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         Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV             Document 52          Filed 02/28/26 Page 1 of 21\n                                                                               USDC SDNY\n                                                                               DOCUMENT\n                                                                               ELECTRONICALLY FILED\n                                                                               DOC #:\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                                   DATE FILED: 2/28/2026\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n    HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT\n    INSURANCE EXCHANGE,\n                                                                       1:24-cv-02412 (MKV)\n                               Plaintiff,\n                                                                 OPINION AND ORDER\n                       -against-                            GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING\n                                                                       IN PART\n    GUY CARPENTER & COMPANY, LLC,                                MOTION TO DISMISS\n\n                               Defendant.\n\n\n\nMARY KAY VYSKOCIL, United States District Judge:\n\n          Plaintiff Housing and Redevelopment Insurance Exchange (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d or \u201cHARIE\u201d)\n\nbrings this action against Defendant Guy Carpenter & Company, LLC (\u201cDefendant\u201d or \u201cGuy\n\nCarpenter\u201d), asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of\n\nfiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and misrepresentation. Before the Court is a Motion to\n\nDismiss the Second Amended Complaint ([ECF No. 40], the \u201cSec. Amend. Compl.\u201d) in its\n\nentirety, or in the alternative, a Motion to Strike Plaintiff\u2019s demand for punitive and consequential\n\ndamages. [ECF No. 44].\n\n                                             BACKGROUND1\n\n     I.      Facts\n\n          Plaintiff is a non-profit reciprocal insurance exchange with a principal place of business in\n\nPennsylvania that provides low-cost insurance for governmental entities, including housing and\n\nredevelopment authorities in Pennsylvania. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 2, 7. In 2009, Plaintiff selected\n\nDefendant to serve as its reinsurance intermediary and broker of record, and the parties executed\n\n\n\n1\n  The facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. See\nAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\n\n                                                       1\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 2 of 21\n\n\n\n\na contract, the \u201cReinsurance Intermediary Authorization,\u201d to that effect. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\n\n18. In 2016, the parties amended and superseded the contract with the \u201cAuthorization Contract.\u201d\n\nSec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 19\u201320. The Authorization Contract provided that Defendant would act as\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s reinsurance intermediary, and would collect and hold \u201call funds owed and due to\u201d\n\nPlaintiff in a \u201cfiduciary capacity,\u201d remit them to Plaintiff \u201cwithin 30 days of receipt,\u201d and provide\n\nnecessary accounting on a monthly basis. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 21, 22.\n\n       Over the course of the parties\u2019 contractual relationship, Plaintiff\u2019s primary contact with\n\nDefendant was Mr. Taubenheim. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 31. When Mr. Taubenheim announced\n\nhis retirement from Defendant in 2020, Plaintiff \u201cbegan exploring hiring a new reinsurance\n\nintermediary.\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 32, 33. Plaintiff alleges that during this time, Defendant\n\n\u201coffered to reduce its [broker\u2019s fee]\u201d if Plaintiff \u201ccontinued to use [Defendant] as its reinsurance\n\nintermediary for an additional three years.\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 34. Plaintiff and Defendant\n\nsubsequently entered a Broker Services Agreement (\u201cBSA\u201d). Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 36. The\n\nBSA did not terminate or supersede the Authorization Contract, but supplemented it with respect\n\nto \u201ccertain aspects\u201d of the parties\u2019 relationship. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 39\u201340. Specifically, the\n\nBSA facilitated the hiring of Mr. Taubenheim as a consultant, Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 40, 72, and\n\nthus required Defendant to \u201cgive twenty percent (20%) of its brokerage from Treaties incepting\n\nduring the term to [Plaintiff].\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 43. Plaintiff in turn paid this 20% to Mr.\n\nTaubenheim for his consultation service. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 70. The 20% brokerage that was\n\nto be returned to Plaintiff for payment to Taubenheim was defined in the BSA as the \u201cBSA\n\nretention.\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 43.\n\n       Section D of the BSA also provided that \u201cin the event [Plaintiff] terminate[s] [Defendant]\n\nas [the] broker of record with respect to the renewal of any Treaty previously placed by\n\n\n\n                                                 2\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52         Filed 02/28/26      Page 3 of 21\n\n\n\n\n[Defendant,] all brokerage earned by [Defendant] from the existing Treaty shall be excluded from\n\nthe calculation [of] the BSA Retention otherwise due hereunder.\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 60.\n\nPlaintiff alleges that the terms of the BSA were effective for the periods \u201cJanuary 1, 2020 \u2013\n\nDecember 31, 2020, January 1, 2021 \u2013 December 31, 2021, and January 1, 2022 \u2013 December 31,\n\n2022 (each a \u2018Calendar Year\u2019).\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 42.\n\n       In late 2022, Plaintiff notified Defendant that it intended to solicit proposals for reinsurance\n\nintermediaries for the 2023 procurement period. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 46. Subsequently,\n\nDefendant submitted a proposal, but was not selected. