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ViaSat, Inc.","case_name_full":"","slug":"bronstin-v-viasat-inc","docket_number":"1:25-cv-00927","docket_number_core":"2500927","docket_number_raw":"1:25-cv-00927","docket_number_source":0,"federal_dn_office_code":"1","federal_dn_case_type":"cv","federal_dn_judge_initials_assigned":"KMN","federal_dn_judge_initials_referred":"","federal_defendant_number":null,"pacer_case_id":"146892","cause":"47:227 Restrictions of Use of Telephone Equipment","nature_of_suit":"485 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)","jury_demand":"Plaintiff","jurisdiction_type":"Federal Question","appellate_fee_status":"","appellate_case_type_information":"","mdl_status":"","filepath_ia":"","filepath_ia_json":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"ia_needs_upload":true,"ia_date_first_change":"2025-05-27T06:10:41.297436-07:00","date_blocked":null,"blocked":false,"appeal_from":null,"parent_docket":null,"tags":[],"panel":[]},"parties":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/16899223/","id":16899223,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/10980090/","attorney_id":10980090,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"role":1},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/10980091/","attorney_id":10980091,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"role":4},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/10980091/","attorney_id":10980091,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"role":1},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/10980092/","attorney_id":10980092,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"name":"Defendant","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2025-12-23T00:14:32.833196-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-23T00:14:32.833208-08:00","name":"ViaSat, Inc.","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/16899222/","id":16899222,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/10980089/","attorney_id":10980089,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/10980089/","attorney_id":10980089,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","docket_id":70376835,"name":"Plaintiff","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2025-12-23T00:14:32.791742-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-23T00:14:32.791756-08:00","name":"Asher Bronstin","extra_info":""}],"entries":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/479140322/","id":479140322,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/494783248/","id":494783248,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/82/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-09-23T13:20:33.716303-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T05:10:16.514880-07:00","sha1":"849b802a079b069aad18ba139c9b6add6d377374","page_count":1,"file_size":84952,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.82.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.82.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 82 Filed 09/23/26 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and on : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00927\nbehalf of all other similarly situated :\n : (JUDGE NEARY)\n :\n Plaintiff, :\n :\n v. :\n :\nVIASAT, INC. , :\nand THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC., :\nd/b/a XYZies :\n :\n Defendants. :\n\n\n ENTRY OF DEFAULT\n\nDefault is hereby entered against defendant, THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC., d/b/a\nXYZies, for failure to file an answer and/or otherwise plead, pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n\n\n\n\n Peter J. Welsh, Clerk of Court\n\n by: /s Ingrid B. Ritchie\n Deputy Clerk\n\nDated: September 23, 2026\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-23T13:20:34.303597-07:00","document_number":"82","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509984208","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Clerk's Entry of Default","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-09-23T13:20:33.679691-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-23T13:20:33.689426-07:00","date_filed":"2026-09-23","time_filed":null,"entry_number":82,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-09-23.001","pacer_sequence_number":219,"description":"Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. Signed on 09/23/2026. (ibr)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/477505117/","id":477505117,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/493101641/","id":493101641,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/81/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-09-10T08:56:32.035632-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-28T15:12:32.491489-07:00","sha1":"5d324c95ad1a71a885b5d3e51f6640059922ff59","page_count":4,"file_size":146103,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.81.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.81.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 81 Filed 09/10/26 Page 1 of 4\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\n on behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n v. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n\n VIASAT, INC.\n and\n THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC.\n d/b/a XYZies\n\n Defendants.\n\n REQUEST FOR CLERK\u2019S ENTRY OF DEFAULT\n AGAINST DEFENDANT THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC.\n\n COMES NOW Plaintiff Asher Bronstin, by and through the undersigned\n\ncounsel, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a), and hereby files this Motion for Clerk\u2019s\n\nEntry of Default against Defendant The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. d/b/a XYZies, in\n\nthe above-styled action. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Clerk of Court enter\n\ndefault as the Defendant has failed to serve or file an answer to Plaintiff\u2019s claims in\n\nthis action within the time permitted by law or otherwise.\n\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a), entitled \u201cTime to Serve a Responsive\n\nPleading,\u201d provides in pertinent part that \u201c[a] defendant must serve an answer\n\nwithin 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint.\u201d FED. R. CIV.\n\nP. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), entitled \u201cEntering a\n\nRequest for Entry of Default\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 81 Filed 09/10/26 Page 2 of 4\n\n\n\n\nDefault,\u201d provides that \u201c[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative\n\nrelief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by\n\naffidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party\u2019s default.\u201d FED. R. CIV. P.\n\n55(a) (emphasis added).\n\n Here, the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint naming Defendant\n\non June 11, 2026. (See ECF No. 70.) Defendant was served on June 29, 2026. (See\n\nECF No. 80.) Through order of the Court, Defendant\u2019s time to file a responsive\n\npleading was extended to August 12, 2026. (See ECF No. 77.) Defendant did not\n\nfile a response as of September 10, 2026. Previously, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel had\n\nreceived email correspondence from Joe Samo of the Samo Law Group, who stated\n\nthat they were retained. However, Mr. Samo has not entered his appearance. No\n\nalternative counsel has appeared for Defendant, and it is well established that, as a\n\ncorporation, Defendant may not represent itself pro se. Accordingly, the Plaintiff\n\nrequests that the Clerk enter the Defendant\u2019s default pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.\n\n55(a).\n\n The Plaintiff intends to move for leave to conduct classwide discovery and\n\nseek a classwide default judgment as to Defendant.\n\n\n\n\nRequest for Entry of Default\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 81 Filed 09/10/26 Page 3 of 4\n\n\n\n\n CONCLUSION\n\nWHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, the Plaintiff respectfully requests\n\nthat the Clerk of Court enter default against the Defendant pursuant to FED. R. CIV.\n\nP. 55(a).\n\nRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this September 10, 2026.\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong,\n Pennsylvania Bar No. 333687 (PHV)\n a@perronglaw.com\n Perrong Law LLC\n 1669 Edgewood Road, Suite 218\n Yardley, PA 19067\n 215-225-5529\n Lead Attorney for Plaintiff and the Proposed\n Class\n\n\n\n\nRequest for Entry of Default\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 81 Filed 09/10/26 Page 4 of 4\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that I filed the foregoing via ECF on the below date, which will\n\nautomatically send a copy to all attorneys of record on the case.\n\nI further certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to:\n\nJOE SAMO\nSAMO LAW GROUP\n2221 CAMINO DEL RIO S\nSAN DIEGO, CA 92108\n\nand\n\nTHE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC. D/B/A XYZIES\n20271 SW ACACIA ST STE 234\nNEWPORT BEACH, CA 92660\n\nDated: September 10, 2026\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong,\n Pennsylvania Bar No. 333687 (PHV)\n a@perronglaw.com\n Perrong Law LLC\n 2657 Mount Carmel Avenue\n Glenside, PA 19038\n 215-225-5529\n Lead Attorney for Plaintiff and the Proposed\n Class\n\n\n\n\nRequest for Entry of Default\n 4\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-10T08:56:32.310286-07:00","document_number":"81","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509964334","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Request for Entry of Default","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-09-10T08:56:32.014717-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-10T08:56:32.020634-07:00","date_filed":"2026-09-10","time_filed":null,"entry_number":81,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-09-10.001","pacer_sequence_number":217,"description":"REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT by Asher Bronstin. (Perrong, Andrew)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/477504795/","id":477504795,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/493101313/","id":493101313,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/80/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-09-10T08:47:30.486294-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-28T09:23:59.205120-07:00","sha1":"549809fd7842db0ad3fad15b1869a2ad51855480","page_count":3,"file_size":803873,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.80.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.80.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 80 Filed 09/10/26 Page1lof3\n\nAO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)\n\nCivil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927\n\nPROOF OF SERVICE\n(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 ())\n\nThis summons for (name of individual and title, if any) The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. d/b/a XYZies\n\nwas received by me on (date) 06/22/2026\n\nC1 I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)\n\non (date) 5 or\n\nC1 I left the summons at the individual\u2019s residence or usual place of abode with (name)\n\n, aperson of suitable age and discretion who resides there,\n\non (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual\u2019s last known address; or\n\nI served the summons on (name of individual) , who is\n\ndesignated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)\n\non (date) 5 or\n\nI returned the summons unexecuted because : or\n\nvf Other (specif): Served per FRCP 4(e)(1) and PA RCP 404(2) and PA RCP 403. Certified Mail Return\nReceipt Attached. Served on 6/29/2026\n\nMy fees are $ for travel and $ 8.86 for services, for a total of $ 8.86\n\nI declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.\n\nDate: 09/10/2026 /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n\nServer\u2019s signature\n\nAndrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\nPrinted name and title\n\n1669 Edgewood Road, Suite 218\nYardley, PA 19067\n\nServer's address\n\nAdditional information regarding attempted service, etc:\n\fPage 2 of 3\n\nFiled 09/10/26\n\nDocument 80\n\nCase 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n\nydjeoey unjey oNSeWOg\n\n\u20acS06-000-20-08S2 NSd 0z0z Ainr \u2018| [gg W04 Sd\n\n(00\u00a2$ 4800)\nAan\\9q peyoj.jsey [EW Paunsu| 2\nIEW pensy| 3\nAeniiag peyoysey ASAaq Pe}O1jSEy AYeA!|eq UO OS|109 F\nUOeUUYUOD eunyeuBbls Aianijeq uo 1991109 O\nwUORELUUIUOD \u2014 aS AsA\\190 PO}NSAH EW ee\n@IEW Peyluso O\n\nZI SES ISG Bb BNR Wh\n\n(laqe] eojues Woy 18JSUBL]) JOQUINN Ee} *Z\n\n98 9129 8S09 6800 cOr6 06S6\n\nmma memes vere] MIMI ANNA A\n@ssaitig WW Aond edAL scans s\nb> \\ ge | -09976 VO HOVAd LYOdMAN\n\\ Nar OT ALS LS VIOVOV MS ILc07\n\\s SaIZAX 2/4/P\nON EDs :mojeq sseu yewe \u2018gaa \u201cat \u201cONI CiVdiud Gaye sAded AHL\nSoA] db Werttwor jue, ppe Aieniep s| *q :0} pesseuppy ejoIuy *}\nSY yOu sis ct \u201csyed eoeds }! 1U01} 8U} UO JO\na t fete'oooIdjeu 8u} JO YOR SY} 0} PueO SIy} YORNY mw\n\n_Menied 40 8120 \u201cO (owen pau) Aq paeosy\u201ca\n\n\u201cSIPPY\nquoby\n\n\u2018NOK 0} ped 8} LUN}e! UBD OM yeY} OS\n@SJBAOJ BY} UO SSouppe pue eWeU UNOA Ud\n\n\"\u20ac pur \u2018Z \u2018| Sway! e}9|WOD m\n\nCO] Rok hey [ee eo [= [CO cO ts br | = hs\n\fPage 3 of 3\n\nFiled 09/10/26\n\nDocument 80\n\nCase 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n\nLL6Z-8\u20ac06l Vd AGISNA19\nFAV TAWYVO LNNOW 2S9Z\n(ZZ6-SZ) O11 MV1 SNOYYAd\n\neX0q SIU} Ul gp+dIZ pue \u2018ssouppe \u2018aweu INOA jULId eSed|q :JEPUSS e\n\n@9IAJ9S |e}SOq\nSaje}S pouy\n\n4? 971729 #5059 bROO eOhb ObSb\n\nOL-9D \u201cON HWS\n\n\u201ca Sdsn\npled sae- 9 ebejysog\nJ! Sse]D-}Sd14\n\nAt\nTee\nPe\n# DNIMOVAL SdSNn\n\n","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-09-10T08:47:31.102494-07:00","document_number":"80","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509964324","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Summons Returned Executed","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-09-10T08:47:30.449586-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-10T08:47:30.461650-07:00","date_filed":"2026-09-10","time_filed":null,"entry_number":80,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-09-10.001","pacer_sequence_number":215,"description":"SUMMONS Returned Executed by Asher Bronstin The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. served on 6/29/2026, answer due 7/20/2026. (Perrong, Andrew)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/474081533/","id":474081533,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/489570225/","id":489570225,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/79/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-08-11T15:18:52.207990-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-22T15:52:09.666135-07:00","sha1":"1befede3a8cc57a01bc24c5a34bd1c137fd15a89","page_count":36,"file_size":231796,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.79.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.79.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 1 of 36\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\n on behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n v.\n CLASS ACTION\n VIASAT, INC. and THE PREFERRED\n PREPAID, INC. d/b/a XYZies,\n\n Defendants.\n\n\n DEFENDANT\u2019S ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES\n TO PLAINTIFF\u2019S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT1\n\n Defendant Viasat, Inc. (\u201cViasat\u201d), in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and\n\nthe Court\u2019s scheduling order (see Dkt. 73), hereby respectfully submits its Answer\n\nand Affirmative Defenses to the \u201cSecond Amended Class Action Complaint\u201d (see\n\nDkt. 70, \u201cSAC\u201d) filed by Plaintiff Asher Bronstin (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) in the above-captioned\n\nmatter, and in so doing, Viasat answers, avers, and responds to each of the claims and\n\nallegations therein asserted against Viasat, and asserts certain defenses, as follows:\n\n 1. The allegations in Paragraph 1 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\n\n\n\n1\n Plaintiff\u2019s Second Amended Complaint is incorrectly captioned as the First\nAmended Complaint.\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 2 of 36\n\n\n\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated any applicable law. Any remaining allegations in this\n\nParagraph are denied.\n\n 2. The allegations in Paragraph 2 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated any applicable law. Any remaining allegations in this\n\nParagraph are denied.\n\n 3. As to the allegations in Paragraph 3 of the SAC, Viasat admits only that\n\nPlaintiff purports to bring a lawsuit against Viasat and the other named defendant for\n\npurported violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (\u201cTCPA\u201d), but\n\ndenies that there has been any such violation or any other legal violation. Any\n\nremaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n PARTIES\n\n 4. Viasat admits the allegations in Paragraph 4 of the SAC.\n\n 5. Viasat admits the allegations in Paragraph 5 of the SAC.\n\n 6. The allegations in Paragraph 6 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and thus no response is required. To the extent a\n\nresponse is deemed required, Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 3 of 36\n\n\n\n\nform a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the SAC and, on this basis, denies\n\nthem.\n\n JURISDICTION AND VENUE\n\n 7. The allegations in Paragraph 7 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is\n\ndeemed required, Viasat admits only that Plaintiff purports to invoke this Court\u2019s\n\nfederal jurisdiction to the extent the TCPA is a federal statute, but denies that such\n\njurisdiction is proper to the extent Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Any remaining\n\nallegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 8. The allegations in Paragraph 8 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Responding\n\nfurther, Viasat admits only that it is registered to do business in Pennsylvania, but\n\ndenies any implication of liability that may be inferred therefrom. Responding\n\nfurther, Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the\n\ntruth of any remaining allegations in Paragraph 8 of the SAC and, on this basis,\n\ndenies them.\n\n 9. The allegations in Paragraph 9 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 4 of 36\n\n\n\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Any remaining\n\nallegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n BACKGROUND\n\nA. The TCPA Prohibits Calls to Numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry.\n\n 10. The allegations in Paragraph 10 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 11. The allegations in Paragraph 11 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 12. The allegations in Paragraph 12 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 5 of 36\n\n\n\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 13. The allegations in Paragraph 13 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\nB. The TCPA Also Requires Telemarketers to Transmit Caller Identification\n Information Including the Telemarketer\u2019s Name.\n\n 14. The allegations in Paragraph 14 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 15. The allegations in Paragraph 15 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 6 of 36\n\n\n\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 16. The allegations in Paragraph 16 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 17. The allegations in Paragraph 17 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 18. The allegations in Paragraph 18 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 7 of 36\n\n\n\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS\n\n 19. The allegations in Paragraph 19 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\nadmits only that Plaintiff is a \u201cperson\u201d but denies any implication of liability that\n\nmay be inferred therefrom and further denies having violated the TCPA or any\n\napplicable law. Any remaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 20. The allegations in Paragraph 20 of the SAC reflect, in whole or in part,\n\nlegal conclusions, as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is\n\ndeemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions.\n\nResponding further, Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a\n\nbelief as to the truth of any allegations in Paragraph 20 of the SAC and, on this basis,\n\ndenies them.\n\n 21. The allegations in Paragraph 21 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Responding\n\nfurther, Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the\n\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 8 of 36\n\n\n\n\ntruth of any remaining allegations in Paragraph 21 of the SAC and, on this basis,\n\ndenies them.\n\n 22. Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to\n\nthe truth of the allegations in Paragraph 22 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies\n\nthem.\n\n 23. The allegations in Paragraph 23 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Responding\n\nfurther, Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the\n\ntruth of any remaining allegations in Paragraph 23 of the SAC and, on this basis,\n\ndenies them.\n\n 24. The allegations in Paragraph 24 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Responding\n\nfurther, Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the\n\ntruth of any remaining allegations in Paragraph 24 of the SAC and, on this basis,\n\ndenies them.\n\n 25. Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to\n\n 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 9 of 36\n\n\n\n\nthe truth of the allegations in Paragraph 25 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies\n\nthem.\n\n 26. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 26 of the SAC.\n\n 27. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 27 of the SAC.\n\n 28. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 28 of the SAC.\n\n 29. The allegations in Paragraph 29 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Any remaining\n\nallegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 30. The allegations in Paragraph 30 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required, and/or purport to summarize a\n\ndocument produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the extent a response is\n\ndeemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions and\n\nsummarization. Responding further, Viasat lacks knowledge or information\n\nsufficient to form a belief as to the truth of any remaining allegations in Paragraph\n\n30 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies them.\n\n 31. The allegations in Paragraph 31 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\n 9\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 10 of 36\n\n\n\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Any remaining\n\nallegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 32. The allegations in Paragraph 32 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Any remaining\n\nallegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 33. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 33 of the SAC.\n\n 34. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 34 of the SAC.\n\n 35. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 35 of the SAC.\n\n 36. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 36 of the SAC.\n\n 37. The allegations in Paragraph 37 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required, and/or purport to summarize a\n\ndocument produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the extent a response is\n\ndeemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions and\n\nsummarization. Responding further, Viasat lacks knowledge or information\n\nsufficient to form a belief as to the truth of any remaining allegations in Paragraph\n\n37 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies them.\n\n 10\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 11 of 36\n\n\n\n\n 38. The allegations in Paragraph 38 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Any remaining\n\nallegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 39. The allegations in Paragraph 39 of the SAC purport to summarize a\n\ndocument or other material produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the\n\nextent a response is deemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nsummarization. Any remaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 40. The allegations in Paragraph 40 of the SAC purport to summarize a\n\ndocument or other material produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the\n\nextent a response is deemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nsummarization. Any remaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 41. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 41 of the SAC.\n\n 42. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 42 of the SAC.\n\n 43. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 43 of the SAC.\n\n 44. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 44 of the SAC, including\n\nany that may be inferred from the included screenshots.\n\n 45. The allegations in Paragraph 45 of the SAC purport to summarize a\n\ndocument produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the extent a response is\n\n 11\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 12 of 36\n\n\n\n\ndeemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s summarization. Any\n\nremaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied, including any that may be\n\ninferred from the included screenshots.\n\n 46. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 46 of the SAC.\n\n 47. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 47 of the SAC.\n\n 48. The allegations in Paragraph 48 of the SAC purport to summarize a\n\ndocument produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the extent a response is\n\ndeemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s summarization. Any\n\nremaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 49. The allegations in Paragraph 49 of the SAC purport to summarize a\n\ndocument produced in discovery, which speaks for itself. To the extent a response is\n\ndeemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s summarization. Any\n\nremaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied, including any that may be\n\ninferred from the included screenshot.\n\n 50. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 50 of the SAC.\n\n 51. As to the allegations of Paragraph 51 of the SAC, Viasat denies that IP\n\nHorizon is Viasat\u2019s \u201ccalling carrier\u201d or that any calls were placed to Plaintiff by or\n\non behalf of Viasat. Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 51 of the SAC (including in\n\nthe provided table) and, on this basis, denies them.\n\n 12\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 13 of 36\n\n\n\n\n 52. As to the allegations of Paragraph 52 of the SAC, Viasat denies that IP\n\nHorizon is Viasat\u2019s \u201ccalling carrier\u201d or that any calls were placed to Plaintiff by or\n\non behalf of Viasat. Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 52 of the SAC and, on this\n\nbasis, denies them.\n\n 53. Viasat lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to\n\nthe truth of the allegations in Paragraph 53 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies\n\nthem, but denies any liability as to Viasat that could be inferred therefrom.\n\n 54. The allegations in Paragraph 54 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Viasat lacks\n\nknowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining\n\nallegations in Paragraph 54 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies them.\n\n 55. The allegations in Paragraph 55 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed\n\nrequired, Viasat denies the accuracy of Plaintiff\u2019s legal conclusions. Viasat lacks\n\nknowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining\n\nallegations in Paragraph 55 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies them.\n\n 13\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 14 of 36\n\n\n\n\n 56. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 56 of the SAC.\n\n 57. The allegations in Paragraph 57 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 58. The allegations in Paragraph 58 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 59. The allegations in Paragraph 59 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 60. The allegations in Paragraph 60 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\n 14\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 15 of 36\n\n\n\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 61. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 61 of the SAC.\n\n 62. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 62 of the SAC.\n\n 63. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 63 of the SAC.\n\n 64. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 64 of the SAC.\n\n 65. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 65 of the SAC.\n\n 66. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 66 of the SAC.\n\n 67. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 67 of the SAC.\n\n 68. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 68 of the SAC.\n\n 69. The allegations in Paragraph 69 of the SAC purport to summarize or\n\ncharacterize the content of a website, which speaks for itself, and thus no response\n\nis required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat denies the accuracy\n\nof Plaintiff\u2019s summarization or characterizations. Responding further, Viasat admits\n\nthat it presently has a business relationship with XYZies, but denies any implication\n\nof liability that may be inferred therefrom. Any remaining allegations in this\n\nParagraph are denied, including any that may be inferred from the provided\n\n 15\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 16 of 36\n\n\n\n\nscreenshot.\n\n 70. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 70 of the SAC.\n\n 71. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 71 of the SAC.\n\n 72. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 72 of the SAC.\n\n 73. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 73 of the SAC.\n\n 74. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 74 of the SAC.\n\n 75. The allegations in Paragraph 75 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 76. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 76 of the SAC.\n\n 77. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 77 of the SAC.\n\n 78. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 78 of the SAC.\n\n 79. As to the allegations in Paragraph 79 of the SAC, Viasat denies that any\n\ncalls were placed to Plaintiff by or on behalf of Viasat. Viasat lacks knowledge or\n\ninformation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in\n\nParagraph 79 of the SAC and, on this basis, denies them.\n\n 80. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 80 of the SAC.\n\n 16\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 17 of 36\n\n\n\n\n CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS\n\n 81. As to the allegations in Paragraph 81 of the SAC, Viasat incorporates\n\nby reference its responses to Paragraph 1 through 80 above, as if fully stated herein.\n\n 82. As to the allegations in Paragraph 82 of the SAC, Viasat admits only\n\nthat Plaintiff purports to bring a claim on behalf of himself and putative class\n\nmembers and seeks class treatment, but denies that any class exists, the proposed\n\nclass definitions are proper, the SAC includes any facially-certifiable class\n\nallegations, Viasat violated the TCPA or any other applicable law, Plaintiff has stated\n\na plausible claim for relief or has standing to bring a claim under the TCPA, Plaintiff\n\nwould be an adequate class representative, or this case is worthy or capable of class\n\ntreatment. Any remaining allegations in this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 83. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 83 of the SAC.\n\n 84. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 84 of the SAC.\n\n 85. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 85 of the SAC.\n\n 86. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 86 of the SAC, including\n\nall subparagraphs.\n\n 87. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 87 of the SAC.\n\n 88. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 88 of the SAC, including\n\nall subparagraphs.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 18 of 36\n\n\n\n\n COUNT I\n Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227\n (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the National DNC Class)\n\n 89. As to the allegations in Paragraph 89 of the SAC, Viasat incorporates\n\nby reference its responses to Paragraphs 1 through 88 above, as if fully stated herein.\n\n 90. The allegations in Paragraph 90 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law. Any remaining allegations\n\nin this Paragraph are denied.\n\n 91. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 91 of the SAC.\n\n 92. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 92 of the SAC.\n\n 93. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 93 of the SAC.\n\n 94. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 94 of the SAC.\n\n COUNT II\n Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227\n (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Telemarketing Caller ID Class)\n\n 95. As to the allegations in Paragraph 95 of the SAC, Viasat incorporates\n\nby reference its responses to Paragraphs 1 through 94 above, as if fully stated herein.\n\n 96. The allegations in Paragraph 96 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\n 18\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 19 of 36\n\n\n\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law or that there is a private cause\n\nof action under the cited regulation. Any remaining allegations in this Paragraph are\n\ndenied.\n\n 97. The allegations in Paragraph 97 of the SAC do not appear to reflect\n\nallegations of fact against Viasat and instead reflect, in whole or in part, legal\n\nconclusions and/or a summary or quotation of legal authority, which speaks for itself,\n\nand thus no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Viasat\n\ndenies having violated the TCPA or any applicable law or that there is a private cause\n\nof action under the cited regulation. Any remaining allegations in this Paragraph are\n\ndenied.\n\n 98. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 98 of the SAC.\n\n 99. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 99 of the SAC.\n\n 100. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 100 of the SAC.\n\n 101. Viasat denies all the allegations in Paragraph 101 of the SAC.\n\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S PRAYER FOR RELIEF\n\n WHEREFORE, Viasat denies each and every allegation set forth in the \u201cPrayer\n\nfor Relief\u201d in Plaintiff\u2019s SAC (including all subparts), and specifically denies that\n\nPlaintiff is entitled to any of the damages or other relief requested in the SAC, either\n\n 19\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 20 of 36\n\n\n\n\nexpressly or by implication, including but not limited to the specific relief requested\n\non pages 18-19 of the SAC, or to any relief whatsoever, and demands the strictest of\n\nproof of all alleged damages, injuries, and harms. Viasat further denies that it violated\n\nthe TCPA or any other law in relation to this action, and thus denies Plaintiff is entitled\n\nto relief under such laws. Viasat further denies that Plaintiff is entitled to treble\n\ndamages or \u201c[s]uch other and further relief\u201d Plaintiff requests in the SAC, including\n\nbut not limited to injunctive relief, fees, costs, or punitive damages.\n\n DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\n\n Viasat does not oppose at this time Plaintiff\u2019s demand for jury trial.\n\n VIASAT\u2019S GENERAL DENIALS\n\n All allegations in the SAC, including those presented in any and all attached\n\nexhibits or in any and all subparts or subparagraphs or in any preamble or footnotes,\n\nthat are not specifically admitted above are hereby expressly and fully denied, and\n\nViasat denies any and all allegations implied or that may be inferred from any captions\n\nor headings in or footnotes to the SAC or that purport to relate to conduct by other\n\nparties. For the avoidance of doubt, as to the responses above, Viasat denies any\n\nliability as to having violated the TCPA, or any other applicable state or federal law,\n\nor that Plaintiff is entitled to any damages or other relief under the TCPA or otherwise,\n\nincluding but not limited to the specific statutory provisions identified in the SAC or\n\nothers. Viasat further denies Plaintiff or any putative class member is entitled to any\n\n 20\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 21 of 36\n\n\n\n\nrelief or damages whatsoever, and demands strict proof thereof. Viasat further denies\n\nthat this Court has proper federal subject matter jurisdiction (particularly to the extent\n\nPlaintiff lacks Article III standing) or that Plaintiff is entitled to class treatment. Any\n\nscrivener\u2019s error herein should not be construed against Viasat and should be\n\nconstrued as a denial rather than an admission of liability.\n\n VIASAT\u2019S AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES\n\n By alleging the affirmative and other defenses herein and below, Viasat intends\n\nno alteration of any burden of proof that otherwise exists with regard to the claims in\n\nthe SAC. All defenses are pled in the alternative and do not constitute an admission\n\neither of liability, of subject matter jurisdiction, or as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to\n\nrelief. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in these defenses should be construed as\n\nan admission of liability, and any allegation of fault by Viasat in the SAC is denied.\n\n FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Failure to State a Claim)\n\n For all of the same reasons Viasat previously identified (see Dkt. 24 and 37),\n\nViasat contends that the SAC fails to set forth facts sufficient to state or constitute a\n\nclaim against Viasat under the TCPA or any other law, fails to plead facts\n\ndemonstrating Article III standing, and fails to state facts sufficient to entitle Plaintiff\n\nor any putative class member to the relief sought, or any relief whatsoever. Further,\n\nViasat contends Plaintiff will be unable to establish such facts as necessary to satisfy\n\n 21\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 22 of 36\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s burden of proof as to the claim asserted.\n\n SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Not Willful and/or Knowing)\n\n Plaintiff has not carried and cannot carry his burden of showing that any action\n\nor omission by Viasat was \u201cwillful\u201d or \u201cknowing\u201d and, therefore, is not entitled to\n\ntreble damages under the TCPA or any other law that provides for treble damages.\n\n THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Consent, and/or Established Business Relationship)\n\n Upon information and belief, Plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred because, to the extent\n\nPlaintiff received any telephonic communications from Viasat, or from third parties\n\non Viasat\u2019s behalf in this action if any, which is denied, (i) Plaintiff requested to\n\nreceive said telephonic communications, (ii) any such telephonic communications\n\nwere sent with Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cprior express invitation or permission\u201d (or \u201cprior express\n\nwritten consent\u201d or \u201cprior express consent\u201d where required), (iii) he had an\n\n\u201cestablished business relationship\u201d with Viasat or the caller, (iv) his consent was not\n\nrequired on account of the nature of the calls or the technology used (i.e., the at-issue\n\ncalls did not involve an artificial or prerecorded voice, or the equipment used to make\n\ncalls is not covered by or subject to the TCPA\u2019s requirements), and/or (v) such\n\ntelephonic communications were sent in response to an inquiry, were not unwanted,\n\nand, in fact, were requested and/or consented to by Plaintiff, an authorized third-party,\n\n 22\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 23 of 36\n\n\n\n\nand/or the regular user and/or subscriber of the subject phone number who may have\n\nbeen acting in concert with Plaintiff.\n\n FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Error)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because, to the extent he\n\nreceived any violative communications directly from Viasat or on behalf of Viasat,\n\nwhich Viasat denies, such communications were the result of bona fide error.\n\n FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Good Faith)\n\n At all times relevant to the matters alleged in the SAC, Viasat acted in good\n\nfaith, reasonably and without any actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged\n\nbreach of any legal duty owed to Plaintiff, or any other alleged wrong done to Plaintiff.\n\n Additionally, all conduct and activities of Viasat alleged in the SAC conformed\n\nto statutes, regulations and industry standards based upon the state of knowledge\n\nexisting at the time(s) alleged in the SAC. As a consequence, some or all of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nclaim is barred in full, or in part, based on Viasat\u2019s (or any purported agent\u2019s) good\n\nfaith belief that they had good cause and/or a legitimate business reason to act as they\n\ndid and did not directly or indirectly perform any acts that would constitute a violation\n\nof Plaintiff\u2019s rights. Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s allegations that he is entitled to treble\n\ndamages based on \u201cknowing\u201d or \u201cwillful\u201d violations are barred for this same reason.\n\n 23\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 24 of 36\n\n\n\n\n SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Third Party Acts)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred because the alleged conduct was caused or\n\ncontributed to by the acts or omissions of Plaintiff and/or third parties other than\n\nViasat, over which Viasat had no control, and for which Viasat is not liable either\n\ndirectly or vicariously. For the avoidance of doubt, Viasat is not directly or vicariously\n\nliable for the alleged unlawful acts of any other party or third party because, inter alia,\n\n(i) it did not physically make the communications at issue, (ii) it did not have a\n\ncommon law agency relationship with any third party that did make the subject\n\ncommunications, and (iii) it cannot be held liable under the TCPA pursuant to any\n\ncommon law agency theory (including actual authority, apparent authority, or\n\nratification).\n\n SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Failure to Join)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims fail due to his failure to join necessary or indispensable parties\n\nin this action, including but not limited to the person(s) or entity (or entities) who sent\n\nthe alleged communications at issue in purported violation of the TCPA and/or acted\n\non such person\u2019s or entity\u2019s behalf in doing so and any other user or owner of the\n\nsubject phone number who provided consent to be contacted by Viasat.\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 25 of 36\n\n\n\n\n EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Fifth Amendment Due Process)\n\n To the extent the TCPA is applied against Viasat to impose upon Viasat liability\n\nin circumstances that Viasat could not have reasonably avoided and/or damages that\n\nwould be grossly disproportional to any actual harm caused by the activity in question,\n\nthe TCPA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United\n\nStates Constitution. See Golan v. Veritas Ent., LLC, 2017 WL 3923162, at *3 (E.D.\n\nMo. Sept. 7, 2017), aff'd sub nom. 930 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Capitol\n\nRecords, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2012) (\u201c[T]he TCPA\u2019s\n\nstatutory damages clause is constitutional, but a specific damages award may be\n\nunconstitutional if it is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to\n\nthe offense and obviously unreasonable.\u201d)).\n\n NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Due Process \u2013 Punitive Damages)\n\n To the extent that the SAC seeks punitive or exemplary damages under the\n\nTCPA, it violates the rights of Viasat under the Due Process provisions of the United\n\nStates Constitution, as grossly excessive penalties entered on a discretionary basis\n\nmay amount to an \u201carbitrary deprivation of property without the due process of law.\u201d\n\nSee, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453, 454 (1993);\n\nBMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996). The TCPA affords discretion\n\n 25\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 26 of 36\n\n\n\n\nto award up to $1,500.00 \u201cper violation.\u201d\n\n TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines)\n\n If the TCPA is applied against Viasat to impose liability grossly disproportional\n\nto any actual harm allegedly caused by the activity in question, the TCPA violates the\n\nEighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits excessive fines.\n\nStatutory penalties violate due process rights \u201cwhere the penalty prescribed is so\n\nsevere and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously\n\nunreasonable.\u201d United States v. Citrin, 972 F. 2d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting\n\nSt. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)).\n\n ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (De Minimis Harm)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of de minimis\n\nharm because the actual harm allegedly suffered by Plaintiff (if any, which is not\n\nconceded and expressly denied) is negligible.\n\n TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Equitable Defenses)\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred, in whole or in part, based upon the doctrines of\n\nunclean hands, estoppel, waiver, and/or other doctrines or theories of equity, including\n\nbut not limited to assumption of risk, particularly (but not limited) to the extent that\n\n 26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 27 of 36\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiff consented to receiving the communications and/or authorized another\n\nperson\u2019s use of the phone number at issue and/or provision of consent for calls to that\n\nnumber, or requested, sought out, induced or otherwise encouraged communications\n\nfor the sole or intended purpose of bringing TCPA claims. For the avoidance of doubt,\n\nfailure to list a specific equitable defense herein should not be construed as a waiver\n\nof any equitable defenses. Rather, Viasat invokes, without limitation, any and all\n\nequitable defenses available to it under applicable law and interpretive authority.\n\n For the avoidance of doubt, Viasat asserts, without limitation, all defenses,\n\nprotections, and limitations available to it under the TCPA and its related\n\nimplementing regulations, or any other applicable law as to Plaintiff\u2019s claims in the\n\nSAC, including but not limited to that (1) Viasat did not contact Plaintiff without\n\nconsent, (2) Viasat did not contact or authorize others to contact Plaintiff as alleged in\n\nthe SAC (or at all), (3) Viasat has established and implemented, with due care,\n\nreasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent violations of the TCPA\u2019s\n\nregulations, and such practices and procedures were in place and followed at all\n\nrelevant times, (4) Plaintiff did not receive an actionable \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d or\n\n\u201ctelemarketing\u201d call within the meaning of the TCPA or other applicable law, (5)\n\nPlaintiff requested, sought out, consented to, induced or otherwise encouraged contact\n\nfor the sole or intended purpose of bringing TCPA and/or equivalent claims, without\n\nhaving suffered any injury, and/or (6) upon information and belief, the telephone\n\n 27\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 28 of 36\n\n\n\n\nnumber at issue is used by and for Plaintiff\u2019s business purposes and is used for\n\n\u201cresidential\u201d purposes (including that the number is not the primary means of reaching\n\nhim at his residence), and therefore Plaintiff does not qualify as a \u201cresidential\n\ntelephone subscriber\u201d within the meaning of the TCPA.\n\n THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Failure to Mitigate)\n\n Plaintiff is not entitled to relief because, if Plaintiff has been damaged, which\n\nViasat denies, Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages, and therefore any recovery\n\nagainst Viasat is barred or should be reduced accordingly.\n\n FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Lack of Standing)\n\n Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims under Article III of the United States\n\nConstitution or otherwise (including \u201cprudential\u201d or \u201cstatutory\u201d standing), particularly\n\nto the extent that Plaintiff did not suffer a concrete and particularized injury in fact\n\nthat is traceable to or redressable by Viasat for all of the reasons previously stated (see\n\nDkt. 24 and 37), and/or to the extent that Plaintiff (i) is not the subscriber, owner\n\nand/or user of the subject phone number, (ii) consented to receiving the\n\ncommunications at issue in this action, (iii) requested to be called, (iv) did not actually\n\nreceive the subject communications or did not do so on the subject number, (v)\n\ninduced the communications and/or authorized another third-party to do so on his\n\n 28\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 29 of 36\n\n\n\n\nbehalf, and/or (vi) is not within the \u201czone of interests\u201d that the TCPA and other laws\n\ninvoked in his SAC were designed to protect, among other reasons.\n\n In particular, and without limitation, Plaintiff lacks standing as Viasat did not\n\nsend or authorize the unlawful communications as alleged (and in fact, upon\n\ninformation and belief, Plaintiff has fabricated his claims in this case and is a\n\nprofessional serial litigant abusing the TCPA for profit) and therefore did not cause\n\nany injury to Plaintiff. Further, because Viasat did not send or authorize the\n\ncommunications as alleged to Plaintiff, Plaintiff\u2019s alleged injury, if any, cannot be\n\ntraced to, or redressed by, Viasat.\n\n FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Legitimate Business Purpose)\n\n All conduct and activities of Viasat, including any purported agents, alleged in\n\nthe SAC conformed to statutes, regulations and industry standards based upon the\n\nstate of knowledge existing at the time(s) alleged in the SAC. As a consequence, some\n\nor all of Plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred in full, or in part, based on Viasat\u2019s good faith\n\nbelief that Viasat or any third party purporting to act on its behalf had good cause\n\nand/or a legitimate business reason to act as they did and did not directly or indirectly\n\nperform any acts that would constitute a violation of Plaintiff\u2019s rights.\n\n\n\n\n 29\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 30 of 36\n\n\n\n\n SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Intervening/Superseding Cause)\n\n The SAC is barred, in whole or in part, to the extent that Plaintiff\u2019s purported\n\ndamages, if any, resulted from acts and/or omissions of other parties, third parties,\n\nconditions, or by forces and/or things over whom/which Viasat had no control,\n\nincluding but not limited to any user or subscriber of the phone number who provided\n\nconsent to receive the calls at issue. Plaintiff\u2019s claim is barred for the additional reason\n\nthat, upon information and belief, Plaintiff consented to receiving the communications\n\nat issue or authorized others to do so, and/or expressly invited or solicited the\n\ncommunications for the intended purpose of bringing a TCPA or equivalent claim.\n\nThus, the acts of Plaintiff or such other parties/third parties/forces/conditions\n\nconstitute intervening or superseding causes of any purported harm.\n\n SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (No Proximate Cause)\n\n If Plaintiff suffered or sustained any damages or injury as a proximate result of\n\nthe purported conduct of Viasat or third parties purportedly acting on its behalf, which\n\nViasat denies, such damages or injury were proximately caused by or contributed to\n\nby the acts and/or negligence of Plaintiff and/or third parties, which bars or reduces\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s right to recover any such damages against Viasat. Accordingly, Plaintiff is\n\nbarred from recovering any such damages and/or is subject to a proportionate\n\n 30\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 31 of 36\n\n\n\n\nreduction on a comparative fault basis for any alleged damages so caused.\n\n EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Ratification)\n\n The cause of action in the SAC is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines\n\nof acquiescence, ratification, and consent for the reasons stated above and below, and\n\nfor others. This is because, among other reasons, Plaintiff consented to receiving the\n\ncommunications at issue, and/or expressly invited or solicited the communications for\n\nthe intended purpose of bringing a TCPA (or equivalent) claim.\n\n NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Safe Harbor)\n\n At all times relevant to the matters alleged in the SAC, Viasat had established\n\nand implemented written procedures to comply with (and has so complied with) the\n\napplicable TCPA Do-Not-Call rules. For the avoidance of doubt, Viasat asserts all\n\n\u201csafe harbor\u201d and other affirmative defenses available to it under all applicable TCPA\n\nprovisions and related implementing regulations, as interpreted by the Federal\n\nCommunications Commission and applicable decisional authority and as amended,\n\n\n\n\n 31\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 32 of 36\n\n\n\n\npertaining to Plaintiff\u2019s allegations against Viasat in this matter (see, e.g., 47 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7\u00a7 227(c) and 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)) without limitation.\n\n\n\n\n TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Class Not Certifiable)\n\n Plaintiff does not meet the class requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules\n\nof Civil Procedure. Specifically, Viasat contends that Plaintiff cannot meet, at the\n\nminimum, the class certification requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality,\n\nand adequate representation. Additionally, the putative class is not ascertainable by\n\nobjective measures and common issues of law and fact do not predominate over\n\nindividualized inquiries, including because the circumstances under which individuals\n\nmight provide consent and/or revoke consent can naturally vary by individual.\n\nPlaintiff also cannot meet the requirements for class certification because he is not a\n\nmember of the class he seeks to represent, to the extent that there has been no TCPA\n\nviolation by Viasat.\n\n TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (No Injunctive Relief)\n\n Plaintiff has failed to state facts (and indeed there are no such facts) that would\n\nentitle Plaintiff or any putative class member to obtain injunctive relief because,\n\n 32\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 33 of 36\n\n\n\n\namong other reasons, there is no threat of immediate, imminent, and/or continuing\n\nharm, and therefore Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this relief and/or such relief is\n\nnot available as a matter of law. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.\n\n149, 158 (2014); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 435 (2021); Miller v.\n\nTime Warner Cable Inc., 2016 WL 7471302, at *2\u20134 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2016).\n\n TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\n\n (Reservation of Defenses; Additional or Other Defenses)\n\n Certain additional affirmative and other defenses to the SAC and to the\n\npurported claims for relief stated therein may be available to Viasat. However, these\n\nadditional defenses may require discovery before they can be properly alleged as\n\ncertain information is in the hands of Plaintiff and/or third parties. Thus, Viasat\n\nreserves the right to assert other separate and additional defenses, if and when they\n\nbecome appropriate in this action and to the extent allowed. Viasat further reserves\n\nand does not waive any arbitral rights against Plaintiff (to the extent Viasat\n\ndetermined that Plaintiff\u2019s claims are subject to a binding arbitration agreement\n\nbetween the parties) and/or any right to seek sanctions against Plaintiff or his counsel\n\nunder 28 U.S.C. \u00a71927, Fed. R. Civ. P 11, and other applicable rules or law,\n\nparticularly as Plaintiff\u2019s SAC lacks any good faith basis in law or fact and indeed\n\ncontains demonstrably false allegations that have already been proven false in\n\ndiscovery, among other reasons. Viasat also reserves and does not waive the right to\n\n 33\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 34 of 36\n\n\n\n\nbring an affirmative action against Plaintiff, his counsel, or any responsible third\n\nparties, if and when it determines it has a legal and factual basis to do so, in accordance\n\nwith applicable rules and law. For the avoidance of doubt, Viasat reserves all rights\n\nand privileges afforded to it under applicable rules and law, and intends no waiver\n\nhereby, whether or not said rights and privilege are expressly identified herein.\n\n VIASAT\u2019S PRAYER FOR RELIEF\n\n WHEREFORE, Viasat respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in\n\nits favor, dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s SAC with prejudice, award Viasat all of its costs and\n\nattorneys\u2019 fees incurred in defending this action to the extent available under\n\napplicable law, and grant Viasat all other relief as the Court deems just and\n\nappropriate.\n\n\n\n\n 34\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 35 of 36\n\n\n\n\nDated: August 11, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n\n By: /s/ Kareem A. Salem\n\n John W. McGuinness\n (Pro Hac Vice to be Requested)\n A. Paul Heeringa\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n Kareem A. Salem\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP\n 1700 M ST, NW, 4th Floor\n Washington, D.C. 20036\n Telephone: 202-585-6500\n jmcguinness@manatt.com\n pheeringa@manatt.com\n ksalem@manatt.com\n\n FREDERICK P. SANTARELLI (PA 53901)\n STEVEN C. TOLLIVER, JR. (PA 327165)\n ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.