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 Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 1 of 37 PageID 260\n\n\n\n\n                        IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                        FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n                                  DALLAS DIVISION\n\nALVAH JOHNSON, MICHAEL PIERCE, and \u00a7\nTHEODORE BRAMBLE,                  \u00a7\n                                   \u00a7\n       Plaintiffs,                 \u00a7\n                                   \u00a7                         Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-01574-E\nv.                                 \u00a7\n                                   \u00a7\nDALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT \u00a7\nd/b/a PARKLAND HEALTH & HOSPITAL \u00a7\nSYSTEM, and MICHAEL WOOD, in his   \u00a7\nindividual capacity,               \u00a7\n\n       Defendants.\n\n                          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER\n\n       Before the Court is Defendants Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health &\n\nHospital System\u2019s (\u201cParkland\u201d) and Michael Wood\u2019s (\u201cWood\u201d) (collectively referred as\n\n\u201cDefendants\u201d) Motion for Partial Dismissal for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiffs\n\nAlvah Johnson (\u201cJohnson\u201d), Michael Pierce (\u201cPierce\u201d), and Theodore Bramble (\u201cBramble\u201d)\n\n(collectively \u201cPlaintiffs\u201d) allege various claims of intentional race discrimination against Parkland\n\nand Wood. Having considered the motion, briefing, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS\n\nParkland\u2019s motion to dismiss.\n\n\n                                        I.   BACKGROUND\n\n       The following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7). This\n\nlawsuit arises from purportedly racially discriminatory employment actions concerning three\n\nBlack individuals employed by Parkland. Defendant Parkland is a statutorily-created hospital\n\ndistrict located in Dallas, Texas. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. \u00a7 281.002. At the time of\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                              Page 1 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                         Page 2 of 37 PageID 261\n\n\n\nthis lawsuit and its underlying events, Defendant Wood was an employee of Parkland, and in a\n\nmanagement position over Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 7 at 3). All three Plaintiffs allege various charges\n\nof race-based discrimination during their employ by Parkland. Further, all Plaintiffs assert that\n\n\u201cDefendant\u2019s custom or policy of discriminating against Black employees with regard to\n\npromotional opportunities was the moving force\u201d behind each of their alleged constructive\n\ndischarges. (ECF No. 7 at 5, 8, 11).\n\nA.      Johnson\u2019s Employment\n\n        From March 2013 until November 26, 2021, Johnson worked at Parkland as a Stationary\n\nEngineer Supervisor. (ECF No. 7 at 3). In May 2021, Johnson applied for the Central Utility Plant\n\n(\u201cCUP\u201d) Manager, which Johnson asserts was a position that he was qualified for\u2014having\n\npreviously served as interim CUP Manager on four different occasions. (ECF No. 7 at 3). Johnson\n\nstates that he was promised an interview with Senior Director of Facilities Support Services Wood\n\nand CUP Director Angelica Flores because he was an internal candidate. (ECF No. 7 at 4). After\n\ninterviewing with Wood, Johnson was told he would have to complete a supplemental interview\n\nprior to being considered for the position. (ECF No. 7 at 4). However, Johnson\u2019s supplemental\n\ninterview never occurred as he was informed that Defendants had already decided to hire a non-\n\nBlack individual\u2014a hiring decision Plaintiffs allege Wood played a key role in. (ECF No. 7 at 4).1\n\n        On July 22, 2021, Johnson wrote a letter to the Parkland Board of Managers\u2014the\n\ngoverning body which makes policy for Parkland\u2014and to Human Resources, to express \u201chis\n\nconcerns regarding a custom or policy of racial disparity in promotion selections within the\n\n\n\n\n1\n Plaintiffs do not plead a date upon which Johnson was not selected for Central Utility Plant Manager position. (See\ngenerally ECF No. 7).\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                           Page 2 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                           Page 3 of 37 PageID 262\n\n\n\ncompany.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 4). As alleged, Johnson never received a response from any Parkland\n\nofficials regarding his race-based concerns. (ECF No. 7 at 4).\n\n           On November 26, 2021, Johnson alleges that his working conditions \u201cwere so intolerable\n\nas to compel him to resign based on Defendants failure to promote him to management level\n\npositions based on his race, Black; his observation that other Black employees were also subjected\n\nto a custom or policy of race-based promotion practices; and since Parkland never took any\n\nmeasures to remedy the deprivation of his rights, specifically, its unlawful promotion practices\n\nbased on race.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 5).\n\nB.        Pierce\u2019s Employment\n\n           Pierce worked as a Director of Environmental Safety and Hospital Safety Officer at\n\nParkland for forty-five years, ending in July 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 5). Pierce asserts he \u201cexperienced\n\ndiscrimination based on race in 2015 when he was initially passed over for the Director role\u201d and\n\nthe position was given to a White employee with less experience. (ECF No. 7 at 5). Eventually,\n\nParkland promoted Pierce to the Director role. (ECF No. 7 at 6). 2\n\n           During his employment, Pierce voiced his concerns about the \u201ccustom or policy of racial\n\ndiscrimination in promotions\u201d to both Human Resources and the Parkland Board of Managers.\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 5). Pierce had telephone conferences with Parkland\u2019s Chief Operating Officer\n\n(\u201cCOO\u201d) and Chief Executive Officer (\u201cCEO\u201d) regarding the alleged discrimination policies and\n\npractices in Parkland\u2019s promotions decisions. (ECF No. 7 at 6). These conferences included reports\n\nthat Black employees had to wait longer to be selected for promotions, while unqualified White\n\ncandidates were selected instead. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Subsequently, Parkland\u2019s CEO set up a panel\n\nto address such policies and procedures. (ECF No. 7 at 6). During the panel, one Black employee\u2014\n\n\n2\n    Pierce does not allege the dates upon which he was passed over for promotion nor promoted to the Director role.\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                             Page 3 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24              Page 4 of 37 PageID 263\n\n\n\nVivian Johnson\u2014stated that it took her to ten to fifteen years to receive her Senior Vice President\n\nposition, as opposed to a White employee who was promoted in less than two years from Director\n\nto Senior Vice President. (ECF No. 7 at 6).\n\n        Pierce also reported to human resources that Wood was calling him and Bramble \u201cboy\u201d\n\nand requested that they make him stop. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Pierce eventually felt his working\n\nconditions were so intolerable as to compel him to resign, with a final date of employment of July\n\n31, 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 8).\n\nC.      Bramble\u2019s Employment\n\n        From 2016 to May 2023, Bramble worked at Parkland as a Senior Environmental Safety\n\nCoordinator. (ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble applied for the Director of Environmental Safety position\n\naround July 28, 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble asserts Human Resources told him that he was\n\nqualified for the position because he held a Certified Healthcare Safety Professional (\u201cCHSP\u201d),\n\nand he had previously served as the interim Director. (ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble alleges that his\n\nsupervisor\u2014Wood\u2014informed him that the position required eight- or nine-years\u2019 experience, but\n\nthis requirement was not posted on any job listing. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Bramble alleges that he met\n\nthis purported job requirement, as he had previously worked in healthcare safety and as a hazmat\n\ntech and hazmat foreman. (ECF No. 7 at 8\u20139).\n\n        As alleged, Wood chose the panelists for interviews for the Director of Environmental\n\nSafety position and had the authority to veto the panelists\u2019 decisions. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Only one\n\nof the panelists chosen to conduct Bramble\u2019s interview was in a Director role. (ECF No. 7 at 9).\n\nTwo members of the panel were co-workers on the same level as Bramble and were allegedly in\n\ncompetition with Bramble for this position. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Parkland selected a non-Black\n\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                            Page 4 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                           Page 5 of 37 PageID 264\n\n\n\ninduvial with allegedly less qualifications and tenure than Bramble for this Director position. (ECF\n\nNo. 7 at 10). 3\n\n           Bramble also alleges that two positions were created in two departments within the facility\n\nin which he worked, the Sustainability Department and the Emergency Management Department,\n\nand as he was never made aware of these positions, he was denied the opportunity to apply for\n\nthem. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Bramble asserts both positions were filled by white individuals with less\n\ntenure than Bramble. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Bramble asserts that he was misled by Wood, who had\n\nstated that new positions could not be created. (ECF No. 7 at 10).\n\n           In or around September 2021, Bramble asserts he reported disparate treatment based on his\n\nrace to Parkland\u2019s Human Resources department, alleging that Black employees in his department\n\nwere not given management positions. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Shortly thereafter, Bramble had two\n\nphone calls with John Proctor, who sits on Parkland\u2019s Board of Managers, to discuss \u201cParkland\u2019s\n\nrace-based customs and policies with regard to promotions.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 10\u201311). Bramble\n\npleads his concerns were never addressed, nor were any remedial measures taken. (ECF No. 7 at\n\n11).\n\n           Bramble asserts he received an unwarranted written warning on January 20, 2022. (ECF\n\nNo. 7 at 11). That same day, Bramble asserts he contacted Human Resources to express that he\n\nwas experiencing retaliation for lodging his discrimination complaint. (ECF No. 7 at 11). Bramble\n\nwas subsequently required to attend weekly meetings regarding his performance, and his work was\n\nsubject to close supervision. (ECF No. 7 at 11).\n\n           In May 2023, Bramble asserts that\u2014after \u201chaving experienced being called \u2018boy,\u2019 having\n\nreceived an unwarranted and retaliatory disciplinary warning and monitoring of his work, having\n\n\n3\n    Bramble does not provide a date upon which he was not selected for Director of Environmental Safety position.\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                            Page 5 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24             Page 6 of 37 PageID 265\n\n\n\nbeen denied promotions and promotional opportunities based on his race, and due to being\n\nsubjected to and observing Defendant Parkland\u2019s discriminatory customs or policies with regard\n\nto the promotion of Black employees,\u201d\u2014he felt compelled to resign from employment. (ECF No.\n\n7 at 11).\n\nD.      Procedural History\n\n        Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on July 13, 2023. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs filed their\n\nAmended Complaint\u2014the operative complaint on which they proceed\u2014on November 20, 2023.\n\n(ECF No. 7). In their complaint, they allege twenty-two causes of action under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983,\n\nTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Texas Employment Discrimination Act.:\n\n        (i) employment discrimination \u2013 promotions & constructive discharge against Parkland;\n        (ii) employment discrimination \u2013 promotion as to Johnson against Wood;\n        (iii) race discrimination \u2013 promotion as to Bramble against Wood;\n        (iv) employment discrimination \u2013 retaliation as to Bramble against Wood;\n        (v) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Pierce against Wood;\n        (vi) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Bramble against Wood;\n        (vii) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Johnson against Wood;\n        (viii) employment discrimination \u2013 failure to adopt policies against Parkland;\n        (ix) employment discrimination \u2013 failure to discipline against Parkland;\n        (x) employment discrimination on the basis of race against Parkland;\n        (xi) employment discrimination \u2013 promotion as to Johnson against Parkland;\n        (xii) employment discrimination \u2013 promotion as to Bramble against Parkland;\n        (xiii) employment discrimination \u2013 retaliation against Parkland;\n        (xiv) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Bramble against Parkland;\n        (xv) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Pierce against Parkland;\n        (xvi) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Johnson against Parkland;\n        (xvii) employment discrimination on the basis of race as to Johnson against Parkland;\n        (xviii) employment discrimination on the basis of race as to Bramble against Parkland;\n        (xix) employment discrimination \u2013 retaliation against Parkland;\n        (xx) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Pierce against Parkland;\n        (xxi) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Johnson against Parkland;\n        and\n        (xxii) employment discrimination \u2013 constructive discharge as to Bramble against Parkland.\n\n        Defendants filed their original Motion to Dismiss on October 30, 2023. (ECF No. 4). In\n\nresponse, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7). Defendants filed the instant\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                           Page 6 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                Page 7 of 37 PageID 266\n\n\n\nPartial Motion to Dismiss on January 2, 2024, seeking dismissal of sixteen causes of action: counts\n\ni\u2013x, xiv\u2013xvi, and xx\u2013xxii. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiffs responded to the Motion, (ECF No. 16), and\n\nDefendants replied, (ECF No. 22). Thus, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration.\n\n                                     II. LEGAL STANDARD\n\nA.      12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss\n\n        Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include \u201ca short and plain\n\nstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If a\n\nplaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the defendant may file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for\n\n\u201cfailure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a\n\nRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as\n\ntrue, to \u201cstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678\n\n(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial\n\nplausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courts to draw the reasonable\n\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But a\n\nplaintiff must provide \u201cmore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements\n\nof a cause of action will not do.