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 50\u201351. Plaintiff\n\nadvised Defendant on November 30, 2022 (the \u201cMcGill Letter\u201d), that it had chosen a new\n\nreinsurance intermediary, McGill Global Risk Solutions (\u201cMcGill\u201d), to replace Defendant for the\n\n2023 procurement period. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 52\u201353. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant\n\nremained the broker of record for the Treaties placed during the 2022 procurement period, and\n\nthen on December 31, 2022, the BSA expired by its own terms. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 55.\n\n       Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant was required to remit all funds it held on behalf of\n\nPlaintiff. Id. Plaintiff claims that, instead, on December 22, 2022, Defendant advised Plaintiff\n\nthat it unilaterally withdrew $101,646.20 from the fiduciary account and claimed it was \u201centitled\n\nto withhold the BSA Retention payments that it owed to [Plaintiff] under the Treaties procured in\n\n2022\u201d because Plaintiff terminated Defendant under Section D of the BSA. Sec. Amend. Compl.\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 56\u201358. Plaintiff claims that it \u201cnever terminated Defendant as its broker of record for the Term\n\ngoverned by the BSA,\u201d and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to withhold the BSA retentions.\n\nSec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 61. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the Authorization Contract\n\nby unilaterally withdrawing and retaining the 20% brokerage held in the fiduciary account.\n\n\n\n\n                                                  3\n\f             Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV             Document 52           Filed 02/28/26        Page 4 of 21\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiff also asserts claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent\n\ninducement and misrepresentation.\n\n       II.      Procedural History\n\n             Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in U.S. District Court in the Middle\n\nDistrict of Pennsylvania. [ECF No. 1] (the \u201cOriginal Complaint\u201d or \u201cOrig. Compl.\u201d). Defendant\n\nmoved to dismiss, or in the alternative transfer to the Southern District of New York pursuant to a\n\nforum selection clause in the BSA. [ECF No. 11]. The Chief Magistrate Judge in the Middle\n\nDistrict of Pennsylvania granted Defendant\u2019s request to transfer the case to the Southern District\n\nof New York, [ECF No. 16], and subsequently the case was transferred and assigned to this Court.\n\n[ECF No. 17].\n\n             Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Complaint. [ECF No 26] (the \u201cAmended Complaint\u201d\n\nor \u201cAmend. Compl.\u201d). Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting\n\nmaterials. [ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31]. Plaintiff opposed, [ECF No. 34], and Defendant replied, [ECF\n\nNo. 38]. The Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, granting leave to amend.\n\n[ECF No. 39].\n\n             Plaintiff thereafter filed a Second Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 40] (the \u201cSecond\n\nAmended Complaint\u201d or \u201cSec. Amend. Compl.\u201d).2 Defendant again filed a Motion to Dismiss and\n\nsupporting materials. [ECF Nos. 44, 45, 46]. Plaintiff filed an opposition and supporting\n\nmaterials. [ECF Nos. 47, 48]. Having obtained an extension, [ECF Nos. 49, 50], Defendant\n\nreplied, [ECF No. 51].\n\n\n\n\n2\n    The Second Amended Complaint was filed late, but the parties consented to belated filing, [ECF Nos. 41, 42].\n\n                                                           4\n\f         Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV         Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 5 of 21\n\n\n\n\n                                     LEGAL STANDARDS\n\n   I. Motion To Dismiss\n\n         To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure\n\n(\u201cFRCP\u201d), a complaint \u201cmust contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to \u2018state a claim\n\nto relief that is plausible on its face.\u2019\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell\n\nAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). On this motion, the Court must \u201caccept as true\n\nall factual statements alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the\n\nnon-moving party.\u201d Id. at 678; see also Marcus & Cinelli, LLP v. Aspen American Ins. Co., 158\n\nF.4th 333, 340 (2d Cir. 2025); McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.\n\n2007).     On an FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the issue is not whether the plaintiff will\n\nultimately prevail, but whether his claim, as pleaded, is sufficient to afford him the opportunity to\n\nproceed on to the evidence. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).\n\nDismissal is therefore \u201cappropriate when \u2018it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of\n\nwhich the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred as a matter of\n\nlaw.\u2019\u201d Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 208\u201309 (2d Cir.\n\n2014). The Court\u2019s role at this stage is \u201c\u2018not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial\n\nbut merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.\u2019\u201d Bertuglia v. City of\n\nNew York, 839 F. Supp. 2d 703, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059,\n\n1067 (2d Cir. 1985)).\n\n                                          DISCUSSION\n\n   I.       The Court Declines to Consider\n            the Original Complaint\n\n         Defendant makes a threshold argument in this case, urging the Court to consider portions\n\nof the Original Complaint despite Plaintiff\u2019s filing of the Amended Complaints. [ECF No. 46]\n\n                                                 5\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 6 of 21\n\n\n\n\n(\u201cDef. Mem.\u201d) at 4\u20135. Defendant argues that certain \u201cadmissions\u201d made by Plaintiff in the\n\nOriginal Complaint are contradicted by the Amended Complaints. Def. Mem. at 4\u20135. Ordinarily,\n\nan amended complaint \u201csuper[s]edes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.\u201d Dluhos v.\n\nFloating & Abandoned Vessel, 162 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). However, the\n\nCourt may consider information from an original pleading for a narrow purpose and only where\n\n\u201ca plaintiff blatantly changes his statement of the facts in order to respond to the defendant\u2019s\n\nmotion to dismiss and directly contradicts the facts set forth in his original complaint[.]