter received significant coverage in local and national\n\nmedia. Tamara and Philip married in 1990 and had nine children together over the course of their\n\nrelationship. (TAC \u00b6 77.) They lived together in Neptune Township, where Philip was a police\n\nofficer and then sergeant, until Tamara filed for divorce and Philip moved out of the family\n\nresidence in 2012. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 67, 69, 73.) Plaintiffs allege a long history of domestic violence and\n\n\u201chorrific abuse\u201d by Philip, both throughout the marriage and during the separation and visitation\n\ndisputes that followed. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 68, 71, 73, 75; see also id. \u00b6\u00b6 75\u2013109.) Tamara and Philip\u2019s divorce\n\nwas finalized on May 27, 2015. (Id. \u00b6 70.)\n\n       Twenty days later, on June 16, 2015, Philip followed Tamara after she left work and\n\nproceeded to chase her by car into Asbury Park. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 162\u201363.) As was later learned, Philip had\n\ntheir 7-year-old daughter T.S. in the car at the time. (Id. \u00b6 182.) Tamara told her older daughter\n\nKirsten that she was being chased by Philip after receiving an \u201cextremely angry and threatening\u201d\n\nphone call from him and that she feared for her life. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 162\u201363.) Kirsten called 9-1-1 on her\n\nmother\u2019s behalf. (Id. \u00b6 194.)\n\n       During the chase, Philip followed Tamara onto Sewell Avenue in Asbury Park, \u201crammed\n\nhis vehicle into [hers],\u201d and \u201cforced her off the road.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 165.) He exited his car and \u201cbegan to\n\nshoot several shots into the driver\u2019s side window . . . at Tamara.\u201d (Id.) Defendant Lawson was\n\n                                                 3\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383          Filed 09/28/26      Page 4 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11734\n\n\n\n\u201calready at the scene dealing with an unrelated motor vehicle stop,\u201d and Defendants Love and\n\nChristie, among others, arrived soon after. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 166, 197; see id. \u00b6 197 (alleging that responding\n\nofficers included Asbury Park Defendants Lawson, Love, Christie, Griswold, and Crawford, \u201cas\n\nwell as other unidentified responding officers from either Asbury Park, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office,\n\nSheriff\u2019s Department or other public entity\u201d (cleaned up)).) Seven-year-old T.S. got out of Philip\u2019s\n\ncar and ran to Defendants Lawson and Love, who drove her to safety before returning to the scene.\n\n(Id. \u00b6 182.) An approximately 13-minute standoff between Philip and the officers ensued, during\n\nwhich Philip shot a second round of fire at Tamara, repeatedly pointed the gun at his own head,\n\nand eventually allowed responders to remove Tamara from her car, but only after it was too late.\n\n(Id. \u00b6\u00b6 165, 181, 185, 194, 198, 200, 202, 213.) Philip was eventually arrested, later pled guilty to\n\naggravated manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a child, and was sentenced to 30 years\u2019\n\nincarceration. (See id. \u00b6 15); State v. Seidle, No. A-1485-19, 2021 WL 3084908, at *1\u20132 (N.J.\n\nSuper. Ct. App. Div. July 22, 2021) (per curiam).\n\n        B.      PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n\n        At the outset, as stated, the horror involved here is undeniable and unimaginable. Given\n\nthe sensitive nature of this case, in the interests of justice and as will be explained in greater detail\n\nlater, the Court addresses each of Plaintiffs\u2019 arguments and claimed \u201cnew\u201d evidence, and has\n\ndeclined to summarily dispense with Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion based on, inter alia, its untimeliness. The\n\nCourt likewise has not truncated its analysis based on any given independently sufficient basis to\n\ndeny Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion, such as the absence of new evidence or the absence of a showing that such\n\nevidence was previously unavailable. In addition, the Court has considered the effect of the\n\npurported new evidence on Judge Shipp\u2019s decision, and ultimately concludes that it does not\n\n\n\n\n                                                   4\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD             Document 383          Filed 09/28/26        Page 5 of 39 PageID:\n                                             11735\n\n\n\nsupport the rare and extraordinary remedy of reconsideration. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs\u2019 Monell\n\nclaim against Asbury Park remains,5 as does the standard appellate process.\n\n        Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on June 16, 2017, (ECF No. 1), followed by their\n\nFirst Amended Complaint on September 29, 2017, (\u201cFAC,\u201d ECF No. 25; see ECF No. 21). Upon\n\nmotions to dismiss by all appearing Defendants, (ECF Nos. 26, 28, 30, 33, 46), Judge Shipp\n\ndismissed the FAC without prejudice for \u201cfail[ing] to meet the pleading requirements of Federal\n\nRule of Civil Procedure 8(a),\u201d (ECF No. 76 at 4; see ECF No. 74). He explained that \u201c[t]he Court\n\nhad difficulty discerning which claims were brought against which entities or individuals and the\n\nfactual basis for each claim\u201d because Plaintiffs had engaged in \u201cgroup pleading\u201d and had not set\n\nforth their factual allegations or claims \u201cin a systematic and appropriate way.\u201d (ECF No. 76 at 4\u2013\n\n5.) Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on May 21, 2018, (\u201cSAC,\u201d ECF No. 75), and\n\nDefendants again moved to dismiss, (ECF Nos. 87, 89, 90, 91, 92). Judge Shipp granted the\n\nmotions and dismissed the SAC without prejudice, finding that it \u201csuffer[ed] from the same flaws\n\nas the [FAC]\u201d and that \u201cthe Court again ha[d] difficulty discerning precisely which legal theories\n\nPlaintiffs are alleging, against which Defendants, and the facts attendant to those claims.\u201d (ECF\n\nNo. 107 at 2\u20133.) He \u201cgrant[ed] Plaintiffs one final opportunity to cure the deficiencies\u201d via a Third\n\nAmended Complaint. (Id. at 3.)\n\n        On January 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their TAC\u2014the fourth complaint in this case\u2014which\n\nremains the operative pleading. (TAC.) On October 31, 2019, Judge Shipp issued a 36-page\n\nOpinion granting in part and denying in part the motions to dismiss filed by, inter alia, the Asbury\n\n\n5\n The Court emphasizes that the analysis and conclusions herein relate only to Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims,\nwhich are legally and factually distinct from Plaintiffs\u2019 surviving Monell claim concerning Asbury Park\u2019s\nalleged failure to enforce and enact appropriate policies. (See 2019 Op. at 13\u201314.) This Opinion neither\nconsiders nor expresses any view regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 Monell claim or its relationship, if any, to the\narguments and evidence presented in Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion.\n                                                     5\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383          Filed 09/28/26        Page 6 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11736\n\n\n\nPark Defendants. (See 2019 Op.; ECF Nos. 117, 118, 119.) As relevant here, Judge Shipp\n\ndismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims. (2019 Op. at 31\u201336.) He concluded that\n\nPlaintiffs failed to plead a duty of care owed by Chief Salerno and Deputy Chief Kelso; that the\n\nNew Jersey Tort Claims Act (the \u201cAct\u201d or \u201cTCA\u201d) immunized the Asbury Park Defendants from\n\nliability because their alleged conduct was discretionary; and that Plaintiffs could not premise a\n\nnegligence claim on an alleged \u201cduty to use lethal force.\u201d (Id. at 31\u201335.) Judge Shipp in turn\n\ndismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 derivative negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.6 (Id. at 35\u201336.)\n\nAlthough not the subject of Plaintiffs\u2019 instant Motion, Judge Shipp also dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nFourth Amendment claim against the Asbury Park Defendant Officers based on qualified\n\nimmunity but allowed Plaintiff\u2019s Monell claim against the City to proceed to discovery. (Id. at 7\u2013\n\n14, 21\u201323); see generally Monell v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).\n\n        Plaintiffs and Defendants Asbury Park, Salerno, and Kelso cross-moved for\n\nreconsideration of the 2019 Opinion. (\u201cPls. First Recon. Mot.,\u201d ECF No. 157; ECF No. 171.) On\n\nJuly 29, 2020, Judge Shipp granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs\u2019 motion and denied Asbury\n\nPark\u2019s motion. (\u201cRecon. Op.,\u201d ECF No. 185.) In particular, Judge Shipp declined to reconsider the\n\ndismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against Defendants Salerno and Kelso, finding that\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 arguments \u201camount[ed] to no more than disagreement with the Court\u2019s previous\n\ndecision.\u201d (Id. at 4.) He also denied Defendants\u2019 request for reconsideration of his decision to\n\nallow Plaintiffs\u2019 Monell claim to proceed against the City despite dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 federal\n\n\n\n6\n  In addition to their claim of negligence (Count 10), Plaintiffs alleged two derivative claims: negligent\ninfliction of emotional distress (Count 13) and a \u201cPortee claim\u201d of negligent infliction of emotional distress\non behalf of T.S. (Count 14). (TAC \u00b6\u00b6 722\u201338; see 2019 Op. at 6 n.6 (explaining that, in Portee v. Jaffee,\n417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court \u201ccreate[d] a negligent infliction of emotional\ndistress cause of action\u201d for an individual who witnesses the death of a close family member and satisfies\ncertain elements).) After dismissing Count 10 for the reasons explained supra, Judge Shipp dismissed\nCounts 13 and 14 as derivative. (2019 Op. at 31\u201336.)\n                                                      6\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD             Document 383          Filed 09/28/26        Page 7 of 39 PageID:\n                                             11737\n\n\n\nconstitutional claims against the Asbury Park Defendant Officers. (Id. at 6\u20137.) Accordingly,\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against the Asbury Park Defendants remained dismissed, and the case\n\nproceeded to discovery with Asbury Park as the only remaining Asbury Park Defendant. (See id.)\n\nThe Neptune Defendants and certain Monmouth County Defendants also remained in the case.7\n\n(See 2019 Op.; ECF No. 242.)\n\n        Approximately six years of fact and expert discovery followed. (See ECF Nos. 155, 169,\n\n335, 351.) The matter was reassigned from Judge Shipp to the Honorable Georgette Castner,\n\nU.S.D.J., in April of 2022, and ultimately, in May of 2023, to the undersigned. (See ECF Nos. 270,\n\n294.) After the close of fact discovery in October of 2024, the remaining parties attended mediation\n\nbefore the Honorable Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J. (ret.), in March of 2025, and all remaining claims\n\nexcept those against Asbury Park were resolved.8 (ECF Nos. 335, 339.) A settlement was reached\n\nbetween Plaintiffs and the Neptune Defendants and Prosecutor\u2019s Office for a payment of $4\n\nmillion to Plaintiffs for wrongful death damages and attorney\u2019s fees and costs. (ECF No. 365 at\n\n3.) Expert discovery proceeded as to Asbury Park and was completed on September 30, 2025.\n\n(ECF No. 351.)\n\n\n\n\n7\n  In the 2019 Opinion, as modified and vacated in part on reconsideration, Judge Shipp dismissed with\nprejudice some claims against the Neptune Defendants (including Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims) and\nallowed others to proceed (such as Plaintiffs\u2019 Monell claim against Neptune Township and their Fourth\nAmendment claim against the Individual Neptune Defendants). (See 2019 Op.; Recon. Op.) In 2020,\nPlaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Monmouth County and the Dispatcher Defendants.\n(ECF Nos. 212, 215.) In 2021, with the parties\u2019 consent, Judge Shipp dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019\nclaims against the Prosecutor\u2019s Office and against the Prosecutor Defendants in their official capacities.