\u201d Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.\n\n        In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, \u201cthe court must accept all well-pleaded\n\nfacts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.\u201d Walker v.\n\nBeaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Campbell v. Wells Fargo\n\nBank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). \u201cThe court\u2019s review is limited to the complaint, any\n\ndocuments attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that\n\nare central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.\u201d Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays\n\nBank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                               Page 7 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                            Page 8 of 37 PageID 267\n\n\n\n                                 III. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS, GENERALLY\n\n           Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint appears to state that their \u00a7 1983 claims are brought to remedy\n\nDefendants\u2019 violations of \u00a7 1981. \u201cThe express cause of action for damages created by \u00a7 1983\n\nconstitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in \u00a7 1981 by state\n\ngovernmental units.\u201d Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989). To state a claim\n\nunder \u00a7 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (i) \u201csome person has deprived him of a federal right\u201d\n\nguaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (ii) \u201cthe person who deprived him\n\nof that right acted under color of state or territorial law.\u201d Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640\n\n(1980). The existence of a constitutional violation is a \u201cthreshold\u201d requirement in any \u00a7 1983\n\nclaim. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 2009). \u201c[W]ithout an underlying\n\nconstitutional violation, there can be no \u00a7 1983 liability.\u201d Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1047\n\n(5th. Cir. 1997).\n\n                              IV. PLAINTIFFS\u2019 CLAIMS AGAINST PARKLAND\n\n           Plaintiffs raise three municipal liability claims\u2014also known as Monell 4 claims\u2014against\n\nParkland, arguing that Parkland\u2019s customs or policies (or lack of policies) were a \u201cmoving force\n\nbehind the deprivations of Plaintiffs\u2019 rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71981.\u201d (See ECF No. 7 at 14, 20,\n\n22). Thus, to prevail on their claims against Parkland, Plaintiffs must show that the violation of\n\ntheir rights to be free from employment discrimination on the basis of race protected by \u00a7 1981\n\nwas caused by a custom or policy within the meaning of Monell and subsequent cases.\n\n           \u201cMunicipal liability under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 requires proof of 1) a policymaker; 2) an\n\nofficial policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose \u2018moving force\u2019 is the policy or\n\ncustom.\u201d Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Piotrowski\n\n\n4\n    See Monell v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                    Page 8 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 9 of 37 PageID 268\n\n\n\nv. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). \u201cTo sustain liability under \u00a7 1983, the\n\n[Plaintiff] must point to more than the actions of an employee, [Plaintiff] must identify a\n\npolicymaker with final policymaking authority and a policy that is the \u2018moving force\u2019 behind the\n\nalleged constitutional violation.\u201d Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. The Supreme Court has explained that\n\na governmental entity may not be held liable under \u00a7 1983 \u201cunless action pursuant to official\n\nmunicipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.\u201d Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.\n\n\u201cMunicipalities are not liable on the theory of respondeat superior and are almost never liable for\n\nan isolated unconstitutional act on the part of an employee.\u201d Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas,\n\n994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021).\n\n       \u201cThe first requirement for imposing municipal liability is proof that an official policymaker\n\nwith actual or constructive knowledge of the constitutional violation acted on behalf of the\n\nmunicipality.\u201d Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010). \u201cThe\n\npolicymaker must have final policymaking authority.\u201d Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. The identity of the\n\npolicymaker is a question of state law. Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2016).\n\n       Once a policymaker has been established, Plaintiffs must prove the existence of an official\n\npolicy. A municipal \u201cpolicy\u201d must be a deliberate and conscious choice by a municipality\u2019s policy-\n\nmaker. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur v. City of\n\nCincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality)). Upon consideration whether the \u201callegedly\n\nunconstitutional action constitutes a custom or policy of the municipality,\u201d two forms must be\n\nconsidered. Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168. \u201cFirst, a plaintiff may point to a policy statement formally\n\nannounced by an official policymaker.\u201d Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168. Alternatively, \u201cthe plaintiff may\n\ndemonstrate a persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not\n\nauthorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 9 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 10 of 37 PageID 269\n\n\n\nconstitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.\u201d Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169. \u201cThe\n\nSupreme Court has explained that a custom may give rise to liability under Monell if the practice\n\nis so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.\u201d Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt.\n\nCo., 41 F.4th 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2022); see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (\u201cOfficial\n\nmunicipal policy includes the decisions of a government\u2019s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking\n\nofficials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.\u201d). \u201cThe\n\ndescription of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation,\n\nmoreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.\u201d Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police\n\nDep\u2019t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).\n\n       Last, regarding the third element that the policy alleged be the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind the\n\nconstitutional violation, a plaintiff must establish that \u201cthe municipal action was taken with the\n\nrequisite degree of culpability and . . . demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal\n\naction and the deprivation of federal rights.\u201d Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown,\n\n520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Plaintiffs assert the following Monell claims against Parkland: (a) count\n\n1\u2014failure to promote and constructive discharge; (b) count 8\u2014failure to adopt policies; and (c)\n\ncount 9\u2014failure to discipline.\n\nA.     Municipal Liability Claims Against Parkland Under \u00a7 1981 through \u00a7 1983 (Counts i,\n       viii, ix)\n\n       1.      Section 1983 Statute of Limitations\n\n       The parties appear to have contested the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to the\n\n\u00a7 1981 through \u00a7 1983 claims asserted. Plaintiffs argue that that this Court should apply a four-\n\nyear statute of limitations\u2014referring to cases from the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit in which they\n\ndetermined \u201cthe four-year statute of limitations provided by \u00a7 1658 applies to a \u00a7 1981 claim\n\nbrought through \u00a7 1983.\u201d (ECF No. 16 at 9) (citing Chambers v. N. Carolina Dep\u2019t of Just., 66\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 10 of 37\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                            Page 11 of 37 PageID 270\n\n\n\nF.4th 139 (4th Cir. 2023).5 However, the Chambers court acknowledges that only the Fourth and\n\nEleventh Circuits decided the four-year statute applies to \u00a7 1981 claim brought through \u00a7 1983.\n\nChambers, 66 F.4th at 142. Plaintiffs refer the Court to no Fifth Circuit precedent that has decided\n\nfour-year statute applies to \u00a7 1981 claim brought through \u00a7 1983, and the Court has found no such\n\nFifth Circuit precedent. The Court declines to adopt Plaintiff\u2019s interpretation and elects to follow\n\nwell-settled precedent in this circuit that \u201c[f]ederal civil rights actions brought under section 1981,\n\nwhich lack an express statute of limitations, are governed by the most closely analogous limitations\n\nperiod provided under state law.\u201d Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 2004),\n\n(abrogated by Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) on other grounds)). \u201cSince\n\nTexas has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims . . . [a Plaintiff] ha[s] two\n\nyears to file suit from the date her claim accrued.\u201d Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (citing Burrell v.\n\nNewsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)); accord Hatchet v. Nettles, 201 F.3d 651, 653 (5th\n\nCir. 2000); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). \u201cThe time\n\nat which a \u00a7 1983 claim accrues is a question of federal law.\u201d McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109,\n\n115 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). \u201cUnder federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run\n\nthe moment the plaintiff becomes aware that [s]he has suffered an injury or has sufficient\n\ninformation to know that [s]he has been injured.\u201d Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (internal quotation\n\nomitted).\n\n         Here, the operative date in this case is July 13, 2023\u2014the date on which Plaintiffs filed\n\ntheir Original Complaint in this Court. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff Pierce alleges that he experienced\n\ndiscrimination when he was passed over for a director role in 2015, nearly eight years before the\n\n\n\n5\n The Eleventh Circuit also held that a four-year statute of limitations applies to \u00a7 1983 claims asserting violations of\n\u00a7 1981 rights. See Baker v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 531 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008).\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                             Page 11 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 12 of 37 PageID 271\n\n\n\noperative date. (ECF No. 7 at 5). This allegation and any adverse employment actions which\n\noccurred prior to July 13, 2021, are not timely filed \u201cwithin two years of the[ir] adverse\n\nemployment action\u201d and therefore, not actionable. Byers, 209 F.3d at 424.\n\n        2.      Section 1983 Failure to Promote and Constructive Discharge Claim (Count i)\n\n        In Count 1, Plaintiffs allege that Parkland established a discriminatory practice of denying\n\nupper-level promotions based on race, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of rights and privileges secured\n\nby 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. (ECF No. 7 at 12). Plaintiffs contend that Parkland\u2019s practice of denying\n\npromotional opportunities to Black employees was so \u201cwidespread\u201d as to constitute \u201ca custom that\n\nfairly represents municipal policy,\u201d thereby rendering Parkland liable under \u00a7 1983. (ECF No. 7\n\nat 12). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege:\n\n        Evidence of such a widespread practice or custom includes the following: (i) The\n        six (6) specific incidents where a more-qualified Black employee was passed over\n        for a promotion that was ultimately given to a non-Black employee, highlighted\n        above; (ii) the fact that the Plaintiffs observed a pattern of such discriminatory\n        conduct in promotions over numerous years; (iii) the three (3) specific incidents\n        where additional requirements for promotions were imposed only on Black\n        employees, highlighted above; (iv) the numerous incidents where Defendant\n        Parkland\u2019s hiring managers used racial epithets; and (v) that Plaintiffs and other\n        Black employees made at least five (5) specific reports directly to either Defendant\n        Parkland\u2019s Board of Directors or Defendant Parkland\u2019s Human Resource\n        Department about this custom or practice, including letters sent directly to the\n        Board of Directors discussing a long pattern of discrimination towards promotions\n        and a phone call from County Commissioner John Price regarding this custom or\n        practice.\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 13). Parkland argues that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead the existence of\n\nan official policy or custom that was the moving force behind the underlying violations. (ECF No.\n\n11 at 8\u201312). Relevant to a failure to promote claim under \u00a7 1983, Plaintiffs contend that there are\n\n\u201csix (6) specific incidents where a more qualified Black employee was passed over for a promotion\n\nthat was ultimately given to a non-Black employee\u201d. (ECF No. 7 at 13; ECF No. 16 at 10-11). The\n\nspecific allegations are:\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 12 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 13 of 37 PageID 272\n\n\n\n       (i) Johnson applied for Central Utility Plant Manager\n       (ii) Pierce applied for a director role\n       (iii) Vivian Johnson took ten years to get her Senior Vice President position\n       (iv) Bramble applied for Director of Environmental Safety\n       (v) Bramble was unaware of a position within the Sustainability Department\n       (vi) Bramble was unaware of a position within the Emergency Management Department\n\n(ECF No. 16 at 10-11) (cleaned up).\n\n       The Court concludes that Plaintiffs\u2019 have failed to plead specific, nonconclusory facts\n\nidentifying an official policy or custom within Parkland resulting in the denial of promotional\n\nopportunities to Black employees. See Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. An employee presents a prima\n\nfacie case of discrimination by failure to promote by demonstrating that: \u201c(1) he was not promoted;\n\n(2) he was qualified for the position he sought; (3) he fell within a protected class at the time of\n\nthe failure to promoted; and (4) the defendant either gave the promotion to someone outside of that\n\nprotected class or otherwise failed to promoted the plaintiff because of his race.\u201d Autry v. Fort\n\nBend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2013).