\n Union Meeting Corporate Center V\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300\n Blue Bell, PA 19422\n (215) 977-1000 (phone)\n FPSantarelli@elliottgreenleaf.com\n sct@elliottgreenleaf.com\n\n Counsel for Defendant Viasat, Inc.\n\n\n\n\n 35\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 79 Filed 08/11/26 Page 36 of 36\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that, on August 11, 2026, I filed the foregoing electronically\n\nthrough the Court\u2019s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of the filing to all counsel\n\nof record.\n\n\n\n\n By: /s/ Kareem A. Salem\n\n\n\n\n 36\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-08-11T15:18:52.693058-07:00","document_number":"79","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509922644","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Answer to Amended Complaint","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-08-11T15:18:52.174066-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-11T15:18:52.185030-07:00","date_filed":"2026-08-11","time_filed":null,"entry_number":79,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-08-11.001","pacer_sequence_number":213,"description":"ANSWER to [70] Amended Complaint by ViaSat, Inc..(Salem, Kareem)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/471294937/","id":471294937,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/486695199/","id":486695199,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/78/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-17T13:58:53.152808-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-12T23:54:54.113469-07:00","sha1":"9cb2c3b56e884a1519accba798f2d4e845d04def","page_count":5,"file_size":479576,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.78.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.78.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 78 Filed 07/17/26 Page 1 of 5\n\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\nIN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR :\nADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THIS COURT :\n\n PETITION\n\n\n I,\n Kareem Salem , hereby petition the United States District\nCourt for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to admit me to practice before that Court. In\nsupport of my petition, I state as follows:\n\n Office address:\n 12730 High Bluff Drive\n Suite 300\n San Diego, CA 92130\n Office phone: (619) 2058520\n KSalem@manatt.com\n Email Address: ___________________________________________\n I was admitted to practice before the Courts listed below on the date shown after\n the name of each Court, and I am currently a member in good standing of all those Courts.\n\n See attached.\n\n\n\nMy attorney Identification number is: CA 288906\n FOR COURT USE ONLY\n\n GENERAL ADMISSION:\n\n GRANTED BY THE COURT: Date:\n\n X SPECIAL ADMISSION:\n\n GRANTED BY THE COURT\n /s/ Keli M. Neary Date: 7/17/2026\n\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 78 Filed 07/17/26 Page 2 of 5\n\n\nPlease Complete the Following:\n\n\n All occasions, if any, on which I have been convicted of a crime (subsequent to my\nbecoming an attorney), censured, suspended, disciplined or disbarred by any court are set\nforth as follows: (State the facts and circumstances connected with each; if none, state\n\u201cnone\u201d.)\nNone\n\n\n\n\n All occasions, if any, on which I have been held in contempt of court are set forth\nas follows: (State the nature and final disposition of contempt; if none, state \u201cnone\u201d.)\nNone\n\n\n\n\n Any disciplinary actions, contempt proceedings, criminal charges, or other\nproceedings in which I am a named party, pending before any court, board, or tribunal:\n(State the facts and circumstances connected with each; if none, state \"none\".)\nNone\n\n\n\n\n I am seeking:\n\n General Admission under Local Rule LR 83.8.1\n \u2714 Special Admission (specify by placing a checkmark in the appropriate\n rule below)\n LR 83.8.2.1 \u2714 , LR 83.8.2.2 , LR 83.8.2.3 , or LR 83.8.2.4\n\nIf seeking special admission under Local Rules LR 83.8.2.1, LR 83.8.2.2, LR 83.8.2.3, or\nLR 83.8.2.4, the basis for my admission under the designated rule is as follows:\n\n\n\n\nNAME THE PARTY YOU REPRESENT:\nDefendant Viasat, Inc.\n\nIf special admission is requested for a particular case, please list case number and caption:\n\nCase # 1:25cv00927KMN\n\nCaption # Asher Bronstin v. Viasat, Inc.\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 78 Filed 07/17/26 Page 3 of 5\n\n\n\n\nI understand that:\n\n 1) If seeking admission under Section LR 83.8.2.2, LR 83.8.2.3, or 83.8.2.4, I\n must submit a letter from a superior stating the agency with which I am\n employed and the duties performed which qualify me for admission under\n those sections.\n\n 2) If petitioning for admission only in a particular case, under Rule LR 83.8.2.1,\n I need no sponsor\u2019s certificate. Any attorney specially admitted under LR\n 83.8.2.1 shall, in each proceeding in which he or she appears, have\n associate counsel who is generally admitted under Local Rule 83.8.1 to\n practice in this court, whose appearance shall also be entered of record and\n upon whom all pleadings, motions, notices, and other papers may be served\n in accordance with any statute or applicable rule. The attendance of any\n such associate counsel upon the hearing of any motion or the taking of any\n testimony shall be sufficient appearance for the party or parties represented\n by such associate counsel. Either the specially admitted attorney or\n associate counsel must be fully prepared to participate in any hearings,\n arguments, conferences, and trials. (See LR 83.9)\n If special admission is requested for a particular case, please list the name,\n address, telephone number and bar identification number of associate\n counsel to be entered of record in the case:\n Steven C. Tolliver, Jr., Esq. (PA Bar No. 327165), Elliot Greenleaf, P.C.\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300, Blue Bell, PA 19422\n Email: sct@elliottgreenleaf.com; Telephone: (215) 977-1023\n\n 3) If seeking general admission under Rule LR 83.8.1, I must be a member of\n the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and have a sponsor who is a\n member in good standing of the Bar of this Court present to move for my\n admission and I must submit the sponsor\u2019s certificate with my petition.\n\n\n SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER\n\n\n (Bar Identification Number and State where admitted)\n\n (Date)\n\nBy signing this petition for admission, I acknowledge that I have read the attached\nMiddle District of Pennsylvania Code of Professional Conduct and agree to subscribe to\nthe standards set forth in the Code.\n\n\n SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER\n\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 78 Filed 07/17/26 Page 4 of 5\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE\n MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT\n\n\n As a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Middle District\nof Pennsylvania, I will strive for the following professional ideal:\n\n1. The rule of law will govern my entire conduct. I will not violate the law or place myself\n above the law.\n\n2. I will treat with civility and respect the lawyers, clients, opposing parties, the court and all\n the officials with whom I work. Professional courtesy is compatible with vigorous\n advocacy and zealous representation. Even though antagonism may be expected by\n my client, it is not part of my duty to my client.\n\n3. I will respect other lawyers' schedules as my own, and will seek agreement on meetings,\n depositions, hearings, and trial dates. A reasonable request for a scheduling\n accommodation should never be unreasonably refused.\n\n4. Communications are lifelines. I will keep the lines open. Telephone calls and\n correspondence are a two-way channel; I will respond to them promptly.\n\n5. I will be punctual in appointments, communications and in honoring scheduled\n appearances. Neglect and tardiness are demeaning to others and to the judicial\n system.\n\n6. I will earnestly attempt to resolve differences through negotiation, expeditiously and\n without needless expense.\n\n7. Procedural rules are necessary to judicial order and decorum. I will be mindful that\n pleadings, discovery processes and motions cost time and money. I will not use them\n heedlessly. If an adversary is entitled to something, I will provide it without unnecessary\n formalities.\n\n8. I will not engage in conduct that brings disorder or disruption to the courtroom. I will\n advise my client and witnesses appearing in court of the proper conduct expected and\n required there and, to the best of my ability, prevent my client and witnesses from\n creating disorder or disruption.\n\n9. Before dates for hearings or trials are set, or if that is not feasible immediately after such\n date has been set, I will attempt to verify the availability of necessary participants and\n witnesses so I can promptly notify the court of any likely problems.\n\n I agree to subscribe to the above\n Code of Professional Conduct:\n\n\n\n Signature of Petitioner\n\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 78 Filed 07/17/26 Page 5 of 5\n\n\n\n\nList of Court/Bar Admissions for Kareem Salem, Esq. of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP\n\nCurrent as of July 13, 2026\n\nNo additional attorney ID number, unless noted. All admissions in good standing.\n\n\n\n \u2022 California State (2/11/2013) \u2013 Bar ID # 288906\n \u2022 U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (3/14/2018)\n \u2022 California Central District Court (8/20/2024)\n \u2022 California Southern District Court (4/22/2024)\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-17T13:58:53.538459-07:00","document_number":"78","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509887855","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Special Admissions Form Approved","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-07-17T13:58:53.097298-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-17T13:58:53.113005-07:00","date_filed":"2026-07-17","time_filed":null,"entry_number":78,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-07-17.001","pacer_sequence_number":211,"description":"SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Kareem Salem. Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 7/17/2026. (mw)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/471058413/","id":471058413,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/486452999/","id":486452999,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/77/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-16T07:06:58.326871-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-12T07:00:08.534649-07:00","sha1":"3c5f04a599512683cccc72a6038e0e419766fb53","page_count":1,"file_size":144229,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.77.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.77.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 77 Filed 07/16/26 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and on\n behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n v.\n (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n VIASAT, INC.,\n\n and\n\n THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC.\n d/b/a XYZies\n\n Defendants.\n\n\n ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANTS TO\n FILE RESPONSE TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\n\n This matter, coming to be heard on Defendants \u201cUnopposed Motion to Extend Time for\n\nDefendants to File Response to Second Amended Complaint\u201d (hereafter, the \u201cMotion\u201d), due notice\n\nhaving been given, the Court being fully apprised in the premises thereof, the Motion being\n\nunopposed, and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: (a) the Motion is\n\nGRANTED for the reasons stated therein; and (b) Defendants shall have until August 12, 2026\n\nto answer, move or otherwise respond to the SAC.\n\n SO ORDERED THIS 16th DAY OF JULY, 2026,\n\n\n\n /s/ Keli M. Neary\n By:___________________________\n\n Hon. Keli M. Neary\n\n United States District Judge\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-16T07:06:58.715984-07:00","document_number":"77","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509884787","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-07-16T07:06:58.262529-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-16T07:06:58.292187-07:00","date_filed":"2026-07-16","time_filed":null,"entry_number":77,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-07-16.001","pacer_sequence_number":205,"description":"ORDER granting [76] Motion for Extension of Time to File - Defendants shall have until August 12, 2026 to answer, move or otherwise respond to the SAC. Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 7/16/2026 (mw)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/471054947/","id":471054947,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/486449415/","id":486449415,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/76/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-16T06:36:59.286696-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-12T06:59:37.447243-07:00","sha1":"24e6b52bbcedd1ba9b50b155c79275bba09522a3","page_count":3,"file_size":140275,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.76.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.76.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 76 Filed 07/16/26 Page 1 of 3\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and on\n behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n v.\n (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n VIASAT, INC.,\n\n and\n\n THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC.\n d/b/a XYZies\n\n Defendants.\n\n\nUNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANTS TO FILE RESPONSE\n TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\n Defendants Viasat, Inc. (\u201cViasat\u201d) and The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. d/b/a XYZies\n\n(\u201cXYZies\u201d), collectively (\u201cDefendants\u201d) respectfully submit this unopposed motion to extend the\n\ntime by which Defendants must submit a response to Plaintiff\u2019s Second Amended Complaint (see\n\nDkt. 70, \u201cSAC\u201d), to August 12, 2026. In support thereof, Defendants states the following:\n\n 1. Plaintiff filed his SAC in this action on June 11, 2026. See Dkt. 70.\n\n 2. On June 18, 2026, the Court ordered that Viasat\u2019s deadline to respond to the SAC\n\nshall be extended to the same deadline applicable to XYZies following service, so that both\n\ndefendants may respond on the same schedule. See Dkt. 723.\n\n 3. On June 27, 2026, XYZies was served with a copy of the SAC.\n\n 4. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 15, XYZies deadline to\n\nrespond to the SAC is July 20, 2026.\n\n 5. On July 14, 2026, XYZies counsel, Joe Samo, requested an extension of XYZies\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 76 Filed 07/16/26 Page 2 of 3\n\n\n\n\nresponse deadline to August 12, 2026.1\n\n 6. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel agreed to extend XYZies and Viasat\u2019s deadline to respond to the\n\nSAC to August 12, 2026.\n\n 7. Pursuant to the requested and agreed to extension, if granted, Defendant\u2019s new\n\ndeadline to answer, move or otherwise respond to the SAC would be August 12, 2026.\n\n 8. This is the Defendants\u2019 first request for an extension of this deadline.\n\n 9. No other case deadlines will be impacted by the requested extension.\n\n 10. This motion is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.\n\n 11. No party to this action will be unduly prejudiced by the granting of the requested\n\nextension of time, especially as the parties are in agreement. An extension will not impact the\n\ntimely resolution of this matter, or any other deadlines, as this case is still in its early stages.\n\n 12. Thus, Defendants respectfully submits that there is sufficient \u201cgood cause\u201d to grant\n\nthe requested extension, for at least the reasons provided above.\n\n WHEREFORE, for all of the reasons above, Defendants respectfully request that the Court\n\nenter an order extending its deadline to answer, move or otherwise respond to the SAC would be\n\nAugust 12, 2026. A proposed order has been included for the Court\u2019s consideration.\n\n\n\nDated: July 16, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIP, LLP\n 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 600\n Washington, D.C. 20036\n Telephone: 202-585-6500\n jmcguinness@manatt.com\n pheeringa@manatt.com\n\n1\n Although Mr. Samo has not formally entered an appearance in this matter he has agreed to allow his signature on\nthis motion.\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 76 Filed 07/16/26 Page 3 of 3\n\n\n\n\n FREDERICK P. SANTARELLI (PA 53901)\n STEVEN C. TOLLIVER, JR. (PA 327165)\n ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.\n Union Meeting Corporate Center V\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300\n Blue Bell, PA 19422\n (215) 977-1000 (phone)\n FPSantarelli@elliottgreenleaf.com\n sct@elliottgreenleaf.com\n\n Counsel for Defendant Viasat, Inc.\n\n By: /s/ Joe Samo\n\n Counsel for Defendant XYZies\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that, on July 16, 2026, I filed the foregoing electronically through the Court\u2019s\n\nCM/ECF system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means on\n\nall parties and their respective counsel of record.\n\n\n\n\n /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-16T06:36:59.548753-07:00","document_number":"76","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509884642","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Motion for Extension of Time to File","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/486449417/","id":486449417,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/76/1/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-16T06:37:00.969427-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-12T06:59:31.459626-07:00","sha1":"e1e8562768993e456ae6018c326eddd0225e6b5d","page_count":1,"file_size":91324,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.76.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.76.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 76-1 Filed 07/16/26 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and on\n behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n v.\n (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n VIASAT, INC.,\n\n and\n\n THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC.\n d/b/a XYZies\n\n Defendants.\n\n\n ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANTS TO\n FILE RESPONSE TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\n\n This matter, coming to be heard on Defendants \u201cUnopposed Motion to Extend Time for\n\nDefendants to File Response to Second Amended Complaint\u201d (hereafter, the \u201cMotion\u201d), due notice\n\nhaving been given, the Court being fully apprised in the premises thereof, the Motion being\n\nunopposed, and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: (a) the Motion is\n\nGRANTED for the reasons stated therein; and (b) Defendants shall have until August 12, 2026\n\nto answer, move or otherwise respond to the SAC.\n\n SO ORDERED THIS ___ DAY OF ____________, 2026,\n\n\n\n By:___________________________\n\n Hon. Keli M. Neary\n\n United States District Judge\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-16T06:37:03.288601-07:00","document_number":"76","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"15509884643","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-07-16T06:36:59.263228-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-16T06:36:59.267824-07:00","date_filed":"2026-07-16","time_filed":null,"entry_number":76,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-07-16.001","pacer_sequence_number":202,"description":"Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to Second Amended Complaint by The Preferred Prepaid, Inc., ViaSat, Inc.. (Attachments: (1) Proposed Order)(Heeringa, Paul)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/470922366/","id":470922366,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/486313986/","id":486313986,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/75/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-07-15T09:15:07.787292-07:00","date_modified":"2026-08-11T15:20:13.677559-07:00","sha1":"151179436e10b332a5c00a1a201fdba01db03fc9","page_count":5,"file_size":582024,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.75.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.75.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 75 Filed 07/15/26 Page 1 of 5\n\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\nIN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR :\nADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THIS COURT :\n\n PETITION\n\n\n I,\n Kareem Salem , hereby petition the United States District\nCourt for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to admit me to practice before that Court. In\nsupport of my petition, I state as follows:\n\n Office address:\n 12730 High Bluff Drive\n Suite 300\n San Diego, CA 92130\n Office phone: (619) 2058520\n KSalem@manatt.com\n Email Address: ___________________________________________\n I was admitted to practice before the Courts listed below on the date shown after\n the name of each Court, and I am currently a member in good standing of all those Courts.\n\n See attached.\n\n\n\nMy attorney Identification number is: CA 288906\n FOR COURT USE ONLY\n\n GENERAL ADMISSION:\n\n GRANTED BY THE COURT: Date:\n\n SPECIAL ADMISSION:\n\n GRANTED BY THE COURT Date:\n\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 75 Filed 07/15/26 Page 2 of 5\n\n\nPlease Complete the Following:\n\n\n All occasions, if any, on which I have been convicted of a crime (subsequent to my\nbecoming an attorney), censured, suspended, disciplined or disbarred by any court are set\nforth as follows: (State the facts and circumstances connected with each; if none, state\n\u201cnone\u201d.)\nNone\n\n\n\n\n All occasions, if any, on which I have been held in contempt of court are set forth\nas follows: (State the nature and final disposition of contempt; if none, state \u201cnone\u201d.)\nNone\n\n\n\n\n Any disciplinary actions, contempt proceedings, criminal charges, or other\nproceedings in which I am a named party, pending before any court, board, or tribunal:\n(State the facts and circumstances connected with each; if none, state \"none\".)\nNone\n\n\n\n\n I am seeking:\n\n General Admission under Local Rule LR 83.8.1\n \u2714 Special Admission (specify by placing a checkmark in the appropriate\n rule below)\n LR 83.8.2.1 \u2714 , LR 83.8.2.2 , LR 83.8.2.3 , or LR 83.8.2.4\n\nIf seeking special admission under Local Rules LR 83.8.2.1, LR 83.8.2.2, LR 83.8.2.3, or\nLR 83.8.2.4, the basis for my admission under the designated rule is as follows:\n\n\n\n\nNAME THE PARTY YOU REPRESENT:\nDefendant Viasat, Inc.\n\nIf special admission is requested for a particular case, please list case number and caption:\n\nCase # 1:25cv00927KMN\n\nCaption # Asher Bronstin v. Viasat, Inc.\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 75 Filed 07/15/26 Page 3 of 5\n\n\n\n\nI understand that:\n\n 1) If seeking admission under Section LR 83.8.2.2, LR 83.8.2.3, or 83.8.2.4, I\n must submit a letter from a superior stating the agency with which I am\n employed and the duties performed which qualify me for admission under\n those sections.\n\n 2) If petitioning for admission only in a particular case, under Rule LR 83.8.2.1,\n I need no sponsor\u2019s certificate. Any attorney specially admitted under LR\n 83.8.2.1 shall, in each proceeding in which he or she appears, have\n associate counsel who is generally admitted under Local Rule 83.8.1 to\n practice in this court, whose appearance shall also be entered of record and\n upon whom all pleadings, motions, notices, and other papers may be served\n in accordance with any statute or applicable rule. The attendance of any\n such associate counsel upon the hearing of any motion or the taking of any\n testimony shall be sufficient appearance for the party or parties represented\n by such associate counsel. Either the specially admitted attorney or\n associate counsel must be fully prepared to participate in any hearings,\n arguments, conferences, and trials. (See LR 83.9)\n If special admission is requested for a particular case, please list the name,\n address, telephone number and bar identification number of associate\n counsel to be entered of record in the case:\n Steven C. Tolliver, Jr., Esq. (PA Bar No. 327165), Elliot Greenleaf, P.C.\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300, Blue Bell, PA 19422\n Email: sct@elliottgreenleaf.com; Telephone: (215) 977-1023\n\n 3) If seeking general admission under Rule LR 83.8.1, I must be a member of\n the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and have a sponsor who is a\n member in good standing of the Bar of this Court present to move for my\n admission and I must submit the sponsor\u2019s certificate with my petition.\n\n\n SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER\n\n\n (Bar Identification Number and State where admitted)\n\n (Date)\n\nBy signing this petition for admission, I acknowledge that I have read the attached\nMiddle District of Pennsylvania Code of Professional Conduct and agree to subscribe to\nthe standards set forth in the Code.\n\n\n SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER\n\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 75 Filed 07/15/26 Page 4 of 5\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE\n MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT\n\n\n As a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Middle District\nof Pennsylvania, I will strive for the following professional ideal:\n\n1. The rule of law will govern my entire conduct. I will not violate the law or place myself\n above the law.\n\n2. I will treat with civility and respect the lawyers, clients, opposing parties, the court and all\n the officials with whom I work. Professional courtesy is compatible with vigorous\n advocacy and zealous representation. Even though antagonism may be expected by\n my client, it is not part of my duty to my client.\n\n3. I will respect other lawyers' schedules as my own, and will seek agreement on meetings,\n depositions, hearings, and trial dates. A reasonable request for a scheduling\n accommodation should never be unreasonably refused.\n\n4. Communications are lifelines. I will keep the lines open. Telephone calls and\n correspondence are a two-way channel; I will respond to them promptly.\n\n5. I will be punctual in appointments, communications and in honoring scheduled\n appearances. Neglect and tardiness are demeaning to others and to the judicial\n system.\n\n6. I will earnestly attempt to resolve differences through negotiation, expeditiously and\n without needless expense.\n\n7. Procedural rules are necessary to judicial order and decorum. I will be mindful that\n pleadings, discovery processes and motions cost time and money. I will not use them\n heedlessly. If an adversary is entitled to something, I will provide it without unnecessary\n formalities.\n\n8. I will not engage in conduct that brings disorder or disruption to the courtroom. I will\n advise my client and witnesses appearing in court of the proper conduct expected and\n required there and, to the best of my ability, prevent my client and witnesses from\n creating disorder or disruption.\n\n9. Before dates for hearings or trials are set, or if that is not feasible immediately after such\n date has been set, I will attempt to verify the availability of necessary participants and\n witnesses so I can promptly notify the court of any likely problems.\n\n I agree to subscribe to the above\n Code of Professional Conduct:\n\n\n\n Signature of Petitioner\n\n\n\n Updated 4/15/26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 75 Filed 07/15/26 Page 5 of 5\n\n\n\n\nList of Court/Bar Admissions for Kareem Salem, Esq. of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP\n\nCurrent as of July 13, 2026\n\nNo additional attorney ID number, unless noted. All admissions in good standing.\n\n\n\n \u2022 California State (2/11/2013) \u2013 Bar ID # 288906\n \u2022 U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (3/14/2018)\n \u2022 California Central District Court (8/20/2024)\n \u2022 California Southern District Court (4/22/2024)\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-15T09:15:08.265143-07:00","document_number":"75","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509883006","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Petition for Special Admission - Pro Hac Vice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-07-15T09:15:07.738036-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-15T09:15:07.756290-07:00","date_filed":"2026-07-15","time_filed":null,"entry_number":75,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-07-15.001","pacer_sequence_number":199,"description":"PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Kareem Salem on behalf of ViaSat, Inc. Attorney Kareem Salem is seeking special admission Filing fee $ 50, receipt number APAMDC-7496150., filed by on behalf of ViaSat, Inc..(Salem, Kareem)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/468234025/","id":468234025,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483520904/","id":483520904,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/74/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-22T06:47:12.947633-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-23T03:56:25.929912-07:00","sha1":"56a4bff8225ef963c3a8ad667f78651533586679","page_count":2,"file_size":212607,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.74.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.74.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 74 Filed 06/22/26 Page 1 of 2\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n for the\n MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN\n Plaintiff\n Civil Action No.:\n 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n v.\n Hon. Keli M. Neary\n\n VIASAT, INC., ET AL.\n Defendant\n\n\n\n\n SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION\nTo: (Defendant's name and address)\n\n SEE COMPLAINT\n\n\n\n\n A lawsuit has been filed against you.\n\n Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) \u2212\u2212\u2212 or 60\ndays if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States\ndescribed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) \u2212\u2212\u2212 you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached\ncomplaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be\nserved on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are:\n\n Andrew Roman Perrong\n Perrong Law LLC\n 1669 Edgewood Road\n Suite 218\n Yardley, PA 19067\n\n If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in\n the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.\n\n\n\n\n PETER J. WELSH\nCLERK OF COURT\n s/ \u2212 Ingrid B Ritchie\nSignature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk\n\n\nISSUED ON 2026\u221206\u221222 09:45:28, Clerk USDC MDPA\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 74 Filed 06/22/26 Page 2 of 2\n\n Civil Action No.: 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n PROOF OF SERVICE\n\n (This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))\n\n This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) ________________________________\n\n was received by me on (date)___________________.\n\n\n I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)______________________________\n\n ____________________________________on (date)_________________________ ; or\n\n\n I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name)_____________\n\n ______________________________, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,\n\n on (date) _________________ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or\n\n I served the summons on (name of individual)________________________________ , who is\n\n designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)_____________\n\n _____________________________________________ on (date) _______________; or\n\n I returned the summons unexecuted because_______________________________________ ; or\n\n\n Other (specify) :\n\n\n\n My fees are $ ________ for travel and $_________ for services, for a total of $______________.\n\n\n I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.\n\n\n\n ___________________ _______________________________________\n Date Server's Signature\n\n _______________________________________\n Printed name and title\n\n\n\n _______________________________________\n Server's Address\n\nAdditional information regarding attempted service, etc:\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-22T06:47:13.450134-07:00","document_number":"74","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509849091","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Summons Issued","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-22T06:47:12.899988-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-22T06:47:12.909786-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-22","time_filed":null,"entry_number":74,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-22.001","pacer_sequence_number":197,"description":"Summons Issued as to The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. and provided TO ATTORNEY ELECTRONICALLY VIA ECF for service on Defendant(s)in the manner prescribed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (NOTICE TO ATTORNEYS RECEIVING THE SUMMONS ELECTRONICALLY: You must print the summons and the attachment when you receive it in your e-mail and serve the complaint on all defendants in the manner prescribed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). (ibr)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/467989162/","id":467989162,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483264693/","id":483264693,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/73/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-18T07:05:48.120874-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-19T02:53:20.081507-07:00","sha1":"63c19f3f66268393e04eed991dec918c9b198fc1","page_count":2,"file_size":118790,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.73.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.73.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 73 Filed 06/18/26 Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\non behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\nv. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n\nVIASAT, INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n ORDER GRANTING THE PARTIES\u2019 REQUEST TO STAY DISCOVERY\n AND CONTINUE RESPONSE DEADLINE\n\n The Court, having received, reviewed, and considered the parties (\u201cJoint\n\nReport Regarding Discovery Status and Proposed Case Management Deadlines\u201d)\n\nfiled in the above-captioned matter, and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY\n\nORDERED that:\n\n 1. All discovery in this matter shall be stayed until Plaintiff serves Defendant\n\n The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. d/b/a XYZies (\u201cXYZies\u201d) and XYZies files a\n\n responsive pleading to the Second Amended Complaint (\u201cSAC\u201d).\n\n 2. Viasat\u2019s deadline to respond to the SAC shall be extended to the same deadline\n\n applicable to XYZies following service, so that both defendants may respond\n\n on the same schedule.\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 73 Filed 06/18/26 Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n 3. Once a responsive pleading is filed by XYZies and Viasat, discovery\n\n thereafter shall proceed only as to Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims, consistent with\n\n the Court\u2019s bifurcation order (Doc. 36).\n\n 4. Discovery shall remain bifurcated, with a 90-day period of individual\n\n discovery followed by a status conference to set a schedule for any summary\n\n judgment briefing on Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims.\n\n\n\nSO ORDERED THIS 18th DAY OF JUNE, 2026\n\n\n\n /s/ Keli M. Neary\n By:_____________________________\n Hon. Keli M. Neary\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-18T07:05:48.473625-07:00","document_number":"73","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509846599","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-18T07:05:48.089616-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T07:05:48.099619-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-18","time_filed":null,"entry_number":73,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-18.001","pacer_sequence_number":195,"description":"ORDER granting the Parties' Request to Stay Discovery and Continue Response Deadline. Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 6/18/2026. (mw)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/467951735/","id":467951735,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483225656/","id":483225656,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/72/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-17T19:19:45.971430-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T12:39:07.893848-07:00","sha1":"bcea3027b249c1bdc79c823ca46326e0b81bb560","page_count":6,"file_size":198851,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.72.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.72.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72 Filed 06/17/26 Page 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and Case No.\n on behalf of all others similarly situated, 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION\n v. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\n VIASAT INC.\n\n Defendant.\n\n JOINT REPORT REGARDING DISCOVERY STATUS AND\n PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT DEADLINES\n\n Pursuant to the Court\u2019s Order dated June 9, 2026 (ECF No. 69), and the\n\nCourt\u2019s prior Orders, plaintiff Asher Bronstin (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) and defendant Viasat,\n\nInc. (\u201cViasat\u201d) respectfully submit this Joint Report addressing whether discovery\n\nshould remain stayed and the parties\u2019 proposed case management deadlines. For\n\nthe reasons set forth below, the parties propose that the stay be lifted, that\n\ndiscovery be bifurcated, and that the case proceed on the schedule outlined herein.\n\nI. Current Posture of the Case\n\n By its Order of June 9, 2026 (ECF No. 69), the Court granted Plaintiff leave\n\nto file his Second Amended Complaint and directed the Clerk to docket it. The\n\nSecond Amended Complaint adds XYZies as a defendant, asserts a claim for direct\n\nliability against XYZies under the TCPA and asserts a claim against Viasat on a\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72 Filed 06/17/26 Page 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\nvicarious liability. The Court further denied as moot Viasat\u2019s motion to dismiss the\n\nFirst Amended Complaint and denied the parties\u2019 respective motions for sanctions.\n\n XYZies is a newly added defendant that has not yet appeared in this action.\n\nA summons has not yet been issued as to XYZies. Plaintiff will promptly request\n\nthat the Clerk issue a summons as to XYZies and will effect service promptly upon\n\nissuance. Plaintiff anticipates that issuance of the summons, service on XYZies,\n\nand the filing of XYZies\u2019s responsive pleading will require 30-45 days.\n\nII. Whether Discovery Should Remain Stayed\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Position. Plaintiff submits that the stay should be lifted so that\n\nthis matter may move forward toward resolution of any questions surrounding\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s individual claims. XYZies, the entity alleged to have placed the calls at\n\nissue and whose relationship with Viasat lies at the heart of Plaintiff\u2019s vicarious\n\nliability theory, is a central party whose appearance is necessary for the efficient\n\nand complete development of the individual claims. Rather than conduct piecemeal\n\ndiscovery before XYZies appears, Plaintiff proposes that the bifurcated discovery\n\nperiod commence upon XYZies\u2019s filing of its responsive pleading, as set forth in\n\nthe proposed deadlines below. This sequencing avoids duplicative discovery,\n\nconserves party and judicial resources, and ensures that the discovery period is\n\nused productively. Discovery should remain bifurcated and focused on Plaintiff\u2019s\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72 Filed 06/17/26 Page 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\nindividual claims, with class discovery to remain stayed pending the resolution of\n\nthose claims.\n\n Defendant\u2019s Position. Viasat agrees that discovery should remain stayed for\n\nan additional period while Plaintiff serves XYZies and XYZies responds to the\n\nSecond Amended Complaint. Specifically, Viasat proposes that discovery remain\n\nstayed until XYZies files a responsive pleading, and that discovery thereafter\n\nproceed only as to Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims, consistent with the Court\u2019s\n\nbifurcation order. This sequencing will allow the parties to determine whether\n\nmaterials can be exchanged informally in the interim and whether the case can be\n\nnarrowed or resolved without immediate discovery practice. If the stay is lifted after\n\nXYZies responds, discovery should remain bifurcated, with a 90-day period of\n\nindividual discovery followed by a status conference to set a schedule for any\n\nsummary judgment briefing on Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims. Viasat further requests\n\nthat its deadline to respond to the Second Amended Complaint be extended to the\n\nsame deadline applicable to XYZies following service, so that both defendants may\n\nrespond on the same schedule.\n\nIII. Proposed Case Management Deadlines\n\n Subject to the Court\u2019s approval, the parties propose the following case\n\nmanagement schedule:\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72 Filed 06/17/26 Page 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 1. Commencement and Length of Bifurcated Discovery. Consistent\n\nwith the Court\u2019s Order, discovery shall remain bifurcated and focused on\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s individual claims. The bifurcated, individual discovery period shall\n\ncommence on the date XYZies files its response to the Second Amended\n\nComplaint and shall run for ninety days thereafter. The bifurcated discovery period\n\nshall encompass discovery into Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims, including, but not\n\nlimited to, the nature and extent of the relationship between XYZies and Viasat,\n\nand the calls XYZies is alleged to have placed to Plaintiff on behalf of Viasat. The\n\nninety day period shall also be of sufficient length to permit the parties to take no\n\nmore than three depositions per side of no more than four hours each.\n\n 2. Dispositive Motions. At the close of the ninety day discovery period,\n\na party may move for summary judgment on Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims. The\n\nparties respectfully request that the Court hold a status conference at the close of\n\nthe discovery period, at which the parties will present a proposed briefing schedule\n\nfor any motion for summary judgment on the individual claims.\n\n Class discovery shall remain stayed pending the resolution of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nindividual claims, consistent with the Court\u2019s bifurcation of discovery. The parties\n\nwill, in accordance with the Court\u2019s direction, proceed in a professional and\n\ncourteous manner and will disclose potentially relevant information as soon as\n\npracticable for the most efficient resolution of this matter.\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72 Filed 06/17/26 Page 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\nDated: June 15, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n PA Bar #333687\n Perrong Law LLC\n 2657 Mount Carmel Avenue\n Glenside, Pennsylvania 19038\n Phone: 215-225-5529 (CALL-LAW)\n Facsimile: 888-329-0305\n a@perronglaw.com\n Counsel for Plaintiff\n\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n\n John W. McGuinness\n (Pro Hac Vice to be Requested)\n A. Paul Heeringa\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIP, LLP\n 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 600\n Washington, D.C. 20036\n Telephone: 202-585-6500\n jmcguinness@manatt.com\n pheeringa@manatt.com\n\n FREDERICK P. SANTARELLI (PA 53901)\n STEVEN C. TOLLIVER, JR. (PA 327165)\n ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.\n Union Meeting Corporate Center V\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300\n Blue Bell, PA 19422\n (215) 977-1000 (phone)\n FPSantarelli@elliottgreenleaf.com\n sct@elliottgreenleaf.com\n\n Counsel for Defendant Viasat, Inc.\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72 Filed 06/17/26 Page 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that I filed the foregoing via ECF on the below date, which will\n\nautomatically send a copy to all attorneys of record on the case.\n\nDated: June 15, 2026\n\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-06-17T19:19:46.402095-07:00","document_number":"72","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509846255","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Status Report","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/483225657/","id":483225657,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/72/1/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-17T19:19:47.501063-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T12:39:05.463078-07:00","sha1":"c230cf85762f6c7429ff7f10056a354689751fee","page_count":2,"file_size":86612,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.72.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.72.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72-1 Filed 06/17/26 Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\non behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\nv. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n\nVIASAT, INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n ORDER GRANTING THE PARTIES\u2019 REQUEST TO STAY DISCOVERY\n AND CONTINUE RESPONSE DEADLINE\n\n The Court, having received, reviewed, and considered the parties (\u201cJoint\n\nReport Regarding Discovery Status and Proposed Case Management Deadlines\u201d)\n\nfiled in the above-captioned matter, and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY\n\nORDERED that:\n\n 1. All discovery in this matter shall be stayed until Plaintiff serves Defendant\n\n The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. d/b/a XYZies (\u201cXYZies\u201d) and XYZies files a\n\n responsive pleading to the Second Amended Complaint (\u201cSAC\u201d).\n\n 2. Viasat\u2019s deadline to respond to the SAC shall be extended to the same deadline\n\n applicable to XYZies following service, so that both defendants may respond\n\n on the same schedule.\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 72-1 Filed 06/17/26 Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n 3. Once a responsive pleading is filed by XYZies and Viasat, discovery\n\n thereafter shall proceed only as to Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims, consistent with\n\n the Court\u2019s bifurcation order (Doc. 36).\n\n 4. Discovery shall remain bifurcated, with a 90-day period of individual\n\n discovery followed by a status conference to set a schedule for any summary\n\n judgment briefing on Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims.\n\n\n\nSO ORDERED THIS ___ DAY OF ____________, 2026\n\n\n\n By:_____________________________\n Hon. Keli M. Neary\n United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-17T19:19:49.654771-07:00","document_number":"72","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"15509846256","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-17T19:19:45.940933-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-17T19:19:45.948032-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-17","time_filed":null,"entry_number":72,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-17.001","pacer_sequence_number":193,"description":"STATUS REPORT And Proposed Order by Asher Bronstin. (Attachments: (1) Proposed Order)(Perrong, Andrew)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/467510355/","id":467510355,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/482776031/","id":482776031,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/71/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-15T13:49:24.122555-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-18T05:23:59.139814-07:00","sha1":"84cf46a89923f6e2d42667c2b6ca7821a1e5325c","page_count":6,"file_size":184713,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.71.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.71.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 71 Filed 06/15/26 Page 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and Case No.\n on behalf of all others similarly situated, 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION\n v. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\n VIASAT INC.\n\n Defendant.\n\n JOINT REPORT REGARDING DISCOVERY STATUS AND\n PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT DEADLINES\n\n Pursuant to the Court\u2019s Order dated June 9, 2026 (ECF No. 69), and the\n\nCourt\u2019s prior Orders, plaintiff Asher Bronstin (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) and defendant Viasat,\n\nInc. (\u201cViasat\u201d) respectfully submit this Joint Report addressing whether discovery\n\nshould remain stayed and the parties\u2019 proposed case management deadlines. For\n\nthe reasons set forth below, the parties propose that the stay be lifted, that\n\ndiscovery be bifurcated, and that the case proceed on the schedule outlined herein.\n\nI. Current Posture of the Case\n\n By its Order of June 9, 2026 (ECF No. 69), the Court granted Plaintiff leave\n\nto file his Second Amended Complaint and directed the Clerk to docket it. The\n\nSecond Amended Complaint adds XYZies as a defendant, asserts a claim for direct\n\nliability against XYZies under the TCPA and asserts a claim against Viasat on a\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 71 Filed 06/15/26 Page 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\nvicarious liability. The Court further denied as moot Viasat\u2019s motion to dismiss the\n\nFirst Amended Complaint and denied the parties\u2019 respective motions for sanctions.\n\n XYZies is a newly added defendant that has not yet appeared in this action.\n\nA summons has not yet been issued as to XYZies. Plaintiff will promptly request\n\nthat the Clerk issue a summons as to XYZies and will effect service promptly upon\n\nissuance. Plaintiff anticipates that issuance of the summons, service on XYZies,\n\nand the filing of XYZies\u2019s responsive pleading will require 30-45 days.\n\nII. Whether Discovery Should Remain Stayed\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Position. Plaintiff submits that the stay should be lifted so that\n\nthis matter may move forward toward resolution of any questions surrounding\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s individual claims. XYZies, the entity alleged to have placed the calls at\n\nissue and whose relationship with Viasat lies at the heart of Plaintiff\u2019s vicarious\n\nliability theory, is a central party whose appearance is necessary for the efficient\n\nand complete development of the individual claims. Rather than conduct piecemeal\n\ndiscovery before XYZies appears, Plaintiff proposes that the bifurcated discovery\n\nperiod commence upon XYZies\u2019s filing of its responsive pleading, as set forth in\n\nthe proposed deadlines below. This sequencing avoids duplicative discovery,\n\nconserves party and judicial resources, and ensures that the discovery period is\n\nused productively. Discovery should remain bifurcated and focused on Plaintiff\u2019s\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 71 Filed 06/15/26 Page 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\nindividual claims, with class discovery to remain stayed pending the resolution of\n\nthose claims.\n\n Defendant\u2019s Position. Viasat agrees that discovery should remain stayed for\n\nan additional period while Plaintiff serves XYZies and XYZies responds to the\n\nSecond Amended Complaint. Specifically, Viasat proposes that discovery remain\n\nstayed until XYZies files a responsive pleading, and that discovery thereafter\n\nproceed only as to Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims, consistent with the Court\u2019s\n\nbifurcation order. This sequencing will allow the parties to determine whether\n\nmaterials can be exchanged informally in the interim and whether the case can be\n\nnarrowed or resolved without immediate discovery practice. If the stay is lifted after\n\nXYZies responds, discovery should remain bifurcated, with a 90-day period of\n\nindividual discovery followed by a status conference to set a schedule for any\n\nsummary judgment briefing on Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims. Viasat further requests\n\nthat its deadline to respond to the Second Amended Complaint be extended to the\n\nsame deadline applicable to XYZies following service, so that both defendants may\n\nrespond on the same schedule.\n\nIII. Proposed Case Management Deadlines\n\n Subject to the Court\u2019s approval, the parties propose the following case\n\nmanagement schedule:\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 71 Filed 06/15/26 Page 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 1. Commencement and Length of Bifurcated Discovery. Consistent\n\nwith the Court\u2019s Order, discovery shall remain bifurcated and focused on\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s individual claims. The bifurcated, individual discovery period shall\n\ncommence on the date XYZies files its response to the Second Amended\n\nComplaint and shall run for ninety days thereafter. The bifurcated discovery period\n\nshall encompass discovery into Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims, including, but not\n\nlimited to, the nature and extent of the relationship between XYZies and Viasat,\n\nand the calls XYZies is alleged to have placed to Plaintiff on behalf of Viasat. The\n\nninety day period shall also be of sufficient length to permit the parties to take no\n\nmore than three depositions per side of no more than four hours each.\n\n 2. Dispositive Motions. At the close of the ninety day discovery period,\n\na party may move for summary judgment on Plaintiff\u2019s individual claims. The\n\nparties respectfully request that the Court hold a status conference at the close of\n\nthe discovery period, at which the parties will present a proposed briefing schedule\n\nfor any motion for summary judgment on the individual claims.\n\n Class discovery shall remain stayed pending the resolution of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nindividual claims, consistent with the Court\u2019s bifurcation of discovery. The parties\n\nwill, in accordance with the Court\u2019s direction, proceed in a professional and\n\ncourteous manner and will disclose potentially relevant information as soon as\n\npracticable for the most efficient resolution of this matter.\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 71 Filed 06/15/26 Page 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\nDated: June 15, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n PA Bar #333687\n Perrong Law LLC\n 2657 Mount Carmel Avenue\n Glenside, Pennsylvania 19038\n Phone: 215-225-5529 (CALL-LAW)\n Facsimile: 888-329-0305\n a@perronglaw.com\n Counsel for Plaintiff\n\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n\n John W. McGuinness\n (Pro Hac Vice to be Requested)\n A. Paul Heeringa\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIP, LLP\n 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 600\n Washington, D.C. 20036\n Telephone: 202-585-6500\n jmcguinness@manatt.com\n pheeringa@manatt.com\n\n FREDERICK P. SANTARELLI (PA 53901)\n STEVEN C. TOLLIVER, JR. (PA 327165)\n ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.\n Union Meeting Corporate Center V\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300\n Blue Bell, PA 19422\n (215) 977-1000 (phone)\n FPSantarelli@elliottgreenleaf.com\n sct@elliottgreenleaf.com\n\n Counsel for Defendant Viasat, Inc.\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 71 Filed 06/15/26 Page 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that I filed the foregoing via ECF on the below date, which will\n\nautomatically send a copy to all attorneys of record on the case.\n\nDated: June 15, 2026\n\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-06-15T13:49:24.354476-07:00","document_number":"71","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509841464","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Status Report","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-15T13:49:24.093676-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-15T13:49:24.100217-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-15","time_filed":null,"entry_number":71,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-15.001","pacer_sequence_number":191,"description":"STATUS REPORT Joint Report Regarding Discovery Status and Proposed Case Management Deadlines by Asher Bronstin. (Perrong, Andrew)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/467072859/","id":467072859,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/482326858/","id":482326858,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/70/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-11T06:28:23.278814-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-12T03:32:56.236734-07:00","sha1":"502684f7cb71af1f90251466d2668f3bc97f2c20","page_count":19,"file_size":457856,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.70.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.70.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 1 of 19\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and on Case No.\n behalf of all others similarly situated, 1:25-cv-00927\n\n Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION\n\n v. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\n\n VIASAT INC.\n\n and\n\n THE PREFERRED PREPAID, INC.\n d/b/a XYZies\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT\n AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\n\n Plaintiff Asher Bronstin (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d or \u201cMr. Bronstin\u201d) brings this Class Action\n\nComplaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendant ViaSat, Inc. and The Preferred Prepaid,\n\nInc. d/b/a XYZies (\u201cDefendants\u201d) and alleges as follows:\n\n 1. Telemarketing calls are intrusive. A great many people object to these calls,\n\nwhich interfere with their lives, tie up their phone lines, and cause confusion and disruption on\n\nphone records. Faced with growing public criticism of abusive telephone marketing practices,\n\nCongress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105\n\nStat. 