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BB OpCo, LLC et al.\n\n\n Present: The Honorable Otis D. Wright II, United States District Judge\n Sheila English Not reported N/A\n Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.\n Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:\n Not present Not present\n Proceedings (In Chambers):\n\n In light of Plaintiff\u2019s Notice of Settlement, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a dismissal\nthat complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 by May 7, 2025. (ECF No. 29.) The\nCourt noted that \u201c[f]ailure to timely comply with this order shall result in the dismissal of this\naction.\u201d Having received no response from Plaintiff to the Court\u2019s Order, Plaintiff\u2019s individual\nclaims are DISMISSED, and his class allegations are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk\nof the Court shall close the case.\n\n IT IS SO ORDERED.\n\n : 00\n Initials of Preparer SE\n\n\n\n\nCV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 1\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2025-12-24T01:08:40.720320-08:00","document_number":"30","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044919189","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive - no proceeding held AND ~Util - Terminate Civil Case AND ~Util - Terminate Deadlines and Hearings","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-05-13T15:37:04.471937-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.592482-08:00","date_filed":"2025-05-13","time_filed":"15:04:40","entry_number":30,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-05-13.001","pacer_sequence_number":89,"description":"MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: In light of Plaintiff's Notice of Settlement, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a dismissal that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 by May 7, 2025 29 . TheCourt noted that \"[f]ailure to timely comply with this order shall result in the dismissal of this action.\" Having received no response from Plaintiff to the Court's Order, Plaintiff's individual claims are DISMISSED, and his class allegations are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (lc) (Entered: 05/13/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/421738855/","id":421738855,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/435747869/","id":435747869,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/29/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-04-08T11:35:06.600634-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T19:20:33.085290-07:00","sha1":"2febbd9efb6277390c6f1f2f3db381c411e71f64","page_count":1,"file_size":105550,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.29.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.29.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":1,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 29 Filed 04/07/25 Page 1 of 1 Page ID\n #:289\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n\n CIVIL MINUTES \u2013 GENERAL\n Case No. 2:24-cv-09629-ODW (JCx) Date April 7, 2025\n Title Kieren Kishnani v. BB OpCo, LLC et al.\n\n\n Present: The Honorable Otis D. Wright II, United States District Judge\n Sheila English Not reported N/A\n Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.\n Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:\n Not present Not present\n Proceedings (In Chambers):\n\n In light of Plaintiff\u2019s Notice of Settlement, (ECF No. 27), indicating that the case has\nsettled in its entirety, this action is placed on inactive status. By May 7, 2025, the parties shall\nfile a dismissal that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Failure to timely\ncomply with this order shall result in the dismissal of this action. All other dates and deadlines\nin this action are VACATED and taken off calendar. Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss is\nDENIED as moot. (ECF No. 21.)\n\n IT IS SO ORDERED.\n\n : 00\n Initials of Preparer SE\n\n\n\n\nCV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 1\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T16:10:41.251894-07:00","document_number":"29","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044646652","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-04-08T11:35:06.592197-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.535158-08:00","date_filed":"2025-04-07","time_filed":null,"entry_number":29,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-04-07.003","pacer_sequence_number":84,"description":"MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: In light of Plaintiff's Notice of Settlement 27, indicating that the case has settled in its entirety, this action is placed on inactive status. By May 7, 2025, the parties shall file a dismissal that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Failure to timely comply with this order shall result in the dismissal of this action. All other dates and deadlines in this action are VACATED and taken off calendar. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot 21 . 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(SBN 301533)\n nkumar@taulersmith.com\n 3 TAULER SMITH LLP\n 626 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 550\n 4 Los Angeles, California 90017\n Tel: (213) 927-9270\n 5\n\n 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff\n Kieren Kishnani\n 7\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 8\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 9\n\n10 KIEREN KISHNANI, individually Case No. 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n and on behalf of all others similarly\n11 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT\n situated,\n12\n Plaintiff,\n13\n vs.\n14\n BB OPCO, LLC d/b/a Brooks\n15\n Brothers, a Connecticut limited\n16 liability company; and DOES 1\n through 25, inclusive,\n17\n\n18 Defendants.\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 27 Filed 04/07/25 Page 2 of 2 Page ID\n #:286\n\n\n\n 1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:\n 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani and Defendant BB\n 3 Opco, LLC have reached a resolution of the above-captioned case. Assuming\n 4 compliance with the terms of the resolution, the parties expect Plaintiff will dismiss\n 5 his individual claims with prejudice within the next thirty (30) days.\n 6\n\n 7\n\n 8\n DATED: April 7, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n 9\n\n10\n By: /s/ Robert Tauler\n11 Robert Tauler, Esq.\n Attorney for Plaintiff\n12\n Kieren Kishnani\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT\n 1\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-12-24T01:28:29.546017-08:00","document_number":"27","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044638252","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Settlement","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-04-07T13:01:22.912004-07:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.420453-08:00","date_filed":"2025-04-07","time_filed":"12:36:48","entry_number":27,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-04-07.001","pacer_sequence_number":80,"description":"NOTICE of Settlement filed by Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani. (Tauler, Robert) (Entered: 04/07/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/418902861/","id":418902861,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/432733887/","id":432733887,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2025-03-11T09:03:53.376281-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-11T09:03:53.382299-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Generic Text Only Entry","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-03-11T09:03:53.320645-07:00","date_modified":"2025-03-11T09:03:53.320667-07:00","date_filed":"2025-03-11","time_filed":"08:33:33","entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-03-11.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/418148692/","id":418148692,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/431938600/","id":431938600,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/25/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-03-03T18:01:41.029809-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T19:20:25.146368-07:00","sha1":"008813eeaa6bc798ce0602b501888a73bce38a14","page_count":16,"file_size":643940,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.25.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.25.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":1,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 1 of 16 Page ID\n #:269\n\n\n\n 1 BLANK ROME LLP\n 2\n Ana Tagvoryan (SBN 246536)\n ana.tagvoryan@blankrome.com\n 3 Victor Sandoval (SBN 344461)\n 4 Victor.sandoval@blankrome.com\n 2029 Century Park East | 6th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, CA 90067\n 6 Telephone: 424.239.3400\n Facsimile: 424.239.3434\n 7\n Attorneys for Defendant\n 8 BB OpCo, LLC\n 9\n\n10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12\n\n13 KIEREN KISHNANI, individually and Case No. 2:24\u2212cv\u221209629-ODW-JC\n on behalf of all others similarly situated,\n14 DEFENDANT BB OPCO LLC\u2019S\n Plaintiff,\n15 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION\n v. TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF\u2019S\n16 AMENDED COMPLAINT\n BB OPCO, LLC\n17 d/b/a Brooks Brothers, a Connecticut\n limited liability company, and DOES 1 Judge: Otis D. Wright II\n18 though 25, inclusive, Date: March 17, 2025\n Time: 1:30 p.m.\n19 Defendants. Place: Courtroom 9C, 350 W. 1st\n Street, Los Angeles, California\n20 90012\n\n21 Complaint Filed: November 7, 2024\n22 Complaint Served: November 12, 2024\n Amended Complaint Filed: January 16,\n23 2025\n24 Trial Date: None set\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n 1\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 2 of 16 Page ID\n #:270\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n 2\n\n 3 I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 6\n 4 II. PLAINTIFF LACKS ARTCILE III AND STATUTORY STANDING TO\n 5 PURSUE HER CLAIMS...................................................................................... 7\n\n 6 III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD A TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE. .................. 8\n 7 IV. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD A QUALIFYING TELEPHONE LINE........ 11\n 8\n A. To The Extent the Statute Is Ambiguous, Legislative History\n 9 Supports Defendant\u2019s Position. ................................................................ 12\n10 V. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD BB OPCO INSTALLED THE TIKTOK\n11 PIXEL IN CALIFORNIA .................................................................................. 13\n\n12 VI. THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION. ............................................. 14\n13 VII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BB OPCO 21 IS AN ELECTRONIC\n14 COMMUNICATION SERVICES PROVIDER. ............................................... 15\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n 2\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 3 of 16 Page ID\n #:271\n\n\n\n 1\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\n 2 Page(s)\n 3 Cases\n 4\n Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc. I\n 5 (Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., April 23, 2024 Minute Order, No.\n 23STCV30742) .......................................................................................................... 9\n 6\n\n 7 Casillas v. Traveler\u2019s Choice\n (Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., May 29, 2024 Minute Order, No.\n 8 24STCV01337) .......................................................................................................... 9\n 9\n Casillas v. Traveler\u2019s Choice Travelware\n10 (LA. Sup. Ct. 24STCV01337) ................................................................................. 16\n11 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell,\n12 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal 2007) .......................................................................... 9\n\n13 Daghaly v. Bloomingdales.Com, LLC,\n 2024 WL 5134350 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024).......................................................... 6, 7\n14\n\n15 Dana Hughes v. Vivint, Inc., et al.,\n 2024 WL 5179917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024) ............................................................ 6\n16\n Earll v. eBay, Inc.,\n17\n 599 F. App\u2019x 695 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 14\n18\n Eng. v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc.,\n19 2019 WL 2619658 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2019), aff\u2019d, 808 F. App\u2019x 529\n20 (9th Cir. 2020) ......................................................................................................... 14\n\n21 Hanley v. Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,\n 2022 WL 2117805 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2022) ........................................................... 15\n22\n\n23 Heiting v. Taylor Fresh Foods, Inc.\n (July 28, 2024) L.A. Sup Court Case No. 24STCV12891 ...................................... 11\n24\n Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.,\n25\n 84 Cal. App. 5th 671 (2022) ...................................................................................... 7\n26\n\n27\n 3\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 4 of 16 Page ID\n #:272\n\n\n\n 1\n Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc.,\n 742 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2024) ......................................................... 9, 10, 11\n 2\n Norwest Mortg., Inc. v. Superior Ct.,\n 3\n 72 Cal. App. 4th 214 (1999) .................................................................................... 14\n 4\n People v. Giordano,\n 5 42 Cal. 4th 644 (2007) ............................................................................................... 8\n 6\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V.,\n 7 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2013)................................................................... 14\n 8 SeeRules and Policies Regarding Calling No. Identification Serv.\u2014\n 9 Caller ID,\n 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 1764 (1994)....................................................................................... 16\n10\n Shah v. Fandom, Inc.,\n11\n No. 24-cv-01062, 2024 WL 4539577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024)........................ 9, 10\n12\n Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,\n13 51 Cal. 4th 1191 (2011) ........................................................................................... 14\n14\n TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n15 594 U.S. 413 (2021)................................................................................................... 7\n16 Vicko Ins. Services v. Ohio Indem. Co.,\n17 70 Cal.App.4th 55 (1999) ........................................................................................ 16\n\n18 Statutes\n19 Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.100-1798.199.100 .................................................................... 13\n20\n Cal Pen. Code 638.50(c) ............................................................................................... 10\n21\n Cal. Pen. Code\n22 \u00a7 637.2 ................................................................................................................. 7, 16\n23 \u00a7 638.55 ................................................................................................................... 16\n24 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a7 629.51, 638.50 .............................................................................. 12\n25 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(2)(C) ................................................................................. 8\n26\n Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 630................................................................................................... 10\n27\n 4\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 5 of 16 Page ID\n #:273\n\n\n\n 1\n Cal Penal Code \u00a7 638.51........................................................................................ passim\n\n 2 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(d)(1) .................................................................................... 11\n 3 California Consumer Privacy Act ................................................................................. 13\n 4\n CCPA ............................................................................................................................ 13\n 5\n Copyright Act................................................................................................................ 14\n 6\n Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510\n 7\n (1986) ....................................................................................................................... 12\n 8\n Trap and Trace Laws ............................................................................................. passim\n 9\n Other Authorities\n10\n\n11 U.S. Constitution Article III ....................................................................................... 6, 7\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n 5\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 6 of 16 Page ID\n #:274\n\n\n\n 1 I. INTRODUCTION\n 2 Plaintiff\u2019s Opposition to BB OpCo\u2019s1 Motion to Dismiss (the \u201cMotion\u201d) only\n 3 confirms that her theory is deficient as a matter of law. Plaintiff\u2019s claim that the\n 4 TikTok software installed on BB OpCo\u2019s website is a trap and trace used in violation\n 5 of California\u2019s criminal laws is not supported by any facts. More fundamentally, the\n 6 Trap and Trace Laws do not and cannot apply to the website software at issue, as both\n 7 the legislative history and statutory text confirm. Plaintiff spends much of her\n 8 Opposition accusing BB OpCo of \u201cspeculation\u201d for simply identifying the myriad\n 9 defects in Plaintiff\u2019s pleading. This includes that Plaintiff did not even try to plead that\n10 the TikTok software captured dialing, routing, or signaling information reasonably\n11 likely to identify the source of a communication\u2014the very essence of trap and trace\n12 device. See Cal Penal Code \u00a7 638.51.\n13 Moreover, Plaintiff urges the Court to ignore the statutory text and legislative\n14 history\u2019s repeated reference to telephone lines and the absurd results that would ensue\n15 if court orders were required to implement standard website analytics tools.\n16 In addition, Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing her claims because she\n17 improperly attempts to apply CIPA extraterritorially to BB OpCo, a Connecticut LLC\n18 that is not alleged to have engaged in any conduct in California. On this issue,\n19 Plaintiff nonsensically claims only Plaintiff\u2019s conduct is relevant in direct\n20 contravention of well settled California law. As to CIPA\u2019s private right of action,\n21 Plaintiff is simply wrong that it applies to the Trap and Trace Laws implemented\n22 three-decades after CIPA\u2019s initial enactment, which make no reference to CIPA\u2019s\n23 private right of action and has it own enforcement provisions.\n24 Finally, the Amended Complaint fails for a fundamental threshold defect.\n25 Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to pursue her claims. Plaintiff does not and\n26\n\n27 1\n Defined terms have the same meaning as defined in BB OpCo\u2019s opening motion.\n 6\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 7 of 16 Page ID\n #:275\n\n\n\n 1 cannot explain any concrete injury caused by her visit to BB OpCo\u2019s website, and she\n 2 ignores the multiple authorities in this District and this Circuit that have dismissed\n 3 effectively identical claims for lack of standing. See, e.g., Dana Hughes v. Vivint, Inc.,\n 4 et al., 2024 WL 5179917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024); Daghaly v. Bloomingdales.Com,\n 5 LLC, 2024 WL 5134350, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024).\n 6 Plaintiff already amended her complaint once, but she failed to cure the\n 7 fundamental defects in her claims. The Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint\n 8 with prejudice.\n 9 II. PLAINTIFF LACKS ARTCILE III AND STATUTORY STANDING TO\n10 PURSUE HER CLAIMS.\n11 At a fundamental and threshold level, Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint fails as a\n12 matter of law for lack of Article III and statutory standing. Plaintiff abjectly fails to\n13 plead an injury-in-fact as required under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because\n14 she fails to identify any harm, let alone a concrete one, stemming from her visit to BB\n15 OpCo\u2019s website. Plaintiff speculates about a purely hypothetical harm to her \u201cprivacy\n16 interest\u201d that is never identified with specificity in her pleading. Aside from vague and\n17 undefined references to \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic information,\n18 referral and url tracking\u201d that the TikTok software may collect, there is not a single\n19 detail alleged concerning what information of Plaintiff\u2019s was collected, or any injury\n20 suffered as a result.\n21 Tellingly, Plaintiff fails to cite or otherwise respond to Vivint, Inc., et al., where\n22 a court in this District dismissed a nearly-identical complaint for lack of Article III\n23 standing. Nor does Plaintiff address recent Ninth Circuit authority confirming that a\n24 plaintiff that complains of third-party website analytics software but alleges only that\n25 she visited a website, does not allege an injury and thus lacks standing.\n26 Bloomingdales.Com, LLC, 2024 WL 5134350, at *1. Because Plaintiff\u2019s Amended\n27 Complaint alleges nothing beyond the fact that she \u201cvisited\u201d BB OpCo\u2019s website, her\n 7\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 8 of 16 Page ID\n #:276\n\n\n\n 1 Amended Complaint is indistinguishable. By not responding, Plaintiff effectively\n 2 concedes she has no standing to pursue her claims.\n 3 Plaintiff instead tries to the muddy the waters by relying on transcripts of\n 4 unrelated TikTok proceedings, that have nothing to do with BB OpCo\u2019s alleged use of\n 5 the TikTok pixel on its website, and have no connection to Plaintiff whatsoever. As\n 6 the Supreme Court has unequivocally established, Article III standing must involve an\n 7 actual injury to Plaintiff herself that is traceable to Defendant; the Court should ignore\n 8 Plaintiff\u2019s extraneous arguments as irrelevant. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594\n 9 U.S. 413, 414 (2021).2\n10 III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD A TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE.\n11 Even if Plaintiff had standing to pursue her claims, she fails to plead the very\n12 essence of a trap and trace device. It is evident that Plaintiff only pays lip service to\n13 the statute\u2019s specific requirement that a trap and trace device (1) capture incoming\n14 electronic or other impulses (2) that identify the originating number or other dialing,\n15 routing, addressing, or signaling information (3) reasonably likely to identify the\n16 source of a wire or electronic communication, but not the contents of a\n17 communication. Cal Penal Code \u00a7 638.51. In particular, Plaintiff conflates all three\n18 requirements and bundles the various types of information to argue that they somehow\n19 satisfy the entirety of the definition, when they do not.\n20 First, Plaintiff claims in her Opposition that she sufficiently pleads a qualifying\n21 trap and trace device under CIPA by alleging that the TikTok software captures\n22 \u201cincoming electronic impulses\u201d including \u201cdevice and browser information,\n23 geographic information, referral tracking, and url tracking.\u201d (Opp. at 10:9-14.) But\n24 device and browser information, geographic information, and referral tracking are not\n25\n 2\n26 Plaintiff likewise fails to plead statutory standing. Section 637.2 provides a private right of action\n only for a person \u201cwho has been injured by\u201d a violation of one of its provisions. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\n27 637.2.\n 8\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 9 of 16 Page ID\n #:277\n\n\n\n 1 \u201celectronic impulses\u201d\u2014the first requirement in the definition. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to\n 2 argue exactly what in her Amended Complaint is meant to reference the \u201celectronic\n 3 impulses\u201d and her Opposition evidently abandons her reliance on the indecipherable\n 4 screenshot in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint\u2014purporting to show\n 5 \u201celectronic impulses being sent to TikTok.\u201d (Am. Compl. \u00b6 12.) As Plaintiff now\n 6 effectively concedes, the screenshot shows no such thing.