\n\n       In four of the alleged incidents, Plaintiffs fail to allege the prima facie elements of a\n\ndiscriminatory failure to promote claim. (See ECF No. 16 at 10\u201311). Taking the incidents in turn,\n\nincidents two and three\u2014involving Pierce and Vivian Johnson\u2014both proclaim that the parties\n\nsubsequently received the promotions each sought. Pierce was \u201cinitially passed over for the\n\nDirector role\u201d but that \u201ceventually, the Director role was given to Plaintiff Pierce.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at\n\n5-6). Therefore, Plaintiffs\u2019 pleadings contain no sufficient factual allegation to the fourth element\n\nof their prima facie burden. Pierce\u2019s allegations of his promotion show Parkland accepted\u2014not\n\nrejected\u2014him for the Director role of which he sought. Therefore, these allegations do not\n\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote. Autry, 704 F.3d at 347.\n\n        Likewise, Plaintiffs\u2019 third example of Vivian Johnson\u2019s \u201cdelayed\u201d promotion suffers from\n\nsimilar deficiencies. (See ECF No. 7 at 6; ECF No. 16 at 10\u201311). That Vivian Johnson was\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 13 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 14 of 37 PageID 273\n\n\n\npromoted to Senior Vice President after ten to fifteen years while a similarly situated White\n\nemployee received the same promotion in less than two years, even taken as true, fails to present\n\na prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote. See Autry, 704 F.3d at 347. Absent\n\nfrom Plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint are any allegations that Vivian Johnson applied and was qualified for\n\na prior promotion for which she was rejected. See Autry, 704 F.3d at 347. (discussing the second\n\nand fourth elements for a failure to promote discrimination claim). Consequently, the vague and\n\nconclusory nature of these alleged instances are insufficient to establish a plausible policy-or-\n\ncustom claim under Monell. See Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167.\n\n       Plaintiffs fail to allege the prima facie elements of a discretionary failure to promote claim\n\nin incidents five and six. (ECF No. 16 at 11). Plaintiffs allege that Bramble was \u201cdenied the\n\nopportunity to apply\u201d to two positions: one within the Sustainability Department and the other\n\nwithin the Emergency Management Department. (ECF No. 16 at 11). Plaintiffs admit that Bramble\n\ndid not apply to either of these positions, an admission which bars a failure to promote claim,\n\n\u201cabsent a showing that such an application would have been a futile gesture.\u201d Irons v. Aircraft\n\nServ. Int\u2019l, Inc., 392 F. App\u2019x 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Grice v. FMC Techs. Inc., 216 F.\n\nApp\u2019x 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2007). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, the \u201cfutile gesture\u201d exception\n\napplies only where \u201cthe applicant for the promotion was deterred by a known and consistently\n\nenforced policy of discrimination.\u201d Irons, 392 F. App\u2019x at 312 (internal citations omitted).\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 argument that Bramble \u201cwas never made aware of these newly created positions,\u201d and\n\nwas therefore \u201cdenied the opportunity to apply to them\u201d, without more, does not suggest a \u201cknown\n\nand consistently enforced policy of discrimination\u201d in Parkland\u2019s promotion system. See Irons,\n\n392 F. App\u2019x at 312 (plaintiff failed to establish \u201cfutile gesture exception\u201d where the employer\n\n\u201capproached who they wanted\u201d to fill the positions without giving plaintiff an opportunity to\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                            Page 14 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 15 of 37 PageID 274\n\n\n\napply); Spears v. Louisiana, 767 F.Supp. 2d 629, 640 (M.D. La. 2011) (plaintiff\u2019s failure to apply\n\nfor a position because her supervisor told her it was already taken was insufficient, without more,\n\nto establish a known and consistently enforced policy of discrimination). Thus, without pleaded\n\nallegation(s) to substantiate the second element of a discrimination by failure to promote claim,\n\nPlaintiffs have not met their burden.\n\n       Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege the prima facie elements of a discriminatory failure to\n\npromote claim in incidents one and four: (i) Johnson\u2019s application to the Central Utility Plant\n\nManager and (ii) Bramble\u2019s application to the Director of Environmental Services. Johnson pleads\n\nthat he is a Black man and had \u201cserved as interim CUP Manger on four (4) separate occasions[,]\u201d\n\nthe position for which he applied. (ECF No. 7 at 3). After his initial interview with Defendant\n\nWood and before he had a second interview, he was notified that Mr. Alvarez was hired for the\n\nposition. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Johnson alleges that that the candidate who was ultimately hired for\n\nthe position \u201chad no prior engineering experience and no certifications that were applicable to\n\nCentral Utility Plan operations.\u201d (ECR No. 7 at 4). The actions, as alleged by the defendant indicate\n\nsufficient pleadings of the prima facie elements of a discriminatory failure to promote claim. See\n\nAutry, 704 F.3d at 346-47.\n\n       Next, Bramble\u2019s application to the Director of Environmental indicates that he is a Black\n\nman and had \u201cserved as interim Director\u201d and \u201cmet the qualifications\u201d for the position he applied.\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 8). Bramble plead additional qualifications, including, that he had worked in\n\n\u201cHealthcare Safety since 2011\u201d, had his \u201cCertified Health[care] Safety Professional (CHSP)\n\ncertificate\u201d, and had been informed by Defendant Parkland\u2019s Human Resources Department that\n\nhe \u201cwas qualified to fill the vacancy.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 9). After his initial panel interview, a non-\n\nBlack individual was selected for the position. (ECF No. 7 at 9-10). To bolster this assertion,\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 15 of 37\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                             Page 16 of 37 PageID 275\n\n\n\nBramble states that the selected party did not have \u201cOSHA training\u201d, which Bramble asserts he\n\nhad. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Additionally, the selected individual had a \u201cCertified Safety Professional\n\n(CSP) Certificate, rather than the [Certified Healthcare Safety Professional] CHSP certificate.\u201d\n\nECF No. 7 at 10). Like with Johnson\u2019s allegations in incident one, Bramble has alleged sufficient\n\npleadings of the prima facie elements of a discriminatory failure to promote claim. Autry, 704 F.3d\n\nat 346-47.\n\n         However, this Court determines that Plaintiffs have failed to plead specific, nonconclusory\n\nfacts identifying an official policy or custom within Parkland resulting in the denial of promotional\n\nopportunities to Black employees. See Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247. Here, Plaintiffs have pled in their\n\ncomplaint that \u201cDefendant Parkland had a custom or policy of denying promotions and\n\npromotional opportunities to Black employees\u201d while only pleading two incidents of such\n\npromotional denials that occurred in the same year. (ECF No. 7 at 12). Plaintiffs\u2019 pleadings do not\n\nestablish a customary policy consisting of \u201cactions that have occurred for so long and with such\n\nfrequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body\u2019s knowledge and\n\nacceptance of the disputed conduct.\u201d Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169. 6\n\n         This Court concludes that Plaintiffs failed to plead constructive discharge under Count 1\n\nbecause a bare conclusion that Defendant Parkland had a \u201cpolicy of constructive discharge\u201d is not\n\nsufficient. Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000) (\u201cTo establish a constructive\n\ndischarge claim, an employee must offer evidence that the employer made the employee\u2019s working\n\n\n\n6\n The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly required more than two isolated incidents in a single year. See Davidson v. City of\nStafford, 848 F.3d 397, 396 (5th Cir. 2017) (three arrests over three and a half years to form the basis of the alleged\npattern of unconstitutional violations was \u201cinsufficient\u201d to establish a pattern of constitutional violations); Peterson,\n588 F.3d at 852 (\u201c[T]he 27 [complaints of excessive force from 2002 to 2005], in the context of this record, do not\nsuggest a pattern \u201cso common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.\u201d); see\ngenerally Hernandez v. Dallas County et al., No. 3:23-CV-01583-E, 2024 WL 4202381, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16,\n2024) (collecting cases).\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                              Page 16 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                    Page 17 of 37 PageID 276\n\n\n\nconditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.\u201d). Therefore,\n\nthis Court grants Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss as to Count i.\n\n        3.      Section 1983 Failure to Adopt Policies Claim (Count viii)\n\n        In Count 8, Plaintiffs allege that Parkland\u2019s official policymakers failed to adopt policies\n\nthat effectively banned discrimination against Black employees in the making of decisions\n\nregarding promotion to management-level positions. (ECF No. 7 at 19). Specifically, Plaintiffs\n\nassert that Parkland\u2019s official policymakers were \u201cdeliberately indifferent to the need to ban race\n\ndiscrimination in promotion decisions to management positions, despite notice that such failures\n\nwould lead to deprivations of rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 20).\n\n        \u201cSupervisory officials may be liable under \u00a7 1983 for their failure to adopt policies if that\n\nfailure causally results in a constitutional injury.\u201d Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 186 (5th\n\nCir. 2022). Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act, with \u201cdeliberate indifference.\u201d\n\nSee Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011). To establish a failure-to-enact policy theory,\n\nplaintiffs must allege the official had \u201cactual or constructive notice\u201d that their failure to adopt\n\npolicies would result in constitutional violations. See generally Porter, 659 F.3d 440. Actual or\n\nconstructive knowledge \u201ctypically requires showing notice of \u2018a pattern of similar constitutional\n\nviolations.\u2019\u201d Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447). \u201cWhile the municipal\n\npolicy-maker\u2019s failure to adopt a precaution can be the basis for \u00a7 1983 liability, such omission\n\nmust amount to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.\u201d Rhyne\n\nv. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387).\n\n        \u201c[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring [allegations] that a\n\nmunicipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.\u201d Connick, 563 U.S. at\n\n61. Plaintiff \u201cmust show that \u2018in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                Page 17 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 18 of 37 PageID 277\n\n\n\nneed for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the\n\nviolation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have\n\nbeen deliberately indifferent to the need.\u2019\u201d Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 547 (5th Cir.\n\n2010) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). In Connick, the Supreme Court summarized this\n\nstandard as follows:\n\n       Thus, when city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular\n       omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens\u2019\n       constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the\n       policymakers choose to retain that program. The city\u2019s \u201c\u2018policy of inaction\u2019\u201d in\n       light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations \u201cis the functional\n       equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.\u201d A less\n       stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim would result in de facto\n       respondeat superior liability on municipalities .... see also Pembaur [v. City of\n       Cincinnati], supra, [475 U.S.] at 483, 106 S. Ct. 1292 [89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)]\n       (opinion of Brennan, J.) (\u201c[M]unicipal liability under \u00a7 1983 attaches where\u2014and\n       only where\u2014a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among\n       various alternatives by [the relevant] officials ...\u201d).\n\nConnick, 563 U.S. at 61\u201362 (citations and quotations omitted).\n\n       Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Parkland\u2019s policymakers failed to adopt policies that\n\n\u201ceffectively banned discrimination against Black employees in the making of decisions regarding\n\npromotion to management-level positions.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 19). Plaintiffs allege that policymakers\n\n\u201chad notice\u201d through \u201cdirect complaints\u201d to \u201cmanagement officials, Defendant Parkland Human\n\nResource officials, Defendant Parkland\u2019s Board of Managers, and a County Court Commissioner,\n\nwho brought this violation to Defendant Parkland\u2019s attention.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 19). Specifically,\n\nPlaintiffs allege that (i) Johnson \u201cwrote a letter to John Proctor of the Parkland Board of Managers\n\nand to Human Resources\u201d; (ii) Pierce conducted phone meetings with Mr. Proctor, human\n\nresources, and the CEO of Parkland hospital; and (iii) Bramble spoke with Mr. Proctor on two\n\nseparate occasions and reported his concerns to human resources. (ECF No. 7 at 4, 6-7, 10).\n\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                              Page 18 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 19 of 37 PageID 278\n\n\n\n        A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference in either of two ways, \u201cFirst, a plaintiff may\n\ndemonstrate \u2018that a municipality had notice of a pattern of similar violations.\u2019\u201d Doe 1 v. Rockwall\n\nIndep. Sch. Dist., No, 3:23-CV-01243-E, 2024 WL 1837967, *13 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2024) (citing\n\nDavidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 397 (5th Cir. 2017). \u201c\u2018Second, a plaintiff may\n\ndemonstrate liability based on a single incident if the constitutional violation was the highly\n\npredictable consequence of a particular failure [to promulgate a policy].\u2019\u201d Doe 1, 2024 WL\n\n1837967 at *13 (citing Davidson, 848 F.3d at 397) (internal quotation marks omitted). As\n\ndiscussed above, Plaintiffs have only pled two instances of discriminatory failure to promote\n\nclaims and instead, rely primarily on broad conclusions that Defendant Parkland was aware of\n\n\u201cdirect complaints of capable and tenured employees.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 19). However, Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nconclusory, unsupported statements that lack specific factual allegations fail to demonstrate a\n\npattern of similar constitutional violations as Plaintiffs only plead two instances of their personal\n\nexperiences occurring during the same calendar year and under the direction of a singular\n\nsupervisor at Parkland. Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege factual\n\nallegations that any official had actual or constructive knowledge that a failure to adopt policies\n\nwould result in constitutional violations. See generally Porter, 659 F.3d 440. This Court concludes\n\nPlaintiffs have failed show deliberate indifference and have failed to meet their burden under\n\nMonell. Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186. Therefore, this Court grants Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss as\n\nto Count viii.\n\n       4.        Section 1983 Failure to Discipline Claim (Count ix)\n\n       In Count 9, Plaintiffs allege that Parkland\u2019s \u201cpattern of failing to discipline deprivations of\n\nindividual rights by employees can be inferred from the failure to discipline any of the six (6)\n\nspecific incidents of discrimination for promotion to management.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 22). Defendant\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 19 of 37\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                            Page 20 of 37 PageID 279\n\n\n\nParkland challenges Plaintiff\u2019s failure to discipline claim on the basis that Plaintiffs fail to plead\n\nsufficient facts to support an inference of deliberate indifference on behalf of Parkland\n\npolicymakers. (ECF No. 11 at 15).\n\n         \u201c[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a \u2018failure to train\u2019 [or failure\n\nto discipline] can be the basis for liability under \u00a7 1983. City of Canton, 486 U.S. at 387. For a\n\nfailure-to-discipline claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead\n\n\u201cthat (1) the [governmental entity] failed to [discipline] the officers involved; (2) there is a causal\n\nconnection between the alleged failure to [discipline] and the alleged violation of the plaintiff\u2019s\n\nrights; and (3) the failure to [discipline] constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff\u2019s\n\nconstitutional rights.\u201d Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482. 7\n\n         \u201cA pattern of similar constitutional violations by [undisciplined] employees is \u2018ordinarily\n\nnecessary\u2019 to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train [or discipline].\u201d\n\nConnick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm\u2019rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl., 520 U.S. at 409.\n\nHowever, \u201cin certain extreme circumstances, a single act by a municipal employee [may] form the\n\nbasis of municipal liability apart from a pattern of unconstitutional activity.\u201d Roberts v. City of\n\nShreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2005). But \u201c[t]he \u2018single incident exception\u2019 is extremely\n\nnarrow,\u201d Valle, 613 F.3d at 549, and \u201cis generally reserved for those cases in which the government\n\nactor was provided no training whatsoever.\u201d Pe\u00f1a v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624\n\n(5th Cir. 2018).\n\n\n\n\n7\n  Hutcheson concerns a failure to train claim rather than failure to discipline, however, the elements required to prove\nboth claims are identical. See E.G. v. Bond, No. 1:16-CV-068-C, 2017 WL 129019, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2017);\nSnow v. City of El Paso, Tex., 501 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 n.5 (W.D. Tex. 2006); see Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336\nF.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003).\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                             Page 20 of 37\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                             Page 21 of 37 PageID 280\n\n\n\n           Here, Plaintiffs fail to assert any factual allegations regarding their failure to discipline\n\nclaim that are not conclusory. Plaintiffs do not allege any specific employees that Parkland failed\n\nto discipline, and it is not apparent from the pleadings whether all six of the \u201cspecific incidents of\n\ndiscrimination for promotion to management\u201d were a result of the same employees\u2019 actions.\n\nFurther, Plaintiffs do not plead\u2014other than in conclusory statements\u2014that any disciplinary failure\n\noccurred with the deliberate indifference of a policymaker as to the allegedly racially\n\ndiscriminatory promotional practices. The Court grants Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss as to Count\n\nix. Combined, the Court grants Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss as to all of Plaintiffs\u2019 \u00a7 1983 claims\n\nagainst Parkland.\n\nB.        \u00a7 1983 Claims Against Wood in His Individual Capacity (Counts ii\u2013iv)\n\n           Plaintiffs assert six \u00a7 1983 claims against Wood in his individual capacity: (i) count ii\u2014\n\npromotion as to Johnson; (ii) count iii\u2014promotion as to Bramble; (iii) count iv\u2014retaliation as to\n\nBramble; (iv) count v\u2014constructive discharge as to Pierce; (v) count vi\u2014constructive discharge\n\nas to Bramble; and (vi) count vii\u2014constructive discharge as to Johnson. 8 (ECF No. 7 at 14\u201319).\n\n           Under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, private citizens may sue public officials for violations of their\n\nfederal statutory or constitutional rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). However,\n\npublic officials are shielded from civil liability under \u00a7 1983 under the doctrine of qualified\n\nimmunity \u201cso long as their conduct \u2018does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional\n\nrights of which a reasonable person would have known.\u2019\u201d Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)\n\n(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). \u201cQualified immunity gives government\n\nofficials breathing room to make reasonable[,] but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the\n\n\n\n\n8\n    All constructive discharge claims will be analyzed under Section \u201cC\u201d, to include counts 5, 6, and 7.\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                               Page 21 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                   Page 22 of 37 PageID 281\n\n\n\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.\u201d Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5 (2013)\n\n(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n       The affirmative defense of qualified immunity has two prongs: (i) whether an official\u2019s\n\nconduct violated a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff, and (ii) whether the right was\n\n\u201cclearly established\u201d at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200\u201301 (2001),\n\noverruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223. The two steps of the qualified immunity inquiry\n\nmay be performed in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. \u201cA court may rest its analysis on either\n\nprong[.]\u201d Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The \u201cclearly\n\nestablish[ed]\u201d prong of the qualified immunity analysis \u201c\u2018is better understood as two separate\n\ninquiries: [(1)] whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the\n\ntime of the incident; and, if so, [(2)] whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively\n\nunreasonable in light of that then clearly established law.\u2019\u201d Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745,\n\n750 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2002)).\n\n       To state a claim in an individual capacity suit brought under \u00a7 1983, a claimant must allege\n\na violation of the Constitution or federal law by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7 1983. In the context of \u00a7 1983 claims against supervisors, \u201c[f]or there to be liability under section\n\n1983, a defendant must have been personally involved in the conduct causing a deprivation of\n\nconstitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of that person and\n\nthe constitutional right sought to be redressed.\u201d King v. Louisiana, 294 F. App\u2019x. 77, 83 (5th Cir.\n\n2008) (per curiam) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983)) (affirming dismissal\n\nof claims against individual defendants, based on qualified immunity, where the allegations against\n\nthese defendants failed to set forth any constitutional violation); see also Anderson v. Pasadena\n\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999) (\u201cIn order to state a cause of action under\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                              Page 22 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                     Page 23 of 37 PageID 282\n\n\n\n\u00a7 1983, [plaintiff] must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the\n\nconstitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation\n\nalleged.\u201d).\n\n         A plaintiff is not required to \u201cfully anticipate the [qualified immunity] defense in his\n\ncomplaint at the risk of dismissal under Rule 12.\u201d Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir.\n\n1995). Although \u201c[t]he generic pleading requirements of [Rule 8] govern suits against individual\n\ndefendants in their official capacity,\u201d \u201c[p]laintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual\n\ncapacities . . . must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation.\u201d Oliver v. Scott,\n\n276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson, 184 F.3d at 443). \u201cThis standard requires more\n\nthan conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a constitutional\n\nviolation.\u201d Oliver, 276 F.3d at 741 (citing Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1996); see\n\nalso Babinski v. Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2023)(\u201cA plaintiff attempting to\n\novercome qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage must plead facts that allow this court to\n\nreasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the harm alleged.\u201d).\n\n         Defendant Wood moves to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 \u00a7 1983 claims against him in his individual\n\ncapacity asserting that Plaintiffs\u2019 pleadings do not overcome his qualified immunity\u2014specifically\n\nthe first prong as Plaintiffs fail to allege a deprivation of any constitutional right. (ECF No. 11 at\n\n17\u201318). Wood argues that to avoid dismissal, the complaint must contain facts that Wood was\n\npersonally involved in the civil rights violation. Wood argues the Complaint fails to allege such\n\nfacts.\n\n         1.     Section 1983 Failure to Promote Claims (Counts ii and iii)\n\n         Plaintiffs assert identical failure to promote claims against Wood regarding Plaintiffs\n\nJohnson and Bramble. (ECF No. 7 at 14-15). Defendants move to dismiss Johnson and Bramble\u2019s\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                 Page 23 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 24 of 37 PageID 283\n\n\n\nclaims of failure to promote against Wood arguing that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege Wood\u2019s\n\ninvolvement in such alleged constitutional violation. (ECF No. 11 at 19).\n\n       A plaintiff asserting failure to promote because of racial discrimination must show: (i) the\n\nemployee is a member of the protected class; (ii) he sought and was qualified for the position; (iii)\n\nhe was rejected for the position; and (iv) the employer continued to seek applicants with the\n\nplaintiff\u2019s qualifications or hired a person outside of the plaintiff\u2019s protected class. McMullin v.\n\nMiss. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Safety, 782 F.3d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 2015); see Williams-Boldware v. Denton\n\nCty., 741 F.3d 635, 643 (5th Cir. 2014).\n\n               (i)     Failure to Promote \u2013 Johnson (Count ii)\n\n       Here, Johnson alleged that he (i) is Black; (ii) he applied for and was qualified for the CUP\n\nManager position; (iii) he was not promoted to CUP Manager; and (iv) a non-Black individual was\n\nhired for the position. (See ECF No. 7 at 3\u20134). Johnson alleges that after applying for the CUP\n\nManager position, he was promised an interview with Defendant Wood and Angela Flores, who\n\nwas serving as the Central Utility Plant Director because he was an internal candidate. (ECF No.\n\n7 at 3-4). Plaintiff then alleges that he interviewed with Defendant Wood and was informed that\n\nhe would need a supplemental interview. (ECF No. 7 at 3-4). However, before the supplemental\n\ninterview could occur, Johnson was informed that another individual had been chosen for the\n\nposition. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because, though\n\nWood interviewed Johnson that the decision to hire someone else was made by others at Parkland.\n\n       In addressing Defendant\u2019s argument, this Court turns to the first prong of the affirmative\n\ndefense of qualified immunity\u2013whether an official\u2019s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional\n\nright of the plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege\n\nthat Defendant Wood personally conducted the interview with Johnson and that Johnson was\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 24 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 25 of 37 PageID 284\n\n\n\nnotified that he had not been selected for the position, though the complaint was silent on who\n\nnotified Johnson. (ECF No. 7 at 4). It is sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when a\n\nplaintiff pleads an affirmative causal link between the individual\u2019s conduct and the\n\ndecisionmaker\u2019s decision. Normore v. Dallas. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:18-CV-02506-E, 2021 WL\n\n5824864 *1, *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2021). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wood personally\n\nconducted the interview and that \u201c[d]efendants\u201d hired someone other than Johnson for the position.\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 4). However, there is nothing in the pleadings that indicate whether Wood ultimately\n\ndecided to not hire Johnson. The Plaintiffs do not plead that Wood interviewed other applicants\n\nnor that he was involved in the final hiring decision. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs\n\nhave failed to sufficiently plead facts to overcome Defendant Wood\u2019s defense of qualified\n\nimmunity. The Court concludes Wood is entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. The Court\n\ngrants Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss on Count ii.\n\n       Assuming arguendo that Johnson had met the first prong. This Court will now analyze the\n\nsecond prong\u2013whether the right was \u201cclearly established\u201d at the time of the violation. Saucier, 533\n\nU.S. at 200-01. Under the clearly established prong the right \u201cmust be particularized to the facts\n\nof the case establishing the right.\u201d Harris v. Clay Cnty., Miss., 47 F.4th 271, 277 (5th Cir. 2022).\n\nPlaintiffs rely on Felton to argue that \u201c\u2026 since 2002, this Circuit recognized that failing to promote\n\nbased on race is an act of disparate treatment and is a clearly established violation of \u00a7 1981.\u201d 315\n\nF.3d at 487. In Felton, the district court denied defendant\u2019s claim for qualified immunity on a\n\nmotion for summary judgment. Felton, 315 F.3d at 479. On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit\n\ndetermined that that the Defendant\u2019s were entitled to qualified immunity on the only two claims\n\non the appeal: racial harassment and disparate treatment. Felton, 315 F.3d at 483. The Fifth Circuit\n\naddresses failure to promote in the context of their disparate treatment analysis but upheld the\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 25 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 26 of 37 PageID 285\n\n\n\ndistrict court\u2019s ruling that the plaintiff did not demonstrate any involvement by the defendant.