\u201d Colliton\n\nv. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 08 Civ. 0400 (NRB), 2008 WL 4386764, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.\n\nSept. 24, 2008) (cleaned up, quotation omitted), aff\u2019d, 356 F. App\u2019x 535 (2d Cir. 2009).\n\n       The Second Circuit has clarified the narrowness of this exception, finding that even where\n\nallegations in the amended complaint may contradict the original complaint, \u201cwe have long held\n\nthat an allegation in a superseded pleading \u2018ceases to be a conclusive judicial admission,\u2019 even as\n\nit may remain \u2018competent evidence\u2019 for submission to the factfinder.\u201d Oberlander v. Coinbase\n\nGlobal Inc., No. 23-184-cv, 2024 WL 1478773, at *3 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2024) (quoting Kunglig\n\nJarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1929)); see also Tho\n\nDinh Tran v. Alphonse Hotel Corp., 281 F.3d 23, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that \u201c[a] statement\n\nin a withdrawn complaint that is superseded by an amended complaint without the statement is no\n\nlonger a conclusive judicial admission\u201d) Further, even where \u201cstatements in an earlier complaint\n\nare determined to be inconsistent with allegations in the superseding complaint, if not repeated\n\nthey are not part of the operative complaint.\u201d McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2020)\n\n(explaining that, \u201c[t]hough the prior statements may be admissible against the plaintiff in later\n\nstages of the proceedings as admissions, consideration of a motion under [FRCP] Rule 12(b)(6) is\n\n\n\n\n                                                 6\n\f        Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV          Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 7 of 21\n\n\n\n\nlimited to the contents of the operative complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated into\n\nit by reference\u201d)\n\n        Defendant argues that Plaintiff, in filing the Amended Complaints, directly contradicts\n\ninformation included in the Original Complaint, and that, therefore, the Court should consider the\n\noriginal pleadings under Colliton\u2019s exception. Def. Mem. at 11; see Colliton, 2008 WL 4386764,\n\nat *6. Defendant\u2019s argument relies on certain portions of the Original Complaint that Plaintiff\n\nomitted from the Amended Complaints, specifically, an express \u201cadmission\u201d by Plaintiff that \u201cif\n\n[Plaintiff] terminated [Defendant,] the BSA entitled [Defendant] \u2018to recoup its 20% fee reduction\n\nthat it had netted out for that policy year.\u2019\u201d Def. Mem. at 4\u20135 (citing Orig. Compl. \u00b6 41).\n\n        While the Second Amended Complaint does not include certain excerpts of the BSA that\n\nwere included in the Original Complaint, the Second Amended Complaint\u2019s substance, read in its\n\nentirety, does not contradict the claim that, if terminated, Defendant was entitled to retain the 20%\n\nfee reduction. See Orig. Compl; Sec. Amend. Compl. Indeed, the Second Amended Complaint\n\nexpressly notes that Section D of the Broker Service Agreement provided \u201cin the event that you\n\nterminate [Defendant] as your broker of record with respect to the renewal of any Treaty previously\n\nplaced by [Defendant], all brokerage earned by Guy Carpenter from the existing Treaty shall be\n\nexcluded from the calculation the BSA Retention otherwise due hereunder.\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl.\n\n\u00b6 60.    Additionally, the Second Amended Complaint claims \u201cit was always [Plaintiff\u2019s]\n\nunderstanding that it was entitled to the BSA Retentions amounts so long as it retained [Defendant]\n\nas its broker of record for the placement and renewal of reinsurance Treaties during the Term of\n\nthe BSA.\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 69. Indeed, Plaintiff explicitly asserts as much, noting both\n\ncomplaints \u201cconsistent[ly] assert[] that [Defendant] was not entitled to unilaterally withdraw the\n\n\n\n\n                                                 7\n\f         Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 8 of 21\n\n\n\n\nMisappropriated Funds and the Section D of the BSA did not apply to the renewal of Treaties after\n\nthe expiration of the BSA.\u201d Pl. Opp. at 12.\n\n          In Collition, the plaintiff \u201cblatantly change[d] his statement\u201d to \u201cdirectly contradict[] the\n\nfacts set forth in his original complaint[.]\u201d 2008 WL 4386764 at *6 (quotation omitted). That is\n\nnot the case here. The fact that Plaintiff did not repeat the precise phrasing used in the superseded\n\ncomplaint does not qualify the omission as a contradiction worthy of the Court\u2019s consideration on\n\na motion to dismiss. See id.; see also Tho Dinh Tran, 281 F.3d at 32. Moreover, the BSA itself is\n\nincorporated by reference in the Original, First Amended, and Second Amended Complaints, such\n\nthat it is before the Court in its entirety regardless of whether or how Plaintiff repeated or\n\nparaphrased certain excerpts. Accordingly, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court will\n\nconsider only allegations included in the Second Amended Complaint, which supersede all\n\nallegations in the Original and First Amended Complaints.\n\n   II.       Plaintiff Has Adequately Pled\n             Breach of Contract\n\n          To sufficiently plead a breach of contract under New York law, Plaintiff must allege that\n\n\u201c(1) a contract exists; (2) plaintiff performed in accordance with the contract; (3) defendant\n\nbreached its contractual obligations; and (4) defendant\u2019s breach resulted in damages.\u201d 34-06 73,\n\nLLC v. Seneca Ins. Co., 39 N.Y.3d 44, 52, 198 N.E.3d 1282, 1287 (N.Y. 2022) (citations omitted);\n\nsee also Lim v. Radish Media Inc., No. 22-1610, 2023 WL 2440160, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 2023)\n\n(The elements of a breach of contract claim under New York law are \u201c(i) the formation of a contract\n\nbetween the parties; (ii) performance by the plaintiff; (iii) failure of defendant to perform; and (iv)\n\ndamages.\u201d (citing Nick\u2019s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir.\n\n2017)).