\n 7 Nor does the Opposition even try to explain how Plaintiff\u2019s allegations fall\n 8 within the purview of dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information to fit\n 9 within the statute. Indeed, after erroneously claiming that \u201cdevice and browser\n10 information, geographic information, referral tracking and url tracking\u201d are somehow\n11 \u201celectronic impulses,\u201d she completely ignores the second requirement that dialing,\n12 routing, addressing or signaling information be identified by such impulses. Plaintiff\n13 completely conflates the statutory requirements. To be clear, none of the information\n14 cited by Plaintiff as purportedly collected by the TikTok software fits either statutory\n15 element. Device and browser information, geographic information, and referral\n16 tracking are not signaling information as they do not fit within the same category as\n17 dialing, routing or addressing. See People v. Giordano, 42 Cal. 4th 644, 660 (2007)\n18 (\u201cEjusdem generis applies whether specific words follow general words in a statute or\n19 vice versa\u2026[T]he general term or category is restricted to those things that are similar\n20 to those which are enumerated specifically.\u201d).\n21 As to the third prong of the statute, requiring that information collected be\n22 \u201creasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication,\u201d the\n23 Amended Complaint is equally deficient. Plaintiff concludes that \u201can individual\u2019s\n24 geographic location, IP address, zip code, cell phone type and model, browser\n25 information, and recently visited websites is the sort of information that is reasonably\n26 likely to identify an individual.\u201d (Opp. at 10:17-20.) But an IP address is excluded\n27 from the Trap and Trace Laws, as information required for internet functionality. See\n 9\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 10 of 16 Page ID\n #:278\n\n\n\n 1 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal 2007); see also\n 2 Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc. I (Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., April 23, 2024 Minute\n 3 Order, No. 23STCV30742). None of the other information alleged\u2014a zip code, a\n 4 phone type, and recently visited websites\u2014could possibly identify or be likely to\n 5 identify an individual anywhere.\n 6 The authorities cited by Plaintiff, including Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., 742 F.\n 7 Supp. 3d 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2024) and Shah v. Fandom, Inc., No. 24-cv-01062,\n 8 2024 WL 4539577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) do not compel a contrary result. Moody\n 9 found that \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic information, and browsing\n10 history\u201d qualified as dialing routing, addressing, or signaling information because the\n11 defendant argued only that the \u201callegation [wa]s vague and conclusory but provide[d]\n12 no support for this argument.\u201d 742 F. Supp. 3d at 1077. In other words, unlike here,\n13 the defendant there effectively conceded the argument. Further, the court erred in\n14 determining that a device that collects contents of communications, even if dialing,\n15 routing, or signaling information are also collected, could qualify as a trap and trace\n16 device, insofar as the statue\u2019s text specifically excludes any technologies that capture\n17 the contents of communications. Cal Pen. Code 638.50(c) (a \u201cTrap and trace device\u201d\n18 does \u201cnot [capture] the contents of a communication.\u201d); see also Shah v. Fandom,\n19 Inc., No. 24-cv-01062, 2024 WL 4539577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (following\n20 Moody and considering only pen registers, rather than a trap and trace device.3) Shah\n21 is also distinguishable as it addressed \u201ctracking\u201d on a user\u2019s device. 2024 WL\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n 3\n25 Shah, like Moody and Greenley, also relied on Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 630 and its directive to interpret\n CIPA in the manner that \u2018fulfills the legislative purpose of CIPA by giving greater protection to\n26 privacy interests.\u2019\u201d Shah v. Fandom, Inc., 2024 WL 4539577, at *4 (quotation omitted). However, as\n explained in the motion (and never addressed in any of Shah, Moody, Greeley, the Trap and Trace\n27 Laws are separate from CIPA. Mot. at 20-21, n.5, 23-25, ns. 7-8.\n 10\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 11 of 16 Page ID\n #:279\n\n\n\n 1 4539577, at *1. That is not the case here as Plaintiff claims BB OpCo installed the\n 2 TikTok software on its own website, not on Plaintiff\u2019s device.4\n 3 IV. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD A QUALIFYING TELEPHONE LINE.\n 4 Although the statutory framework makes clear that a trap and trace device\n 5 requires a device or process attached to a telephone line, Plaintiff urges the Court to\n 6 ignore the statutory text and legislative history, and to blindly follow non-binding\n 7 authorities that mistakenly applied the Trap and Trace Laws to website software. See\n 8 Heiting v. Taylor Fresh Foods, Inc. (July 28, 2024) L.A. Sup Court Case No.\n 9 24STCV12891; Moody, 742 F. Supp. 3d at 1077. The statutory text and structure,\n10 however, confirm otherwise.\n11 As explained in BB OpCo\u2019s opening Motion, the Trap and Trace Law\u2019s\n12 implementing sections make clear that for a trap and trace device to be employed, a\n13 telephone line is required. Subsection (d) of section 638.52 details specific\n14 information that must be included in a court order authorizing the use of a trap and\n15 trace device, including specifically a telephone line and telephone number.\n16 Specifically, a court order permitting the use of a trap and trace device must include\n17 \u201c[t]he identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed\n18 the telephone line to which the . . . trap and trace device is to be attached.\u201d Cal. Penal\n19 Code \u00a7 638.52(d)(1) (emphasis added). The order must also include \u201c[t]he number\n20 and, if known, physical location of the telephone line to which the . . . trap and trace\n21 device is to be attached.\u201d Id. \u00a7 638.52(d)(3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not\n22 bother to address these clear provisions in any manner and instead suggests the court\n23\n\n24 4\n If every website using various analytics and marketing tools were subject to criminal liability, it\n25 would lead to absurd outcomes. Website operators cannot obtain court orders to use such technology\n because they are not peace officers, and according to Plaintiff, they cannot obtain consent under\n26 section 638.51, which only allows consent as a defense for providers of electronic communication\n services, which Plaintiff argues BB OpCo is not. This interpretation would effectively criminalize\n27 common website practices, which is not a reasonable (or constitutional) result.\n 11\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 12 of 16 Page ID\n #:280\n\n\n\n 1 can simply ignore them because CIPA\u2019s definition of \u201celectronic communication\u201d\n 2 confirms the Trap and Trace Laws apply to website software. This is non-sensical.\n 3 Extending the definition of the \u201celectronic communication\u201d beyond telephonic\n 4 communications in light of the express requirements for a telephone line in \u00a7 638.52\n 5 cannot be reconciled. Quite simply, a court would be unable to comply with section\n 6 638.52 if website technologies were construed as trap and trace devices.\n 7 In addition to this irreconcilable statutory conflict, nothing in the definition of\n 8 electronic communication suggest that it intended to apply to internet\n 9 communications. Indeed, the Trap and Trace Law\u2019s definition of \u201celectronic\n10 communication\u201d is the same definition used in the federal trap and trace law since\n11 1986\u2014before websites were even invented. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a7 629.51, 638.50;\n12 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510 (1986). If the\n13 California legislature intended \u201celectronic communication\u201d to apply to website\n14 communications when it enacted the Trap and Trace Laws in 2015, it would have\n15 specifically stated.\n16 Plaintiff\u2019s attempt to distinguish Application of U.S. of Am. For an Order\n17 Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal.\n18 1995) as involving only federal pen register act is unpersuasive. The court\u2019s holding\n19 is directly analogous to the circumstances here and unequivocally held that \u201conly\n20 devices that are attached to a telephone line\u201d were covered by the statute\u2019s trap and\n21 trace provisions. Id.\n22 A. To The Extent the Statute Is Ambiguous, Legislative History\n23 Supports Defendant\u2019s Position.\n24 Plaintiff urges the court to ignore the substantial legislative history that\n25 repeatedly references telephone lines and makes no reference whatsoever to website\n26 technologies. Indeed, the legislative history of sections 638.50-638.53 shows that the\n27 statute intended to authorize state and local law enforcement to use trap and trace\n 12\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 13 of 16 Page ID\n #:281\n\n\n\n 1 devices for telephone surveillance. Without any response for this undeniable\n 2 conclusion, Plaintiff falls back on its specious \u201celectronic communication\u201d argument\n 3 that has no merit.\n 4 Plaintiff likewise misconstrues the import of the comprehensive California\n 5 Consumer Privacy Act (\u201cCCPA\u201d) enacted specifically to govern the disclosure and\n 6 sale of personally identifying information in marketing.5 Plaintiff claims only\n 7 generally that the CCPA does not \u201camend\u201d or \u201crepeal\u201d the Trap and Trace Laws and\n 8 should be \u201charmonized\u201d with other laws. Plaintiff misses the point. The enactment of\n 9 the CCPA does not in any way alter the Trap and Trace Laws, it merely demonstrates\n10 that the California Legislature never believed that the Trap and Trace Laws applied to\n11 website analytics tools to begin with.\n12 V. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD BB OPCO INSTALLED THE TIKTOK\n13 PIXEL IN CALIFORNIA\n14 Plaintiff concedes that it failed to plead that BB OpCo installed the TikTok\n15 pixel in California, and she does not dispute the well settled presumption against the\n16 extraterritorial application of California law unless that intent \u201cis clearly expressed or\n17 reasonably to be inferred from the language of the act or from its purpose, subject\n18 matter or history.\u201d Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1207 (2011). Plaintiff\n19 also does not contest that there is no legislative intent for CIPA to apply\n20 extraterritorially. Instead, Plaintiff argues without any support that it is sufficient for\n21 Plaintiff to have used BB OpCo\u2019s website in California. Plaintiff is wrong.\n22 By focusing only on Plaintiff\u2019s access of the website in California, and even\n23 more irrelevantly TikTok\u2019s place of business in California, Plaintiff ignores the crucial\n24 elements of her claim are BB OpCo\u2019s alleged installation or use of a trap and trace\n25\n 5\n26 The CCPA, enacted three years after section 638.51, regulates the collection of personal\n information by businesses, including email addresses, geolocation data, and a consumer's interaction\n27 with an internet website. See Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.100-1798.199.100.\n 13\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 14 of 16 Page ID\n #:282\n\n\n\n 1 device. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51. As a practical matter, the location where the\n 2 trap and trace device was installed is the triggering conduct forming the basis of\n 3 Plaintiff\u2019s claims. That undisputedly occurred on BB OpCo\u2019s website. Plaintiff does\n 4 not and cannot claim that this conduct occurred in California\u2014it did not.6\n 5 Nothing about Plaintiff\u2019s visit to the website in California changes this result.\n 6 To the contrary, California courts have repeatedly confirmed that a plaintiff\u2019s location\n 7 has no bearing on the extraterritorial application of California laws to a defendant. See\n 8 Eng. v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 2619658, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 8,\n 9 2019), aff\u2019d, 808 F. App\u2019x 529 (9th Cir. 2020) (dismissing claims seeking to apply\n10 California law extraterritorially where the plaintiff was a \u201cCalifornia resident,\n11 received her pay in California, paid California income taxes, performed a significant\n12 amount of her work assignments in California, was terminated in California, and her\n13 HR representative was based in California\u201d) (cleaned up); Hanley v. Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of\n14 Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 2022 WL 2117805, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2022)\n15 (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s residency in California, and the fact that Plaintiff was in California when\n16 the termination decision was made and when he was informed of his termination, are\n17 insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of\n18 FEHA.\u201d).\n19 VI. THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.\n20 Moreover, the Amended Complaint should also be dismissed because there is\n21 no private right of action under CIPA for violation of the Trap and Trace Laws.\n22 Plaintiff is wrong that courts have \u201cuniversally\u201d concluded that a private right of\n23 action applies to the Trap and Trace Laws. (See Opp. at 16:6-8.). Not so. See Casillas\n24\n 6\n25 Courts typically look to the location of servers in determining the location of a website. See Earll v.\n eBay, Inc., 599 F. App\u2019x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (web services are not \u201can actual physical place\u201d);\n26 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2013), as amended (Sept. 6,\n 2013) (dismissing complaint involving extraterritorial application of Copyright Act where website\n27 servers were not located in U.S.)\n 14\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 15 of 16 Page ID\n #:283\n\n\n\n 1 v. Traveler\u2019s Choice Travelware (LA. Sup. Ct. 24STCV01337) (dismissing complaint\n 2 with prejudice and holding Section 638.51 does not carry a private right of action\n 3 upon which Plaintiff\u2019s claim may be based\u201d).\n 4 Plaintiff\u2019s Opposition relies solely on Section 637.2\u2019s reference to \u201cchapter\u201d as\n 5 necessarily encompassing the Trap and Trace Laws but fails to address the Motion\u2019s\n 6 argument, which is not addressed in any case Plaintiff cites, that this term is\n 7 ambiguous in context. See Mot. 23 at n.8. Plaintiff also ignores that Section 638.55\n 8 expressly provides remedies for violations of the Trap & Trace Laws and, unlike other\n 9 provisions that were added after CIPA was initially enacted, makes no mention of\n10 section 637.2. Pen. Code \u00a7 638.55; Mot at 24 (citing Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 632.5). Instead,\n11 Section 638.55 confirms that only the Attorney General is permitted to commence a\n12 civil action evidencing an intentional departure from Section 637.2. Vicko Ins.\n13 Services v. Ohio Indem. Co., 70 Cal.App.4th 55, 66 (1999) (finding existing remedies\n14 \u201ctogether with the absence of any reference to a private right of action\u201d to be \u201cstrong\n15 evidence the Legislature did not intend to create such a private right to sue for\n16 damages\u201d). Plaintiff\u2019s unsupported assumption thus fails to account for the entire\n17 statutory structure and legislative intent.\n18 VII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BB OPCO 21 IS AN ELECTRONIC\n COMMUNICATION SERVICES PROVIDER.\n19\n\n20 Finally, even if the Trap and Trace Laws could apply, BB OpCo is plainly\n21 exempt as an electronic communication service provider. Section 638.51(b) allows a\n22 provider of electronic or wire communication service to use a trap and trace device to\n23 \u201coperate\u2026a wire or electronic communication service\u201d and \u201cif the consent of the user\n24 of that service has been obtained.\u201d It is BB OPCo\u2019s\u2014not Plaintiff\u2019s\u2014consent\n25 required to employ the TikTok software on its own website. Indeed, courts have\n26 reached this precise result under analogous technologies and Plaintiff provides no\n27 compelling reason for website tools to be treated differently. SeeRules and Policies\n 15\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 25 Filed 03/03/25 Page 16 of 16 Page ID\n #:284\n\n\n\n 1 Regarding Calling No. Identification Serv.\u2014Caller ID, 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 1764 (1994)\n 2 (addressing caller ID feature). The Amended Complaint should be dismissed with\n 3 prejudice.\n 4\n\n 5 DATED: March 3, 2025 BLANK ROME LLP\n 6\n By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n 7 Ana Tagvoryan\n Victor Sandoval\n 8 Attorneys for Defendant\n BB OpCo LLC\n 9\n\n10\n The undersigned, counsel of record for BB OpCo, certifies that this brief\n11\n contains 3,293 words, which complies with the word limit of this Court\u2019s procedures.\n12\n\n13 By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n Ana Tagvoryan\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n 16\n28 DEFENDANT\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:25:24.979851-07:00","document_number":"25","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044375214","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply (Motion related)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-03-03T18:01:41.014214-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.315802-08:00","date_filed":"2025-03-03","time_filed":"17:54:14","entry_number":25,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-03-03.001","pacer_sequence_number":75,"description":"REPLY in support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint 21 filed by Defendant BB OpCo, LLC. (Tagvoryan, Anahit) (Entered: 03/03/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/417445065/","id":417445065,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/431208743/","id":431208743,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/24/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-02-25T03:31:11.098837-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T11:24:04.728434-07:00","sha1":"46cb7d7a135ae4e11b0828294d521c75a9f44163","page_count":29,"file_size":238531,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.24.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.24.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 1 of 29 Page ID\n #:240\n\n\n 1 Robert Tauler (SBN 241964)\n robert@taulersmith.com\n Narain Kumar, Esq. (SBN 301533)\n 2 nkumar@taulersmith.com\n TAULER SMITH LLP\n 3 626 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 550\n Los Angeles, California 90017\n Tel: (213) 927-9270\n 4\n Attorneys for Plaintiff\n 5 Kieren Kishnani\n\n 6\n\n 7\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 8\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 9\n KIEREN KISHNANI, individually and Case No.: 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n10 on behalf of all others similarly\n situated,\n11 PLAINTIFF KIEREN KISHNANI\u2019S\n Plaintiff, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BB\n12 vs. OPCO, LLC\u2019S MOTION TO\n DISMISS PLAINTIFF\u2019S AMENDED\n13 BB OPCO, LLC d/b/a Brooks COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF\n Brothers, a Connecticut limited POINTS AND AUTHORITIES\n14 liability company; and DOES 1\n through 25, inclusive, Hearing\n15 Date: March 17, 2025\n Time: 9:30 am\n16 Defendants. Courtroom: 9C\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 2 of 29 Page ID\n #:241\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n 2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii\n\n 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................... 1\n\n 4 I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1\n\n 5 II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND .................................................................. 4\n\n 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................... 5\n\n 7 IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 7\n\n 8 A. The California Invasion of Privacy Act\u2019s Prohibition on Trap and Trace\n Devices Applies To The Internet ................................................................................... 7\n 9\n 1. Plaintiff Properly Pleads Defendant Used a Trap and Trace Device Under\n10 the Plain Meaning of the Statute ............................................................................... 8\n\n11 2. Defendant\u2019s Extraterritoriality Arguments Lack Merit ...................................... 13\n\n12 3. Defendant\u2019s Remaining Arguments Lack Legal Support ................................... 15\n\n13 B. CIPA Provides Plaintiff a Private Right of Action .................................................. 18\n\n14 C. Defendant Is Not Exempt and Cannot Consent to Its Own Invasion of\n Plaintiff\u2019s Privacy......................................................................................................... 20\n15\n D. Plaintiff Has Both Article III and Statutory Standing ............................................. 22\n16\n V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 26\n17\n LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................... 28\n18\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.......................................................................................... 29\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n i\n PTF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 3 of 29 Page ID\n #:242\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\n 2 Cases\n\n 3 Anne Heiting v. Taylor Fresh Foods, Inc., LASC Case No. 24STCV12891 at 4 (July 31,\n 2024) ................................................................................................................................ 9\n 4 Application of U.S. of Am. for an Ord. Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital\n Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ........................................................ 15\n 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ....................................................................... 5\n Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) .............................. 5\n 6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ....................................................... 5\n Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 824 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016). ...... 5\n 7 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) .......................................................................... 5\n Ernst & Haas Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Hiscox, Inc., 23 F.4th 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2022) ......... 5\n 8 Greenley, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 1050 ................................................................................ 8, 11\n In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2020) (\u201cIn re\n 9 Facebook\u201d)) ................................................................................................................... 20\n Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 10 Cal.5th 375 (2020)................................................... 9\n10 Jurdi v. MSC Cruises, LASC Case No. 24STCV14098 at 3 (September 17, 2024) ......... 10\n Lesh v. CNN, Inc., No. 24 CIV. 03132 (VM), 2025 WL 563358, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.\n11 20, 2025) .............................................................................................................. 9, 19, 23\n Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 627, 637 (2018) ...................................................... 14\n12 Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735 (1988) .......................................................... 9\n Mirmalek v. Los Angeles Times Commc'ns LLC, No. 24-CV-01797-CRB, 2024 WL\n13 5102709 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2024) ................................................................................. 8\n Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., No. 2:24-CV-04249-RGK-SK, 2024 WL 3561367 .... passim\n14 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 2019) .......................................... 20\n Price v. Entravision Comm\u2019s, LASC Case No. 24SMCV02630 (November 21, 2024). .. 10\n15 Rodriguez v. Autotrader.com, Inc., 2:24-cv-08735-RGK-JC, ECF No. 25 (C.D. Cal.\n January 8, 2024) ..................................................................................................... 1, 2, 19\n16 Shah v. Fandom, Inc., No. 24-CV-01062-RFL, 2024 WL 4539577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,\n 2024) ................................................................................................................ 1, 8, 16, 22\n17 TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 122 F.4th 930, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ........................................... 22\n Statutes\n18 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 204 (A.B. 929) ......................................................................... 9\n Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.175. ............................................................................................... 14\n19 Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a) ............................................................................................... 2, 6, 9\n Penal Code \u00a7 637.2(a) ................................................................................................. 16, 17\n20 Penal Code \u00a7 638.50................................................................................................... passim\n Penal Code \u00a7 638.51................................................................................................... passim\n21 Penal Code \u00a7638.52(c) ...................................................................................................... 