\n\nFelton, 315 F.3d at 487. The promotion at dispute in Felton included both an interview and a \u201cState\n\nPersonnel Board score \u2026 [and included] factors such as an applicant\u2019s education level or military\n\nservice\u201d. Felton, 315 F.3d at 477. These facts contrast with the instant facts of Johnson\u2019s complaint\n\nbecause here the interview process included a single in-person interview before notification of\n\nanother party\u2019s hiring. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Therefore, this Court finds that Felton does not\n\ndemonstrate a clearly established right particularized to the facts of our case. No other precedent\n\ndemonstrates a clearly established right particularized to the facts of this case as to Johnson\u2019s\n\nfailure to promote allegations. Therefore, the Court concludes Wood is entitled to qualified\n\nimmunity as to this claim. The Court grants Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss as to Count ii.\n\n               (ii)    Failure to Promote \u2013 Bramble (Count iii)\n\n       Here, Bramble alleged that he (i) is Black; (ii) he applied for and was qualified for the\n\nDirector of Environmental Safety position; (iii) he was not promoted to Director of Environmental\n\nSafety; and (iv) a non-Black individual was hired for the position. (See ECF No. 7 at 8-10).\n\nBramble applied for the Director of Environmental Safety position and was scheduled for a panel\n\ninterview. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wood chose the panelists for the\n\ninterview and that Defendant Wood \u201chad the authority to veto the panelists\u2019 decisions.\u201d (ECF No.\n\n7 at 9). After Bramble\u2019s interview with the panel, he was notified that another individual had been\n\nselected for the promotion. (ECF No. 7 at 9-10). Defendants move to dismiss this claim because\n\nBramble fails to plead that Wood was personally involved in the denial of promotion. (ECF No.\n\n11 at 19-20). This Court agrees.\n\n       The first prong of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity\u2013whether an official\u2019s\n\nconduct violated a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. In\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 26 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 27 of 37 PageID 286\n\n\n\ntheir amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wood \u201cchose the panelists for\n\ninterviews\u201d and \u201chad the authority to veto the panelists\u2019 decision.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 9). However, to\n\nsurvive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the court to\n\ndraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556\n\nU.S. at 678. Here, the Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Wood participated in the interview\n\nof Johnson, nor do they allege that he did veto the panel\u2019s decision to hire Johnson.\n\n        Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead facts to\n\novercome Defendant Wood\u2019s defense of qualified immunity. The Court concludes Wood is\n\nentitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. The Court grants Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n\nas to Count iii.\n\n        2.         Section 1983 Retaliation Claim \u2013 Bramble (Count iv)\n\n        In Count 4, Bramble asserts a retaliation claim against Defendant Wood under \u00a7 1981.\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 16). Defendants move to dismiss this claim arguing that Plaintiffs fail to allege\n\nDefendant Wood\u2019s involvement. (ECF No. 11 at 21). \u201cWe examine retaliation claims under\n\nSection 1981 using the \u201csame rubric of analysis\u201d as Title VII.\u201d Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n, 16\n\nF.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Nov. 26, 2021) (citing Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc.,\n\n7 F.4th 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2021)). A prima facie case of retaliation under \u00a7 1981 requires a showing\n\nthat (i) the employee engaged in a protected activity, (ii) he was subjected to an adverse\n\nemployment action, and (iii) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse\n\nemployment action. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004).\n\n        Here, Bramble asserts that (i) he reported \u201cdisparate treatment based on his race\u201d to human\n\nresources around September 2021; (ii) he received an \u201cunwarranted written warning\u201d in January\n\n2022 and was required to attend weekly meetings; and (iii) he \u201cbelieved he was experiencing\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 27 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 28 of 37 PageID 287\n\n\n\nretaliation for lodging the complaint of discrimination.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 10-11). Bramble alleges in\n\nhis petition that he was discriminatorily passed over for promotion in the summer of 2021, and\n\nwas not subsequently notified of two specific open positions. (ECF No. 7 at 10). As a result of\n\nthese actions, Bramble made a report to Parkland\u2019s Human Resources Department in September\n\n2021 and subsequently had two phone calls with a member of the Board of Managers in the Fall\n\nof 2021. (ECF No. 7 at 10). As alleged, Bramble received, through Defendant Wood\u2019s supervisee,\n\nan \u201cunwarranted written warning\u201d on January 20, 2022. (ECF No. 7 at 10). Bramble asserts he\n\npromptly notified human resources that he believed he was experiencing retaliation for lodging his\n\ncomplaint of discrimination. (ECF No. 7 at 16). After this report, it is alleged that he was required\n\nto attend weekly meetings regarding his performance, meetings he alleges were not warranted nor\n\ntied to the subject of the written warning. (ECF No. 7 at 10).\n\n       Assuming arguendo that Bramble has established the prima facie case for retaliation,\n\nDefendants move to dismiss this count on the grounds that \u201cBramble does not assert any facts\n\nshowing Wood\u2019s involvement in the write-up or any other alleged retaliatory act.\u201d (ECF No. 11 at\n\n21). Defendant\u2019s argument addresses the affirmative defense of qualified immunity as it pertains\n\nto claims by Plaintiffs against Defendant Wood. (ECF No. 11 at 16-18). Under the first prong of a\n\nqualified immunity defense, the inquiry is whether \u201can official\u2019s conduct violated a statutory or\n\nconstitutional right of the plaintiff.\u201d Saucier, 533 U.S. 194 at 200-01. Inherent in that inquiry is\n\nthat a defendant must have been personally involved in the conduct causing a deprivation of\n\nconstitutional rights.\u201d King, 294 F. App\u2019x. at 83. Here, Plaintiff made the conclusory claim that\n\n\u201cDefendant Wood, through his supervisee, issued Bramble an unwarranted disciplinary warning\n\nand unwarranted monitoring of his work performance in retaliation for complaining of\n\ndiscrimination.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 16). However, this alone is not satisfactory because a plaintiff must\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                             Page 28 of 37\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                         Page 29 of 37 PageID 288\n\n\n\nprovide \u201cmore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause\n\nof action will not do.\u201d Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff does nothing further to allege Defendant\n\nWood\u2019s involvement in the write up or required weekly meetings in their pleadings, instead merely\n\nstating that, nearly four months after his initial discrimination report to human resources, he\n\n\u201creceived an unwarranted written warning\u201d. (ECF No. 7 at 11). Plaintiff does not allege that\n\nDefendant Wood was the individual who wrote him up or that he was involved in the process in\n\nany manner. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Defendant Wood became involved after the written\n\nwarning, when he was required to attend meetings with, again an unnamed individual. (ECF No.\n\n7 at 11). Plaintiff has alleged no sufficient factual allegations that Wood was personally involved\n\nin a deprivation of rights as to this claim. Therefore, the Court concludes Wood is entitled to\n\nqualified immunity as to this claim. Consequently, this Court grants Defendant\u2019s Motion to\n\nDismiss as to Count iv.\n\nC.      Constructive Discharge (Counts v-vii, xiv-xvi, and xx-xxii)\n\n        Plaintiffs assert identical constructive discharge claims under both Title VII and Texas\n\nLabor Code 9 \u00a7 21.055 against Parkland. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the following claims under\n\nTitle VII: (i) count xiv\u2014as to Bramble; (ii) count xv\u2014as to Pierce; and (iii) count xvi\u2014as to\n\nJohnson. Plaintiffs bring the same claims under \u00a7 21.055: (i) count xx\u2014as to Pierce; (ii) count\n\nxxi\u2014as to Johnson; and (iii) count xxii\u2014as to Bramble. Plaintiffs\u2019 assert an additional three\n\nconstructive discharge claims under \u00a7 1983 against Defendant Wood: (i) count v\u2014as to Pierce;\n\n(ii) count vi\u2014as to Bramble; (iii) count vii\u2014as to Johnson. Defendants move to dismiss each of\n\nthe enumerated claims alleging constructive discharge.\n\n\n9\n The Court recognizes that the Commission on Human Rights (TCHRA) has been replaced with the Texas Workforce\nCommission\u2019s civil rights division. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 798 n.1 (Tex. 2010) (citing Tex.\nLab. Code Ann. \u00a7 21.0015). Throughout this memorandum opinion and order, the Court refers to Texas Labor Code\nChapter 21 as the Texas Labor Code.\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                          Page 29 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                             Page 30 of 37 PageID 289\n\n\n\n         The same substantive legal standards and evidentiary framework apply to discrimination\n\nand harassment claims under Title VII, Chapter 21, and Section 1983. See Culwell v. City of Fort\n\nWorth, 468 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2006). 10 Thus, the Court considers identical claims under Title\n\nVII, Section 1983, and the Texas Labor Code together. \u201cA resignation is actionable under Title\n\nVII, allowing the plaintiff to seek compensatory damages for events after the resignation, only if\n\nthe resignation qualifies as a constructive discharge.\u201d Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556,\n\n566 (5th Cir. 2001). \u201cTo prove a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must establish that working\n\nconditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.\u201d Kinney\n\nShoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566 (citation omitted). 11 Whether that standard is met depends on the facts\n\nof each case, but the following factors are relevant:\n\n         (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities;\n         (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a\n         younger [or less experienced/qualified] supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or\n         humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee\u2019s resignation;\n         or (7) offers of early retirement on terms that would make the employee worse off\n         whether the offer was accepted or not.\n\nBarrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass\u2019n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). According to Fifth Circuit\n\nprecedent, \u201c[d]iscrimination alone, without aggravating factors, is insufficient for a claim of\n\nconstructive discharge\u201d Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566.\n\n\n\n\n10\n  See Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012) (\u201cSection 21.051 is effectively identical to Title\nVII, its federal equivalent, except that Title VII does not protect against age and disability discrimination . . . Because\none of the purposes of [the Texas Labor Code] is to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII . . . we have\nconsistently held that those analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the [Texas\nLabor Code].\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566 (applying\nconstructive discharge elements from Title VII to Section 1981 claims).\n11\n   See also, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (\u201cThe inquiry [for constructive discharge] is objective:\nDid working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee\u2019s position would have felt\ncompelled to resign?\u201d).\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                                Page 30 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                  Page 31 of 37 PageID 290\n\n\n\n       In all six claims of constructive discharge against Parkland under Title VII and \u00a7 21.055 of\n\nthe Texas Labor Code, Plaintiffs allege in conclusory fashion that: \u201cDefendant Parkland\u2019s actions\n\nin denying Plaintiff [] promotions to management-level positions based upon race, thereby\n\naffecting his compensation, made the work conditions so intolerable that Plaintiff [] was compelled\n\nto resign.\u201d (See ECF No. 7 at 25\u201326, 28\u201329). A failure to promote\u2014on its own\u2014does not prove\n\nconstructive discharge. See Barrow, 10 F.3d at 297 (not including failure to promote as a factor\n\nfor meeting the standard for constructive discharge); Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566.\n\n       Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wood called Plaintiffs Pierce and Bramble,\n\n\u201cboy\u201d on \u201cnumerous occasions.\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 7). Only one instance of this language is\n\nspecifically pled\u2014 as alleged, \u201cDefendant Wood said, \u2018Hey, boys, how\u2019re you doing?\u2019 to Plaintiff\n\nPierce and Plaintiff Bramble. Plaintiff Pierce said, \u2018I\u2019m older than you, so why\u2019re you calling me\n\nthat?\u2019\u201d (ECF No. 7 at 7). In response to the use of \u201cboy\u201d by Wood, Pierce reported the incident to\n\nHuman Resources; Pierce does not allege that this conduct or language continued after he reported\n\nit. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Bramble pled, regarding the same language, only that \u201cDefendant Michael\n\nWood, referred to Plaintiff Bramble and Plaintiff Pierce as \u2018boys\u2019 on numerous occasions.\u201d (ECF\n\nNo. 7 at 8). In light of the above, Plaintiffs fail to plead any factual allegations of how these\n\ninstances are \u201cso intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.\u201d Kinney\n\nShoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566. And, Plaintiffs direct the Court to no law as to the same.\n\n       As pleaded, Plaintiffs\u2019 conclusory statements cannot support a finding of a constructive\n\ndischarge as to Bramble, Johnson, or Pierce. At this stage, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have\n\nfailed to allege factual allegations that establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a\n\nreasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566. The\n\nCourt grants Defendants\u2019 corresponding motion to dismiss\u2014all Plaintiffs\u2019 claims of constructive\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                              Page 31 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 32 of 37 PageID 291\n\n\n\ndischarge under Title VII and the Texas Labor Code (counts 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, and 22) are\n\ndismissed.