\n(ECF No. 241 at 2; ECF No. 242 at 6\u20137.) He further granted in part the Monmouth County Defendants\u2019\nmotion to dismiss, dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against all Monmouth County\nDefendants, and allowed certain claims to proceed, such as Plaintiffs\u2019 Fourth Amendment claim against the\nProsecutor Defendants. (ECF Nos. 241, 242; see ECF No. 204.)\n8\n  Also in March of 2025, Plaintiffs advised the Court that they intended to move for reconsideration\nregarding certain aspects of Judge Shipp\u2019s 2019 Opinion. (ECF No. 339.)\n                                                     7\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383          Filed 09/28/26        Page 8 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11738\n\n\n\n        On May 5, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion. (Mot.) They assert that discovery has\n\nrevealed new evidence warranting reconsideration of Judge Shipp\u2019s 2019 dismissal of their\n\nnegligence claims against the Asbury Park Defendants. (See id.) Asbury Park opposed, and\n\nPlaintiffs replied. (Opp.; Reply.) It is unclear whether the Asbury Park Defendant Officers are\n\naware of the Motion, and they have not filed a response. Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel concedes that the\n\nMotion papers were not served on the individual officers but contends that such service was\n\nunnecessary.9 (Reply at 18.) Because Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion is denied for the reasons below, the Court\n\nneed not resolve the issue.\n\nII.     LEGAL STANDARD\n\n        In the District of New Jersey, \u201c[t]he proper procedural mechanism for reconsideration of\n\n[an] interlocutory order is Local Civil Rule 7.1(i).\u201d Warner v. Township of S. Harrison, 885 F.\n\nSupp. 2d 725, 747\u201348 (D.N.J. 2012). Under the Local Rule, motions for reconsideration must be\n\nserved and filed within 14 days of the entry of the subject order. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Here, Plaintiffs\n\nde facto seek reconsideration of two decisions issued six and seven years ago. (See 2019 Op.;\n\nRecon. Op.)\n\n        It is well established that reconsideration is \u201c\u2018an extraordinary remedy\u2019 that is to be granted\n\n\u2018very sparingly.\u2019\u201d Heartland Payment Sys., LLC v. Carr, No. 18-9764, 2021 WL 9667965, at *1\n\n(D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2021) (quoting NL Indus. Inc. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516\n\n\n9\n  Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel certified that the Motion papers were \u201cserved upon counsel of record.\u201d (ECF No. 380-\n1.) In its Opposition, Asbury Park pointed out that \u201c[P]laintiffs haven\u2019t served anyone but Asbury Park with\nthis motion\u201d and explained that Counsel for the City has not represented any Asbury Park Defendant\nOfficers since their dismissal pre-discovery. (Opp. at 9 n.2, 42.) Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel asserts in Reply that\n\u201c[t]here was no need to serve each individual defendant with this motion\u201d because \u201cAsbury Park will be\nvicariously liable for the actions of the Asbury Park officers and officials\u201d and \u201c[t]he individuals certainly\ndon\u2019t need individual representation on the negligence claims unless they wish to, as they will be\nindemnified by the City.\u201d (Reply at 18.) Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel further asserts that \u201cAsbury Park would of\nnecessity be counsel of record\u201d for the Asbury Park Defendant Officers, (id.), despite the fact that Counsel\nfor the City \u201cnever represented [Defendant] Love,\u201d (Opp. at 9 n.2).\n                                                      8\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD           Document 383        Filed 09/28/26      Page 9 of 39 PageID:\n                                           11739\n\n\n\n(D.N.J. 1996)). Thus, a motion for reconsideration must be denied where a party \u201csimply asks the\n\ncourt to analyze the same facts and cases it had already considered in reaching its original\n\ndecision,\u201d expresses \u201cmere disagreement with a decision of the district court,\u201d or presents evidence\n\nor arguments that could have been raised prior. Bonds v. N.J. Judiciary Admin., No. 19-18983,\n\n2026 WL 1948816, at *3 (D.N.J. July 6, 2026) (first quoting Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Servs.,\n\nInc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (D.N.J. 2000); then quoting Morris v. Siemens Components, Inc.,\n\n938 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D.N.J. 1996); then citing Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F.Supp.2d 610, 613 (D.N.J.\n\n2001)). Reconsideration is \u201can extremely limited procedural vehicle\u201d that does not provide \u201ca\n\nsecond bite at the apple.\u201d Heartland, 2021 WL 9667965, at *5; see United States v. Jones, 158\n\nF.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994) (\u201cThe purpose of the [reconsideration] rule . . . is . . . to prevent\n\nparties from filing a second motion, with the hindsight provided by the court\u2019s analysis, covering\n\nissues that should have been raised in the first set of motions.\u201d). \u201cA difference of opinion with a\n\ncourt\u2019s decision should be addressed through the appellate process.\u201d Garcia v. Bartkowski, No.\n\n11-3689, 2017 WL 3671289, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2017); see also Kanter v. Barella, No. 04-\n\n5542, 2005 WL 3088336, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2005) (\u201cA motion for reconsideration is improper\n\nwhen it is used solely to ask the court to rethink what it has already thought through\u2014rightly or\n\nwrongly.\u201d), aff\u2019d, 489 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2007).\n\n       Reconsideration may be sought \u201conly in three situations.\u201d Rodrigues v. Wells Fargo Bank,\n\nN.A., No. 16-3845, 2017 WL 2345559, at *1 (D.N.J. May 30, 2017). The party seeking\n\nreconsideration bears the burden of showing: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) new\n\nevidence that was not available at the time of the prior decision, or (3) the need to correct a clear\n\nerror of law or prevent manifest injustice. Garcia, 2017 WL 3671289, at *2 (citing Max\u2019s Seafood\n\nCafe v. Quinteros, 176 F. 3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). When reconsideration is sought based on\n\n\n                                                  9\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD             Document 383 Filed 09/28/26               Page 10 of 39 PageID:\n                                             11740\n\n\n\n new evidence, the movant \u201cbears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was unavailable\n\n or unknown at the time of the original [decision].\u201d Id. at *1; see Interfaith Cmty. Org. Inc. v. PPG\n\n Indus., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 295, 317 (D.N.J. 2010). \u201cA court will grant a motion for\n\n reconsideration only where a previous decision has overlooked a factual or legal issue that may\n\n alter the disposition of the matter.\u201d Heartland, 2021 WL 9667965, at *1.\n\n III.    DISCUSSION\n\n         In 2019, Judge Shipp issued a thorough, rather lengthy decision dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n negligence claims against supervisory officials Defendants Salerno and Kelso; responding officers\n\n Defendants Love, Lawson, and Christie; and the City of Asbury Park. (2019 Op. at 31\u201336.) In\n\n 2020, upon a timely motion for partial reconsideration filed by Plaintiffs, Judge Shipp declined to\n\n reconsider his dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against Defendants Salerno and Kelso.\n\n (Recon. Op. at 4; see also id. at 5\u20137 (granting in part Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration on other\n\n grounds and denying Defendants\u2019 cross-motion for reconsideration).) Now before the Court is\n\n Plaintiffs\u2019 second motion for reconsideration, filed in May of 2025, again concerning their\n\n dismissed negligence claims against the Asbury Park Defendants. (See Mot.)\n\n         According to Plaintiffs, \u201cdiscovery has revealed new facts establishing negligence not\n\n known to plaintiffs at the time of the filing\u201d of their TAC\u2014namely, the Asbury Park Police\n\n Department\u2019s Active Shooter Policy (the \u201cActive Shooter Policy\u201d or \u201cPolicy\u201d),10 which Plaintiffs\n\n assert was \u201can applicable policy which should have been implemented at the scene of the\n\n shooting.\u201d (Id. at 13, 27.) Based on this \u201cnew evidence,\u201d Plaintiffs ask the Court to \u201creconsider\n\n\n\n 10\n   The Policy is attached to Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion and Counsel Certification as Exhibit H. (See \u201cPls. Cert.,\u201d\n ECF No. 380-2; see also ECF Nos. 380-3 to 380-5 (Exhibits A through CC).) The Policy does not contain\n internal pagination, so the Court will cite the Bates numbering therein, with the initial \u201c0s\u201d omitted.\n (\u201cPolicy,\u201d ECF No. 380-3 at AP324\u2013AP334.)\n                                                    10\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 11 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11741\n\n\n\n and reinstate\u201d their dismissed negligence claims against the Asbury Park Defendants. (Id. at 27.)\n\n However, because this evidence is not new and would not alter Judge Shipp\u2019s 2019 decision,\n\n reconsideration is improper.\n\n        A.      UNTIMELINESS\n\n        The Court begins\u2014but does not end\u2014with the untimeliness of Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion.\n\n Plaintiffs agree on the relevant legal standard for reconsideration, set forth supra, and appear to\n\n agree that Local Rule 7.1(i) governs, but they disagree that its timing requirement precludes their\n\n Motion. (Id. at 1, 10, 12; Reply at 2, 4.) They point to general principles of inherent judicial power\n\n and discretion, the overall distinction between final and non-final orders, and Federal Rules of\n\n Civil Procedure 15(b) (\u201cAmendments During and After Trial\u201d) and 54(b) (\u201cJudgment on Multiple\n\n Claims or Involving Multiple Parties\u201d) to contend that Judge Shipp\u2019s decision may be revised \u201cany\n\n time\u201d before the entry of a judgment. (Mot. at 9\u201311.)\n\n        The Court notes, for starters, that Plaintiffs previously timely moved for reconsideration\n\n pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(i) when they asked, for the first time, for reconsideration of Judge\n\n Shipp\u2019s 2019 Opinion. (See Pls. First Recon. Mot.) In contrast, their instant Motion was filed six-\n\n and-a-half years after that 2019 Opinion, and almost six years after the 2020 reconsideration\n\n decision thereafter (which Plaintiffs now reargue in relevant part, as explained infra). (See 2019\n\n Op. (issued October 31, 2019), Recon. Op. (issued July 29, 2020); Mot. (filed May 5, 2026).) It is\n\n beyond dispute that Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion is untimely under Local Rule 7.1(i).\n\n        \u201cUntimeliness alone is sufficient grounds to deny\u201d reconsideration. Takata v. Riot\n\n Blockchain, Inc., No. 18-2293, 2019 WL 2710273, at *1 (D.N.J. June 26, 2019) (cleaned up).\n\n Courts within this District \u201croutinely\u201d deny motions for reconsideration that are untimely under\n\n Local Rule 7.1(i), and the Third Circuit has upheld those denials. Schlafly v. Eagle F., No. 17-\n\n                                                  11\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26               Page 12 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11742\n\n\n\n 2522, 2020 WL 2790519, at *6 (D.N.J. May 30, 2020) (collecting cases). Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion that\n\n \u201c[t]here is no restriction on the time within which to file the Motion plaintiff[s] seek[],\u201d (Mot. at\n\n 7), is thus inaccurate\u2014Local Rule 7.1(i) imposes such a restriction, and it is well established that\n\n Local Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration of non-final orders filed in this District. See,\n\n e.g., Zitter v. Petruccelli, No. 15-6488, 2017 WL 1837850, at *2 & n.2 (D.N.J. May 8, 2017)\n\n (collecting cases).