11\n\n ii\n PTF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 4 of 29 Page ID\n #:243\n\n\n\n 1 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. No.\n 118-50, div. H (2024)..................................................................................................... 22\n 2 Pub.L. 107-56, Title II, \u00a7\u00a7 216(c)(1) to (4), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 290 ....................... 15\n\n 3\n Other Authorities\n 4 Rule 9 ................................................................................................................................ 12\n\n 5\n\n 6\n\n 7\n\n 8\n\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n iii\n PTF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 5 of 29 Page ID\n #:244\n\n\n\n 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES\n\n 2 I. INTRODUCTION\n\n 3 Defendant collects data on unsuspecting visitors to its website using sophisticated\n\n 4 technology so that it can identify and track Californians with the assistance of TikTok.\n\n 5 Defendant, like other defendants before it, seek the Court\u2019s assistance to bail them out of\n\n 6 their privacy collection practices that are illegal in this state. E.g., Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys.\n\n 7 Inc., No. 2:24-CV-04249-RGK-SK, 2024 WL 3561367, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024)\n\n 8 (concluding that defendant could be held liable for violating California\u2019s prohibition on\n\n 9 trap and trace devices over the internet) (\u201cC2\u201d); Shah v. Fandom, Inc., No. 24-CV-01062-\n\n10 RFL, 2024 WL 4539577, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (same); Mirmalek v. Los Angeles\n\n11 Times Commc'ns LLC, No. 24-CV-01797-CRB, 2024 WL 5102709, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.\n\n12 12, 2024) (same). However, virtually every court who has assessed the TikTok Software\n\n13 at the pleading stage has come to the same conclusion \u2013 that the TikTok Software fits\n\n14 within the definition of an illegal \u201cTrap and Trace\u201d device under California Penal Code\n\n15 Section 638.51 because of the way it is designed to collect information from Californians\n\n16 without their consent. As Judge Klausner explained in C2, \u201cDefendant argues that \u00a7\n\n17 638.52 indicates that a pen register or trap and trace device must be a physical device\n\n18 attached to a telephone line. . . . The Court disagrees.\u201d 2024 WL 3561367, at *2; see also\n\n19 Rodriguez v. Autotrader.com, Inc., 2:24-cv-08735-RGK-JC, ECF No. 25 (C.D. Cal.\n\n20 January 8, 2024) (same).\n\n21\n\n 1\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 6 of 29 Page ID\n #:245\n\n\n\n 1 Defendant relies on a series of specious and increasingly fanciful legal theories to\n\n 2 avoid liability but tellingly never even cites to the applicable statutory definition of\n\n 3 \u201celectronic communication\u201d when it argues that the term does not extend to the internet.\n\n 4 See Penal Code \u00a7\u00a7 638.50(a), (c) (defining trap and trace devices and incorporating the\n\n 5 definition for an \u201celectronic communication\u201d found in Penal Code Section 629.51(a)(2));\n\n 6 Mirmalek, 2024 WL 5102709, at *3 (noting the \u201cexpansive\u201d definition used by the\n\n 7 California Legislature).\n\n 8 Defendant instead chooses to make multiple incorrect factual representations about\n\n 9 Plaintiff\u2019s allegations or engage in wild and unsupported speculation about the technology\n\n10 involved. Defendant for example goes on unrelated tangents about what a ruling for\n\n11 Plaintiff would mean for caller ID systems. Mot. at 31 n.12. But nothing in Plaintiff\u2019s\n\n12 FAC involves caller ID and courts have concluded that caller ID systems are not analogous\n\n13 to Trap and Trace devices on websites. Rodriguez, No. 2:24-CV-08735-RGK-JC, 2025\n\n14 WL 65409, at *6 (\u201cUnlike a caller ID system, which is installed on the call recipient's\n\n15 device, the Website installs the tracking software on the visitor's browser. The software\n\n16 then remains on the visitor's browser unless the visitor decides to delete it.\u201d).\n\n17 Defendant similarly makes multiple arguments based on the failure of the FAC to\n\n18 allege that Plaintiff had a TikTok account, Mot. at 16 n.3, 25, but part of the reason why\n\n19 Defendant\u2019s conduct that enabled TikTok is so problematic is because TikTok was\n\n20 attempting to fingerprint and de-anonymize everyone it could regardless of whether they\n\n21 ever had a TikTok account. Defendant writes that \u201c[i]f Plaintiff does not have a TikTok\n\n 2\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 7 of 29 Page ID\n #:246\n\n\n\n 1 account, Plaintiff\u2019s identity cannot be connected to Plaintiff\u2019s browsing activity\u201d but there\n\n 2 is simply no basis for Defendant\u2019s factual assertion in its Motion. Id. at 16 n.3. The whole\n\n 3 point of TikTok\u2019s scheme is to gather as much data as it can about as many people as\n\n 4 possible in order to connect as many dots between various data points as it can in order\n\n 5 create a fingerprint that can identify someone from their anonymous activity. FAC \u00b6\u00b6 10,\n\n 6 15, 18, 29-31. And while that may be easier if a person has a TikTok account, an account\n\n 7 is not necessary and Defendant cannot simply make up facts in its Motion that are not in\n\n 8 the FAC and in fact contradict the theory alleged in the FAC.\n\n 9 Defendant ultimately argues that the federal courts cannot hold Defendant\n\n10 accountable for its conduct because the injuries it caused by invading Plaintiff\u2019s privacy\n\n11 with an illegal trap and trace device are simply not cognizable under Article III. Similarly,\n\n12 the State of California cannot hold it accountable for violating California law because\n\n13 Defendant was in another state when it used the internet to violate invade the privacy of\n\n14 Plaintiff and potentially millions of other people in California. Fortunately, Defendant is\n\n15 not above the law. Privacy-based injuries like those alleged in the FAC have long been\n\n16 cognizable under Article III, and there are no extraterritoriality concerns with holding\n\n17 Defendant accountable under California law for communicating with and violating the\n\n18 privacy of people within California.\n\n19 II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\n20 Defendant is \u201cthe proprietor of www.brooksbrothers.com, an online platform that\n\n21 sells clothing for men, women, and children. (\u201cWebsite\u201d). FAC \u00b6\u00b6 5, 8. On that website\n\n 3\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 8 of 29 Page ID\n #:247\n\n\n\n 1 Defendant installed code written and controlled by TikTok, a California company, that\n\n 2 violates California law and invades the privacy of every person that visits its website,\n\n 3 including Plaintiff, without their consent. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 8-25. This was because the code acted as\n\n 4 an illegal \u201cTrap and Trace\u201d device, in violation of California Penal Code Section 638.51\n\n 5 (California\u2019s \u201cTrap and Trace Law), part of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, \u00a7 630\n\n 6 et seq. Defendant\u2019s purpose in violating the privacy rights of Plaintiff and countless others\n\n 7 was because data is valuable, and data about specific individuals is more valuable than\n\n 8 anonymous or aggregated data. E.g., FAC \u00b6\u00b6 10-12, 20-21. By operating an illegal trap and\n\n 9 trace device Defendant could turn anonymous data in personalized data about specific\n\n10 individuals through de-anonymizing the data or \u201cfingerprinting.\u201d Id. \u00b6 10. Fingerprinting\n\n11 can only happen because companies like TikTok have collected vast troves of personal\n\n12 data which it then uses build up enough of a profile on an individual so it can identify the\n\n13 source and origin of otherwise anonymous website visits and interactions. And in exchange\n\n14 for contributing to TikTok\u2019s massive database by installing its code Defendant gets to\n\n15 enjoy the benefits that come when an online retailer has removed visitors\u2019 privacy thereby\n\n16 turning the anonymous website visitor into the specifically identifiable recipient of highly\n\n17 personalized and universally unwanted marketing efforts. E.g., FAC \u00b6\u00b6 10, 15, 18, 29-31.\n\n18 If people like Plaintiff actually wanted Defendant\u2019s marketing and advertising to be more\n\n19 aggressive, personalized, and tailored, companies like Defendant have a lot of options and\n\n20 make it very easy to do just that, from email-signups to expressly asking customers for\n\n21 their preferences or countless other options. Companies like Defendant choose to use an\n\n 4\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 9 of 29 Page ID\n #:248\n\n\n\n 1 illegal Trap and Trace device because clearly many people do not want to give up their\n\n 2 anonymity and privacy to every company whose website they visit, that is why the TikTok\n\n 3 Software was designed to meet this sole objective. FAC \u00b6 15.\n\n 4 III. LEGAL STANDARD\n\n 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint set forth \u201ca short\n\n 6 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,\u201d in order to\n\n 7 \u201cgive the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it\n\n 8 rests.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,\n\n 9 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).\n\n10 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when a complaint exhibits either a\n\n11 \u201clack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a\n\n12 cognizable legal theory.\u201d Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.\n\n13 1988). The Court \u201cmust accept\u201d all facts alleged by Plaintiff \u201cas true.\u201d Caltex Plastics,\n\n14 Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 824 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016). \u201cA claim has facial\n\n15 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\n\n16 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Ashcroft v.\n\n17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). \u201cIt is axiomatic that\n\n18 the motion to dismiss . . . is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.\u201d Ernst & Haas\n\n19 Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Hiscox, Inc., 23 F.4th 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).\n\n20 IV. ARGUMENT\n\n21\n\n 5\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 10 of 29 Page ID\n #:249\n\n\n\n 1 A. The California Invasion of Privacy Act\u2019s Prohibition on Trap and Trace\n\n 2 Devices Applies To The Internet\n\n 3 It is very clear from the relevant terms and their statutory definitions that CIPA\u2019s\n\n 4 prohibition on trap and trace devices in Section 638.51 applies to internet communications\n\n 5 because internet communications obviously involve the transfer of data \u201cby a wire, radio,\n\n 6 electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.\u201d Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(a)\n\n 7 (incorporating the meaning of \u201celectronic communication\u201d set forth in \u00a7 629.51(a)(2)). The\n\n 8 analysis is straightforward, the relevant terms are clearly defined and lack any ambiguity,\n\n 9 and the statutory language speaks directly to the issue and indisputably shows that Section\n\n10 638.51 applies to all electronic communications and is not limited to telephone\n\n11 communications. Virtually every judge who has addressed the issue has found it to be clear\n\n12 and straightforward, but Defendant seeks to make the issue appear complicated and\n\n13 confusing because it does not like that result. This is also not a question of whether an older\n\n14 statute applies to a new form of technology because Section 638.51 was passed in 2015 by\n\n15 legislators who were obviously very aware of internet communications and clearly\n\n16 understood that the definition chose for \u201celectronic communication\u201d included the internet.\n\n17 The analysis below will go through CIPA\u2019s statutory provisions to prove the California\n\n18 Legislature clearly chose to cover internet communications under CIPA and then explain\n\n19 why Defendant\u2019s scattershot arguments to the contrary are simply wrong, ignore\n\n20 dispositive provisions, or can otherwise be rejected out of hand.\n\n21\n\n 6\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 11 of 29 Page ID\n #:250\n\n\n\n 1 1. Plaintiff Properly Pleads Defendant Used a Trap and Trace Device\n\n 2 Under the Plain Meaning of the Statute\n\n 3 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated California\u2019s Trap and Trace Law. California\n\n 4 Penal Code Section 638.51 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\n 5 (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), a person may not\n install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first\n 6 obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.52 or 638.53.\n (b) A provider of electronic or wire communication service may\n 7 use a pen register or a trap and trace device for any of the\n following purposes:\n 8 (1) To operate, maintain, and test a wire or electronic\n communication service.\n 9 ***\n (5) If the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.\n10\n Thus, to state a claim under \u00a7 638.51, a plaintiff must allege, at most, that a\n11\n defendant installed and used a pen register or trap and trace device without first obtaining\n12\n a court order. Id. \u00a7 638.51. California law defines a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d as:\n13\n a device or process that captures the incoming electronic or other\n14 impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing,\n routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to\n15 identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but\n not the contents of a communication.\n16 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c). And in the same section just a few lines earlier \u00a7 638.50(a)\n\n17 instructs that the terms \u201c\u2018Wire communication\u2019 and \u2018electronic communication\u2019 have the\n\n18 meanings set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 629.51.\u201d \u00a7 638.50(a). The definition for\n\n19 \u201celectronic communication\u201d in \u00a7 629.51(a)(2) states that, subject to certain exceptions not\n\n20 relevant here, the term \u201cElectronic communication\u201d means \u201cany transfer of signs, signals,\n\n21 writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire,\n\n 7\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 12 of 29 Page ID\n #:251\n\n\n\n 1 radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.\u201d By incorporating this\n\n 2 definition for electronic communication into the definition of a trap and trace device in \u00a7\n\n 3 638.50(c) CIPA clearly encompasses internet communications because they involve the\n\n 4 transfer of data by \u201ca wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.\u201d\n\n 5 There is simply no way to read the expansive language of the statutory definition of trap\n\n 6 and trace devices and conclude that the California Legislature actually meant to cover\n\n 7 telephone communications and nothing else.\n\n 8 Defendant\u2019s arguments simply have no basis in any of CIPA\u2019s statutory definitions\n\n 9 discussed above and courts have repeatedly and universally rejected it. If the Legislature\n\n10 had intended to limit trap and trace devices to telephone communications then that is what\n\n11 CIPA would have said. But it doesn\u2019t. Judge Breyer in the Northern District recently\n\n12 explained:\n\n13 As the Shah and Greenley courts held, \u201cthe Court cannot ignore\n the expansive language in the California Legislature's chosen\n14 definition of pen register,\u201d which is \u201cspecific as to the type of\n data collected,\u201d but \u201cvague and inclusive as to the form of the\n15 collection tool\u201d (i.e. \u201cdevice or process\u201d).\n\n16 Mirmalek, 2024 WL 5102709, at *3 (quoting Greenley, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 1050 and Shah,\n\n17 2024 WL 4539577, at *1) (cleaned up). The expansive language chosen by the legislature\n\n18 requires the Court to reject Defendant\u2019s attempt to ignore its plain and unambiguous terms.\n\n19 And while Shah and Greenley concerned pen registers, Section 638.50(a) of CIPA requires\n\n20 the statutory definitions of \u201cpen register\u201d in \u00a7 638.50(b) and \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d in \u00a7\n\n21 638.50(c) to both use the exact same definition of \u201celectronic communication\u201d found in \u00a7\n\n 8\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 13 of 29 Page ID\n #:252\n\n\n\n 1 629.51(a)(2) making the analyses identical. This exact same argument was also rejected in\n\n 2 C2 because \u201cDefendant fails to explain why the definitions under \u00a7 638.50 should be so\n\n 3 limited given their references to \u2018wire or electronic communication.\u2019\u201d C2, 2024 WL\n\n 4 3561367, at *2 (citing Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a7 638.50(b)\u2013(c)); see also Lesh v. CNN, Inc., No.\n\n 5 24 CIV. 03132 (VM), 2025 WL 563358, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2025) (same).\n\n 6 Defendant\u2019s attempts to invoke selective parts of the legislative history are similarly\n\n 7 unhelpful to its attempts to evade the statute\u2019s plain meaning under California\u2019s rules for\n\n 8 statutory interpretation. \u201cWords used in a statute or constitutional provision should be\n\n 9 given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. If the language is clear and unambiguous\n\n10 there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the\n\n11 Legislature (in the case of a statute).\u201d Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735 (1988)\n\n12 (citations omitted); see also Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 10 Cal.5th 375 (2020) (\u201cIf\n\n13 the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning . . .\u201d). If the California\n\n14 Legislature had wanted to limit trap and trace devices to just telephones then the very first\n\n15 line of Assembly Bill 929 adding \u00a7 638.50(a) to the Penal Code would have said that\n\n16 \u201celectronic communication means telephone communications\u201d instead of expressly\n\n17 adopting the expansive definition of \u201celectronic communication\u201d set forth in Section\n\n18 629.51(a). 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 204 (A.B. 929).\n\n19 Moreover, in addition to the federal decisions discussed above which reached this\n\n20 conclusion, numerous state court judges have also reached the same conclusion. E.g., Anne\n\n21 Heiting v. Taylor Fresh Foods, Inc., LASC Case No. 24STCV12891 at 4 (July 31, 2024)\n\n 9\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 14 of 29 Page ID\n #:253\n\n\n\n 1 (\u201cneither CIPA nor the modern version of the federal statutes cited in Digital Analyzer\n\n 2 limit the definition of \u2018pen register\u2019 or \u2018trap and trace device\u2019 to physical devices attached\n\n 3 to telephone lines.\u201d); Jurdi v. MSC Cruises, LASC Case No. 24STCV14098 at 3\n\n 4 (September 17, 2024) (\u201cThe plain language of section 638.51 does not limit the statute to\n\n 5 telephone-based communications.\u201d); Heiting v. IHOP Restaurants, LASC Case No.\n\n 6 24STCV14453 (October 28, 2024); Price v. Entravision Comm\u2019s, LASC Case No.\n\n 7 24SMCV02630 (November 21, 2024).\n\n 8 Defendant also faults Plaintiff for not doing more to identify the specific \u201cincoming\n\n 9 electronic impulses\u201d of hers that were captured and allege which specific pieces of her\n\n10 personal information were identified. But Plaintiff has alleged more than enough to identify\n\n11 the categories and types of information the TikTok Software collected about everyone,\n\n12 including Plaintiff, which includes \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic\n\n13 information, referral tracking, and url tracking.\u201d FAC \u00b6 11. This type of information also\n\n14 plainly falls under the definition of electronic communications despite Defendant\u2019s absurd\n\n15 argument that any geographically identifying information makes the TikTok Software a\n\n16 \u201ctracking device\u201d despite the fact that identifying someone\u2019s location does not involve\n\n17 tracking a single inch of movement. It is also clear that collecting information including an\n\n18 individual\u2019s geographic location, IP address, zip code, cell phone type and model, browser\n\n19 information, and recently visited websites is the sort of information that is reasonably likely\n\n20 to identify an individual. Defendant apparently demands specific identification of the\n\n21\n\n 10\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 15 of 29 Page ID\n #:254\n\n\n\n 1 individual 1\u2019s and 0\u2019s involved but that would be a near-impossibility at this stage and goes\n\n 2 far beyond what is required to give it fair notice of the allegations against it.\n\n 3 Defendant also incorrectly asserts that location data \u201cis expressly excluded from the\n\n 4 statute\u201d under Section 638.52(c) and that \u201clocation data from telephone numbers are okay\u201d\n\n 5 - in clear violation of the Trap and Trace Law. Mot. at 28. Section 638.52(c) provides that\n\n 6 information from a trap and trace device that was legally obtained pursuant to a court\n\n 7 order \u201cshall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the\n\n 8 subscriber, except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone\n\n 9 number.\u201d This does not make it acceptable for Defendant anyone else using an illegal trap\n\n10 and trace device to obtain location data based on a telephone number, nor does it immunize\n\n11 Defendant from obtaining location data on Plaintiff via any other information besides\n\n12 telephone numbers.\n\n13 In short, Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 unambiguously applies to internet communications\n\n14 and the FAC alleges the two elements necessary to establish a violation of Penal Code\n\n15 Section 638.51: (i) Defendant installed a prohibited device (pen register or trap and trace);\n\n16 (ii) without a court order. E.g., Greenley, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 1050-51. Plaintiff has therefore\n\n17 properly stated a claim under Section 638.51.\n\n18 2. Defendant\u2019s Extraterritoriality Arguments Lack Merit\n\n19 Defendant argues that Plaintiff must plead where the TikTok pixel was installed in\n\n20 California or that TikTok collected Plaintiff\u2019s information in California because CIPA does\n\n21 not apply extraterritorially. First, there is no general requirement in the federal pleading\n\n 11\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 16 of 29 Page ID\n #:255\n\n\n\n 1 rules to allege the specific location of any acts, nor does Rule 8 require a complaint to\n\n 2 allege facts affirmatively disproving any potential extraterritorial application of a state\u2019s\n\n 3 law in order to state a claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires specifics\n\n 4 including the who, what, and where, but such geographic allegations are simply not\n\n 5 required for complaints for ordinary complaints. Indeed, in the era before the Federal Rules\n\n 6 of Civil Procedure allegations of time and place were considered immaterial and it is only\n\n 7 because of Rule 9(h) that any allegations that are made regarding time and place may be\n\n 8 considered material in the first place.\n\n 9 Defendant also asserts as a matter of law that \"the alleged offending conduct\n\n10 occurred where BB OpCo\u2019s website is located\u2014not where TikTok happens to maintain an\n\n11 office\u201d or where Plaintiff was located. Mot. at 29. There is no factual or legal basis for this\n\n12 assertion, and it is quite clear that Defendant\u2019s conduct in operating a website that sent\n\n13 instructions to Plaintiff\u2019s browser in California that violated her privacy means that\n\n14 Plaintiff\u2019s rights were violated in California by conduct that occurred in California. Phrased\n\n15 another way, if Plaintiff was in California at all relevant times and Defendant violated her\n\n16 privacy with an illegal trap and trace device then Defendant must have been sending\n\n17 information to Plaintiff in California. The fact that Defendant did so using software from\n\n18 a California company that also collected the data itself even further cements California as\n\n19 the nexus of Defendant\u2019s wrongful conduct and the wrongdoing alleged in the FAC.\n\n20 Plaintiff would be more than happy to include much more detailed factual allegations\n\n21 regarding things like the location of Defendant\u2019s servers, the locations of Defendant\u2019s\n\n 12\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 17 of 29 Page ID\n #:256\n\n\n\n 1 personnel involved in the decision to contract with TikTok for this software and install it\n\n 2 on its website, and where Plaintiff\u2019s data was sent once it left her computer, but Plaintiff\n\n 3 will have to uncover this information in discovery and is certainly not required to try to\n\n 4 satisfy Defendant\u2019s moving targets of pleading rules.\n\n 5 3. Defendant\u2019s Remaining Arguments Lack Legal Support\n\n 6 Defendant next argues that CIPA does not apply to the internet because of the\n\n 7 subsequent enactment in 2018 of the California Consumer Privacy Act (\u201cCCPA\u201d). Mot. at.