2394 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227). As Congress explained, the law was a response\n\nto Americans \u2018outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from\n\ntelemarketers\u2019 id. \u00a7 2(6), and sought to strike a balance between \u2018[i]ndividuals\u2019 privacy rights,\n\npublic safety interests, and commercial freedoms\u2019 id. \u00a7 2(9).\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 2 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 2. \u201cThe law opted for a consumer-driven process that would allow objecting\n\nindividuals to prevent unwanted calls to their homes. The result of the telemarketing regulations\n\nwas the national Do-Not-Call registry. See 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2). Within the federal\n\ngovernment\u2019s web of indecipherable acronyms and byzantine programs, the Do-Not-Call registry\n\nstands out as a model of clarity. It means what it says. If a person wishes to no longer receive\n\ntelephone solicitations, he can add his number to the list. The TCPA then restricts the telephone\n\nsolicitations that can be made to that number. See id.; 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 310.4(b)(iii)(B) (\u2018It is an\n\nabusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for a telemarketer to . . .\n\ninitiat[e] any outbound telephone call to a person when . . . [t]hat person\u2019s telephone number is\n\non the \u201cdo-not-call\u201d registry, maintained by the Commission.\u2019)\u2026Private suits can seek either\n\nmonetary or injunctive relief. Id\u2026This private cause of action is a straightforward provision\n\ndesigned to achieve a straightforward result. Congress enacted the law to protect against\n\ninvasions of privacy that were harming people. The law empowers each person to protect his\n\nown personal rights. Violations of the law are clear, as is the remedy. Put simply, the TCPA\n\naffords relief to those persons who, despite efforts to avoid it, have suffered an intrusion upon\n\ntheir domestic peace.\u201d Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643, 649-50 (4th Cir. 2019).\n\n 3. The Plaintiff brings this action to enforce the consumer-privacy provisions of the\n\nTCPA alleging that the Defendants violated the TCPA by making telemarketing calls to Plaintiff\n\nand other putative class members listed on the National Do Not Call Registry without their\n\nwritten consent, by making telemarketing calls without the accurate provision of Caller ID Name\n\n(CNAM), as well as calling people who had previously asked to no longer receive calls.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 3 of 19\n\n\n\n\n PARTIES\n\n 4. Plaintiff Asher Bronstin is an individual.\n\n 5. Defendant ViaSat Inc., is a Delaware Company which is registered to do business\n\nin Pennsylvania, with its registered agent office address in Dauphin County, which lies within\n\nthis District.\n\n 6. Defendant The Preferred Prepaid, Inc. d/b/a XYZies is a California corporation.\n\n JURISDICTION AND VENUE\n\n 7. This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331 and 47\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 227 et seq.\n\n 8. The Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant ViaSat because it has\n\nregistered to do business in Pennsylvania, thereby consenting to the exercise of general personal\n\njurisdiction in Pennsylvania. This Court has specific jurisdiction over XYZies because it\n\ncontracted with a Pennsylvania Defendant to send calls across the United States.\n\n 9. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1391(b)(2) because a\n\nsubstantial portion of the acts giving rise to the complaint, took place in this District because the\n\ncalls were sent on behalf of a company that is subject to general personal jurisdiction in this\n\nDistrict.\n\n BACKGROUND\n\nA. The TCPA Prohibits Calls to Numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry.\n\n 10. The TCPA prohibits making multiple telemarketing calls to a residential\n\ntelephone number that has previously been registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. See\n\n47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 4 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 11. The National Do Not Call Registry allows consumers to register their telephone\n\nnumbers and thereby indicate their desire not to receive telephone solicitations at those numbers.\n\nSee 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2).\n\n 12. A listing on the National Do Not Call Registry \u201cmust be honored indefinitely, or\n\nuntil the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone number is removed by the\n\ndatabase administrator.\u201d Id.\n\n 13. The TCPA and implementing regulations prohibit the initiation of telephone\n\nsolicitations to residential telephone subscribers on the Registry and provide a private right of\n\naction against any entity that makes those calls, or \u201con whose behalf\u201d such calls are promoted. 47\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5); 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2).\n\nB. The TCPA Also Requires Telemarketers to Transmit Caller Identification\n Information Including the Telemarketer\u2019s Name.\n\n 14. The TCPA requires any \u201cperson or entity that engages in telemarketing\u201d to\n\n\u201ctransmit caller identification information.\u201d 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1601(e).\n\n 15. The relevant regulation defines \u201ccaller identification information\u201d as \u201ceither CPN\n\nor ANI, and, when available by the telemarketer's carrier, the name of the telemarketer.\u201d 47\n\nC.F.R. \u00a7 64.1601(e)(1).\n\n 16. The regulations also require any caller identification information to \u201cinclude\n\neither CPN or ANI\u201d and \u201cpermit any individual to make a do-not-call request during regular\n\nbusiness hours.\u201d Id.\n\n 17. A violation of this subsection of the TCPA is enforceable under the private right\n\nof action provided for under 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5)\u2019s private right of action. Dobronski v.\n\nSelectquote Ins. Servs., No. 2:23-CV-12597, 2025 WL 900439, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25,\n\n2025).\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 5 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 18. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently confirmed that there is a private\n\nright of action for violations of this provision. Newell v. JR Cap., LLC, No. CV 25-1419, 2025\n\nWL 2004706, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2025).\n\n FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS\n 19. The Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a \u201cperson\u201d as defined by\n\n47 U.S.C. \u00a7 153(39).\n\n 20. At no point did the Plaintiff consent to receiving telemarketing calls or text\n\nmessages from either of the Defendants prior to receiving the calls at issue.\n\n 21. Plaintiff\u2019s telephone number, (760) XXX-XXXX, is a residential, non-\n\ncommercial telephone number.\n\n 22. Plaintiff uses the number for personal, residential, and household reasons.\n\n 23. The number is a residential telephone line because it is assigned to a residential\n\ntelephone exchange service for consumers and is not assigned to a telephone exchange service\n\nfor businesses.\n\n 24. Moreover, the telephone line is assigned to a cellular service which is\n\npresumptively residential and was eligible for registration on the National Do Not Call Registry\n\nat the time it was registered.\n\n 25. Plaintiff\u2019s telephone number has been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry\n\nsince he registered it there on February 23, 2021.\n\n 26. Plaintiff has never been a customer of ViaSat.\n\n 27. Despite that fact, the Plaintiff received at least two telemarketing calls from\n\nDefendant XYZies placed on behalf of ViaSat on April 19, 2024.\n\n 28. The first call was made at 2:12 pm from the spoofed caller ID (931) 413-8533 and\n\nlasted one minute and thirty-seven seconds.\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 6 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 29. Caller ID \u201cspoofing\u201d is an illegal practice whereby a caller uses an otherwise\n\nlegitimate Caller ID that is not their own for the purpose of hiding their identity and illegal\n\nactivities.\n\n 30. The subscriber of record of this \u201cspoofed\u201d number is Fibernetics Corporation, as\n\nrevealed through a subpoena to IP Horizon LLC, the telephone carrier of record for the number.\n\n 31. But, because anyone with sufficient technical ability can \u201cspoof\u201d a phone number,\n\nsimply identifying the true subscriber of record for the number at issue, here, Fibernetics\n\nCorporation, will not reveal the actual caller responsible for the calls; only by engaging the caller\n\non the calls will the call recipient be able to ascertain the true identity of the caller.\n\n 32. In other words, simply receiving a call from 570-207-5600 and serving a\n\nsubpoena on the Court\u2019s telephone provider will not show that someone from this Court\u2019s\n\nClerk\u2019s Office actually called in the absence of some other evidence.\n\n 33. During this call, the Plaintiff spoke with an individual who was attempting to sell\n\nViaSat\u2019s internet services in the Plaintiff\u2019s local area, for which the \u201cservice [prices] have been\n\ndropped down in your local area.\u201d\n\n 34. The Plaintiff hung up the call, thereby indicating that he was not interested.\n\n 35. Despite this fact, the Plaintiff received a second call.\n\n 36. The second call was made by the Defendant XYZies at 2:14 pm from the spoofed\n\ncaller ID (530) 235-8385 and lasted twenty-five minutes and twenty-three seconds. This call had\n\nthe same representative as the first call and when Plaintiff answered, the representative stated,\n\n\u201c[Y]our call was declined. I\u2019m sorry. I have my verifier on line. He will assess more\n\ninformation.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 7 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 37. This call, like the first, was also \u201cspoofed.\u201d As revealed through a subpoena to IP\n\nHorizon LLC, the telephone carrier of record for the number, the number was not assigned to\n\nany customer on April 19, 2024, and thus could not possibly have been used to place a legitimate\n\ncall.\n\n 38. This is akin to receiving a call from the caller ID 570-555-1234, a number which\n\ndoes not exist, and when called back, would simply result in a message stating that the number is\n\nout of service.\n\n 39. This \u201cverifier\u201d asked various questions about the Plaintiff\u2019s existing internet\n\nservices and asked the Plaintiff if he was interested in getting \u201ccheaper and better rates\u201d on his\n\ninternet service and if he was \u201cinterested in getting a quote\u201d for \u201cwhat I have right now.\u201d The\n\n\u201cverifier\u201d stated that he would then connect the call to \u201cthe licensed agent in your zip code . . . on\n\nthe line, and they\u2019re going to let you know about what types of promotions are available in your\n\nZIP code and how you can get that.\u201d\n\n 40. The Plaintiff was then transferred to a sales specialist and \u201chome services\n\nadvisor\u201d who confirmed they were calling from ViaSat. This individual quoted a monthly price\n\nof $94.99 for ViaSat\u2019s internet services and stated that the Plaintiff would need to provide a $300\n\ndown payment in advance.\n\n 41. Upon information and belief, this individual is, in fact, a ViaSat employee.\n\n 42. Upon information and belief, the relationship between ViaSat and XYZies on a\n\ncall proceeds in that XYZies places the initial call and pitches the call recipient ViaSat\u2019s\n\nservices, which are then sold by ViaSat itself. If a sale results, ViaSat pays XYZies a\n\ncommission for its efforts in placing the call, getting the caller interested, and then handing the\n\ncall over to ViaSat for ViaSat to ultimately sell.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 8 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 43. Both calls were thus made to sell and attempted to sell the Plaintiff ViaSat\u2019s\n\ninternet services.\n\n 44. To be clear, with the benefit of discovery, it has been revealed that XYZies placed\n\nboth illegal calls with illegally \u201cspoofed\u201d caller IDs, as reflected by the Plaintiff\u2019s call log\n\nscreenshots. These screenshots confirm that the subject calls described in the complaint were\n\nincoming calls to the Plaintiff, not the other way around, that is, calls from the Plaintiff to either\n\nDefendant:\n\n\n\n\n 45. A subpoena to Google Fi, Plaintiff\u2019s telephone company provider, confirmed that\n\nthe calls were \u201cINBOUND\u201d, that is, calls placed to the Plaintiff, with identical durations:\n\n\n\n\n 46. Plaintiff is currently sufficient information to explain why ViaSat\u2019s records show\n\nan inbound call from Plaintiff, but the most logical explanation, with the facts available to\n\nPlaintiff thus far, is that Defendant XYZies placed the subject calls, pitched internet services on\n\nthem, and then transferred the call to ViaSat to complete the sale.\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 9 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 47. The purpose of the Defendants\u2019 calls was to sell the Plaintiff satellite internet\n\nservices.\n\n 48. As a result of the second call, including speaking to the ViaSat employee therein,\n\nPlaintiff received an email from Defendant ViaSat, attached herein as Exhibit A, and his card\n\nattempted to be charged for Defendant ViaSat\u2019s services, which were attempted to be sold on the\n\ncall. The Plaintiff ultimately was not charged and did not complete the purchase.\n\n 49. A copy of the full email, with the Plaintiff\u2019s email address redacted, is attached\n\nherein as Exhibit A. Below is a copy of the declined charge:\n\n\n\n\n 50. With the benefit of discovery and identification of XYZies, the Plaintiff alleges\n\ndirect liability as to XYZies and vicarious liability as to ViaSat here. Discovery has revealed that\n\nwhat most probably occurred here was that XYZies placed the calls for which ViaSat is\n\nvicariously liable, including because ViaSat\u2019s goods and services were offered on the call, the\n\nindividuals all spoke as though they were calling from ViaSat, or various offices and\n\ndepartments therein (instead of XYZies, whose identity was only revealed after the Court\n\ncompelled discovery into the name of the vendor that ViaSat claims to have received an inbound\n\ncall from), and pitched ViaSat\u2019s internet services and only ViaSat\u2019s internet services. No other\n\ncompany names or other goods or services were mentioned or pitched on the calls, including any\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 10 of 19\n\n\n\n\nother company\u2019s internet services. And none of the callers at all indicated that they were calling\n\nfrom any third party entity, including XYZies. From the Plaintiff\u2019s perspective, the call\n\ncampaign was a ViaSat calling campaign from start to finish.\n\n 51. The calls all came from the following numbers, which transmitted the caller ID, in\n\nthe form of both CPN and ANI as \u201cspoofed\u201d or potentially \u201cspoofed\u201d numbers. Counsel for the\n\nPlaintiff has access to \u201cdip\u201d the Caller ID database of the calling carrier to ascertain the CNAM\n\ninformation to ascertain (1) whether caller name delivery (CNAM) is available with the\n\nDefendant\u2019s calling carrier, and (2) whether such CNAM information contained the name of the\n\ntelemarketer. The results of those dips are as follows:\n\n\n Number (Spoofed) Date CNAM CNAM Result Carrier\n Avail?\n 9314138533 19/04/2024 Y CUNNINGHAM TN IP Horizon\n\n 5302358385 19/04/2024 Y DUNSMUIR CA IP Horizon\n 52. As the aforementioned chart shows, the CNAM transmitted by the telephone\n\ncarrier, IP Horizon, provided CNAM functionality, but provided inaccurate CNAM functionality,\n\ntransmitting a geographic location instead of the caller\u2019s name.\n\n 53. Indeed, the Defendant XYZies spoofed the numbers to further hide its identity.\n\n 54. With respect to each of the numbers listed above, none of the numbers permit a\n\ncaller to call the number and lodge a do not call request during regular business hours, because\n\nthey are spoofed to unrelated third-party phone numbers. It is not possible to call any of those\n\nnumbers back to lodge a Do Not Call request during regular business hours.\n\n 55. Nor will anybody texting or calling those telephone numbers receive an alternate\n\nnumber to call to lodge a Do Not Call request during regular business hours.\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 11 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 56. Defendant ViaSat ratified XYZies conduct by accepting the lead and referrals\ngenerated as a result of XYZies\u2019 illegal telemarketing conduct for some of the calls at issue.\n\n 57. For more than twenty years, the FCC has explained that its \u201crules generally\nestablish that the party on whose behalf a solicitation is made bears ultimate responsibility for\nany violations.\u201d In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection\nAct, 10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 12397 \u00b6 13 (1995).\n 58. In 2008, the FCC likewise held that a company on whose behalf a telephone call\nis made bears the responsibility for any violations.\n 59. The FCC has instructed that sellers such as ViaSat may not avoid liability by\noutsourcing telemarketing to third parties, such as XYZies:\n [A]llowing the seller to avoid potential liability by outsourcing its telemarketing activities\n to unsupervised third parties would leave consumers in many cases without an effective\n remedy for telemarketing intrusions. This would particularly be so if the telemarketers\n were judgment proof, unidentifiable, or located outside the United States, as is often the\n case. Even where third-party telemarketers are identifiable, solvent, and amenable to\n judgment, limiting liability to the telemarketer that physically places the call would make\n enforcement in many cases substantially more expensive and less efficient, since\n consumers (or law enforcement agencies) would be required to sue each marketer\n separately in order to obtain effective relief. As the FTC noted, because \u201csellers may have\n thousands of \u2018independent\u2019 marketers, suing one or a few of them is unlikely to make a\n substantive difference for consumer privacy.\u201d\nIn re DISH Network, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574, 6588 \u00b6 37 (2013) (cleaned up).\n\n 60. In 2013, the FCC held that a corporation or other entity that contracts out its\ntelephone marketing \u201cmay be held vicariously liable under federal common law principles of\nagency for violations of either section 227(b) or section 227(c) that are committed by third-party\ntelemarketers.\u201d Id. at 6574 \u00b6 1.\n 61. ViaSat is liable for any telemarketing calls placed by XYZies and transferred to\nand using ViaSat\u2019s name to generate customers for ViaSat, including the Plaintiff.\n 62. ViaSat was interested in hiring a lead generator that could make phone calls to\npotential customers, vet potential clients, and work up deals by taking advantage of an\n\noutsourced qualification and advertising process, including doing all the initial gruntwork and\n\n\n\n 11\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 12 of 19\n\n\n\n\nqualification so that ViaSat could ultimately sell its products and services directly on the same\ncall.\n\n 63. To do so, it hired XYZies to orchestrate an en masse telemarketing campaign that\nincentivized them to work up interested customer deals that met ViaSat\u2019s criteria.\n 64. To that end, the indicia of the calls, and the questions asked, including the\ncustomer\u2019s budget, whether they had existing internet service, and service area, were, upon\ninformation and belief, all criteria that ViaSat instructed XYZies to inquire of and only sell them\nleads that met those criteria.\n 65. ViaSat controlled the day-to-day activities of XYZies by allowing them to work\nup such deals on their behalf before closing them itself.\n 66. ViaSat also could have prohibited XYZies from generating leads based on calls\nplaced to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry, let alone using highly-illegal spoofed caller ID\ninformation.\n 67. It did not.\n 68. Finally, ViaSat could have terminated XYZies once it learned of XYZies\u2019s illegal\nmarketing conduct.\n 69. It did not. In fact, upon information and belief, ViaSat continues to work with\nXYZies, proudly listing itself as a ViaSat \u201cauthorized retailer\u201d to this day on its website:\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 13 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 70. A reasonable seller would investigate into the reasons why their marketer would\n\nbe calling numbers using highly illegal calls to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry.\n 71. It did not.\n 72. ViaSat hired XYZies without a proper investigation and did not terminate them\nwhen they were informed of XYZies\u2019s illegal calling conduct.\n 73. As such, they knowingly ratified XYZies\u2019s conduct.\n 74. ViaSat accepted the Plaintiff\u2019s lead and then utilized it for a benefit by continuing\nto promote its services to him.\n 75. The 2013 FCC ruling holds that called parties may obtain \u201cevidence of these\nkinds of relationships . . . through discovery, if they are not independently privy to such\ninformation.\u201d In re DISH Network, 28 FCC Rcd. 6592-93 \u00b6 46. Evidence of circumstances\npointing to apparent authority on behalf of the telemarketer \u201cshould be sufficient to place upon\nthe seller the burden of demonstrating that a reasonable consumer would not sensibly assume\nthat the telemarketer was acting as the seller\u2019s authorized agent.\u201d Id. at 6593 \u00b6 46.\n 76. The calls were unwanted.\n 77. The calls were nonconsensual encounters.\n 78. Plaintiff\u2019s privacy has been repeatedly violated by the above-described\ntelemarketing calls.\n 79. Plaintiff never provided his consent or requested the calls.\n 80. Plaintiff and the Classes have been harmed by the acts of Defendants because\ntheir privacy has been violated and they were annoyed and harassed. In addition, the calls\noccupied their telephone lines, storage space, and bandwidth, rendering them unavailable for\nlegitimate communication, including while driving, working, and performing other critical tasks.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 14 of 19\n\n\n\n\n CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS\n 81. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if\n\nfully stated herein.\n 82. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following classes (the\n\u201cClasses\u201d) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.\n\n\n National DNC Class: All persons in the United States whose (1)\n telephone numbers were on the National Do Not Call Registry for\n at least 31 days, (2) but who received more than one telemarketing\n call from or on behalf of Defendants encouraging the purchase of\n goods or services, (3) within a 12-month period (4) at any time in\n the period that begins four years before the date of filing this\n Complaint to trial.\n\n ViaSat National DNC SubClass: All persons in the United\n States whose (1) telephone numbers were on the National Do\n Not Call Registry for at least 31 days, (2) but who received\n more than one telemarketing call from or on behalf of\n Defendants encouraging the purchase of ViaSat\u2019s goods or\n services, (3) within a 12-month period (4) at any time in the\n period that begins four years before the date of filing this\n Complaint to trial.\n\n Telemarketing Caller ID Class: All persons within the United\n States to whom: (1) Defendants (or a third-party acting on behalf of\n Defendants) sent (2) two or more telemarketing calls in a 12-month\n period, (3) which either (a) did not transmit caller identification\n information that included either CPN or ANI and the Defendants\u2019 or\n telemarketer\u2019s name, (b) did not transmit a valid CPN or ANI at all,\n or (c) transmitted a CPN or ANI that would not have allowed an\n individual to make a do not call request during regular business\n hours, (4) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint.\n\n 83. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown but based on the\n\nen masse nature of telemarketing is believed to be at least hundreds of persons at this time, and\n\nindividual joinder in this case is impracticable. Class members can be easily identified through\n\nDefendants\u2019 records, or those of their agents.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 15 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 84. Typicality: Plaintiff\u2019s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members in\n\nthat Plaintiff, and Class members, sustained damages arising out of Defendants\u2019 telemarketing\n\ncalls and Class members sustained similar injuries and damages as a result of Defendants\u2019\n\nuniform illegal conduct.\n\n 85. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests\n\nof the Classes and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions to\n\nvigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict\n\nwith, or are antagonistic to those of, the Classes, and Defendants have no defenses unique to\n\nPlaintiff.\n\n 86. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact\n\ncommon to the claims of Plaintiff and members of the Classes, and those questions predominate\n\nover any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the\n\nClasses include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:\n\n a. Whether Defendants obtained \u201cprior express invitation or permission\u201d\n\nunder the TCPA, before the calls at issue;\n\n b. whether Defendants transmitted CPN or ANI and either Defendant\u2019s name\n\nin the caller ID information, when provided as an option by their telephone carrier, to Plaintiff\n\nand members of the Telemarketing Caller ID Class;\n\n c. Whether Defendants have established and implemented, with due care,\n\nreasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of\n\nthe TCPA\u2019s do-not-call regulations; and\n\n d. Damages, including whether any violations were performed willfully or\n\nknowingly, such that Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to treble damages under\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 16 of 19\n\n\n\n\n47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\n\n 87. Superiority: Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and\n\nefficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large\n\nnumber of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum\n\nsimultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous\n\nindividual actions would entail. There are hundreds of Class members in each class, such that\n\njoinder of all members is impracticable.\n\n 88. In addition to satisfying the prerequisites of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), Plaintiff\n\nsatisfies the requirements for maintaining a class action under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) because:\n\n a. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual Class members\n\nwould create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication which would establish incompatible\n\nstandards of conduct for Defendants;\n\n b. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would\n\ncreate a risk of adjudications with respect to them which would, as a practical matter, be\n\ndispositive of the interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or\n\nsubstantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;\n\n c. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to\n\nthe proposed Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief or declaratory relief herein\n\nappropriate with respect to the proposed Classes as a whole; and\n\n d. Questions of law or fact common to the members of the Classes\n\npredominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is\n\nsuperior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 17 of 19\n\n\n\n\n COUNT I\n Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227\n (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the National DNC Class)\n\n 89. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth\n\nin the preceding paragraphs.\n\n 90. It is a violation of the TCPA to initiate any telephone solicitation to a residential\n\ntelephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the National Do Not Call\n\nRegistry. 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(c)(2).\n\n 91. Defendants, or any of its affiliates, agents, or other persons or entities acting on\n\nDefendants\u2019 behalf or involved in the conduct at issue, as may be further uncovered or developed\n\nthrough discovery, violated the TCPA by causing multiple telephone solicitation calls to be\n\ninitiated to Plaintiff and members of the National DNC Class in a 12-month period, despite the\n\nperson\u2019s registration of his or her telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry.\n\n 92. These violations were willful or knowing.\n\n 93. As a result of Defendants\u2019, or any possible other affiliates, agents, or other persons\n\nor entities acting on Defendants\u2019 behalf, as discovery may reveal, violations of the TCPA\u2019s\n\nnational do-not-call rule, Plaintiff and members of the National DNC Class are each entitled to an\n\ninjunction and up to $500 in damages for each such violation. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\n\n 94. Because such violations were willful or knowing, the Court should treble the\n\namount of statutory damages, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\n\n COUNT II\n Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227\n (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Telemarketing Caller ID Class)\n\n 95. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth\n\nin the preceding paragraphs.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 18 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 96. It is a violation of the TCPA to make a telemarketing call without the transmission\n\nof caller identification information including either a CPN or ANI and, when available by the\n\ntelemarketer\u2019s carrier, the name of the telemarketer. 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1601(e)(1).\n\n 97. It is a violation of the TCPA to transmit a CPN or ANI that does not allow any\n\nindividual to make a do-not-call request during regular business hours. 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1601(e)(1).\n\n 98. Defendants, and any possible other affiliates, agents, or other persons or entities\n\nacting on Defendants\u2019 behalf, as discovery may reveal, violated the TCPA by causing multiple\n\ntelemarketing calls to be initiated to Plaintiff and members of the Telemarketing Caller ID Class\n\nin a 12-month period, without transmitting the name of the telemarketer, despite such option for\n\ntransmission of accurate CNAM information being available by its carrier, and without\n\ntransmitting a Caller ID that would permit a call recipient to make a do not call request during\n\nregular business hours.\n\n 99. These violations were willful or knowing.\n\n 100. As a result of Defendants\u2019, or any possible other affiliates, agents, or other persons\n\nor entities acting on Defendants\u2019 behalf, as discovery may reveal, violations of the TCPA\u2019s\n\ntelemarketing Caller ID transmission requirement, Plaintiff and members of the Telemarketing\n\nCaller ID are each entitled to an injunction and up to $500 in damages for each such violation. 47\n\nU.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\n\n 101. Because such violations were willful or knowing, the Court should treble the\n\namount of statutory damages, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\n\n PRAYER FOR RELIEF\n WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Classes, respectfully request\n\nthat the Court enter judgment against Defendants for:\n\n A. Certification of the Classes as alleged herein;\n\n\n 18\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 70 Filed 06/11/26 Page 19 of 19\n\n\n\n\n B. Appointment of Plaintiff as representative of the Classes;\n\n C. Appointment of the undersigned as counsel for the Classes;\n\n D. Damages to Plaintiff and members of the Class pursuant to 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5);\n\n E. Injunctive relief for Plaintiff and members of the Class, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. \u00a7\n\n227(c)(5), preventing the Defendants from making calls to numbers listed on the National Do Not\n\nCall Registry, or while failing to transmit the caller ID information required by law;\n\n F. Attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, as permitted by law; and\n\n G. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\n DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\n\n Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-11T06:28:23.771812-07:00","document_number":"70","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509835277","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Amended Complaint","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-11T06:28:23.246712-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-11T06:28:23.255598-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-11","time_filed":null,"entry_number":70,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-11.001","pacer_sequence_number":188,"description":"SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Asher Bronstin.(mw)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/466848178/","id":466848178,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/482097416/","id":482097416,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/69/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-09T13:02:28.140033-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-10T06:09:43.748115-07:00","sha1":"21cd1319da2e65a4e3a395f201be1b448e874823","page_count":2,"file_size":118721,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.69.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.69.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 69 Filed 06/09/26 Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-927\non behalf of all others similarly :\nsituated, : (Judge Neary)\n :\n Plaintiff :\n :\n v. :\n :\nVIASAT, INC., :\n :\n Defendant :\n\n ORDER\n\n AND NOW, this 9th day of June, 2026, upon consideration of plaintiff Asher\n\nBronstin\u2019s motion (Doc. 49) for leave to file an amended complaint, and the motions\n\n(Docs. 57, 61) for sanctions filed by Bronstin and defendant Viasat, Inc., and for the\n\nreasons given in the court\u2019s memorandum of today\u2019s date, it is hereby ORDERED\n\nthat:\n\n 1. Bronstin\u2019s motion for leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. 49) is\n GRANTED.\n\n 2. The Clerk of Court shall docket the proposed amended complaint (Doc.\n 49-1) as the Second Amended Complaint.\n\n 3. Viasat\u2019s motion (Doc. 23) to dismiss the First Amended Complaint is\n DENIED as moot due to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.\n\n 4. The parties\u2019 dueling motions (Docs. 57, 61) for sanctions are DENIED.\n\n 5. The parties are instructed to proceed in this litigation in a professional\n and courteous manner, including by disclosing potentially relevant\n information as soon as practical for the most efficient resolution of this\n case.\n\fCase 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 69 Filed 06/09/26 Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n6. Discovery in this matter, when it resumes, shall remain bifurcated,\n with the current stage of litigation focused on Bronstin\u2019s individual\n claims, rather than potential class claims.\n\n7. Pursuant to the court\u2019s prior order, (Doc. 51), the parties shall jointly\n report whether discovery should remain stayed and whether the court\n should set new case management deadlines within seven (7) days of\n this order. The parties shall include recommended case management\n deadlines if applicable.\n\n /S/ KELI M. NEARY\n Keli M. Neary\n United States District Judge\n Middle District of Pennsylvania\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-09T13:02:28.408428-07:00","document_number":"69","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509832950","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion to Amend/Correct","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-09T13:02:28.092101-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-09T13:02:28.107925-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-09","time_filed":null,"entry_number":69,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-09.001","pacer_sequence_number":183,"description":"ORDER (Memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry) - it is hereby ORDERED that Bronstin's motion for leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. 49) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall docket the proposed amended complaint (Doc. 49-1) as the Second Amended Complaint. Viasat's motion (Doc. 23) to dismiss the First Amended Complaint is DENIED as moot due to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. The parties' dueling motions (Docs. 57, 61) for sanctions are DENIED. SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS. Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 6/9/2026 (mw)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/466848156/","id":466848156,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/482097392/","id":482097392,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/68/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-06-09T12:59:31.578499-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-09T04:01:17.161996-07:00","sha1":"f6251bf50c6ee0ffcc193c608365deb12a35ea65","page_count":8,"file_size":123752,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.68.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.68.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 1 of 8\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-927\non behalf of all others similarly :\nsituated, : (Judge Neary)\n :\n Plaintiff :\n :\n v. :\n :\nVIASAT, INC., :\n :\n Defendant :\n\n MEMORANDUM\n\n Litigation often involves important personal issues and significant amounts\n\nof money. This is why it is not a surprise that some cases can be highly emotional\n\nfor everyone involved. Still, as stewards of the process, lawyers are expected to be\n\ncourteous, collaborative, and maintain a high level of professionalism. It is\n\nincredibly rare that parties cannot foster a working relationship sufficient to\n\ncooperatively marshal cases through the federal system. This case presents that\n\nrare instance and should not be modeled by others.\n\n For a case about unwanted marketing calls, it is unclear why passions have\n\nrisen so high between the parties. Although the parties\u2019 conduct has unnecessarily\n\ncomplicated this matter, the court will resolve the numerous pending motions\n\naccording to the governing legal standards. The court finds allowing an amended\n\ncomplaint would not be futile and so will allow this case to continue. The dueling\n\nmotions for sanctions, however, will be denied.\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 2 of 8\n\n\n\n\n I. Procedural and Factual Background\n\n Despite being on the no-call registry, plaintiff Asher Bronstin alleges agents\n\nfor defendant ViaSat, Inc. called him twice, trying to market Viasat\u2019s services. (Doc.\n\n49-1 \u00b6\u00b6 20, 25, 43, 50). Because of these unwanted calls, Bronstin brought this\n\nputative class action. In a prior order, the court bifurcated discovery, having the\n\nparties focus only on Bronstin\u2019s individual claim before delving into possible class\n\ncertification. (Doc. 36).\n\n At the same time, Viasat had filed a motion to dismiss this case. (Doc. 23). An\n\nassociate director for the company claims it does not place outgoing calls to market\n\nits services and expressly forbids its contractors from doing so on its behalf. (Doc.\n\n23-1 \u00b6\u00b6 2, 9). Further, the company argued Bronstin did not actually receive the\n\ncalls in question and that the complaint did not adequately plead direct liability as\n\nto Viasat. (Doc. 24 at 9-14).\n\n After briefing had completed on this motion, Bronstin filed a motion (Doc. 49)\n\nto file an amended complaint. In it, Bronstin argued that with the benefit of the\n\ndiscovery conducted thus far, his theory of the case had changed. Per this new\n\ntheory, a new defendant company, XYZies, called Bronstin and then transferred\n\nhim to Viasat. (Doc. 52 at 2). In his proposed amended complaint, Bronstin argues\n\nfor direct liability as to XYZies and vicarious liability as to Viasat. (Doc. 49-1 \u00b6 50).\n\nIt appears Viasat acknowledges XYZies is one of its contractors. (Doc. 64 at 15).\n\n Further, the parties now appear to agree that Bronstin received two calls on\n\nApril 19, 2024. (See Doc. 44). In the second call on April 19, 2024, Bronstin was\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 3 of 8\n\n\n\n\ntransferred from the person who initially called him to another entity. (Doc. 44-2 at\n\n2:17-24). After the transfer, Bronstin attempted to figure out who he was speaking\n\nto and the person on the other end of the line responded, \u201cViasat Authorized\n\nRetailer.\u201d (Id. at 9:18). The other individual then continues, saying \u201cWe are Viasat.\u201d\n\n(Id. at 9:22).\n\n Shortly after Bronstin filed his motion for leave to file an amended complaint,\n\nViasat filed a motion for sanctions. Among Viasat\u2019s gripes was that Bronstin did not\n\ndisclose the call recordings at the heart of this case until November 20, 2025, almost\n\nsix months after this case was filed. (Doc. 58 at 6). Bronstin retaliated with his own\n\nmotion for sanctions. He defended not disclosing the calls earlier by saying neither\n\nparty met the joint deadline of August 1, 2025, for initial disclosures. (Doc. 64 at\n\n15). He further complained about Viasat not disclosing its relationship with XYZies\n\nfor several months as well. (Doc. 62 at 7).\n\n II. Standards of Review\n\n Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave to amend should be freely\n\ngiven \u201cwhen justice so requires.\u201d FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). In the seminal case of\n\nFoman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States\n\nprovided guidance for when leave to amend may be denied. The circumstances that\n\nweigh against granting leave include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive,\n\nrepeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue\n\nprejudice to the opposing party, and futility. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Amendment is\n\nconsidered futile if the pleading, \u201cas amended, would fail to state a claim upon\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 4 of 8\n\n\n\n\nwhich relief could be granted.\u201d In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA\n\nLitig., 493 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.\n\nLitig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)). Rule 15 aims to offer \u201cthe maximum\n\nopportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural\n\ntechnicalities.\u201d United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 435 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations\n\nomitted).\n\n Whether to impose sanctions under Rule 11 is committed to a district court\u2019s\n\ndiscretion. See Scott v. Vantage Corp., 64 F.4th 462, 471-72 (3d Cir. 2023). \u201c[T]he\n\ncentral purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court . . . .\u201d Cooter &\n\nGell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). \u201cIn assessing compliance with\n\nRule 11, courts must apply an objective standard of reasonableness, assessing a\n\nparty\u2019s or attorneys\u2019 conduct based on what was reasonable to believe at the time\n\nthe complaint was submitted. In other words, courts should avoid the wisdom of\n\nhindsight when conducting Rule 11 inquiries.\u201d Scott, 64 F.4th at 473 (cleaned up).\n\n III. Discussion\n\n The court begins with Bronstin\u2019s motion to file an amended complaint. When\n\nopposing the first two complaints, it was Viasat\u2019s position that Bronstin did not\n\nreceive the calls forming the basis of this lawsuit. (Doc. 24 at 4-5). That was the\n\nbasis for its motion to dismiss for lack of standing. However, discovery has\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 5 of 8\n\n\n\n\nconfirmed that Bronstin did, in fact, receive two calls. (Docs. 44-1, 44-2). Therefore,\n\nthere can be no question he has suffered an injury in fact.\n\n With an injury in fact established, Viasat argues Bronstin has failed to meet\n\nthe traceability requirement of standing. In this way, its arguments on standing\n\nmore or less merge with its arguments on why Bronstin\u2019s proposed amended\n\ncomplaint fails to state a claim: it argues Bronstin has not established Viasat\u2019s\n\nliability in this case. (Doc. 56 at 5-8).\n\n At this stage in the litigation, all Bronstin has to do is offer a plausible\n\naccount of how Viasat violated the TCPA and harmed him. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556\n\nU.S. 662, 678 (2009); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (requiring\n\nthat standing must be established \u201cwith the manner and degree of evidence\n\nrequired at the successive stages of the litigation.\u201d).\n\n Bronstin clears this threshold. Someone called him, and, after a transfer by\n\nthat initial individual, a new person told Bronstin, \u201cWe are Viasat, but we are an\n\nauthorized retailer of them.\u201d (Doc. 44-2 at 9:22-23). Viasat\u2019s contention that \u201cno\n\ncaller identifies themselves as Viasat\u201d is plainly untrue. (Doc. 56 at 6). Moreover,\n\nBronstin\u2019s proposed amended complaint premises its claims against Viasat on\n\nvicarious liability. (Doc. 49-1 \u00b6 50). Thus, to the extent there is daylight between\n\nsaying an organization is not the entity, but an authorized retailer of such entity,\n\nthat is sufficient\u2014at the pleading stage\u2014to have the case proceed on a vicarious\n\nliability theory.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 6 of 8\n\n\n\n\n The court is aware Viasat strongly disagrees with the notion it violated the\n\nTCPA. And it does not discount the declaration from its associate director stating\n\nthe company does not place outgoing calls to market its services and expressly\n\nforbids its contractors from doing so on its behalf. (Doc. 23-1 \u00b6\u00b6 2, 9). However, \u201ca\n\nwell-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual\n\nproof of those facts is improbable, and \u2018that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.\u2019\u201d\n\nBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes,\n\n416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). This is not to say the court deems recovery remote in this\n\ncase, but simply the burden on Bronstin at this point is quite light.\n\n Finally, the court will continue to impose some restraints to control costs in\n\nthis litigation. Though this action began as a putative class action, the court already\n\nbifurcated discovery to focus on the claims of the named plaintiff. (Doc. 36). The\n\ncourt stands by that decision and before turning to the potential class action aspect\n\nof this case, Bronsin will first be required to show that he, himself as the named\n\nplaintiff, has a triable case against Viasat. But for now, Bronstin\u2019s motion to file an\n\namended complaint will be granted.\n\n Turning to the next issue, both parties claim the other has committed\n\nsanctionable conduct. The core of Viasat\u2019s argument is that the call recordings show\n\nthe case is meritless. (Doc. 58 at 1-2). Given the court finds Bronstin\u2019s proposed\n\namended complaint states a viable claim, Viasat\u2019s motion must therefore be denied;\n\na viable complaint cannot be frivolous. Again, discovery could very well prove Viasat\n\nhas no connection to this case. But at this moment, the recordings show someone\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 7 of 8\n\n\n\n\nclaiming to be an authorized retailer of Viasat attempting to sell services as a result\n\nof a call which Bronstin did not place. That factual basis gives rise to a plausible\n\nclaim, and so Viasat\u2019s request for sanctions will be denied.\n\n Turning to Bronstin, he requests sanctions as a result of Viasat\u2019s motion for\n\nsanctions. Specifically, he argues the Viasat\u2019s motion rests on a \u201cfalse narrative\u201d\n\nbecause the limited discovery has shown Viasat has some relationship with XYZies\n\nand that, contrary to Viasat\u2019s original claims, Bronstin never called Viasat. (Doc. 61\n\nat 1-2). Neither of those arguments are convincing.\n\n To the extent Bronstin complains about Viasat hiding its relationship with\n\nXYZies, such an accusation rings hollow when Bronstin did much the same with the\n\ncall recordings in this case. The point of discovery is to reduce litigation costs, and\n\nsometimes that is accomplished by sharing potentially inculpatory evidence with\n\nthe opposing side. The court is disappointed in both parties\u2019 reluctance to share\n\ncrucial information in this case.\n\n Regardless, at this point, the evidence presently before the court does not\n\nestablish objective unreasonableness by Viasat. Its position is that the company\n\ndoes not call others, and it prohibits its contractors from doing so on its behalf. Not\n\neven Bronstin contends Viasat called him at this point and, to the extent XYZies is\n\nresponsible for calling him in violation of the TCPA, it is still possible that entity\n\ndid so without Viasat\u2019s knowledge or consent. Bronstin\u2019s motion effectively assumes\n\nhe has proven Viasat is liable for the claims asserted in the proposed amended\n\ncomplaint. That is far from certain at this juncture. Viasat\u2019s theory of the case is\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 68 Filed 06/09/26 Page 8 of 8\n\n\n\n\nwell-within the bounds of reasonableness at this stage in the litigation and not\n\ngrounds for sanctions.\n\n IV.Conclusion\n\n The bar for stating a viable claim, while not nothing, is also not very\n\ndemanding. Bronstin\u2019s proposed amended complaint clears that threshold, and so\n\nthis case will be allowed to continue. As for both parties\u2019 requests for sanctions, the\n\ncourt finds neither party has lived up to standards all lawyers should strive for. At\n\nthe same time, the court declines to issue sanctions and cautions the parties against\n\nsimilar finger-pointing cross-filings in the future.\n\n\n /S/ KELI M. NEARY\n Keli M. Neary\n United States District Judge\n Middle District of Pennsylvania\n\nJune 9th, 2026\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-06-09T12:59:31.988266-07:00","document_number":"68","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509832943","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-09T12:59:31.538631-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-09T04:01:17.095592-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-09","time_filed":null,"entry_number":68,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-09.001","pacer_sequence_number":181,"description":"MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 6/9/2026. (mw)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/462304928/","id":462304928,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/477416557/","id":477416557,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/67/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-28T20:35:24.896322-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.641476-07:00","sha1":"1d555284e343ca8ab325332bf52f3acaccf54fc2","page_count":24,"file_size":228787,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.67.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.67.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 1 of 24\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and Case No.\non behalf of all others similarly situated, 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION\nv. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\nVIASAT INC.\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS\n\n AGAINST DEFENDANT AND ITS COUNSEL\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 2 of 24\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\nINTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 4\n A. ViaSat\u2019s \u201cLimited Information\u201d Defense Cannot Excuse Affirmative Sworn\n Misrepresentations It Voluntarily Made. ............................................................... 4\n B. ViaSat\u2019s Effort to Reduce the Motion to \u201cCall-Routing Semantics\u201d\n Mischaracterizes the Record and the Misrepresentations at Issue. ...................... 12\n C. ViaSat\u2019s Rule 11(d) Argument Is Misdirection. The Sanctionable Conduct Is\n in ViaSat\u2019s Court Filings, Not Its Discovery Responses. .................................... 14\n D. The Recordings Do Not Rehabilitate ViaSat\u2019s Misrepresentations. ............. 16\n E. ViaSat\u2019s Amendment Defense to Its Sanctions Motion Inverts the Causal\n Chain. ................................................................................................................... 19\n F. Inherent Authority Is Properly Before the Court. ......................................... 20\nCONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 21\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nIn re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 162 F.R.D. 46 (D.V.I.) .............................. 20\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 3 of 24\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n ViaSat\u2019s Opposition rests on a single, much-repeated refrain: that its sworn\n\nfactual misrepresentations were \u201caccurate and based on the limited information\n\navailable to it at the time.\u201d (Oppn. at 8.) That refrain cannot bear the weight\n\nViaSat asks it to bear.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s Opposition contains a self-defeating admission that, by itself,\n\nwarrants sanctions. To salvage the \u201cinbound call\u201d representation it placed at the\n\nheart of its first motion to dismiss, ViaSat\u2019s Opposition now argues, in footnote 4,\n\nthat \u201cinbound\u201d should be read to apply \u201cwhether [the call] was made by Plaintiff or\n\nwhether it was transferred from an unknown third party.\u201d (Oppn. at 16 n.4.) That\n\ndefense is squarely irreconcilable with Mr. Henderson\u2019s second sworn declaration,\n\nwhich categorically denied the very mechanism on which the Opposition now\n\nrelies, stating, \u201cCalls are not transferred by these vendors to Viasat, for example.\u201d\n\n(ECF 23-1 \u00b6 10.) ViaSat cannot have it both ways. Either the \u201cinbound\u201d\n\nrepresentation was supported only by the kind of vendor transfer Henderson swore\n\ndid not occur, meaning the representation was unsupported when made, or\n\nHenderson\u2019s declaration was false when sworn and ViaSat did receive a transfer.\n\nEither alternative independently violates Rule 11, and ViaSat\u2019s Opposition does\n\nnot, and cannot, reconcile the two.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 4 of 24\n\n\n\n\n No one forced ViaSat to file a sworn declaration. No one forced ViaSat to\n\ndeclare, in bold, that \u201cit was the Plaintiff who called Viasat\u2014not the other way\n\naround.\u201d (ECF 11-1 at 7) (emphasis original). No one forced ViaSat to swear,\n\nthrough Mr. Henderson, that it had \u201cno records of making an outbound call to the\n\nphone number alleged in the Complaint\u201d and \u201cconfirmed that no third parties did\n\nso on Viasat\u2019s behalf.\u201d (ECF 11-2 \u00b6\u00b6 9-10.) And no one forced ViaSat to sign\n\nverified interrogatory responses perpetuating the refrain that the calls \u201cdid not\n\noccur\u201d and that there were no responsive documents reflecting any third-party\n\ninvolvement. Those were ViaSat\u2019s voluntary, affirmative choices, made to obtain\n\ndismissal against Plaintiff by denying the very premises of his direct liability\n\ntheory. They were not \u201cpreliminary characterizations\u201d subject to later refinement,\n\nas ViaSat now suggests. They were sworn representations made to a Federal Court,\n\nsubject to Rule 11, submitted to falsely portray Plaintiff\u2019s claims as fictitious.\n\n More fundamentally, this was not innocent error. ViaSat deployed these\n\nmisrepresentations through the highest-impact procedural vehicles available to it: a\n\nRule 12 motion to dismiss, filed weeks into the case and before any discovery had\n\noccurred, and then doubled down in its second motion and its own motion for\n\nsanctions against Plaintiff. ViaSat placed its core misrepresentation, that the\n\nPlaintiff called Viasat, in bold at the head of its argument. It backed that\n\nmisrepresentation with a sworn declaration from its own employee, attached to the\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 5 of 24\n\n\n\n\nmotion, so the Court would treat the falsehood as an established fact. And it did so\n\nthrough a fact-based standing challenge, the procedural vehicle most likely to\n\nterminate the case at the threshold, before Plaintiff could test the assertions in\n\ndiscovery, and then weaponized its own misrepresentations in seeking to sanction\n\nPlaintiff for daring to seek leave to amend his complaint after Defendant\u2019s\n\ndeception was exposed. The deliberate selection of emphasis and procedural device\n\nconfirms that what occurred here was a litigation strategy designed to win the case\n\nbefore it could begin, not a misjudgment under uncertainty.\n\n Rule 11 contains no \u201climited information\u201d exception that excuses\n\nunequivocal sworn declarations that declarant\u2019s own records show to be false, and\n\nit certainly contains no such exception when the party invoking it is the only party\n\nwith complete access to the records in question. ViaSat, not Plaintiff, knew about\n\nits own vendor relationships, knew about XYZies\u2019 existence, and knew, at the time\n\nof the Henderson Declaration, whether the call its records reflected was a direct\n\ncall to ViaSat or a transfer in from elsewhere, including XYZies. ViaSat could\n\nhave said \u201cwe do not yet know\u201d or \u201cinvestigation is ongoing.\u201d It could have said\n\nthat, based on the records, it appeared that the Plaintiff allegedly called XYZies, or\n\nthat it obtained the Plaintiff\u2019s information from XYZies. Instead, it told the Court\n\nthe opposite, in bold, that the Plaintiff \u201ccalled Viasat\u201d and used that representation\n\nto wrongfully attempt to obtain dismissal and forestall discovery into XYZies. And\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 6 of 24\n\n\n\n\nwhen Plaintiff\u2019s discovery requests gave ViaSat the chance to correct the record,\n\nViaSat doubled down rather than correct, verifying, through Henderson again, that\n\n\u201cthe calls alleged in the Complaint did not occur\u201d and that no responsive\n\ndocuments existed. ViaSat disclosed XYZies only when this Court ordered it to.