\n\n       In turn, each Plaintiff brought identical constructive discharge claims under \u00a7 1983 against\n\nDefendant Wood in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 7 at 16-19). Defendants move to dismiss\n\nthese claims because they are insufficiently pled, and as such Defendant Wood is entitled to\n\nqualified immunity. (ECF No. 11 at 21-22).\n\n       Plaintiffs each plead, in conclusory fashion: \u201cDefendant Wood\u2019s actions in denying\n\npromotions to management-level positions based upon race, in violation of his rights under 42\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 1981, made the work conditions so intolerable that Plaintiff\u2026 was compelled to resign.\u201d\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 17-18). As with Plaintiffs\u2019 claims of constructive discharge against Parkland, these\n\ntoo fail. The bald conclusion that a failure to promote alone caused an employee to resign is not\n\nenough to allege conditions \u201cso intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to\n\nresign.\u201d Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d at 566.\n\n       Plaintiffs\u2019 have not sufficiently pled constructive discharge, their claims also fail on the\n\nfirst prong of qualified immunity\u2014 \u201cwhether the plaintiff[\u2018s] allegations, if true, establish a\n\nviolation of a clearly established right.\u201d Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir.\n\n2005). Thus, the Court concludes that all Plaintiffs\u2019 claims of constructive discharge under Section\n\n1981\u2014counts 5, 6, and 7\u2014are dismissed.\n\n       In summary, the Court grants Defendants\u2019 motion as to all of Plaintiffs\u2019 constructive\n\ndischarge claims, thus, such claims are dismissed.\n\nD.    Employment Discrimination Claim under Title VII (Count x)\n\n       Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim of employment discrimination, count x, on the basis of race\n\nunder Title VII against Parkland. Defendants move to dismiss this claim alleging that Plaintiffs\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                            Page 32 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                            Page 33 of 37 PageID 292\n\n\n\nfail to state a claim for relief for Title VII discrimination based on a custom or practice. (ECF No.\n\n11 at 24).\n\n         To analyze the merits of a plaintiff\u2019s Title VII discrimination claim, we use the McDonnell\n\nDouglas framework, which first requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of\n\ndiscrimination. 12 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36\n\nL.Ed.2d 668 (1973). \u201cHowever, the McDonnell Douglas framework is an evidentiary standard, not\n\na rigid pleading requirement.\u201d Puente v. Ridge, 324 F. App\u2019x 423, 427\u201328 (5th Cir. 2009); see\n\nSwierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 506\u201307 (2002). Thus, for purposes of surviving a Rule\n\n12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, \u201can employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie\n\ncase of discrimination.\u201d Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503,\n\n531 (5th Cir. 2004). Still, this court may consider the McDonnell Douglas framework, and no\n\nplaintiff is exempt from her obligation to \u201callege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her\n\nclaim.\u201d Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass\u2019n, 265 F. App\u2019x 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2008).\n\n          Northern District of Texas Local Civil Rule 7.1(e) instructs that \u201c[a] response and brief to\n\nan opposed motion must be filed within 21 days from the date the motion is filed.\u201d N.D. Tex. Loc.\n\nCiv. R. 7.1(e). A party who fails to pursue a claim beyond its initial pleading may waive or abandon\n\nthe claim. Black v. N. Panola School Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (\u201c[Plaintiff]\n\nfurther failed to defend her retaliatory abandonment claim in both responses to the defendant\u2019s\n\nmotion to dismiss.\u201d). Thus, a party\u2019s failure to defend a claim in her response to a motion to dismiss\n\n\n\n\n12\n   A prima facie case requires the plaintiff to show that: \u201c(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was\nqualified for her position; (3) [she] was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) . . . in the case of disparate\ntreatment, . . . that others similarly situated were treated more favorably.\u201d Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci.\nCtr., 245 F.3d 507, 512\u201313 (5th Cir. 2001).\n\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                              Page 33 of 37\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                           Page 34 of 37 PageID 293\n\n\n\nconstitutes abandonment. See Matter of Dallas Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2017)\n\n(concluding plaintiff\u2019s failure to respond to defendant\u2019s argument in a motion to dismiss\n\nconstituted abandonment) (citing Black, 461 F.3d at 588 n.1); see, e.g., Vela v. City of Houston,\n\n276 F.3d 659, 678-79 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing abandonment of theories of recovery and\n\ndefenses when such theories were not presented to the trial court).\n\n         Here, Plaintiffs failed to defend their Title VII employment discrimination on the basis of\n\nrace claim in their response to Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 16). Because Plaintiffs\n\nfailed to address\u2014much less defend\u2014Defendants\u2019 challenge to Plaintiffs\u2019 Title VII employment\n\ndiscrimination on the basis of race claim, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have abandoned this claim.\n\nSee Black, 461 F.3d at 588 n.1; Matter of Dallas Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d at 126; Vela, 276 F.3d\n\nat 678-79. 13 Thus, the Court dismisses count x with prejudice. In summary, the Court grants\n\nDefendants\u2019 motion as to all of Plaintiffs\u2019 Title VII and Texas Labor Code claims against Parkland,\n\nthus, such claims are dismissed. 14\n\n\n13\n   See also, e.g., JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (\u201c[F]ailure to brief\nan argument in the district court waives that argument in that court.\u201d) (quoting Magee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 261\nF. Supp. 2d 738, 748 n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2003)) (citations omitted); Kellam v. Servs., No. 12-352, 2013 WL 12093753,\nat *3 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2013), aff\u2019d sub nom. Kellam v. Metrocare Servs., 560 F. App\u2019x 360 (5th Cir.\n2014) (\u201cGenerally, the failure to respond to arguments constitutes abandonment or waiver of the issue.\u201d) (citations\nomitted); Mayo v. Halliburton Co., No. 10-1951, 2010 WL 4366908, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2010) (granting motion\nto dismiss breach of contract claim because plaintiff failed to respond to defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on this issue\nand thus waived the argument).\n14\n  An employee must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the Texas Workforce Commission within 300\ndays (for federal law claims brought under Title VII) or 180 days (for state law claims under the Texas Labor Code).\nSee Nat\u2019l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). And he or she must file a separate charge for\neach discrete discriminatory or adverse employment action. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110. The Court has concerns\nabout whether Plaintiffs sufficiently exhausted their administrative remedies to proceed on Title VII or Texas Labor\nCode claims. Plaintiffs fail to attach their charges to the EEOC\u2014in fact, Plaintiffs only reference to the exhaustion of\nadministrative remedies is a single paragraph in the complaint stating:\n\n         Plaintiffs have each timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which constitutes cross-\n         filing with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. Plaintiffs received their Notices of Right to\n         Sue from the EEOC within 90 days prior to the filing of this First Amended Complaint.\n\n(ECF No. 7 at 2). However, Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs\u2019 exhaustion of administrative remedies.\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                             Page 34 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                    Page 35 of 37 PageID 294\n\n\n\nE.     Leave to Amend\n\n        Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend their complaint. (ECF No. 16 at 33).\n\nNotwithstanding a plaintiff\u2019s failure to plead sufficient facts, \u201cdistrict courts often afford plaintiffs\n\nat least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear\n\nthat the defects are incurable, or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are willing or unable to\n\namend in a manner that will avoid dismissal.\u201d In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F.\n\nSupp.2d 552, 567\u201368 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Witter\n\n& Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)). Nevertheless, courts may appropriately dismiss an\n\naction with prejudice if a court finds that the plaintiff has alleged his or her best case. Jones v.\n\nGreninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). \u201cA plaintiff has pleaded her best case after she is\n\napprised of the insufficiency of her complaint.\u201d Wiggins v. Louisiana State Univ.-Health Care\n\nServs. Div., 710 F. App\u2019x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768\n\n(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (internal\n\nquotation and citation omitted))). As explained by the Fifth Circuit:\n\n        A plaintiff may indicate she has not pleaded her best case by stating material\n        facts that she would include in an amended complaint to overcome the\n        deficiencies identified by the court. See Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767\u201368. Similarly,\n        a district court need not grant a futile motion to amend. Legate, 822 F.3d at 211\n        (citing Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872\u201373 (5th Cir. 2000)).\n        \u201cFutility is determined under Rule 12(b)(6) standards, meaning an amendment is\n        considered futile if it would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\u201d\n        Id.\n\nWiggins, 710 F. App\u2019x at 627 (emphasis added in bold). The Fifth Circuit has affirmed denials of\n\nleave to amend where it determined that the proposed amendment would be futile after analyzing\n\nthe claims. See Edoinwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2017) (where the proposed amended\n\ncomplaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983). \u201c[A] bare request in an opposition to a\n\nmotion to dismiss\u2014without any indication of the particular grounds on which the amendment is\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                                Page 35 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24                 Page 36 of 37 PageID 295\n\n\n\nsought, cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)\u2014does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule\n\n15(a).\u201d Confederate Mem\u2019l Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993). If the plaintiff\n\ndoes not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a\n\ndistrict court may deny leave. Scott, 16F.4th at 1209, (citing McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist.,\n\n309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs \u201cfailed to\n\namend their complaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district court with a proposed\n\namended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the defendants to the substance of their\n\nproposed amendment\u201d)).\n\n        Here, Plaintiffs did not expressly request, with particularity, the request to amend their\n\ncomplaint. U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir.\n\n2003). Plaintiff\u2019s request for leave states:\n\n        In the event this Court determines that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim [,]\n        Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend\n        should be freely given when justice so requires and should be granted absent some\n        substantial justification for refusal. Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183 (1962).\n        Allowing Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint would serve justice and promote\n        judicial efficiency. Further, there would be no substantial or undue hardship,\n        prejudice, bad faith, undue delay, or futility by granting Plaintiffs leave to amend.\n\n(ECF No. 16 at 25). This \u201cdoes not provide any indication of the grounds on which such an\n\namendment should be permitted.\u201d Willard, 336 F.3d at 387. Northern District of Texas Local Rules\n\n15.1(a) requires a party seeking leave to file an amended pleading to \u201cattach a copy of the proposed\n\namended pleading as an exhibit to the motion[.]\u201d N.D. Tex. Loc. Civ. R. 15.1(a). Plaintiffs attached\n\nno amended pleadings to their request for leave. Further, the Court determines Plaintiffs\u2019\n\namendment would be futile. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint in response to Defendant\u2019s\n\noriginal Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 4 and No. 7). However, in Plaintiffs\u2019 request for leave to\n\namend they do not state, \u201cmaterial facts that [they] would include in an amended complaint to\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                            Page 36 of 37\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-01574-E Document 28 Filed 10/03/24              Page 37 of 37 PageID 296\n\n\n\novercome the deficiencies.\u201d Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767\u201368. For those reasons, the Court concludes\n\npermitting Plaintiffs \u201cany [further] attempts at amendment would be futile.\u201d See Wiggins, 710 F.\n\nApp\u2019x at 627 (discussing the same); Harris v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. of Texas, No. 3:23-CV-\n\n02486-E; 2024 WL 2734974 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2024) (denying motion for leave to amend\n\ncomplaint). For those reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs\u2019 Request for Leave to Amend.\n\n                                      V.   CONCLUSION\n\n       For the reasons enumerated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\n\n(ECF No. 11). The Motion is granted as to counts i, ii\u2013x, xiv\u2013xvi, and xx\u2013xxii, and thus, these\n\nclaims are dismissed. Plaintiffs\u2019 request for leave to amend their complaint is DENIED. (ECF No.\n\n16 at 25). Additionally, Defendants\u2019 first motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 4), is DENIED AS MOOT.\n\n\n\n       SO ORDERED this 3rd day of October, 2024.\n\n\n\n\n                                                  Ada Brown\n                                                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE\n\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                                                         Page 37 of 37\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-10-04T01:36:10.674605-07:00","document_number":"28","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017174061","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Memorandum Opinion and Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-10-03T13:12:29.401239-07:00","date_modified":"2024-12-21T03:08:26.422971-08:00","date_filed":"2024-10-03","time_filed":"15:07:10","entry_number":28,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-10-03.001","pacer_sequence_number":84,"description":" MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No.  11 ). The Motion is granted as to counts i, iix, xivxvi, and xxxxii, and thus, these claims are dismissed. Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend their complaint is DENIED. (ECF No.  16  at 25). Additionally, Defendants' first motion to dismiss, (ECF No.  4 ), is DENIED AS MOOT.  (Ordered by Judge Ada Brown on 10/3/2024) (kcr)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/403298574/","id":403298574,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67607457/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/413411602/","id":413411602,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67607457/27/johnson-v-dallas-county-hospital-district/","date_created":"2024-09-25T10:20:30.915569-07:00","date_modified":"2024-09-25T10:20:30.918228-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"27","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017153553","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order Staying Case","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-09-25T10:20:30.899938-07:00","date_modified":"2024-09-25T10:20:30.905269-07:00","date_filed":"2024-09-25","time_filed":"12:17:17","entry_number":27,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-09-25.001","pacer_sequence_number":82,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/400304650/","id":400304650,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67607457/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/409534248/","id":409534248,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67607457/26/johnson-v-dallas-county-hospital-district/","date_created":"2024-08-23T12:23:34.212884-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-08T21:27:38.787281-07:00","sha1":"033c6536632855f665d1f1e959299af644896313","page_count":14,"file_size":775977,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.379046/gov.uscourts.txnd.379046.26.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.379046/gov.uscourts.txnd.379046.26.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Pagel of 14 14.5, HAGEAR 124,\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |...\nFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS | <>\nDALLAS DIVISION |\n\nAUG 23 2024\n\nSPECIAL ORDER NO. 3-354\n\nEffective August 23, 2024, the cases listed on Exhibit A to this order are transferred to\nMagistrate Judge Brian McKay and shall henceforth carry the suffix letters \u201cBW.\u201d Magistrate\nJudge McKay shall seek consent of the parties in these cases to conduct all further proceedings\nand order the entry of final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c). Ifall parties do not\nconsent, Magistrate Judge McKay shall, unless the assigned district judge otherwise orders,\n\nexercise all powers permitted by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b).\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nAugust 23, 2024\n\nDect (_ wes\n\nDAVID C. GODBEY\nCHIEF JUDGE\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24\n\nPage 2o0f14 PagelD 125\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n1 2:24-CV-0142-BK Hasan v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n2 3:18-CV-1933-N Lexor Manufacturing LLC v. Luraco Ine, et al.\n\n3 3:19-CV-2204-X Retail Ready Career Center inc v. United States of America, et al.\n\n4 3:19-CV-2218-E Southwest Airlines Co v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc\n\n5 3:19-CV-2281-K FTC v. Match Group\n\n6 3:20-CV-0656-K-BK Buzz Photo, et al. v. People's Republic of China, et al.\n\n7 3:20-CV-2935-N Carswell v. Hunt County Texas, et al.\n\n8 3:20-CV-3718-D Samurai Global LLC v. Landmark American Insurance Company\n3:21-CV-0116-B Rainier Arms LLC, et al. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and\n\n9 Explosives, et al.\n\n10 3:21-CV-0840-E TNT Quadrangle Partner, LP, et al. v. SRPF B/Quadrangle Property, LLC, et al.\n\n11 3:21-CV-1764-D Vess v. City of Dallas, et al.\n\n412 3:21-CV-2429-L Raskin, et al. v. Dallas Independent Schoo! District, et al.\n\n13 3:22-CV-0654-N Salt and Light Energy Equipment LLC v. Crigin Bancorp\n\n14 3:22-CV-0663-E United States of America v. All Funds in 199 Bank Accounts Located in India\n\n15 3:22-CV-0780-M State of Texas, et al. v. Biden, et al.\n\n16 3:22-CV-0907-5 Hilltop Holdings Inc v. AlG Specialty Insurance Company\n\n17 3:22-CV-1185-X Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company v. Morgan\n\n18 3:22-CV-1869-E Walsh v. Peterson\n\n19 3:22-CV-2118-X Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton, et al.\n\n20 3:22-CV-2272-S Thomas v. McDonough, et al.\n\n21 3:22-CV-2597-K Pearson, et al. v. Gage\n\n22 3:22-CV-2624-B Iske v. Precision Dynamics International LLC\n\n23 3:22-CV-2763-E Boy Scouts of America v. Touch A Life Foundation Inc\n\n24 3:22-MC-0079-X-BK NiRB v. LM Carpet\n\n25 3:23-CV-0037-5 Young v. Baylor Scott & White Health\n\n26 3:23-CV-0133-B Endurance American Insurance Company v. Lloyd's Syndicate 3624\n\n27 3:23-CV-0313-S G Thomas Air LLC v. Pratt & Whitney Engine Services Inc\n\n28 3:23-CV-0342-M Ariat International Inc v. Khemchand Handicrafts Limited, et ai.\n\n29 3:23-CV-0464-D Alford v. Wonderland Montessori Academy LLC\n\n30 3:23-CV-0584-G Lee Ir v. United States\n3:23-CV-0640-D M Central Residences Condominium Association Inc v. Technology\n\n31 Insurance Company Inc\n\n32 3:23-CV-0641-L Securities and Exchange Commission v. McKnight\n\n33 3:23-CV-0811-E Alawei v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service\n\n34 3:23-CV-0881-X GS Holistic LCC v. Sri Manakamana Inc\n\n35 3:23-CV-0910-B Brandon Architects Inc v. Olerio Home LLC\n\n36 3:23-CV-0954-X Lopez v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.\n\n37 3:23-CV-0965-X Wilcox v. Equifax Information Services LLC\n\n38 3:23-CV-1171-K Modern Vascular of Southaven LLC, et al. v. Qlarant Integrity Solutions LLC\n\n39 3:23-CV-1198-G White v. American Economy Insurance Company\n\n40 3:23-CV-1351-X $2 Brothers LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company\n\n41 3:23-CV-1399-G Dill v. Experian Information Solutions Inc\n\n1\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20\n\nFiled 08/23/24 Page3o0f14 PagelD 126\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n42 3:23-CV-1457-5 Denison Glass & Mirror Ine v. EFCO LLC\n\n43 3:23-CV-1559-B Fitton v. Pinnacle Propane LLC\n\n44 3:23-CV-1574-E Johnson, et al. v. Dallas County Hospital District, et al.\n\n45 3:23-CV-1583-E Hernandez v. Brown\n\n46 3:23-CV-1663-D-BK Hill v. Norman, et ai.\n\n47 3:23-CV-1698-L-BK Jaffari v. Garland, et al.\n\n48 3:23-CV-1772-B Uliman v. OBM Miami\n\n49 3:23-CV-1915-B-BK Pinson v. Dallas Cnty. Sherriff\u2019s Office, et al.\n\n50 3:23-CV-1918-N Martinez v. Kroger\n3:23-CV-1945-D-BK Thornton v. Dallas County d/b/a Dallas County District Attorney's Office, et\n\n51 al.\n\n52 3:23-CV-2088-L-BK Gordon v. Kellam\n\n53 3:23-CV-2090-N-BK Tyson v. Commissioner of Social Security\n\n54 3:23-CV-2094-N-BK Humble v. Enge, et al.\n\n55 3:23-CV-2112-D King v. SeaHarbor Insurance Agency LLC\n\n56 3:23-CV-2162-5 Sealed v. Sealed\n\n57 3:23-CV-2195-X-BK Ashley v. DOL\n\n58 3:23-CV-2212-B Hunter v. Procollect Inc\n\n59 3:23-CV-2231-5 82 Glenwood Avenue LLC v. Schutze, et al.\n\n60 3:23-CV-2385-BK Fernandez v. Social Security Administration\n\n61 3:23-CV-2412-D Beasley v. Castle Credit Co Holdings LLC\n\n62 3:23-CV-2438-N-BK Blanks v, Federal Correctional Institution Seagoville, et al.\n\n63 3:23-CV-2493-K-BK Dickerson v. Conduent Commercial! Solutions LLC\n\n64 3:23-CV-2656-K-BK United States of America v. Rehab 4 Work Services LLC, et al.\n\n65 3:23-CV-2728-B Factor Mutual Insurance Company v. Southwest Pumps LLC, et al.\n\n66 3:24-CV-0013-B SW Marine v. Valentine\n\n67 3:24-CV-0072-E Katz v. Gruenberg, et al.\n\n68 3:24-CV-0104-E Tupac v. Asbury Automotive Group Inc, et al.\n\n69 3:24-CV-0112-E-BK Keys v. Connors et al.\n\n70 3:24-CV-0113-K-BK Smith v. Federai Bureau of Prisons, et al.\n\n71 3:24-CV-0148-B Samiappan v. Su\n\n72 3:24-CV-0244-N Sukin v. Experian Information Soiutions Inc, et al.\n\n73 3:24-CV-0298-G Liu v. U.S. Department of State, et ai.\n\n74 3:24-CV-0376-X Colonna, et al. v. LoanDepot.com LLC\n\n75 3:24-CV-0626-S-BK Alfano v. Allred Unit Mailroom\n\n76 3:24-CV-1060-L-BK Butler v. Lee at al\n\n77 3:24-CV-1063-D Rodriguez v. ALDI Inc\n\n78 3:24-CV-1083-K G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Frida's Tacos LLC, et al.\n\n79 3:24-CV-1089-X Feit Electric Company Inc v. Elong international USA Inc, et al.\n\n80 3:24-CV-1117-K Umoru v. Walmart Stores Texas LLC\n\n81 3:24-CV-1149-X-BK Central States Health and Welfare Fund v. Contreras\n3:24-CV-1151-X Dallas Food & Beverage LLC, et al. v. United States Smail Business\n\n82 Administration, et al.\n\n83 3:24-CV-1245-B Sealed v. Sealed\n\n84 3:24-CV-1367-S Jain, et al. v. Jaddou\n\n85 3:24-CV-1416-G-BK Henderson v. Trump\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page4of14 PagelD 127\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n86 3:24-CV-1422-5 Kearney v. Equifax Information Services LLC\n\n87 3:24-CV-1551-B Zachary v. Environmental Protection Agency\n\n88 3:24-CV-1587-S-BK Henderson v. Trump\n\n89 3:24-CV-1621-G Hamilton v. Walmart Inc\n\n90 3:24-CV-1677-X EYM Pizza of Georgia LLC, et al. v. Pizza Hut LLC, et al.\n\n91 3:24-CV-1705-D Ogboru v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company\n92 3:24-MC-0017-E NFinity IP v. Varsity Spirit\n\n93 4:24-CV-0592-BK Johnson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n94 5:23-CV-0259-BK Arguello v. Social Security Administration\n\n95 5:23-CV-0281-BK Murphy v. Social Security Administration\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20\n\nFiled 08/23/24 Page5of14\n\nPagelD 128\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n1 3:16-cv-00764-N VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc\nCapio Funding LLC v. Rural/Metro Operating\n2 3:17-cv-02713-X Company LLC et al\n3 3:19-cv-01067-K Von Colditz v. Woods et af\n4 3:20-cv-00045-D Rodriguez v. Southern Health Partners Inc et al\n5 3:20-cv-00313-N Hamilton et al v. Dallas County\n6 3:20-cv-01358-E Coleman et al v. Brozen et al\n7 3:20-cv-03636-K Blue Yonder Group inc v. Kinaxis inc et al\n8 3:21-cv-01498-B Halperin et al v. Wills et al\n9 3:22-cv-00034-X McClung et al v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC et al\n10 3:22-cv-00141-N-BN Bell v. Moore\nit 3:22-cv-00525-X Fiberco, Inc. v. Acadia Insurance Company\nHighland Capital Management LP et al v. Highland Capital Management Fund\n12 3:22-cv-00789-X Advisors LP\n13 3:22-cv-00794-$ Legacy Exploration LLC v. Optimum Energy Partners LLC et al\n14 3:22-cv-01498-G-BN Timmons v. Director\n45 3:22-cy-01581-G-BN Sharper v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n416 3:22-cv-01600-G-BN Matthews v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n17 3:22-cv-01871-G-BN Turner v. O'Daniel\n18 3:22-cv-02062-X Shuler Drilling Company Inc v. Disiere Partners LLC, et al\n19 3:22-cv-02312-G-BN Mornes v, Director, TDCJ-CID\n20 3:22-cv-02403-N-BN Carey v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n21 3:22-cv-02410-G Castillo v. Walmart Inc et ai\n22 3:22-cv-02589-S-BN Minze v. Director, TOCJ-CID\n23 3:22-cv-02600-X Venzant v. Bigelow Arizona TX-282 LP et al\n24 3:22-cv-02891-N-BN Carcamo v. Director, FDCJ-CID\n25 3:23-cv-00057-K-BN Turner v. Wellpath Med Co\n26 3:23-cv-00066-B-BN Hernandez v. Director, TDCJ-CID\nTrustees of the IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health and Benefit Fund et al v. Rockey\n27 3:23-cv-00224-B Electric Inc\n28 3:23-cv-00280-K Mercury Associates Inc v. Primoris Services Corporation\n29 3:23-cv-00303-N Paige v. State Farm Lloyds\n30 3:23-cv-00337-X-BN Roccaforte v. Transunion\n31 3:23-cv-00338-N-BN Roccaforte v. Experian information Solutions Inc\n32 3:23-cv-00339-E-BN Roccaforte v. Equifax Inc\n33 3:23-cv-00355-X EDN Global Inc et al v. AT&T Mobility Services LUC et al\n34 3:23-cv-G0391-D Walker v. Hoffman et al\n35 3:23-cv-00410-E-BN Lewis v. Equifax\n36 3:23-cv-00435-B-BN Lewis v. Experian\n37 3:23-cv-00508-N Doe v. Backpage.com LLC et al\n38 3:23-cv-00547-K Bilbo v. Central Transport LLC\n39 3:23-cv-00568-B Cunningham v. State Farm Lloyds\n40 3:23-cv-00574-B Martin v. Penske Logistics LLC\n41 3:23-cv-80603-E Bridging Biosciences LLC v, Esch et al\n42 3:23-cv-00668-E-BN Spillman Jr v. Director, TDCI-CID\n43 3:23-cv-00706-E Arka Mesquite Investments LLC et al v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company\n44 3:23-cv-00736-M Powell v. Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana\n45 3:23-cv-00755-M-BN Toliver v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n46 3:23-cv-00772-E-BN Cloninger v. Director, TDC)-CID\n47 3:23-cv-00819-G White v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page6of14 PagelD 129\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n4g 3:23-cv-00844-M Bellinger v. CureWave Lasers LLC et al\n49 3:23-cv-00852-G New York inn Inc et al v, Associated Industries Insurance Company Inc\n50 3:23-cv-00882-L GS Holistic LLC v. B Over 21 Inc et al\n51 3:23-cv-00915-B SMA v. Salesforce et al\n52 3:23-cv-00948-K Eder v. City of Burleson\n53 3:23-cv-00977-5 Brown v. Sarn\u2019s East Inc\n54 3:23-cv-01016-D Johnson v. Epsilon Data Management LLC\n55 3:23-cv-01018-X Licht v. Ling et al\n56 3:23-cv-01024-L GS Holistic LLC v. OMS Investment LLC et al\n57 3:23-cv-01039-B Jone Doe AS v. Salesforce Inc et a!\n58 3:23-cv-01089-N-BN Rountree v, FedEx Ground Package System Inc\n59 3:23-cv-01228-G Garcia v. Fiesta Mart LLC et al\n60 3:23-cv-01230-B Horton et al v. Heppner et al\n61 3:23-cv-01286-E Warner v. Equifax information Services LLC et ai\n62 3:23-cv-01301-X Dheera Limited Company v. Johnson Controls Inc et ai\n63 3:23-cv-01320-N-BN Silvers v. Director, TOCJ-CIB\n64 3:23-cv-01339-E Terri E Newkirk IRA v. Kelly e\u00a2 al\n65 3:23-cv-01345-L Russell v. Kroger Texas, LP\n66 3:23-cv-01356-L-BN Perez v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC et al\n6&7 3:23-cv-01366-N Husinger v. Smart Start Real estate Corporation\n68 3:23-cv-01376-X Harris v. Papa Texas LLC\n69 3:23-cv-01468-D Nieves v. Uber Technologies Inc et al\n70 3:23-cv-01484-L Red Barn Candle Company ELC v. Bath & Body Works Brand Management Inc\n7t 3:23-cv-01497-L Rittman v. Amguard Insurance Company\n72 3:23-cv-01502-G-BN Cook v. Costco Wholesale Corporation\n73 3:23-cv-01503-B Charitable DAF Fund LP et al v. Highland Capital Management LP\n74 3:23-cv-01517-N Bahamas Laguna Azure LLC v. City of Royse City, Texas\n75 3:23-cv-01525-X Biovant LLC v. BTEAG LLC et al\n76 3:23-cv-01548-5 Cobbs v. Baylor Scott & White\n77 3:23-cv-01557-D Clark v. Wyndham Worldwide, Inc\n78 3:23-cv-01561-K Erwin et al v. Metalcraft of Mayville Inc\n79 3:23-cv-01565-S-BN Fields v. Kelley\n80 3:23-cv-01617-X Holmes v. Equifax information Services LLC et al\n81 3:23-cv-01621-5 Niter et al v. Brown et al\n82 3:23-cv-01669-B Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n83 3:23-cv-01674-B Brookfield Property Retail Holdings LLC et ai v. Dillard Texas Central LLC\n84 3:23-cv-01675-L Van-Zandt Reiss et al v. The Bank of New York Melon\n&5 3:23-cv-01679-E Harris v. HireRight LLC\n86 3:23-cv-01775-X Palmer v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc\n87 3:23-cv-01791-L SPBL-1119 LLC v. Arciterra Strategic Retail Advisor LLC et al\n8&8 3:23-cv-01793-L LSM Blue Sky LLC v. AT Olathe Outlot 5 LLC et al\n89 3:23-cv-01802-E Megehee v. Pallida LLC\n90 3:23-cv-01805-E McConnell v. Applied Digital Corporation et al\n91 3:23-cv-01832-8 Doe v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit et al\n92 3:23-cv-01870-K GS Holistic LLC v. GNS Sons Inc\n93 3:23-cv-01889-S Velis v. Bangert et al\n94 3:23-cv-01910-E Hagans v. Child Care Group\n95 3:23-cv-01912-S Lessig v. Fiesta Mart LLC\n96 3:23-cv-01937-N Kustom Signals Inc v. Applied Concepts Inc\n97 3:23-cv-01972-L Owens v. Dallas Country Club\n98 3:23-cv-01973-K-BN Bohemond v. City of Dallas TX\n99 3:23-cv-01998-B Harland v. Workforce outsource Services Inc\n\n5\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page7of1i4 PagelD 130\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n100 3:23-cv-02009-G-BN Hunsinger v. Atmos Energy Corporation\n101 3:23-cv-02010-B Johnson et al v. Crosby Elementary School et al\n3:23-cv-02011-B\n\n102 Sample v. SLI Enterprises Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02023-B\n\n103 Promed LLC v, Quintairos Prieto Wood & Boyer PA\n3:23-cv-02050-X\n\n104 Taste of Chengdu LLC v. Feng\n3:23-cv-G2070-G6\n\n105 Summers v. Longbrake et al\n3:23-cv-02071-E\n\n106 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:23-cv-02097-X\n\n107 Holcamb v. Monitronics International\n3:23-cv-02110-B\n\n108 Consumer Data Partners, LP et al v. Agentra LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02126-5\n\n109 Mosure et al. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.\n3:23-cv-02143-N\n\n110 Dillard v. Gaines Investment Trust et al\n3:23-cv-02148-K-BN\n\n411 Booth v. US Bank Trust NA\n3:23-ev-02155-L\n\n412 cici Enterprises LP v. HSB Specialty Insurance Company\n3:23-cv-02158-D\n\n113 Wilson v. Korth Direct Mortgage et al\n3:23-cv-02203-E\n\n114 Warehouse Solutions Inc v. Plus Veterans, LLC\n3:23-cv-02214-$\n\n115 Big Games Management LLC v. Bespoke Piush LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02232-B\n\n116 Campbell v. Methodist Hospitais of Dallas et al\n3:23-cv-02238-E\n\n117 Cameron v. QT South LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02243-E\n\n118 Paez v. Childrens Health System of Texas\n3:23-cv-02284-G\n\n119 Stanley v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC\n3:23-cv-02286-X\n\n120 Brandon Wade Photography LLC v. Killian Design LLC\n3:23-cv-02292-L\n\n121 Lloyd v. Athena Condominiums Co-Owners Association\n3:23-cv-02294-B-BN\n\n422 Andrews v. York et af\n3:23-cv-02307-G\n\n123 Lee v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02367-K\n\n124 City of Dallas v. Triple D Gear, LLC\n3:23-cv-02387-L\n\n125 Nasrallah v. Scottsdale Insurance Company\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page8of14 PagelD 131\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:23-cv-02404-L\n126 Lilium GVP LLC v. Transportation Insurance Company et al\n3:23-cv-02421-X\n127 Principal Life Insurance Company v. Roque et al\n3:23-cv-02457-B-BN\n428 Young v. United Parcel Service Inc (Ohio)\n3:23-cv-02494-\u00a7\n4129 Hossain v. The Boeing Company\n3:23-cv-02504-K\n130 DAV Sub Inc v. QligSOFT Inc\n3:23-cv-02531-E\n131 Dawson v. Union Pacific Railroad\n3:23-cv-02532-E-BN\n132 Randle v. Brown et al\n3:23-cv-02539-X\n133 Bowers v. Uplift Education\n3:23-cv-02547-E\n134 Session v. Sanofi US Services Inc. et al\n3:23-cv-02594-E\n135 Verna IP Holdings LLC v. Dais Inc\n\n3:23-cv-02624-N\n\n136 Doe v. International Association of Eating Disorder Professionals Foundation Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02633-S\n137 Motton v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC\n3:23-cv-02670-E\n138 Samadian v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company\n3:23-cv-02671-X\n139 APOD Group ELC v. Glen Lakes Homeowners Association Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02673-G\n140 Elliott v. Gonzalez et al\n3:23-cv-02708-B\n144 Dishmon v. Newkirk Logistics Inc\n3:23-cv-02725-D\n142 Pradia v. The City of Rhome et al\n3:23-cv-02737-N\n143 Rollins-Booker v. Senture LLC\n3:23-cv-02770-S\n144 Camacho v. Sajeda Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02795-E\n145 Coil v. Experian Information Solutions Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02807-K\n146 Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Williams et al\n3:23-cv-02827-G-BN\n447 Moka v. Huntex Properties LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02830-X\n148 Mesa Digital LLC v. One Plus USA Corp\n3:23-cv-02834-E\n149 Canada, Jr. et al v. Sherman\n3:23-cv-02839-E\n150 Accurate Metal Stamping LLC v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company et al\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page9of14 PagelD 132\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:24-cv-00002-L\n\n151 McLaughlin et al v. Family Assets Management LLC\n3:24-cv-00004-N\n\n152 Hill v. Garcia et af\n3:24-cv-00631-L\n\n153 Great American Insurance v, Truckmax Inc\n3:24-cv-00098-L\n\nLeon Capital Group LEC et al v. Princeton Excess & Surplus Lines Insurance Company\n\n154 et al\n3:24-cv-00122-B\n\n455 Slate/Sefect Inc v. Martin Marietta Materials Inc et al\n3:24-cv-00191-E\n\n156 Crum & Forster Insurance Company v. Shreno Limited\n3:24-cv-00255-E\n\n157 Blacknall v. Allata LLC et al\n3:24-cv-00285-G-BN\n\n158 Davis et al v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et ai\n3:24-cv-00331-5\n\n159 Tafolla v. Wacker et al\n3:24-cv-00341-S\n\n160 Forsythe et al v. Equifax Information Services LLC et ai\n3:24-cv-00347-K\n\n161 Homesteaders Life Company v. Williams\n3:24-cv-00361-E\n\n162 Kendrick v. QuickTrip Corporation\n3:24-cv-00382-B\n\n463 US Bank National Association v. Malloy\n3:24-cv-00388-E\n\n164 Elioznde v. Randalls Food and Drug LP\n3:24-cv-00417-X\n\n165 Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe\n3:24-cv-00434-L\n\n166 G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Aguifar\n3:24-cv-00498-K\n\n167 Highland Employee Retention Assets LLC v. Dondero et al\n3:24-cv-00528-B\n\n168 Texas State Board of Dental Examiners v. Doe\n3:24-cv-00544-D-BN\n\n169 Rector v. Director, TDC)-CID\n3:24-cv-00568-N\n\n170 Strong v. Bank of America Corporation et al\n3:24-cv-00569-5\n\ni71 Haag Engineering Co v. Ellis et al\n3:24-cv-00647-L\n\n172 Languasco et al v. Blair Logistics LLC\n3:24-cv-00658-5\n\n173 Gardner v. The Lincoin National Life Insurance Company\n3:24-cv-00691-D\n\n174 Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP\n3:24-ev-00702-L\n\n175 Birrueta v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page10o0f14 PagelD 133\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:24-cv-00728-X-BN\n\n176 Said v. EAN Holdings LLC et al\n3:24-cv-00791-E\n\n177 Wilson v. British Airways PLC\n3:24-cv-00796-L\n\n178 Sanchez v. Caliber Holdings LLC\n\n179 3:24-cv-00798-E King v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC\n3:24-cv-00809-S\n\n180 Kenney et al v. Dallas County Texas\n3:24-cv-00817-B\n\n181 Children's Health System of Texas v. UnitedHeaithcare Insurance Company\n3:24-cv-00892-B\n\n182 Toombs et al v. Kaufman County, Texas et al\n3:24-cv-00905-E-BN\n\n183 Rass v. Texas Instruments\n3:24-cv-00909-K-BN\n\n184 Bryant v. EverBank NA\n3:24-cv-00971-X\n\n185 Morgan v. Fundamental Clinical And Operational Services LLC\n3:24-cv-01020-X\n\n186 The Shore Firm LLP v. Videoshare LLC\n\n187 3:24-cv-01051-5 Gilliard v. Southwest Airlines Federal Credit Union\n3:24-ev-01075-N\n\n188 Ayangbile et al v. Children's Health Services of Texas\n3:24-cyv-011329-X\n\n189 Ray v. Experian Information Solutions Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01175-S-BN\n\n190 Romero et al v. US Bank National Association\n3:24-cv-01198-L\n\n191 Nautilus Hyosung America Inc v. BMO Bank NA et al\n3:24-cv-01209-D\n\n192 American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Southwest Airlines Co\n3:24-cv-01233-5\n\n193 Smith v. Montez et al\n3:24-cv-01262-D\n\n194 Brandon Wade Photography, LLC v. OTC Bar LLC\n3:24-cv-01288-D-BN\n\n195 Williams v. Richardson Independent School District\n3:24-cv-01319-G\n\n196 Daniels-Mock v. Taxir Logistics Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01326-K-BN\n\n197 Wickman v. Navarro County Jail\n3:24-cv-01339-B\n\n198 Travers v. Allstate Vehicle and Property insurance Company\n3:24-cv-01358-E\n\n199 Joe Hand Promotions inc v. Carbajal et at\n3:24-cv-01370-D-BN\n\n200 Council v. Draftkings et al\n3:24-cv-01397-K\n\n201 PacSec3 LLC v. RSA Federal LLC\n3:24-cv-01413-X\n\n202 Guillen et al v. U-Haul Company of Texas et al\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Pagei1i1of14 PagelD 134\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n203 3:24-cv-01418-L Wilson v. Frontier Communications Parent, Inc.\n3:24-cv-O1447-E\n204 Akhmedov v. TA Operating LLC\n\n3:24-cv-01461-K\n\n205 Moreno et al v. Alan Halperin, In his capacity as Trustee of the GFES Liquidation Trust\n3:24-cv-01479-$\n\n206 NexPoint Real Estate Partners LLC et al v. Highland Capital Management LP\n3:24-cv-01483-G\n\n207 Amazon.com Inc et al v. Baik et al\n3:24-cv-01519-B-BN\n\n208 Robinson-Durham v. Navarro County Jail\n3:24-cv-01531-X\n\n209 Dugaboy Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:24-cv-01541-B\n\n210 Sanchez et ai v. Schneider National Carriers Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01554-D\n\n211 Hernandez v. Bishop Cider Company LLC et al\n\n3:24-cv-01563-D\nWLands Limited Partnership LP et al v. Founders Plaza Nursing & Rehabilitation\n\n212 Partners LLC et al\n\n213 3:24-cv-01603-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n\n214 3:24-cv-01610-E Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n\n215 3:24-cv-01641-D Elizondo v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n216 3:24-cv-01642-X Aurzada et af v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al\n217 3:24-cv-01646-G-BN Sharman v. H&R Block et al\n\n218 3:24-cv-01647-N Rodriguez v. Home Depot USA inc\n\n219 3:24-cv-01684-L Criss v. Grocery Delivery E-Services USA Inc\n220 3:24-cv-01685-G Harris v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n221 3:24-cv-01692-N Ricker v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n222 3:24-cv-01711-D Mitchel v. Pitre et al\n\n223 3:24-cv-01717-K Ayala v. Chedraui USA Inc\n\n224 3:24-cv-01716-L Hutchinson v. Sunrun Inc\n\n225 3:24-cv-01720-K Miller v. Xpress Global Systems LLC\n\n226 S:24-cv-01743-L Collier v. Carter\n\n227 3:24-cv-O1768-5 Bosman v. Amazon.com inc et al\n\n3:24-cv-01786-L\n\n228 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:24-cv-01787-L\n\n229 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n\n230 3:24-cv-01796-B Larsen v. Apt All Points Transportation LLC et al\n\n231 3:24-cv-01811-D McAfee v. Lear Corporation\n\n232 3:24-cv-01821-K Ryan LLC v, Radin\n\n233 3:24-cv-01839-E Forstey v. Jordan et al\n\n234 3:24-cv-01873-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n\n235 3:24-cv-01882-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n\n236 3:24-cv-01908-D Hibdon v. Atrium Hospitality LP\n3:24-cv-01912-E\n\n237 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n\n10\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20\n\nFiled 08/23/24 Page12o0f14 PagelD 135\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n238 3:24-cv-01949-X Alentisar Trading Company v. Eyondi et al\n239 3:24-cv-01967-S-BN Willtams v. Richardson ISD\n\n41\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page130f14 PagelD 136\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE REBECCA RUTHERFORD\nTO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n1 3:22-cv-02887-L-BT Murphy v. Director\n\n2 3:23-cv-00316-B-BT Marcus v. Director\n\n3 3:23-cv-00978-D-BT Walton v. USA\n\n4 3:23-cv-02449-D-BT Manzo v. Federal Bureau of Prisons\n\n5 3:23-cv-2677-S-BT Jackson v. Smali Business Administration et al\n\n6 3:24-cv-00175-S-BT Gonzales v. Collier\n\n7 3:24-cv-00661-B-BT Hammons v. Tradeline Motorcars et al\n\n8 3:24-cv-00637-S-BT Humes v. McDonald's Walmart #5416-945\n\n9 3:24-cv-01708-X-BT Traeger v. Jones et al\n\n10 3:23-cv-00315-X-BT Duhon v. Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company et al\n\n11 3:23-cv-02194-8-BT Walters v. Garland\n\n12 3:23-cv-02157-L-BT United States of America v. Morgan et al\n3:24-cv-00277-L National Association of Blind Merchants et al v. The Army & Air Force Exchange\n\n13 Service et al\n\n14 3:24-cv-00273-N-BT De Pute v. United States of America et al\n\n15 3:24-cv-00703-B-BT Freeman v. USA et al\n\n16 3:23-cv-01994-S-BT Davis v. City of Mclendon Chisholm et al\n\n17 3:24-cv-00731-L Crenshaw v. Anderson et al\n\n18 3:24-mc-00034-B-BT Calhoun v. United States\n\n19 3:23-cv-02682-5-BT Phoenix Bulk Carriers LLC v. CAL-IXA Aggregates LLC\n\n20 3:24-cv-01590-N-BT Jackson v. United States Postal Service et al\n\n27 3:24-cv-01759-B-BT Woods v. Delta Air Lines inc\n\n22 2:23-cv-00171-BT Row v. Commissioner\n\n23 1:24-cv-00083-BT Gonzales v. Commissioner\n\n24 5:23-cv-00293-BT Mims v. Commissioner\n\n25 3:14-cv-02970-X Clapper et al v. American Realty Investors Inc et al\n\n26 3:20-cv-01276-N Kunze et al v. Baylor Scott & White Health et al\n\n27 3:20-cv-01364-E Malbrew et al v. A+ Charter Schools\n\n28 3:21-cv-02131-K Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services Inc\n\n29 3:22-cv-00876-N Grimmett et al v. Coleman et al\n\n30 3:22-cv-02116-X Black v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America\n\n31 3:22-cv-02182-M Range! de Oliveira v. Bierman\n\n32 3:22-cv-02184-B Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Vibrant Builders et ai\n\n33 3:23-cv-00271-K Green v. USA\n\n34 3:23-cv-01340-L Perez v. Experian Information Solutions Inc\n\n35 3:23-cv-01412-N Aravamuthan v. US Citizenship & immigration Service et al\n\n36 3:23-cv-01416-B8 Landmark American Insurance Company v. Richland Trace Owners Association Inc\n\n37 3:23-cv-01441-N Thompson v. McGehee et al\n\n38 3:23-cv-01490-S Norwood v. Dallas County Hospital District\n\n39 3:23-cv-01494-N Mathew v. Santander Consumer USA Inc\n\n40 3:23-cv-02051-N Shrestha et al v. USCIS et al\n\n41 3:23-cv-02089-E Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. ACI Payments Inc et al\n\n42 3:22-cv-01529-N Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC et al\n\n12\n\n\fCase 3:23-cv-00881-X Document 20 Filed 08/23/24 Page14o0f14 PagelD 137\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE REBECCA RUTHERFORD\nTO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n43 3:23-cv-00045-E Mauricio et al v. US Postal Service\n\n44 3:23-cv-01168-N-BT United States of America v. $39,900 in US Currency\n45 3:23-cv-02146-D Securities and Exchange Commission v. Verges et al\n\n46 3:23-cv-02222-K Heard et al v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n47 3:23-cv-02591-D Oldham v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n48 3:23-cv-02621-8 Sealed v. Sealed\n\n49 3:23-cv-02701-\u00a3 Pertrorock Mineral Holdings, LLC et al v. Minerva Resources, LLC et al\n50 3:23-cv-02271-S Hayes v. City of Dallas et al\n\n51 3:23-cv-02338-K Smith v. USA\n\n52 3:23-cv-02462-D Botone et al v. Unitrin Safeguard Insurance Company\n\n53 3:24-cv-00014-D Hardrick v. Wells Fargo Bank National Association et al\n54 3:24-cv-00201-K Ware et al v. Meridian Security Insurance Company\n\n55 3:24-cv-00204-X United States of America v. $45,000.00 in US Currency\n56 3:24-cv-00220-B Bayazeed v. Robinson et al\n\n57 3:24-cv-00664-X VDPP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC\n\n58 3:24-cv-00700-X-BT Garrison v. John Doe et al\n\n59 3:24-cv-00943-E M&H Metal Specialties Inc v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fd\n60 3:24-cv-00944-5 USA v. Various Amounts of Funds Seized\n\n61 3:24-cv-01169-B Nieto v. USA\n\n62 3:24-cv-01484-S5 Antunez-Martinez v. Mayorkas\n\n63 3:24-cv-01525-K Gonzales Miranda et al v. Jaddou\n\n64 3:24-cv-01674-E-BT Turner v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm et al\n65 3:24-cv-01676-S Bibars v. Jaddou et al\n\n66 3:24-cv-01795-S Valtrus Innovations Ltd et al v. Google LLC\n\n67 3:24-cv-01902-K-BT Allen-Straight v. Director-TBC)\n\n68 3:24-cv-02028-X-BT Lockwood v. Chilcoat et al\n\n69 3:24-cv-02114-K-BT Santana v. Cantu et al\n\n70 3:24-cv-02127-X-BT Stancu v. Equal Employment Cppertunity Commission\n71 3:24-cy-02132-S-BT Damm v. Dallas County Jail\n\n72 3:24-cv-02143-B-BT Jalloul v. USA\n\n73 3:24-cv-02144-5-BT Jeffery v. NLN\n\n74 4:24-cv-00678-B8T Bolden v. 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