\n\n\n\n\n                                                   8\n\f        Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52         Filed 02/28/26      Page 9 of 21\n\n\n\n\n        Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that there was a\n\ncontract, that Plaintiff performed under the contract, and that Plaintiff suffered damages. The only\n\nissue in dispute is whether, as a matter of law, Defendant\u2019s withdrawal of the $101,646.20 from\n\nthe fiduciary account constituted a failure to perform by Defendant under the Authorization\n\nContract or whether it was authorized under Section D of the BSA. Defendant argues that Section\n\nD of the BSA unambiguously states that once Plaintiff terminated Defendant as its reinsurance\n\nbroker it was entitled to withdraw the disputed funds. Def. Mem. at 7\u20138. Plaintiff, on the other\n\nhand, argues that the term \u201ctermination\u201d in this context is at minimum ambiguous because in its\n\nview Defendant was not terminated, but rather the rights and obligations under the BSA simply\n\nexpired. [ECF no. 48] (\u201cPl. Opp.\u201d) at 7\u201311. Plaintiff contends, therefore, that Defendant was not\n\nterminated, Section D of the BSA was never triggered, and Defendant\u2019s withdrawal and\n\nsubsequent retention of the $101,646.20 amounts to a breach of the parties\u2019 contract. Pl. Opp. at\n\n7\u201311.\n\n        \u201c[I]f a contract is ambiguous as applied to [the facts that provide the foundation of the suit],\n\na court has insufficient data to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim.\u201d Eternity Global\n\nMaster Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). \u201cWhether\n\nor not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts.\u201d W.W.W. Assocs.,\n\nInc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted); see\n\nalso Cerveceria Modelo de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. CB Brand Strategies, LLC, No. 23-810-\n\ncv, 2024 WL 1253593, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2024); Sec. Plans, Inc. v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 769\n\nF.3d 807, 816 (2d Cir. 2014); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 754 F.3d 114, 122 (2d\n\nCir. 2014) (\u201cThe existence of an ambiguity is to be ascertained from the face of an agreement\n\nwithout regard to extrinsic evidence.\u201d (quotation omitted)).\n\n\n\n                                                   9\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV             Document 52         Filed 02/28/26        Page 10 of 21\n\n\n\n\n       A contract term is unambiguous if it has \u201ca definite and precise meaning, unattended by\n\ndanger of misconception in the purport of the contract itself, and concerning which there is no\n\nreasonable basis for a difference of opinion.\u201d Olin Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 704 F.3d 89,\n\n99 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). On the other hand, a contract is ambiguous under New\n\nYork law \u201cif its terms could suggest more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a\n\nreasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and\n\nwho is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the\n\nparticular trade or business.\u201d Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., 773\n\nF.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see generally 1 Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R.\n\nNewman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes \u00a7 1.02 (22nd ed. 2025).                               The\n\nambiguity analysis should be constrained by normal rules of contract interpretation: \u201cwords and\n\nphrases . . . should be given their plain meaning\u201d and a \u201ccontract should be construed so as to give\n\nfull meaning and effect to all of its provisions.\u201d Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine Int\u2019l Corp., 322 F.3d\n\n115, 121 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).\n\n       However, \u201cwhen the language of a contract is ambiguous, its construction presents a\n\nquestion of fact, which . . . precludes summary dismissal\u201d on an FRCP Rule 12(b)(6)\n\nmotion. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Trans Energy, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y.\n\n2013) (quotation omitted); Eternity Glob., 375 F.3d at 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (\u201cUnless for some reason\n\nan ambiguity must     be     construed   against   the   plaintiff,    a   claim    predicated       on    a\n\nmaterially ambiguous contract term is not dismissable on the pleadings.\u201d). Basically, while a court\n\nis not \u201cobliged to accept the allegations of the complaint as to how to construe\u201d a contract, it\n\n\u201cshould     resolve    any      contractual ambiguities in     favor       of   the     plaintiff\u201d        on\n\n\n\n\n                                                   10\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 11 of 21\n\n\n\n\na motion to dismiss. Subaru Distrib. Corp. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.\n\n2005).\n\n         Section D of the BSA provides, \u201cin the event that you terminate Guy Carpenter as your\n\nbroker of record with respect to the renewal of any Treaty previously placed by Guy Carpenter, all\n\nbrokerage earned by Guy Carpenter from the existing Treaty shall be excluded from the calculation\n\nof the BSA Retention otherwise due hereunder.\u201d [ECF No. 45-6]. Defendant takes the position\n\nthat Plaintiff terminated Defendant when it issued the McGill Letter which appointed McGill as\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s exclusive broker. Def. Mem. At 6. Plaintiff contends that Guy Carpenter was not\n\nterminated, but rather the contract simply expired without renewal. Pl. Opp. At 7\u20138. As Plaintiff\n\ncorrectly points out, the BSA contained no definitions for crucial contract terms including\n\n\u201ctermination\u201d and \u201crenewal.\u201d Resolving contractual ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff, as the\n\nCourt must on a motion to dismiss, Subaru Distrib. Corp. 425 F.3d at 122, the BSA could\n\nreasonably be interpreted to mean that the McGill Letter did not amount to a termination sufficient\n\nto trigger Section D.\n\n         Therefore, the Court concludes that Section D of the BSA is ambiguous as applied to the\n\nfacts giving rise to this suit, because the resolution of the dispositive question\u2014whether the parties\n\nintended that an event such as the appointment of a new broker of record for the 2023 procurement\n\nperiod would qualify as a termination so as to trigger Section D\u2014is not possible at this early stage\n\nof the litigation. Even if Defendant\u2019s interpretation were accepted, at best the contract would be\n\nambiguous, see Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 573 (2d Cir.