\n\n 8 21-22. Obviously CCPA itself has no bearing on the plain meaning of CIPA because it was\n\n 9 passed three years later by a different Legislature and the CCPA does not amend or even\n\n10 reference CIPA in any way, and the most Defendant can assert is that the CCPA is \u201cat\n\n11 odds\u201d with CIPA and \u201cthe two laws would impose differing requirements for when the\n\n12 disclosure of information that identifies an individual is actionable.\u201d Id. This is on its face\n\n13 incorrect and legally meaningless. There is no legal doctrine involved when two laws are\n\n14 simply \u201cat odds,\u201d and it is quite common that different laws have different requirements\n\n15 for bringing suit based on different legal violations, just as the same wrongful act may be\n\n16 alleged to be both negligent and fraudulent. Defendant does not even identify a conflict, at\n\n17 best Defendant has merely argued that one law is harder for an individual to enforce in\n\n18 court than the other. By arguing that a subsequently enacted statute requires a prior statute\n\n19 to be interpreted more narrowly despite the absence of any such language, Defendant\n\n20 appears to be arguing that a portion of CIPA was repealed by implication with the passing\n\n21 of the CCPA. But repeals by implication are disfavored when interpreting California\n\n 13\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 18 of 29 Page ID\n #:257\n\n\n\n 1 statutes. Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 627, 637 (2018) (\u201cWe do not presume that\n\n 2 the Legislature intends, when it enacts a statute, to overthrow long-established principles\n\n 3 of law unless such intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied.\u201d) (citation\n\n 4 omitted). In order to invoke the doctrine of implied repeal there must be no rational basis\n\n 5 for harmonizing the two statutes, and the statutes must \u201cirreconcilable, clearly repugnant,\n\n 6 and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.\u201d Id. (cleaned up). None\n\n 7 of that applies here. And far from being repugnant and irreconcilable courts have found\n\n 8 that \u201cCCPA and CIPA are complementary.\u201d Mirmalek, 2024 WL 5102709, at *5.\n\n 9 Moreover, Defendant\u2019s argument is expressly foreclosed by the plain text of the\n\n10 CCPA. Defendant plainly ignores the provision of the CCPA stating that \u201claw relating to\n\n11 consumers' personal information should be construed to harmonize with the provisions of\n\n12 this title.\u201d Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.175. The CCPA also explicitly states that \u201cin the event\n\n13 of a conflict between other laws and the provisions of this title, the provisions of the law\n\n14 that afford the greatest protection for the right of privacy for consumers shall control.\u201d Id.\n\n15 So, even if the CCPA and CIPA were not complementary and instead they completely and\n\n16 irreconcilably conflicted such that the terms of the CCPA controlled, then Section\n\n17 1798.175 of CCPA itself would require that CIPA be applied in this case because it would\n\n18 afford greater privacy protections. Mirmalek, 2024 WL 5102709, at *5.\n\n19 Defendant also makes an argument based on the federal trap and trace law that is\n\n20 equally incorrect. Mot. at 19-20 (citing to Application of U.S. of Am. for an Ord.\n\n21 Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal.\n\n 14\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 19 of 29 Page ID\n #:258\n\n\n\n 1 1995)). As explained in C2, that case and Defendant\u2019s argument involve a federal law\n\n 2 which is at best persuasive and the few lines from the opinion quoted by Defendant do little\n\n 3 to even establish how that federal law has any bearing on CIPA. C2, 2024 WL 3561367,\n\n 4 at *2. Moreover, the language from Application of U.S. of Am. for an Ord. Authorizing Use\n\n 5 of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer that Defendant relies on is from the federal statute\n\n 6 referencing the physical attachment of pen registers, not trap and trace devices, and was\n\n 7 repealed by the Patriot Act over two decades ago. Pub.L. 107-56, Title II, \u00a7\u00a7 216(c)(1) to\n\n 8 (4), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 290 (amending 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3127). Indeed, Defendant even\n\n 9 acknowledges that the scope of the federal law was expanded (thereby invalidating its own\n\n10 arguments based on the prior law) but Defendant fails to acknowledge that California\u2019s\n\n11 version is easily broad enough to cover its conduct here. More fundamentally, Defendant\n\n12 repeatedly tries to treat the Trap and Trace Law as merely giving law enforcement a new\n\n13 tool it previously lacked but ignores the very structure of the law which first creates a\n\n14 general prohibition on trap and trace devices and then creates narrow exceptions for law\n\n15 enforcement acting pursuant to court orders. If all the Legislature had wanted to do was\n\n16 give law enforcement an additional tool then there was no need to pass a law stating that\n\n17 \u201ca person may not install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first\n\n18 obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.52 or 638.53,\u201d the Legislature would have\n\n19 just included the provisions authorizing court orders. And it is indelibly clear that this\n\n20 prohibition was intended to apply to all public and private entities because there is an\n\n21 express exception to it for providers of electronic or wire communication services in\n\n 15\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 20 of 29 Page ID\n #:259\n\n\n\n 1 specifically enumerated circumstances. If the Trap and Trace Law were solely to give law\n\n 2 enforcement another tool then that entire section should not exist. Moreover, the fact that\n\n 3 Defendant cannot obtain a court order for is not an accident but in fact the purpose of the\n\n 4 law because Defendant should not be operating Trap and Trace devices.\n\n 5 B. CIPA Provides Plaintiff a Private Right of Action\n\n 6 Defendant next argues that CIPA\u2019s private right of action in Section 637.2 does not\n\n 7 encompass violations of the Trap and Trace Law. But courts have universally concluded\n\n 8 that \u201cSection 637.2 confers a private right of action on \u2018[a]ny person who has been injured\n\n 9 by a violation of this chapter.\u2019\u201d Shah v. Fandom, Inc., No. 24-CV-01062-RFL, 2024 WL\n\n10 4539577, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (quoting Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 637.2(a)); see also\n\n11 Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., 742 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1077\u201378 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (\u201cCalifornia\n\n12 Penal Code \u00a7 637.2 states that an individual injured by a violation of CIPA may bring a\n\n13 private action to enforce it. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 637.2. The Trap and Trace Law is a part of\n\n14 CIPA. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51.\u201d). Defendant raises a series of unrelated points about\n\n15 statutory interpretation to try to avoid the simple language of Section 637.2(a), including\n\n16 language authorizing the Attorney General to \u201ccommence a civil action to compel any\n\n17 government entity to comply with the provisions of this chapter\u201d and the fact that Section\n\n18 638.51 does not fall between Sections 630 and 637. Mot. at 23-25. Defendant repeatedly\n\n19 references the legislative history but at no point actually cites to or discusses anything in\n\n20 the purported legislative history indicating an intention to exclude Section 638.51 from\n\n21 CIPA\u2019s clear private right of action. Defendant\u2019s only explanation for how the clear\n\n 16\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 21 of 29 Page ID\n #:260\n\n\n\n 1 language of Section 637.2(a) authorizing \u201cAny person who has been injured by a violation\n\n 2 of this chapter may bring an action against the person who committed the violation\u201d\n\n 3 actually does not apply to the Trap and Trace Law is offered in a footnote where Defendant\n\n 4 argues that the Legislature didn\u2019t understand what a \u201cchapter\u201d of the Penal Code meant in\n\n 5 the law they enacted. Mot. at 23 n.8. Defendant\u2019s argument is that the Legislature that\n\n 6 enacted the Trap and Trace Law did not understand the word \u201cchapter\u201d in 637.2 to mean\n\n 7 chapter 1.5 of the Penal Code which contains CIPA, and instead the Legislature in 2015\n\n 8 might have thought that the word chapter in 637.2 meant the chapter of the specific session\n\n 9 law that originally enacted CIPA in 1967. Defendant cites to no California case ever\n\n10 applying their preferred interpretation of the word chapter, and it is a ridiculous argument.\n\n11 The fact that CIPA contains the word \u201cchapter\u201d eighteen different times and every single\n\n12 one of them is referring to a chapter of the compiled statutory code and not to the chapter\n\n13 of the book recording the legislative session clearly demonstrates that Defendant\u2019s\n\n14 argument is erroneous. In 2015 the Legislature demonstrated that they intended to have the\n\n15 Trap and Trace Law privately enforceable through Section 637.2 because they chose to\n\n16 place the Trap and Trace Law in that very same place which they also described using the\n\n17 exact same word \u2013 chapter. If chapter actually meant two different things then it\u2019s an\n\n18 awfully big coincidence that two different Legislatures both enacted laws that used the\n\n19 word \u201cchapter\u201d and both decided to place those laws into the same \u201cchapter\u201d of the Penal\n\n20 Code and both laws ended up right next to each other within Chapter 1.5 of Title 15 of Part\n\n21 1 of the California Penal Code. Defendant\u2019s argument therefore has no legal basis.\n\n 17\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 22 of 29 Page ID\n #:261\n\n\n\n 1 C. Defendant Is Not Exempt And Cannot Consent to Its Own Invasions of\n\n 2 Plaintiff\u2019s Privacy\n\n 3 Defendant next argues that it is entitled to take advantage of the exception to liability\n\n 4 for a \u201cprovider of electronic or wire communication service\u201d who uses a trap and trace\n\n 5 device \u201c[i]f the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.\u201d Section 638.51(b)(5).\n\n 6 Defendant therefore argues that it is both the provider of the electronic communication\n\n 7 service and the user of that service. This is wrong for a myriad of reasons. First, there is\n\n 8 nothing in the FAC alleging that Defendant was the provider of an electronic\n\n 9 communication service. And contrary to Defendant\u2019s assertion Plaintiff in fact strongly\n\n10 disputes that Defendant is a provider of an electronic communication service within the\n\n11 meaning of the Trap and Trace Law, and Defendant provides no statutory basis for the\n\n12 assertion that every website operator is the provider of an electronic communication\n\n13 service. Mot. at 30 n.11. Second, Defendant cannot be both the provider and the user of the\n\n14 service because those are clearly meant to be two different entities and there are no\n\n15 allegations in the FAC sufficient to conclude that Defendant is either or both as a matter of\n\n16 law for the purposes of applying this exception. Indeed, as a matter of federal pleading\n\n17 rules Plaintiff is the party that is allowed to plead in the alternative, not Defendant, and\n\n18 construing the allegations in the FAC in Plaintiff\u2019s favor means that if there is any basis to\n\n19 conclude that Defendant is either of those entities also means it cannot be both. Third, it\n\n20 would be irrational and absurd to allow an entity to consent to its own violation of the\n\n21 rights of a third-party. \u201cGiven the location and degree of control that the visitor has over\n\n 18\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 23 of 29 Page ID\n #:262\n\n\n\n 1 the software, it only seems natural that the visitor, not Defendant, would be software's user\n\n 2 in these circumstances. And according to the plain allegations of the FAC, Plaintiff did not\n\n 3 consent to the software's installation and use.\u201d Rodriguez, No. 2:24-CV-08735-RGK-JC,\n\n 4 2025 WL 65409, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2025); see also Lesh, No. 24 CIV. 03132 (VM),\n\n 5 2025 WL 563358, at *5 (\u201cCNN cannot apply this exception. Lesh is also a user of CNN's\n\n 6 Website and did not consent to the Trackers collecting her information. It would be\n\n 7 illogical to allow CNN's consent to the installation of Trackers to bar claims from users\n\n 8 like Lesh who did not give their consent. Doing so would absolve many actors from\n\n 9 liability under CIPA based on their self-serving consent to the use of pen registers they\n\n10 installed or caused to be installed.\u201d); Mirmalek, No. 24-CV-01797-CRB, 2024 WL\n\n11 5102709, at *5 (\u201cSection 638.51(b) does not apply because Defendant fails to establish\n\n12 that it is a provider of electronic or wire communication service.\u201d) (quotation omitted).\n\n13 What would be the point of an exception for when the user consents if it could be satisfied\n\n14 by a person deciding their own behavior was fine and without the consent of the user whose\n\n15 privacy was being violated?\n\n16 D. Plaintiff Has Both Article III And Statutory Standing\n\n17 Plaintiff suffered a constitutionally cognizable injury when Defendant violated her\n\n18 right to privacy. After reviewing allegations substantially similar to those in the FAC, C2\n\n19 explained:\n\n20 there is no credible dispute that Plaintiff has alleged an injury\n necessary for both \u00a7 637.2 and standing. Plaintiff alleges: (1)\n21 Defendant operates its TikTok Software on its Website; (2) the\n\n 19\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 24 of 29 Page ID\n #:263\n\n\n\n 1 TikTok Software collects data from every visitor of the Website;\n and (3) Plaintiff visited the Website after the TikTok Software\n 2 was installed. These allegations demonstrate that Defendant,\n through the use of the TikTok Software, collected Plaintiff\u2019s\n 3 information, thereby constituting an invasion of privacy. And\n invasions of privacy are actionable injuries.\n 4\n 2024 WL 3561367, at *2-*6 (citing In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d\n 5\n 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2020) (\u201cIn re Facebook\u201d)).\n 6\n Indeed, violations of someone\u2019s right to privacy fall into the category of traditionally\n 7\n recognized harms that constitute an Article III injury in fact. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932\n 8\n F.3d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 2019) (recognizing the \u201ccommon law roots of the right to\n 9\n privacy\u201d). \u201cA right to privacy \u2018encompass[es] the individuals\u2019 control of information\n10\n concerning his or her person.\u2019\u201d In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 598-99. There, Facebook\n11\n \u201ccontinued to collect [plaintiffs\u2019] data after they had logged off the social media platform,\n12\n to receive and compile their personally identifiable browsing history.\u201d Id. at 599. The Ninth\n13\n Circuit concluded that such an \u201cunauthorized exploration\u201d of someone\u2019s private life and\n14\n information behind their back constitutes a cognizable Article III injury. Id. at 599.\n15\n The allegations of the FAC more than adequately describe the relevant facts and how\n16\n Defendant violated Plaintiff\u2019s privacy in a constitutionally cognizable way. The Motion\n17\n spends considerable space faulting Plaintiff for not alleging things that are plainly alleged\n18\n in the FAC, Defendant simply chose to ignore them or decided they were not good enough.\n19\n Defendant criticizes Plaintiff for \u201cgeneric\u201d and \u201chypothetical\u201d allegations but the FAC\n20\n alleges is that \"the TikTok Software gathers data including device and browser\n21\n\n 20\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 25 of 29 Page ID\n #:264\n\n\n\n 1 information, geographic information, referral and url tracking.\u201d FAC \u00b6 11. And this begins\n\n 2 from the very first moment that Plaintiff or anyone else arrives on the Website and\n\n 3 continues whenever someone clicks on a new page on the Website. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 10-12, 15. The\n\n 4 FAC also alleges Defendant went far beyond merely collecting basic technical information.\n\n 5 Defendant used the information collected to fingerprint the data and deanonymize Plaintiff\n\n 6 by matching it \u201cwith existing data TikTok has acquired and accumulated about hundreds\n\n 7 of millions of Americans,\u201d including Plaintiff, presumably because Defendant found more\n\n 8 profit in invading Plaintiff\u2019s privacy than playing by the rules. Id. \u00b6 10, 20, 30. Moreover,\n\n 9 people like Plaintiff had no idea any of their data was potentially being sent to a foreign\n\n10 government. Id. \u00b6 14. These allegations all involve Defendant\u2019s wrongdoing and the\n\n11 specific injury that Plaintiff personally experienced.\n\n12 Defendant faults Plaintiff for not alleging the more about the information\n\n13 \u201cdisclosed,\u201d but to be clear none of the information collected through the TikTok Software\n\n14 was willingly, knowingly, or voluntarily \u201cdisclosed\u201d by Plaintiff. This information was\n\n15 collected so Defendant and TikTok could help themselves make more money at the\n\n16 expense of Plaintiff\u2019s privacy none of the information collected was in any way necessary\n\n17 because Defendant\u2019s website would still run perfectly fine even if it had never sent any of\n\n18 Plaintiff\u2019s personal information to TikTok. Indeed, this exact same concern was raised\n\n19 during oral arguments in the Supreme Court. \u201cJust on the data collection, that seems like a\n\n20 huge concern for the future of the country,\u201d said Justice Brett Kavanaugh. He suggested\n\n21 that TikTok\u2019s vast trove of information on Americans could be used \u201cto develop spies, to\n\n 21\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 26 of 29 Page ID\n #:265\n\n\n\n 1 turn people, to blackmail people, people who a generation from now will be working in the\n\n 2 FBI or the CIA or in the State Department.\u201d Transcript of Oral Argument, TikTok, Inc. v.\n\n 3 Garland (24-656). Oyez. Retrieved at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-656. It is\n\n 4 difficult to see how the injury Defendant caused is too intangible for Article III when\n\n 5 Supreme Court Justices discuss it during oral arguments. Congress itself recognized that\n\n 6 millions of Americans have been injured by the depth and volume of data being collected\n\n 7 about them that a foreign government could possibly have access to that the United States\n\n 8 Congress actually passed a law addressing that concern. See Protecting Americans from\n\n 9 Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. No. 118-50, div. H (2024),\n\n10 codified as 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 9901; see generally TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 122 F.4th 930, 939\n\n11 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (subsequent history omitted). Plaintiff has alleged specific types of\n\n12 information that Defendant\u2019s illegal Trap and Trace device collected on her and countless\n\n13 others and explained how that information becomes valuable because TikTok uses the\n\n14 anonymous data from Defendant\u2019s website and countless others sources to be able to\n\n15 digitally fingerprint, personally identify, and track Plaintiff across the digital and physical\n\n16 world.\n\n17 It is also clear that these allegations are similarly sufficient to constitute an injury\n\n18 for purpose of statutory standing under Section 637.2. See Shah, 2024 WL 4539577, at *5\n\n19 (concluding plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged statutory standing because \u201cPlaintiffs have\n\n20 plausibly alleged that they were injured by being tracked across multiple visits for\n\n21 marketing and advertising purposes, and that they did not expect or agree to such\n\n 22\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 27 of 29 Page ID\n #:266\n\n\n\n 1 tracking.\u201d); see also Mirmalek, 2024 WL 5102709, at *4 (same); Lesh, No. 24 CIV. 03132\n\n 2 (VM), 2025 WL 563358, at *3 (\u201cLesh alleges that CNN installed Trackers, owned by third-\n\n 3 party entities, which then received her IP address for purposes of advertisement placement.\n\n 4 These facts plausibly suggest that Lesh did not expect the disclosure of this information to\n\n 5 third parties, placing the conduct alleged within the scope of CIPA. . . . taking the\n\n 6 allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, Lesh has statutory standing to sue under\n\n 7 CIPA.\u201d).\n\n 8 V. CONCLUSION\n\n 9 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny the\n\n10 Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, permit Plaintiff leave to amend to add more facts\n\n11 should the Court find the Complaint deficient.\n\n12\n\n13 DATED: February 24, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n\n14\n\n15 By: /s/ Robert Tauler\n Robert Tauler, Esq.\n16 Attorneys for Plaintiff\n Kieren Kishnani\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 23\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 28 of 29 Page ID\n #:267\n\n\n\n 1 LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\n 2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani, certifies that this\n\n 3 brief contains 6,278 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.\n\n 4\n\n 5 DATED: February 25, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n\n 6\n\n 7 By: /s/ Narain Kumar\n Narain Kumar, Esq.\n 8 Attorneys for Plaintiff\n Kieren Kishnani\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 24\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 24 Filed 02/25/25 Page 29 of 29 Page ID\n #:268\n\n\n\n 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n 2 I hereby certified that I served the foregoing document on all parties of record by\n\n 3 CM/ECF.\n\n 4\n\n 5 DATED: February 25, 2025 TAULER SMITH LLP\n\n 6\n\n 7 By: /s/ Narain Kumar\n Narain Kumar, Esq.\n 8 Attorneys for Plaintiff\n Kieren Kishnani\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n 25\n PTF\u2019S OPP. TO DEF\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:25:22.360151-07:00","document_number":"24","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044320403","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Memorandum in Opposition to Motion","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-02-25T03:31:11.049820-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.261370-08:00","date_filed":"2025-02-25","time_filed":"03:12:56","entry_number":24,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-02-25.001","pacer_sequence_number":72,"description":"MEMORANDUM in Opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint 21 filed by Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani. 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Wright, II. (lc) Modified on 2/3/2025 (lc). (Entered: 02/03/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/415176344/","id":415176344,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/428853647/","id":428853647,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2025-01-31T09:35:14.932407-08:00","date_modified":"2025-01-31T09:35:14.942356-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Generic Text Only Entry","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-01-31T09:35:14.919714-08:00","date_modified":"2025-01-31T09:35:14.919728-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-31","time_filed":"09:09:15","entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-31.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/415114784/","id":415114784,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/428789031/","id":428789031,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/21/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-01-30T17:32:54.013619-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T14:34:59.579935-07:00","sha1":"6b682596c04ef6586a3b03bdbc0eb381183959d1","page_count":32,"file_size":534191,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.21.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.21.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 1 of 32 Page ID\n #:144\n\n\n\n1 BLANK ROME LLP\n2\n Ana Tagvoryan (SBN 246536)\n ana.tagvoryan@blankrome.com\n3 Victor Sandoval (SBN 344461)\n4 Victor.sandoval@blankrome.com\n 2029 Century Park East | 6th Floor\n5 Los Angeles, CA 90067\n6 Telephone: 424.239.3400\n Facsimile: 424.239.3434\n7\n Attorneys for Defendant\n8 BB OpCo, LLC\n9\n\n10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12\n\n13 KIEREN KISHNANI, individually and Case No. 2:24\u2212cv\u221209629-ODW-JC\n on behalf of all others similarly situated,\n14 DEFENDANT BB OPCO LLC\u2019S\n Plaintiff,\n15\n NOTICE OF MOTION AND\n v. MOTION TO DISMISS\n16 PLAINTIFF\u2019S AMENDED\n BB OPCO, LLC\n17 d/b/a Brooks Brothers, a Connecticut COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM\n limited liability company, and DOES 1 OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES\n18 though 25, inclusive, IN SUPPORT THEREOF\n19 Defendants.\n Judge: Otis D. Wright II\n20 Date: March 17, 2025\n Time: 9:30 a.m.