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s secondary argument, that Plaintiff\u2019s motion really attacks discovery\n\nconduct foreclosed by Rule 11, is misdirection. The principal sanctionable conduct\n\nidentified in Plaintiff\u2019s motion is ViaSat\u2019s motion to dismiss and the Henderson\n\nDeclaration, both of which are textbook Rule 11 filings. The discovery responses\n\ncorroborate the pattern of misrepresentation and further disprove ViaSat\u2019s \u201climited\n\ninformation\u201d theory, but they are not the predicate. Plaintiff\u2019s motion can be\n\ngranted on the motion to dismiss and the Declarations alone. ViaSat\u2019s effort to\n\nrecharacterize the motion as one about \u201ccall-routing semantics\u201d or as a backdoor\n\ndiscovery motion misses, by some distance, the point Plaintiff actually made.\n\n For these and the further reasons set forth below, the Court should grant\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s Motion and award the relief identified in Plaintiff\u2019s opening brief.\n\n ARGUMENT\n\nA. ViaSat\u2019s \u201cLimited Information\u201d Defense Cannot Excuse Affirmative\nSworn Misrepresentations It Voluntarily Made.\n\n The centerpiece of ViaSat\u2019s Opposition is the contention that its motion to\n\ndismiss and Henderson Declarations, however inaccurate they may have been in\n\nretrospect, were \u201creasonable based on what Viasat understood at the time.\u201d (Oppn.\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 7 of 24\n\n\n\n\nat 4.) ViaSat repeats variations on this theme throughout its brief. It states that the\n\n\u201cinbound\u201d characterization was \u201caccurate\u201d and \u201cbased on the limited information\n\navailable to it\u201d (id. at 5); that \u201csubsequent discovery indicates\u201d the call was\n\nactually transferred to XYZies (id. at 4), that \u201cViasat\u2019s (unidentified) later filings\n\nreflected the developing evidentiary record\u201d (id. at 10), and that \u201c[r]efining\n\npositions as evidence develops is not sanctionable\u201d (id. at 16). This argument fails\n\non five independent grounds.\n\n First, ViaSat is not Plaintiff. The premise of ViaSat\u2019s defense, that it\n\noperated under conditions of limited information about how the call alleged in the\n\nComplaint reached ViaSat, is implausible on its face. ViaSat is the party in\n\npossession of its own vendor relationships. ViaSat now admits that it retained\n\nXYZies \u201cto receive marketing calls on behalf of Viasat (and other entities).\u201d\n\n(Oppn. at 10.) But, despite that being the case, and despite knowing that this was\n\nthe case when it filed its motion to dismiss and the Henderson Declaration, ViaSat\n\ndid not even disclose XYZies involvement until the Court ordered it to do so,\n\nwhich it did in December. ViaSat had the contracts. ViaSat had the records. ViaSat\n\nhad the routing information, knew of XYZies involvement, and had the personnel\n\nto interpret such records. If anyone in this litigation had complete information\n\nabout whether the call reflected in the Henderson Declaration was an inbound call\n\ndirectly to ViaSat or, instead, a transfer in from XYZies (or someone else), or even\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 8 of 24\n\n\n\n\nif XYZies was involved at all, it was ViaSat. Plaintiff was the only party operating\n\nin a vacuum about ViaSat\u2019s vendor relationships, and that vacuum existed\n\nprecisely because ViaSat denied that any vendor relationship was implicated.\n\n Second, Rule 11 does not exempt a party from accountability for affirmative\n\nmisrepresentations, or what is, at best, concealment of critical facts, merely\n\nbecause the party preferred not to investigate before making them. The reasonable\n\ninquiry obligation under Rule 11(b)(3) is a precondition to certifying a filing, not a\n\nstandard to be applied after the fact when the filing turns out to be wrong. And\n\nmootness does not retroactively render Rule 11 misrepresentations un-\n\nsanctionable. If ViaSat lacked complete information about whether the call in its\n\nrecords was a direct call to it or a transfer from XYZies, the appropriate course was\n\nto say so. Counsel could have said any number of things short of affirmatively\n\nrepresenting both that the Plaintiff called ViaSat and that no third party was even\n\ninvolved. For example, it could have stated that it was investigating whether any\n\nthird parties were involved, that its records indicated that the origin of the calls was\n\nXYZies, or that it had no involvement in any call transfer. Instead, ViaSat\n\naffirmatively declared in bold that \u201cit was the Plaintiff who called Viasat\u201d and\n\nsubmitted Henderson\u2019s sworn declaration that ViaSat had \u201cconfirmed that no third\n\nparties did so on Viasat\u2019s behalf.\u201d Characterizing a call transfer to ViaSat from\n\nXYZies as a call from the Plaintiff to ViaSat without any third parties is not \u201ccall-\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 9 of 24\n\n\n\n\nrouting semantics.\u201d It is an affirmative misrepresentation and concealment of a\n\ncritical fact, XYZies involvement, that directly impugned the Plaintiff\u2019s testimony,\n\npleadings, and credibility. Rule 11 does not permit a party to make affirmative\n\nsworn representations based on concealment and then retreat behind a \u201climited\n\ninformation\u201d excuse it never invoked at the time that in any event was improper.\n\n Third, even taking ViaSat\u2019s (mis)characterization of the record at face value,\n\nthe Henderson Declarations were not \u201cpreliminary characterizations.\u201d They were\n\ndeclarations drafted, signed, and submitted under penalty of perjury, attached to\n\nmotions that affirmatively made incorrect and unqualified representations about\n\nwhat the Plaintiff did. The first Declaration did not disclose that it received the\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s information or any call transfer, instead stating that ViaSat\u2019s records\n\nshow that the Plaintiff called ViaSat and no third party was involved. Henderson\n\nshifted those representations in his second Declaration, swearing categorically that\n\n\u201cat no time was a call made to the Subject Number by or on behalf of Viasat\u201d and\n\nthat \u201cViasat had no involvement in, and has no knowledge of, any of the calls\n\nalleged in the Complaint.\u201d (ECF 23-1 \u00b6 14.) And, despite stating that ViaSat \u201chas\n\ndeveloped an \u201cinbound\u201d marketing program,\u201d where \u201cconsumers will place\n\ninbound calls to certain third party vendors (and to a lesser event [sic], to Viasat\n\ndirectly),\u201d \u00b6 8, the second Henderson declaration was deliberately silent about\n\nwhether the Plaintiff is alleged to have made an inbound call as part of that\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 10 of 24\n\n\n\n\nprogram or if any \u201ccertain third party vendor[]\u201d was involved. For that matter,\n\nViaSat\u2019s own declarations are internally inconsistent on third party involvement.\n\nRule 11 does not allow a party to \u201cpreliminarily\u201d swear something under oath and\n\nthen disclaim the consequence by claiming the oath was conditional and\n\nconcealing critical facts.\n\n Fourth, and most importantly, ViaSat\u2019s defense of the \u201cinbound\u201d\n\ncharacterization is itself self-defeating and exposes yet another sworn\n\nmisrepresentation. The Opposition now concedes that the call reflected \u201cin\n\nViaSat\u2019s records\u201d \u201cpossibly captures an eventual call transfer by a still-unknown\n\nthird party to another third party (XYZies) that was retained to receive marketing\n\ncalls on behalf of Viasat (and other entities).\u201d (Oppn. at 10.) Footnote 4 then\n\ndoubles down by stating, \u201cIt is entirely accurate to refer to this call as \u2018inbound\u2019 to\n\nViasat, whether it was made by Plaintiff or whether it was transferred from an\n\nunknown third party. In either case, Viasat and its vendor (hired only to receive\n\ncalls) did not place the call.\u201d (Oppn. at 16 n.4.) ViaSat\u2019s entire defense of the\n\n\u201cinbound\u201d characterization thus depends on the proposition that a transfer from an\n\nunknown third party to ViaSat\u2019s vendor counts as an \u201cinbound\u201d call to ViaSat as\n\nreflected in its records.\n\n That position is irreconcilable with Henderson\u2019s second sworn declaration.\n\nHenderson swore, categorically and under penalty of perjury, that \u201c[c]alls are not\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 11 of 24\n\n\n\n\ntransferred by these vendors to Viasat, for example.\u201d (ECF 23-1 \u00b6 10.) ViaSat\u2019s\n\npresent defense for its \u201cinbound\u201d characterization depends on precisely the kind of\n\ntransfer Henderson swore does not occur and expressly disclaimed under oath, that\n\na transfer involving ViaSat\u2019s vendor (XYZies), counted as a call \u201cto Viasat.\u201d The\n\ntwo positions cannot coexist. If Henderson\u2019s sworn statement that vendors do not\n\ntransfer calls to ViaSat was true, then ViaSat\u2019s current defense of the \u201cinbound\u201d\n\ncharacterization collapses, because the only way that characterization can be saved\n\nis by construing the transfer from XYZies as a call to ViaSat, a position the\n\ndeclaration disclaims. And if ViaSat\u2019s current defense to the instant sanctions\n\nmotion is true, then Henderson\u2019s sworn statement was false when made. The\n\nOpposition does not, and cannot, reconcile the two.\n\n The Opposition tries to paper over this by pivoting to the irrelevant point\n\nthat \u201cViasat and its vendor (hired only to receive calls) did not place the call.\u201d\n\n(Oppn. at 16 n.4.) But who physically dialed Plaintiff\u2019s number was never the\n\nquestion Henderson\u2019s declarations purported to settle. The questions Henderson\n\npurported to settle were whether ViaSat had any third party involved in the\n\nconduct, whether vendors like XYZies transferred calls to ViaSat, and whether the\n\ncall reflected in ViaSat\u2019s records was a direct customer call by Plaintiff to ViaSat\n\nitself. Henderson swore \u201cno\u201d to the first two and \u201cyes\u201d to the third. ViaSat now\n\nconcedes \u201cyes\u201d to first two and \u201cno\u201d to the third, while simultaneously asking the\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 12 of 24\n\n\n\n\nCourt to treat its earlier sworn answers as accurate \u201cbased on the limited\n\ninformation available to it at the time.\u201d (ECF 65 at 1.) That is not refinement of\n\npreliminary characterizations. It is the abandonment of sworn factual\n\nrepresentations that ViaSat used, successfully, for many months, to try to obtain\n\ndismissal, malign the Plaintiff as some sort of fraudster, and to forestall vicarious\n\nliability discovery. Each is independently sanctionable.\n\n The Declarations did not say that XYZies received the call now in dispute.\n\nThey did not say that ViaSat was still investigating. They said, in unequivocal\n\nterms, that ViaSat had \u201cno involvement in, and has no knowledge of, any of the\n\ncalls alleged in the Complaint.\u201d (ECF 23-1 \u00b6 14.) The Opposition simply continues\n\nto expose ViaSat\u2019s sworn misrepresentations and show why sanctions against both\n\nViaSat and its counsel are appropriate. ViaSat stands in the awkward position of\n\narguing that its sworn statements were reasonable when made, while in the same\n\nbrief admitting that those sworn statements were factually wrong. The reasonable\n\ninquiry standard does not tolerate that distance between what was sworn and what\n\nwas true. ViaSat knew of XYZies\u2019 involvement when Henderson signed his\n\ndeclarations, in which case the declarations were knowingly false, and has all but\n\nconceded that the Plaintiff\u2019s interpretations of the declarations and motions is\n\ncorrect by attempting to defend its characterization of the term \u201cinbound.\u201d The\n\nopposition simply confirms the appropriateness of sanctions here.\n\n\n\n 10\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 13 of 24\n\n\n\n\n Fifth, even setting aside everything above, ViaSat\u2019s post-filing conduct\n\nforecloses any inference that the Henderson Declarations were a good faith effort\n\nmade under conditions of imperfect information. A party that genuinely operates\n\non incomplete information, and that later learns its sworn statements were\n\ninaccurate, has obvious options. It can file a corrected declaration, withdraw the\n\ninaccurate filings, or simply disclose the correct information to the opposing party\n\nso that both sides can litigate on equal footing. ViaSat did none of those things. It\n\ndid the opposite. When Plaintiff served discovery asking ViaSat to identify any\n\nthird party that \u201cmade or was involved in the calls alleged in the complaint,\u201d\n\nViaSat had Henderson verify, again under penalty of perjury, that \u201cthe calls alleged\n\nin the Complaint did not occur and therefore none\u201d had any third party\n\ninvolvement. When Plaintiff served a Request for Production seeking \u201call contracts\n\nor documents representing agreements with any third party that dialed the calls to\n\nthe Plaintiff,\u201d ViaSat answered that no responsive documents existed. Each of\n\nthose responses was a chance to correct the record. ViaSat seized none of them.\n\n It was only after Plaintiff was forced to raise these contradictions with the\n\nCourt, and after the Court compelled ViaSat to identify any vendors involved in\n\nthe calls, that ViaSat finally acknowledged XYZies\u2019 existence in December 2025,\n\nnearly six months after Henderson\u2019s first declaration, and only when continued\n\nconcealment was no longer an option. ViaSat did everything it could to prevent\n\n\n\n 11\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 14 of 24\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiff from learning the same information it was withholding. And it was only\n\nafter the Court forced ViaSat to identify the third party that ViaSat adjusted its\n\nposition. A party operating in good faith on imperfect information does not resist\n\nevery opportunity to correct the record, withhold the corrective information from\n\nits adversary, and disclose the truth only when ordered to do so. Whatever\n\ncharitable inference might otherwise have attached to ViaSat\u2019s earliest\n\nsubmissions, that the Court should treat them as a hasty first effort that turned out\n\nto be wrong or the kind of investigative misstep that occurs in the ordinary course\n\nof litigation, evaporates in the face of ViaSat\u2019s post-filing course of conduct.\n\nViaSat had every chance to correct course. It chose, repeatedly, not to.\n\nB. ViaSat\u2019s Effort to Reduce the Motion to \u201cCall-Routing Semantics\u201d\nMischaracterizes the Record and the Misrepresentations at Issue.\n\n ViaSat repeatedly describes Plaintiff\u2019s theory as one about whether the call\n\nwas \u201cinbound, outbound, routed, or transferred.\u201d (Oppn. at 5.) In addition to being\n\nself-defeating, as outlined above, that framing is wrong twice over.\n\n First, the misrepresentations Plaintiff identifies are not about call routing in\n\nthe abstract. They are about who placed the calls and whether anyone besides\n\nViaSat had any involvement at all. In the original motion to dismiss, ViaSat\n\ndeclared in bold that \u201cit was the Plaintiff who called Viasat\u2014not the other way\n\naround.\u201d (ECF 11-1 at 7.) That was an affirmative attribution that the Plaintiff\n\ndialed ViaSat\u2019s number and spoke to ViaSat. Henderson\u2019s declaration echoed and\n\n\n 12\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 15 of 24\n\n\n\n\namplified that attribution by swearing the call was an \u201cinbound call\u201d placed by \u201can\n\nindividual using\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s number, who provided the name \u201cAsh Bronstin\u201d and a\n\n\u201ccredit card number,\u201d and who remained on the line for \u201c23 minutes and 41\n\nseconds.\u201d (ECF 11-2 \u00b6 12.) ViaSat cannot now reduce that affirmative attribution\n\nto a benign observation about which direction the audio was flowing through the\n\nwires. ViaSat told the Court who placed the call, and that representation was false.\n\n Second, the central misrepresentation is not really about routing at all. It is\n\nabout the existence of a vendor and ViaSat\u2019s relationship to it. ViaSat\u2019s first\n\nmotion to dismiss, the Henderson Declarations, and ViaSat\u2019s verified discovery\n\nresponses each represented, in essence, that the entire program was a ViaSat\n\nprogram from beginning to end and that no third parties made the calls or were\n\ninvolved. ViaSat then leveraged those misrepresentations offensively to paint the\n\nPlaintiff as some sort of fraudster who lied about receiving calls and to forestall\n\ndiscovery into its vendor relationships. Defendant\u2019s hair splitting by parsing\n\nHenderson\u2019s words as carefully as possible fails. If the truth was that some third\n\nparty existed and was involved, but that there was insufficient evidence as to what,\n\nprecisely, they did, then Rule 11 imposed an obligation to state that, not hide\n\nbehind a deceptively-written declaration. And, as outlined above, Defendant\u2019s own\n\nreading is self-defeating, as ViaSat\u2019s characterization of a call transfer as an\n\n\u201cinbound\u201d call in footnote 4 of its Opposition, and its position that a call to\n\n\n\n 13\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 16 of 24\n\n\n\n\nViaSat\u2019s vendors can be treated as one \u201cto ViaSat,\u201d Oppn. at 6, is irreconcilable\n\nwith the Second Henderson Declaration\u2019s statement that \u201cCalls are not transferred\n\nby these vendors to Viasat, for example,\u201d coupled with either Declaration\u2019s failure\n\nto identify XYZies. ViaSat now admits the call alleged in the Complaint was\n\nplaced by a third party that was transferred to ViaSat\u2019s vendor. Those positions\n\ncannot both be true. The Opposition\u2019s textual parsing does not change that result.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s framing assumes that the only point of contention is the disputed\n\ncall direction. It is not. Whatever else can be said about call direction or routing,\n\nViaSat cannot reasonably maintain, and its sanctions motion no longer maintains,\n\nthat the calls \u201cdid not occur,\u201d that the \u201cPlaintiff called Viasat,\u201d or that no third\n\nparties were involved and that no call transfers took place. All those\n\nrepresentations, and more of the same ilk in the same context, sworn under penalty\n\nof perjury, were indisputably false when made.\n\nC. ViaSat\u2019s Rule 11(d) Argument Is Misdirection. The Sanctionable\nConduct Is in ViaSat\u2019s Court Filings, Not Its Discovery Responses.\n\n ViaSat devotes a full section of its Opposition to arguing that Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nmotion is \u201coverwhelmingly a baseless complaint about discovery responses,\n\nvendor disclosures, and discovery timing,\u201d and that Plaintiff\u2019s motion is therefore\n\nforeclosed by Rule 11(d). (Oppn. at 18.) That characterization is incorrect.\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s motion targets ViaSat\u2019s motions to dismiss and the Henderson\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 17 of 24\n\n\n\n\nDeclarations submitted in support, both of which are paradigmatic Rule 11 filings.\n\nDiscovery responses simply corroborate the pattern of misrepresentations.\n\n A motion to dismiss is a motion. Rule 11(b) plainly applies to motions. A\n\ndeclaration, sworn under penalty of perjury, attached as a supporting document to a\n\nmotion is a \u201cpaper\u201d certified under Rule 11. Rule 11(b) plainly applies to that, too.\n\nThe misrepresentations Plaintiff identifies all appear in those filings. They were\n\ncertified under Rule 11. They are subject to Rule 11. Plaintiff\u2019s motion succeeds on\n\nthe motions to dismiss and the Declarations alone. The discovery responses simply\n\nshow that ViaSat\u2019s pattern of misrepresentations wasn\u2019t just a one-off accident,\n\nprecisely what ViaSat now pleads in its Oppositions.\n\n The discovery responses thus serve as pattern evidence, confirming that the\n\nmisrepresentations were neither isolated nor accidental and that ViaSat doubled\n\ndown on them through three rounds of motion practice and into discovery.\n\nViaSat\u2019s reliance on Rule 11(d) is, in effect, an attempt to avoid scrutiny of its\n\nmotions to dismiss and the Declarations by repackaging Plaintiff\u2019s argument as a\n\ndiscovery dispute. That repackaging fails because Plaintiff has not asked the Court\n\nto sanction ViaSat under Rule 11 for its discovery objections. Plaintiff has asked\n\nthe Court to sanction ViaSat for misrepresentations made in connection with its\n\nmotion practice and for prosecuting a sanctions motion built on a factual predicate\n\n(XYZies\u2019 involvement) that ViaSat\u2019s prior sworn submissions denied.\n\n\n\n 15\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 18 of 24\n\n\n\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s motion does, of course, identify ViaSat\u2019s discovery responses as\n\nfurther evidence of the same pattern. That use is permissible. Rule 11(d) excludes\n\ndiscovery motions and objections from Rule 11\u2019s direct scope. It does not preclude\n\nthe Court from considering ViaSat\u2019s discovery conduct as circumstantial evidence\n\nof bad faith or as evidence that ViaSat\u2019s pleadings were knowingly false. The\n\nCourt can sanction ViaSat for what it told the Court in its motions to dismiss, the\n\nHenderson Declarations, and for its own baseless sanctions motion, and it can do\n\nso even if every discovery response in the case were withdrawn tomorrow. The\n\nRule 11(d) defense, in short, addresses an argument Plaintiff did not make.\n\nD. The Recordings Do Not Rehabilitate ViaSat\u2019s Misrepresentations.\n\n ViaSat repeatedly suggests that the Court should excuse its sworn\n\nmisrepresentations because Plaintiff \u201cwithheld\u201d1 his recordings of the calls. (Oppn.\n\nat 10.) That argument fails on two levels.\n\n First, as Plaintiff has explained at length in his Reply in Support of Motion\n\nfor Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and his Opposition to Defendant\u2019s\n\nMotion for Sanctions, the recordings do not \u201cdestroy\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s claims. The\n\nrecordings reflect a series of transfers (which ViaSat denied occurred in the Second\n\n\n\n1\n Plaintiff complied with Rule 34 and Defendant makes no arguments otherwise.\nResponding to discovery propounded on a party within the express text of Rule 34\nis not \u201cwithholding\u201d discovery under any fair of that term, especially when the\nDefendant has taken the position that discovery should be stayed.\n\n 16\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 19 of 24\n\n\n\n\nHenderson Declaration), ending with an individual who collected Plaintiff\u2019s\n\npersonal information, processed a $300 charge for ViaSat\u2019s service, scheduled a\n\nViaSat installation, and ultimately conceded that \u201c[i]t\u2019s only ViaSat\u201d and \u201c[w]e are\n\nonly authorized to provide the service to the customers.\u201d The recordings are\n\ncorroborative of, not contradictory to, Plaintiff\u2019s initial theory that the calls were\n\nplaced by ViaSat and simply transferred between departments internally (as\n\nconfirmed by the First Henderson Declaration), making the only dispute as to call\n\ndirection. ViaSat\u2019s mantra that the recordings \u201cdestroy\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s case is, at best,\n\nan aggressive characterization of what they actually contain. At worst, those\n\ncharacterizations are themselves additional misrepresentations of the record.\n\n Second, and more fundamentally, Plaintiff\u2019s production and the recordings\n\nhe had in his possession are irrelevant to whether ViaSat\u2019s representations were\n\nsupported when ViaSat made them. Rule 11 measures, at the time each\n\ncertification was made, ViaSat\u2019s certification against the information ViaSat had.\n\nViaSat\u2019s misrepresentations were about ViaSat\u2019s own vendor relationships, facts\n\nuniquely and exclusively within ViaSat\u2019s possession. No recording in Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nhands could possibly inform what ViaSat knew about XYZies. The recordings\n\nissue is therefore irrelevant to ViaSat\u2019s certification obligations.\n\n ViaSat concealed all the information it had. All Plaintiff had was a recording\n\nreflecting an inbound call that was transferred between two individuals that\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 20 of 24\n\n\n\n\nultimately resulted in ViaSat credit card charges, a ViaSat installation appointment,\n\nand a concession that the Plaintiff was basically speaking to ViaSat. Those\n\nrecordings support an internal transfer theory just as accurately as they do a third\n\nparty transfer theory. Whether Plaintiff produced his recordings earlier, despite\n\nbeing under no obligation to do so, or later, does not change whether ViaSat,\n\npossessing its own records, knowledge of relationships, and contracts, had a\n\nreasonable basis to swear and plead what it did. ViaSat\u2019s sworn representations\n\nwere either supported by reasonable inquiry into ViaSat\u2019s own records and vendor\n\nrelationships, or they were not. The state of Plaintiff\u2019s discovery production does\n\nnot bear on that question.\n\n Perplexingly, ViaSat\u2019s defense of its inquiry treats the existence of XYZies\n\nas a matter that \u201cemerged\u201d only \u201c[a]s the case progressed\u201d through \u201csubsequent\n\ndiscovery.\u201d (Oppn., passim.) But XYZies was not Plaintiff\u2019s vendor. XYZies was\n\nViaSat\u2019s vendor. ViaSat retained XYZies. ViaSat could have identified XYZies\u2019\n\nexistence at any time, including before Henderson signed his first Declaration or\n\nbefore it filed its first Motion to Dismiss. That ViaSat instead chose to file\n\ndeclarations affirmatively denying any third party involvement, while concurrently\n\nknowing it had a relationship with XYZies, is the precise misconduct Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nmotion targets. The recordings are a sideshow.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 21 of 24\n\n\n\n\nE. ViaSat\u2019s Amendment Defense to Its Sanctions Motion Inverts the\nCausal Chain.\n\n ViaSat protests that its sanctionable sanctions motion does not penalize\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s amendment, but rather his \u201cdemonstrably false allegations\u201d and his\n\ndelay in producing the recordings. (Oppn. at 19.) That argument inverts the causal\n\nchain. Plaintiff pleaded direct liability in his Amended Complaint against ViaSat\n\nbecause ViaSat affirmatively represented that direct liability was the only available\n\ntheory: that \u201cit was the Plaintiff who called Viasat\u201d (in bold), that no third party\n\nhad any involvement, and that the calls \u201cdid not occur.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s amendment to\n\nadd XYZies, and to plead vicarious liability against ViaSat, was a direct response\n\nto the disclosure the Court compelled and identification of XYZies, an entity\n\nViaSat had previously denied existed and whose involvement ViaSat had\n\npreviously denied under oath. ViaSat now seeks sanctions because Plaintiff\u2019s\n\npleadings did not match facts ViaSat itself withheld.\n\n That is precisely the kind of ball hiding Rule 11 is designed to prevent.\n\nViaSat cannot misdirect facts uniquely within its possession and then weaponize its\n\nown misrepresentations into a sanctions motion against Plaintiff. It certainly cannot\n\ndo so after having knowledge of all facts and (1) swearing that no vendor was\n\ninvolved, (2) denying in discovery that any responsive documents existed, (3)\n\nrefusing to participate in discovery on vicarious liability on the ground that no such\n\ntheory was pleaded, (4) finally identifying XYZies only when ordered to do so, and\n\n\n 19\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 22 of 24\n\n\n\n\nthen (5) seeking sanctions because Plaintiff did not name XYZies sooner. Each\n\nlink in that chain forecloses the next. ViaSat is not entitled to the benefit of its own\n\nconcealment. See, e.g., In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 162 F.R.D. 46, 68\n\n(D.V.I.) (where party\u2019s prejudice was \u201cwas due entirely to their own lack of\n\ndiligence [and] concealment,\u201d it \u201cadd[ed] insult to injury\u201d to complain of\n\nconsequences flowing from that concealment). The principle of Tutu Wells, that a\n\nparty cannot leverage prejudice it created through concealment, is independent of\n\ndegree. The question is the conduct\u2019s character of concealment, not the\n\nconcealment\u2019s magnitude.\n\nF. Inherent Authority Is Properly Before the Court.\n\n ViaSat asserts that Plaintiff \u201cwaived\u201d inherent authority sanctions by failing\n\nto develop a separate argument. (Oppn. at 20.) Not so. Plaintiff\u2019s motion expressly\n\ninvoked the Court\u2019s inherent authority and tied it to the same conduct that supports\n\nRule 11 relief. That is not waiver. It is a properly developed argument, pled in the\n\nalternative, that the same conduct, evaluated under the inherent authority standard,\n\nsupports the same relief. The conduct here easily meets that standard. ViaSat made\n\nsworn statements its own records contradict. It concealed the very party it now\n\nrelies on for its sanctions motion. It used those statements to obtain favorable\n\ninferences and to forestall vicarious liability discovery. And it now seeks fees for\n\nlitigation that occurred only because it hid the truth. ViaSat\u2019s months of\n\n\n\n 20\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 23 of 24\n\n\n\n\nconcealment plus contradictory sworn statements plainly fit any reading of\n\ninherent authority. Whether viewed under Rule 11 or under the Court\u2019s inherent\n\nauthority, the conduct merits the relief Plaintiff seeks.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n ViaSat\u2019s Opposition confirms, rather than cures, its Rule 11 violations. To\n\ndefend the \u201cinbound\u201d representation, ViaSat now relies on the very vendor transfer\n\nHenderson swore \u201cdo[es] not occur.\u201d (ECF 23-1 \u00b6 10.) One of those sworn\n\npositions is false, and Rule 11 measures both at the time of filing. ViaSat\u2019s\n\ninvocation of \u201climited information\u201d is itself an admission that the reasonable\n\ninquiry obligation was not met. Nobody forced ViaSat to swear what it swore, and\n\nit cannot now fault Plaintiff for taking those representations at face value. And\n\nViaSat\u2019s concealment of XYZies, broken only by this Court\u2019s order, forecloses any\n\ninference of good faith. For the foregoing reasons, and for those set forth in\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s opening brief, the Court should grant Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Sanctions,\n\ndeny ViaSat\u2019s sanctions motion, and award the relief requested, including\n\nreasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.\n\n\n RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this 28th day of April,\n2026.\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n PA Bar #333687\n Perrong Law LLC\n 2657 Mount Carmel Avenue\n\n\n 21\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 67 Filed 04/28/26 Page 24 of 24\n\n\n\n\n Glenside, Pennsylvania 19038\n Phone: 215-225-5529 (CALL-LAW)\n Facsimile: 888-329-0305\n a@perronglaw.com\n\n CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT\n\n Pursuant to Local Rule 7.8(b)(2), I hereby certify that this brief contains\n\n4,946 words.\n\n DATED this April 28, 2026\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I certify that I filed the foregoing via ECF on the below date, which will\n\nautomatically send a copy to all attorneys of record on the case.\n\nDated: April 28, 2026\n\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-28T20:35:25.325744-07:00","document_number":"67","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509771226","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply Brief","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-04-28T20:35:24.848625-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.587882-07:00","date_filed":"2026-04-28","time_filed":null,"entry_number":67,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-04-28.001","pacer_sequence_number":178,"description":"REPLY BRIEF re 61 MOTION for Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel filed by Asher Bronstin.(Perrong, Andrew) (Entered: 04/28/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/460862758/","id":460862758,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/475938851/","id":475938851,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/66/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-15T11:52:55.060662-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.551221-07:00","sha1":"80940caa92342abc38420b1108e9430496f902ce","page_count":22,"file_size":408964,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.66.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.66.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 1 of 22\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\non behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n\nv. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n\nVIASAT, INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n\n DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR\n SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF\u2019S COUNSEL\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 2 of 22\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nINTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................2\nI. Counsel\u2019s repeated false statements on an issue going to the heart of the case\n warrant sanctions. ............................................................................................2\nII. Precedent supports issuing sanctions here.......................................................8\nIII. Counsel\u2019s narrative concerning Viasat\u2019s early call-record positions is\n irrelevant and meritless. .................................................................................11\nIV. Counsel\u2019s reliance on amendment does not excuse his conduct. ..................14\nV. Counsel\u2019s \u00a7 1927 arguments ignore the multiplication of proceedings. .......15\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................16\n\n\n\n\n i\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 3 of 22\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\n CASES\nArio v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Acct.,\n 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010) .................................................................1, 9, 10, 12\nBalthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr.,\n 279 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D.N.J. 2003), aff\u2019d, 137 F. App\u2019x 482 (3d Cir.\n 2005) (unpublished) ............................................................................................15\nGaiardo v. Ethyl Corp.,\n 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1987) .........................................................................10, 11\nGillam v. Reliance First Capital, LLC,\n 2023 WL 2163775 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023) ..................................................1, 4\nIn re Kunstler,\n 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................ 8\nIn re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions,\n 278 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2002) .......................................................................3, 9, 16\nJasinski v. Showboat Operating Co.,\n 644 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) ..............................................................................2\nKeister v. PPL Corp.,\n 318 F.R.D. 247 (M.D. Pa. 2015) ....................................................................8, 15\nMary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle,\n 847 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1988) .............................................................................9, 15\nSussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A.,\n 818 F. Supp. 1510 (M.D. Fla. 1993)..................................................................... 9\nValdez v. Kreso, Inc.,\n 144 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Tex. 2001) ................................................................. 9\nWharton v. Superintendent Graterford SCI,\n 95 F.4th 140 (3d Cir. 2024) .................................................................................. 3\nYoung v. Smith,\n 269 F. Supp. 3d 251 (M.D. Pa. 2017), aff\u2019d, 905 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2018) ........ 11\n\n\n STATUTES\n47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5) .................................................................................................4\n\n\n\n ii\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 4 of 22\n\n\n\n\n RULES\n47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2) ..........................................................................................4\nFed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2) ..............................................................................................2\nL.R. 7.8(a) ..................................................................................................................2\nRule 11 ..............................................................................................................passim\n\u00a7 1927 .........................................................................................................2, 9, 15, 16\n\n\n\n\n iii\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 5 of 22\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n Viasat\u2019s Motion for Sanctions, like this case as a whole, is straightforward. To\n\nprove his direct liability claims under the TCPA, Plaintiff needed to show that Viasat\n\nplaced at least two solicitation calls to him in a 12-month period. 1 Despite Viasat\u2019s\n\nadamant denials, Plaintiff spent months alleging that Viasat did just that, specifically\n\nclaiming that various callers \u201cstated\u201d and \u201cconfirmed\u201d that they were calling from\n\nViasat. That was not true. Plaintiff possessed recordings of the calls that directly\n\ncontradict Plaintiff\u2019s allegations and show that Viasat cannot be liable under the\n\nTCPA.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s TCPA claims are not merely \u201closing\u201d and \u201cadventuresome.\u201d Dkt.\n\n64 at 5 (quoting Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998\n\nYear of Acct., 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010)). They are squarely foreclosed by\n\nevidence Plaintiff possessed since before this action was filed. Particularly unfortu-\n\nnate, Plaintiff is still making representations contradicted by the evidence, now seek-\n\ning to amend his current pleading to add more falsehoods. That is not mere early-\n\ndays confusion. It is a consistent pattern of disrespect for the truth warranting sanc-\n\ntions from this Court.\n\n\n\n\n1\n See also Gillam v. Reliance First Capital, LLC, 2023 WL 2163775, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.\nFeb. 22, 2023) (dismissing on this basis, where plaintiff alleges only one call).\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 6 of 22\n\n\n\n\n Counsel\u2019s response ignores the simple narrative Viasat laid out, seeking to\n\ndeflect blame by sowing confusion. But Plaintiff\u2019s opposition is meritless and, more\n\nimportantly, legally irrelevant. Plaintiff needed to show inter alia that Viasat placed\n\ntwo solicitation calls to him. The recordings show that he cannot do so and has\n\nknown that all along. Any supposed confusion over whether Plaintiff placed or re-\n\nceived one of the two calls cannot possibly justify his and his counsel\u2019s repeated\n\nfalse statements about the content of both calls. Those false statements have bred\n\ncostly motions practice, third-party discovery, and court interventions. That miscon-\n\nduct and the resultant waste of party and judicial resources it has caused warrants a\n\nfirm response, whether under \u00a7 1927, Rule 11, or the Court\u2019s inherent powers.\n\n ARGUMENT2\nI. Counsel\u2019s repeated false statements on an issue going to the heart of the\n case warrant sanctions.\n Section 1927 sanctions apply when counsel multiplies proceedings unreason-\n\nably and vexatiously, increasing an opponent\u2019s costs, and acts intentionally or in bad\n\n\n\n2\n Viasat inadvertently omitted separately captioned \u201cprocedural history\u201d and \u201cques-\ntions involved\u201d sections in its initial briefing. L.R. 7.8(a). It acknowledges and re-\ngrets the omissions. Still, the briefing substantively covered those items, and Plain-\ntiff\u2019s own identification and analysis of the sanctions issues shows that the nature of\nthe dispute is clear and that he suffered no prejudice. He has not requested any rem-\nedy in this regard, and none is warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2) (\u201cA local rule\nimposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in a way that causes a party to\nlose any right because of a nonwillful failure to comply.\u201d); cf. Jasinski v. Showboat\nOperating Co., 644 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (\u201cnonprejudicial noncom-\npliance with local rules\u201d is no reason to reverse).\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 7 of 22\n\n\n\n\nfaith. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d\n\n175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002). Rule 11 sanctions, in contrast, apply when counsel unrea-\n\nsonably makes false claims. See Wharton v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 95 F.4th\n\n140, 147 (3d Cir. 2024). And inherent-powers sanctions may apply if no other bases\n\nfor sanctions exist. See In re Prudential, 278 F.3d at 189.\n\n Here, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel acted in bad faith, or at the very least unreasonably\n\nand vexatiously, by repeatedly falsely claiming that callers stated and confirmed that\n\nthey were calling directly from Viasat. Those claims were not one-offs and were not\n\ntangential to the case. Instead, Plaintiff and his counsel repeatedly mischaracterized\n\nfacts going to the very core of the dispute in complaints, briefing, and attachments.\n\nTellingly, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel offers little to justify those false statements.\n\n Nor could he. The original complaint alleged that the first caller \u201cstated he\n\nwas calling from ViaSat\u201d and that the second caller \u201cstated they were calling from\n\nViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 1 at 26. The first amended complaint, similarly, alleged that the second\n\ncaller transferred Plaintiff to a \u201csales specialist \u2026 who confirmed they were calling\n\nfrom ViaSat\u201d and that \u201cthe individuals all spoke as though they were calling from\n\nViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 21 at 6, 8. Later, in opposing Viasat\u2019s motion to dismiss, counsel con-\n\nfirmed that the complaint alleged \u201cself-identification as \u2018ViaSat.\u2019\u201d Dkt. 30 at 7. He\n\nalso included a declaration from Plaintiff himself, in which Plaintiff said that, on the\n\nsecond call, he \u201csp[oke] with a representative who confirmed that they were calling\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 8 of 22\n\n\n\n\nfrom ViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 30-2 at 2. And even now, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel seeks to file a second\n\namended complaint alleging that the second caller transferred Plaintiff to a \u201csales\n\nspecialist \u2026 who confirmed they were calling from ViaSat\u201d and that \u201cthe individuals\n\nall spoke as though they were calling from ViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 49-1 at 7, 9.\n\n None of that was true, as shown by the call recordings Plaintiff and his counsel\n\nhave possessed from (indeed well before) the start of this case. On the first call, the\n\ncaller said only that he was \u201cSam.\u201d Dkt. 44-1 at 2. He did not disclose his employer\n\nor even mention Viasat. See id. So, the assertion that the first caller \u201cstated he was\n\ncalling from ViaSat\u201d is false. Dkt. 1 at 26. Importantly, that alone should be case\n\ndispositive. Whatever occurred on the second call, TCPA liability requires two calls\n\nfrom the same entity in the relevant time period. Plaintiff has no evidence tying the\n\nfirst alleged call to Viasat and thus no basis to sue Viasat for TCPA violations at all.3\n\n On the second call\u2014which came from a different number with a different area\n\ncode, see Dkt 30-2 at 2\u2014an unidentified caller 4 transferred Plaintiff to a \u201cverifica-\n\ntion officer\u201d named \u201cRyan Wilson,\u201d Dkt. 44-2 at 2. Neither person (the initial caller\n\n\n3\n As noted above, the TCPA provision at issue explicitly requires that a plaintiff\n\"has received more than one telephone [solicitation] call within any 12-month pe-\nriod by or on behalf of the same entity\" to bring a private action for violations of\nthe National Do-Not-call Registry regulations. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5); 47 C.F.R. \u00a7\n64.1200(c)(2). Only one such call mandates dismissal. See Gillam, 2023 WL\n2163775, at *3.\n4\n This unidentified caller\u2019s voice on the recording is distinct from the initial\ncaller\u2019s, suggesting that Plaintiff spoke with a different individual than the first\ncaller.\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 9 of 22\n\n\n\n\nor Ryan Wilson) disclosed their employer or mentioned Viasat. See id. at 2\u20133. Only\n\nafter \u201cRyan\u201d transferred Plaintiff to a third speaker did anyone talk about Viasat (al-\n\nbeit not only Viasat). So, Plaintiff\u2019s claims that \u201cthe individuals all spoke as though\n\nthey were calling from ViaSat\u201d were likewise false. Dkt. 21 at 8; Dkt 49-1 at 9 (em-\n\nphasis added). Plaintiff\u2019s counsel does not argue otherwise.\n\n And while the final speaker mentioned Viasat, it was not at all accurate to say\n\nthat person \u201cconfirmed they were calling from ViaSat\u201d or engaged in \u201cself-identifi-\n\ncation as \u2018ViaSat.\u2019\u201d Dkt. 21 at 6; Dkt 30 at 7; Dkt 30-2 at 2; Dkt 49-1 at 7. On the\n\ncontrary, the final speaker initially identified himself only as \u201cAngel,\u201d said he was a\n\n\u201chome service advisor,\u201d and eventually pitched Viasat services after suggesting that\n\nhe had looked at which services would be most affordable. Dkt. 44-2 at 3\u20134. Over\n\nhalfway through the call, Angel said, when asked, that his company\u2019s name was \u201cVi-\n\nasat Authorized Retailer.\u201d Id. at 10; see also id. (\u201cWe are [not] Viasat, but we are an\n\nauthorized retailer of them.\u201d). But Angel likewise identified \u201cthe name of our com-\n\npany\u201d (i.e., his employer) and its website name as \u201cGetTheFastestInternet.com,\u201d\n\nwhile also saying \u201cwe buy assets\u201d and that Plaintiff \u201ccan check the information on\n\nBuyAssets.com.\u201d Id. at 11\u201312. Angel also clarified and stressed that \u201cwe work with\n\nmore than ten companies\u201d and \u201care an authorized retailer with more than ten com-\n\npanies.\u201d Id. at 11; see also id. at 13 (\u201cWe work with more than ten companies for the\n\ninternet service right now on your area.\u201d). And indeed, before ever giving his\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 10 of 22\n\n\n\n\ncompany name or information, Angel mentioned that he could offer Plaintiff services\n\n\u201cwith the company AirLink\u201d too. Id. at 7. All of that prompted Plaintiff himself to\n\nnote, \u201cyou aren\u2019t Viasat.\u201d Id. at 14.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s counsel acknowledges the call\u2019s contents in passing. See Dkt. 64 at\n\n11\u201312. Yet he overlooks or downplays many statements, while mischaracterizing\n\nothers. He says Angel \u201cat various points states that he either was ViaSat, was \u2018au-\n\nthorized\u2019 by ViaSat, and eventually conceded that he was \u2018just\u2019 ViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 64 at\n\n11 (emphasis added). But in fact, as noted, Angel ultimately claimed only that his\n\ncompany \u201cwas an authorized retailer\u201d of Viasat\u2019s services. Dkt. 44-2 at 10.5 And he\n\nrepeatedly stressed that he was an \u201cauthorized retailer\u201d for not only Viasat, but also\n\nmore than 10 other internet service providers\u2014something counsel never\n\n\n\n\n5\n Angel appeared to acknowledge that \u201conly Viasat\u201d was an actual entity and to \u201cun-\nderstand\u201d that his purported company\u2019s name, \u201cViasat Authorized Retailer,\u201d was not\nan official company name, while maintaining that his company was \u201conly authorized\nto provide [Viasat]\u2019s service.\u201d See id. at 15 (Bronstin: \u201cYeah, your website doesn\u2019t\nwork, and there\u2019s no company in California named Viasat Authorized Retailer.\u201d An-\ngel: \u201cIt\u2019s only Viasat. Basically, it\u2019s only Viasat. We are only authorized to provide\nthe service to customers.\u201d Bronstin: \u201cRight, but what\u2026 if it\u2019s not the name of\nyour\u2026\u201d Angel: \u201cI understand\u2026\u201d Bronstin: \u201cWait\u2026 yeah.\u201d Angel: \u201cGo ahead, go\nahead, sorry.\u201d Bronstin: \u201cThat\u2019s not even\u2026 Viasat isn\u2019t even Viasat\u2019s actual entity\nname.\u201d Angel: \u201cOh, it\u2019s Viasat, the entity, the name of the company, the name of the\nprovider.\u201d). Consistent with other portions of the call, Angel ultimately never\nclaimed that he was with or directly employed by Viasat, but only that he was au-\nthorized to provide Viasat\u2019s services (among many others, as he stressed throughout\nthe call).\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 11 of 22\n\n\n\n\nacknowledges. See id. at 11, 13. That all showed that Angel was not in fact, an em-\n\nployee of Viasat itself.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s counsel also downplays Angel\u2019s pitch for AirLink (which is an un-\n\nrelated entity) since it is \u201ca rural Oklahoma ISP that does not offer services in [Plain-\n\ntiff]\u2019s California zip code,\u201d and he downplays the fact that Angel gave the company\n\nand website name \u201cGetTheFastestInternet.com\u201d since that \u201cisn\u2019t a real website.\u201d\n\nDkt. 64 at 12. But of course, those points only underscore Viasat\u2019s argument here:\n\nno one could credibly believe that a sales representative pitching \u201canother internet\n\ncompany in Oklahoma and a fictitious website\u201d was Viasat, id. at 11, and no one\n\ncould credibly claim that the representative had confirmed that they were Viasat. 6\n\n In short, no one could plausibly maintain that a company purporting to repre-\n\nsent more than 10 internet service providers, pitching services from another provider,\n\nand offering up fictitious website and company names was in fact the internet service\n\nprovider Viasat. That includes Plaintiff himself, who ended the call after stating the\n\nconclusion any reasonable person would have reached under the circumstances: \u201cyou\n\naren\u2019t Viasat.\u201d Id. at 14 (emphasis added). And yet Plaintiff and his counsel have\n\n\n6\n For all those reasons, Bronstin cannot credibly argue that receiving a \u201cViaSat email\nand [declined] credit card charge\u201d after the fact, id. at 12, somehow supports his false\nclaims that the callers stated and confirmed that they were calling from Viasat. The\ncontent of the calls showed that those statements were not true. Instead, the last caller\nat most claimed to be an authorized retailer of Viasat (among others) who would\nhelp Bronstin obtain Viasat services. Nothing about the email was inconsistent with\nthat or could transform the caller\u2019s statements into confirmations that he was Viasat.\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 12 of 22\n\n\n\n\nnow spent months doubling and tripling down by asserting not only that the callers\n\nare Viasat, but that they stated and confirmed as much. Just as Plaintiff himself con-\n\nfirmed before this case ever began, those statements were false.\n\nII. Precedent supports issuing sanctions here.\n This Court and others have imposed sanctions when, as here, counsel made\n\nconsistently false claims when they knew or reasonably should have known the truth.\n\nIn one case involving unsupported age-discrimination claims, for example, this\n\nCourt noted, \u201c[t]he weak basis for Plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit was clear from the start, and\n\nvery little could have altered its failing trajectory. The claims simply had no basis in\n\nfact, yet Plaintiff nevertheless chose to advance them.\u201d Keister v. PPL Corp., 318\n\nF.R.D. 247, 262 (M.D. Pa. 2015). Rule 11 sanctions were thus proper, as \u201cthe alle-\n\ngations in Plaintiff\u2019s Second Amended Complaint were unsupported at the time that\n\n[his counsel] wrote them, and were unlikely to ever gain factual support during the\n\ncourse of discovery, because they simply were inaccurate. More troubling, this reli-\n\nance on unsupported factual allegations was not accidental.\u201d Id. The very same can\n\nbe said here of Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s claims, which are as false today as he knew or\n\nreasonably should have known them to be at the outset of this case.\n\n Other cases are broadly similar. See Dkt. 58 at 9\u201310, 12\u201313, 16\u201319 (citing\n\nvarious cases); see also In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 1990) (Rule 11\n\nsanctions proper since \u201cerrors pervade the complaint and concern information which\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 13 of 22\n\n\n\n\neither was or should have been known to appellants\u201d and counsel \u201cappear to have\n\nrelied entirely upon discovery in the hope of finding some factual support for many\n\nof their claims\u201d); Valdez v. Kreso, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 663, 670 (N.D. Tex. 2001)\n\n(Rule 11 sanctions proper since counsel \u201cknew that he was making false factual al-\n\nlegations when he made them\u201d and \u201c[n]o reasonable attorney would have made those\n\nfactual allegations after the slightest inquiry, much less a reasonable inquiry\u201d); Suss-\n\nman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 818 F. Supp. 1510, 1517 (M.D. Fla. 1993)\n\n(Rule 11 sanctions proper since \u201cthere is substantial evidence of inclusion of allega-\n\ntions in the Complaint which Plaintiff knew to be false\u201d).\n\n Counsel\u2019s reliance on cases emphasizing restraint under Rule 11 does warrant\n\na different conclusion. See Dkt. 64 at 5\u20137, 13\u201314, 16\u201318. Those cases addressed\n\ninstances in which counsel acted amid genuine factual uncertainty, refined claims\n\ntransparently through discovery, or advanced aggressive but evidentially supported\n\npositions. See Ario, 618 F.3d at 297; In re Prudential, 278 F.3d at 188; Mary Ann\n\nPensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 95\u201396 (3d Cir. 1988). In those instances, courts\n\ndenied sanctions because counsel grounded allegations in information they reasona-\n\nbly believed to be accurate at the time, because adverse facts emerged only through\n\ndiscovery, or because counsel corrected course once evidentiary gaps were revealed.\n\nThe cases rightly stressed that Rule 11 and \u00a7 1927 are not designed to punish losing\n\narguments in those situations, but do apply when counsel advances factual contentions\n\n\n 9\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 14 of 22\n\n\n\n\nwithout evidentiary support or persists after that lack of support becomes apparent.\n\nSee Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482\u201383 (3d Cir. 1987).\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s cases do not apply here because none involved counsel who pos-\n\nsessed evidence directly contradicting his allegations from the outset of the case and\n\nnevertheless reaffirmed those allegations by his client under oath and through brief-\n\ning, multiple times. Objectively, an attorney who pleads facts contradicted by evi-\n\ndence in his possession does not act reasonably. See Ario, 618 F.3d at 297. That is\n\ndifferent in kind than merely advancing \u201can ultimately unsuccessful pleading the-\n\nory.\u201d Dkt. 64 at 2. And yet that is what happened here. Counsel did not operate under\n\nuncertainty. He possessed the most probative evidence from the outset\u2014recordings of\n\nboth calls on which Plaintiff\u2019s claims depend. Those recordings undercut any claim\n\nthat the callers stated or confirmed that they were calling from Viasat, or that the calls\n\nwere transferred to Viasat. Yet counsel chose to make those claims in the initial com-\n\nplaint, repeat them in an amended complaint, and include them in briefing and a dec-\n\nlaration from Plaintiff\u2014all while withholding the recordings and forcing dispositive\n\nmotion practice, third\u2011party discovery, and Court intervention\u2014and he now repeats\n\nthose false claims again in a proposed second amended complaint. Courts impose\n\nsanctions where counsel advances factual narratives contradicted by evidence in their\n\npossession or maintain those narratives after the factual foundation has collapsed. See\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 15 of 22\n\n\n\n\nGaiardo, 835 F.2d at 482; Young v. Smith, 269 F. Supp. 3d 251, 333 (M.D. Pa. 2017),\n\naff\u2019d, 905 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2018). This Court should do the same.\n\nIII. Counsel\u2019s narrative concerning Viasat\u2019s early call-record positions is ir-\n relevant and meritless.\n Counsel devotes most of his briefing not to explaining why his repeated state-\n\nments that the callers expressly stated and confirmed that they were from Viasat were\n\ntrue (as he should), but to falsely pointing a finger at Viasat and its counsel. He\n\nstresses Viasat\u2019s early litigating position in a motion no longer before this Court re-\n\nlating to whether the subject calls occurred, whether Plaintiff made or received the\n\ncalls, who Plaintiff called if he made the call, and so on. See, e.g., Dkt. 64 at 1, 3\u20134,\n\n7\u20138, 10. He also complains about the timing of Viasat\u2019s discovery disclosure relating\n\nto vendor XYZies (a vendor which, as Viasat\u2019s sworn declaration in support of its\n\nmotion to dismiss confirms, was contractually prohibited from making outbound\n\ncalls and only retained to receive calls). See, e.g., id. at 4, 8, 10, 15, 18. But none of\n\nthose arguments help him here or undercut the case for sanctions.