\n\n1993), and, on a motion to dismiss, the Court would be obligated to construe that ambiguity in\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s favor. See Subaru Distrib. Corp. 425 F.3d at 122. In other words, proper interpretation\n\n\n\n\n                                                 11\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV             Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 12 of 21\n\n\n\n\nof section D of the BSA is at least a question of fact that cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss\n\nphase.\n\n   III.      Plaintiff\u2019s Breach of Fiduciary Duty\n             Claim is Duplicative\n\n          To claim a breach of fiduciary duty in New York, \u201ca plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence\n\nof a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by\n\nthe defendant\u2019s misconduct.\u201d Parekh v. Cain, 96 A.D.3d 812, 816, 948 N.Y.S.2d 72, 77 (2d Dep\u2019t\n\n2012) (quotation and citations omitted); see also Palmetto Partners, L.P. v. AJW Qualified\n\nPartners, LLC, 83 A.D.3d 804, 807, 921 N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (2d Dep\u2019t 2011). When an express\n\ncontract exists, \u201cbeing a party to a contract does not itself impose a fiduciary duty. Rather, this\n\nduty must arise from a position of trust or special confidence that imposes obligations beyond the\n\nexpress agreements between the parties.\u201d Poon v. Roomorama, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 3224 (RMB),\n\n2009 WL 3762115, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009) (cleaned up, quotation omitted). \u201cA cause of\n\naction for breach of fiduciary duty which is merely duplicative of a breach of contract claim cannot\n\nstand.\u201d Id. (quotation omitted). New York courts have emphasized that \u201c\u2018where plaintiff is\n\nessentially seeking enforcement of the bargain, the action should proceed under a contract\n\ntheory.\u2019\u201d Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y. v. Samson Constr. Co., 30 N.Y.3d 704, 711, 94\n\nN.E.3d 456, 461 (N.Y. 2018) (quoting Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d, 540, 552, 593\n\nN.E.2d 1365, 1369 (N.Y. 1992)); see also IKB Intl., S.A. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 40 N.Y.3d\n\n277, 290, 220 N.E.3d 646, 655 (N.Y. 2023) (holding that \u201cfiduciary duty claims . . . based on\n\ndefendants\u2019 failure to act as contractually required\u201d are not maintainable as they are \u201cduplicative\n\nof . . . breach of contract claims\u201d (quotation omitted)).\n\n          The Court may, however, consider a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim if it is created\n\nby conduct which is \u201cindependent of the contract itself.\u201d Mandelblatt v. Devon Stores, 132 A.D.2d\n\n                                                  12\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 13 of 21\n\n\n\n\n162, 168, 521 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (1st Dep\u2019t 1987). In determining whether claims are duplicative,\n\nthe Court should \u201cevaluate the nature of the injury, how the injury occurred and the harm it\n\ncaused[.]\u201d IKB Intl., S.A., 40 N.Y.3d at 291, 220 N.E.3d at 656 (cleaned up, quotation omitted).\n\n       Plaintiff attempts to argue that separate and apart from Defendant\u2019s obligations under the\n\nAuthorization Contract, Defendant had a separate fiduciary duty, created under New York\n\nInsurance Law \u00a7 2120. Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 88; Pl. Opp. at 14. The relevant regulation,\n\nRegulation 98, provides that \u201c[e]very person, firm, association or corporation acting as reinsurance\n\nintermediary in this State, is responsible as a fiduciary for funds received by such reinsurance\n\nintermediary, in such capacity.\u201d N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, \u00a7 32.3(a) (\u201cRegulation\n\n98\u201d). However, this argument fails because Plaintiff\u2019s allegations relating to the breach of\n\nfiduciary duty claim are identical to the breach of contract claim with respect to \u201cthe nature of the\n\ninjury, how the injury occurred, and the harm it caused[,]\u201d rendering the fiduciary duty claim\n\nduplicative. See IKB Intl., S.A., 40 N.Y.3d at 291, 220 N.E.3d at 656 (quotation omitted). For\n\nexample, Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the Authorization Contract by \u201cunilaterally\n\nwithdrawing funds from the Fiduciary Account without prior notice to [Plaintiff] and without\n\n[Plaintiff\u2019s] consent to pay itself increased commissions, which were not agreed to by the Parties.\u201d\n\nSec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 83. Then Plaintiff goes on to allege that Defendant breached its fiduciary\n\nduties to Plaintiff under Regulation 98 by \u201cwrongfully diverting the funds held in the Fiduciary\n\nAccount or other accounts, without any basis, for the purpose of benefiting [Defendant] at\n\n[Plaintiff\u2019s] expense, without [Plaintiff\u2019s] knowledge.\u201d      Sec. Amend. Comp. \u00b6 91.         These\n\nallegations are based on and allege the same underlying conduct as the breach of contract claim.\n\nMoreover, both claims rise and fall on interpretation of the Authorization Contract and BSA. [ECF\n\n\n\n\n                                                 13\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52        Filed 02/28/26       Page 14 of 21\n\n\n\n\nNo. 51] (\u201cReply\u201d) at 5\u20137. As such, Plaintiff\u2019s breach of fiduciary duty claim is duplicative of its\n\nbreach of contract claim and at this point must be dismissed.\n\n   IV.      Plaintiff\u2019s Conversion Claim is\n            Precluded Under New York Law\n\n         Under New York law, \u201c[a] conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and\n\nwithout authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else,\n\ninterfering with that person\u2019s right of possession.\u201d Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network,\n\nInc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49\u201350, 860 N.E.2d 713, 717 (N.Y. 2006) (citation omitted). In other words, a\n\nplaintiff states a claim for conversion by alleging that \u201c\u2018(1) the property subject to conversion is a\n\nspecific identifiable thing; (2) plaintiff had ownership, possession or control over the property\n\nbefore its conversion; and (3) defendant exercised an unauthorized dominion over the thing in\n\nquestion, to the alteration of its condition or to the exclusion of the plaintiff's rights.