\n21 Place: Courtroom 9C, 350 W. 1st\n Street, Los Angeles, California\n22 90012\n\n23 Complaint Filed: November 7, 2024\n24\n Complaint Served: November 12, 2024\n Amended Complaint Filed: January 16,\n25 2025\n26 Trial Date: None set\n\n27\n\n28 1\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 2 of 32 Page ID\n #:145\n\n\n\n1 TO ALL PARTIES OF RECORD:\n2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 17, 2025 at 9:30 a.m., or as soon\n3 thereafter as the Motion may be heard in Courtroom 9C of the above entitled Court\n4 located at the First Street U.S. Courthouse, 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, CA\n5 90012, the Honorable Otis D. Wright II presiding, Defendant BB OpCo, LLC (\u201cBB\n6 OpCo\u201d) will, and hereby does, move the Court for an order dismissing this action in\n7 its entirety with prejudice and without leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of\n8 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). This Motion is made following the conference\n9 of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place on January 23, 2025.\n10 BB OpCo LLC moves to dismiss Plaintiff KIEREN KISHNANI\u2019S First\n11 Amended Class Action Complaint (\u201cAmended Complaint\u201d) under Federal Rule of\n12 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing.\n13 Specifically, Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint fails to allege any injury arising from\n14 Plaintiff\u2019s alleged website visit.\n15 In addition, BB OpCo moves to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint under\n16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state a\n17 claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the Court should dismiss\n18 Plaintiff\u2019s claim because the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of\n19 action against BB OpCo.\n20 This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the\n21 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, BB OpCo\u2019s Request for\n22 Judicial Notice filed concurrently herewith, and the exhibits attached thereto, and all\n23 pleadings and papers in the Court\u2019s file, the record and files herein, and upon such\n24 oral argument as may be made at the hearing on the Motion and such other evidence\n25 as may be admitted at the time of the hearing on the Motion.\n26 ///\n27 ///\n28 2\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 3 of 32 Page ID\n #:146\n\n\n\n1 DATED: January 30, 2025 BLANK ROME LLP\n2\n\n3\n By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n4 Ana Tagvoryan\n Victor Sandoval\n5 Attorneys for Defendant\n BB OpCo LLC\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 3\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 4 of 32 Page ID\n #:147\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n1\n Page\n2\n\n3 I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................10\n\n4 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................13\n\n5 III. LEGAL STANDARDS ...........................................................................................................14\n\n6 IV. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE SHE SUFFERED AN INJURY-IN-FACT. .....................15\n7 V. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) ...........................17\n8 A. The Trap & Trace Laws Are Inapplicable Here. .........................................................18\n9\n 1. The Trap and Trace Laws Are Intended to Apply Only to Devices\n10 Attached to Telephone Lines. ..........................................................................18\n\n11 2. CIPA\u2019s Legislative History Demonstrates that Website Tools are Not\n Trap and Trace Devices. ..................................................................................20\n12\n 3. Other California Legislation Governs the Use of Website Analytics\n13 Tools. ...............................................................................................................21\n14 B. Section 637.2\u2019s Private Right of Action Does not Apply to Section 638.51. ..............23\n15\n C. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting Statutory Standing Under Section\n16 637.2.............................................................................................................................25\n\n17 D. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting the Claim that BB OpCo Installed or\n Used a \u201cTrap and Trace Device\u201d. ................................................................................26\n18\n E. Plaintiff Fails to Plead BB OpCo Installed the TikTok Pixel in California.................28\n19\n F. BB OpCo Is Exempt As The Website Operator And/Or Because It Was a\n20 Party to the Communication. .......................................................................................30\n21\n VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................32\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 4\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 5 of 32 Page ID\n #:148\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n1\n Page(s)\n2\n\n3 Cases\n\n4 Animal League Defense Fund v. Mendes,\n 160 Cal.App.4th 136 (2008) ..........................................................................................................25\n5\n Application of U.S. of Am. For an Ord. Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital\n6 Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ................................................................................19\n7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n8 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................................................15\n\n9 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................................................15\n10\n Brown v. Google LLC,\n11 2021 WL 6064009 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .............................................................................................31\n12 Byars v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc.,\n 2023 WL 2996686 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023) .................................................................................16\n13\n\n14 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,\n 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ...........................................................................................15\n15\n Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc.,\n16 2024 WL 4873370 (Cal. Sup. Sep. 09, 2024) ..........................................................................21, 30\n17 Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,\n 598 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................................14\n18\n Coburn v. Sievert,\n19\n 133 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (2005) ......................................................................................................23\n20\n Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell,\n21 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal 2007).........................................................................................11, 30\n\n22 Daghaly v. Bloomingdales.Com, LLC,\n 2024 WL 5134350 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024) ............................................................................13, 17\n23\n Dana Hughes v. Vivint, Inc., et al.,\n24\n 2024 WL 5179917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024).....................................................................13, 16, 17\n25\n Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Super. Ct.,\n26 19 Cal. 4th 1036 (1999) .................................................................................................................29\n\n27\n\n28 5\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 6 of 32 Page ID\n #:149\n\n\n\n In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation\n1 154 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)..............................................................................................31\n2\n Eng. v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc.,\n3 808 F. App\u2019x 529 (9th Cir. 2020) ..................................................................................................29\n\n4 In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.,\n 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) .........................................................................................................16\n5\n Glob. Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-New Jersey, Inc.,\n6 287 F.Supp. 2d 532 (D.N.J. 2003) .................................................................................................24\n7\n Heeger v. Facebook, Inc.,\n8 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .........................................................................................11\n\n9 Heiting v. F21 OPCO, LLC,\n No. 24STCV20340 (Cal. Sup., Nov. 18, 2024 Minute Order) ......................................................27\n10\n I.C. v. Zynga, Inc.,\n11 600 F. Supp. 3d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2022) .........................................................................................26\n12 Levings v. Open Text Corporation,\n13 No. 24STCV05440 ..................................................................................................................30, 32\n\n14 Lightoller v. Jetblue Airways Corp.,\n 2023 WL 3963823 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023)................................................................................16\n15\n Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.,\n16 84 Cal. App. 5th 671 (2022), review denied (Jan. 25, 2023) ...................................................25, 26\n17 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,\n 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......................................................................................................................14\n18\n\n19 Mayron v. Google LLC,\n 54 Cal.App.5th 566 (2020) ............................................................................................................25\n20\n Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc.,\n21 2024 WL 3561367 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) ................................................................................23\n22 Moore v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.,\n 58 Cal.App.5th 561 (2020) ............................................................................................................22\n23\n\n24 People v. Giordano,\n 42 Cal. 4th 644, 170 P.3d 623 (2007) ............................................................................................27\n25\n Rodriguez v. Fountain9, Inc.,\n26 2024 WL 3886811 (Cal. Sup. July 09, 2024), 2024 WL 4905217 (Cal. Sup. Nov.\n 21, 2024) ........................................................................................................................................16\n27\n\n28 6\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 7 of 32 Page ID\n #:150\n\n\n\n Rules and Policies Regarding Calling No. Identification Serv.-Caller ID\n1 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 1764 (1994) .............................................................................................................31\n2\n S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm,\n3 306 S.C. 70 (1991) .........................................................................................................................31\n\n4 Saracco Tank and Welding Co. v. Platz,\n 65 Cal.App.2d 306 (1944) .............................................................................................................32\n5\n Sexton v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,\n6 2023 WL 1823487 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8,2023) ...................................................................................30\n7\n Smith v. Maryland,\n8 442 U.S. 735 (1979) .......................................................................................................................28\n\n9 Sparshott v. Feld Ent., Inc.,\n 311 F.3d 425 (D.C.Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................31\n10\n Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,\n11 51 Cal. 4th 1191 (2011) ...........................................................................................................29, 30\n12 Thomas v. Papa Johns Int\u2019l, Inc.,\n13 2024 WL 2060140 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2024)..................................................................................26\n\n14 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) .............................................................................................................15, 16\n15\n Tumampos v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd.,\n16 2017 WL 10446824 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) .............................................................................30\n17 United States v. Jean,\n 207 F.Supp.3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016)............................................................................................31\n18\n\n19 Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,\n 570 U.S. 338 (2013) .......................................................................................................................24\n20\n Vasquez v. Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc.,\n21 27 Cal. App. 5th 84 (2018) ............................................................................................................23\n22 Vicko Ins. Services v. Ohio Indem. Co.,\n 70 Cal.App.4th 55 (1999) ..............................................................................................................24\n23\n\n24 In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig.,\n 238 F.Supp. 3d 1204 (C.D.Cal. 2017) ...........................................................................................20\n25\n Waits v. Pacifica Villa Royale, LLC\n26 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) 2008 WL 3906679.........................................................................24\n\n27\n\n28 7\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 8 of 32 Page ID\n #:151\n\n\n\n Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Public Service Commission,\n1 205 Wis. 2d 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ............................................................................................31\n2\n Statutes\n3\n Cal. Civ. Code\n4 \u00a7 1798.100......................................................................................................................................21\n \u00a7 1798.140(v)(1) ............................................................................................................................22\n5 \u00a7 1798.150(a) .................................................................................................................................22\n6 Cal. Pen. Code\n7 \u00a7 629.51(a) .....................................................................................................................................28\n \u00a7 629.51(a)(1) ................................................................................................................................28\n8 \u00a7 629.51(a)(2)(C) ...........................................................................................................................28\n \u00a7 629.51(a)(3) ................................................................................................................................28\n9 \u00a7 629.51(a)(4) ................................................................................................................................28\n \u00a7 630...............................................................................................................................................24\n10 \u00a7 631...................................................................................................................................20, 24, 31\n11 \u00a7 631(a) ..........................................................................................................................................31\n \u00a7 632.........................................................................................................................................20, 24\n12 \u00a7 632.5 ...........................................................................................................................................24\n \u00a7 632.5(a) .......................................................................................................................................24\n13 \u00a7 632.7............................................................................................................................................24\n \u00a7 633.........................................................................................................................................20, 24\n14 \u00a7 633.02..........................................................................................................................................20\n15 \u00a7 634...............................................................................................................................................24\n \u00a7 635...............................................................................................................................................24\n16 \u00a7 636...............................................................................................................................................24\n \u00a7 637...............................................................................................................................................24\n17 \u00a7 637.2.................................................................................................................................... passim\n \u00a7 638.1............................................................................................................................................11\n18\n \u00a7 638.50....................................................................................................................................10, 20\n19 \u00a7 638.50(a) .....................................................................................................................................28\n \u00a7 638.50(c) ...................................................................................................................10, 18, 28, 29\n20 \u00a7 638.51.................................................................................................................................. passim\n \u00a7 638.51(a) .....................................................................................................................................10\n21 \u00a7 638.51(b) .....................................................................................................................................30\n \u00a7 638.51(b)(1) ................................................................................................................................30\n22\n \u00a7 638.51(b)(5) ................................................................................................................................31\n23 \u00a7 638.52..............................................................................................................................10, 18, 20\n \u00a7 638.52(c) ...............................................................................................................................19, 28\n24 \u00a7 638.52(d)(1) ................................................................................................................................19\n \u00a7 638.52(d)(3) ................................................................................................................................19\n25 \u00a7 638.53..............................................................................................................................10, 18, 20\n \u00a7 638.54..........................................................................................................................................10\n26\n \u00a7 638.55....................................................................................................................................10, 24\n27\n\n28 8\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 9 of 32 Page ID\n #:152\n\n\n\n Other Authorities\n1\n Fed. R. Civ. P.\n2\n \u00a7 12(b)(1) ...........................................................................................................................14, 15, 32\n3 \u00a7 12(b)(6) ...........................................................................................................................15, 17, 32\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 9\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 10 of 32 Page ID\n #:153\n\n\n\n1 I. INTRODUCTION\n\n2 Plaintiff attempts to apply a telephone surveillance statute in a manner that its\n3 text does not support and it was never intended: to criminalize commonly used\n4 website functionality and analytics tools. Kieren Kishnani (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) brings a First\n5 Amended Class Action Complaint (\u201cAmended Complaint\u201d) against BB OpCo, LLC\n6 (\u201cBB OpCo\u201d or \u201cDefendant\u201d), claiming that one such website tool\u2014the TikTok\n7 pixel\u2014is actually a \u201ctrap and trace\u201d device under Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 (\u201cSection\n8 638.51\u201d). Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint does not and cannot cure the deficiencies in\n9 her original Complaint because her entire theory is fundamentally unsound. Plaintiff\u2019s\n10 attempt to apply Section 638.51 to commonplace website technology and information\n11 that is communicated every day on every website is simply not cognizable under the\n12 California Penal Code section at issue.\n13 Sections 638.50 to 638.55 (the \u201cTrap & Trace Laws\u201d) were enacted to prohibit\n14 law enforcement surveillance of calling and routing information (phone numbers)\n15 between an individual and a third-party without a court order. See Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7\n16 638.51(a). The legislative history makes clear that the express purpose of the Trap &\n17 Trace Laws is \u201cto authorize state and local law enforcement to seek emergency orders\n18 for pen registers/trap and trace devices used in telephone surveillance, while\n19 requiring as a precondition a standard of evidence higher than under federal law.\u201d RJN\n20 Ex. A, p.4. Website functionality software simply does not fit within the purview of\n21 the statute. Even if it did, Plaintiff fails to identify the various elements necessary for a\n22 Section 638.51 claim to survive.\n23 The statute requires three independent allegations of (1) \u201celectronic or other\n24 impulses\u201d that identify, (2) the \u201csignaling information,\u201d and (3) are reasonably likely\n25 to identify the source of the electronic communication. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c).\n26 Moreover, the general data points (device, location, and referral information)\n27 identified by Plaintiff as part of her vague narrative of \u201cfingerprinting\u201d do not fall\n28 10\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 11 of 32 Page ID\n #:154\n\n\n\n1 within the purview of the statute. (Am. Compl. \u00b610.)1 And, equally problematic, to\n2 the extent Plaintiff claims that the TikTok software collects geographic information\n3 and the contents of Plaintiff\u2019s communications with the website, such information\n4 falls outside of Section 638.1 on its face.\n5 Plaintiff\u2019s theory that the TikTok pixel captures electronic impulses to identify\n6 the \u201coriginating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\n7 reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not\n8 the contents of a communication,\u201d is plainly deficient. The information Plaintiff\n9 alleges was collected, \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic information,\n10 referral tracking, and url tracking\u201d do not qualify as either electronic impulses or\n11 signaling information. And, to the extent Plaintiff claims these pieces of information\n12 help identify the website user, personally identifying information is not the type of\n13 source information contemplated by the statute. More fundamentally, there is not a\n14 single specific detail alleged in the Amended Complaint about Plaintiff\u2019s own\n15 interactions with the Website or the TikTok software.\n16 Moreover, like the original Complaint, Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint entirely\n17 ignores that website analytics tools cannot qualify as trap and trace devices or\n18 processes because the Trap & Trace Laws apply only to devices attached to telephone\n19 lines\u2014not internet software. Not only do the law\u2019s text and legislative history make\n20 clear that only devices connected to telephone lines may qualify as a trap and trace\n21 device, the California legislature has already implemented separate legislation, the\n22 1\n Plaintiff omits any reference to collection of her \u201cIP address\u201d in her amended complaint,\n23 presumably because multiple courts have conclusively rejected the theory that collection of an IP\n address could implicate CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provisions. It does not. See Columbia Pictures Indus.\n24 v. Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419, at *11 (C.D. Cal 2007). Instead, Plaintiff attempts to muddy the\n waters by referencing vague data points such as \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic\n25 information, referral tracking, and url tracking.\u201d (See Am. Compl. \u00b6 11.) Much like an IP address,\n26 this is precisely the same type of general data points required to facilitate website interactions in\n which a website user simply maintains no privacy interest. See Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., 509 F.