\n\n        True, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that an order \u201cthat adjudicates fewer\n\n than all the claims . . . [or] parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment.\u201d\n\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); (see Mot. at 7). However, Rule 54(b) does not create a vehicle for\n\n reconsideration and, in any event, \u201c[t]he Court is doubtful that Rule 54(b) acts as an atemporal\n\n mechanism for reconsideration of interlocutory discovery orders, especially considering the\n\n existence of Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)\u201d as well as the absence of a corresponding federal mechanism\n\n for seeking reconsideration of interlocutory orders. Bonds, 2026 WL 1948816, at *5 n.5 (collecting\n\n cases); see Weston v. Subaru of Am., Inc., No. 20-5876, 2022 WL 18024222, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec.\n\n 31, 2022) (\u201cWhile not expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motions for\n\n reconsideration are provided for and governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i).\u201d).\n\n        Moreover, although the Court has discretion to excuse some untimely filings, the movant\n\n must still justify both their untimeliness and the Court\u2019s reconsideration, and Plaintiffs do neither.\n\n See, e.g., Garrison v. Porch, No. 04-1114, 2008 WL 1744730, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2008); J.A.\n\n v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 20-9498, 2025 WL 3238267, at *3 n.7 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2025);\n\n Takata, 2019 WL 2710273, at *1 n.1; see also Bonds, 2026 WL 1948816, at *5 n.5 (\u201c[M]any of\n\n the jurisdictions that view Rule 54(b) as a basis for reconsideration of interlocutory discovery\n\n orders commit the decision for reconsideration \u2018to the discretion of the district court,\u2019 as \u2018justice\n\n\n                                                   12\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                Page 13 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11743\n\n\n\n requires,\u2019 or apply a legal standard that mirrors the three-pronged standard that governs\n\n reconsideration in this jurisdiction.\u201d (collecting cases)).\n\n         Notwithstanding the Court\u2019s finding of Plaintiffs\u2019 untimeliness, the Court will proceed to\n\n address the substantive arguments presented in their Motion.\n\n         B.      ALLEGED NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND TRAINING\n\n         The Court now addresses Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against Defendants Salerno and\n\n Kelso, Asbury Park\u2019s respective Acting Police Chief and Deputy Police Chief at the time Plaintiffs\n\n filed the TAC. 11 (TAC \u00b6\u00b6 10\u201311.) In 2019, Judge Shipp dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n negligence claims against Defendants Salerno and Kelso, finding that, despite twice dismissing\n\n Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for impermissible group pleading and twice granting Plaintiffs the opportunity\n\n to amend to correct the deficiency, Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege any duty of care owed by\n\n the two Defendants in the TAC.12 (2019 Op. at 32 (\u201cPreliminarily, the Court notes that it is unclear\n\n which specific duties Plaintiffs allege against which specific Defendants because Plaintiffs, again,\n\n resort to group pleading.\u201d); id. at 32 n.14 (\u201cThe flaw in Plaintiffs\u2019 group pleading method is further\n\n underscored by their failure to name any duty as it pertains to Deputy Chief David Kelso and\n\n former Police Chief Anthony Salerno. Because Plaintiffs fail to explicitly plead any duty\n\n\n\n 11\n   Plaintiffs refer to Defendants as \u201cChief Salerno\u201d and \u201cDeputy Chief Kelso\u201d throughout their TAC, and\n Judge Shipp in turn does the same in his 2019 Opinion. (See TAC \u00b6\u00b6 10\u201311; 2019 Op. at 6, 32 n.14.) The\n parties likewise use the same titles in their instant briefing. (See Mot.; Opp.; Reply.) For the sake of\n completeness, the Court notes that, per the TAC, Defendants Salerno and Kelso were Police Directors on\n June 16, 2015 (then became Acting Police Chief and Deputy Police Chief by the time the lawsuit was\n brought two years later). (TAC \u00b6\u00b6 10\u201311.)\n 12\n   As Judge Shipp summarized, \u201c[t]he Court . . . repeatedly emphasized before Plaintiffs filed their [TAC]\n that claims would be dismissed where they fail to state specific allegations attributable to specific\n defendants.\u201d (Recon. Op. at 4.) He previously dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019 FAC \u201cbecause the\n \u2018Court had difficulty discerning which claims were brought against which entities or individuals and the\n factual basis for each claim\u2019\u201d and dismissed without prejudice the SAC \u201cbecause it \u2018mainly group pleads\n Defendants without applying specific facts to specific actors.\u2019\u201d (Id. (first quoting ECF No. 76 at 4\u20135; then\n quoting ECF No. 107 at 2\u20133).)\n                                                     13\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26               Page 14 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11744\n\n\n\n pertaining to those defendants, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence-based\n\n claims against Kelso and Salerno.\u201d).)\n\n         Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of that decision, arguing that the TAC sufficiently pled\n\n that Salerno and Kelso \u201cfail[ed] to train and supervise responding officers on active shooter\n\n policies and/or enact, promulgate and enforce such policies.\u201d (Pls. First Recon. Mot. at 13 (citing\n\n TAC \u00b6\u00b6 682\u201383); see id. (asserting that \u201c[t]hese failures [to train and supervise] were noted\n\n multiple times throughout the TAC\u201d).) Judge Shipp, having previously considered Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n allegations and having found them deficient under Rule 12(b)(6), concluded that \u201cPlaintiffs\u2019\n\n argument . . . amount[ed] to no more than disagreement with the Court\u2019s previous decision.\u201d\n\n (Recon. Op. at 4); see Jones v. Sanko Steamship Co., No. 10-6787, 2016 WL 819618, at *3 (D.N.J.\n\n Mar. 2, 2016) (\u201c[R]econsideration does not provide \u2018an opportunity for a second bite at the apple,\u2019\n\n nor a vehicle \u2018to relitigate old matters.\u2019 Indeed, mere disagreement with the court\u2019s decision\u2014\n\n particularly its reasoning and distillation of the applicable law and facts\u2014should be aired through\n\n the appellate process.\u201d (citations omitted)). So too here.\n\n         In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs maintain that they adequately alleged Defendants Salerno\n\n and Kelso\u2019s duty to train and supervise, including with respect to \u201can active shooter/rapid\n\n response/hostage event,\u201d in their TAC. (Mot. at 3; see id. at 6 (asserting that Judge Shipp, in his\n\n 2019 Opinion, \u201cdetermined that the negligence count impermissibly resorted to \u2018group pleadings\u2019\n\n and that plaintiff[s] fail[ed] to name any duty as it pertains to . . . Kelso and . . . Salerno\u201d despite\n\n the TAC \u201cexhaustively and repeatedly review[ing] the liability of each individual defendant,\n\n including Salerno and Kelso in the various counts\u201d (omissions in original)); Reply at 7\u20139.) In\n\n summarizing their TAC allegations, Plaintiffs assert that they \u201cpled that there was no training or\n\n supervision,\u201d that \u201c[n]ot one of the officers had received active shooter or rapid response training,\u201d\n\n\n                                                   14\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 15 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11745\n\n\n\n and that \u201cthe supervisory officers failed to establish, consider and enact any policies or protocol\n\n for the handling of an active shooter/rapid response/hostage event.\u201d (Mot. at 3 (citing TAC \u00b6\u00b6 211,\n\n 214, 217, 219, 382, 391).) Plaintiffs thus contend that \u201cthe pleadings were and remain sufficient\u201d\n\n such that \u201cthere is little necessity for an amended complaint\u201d were reconsideration granted. (Reply\n\n at 1, 7; see id. at 1\u20132 (\u201cThe 143 page [TAC] finely details the individual liability of the Asbury\n\n Park Police Chief and Deputy Chief for the failure to train and supervise so that the Court\u2019s\n\n statement about \u2018group pleading\u2019 in the negligence count also needs to be revisited as clearly\n\n erroneous and not in the interests of justice.\u201d).) As explained, Judge Shipp considered those TAC\n\n allegations and found them insufficient in his 2019 Opinion, and he considered Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n arguments on reconsideration that his dismissal should be revisited because, according to\n\n Plaintiffs, the TAC adequately alleged the supervisory officials\u2019 duty to train and supervise. (2019\n\n Op. at 32 & n.14; Recon. Op. at 4; see also ECF No. 126 at 48\u201349 (Plaintiffs making similar\n\n arguments in their opposition to the Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 underlying motion to dismiss).)\n\n        Six years later, Plaintiffs re-raise the same arguments for reconsideration, this time under\n\n the guise of \u201cnew evidence.\u201d (See Mot. at 17\u201318, 26.) For the reasons explained infra, the evidence\n\n Plaintiffs present in support of their Motion is not new\u2014but even if it were, it would not alter\n\n Judge Shipp\u2019s previous decision. As Judge Shipp\u2019s decisions and Plaintiffs\u2019 prior motions make\n\n clear, Plaintiffs could have pled Defendants Salerno and Kelso\u2019s duty to train and supervise in\n\n support of their negligence claims when they filed the TAC. (See Recon. Op. at 4 (\u201cThe Court\n\n takes this opportunity to note . . . that it repeatedly emphasized before Plaintiffs filed their Third\n\n Amended Complaint that claims would be dismissed where they fail to state specific allegations\n\n attributable to specific defendants.\u201d); 2019 Op. at 32 & n.14.) Within their negligence count (Count\n\n\n\n\n                                                  15\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                Page 16 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11746\n\n\n\n 10), they pled the duties owed by other Defendants,13 including that the Neptune Defendants \u201chad\n\n a duty to hire, train, supervise, and discipline\u201d Philip.14 (2019 Op. at 33 (citing TAC \u00b6 683); see\n\n Recon. Op. at 4.) Similarly, in support of their Fourth Amendment claims, Plaintiffs alleged\n\n failures to train and/or supervise by Defendants Salerno, Kelso, and Love. (2019 Op. at 21\n\n (analyzing Plaintiffs\u2019 Fourth Amendment claims and describing their allegations that \u201cSalerno and\n\n Kelso \u2018failed to assure [their] subordinates received appropriate and critical training concerning\n\n the handling of an active shooter/rapid responder/hostage situation\u2019\u201d; that \u201cSalerno and Kelso\n\n \u2018failed to enact, promulgate[,] and enforce any policies or practices for the handling of an active\n\n shooter/rapid responder/hostage situation\u2019\u201d; and that \u201cSergeant Love failed to train and supervise\n\n his subordinates\u201d (alterations in original) (quoting TAC \u00b6\u00b6 382\u201383, 391\u201392, 412)).)\n\n\n\n\n 13\n   Judge Shipp explained that Plaintiffs \u201cdid not specifically plead any duty for Salerno and Kelso, unlike\n their pleadings as to Neptune officials.\u201d (Recon. Op. at 4.) Within Count 10, Plaintiffs alleged duties owed\n by each Individual Neptune Defendant, as well as by Asbury Park Defendants Lawson, Love, Christie,\n Griswold, and Crawford\u2014inter alia, that \u201cNeptune and its officials had a duty to use reasonable care in the\n hiring, training, supervision and retention of Seidle\u201d; \u201c[t]he Neptune officials Chief O\u2019Neil, Chief Adams,\n Chief Hunt and Director Bascom had a duty to act reasonably in connection with the hiring, training and\n supervision of Seidle and to use reasonable care in the discipline of Seidle\u201d; and \u201c[t]he Asbury Park police\n defendants Lawson, Love, Christie, Griswold and Crawford all had a duty to act reasonably in their\n performance and actions once the duty was undertaken to provide police protection\u201d\u2014but nowhere\n addressed Defendants Salerno or Kelso or their duties. (TAC \u00b6 683 (cleaned up).)