\u2019\u201d Ellington\n\nCredit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 162, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)\n\n(quoting Moses v. Martin, 360 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). In New York, however, a\n\nbreach of an existing contract is \u201cnot to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the\n\ncontract itself has been violated[,]\u201d and \u201cwhere plaintiff is essentially seeking enforcement of the\n\nbargain, the action should proceed under a contract theory.\u201d Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y.,\n\n30 N.Y.3d at 711, 94 N.E.3d at 460\u201361 (quotation and citation omitted). A conversion claim may\n\nonly succeed where a breach of contract claim exists \u201cif a plaintiff alleges wrongs and damages\n\ndistinct from those predicated on a breach of contract.\u201d Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd., 837 F. Supp.\n\n2d at 204 (emphasis added). Thus, a conversion claim may not proceed parallel to a breach of\n\ncontract claim if in effect, Plaintiff would be \u201cpaid twice\u201d should they recover under both claims.\n\nAD Rendon Commc\u2019ns, Inc., v. Lumina Ams., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8832, 2007 WL 2962591, at *5\n\n(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007)).\n\n                                                  14\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 15 of 21\n\n\n\n\n        Plaintiff\u2019s conversion claim and breach of contract claim are predicated on the same facts.\n\nBoth claims allege that Defendant improperly withdrew funds from a fiduciary account. Sec.\n\nAmend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 83, 100. As indicated above, Plaintiff has sufficiently plead a breach of contract\n\nclaim relating to Defendant\u2019s withdrawal and retention of the funds, and therefore, the claim for\n\nconversion, which \u201crests on the same factual allegations as his breach of contract claim[,]\u201d must\n\nbe dismissed. Hofmann v. Long Island Univ., No. 22-393-cv, 2024 WL 3262819, at *2 (2d Cir.\n\nJuly 2, 2024) (summary order); see also Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd., 837 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (\u201cA\n\nconversion claim may only succeed, however, if a plaintiff alleges wrongs and damages distinct\n\nfrom those predicated on a breach of contract.\u201d). Furthermore, Plaintiff\u2019s claim of breach of\n\nfiduciary duty under Regulation 98 is dismissed as duplicative of its breach of contract claim and\n\nthus cannot serve as the basis for a legal duty independent from the contract to save Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nconversion claim.\n\n   V.      Plaintiff\u2019s Unjust Enrichment Claim\n           is Precluded Under New York Law\n\n        \u201c[I]n order to adequately plead [an unjust enrichment] claim, the plaintiff must allege that\n\n(1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party's expense, and (3) that it is against equity and\n\ngood conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered.\u201d Georgia\n\nMalone & Co. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 516, 973 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 2012) (quotation and\n\ncitation omitted); see also Alpert v. M.R. Beal & Co., 162 A.D.3d 491, 492, 79 N.Y.S.3d 142, 143\n\n(N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (To state a cause of action for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege\n\nthat it \u201cconferred a benefit upon the defendant, and that the defendant obtained such benefit without\n\nadequately compensating plaintiff.\u201d (citation omitted)). However, a valid and enforceable contract\n\n\u201cordinarily precludes recovery in [unjust enrichment] for events arising out of the same subject\n\nmatter.\u201d Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc., 448 F.3d\n\n                                                 15\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 16 of 21\n\n\n\n\n573, 588 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Clark\u2013Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382,\n\n388, 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (N.Y. 1987)).\n\n       While it is true that a plaintiff can plead unjust enrichment in the alternative if there is a\n\n\u201cbona fide dispute as to the existence of a contract or whether the scope of an existing contract\n\ncovers the disagreement between the parties,\u201d Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP, 83 F.4th 171, 188 (2d Cir.\n\n2023) (quotation omitted); Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 1999),\n\nthat is not the case here. The parties do not dispute the existence of the contract at issue. See Pl.\n\nOpp. at 7. Nor do they dispute that the contract is enforceable. See Pl. Opp. at 18; Def. Mem. at\n\n15. Nor do they dispute that the contract at issue applies to the disagreement before the Court.\n\nSee id.; Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 83. Therefore, for Plaintiff\u2019s unjust enrichment claim to survive at\n\nthis stage, in tandem with its breach of contract claim, there must be facts underlying the unjust\n\nenrichment claim that fall outside of the contract. See Pauwels, 83 F.4th at 188. Plaintiff at once\n\nseems to concede that it pleads unjust enrichment \u201cin the alternative\u201d should the Court dismiss the\n\nbreach of contract claim, and to assert that \u201cmisappropriated funds from a client constitutes\n\nconduct outside the scope of the contract,\u201d arguing that the unjust enrichment claim therefore\n\nshould survive. Pl. Opp. at 18. Plaintiff\u2019s argument fails.\n\n       The conduct that Plaintiff alleges as the basis for its unjust enrichment claim lies directly\n\nwithin the scope of the parties\u2019 contract and is covered by Plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim.\n\nPlaintiff argues that under Sergeants Benevolent Association Annuity Fund v. Renck, 19 A.D.3d\n\n107, 796 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1st Dep\u2019t 2005), a defendant retaining funds it was not entitled to\n\n\u201cconstitutes conduct outside the scope of the contract.\u201d Pl. Opp. at 18. However, unlike in\n\nSergeants Benevolent Association, the Second Amended Complaint here relies on a specific term\n\nin the BSA explicitly addressing the retention or disbursement of the funds at issue. Sec. Amend.\n\n\n\n                                                 16\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52        Filed 02/28/26     Page 17 of 21\n\n\n\n\nCompl. \u00b6 43.     