Case 2:24-cv-01744-JLR Document 58 Filed 07/07/26 Page 1 of 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 ANCHORAGE LENDING CA LLC, a Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR 9 Delaware limited liability company, PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 10 Plaintiff, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 11 v. Noting Date: July 7, 2026 SCOTT D. BENNETT, an individual; 12 KATHRYN A. BENNETT, an individual; 13 SCATE LABS, INC., a Washington corporation; TETON DIGITAL, LLC, a 14 Wyoming limited liability company; and TRINITY 1 LLC, a Wyoming limited 15 liability company, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Miller Nash LLP Plaintiff’s Reply Supporting Motion for Reconsideration 605 5th Ave S, Ste 900 (Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR) Seattle, WA 98104 206.624.8300 | Fax: 206.340.9599 Case 2:24-cv-01744-JLR Document 58 Filed 07/07/26 Page 2 of 6 1 The Opposition confirms reconsideration is warranted because Defendants never dispute 2 the Motion’s (ECF 53; “MFR”) grounds: that the Order (1) only addressed two of six badges of 3 fraud proven against the Bitcoin Transfer; (2) analyzed neither the badges nor the insider- 4 preference evidence against the Money Transfers; and (3) never applied the RCW 19.40.081(7)(a) 5 burden-shift after finding “indicia of fraudulent intent.” Fully briefed, dispositive theories the 6 Order did not reach are “matters . . . overlooked.” LCR 7(h)(2). 7 Rather than engage those grounds, Defendants re-argue the merits under the wrong 8 standard: the “substantive evidentiary burden” they invoke is Sedwick v. Gwinn’s “clear and 9 satisfactory proof” standard. Opp. at 2 & n.4. The 2017 UVTA amendments superseded that 10 standard: preponderance governs every transfer and defense at issue. RCW 19.40.041(3); ECF 53 11 at 2. 12 I. The Bitcoin Transfer 13 A. Absent badges cannot rebut the six badges of fraud present 14 The Opposition, like Defendants’ prior brief, leaves five of Anchorage’s six badges 15 undisputed, contesting only badge (b), stating “Scate did not retain ‘possession or control’ of the 16 Bitcoins ‘after the transfer’ to Scott” without elaborating further. ECF 33 at 22–23; ECF 42 at 10; 17 ECF 53 at 4–5. Defendants attack badges Anchorage never lodged against the Bitcoin Transfer 18 (litigation; all assets; solvency; lienor assets). Opp. at 3. 19 The UVTA’s badges are non-exclusive: “The proper inquiry is whether the badges of 20 fraud are present, not whether some factors are absent.” In re Kern, 2021 WL 4071848, at *15 21 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2021) (unpublished); Douglas v. Hill, 148 Wn. App. 760, 768 (2009); In 22 re Acequia, Inc., 34 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1994). 23 Defendants’ solvency evidence goes only to badge (i), not among Anchorage’s six badges. 24 Opp. at 2–3; ECF 33 at 15–22. Courts regularly void transfers as actually fraudulent while 25 accepting a debtor’s claimed solvency. E.g., In re Livecchi, 2014 WL 6668886, at 11–14 (Bankr. 26 W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2014) (unpublished). Miller Nash LLP Plaintiff’s Reply Supporting Motion for Reconsideration - 1 605 5th Ave S, Ste 900 (Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR) Seattle, WA 98104 206.624.8300 | Fax: 206.340.9599 Case 2:24-cv-01744-JLR Document 58 Filed 07/07/26 Page 3 of 6 1 B. Defendants’ “ordinary course” defense fails 2 Defendants concede they made no good faith or REV showing: Scott, they say, did not 3 “need[] to prove a defense.” Opp. at 4. Instead, they raise an “ordinary course” defense under 4 RCW 19.40.081(6)(b) for the first time; this was absent from their summary judgment brief 5 (ECF 38) and untimely now. Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th 6 Cir. 2000). It also fails textually: .081(6) applies only to insider preference claims “under RCW 7 19.40.051(2),” not to actual fraud under RCW 19.40.041(1)(a), Anchorage’s only theory against 8 the Bitcoin Transfer. Even so, Defendants cite no evidence that an unrecorded Bitcoin transfer to 9 Scate’s CEO was “ordinary course.” 10 The unperformed burden shifting remains dispositive. Once the Court found “indicia of 11 fraudulent intent” (Order at 8), the burden shifts to Scott for the required good faith and REV. 12 RCW 19.40.081(7)(a), (8). Defendants do not defend the Order’s reading of Suess or dispute that 13 a distribution provides no value as a matter of law. ECF 53 at 5. 14 C. The WBCA does not apply 15 Defendants’ RCW 23B.06.400(7) supersession argument – absent from ECF 38 – fails 16 three ways. First, the WBCA governs claims by a corporation: RCW 23B.08.310 makes directors 17 liable to the corporation for unlawful distributions; a judgment creditor like Anchorage cannot sue 18 under it. Metropolitan dismissed a bankruptcy trustee’s constructive fraud claim against 19 shareholders related “to the unlawful nature of a stock dividend” because the trustee’s “sole 20 causes of action relating” to distributions was the WBCA. 347 B.R. 406, 410–11 (Bankr. E.D. 21 Wash. 2006). Only Scate could bring WBCA claims against Scott. 