\n\n First, no claim against Viasat and its counsel shows impropriety, as Viasat ex-\n\nplains more fully in its response to counsel\u2019s own sanctions motion\u2014a motion he\n\nfiled solely because Viasat filed a sanctions motion. See Dkt. 61 at 1 (\u201cThis motion\n\nis directed at Defendant\u2019s sanctions motion itself.\u201d).7 Unlike Plaintiff and his\n\n\n7\n Indeed, because Plaintiff repeats most of his claims about Viasat\u2019s alleged con-\nduct in his sanctions motion and the conduct mainly pertains to that motion, an ex-\ntended discussion makes more sense in that context. But suffice it to say here, at\n 11\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 16 of 22\n\n\n\n\ncounsel, neither Viasat nor its counsel initially possessed the best evidence of\n\nwhether the calls occurred and who was on them. But Viasat always accurately sum-\n\nmarized the evidence it possessed. Plaintiff now suggests that certain statements\n\nViasat made essentially misled him into continually pleading a demonstrably false\n\ndirect TCPA liability theory against Viasat, but disclosing the recordings would have\n\ncleared up any supposed confusion. Unfortunately, Plaintiff and his counsel chose to\n\nwithhold the recordings instead, and now seek to capitalize on the early ambiguity\n\nthey caused through a self-consciously retaliatory sanctions motion.\n\n Second, and more importantly for this motion, Plaintiff\u2019s claims about Vi-\n\nasat\u2019s or its counsel\u2019s conduct are wholly irrelevant to his own repeated false state-\n\nments about the contents of both calls. In fact, counsel\u2019s own authorities confirm that\n\nalleged reliance on an adversary\u2019s representations does not excuse advancing unsup-\n\nported facts. Rule 11 places the burden on the filer\u2014not the opposing party\u2014to en-\n\nsure factual accuracy. See Ario, 618 F.3d at 297. That, of course, makes sense. Log-\n\nically speaking, that Viasat, operating on less information than Plaintiff and his coun-\n\nsel, disputed whether the calls occurred, whether Plaintiff received or made the calls,\n\nand so on, simply could not justify Plaintiff and his counsel making false statements\n\nabout calls of which they possessed recordings from the outset. If Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\n\n\n\nmost Plaintiff can show that Viasat and its counsel acted reasonably amid factual\nuncertainty and incomplete information and refined claims through discovery.\n 12\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 17 of 22\n\n\n\n\nwanted to clear the air, he could have disclosed the call recordings at any point. But\n\nwhat he could not do is say that callers stated and confirmed that they were from\n\nViasat, because the callers did not actually do that.\n\n In fact, as discussed at length above, the first caller says nothing about Viasat\n\nat all, despite the TCPA\u2019s requirement (as relevant to Plaintiff\u2019s claim) that Plaintiff\n\nconnect at least two calls to Viasat. Plaintiff\u2019s false statement that the first caller\n\n\u201cstated he was calling from ViaSat\u201d was legally necessary to avoid dismissal of this\n\nentire action. Put differently, even if all of Plaintiff\u2019s statements about the second\n\ncall were accurate, the recording of the first call doomed Plaintiff\u2019s claim.\n\n But, of course, Plaintiff\u2019s statements about the subsequent call were also false.\n\nA person on the second call 8 who mentioned Viasat claimed only that he was an\n\nauthorized services provider for the company; made clear that he represented over\n\n10 different internet service providers; expressly pitched services from an Oklahoma\n\nprovider; and cited fake internet addresses, causing even Plaintiff himself to draw\n\nthe commonsense conclusion that the caller was not with Viasat. See Dkt. 44-2 at 14.\n\nAny confusion on Viasat\u2019s part about the calls, based on the limited information it\n\n\n\n\n8\n To be clear, the person who actually made the second call was not identified on\nthe recording. Plaintiff was transferred twice before Viasat is even mentioned. It\nalso bears repeating that Viasat did not authorize anyone to make any outbound\ncalls.\n 13\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 18 of 22\n\n\n\n\nhad about them at the time, could not possibly justify Plaintiff and his counsel re-\n\npeatedly misrepresenting the nature of the calls from the outset of the case.\n\n Finally, even if there were some justification for counsel\u2019s initial misstate-\n\nments based on some action of Viasat\u2019s, counsel does not claim that Viasat\u2019s actions\n\nare still creating confusion or currently justify continued misstatements. And yet\n\neven now he asks the Court to permit him to file yet another complaint alleging that\n\nthe second caller transferred Plaintiff to a \u201csales specialist \u2026 who confirmed they\n\nwere calling from ViaSat\u201d and that \u201cthe individuals all spoke as though they were\n\ncalling from ViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 49-1 at 7, 9. That persistence in making false claims un-\n\nderscores the need for sanctions here. Counsel has repeatedly misrepresented facts\n\nto this Court, keeps doing so, and needs to stop.\n\nIV. Counsel\u2019s reliance on amendment does not excuse his conduct.\n As a direct result of counsel\u2019s misstatements, Viasat was forced to incur sub-\n\nstantial legal fees and costs associated with two motions to dismiss and comprehen-\n\nsive briefing, standing and liability analysis necessitated by Plaintiff and his coun-\n\nsel\u2019s shifting factual narratives, third-party subpoenas to disprove liability to Viasat,\n\ndiscovery disputes and Court conferences to obtain withheld evidence, supplemental\n\nevidence submissions, and opposition to futile attempts to further amend.\n\n Counsel contends that his current effort to amend shows compliance with Rule\n\n11\u2019s continuing\u2011duty framework. That argument ignores the factual chronology and\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 19 of 22\n\n\n\n\nthe law. The issue is not that Plaintiff\u2019s counsel sought leave to amend after discov-\n\nery progressed. It is that counsel filed and maintained allegations and sworn testi-\n\nmony without evidentiary support while purposefully withholding the most proba-\n\ntive evidence disproving those allegations and exonerating Viasat. Amendment after\n\nmonths of litigation does not undo the costs imposed by earlier misconduct, nor does\n\nit retroactively validate earlier pleadings. See Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 95\u201396. That is\n\nparticularly true when even the proposed amendment continues to advance the same\n\ndisproved claims that warrant sanctions in the first instance.\n\n Courts routinely reject attempts to use amendment to manufacture ambiguity\n\nand prolong litigation after the factual basis for claims has collapsed. See Keister,\n\n318 F.R.D. at 267\u201369; Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 279 F. Supp. 2d 574, 594\n\n(D.N.J. 2003), aff\u2019d, 137 F. App\u2019x 482 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished). That should be\n\ndoubly true when, as noted, the amended complaint itself contains the same mis-\n\nstatements that counsel has consistently advanced throughout the course of the case.\n\nV. Counsel\u2019s \u00a7 1927 arguments ignore the multiplication of proceedings.\n Counsel correctly observes that \u00a7 1927 targets post\u2011filing conduct. That is pre-\n\ncisely why sanctions are appropriate here under \u00a7 1927. After filing, Plaintiff and his\n\ncounsel escalated unsupported allegations, submitted sworn testimony repeating\n\nthem, withheld recordings that would have streamlined litigation (not to mention\n\nexonerate Viasat), and forced multiple motions and discovery disputes.\n\n\n 15\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 20 of 22\n\n\n\n\n The sequence of events is undisputed. Plaintiff did not produce the recordings\n\nwith his pleadings, did not reference them when opposing dismissal, did not produce\n\nthem in discovery, and produced them only after a discovery conference, when the\n\nCourt ordered it. During that lengthy period, Viasat was forced to file dispositive\n\nmotions, pursue third\u2011party subpoenas, and seek court intervention.\n\n That conduct falls squarely within \u00a7 1927, as interpreted by the Third Circuit.\n\nSee In re Prudential, 278 F.3d at 188; Schaefer Salt, 542 F.3d at 101. Counsel\u2019s re-\n\nliance on cases involving aggressive but transparent litigation does not address the\n\nconcealment of dispositive evidence presented here.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n The Court should grant the motion for sanctions under \u00a7 1927, Rule 11, and\n\nthe Court\u2019s inherent sanctions authority.\n\nDated: April 15, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n John W. McGuinness\n (Pro Hac Vice to be Requested)\n A. Paul Heeringa\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIP, LLP\n 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 600\n Washington, D.C. 20036\n Telephone: 202-585-6500\n jmcguinness@manatt.com\n pheeringa@manatt.com\n FREDERICK P. SANTARELLI (PA 53901)\n STEVEN C. TOLLIVER, JR. (PA 327165)\n ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.\n Union Meeting Corporate Center V\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300\n Blue Bell, PA 19422\n\n 16\n\fCase 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 21 of 22\n\n\n\n (215) 977-1000 (phone)\n FPSantarelli@elliottgreenleaf.com\n sct@elliottgreenleaf.com\n Counsel for Defendant Viasat, Inc.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66 Filed 04/15/26 Page 22 of 22\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LR 7.8\n I hereby certify that, pursuant to M.D.Pa. Local Rule 7.8(b)(2), this Brief com-\n\nplies with the word-count limitation of Local Rule 7.8, as the Brief is less than 5000\n\nwords (including headings and footnotes but not including the cover page, tables, sig-\n\nnature block, or certificates) in 14-point Times New Roman font.\n\nDated: April 15, 2026 /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n A. PAUL HEERINGA\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that, on April 15, 2026, I filed the foregoing electronically\n\nthrough the Court\u2019s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of the filing to all counsel\n\nof record.\n\n\n\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n A. PAUL HEERINGA\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-04-15T11:52:55.342263-07:00","document_number":"66","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509752621","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply Brief","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/475938858/","id":475938858,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/66/1/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-15T11:53:25.585876-07:00","date_modified":"2026-04-18T09:53:21.581456-07:00","sha1":"7c3851431c4ed289ed436e03059f49e0ce2ea64d","page_count":14,"file_size":526037,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.66.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.66.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1 Filed 04/15/26 Page 1 of 14\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\non behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff,\n Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\nv. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n\nVIASAT, INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n\n DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR\n SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF\u2019S COUNSEL\n (APPENDIX OF UNPUBLISHED CASE CITATIONS)\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 2 of 14\n\n\n [2] court could consider counsel's appeal in his own capacity,\n 137 Fed.Appx. 482 as distinct from his client's;\n This case was not selected for\n publication in West's Federal Reporter. [3] action was barred by res judicata; and\n See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1\n generally governing citation of judicial decisions [4] non-monetary Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed.\n issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also U.S.Ct.\n of Appeals 3rd Cir. App. I, IOP 5.1, 5.3, and 5.7.\n Affirmed.\n United States Court of Appeals,\n Third Circuit.\n Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal.\n Enez BALTHAZAR, Appellant,\n v. West Headnotes (5)\n ATLANTIC CITY MEDICAL CENTER; Atlantic\n City Medical Center Community Health Services;\n [1] Federal Courts Pleading\n Barbara Henderson, M.D.; Joseph Destefano, M.D.;\n Following expiration of the 30\u2013day amendment\n Allan Feldman, M.D.; Phillip Korzeniowski, M.D.;\n period in a district court's order, the court's\n Destefano, Feldman, Kaufman & Korzeniowski, P.A.;\n subsequent order denying leave to file the\n Destafano, Feldman & Kaufman, P.A.; University amended complaint had the effect of dismissing\n of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, School of the plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice, thus\n Osteopathic Medicine; Richard Cooper, D.O., Appellees. rendering a final decision for purposes of appeal.\n 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1291.\n No. 03\u20133772.\n | 1 Case that cites this headnote\n Argued June 9, 2005.\n |\n [2] Federal Courts Requisites and\n Decided June 22, 2005.\n sufficiency; defects\nSynopsis Appellate court could consider counsel's appeal\nBackground: Patient sued physicians and medical center, in his own capacity, as distinct from his\nalleging that defendants' acts subsequent to their medical client's, from a district court's imposition of Rule\ntreatment of the patient established a pattern of mail or 11 sanctions against him; notwithstanding his\nwire fraud and other activities constituting predicate offenses absence in the caption of the notice of appeal,\nunder the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations counsel identified himself in its body, identified\nAct (RICO). The United States District Court for the District with specificity the sanctions levied against him,\nof New Jersey, 279 F.Supp.2d 574, Stephen M. Orlofsky, J., and expressly gave notice that those sanctions\ndenied the patient's motion to file an amended complaint, and would be appealed, albeit by his client, and such\nsanctioned the patient's attorney. Patient appealed. information, set forth in a case with a single\n appellant who was not sanctioned in her own\n capacity, sufficiently evidenced counsel's intent\n to appeal alongside his client. F.R.A.P.Rule 3(c)\nHoldings: The Court of Appeals, Van Antwerpen, Circuit\n (4), 28 U.S.C.A.\nJudge, held that:\n 5 Cases that cite this headnote\n[1] order denying leave to file an amended complaint had\nthe effect of dismissing the plaintiff's federal claims with\nprejudice, thus rendering a final decision for purposes of [3] Judgment Dismissal and nonsuit\nappeal; Judgment Reviewing court's\n determination\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 3 of 14\n\n\n Under New Jersey law, state appellate court's\n affirmance of a dismissal with prejudice for want *483 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n of an affidavit of merit was an adjudication on District of New Jersey. (Dist.Ct. No. 02\u2013CV\u20131136). Before:\n the merits for purposes of res judicata. Hon. Stephen M. Orlofsky.\n\n 6 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms\n\n Frank D. Branella, Philadelpia, PA, for Appellant.\n [4] Judgment Identity of Cause of Action or\n Relief Sought Alan S. Gold, Gold, Butkovitz & Robins, Elkins Park, PA,\n Stanley P. Stahl, Sharon K. Galpern, Stahl & Delaurentis,\n Patient's federal action, alleging that defendants'\n Voorhees, NJ, Joseph A. Martin, Kerri E. Chewning, Archer\n acts subsequent to their medical treatment of\n & Greiner, Haddonfield, NJ, Thomas F. Marshall, Law Office\n the patient established a pattern of activities\n of Thomas F. Marshall, Mount Holly, NJ, for Appellees.\n constituting predicate offenses under the\n Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations\n Before AMBRO, VAN ANTWERPEN, and TASHIMA, *\n Act (RICO), did not arise from a separate\n Circuit Judges.\n transaction or occurrence from that underlying\n her state court medical malpractice suit for\n purposes of res judicata under New Jersey\n law; patient could have presented her federal OPINION OF THE COURT\n RICO claims in state court, and made\n VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.\n fraudulent concealment claims arising out of her\n hysterectomy procedure as early as the date the **1 Appellant Enez Balthazar brought a medical\n lower state court denied her motion to amend malpractice suit in New Jersey state court that was dismissed\n her state complaint to allege such claims. 18 with prejudice when her attorney failed to file an affidavit\n U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1962. of merit as required by state law. Before a state appeals\n court affirmed that *484 dismissal, Balthazar brought this\n 10 Cases that cite this headnote\n action based upon the same events she had alleged in\n state court. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the District\n [5] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions Affirmative Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, granting\n defenses, effect of Balthazar leave to move to file an amended complaint. Before\n Attorneys and Legal Services Non- she did so, a state appeals court affirmed the dismissal of her\n monetary sanctions state court action. Balthazar subsequently moved to amend\n her federal complaint. The proposed amended complaint\n Non-monetary Rule 11 sanctions, ordering\n sounded not only in the same underlying allegations already\n counsel to attend two continuing legal education\n rejected by the state appellate court, but also essentially in the\n courses, were properly imposed on counsel for\n same underlying allegations already once dismissed by the\n filing a proposed amended complaint that was\n District Court. The District Court denied Balthazar's motion\n barred by res judicata; substantive allegations in\n on several grounds, including res judicata, forming the basis\n the proposed amended complaint were almost\n for this appeal. The District Court also sanctioned Balthazar's\n precisely parallel to the client's unsuccessful\n attorney, requiring him to attend continuing legal education\n state court claims, and were also almost\n classes. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.\n identical to allegations that the district court\n had already dismissed in the client's original\n federal complaint. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 11,\n 28 U.S.C.A. I.\n\n 9 Cases that cite this headnote The origins of this appeal may be summarized as follows.\n After filing a medical malpractice action in New Jersey state\n court on behalf of his client, Ms. Balthazar, attorney Frank\n Branella failed to file an affidavit of merit in support of his\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 4 of 14\n\n\nclient's action. The omission, which has never been disputed\nand is required by New Jersey law, caused Ms. Bathazar's On appeal, Balthazar argues that her complaint should\nmedical malpractice action to be dismissed with prejudice have been preserved because of the allegedly fraudulent\non May 14, 2001. Balthazar v. Atlantic City Med. Ctr., et maintenance of relevant records.... Balthazar also ... claims\nal., N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div., Camden County, No. L\u20134527\u2013 error in the court's denial of her motion to amend her\n99 (2001). A state appellate court would later affirm that complaint....\ndismissal on March 5, 2003. 358 N.J.Super. 13, 816 A.2d\n ...\n1059 (2003). 1\n ... Balthazar argues in her brief, and counsel argued orally\nWhile the state appellate decision was pending, Ms. that: \u2018The pivotal issue is whether appellant must rely on\nBalthazar, through Mr. Branella, filed a complaint in federal the fraudulent medical record that has been provided by\ncourt against the same defendants. The federal complaint respondents.... Appellant can prove the record is fraudulent\nalleged that defendants' acts subsequent to their medical and unreliable....\u2019\ntreatment of Ms. Balthazar established a pattern of mail or\nwire fraud and other activities constituting predicate offenses Balthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, et al., 358\nunder the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations N.J.Super. 13, 16\u201321, 816 A.2d 1059, 1061\u201363 (2003). With\n respect to these issues, the appellate court determined that:\nAct, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1962 et seq. (\u201cRICO\u201d). 2 This federal\ncomplaint arose from the same conduct at issue in the\ndismissed state court action; it alleged that the same\n We do not find patent the \u2018fraud\u2019 that\ndefendants had attempted to conceal the same acts of medical\n plaintiff claims to exist, and find no\nnegligence that had occurred during the same (and only)\n evidence that would suggest that it\nmedical procedure that defendants had ever performed on Ms.\n occurred.... Thus, this is not a case in\nBalthazar\u2014an abdominal hysterectomy on January 27, 1998.\n which there is evidence of deliberate\nSpecifically, the federal complaint alleged the defendants had\n destruction or alteration of medical\nconspired to use false records to defeat Ms. Balthazar's state\n records in anticipation of suit....\ncourt case and to defraud Ms. Balthazar by increasing the cost\nof litigation, thereby wasting her assets. 3 In addition to this\nRICO claim, Balthazar's federal compliant *485 alleged a\n Id. at 21, 816 A.2d at 1064. Further, as to allegedly\nconspiracy to deny her due process and equal protection under\n fraudulent acts arising out of the surgery, the appellate court\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985 as well as related state law claims.\n also determined that the allegedly fraudulent document\u2014a\n second operative report in Balthazar's hospital chart\u2014was\n **2 Subsequent to the filing of this federal complaint, a New\n substantially similar to the first operative report, and that\nJersey appellate court affirmed, in a published opinion, the\n defendants had provided a reasonable explanation for the\ndismissal of Ms. Balthazar's state court medical malpractice\n presence of the second operative report. As such, it concluded,\naction. As discussed infra, central to our analysis in this case\n \u201c[a]ny \u2018fraud\u2019 was thus inconsequential.\u201d Id. at 22, 816 A.2d\nis the question of what the state appellate court adjudicated as\n at 1064. In so concluding, the appellate court also rejected\nto Ms. Balthazar's state court litigation. On its face, the state\n claims by Balthazar that defendants had \u201cdeliberately misled\nappellate court decision states in pertinent part:\n her\u201d about certain sutures, finding \u201c[n]o support for the claim\n Plaintiff Enez Balthazar appeals from an order of May of deliberate misinformation ... in the record.\u201d Id. at n. 8.\n 23, 2000 dismissing with prejudice her claims for medical Further as to the allegedly fraudulent acts that Balthazar\n malpractice against [the defendants] as the result of [her] had used to support her motion to amend her complaint, the\n failure to comply with the requirements of the affidavit of appellate court stated:\n merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A\u201326 through \u201329. Balthazar\n As a final matter, Balthazar argues that the court committed\n also appeals from an order of May 14, 2001 denying her\n error in denying as lacking factual support her motion to\n motion to amend her complaint to allege claims of battery\n amend her complaint to assert causes of action for battery\n and fraudulent concealment. We affirm.\n and fraudulent concealment....\n ...\n **3 ...\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 5 of 14\n\n\n Branella, as well as cross-motions by the parties to disqualify\n ... For the reasons discussed at length earlier in this opinion, their respective counsel. In an opinion and order filed August\n we find no grounds for a claim of fraudulent concealment. 15, 2003, the District Court (1) denied Balthazar's motion for\n We thus find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in leave to file the amended complaint and (2) imposed non-\n denying Balthazar the right of amendment. monetary sanctions on Mr. Branella pursuant to Rule 11(b)\n (1). The District Court determined that Balthazar's proposed\nId. at 26\u201327, 816 A.2d at 1067\u201368. For these reasons,\n amended complaint (I) failed to state claims under RICO\nthe state appellate court affirmed the state trial court in\n and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985; (ii) was barred by the doctrine of res\nits entirety, including the state trial court's dismissal of\n judicata; and (iii) was also barred by the Rooker\u2013Feldman\nBalthazar's case with prejudice for *486 failing to comply\n doctrine. The District Court then denied the parties' motions\nwith the requirements of New Jersey's affidavit of merit\n for sanctions and disqualifications. This appeal followed.\nstatute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A\u201326 through \u201329. Id.\n\nMeanwhile, in federal court, before the state appellate court\nhad rendered this decision, Appellees the University of II.\nMedicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and Dr. Richard Cooper\nmoved to dismiss Balthazar's federal complaint pursuant to **4 [1] This case presents two questions of jurisdiction that\nFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because the state appellate court had we must resolve at the outset. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\nnot yet rendered its opinion, summarized above, the District Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d\nCourt denied the motion on the grounds that Balthazar's 210 (1998) (\u201c[E]very federal appellate court has a special\nfederal claims were not plainly \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d obligation to satisfy itself ... of its own jurisdiction ....\u201d)\nwith a state court adjudication. (internal quotation omitted); Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d\n 812, 815 (3d Cir.2005) (same). We first determine the status\nSubsequently, Appellees the Atlantic City Medical Center and of the order from which Balthazar appeals, the District Court's\nAtlantic City Medical Center Community Health Services August 15, 2003 order denying her motion for leave to file an\nalso moved to dismiss the federal complaint pursuant to amended complaint. We have jurisdiction over appeals \u201cfrom\nFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The District Court granted that motion all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,\u201d\non March 3, 2003, dismissing Balthazar's claims without 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, but here, from our review of the record,\nprejudice and granting Balthazar leave for 30 days to move it appears there was neither a final order nor a dismissal\nto file an amended complaint. Balthazar does not appeal from of Balthazar's claims with prejudice after the District Court\nthat ruling. denied her motion for leave to file an amended complaint.\n\n\nTwo days latter, as summarized above, the state appellate Guided by the Supreme Court's directive that we employ\ncourt affirmed the dismissal of Balthazar's state court a \u201cpractical rather *487 than a technical construction\u201d of\ncomplaint and the denial of her motion to amend her \u00a7 1291's finality requirement, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.\ncomplaint to allege claims of, inter alia, fraudulent Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed.\nconcealment. Upon learning of the state appellate decision, 1528 (1949), we have previously held that a plaintiff can\nthe District Court in this case notified Balthazar's attorney convert a dismissal with leave to amend into a final order\non March 12, 2003 that it had reviewed the state appellate by electing to stand upon the original complaint. See, e.g.,\ndecision and that, should he move to amend based upon the Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951\u201352 (3d Cir.1976)\nevents and allegations already adjudicated therein, the District (\u201cOnly if the plaintiff ... declares his intention to stand on his\nCourt would carefully scrutinize the proposed amended complaint ... [does] the order become final and appealable.\u201d).\ncomplaint for potential Rule 11 violations. Here, however, the record shows that Balthazar did not so\n stand; indeed, as discussed, she sought to amend and appeals\nMs. Balthazar, through her attorney Mr. Branella, only from the denial of her motion to do so. Nevertheless,\nsubsequently so moved. The District Court reviewed the we believe that the grounds of the District Court's ruling,\nproposed amended complaint and issued an order to show especially as to the preclusive effect of the state court\ncause as to why Mr. Branella had not violated Rule 11 in light adjudication of Balthazar's claims, make plain the District\nof the state appellate court's adjudication. This prompted the Court's intent to dismiss her federal claims with prejudice.\ndefendants to file several motions for sanctions against Mr. As such, requiring Balthazar to return to the District Court\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 6 of 14\n\n\nnow would wastefully elevate form over substance. See, e.g., dismissed for ... failure to name a party whose intent to appeal\nSchrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1407 (3d Cir.1991) is otherwise clear from the notice.\u201d Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(4).\n(holding district court's use of transcript as a final order,\nwhile inappropriate, did not deprive us of jurisdiction). We While we have not applied our decision in Collier to Rule 3 as\nthus conclude that, with the 30\u2013day amendment period in revised, we have held that \u201c[t]he purpose of Rule 3(c)'s *488\nthe District Court's March 3, 2003 order having expired, the identification requirement is to provide notice to the court\nDistrict Court's subsequent August 15, 2003 order had the and the opposing parties of the identity of the appellants.\u201d\neffect of dismissing Balthazar's federal claims with prejudice, In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir.1997)\nthus rendering a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 (citing Torres, 487 U.S. at 318, 108 S.Ct. 2405). Such purpose\n1291. has been satisfied here. Notwithstanding his absence in the\n caption of the notice of appeal, Branella identified himself\nWe believe our conclusion is supported by our decision in in its body, identified with specificity the sanctions levied\nShapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 279 (3d against him, and expressly gave notice that those sanctions\nCir.1992) (holding \u201cno practical purpose would be served\u201d would be appealed, albeit by his client. We believe that,\nin dismissing an appeal where defendants did not question in this case, such information, set forth in a case with a\nthe appeal's timeliness and where there was but little doubt single appellant who was not sanctioned in her own capacity,\nthat the district court would, on remand, dismiss the claims sufficiently evidences attorney Branella's intent to appeal\nwith prejudice rather than revise its ruling). With no Appellee alongside his client. See Rule 3(c)(4); see also Rule 3, 1993\nin this case having questioned the timeliness of this appeal Advisory Committee Note (noting that the 1993 amendment\neither in briefing or at oral argument, and it being clear from to Rule 3(c) was intended to \u201cmake[ ] it clear that dismissal\nthe record that the District Court here would dismiss with of an appeal should not occur when it is otherwise clear from\nprejudice on remand, the reasoning of Shapiro counsels that the notice that the party intended to appeal\u201d).\nwe treat the August 15, 2003 order as a final decision for\npurposes of \u00a7 1291.\n\n III.\n **5 [2] Our second jurisdictional question is whether we\nmay consider Mr. Branella's appeal in his own capacity, as Our jurisdiction satisfied, we summarize the applicable\ndistinct from his client's, from the District Court's imposition standards of review. This Court reviews for abuse of\nof Rule 11 sanctions against him. Citing Rule 3 of the Federal discretion a district court's refusal to grant leave to amend a\nRules of Appellate Procedure and a 1992 decision of this complaint on grounds of futility. In re Adams Golf, Inc. Secs.\nCourt, Appellees contend that we lack jurisdiction to review Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir.2004). We likewise will not\nthe imposition of sanctions on attorneys who file notices disturb a district court's decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions\nof appeal only in the names of their clients. See Collier v. absent an abuse of discretion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\nMarshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 977 F.2d Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359\n93 (3d Cir.1992); Fed. R.App. P. 3(c). Generally speaking, this (1990); Waltz v. County of Lycoming, 974 F.2d 387, 288 (3d\nis true: the requirements of Rule 3(c) are jurisdictional, see Cir.1992).\nTorres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 320\u201321, 108\nS.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988), and Rule 3(c) requires\nthat a notice of appeal identify each appellant. Mr. Branella, in\nturn, observes that Torres emphasize that \u201cmere technicalities IV.\nshould not stand in the way of consideration of a case on the\n **6 Ms. Balthazar first contends that the District Court\nmerits.\u201d Id. (internal quotations omitted). He further argues abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to file\nthat Rule 3(c) was amended on December 1, 1993, after our her amended complaint. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\ndecision in Collier, and that, under the revised rule, a notice of require that leave to file an amended pleading \u201cshall be freely\nappeal may specify the parties taking the appeal by \u201cnaming given as justice so requires.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see also\neach one in the caption or body of the notice.\u201d Rule 3(c)(1) Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir.1989) (finding\n(A) (emphasis added). Mr. Branella further observes a second a \u201cstrong liberality\u201d in permitting leave to file an amended\nrevision to the Rule stating that \u201c[a]n appeal must not be\n pleading). However, leave to file is not without limits. See,\n e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 7 of 14\n\n\nL.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (denial of leave to amend is appropriate omitted). More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has\nin circumstances \u201csuch as ... bad faith, ... undue prejudice to determined that there is no reason to depart from Velasquez'\nthe opposing party ..., [and] futility of amendment\u201d). Here, the s well-settled principle in the scenario presented here, where\nDistrict Court determined that Balthazar's amended complaint the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to file an\nwas futile on several alternative grounds, a determination affidavit of merit as required by the New Jersey affidavit of\nthat appears correct in all respects. That said, the Supreme merit statute:\nCourt has instructed that, in cases such as this involving\nstate court adjudications, \u201c[d]isposition of the federal action,\nonce the state-court adjudication is complete, [is] governed **7 Like the dismissal addressed\nby preclusion law.\u201d Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. in Velasquez, a dismissal under the\nCorp., 544U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1527, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 Affidavit of Merit [statute] involves\n(2005). Accordingly, we will affirm on that basis alone. a failure to comply with the statute\n that the plaintiff cannot cure merely\nThe preclusion analysis in this case is straightforward. \u201c \u2018It by amending the complaint. Non-\nis now settled that a federal court must give to a state court compliance does not inhere in the\njudgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that complaint but in the failure to\njudgment under the law of the State in which the judgment satisfy the essential, collateral affidavit\nwas rendered.\u2019 \u201d Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 337 (3d requirement. The plaintiff would be\nCir.2004) (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of prohibited by res judicata based on the\nEduc., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984)); Court's ruling in Velasquez from filing\nsee also Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, a new but identical claim.\n135 (3d Cir.1999) (\u201cfederal courts should apply the general\nrule that the preclusive effect of a judgment is determined\nby the preclusion law of the issuing court\u201d). 4 Under New Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 246 708 A.2d 401, 415\n *489 Jersey law, the following elements are required for res (1998). In addition to this controlling authority establishing\njudicata: (1) the final judgment in the prior action must be that Ms. Balthazar's state court case was adjudicated on\nvalid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action the merits as a matter of law, it is clear that the state\nmust be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; appellate court, as discussed supra, thoroughly considered\nand (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same Ms. Balthazar's claims and evidence sounding in fraudulent\ntransaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. See concealment with respect to both her argument against\nMcNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm'n of the State of dismissal and her argument that the trial court erred in\nN.J., 117 N.J. 364, 395, 828 A.2d 840, 859 (2003); see also refusing her motion to amend.\nWatkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398,\n412, 591 A.2d 592, 599 (N.J.1991). [4] Balthazar next suggests that her federal action arises\n from a separate transaction or occurrence, but we are not\n [3] Here, as to the first element, it is undisputed that the persuaded by her arguments that she could not raise her\nstate court adjudication was valid and final, leaving only federal claim in her state court action and that she did\nthe questions of whether there has been an adjudication not discover the facts supporting her federal claim until\non the merits and whether the claims grow out of the the fall of 2001. First, Balthazar could have presented\nsame transaction or occurrence. Balthazar argues both in her federal RICO claims in state court. See Tafflin v.\nthe negative. She first suggests that an appellate court's Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887\naffirmance of a dismissal with prejudice for want of an (1990) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims\naffidavit of merit is not an adjudication on the merits. The brought pursuant to federal RICO statute). Second, Balthazar\nargument is unpersuasive because it is incorrect as a matter made fraudulent concealment claims arising out of her\nof New Jersey law. Under New Jersey law, \u201ca judgment of hysterectomy procedure as early as May 14, 2001, the date\ninvoluntary dismissal or a dismissal with prejudice constitutes the lower state court denied her motion to amend her *490\nadjudication on the merits as fully and completely as if the state complaint to allege such claims. 816 A.2d at 1061.\norder had been entered after trial.\u201d Velasquez v. Franz, 123\nN.J. 498, 507, 589 A.2d 143, 148 (1991) (internal quotation\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 8 of 14\n\n\n 11 sanctions on Mr. Branella for filing the proposed amended\nThe remaining element necessary for res judicata is not\n complaint. Upon review of the record, we conclude the\nseriously in dispute, as the parties in the federal action\n sanctions were proper in all respects. As the District Court\nare identical to the parties in the state court action, with\n correctly noted in its analysis of the substantive allegations in\nthe minor exception that Dr. Larry Kaufman was named\n the proposed amended complaint, they were almost precisely\nas a state court defendant but not as a federal defendant.\n parallel to Balthazar's unsuccessful state court claims. They\nIn her federal complaint, Balthazar sued two practices that\n were also almost identical to allegations that the District\nKaufman was affiliated with, DeStefano, Feldman, Kaufman\n Court had already dismissed in Balthazar's original federal\n& Korzeniowski, P.A., and DeStefano, Feldman & Kaufman,\n complaint. As such, the District Court acted within its\nP.A. Balthzar does not allege that Kaufman was negligent or\n discretion, as sanctions are proper when, inter alia, a party\nconspired to cover up the alleged negligence; she alleges that\n \u201cinsist[s] upon a position after it is no longer tenable....\u201d\nshe underwent a hysterectomy performed by Dr. Henderson,\n Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note.\nan employee of the medical group of DeStefano, Feldman,\nKaufman & Korzeniowski, P.A., with the assistance of Dr.\n Under Rule 11, the appropriate sanction must be limited to one\nKorzeniowski, in the presence of a resident, Dr. Richard\n \u201csufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable\nCooper. Given Dr. Kaufman's lack of direct involvement\n conduct by others similarly situated.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)\nas well as the fact that Balthazar has not argued that\n (2). Among the sanctions contemplated by Rule 11 for\nDr. Kaufman's absence prohibits preclusion, we believe his\n this purpose are compulsory attendance of legal education\nabsence is immaterial.\n classes. See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,\n 482 (3d Cir.1987). This is precisely what the District Court\nFor all of these reasons, the elements of res judicata under\n did here, ordering Mr. Branella to attend two continuing\nNew Jersey law are thus easily satisfied by the facts of this\n legal education courses, one entitled Federal Practice and\ncase.\n Procedure, the other entitled Attorney Professionalism and\n Rules of Professional Conduct. As the titles of these\nFinally, we observe counsel's correct concession at oral\n educational courses indicate, they constitute no more of a\nargument that, even if Ms. Balthazar were granted leave to\n sanction than is necessary for deterring the conduct at issue\nfile another amended complaint, she would not, and could\n here. Accordingly, *491 for this reason as well, we discern\nnot, substantially depart from the amended complaint already\n no abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court with\nrejected by the District Court. Because no amendment to Ms.\n respect to the sanctions imposed against Mr. Branella.\nBalthazar's federal complaint could abate the preclusive effect\narising from the adjudication of her state court complaint, her\nproposed amendments were futile, as would be any future\nproposed amendments. Therefore the District Court did not V.\n 5\nabuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.\n For the foregoing reasons, the August 15, 2003 order of the\n District Court is affirmed.\n\n IV.\n All Citations\n**8 [5] The final issue before us is whether the District\nCourt abused its discretion in imposing non-monetary Rule 137 Fed.Appx. 482, 2005 WL 1473901\n\n\n\n\n Footnotes\n\n\n* The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals\n for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nBalthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, 137 Fed.Appx. 482 (2005)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 9 of 14\n\n\n1 Balthazar also filed a Petition for Certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court that was denied on June\n 5, 2003.\n\n2 The civil RICO statute allows \u201c[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of\n section 1962 of this chapter [to] sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\n 1964(c).\n\n3 As Balthazar concedes in her briefs before this Court, she had previously filed a state law malpractice action\n against the same defendants alleging the same underlying harm arising out of a hysterectomy performed\n on January 27, 1998 by or through Appellees. Balthazar named in her state court action defendants Atlantic\n City Medical Center, Atlantic City Medical Center Community Health Services; Barbara Henderson; M.D.;\n Joseph DeStefano, M.D.; Allan Feldman, M.D.; Phillip Korzeniowski, M.D.; Destefano, Feldman, Kaufman\n & Korzeniowski, P.A.; Richard Cooper, M.D.; and University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey School\n of Osteopathic Medicine. Dr. Larry Kaufman was named in the state court action but not in the federal court\n action.\n\n4 Additionally, as the Supreme Court explained in Exxon, the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1738,\n requires federal courts to \u201c \u2018give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that\n State would give.\u2019 \u201d Exxon, 125 S.Ct. at 1527 (quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S.\n 518, 523, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986)).\n\n5 As such, we need not reach the District Court's alternative grounds for denying the motion.\n\n\n\nEnd of Document \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nGillam v. Reliance First Capital, LLC, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 10 of 14\n2023 WL 2163775\n\n The following facts, set forth in the Complaint and\n the attached exhibits, are presumed true for purposes of\n KeyCite Yellow Flag Defendant's motion to dismiss.\nDistinguished by Schmitendorf v. Juicy's Vapor Lounge, Inc., D.Kan.,\nMarch 6, 2024\n Plaintiff Adam Gillam (\u201cGillam\u201d or \u201cPlaintiff\u201d) is an\n 2023 WL 2163775 individual who resides in Elwood, Indiana. (See Complaint\n Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. (\u201cCompl.\u201d) ECF No. 1, \u00b6 1.) Defendant RFC is a\n For Online Publication Only Delaware-registered limited liability company headquartered\n United States District Court, E.D. New York. in Melville, New York. (Id. \u00b6 2.) RFC is a telemarketing\n company that \u201csell[s] home loans and refinancing plans to\n Adam GILLAM, individually and on behalf consumers.\u201d (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 16-17.)\n of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,\n v. Plaintiff alleges that, on or about February 22, 2017, he\n RELIANCE FIRST CAPITAL, LLC, Defendant. registered his cell phone number 1 on the National Do Not\n Call (\u201cDNC\u201d) registry. 2 (Id. \u00b6 23.) According to Gillam, his\n 21-CV-4774 (JMA) (JMW)\n cell phone number \u201cis not associated with a business, has\n |\n never been held out by Plaintiff to the public, and is primarily\n Signed February 22, 2023\n for personal use.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 24.) Between January 20 and August\n 3, 2021, Plaintiff received, but did not answer, any of the\nAttorneys and Law Firms\n approximately seventeen (17) calls originating from the same\nAvi Robert Kaufman, Pro Hac Vice, Kaufman P.A., Coral number \u2013 (877) 271-3082. (Id. \u00b6 26.) On or about August\nGables, FL, Stefan Louis Coleman, Coleman, PLLC, New 4, 2021, Gilliam received another call from the same phone\nYork, NY, for Plaintiff. number, but this time answered the call and \u201cspoke to an agent\n who was soliciting refinancing products and identified their\nAnthony J. Staltari, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, company as [Defendant].\u201d (Id. \u00b6 28.) Gillam instructed the\nLLP, New York, NY, John W. McGuinness, Manatt, Phelps agent to \u201cstop calling him,\u201d which RFC did. (Id.)\n& Phillips, Washington, DC, Paul Heeringa, Pro Hac Vice,\nManatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant. 1 Plaintiff does not include his cell phone number\n in the Complaint or his opposition to Defendant's\n motion to dismiss.\n ORDER\n 2 The National DNC Registry allows consumers\nAZRACK, United States District Judge: to register their telephone numbers and thereby\n indicate their desire not to receive telephone\n *1 Before the Court is the motion filed by Defendant\n solicitations at those numbers. See Compl. \u00b6 6; 47\nReliance First Capital, LLC (\u201cRFC\u201d or \u201cDefendant\u201d) that\n C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2).\nseeks dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (\u201cFed. R. Civ. Plaintiff initiated this action on August 24, 2021. (See\nP.\u201d), or in the alternative, to strike certain allegations from the Compl.) The Complaint asserts a single claim on behalf of\nComplaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). (See ECF No. Gillam and a putative class 3 against RFC, for its purported\n19 (Defendant's Motion)). For the reasons set forth herein, violation of their rights under Section 227(c)(5) of the\nthe Court GRANTS Defendant's motion, and dismisses the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (\u201cTCPA\u201d), 47 U.S.C. \u00a7\nComplaint with prejudice. 227, et seq. (Id.) In the Complaint, Gillam seeks injunctive,\n statutory, compensatory, and declaratory relief. (Id.)\n\n\n I. BACKGROUND 3 Gillam seeks to certify the \u201cDo Not Call Registry\n Class\u201d (\u201cDNC Registry Class\u201d), consisting of \u201c[a]ll\n persons in the United States who from four years\n prior to the filing of this action through trial\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nGillam v. Reliance First Capital, LLC, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 11 of 14\n2023 WL 2163775\n\n (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of action, providing for statutory damages in the amount of $500\n the Defendant) called more than one time, (2) for each violation as well as injunctive relief against future\n within any 12-month period, (3) where the person's violations.\u201d).\n telephone number had been listed on the National\n Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days, (4) Where, as here, a plaintiff asserts a cause of action pursuant\n for substantially the same reason Defendant called to Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA (\u201cSection 227(c)(5)\u201d), that\n Plaintiff.\u201d Compl. \u00b6 31. plaintiff must allege that the defendant: (1) initiated more than\n one \u201ctelephone solicitation call\u201d within a 12-month period;\n *2 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff\n (2) to a \u201cresidential telephone subscriber who has registered\nhas failed to sufficiently plead facts to support his TCPA cause\n his or her telephone number\u201d on the National DNC registry;\nof action. The Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss and\n (3) without the prior consent of the recipient. See Sterling v.\ndismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.\n Securus Tech., Inc., No. 18-cv-1310, 2019 WL 3387043, at\n *5-6 (D. Conn. Jul. 26, 2019) (citing Jennings, 239 F. Supp.\n 3d at 665); 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(b)(1)(A)-(B), (c)(5); 47 C.F.R. \u00a7\n II. DISCUSSION 64.1200(c)(2).\n\nA. Legal Standard\n Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint based on\nTo survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of\n Plaintiff's purported failure to sufficiently allege that he: (1)\nCivil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege sufficient\n received more than one RFC-initiated \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d\nfacts \u201cto state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\u201d\n in a 12-month period; and (ii) is a \u201cresidential telephone\nBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).\n subscriber\u201d under Section 227(c)(5). The Court agrees and\nA claim is facially plausible only \u201cwhen the plaintiff pleads\n dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.\nfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\nalleged.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 1. Plaintiff Does Not Plausibly Allege That He\nTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Mere labels and legal conclusions Received More Than One \u201cTelephone Solicitation\u201d in\nwill not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a 12-Month Period\na motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual *3 Defendant initially contends that Gillam's TCPA claim\nallegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all should be dismissed with prejudice based on his failure to\nreasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Dobroff sufficiently allege that he received more than one RFC-\nv. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., No. 21-cv-1567, initiated \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d in a 12-month period. See\n2022 WL 4641128, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (citing 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c). Under the TCPA's promulgating\nCleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. regulations, a \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d means \u201cthe initiation of\n2006)). A court may also consider materials attached to the a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging\ncomplaint, materials integral to the complaint, and materials the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or\nincorporated into the complaint by reference. See Sira v. services.\u201d Id. \u00a7 64.1200(f)(15). A telephone solicitation does\nMorton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004). not, however, include \u201ca[ny] call or message [t]o any person\n with that person's express invitation or permission, [or] [t]o\n any person with whom the caller has an established business\nB. Plaintiff's Telephone Consumer Protection Act Claim\n relationship.\u201d Id. \u00a7\u00a7 64.1200 (f)(5) & (f)(15). A review of\nUnder the TCPA, it is generally unlawful \u201cto make any call\n the Complaint reveals Plaintiff's failure to adequately plead\n(other than a call made for emergency purposes or made\n these facts. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege that: (1)\nwith the prior express consent of the called party) using\n Plaintiff had not previously invited or permitted Defendant\nany automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or\n to call him and that (2) he and RFC lacked an \u201cestablished\nprerecorded voice\u2014to any ... cellular telephone service [or]\n business relationship\u201d prior to the receipt of any calls from\nresidential telephone line[.]\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(b)(1)(A)-(B);\nJennings v. Cont. Serv. Group, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 662, RFC's agent(s). 4 See Compl. \u00b6 17.\n665 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Physicians Healthsource, Inc.\nv. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 847 F.3d 92, 94-95 4 Plaintiff's reliance on paragraphs 19-21 of\n(2d Cir. 2017)) (\u201cThe [TCPA] creates a private right of the Complaint is misplaced. Specifically, those\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nGillam v. Reliance First Capital, LLC, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 12 of 14\n2023 WL 2163775\n\n paragraphs contain general allegations about the solicitation[s]\u201d under Section 227(c)(5). See Greene, 2021\n class and do not specifically address Plaintiff. WL 4926495, at *5. As Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege\n this element of his claim, the Court grants Defendant's motion\nPlaintiff has similarly failed to allege sufficient facts\n to dismiss.\nregarding the content of the calls from which the Court\ncould infer that the purpose of the calls was to encourage\n\u201cthe purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, 2. Plaintiff Does Not Plausibly Allege That He is a\nor services.\u201d 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200 (f)(15). Rather, Plaintiff \u201cResidential Telephone Subscriber\u201d\nmerely concludes, without any factual support, that an RFC *4 On its face, Section 227(c) applies only to \u201cresidential\u201d\nagent \u201csolicit[ed] refinancing products\u201d on the August 4, telephone subscribers. See 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5); 47 C.F.R.\n2021 telephone call. Compl. \u00b6 28. When faced with similarly \u00a7 64.1200(c). While multiple federal courts have found that\ndeficient complaints, courts within and outside of this Circuit a cellular telephone subscriber may satisfy Section 227(c)\u2019s\nhave dismissed the complaints without prejudice, and with \u201cresidential telephone subscriber\u201d element, a plaintiff must\nleave to amend. See Sterling, 2019 WL 3387043, at *10 plausibly allege facts establishing that his cellular telephone\n(dismissing TCPA claim without prejudice and with leave to is actually used for \u201cresidential purposes.\u201d See, e.g., Marks\nfile an amended complaint, assuming \u201cPlaintiffs [could] cure v. Unique Lifestyle Vacations, LLC, No. 20-cv-4915, 2021\nthe deficiencies of their TCPA claims.\u201d); Gulden v. Consol. WL 5495778, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2021) (\u201cA plaintiff\nWorld Travel Inc., No. 16-cv-01113, 2017 WL 3841491, at *3 may provide specific facts to support his allegation that his\n(D. Ariz. Feb. 15, 2017) (same); Jackson v. Caribbean Cruise cell phone is residential under the TCPA. However, it is\nLine, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 129, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same). not required that a plaintiff provide extensive detail to state\n a plausible claim as to the residential character of his cell\nAdditionally, while Plaintiff alleges receiving multiple phone.\u201d); Strange v. ABC Co., No. 19-cv-1361, 2021 WL\ncalls, he only alleges answering one call and having 798870, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2021) (citing Cunningham\none conversation with an RFC representative. See Compl. v. McDonald, No. 15-cv-215, 2018 WL 6737418, *2 (M.D.