\n27 Supp. 3d 1182, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (\u201cIP addresses \u2018are voluntarily turned over in order to direct\n the third party\u2019s servers,\u2019 ... so no reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to them.\u201d).\n28 11\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 12 of 32 Page ID\n #:155\n\n\n\n1 California Consumer Privacy Act, governing the collection of \u201cpersonal information\u201d\n2 by website analytics software. Imposing conflicting and inconsistent obligations\n3 across these statutes is antithetical to California\u2019s strong preference to interpret\n4 statutes consistently.\n5 Plaintiff is also wrong that CIPA\u2019s private right of action applies to the Trap\n6 and Trace Laws. To the contrary, nothing in the statutory text or legislative history\n7 extends the private right of action to the Trap and Trace Laws, which were enacted\n8 more than forty-years later and in a completely separate statutory section. Nor does\n9 Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint add any detail to connect BB OpCo\u2019s installation or\n10 use of the purported \u201ctrap and trace\u201d device to California. Because CIPA does not\n11 apply extraterritorially, and BB OpCo is a Connecticut Limited Liability Company\n12 alleged to have installed the TikTok Software on its own Website, the Trap and Trace\n13 Laws have no application here.\n14 Even if Plaintiff could overcome all of these fundamental deficiencies, BB\n15 OpCo would nevertheless be exempt from liability either as the provider of an\n16 electronic communication service, or as a party to the communication itself. As BB\n17 OpCo provides the website\u2014and allows users to communicate with it\u2014it is the\n18 provider of an electronic communication servie, which is expressly permitted to use a\n19 trap and trace device. Otherwise, the statute does not and cannot apply to BB OpCo as\n20 a participant to the communication (i.e., the party that picks up and responds to the\n21 electronic impulses/signals on the other end). In either case, BB OpCo is the wrong\n22 party here. There is no law that states that a website visitor must remain anonymous to\n23 a website operator. The Trap and Trace Laws are no exception.\n24 Finally, Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint remains deficient for a threshold\n25 reason. She does not and cannot allege facts required to allege a concrete injury and\n26 establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff does not\n27 and cannot, assert an expectation of privacy recognized at common law, or any other\n28 12\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 13 of 32 Page ID\n #:156\n\n\n\n1 cognizable harm. Courts in this district and the Ninth Circuit have dismissed\n2 effectively identical complaints for lack of Article III standing. See Dana Hughes v.\n3 Vivint, Inc., et al., 2024 WL 5179917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024); Daghaly v.\n4 Bloomingdales.Com, LLC, 2024 WL 5134350, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024).\n5 As Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to replead her deficient claims, but\n6 has abjectly failed to do so, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with\n7 prejudice.\n8 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS\n9 BB OpCo\u2014a Connecticut limited liability company\u2014operates the website, an\n10 \u201conline platform that sells clothes for men, women, and children.\u201d (Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 5,\n11 8.) Plaintiff is a California resident who allegedly \u201cvisited Defendant\u2019s website,\u201d but\n12 otherwise provides zero detail as to the date, nature or length of her visit to the\n13 website, whether she made a purchase on the website, or whether she held an account\n14 with BB OpCo. (See id. \u00b6\u00b6 4, 9.)\n15 As to BB OpCo\u2019s purported conduct, Plaintiff alleges in wholly conclusory\n16 fashion that BB OpCo \u201cinstalled on its [w]ebsite software created by TikTok in order\n17 to identify website visitors.\u201d (Id. \u00b69.) Plaintiff concludes that the TikTok software\n18 \u201cacts via a process known as \u2018fingerprinting\u2019\u201d and gathers \u201cdevice and browser\n19 information, geographic information, referral tracking, and url tracking by running\n20 code or \u201cscripts\u201d on the [w]ebsite to send user details to TikTok.\u201d (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 10-11.)\n21 Plaintiff claims that the website \u201cinstantly sends communications to TikTok when a\n22 user lands, and every time a user clicks on page.\u201d (Id. \u00b612.) But the Amended\n23 Complaint does not identify what \u201ccommunications\u201d, if any, are actually sent to\n24 TikTok or how. Tellingly, Plaintiff does not allege that any of her own information\n25 was captured by the TikTok pixel, or that it otherwise identified her. In sum, the\n26 Amended Complaint\u2019s allegations are hopelessly generic as to how the TikTok\n27 software purportedly functions.\n28 13\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 14 of 32 Page ID\n #:157\n\n\n\n1 Paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint is even vaguer, and purports to\n2 display unreadable and patently indecipherable screenshots of \u201celectronic impulses\u201d\n3 sent to TikTok. (See id. \u00b612). The screenshot shows no such thing. The Amended\n4 Complaint never identifies what specifically the \u201celectronic impulses\u201d are, or how or\n5 if they are sent to TikTok. Importantly, the screenshot does not purport to depict\n6 Plaintiff\u2019s own interactions with the website.\n7 Based solely on the above conclusory allegations, Plaintiff concludes that the\n8 TikTok software qualifies as a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d under Section 638.51, by doing\n9 nothing more than parroting the statutory language. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 14-15.) There is also not a\n10 single allegation in the Amended Complaint claiming that Plaintiff suffered any injury\n11 from defendant\u2019s purported conduct, notwithstanding that an injury is required under\n12 Article III of the United States Constitution and Section 637.2 of CIPA. Nor does the\n13 Amended Complaint add a single allegation to support that BB OpCo installed or used\n14 a trap and trace device in California. Instead, and irrelevantly, Plaintiff alleges that\n15 TikTok maintains its headquarters in California. (Id. \u00b62.) As Plaintiff\u2019s claims are\n16 against BB OpCo only, this makes no difference.\n17 III. LEGAL STANDARDS\n18 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal\n19 of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto.\n20 Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff bears the burden of\n21 establishing standing under Article III of the Constitution, which requires an \u201cinjury in\n22 fact\u201d that is both \u201cconcrete and particularized\u201d as well as \u201cactual or imminent, not\n23 conjectural or hypothetical.\u201d Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)\n24 (internal citation omitted). The injury must be \u201cfairly traceable to the challenged\n25 action of the defendant,\u201d and it must be likely \u201cthat the injury will be redressed by a\n26 favorable decision.\u201d Id. at 560-61.\n27\n\n28 14\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 15 of 32 Page ID\n #:158\n\n\n\n1 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to\n2 dismiss for failure to state a claim is proper where a plaintiff fails to allege sufficient\n3 facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule\n4 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must set forth factual allegations sufficient \u201cto raise a\n5 right to relief above the speculative level.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,\n6 555 (2007). \u201c[A] plaintiff\u2019s obligation to provide the \u2018grounds\u2019 of his \u2018entitle[ment] to\n7 relief\u2019 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the\n8 elements of a cause of action will not do.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). \u201cThreadbare recitals\n9 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not\n10 suffice.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a court is not required to\n11 \u201caccept \u2018conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations if those\n12 conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.\u2019\u201d Cairns v. Franklin\n13 Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 1998).\n14 IV. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE SHE SUFFERED AN INJURY-IN-\n15 FACT.\n16 Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). To\n17 have Article III standing, Plaintiff is required to show that Plaintiff has suffered an\n18 injury that is \u201c(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not\n19 conjectural or hypothetical.\u201d TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2199\n20 (2021). A statute that gives the plaintiff a right to sue for violation of the legislation\n21 does not automatically establish standing. Id. \u201cArticle III standing requires a concrete\n22 injury even in the context of a statutory violation.\u201d Id. The Supreme Court \u201chas\n23 rejected the proposition that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact\n24 requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to\n25 authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.\u201d Id. The legislature cannot \u201csimply\n26 enact an injury into existence[.]\u201d Id.\n27\n\n28 15\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 16 of 32 Page ID\n #:159\n\n\n\n1 Plaintiff, on her second attempt to plead her claims after reviewing Defendant\u2019s\n2 initial motion to dismiss (which raised the same arguments herein), fails to allege facts\n3 establishing an injury in fact. Notably, Plaintiff still does not plead any facts regarding\n4 what information of Plaintiff allegedly was collected by TikTok on the website.\n5 Plaintiff does not contend that Plaintiff entered her email address or phone number\n6 into any fields on the website or that the TikTok pixel captured that personal\n7 information, nor does Plaintiff allege that Plaintiff was referred to the website from\n8 another URL, such that the TikTok pixel would have captured \u201creferral tracking\u201d or\n9 \u201curl tracking\u201d information. 2 All Plaintiff pleads is an abstract and hypothetical injury,\n10 which wholly fails to establish standing. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2199.3\n11 Indeed, a Court in this district recently dismissed a claim\u2014nearly identical to\n12 Plaintiff\u2019s\u2014asserting that a defendant violated Section 638.51 by installing the\n13 TikTok pixel on its website, holding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate an injury-\n14 in-fact and thus failed to establish standing. Vivint, Inc., 2024 WL 5179916.4 The\n15 Court found that Plaintiff could not establish standing where, as here, the complaint\n16\n 2\n Plaintiff may argue that Section 638.51 \u201ccodif[ies] a substantive right to privacy, the violation of\n17 which gives rise to a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.\u201d In re Facebook, Inc. Internet\n Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). But Plaintiff\u2019s pleading fails to\n18\n identify any harm to a protected privacy interest and thus cannot establish standing. See, e.g., Byars\n19 v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 2023 WL 2996686, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023) (dismissing complaint\n for lack of standing where plaintiff failed to identify any specific personal information disclosed that\n20 implicates a protectible privacy interest).\n 3\n Having otherwise anonymous browsing data be linked to Plaintiff\u2019s identity through\n21 \u201cfingerprinting\u201d is still not enough to find concrete injury. For example, Plaintiff does not even\n22 allege that Plaintiff has a TikTok account that would allow TikTok\u2019s purported collection of\n Plaintiff\u2019s anonymous information from visiting the website to be associated with Plaintiff. If\n23 Plaintiff does not have a TikTok account, Plaintiff\u2019s identity cannot be connected to Plaintiff\u2019s\n browsing activity.\n24 4\n See also Lightoller v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 2023 WL 3963823, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023)\n (dismissing for lack of standing because the plaintiff failed to allege she disclosed any personal\n25 information); Byars v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 2023 WL 2996686, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023)\n26 (plaintiff lacked standing where she failed to allege that she disclosed any sensitive information);\n Rodriguez v. Fountain9, Inc., 2024 WL 3886811, at *4 (Cal. Sup. July 09, 2024) (no standing under\n27 638.51 for similar complaint), 2024 WL 4905217, at *4 (Cal. Sup. Nov. 21, 2024) (finding same\n without leave to amend).\n28 16\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 17 of 32 Page ID\n #:160\n\n\n\n1 was \u201cvague as to many, if not all, of the details surrounding [plaintiff\u2019s] use of the\n2 Website and what specific information was captured by the TikTok Software.\u201d See id.\n3 Here too, Plaintiff has omitted any specific information that BB OpCo or TikTok\n4 allegedly collected from Plaintiff.\n5 Even more recently, the Ninth Circuit has confirmed that a plaintiff who\n6 complains of third-party website analytics software but alleges only that she visited a\n7 website, does not allege an injury and thus lacks standing. Bloomingdales.Com, LLC,\n8 2024 WL 5134350, at *1. There, the plaintiff made only \u201cgeneral allegations\u201d about\n9 \u201cthe types of information Bloomingdales.com collects and the mechanisms of\n10 collection\u201d but the plaintiff\u2019s \u201callegations about her own interactions with the\n11 Bloomingdales.com website [we]re sparse. She allege[d] only that she \u2018visited\u2019 and\n12 \u2018accessed\u2019 the website\u2026 She d[id] not assert, for example, that she made a purchase,\n13 entered text, or took any actions other than simply opening the webpage and then\n14 closing it.\u201d Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that she had not alleged an injury\n15 sufficient to have standing. Id. at *1-2. The allegations here are indistinguishable. All\n16 that Plaintiff alleges about her own interactions with the website is that she visited\n17 it\u2014nothing more. The remainder of the \u201cgeneral allegations\u201d about \u201cthe types of\n18 information [that the TikTok pixel can] collect[] and the mechanisms of collection\u201d do\n19 not suffice. Id. at *1-2.\n20 V. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)\n21 As an initial matter, the text, legislative history, and legislative context of the\n22 Trap & Trace Laws make clear that they do not apply to the website analytics tools at\n23 issue here. Even if they did, Plaintiff is incorrect that Section 637.2 provides a private\n24 right of action to sue for violations of Section 638.51. And, even if Plaintiff were\n25 correct, Plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim insofar as Plaintiff fails to allege\n26 facts supporting the allegation that BB OpCo installed a \u201ctrap and trace device or\n27 process\u201d within the meaning of the statute, the requisite scienter, and that BB OpCo\n28 17\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 18 of 32 Page ID\n #:161\n\n\n\n1 installed the TikTok pixel in California. Finally, even if Plaintiff had made these\n2 essential allegations, BB OpCo is nevertheless exempt from the Trap and Trace Laws\n3 as a provider of electronic or wire communication service and because BB OpCo is a\n4 party participant who consented to the TikTok pixel.\n5 A. The Trap & Trace Laws Are Inapplicable Here.\n6 1. The Trap and Trace Laws Are Intended to Apply Only to\n7 Devices Attached to Telephone Lines.\n8 Plaintiff\u2019s novel theory fails because the plain language and legislative history\n9 of the Trap & Trace Laws make clear that a trap and trace device or process must be\n10 attached to a telephone line. A \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d is defined as a \u201cdevice or\n11 process that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the\n12 originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\n13 reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not\n14 the contents of a communication.\u201d Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c). Section 638.51\n15 provides that \u201ca person may not install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device\n16 without first obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.52 or 638.53.\u201d Id. \u00a7\n17 638.51 (emphasis added). Considering the statute in context, Sections 638.52 and\n18 638.53 confirm unequivocally that the TikTok software, and other web-based software\n19 like it, simply are not covered as a trap and trace device or process.\n20 Section 638.52\u2014invoked directly in Section 638.51\u2014makes clear that the\n21 legislature intended only processes and devices attached to telephone lines to qualify\n22 under its trap and trace provisions. For example, Section 638.53 requires that the court\n23 order authorizing a trap and trace device shall specify a specific telephone line:\n24 (1) The identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose\n25 name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and\n26 trace device is to be attached. . . .\n27\n\n28 18\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 19 of 32 Page ID\n #:162\n\n\n\n1 (3) The number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line\n2 to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in\n3 the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and\n4 trace order.\n5 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(d)(1), (3) (emphases added). Section 638.52(c) likewise\n6 limits disclosure of information acquired in the context of a telephone line: \u201cthe\n7 authority for a pen register or a trap and trace device shall not include any information\n8 that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber, except to the extent that the\n9 location may be determined from the telephone number.\u201d Id. \u00a7 638.52(c) (emphasis\n10 added). The repeated references to telephone lines and telephones in the implementing\n11 provisions of the Trap & Trace Laws make explicit the statute\u2019s plain intent to\n12 encompass telephone communications only. If the legislature intended trap and trace\n13 devices to apply to website software, it would not have continued to mandate a court\n14 order authorizing its use to require the \u201cnumber\u201d and \u201cphysical location of a telephone\n15 line.\u201d See id. \u00a7 638.52(d)(3).\n16 Application of U.S. of Am. For an Ord. Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel.\n17 Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 199\u2013200 (C.D. Cal. 1995) is instructive. There,\n18 the court interpreted a similar definition of \u201ctrap and trace\u201d device, which was then in\n19 effect under the federal Pen Register Act. The court held unequivocally that \u201conly\n20 devices that are attached to a telephone line\u201d were covered by the statute. Id. The\n21 court looked to related sections of the Pen Register Act\u2014the analogous Federal law\u2014\n22 and found they evidenced clear legislative intent that a telephone line was\n23 unequivocally required to qualify as a trap and trace device in the first instance. Id.\n24 The same reading is compelled here.\n25 Tellingly, while the federal Pen Register Act was later amended in 2001 to\n26 apply to a wider range of technology by expressly expanding the definition of a trap\n27 and trace device to permit the use of technology on a \u201ctelephone line or other\n28 19\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 20 of 32 Page ID\n #:163\n\n\n\n1 facility,\u201d to which it could be \u201cattached or applied,\u201d there has been no corresponding\n2 amendment to the Trap & Trace Laws. 5 The logical conclusion is that unlike its\n3 federal counterpart, the California legislature intended a narrower application in its\n4 authorization of trap and trace devices in the context of telephone lines. As a result,\n5 the TikTok pixel simply has no application here.\n6 2. CIPA\u2019s Legislative History Demonstrates that Website Tools\n7 are Not Trap and Trace Devices.\n8 Even if the Court found the Trap & Trace Laws ambiguous, their legislative\n9 history also compels a finding that the TikTok software is not a trap and trace device,\n10 because as explained above, the statute applies only to telephonic communications.\n11 Indeed, the legislative history of sections 638.50-638.53 shows that the statute was\n12 intended to authorize state and local law enforcement to use trap and trace devices for\n13 telephone surveillance. The California legislature enacted Sections 638.50-638.53 to\n14 resolve a conflict with state and federal law. The federal pen register act only\n15 authorized state law enforcement to obtain an emergency pen register order if\n16 authorized by a state statute, but none existed in California. See RJN at Ex. B, p. 10.\n17 the Trap & Trace Laws were enacted to remedy this conflict and \u201cexplicitly authorize\n18 state and local law enforcement officers to use pen register and trap and trace devices,\n19 including during emergency situations.\u201d RJN at Ex. A, p. 6. As one Court recently put\n20 it when dismissing a claim brought under the Trap & Trace Laws, \u201c[t]he legislative\n21\n 5\n22 The Trap & Trace Laws were enacted in 2015\u2014at a time when the internet and website tracking\n software were both known and omnipresent\u2014thus, there is no need for the Court to evaluate whether\n23 they were intended to evolve and apply to future (unimaginable) technologies. See, e.g., In re Vizio,\n Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F.Supp. 3d 1204, 1227 (C.D.Cal. 2017) (discussing decisions\n24 interpreting California\u2019s wiretap laws from the 1960s to potentially apply to modern forms of\n communications such as the internet and session replay software). The Legislature was aware of the\n25 internet and, if it wanted internet software to fall within the purview of Trap & Trace Laws it would\n26 have explicitly said so. Similarly, the legislature has regularly amended other sections of the Penal\n Code and has declined to amend Trap & Trace Laws to bring internet technologies into its purview.\n27 See Pen. Code \u00a7\u00a7 631 (amended 2022, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), 632 (amended 2016), 633 (amended 2018),\n 633.02 (added 2015), and 633.05 (added 2011).\n28 20\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 21 of 32 Page ID\n #:164\n\n\n\n1 purpose of the [Trap & Trace Laws] was to authorize law enforcement to seek orders\n2 for telephone surveillance. [The law] does not address the privacy rights of Internet\n3 users.\u201d Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc., 2024 WL 4873370, at *2 (Cal. Sup. Sep.\n4 09, 2024).\n5 Significantly, the legislative history repeatedly refers to pen registers and trap\n6 and trace devices as tools for collecting telephone numbers, not for an operator\u2019s\n7 collection of data from website visitors. Tellingly, the legislative history expressly and\n8 repeatedly contemplates telephone surveillance, and makes no mention of website\n9 analytics tools. See RJN at Ex. A, p. 1 (explaining that the enactment of CIPA\u2019s trap\n10 and trace provisions \u201c[a]uthorizes state and local law enforcement agencies to seek an\n11 emergency order to use pen registers and trap and trace devices in telephone\n12 surveillance\u201d (emphasis added)); RJN at Ex. B, p. 10 (\u201c[A]nother tool law\n13 enforcement uses is called a \u2018trap and trace device\u2019 which allows them to record\n14 what numbers have called a specific telephone line, i.e. all incoming phone\n15 numbers.\u201d) (emphasis added).6 This context supports a narrow interpretation of the\n16 statute, limiting it to telephonic communications only.\n17 3. Other California Legislation Governs the Use of Website\n18 Analytics Tools.\n19 Not only is the application of the Trap & Trace Laws to website analytics tools\n20 entirely omitted from the statute, and contradicted by the legislative history, it is also\n21 at odds with California Consumer Privacy Act (\u201cCCPA\u201d), a separate statute that\n22 directly governs the sharing of \u201cpersonal information\u201d by businesses, including\n23 through online analytics tools. See Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.100 et seq. The CCPA,\n24\n 6\n See also RJN at Ex. B, p. 10 (\u201cPen registers and track [sic] and trace devices track incoming and\n25 outgoing telephone calls.\u201d) (emphasis added)); id., p. 11 (\u201cany location information obtained by a\n26 pen register or a track [sic] and trace device is limited to the information that is contained in the\n telephone number\u201d (emphasis added); RJN at Ex. A, p. 5 (\u201cAs noted above, pen registers/trap and\n27 trace devices are used by law enforcement for telephone surveillance to record incoming and\n outgoing phone numbers from a tapped line.\u201d (emphasis added)).\n28 21\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 22 of 32 Page ID\n #:165\n\n\n\n1 initially enacted three years after the enactment of Section 638.51, governs personal\n2 information that \u201cidentifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being\n3 associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly with a particular\n4 consumer.