22 Second, the supersession clause applies to statutes addressing “the legality of 23 distributions”; actual-fraud turns on Scate’s intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, not on 24 corporate-law solvency tests. Third, no court has adopted Defendants’ reading, whereas 25 Washington courts do cite WBCA violations to support UVTA liability. Suess, 2022 WL 26 14297047, at 13. Straightshot (Opp. at 4) is no better: it rejected a WBCA unlawful-distribution Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration - 2 Miller Nash LLP (Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR) 605 5th Ave S, Ste 900 Seattle, WA 98104 206.624.8300 | Fax: 206.340.9599 4930-7312-2235.1 Case 2:24-cv-01744-JLR Document 58 Filed 07/07/26 Page 4 of 6 1 claim for lack of insolvency evidence while separately adjudicating the fraudulent-transfer claim 2 on its merits, treating the statutes as distinct, not superseded. 2011 WL 1770930, at *2–3. 3 II. The Money Transfers 4 The Opposition concedes Anchorage’s reconsideration ground by never addressing (1) the 5 eight unrebutted badges of fraud (including Scott ordering QuickBooks edits “before we share our 6 financials with Anchorage,” ECF 35-7); (2) the Order’s findings establishing every insider- 7 preference element (ECF 53 at 3–4); or (3) that unrebutted badges establish actual intent as a 8 matter of law. In re O’Gorman, 115 F.4th 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2024). 9 Instead, Defendants assert a netting theory to defend the Money Transfers: Teton and 10 Trinity “returned more than they received,” so there is “nothing to void.” Opp. at 6. Their netting 11 theory fails under the very statute they quote. RCW 19.40.081(6)(a) protects an insider only “To 12 the extent the insider gave new value . . . after the transfer was made.” The exhibit Defendants 13 cite shows the opposite: money came in before it went out. Teton wired Scate $30,000 on 14 December 4, 2023, and Scate wired it back the next day. ECF 35-41 at 2 (counterparties are Teton 15 and Scate Labs, not Trinity). 16 If Scate received more money than it gave the Successors when it made a Money Transfer, 17 Scate paid (preferred) an antecedent debt instead of paying creditors. If the Money Transfer paid 18 no debt, then Scate received nothing at the time of each transfer, and later inflows supply no 19 value. Kreidler v. Cascade Nat’l Ins. Co., 179 Wn. App. 851, 864 n.5 (2014). Either way, the 20 transfers are voidable. And the insider-preference theory has no REV element, so the Order’s 21 “disputed fact” finding cannot preclude summary judgment. Order at 15–16; ECF 53 at 3. 22 Defendants’ double-recovery objection confuses remedy with liability: the value offset 23 operates “Notwithstanding voidability” and reduces only “the amount of the liability on the 24 judgment.” RCW 19.40.081(4); Thompson v. Hanson, 168 Wn.2d 738, 749–52 (2009). 25 RCW 19.40.071(1)(a) caps collection, not voidability; and the Court preserved setoff for this 26 purpose. Order at 11. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration - 3 Miller Nash LLP (Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR) 605 5th Ave S, Ste 900 Seattle, WA 98104 206.624.8300 | Fax: 206.340.9599 4930-7312-2235.1 Case 2:24-cv-01744-JLR Document 58 Filed 07/07/26 Page 5 of 6 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 The Court should (1) adjudicate the actual fraud and insider-preference theories that each 3 void the Money Transfers; (2) apply all six badges of fraud to the Bitcoin Transfer; and 4 (3) complete the RCW 19.40.081(7)(a) burden-shift for good faith and REV. 5 DATED this 7th day of July 2026. MILLER NASH LLP 6 7 /s/ Jesús Miguel Palomares 8 Jesús Miguel Palomares, WSB No. 51858 /s/ Edward T. Decker 9 Edward T. Decker, WSB No. 57841 /s/ Elena M. Thompson 10 Elena M. Thompson, WSB No. 59626 605 5th Ave. S., Suite 900 11 Seattle, WA 98104 12 Telephone: (206) 624-8300 Fax: (206) 340-0599 13 Email: jesus.palomares@millernash.com edward.decker@millernash.com 14 elena.thompson@millernash.com Attorneys for Plaintiff 15 Anchorage Lending CA LLC 16 I certify that this memorandum contains 1,042 words, in compliance with the Court’s Scheduling 17 Order (ECF 54). 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration - 4 Miller Nash LLP (Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR) 605 5th Ave S, Ste 900 Seattle, WA 98104 206.624.8300 | Fax: 206.340.9599 4930-7312-2235.1 Case 2:24-cv-01744-JLR Document 58 Filed 07/07/26 Page 6 of 6 1 DECLARATION OF SERVICE 2 I, Edgar Y. Rosales, hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 3 States that on this 7th day of July, 2026, I caused the foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of the 4 Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of the same to all registered users. 5 EXECUTED in Vancouver, Washington on this 7th day of July, 2026. 6 /s/ Edgar Y. Rosales 7 Edgar Y. Rosales 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration - 5 Miller Nash LLP (Case No. 2:24-cv-01744-JLR) 605 5th Ave S, Ste 900 Seattle, WA 98104 206.624.8300 | Fax: 206.340.9599 4930-7312-2235.1