\n\u00b6\u00b6 25-28. Even if the Court were to assume arguendo Tenn. Nov. 5, 2018) (\u201cWhile a person utilizing a cellular\nthat Plaintiff had sufficiently pled receipt of a telephone phone may fall within the definition of a \u2018residential\nsolicitation on August 4, 2021, his failure to plausibly plead telephone subscriber\u2019 under the act, Plaintiff's pleadings\nreceipt of at least one additional telephone solicitation from allege only that calls were made to his cellular phone and\nan RFC agent within the requisite 12-month period is fatal to he has pled no facts or offered evidence sufficient for the\nhis Section 227(c)(5) cause of action. See 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c) court to draw the conclusion that he has stated a cause of\n(5); 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(f)(15). Plaintiff's contention that the action under subsection (c)(5)\u201d)). A plaintiff's failure to do so\nCourt should consider the other calls received by Gillam as renders his Section 227(c)(5) claim(s) vulnerable to dismissal.\n\u201ctelephone solicitations\u201d because they were allegedly \u201cclose See Kemen v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. LLC, No. 22-cv-152,\nin time to and from the same telephone numbers\u201d as the\n 2023 WL 361136, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2023) (finding\nAugust 4, 2021 telephone solicitation, is unavailing. See ECF a TCPA claim inadequately pled without allegations showing\nNo. 21 (Pl. Opp.) at 2; Nicholas Greene v. Select Funding, residential use); Hicks v. Alarm.com, Inc., No. 20-cv-532,\nLLC, No. 2:20-cv-7333, 2021 WL 4926495, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2020 WL 9261758, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2020) (same).\nFeb. 5, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint because he\n\u201conly alleged one telephone solicitation\u201d because \u201cmore than Based on the above caselaw, the Court finds that Gillam has\none telephone solicitation is needed to trigger a violation\u201d and failed to sufficiently plead that he was, at the time of the\nthe plaintiff failed to allege \u201cthe content of the other calls that calls in question, a \u201cresidential telephone subscriber.\u201d Here,\nwould allow the Court to reasonably infer that these other Plaintiff's Complaint contains conclusory allegations that his\ncalls were solicitations.\u201d) Even assuming the accuracy of the cell phone number was not \u201cassociated with a business, has\nscreenshot of the call log included in Plaintiff's Complaint, never been held out by Plaintiff to the public, and is primarily\nGillam did not actually engage with any of RFC's purported for personal use,\u201d he fails to specifically allege any facts from\nrepresentatives until the August 4, 2021 call. See Compl. \u00b6 which the Court could infer that the phone number is used\n26. Specifically, the call log shows, with the exception of for residential purposes. (See Compl. \u00b6 24). This deficiency\nthe August 4, 2021 call, that the other calls were \u201cblocked,\u201d is similar to the plaintiff's pleading miscues in Hicks, where\n\u201cmissed call[s]\u201d or \u201cdeclined call[s].\u201d As such, Plaintiff has that court dismissed the plaintiff's Section 227(c) claim based\nnot plausibly alleged that these prior calls were \u201ctelephone on the plaintiff's failure to articulate \u2013 despite his allegations\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1\nGillam v. Reliance First Capital, LLC, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/15/26 Page 13 of 14\n2023 WL 2163775\n\n No. 20-cv-3583, 2021 WL 4623275, at *4 (E.D. Pa.\nthat the subject cell phone number was \u201cnot associated with a\n Oct. 7, 2021).\nbusiness\u201d and was \u201cfor personal use\u201d \u2013 any factual support for\nthe \u201cresidential telephone subscriber\u201d element of his Section\n227(c) claim. Hicks, 2020 WL 9261758, at *5. The Court\n CONCLUSION\nsimilarly finds that Gillam has failed to sufficiently plead this\nadditional element of his Section 227(c) claim. Accordingly, For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has\n 5 failed to allege sufficient facts to support his one-count TCPA\nthe Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss.\n Complaint. The Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss\n5 and dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.\n Based on the Court's above findings and dismissal\n of Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, it is\n unnecessary to address Defendant's motion to SO ORDERED.\n strike certain portions of the Complaint, which\n the Court denies as moot. See Kemen, 2023 WL All Citations\n 361136, at *5; Smith v. Direct Bldg Supplies, LLC,\n Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2023 WL 2163775\n\nEnd of Document \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 66-1 Filed 04/15/26 Page 14 of 14\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n The undersigned hereby certifies that I am causing the foregoing and all\n\nattachments to be filed electronically with the Court, where it is available for viewing\n\nand downloading from the Court\u2019s ECF system, and that such electronic filing\n\nautomatically generates a Notice of Electronic Filing constituting service of the filed\n\ndocument upon all counsel of record.\n\n\nDated: April 15, 2026 /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n A. PAUL HEERINGA\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-15T11:53:28.177814-07:00","document_number":"66","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"15509752622","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Unpublished Opinion(s)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-04-15T11:52:55.026851-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.498641-07:00","date_filed":"2026-04-15","time_filed":null,"entry_number":66,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-04-15.002","pacer_sequence_number":175,"description":"REPLY BRIEF re 57 MOTION for Sanctions filed by ViaSat, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Opinion(s))(Heeringa, Paul) (Entered: 04/15/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/460805582/","id":460805582,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/475879987/","id":475879987,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2026-04-15T05:52:08.052745-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.449458-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Docket Annotation","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-04-15T05:52:08.033608-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.409918-07:00","date_filed":"2026-04-15","time_filed":null,"entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-04-15.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"DOCKET ANNOTATION: Counsel is advised to refile docket entry 65 using the correct event: Civil Events - Motions and Related Filings - Responses and Replies (Briefs) -- Brief in Opposition (Do not use for Summary Judgment Motions). (ibr) -- (PLEASE DISREGARD THIS ANNOTATION, ATTORNEY USED CORRECT DOCKET EVENT)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/460751257/","id":460751257,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/475820451/","id":475820451,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/65/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-14T13:10:51.854250-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.378615-07:00","sha1":"b5d9582548f2bfec76265749608466d5fd7e35aa","page_count":22,"file_size":399846,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.65.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.65.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 1 of 22\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\non behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n\nv. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n\nVIASAT, INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n\nDEFENDANT\u2019S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF\u2019S MOTION FOR\n SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT\u2019S COUNSEL\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 2 of 22\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nINTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................... 2\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................... 3\n A. Plaintiff Possessed Recordings of the Alleged April 19, 2024 Calls\n Before Filing Suit. .................................................................................3\n B. Plaintiff\u2019s Detailed Description of The Contents of The Calls is\n Inconsistent With The Recordings. .......................................................4\n C. Viasat\u2019s Initial Motion to Dismiss Was Accurate and Based on the\n Limited Information Available to it at the Time. ..................................5\n D. Plaintiff Withheld the Recordings Until November 20, 2025. .............7\n E. Plaintiff Files a Retaliatory Sanctions Motion Just Twelve Days After\n Defendant Filed its Own Sanctions Motion. .........................................8\nSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED ........................................................... 9\nLEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................................. 9\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 10\nI. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY UNSUPPORTED OR\n OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE FACTUAL CONTENTION IN\n VIASAT\u2019S SANCTIONS MOTION. .............................................................. 10\nII. PLAINTIFF\u2019S \u201cIRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTION\u201d THEORY\n MISCHARACTERIZES VIASAT\u2019S SANCTIONS MOTION. .................... 12\nIII. PLAINTIFF\u2019S VENDOR\u2011CONCEALMENT THEORY IS A DISCOVERY\n DISPUTE FORECLOSED BY RULE 11(D).................................................. 15\nIV. VIASAT CHALLENGES PLAINTIFF\u2019S DEMONSTRABLY FALSE\n ALLEGATIONS, NOT AMENDMENT. ....................................................... 16\nV. PLAINTIFF PROVIDES NO DEVELOPED BASIS FOR\n INHERENT\u2011AUTHORITY SANCTIONS. .................................................... 17\nCONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 18\n\n\n\n\n i\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 3 of 22\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\n CASES\nArio v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Acct.,\n 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010). ..............................................................9, 11, 13, 14\nCooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,\n 496 U.S. 384 (1990). ...........................................................................................10\nFord Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc.,\n 930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1991) ...................................................................10, 11, 13\nGaiardo v. Ethyl Corp.,\n 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1987) .........................................................................10, 11\nIn re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions,\n 278 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2002) ...............................................................................17\nIn re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation,\n 162 F.R.D. 46 (D.V.I. 1995) ...............................................................................16\nWartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int\u2019l, Inc.,\n 315 F. Supp. 2d 623 (D.N.J. 2004) .....................................................................10\nYoung v. Smith,\n 269 F. Supp. 3d 251 (D.N.J. 2017) ...............................................................11, 13\n RULES\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)........................................................................................9, 10\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) ........................................................................................2, 17\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(d) ................................................................................1, 10, 15, 18\nRule 11 ..............................................................................................................passim\nRule 11(b)(3) ..............................................................................................................3\nRule 16 .....................................................................................................................16\nRule 37 .....................................................................................................................16\nRules 26\u201337....................................................................................................1, 10, 16\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 4 of 22\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Sanctions (see Dkt. 61) is not a good\u2011faith effort to\n\nenforce Rule 11. It is a retaliatory cross\u2011motion\u2014filed only after Viasat moved for\n\nsanctions against Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2014 that improperly asserts discovery grievances\n\nand disputed characterizations of the record as \u201csanctionable\u201d misconduct, all in an\n\neffort to distract from the serious issues raised by Viasat\u2019s own motion.1\n\n Plaintiff claims Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion is itself sanctionable because it\n\nhinges on a supposed \u201cirreconcilable contradiction.\u201d Dkt. 62 at 9. But Viasat did not\n\nchange positions. It has consistently and accurately maintained that it did not make\n\nor authorize the subject calls. Viasat\u2019s reference to an \u201cinbound\u201d call in its first\n\nmotion to dismiss was accurate\u2014the call records in Viasat\u2019s possession show the\n\nreceipt of an inbound call from Plaintiff\u2019s number. While subsequent discovery\n\nindicates that this call was likely transferred by an unknown third party to Viasat\u2019s\n\nvendor, XYZies, Viasat\u2019s statement in one sentence in one brief that the relevant call\n\nwas made \u201cto Viasat\u201d was not sanctionable. It was reasonable based on what Viasat\n\nunderstood at the time.\n\n\n\n\n1\n Rule 11 explicitly excludes discovery conduct from its scope. Fed. R. Civ. P.\n11(d). To the extent Plaintiff believes discovery misconduct occurred, he should\nhave moved under the appropriate rules (i.e., Rules 26 through 37) and not brought\nthis retaliatory Rule 11 motion.\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 5 of 22\n\n\n\n\n Most importantly, Viasat\u2019s own sanctions motion does not turn on whether the\n\nsecond call described by Plaintiff was inbound, outbound, routed, or transferred.\n\nInstead, the motion targets a narrower and indisputable set of facts: Plaintiff and his\n\ncounsel repeatedly alleged\u2014both in pleadings and sworn submissions\u2014that callers\n\non two different calls stated and confirmed they were calling from Viasat, despite\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s possession of audio recordings that contradict those allegations. Those\n\nrecordings, produced many months into this case\u2014and after much litigation\n\noccurred that would have been entirely unnecessary had the recordings been\n\nrevealed sooner\u2014prove that this lawsuit should have never been filed against Viasat\n\nand thus that Plaintiff\u2019s retaliatory sanctions motion should be denied.\n\n PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Sanctions and Brief in\n\nSupport, seeking sanctions against Viasat and its counsel pursuant to Federal Rule\n\nof Civil Procedure 11(c)(2). See Dkts. 61 and 62.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s motion is expressly directed at Viasat\u2019s motion for sanctions against\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s counsel. See Dkts. 57 and 58. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that Viasat\u2019s\n\nsanctions motion is itself sanctionable because it allegedly relies on factual\n\ncontentions \u201cirreconcilably contradicted\u201d by Viasat\u2019s earlier submissions and\n\nbecause it purportedly attempts to punish Plaintiff for seeking leave to amend after\n\nViasat allegedly concealed a vendor\u2019s identity. Dkt. 61 at 2; Dkt. 62 at 9.\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 6 of 22\n\n\n\n\n Viasat submits this opposition to show that Plaintiff\u2019s sanctions motion (i)\n\ndoes not identify any factual contention in Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion that lacked\n\nevidentiary support when made or later advocated, (ii) mischaracterizes Viasat\u2019s\n\nearlier filings and declarations, (iii) improperly seeks Rule 11 relief for discovery\n\nconduct outside Rule 11\u2019s scope, and (iv) attempts to convert Rule 11 into a\n\nretaliation mechanism.\n\n STATEMENT OF FACTS\n This dispute concerns whether Viasat\u2019s counsel acted reasonably when\n\nadvocating positions based on the information available at the time, and whether\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s later litigation tactics\u2014particularly his withholding of critical call\n\nrecordings\u2014was justified given what Viasat stated in its early filings.\n\n A. Plaintiff Possessed Recordings of the Alleged April 19, 2024\n Calls Before Filing Suit.\n\n Before filing this action, Plaintiff recorded the two calls he allegedly received\n\non April 19, 2024, that form the entire basis of his claims against Viasat. See Dkts.\n\n44-1 and 44-2. Plaintiff undisputedly possessed those recordings prior to suit, prior\n\nto the filing of the Complaint, and prior to the certification of factual contentions\n\nunder Rule 11(b)(3).\n\n Those recordings were uniquely within Plaintiff\u2019s control. They captured the\n\nalleged calls contemporaneously and reflected precisely what the callers said\u2014or\n\ndid not say\u2014about their identity and corporate affiliation. Plaintiff nevertheless\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 7 of 22\n\n\n\n\nchose not to disclose or produce those recordings with his Complaint, with his First\n\nAmended Complaint, or during the early stages of the litigation.\n\n B. Plaintiff\u2019s Detailed Description of The Contents of The\n Calls is Inconsistent With The Recordings.\n\n Despite having call recordings proving otherwise, Plaintiff affirmatively\n\nalleged\u2014repeatedly and in detail\u2014that the callers identified and confirmed\n\nthemselves as calling from Viasat, marketed only Viasat products, and spoke as\n\nthough they were representatives of Viasat. Those allegations were the linchpin of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s theory as to who placed the subject calls and his efforts to impose direct\n\nTCPA liability on Viasat. See Dkt. 1.\n\n Plaintiff doubled down on that narrative in the First Amended Complaint and\n\nin sworn submissions, again without producing the recordings. See Dkt. 21. Plaintiff\n\nrepeated these false assertions under oath in a sworn declaration. See Dkt. 30-2. At\n\nno point did Plaintiff disclose that the recordings failed to contain the\n\n\u201cconfirmations\u201d he alleged, or that they undermined his twice pleaded narrative.\n\nViasat\u2014and the Court\u2014were asked to assess his liability theory without access to\n\nthe most direct contemporaneous evidence of what actually occurred on the calls.\n\n Critically, the call recordings establish the callers never claimed to be from\n\nViasat. The first caller did not identify himself at all, let alone mention Viasat. Nor\n\ndid the second individual who initially called Plaintiff. And the \u201cspecialist\u201d to whom\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 8 of 22\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiff later spoke on the second call (after being transferred by two unidentified\n\ncallers) claimed to represent more than 10 companies and pitched services from\n\nmore than just Viasat. In fact, the second recording itself suggests that Plaintiff has\n\nalways known he was not speaking to Viasat; Plaintiff himself tells the \u201cspecialist\u201d\n\nthat \u201cyou aren\u2019t Viasat\u201d before ending the call. Dkt. 44-2 at 11 (emphasis added).\n\nAnd yet Plaintiff and his counsel still sued Viasat, repeatedly alleging that the callers\n\nconfirmed they were from Viasat. Plaintiff repeated those false claims in his First\n\nAmended Complaint, and seeks to add more falsehoods through a proposed Second\n\nAmended Complaint.\n\n C. Viasat\u2019s Initial Motion to Dismiss Was Accurate and Based\n on the Limited Information Available to it at the Time.\n\n When Viasat timely responded to the original Complaint weeks after its filing,\n\nit did so without knowledge of the contents of Plaintiff\u2019s recordings and without any\n\ndisclosure from Plaintiff that recordings existed. Plaintiff also failed to preserve his\n\nown phone records. With no phone records and no recordings, Viasat had no proof\n\nthat Plaintiff actually received either call alleged in his complaint.\n\n The only evidence Viasat had at that time it moved to dismiss was its own\n\npolicy prohibiting outbound telemarketing and its business records. Viasat\n\nintroduced that evidence through the declaration of Mr. Gregory Henderson. Dkt.\n\n11-2. Mr. Henderson explained, among other things, that consumers place calls \u201cto\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 9 of 22\n\n\n\n\nViasat or to certain third parties\u201d to request information or purchase services, and\n\nthat Viasat does not make outbound telemarketing calls and does not allow third\n\nparties to telemarket on its behalf. Dkt. 11-2 at 3. 2 Plaintiff\u2019s sanctions motion and\n\nbrief repeatedly claim Viasat swore \u201cno third party was involved.\u201d Dkt. 61 at 2. But\n\nthe Henderson declaration filed in support of Viasat\u2019s initial motion to dismiss does\n\nnot state that \u201cno third party exists.\u201d Dkt. 11-2. As noted above, it specifically\n\ndiscusses third parties and notes that consumers may place calls to such third parties\n\nbut that those parties are not permitted to make outbound calls on Viasat\u2019s behalf.\n\nId. at \u00b6 8.\n\n The Henderson declaration also described the call records in Viasat\u2019s\n\npossession at the time of its initial motion to dismiss. Those records contained one\n\nrelevant entry that appeared to show that Plaintiff placed an inbound call to inquire\n\nabout internet services. Dkt. 11-2 at \u00b6 12. Viasat thus reasonably argued that, as far\n\nas it knew at the time, Plaintiff made an inbound call \u201cto Viasat.\u201d\n\n As the case progressed, Viasat reviewed and undertook its own third party\n\ndiscovery to test Plaintiff\u2019s attribution claims. For instance, a subpoena to IP Horizon\n\n\n2\n Similarly, the later Henderson declaration filed in support of Viasat\u2019s motion to\ndismiss the First Amended Complaint describes Viasat\u2019s \u201cinbound\u201d marketing\nprogram (consumer\u2011initiated calls), reiterates that Viasat does not make outbound\nmarketing calls and contractually prohibits outbound telemarketing on its behalf,\nstates Viasat has no records of making an outbound call to Plaintiff\u2019s number and\nhas confirmed that no third party vendors working with Viasat called Plaintiff\u2019s\nnumber on Viasat\u2019s behalf. Dkt. 23-1.\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 10 of 22\n\n\n\n\n(issued by Plaintiff) revealed that the phone numbers Plaintiff attributed to Viasat\n\nwere not associated with Viasat and were not assigned to any vendor authorized to\n\nhandle calls on Viasat\u2019s behalf. See Dkts. 23-26, 23-7, 23-8. A subpoena to T-Mobile\n\n(issued by Viasat), Plaintiff\u2019s cell carrier, yielded authenticated call records that did\n\nnot reflect Plaintiff\u2019s receipt of the subject calls, let alone a call to Plaintiff from\n\nViasat. See Dkts. 23-3, 23-4, and 23-25.\n\n Subsequent discovery clarified what the carrier and call records available at\n\nthe time of Viasat\u2019s initial motion to dismiss could not: the relevant call reflected in\n\nViasat\u2019s records possibly captures an eventual call transfer by a still-unknown third\n\nparty to another third party (XYZies) that was retained to receive marketing calls on\n\nbehalf of Viasat (and other entities). Once that fuller picture emerged, Viasat\u2019s later\n\nfilings reflected the developing evidentiary record.\n\n D. Plaintiff Withheld the Recordings Until November 20, 2025.\n\n While Viasat\u2019s precise understanding of the second alleged call changed in\n\ndiscovery, the case dispositive facts have been constant throughout. Viasat has\n\nalways contended that it did not place any calls to Plaintiff and was not otherwise\n\nresponsible for the subject calls (e.g., it did not authorize them and in fact\n\ncontractually forbade third parties from making outbound calls) and thus it could not\n\nbe liable under the TCPA. The recordings Plaintiff belatedly produced bear that out.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 11 of 22\n\n\n\n\n Plaintiff did not produce the call recordings until ordered to do so at an\n\ninformal discovery conference in November 2025\u2014months into the litigation, after\n\nmultiple motions to dismiss, discovery disputes, and third party subpoenas had\n\nalready occurred. The recordings do not support Plaintiff\u2019s repeated allegations that\n\ncallers identified or confirmed themselves as calling from Viasat. Nor do they\n\nsupport Plaintiff\u2019s new allegations that he was transferred to an individual who\n\nconfirmed he was a Viasat employee. In fact, Plaintiff himself states on the second\n\nrecording that he knows he is not speaking to Viasat itself. Dkt. 44-2, supra, page 5\n\nat 11. Had Plaintiff produced the recordings at the outset, much of the early pleading\n\nand discovery practice\u2014including disputes about call direction, attribution, and\n\nvendor involvement\u2014could have been clarified immediately. But Plaintiff did not\n\nmake that choice, presumably because he recognized that, fundamentally, the\n\nrecordings are irreconcilable with (if not destroy) his liability claims.\n\n E. Plaintiff Files a Retaliatory Sanctions Motion Just Twelve Days\n After Defendant Filed its Own Sanctions Motion.\n\n Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion does not fault Plaintiff or his counsel for disputing\n\nViasat\u2019s early characterization of an inbound call, nor does it argue that initial\n\nmisunderstandings about call routing are sanctionable. It targets something much\n\ndifferent: Plaintiff\u2019s continued advocacy of specific call\u2011content allegations, pleaded\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 12 of 22\n\n\n\n\nand sworn, despite Plaintiff\u2019s possession of recordings that undermine those\n\nallegations.\n\n Plaintiff now seeks to isolate a single early inference advanced by Viasat\u2019s\n\ncounsel made in connection with a now-moot motion and convert it into retroactive\n\njustification for Plaintiff\u2019s own litigation strategy. This is untenable.\n\n STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED\n Should the Court sanction Viasat and its counsel under Rule 11 and/or the\n\nCourt\u2019s inherent authority for filing a Rule 11 sanctions motion brought about by its\n\nown litigation misconduct?3\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Suggested Answer: Yes.\n\n Viasat\u2019s Answer: No.\n\n LEGAL STANDARDS\n Rule 11 imposes an objective obligation: by presenting a filing, counsel\n\ncertifies that factual contentions have evidentiary support (or will likely have support\n\nafter reasonable investigation) and that the filing is not presented for an improper\n\npurpose. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3). The Third Circuit inquires whether the\n\nattorney\u2019s conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Ario v.\n\n\n\n3\n Plaintiff exclusively moves pursuant to Rule 11 for an order imposing sanctions\nagainst Viasat and its counsel for filing its motion for sanctions against Plaintiff\u2019s\ncounsel. Dkt. 61. While Plaintiff also suggests in passing the Court should sanction\nViasat under its inherent authority, the brief does not provide any argument or law\nin support of that request. Dkt. 62. Accordingly, the argument is waived.\n 9\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 13 of 22\n\n\n\n\nUnderwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Acct., 618 F.3d\n\n277 (3d Cir. 2010); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289\n\n(3d Cir. 1991).\n\n Courts repeatedly warn against using Rule 11 as a tactical weapon. Gaiardo\n\nv. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1987); Advisory Committee Notes to 1993\n\nAmendments (warning against using Rule 11 to intimidate or increase costs); see\n\nalso Wartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int\u2019l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (D.N.J.\n\n2004) (Rule 11 not a substitute for merits litigation absent patent frivolousness);\n\nCooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (Rule 11\u2019s purpose is\n\ndeterrence of baseless filings, not chilling advocacy).\n\n Rule 11 does not apply to discovery: \u201cdisclosures and discovery requests,\n\nresponses, objections, and motions\u201d under Rules 26\u201337 are excluded. Fed. R. Civ. P.\n\n11(d).\n\n ARGUMENT\nI. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY UNSUPPORTED OR\n OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE FACTUAL CONTENTION IN\n VIASAT\u2019S SANCTIONS MOTION.\n Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion advances\n\nfactual contentions so lacking in evidentiary support that no reasonable attorney\n\ncould have filed or maintained them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3). He does\n\nnot meet that burden. Rule 11 asks only whether the attorney\u2019s conduct was\n\nobjectively reasonable under the circumstances\u2014not whether the opposing party\n\n 10\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 14 of 22\n\n\n\n\ndisputes the narrative or whether positions evolve as the evidentiary record develops.\n\nArio, 618 F.3d at 297; Ford Motor Co. 930 F.2d at 289.\n\n Measured against that standard, Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion is plainly\n\nreasonable. It is grounded in record evidence showing inter alia that Plaintiff\n\npossessed call recordings before suit; that those recordings do not support the\n\ncall\u2011content allegations pleaded and sworn to by Plaintiff; that Plaintiff withheld\n\nthose recordings for months; and that carrier and vendor records undermine\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s attribution theory. At a minimum, a reasonable attorney could conclude\n\nthat these facts support a sanctions motion directed at false factual contentions and\n\nthe delayed disclosure of material evidence.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s contrary suggested approach would transform Rule 11 into an\n\nautomatic penalty for litigating disputed issues\u2014precisely what the Third Circuit\n\nhas warned against. See Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 482. Rule 11 does not punish advocacy\n\nsimply because an opponent disagrees or because arguments are refined as discovery\n\nproceeds and facts develop. To the contrary, it requires counsel to reasonably\n\nreassess factual positions as better evidence emerges and to abandon allegations that\n\nlack evidentiary support. Young v. Smith, 269 F. Supp. 3d 251, 334 (D.N.J. 2017).\n\n Plaintiff does not contend that Viasat fabricated evidence, knowingly\n\nmisrepresented the contents of the recordings, or relied on facts it knew to be false.\n\nNor could he. Instead, he seeks sanctions based on disagreement with Viasat\u2019s\n\n\n 11\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 15 of 22\n\n\n\n\ncharacterization of the record and on the fact that Viasat advanced an earlier\n\nargument\u2014now moot\u2014based on the limited information available to it at the time.\n\nRule 11 does not reach that conduct.\n\n The Advisory Committee has cautioned that Rule 11 should not be used to\n\nintimidate opponents, drive up costs, or manufacture ancillary disputes between\n\ncounsel and client. See Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments. Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nmotion implicates exactly those concerns: he did not seek Rule 11 relief when Viasat\n\nfiled its motions to dismiss or in connection with any alleged discovery dispute\n\n(which would be an improper procedural vehicle in any event), but only after Viasat\n\nmoved for sanctions against Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2014confirming the retaliatory nature\n\nof this filing and its lack of grounding in Rule 11\u2019s objective requirements.\n\nII. PLAINTIFF\u2019S \u201cIRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTION\u201d THEORY\n MISCHARACTERIZES VIASAT\u2019S SANCTIONS MOTION.\n Plaintiff\u2019s motion assumes Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion depends on \u201ccall\u2011routing\n\nsemantics\u201d\u2014whether Plaintiff \u201ccalled Viasat\u201d versus being called, routed, or\n\ntransferred. But Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion is directed at something else: Plaintiff\u2019s and\n\ncounsel\u2019s repeated factual representations\u2014pleaded and sworn\u2014about what the\n\ncallers said and did (including alleged \u201cconfirmation\u201d they were Viasat), despite\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s possession of recordings Viasat contends contradict those representations.\n\n Even taking Plaintiff\u2019s faulty premise at face value, Rule 11 does not require\n\nparties to freeze preliminary characterizations forever. It demands a reasonable\n\n 12\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 16 of 22\n\n\n\n\ninquiry and evidentiary support\u2014objectively assessed at the time. Ford Motor, 930\n\nF.2d at 289; Ario, 618 F.3d at 297. Refining positions as evidence develops is not\n\nsanctionable; persisting in positions without support is. Young, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 333.\n\n Plaintiff also mischaracterizes the earlier declarations he cites. As Viasat has\n\nshown, the declarations on which Plaintiff relies do not say \u201cno third party exists\u201d;\n\nthey describe an entirely inbound marketing ecosystem, whereby calls are made to\n\nViasat or to third parties, and contractual prohibitions on outbound telemarketing on\n\nViasat\u2019s behalf\u2014points that are not \u201cirreconcilable\u201d with later evidence about whether\n\nparticular numbers were associated with Viasat or with any vendor. Rather, Viasat has\n\nbeen consistent on its position: it did not call Plaintiff, did not authorize calls to\n\nPlaintiff, and contractually forbade such calls. Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cirreconcilable\u201d framing\n\ndepends on rewriting the record, not on demonstrating objective unreasonableness.\n\n More fundamentally, nothing about whether Viasat was correct to initially\n\ndescribe one call (based on the limited information available to it4) as an inbound call\n\nis legally relevant to Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion. Again, Viasat is reluctantly seeking\n\nsanctions because Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has repeatedly misrepresented the contents of\n\nboth recorded calls on which Plaintiff\u2019s case entirely depends.\n\n Counsel\u2019s own authorities confirm that alleged reliance on an adversary\u2019s\n\n\n4\n It is entirely accurate to refer to this call as \u201cinbound\u201d to Viasat, whether it was\nmade by Plaintiff or whether it was transferred from an unknown third party. In\neither case, Viasat and its vendor (hired only to receive calls) did not place the call.\n 13\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 17 of 22\n\n\n\n\nrepresentations does not excuse advancing unsupported facts. Rule 11 places the\n\nburden on the filer\u2014not the opposing party\u2014to ensure factual accuracy. See Ario,\n\n618 F.3d at 297. That, of course, makes sense. Logically speaking, that Viasat,\n\noperating on less information than Plaintiff and his counsel, disputed whether the\n\ncalls occurred, whether Plaintiff received or made the calls, and so on, simply could\n\nnot justify making false statements about the calls. If counsel wanted to clear the air,\n\nhe could have disclosed the calls. Why he did not is obvious \u2013 the recordings destroy\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims against Viasat. But what he could not do is say that callers stated\n\nand confirmed that they were from Viasat, because the callers did not do so. In fact,\n\nas discussed at length, the one caller who mentioned Viasat claimed only that he was\n\nan authorized services provider for the company, made clear that he represented over\n\n10 different internet service providers, pitched services from an Oklahoma provider,\n\nand supposedly cited fake internet addresses, causing even Plaintiff himself to draw\n\nthe commonsense conclusion that the caller was not with Viasat. See Dkt. 44-2 at 14.\n\nAny initial confusion on Viasat\u2019s part about the call and who placed it could not\n\npossibly justify Plaintiff repeatedly misrepresenting the nature of the calls.\n\n Finally, even if there were some justification for Plaintiff\u2019s or his counsel\u2019s\n\ninitial misstatements based on some action of Viasat\u2019s, they do not claim that Viasat\u2019s\n\nactions are currently creating confusion or currently offering some justification for\n\ncontinued misstatements. Nor could they, as they have had the recordings the whole\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 18 of 22\n\n\n\n\ntime. And yet even now he asks the court to permit him to file yet another complaint\n\nalleging that the second caller transferred Plaintiff to a \u201csales specialist \u2026 who\n\nconfirmed they were calling from ViaSat\u201d and that \u201cthe individuals all spoke as\n\nthough they were calling from ViaSat.\u201d Dkt. 49-1 at 7, 9. Plaintiff\u2019s and his counsel\u2019s\n\npersistence in making false claims to this Court underscores the need for sanctions\n\nhere, per Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion.\n\nIII. PLAINTIFF\u2019S VENDOR\u2011CONCEALMENT THEORY IS A\n DISCOVERY DISPUTE FORECLOSED BY RULE 11(D).\n Plaintiff\u2019s second theme\u2014vendor identification and alleged \u201cconcealment\u201d\u2014\n\nis overwhelmingly a baseless complaint about discovery responses, vendor\n\ndisclosures, and discovery timing. In other words, it is about a garden-variety\n\ndiscovery dispute. Rule 11 expressly excludes those matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d).\n\nPlaintiff cannot evade Rule 11(d) by styling discovery grievances as an attack on\n\nViasat\u2019s sanctions motion. Whether Plaintiff believes Viasat should have identified\n\na vendor earlier or disputes the content and timing of discovery responses (which\n\nnotably were provided months before Plaintiff provided the call recordings) is\n\ngoverned\u2014if at all\u2014by the rules designed to address discovery disputes, not by\n\nRule 11. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s sanctions motion should be denied on Rule 11(d)\n\ngrounds alone, without reaching Plaintiff\u2019s recharacterization of Viasat\u2019s earlier\n\npleadings or the merits of Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion.\n\n That Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 11 motion is truly a discovery motion in disguise is\n\n 15\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 19 of 22\n\n\n\n\nobvious from the remedies it seeks (aimed at discovery and case management such\n\nas striking filings, compelling revised discovery responses, and fee\u2011shifting tied to\n\ndiscovery efforts), and reliance on cases about misrepresentations and concealment\n\nin discovery\u2011adjacent contexts.5 While no discovery violation occurred here, to the\n\nextent Plaintiff contends otherwise Rules 26-37 are the appropriate vehicle for his\n\ncomplaints.\n\nIV. VIASAT CHALLENGES PLAINTIFF\u2019S DEMONSTRABLY FALSE\n ALLEGATIONS, NOT AMENDMENT.\n Plaintiff asserts Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion \u201ctries to punish Plaintiff for simply\n\namending\u201d after Viasat allegedly concealed a vendor. See Dkt. 62 at 1. That framing\n\nis incorrect. Viasat concealed nothing from Plaintiff, and its sanctions motion is\n\ndirected at Plaintiff\u2019s and his counsel\u2019s repeated demonstrably false call\u2011content\n\nallegations and sworn submissions, as well as the months\u2011long delay in producing\n\nrecordings Plaintiff possessed from the outset\u2014conduct Viasat contends forced\n\nextensive motion practice, third party discovery, and court intervention.\n\n Viasat\u2019s sanctions motion discusses Plaintiff\u2019s proposed amendment as part of\n\nthe broader chronology to show Plaintiff counsel\u2019s continued advocacy of an\n\nattribution narrative Viasat contends is contradicted by recordings and carrier\n\n\n5\n Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation, 162 F.R.D. 46\n(D.V.I. 1995), is misplaced and unavailing. It is not controlling authority, and it\naddressed extreme, years\u2011long discovery misconduct\u2014violations of discovery\norders, deliberate concealment of evidence, misleading discovery responses, and\nsanctions imposed pursuant to Rules 11, 16, 37, and the court\u2019s inherent authority.\n 16\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 20 of 22\n\n\n\n\nevidence. Viasat does not argue that seeking to amend a pleading, standing alone, is\n\nsanctionable. But this particular amendment is further evidence of Plaintiff\u2019s\n\ncontinuingly false narrative. Plaintiff had no good faith basis in fact to allege Viasat\n\ndirectly called him in his first two complaints. He has no good faith basis in fact to\n\namend to allege a call was transferred to someone who worked for Viasat. The call\n\nrecordings confirm that Plaintiff\u2019s allegations are false.\n\nV. PLAINTIFF PROVIDES NO DEVELOPED BASIS FOR\n INHERENT\u2011AUTHORITY SANCTIONS.\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s motion is brought pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) and seeks sanctions\n\nbased on Viasat\u2019s filing of its sanctions motion and alleged discovery conduct.\n\nPlaintiff nominally references inherent authority in his cover motion but, to the\n\nextent Plaintiff references inherent authority, Plaintiff does not provide a developed,\n\nindependent legal argument warranting inherent\u2011authority sanctions against Viasat\n\nor its counsel for filing a sanctions motion grounded in record evidence.\n\n Where a party fails to present developed argument, the Court may treat the\n\npoint as waived. And even setting waiver aside, inherent power is reserved for\n\nbad\u2011faith conduct and is generally unnecessary where Rule\u2011based mechanisms\n\ngovern. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d\n\n175, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2002).\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 21 of 22\n\n\n\n CONCLUSION\n Plaintiff\u2019s Rule 11 motion is a retaliatory effort that mischaracterizes the\n\nrecord and attempts to convert discovery grievances into Rule 11 sanctions. Plaintiff\n\nfails to identify any objectively unsupported factual contention in Viasat\u2019s sanctions\n\nmotion, and Plaintiff\u2019s motion is independently foreclosed because Rule 11 does not\n\napply to discovery responses and related discovery conduct under Rule 11(d). The\n\nCourt should deny Plaintiff\u2019s motion in its entirety.\n\n\n\nDated: April 14, 2026 Respectfully submitted,\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n John W. McGuinness\n (Pro Hac Vice to be Requested)\n A. Paul Heeringa\n (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)\n MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIP, LLP\n 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 600\n Washington, D.C. 20036\n Telephone: 202-585-6500\n jmcguinness@manatt.com\n pheeringa@manatt.com\n FREDERICK P. SANTARELLI (PA 53901)\n STEVEN C. TOLLIVER, JR. (PA 327165)\n ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.\n Union Meeting Corporate Center V\n 925 Harvest Drive, Suite 300\n Blue Bell, PA 19422\n (215) 977-1000 (phone)\n FPSantarelli@elliottgreenleaf.com\n sct@elliottgreenleaf.com\n Counsel for Defendant Viasat, Inc.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65 Filed 04/14/26 Page 22 of 22\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LR 7.8\n I hereby certify that, pursuant to M.D.Pa. Local Rule 7.8(b)(2), this Brief\n\ncomplies with the word-count limitation of Local Rule 7.8, as the Brief is less than\n\n5,000 words (including headings and footnotes but not including the cover page,\n\ntables, signature block, or certificates) in 14-point Times New Roman font.\n\nDated: April 14, 2026 /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n A. PAUL HEERINGA\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that, on April 14, 2026, I filed the foregoing electronically\n\nthrough the Court\u2019s CM/ECF system, which will send notice of the filing to all counsel\n\nof record.\n\n\n\n By: /s/ A. Paul Heeringa\n A. PAUL HEERINGA\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-14T13:10:52.221506-07:00","document_number":"65","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509751044","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Brief in Opposition","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/475820452/","id":475820452,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/65/1/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-14T13:10:53.418189-07:00","date_modified":"2026-04-18T07:28:49.597555-07:00","sha1":"25bdb864d8d336ff3838d5034f9b541c58689f36","page_count":1,"file_size":121685,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.65.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.65.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 65-1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and\n on behalf of all other similarly situated,\n\n Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00927-KMN\n v. (Hon. Keli M. Neary)\n VIASAT, INC.,\n\n Defendant.\n\n ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS\n\n This matter, coming to be heard on Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Sanctions (hereafter,\n\nthe \u201cMotion\u201d), due notice having been given, the Court being fully apprised in the\n\npremises thereof, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion is DENIED. The\n\nCourt finds that Defendant and Defendant\u2019s Counsel did not engage in sanctionable\n\nconduct pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) and 11(b)(3), and\n\nthe Court\u2019s inherent authority.\n\n SO ORDERED THIS _____ DAY OF _____________, 2026,\n\n\n\n\n Hon. Keli M. Neary\n United States District Judge\n Middle District of Pennsylvania\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-14T13:10:55.549793-07:00","document_number":"65","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"15509751045","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-04-14T13:10:51.811928-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.337885-07:00","date_filed":"2026-04-14","time_filed":null,"entry_number":65,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-04-14.001","pacer_sequence_number":170,"description":"RESPONSE in Opposition re 61 MOTION for Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel, filed by ViaSat, Inc.. Related document: 61 MOTION for Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel filed by Asher Bronstin. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Heeringa, Paul) (Entered: 04/14/2026)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/459419588/","id":459419588,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/70376835/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/474445901/","id":474445901,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/64/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-01T18:25:12.854919-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.300079-07:00","sha1":"e5ceddbb015dad16429751d1840222e7df47600e","page_count":25,"file_size":345000,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 1 of 25\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\nASHER BRONSTIN, individually and Case No.\non behalf of all others similarly situated, 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION\nv. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\nVIASAT INC.\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO\n\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 2 of 25\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nINTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................................................2\nSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED .........................................................4\nLEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................5\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................7\n I. Defendant\u2019s 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927 motion fails. .......................................................7\n A. Plaintiff\u2019s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of ViaSat\u2019s own\n sworn misrepresentations. ...................................................................................7\n B. The Plaintiff\u2019s recordings do not change the analysis. By ViaSat\u2019s own\n logic, ViaSat advances a theory directly contradicted by the recordings. ........11\n II. Defendant\u2019s Rule 11 motion fails. ...................................................................15\n A. The Complaints were objectively reasonable. ...........................................15\n B. The Bronstin declaration was reasonable in light of Defendant\u2019s\n contention that Mr. Bronstin called Defendant. ................................................18\n III. By seeking to amend, Plaintiff does what Rule 11 requires. .........................20\n IV. Inherent authority sanctions are unwarranted. ...............................................21\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................21\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases\nAlphonso v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D.N.J. 2005) ........................ 9\nArio v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Acct.,\n 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 5\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, No. CV 22-04464, 2023 WL 166168 (D.N.J.\n Jan. 11, 2023) ................................................................................................. 17\nBarley v. Fox Chase Cancer Ctr., 54 F. Supp. 3d 396 (E.D. Pa. 2014) .................... 9\nCambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .. 16\nCooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) ........................................... 5\n\n\n ii\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 3 of 25\n\n\n\n\nEuroOptic Ltd. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D. Pa. 2025)\n ....................................................................................................................... 20\nFord Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1991) ........... 6\nFord v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1986) ............................................. 6, 7\nGaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1987) ............................................... 5\nHicks v. City of Philadelphia, 753 F. Supp. 3d 409 (E.D. Pa. 2024) ...................... 21\nHoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............ 18\nIn re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175 (3d\n Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................6, 10\nIn re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2008) ............................ 6, 7\nIntamin Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs., Corp., 483 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .............. 17\nKamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986) ................................. 16\nKeister v. PPL Corp., 318 F.R.D. 247 (M.D. Pa. 2015) ....................................19, 20\nMary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1988) ................5, 6, 13, 14\nMoore v. Healthcare Sols. Inc., No. 21-CV-4919, 2022 WL 17487823 (N.D. Ill.\n Dec. 7, 2022)............................................................................................17, 18\nMorris v. W. Manheim Twp., No. 1:CV-12-1647, 2013 WL 2177759 (M.D. Pa.\n May 20, 2013) .................................................................................................. 6\nWartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int\u2019l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 623 (D.N.J. 2004) .... 6\n\nStatutes\n28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927 ..................................................................................4, 7, 11, 14, 15\n\nRules\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11 ...........................................................................5, 6, 13, 15, 16, 20\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3)............................................................................................ 16\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4) .............................................................................................. 6\n\n\n\n\n iii\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 4 of 25\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n ViaSat\u2019s sanctions motion asks this Court to punish Plaintiff for doing the\n\none thing that he and his counsel in this case have done consistently right, that is,\n\nfollowing the evidence and amending accordingly. The motion is not a\n\nstraightforward Rule 11 dispute about a frivolous claim. It is an attempt to\n\nweaponize Rule 11 and \u00a7 1927 against opposing counsel for litigating on the\n\nfactual record that ViaSat itself created, concealed, and then contradicted.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s first motion to dismiss proclaimed, in bold, that \u201cit was the\n\nPlaintiff who called Viasat\u2014not the other way around.\u201d (ECF 11-1.) It declared\n\nno third party was involved and that its records showed an \u201cinbound call\u201d from\n\nPlaintiff. ViaSat\u2019s discovery responses doubled down on this false narrative that\n\nthere was no third party involved, that no responsive documents existed, and that\n\nthe calls did not occur. On that sworn record and pleadings, Plaintiff pled and\n\nmaintained a direct liability theory against ViaSat.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s motion argues that Plaintiff\u2019s counsel should have known better\n\nbecause Plaintiff possessed recordings of the calls from the start. Not so. As\n\ndiscussed at length in Plaintiff\u2019s Reply in Support of his Motion to Amend (ECF\n\nNo. 63,) the recordings, which reflect inbound calls to Plaintiff, and not outbound\n\ncalls to ViaSat, are themselves internally contradictory and end with the caller\n\nconceding that he was \u201conly ViaSat.\u201d Plaintiff received emails and credit card\n\n\n\n 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 5 of 25\n\n\n\n\ncharges from ViaSat. Plaintiff\u2019s Google Fi carrier records confirm the calls were\n\nplaced to Plaintiff. And, as discussed in Plaintiff\u2019s pending sanctions motion,\n\nViaSat acted wrongly by incorrectly claiming that the Plaintiff called ViaSat.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s motion also fails because it conflates an ultimately unsuccessful\n\npleading theory with a sanctionable one. Reasonableness is judged by the\n\ninformation available to the pleader at the time of filing. Plaintiff\u2019s filings were\n\ngrounded in the facts then available to Plaintiff. The sanctions motion does not and\n\ncannot identify any specific filing that was objectively baseless when made,\n\nbecause no such filing exists. For the reasons that follow, both sanctions theories\n\nare unwarranted, and the motion should be denied.\n\n\n PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n\n Plaintiff Asher Bronstin received two telemarketing calls on April 19, 2024\n\nfrom \u201cspoofed\u201d caller IDs selling internet services, both of which he recorded. His\n\ntelephone records and recordings of those calls confirm that they were placed to\n\nPlaintiff. As such, Plaintiff filed his original complaint against ViaSat alleging that\n\nViaSat called him, because the second call with the representative, Angel,\n\nultimately ended with a concession that he was calling from ViaSat, no other\n\nlegitimate entity was named on the call, and the Plaintiff received both an\n\nattempted credit card charge and email from ViaSat.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 6 of 25\n\n\n\n\n In response, ViaSat moved to dismiss. Rather than identifying XYZies or\n\nacknowledging any third party involvement whatsoever, ViaSat submitted a\n\ndeclaration and proclaimed in bold that \u201cit was the Plaintiff who called Viasat\u2014\n\nnot the other way around.\u201d Notably, ViaSat did not say that the Plaintiff called\n\nXYZies or was transferred by XYZies to ViaSat. ViaSat plainly, boldly, and\n\nunequivocally stated that the Plaintiff called \u201cViasat.\u201d The Henderson Declaration\n\nconfirmed and swore that \u201cno third parties [made an outbound call] on ViaSat\u2019s\n\nbehalf,\u201d stated the telephone numbers at issue were \u201cnot also [sic] associated with\n\nany vendor Viasat uses,\u201d and confirmed that the Plaintiff made \u201can inbound call to\n\n855-478-5112 on April 19, 2024, at 2:17 pm Pacific Time.\u201d Mr. Henderson also\n\nconfirmed that a purchase was made on the call. To address the motion, Plaintiff\n\namended his complaint to plead more details about the calls he received.\n\n Given ViaSat\u2019s submissions denying the involvement of any third party and\n\nproclaiming in a pleading that the \u201cPlaintiff . . . called ViaSat,\u201d direct liability was\n\nthe only available theory. Indeed, the first MTD and the first Henderson\n\nDeclaration made clear that the parties did not dispute ViaSat\u2019s involvement, only\n\nthe direction of the calls. Plaintiff then submitted a sworn declaration in opposition\n\nto ViaSat\u2019s second MTD, addressing his receipt of the calls from ViaSat, as the\n\ncalls named no other plausible entity other than ViaSat.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 7 of 25\n\n\n\n\n Plaintiff then sought discovery, including about any third party\u2019s\n\ninvolvement in the call. ViaSat\u2019s discovery responses, verified by the same\n\nGregory Henderson, articulated in various parts that no third parties were involved\n\nin the calls, that the calls alleged did not occur, and that ViaSat had no documents\n\nor information responsive to the involvement of any third parties. (Ex. A.)\n\nSimultaneously, ViaSat resisted all discovery aimed at even uncovering the\n\nexistence of third party vendors on the ground that \u201cPlaintiff does not purport to\n\nplead a vicarious TCPA liability theory in the operative Complaint, and expressly\n\ndisclaims such a theory,\u201d which blocked discovery into XYZies while\n\nsimultaneously \u201cdisclaiming\u201d the very theory that Defendant says Plaintiff should\n\nbe sanctioned for not making in its instant motion.