\u201d Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.140(v)(1). It provides a private right of action only\n5 for those \u201cconsumer[s] whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information ...\n6 is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of\n7 the business's violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security\n8 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information.\u201d Cal. Civ. Code\n9 \u00a7 1798.150(a). If Plaintiff\u2019s novel theory were to be accepted, it would impose a\n10 conflicting obligation on website operators, insofar as the two laws would impose\n11 differing requirements for when the disclosure of information that identifies an\n12 individual is actionable.\n13 California courts instruct that when interpreting two statutes that would impose\n14 conflicting obligations, \u201c[a] court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize [the]\n15 statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force\n16 and effect to all of their provisions.\u201d Moore v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 58\n17 Cal.App.5th 561, 574 (2020). The inconsistencies in applying the Trap & Trace Laws\n18 to website analytics tools\u2014which would require a court order for their use\u2014and the\n19 CCPA, which contains no such requirement, is easily reconciled. The plain language,\n20 supported by its legislative history, demonstrates that the Trap & Trace Laws apply to\n21 telephone surveillance only. See, e.g., Hickory Farms, 2024 WL 1698147, at *3\n22 (Cal.Sup. Mar. 13, 2024) (granting dismissal of Section 638.51 claim where complaint\n23 did not allege use of \u201ca mobile phone or other potential form of communication device\n24 potentially qualifying as a cellular device\u201d that would fit within the purview of the\n25 statute).\n26 //\n27 //\n28 22\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 23 of 32 Page ID\n #:166\n\n\n\n1 B. Section 637.2\u2019s Private Right of Action Does not Apply to Section\n2 638.51.\n3 Not only are the Trap and Trace Laws inapplicable to the conduct at issue, but\n4 Plaintiff is incorrect that Section 637.2 provides a private right of action to sue for\n5 violations of Section 638.51. \u201cThe Legislature\u2019s intention to create a private cause of\n6 action must be expressly stated or strongly implied in the statutory language or\n7 legislative history.\u201d Vasquez v. Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 5th 84, 91 (2018).\n8 Even where statutory language appears clear, the court must assess whether the statute\n9 contains a latent ambiguity, or \u201csome extrinsic evidence creates a necessity for\n10 interpretation for a choice among two or more possible meanings.\u201d Coburn v. Sievert,\n11 133 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495 (2005). \u201cSuch a necessity is also present\u201d where, as\n12 here, \u201ca literal construction would produce absurd consequences.\u201d Id.\n13 In 1967, the California Legislature enacted Chapter 1509, which added to the\n14 Penal Code, sections 630 through 637.2 (the \u201cCalifornia Invasion of Privacy Act\u201d or\n15 \u201cCIPA\u201d). See RJN, Ex. C. In 2015 and 2016, forty-eight years after passage of CIPA,\n16 the Trap & Trace Laws were added to the Penal Code to provide law enforcement a\n17 path to use surveillance devices. RJN, Exs. D, E. 7 The Trap & Trace Laws do not\n18 include language supporting incorporation or applicability of Section 637.2 into the\n19 Trap & Trace Laws. As such, the plain language does not support Plaintiff\u2019s position.8\n20 Additionally, Plaintiff\u2019s proposed interpretation would create a conflict with the\n21\n 7\n22 In enacting Trap & Trace Laws, the Legislature stated only that they were added \u201cto the Penal\n Code\u201d and unlike past CIPA enactments, did not include a reference to 637.2, the California\n23 Invasion of Privacy Act or any particular legislative Part, Title, or Chapter. Id.\n 8\n Plaintiff cites Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., 2024 WL 3561367, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024)\n24 which incorrectly found that \u201c637.2 expressly states that all CIPA violations, including \u00a7 638.51,\n confer a private right of action.\u201d It does not. In fact, 637.2 only provides a private right of action for\n25 violations of \u201cthis chapter.\u201d \u201cThis chapter\u201d is ambiguous and could be referring to Chapter 1509\n26 which added Sections 630 to 637.2 to the Penal Code or could be referring to only those sections\n enacted with 637.2. Moreover, in enacting the Trap & Trace Laws, the Legislature did not state that\n27 the provisions should be part of the same legislative chapter as Section 637.2. The structural choice\n to nest it outside indicates otherwise. Moody did not address these contentions. Am. Compl. \u00b617.\n28 23\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 24 of 32 Page ID\n #:167\n\n\n\n1 remedies expressly provided. Specifically, Section 638.55 provides remedies for\n2 violations of the Trap & Trace Laws but does not reference a private right of action\n3 for statutory damages. Pen. Code \u00a7 638.55. Instead, Section 638.55 confirms that only\n4 the Attorney General is permitted to commence a civil action. This evidences an\n5 intentional decision to treat the Trap & Trace Laws as separate and apart from the\n6 statutory framework for Sections 630 to 637. Vicko Ins. Services v. Ohio Indem. Co.,\n7 70 Cal.App.4th 55, 66 (1999) (finding existing remedies \u201ctogether with the absence of\n8 any reference to a private right of action\u201d to be \u201cstrong evidence the Legislature did\n9 not intend to create such a private right to sue for damages\u201d).9 Moreover, the fact that\n10 the Legislature chose to nest the relevant provision outside of Sections 630 to 637,\n11 further evidences an intent that the Trap & Trace Laws be construed separately from\n12 Sections 630 to 637, such that Section 637.2\u2019s civil damages provision should not\n13 apply to the Trap & Trace Laws. See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.\n14 338, 353 (2013) (finding that a provision added to a particular statutory section, did\n15 not apply to a subsequent statutory section because in the same way that a legislature\u2019s\n16 \u201cchoice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices.\u201d).10\n17 Indeed, on other occasions, the California Legislature nested new provisions within\n18 sections 630 to 637. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 632.5 (enacted in 1985). In fact, when\n19 the Legislature enacted Section 632.5, it made express reference to the civil penalties\n20 available under Section 632.7. Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 632.5(a). That the Legislature placed\n21 the Trap & Trace Laws outside of the existing framework (without any such cross-\n22 reference) must be interpreted as an intentional structural decision.\n23\n\n24 9\n See also Waits v. Pacifica Villa Royale, LLC (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) 2008 WL 3906679, at\n *10 (noting that \u201c[b]ecause the Legislature provided for these specific remedies, and did not include\n25 a private damages remedy, we necessarily presume that this remedy is not available\u201d).\n 10\n26 Faced with similar questions, courts generally refuse to apply old private rights of action to new\n provisions enacted thereafter for other purposes. See, e.g., Glob. Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-New Jersey,\n27 Inc., 287 F.Supp. 2d 532, 545 (D.N.J. 2003) (refusing to apply private right of action in statute\n enacted long before substantive statute allegedly violated).\n28 24\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 25 of 32 Page ID\n #:168\n\n\n\n1 Similarly, the legislative history confirms that the private right of action should\n2 not be extended to the Trap & Trace Laws. \u201c[L]egislative history can reveal the\n3 Legislature\u2019s intent to create a private right of action . . . though it must be \u2018clear\u2019 that\n4 was the intent.\u201d Mayron v. Google LLC, 54 Cal.App.5th 566, 573 (2020). Nothing in\n5 the legislative history evidences an intent to invoke Section 637.2\u2019s civil liability\n6 provision\u2014let alone a clear intent. Where \u201cLegislation expresse[s] no intent on the\n7 matter either way, directly or impliedly, there is no private right of action.\u201d Animal\n8 League Defense Fund v. Mendes, 160 Cal.App.4th 136, 142 (2008).\n9 C. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting Statutory Standing Under\n10 Section 637.2.\n11 Even if Section 637.2 did provide a private right of action to sue for violations\n12 of Section 638.51 (it does not), the Complaint would still fail because Plaintiff lacks\n13 statutory standing to sue under Section 637.2.\n14 Section 637.2 provides a private right of action only for a person \u201cwho has been\n15 injured by\u201d a violation of one of its provisions. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 637.2. The\n16 Complaint does not even try to assert that Plaintiff was harmed by BB OpCo\u2019s use of\n17 the TikTok software, and thus, Plaintiff effectively concedes that she suffered no\n18 injury. There are no facts that could even possibly imply an injury because Plaintiff\u2019s\n19 Amended Complaint fails to allege what, if any, of her own information may have\n20 been collected by the TikTok software or how it could constitute an invasion of\n21 privacy. She does not even allege she had a TikTok account at the time of her website\n22 visit, or that her device had any connection to TikTok whatsoever such that TikTok\n23 could match her separately through her visit to defendant\u2019s website. Plaintiff\u2019s abject\n24 failure to plead any such facts leaves both BB OpCo and this Court guessing as to the\n25 basis of the claim for damages. This is plainly deficient.\n26 As the court made clear in Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc., 84 Cal. App. 5th 671\n27 (2022), review denied (Jan. 25, 2023), the purported availability of statutory damages\n28 25\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 26 of 32 Page ID\n #:169\n\n\n\n1 does not negate the requirement to establish an actual injury to recover under a\n2 statutory violation, particularly where, as here, an injury requirement is expressly\n3 written into the statute. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 637.2. There, the court reiterated that\n4 statutory damages, as opposed to statutory penalties, \u201cwere intended to compensate a\n5 plaintiff for injury\u201d and designed to provide redress where damages are \u201cdifficult or\n6 impossible to quantify or prove.\u201d Id. at 703. But a mere statutory violation is not itself\n7 sufficient. Id. at 706 (no standing where no \u201cconcrete or particularized injury to\n8 privacy interests\u201d).\n9 Here, Plaintiff has omitted any specific information that BB OpCo or TikTok\n10 allegedly collected from Plaintiff herself. But even if Plaintiff had alleged her\n11 information was collected, the information she alleges can be collected by the TikTok\n12 pixel falls outside of a recognized privacy interest. See I.C. v. Zynga, Inc., 600 F.\n13 Supp. 3d 1034, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (no standing based on disclosure of \u201cemail\n14 address, phone number, or Facebook or Zynga username\u201d). As aptly stated by a\n15 district court recently, \u201c[g]iven the inherent nature of the internet, a number of courts\n16 have found that consumers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over their\n17 activity in that space.\u201d Thomas v. Papa Johns Int\u2019l, Inc., 2024 WL 2060140, at *2\n18 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2024). As a result, the Court should dismiss the Complaint because\n19 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish an injury as is required to sue\n20 under Section 637.2.\n21 D. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting the Claim that BB OpCo\n22 Installed or Used a \u201cTrap and Trace Device\u201d.\n23 Even if all of these threshold defects did not exist, Plaintiff\u2019s claim would still\n24 fail because she fails to allege the essential elements of her claim. To state a claim\n25 Plaintiff must put forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that BB OpCo installed a trap\n26 and trace device in violation of Section 638.51. But Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint\n27 only pays lip service to Section 638.51\u2019s specific requirements that a trap and trace\n28 26\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 27 of 32 Page ID\n #:170\n\n\n\n1 device (1) captures incoming electronic or other impulses, (2) that identify the\n2 originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information,\n3 (3) that is reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic\n4 communication, but not the contents of a communication. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51.\n5 There are simply no facts alleged in the Amended Complaint that identify any\n6 \u201cincoming electronic impulses\u201d captured by the TikTok software whatsoever, nor\n7 whether or how the vague information that Plaintiff identifies qualifies as \u201cdialing,\n8 routing, addressing, or signaling information\u201d\u2014it plainly does not.\n9 Although Plaintiff lists examples of record data points that the TikTok software\n10 could hypothetically collect from a website user (such as device, browser, geographic,\n11 and referrer information), Plaintiff fails to allege any fact identifying what information\n12 of hers BB OpCo collected, so that the Court may assess whether any such\n13 information is covered by the Penal Code. See e.g., RJN Ex. F, Heiting v. F21 OPCO,\n14 LLC, No. 24STCV20340 (Cal. Sup., Nov. 18, 2024 Minute Order) (sustaining\n15 demurrer and dismissing complaint alleging trap and trace claims based on the TikTok\n16 pixel where the complaint alleged no specific facts supporting that the plaintiff was\n17 actually identified, or how the TikTok pixel functioned to collect \u201celectronic\n18 impulses\u201d).\n19 Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s reference to device and browser information, referral and\n20 url tracking, and geographic information, are so vague that neither BB OpCo nor the\n21 Court can discern whether any of these categories falls within the purview of \u201cdialing,\n22 routing, addressing, or signaling information\u201d of a communication instrument covered\n23 under Section 638.51. On their face, device and browser information, geographic\n24 information, and referral tracking are not signaling information as they do not fit\n25 within the same category as dialing, routing or addressing. See People v. Giordano, 42\n26 Cal. 4th 644, 660, 170 P.3d 623, 633 (2007) (\u201cEjusdem generis applies whether\n27 specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa\u2026[T]he general term or\n28 27\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 28 of 32 Page ID\n #:171\n\n\n\n1 category is restricted to those things that are similar to those which are enumerated\n2 specifically.\u201d). Location data, another category of information Plaintiff claims the\n3 TikTok pixel may collect, is expressly excluded from the statute. See Cal. Penal Code\n4 \u00a7 638.52(c) (location data from telephone numbers are okay). As are \u201ccontents of\n5 communications\u201d. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442\n6 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (stating that trap and trace devices do not overhear\n7 conversations or confirm whether a call was completed).\n8 Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint not only fails to identify the required \u201cdialing,\n9 routing, addressing or signaling information,\u201d it also does not allege that such\n10 information is \u201creasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic\n11 communication\u2026\u201d to fit within the statutory requirements. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\n12 638.50(c) (emphasis added). \u201cWire communication\u201d and \u201celectronic communication\u201d\n13 are defined in Penal Code section 629.51(a). Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(a) (stating that\n14 definition contained in section 629.51(a) applies). \u201cWire communication\u201d is an \u201caural\n15 transfer,\u201d meaning a transfer \u201ccontaining the human voice.\u201d Thus, a \u201cwire transfer\u201d is\n16 not applicable here on its face. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(1), (4). \u201cElectronic\n17 communication\u201d is defined to expressly exclude \u201cany communication from a tracking\n18 device.\u201d Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(2)(C). \u201cTracking device\u201d is defined, in relevant\n19 part, as \u201can electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement\n20 of a person or object.\u201d Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(3). The TikTok software, alleged\n21 by Plaintiff to operate as a fingerprinting process that purportedly tracks the location\n22 and identity of users, falls far outside these statutory definitions.\n23 E. Plaintiff Fails to Plead BB OpCo Installed the TikTok Pixel in\n24 California.\n25 Under California law, a presumption exists against the extraterritorial\n26 application of state law unless the Legislature\u2019s intention to have the law apply\n27 extraterritorially \u201cis clearly expressed or reasonably to be inferred from the language\n28 28\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 29 of 32 Page ID\n #:172\n\n\n\n1 of the act or from its purpose, subject matter or history.\u201d Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51\n2 Cal. 4th 1191, 1207 (2011). Section 638.51 does not \u201cclearly express,\u201d nor can it be\n3 \u201creasonably\u2026inferred\u201d from its language that the Legislature intended it to apply\n4 beyond California\u2019s borders. Therefore, under binding precedent, Section 638.51\n5 should apply only to trap and trace devices installed or used in California.\n6 Plaintiff fails to state a claim because Plaintiff does not plead that Defendant\u2019s\n7 alleged trap and trace activity took place in California. \u201cTo avoid an impermissible\n8 extraterritorial application of state law, a \u2018crucial element\u2019 of [the plaintiff\u2019s] claim\n9 must have occurred in California.\u201d Eng. v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc., 808 F.\n10 App\u2019x 529, 530 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, Plaintiff alleges that BB OpCo installed the\n11 TikTok pixel on the website and collected information about the Plaintiff\u2019s website\n12 visit. (Am. Compl. \u00b61.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that BB OpCo is a Connecticut\n13 limited liability company (see id. \u00b68) and does not plead any facts showing that the\n14 TikTok pixel was installed in, or that TikTok collected Plaintiff\u2019s information in,\n15 California.\n16 In attempt to cure this defect, the Amended Complaint alleges that TikTok \u201chas\n17 global headquarters in Los Angeles, California\u201d and that BB OpCo allegedly\n18 \u201ccontracted with TikTok while it was headquartered in California.\u201d (Id. \u00b62.) This\n19 makes no difference because the alleged offending conduct occurred where BB\n20 OpCo\u2019s website is located\u2014not where TikTok happens to maintain an office. See\n21 Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 19 Cal. 4th 1036, 1059 (1999) (offense is\n22 committed in the location where the \u201cconduct which gives rise to liability\u201d occurs). As\n23 confirmed by Plaintiff\u2019s own allegations, and the statutory structure of the Trap and\n24 Trace laws, the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff\u2019s claim is where the trap and trace\n25 device was installed and used\u2014by defendant on defendant\u2019s website. See Cal. Penal\n26 Code \u00a7 638.50(c) (a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d \u201ccaptures the incoming electronic or other\n27 impulses . . . of a wire or electronic communication.\u201d). Notably, Plaintiff does not and\n28 29\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 30 of 32 Page ID\n #:173\n\n\n\n1 cannot allege that BB OpCo\u2019s website is hosted in California, that the TikTok\n2 Software was installed in California, or that the TikTok software operates in\n3 California. Nor could she. California courts routinely dismiss claims where the\n4 Plaintiff fails to plead that the offending conduct occurred in California, and this Court\n5 should do the same. See Sexton v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 2023 WL 1823487, at *1 (E.D.\n6 Cal. Feb. 8,2023) (dismissing claims where plaintiffs failed to include allegations\n7 regarding the location of the alleged conduct): Tumampos v. Cathay Pac. Airways\n8 Ltd., 2017 WL 10446824, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (dismissing employment\n9 claims where \u201cPlaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to establish that they worked\n10 principally in California or that Defendant is a California employer\u2026.\u201d)\n11 Because Plaintiff fails to allege that the challenged conduct occurred in\n12 California, the Trap and Trace laws do not apply. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207.\n13 F. BB OpCo Is Exempt As The Website Operator And/Or Because It\n14 Was a Party to the Communication.\n15 Even if Plaintiff otherwise states a claim\u2014Plaintiff has not for all the reasons\n16 explained herein\u2014BB OpCo is nevertheless exempt.\n17 Section 638.51(b) allows a provider of electronic or wire communication\n18 service 11 to use a trap and trace device to \u201coperate\u2026a wire or electronic\n19 communication service.\u201d Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 638.51 (b). Much like in Columbia\n20 Pictures, BB OpCo\u2019s alleged collection of incoming user information like the device,\n21 browser, geographic, and referrer information as alleged by Plaintiff is necessary to\n22 operate the website. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419, at\n23\n 11\n Plaintiff cannot dispute that BB OpCo is a provider of a communication service as contemplated\n24 by Section 638.51(b), as multiple courts have recognized. See Open Text Corporation, No.\n 24STCV05440 at 6 (addressing pen register claim against website operator and finding that\n25 \u201cDefendant\u2019s website is an electronic communication service\u201d within the meaning of Section\n26 638.51(b)(1) (emphasis added)); Transitions Optical II, No. 23STCV30742 at 5 (considering\n exemption provisions under Section 638.51(b) in context of trap and trace and pen register claims\n27 brought against website operator and concluding that \u201cDefendant\u2019s website is an electronic\n communication service\u201d).\n28 30\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 31 of 32 Page ID\n #:174\n\n\n\n1 *11 (C.D. Cal 2007) (interpreting analogous federal exemption). Critically, BB OpCo\n2 necessarily captures such data when a user accesses their website, which is related to\n3 the functioning of the internet and connectivity between a user\u2019s browser and the\n4 website. See United States v. Jean, 207 F.Supp.3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016); Brown v.\n5 Google LLC, 2021 WL 6064009 (N.D. Cal. 2021).\n6 Moreover, and significantly, in addition to exempting a communication\n7 provider from using a trap and trace device to operate, maintain, and test a wire or\n8 electronic communication service, Section 638.51 also allows a communication\n9 provider to use a trap and trace device when the \u201cconsent of the user of that service\n10 has been obtained.\u201d Cal. Pen. Code 638.51(b)(5). It is BB OpCo\u2019s\u2014not Plaintiff\u2019s\u2014\n11 consent required to employ the TikTok software on its own website. 12 Id.; see Rules\n12 and Policies Regarding Calling No. Identification Serv.-Caller ID 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 1764\n13 (1994) (addressing caller ID feature as trap and trace device under federal statute and\n14 holding that telephone company need only obtain the telephone subscriber\u2019s, rather\n15 than the third-party caller\u2019s, consent to fit within the analogous federal exception);\n16 Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Public Service Commission, 205 Wis. 2d 60,\n17 80 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases finding same). Because BB OpCo provided\n18 its consent to the installation of the TikTok software, it is covered under the separate\n19\n\n20\n\n21 12\n The Legislature\u2019s use of the singular \u201cuser\u201d for Section 638.51\u2019s consent requirement is a notable\n22 and intentional departure from Section 631\u2019s prohibition on wiretapping, which requires the consent\n of \u201call parties.\u201d See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 631(a) (forbidding wiretapping \u201cwithout the consent of all\n23 parties to the communication\u201d). Indeed, if 638.51 required the consent of all parties, then \u201cit is hard\n to see how any caller ID system, even that used for emergency services, would be legal.\u201d Sparshott\n24 v. Feld Ent., Inc., 311 F.3d 425, 432 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (interpreting federal law identical to Section\n 638.51). After all, caller ID allows the recipient of a call to learn the identity of the caller. See id.\n25 Accordingly, if Section 638.51 is interpreted to require all-party consent, then caller ID is a crime.