\n In denying reconsideration in relevant part, Judge Shipp summarized his multiple prior directives regarding\n Plaintiffs\u2019 impermissible group pleading, see supra note 12, rejected Plaintiffs\u2019 contention that they\n \u201cadequately pleaded a duty of care for [Defendants Salerno and Kelso],\u201d and advised that, \u201c[o]n their\n [TAC], it is not enough for Plaintiffs to omit specific allegations against Salerno and Kelso on the chance\n that the Court may find sufficient factual allegations within the previous 682 paragraphs.\u201d (Recon. Op. at 4\n (citing 2019 Op. at 32).)\n 14\n    Judge Shipp nonetheless found the Neptune Defendants immune from Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims under\n the TCA based on the discretionary nature of their conduct and the \u201c\u2018broad immunity protection\u2019 for claims\n arising from alleged failures to enforce the law.\u201d (2019 Op. at 34 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 59:3\u20135, :5-4).)\n Judge Shipp likewise found the Asbury Park Defendants immune for the discretionary conduct underlying\n Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims, as discussed in detail below. (Id. at 33.) Because Plaintiffs fail to justify\n reconsideration of that conclusion, see infra, it remains fatal to Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims.\n                                                     16\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD               Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                 Page 17 of 39 PageID:\n                                               11747\n\n\n\n         Judge Shipp dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against Defendants Salerno and Kelso\n\n because of Plaintiffs\u2019 continued pleading deficiency.15 (See 2019 Op. at 32 & n.14 (describing\n\n Plaintiffs\u2019 continued use of group pleading and concluding that, \u201c[b]ecause Plaintiffs fail to\n\n explicitly plead any duty pertaining to [Defendants Kelso and Salerno], the Court dismisses with\n\n prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence-based claims against [them]\u201d); Recon. Op. at 3 (\u201cThe Court\n\n dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence-based claims against Kelso and Salerno because Plaintiffs failed\n\n to plead Salerno and Kelso had any duty of care.\u201d).) This reasoning is unaffected by purported,\n\n claimed \u201cnew\u201d facts. See English v. Fed. Nat\u2019l Mortg. Ass\u2019n, No. 13-2028, 2020 WL 11027479,\n\n at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2020) (denying reconsideration of with-prejudice dismissal of complaint\n\n where \u201cthe Court previously dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s original, and First, Second, and Third Amended\n\n Complaints for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6), after finding that, even accepting\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s allegations as true, she had not stated a claim to relief\u201d and reasoning that \u201ceven a\n\n finding that [Plaintiffs presented] \u2018new evidence\u2019 would not change the Court\u2019s repeated\n\n conclusion that Plaintiff[s] ha[d] not stated a claim to relief and that dismissal of th[ese] [claims]\n\n is required\u201d). Plaintiffs\u2019 disagreement with the 2019 dismissal of their negligence claims against\n\n\n\n\n 15\n    Judge Shipp also considered Plaintiffs\u2019 argument in their first motion for reconsideration that\n reconsideration was warranted on the basis of clear error of law or manifest injustice. (See Pls. First Recon.\n Mot. at 5\u20136; Recon. Op. at 2\u20134.) As he explained, \u201c[a] court commits clear error of law only if the record\n cannot support the findings that led to the ruling\u201d and \u201ca party must do more than allege that portions of a\n ruling were erroneous in order to obtain reconsideration of that ruling.\u201d (Recon. Op. at 2 (first quoting Rich\n v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 272 (D.N.J. 2018); then quoting ABS Brokerage Servs., LLC v. Penson Fin.\n Servs., Inc., No. 09-4590, 2010 WL 3257992, at *6 (D.N.J. 2010)); see id. (\u201cA moving party\u2019s \u2018[m]ere\n disagreement with the Court's decision\u2019 is insufficient to show a clear error of law.\u201d (alteration in original)\n (quoting ABS Brokerage Servs., 2010 WL 3257992, at *6)).) Similarly, \u201c[m]anifest injustice pertains to\n situations where a court overlooks some dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it.\u201d\n Heartland, 2021 WL 9667965, at *2; see Pittman v. Zickefoose, No. 10-5057 RMB, 2011 WL 4729021, at\n *2 n.2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2011) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018manifest injustice\u2019 could be defined as \u2018an error in the trial court\n that is direct, obvious, and observable.\u2019 Most cases, therefore, use the term \u2018manifest injustice\u2019 to describe\n the result of a plain error.\u201d (cleaned up)).\n                                                       17\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                Page 18 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11748\n\n\n\n Defendants Salerno and Kelso, and with the 2020 decision to not reconsider that dismissal, does\n\n not support reconsideration.16\n\n         Plaintiffs similarly seek reconsideration of Judge Shipp\u2019s dismissal of their negligent-\n\n training-and-supervision claims against Asbury Park. (Mot. at 18\u201319.) As explained, Asbury Park\n\n is the only remaining Defendant in this case, against whom Plaintiffs\u2019 Monell claim is presently\n\n pending. (See 2019 Op. at 13\u201314.) Judge Shipp previously concluded that dismissal of these claims\n\n was appropriate given his dismissal of all negligence claims against the individual Asbury Park\n\n Defendants. (Id. at 35.) Plaintiffs do not challenge that reasoning. They assert that, \u201c[s]ince the\n\n evidence in discovery overwhelmingly supports the claims for negligent supervision and training\n\n against both the public entity [i.e., Asbury Park] and its Acting Chief and Deputy Chief of police\n\n [i.e., Defendants Salerno and Kelso], plaintiff[s] should be permitted to amend the complaint\n\n and/or to reinstate that dismissed claim.\u201d (Mot. at 19. Compare also id. at 16, with ECF No. 126\n\n at 44 (Plaintiffs\u2019 opposition to Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss).) Because the Court\n\n declines to reconsider the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against Defendants Salerno\n\n and Kelso, it likewise declines to reconsider the dismissal of those claims against Asbury Park.\n\n\n\n\n 16\n   The Court further notes that New Jersey law appears to recognize negligent training and supervision\n claims only against \u201cthe employer entity\u201d and \u201cnot . . . the individual supervisor.\u201d A.C. v. Dwight-\n Englewood Sch., No. 21-6376, 2022 WL 1184799, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2022) (quoting Duran v. Warner,\n No. 07-5994, 2013 WL 4483518, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013); citing G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 210 A.3d 907,\n 916 (N.J. 2019)); accord Mills v. Pivot Occupational Health, No. 21-846, 2022 WL 610781, at *4 (D. Del.\n Feb. 15, 2022) (\u201cAlthough \u2018Delaware law recognizes claims of negligent hiring and supervision of\n employees, . . . liability is imposed on the employer where the employer is negligent, not on supervisors.\u2019\u201d\n (omission in original)). Defendant Asbury Park raises this issue in its Opposition, but Plaintiffs do not\n address it in Reply. (Opp. at 40; Reply at 17\u201318 (addressing only Defendant\u2019s argument about knowledge\n element).)\n                                                     18\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                 Page 19 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11749\n\n\n\n         C.      PURPORTED \u201cNEW\u201d EVIDENCE\n\n         The Court next addresses Plaintiffs\u2019 arguments for reconsideration based on the alleged\n\n \u201cnew\u201d evidence uncovered during discovery\u2014the Active Shooter Policy.17 Plaintiffs contend that\n\n this Policy warrants reconsideration of Judge Shipp\u2019s 2019 Opinion because it shows that\n\n (1) Defendants\u2019 conduct was ministerial, rather than discretionary, so they are not entitled to TCA\n\n immunity, and (2) \u201cthe use of lethal force is required, if necessary, in an active shooter situation,\u201d\n\n so Judge Shipp\u2019s conclusion regarding such force should be revisited. (Mot. at 5\u20136.) The Court\n\n takes these arguments in turn.\n\n         1.      Discretionary Conduct\n\n         As Plaintiffs recognize, in the 2019 Opinion, \u201c[t]he Court found the conduct of the Asbury\n\n Park Defendants[] to be discretionary\u201d as opposed to ministerial, thus rendering these Defendants\n\n immune from liability under the TCA. (Id. at 6 (citing 2019 Op. at 33\u201334).) The TCA, as Judge\n\n Shipp explained, generally immunizes public entities and public employees, including police\n\n officers, from tort liability. (2019 Op. at 31 (\u201c[T]he immunities set forth in the Act prevail over\n\n\n\n\n 17\n    At the outset, the Court notes that the parties dispute whether the Active Shooter Policy applied to the\n Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 conduct on June 16, 2015. (Compare Pls. Cert. \u00b6\u00b6 9, 22\u201325, 40\u201360 (asserting that\n the Active Shooter Policy applied based on the expert report and deposition testimony of Plaintiffs\u2019 expert\n and the deposition testimony of various Defendants such as responding officers and prosecutors), with Opp.\n at 4 (\u201c[A]ctive shooters are those seeking to indiscriminately kill en masse. The sheer fact that a suspect is\n armed and shoots one person doesn\u2019t transform him into an active shooter. If that were the case, then every\n shooting would be considered an active shooter event.\u201d (citing Policy at AP326; Dep. of Asbury Park\n Captain, ECF No. 381-1, Tr. 154:6\u201315)); Pls. Cert. \u00b6 20 (explaining that Asbury Park developed its Active\n Shooter Policy in response to New Jersey Attorney General\u2019s directive that police departments \u201cimplement\n procedures enhancing school safety and safety including active shooter response\u201d); Policy at AP333\u2013\n AP334 (setting forth recommendations for school officials in connection with the Policy); and Pls. Cert. \u00b6\n 14 n.3 (\u201cIt is unclear whether use of the word \u2018facility\u2019 was used to describe schools or other locations but\n the effective meaning is to save the victims.\u201d). See also Monmouth County Prosecutor\u2019s Office Internal\n Review Report of Law Enforcement Response to the Killing of Tamara Seidle on June 16, 2015\n (\u201cMonmouth County Investigation Report\u201d), Ex. A to Pls. Cert., 16 (\u201cExisting law enforcement policies at\n either the State or County level do not anticipate or encompass the situation which unfolded on June 16,\n 2015.\u201d).)\n                                                      19\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26               Page 20 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11750\n\n\n\n any liabilities, whether found in the Act or in preexisting law, including statutes. Immunity for\n\n public entities is the general rule and liability is the exception.\u201d (cleaned up) (first quoting Tice v.\n\n Cramer, 627 A.2d 1090, 1103 (N.J. 1993); then quoting Parsons ex rel. Parsons v. Mullica Twp.\n\n Bd. of Educ., 142 A.3d 715, 718 (N.J. 2016)))); see Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 963 A.2d\n\n 828, 835 (N.J. 2009) (\u201cThe Legislature [in enacting the TCA] provided broad immunity protection\n\n for public entities because \u2018the area within which the government has the power to act for the\n\n public good is almost without limit and therefore government should not have the duty to do\n\n everything that might be done.\u2019\u201d). As relevant here, the Act provides immunity for police officers\u2019\n\n \u201cdiscretionary\u201d conduct but not for negligently performed \u201cministerial\u201d acts. (See 2019 Op. at 32\n\n (\u201c[T]he Act does not provide complete immunity from all tort liability arising out of acts or\n\n omissions, and police officers may be subject to liability for negligence in the performance of their\n\n ministerial (as opposed to discretionary) duties.