\n\n Only after this Court directed ViaSat to identify any vendors involved did\n\nViaSat disclose XYZies, an entity ViaSat knew of throughout the entire period of\n\nsworn denials. Plaintiff immediately sought leave to amend. ViaSat has filed the\n\ninstant Rule 11 motion, and the Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion against ViaSat\n\nand its counsel based on the aforementioned pattern of sworn misrepresentations.\n\nThis response follows.\n\n STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED\n\n 1. Should the Court deny Defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C.\n\n\u00a7 1927, Rule 11, and the Court\u2019s inherent authority, where Plaintiff\u2019s litigation\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 8 of 25\n\n\n\n\nconduct was objectively reasonable at each stage in light of Defendant\u2019s own\n\nrepresentations, and where Plaintiff amended promptly once the Court compelled\n\ndisclosure of a vendor whose existence Defendant had denied under oath for over\n\nsix months?\n\n Plaintiff\u2019s Suggested Answer: Yes.\n\n Defendant\u2019s Anticipated1 Answer: No.\n\n LEGAL STANDARD\n\n Rule 11\u2019s central purpose is to deter baseless filings, not to chill vigorous\n\nadvocacy. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). The\n\ninquiry is objective, focusing on whether the challenged filing was objectively\n\nreasonable under the circumstances at the time it was presented. Ario v.\n\nUnderwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Acct., 618 F.3d\n\n277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010). Sanctions \u201cmust not be used as an automatic penalty\n\nagainst an attorney or party advocating the losing side of a dispute,\u201d and it \u201cshould\n\nnot be applied to adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates\n\ncreative legal theories.\u201d Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d\n\nCir. 1988). It bears repeating that the target is abuse\u2014the Rule must not be used as\n\nan automatic penalty against an attorney or a party advocating the losing side of a\n\ndispute. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987).\n\n\n\n1\n Defendant\u2019s sanctions motion fails to include the statement of questions involved as required by the Local Rules.\n\n\n 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 9 of 25\n\n\n\n\n Contesting the sufficiency of a pleading through Rule 11 rather than an\n\nappropriate merits motion is inappropriate unless the pleading was patently\n\nfrivolous when filed. Wartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int\u2019l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d\n\n623, 628 (D.N.J. 2004). \u201cTo say that a party confronts difficult questions of factual\n\nsufficiency is not the same as saying its claims are patently frivolous.\u201d Id. (quoting\n\nFord Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 290 (3d Cir. 1991)).\n\nSanctions must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition. Rule 11(c)(4).\n\n Section 1927 requires a finding that the attorney (1) multiplied proceedings;\n\n(2) in an unreasonable and vexatious manner; (3) thereby increasing costs; and (4)\n\ndoing so in bad faith or by intentional misconduct. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am.\n\nSales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002). Bad faith may\n\nbe inferred where counsel demonstrates reckless indifference to the truth or a\n\n\u201cserious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice,\u201d Ford v. Temple\n\nHosp., 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 1986), but not where counsel acts on the basis of\n\nthe opposing party\u2019s own misconduct or even misunderstanding. See Morris v. W.\n\nManheim Twp., No. 1:CV-12-1647, 2013 WL 2177759, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 20,\n\n2013); Mary Ann Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 95 (3d Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts have\n\nexpressed doubt as to whether or not Section 1927 applies to initial pleadings\n\nbecause \u201cthe proceedings in a case cannot be multiplied until there is a case.\u201d In re\n\nSchaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir. 2008)\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 10 of 25\n\n\n\n\n ARGUMENT\n\nI. Defendant\u2019s 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927 motion fails.\n\n A. Plaintiff\u2019s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of ViaSat\u2019s own\n sworn misrepresentations.\n\n Section 1927\u2019s demanding standard cannot be satisfied on this record. As a\n\nthreshold matter, Section 1927 is the wrong mechanism here, since it is directed at\n\npost-filing multiplication of proceedings, not initial pleadings. In re Schaefer, 542\n\nF.3d at 101 (\u201c\u00a7 1927 explicitly covers only the multiplication of proceedings that\n\nprolong the litigation of a case and likely not the initial pleading, as the\n\nproceedings in a case cannot be multiplied until there is a case\u201d). The bad faith that\n\nSection 1927 requires is characterized by reckless indifference to the truth or\n\ndisregard for the orderly processes of justice. Ford, 790 F.2d at 347.\n\n Plaintiff was not recklessly indifferent to the truth. Rather, Plaintiff was\n\nfastidiously attentive to it. The \u201ctruth\u201d ViaSat told him, under oath, was that no\n\nthird party was involved and that the Plaintiff called ViaSat. That sworn narrative\n\ndirectly supported a direct liability theory, and proceeding on that theory and\n\nattempting to disprove Defendant\u2019s allegations that the Plaintiff called Defendant\n\nwas not only reasonable, it was the only available responsible course.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s first motion to dismiss proclaimed, in bold, that \u201cit was the\n\nPlaintiff who called Viasat\u2014not the other way around.\u201d The Henderson\n\nDeclaration identified ViaSat\u2019s records of a 23-minute-and-41-second \u201cinbound\n\n\n 7\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 11 of 25\n\n\n\n\ncall\u201d to ViaSat from Plaintiff\u2019s number on the exact date and time Plaintiff alleged\n\nhe received a telemarketing call. Plaintiff knew he had not placed that call. The\n\nmost natural inference from ViaSat\u2019s own representations was therefore that a\n\nViaSat employee had called him, and that ViaSat was characterizing the call as\n\n\u201cinbound\u201d in a misleading or erroneous way. That inference, which tracks ViaSat\u2019s\n\nown sworn narrative precisely, is what the First Amended Complaint alleged.\n\nViaSat cannot now argue that the inference it invited was in bad faith.\n\n ViaSat then not only contradicted its false position in its responses to the\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s discovery but also contended that it was \u201cdisclaiming\u201d a vicarious\n\nliability theory that it contends that the Plaintiff should be sanctioned for not\n\npleading at the outset. When asked directly whether any third party made or \u201cwas\n\ninvolved in\u201d the calls, ViaSat answered: \u201cthe calls alleged in the Complaint did not\n\noccur and therefore none.\u201d But when asked to identify persons who spoke with\n\nPlaintiff from ViaSat or any of its vendors, ViaSat answered: \u201cPlaintiff did not\n\nspeak with anyone at Viasat\u201d and \u201cViasat has located no additional information\n\nresponsive.\u201d ViaSat signed this response despite previously submitting a pleading\n\nin which it contended that the \u201cplaintiff . . . called Viasat.\u201d Both statements cannot\n\nsimultaneously be true. And, when asked for documents reflecting agreements with\n\nany third party (i.e. XYZies), ViaSat swore no such documents existed. On that\n\nsworn record, Plaintiff had not merely a reasonable basis to proceed on direct\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 12 of 25\n\n\n\n\nliability, he had an affirmative sworn confirmation from the opposing party that\n\ndirect liability was the only theory available because no third party was involved.\n\n The cases ViaSat relies on to establish bad faith are inapposite precisely\n\nbecause they involve counsel who persisted in claims known to be unsupported. If\n\nanything, those cases support sanctions against ViaSat and its counsel, not the\n\nother way around. For example, in Barley, the Court denied Rule 11 sanctions, but\n\nupheld Section 1927 sanctions against the Defendant, even when the Defendant\n\nprevailed at summary judgement, for filing two improper Rule 11 motions \u201cthat\n\nwere unsupported by billing records that conformed to our Court of Appeals\u2019s\n\nlongstanding precedents for attorney\u2019s fee submissions,\u201d and which also \u201cfailed to\n\ncomply with the plain language of [Rule 11] and was untimely served.\u201d Barley v.\n\nFox Chase Cancer Ctr., 54 F. Supp. 3d 396, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2014). On that basis, the\n\nCourt sanctioned the Defendant for filing two sanctions motions \u201cfor the improper\n\npurpose of harassing the opponent by burdening her with a needless defense.\u201d Id.\n\n In Alphonso, the court found that plaintiff\u2019s counsel acted in bad faith by\n\npursuing an inflated claim for economic losses and an unsupported emotional\n\ndistress claim based on evidence within the Plaintiff\u2019s possession, namely, that the\n\nplaintiff had stated after the lawsuit was filed that he had no \u201cpsychological or\n\nsleep problems.\u201d Alphonso v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 442, 455 (D.N.J.\n\n2005). That is plainly not the case here. All the evidence in the Plaintiff\u2019s\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 13 of 25\n\n\n\n\npossession pointed at ViaSat\u2019s direct involvement, and ViaSat persisted for over\n\nsix months in a theory that the \u201cplaintiff . . . called Viasat.\u201d ViaSat, not the\n\nPlaintiff, knew of XYZies involvement, and never disclosed this involvement,\n\nincluding in Mr. Heeringa\u2019s calls in which he requested Plaintiff\u2019s counsel to drop\n\nthe case, and which it persisted in hiding through discovery.\n\n Similarly, in In re Prudential, the Court considered the totality of an\n\nattorney\u2019s conduct throughout the course of the litigation, including \u201cbombarding\n\nthe court with paper,\u201d and other \u201cemergency\u201d motions of similar ilk. In re\n\nPrudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 190 (3d\n\nCir. 2002). Plaintiff has simply opposed ViaSat\u2019s first two motions to dismiss in\n\nwhich it claimed that the Plaintiff called ViaSat and now has sought leave to\n\namend when he found out that ViaSat\u2019s own representation was wrong.\n\n None of these cases applies to a counsel who advances a theory directly\n\ncorroborated by their own evidence and the opposing party\u2019s own sworn\n\nsubmissions. Plaintiff did not disregard contrary evidence. He relied on affirmative\n\nrepresentations from ViaSat itself, representations now shown to be false because\n\nViaSat concealed XYZies\u2019 involvement. If anything, the multiplication of\n\nproceedings in this case, the two rounds of motion to dismiss briefing, two rounds\n\nof bifurcation premised on the false assertion that the Plaintiff called ViaSat, the\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 14 of 25\n\n\n\n\namendment filings, and these Rule 11 filings, were all caused by Defendant\u2019s\n\npositions disclaiming third party involvement and the outbound calls.\n\n B. The Plaintiff\u2019s recordings do not change the analysis. By ViaSat\u2019s own\n logic, ViaSat advances a theory directly contradicted by the recordings.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s other Section 1927 theory is that Plaintiff possessed recordings\n\ncontradicting his direct liability allegations, and that proceeding with those\n\nallegations while withholding the recordings for six months constitutes actionable\n\nbad faith. This argument fails at both levels.\n\n First, as explained more fully in the Plaintiff\u2019s Reply in support of his\n\nMotion to Amend, the recordings did not \u201ccontradict\u201d direct liability in any\n\nmeaningful sense, and certainly not for Section 1927 purposes, particularly when\n\nthe recordings are internally contradictory. The Plaintiff\u2019s recording of the first call\n\nhe received reveals an individual calling him about internet service that drops\n\nshortly into the call. And the second call, placed a few minutes later, reveals the\n\nsame individual calling back, apologizing, stating that the call was declined, and\n\nthen retrying the transfer to Angel. And, when the Plaintiff spoke to Angel, he at\n\nvarious points stated that he either was ViaSat, was \u201cauthorized\u201d by ViaSat, and\n\neventually conceded that he was \u201cjust\u201d ViaSat.\n\n The references to another internet company in Oklahoma and a fictitious\n\nwebsite do not change the fact that the only cognizable legal entity referenced on\n\nthe calls was ViaSat. Angel exclusively pitched ViaSat\u2019s satellite internet service,\n\n\n 11\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 15 of 25\n\n\n\n\nat specific pricing, with apparent direct access to ViaSat\u2019s discount structure,\n\ninstallation scheduling system, email sending system, and credit card processing\n\nsystem. Based on these manifestations, ViaSat cannot now reasonably claim that\n\nthe Plaintiff should have sued \u201cGetTheFastestInternet.com,\u201d which isn\u2019t a real\n\nwebsite, or AirLink, a rural Oklahoma ISP that does not offer services in Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nCalifornia zip code he provided. Suing those entities would be the sanctionable\n\nthing to do, particularly in light of the ViaSat email and credit card charge.\n\n In short, when Plaintiff reviewed the recordings, which revealed calls to\n\nPlaintiff, the only legally cognizable entity he could identify as responsible for the\n\ncalls was ViaSat. GetTheFastestInternet.com does not exist. AirLink serves only\n\nrural Oklahoma. Angel could not name a California entity other than ViaSat itself.\n\nThe only company for which Angel would identify was ViaSat. Proceeding against\n\nViaSat on the basis of those recordings, particularly given the email and credit card\n\ncharge, was not done in bad faith or to multiply the proceedings. Rather, it was the\n\nonly reasonable conclusion the recordings supported.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s characterization of Plaintiff as a \u201cserial TCPA litigant\u201d who should\n\nhave divined the proper defendant cuts against ViaSat. A TCPA litigant facing\n\nViaSat\u2019s sworn denial of third-party involvement and a contention that he called\n\nViaSat, when he possessed a recording showing the call was placed to him, would\n\nnot be expected to independently hypothesize that a company ViaSat swore did not\n\n\n\n 12\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 16 of 25\n\n\n\n\nexist had placed the calls. Indeed, the admission made by Angel at the conclusion\n\nof the call, the email the Plaintiff received from ViaSat directly, and the attempted\n\ncredit card charge that the Plaintiff received from ViaSat directly, all support the\n\nconclusion that ViaSat placed the call, not the other way around.\n\n As the Third Circuit has remarked in the Rule 11 context:\n\n In scrutinizing a filed paper against these requirements, courts must apply an\n objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. The wisdom\n of hindsight should be avoided; the attorney\u2019s conduct must be judged by\n what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other\n paper was submitted. . . . Imposing a continuing duty on counsel to amend or\n correct a filing based on after-acquired knowledge is inconsistent with the\n Rule. . . . As the recited facts establish, at the time the Pensieros\u2019 counsel\n filed this complaint his investigation revealed the exclusive dealership of the\n disputed product brands, . . . the apparent approval by the product\n manufacturers, and [an AG] opinion [that defendant\u2019s actions were\n unlawful.]\n A requirement that counsel, before filing a complaint, secure the type of\n proof necessary to withstand a motion for summary judgment would set a\n pre-filing standard beyond that contemplated by Rule 11. At the time\n plaintiffs\u2019 counsel filed the complaint here, he knew facts that supported a\n reasonable suspicion of cooperation between defendants and other parties\n who could have been expected to benefit from the defendants\u2019 intransigence.\n These factual circumstances and the rational inferences that may be drawn\n from them convince us that the allegations of the first count comported with\n Rule 11\u2019s pre-filing investigation requirement.\n That plaintiffs abandoned the conspiracy count some months after the\n complaint was filed does not negate the reasonableness of the inferences\n existing at the time the complaint was prepared. Indeed, abandoning a claim\n that appears unlikely to succeed is responsible advocacy to be\n commended\u2014not abuse of the court\u2019s process to be deterred. Courts benefit\n when counsel reduce the issues in dispute by objectively reappraising the\n evolving strengths of their positions throughout the course of litigation. Rule\n 11 was not intended to inhibit such activity by permitting it to be\n characterized by an adversary as an admission of liability.\n\n 13\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 17 of 25\n\n\n\n\nMary Ann Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 94-96 (cleaned up)\n\n Relatedly, the recordings confirm that the calls were received by Plaintiff,\n\nnot placed by him. Plaintiff knew he had not called ViaSat, and the recordings and\n\nthe Google Fi records confirm it. Thus, if possession of recordings establishing that\n\ncalls were received by someone constitutes sanctionable bad faith for the party\n\nreceiving the calls, then ViaSat has a far graver problem given that it has signed\n\npleadings, in bold, contending that \u201cit was the Plaintiff who called Viasat\u2014not the\n\nother way around.\u201d Mr. Henderson confirmed this in a sworn declaration. If the\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s call recordings are sufficient to form the basis for sanctions, then it is\n\nViaSat who should be sanctioned for multiplying the proceedings despite knowing\n\nthat the Plaintiff possessed evidence that the calls were placed to Plaintiff. If\n\nvexatiousness is established by advancing facts that recordings directly contradict,\n\nViaSat\u2019s motions, declarations, and discovery responses all constitute far more\n\negregious conduct than anything Plaintiff\u2019s counsel is accused of doing. The\n\nmotion inverts who should answer for misconduct here.\n\n The \u201cmultiplication of proceedings\u201d ViaSat complains of was caused by\n\nViaSat\u2019s own sworn misrepresentations. ViaSat cannot come to this Court seeking\n\nsanctions for the natural consequence of its own false sworn record and reckless\n\ndisregard of the evidence adduced. Moreover, it only requested the call recordings\n\nin discovery months after taking the position that discovery should be bifurcated\n\n\n\n 14\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 18 of 25\n\n\n\n\non the basis that the \u201cPlaintiff did not receive either call alleged in the FAC, let\n\nalone any call from or on behalf of Viasat.\u201d (ECF No. 27-1). That very conduct\n\ncannot be the basis on which to grant Section 1927 sanctions.\n\n Moreover, neither party served initial disclosures in this case, despite a joint\n\nagreement to do so by August 1, 2025. ViaSat cannot credibly accuse Plaintiff of\n\n\u201chiding the ball\u201d by withholding recordings in its initial disclosures when both\n\nparties failed to do so through inadvertence. What\u2019s more, ViaSat\u2019s missing\n\ndisclosures would have (or should have) identified XYZies months earlier and\n\navoided the very proceedings ViaSat now complains about.\n\n At bottom, any \u201cmultiplication\u201d of the proceedings was not caused by\n\nPlaintiff or his counsel. To the contrary, it was directly caused by ViaSat\u2019s\n\nconcealment of XYZies and ViaSat\u2019s own decision to file two motions to dismiss,\n\ntwo motions to bifurcate discovery, and to create a sworn factual record that\n\nViaSat knew to be false or at least incomplete. ViaSat\u2019s own conduct generated the\n\nlitigation complexity it now attributes to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel. That itself warrants\n\nsanctions against ViaSat, not Plaintiff.\n\nII. Defendant\u2019s Rule 11 motion fails.\n\n A. The Complaints were objectively reasonable.\n\n The Plaintiff\u2019s complaints allege that Plaintiff received two telemarketing\n\ncalls from ViaSat selling ViaSat\u2019s services from a \u201cspoofed\u201d caller ID. This was a\n\n\n\n 15\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 19 of 25\n\n\n\n\nstraightforward and accurate description of what occurred. Plaintiff received calls,\n\nthe calls directly sold ViaSat\u2019s satellite internet services, and the only legitimate\n\nentity identified on the calls was ViaSat. These were followed by an email and a\n\ncredit card charge from ViaSat directly. This satisfies Rule 11(b)(3)\u2019s standard that\n\nthe Plaintiff\u2019s factual contentions either have, or are likely to have, evidentiary\n\nsupport. This is objectively reasonable, particularly as any contrary evidence was\n\nnot available to the Plaintiff and indeed in ViaSat\u2019s sole knowledge and control.\n\n When facts which \u201ccould hardly be known to an outsider\u201d and other relevant\n\ninformation is \u201clargely in the control of the defendants,\u201d under the circumstances,\n\nan inquiry consisting of information supplied by the plaintiff is \u201creasonable\u201d within\n\nthe meaning of Rule 11. Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d\n\nCir. 1986). Based on the totality of the evidence, including the recording, call\n\nrecords, email, and credit card charge, a competent attorney could form a\n\nreasonable belief that the Plaintiff\u2019s complaints were well grounded in fact and\n\nlaw. Id. Here, without the benefit of discovery, no information regarding XYZies\n\nor any third party at all was \u201cpractically obtainable\u201d by Plaintiff, and so the Rule\n\n11 requirements for filing were met. Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients,\n\nInc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1992). What\u2019s more, a party cannot impose\n\n\u201cunreasonable obstacles\u201d to obtaining evidence and then seek to sanction the\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 20 of 25\n\n\n\n\ncounterparty on that very basis. See Intamin Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs., Corp., 483\n\nF.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2007).\n\n At bottom, any reasonable person, having received the calls that Plaintiff did\n\nnaming ViaSat as the only cognizable entity and then receiving a credit card charge\n\nand email from ViaSat, would reasonably conclude that ViaSat made the calls. So\n\ntoo would any person who received a call selling internet services that\n\ndisconnected and then receive a call selling the same thing from the same person\n\nreasonably conclude that both calls are connected. On this point, ViaSat\u2019s claim,\n\nrelying on Gillam, claiming that the claimed inability to connect both calls to\n\nViaSat is sanctionable, is off base. First, Gillam was a merits case, not a sanctions\n\ncase, and it granted a motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff there did not\n\nplausibly allege more than one call from the defendant. For starters, ViaSat didn\u2019t\n\neven raise Gillam in its second MTD, and raised it in its first only in the context of\n\na string citation. Regardless, courts have held, including with respect to the same\n\ndefense counsel firm here, that the indicia of the calls, such as them being from the\n\nsame named entity, give rise to a presumption they come from the same place.\n\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, No. CV 22-04464, 2023 WL 166168, at *5\n\n(D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2023) (denying MTD because plaintiff pled facts connecting the\n\ncalls); Moore v. Healthcare Sols. Inc., No. 21-CV-4919, 2022 WL 17487823, at *3\n\n(N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2022) (\u201cThe issue of who made the first call isn\u2019t much of a\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 21 of 25\n\n\n\n\nwhodunit. Moore received two calls from the same number, and the second caller\n\nwas Healthcare Solutions. It is reasonable to conclude that Healthcare Solutions\n\ncalled the first time, too.\u201d).\n\n A reasonable person having received such calls would also reasonably\n\nunderstand that, if ViaSat engaged third parties to conduct marketing on their\n\nbehalf, ViaSat would be uniquely situated to identify who those third parties are.\n\nHoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000)\n\n(holding sanctions were unwarranted when defendant refused to disclose a\n\nmanufacturing process in its knowledge, and noting, \u201cIt is difficult to imagine what\n\nelse Roche and Syntex could have done to obtain facts relating to Torpharm\u2019s\n\nalleged infringement of their process patents.\u201d). Instead, ViaSat denied XYZies\n\ninvolvement and instead claimed that the Plaintiff called ViaSat, which was\n\ndemonstrably false based on the Plaintiff\u2019s recordings. The Plaintiff and his\n\ncounsel conducted a reasonable inquiry into the evidence before filing the\n\nComplaints.\n\n\n B. The Bronstin declaration was reasonable in light of Defendant\u2019s contention\n that Mr. Bronstin called Defendant.\n\n The framing ViaSat attempts of the Bronstin Declaration is staggering in its\n\naudacity. Before it was made, ViaSat pled and swore that the Plaintiff called\n\n\u201cViasat,\u201d not a third party, and further that the Plaintiff made a purchase from\n\n\n\n 18\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 22 of 25\n\n\n\n\nViaSat. ViaSat doubled down on these representations by expressly disclaiming the\n\ninvolvement of any third party that would have acted on ViaSat\u2019s behalf. Given\n\nthat Plaintiff knew that he had not called ViaSat, what was Plaintiff to do? The\n\nBronstin Declaration directly addresses the discrepancy that ViaSat invited:\n\nwhether the Plaintiff called ViaSat, or whether ViaSat called him. It pleads facts\n\ndirectly addressing the very issue that ViaSat put at issue: who called whom?\n\n The most logical explanation for any discrepancy as to what the caller\n\n\u201cconfirmed,\u201d (a confirmation supported by the recordings), on the factual record as\n\nit existed before XYZies was disclosed, was that ViaSat was characterizing a call\n\nas \u201cinbound\u201d when in fact ViaSat had called Plaintiff and ViaSat was\n\nmisrepresenting the call direction. That inference, and the declaration, was\n\nobjectively reasonable given what ViaSat had sworn. After all, ViaSat pled and\n\nswore that Plaintiff called ViaSat and there was no third party involved. On those\n\nfacts, the declaration\u2019s characterization that the caller \u201cconfirmed\u201d he was calling\n\nfrom ViaSat was a reasonable description of what occurred, and a description that\n\nany objective reader of the transcript could reasonably reach.\n\n Here, the record not only \u201csupplied support,\u201d for Mr. Bronstin\u2019s Declaration,\n\nbut it also directly addressed Mr. Henderson\u2019s two Declarations to the contrary\n\naddressing the very same topic. On this point, Keister actually supports Plaintiff.\n\nThere, counsel \u201cimplanted uncertainty and ambiguity into the factual posture of\n\n\n\n 19\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 23 of 25\n\n\n\n\n[the case] where no such vagueness was warranted and where such inconsistencies\n\nwere often contradicted by [sworn] testimony.\u201d Keister v. PPL Corp., 318 F.R.D.\n\n247, 268 (M.D. Pa. 2015). Like in Keister, and unlike in Shelton, if anyone was\n\ncontradicting the record, it was ViaSat, since the Bronstin Declaration merely\n\naddresses ViaSat\u2019s own assertions and manufactured ambiguity which contended\n\nthat the Plaintiff called ViaSat directly. The Bronstin declaration was a direct\n\nresponse to those filings. ViaSat, not Plaintiff, was \u201cintentionally vague and\n\nincomplete,\u201d and these \u201ctactics added significantly more work.\u201d Id. at 269.\n\n\nIII. By seeking to amend, Plaintiff does what Rule 11 requires.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s attack on the proposed SAC is curious because the SAC is textbook\n\nRule 11 compliance. Once ViaSat disclosed XYZies, under Court compulsion after\n\nsix months, Plaintiff did exactly what Rule 11 requires: he sought leave to amend\n\nto conform the pleadings to the newly disclosed facts. As Hanoverian counsels,\n\nwhat would have been sanctionable is the opposite, persisting in a direct liability\n\ntheory against ViaSat after discovery revealed that XYZies was directly involved.\n\n Rule 11 also imposes \u201can implied duty of candor, which attorneys violate\n\nwhenever they misrepresent the evidence supporting their claims.\u201d EuroOptic Ltd.\n\nv. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 3d 320, 333 (M.D. Pa. 2025). This duty\n\nruns both ways. ViaSat\u2019s submissions to this Court violated it. In amending once\n\nthose misrepresentations were exposed, Plaintiff did not. The earlier complaints\n\n\n 20\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 24 of 25\n\n\n\n\nwere objectively reasonable when filed because ViaSat\u2019s own submissions\n\nsupported them. The SAC is objectively reasonable now because it conforms to the\n\nfacts ViaSat was ordered to disclose. Nothing about this is sanctionable. It is the\n\nstory of a litigation conducted on the available record at each point in time.\n\n\nIV. Inherent authority sanctions are unwarranted.\n\n ViaSat\u2019s alternative bid for sanctions under this Court\u2019s inherent authority\n\nalso fails for the same reasons as ViaSat\u2019s other theories. This sanction requires an\n\nexplicit finding of bad faith. No such finding is warranted here for the reasons set\n\nforth above, particularly given Plaintiff\u2019s amendment. See Hicks v. City of\n\nPhiladelphia, 753 F. Supp. 3d 409, 415 (E.D. Pa. 2024).\n\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n For these reasons, Defendant\u2019s Sanctions Motion should be denied in toto.\n\n\nRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this April 1, 2026\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n PA Bar #333687\n Perrong Law LLC\n 2657 Mount Carmel Avenue\n Glenside, Pennsylvania 19038\n Phone: 215-225-5529 (CALL-LAW)\n Facsimile: 888-329-0305\n a@perronglaw.com\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64 Filed 04/01/26 Page 25 of 25\n\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT\n\n Pursuant to Local Rule 7.8(b)(2), I hereby certify that this brief contains\n\n4,998 words.\n\n DATED April 1, 2026\n\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n I hereby certify that, on April 1, 2026, I served the foregoing on counsel for\n\nthe Defendant via CM/ECF.\n\n\n\nDated: April 1, 2026\n /s/ Andrew Roman Perrong\n Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.\n PA Bar #333687\n Perrong Law LLC\n 2657 Mount Carmel Avenue\n Glenside, Pennsylvania 19038\n Phone: 215-225-5529 (CALL-LAW)\n Facsimile: 888-329-0305\n a@perronglaw.com\n .\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-01T18:25:13.160230-07:00","document_number":"64","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"15509734323","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Brief in Opposition","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/474445902/","id":474445902,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/64/1/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-01T18:25:14.292355-07:00","date_modified":"2026-04-10T05:04:46.724221-07:00","sha1":"9f837275af31448cf434b0bb25379b33f39caca2","page_count":11,"file_size":470990,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 1 of 11\n\n\n\n\nnot understand what information is being sought and cannot reasonably respond; and\n\n\n\n ogatory) is vague, ambiguous, virtually limitless in scope,\n\nand capable of multiple interpretations and, as such, Defendant cannot be reasonably\n\ncertain of the scope, type, subject matter or nature of the information being sought.\n\nDefendant further objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it incorporates the\n\n reasons stated in its\n\nPreliminary Statements. Defendant further objects to the extent Plaintiff seeks\n\ndiscovery relating to third parties, as the tes to Federal Rule\n\n entitlement to discovery to develop new\n\nclaims or defenses that are not already iden and Plaintiff does\n\nnot purport to plead a vicarious TCPA liability theory in the operative Complaint, and\n\nexpressly disclaims such a theory.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant incorporates by reference its Answer to Interrogatory No. 5 above as if\n\nfully stated herein, and states none.\n\n 8. Identify each of the individuals that spoke with Plaintiff from your\n\ncompany or any of its vendors.\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 2 of 11\n\n\n\n\n ANSWER: Defendant specifically objects to this Interrogatory, as stated, on\n\nthe grounds and to the extent that: (1) it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not\n\nreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, in that it is not\n\nreasonably limited in scope to the facts and allegations at issue in the Complaint, or\n\nto the parties, claims and/or defenses at issue in this litigation (and in fact, is virtually\n\nunlimited as to the subject matter of information sought), and therefore it is not\n\nproportional to the needs of the case; (2) as worded, it is not necessarily limited to\n\nseeking information within the possession, custody or control of Defendant, seeks\n\ninformation that is in the possession of third parties, and/or seeks information that is\n\nmore readily available from other sources; (3) the provided definition of the term\n\n virtually limitless in scope, and capable of multiple\n\ninterpretations and, as such, Defendant cannot be reasonably certain of the scope, type,\n\nsubject matter or nature of the information being sought; and (4) it would require\n\nViasat to reveal trade secrets and/or other non-public, confidential and proprietary\n\nbusiness information of Viasat and others, without having an appropriate protective\n\norder in place. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it\n\nincorporates the purportedly for all the reasons stated in its\n\nPreliminary Statements. Defendant further objects to the extent Plaintiff seeks\n\ndiscovery relating to third parties, as the tes to Federal Rule\n\n\n\n 22\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 3 of 11\n\n\n\n\n entitlement to discovery to develop new\n\nclaims or defenses that are not already iden and Plaintiff does\n\nnot purport to plead a vicarious TCPA liability theory in the operative Complaint, and\n\nexpressly disclaims such a theory.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant states that (i) Plaintiff did not speak with anyone at Viasat and (ii) after\n\nconducting a reasonably diligent inquiry, Viasat has located no additional information\n\nresponsive to this Interrogatory. Investigation continues.\n\n 9. If you contend that Plaintiff provided consent to receive solicitation\n\ntelephone calls, state all facts in support of that contention and identify the date(s) on\n\nwhich and the means by which you contend consent was obtained.\n\n ANSWER: Defendant specifically objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds\n\nand to the extent that: (1) as worded, it assumes facts not in evidence or would require\n\nDefendant to make legal conclusions to properly respond, specifically that Defendant\n\nor a third party acting on its\n\nrequired to contact Plaintiff within the meaning of the TCPA; (2) as worded, it may\n\nbe read as seeking information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client\n\nprivilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine and/or any other privilege or\n\nimmunity, including but not limited to seeking the mental impressions, litigation/trial\n\n\n\n 23\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 4 of 11\n\n\n\n\nstrategy and/or le l, or that is protected by the\n\njoint defense or common interest (or equivalent) privileges; and (3) it seeks\n\ninformation that is or should already be\n\nunduly burdensome. Defendant further objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that\n\nit incorporates the purportedly defined term\n\nPreliminary Statements.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\n t was not required because he did not receive\n\nan outbound call from or on behalf of Viasat; (ii) in any event, to the extent Plaintiff\n\nmade an inbound call to products and services, such an act\n\n\n\nobviate the need for consent) or could otherwise constitute prior express invitation or\n\npermission to be called; and (iii) upon information and belief, Plaintiff made such an\n\ninbound call (in this regard, Defendant refers to the Declaration of Greg Henderson,\n\nDkt. 11-2, and Exhibit A thereto, and its Answer to Interrogatory No. 11 below).\n\n 10. If you contend that a third party made or was involved in the calls alleged\n\nin the complaint, identify that third party and state all facts in support of the same.\n\n ANSWER: Defendant specifically objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds\n\nand to the extent that: (1) it may be read as seeking information protected by the joint\n\n\n\n 24\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 5 of 11\n\n\n\n\ndefense or common interest (or equivalent) privileges; (2) it incorporates the\n\npurportedly defined ore is objectionable for the reasons stated\n\n and (3) it would require Viasat to reveal\n\ntrade secrets and/or other non-public, confidential and proprietary business\n\ninformation of Viasat and others, without having an appropriate protective order in\n\nplace.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant states the calls alleged in the Complaint did not occur and therefore none.\n\n 11. If you contend that the Plaintiff called you, state all facts in support of\n\nthe same.\n\n ANSWER: Defendant specifically objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds\n\nand to the extent that: (1) as worded, it may be read as seeking information protected\n\nfrom disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product\n\ndoctrine and/or any other privilege or immunity, including but not limited to seeking\n\nthe mental impressions, litigation/trial strategy and/or legal conclusions of\n\n is protected by the joint defense or common interest (or\n\nequivalent) privileges; and (2) it seeks information that is or should already be in\n\n erefore is unduly burdensome. Defendant further objects\n\nto this Interrogatory to the extent that it incorporates the purportedly defined term\n\n\n\n 25\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 6 of 11\n\n\n\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant states as follows: available records reflect Plaintiff made an inbound call\n\nto 855-478-5112 on April 19, 2024, at 2:17 pm Pacific Time. Among other identifying\n\ninformation, the individual who called gave his name as Ash Bronstin, expressed\n\n internet services during the call, and provided a credit\n\ncard number for Plaintiff to make the purchase. This call lasted 23 minutes and 41\n\nseconds. Defendant also refers Plaintiff to Dkt. 11-2, and Exhibit A thereto.\n\n 12. Identify any third party who provided you with the telephone number at\n\nissue.\n\n ANSWER: Defendant specifically objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds\n\nand to the extent that: (1) it may be read as seeking information protected by the joint\n\ndefense or common interest (or equivalent) privileges; (2) it incorporates the\n\npurportedly defined ore is objectionable for the reasons stated\n\n and (3) it would require Viasat to reveal\n\ntrade secrets and/or other non-public, confidential and proprietary business\n\ninformation of Viasat and others, without having an appropriate protective order in\n\nplace. Defendant further objects to the extent Plaintiff seeks discovery relating to third\n\n to Federal Rule 26(b)(1) make plain that\n\n\n\n 26\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 7 of 11\n\n\n\n\nthis RFP to the extent that it incorporates the purportedly define\n\nthe reasons stated in its Preliminary Statements. Defendant further objects to the\n\nextent that responding would require Viasat to reveal trade secrets and/or other non-\n\npublic, confidential and proprietary business information of Viasat and others, without\n\nhaving an appropriate protective order in place. Defendant further objects to the extent\n\nPlaintiff seeks discovery relating to third pa\n\nto Federal Rule 26(b)(1) make plain that pa\n\ndevelop new claims or defenses that are not already identified\n\nPlaintiff does not purport to plead a vicarious TCPA liability theory in the operative\n\nComplaint, and expressly disclaims such a theory.\n\n Based on the foregoing, and without waiving any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant stands on its objections and will not provide a substantive response to this\n\nRFP or produce any responsive documents at this time.\n\n 8. All contracts or documents representing agreements with any third party\n\nthat dialed the calls to the Plaintiff.\n\n RESPONSE: Defendant specifically objects to this RFP, as stated, on the\n\ngrounds and to the extent that: (1) it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not\n\nreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, in that it is not\n\nreasonably limited in scope to the facts and allegations at issue in the Complaint, or\n\n\n\n 46\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 8 of 11\n\n\n\n\nto the claims and/or defenses at issue in this litigation, and therefore it is not\n\nproportional to the needs of the case; (2) as worded, overly broad in that it is not\n\nnecessarily limited to contracts or agreements involving Defendant; and (3) it assumes\n\nfacts not in evidence, specifically that any\n\n or that Plaintiff necessarily received such calls, and\n\ntherefore Defendant would be required to assume or admit said facts to properly\n\nrespond; and (4) responding would require Viasat to reveal trade secrets and/or other\n\nnon-public, confidential and proprietary business information of Viasat and others,\n\nwithout having an appropriate protective order in place. Defendant further objects to\n\nthe extent Plaintiff seeks discovery relating to third parties, as the Advisory\n\n\n\nentitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already\n\n es not purport to plead a vicarious TCPA\n\nliability theory in the operative Complaint, and expressly disclaims such a theory.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant states that, after conducting a reasonably diligent investigation and inquiry,\n\nDefendant has determined that it does not have documents responsive to this RFP.\n\n 9. All communications with any third party that dialed the calls to the\n\nPlaintiff.\n\n\n\n 47\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 9 of 11\n\n\n\n\n RESPONSE: Defendant specifically objects to this RFP, as stated, on the\n\ngrounds and to the extent that: (1) it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not\n\nreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, in that it is not\n\nreasonably limited in scope to the facts and allegations at issue in the Complaint, or\n\nto the claims and/or defenses at issue in this litigation, and therefore it is not\n\nproportional to the needs of the case; (2) as worded, overly broad in that it is not\n\nnecessarily limited to contracts or agreements involving Defendant; and (3) it assumes\n\nfacts not in evidence, specifically that any\n\n or that Plaintiff necessarily received such calls, and\n\ntherefore Defendant would be required to assume or admit said facts to properly\n\nrespond; and (4) responding would require Viasat to reveal trade secrets and/or other\n\nnon-public, confidential and proprietary business information of Viasat and others,\n\nwithout having an appropriate protective order in place.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant states that, after conducting a reasonably diligent investigation and inquiry,\n\nDefendant has determined that it does not have documents responsive to this RFP.\n\n 10. All internal communications at your company regarding any third party\n\nthat dialed the calls to the Plaintiff.\n\n\n\n\n 48\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 10 of 11\n\n\n\n\n RESPONSE: Defendant specifically objects to this RFP, as stated, on the\n\ngrounds and to the extent that: (1) it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not\n\nreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, in that it is not\n\nreasonably limited in scope to the facts and allegations at issue in the Complaint, or\n\nto the claims and/or defenses at issue in this litigation, and therefore it is not\n\nproportional to the needs of the case; (2) as worded, overly broad in that it is not\n\nnecessarily limited to contracts or agreements involving Defendant; and (3) it assumes\n\nfacts not in evidence, specifically that any\n\n or that Plaintiff necessarily received such calls, and\n\ntherefore Defendant would be required to assume or admit said facts to properly\n\nrespond; (4) responding would require Viasat to reveal trade secrets and/or other non-\n\npublic, confidential and proprietary business information of Viasat and others, without\n\nhaving an appropriate protective order in place; and (5) as worded, it may be read as\n\nseeking information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or\n\nthe attorney work-product doctrine and/or any other privilege or immunity, including\n\nbut not limited to seeking the mental impressions, litigation/trial strategy and/or legal\n\n the joint defense or common interest (or\n\nequivalent) privileges. Defendant further objects to this RFP to the extent that it\n\nincorporates the purportedly\n\n\n\n 49\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-1 Filed 04/01/26 Page 11 of 11\n\n\n\n\nPreliminary Statements. Defendant further objects to the extent Plaintiff seeks\n\ndiscovery relating to third parties, as the tes to Federal Rule\n\n entitlement to discovery to develop new\n\nclaims or defenses that are not already iden and Plaintiff does\n\nnot purport to plead a vicarious TCPA liability theory in the operative Complaint, and\n\nexpressly disclaims such a theory.\n\n Without waiving the foregoing objections or any reserved objections,\n\nDefendant states that, after conducting a reasonably diligent investigation and inquiry,\n\nDefendant has determined that it does not have documents responsive to this RFP.\n\n 11. All communications with any third party that pr\n\ntelephone number.\n\n RESPONSE: Defendant specifically objects to this RFP, as stated, on the\n\ngrounds and to the extent that: (1) it assumes facts not in evidence, specifically that\n\nthe subject phone number is necessarily Plai , and therefore\n\nDefendant would be required to assume or admit said facts to properly respond; (2) it\n\nis duplicative of previous RFPs and therefore is unduly burdensome and harassing;\n\n(3) responding would require Viasat to reveal trade secrets and/or other non-public,\n\nconfidential and proprietary business information of Viasat and others, without having\n\nan appropriate protective order in place; and (4) as worded, it may be read as seeking\n\n\n\n 50\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-01T18:25:17.557113-07:00","document_number":"64","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"15509734324","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Exhibit(s) A - Discovery Responses","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/474445903/","id":474445903,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/64/2/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-01T18:25:14.302995-07:00","date_modified":"2026-04-10T05:04:39.230534-07:00","sha1":"98729a003bb910e8ae55bc7bc3941312557962c4","page_count":15,"file_size":672795,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.2.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.2.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 1 of 15\n2023 WL 166168\n\n 2021, Defendant began calling Ms. Atkinson on her cellular\n 2023 WL 166168 telephone to sell Plaintiff a home warranty plan.\u201d Id. \u00b6 16.\n Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. Plaintiff did not consent to these calls. Id. \u00b6 18. The Complaint\n Not for Publication alleges that \u201cDefendant placed at least 7 calls to Plaintiff,\u201d\n United States District Court, D. New Jersey. and includes the following chart of the calls:\n\n\n Tracy ATKINSON, Plaintiff,\n v.\n CHOICE HOME WARRANTY, Defendant.\n\n Civil Action No. 22-04464\n |\n Signed January 11, 2023 Id. \u00b6\u00b6 21-22.\n During the October 27, 2021, 3:12 pm call, Plaintiff \u201casked\nAttorneys and Law Firms if the company making the calls had a website.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24.\n Plaintiff alleges that the person on the phone \u201cprovided\nJacob U. Ginsburg, Kimmel & Silverman, Ambler, PA, for\n \u2018ChoiceHomeWarranty.com\u2019 as the website associated with\nPlaintiff.\n the party making the calls.\u201d Id. During that same call, Plaintiff\nKenneth D. Friedman, Manatt, Phelps, & Phillips, LLP, New requested to be removed from the company's call list. Id.\nYork, NY, for Defendant. \u00b6\u00b6 26-27. However, Plaintiff continued to receive calls from\n Defendant. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 28, 30, 32. Plaintiff informed the caller on\n two subsequent calls that she had requested to be removed\nOPINION from the call list. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 29, 31. Plaintiff alleges that CHW\n \u201cdirectly placed the subject calls,\u201d but that \u201c[i]f in fact, during\nJohn Michael Vazquez, United States District Judge the course of discovery, Plaintiff learns [CHW] engaged a\n third-party vendor to place the subject calls, [CHW] would\n *1 This matter arises out of an alleged series of unwanted be vicariously liable for such calls.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 35-36. Moreover,\ntelephone solicitations. Plaintiff Tracy Atkinson claims that Plaintiff alleges that the calls were placed with \u201cmalicious,\nDefendant Choice Home Warranty (\u201cCHW\u201d) placed at least intentional, willful, reckless, wanton, and negligent disregard\nseven calls to her cell phone attempting to sell her a home for Plaintiff's rights under the law and with the purpose of\nwarranty in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection harassing Plaintiff.\u201d Id. \u00b6 40. Plaintiff also alleges that CHW\nAct, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227, et seq. (\u201cTCPA\u201d) and the Texas \u201csought the business of Plaintiff at her Texas phone number\nBusiness and Commerce Code \u00a7 302.101. Defendant filed while she was a Texas resident.\u201d Id. \u00b6 34. Plaintiff claims,\nthe present motion, seeking dismissal of the Complaint for however, that CHW did not \u201cregister as a telephone solicitor\nfailure to state a claim and dismissal of Plaintiff's request with the Texas Secretary of State\u201d as required by Texas law.\nfor injunctive relief for lack of standing. D.E. 8. The Court Id. \u00b6\u00b6 34, 45.\nreviewed the parties\u2019 submissions1 and decided the motion\nwithout oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and *2 Plaintiff's Complaint seeks actual and statutory damages\nL. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, Defendant's under the TCPA and Texas law as well as injunctive relief. Id.\nmotion is DENIED. The present motion followed. D.E. 8.\n\n\n\nI. BACKGROUND2 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nPlaintiff had a cell phone which she \u201cprimarily used ... CHW moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state\nfor residential purposes.\u201d D.E. 1. (\u201cCompl.\u201d) \u00b6\u00b6 12-13. a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.\nPlaintiff \u201cregistered that cell phone number on the Do 12(b)(6). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)\nNot Call Registry on or around December 2, 2008.\u201d Id. \u00b6 (6), a plaintiff must allege \u201cenough facts to state a claim to\n14. Nevertheless, \u201c[b]eginning on or around October 13, relief that is plausible on its face.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 2 of 15\n2023 WL 166168\n\n550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its attack, and as a result, like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,\nface when there is enough factual content \u201cthat allows the \u201cthe Court must consider the allegations of the complaint as\ncourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is true.\u201d Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d\nliable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).\n662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard \u201cdoes not\nimpose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to\nshow more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted III. ANALYSIS\nunlawfully.\u201d Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,\n A. Count I \u2013 TCPA Claim\n786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations\n *3 Congress passed the TCPA to protect individual\nomitted). As a result, a plaintiff must \u201callege sufficient facts\n consumers from receiving intrusive and unwanted calls.\nto raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover\n See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372\nproof of her claims.\u201d Id. at 789.\n (2012). Congress also provided a private right of action\n for people who have \u201creceived more than one telephone\nIn evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district\n call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the\ncourt must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in\n same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under\nthe complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in\n this subsection[.]\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5). The regulations\nfavor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515\n provide that \u201c[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone\nF.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court,\n solicitation to ... [a] residential telephone subscriber who has\nhowever, is \u201cnot compelled to accept unwarranted inferences,\n registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-\nunsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as\n call registry[.]\u201d 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2).\nfactual allegations.\u201d Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187,\n211 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). If, after viewing the\n CHW raises many perceived pleading deficiencies as to\nallegations in the complaint in the manner most favorable to\n Plaintiff's TCPA claim. First, CHW claims that Plaintiff\nthe plaintiff, it appears that no relief could be granted under\n has not pled that CHW directly, physically made the calls\nany set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may\n at issue, as required for direct liability under the TCPA.\ndismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. DeFazio\n See Aaronson v. CHW Grp., Inc., No. 18-1533, 2019 WL\nv. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., LLC, No. 10-2945, 2010\n 8953349, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2019) (\u201cIn order to\nWL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010). \u201c[T]he defendant\n establish that a defendant is directly liable under the TCPA,\nbears the burden of showing that the plaintiff has not stated\n courts have concluded that the plaintiff must show that the\na claim.\u201d United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic\n defendant actually, physically initiated the telephone call at\nBlue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 299 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016)\n issue.\u201d (citation omitted)). The Court disagrees. In various\n(citing Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178\n instances, Plaintiff explicitly alleges that Defendant directly\n(3d Cir. 2000)).\n placed the relevant calls. See, e.g., Compl. \u00b6 16 (\u201cDefendant\n began calling Ms. Atkinson\u201d on or around October 13,\nCHW also seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's request for injunctive\n 2021 (emphasis added)); id. \u00b6 20 (\u201cDefendant placed calls\nrelief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject\n to Ms. Atkinson on numerous occasions attempting to\nmatter jurisdiction. To decide such a motion, a court must\n solicit Plaintiff a home warranty plan[.]\u201d (emphasis added));\nfirst determine whether the party presents a facial or factual\n id. \u00b6 21 (\u201cIn total, Defendant placed at least 7 calls to\nattack against a complaint. A facial attack contests \u201csubject\n Plaintiff[.]\u201d (emphasis added)). While these allegations might\nmatter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the\n be too conclusory to state a claim standing alone, Plaintiff\ncomplaint, and it requires the court to \u2018consider the allegations\n further alleges that when she \u201casked if the company making\nof the complaint as true.\u2019 \u201d Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333,\n the calls had a website,\u201d the person on the phone \u201cprovided\n346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462\n \u2018ChoiceHomeWarranty.com\u2019 as the website[.]\u201d Id. \u00b6 24\nF.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)). A factual attack challenges\n (emphasis added). Considered in a light most favorable to\n\u201cthe factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion\n Plaintiff, as is required on a motion to dismiss, this allegation\nof jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or\n allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that CHW\n\u2018otherwise presenting competing facts.\u2019 \u201d Davis, 824 F.3d at\n directly made the October 27, 2021, 3:12 pm call. Cf. Dudley\n346 (quoting Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358\n v. Vision Solar, LLC, No. 21-659, 2021 WL 3077557, at *4\n(3d Cir. 2014)). Here, CHW's motion appears to be a facial\n (D.N.J. July 21, 2021) (relying on \u201ccommon sense alone\u201d\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 3 of 15\n2023 WL 166168\n\nto find a claim facially plausible where plaintiff alleged that regarding the source of the [call] or the entity or entities\n\u201cthe entity that placed the call and scheduled the appointment whose business was being promoted.