Therefore, even though Plaintiff and Defendant disagree as to the ultimate\n\ninterpretation of that BSA contract term, the conduct of retaining or disbursing the funds plainly\n\nfalls well within the scope of the contract. See Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 60. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nunjust enrichment claim is duplicative of its breach of contract claim and must be dismissed. See\n\nPauwels, 83 F.4th at 188; see also Hofmann, 2024 WL 3262819, at *1 (affirming the District\n\nCourt\u2019s dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s unjust enrichment claim as \u201centirely duplicative of\n\nhis breach of contract claim\u201d because there was no dispute over the existence of a contract\n\n(quotation omitted)).\n\n   VI.      Plaintiff\u2019s Fraudulent Inducement and\n            Misrepresentation Claims Are Not Pled\n            With Sufficient Particularity\n\n         Under New York law, claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement\n\nrequire a plaintiff to prove: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) made by the\n\ndefendant with knowledge of its falsity (3) and an intent to defraud; (4) reasonable reliance on the\n\npart of the plaintiff; (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff. Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein,\n\n16 N.Y.3d 173, 178, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (N.Y. 2011); Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d\n\n230, 234 (2d Cir. 2006). \u201c[T]he Complaint must state with particularity the circumstances of the\n\nfraud under [FRCP] Rule 9(b) and contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state claims for\n\nrelief for common-law fraud that are facially plausible under [FRCP] Rule 8(a)(2).\u201d Minnie Rose\n\nLLC v. Yu, 169 F. Supp. 3d 504, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (cleaned up, quotation and citation omitted).\n\nTo satisfy FRCP Rule 9(b) the complaint must \u201c\u2018(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff\n\ncontends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were\n\nmade, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.\u2019\u201d DiMuro v. Clinique Labs., LLC, 572\n\nF. App\u2019x. 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d\n\n\n\n                                                17\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 18 of 21\n\n\n\n\nCir. 1993)). Under the enhanced pleading standards of FRCP Rule 9(b), plaintiffs \u201cmust not only\n\nallege that the content is false, but \u2018they must demonstrate with specificity why and how that is\n\nso.\u2019\u201d Travelex Currency Servs., Inc. v. Puente Enterprises, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 385, 395\n\n(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2004)). In sum, FRCP\n\nRule 9(b) \u201crequires that a plaintiff set forth the who, what, when, where and how of the alleged\n\nfraud.\u201d See U.S. ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 242, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).\n\n       Defendant asserts various arguments for why Plaintiff\u2019s fraud and misrepresentation claims\n\nfail as a matter of law, including that the statements alleged (1) are simply promises to perform the\n\ncontract, (2) are about the scope of the contract, (3) arise from the same facts as Plaintiff\u2019s breach\n\nof contract claim, (4) do not include a factual basis which gives rise to a strong inference of\n\nfraudulent intent, (5) do not plead reasonable reliance, and finally (6) are not pleaded with\n\nsufficient particularity to satisfy FRCP Rule 9(b). Def. Mem. at 17\u201321. Plaintiff counters that its\n\nfraud and misrepresentation claims are not duplicative of its breach of contract claims because it\n\ndemonstrated a legal duty separate from the contract and it demonstrated a fraudulent\n\nmisrepresentation collateral to the contract. Pl. Opp. at 10. Plaintiff further argues that it\n\nsufficiently alleged facts to support an inference of Defendant\u2019s fraudulent intent and Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nreasonable reliance. Pl. Opp. at 20\u201321. Finally, Plaintiff argues that its fraudulent inducement\n\nand misrepresentation claims are all alleged with sufficient particularity. Pl. Opp. at 21\u201322.\n\n       Regardless of the other potential issues raised by Defendant concerning the sufficiency of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s fraud and misrepresentation claims simply\n\nbecause the Second Amended Complaint is deficient under FRCP Rule 9(b) in pleading with\n\nparticularity the circumstances of the fraud. See Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 34\u201335, 111\u201321. The\n\nSecond Amended Complaint does not identify the individual speaker of the alleged misstatements.\n\n\n\n                                                 18\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV            Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 19 of 21\n\n\n\n\nSee id. Further, the Second Amended Complaint does not state where or how the statements were\n\nmade, whether verbally or in writing. See id. Nor does it allege when the statements were made.\n\nSee id. The Second Amended Complaint contains the broad allegation that based on \u201cGuy\n\nCarpenter\u2019s representations that HAIRE was only retaining Guy Carpenter for a fixed term . . . and\n\nthe money from Guy Carpenter\u2019s reduced brokerage would be used to retain Mr. Taubenheim as\n\na consultant . . . HAIRE agreed to retain Guy Carpenter . . . .\u201d Sec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 35; see also\n\nSec. Amend. Compl. \u00b6 75. These vague and broad allegations do not \u201cset forth the who, what,\n\nwhen, where and how of the alleged fraud\u201d and are therefore insufficient to support a claim for\n\nfraudulent inducement and misrepresentation. U.S. ex rel. Kester, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 252.\n\n   VII.    Motion to Strike Punitive and Consequential Damages\n\n       Defendant argues that the Court should strike Plaintiff\u2019s demand for punitive and\n\nconsequential damages because their contract explicitly contains a limit of liability provision that\n\nwaives the availability of such damages. Def. Mem. at 21\u201325. Specifically, the waiver provides\n\nthat \u201c[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Authorization in no event shall any Party\n\nto this Authorization be liable for any indirect, special, incidental, consequential or punitive\n\ndamages or for any lost profits arising out of or relating to any actions or omissions by that Party.