\u201d (citing Lee v. Doe, 557 A.2d 1045, 1049\u201350 (N.J.\n\n Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989))).)\n\n         An act is discretionary, and thus protected by TCA immunity, if it \u201ccalls for the exercise\n\n of personal deliberations and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching\n\n reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.\u201d (Id. (quoting S.P. v.\n\n Newark Police Dep\u2019t, 52 A.3d 178, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012))); see Coyne v. State of\n\n New Jersey, 867 A.2d 1159, 1164 (N.J. 2005) (explaining that public employees\n\n \u201cexercise . . . discretion\u201d within the meaning of the TCA when they make \u201cactual, high-level\n\n policymaking decisions involving the balance of competing considerations\u201d). Conversely, when\n\n \u201ca person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of\n\n legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act\n\n being done,\u201d his conduct is ministerial, and he may be held liable when he acts negligently. (2019\n\n\n                                                   20\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD             Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                Page 21 of 39 PageID:\n                                             11751\n\n\n\n Op. at 32 (alteration omitted) (quoting Newark Police Dep\u2019t, 52 A.3d at 190).) \u201cIn essence, where\n\n \u2018the circumstances [are] thought to be such that reasonable policemen in the position of the\n\n defendants could have differed about whether or how to act,\u2019 the specific decision at issue may be\n\n considered discretionary for the purposes of determining TCA immunity.\u201d Gonzalez by Gonzalez\n\n v. City of Jersey City, 255 A.3d 1175, 1187 (N.J. 2021) (alteration in original).\n\n         Judge Shipp concluded that the TCA immunized the Asbury Park Defendants. Reviewing\n\n their alleged conduct, he found that \u201cthe Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 response to the events that\n\n unfolded during the standoff, such as the Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 taking improper tactical cover\n\n and parking cars, speaking to Seidle \u2018without first waiting for command,\u2019 yelling \u2018shots fired,\u2019 and\n\n \u2018creating panic,\u2019\u201d18 constituted discretionary acts subject to immunity under \u00a7 59:5-4 of the TCA.19\n\n (2019 Op. at 33); see N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 59:5-4 (providing immunity for \u201cfailure to provide sufficient\n\n police protection service\u201d); (see also 2019 Op. at 29 (\u201cFinally, regarding Officer Lawson\u2019s yelling\n\n \u2018shots fired\u2019 instead of \u2018active shooter,\u2019 the Court finds Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts that\n\n\n 18\n   Judge Shipp summarized the relevant allegations as follows:\n         Plaintiffs argue that Officer Lawson . . . acted in a \u201cgrossly deficient manner,\u201d including\n         \u201crunning in the opposite direction of the shooting, taking improper cover and tactical\n         positions, and relaying the wrong and in fact harmful information of \u2018shots fired\u2019 to\n         dispatch,\u201d which added \u201cconfusion and chaos\u201d to the scene. Regarding Officers Christie,\n         Griswold, and Crawford, Plaintiffs allege these individuals also \u201ctook wrong positions\u201d\n         such that they blocked the view of Seidle and, therefore, there was no \u201cstraight line of fire.\u201d\n         Plaintiffs also allege that Officers Christie. Griswold, and Crawford improperly parked\n         cars, which did not \u201ceffectively close off pedestrian and civilian movement in the\n         immediate area of the shooting,\u201d and \u201cspoke to Seidle without waiting for command or\n         coordinating the response first before attempting any intervention.\u201d\n (2019 Op. at 28 (cleaned up) (citing TAC \u00b6\u00b6 613, 617, 621, 625).) He analyzed these allegations at length\n with respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under \u00a7 1983. (Id. at 21\u201323, 28\u201329.)\n 19\n   In its Opposition, Defendant Asbury Park notes that \u201cthe individually-named Asbury Park officers could\n also assert immunity under N.J.S.A. \u00a7 59:3-3, which mirrors, at least as to the \u2018clearly established law\u2019\n prong, the analysis of qualified immunity under \u00a7 1983.\u201d (Opp. at 17 n.5; see 2019 Op. at 21\u201323 (finding\n the Asbury Park defendant officers entitled to qualified immunity and dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs\u2019\n Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983).) Defendant further states that, \u201c[s]ince plaintiffs are\n not seeking to challenge that portion of Judge Shipp\u2019s decision granting qualified immunity on the \u00a7 1983\n claim, that analysis would likely be dispositive of any amended negligence claim.\u201d (Opp. at 17 n.5.)\n                                                     21\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 22 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11752\n\n\n\n would support their assertion that there is a meaningful difference between those two phrases.\u201d)).\n\n Plaintiffs assert that Asbury Park\u2019s Active Shooter Policy, obtained through discovery, applied to\n\n officers\u2019 conduct during the standoff, thus making their conduct ministerial rather than\n\n discretionary. (E.g., Mot. at 6 (\u201cThe Court found the conduct of the Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 to\n\n be discretionary. . . . Now that the proofs are in, there is an actual policy which was not followed.\n\n Accordingly, the conduct involved was ministerial and the Order/Opinion should be vacated on\n\n that issue.\u201d (citations omitted)).) Although not the basis for their Motion, Plaintiffs also reference\n\n statewide and nationwide analogues. (See id. at 13, 15 n.7, 27; Pls. Cert. \u00b6 20.)\n\n        However, what Plaintiffs present in their Motion is not new. Plaintiffs allege throughout\n\n their TAC that the Asbury Park Defendant Officers acted in contravention of active shooter policy\n\n and procedure. (See, e.g., TAC \u00b6\u00b6 172 (alleging that Defendant Lawson acted \u201c[i]n a gross\n\n disregard of police procedure and policy . . . as expected in any situation where there is an active\n\n shooting\u201d), 194 (alleging that Defendant Love \u201cfailed to follow any accepted guidelines on how\n\n to handle an active shooter/rapid response situation\u201d), 199 (alleging that Defendants Christie,\n\n Griswold, and Crawford violated \u201call active shooter guidelines, both state, national and local\u201d),\n\n 215 (alleging \u201cvarious actions tak[en] by the responding officers which did not comport with\n\n policy and procedure\u201d).) They allege actions taken by the Asbury Park responding officers and\n\n that such conduct deviated from what was required \u201cin an active shooter situation.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 173; see\n\n id. \u00b6\u00b6 167 (alleging that Defendant Lawson acted \u201c[i]n a gross disregard of police procedure and\n\n policy\u201d by \u201cyell[ing] \u2018shots fired\u2019 to dispatch instead of indicating that there was an active shooter\n\n and rapid responder situation evolving\u201d), 171 (alleging that Defendant Lawson acted \u201c[i]n a gross\n\n disregard of police procedure and policy\u201d by \u201cfailing to take available cover with a direct line of\n\n\n\n\n                                                  22\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD               Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                 Page 23 of 39 PageID:\n                                               11753\n\n\n\n fire to Seidle\u201d),20 172 (alleging that Defendant Lawson acted \u201c[i]n a gross disregard of police\n\n procedure and policy\u201d by \u201cfail[ing] to take Seidle down by the use of lethal force as mandated\n\n under the use of force guidelines and as expected in any situation where there is an active\n\n shooting\u201d), 173 (alleging that Defendant Lawson did not act \u201cas required in an active shooter\n\n situation\u201d), 189\u201390 (alleging that Defendant Love \u201cfailed to take command of operations as\n\n required\u201d and acted \u201cin gross disregard of police procedure and policy\u201d), 197 (alleging that Asbury\n\n Park responding officers acted contrary to what was \u201crequired under mandated use of force policy\n\n and local and nationwide police standards for the handling of the situation\u201d), 198 (alleging that\n\n Defendants Christie, Griswold, and Crawford \u201cfail[ed] to take tactical positions in the direct line\n\n of fire to Seidle, as each of them were required to [do]\u201d), 428\u201329 (alleging that Defendant Christie\n\n \u201cfailed to follow mandated, required protocol in the situation before him\u201d and that, \u201c[i]n an active\n\n shooter situation, certain equipment such as bulletproof vests and shields are required and Christie\n\n did not show up in accordance with proper protocol and police standards\u201d), 436\u201337 (same as to\n\n Griswold), 444\u201345 (same as to Crawford); see also id. \u00b6\u00b6 41\u201342, 166, 168\u201369, 175, 177\u201378, 181,\n\n 206, 212, 217, 219, 366\u201369, 406, 417.)\n\n         Plaintiffs\u2019 summary of their TAC allegations is instructive: they assert that the TAC \u201cset\n\n forth a litany of violations of policy by the Asbury Park officers at or who came to the scene,\n\n including running in the opposite direction from the shooting, failing to dispatch or communicate\n\n active shooter, failing to coordinate, command and control the situation as required, failing to\n\n isolate and contain Seidle, failing to take tactical positions, failing to extricate and rescue the dying\n\n Tamara and failing in their ministerial duties to follow policy.\u201d (Mot. at 3 (citing TAC \u00b6\u00b6 166\u201371,\n\n\n\n 20\n   In many filings, Philip is referred to as \u201cSeidle\u201d rather than by first name. The Court has not altered these\n direct quotations but notes that the use of \u201cSeidle\u201d in such instances refers to Philip Seidle.\n                                                       23\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD           Document 383 Filed 09/28/26            Page 24 of 39 PageID:\n                                           11754\n\n\n\n 182\u201384, 186, 189, 190, 194, 197, 201, 202, 212, 403, 404, 406, 407).) In short, Plaintiffs maintain\n\n that their TAC already alleged what they argue their \u201cnew\u201d evidence now \u201cestablishes\u201d\u2014i.e., that\n\n the Asbury Park Defendant Officers violated relevant police policy through their conduct. (Id. at\n\n 13.)\n\n        Likewise, Plaintiffs\u2019 instant arguments for reconsideration\u2014that the Policy shows the\n\n Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 conduct was ministerial and thus defeats TCA immunity\u2014were raised\n\n in their opposition to Defendants\u2019 underlying motion to dismiss. (Compare id. at 23\u201326, with ECF\n\n No. 126 at 45\u201347 (Plaintiffs opposition to Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss)\n\n (disagreeing with Defendants\u2019 argument that \u201cthere is no ministerial duty to shoot Seidle, to\n\n designate the event as an active shooter, and to handle the event in the matter factually pled\u201d and\n\n arguing that \u201c[v]iolation of actual policies and Standard Operating Procedures are ministerial in\n\n nature\u201d and \u201c[t]he ministerial duties are those mandated by policy, which remain to be explored\n\n during discovery\u201d).) In their second motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs continue to describe,\n\n dispute, and relitigate what the Asbury Park Defendants argued in the underlying motion to\n\n dismiss.