\u201d Atkinson, however,\nwas the same entity that arrived at Plaintiffs\u2019 home for the provided such a detail by alleging that she \u201casked if the\nprearranged meeting and presented Plaintiffs with a business company making the calls had a website\u201d and was \u201cprovided\ncard\u201d). Moreover, because four other calls came from the \u2018ChoiceHomeWarranty.com\u2019 as the website associated with\nsame phone number as that call, the Court can reasonably the party making the calls.\u201d Compl. \u00b6 24. Thus, Plaintiff has\ninfer that \u201cmore than one telephone call\u201d was directly placed pled what the Aaronson and Vivint Solar courts said was\nby Defendant. lacking\u2014specific facts to support a reasonable inference that\n the defendant made the call.\nDefendant cites to various non-binding decisions in search\nof a contrary result. For instance, Defendant relies on Landy Defendant's reliance on Meeks v. Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc.,\nv. Natural Power Sources, LLC, No. 21-00425, 2021 WL No. 17-07129, 2018 WL 1524067, at *1-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar.\n3634162, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2021). In that case, the 28, 2018), fares no better. Meeks held that the plaintiff had\ncourt ruled that plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that not alleged liability as to defendant Yelp because, while the\ndefendant was directly liable for making the call. Id. The text messages were sent through Yelp's application, plaintiff's\nplaintiff in Landy only alleged that once he was on the call, complaint contained \u201caffirmative allegations confirming that\n\u201che was transferred to\u201d the defendant, without alleging that Yelp was not the maker or initiator of those text messages.\u201d\nthe defendant placed the initial call. Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges Id. at *5 (emphasis in original). Instead, the plaintiff alleged\nexplicitly that Defendant placed at least seven calls and that that \u201cthe app users, i.e., the Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants,\nshe was provided with \u201cChoiceHomeWarranty.com\u201d when initiated the text messages because they, and not Yelp, decided\nshe asked \u201cif the company making the calls had a website.\u201d whether, when, and to whom to send the text messages.\u201d Id.\nCompl. \u00b6\u00b6 21-24. Landy is inapposite. at *4. Atkinson alleges that CHW directly placed the calls\n at issue, not that it was a software middleman or \u201cplatform\u201d\nPlaintiff also cites to Smith v. Vision Solar LLC, No. 20-2185, through which the calls were made, making Meeks inapposite.\n2020 WL 5632653, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2020). In Defendant's reliance on Sheski v. Shopify (USA) Inc., No.\nthat case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant contacted 19-06858, 2020 WL 2474421, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. May 13,\none plaintiff \u201cfrom multiple telephone numbers confirmed to 2020), another case where the defendant merely \u201cprovide[d]\nbelong to Defendant.\u201d Id. Plaintiff did not, however, \u201cpoint a platform\u201d for sending text messages but did not have \u201cany\nto any further information ... to justify this conclusion.\u201d Id. control over a retailer's actual text marketing campaigns,\u201d\nThus, the court found that plaintiffs had not sufficiently pled fails for the same reason.\nthat the calls came from the defendant. Id. But here, Atkinson\npoints to a specific fact leading to her conclusion that the calls Second, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to\ncame from CHW\u2014the provision of the website bearing their adequately plead common law agency as necessary to support\nname. Thus, Smith is also distinguishable. a claim that CHW is vicariously liable for the calls. Plaintiff\n admits that she did not \u201cattempt to plead the factual basis\n *4 CHW also relies on Aaronson v. CHW Group, Inc., for vicarious liability.\u201d Opp. at 12; Compl. \u00b6 36 (\u201cIf in\n2019 WL 8953349, at *2. That case noted that \u201cat the fact, during the course of discovery, Plaintiff learns [CHW]\npleading stage, plaintiff must allege facts to support [her] engaged a third-party vendor to place the subject calls,\nconclusion or belief that defendant is the party that made [CHW] would be vicariously liable for such calls.\u201d). Given\nthe calls to plaintiff's cellular phone.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff's concession that this was not an attempt to plead\nThere, the plaintiff did not provide any \u201cdetails from the vicarious liability, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider\ntelephone calls that would tend to identify defendant as the Defendant's arguments on this point. Both parties and the\nparty that actually, physically took the steps to place the Court agree that Plaintiff has not adequately pled vicarious\ncalls to plaintiff's phone.\u201d Id. Similarly, the court in Bank liability\u2014instead, as explained above, she relies on a theory\nv. Vivint Solar, Inc., No. 18-2555, 2019 WL 2280731, at *2 of direct liability at this stage.\n(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2019), report and rec. adopted, 2019 WL\n1306064 (Mar. 22, 2019), found that plaintiff failed to state Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to adequately\na TCPA claim, observing that \u201cabsent from the pleading are plead that the phone receiving the calls was a \u201cresidential\nany specifics as to the statements made [on the phone call] telephone.\u201d Br. at 18-20. As noted, the relevant regulations\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 4 of 15\n2023 WL 166168\n\nprohibit a person or entity from initiating \u201cany telephone by the statute. Thus, Defendant's argument on this point falls\nsolicitation to ... [a] residential telephone subscriber who short.\nhas registered his or her telephone number on the national\ndo-not-call registry[.]\u201d 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2) (emphasis Fifth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not adequately pled\nadded). \u201cThe consensus in [the Third] Circuit is that Do that Defendant made more than one \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d\nNot Call claims may apply to cell phones.\u201d Dudley, 2021 to Plaintiff within twelve months. Br. at 22. As noted above,\nWL 3077557, at *5 (citations omitted). Defendant's own Plaintiff alleges at least seven total calls, all of which took\nauthority shows that some courts begin with a presumption place within less than one month.3 Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 21-22. Five\nthat a cellular phone number is \u201cresidential\u201d where it has been of these calls came from the phone number 210-712-1299,\nregistered on the national do-not-call registry. See Mantha v. which was the phone number that called when Plaintiff was\nQuoteWizard.com, LLC, No. 19-12235, 2022 WL 325722, at provided with \u201cChoiceHomeWarranty.com\u201d as the website\n*6 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 2022). \u201c[I]t is not required that a plaintiff for \u201cthe company making the calls.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 22, 24. Thus, at\nprovide extensive detail to state a plausible claim as to the a minimum, the five calls which came from the same phone\nresidential character of his cell phone.\u201d Dudley, 2021 WL number can be directly attributed to Defendant and Plaintiff\n3077557, at *5 (citation omitted). has sufficiently alleged that she received \u201cmore than one\n telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of\n *5 Plaintiff alleges that she registered her cell phone number the same entity.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5).\non the do-not-call registry, and that she uses that cell phone\n\u201cprimarily ... for residential purposes.\u201d Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 13, 15. In Defendant relies on Greene v. Select Funding, LLC, No.\nDudley, the plaintiff only alleged that \u201c[p]laintiffs cell phone 20-07333, 2021 WL 4926495, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5,\nnumbers [were] used for \u2018residential purposes.\u2019 \u201d Dudley, 2021), in which the court observed that the plaintiff had only\n2021 WL 3077557, at *5. The court noted that \u201c[w]hile answered one call from defendant, which was insufficient\nthe Complaint does not allege additional facts to elaborate to allow the court \u201cto reasonably infer that [the] other calls\non the residential nature of [p]laintiff's cell phones,\u201d such were solicitations.\u201d Id. Here, while Plaintiff only alleges\nallegations are not necessary to state a claim. Id. Instead, the specific content of one call, she answered the phone\n\u201cthe explicit allegation that the cell phone numbers were on at least three occasions, Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 24, 29, 31, claims\nused \u2018for residential purposes\u2019 \u201d was sufficient. Id. (citation that \u201cDefendant began calling Ms. Atkinson on her cellular\nomitted). Here, Plaintiff's registration with the do-not-call telephone to sell Plaintiff a home warranty plan,\u201d id. \u00b6 16, that\nregistry, Compl. \u00b6 15, coupled with her explicit allegation that the \u201ccalls\u201d were \u201cfor telemarketing purposes,\u201d id. \u00b6 19 and\nthe cell phone is in fact \u201cresidential,\u201d id. \u00b6 15, is sufficient at that \u201cDefendant placed calls to Ms. Atkinson on numerous\nthis stage. occasions attempting to solicit Plaintiff a home warranty\n plan,\u201d id. \u00b6 20 (emphasis added). These allegations create a\nFourth, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to reasonable inference that more than one of the seven calls\nadequately plead that the calls here constitute \u201ctelephone explicitly listed were \u201ctelephone solicitations\u201d in violation of\nsolicitations\u201d as required by the statute. Br. at 20-21. The the statute.\nTCPA defines \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d as \u201cthe initiation of\na telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging Defendant's sixth and final argument as to the TCPA claim\nthe purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, is that Plaintiff has not adequately pled a willful or knowing\nor services, which is transmitted to any person[.]\u201d 47 U.S.C. violation, as necessary to allow entitlement to treble damages.\n\u00a7 227(a)(4). Plaintiff alleges that \u201cDefendant began calling See 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(b)(3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's\nMs. Atkinson on her cellular telephone to sell Plaintiff a actions were \u201cmalicious, intentional, willful, reckless, wanton\nhome warranty plan.\u201d Compl. \u00b6 16. Plaintiff further alleges and negligent\u201d and had the \u201cpurpose of harassing Plaintiff.\u201d\nthat the calls were made \u201cfor telemarketing purposes\u201d and Compl. \u00b6 40. While these allegations are conclusory, Plaintiff\nthat \u201cDefendant placed calls to Ms. Atkinson on numerous further alleges that she asked to be removed from Defendant's\noccasions attempting to solicit Plaintiff a home warranty call list on three occasions but continued to receive calls.\nplan that Plaintiff had no interest in.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 19-20. Plaintiff Id. \u00b6\u00b6 26-32. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of\nhas clearly alleged that the calls were for the purpose of Plaintiff, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant\nencouraging her to purchase a good or service, as required acted willfully or knowingly in continuing to call Plaintiff\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 5 of 15\n2023 WL 166168\n\ndespite her repeated indications that she did not wish to is entitled to relief,\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and a plaintiff\nreceive such calls. is not required to plead around every possible statutory\n exception or defense to her claim. Bello v. Cap. One Bank\n *6 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss Count (USA) N.A., No. 20-01218, 2020 WL 728804, at *4 (D.N.J.\nI is denied. Feb. 13, 2020) (citing United States v. Columbus Country\n Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir. 1990)) (noting that \u201cit is\n not [p]laintiff's responsibility to foreclose\u201d the application\n B. Count II \u2013 Texas Law Claim4 of statutory exceptions; rather, it is the defendant's burden\nDefendant, without citing to any authority, also challenges to establish that a statutory exception to liability applies).\nPlaintiff's claim for violation of the Texas Business and It is sufficient that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the prima\nCommerce Code, arguing that \u201cthe Complaint provides zero facie elements of her claim, and that the application of the\nfacts supporting the essential elements of such a claim.\u201d Br. exceptions noted by Defendant is not apparent from the face\nat 23 (emphasis in original). Texas law provides that \u201c[a] of the Complaint.\nseller may not make a telephone solicitation ... to a purchaser\nlocated in [Texas] unless the seller holds a registration\ncertificate for the business location from which the telephone C. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief\nsolicitation is made.\u201d Tex. Bus. & Com. Code \u00a7 302.101(a). *7 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks Article\n III standing to pursue injunctive relief because she has not\nPlaintiff alleges that CHW \u201csought the business of Plaintiff alleged any threat of future injury.5 Br. at 23-25. Article III\nat her Texas phone number while she was a Texas resident, of the U.S. Constitution limits the judicial power of federal\ndespite the fact that [CHW] failed to register as a telephone courts to deciding \u201cCases\u201d or \u201cControversies.\u201d U.S. Const.\nsolicitor with the Texas Secretary of State.\u201d Compl. \u00b6 34. art. III, \u00a7 2. To meet the case-or-controversy requirement, a\nPlaintiff further alleges that CHW engaged in \u201ccontinuous and plaintiff must show that she has standing to sue. See Raines v.\nrepetitive telephone solicitation of Plaintiff without obtaining Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (citation omitted); Taliaferro\na registration certificate from the Office of the Secretary of v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006)\nState.\u201d Id. \u00b6 45. These allegations sufficiently state a claim (\u201cSubsumed within [Article III] is the requirement that a\nfor a violation of \u00a7 302.101, and thus the motion to dismiss litigant have standing[.]\u201d). To satisfy Article III's standing\nis denied as to Count II. requirements, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the\n following:\nIn its reply, Defendant seeks to distinguish a case cited by\nPlaintiff, Pepper v. Life Protect 24/7, Inc., No. 20-02154, (1) [she] has suffered an \u201cinjury in fact\u201d that is (a)\n2021 WL 4084514, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2021), on the basis concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not\nthat, there, \u201cthe plaintiff's complaint \u2018cite[d] a web address conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable\nthat confirmed[ed] that [the defendant] was [not] registered to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely,\nwith the Office of the Secretary of State at the time the calls as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be\nwere placed.\u2019 \u201d Reply at 14. That case, however, did not find redressed by a favorable decision.\nthat such allegations were necessary to state a claim. Further, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC),\nwhat Defendant appears to demand is closer to evidence than Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders\nit is to the plausible allegations required to survive a Rule of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). \u201c[A] plaintiff\n12(b)(6) motion. See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief\n277, 296 (3d Cir. 2015) (\u201c[w]hile it is possible that Plaintiffs sought[.]\u201d DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,\nwill ultimately falter in meeting their burden of proof, the 352 (2006) (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185).\ncollection of evidence is the object of discovery\u201d and the The Court must presume that it lacks jurisdiction unless the\n\u201cpleading of \u2018evidence\u2019 \u201d is not required). party invoking jurisdiction establishes otherwise. Cohen v.\n Kurtzman, 45 F. Supp. 2d 423, 429 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing\nDefendant also notes that Plaintiff did not allege facts to Phila. Fed. of Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir.\ndemonstrate that three statutory exceptions to liability do not 1998)).\napply. Br. at 23 n.10. But the Federal Rules only require \u201ca\nshort and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, they must\n demonstrate that they are \u201clikely to suffer future injury\u201d\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nAtkinson v. Choice Home Warranty, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2023)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 6 of 15\n2023 WL 166168\n\n for injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is\nfrom the conduct to be enjoined. City of Los Angeles v.\n denied.\nLyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 111 (1983) (\u201cThe equitable remedy\n[of injunctive relief] is unavailable absent a showing of\nirreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where IV. CONCLUSION\nthere is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss,\nplaintiff will be wronged again[.]\u201d (citation omitted)). At this D.E. 8, is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this\nstage, given the recurrent and relatively recent nature of the Opinion.\nalleged calls, Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 21-22, and the fact that Defendant\ncontinued to call Plaintiff after she repeatedly asked to be\nremoved from the call list, id. \u00b6\u00b6 26-32, the Court finds that All Citations\nPlaintiff has alleged facts which, accepted as true, establish\na sufficient likelihood that Defendant will call her again in Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2023 WL 166168\nthe future. Thus, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's request\n\n\nFootnotes\n1 The submissions consist of CHW's motion to dismiss, D.E. 8 (\u201cBr.\u201d); Plaintiff's opposition, D.E. 10 (\u201cOpp.\u201d); and CHW's\n reply, D.E. 11 (\u201cReply\u201d).\n\n2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint. D.E. 1.\n\n3 Plaintiff also alleges that she \u201creceived additional calls from Defendant\u201d beyond those seven. Compl. \u00b6 23.\n\n4 Defendant argues that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim if\n the TCPA claim is dismissed. Br. at. 23. Because Plaintiff's TCPA claim survives the motion to dismiss, the Court does\n not reach this argument.\n\n5 The TCPA explicitly provides a private right of action which permits a plaintiff to bring \u201can action based on a violation of the\n regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5)(A). This statutory provision,\n however, does not obviate the need to establish the constitutional prerequisite of Article III standing. See Gladstone\n Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (\u201cCongress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent\n permitted by Art. III ... In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima[.]\u201d (citations omitted)).\n\n\n\nEnd of Document \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.\n Government Works.\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMoore v. Healthcare Solutions Inc., Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2022)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 7 of 15\n2022 WL 17487823\n\n Healthcare Solutions for violating the Telephone Consumer\n 2022 WL 17487823 Protection Act (\u201cTCPA\u201d) when it called him more than once.\n Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.\nUnited States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division. Healthcare Solutions, in turn, moved to dismiss the complaint.\n For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant's\n motion to dismiss.\n George MOORE, on behalf of himself\n and others similarly situated, Plaintiff,\n v.\n Background\n HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS\n At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court must accept as\n INC. and Prosperity Life Insurance\n true the complaint's well-pleaded allegations. See Lett v. City\n Group LLC, Defendants. of Chicago, 946 F.3d 398, 399 (7th Cir. 2020). The Court\n \u201coffer[s] no opinion on the ultimate merits because further\n Case No. 21-cv-4919 development of the record may cast the facts in a light\n | different from the complaint.\u201d Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d\n Signed December 7, 2022 409, 412 (7th Cir. 2020).\n\nAttorneys and Law Firms\n On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff George Moore received two\nAnthony Paronich, Paronich Law, P.C., Hingham, MA, for phone calls to his residential telephone line from the same\nPlaintiff. phone number. See Cplt., at \u00b6\u00b6 19, 22\u201323 (Dckt. No. 1). The\n calls went to a residential number \u201cused by Mr. Moore only.\u201d\nJason Edward Hunter, Bryan Eliot Curry, Litchfield Cavo Id. at \u00b6 20. Moore's caller ID showed that both phone calls\nLLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Healthcare Solutions Inc. came from the same phone number. Id. at \u00b6 23.\n\n Moore didn't answer the first call. Id. at \u00b6 24. The complaint\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER does not reveal why. Maybe, like many of us when we receive\n a call from an unknown number, Moore simply ignored the\nSteven C. Seeger, United States District Judge call. After all, answering the phone from an familiar number\n is a dicey proposition. Not much good can come from it. Most\n *1 Plaintiff George Moore received two calls to his home\n of the time, there is more downside than upside in exposing\nphone from the same phone number, on the same day. He\n oneself to a stranger on the phone.\ndidn't answer the first call. But when the caller rang his phone\na second time, he picked up. And it didn't take him long to\n Maybe he had his hands full. Maybe the game was on, or\nregret it. Instead of hearing a friendly voice, he heard a sales\n maybe he simply didn't feel like getting interrupted. Whatever\npitch for a product that he didn't want.\n the reason, the key point is that someone called, and Moore\n didn't answer.\nThe caller was a representative from Defendant Healthcare\nSolutions, Inc., offering to sell Moore an insurance policy.\n But when Moore received a second call from that number,\nAnd just like that, Moore's home turned into an insurance\n he picked up. Id. at \u00b6 26. Moore soon discovered that Carol\nbazaar, with a salesperson peddling products that Moore\n Jandera, an employee of Defendant Healthcare Solutions, was\ndidn't want or need. Moore wasn't interested in insurance, so\n on the other end of the line. And she wanted to sell.\nhe hung up.\n Jandera offered to sell Moore an insurance policy from\nBut Moore didn't leave it at that. His phone number is on\n Prosperity Life Insurance Group. Id. at \u00b6 28. Jandera then\nthe national Do Not Call Registry, and he isn't supposed to\n offered to transfer Moore to Prosperity Life so that he could\nreceive sales calls at home. So Moore turned the tables and\n sign up for an insurance policy. Id. at \u00b6 29.\ndelivered an unwelcome communication of his own. He sued\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMoore v. Healthcare Solutions Inc., Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2022)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 8 of 15\n2022 WL 17487823\n\nMoore apparently wasn't interested in buying insurance, so he 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)\nended the call. Id. at \u00b6 30. Sometime later, Moore received (6) motion, the complaint must provide the defendant with\nan email from Jandera to confirm Prosperity Life's policy fair notice of the basis for the claim, and it must be facially\noffer. Id. at \u00b6 31. Jandera's email address had the domain plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);\n\u201courhcs.com,\u201d which is a domain owned by Healthcare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). \u201cA\nSolutions. Id. at \u00b6\u00b6 32\u201333. claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\n content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\n *2 That email, like the call, apparently didn't sit well that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Iqbal,\nwith Moore. He wrote Healthcare Solutions and requested 556 U.S. at 678.\nevidence showing that it had permission to contact him. Id. at\n\u00b6 34. He never received a response. Id. at \u00b6 35.\n Discussion\nAs it turns out, Moore's phone number was listed on the Do\nNot Call Registry since July 7, 2017. Id. at \u00b6 21; see also 15 Moore's complaint has a single count. He alleges that\nU.S.C. \u00a7 6151. He didn't expect unwanted calls as someone Healthcare Solutions violated the TCPA by calling him more\nwith a number on the Do Not Call Registry. He expected than once within a twelve-month period, even though his\ndomestic tranquility. He didn't want calls from salespeople. phone number is on the Do Not Call Registry. See Cplt., at \u00b6\nHe wanted peace and quiet. 64 (Dckt. No. 1).\n\nMoore responded with his own form of unsolicited The TCPA creates a private right of action for \u201c[a] person\ncommunication. He filed a class action complaint against who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-\nHealthcare Solutions and Prosperity Life, alleging violations month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation\nof the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227, of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.\u201d See 47\net seq. See Cplt., at \u00b6\u00b6 63\u201364 (Dckt. No. 1). He seeks statutory U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5). One such regulation prohibits calls to\ndamages of up to $500 for each violation, and treble damages numbers on the Do Not Call Registry.\nfor any knowing or willful violation. Id. at \u00b6\u00b6 65\u201366.\n Under the regulation, \u201c[n]o person or entity shall initiate any\nProsperity Life filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for telephone solicitation to ... [a] residential telephone subscriber\nlack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. who has registered his or her telephone number on the\nSee Prosperity Life's Mtn. to Dismiss (Dckt. No. 11). After national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish\njurisdictional discovery, the parties agreed to dismiss Moore's to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the\nclaims against Prosperity Life with prejudice. See Stipulation Federal Government.\u201d See 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2). The\nof Dismissal (Dckt. No. 36); see also 6/1/22 Order (Dckt. No. TCPA defines a \u201ctelephone solicitation\u201d as \u201cthe initiation of\n38). a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging\n the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or\nHealthcare Solutions, the only remaining defendant, later services, which is transmitted to any person.\u201d See 47 U.S.C.\nfiled a motion to dismiss. See Healthcare Solution's Mtn. to \u00a7 227(a)(4).\nDismiss (Dckt. No. 39). That motion is now before the Court.\n *3 Once a telephone number is registered on the Do Not\n Call Registry, \u201cregistrations must be honored indefinitely,\nLegal Standard or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the\n telephone number is removed by the database administrator.\u201d\nA motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the See 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2). A failure to respect those\nsufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. See Fed. R. Civ. technological boundaries can lead to significant relief for\nP. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 the person receiving the call. A plaintiff suing under section\n(7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 227(c)(5) can recover actual monetary losses or statutory\ndismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in damages up to $500. See 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5)(B).\nthe complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those\nfacts in the plaintiff's favor. See AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer,\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMoore v. Healthcare Solutions Inc., Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2022)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 9 of 15\n2022 WL 17487823\n\nMoore contends that the calls from Healthcare Solutions fit If anything, it is hard to imagine why else Healthcare\nthe bill. He alleges that Healthcare Solutions called him twice, Solutions would have called him. There is no suggestion in\nthe minimum number of times to bring a claim. And his the complaint that Moore worked there, or knew someone\nresidential phone number is on the Do Not Call Registry. So, who worked there, or anything along those lines. Maybe\nas Moore sees it, he received too many calls to his phone when Healthcare Solutions has some other story to tell, but if so,\nhe should have received none. summary judgment \u2013 not a motion to dismiss \u2013 is the time to\n tell it. It is unlikely that an insurance agent was simply calling\nHealthcare Solutions moves to dismiss on two grounds. a stranger out of the blue to say \u201cHi.\u201d\n\nHealthcare Solutions first argues that the complaint does Two judges in this district have held that the \u201ccontent and\nnot allege that Moore received more than one telephone timing\u201d of an answered call can \u201callow[ ] the court to draw\nsolicitation. Under the regulation, a caller cannot be liable for [the] reasonable inference\u201d that unanswered calls were sales\nonly one call. The regulation adopts a call-me-twice, shame- solicitations from the defendant. See Toney v. Quality Res.,\non-you approach. Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727, 746 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (St. Eve, J.); see\n also Moore v. Pro Custom Solar LLC, 2022 WL 1092186, at\nThe argument rests on the fact that Moore didn't pick up *2\u20133 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (Kocoras, J.). The basic idea is that calls\nthe first call. Healthcare Solutions points out that Moore from the same number tend to come from the same person.\n\u201cterminated the first call\u201d without answering. See Cplt., at \u00b6 And a salesperson tends to call for only one reason.\n24 (Dckt. No. 1). But he did answer the second call, and only\nthen did Moore \u201cengage[ ] the telemarketer ... to learn the *4 In Toney, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant called\npurpose of the call.\u201d Id. at \u00b6 24. So, according to Healthcare her four times in a two-day period. See Toney, 75 F. Supp. 3d\nSolutions, Moore has no way of knowing whether the first call at 746. The first day, the plaintiff's caller ID showed that she\nwas a \u201ctelephone solicitation,\u201d or whether it was Healthcare received three calls from the same phone number. Id. at 732,\nSolutions calling at all. 746. She didn't answer any of those calls. Id. The second day,\n she received a fourth call from the same phone number, and\nMoore acknowledges that he never spoke with anyone \u2013 she finally picked up. Id. The caller was a representative of the\nincluding anyone from Healthcare Solutions \u2013 during the first defendant telemarketing company, offering to sell plaintiff a\ncall. See Pl.\u2019s Resp. to Def.\u2019s Mtn. to Dismiss, at 5 (Dckt. No. membership to a subscription retail-discount service. Id.\n40). That said, he points out that both calls came from the\nsame number, on the same day. So, it is reasonable to assume The defendant argued that by answering only one call, the\nthat the same caller made both calls for the same reason. plaintiff didn't plausibly allege that she had received at least\n two calls from the defendant. Id. at 746. Judge St. Eve rejected\nThe complaint includes enough facts to support a reasonable that argument. The plaintiff answered the fourth call and\ninference that Healthcare Solutions made two telemarketing learned that it was a telemarketer. So it was a \u201creasonable\ncalls. The issue of who made the first call isn't much inference\u201d that the three unanswered calls from the same\nof a whodunit. Moore received two calls from the same number a day earlier were from the same person for the same\nnumber, and the second caller was Healthcare Solutions. It purpose. Id.\nis reasonable to conclude that Healthcare Solutions called\nthe first time, too. Does Healthcare Solutions share a phone The inference that a telemarketer called to sell something\nnumber with someone else? Unlikely. wasn't much of a stretch. After all, that's what telemarketers\n do. That's the whole point. They use the telephone to market\nMoore may not know for certain why Healthcare Solutions something. Telemarketers aren't known for calling people for\ncalled him the first time. But the content of the second call other reasons.\ngives a pretty good idea. As the plaintiff, Moore is entitled to\nreasonable inferences in his favor. It is a reasonable inference Judge Kocoras reached a similar result in Moore. There, the\nthat the two calls from the same number on the same day were plaintiff (George Moore, presumably the same George Moore\nabout the same thing. in the case at hand) received six calls on five different days in\n July 2021. See Moore, 2022 WL 1092186, at *1. He \u201clistened\n to and terminated\u201d these calls without engaging the caller. Id.\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMoore v. Healthcare Solutions Inc., Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2022)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 10 of 15\n2022 WL 17487823\n\nOnly during the seventh call, in early August 2021, did the \u2013 as opposed to someone else \u2013 personally registered his\nplaintiff engage the caller to learn who was calling. Id. phone number on the Do Not Call Registry.\n\nThe defendant argued that \u201c[b]ecause Moore was only able As Healthcare Solutions points out, the regulation prohibits\nto identify the seventh caller in a stream of identical calls ... initiating a telephone solicitation to a \u201cresidential telephone\nhe [did] not allege he received the requisite two or more calls subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number\u201d\nrequired under the TCPA.\u201d Id. at *2. Building on Toney, Judge on the Do Not Call Registry. See 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 64.1200(c)(2)\nKocoras ruled that \u201cit is reasonable to believe the first six calls (emphasis added). So, Healthcare Solutions argues that the\nfrom the same number with the same content were also from regulation applies only if Moore himself registered his phone\n[defendant].\u201d Id. at *3. number.\n\nThe case at hand does not require a daunting inferential leap, Healthcare Solutions doesn't dispute that Moore's phone\neither. Moore received two calls from the same number, on number was on the Do Not Call Registry. Instead, it argues\nthe same day. Given the content of the second call, it is a that Moore cannot bring a claim because the complaint doesn't\nreasonable inference that the first call was a telemarketing call allege that Moore himself registered the phone number.\nfrom Healthcare Solutions.\n That argument rests on an unduly strict reading of the\nIf anything, the inference is almost unavoidable. Imagine regulation. The text refers to a subscriber \u201cwho has\nasking your Average Joe on the street why an insurance agent registered\u201d a telephone number. Id. Healthcare Solutions\ncalled someone at home. It does not require much creativity reads that provision to mean a subscriber \u201cwho has\nto think that the call was about selling insurance. And then, [personally] registered\u201d a particular number. In effect,\nimagine telling Average Joe that there were two calls from the Healthcare Solutions is attempting to inject an adverb that is\ninsurance agent on the same day: Call #1 went unanswered, nowhere to be seen.\nand Call #2 was about selling insurance. Average Joe isn't\nlikely to be stumped about the reason for Call #1. Nothing in the text ascribes any importance to the person\n who registered the number. The focus is on whether the\nMaybe Healthcare Solutions can show that it wasn't behind number was registered, not who did the registration. The\nthe first call, or that the call wasn't a telephone solicitation. regulation protects numbers, not particular people. That's why\nBut that's a question for another day. At the motion-to- the Registry includes numbers, not names.\ndismiss stage, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences\nin Moore's favor. See AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 614. For now, That reading reflects the reality of living together. The\nthe complaint plausibly alleges that Healthcare Solutions regulation covers a \u201cresidential telephone subscriber.\u201d Id.\ncalled him twice to peddle a policy. People tend to share residences, and share home telephone\n numbers. It is hard to see why one spouse would receive the\nA different approach would change the incentives against protections of the statute, and another spouse would not. After\ncalling and calling and calling people. Congress recognized all, the same phone ringing in the same house could annoy\nthat unwanted phone calls are an unwelcome intrusion. That's several people. An unwanted phone call to a shared number\ntrue when you answer your phone. But it is also true when could annoy everyone in earshot, even if only one member of\nyour phone rings, and then rings again \u2013 for call after call, the household took the time to register the number.\nagain and again \u2013 when you don't pick up. The interruption\nexists without answering the phone. If the calls don't count The most natural reading of the regulation prohibits unwanted\nunder the TCPA unless the person picks up, telemarketers calls to a number. It is natural to read the statute to protect a\nwould escape liability for all previous interruptions, no matter number, not simply the person who registered the number.\nhow annoying or intrusive. Nothing in the statutory text\nsupports giving callers a pass for such intrusions. That reading of the regulation seems to fit with the breadth\n of the statutory text, too. The statute greenlights a claim by\n *5 Healthcare Solutions also makes a second argument, but a \u201cperson who has received more than one telephone call\nit does not get very far. The argument is about whether Moore within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same\n entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMoore v. Healthcare Solutions Inc., Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2022)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 11 of 15\n2022 WL 17487823\n\nsubsection.\u201d See 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5). It protects a \u201cperson\u201d\nwho \u201creceived more than one telephone call.\u201d Id. It doesn't\nseem to matter who registered the number. Anyone on the Conclusion\nreceiving end of the call can turn the tables and file suit.\n For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the complaint\nIt does not matter who registered the phone number on the is denied.\nDo Not Call Registry. But even if it mattered, the complaint\nwould survive. The complaint alleges that Moore's phone\n All Citations\nnumber is registered, and that Moore is the only person\nwho uses that number. That's more than enough to support a Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2022 WL 17487823\nreasonable inference that Moore registered his number. See\nCplt., at \u00b6\u00b6 19\u201321 (Dckt. No. 1).\n\nEnd of Document \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.\n Government Works.\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMorris v. West Manheim Tp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2013)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 12 of 15\n\n\n were dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules\n 2013 WL 2177759 of Civil Procedure. See Morris v. Kesselring, et al., No. 1:09\u2013\n Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. cv\u20131739 (M. D.Pa. May 9, 2011), ECF No. 156. Following\n United States District Court, the dismissal of the 2009 Action, Defendants Strausbaugh\n M.D. Pennsylvania. and Barney were awarded their attorney's fees pursuant to 42\n U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. Morris v. Kesselring, et al., No. 1:09\u2013cv\u20131739\n (M. D.Pa. Dec. 8, 2011), ECF No. 178.\n David MORRIS and Pamela Morris, Plaintiffs,\n v. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the action, Morris v.\n WEST MANHEIM TOWNSHIP, Kesselring, et al., No. 1:09\u2013cv\u20131739 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 5, 2011),\n Chief Timothy Hippensteel, Officer ECF No. 177, and the award of attorney's fees to the United\n States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Morris v.\n Schneider, Scott Strausbaugh, Mark Kesselring, et al., No. 1:09\u2013cv\u20131739 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 6, 2012),\n Barney, and Kevin Null, Defendants. ECF No. 182.\n\n Civil Action No. 1:CV\u201312\u20131647. While the 2009 Action was pending on appeal, Plaintiffs\n | commenced the instant litigation. Morris v. W. Manheim Twp.,\n May 20, 2013. et al., No. 1:12\u2013cv\u20131647 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF\n No. 1 (the \u201c2012 Action\u201d). As in the 2009 Action, the 2012\n Action asserted claims against Defendants Strausbaugh and\nMEMORANDUM Barney for deprivations of Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth\n Amendment rights. Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney\nA. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge. moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Morris v. W. Manheim\n Twp., et al., No. 1:12\u2013cv\u20131647 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 22, 2012), ECF\n *1 Presently before the Court is the Motion of Defendants\n No. 12.\nScott Strausbaugh and Mark T. Barney to Recover Attorney's\nFees. (Doc. 21 .) Defendants seek to recover fees from\n Prior to the resolution of Defendants Strausbaugh and\nPlaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\n Barney's motion to dismiss the 2012 Action, the Third Circuit\n1988, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927, Rules 11 and 54 of the Federal\n affirmed the dismissal of the 2009 Action and the award\nRules of Civil Procedure, and Middle District of Pennsylvania\n of attorney's fees to Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney.\nLocal Rule 83.3.1. For the reasons that follow, Defendants\n See Morris v. Kesselring, Nos. 11\u20134360, 12\u20131069, 2013 WL\nStrausbaugh and Barney's motion will be denied.\n 618797, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2013). Shortly thereafter,\n Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney's motion to dismiss the\n 2012 Action was granted. See Morris v. W. Manheim Twp .,\nI. Background No. 12\u20131647, 2013 WL 995551 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 13, 2013).\n\nThe instant action is the second of two federal lawsuits On March 27, 2013, Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney\nfiled by Plaintiffs against multiple Defendants, including filed the instant motion for recovery of attorney's fees\nDefendants Strausbaugh and Barney. With respect to incurred in defending the 2012 Action. (Doc. 21.) The motion\nDefendants Strausbaugh and Barney, both actions relate to is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.\ntheir alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs' rights by erecting a\ngate blocking a driveway entrance used by Plaintiffs. In both\ncases, Plaintiffs claimed Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney\nviolated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. II. Discussion\n\n *2 Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney seek recovery of\nThe first action, Morris v. Kesselring, et al., No. 1:09\u2013\n their attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\ncv\u20131739 (M. D.Pa.) (the \u201c2009 Action\u201d), was resolved\n 1927, Rules 11 and 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,\nin this Court in favor of Defendants Strausbaugh and\n and Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 83.3.1.\nBarney. Specifically, the claims against these Defendants\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMorris v. West Manheim Tp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2013)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 13 of 15\n\n\n Second, Defendants argue that sanctions should be imposed\nA. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 on Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927. Section\nFirst, Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney seek recovery of 1927 states:\ntheir attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988, which\nprovides: \u201c[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases\nof section[ ] ... 1983 ..., the court, in its discretion, may allow in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof\nthe prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably\nattorney's fee as part of the costs, ...\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988(b). The and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy\n\u201cprevailing party\u201d can be either the plaintiff or the defendant, personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees\n\u201cbut a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.\nonly \u2018upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, *3 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927. Section 1927 \u201crequires a court to\nunreasonable or without foundation ....\u2018 \u201c Barnes Found. v. find an attorney has (1) multiplied proceedings; (2) in an\nTwp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 157\u201358 (3d Cir.2001) unreasonable and vexatious manner; (3) thereby increasing\n(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, the cost of the proceedings; and (4) doing so in bad faith\n416\u201317, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)). A court or by intentional misconduct.\u201d In re Schaefer Salt Recovery,\nneed not find the plaintiff brought the action in bad faith to Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir.2008) (In re Prudential Ins.\naward attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant, but the court Co. America Sales Practice Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d\nmust \u201c \u2018resist the understandable temptation to engage in post Cir.2002)). Prior to imposing sanctions under \u00a7 1927, the\nhoc reasoning by concluding that because a plaintiff did not court must find willful bad faith on the part of the offending\nultimately prevail his action must have been unreasonable or attorney. In re Prudential, 278 F.3d at 188 (citing Zuk v.\nwithout foundation.\u2019 \u201c Id. at 158 (quoting Christiansburg, 434 Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute, 103 F.3d 294, 297\nU.S. at 421\u201322, 98 S.Ct. 694). (3d Cir.1996)). \u201c \u2018Indications of this bad faith are findings\n that the claims advanced were meritless, that counsel knew\nThe Third Circuit has identified a number of factors relevant or should have known this, and that the motive for filing\nto a court's determination whether an award of attorneys' the suit was for an improper purpose such as harassment.\u2019\nfees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate under \u00a7 1988, \u201c Id. (quoting Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231,\nincluding: (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima Am. Fed. of Teachers, AFL\u2013CIO, 829 F.2d 1370, 1375 (6th\nfacie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; (3) Cir.1987).\nwhether the case was dismissed prior to trial; (4) whether the\ncase involved an issue of first impression requiring judicial Sanctions will not be imposed against Plaintiffs' counsel\nresolution; (5) whether the controversy was based on a real under \u00a7 1927. While Plaintiffs' counsel multiplied and\nthreat of injury to the plaintiff; and (6) whether the trial court increased the costs of the proceedings, the Court does\nfound the suit frivolous. Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 158. not find counsel's actions to have been vexatious or in\nThese considerations, however, are only guidelines, not strict bad faith. Rather, counsel's conduct was a product of\nrules. Id. \u201cmisunderstanding, bad judgment, or well-intentioned zeal.\u201d\n Lasalle Nat'l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Grp., LLC, 287 F.3d\nAlthough Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in this action, the Court 279, 289 (3d Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Thus, sanctions\nwill not rely on \u201chindsight logic,\u201d Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at under \u00a7 1927 are not warranted in this case.\n422, 98 S.Ct. 694, in determining whether to award fees in this\ncase. Rather, considering the relevant factors identified by the\nThird Circuit as a whole, and also noting that \u201cdeterminations C. Rule 11\nregarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis,\u201d Next, Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney assert that\nBarnes Found., 242 F.3d at 158 (citation omitted), the Court attorney's fees should be awarded under Rule 11 of the Federal\nwill not award attorney's fees to Defendants Strausbaugh and Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b) provides:\nBarney under \u00a7 1988 in this case.\n By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or\n other paper\u2014whether by signing, filing, submitting, or\nB. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927 later advocating it\u2014an attorney or unrepresented party\n certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMorris v. West Manheim Tp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2013)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 14 of 15\n\n\n information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable of alternative possible sanctions for violations of Rule 11.\n under the circumstances: See Doering, 857 F.2d at 194. And, \u201cthe imposition of\n sanctions for a Rule 11 violation is discretionary rather than\n (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, mandatory.\u201d Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc.,\n such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 580 F.3d 119, 146 n. 28 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Knipe v.\n increase the cost of litigation; Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir.1994)).\n (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are\n The Court declines to impose sanctions against Plaintiffs or\n warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument\n their counsel as requested by Defendants under Rule 11, i.e.,\n for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for\n the attorney's fees they incurred in defending the 2012 action.\n establishing new law;\n First, for the reasons stated previously, the Court does not\n (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, find that monetary sanctions are necessary or warranted in\n if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary this case. Second, the record is devoid of any indication\n support after a reasonable opportunity for further that Defendants complied with the requirements of Rule\n investigation or discovery; and 11(c)(2) prior to filing the instant motion for sanctions. See\n Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2) (Rule 11 motion \u201cmust not be filed or be\n (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,\n evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected\n based on belief or a lack of information. within 21 days after service or within another time the court\nFed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). Under Rule 11(c), \u201c[i]f, after notice and sets.\u201d). According to the Third Circuit, \u201cif the twenty-one day\na reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines period is not provided, the [Rule 11] motion must be denied.\u201d\nthat Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Kalenevitch, No. 12\u20131619, 2012 WL\nan appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party 5279264, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2012) (quoting Schaefer Salt\nthat violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.\u201d Recovery, 542 F.3d at 99). The motion for sanctions pursuant\nFed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1). When a request for sanctions are made to Rule 11 will therefore be denied.\nby motion under Rule 11, the motion \u201cmust not be filed\nor be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim,\ndefense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately D. Local Rule 83.3.1\ncorrected within 21 days after service or within another time Lastly, Defendants Strausbaugh and Barney seek recovery of\nthe court sets.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2). Sanctions imposed their attorney's fees pursuant to Local Rule 83.3.1. That Rule\nunder Rule 11, however, \u201cmust be limited to what suffices provides, in pertinent part:\nto deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by\n In the sound discretion of any judge in this court, after\nothers similarly situated.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(4). Sanctions\n notice and an opportunity to be heard, one or more of the\nmay \u201cinclude nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a\n following sanctions may be imposed for failure to comply\npenalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted\n with any rule or order of court:\nfor effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the\nmovant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and ....\nother expenses directly resulting from the violation.\u201d Id.\n (b) Imposition of Costs on Attorneys.\n *4 In evaluating a Rule 11 motion for sanctions, a district\ncourt must determine whether the attorney's conduct was If counsel acts in a dilatory manner or files motions for\nobjectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Ario v. the purposes of delay, or fails to comply with any rule or\nUnderwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for the order of court, and the judge finds that the sanctions in\n1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir.2010). subsection 83.3.1(a) above are inadequate or unjust to the\nSanctions under Rule 11 are \u201cto be applied only \u2018in the parties in light of the facts or circumstances, the judge may,\nexceptional circumstance\u2019 where a claim or motion is patently in addition to, or in lieu of, such sanctions assess reasonable\nunmeritorous or frivolous.\u201d Id. (quoting Doering v. Union costs directly against counsel whose action has obstructed\nCnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d the effective administration of the court's business, ...\nCir.1988)). A district court is to consider a wide range M.D. Pa. L.R. 83.3.1.\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3\n\f Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-2\nMorris v. West Manheim Tp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2013)\n Filed 04/01/26 Page 15 of 15\n\n\n An appropriate order follows.\n *5 Counsel's conduct does not require the imposition of\ndiscretionary sanctions under Local Rule 83.3.1. Specifically,\nthe Court does not find that counsel acted dilatory or\nfor purposes of delay. Likewise, counsel's conduct did not ORDER\nobstruct the Court's administration of its business. Sanctions\nunder Local Rule 83.3.1 are therefore not justified in this case. NOW, this 20th day of May, 2013, IT IS HEREBY\n ORDERED that the Motion of Defendants Scott Strausbaugh\n and Mark T. Barney to Recover Attorney's Fees (Doc. 21) is\n DENIED.\nIII. Conclusion\n\nFor the above stated reasons, Defendants Strausbaugh and All Citations\nBarney's motion will be denied.\n Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 2177759\n\nEnd of Document \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.\n Government Works.\n\n\n\n\n \u00a9 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-01T18:25:21.198541-07:00","document_number":"64","attachment_number":2,"pacer_doc_id":"15509734325","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Unpublished Opinion(s) Unpublished Opinions","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/474445904/","id":474445904,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/70376835/64/3/bronstin-v-viasat-inc/","date_created":"2026-04-01T18:25:14.312845-07:00","date_modified":"2026-04-10T04:57:11.302618-07:00","sha1":"c9fe8c88e1e8bc35f43a498c196e14c8bb5e3275","page_count":1,"file_size":134001,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.3.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892/gov.uscourts.pamd.146892.64.3.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:25-cv-00927-KMN Document 64-3 Filed 04/01/26 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n ASHER BRONSTIN, individually and Case No.\n on behalf of all others similarly situated, 1:25\u2212CV\u221200927\u2212KMN\n Plaintiff, CLASS ACTION\n v. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED\n VIASAT INC.\n\n Defendant.\n\n [PROPOSED ORDER DENYING]\n MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF\n\n\n AND NOW, this _____ day of ___________, 2026, it is hereby ORDERED\n\nthat the Defendant\u2019s Motion for Sanctions is hereby DENIED.\n\n\n\n\n BY THE COURT:\n\n\n ____________________________\n J.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-04-01T18:25:23.938881-07:00","document_number":"64","attachment_number":3,"pacer_doc_id":"15509734326","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-04-01T18:25:12.829920-07:00","date_modified":"2026-05-15T07:03:52.212541-07:00","date_filed":"2026-04-01","time_filed":null,"entry_number":64,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-04-01.001","pacer_sequence_number":167,"description":"BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 57 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Asher Bronstin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A - Discovery Responses, # 2 Unpublished Opinion(s) Unpublished Opinions, # 3 Proposed Order)(Perrong, Andrew) (Entered: 04/01/2026)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=70376835&page_size=40"}