\u201d\n\nDef. Mem. at 23\u201324 (quoting [ECF No. 45-8]). Plaintiff does not dispute the limit of liability\n\nprovision contained within the parties\u2019 contract and thus the waiver of punitive and consequential\n\ndamages for its breach of contract claim. Instead, Plaintiff argues that since it is seeking punitive\n\nand consequential damages in connection with its non-breach-of-contract claims, the punitive and\n\nconsequential damages are not waived and thus should remain. Pl. Opp. at 22\u201324.\n\n       \u201cThe court may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or\n\nscandalous matter.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). In general, \u201c\u2018[m]otions to strike are disfavored.\u2019\u201d\n\n\n\n                                                 19\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV           Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 20 of 21\n\n\n\n\nAmbac Assur. Corp. v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 9464 (RMB) (MHD), 2009 WL 734073,\n\nat *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009) (quoting Roe v. City of N.Y., 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 510 (S.D.N.Y.\n\n2001)). \u201cWhere a demand for damages is not recoverable as a matter of law, however, it may be\n\nstricken.\u201d Phila. Stock Exch. v. Int\u2019l Sec. Exch., Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5390 (NRB), 2005 WL 2923519,\n\nat *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005).\n\n       \u201cLimitation on liability provisions routinely are agreed upon by parties to contracts and\n\nenforced by courts inasmuch as they \u2018represent the parties\u2019 agreement on the allocation of the risk\n\nof economic loss in the event that the contemplated transaction is not fully executed.\u2019\u201d In re\n\nLehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 544 B.R. 62, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (cleaned up, quoting Metro.\n\nLife Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int\u2019l, Inc., 84 N.Y. 430, 436, 643 N.E.2d 504, 507 (N.Y. 1994)).\n\nSuch waivers will be enforced if the waiver is set forth clearly in the agreement between the parties\n\nand the agreement was \u201cknowingly, voluntarily and intentionally\u201d entered into. See Coraud LLC\n\nv. Kidville Franchise Co., LLC, 109 F. Supp. 3d 615, 624\u201325 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quotation omitted)\n\n(enforcing damages waiver provision and dismissing demand for punitive and exemplary\n\ndamages). Explicit waivers of punitive and lost profit damages like the one at issue here are\n\nroutinely upheld by courts. See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros., 544 B.R. at 70 (denying punitive\n\nand consequential damages where clause in credit agreement waived them); E*TRADE Fin. Corp.\n\nv. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 05 Civ. 902, 2008 WL 2428225, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. June 13,\n\n2008) (enforcing clause in contract that specified that no party would be \u201cliable to the other for\n\nconsequential, incidental[,] or punitive damages\u201d (quotation omitted)); Rubin v. Telemet Am. Inc.,\n\n698 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying consequential damages where contract waived\n\nright to receive them).\n\n\n\n\n                                                 20\n\f      Case 1:24-cv-02412-MKV          Document 52        Filed 02/28/26      Page 21 of 21\n\n\n\n\n       Here, the parties do not seem to dispute that the punitive and consequential damages have\n\nbeen waived contractually and are not recoverable with regard to Plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract\n\nclaim pursuant to the parties\u2019 contract, short of intentional tortious conduct or fraud. Therefore,\n\nthe Court focuses solely on the availability of these damages for Plaintiff\u2019s unjust enrichment,\n\nconversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and misrepresentation claims. Since\n\nnone of those claims survive Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the Court strikes Plaintiff\u2019s claim for\n\npunitive and consequential damages.\n\n                                        CONCLUSION\n\n       For the reasons set forth above, Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nbreach of contract claim and GRANTED as to Plaintiff\u2019s unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of\n\nfiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and misrepresentation claims. Defendant\u2019s motion to strike\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s demand for punitive and consequential damages is GRANTED. Defendant\u2019s request\n\nfor oral argument is DENIED as moot.\n\n       The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motion pending at docket\n\nentry 44.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\n                                                     _________________________________\nDate: February 28, 2026                              MARY KAY VYSKOCIL\n      New York, NY                                   United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\n                                                21\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-07T12:23:46.652411-07:00","document_number":"52","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"127039152919","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Memorandum & Opinion","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-03-02T09:08:43.375507-08:00","date_modified":"2026-07-07T12:23:37.605172-07:00","date_filed":"2026-02-28","time_filed":"10:11:49","entry_number":52,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-03-02.001","pacer_sequence_number":171,"description":" OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS    re:  44     MOTION  to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Strike Demand For Consequential And Punitive Damages filed by   Guy Carpenter & Company L.L.C. For the reas ons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim and GRANTED as to Plaintiff's unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and misrepresentation  claims.  Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's demand for punitive and consequential damages is GRANTED.   Defendant's request for  oral argument is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motion pending at docket entry 44. SO ORDERED.   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