\n\n        Judge Shipp in turn considered the above allegations (and Plaintiffs\u2019 arguments in the\n\n underlying briefing) in reaching his prior decision. Indeed, he denied dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n Monell claim against the City based on Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that Asbury Park failed to enforce\n\n \u201cnecessary policies related to active shooter situations,\u201d and their Monell claim remains pending\n\n today. (2019 Op. at 13 (citing TAC \u00b6\u00b6 166\u201378).) He reached a different conclusion with respect to\n\n Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against the Asbury Park Defendants. (Id. at 31\u201336.) Plaintiffs may\n\n well disagree with that decision, and they may raise that disagreement through the appellate\n\n process, but not on reconsideration. See Heartland, 2021 WL 9667965, at *5 (\u201cWhere a party\n\n\n                                                 24\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD           Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 25 of 39 PageID:\n                                           11755\n\n\n\n merely has a difference of opinion with the court\u2019s decision, the issue should be raised through the\n\n normal appellate process; reconsideration is not the appropriate vehicle.\u201d). It is well established\n\n that \u201cnew\u201d evidence for purposes of reconsideration cannot be cumulative of evidence already\n\n presented and considered. See Bonds, 2026 WL 1948816, at *6 n.7 (\u201cEach step of the litigation\n\n should build upon the last and, in the absence of newly discovered, non-cumulative evidence, the\n\n parties should not be permitted to reargue previous rulings made in the case.\u201d (quoting Oritani\n\n Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990))).\n\n Reconsideration also \u201cmay not be used to rehash arguments which have already been briefed by\n\n the parties and considered and decided by the Court.\u201d Jester v. State Dep\u2019t of Safety, No. 14-1124,\n\n 2016 WL 4497055, *1 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2016); see Roggio v. FBI, No. 08-4991, 2025 WL\n\n 1511141, at *4 (D.N.J. May 28, 2025) (\u201cBecause of the court\u2019s interest in the finality of judgments,\n\n motions for reconsideration \u2018should be granted sparingly and may not be used to rehash arguments\n\n which have already been briefed by the parties and considered and decided by the Court.\u2019 Said\n\n differently, a motion for reconsideration . . . should not be \u2018grounded on a request that a court\n\n rethink a decision already made.\u2019\u201d).\n\n        Nor is evidence \u201cnew\u201d merely because a party \u201cobtains or submits [it] to the court after an\n\n adverse ruling. Rather, new evidence in this context [of reconsideration] means evidence that a\n\n party could not earlier submit to the court because that evidence was not previously available.\u201d\n\n Howard Hess Dental Lab\u2019ys Inc. v. Dentsply Int\u2019l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis\n\n added); see English, 2020 WL 11027479, at *2 (\u201c[E]vidence is not considered to be previously\n\n unavailable just because Plaintiff is now accessing it.\u201d). \u201cAbsent unusual circumstances, a court\n\n should reject new evidence that was not presented when the contested decision was made. A party\n\n seeking to introduce new evidence on reconsideration bears the burden of demonstrating that the\n\n\n                                                 25\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26               Page 26 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11756\n\n\n\n evidence was unavailable or unknown at the time of the original [decision].\u201d Garcia, 2017 WL\n\n 3671289, at *1 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs do not satisfy this burden. They assert, without\n\n elaboration, that \u201cdiscovery has revealed\u201d the Policy, (Mot. at 13; see id. at 19, 27), but they neither\n\n argue the Policy was previously unavailable nor explain why it \u201ccould not have been discovered\n\n earlier through the exercise of due diligence,\u201d English, 2020 WL 11027479, at *2; see Stokes v.\n\n Internal Affs. Section, No. 19-20414, 2020 WL 2537575, at *2 (D.N.J. May 19, 2020) (\u201cEvidence\n\n that could have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence does not constitute\n\n newly discovered evidence for reconsideration purposes.\u201d).\n\n        Per Plaintiffs\u2019 own description, the Policy was \u201ceffective 2007\u201d and in effect as of June 16,\n\n 2015, and it \u201ccopied virtually word for word\u201d the New Jersey Attorney General\u2019s \u201cmodel policy\u201d\n\n also issued in 2007.21 (Mot. at 20; Pls. Cert. \u00b6 20; see also Opp. at 37 (asserting that Plaintiffs\n\n could have obtained the Policy via the Open Public Records Act). But see Reply at 16 n.2\n\n (disagreeing that an OPRA request would have yielded the Policy).) What is more, even assuming,\n\n arguendo, that Plaintiffs could not have obtained the Active Shooter Policy before their TAC was\n\n filed and then partially dismissed in 2019\u2014and even putting aside that their TAC nonetheless\n\n repeatedly alleges violations of \u201cactive shooter policies\u201d and further assuming that Local Rule\n\n 7.1(i)\u2019s 14-day time limit does not itself foreclose Plaintiffs\u2019 2025 Motion\u2014Plaintiffs appear to\n\n have been in possession of the Policy no later than September 1, 2021, three-and-a-half years\n\n before they first raised the prospect of their Motion to the Court and almost five years before they\n\n\n\n\n 21\n   According to Plaintiffs, in 2007, the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General (\u201cNJOAG\u201d) issued an\n active shooter directive\u2014which the Court notes is publicly available online\u2014instructing \u201call law\n enforcement agencies [to] implement procedures enhancing school safety and safety including active\n shooter response.\u201d (Pls. Cert. \u00b6 20.) Also in 2007, the NJOAG \u201ccreated a model policy,\u201d which Asbury\n Park \u201ccopied virtually word for word\u201d in its Active Shooter Policy the same year. (Id.)\n                                                   26\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD                Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                  Page 27 of 39 PageID:\n                                                11757\n\n\n\n filed it.22 (ECF No. 256 at 2\u20133 (parties\u2019 discovery dispute letter setting forth Plaintiffs\u2019 position\n\n and discovery request regarding the Active Shooter Policy); ECF No. 339.)\n\n         Furthermore, Plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cnew\u201d evidence fails to alter Judge Shipp\u2019s 2019 decision that\n\n TCA immunity warranted dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims against the Asbury Park\n\n Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (\u201cTo permit\n\n reconsideration when new evidence is available, the moving party must present new evidence that\n\n would alter the disposition of the case.\u201d); Garcia, 2017 WL 3671289, at *1 (\u201cA court will grant a\n\n motion for reconsideration only where a previous decision has overlooked a factual or legal issue\n\n that may alter the disposition of the matter.\u201d). The existence of an allegedly applicable policy or\n\n law does not make officers\u2019 conduct ministerial rather than discretionary. See, e.g., Newark Police\n\n Dep\u2019t, 52 A.3d at 190\u201391 (concluding that statutory arrest mandate for certain domestic violence\n\n situations did not impose ministerial duty preventing TCA immunity for officers who failed to\n\n effect arrest because \u201censuing decisions of a responding officer\u201d entailed discretion, including\n\n whether and how the statute and its mandate applied in a given situation); Thompson v. State of\n\n New Jersey, No. A-1973-13T3, 2015 WL 5511948, at *6 & n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept.\n\n 17, 2015) (per curiam) (rejecting plaintiff\u2019s argument that provisions in Police Training Manual\n\n imposed ministerial duties on police officers in responding to and investigating shots fired and\n\n\n\n 22\n   Plaintiffs do not dispute this timeline but state in their Reply that they \u201chad to wait until discovery was\n completed to bring this matter back before the Court.\u201d (Reply at 2.) Their other filings echo that position.\n (E.g., ECF No. 343 (\u201cPlaintiff requests that expert discovery be completed prior to motions seeking to\n vacate or reconsider the initial dismissal motions . . . .\u201d).) This statement by Plaintiffs offers further support\n for the Court\u2019s discussion below, see infra note 27, that Plaintiffs appear to ultimately seek to place their\n expert\u2019s opinion, rather than the Policy, before the Court as a basis for reconsideration. Furthermore, to the\n extent Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their TAC, see infra Section III.D, the Court would find that this\n constitutes undue delay. See, e.g., Santoro v. Tower Health, No. 24-3173, 2026 WL 2543842, at *6 (3d Cir.\n Aug. 28, 2026) (affirming with-prejudice dismissal of second amended complaint and denial of motion for\n reconsideration and for leave to amend where, inter alia, plaintiffs were given multiple opportunities to\n amend and \u201crel[ied] on facts that could have been pled much earlier,\u201d showing undue delay).\n                                                        27\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD             Document 383 Filed 09/28/26               Page 28 of 39 PageID:\n                                             11758\n\n\n\n explaining that the manual \u201cmerely identifies performance objectives to be completed by police\n\n trainees, and is not a formal code of conduct or performance manual\u201d and that plaintiff \u201cproffer[ed]\n\n no legal precedent supporting [her] assertion\u201d about duty owed by responding and investigating\n\n officers). The instant Policy illustrates why.\n\n         The Active Shooter Policy expressly recognizes that \u201cactive shooter incidents . . . are\n\n sufficiently unique in that their effective handling cannot be totally reduced to standardized and\n\n generic procedures.\u201d (Policy at AP328.) The Policy accordingly sets out seven \u201ctenets,\u201d i.e.,\n\n \u201cresponse guidelines,\u201d that \u201crepresent a means of intervention available to officers\u201d and \u201care not\n\n meant to limit conventional police tactics appropriate to a crisis situation.\u201d (Id.; see also id. at\n\n AP329 (\u201cThe traditional uniform responses of contain, isolate, evacuate and wait for a tactical\n\n response team and Crisis Negotiators may not be adequate or appropriate in an active shooter\n\n incident. The incident commander will need to consider the following [tactics].\u201d (emphasis\n\n added)), AP325 (\u201cIt is the policy of the Asbury Park PD to empower initial responding officers\n\n with the authority and responsibility to take immediate action, consistent with their training and\n\n experience, to contain and, if necessary, to neutralize active shooters.\u201d (emphasis added)).) One of\n\n these tenets is \u201csituational analysis,\u201d whereby officers \u201cmust . . . deci[de] . . . whether the situation\n\n is an active shooter incident, whether an opportunity exists for immediate intervention leaning to\n\n accomplishment of one of the goals listed above, and how responding resources should be\n\n deployed at the scene.\u201d (Id. at AP328\u2013AP329.) This \u201csituational analysis\u201d appears to \u201crequire[] a\n\n significant thoughtful analysis and exercise of personal deliberations regarding a variety of factors\n\n\n\n\n                                                    28\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD                 Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                  Page 29 of 39 PageID:\n                                                 11759\n\n\n\n such that discretionary immunity should attach under the TCA.\u201d Newark Police Dep\u2019t, 52 A.3d at\n\n 190; see id. at 190\u201391.23\n\n            Plaintiffs suggest that the Policy warrants reconsideration because of a footnote in the 2019\n\n Opinion. (See Mot. at 6.) Therein, Judge Shipp noted that, to the extent Plaintiffs alleged that\n\n Asbury Park failed to not only enforce but also enact a proper policy, \u201cOfficer Lawson\u2019s yelling\n\n \u2018shots fired\u2019 instead of \u2018active shooter\u2019 could not have been a ministerial act\u201d performed pursuant\n\n to policy.24 (2019 Op. at 33 n.15.) Plaintiffs recognize that this observation by the Court was not\n\n dispositive. (See Mot. at 13 n.5 (stating that, in their TAC, \u201cPlaintiff[s] pled that . . . Asbury Park\n\n failed to \u2018enact, promulgate and enforce [such policies]\u2019\u201d and that \u201c[t]his pleading\u201d was \u201ca basis\n\n to dismiss the negligence claims, as there could be no ministerial failures absent a policy setting\n\n\n\n 23\n   The Court notes that Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion does not bridge the gap between the conduct alleged in the TAC\n and the \u201cmandated ministerial obligations\u201d they reference in their Motion. (Mot. at 26.) They cite the Policy\n as a whole but nowhere offer pincites, specific provisions, or direct quotations in support of their arguments.\n (See id. at 20, 26.) It is only in their accompanying Counsels\u2019 Certification that they begin to offer such\n specificity, primarily based on other evidence in the record such as depositions and their expert\u2019s report.\n (See Pls. Cert. \u00b6\u00b6 61\u201379); cf. Smith v. Haverfield Int\u2019l Inc., No. 22-3207, 2023 WL 6164368, at *3 (D.N.J.\n Jan. 18, 2023) (\u201c[A]rgument . . . is more appropriately set forth in a legal brief and not an attorney\n certification.\u201d).\n Although Plaintiffs attach over 3,000 pages of evidence to their Motion, their Motion addresses none of it.\n (See Mot.; ECF Nos. 380-3 to 380-5.) They then argue in Reply that \u201c[t]his is not simply about the policy\n provided in discovery. It is about the full breadth of discovery required to address the policy and obligations\n of the Asbury Park officers including depositions, application of the policy, the views of the Asbury Park\n superior official Salerno and expert review\u201d\u2014despite expressly identifying the Active Shooter Policy as\n the \u201cnew evidence\u201d on which their Motion relies (and despite citing none of this evidence in their Motion).\n (Reply at 16 n.2; see, e.g., Mot. at 6, 13, 27.)\n 24\n      In full, this footnote said:\n            Plaintiffs argue that Asbury Park lacks a proper procedure pertaining to active shooter\n            situations. (See TAC \u00b6 41 (alleging that Asbury Park knew and was deliberately indifferent\n            to its lack of procedures pertaining to active shooter situations).) As such, Officer Lawson\u2019s\n            yelling \u201cshots fired\u201d instead of \u201cactive shooter\u201d could not have been a ministerial act\n            performed pursuant to \u201cthe mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of\n            his own judgment,\u201d because, as Plaintiffs themselves aver, there is no policy established\n            regarding such circumstances. Newark Police Dep\u2019t, 52 A.3d at 191.\n (2019 Op. at 33 n.15.)\n\n                                                         29\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 30 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11760\n\n\n\n forth specific obligations\u201d (emphasis added)).) Indeed, Judge Shipp considered and accepted as\n\n true Plaintiffs\u2019 alternative allegations of both the non-existence and non-enforcement of a policy\n\n in reaching his decision. (See, e.g., 2019 Op. at 13 (concluding that Plaintiffs adequately alleged\n\n their Monell claim against the City based on Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that Asbury Park \u201cfailed to\n\n enforce or enact necessary policies related to active shooter situations\u201d).) He found the Asbury\n\n Park Defendants\u2019 conduct discretionary regardless and independent of what he additionally noted\n\n via footnote. (Id. at 33.) The Policy thus does not alter Judge Shipp\u2019s previous conclusion. See\n\n Jones, 2016 WL 819618, at *3 (\u201cIn order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration, . . . the\n\n moving party must set forth the \u2018dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law\u2019 it\n\n believes the Court overlooked when rendering its initial decision.\u201d (quoting Mitchell v. Twp. of\n\n Willingboro Mun. Gov\u2019t, 913 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.N.J. 2012))).\n\n        2.      Use of Force\n\n        For similar reasons, reconsideration is not warranted based on \u201cuse of force\u201d provisions\n\n within the Policy. In addition to finding the Asbury Park Defendants immune under the TCA due\n\n to the discretionary nature of their conduct, Judge Shipp previously concluded that Plaintiffs could\n\n not premise their negligence claims against any Defendant on an alleged duty to use lethal force.\n\n (2019 Op. at 34 (\u201cTo the extent Plaintiffs allege that any Defendants had a duty to use lethal force,\n\n the Court finds no such legal duty exists. . . . For the reasons previously discussed, the Court finds\n\n imposing a duty to use lethal force is contrary to public policy, and would interfere with \u2018[t]he\n\n deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion.\u2019\u201d (second alteration in original) (quoting Town\n\n of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005))).) Plaintiffs argue that \u201cthe Court did not\n\n have the benefit of discovery establishing that the use of lethal force is required, if necessary, in\n\n\n\n\n                                                  30\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD               Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                  Page 31 of 39 PageID:\n                                               11761\n\n\n\n an active shooter situation and that all national policies on active shooter set forth this mandate.\u201d\n\n (Mot. at 5.)\n\n         However, Plaintiffs alleged as much in their TAC, which was filed well before discovery\n\n commenced. They alleged, for example, that the Asbury Park responding officers failed to use\n\n lethal force \u201cas mandated,\u201d including as required under \u201clocal and nationwide police standards.\u201d\n\n (TAC \u00b6\u00b6 172, 197.) Judge Shipp therefore already considered and accepted those allegations as\n\n true pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), determined that dismissal was appropriate, and concluded that\n\n Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims could not proceed to the extent they were premised on a duty to use\n\n lethal force.25 (See, e.g., id. \u00b6\u00b6 172 (alleging that Defendant Lawson acted \u201c[i]n a gross disregard\n\n of police procedure and policy\u201d by \u201cfail[ing] to take Seidle down by the use of lethal force as\n\n mandated under the use of force guidelines and as expected in any situation where there is an\n\n active shooting\u201d (emphasis added)), 173 (alleging that Defendant Lawson had \u201csufficient\n\n time . . . to use deadly force against Seidle, as required in an active shooter situation\u201d and that\n\n \u201c[t]he use of deadly force would have either prevented any of the first round of shots or some of\n\n them\u201d (emphasis added)), 429 (alleging that Defendant Christie failed \u201cto neutralize the threat of\n\n harm to Tamara by shooting Seidle once he began the second round of shots as required under the\n\n AG guidelines for the use of deadly force\u201d (emphasis added)), 439 (same as to Defendant\n\n Griswold), 445 (same as to Defendant Crawford); see also id. \u00b6\u00b6 41 (alleging \u201cthe need to\n\n neutralize by death or otherwise the shooter upon contact\u201d as part of \u201cthe handling of an active\n\n\n\n 25\n    Plaintiffs assert in a footnote that they \u201c[are] not claiming and never ha[ve] claimed that there is a \u2018duty\u2019\n to use lethal force.\u201d (Mot. at 15 n.7.) This representation is contradicted by their assertions throughout their\n TAC and briefing. (See, e.g., Reply at 14 (\u201cThe Court\u2019s finding that there was \u2018no duty\u2019 to shoot Seidle\n flies in the face of every recognized authority on the subject and every policy both local and national.\u201d).)\n Furthermore, Judge Shipp\u2019s previous decision noted that Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims could not proceed\n \u201c[t]o the extent\u201d they depended on such a duty. (2019 Op. at 34.) If Plaintiffs agree that there is no such\n duty, there is no basis to reconsider that conclusion.\n                                                       31\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26              Page 32 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11762\n\n\n\n shooter/rapid responder/hostage taking situation\u201d), 175 (\u201cThe [New Jersey] Attorney General\n\n guidelines state that an officer may use deadly force when there is a reasonable belief that such\n\n action is immediately necessary to protect the officer or another person from imminent danger of\n\n death or serious bodily harm.\u201d), 176 (\u201cThe Police Training Commission guidelines, which are used\n\n to train all new police recruits, lists as a \u2018Performance Objective\u2019 for active shootings in a school\n\n that the priority of law enforcement is to \u2018Stop shooter- as soon as possible,\u2019 which means to\n\n neutralize the threat immediately by shooting the suspect.\u201d), 197 (alleging that Asbury Park\n\n responding officers acted contrary to what was \u201crequired under mandated use of force policy and\n\n local and nationwide police standards for the handling of the situation\u201d), 199 (same), 403 (alleging\n\n that \u201cthe responding officers were permitted by the AG guidelines to use deadly force\u201d).) In other\n\n words, Plaintiffs purport to offer evidence that simply bears out what they allege throughout their\n\n TAC.\n\n        Plaintiffs agree that the TAC contained such allegations. They contend the TAC already\n\n \u201cpled that the use of lethal force was necessary to take down the shooter\u201d and \u201cpled that protocol\n\n states that neutralizing the threat is a primary and appropriate response to an active shooter.\u201d (Mot.\n\n at 3 (citing TAC \u00b6\u00b6 172\u201376); Reply at 14.) They expressly disagree with the conclusion Judge\n\n Shipp reached based on what was already before him. (See Reply at 14 (\u201cThe Court\u2019s finding that\n\n there was \u2018no duty\u2019 to shoot Seidle flies in the face of every recognized authority on the subject\n\n and every policy both local and national. . . . At the time the Court made its original findings, none\n\n of the discovery on this issue had taken place. Plaintiff pled it, and pled that protocol states that\n\n neutralizing the threat is a primary and appropriate response to an active shooter. Plaintiff did plead\n\n that policy requires a responder to shoot an active shooter.\u201d)); Warner, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (\u201cA\n\n party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court\u2019s decision, and\n\n\n                                                   32\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD            Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 33 of 39 PageID:\n                                            11763\n\n\n\n recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original\n\n decision fails to carry the moving party\u2019s burden.\u201d). For the reasons explained hereinabove,\n\n reconsideration is not warranted based on alleged \u201cproofs\u201d of allegations already considered and\n\n accepted as true in the original decision. (Mot. at 13.) Evidence is not \u201cnew\u201d when it is repetitive\n\n or cumulative of what was already considered by the Court, and it does not support reconsideration\n\n when it would not have altered the basis for the Court\u2019s prior decision. Reconsideration is\n\n permitted \u201conly when \u2018dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law\u2019 were presented\n\n to the court but were overlooked.\u201d Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507; see Bowers, 130\n\n F.Supp.2d at 612 (\u201cThe word \u2018overlooked\u2019 is the operative term in the Rule. Mere disagreement\n\n with a decision of the District Court should normally be raised through the appellate process and\n\n is inappropriate on a motion for reargument.\u201d (citation omitted)).\n\n        Moreover, the Active Shooter Policy does not contain a mandate to use lethal force, so it\n\n does not alter the previous outcome. Most obviously, the Policy does not change Judge Shipp\u2019s\n\n conclusion that no such duty exists so as to support a negligence claim. It also does not alter his\n\n conclusion that the Asbury Park Defendants\u2019 conduct was discretionary. See Thompson, 2015 WL\n\n 5511948, at *5\u20136 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 59:2-3, :3-2, :5-4; Wuethrich v. Delia, 382 A.2d 929,\n\n 930 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (per curiam)); see also id. at *5 (\u201cWhen both liability and\n\n immunity exist, immunity prevails.\u201d (quoting Dickson ex rel. Duberson v. Township of Hamilton,\n\n 946 A.2d 617, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008))). The Policy expressly confers discretion\n\n with respect to the use of force, as even Plaintiffs acknowledge. (Policy at AP325\u2013AP326 (\u201cIt is\n\n the goal of the Asbury Park PD to intervene in active shooter situations to neutralize the threat by\n\n preventing access to potential victims and to rescue injured persons and potential victims. . . . This\n\n may include arrest, containment, or use of deadly force.\u201d (emphasis added)), AP328 (\u201cUnder New\n\n\n                                                  33\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD               Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                 Page 34 of 39 PageID:\n                                               11764\n\n\n\n Jersey law, a law enforcement officer can use deadly force as long as the officer reasonably\n\n believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons.\u201d\n\n (emphasis added)); Mot. at 15 n.7 (\u201c[T]he decision to use lethal or deadly force is permitted under\n\n the Attorney Generals Use of Force policy and Asbury Park\u2019s use of force and active shooter\n\n policies.\u201d (emphasis added)); Pls. Cert. \u00b6 27 (\u201cThe use of deadly force is explicitly authorized to\n\n be used as necessary in the [Active Shooter Policy].\u201d (emphasis added)).)26 This comports with\n\n Judge Shipp\u2019s conclusion, as well as with public policy and common sense, that \u201cno such legal\n\n duty [to use lethal force] exists.\u201d (2019 Op. at 34; see id. at 22 (\u201c[Plaintiffs\u2019] position promotes the\n\n notion that police officers should shoot first and ask questions later and pushes the Court to support\n\n a policy under which lethal force is not merely condoned, but affirmatively required. The Court is\n\n loath to endorse such a position . . . .\u201d).)\n\n         To the extent Plaintiffs recognize the absence of a mandate to use lethal force yet\n\n nonetheless seek reconsideration, they appear ultimately concerned not with the Policy but with\n\n the opinions of their expert and issues of admissibility.27 Plaintiffs assert they \u201cseek[] to offer\n\n\n 26\n    The Prosecutor\u2019s Office apparently examined \u201cwhether deadly force should have been utilized against\n Philip Seidle\u201d as part of its investigation into the law enforcement response on June 16, 2015, per the report\n Plaintiffs submitted in support of their Motion. (Monmouth County Investigation Report at 15.) The\n Prosecutor\u2019s Office concluded that, \u201c[b]ased on a thorough review of the evidence from this incident, the\n decision not to utilize deadly force against Philip Seidle was reasonable\u201d and \u201c[t]he responding officers\u2019\n ability to use force against Seidle was limited because of two (2) overarching and fundamental principles\n in use of force assessments.\u201d (Id. (emphasis added).)\n First, \u201c[o]fficers are prohibited by State law and policy from using lethal force against a person, or shooting\n a person, who could be injurious only to themselves,\u201d and, second, \u201c[e]ven during the brief period when\n Seidle was discharging his gun and not threatening suicide, responding officers had no ability or opportunity\n to shoot Seidle without creating a substantial risk to innocent civilians in this densely populated\n neighborhood.\u201d (Id. at 15\u201316.) This aligns with the Policy\u2019s statement that \u201ca law enforcement officer can\n use deadly force as long as the officer reasonably believes that the force employed creates no substantial\n risk of injury to innocent persons.\u201d (Policy at AP328.)\n 27\n    Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel\u2019s Certification suggests that their request for reconsideration is largely if not\n ultimately founded not on the Policy but on their expert\u2019s opinions regarding the duties and failures of the\n\n\n                                                       34\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD               Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                  Page 35 of 39 PageID:\n                                               11765\n\n\n\n expert testimony on policies which were not adhered to or understood, including the ability to use\n\n deadly force,\u201d and that \u201c[t]o prohibit plaintiff from establishing what is a national and local\n\n standard is contrary to the rules of evidence.\u201d (Mot. at 5; see id. at 27 (\u201cDiscovery reveals that the\n\n use of deadly force can and should be used in an appropriate situation. For the expert not to be able\n\n to include this critical piece of the policy at trial would amount to a distortion and inaccurate\n\n presentation of policy, which would clearly not be in the interests of justice.\u201d); Reply at 15 (\u201c[The\n\n Court\u2019s prior decision] makes it virtually impossible to present this case on the merits \u2013 that law\n\n enforcement had various tools and protocols at their disposal to stop Seidle and save Tamara,\n\n including the use of deadly force.\u201d).) The Court does not consider the previous decisions, at the\n\n pleadings stage, to be evidentiary rulings. Nor do such concerns provide a basis for\n\n reconsideration.28\n\n         Finally, Judge Shipp dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence-based claims in Counts 13 and 14,\n\n see supra note 6, as derivative of Plaintiffs\u2019 dismissed negligence claims in Count 10. (2019 Op.\n\n at 36 (\u201c[B]ecause the Court dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims, any derivative claim,\n\n including the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, must also be dismissed.\u201d).) Plaintiffs\n\n make no separate argument as to their derivative negligence claims and seek reinstatement thereof\n\n based on their other arguments. (See Mot. at 26 (asserting that, \u201cin the event the negligence claims\n\n\n Asbury Park Defendants. (See Pls. Cert. \u00b6\u00b6 61\u201379.) Such opinions also do not affect the previous decision.\n See Jerkins ex rel. Jerkins v. Anderson, 922 A.2d 1279, 1284 (N.J. 2007) (\u201cWhether a duty of care exists is\n a question of law that must be decided by the court.\u201d); Coleman v. Martinez, 254 A.3d 632, 648\u201349 (N.J.\n 2021) (\u201c[W]hether a defendant owes a legal duty to another and the scope of that duty are generally\n questions of law for the court to decide.\u201d); Est. of Campagna v. Pleasant Point Props., LLC, 234 A.3d 348,\n 359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020) (\u201cWe are not bound by the opinion of plaintiffs\u2019 expert that the\n recognition of such a duty is legally required because it is reflective of industry practices and customs. An\n expert\u2019s opinion on a question of law is neither appropriate nor probative. It is the exclusive province of\n the court to decide questions of law . . . \u201d (cleaned up)).\n 28\n    Again, the Court reiterates that this Opinion relates only to Plaintiffs\u2019 dismissed negligence claims against\n the Asbury Park Defendants and should not be read as expressing any view about Plaintiffs\u2019 Monell claim\n against the City, which remains pending.\n                                                       35\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD           Document 383 Filed 09/28/26             Page 36 of 39 PageID:\n                                           11766\n\n\n\n are reinstated,\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 emotional distress and Portee claim \u201cmust also be reinstated\u201d).) Absent\n\n any reason to disturb the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims, for the reasons explained\n\n hereinabove, reconsideration is improper as to Plaintiffs\u2019 derivative negligence claims.\n\n         D.       AMENDMENT OF THE TAC\n\n         As stated, see supra note 1, Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion is titled \u201cBrief in Support of Motion to\n\n Vacate, Modify or Reverse Interlocutory Order,\u201d and, as evidenced by the foregoing, Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n substantive focus in their Motion is reconsideration. However, their Notice of Motion includes an\n\n alternative or additional request: \u201cMotion to Vacate, Modify or Reverse Interlocutory Order or\n\n Permit Motion to File an Amended Complaint.\u201d (ECF No. 380 (emphasis added).) The Court will\n\n briefly address Plaintiffs\u2019 imprecise, offhanded, and contradictory request regarding amendment\n\n of the TAC.\n\n         Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion contains three passing and perfunctory assertions, without any\n\n developed argumentation, that they should be permitted to amend the TAC. (Mot. at 27 (stating\n\n that the Court should \u201cpermit the [TAC] to either be amended to permit the negligence claims to\n\n proceed or reconsider and reinstate those claims\u201d); see id. at 19, 26.) However, they elsewhere\n\n recognize that, in order to seek such amendment, they would need to file a proper Rule 15(a)\n\n motion with a proposed amended complaint attached. (See, e.g., Reply at 1 (\u201c[A] motion for an\n\n amended complaint . . . would then require the proposed amended pleading . . . .\u201d).) Plaintiffs\n\n further advise that they simply seek to \u201cleave[] open the remedy of amendment\u201d but maintain that\n\n \u201cthere is little necessity for an amended complaint\u201d because \u201cthe pleadings were and remain\n\n sufficient.\u201d (Id. at 1, 7.)\n\n         In Plaintiffs\u2019 Reply, they appear to seek slightly different relief. Rather than presently\n\n asking to amend the TAC, they seem to ask to file a future motion to make that request. (Id. at 19\n\n                                                 36\n\fCase 3:17-cv-04428-RK-JBD              Document 383 Filed 09/28/26                 Page 37 of 39 PageID:\n                                              11767\n\n\n\n (asking the Court to \u201creconsider and reinstate\u201d negligence claims against Asbury Park Defendants\n\n \u201cor permit plaintiff[s] to file a motion with a proposed amended pleading to amend the\n\n complaint\u201d); see id. at 1.) Put another way, Plaintiffs make a passing request for leave to move for\n\n leave to amend, rather than presently requesting leave to amend.29\n\n         It is thus ultimately unclear whether Plaintiffs seek any additional or alternative relief other\n\n than reconsideration. Any request they make is cursory and undeveloped. It is \u201cwell-settled\u201d that\n\n \u201cissues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed\n\n argumentation, are deemed\u201d forfeited. Gladysiewski v. Allegheny Energy Serv. Corp., 282 F.\n\n App\u2019x 979, 981 (3d Cir. 2008); see Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763\n\n (3d Cir. 2023) (\u201cA passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this\n\n court.\u201d).\n\n         Albeit confusing and undeveloped, to the extent Plaintiffs request to amend the TAC, thus\n\n constituting the fifth complaint in this action, such a request is denied. Plaintiffs fail to attach \u201ca\n\n copy of the proposed amended pleading\u201d as required under Local Rule 15.1(a); fail to analyze the\n\n necessary Rule 15(a) factors, many of which present a further barrier to amendment; and fail to\n\n justify reconsideration for overlapping reasons. L. Civ. R. 15.1(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see\n\n Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 149\u201350 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that district courts\u2019 discretion\n\n\n 29\n   Plaintiffs appear to recognize that Rule 15(a) is not the proper vehicle for reinstating claims that were\n dismissed with prejudice, and amendment would be futile, as a matter of law, without reconsideration and\n reinstatement of those claims. See, e.g., McAdory v. M.N.S. & Assocs., No. 17-777, 2018 WL 1256482, at\n *1 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2018) (\u201cGiven that the dismissal . . . was with prejudice, Plaintiff\u2019s current motion [for\n leave to amend] is more appropriately considered a motion for reconsideration . . . . I construe the motion\n as a motion for reconsideration and I deny it.\u201d); cf. Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27\n (D.D.C. 2001) (denying Rule 59(e) motion to vacate with-prejudice dismissal and explaining that, before a\n district court can consider a motion for leave to amend a dismissed complaint, \u201cthe Court must first rule\n upon\u201d the motion for reconsideration); Jang v. Bos. Sci. 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