\n26 See id. Section 638.51 avoids that absurd result by requiring only the consent of one party (the\n \u201cuser,\u201d singular). See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 306 S.C. 70, 73 (1991) (interpreting\n27 materially identical law); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation 154 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.\n 2001) (\u201cuser\u201d of web service was website operator; not website visitor).\n28 31\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 21 Filed 01/30/25 Page 32 of 32 Page ID\n #:175\n\n\n\n1 statutory consent exception. See, e.g., Hickory Farms, 2024 WL 1698147, at *4\n2 (granting dismissal of Section 638.51 on the basis of consent). 13\n3 VI. CONCLUSION\n4 For the foregoing reasons, BB OpCo respectfully requests that this Court\n5 dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule\n6 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n7\n DATED: January 30, 2025 BLANK ROME LLP\n8\n9\n\n10 By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n Ana Tagvoryan\n11 Victor Sandoval\n Attorneys for Defendant\n12 BB OpCo LLC\n13\n\n14 The undersigned, counsel of record for BB OpCo, certifies that this brief\n15 contains 6,647 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.\n16\n\n17 By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n Ana Tagvoryan\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n 13\n If the exceptions did not apply, and liability could extend to a website provider in these\n24 circumstances, it would lead to absurd results. A website operator would be forced to obtain a court\n order to use technology to operate its website. Nothing in the statute suggests that the legislature\n25 intended to criminalize website analytics tools used in the ordinary course. See Levings v. Open Text\n26 Corporation, No. 24STCV05440 at 4 (sustaining demurrer on analogous Section 638.51 claim and\n explaining that the statute \u201cdid not criminalize the process by which all websites communicate with\n27 all users who choose to access them.\u201d); see also Saracco Tank and Welding Co. v. Platz, 65\n Cal.App.2d 306, 315 (1944) (instructing that penal statutes should be interpreted narrowly).\n28 32\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:24:38.388300-07:00","document_number":"21","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044149622","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss (cause or other)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-01-30T17:32:53.989318-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.098252-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-30","time_filed":"17:22:06","entry_number":21,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-30.001","pacer_sequence_number":66,"description":"NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by defendant BB OpCo, LLC. Motion set for hearing on 3/17/2025 at 09:30 AM before Judge Otis D. Wright II. (Attachments: # 1 Request for Judicial Notice, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Proposed Order) (Tagvoryan, Anahit) (Entered: 01/30/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/413941033/","id":413941033,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/427555094/","id":427555094,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/20/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-01-17T14:33:00.060658-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.076634-08:00","sha1":"9a724e6f3836f49a0b8d28066fcb20014a1977c3","page_count":2,"file_size":135698,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.20.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.20.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 20 Filed 01/17/25 Page 1 of 2 Page ID\n #:142\n\n\n\n 1 O\n 2\n 3\n 4\n 5\n 6\n 7\n 8 United States District Court\n 9 Central District of California\n10\n11 Kieren Kishnani, Case \u2116 2:24-cv-09629-ODW (JCx)\n12 Plaintiff,\n13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO\n14 BB OpCo, LLC et al., DISMISS AS MOOT [17]\n15 Defendants.\n16\n17 ///\n18 ///\n19 ///\n20 ///\n21 ///\n22 ///\n23 ///\n24 ///\n25 ///\n26 ///\n27 ///\n28\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 20 Filed 01/17/25 Page 2 of 2 Page ID\n #:143\n\n\n\n 1 Defendant BB OpCo, LLC served Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani with a Federal Rule\n 2 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in this case on January 10,\n 3 2025. (ECF No. 17.) On January 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended\n 4 Complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows plaintiffs to file an\n 5 amended complaint once as a matter of course within twenty-one days of service of a\n 6 Rule 12(b) motion. Therefore, Plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint was proper. As the\n 7 pending motion to dismiss was based on a complaint that is no longer operative, the\n 8 motion is DENIED as MOOT. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d\n 9 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).\n10\n11 IT IS SO ORDERED.\n12 January 17, 2025\n13\n14 ____________________________________\n15 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-01-21T01:49:20.076922-08:00","document_number":"20","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044055968","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-01-17T14:33:00.050495-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:21.048660-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-17","time_filed":"14:03:54","entry_number":20,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-17.001","pacer_sequence_number":64,"description":"ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT 17 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: On January 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows plaintiffs to file an amended complaint once as a matter of course within twenty-one days of service of a Rule 12(b) motion. Therefore, Plaintiff's amended complaint was proper. As the pending motion to dismiss was based on a complaint that is no longer operative, the motion is DENIED as MOOT. (lc) (Entered: 01/17/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/413826745/","id":413826745,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/427438386/","id":427438386,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/19/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-01-16T20:31:41.802388-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T19:20:33.502142-07:00","sha1":"d8fe83ac5fd48edd79acf8bdc9f8da030fd3437c","page_count":11,"file_size":206383,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.19.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.19.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":1,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 1 of 11 Page ID\n #:131\n\n\n\n 1 Robert Tauler (SBN 241964)\n robert@taulersmith.com\n 2 Narain Kumar, Esq. (SBN 301533)\n nkumar@taulersmith.com\n 3 TAULER SMITH LLP\n 626 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 550\n 4 Los Angeles, California 90017\n Tel: (213) 927-9270\n 5\n\n 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff\n Kieren Kishnani\n 7\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 8\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 9\n\n10 KIEREN KISHNANI, individually Case No. 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC\n and on behalf of all others similarly FIRST AMENDED CLASS\n11\n situated, ACTION COMPLAINT FOR:\n12\n Plaintiff, 1. VIOLATIONS OF THE\n13 CALIFORNIA TRAP AND\n vs.\n14 TRACE LAW (CAL. PENAL\n BB OPCO, LLC d/b/a Brooks CODE \u00a7 638.51)\n15\n Brothers, a Connecticut limited\n16 liability company; and DOES 1\n through 25, inclusive,\n17\n\n18 Defendants.\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 2 of 11 Page ID\n #:132\n\n\n\n 1 JURISDICTION\n 2 1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to\n 3 the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1332(d)(2), because the total\n 4 matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and there are over 100 members of the\n 5 proposed class. Further, at least one member of the proposed class is a citizen of a\n 6 State within the United States and at least one defendant is the citizen or subject of\n 7 a foreign state.\n 8 2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because, on\n 9 information and belief, Defendant has purposefully directed its activities to the\n10 Central District of California by regularly engaging with individuals in California\n11 through its website. Defendant\u2019s illegal conduct is directed at and harms California\n12 residents, including Plaintiff, and if not for Defendant\u2019s contact with the forum,\n13 Plaintiff would not have suffered harm. TikTok also has global headquarters in Los\n14 Angeles, California, and Defendant contracted with TikTok while it was\n15 headquartered in California in order to engage in the wrongdoings described herein.\n16 3. Venue is proper in the Central District of California pursuant to 28\n17 U.S.C. \u00a7 1391 because Defendant (1) is authorized to conduct business in this\n18 District and has intentionally availed itself of the laws and markets within this\n19 District; (2) does substantial business within this District; (3) is subject to personal\n20 jurisdiction in this District because it has availed itself of the laws and markets within\n21 this District; and the injury to Plaintiff occurred within this District.\n22 PARTIES\n23 4. Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) is a citizen and resident of\n24 California. Plaintiff was located within the Central District of California at all times\n25 relevant to the allegations herein.\n26 5. Defendant BB OpCo, LLC dba Brooks Brothers (\u201cDefendant\u201d or\n27 \u201cBrooks Brothers\u201d) is Connecticut limited liability company that owns, operates,\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 1\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 3 of 11 Page ID\n #:133\n\n\n\n 1 and/or controls www.brooksbrothers.com, an online platform that sells clothing for\n 2 men, women, and children.\n 3 6. The above-named Defendant, along with its affiliates and agents, are\n 4 collectively referred to as \u201cDefendants.\u201d The true names and capacities of the\n 5 Defendants sued herein as DOE DEFENDANTS 1 through 25, inclusive, are\n 6 currently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues such Defendants by fictitious\n 7 names. Each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE is legally responsible for\n 8 the unlawful acts alleged herein. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend the\n 9 Complaint to reflect the true names and capacities of the DOE Defendants when\n10 such identities become known.\n11 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at all relevant times, every\n12 Defendant was acting as an agent and/or employee of each of the other Defendants\n13 and was acting within the course and scope of said agency and/or employment with\n14 the full knowledge and consent of each of the other Defendants, and that each of the\n15 acts and/or omissions complained of herein was ratified by each of the other\n16 Defendants.\n17 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS\n18 8. BB OpCo, LLC is the proprietor of www.brooksbrothers.com, an\n19 online platform that sells clothing for men, women, and children.\n20 9. Defendant has installed on its Website software created by TikTok in\n21 order to identify website visitors (the \u201cTikTok Software\u201d). Plaintiff visited\n22 Defendant\u2019s website after this occurred.\n23 10. The TikTok Software acts via a process known as \u201cfingerprinting.\u201d Put\n24 simply, the TikTok Software collects as much data as it can about an otherwise\n25 anonymous visitor to the Website and matches it with existing data TikTok has\n26 acquired and accumulated about hundreds of millions of Americans.\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 2\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 4 of 11 Page ID\n #:134\n\n\n\n 1 11. The TikTok Software gathers data including device and browser\n 2 information, geographic information, referral tracking, and url tracking by running\n 3 code or \u201cscripts\u201d on the Website to send user details to TikTok.\n 4 12. The Brooks Brothers Website instantly sends communications to\n 5 TikTok whenever a user lands on the Website, and every time a user clicks on a\n 6 page. In the examples below, the right side of the image shows the various TikTok\n 7 scripts being run by Defendant, and the electronic impulses being sent to TikTok to\n 8 add to their collection of user behavior.\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n 13. California law defines a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d as \u201ca device or process\n22\n that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating\n23\n number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably\n24\n likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not the\n25\n contents of a communication.\u201d California Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c).\n26\n 14. The TikTok Software is a process to identify the source of electronic\n27\n communication by capturing incoming electronic impulses and identifying dialing,\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 3\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 5 of 11 Page ID\n #:135\n\n\n\n 1 routing, addressing, and signaling information generated by users, who are never\n 2 informed that the website is collaborating with the Chinese government to obtain\n 3 their phone number and other identifying information.\n 4 15. The TikTok Software is \u201creasonably likely\u201d to identify the source of\n 5 incoming electronic impulses. In fact, it is designed solely to meet this objective.\n 6 16. Defendant did not obtain Class Members\u2019 express or implied consent\n 7 to be subjected to data sharing with TikTok for the purposes of fingerprinting and\n 8 de-anonymization.\n 9 17. The California Invasion of Privacy Act (\u201cCIPA\u201d), California Penal\n10 Code \u00a7 630 et. seq., imposes civil liability and provides for statutory damages for\n11 the installation of trap and trace software without a court order. Id. \u00a7\u00a7 637.2, 638.51;\n12 see Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., No. 2:24-CV-04249-RGK-SK, 2024 WL 3561367\n13 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) (holding that TikTok Software was properly alleged to be\n14 a trap and trace device because it communicates over the internet and the statutory\n15 definition of a trap and trace device expressly covers \u201cwire communication\u201d and\n16 \u201celectronic communication\u201d and is not limited to telephone lines).\n17 18. Defendant did not obtain Class Members\u2019 express or implied consent\n18 to be subjected to data sharing with TikTok for the purposes of fingerprinting and\n19 de-anonymization.\n20 CLASS ALLEGATIONS\n21 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others\n22 similarly situation (the \u201cClass\u201d) defined as follows:\n23 All persons within California who whose identifying\n24 information was sent to TikTok within the statute of\n25 limitations period.\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 4\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 6 of 11 Page ID\n #:136\n\n\n\n 1 20. NUMEROSITY: Plaintiff does not know the number of Class Members\n 2 but believes the number to be in the thousands, if not more. The exact identities of\n 3 Class Members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant.\n 4 21. COMMONALITY: Common questions of fact and law exist as to all\n 5 Class Members, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual\n 6 members of the Class. Such common legal and factual questions, which do not vary\n 7 between Class members, and which may be determined without reference to the\n 8 individual circumstances of any Class Member, include but are not limited to the\n 9 following:\n10 a. Whether Defendant installed the TikTok Software on the\n11 Website;\n12 b. Whether the TikTok Software is a trap and trace process as\n13 defined by law;\n14 c. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to statutory\n15 penalties;\n16 d. Whether Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief;\n17 e. Whether Class Members are entitled to disgorgement of data\n18 obtained unlawfully.\n19 f. Whether Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief.\n20 22. TYPICALITY: As a person who visited Defendant\u2019s Website and\n21 whose personal information was fingerprinted and de-anonymized by TikTok,\n22 Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class.\n23 23. ADEQUACY: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests\n24 of the members of The Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the class\n25 action litigation. All individuals with interests that are actually or potentially adverse\n26 to or in conflict with the class or whose inclusion would otherwise be improper can\n27 be excluded.\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 5\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 7 of 11 Page ID\n #:137\n\n\n\n 1 24. SUPERIORITY: A class action is superior to other available methods\n 2 of adjudication because individual litigation of the claims of all Class Members is\n 3 impracticable and inefficient. Even if every Class Member could afford individual\n 4 litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts\n 5 in which individual litigation of numerous cases would proceed.\n 6 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION\n 7 Violations of California Trap and Trace Law\n 8 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51\n 9 25. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in every\n10 preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.\n11 26. California\u2019s Trap and Trace Law is part of the California Invasion of\n12 Privacy Act (\u201cCIPA\u201d), codified at Cal. Penal Code 630, et. seq.\n13 27. CIPA was enacted due to curb \u201cthe invasion of privacy resulting from\n14 the continual and increasing use of\u201d certain technologies determined to pose \u201ca\n15 serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties.\u201d CIPA extends civil liability\n16 for various means of surveillance using technology, including the installation of a\n17 trap and trace device.\n18 28. California Penal Code \u00a7638.51 (the \u201cCalifornia Trap and Trace Law\u201d)\n19 provides that \u201ca person may not install or use\u2026a trap and trace device without first\n20 obtaining a court order. . . .\u201d \u00a7 638.51(a).\n21 29. A \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d as \u201ca device or process that captures the\n22 incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other\n23 dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify\n24 the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not the contents of a\n25 communication.\u201d California Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c).\n26 30. Defendant uses a trap and trace process on its Website by deploying the\n27 TikTok Software on its Website, because the software is designed to capture the\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 6\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 8 of 11 Page ID\n #:138\n\n\n\n 1 phone number, email, routing, addressing and other signaling information of website\n 2 visitors. As such, the TikTok Software is designed precisely to identify the source\n 3 of the incoming electronic and wire communications to the Website.\n 4 31. Defendant did not obtain consent from Plaintiff or any of the class\n 5 members before using trap and trace technology to identify users of its Website and\n 6 has therefore violated Section 638.51.\n 7 32. CIPA imposes civil liability including statutory damages for violations\n 8 of the California Trap and Trace Law. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 637.2; see also C2 Educ.\n 9 Sys. Inc., 2024 WL 3561367.\n10 PRAYER\n11 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief against Defendant:\n12 1. An order certifying the Class, naming Plaintiff as the representative of\n13 the Class and Plaintiff\u2019s attorneys as Class counsel;\n14 2. An order declaring Defendant\u2019s conduct violates CIPA;\n15 3. An order of judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class against\n16 Defendant on the cause of action asserted herein;\n17 4. An order enjoining Defendant\u2019s conduct as alleged herein,\n18 disgorgement of any unlawfully data still in its possession, and any other\n19 injunctive relief that the Court finds proper;\n20 5. Statutory damages pursuant to CIPA;\n21 6. Prejudgment interest;\n22 7. Reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and costs; and\n23 8. All other relief that would be just and proper as a matter of law or\n24 equity, as determined by the Court.\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 7\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 9 of 11 Page ID\n #:139\n\n\n\n DATED: January 16, 2024 TAULER SMITH LLP\n 1\n\n 2\n By: /s/ Robert Tauler\n 3\n Robert Tauler, Esq.\n 4 Attorney for Plaintiff\n Kieren Kishnani\n 5\n\n 6\n\n 7\n\n 8\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 8\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 10 of 11 Page ID\n #:140\n\n\n\n 1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL\n 2 Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani hereby demands a trial by jury.\n 3\n\n 4 DATED: January 16, 2024 TAULER SMITH LLP\n 5\n\n 6 By: /s/ Robert Tauler\n Robert Tauler, Esq.\n 7\n Attorney for Plaintiff\n 8 Kieren Kishnani\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 9\n\f Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 19 Filed 01/16/25 Page 11 of 11 Page ID\n #:141\n\n\n\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n 1\n I hereby certified that I served the foregoing document on all parties of\n 2\n record by via the Court\u2019s CM/ECF system.\n 3\n\n 4\n DATED: January 16, 2024 TAULER SMITH LLP\n 5\n\n 6\n By: /s/ Robert Tauler\n 7\n Robert Tauler, Esq.\n 8 Attorney for Plaintiff\n 9\n Kieren Kishnani\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 10\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T18:10:38.903716-07:00","document_number":"19","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044050592","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Amended Complaint/Petition","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-01-16T20:31:41.757079-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:20.998213-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-16","time_filed":"20:18:39","entry_number":19,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-16.001","pacer_sequence_number":61,"description":"First AMENDED COMPLAINT against Defendants All Defendants amending Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening) 1, filed by Plaintiff Kieren Kishnani(Tauler, Robert) (Entered: 01/16/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/413320425/","id":413320425,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/426914094/","id":426914094,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2025-01-13T08:32:49.545175-08:00","date_modified":"2025-01-13T08:32:49.549537-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Generic Text Only Entry","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-01-13T08:32:49.520903-08:00","date_modified":"2025-01-13T08:32:49.520915-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-13","time_filed":"08:13:34","entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-13.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/413227836/","id":413227836,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/426803353/","id":426803353,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/17/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2025-01-10T18:32:04.210539-08:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T18:46:09.278680-07:00","sha1":"5b762ffe2af5ea2ed227e74f2c22e9ce09d075c3","page_count":31,"file_size":668134,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.17.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533/gov.uscourts.cacd.947533.17.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 1 of 31 Page ID\n #:42\n\n\n\n 1 BLANK ROME LLP\n 2\n Ana Tagvoryan (SBN 246536)\n ana.tagvoryan@blankrome.com\n 3 Victor Sandoval (SBN 344461)\n 4 Victor.sandoval@blankrome.com\n 2029 Century Park East | 6th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, CA 90067\n 6 Telephone: 424.239.3400\n Facsimile: 424.239.3434\n 7\n Attorneys for Defendant\n 8 BB OpCo, LLC\n 9\n\n10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n12\n\n13 KIEREN KISHNANI, individually and Case No. 2:24\u2212cv\u221209629-ODW_JC\n on behalf of all others similarly situated,\n14 DEFENDANT BB OPCO LLC\u2019S\n Plaintiff,\n NOTICE OF MOTION AND\n15\n v. MOTION TO DISMISS\n16 PLAINTIFF\u2019S COMPLAINT;\n BB OPCO, LLC\n17 d/b/a Brooks Brothers, a Connecticut MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND\n limited liability company, and DOES 1 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT\n18 though 25, inclusive, THEREOF\n19 Defendants.\n Judge: Otis D. Wright II\n20 Date: February 10, 2025\n Time: 9:30 a.m.\n21 Place: Courtroom 9C, 350 W. 1st\n Street, Los Angeles, California\n22 90012\n\n23\n\n24\n Complaint Filed: November 7, 2024\n Complaint Served: November 12, 2024\n25 Trial Date: None set\n26\n\n27\n\n28 2\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 2 of 31 Page ID\n #:43\n\n\n\n 1 TO ALL PARTIES OF RECORD:\n 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 10, 2025 at 9:30 a.m., or as\n 3 soon thereafter as the Motion may be heard in Courtroom 9C of the above entitled\n 4 Court located at the First Street U.S. Courthouse, 350 W. 1st Street, Los\n 5 Angeles, CA 90012, the Honorable Otis D. Wright II presiding, Defendant BB\n 6 OpCo, LLC (\u201cBB OpCo\u201d) will, and hereby does, move the Court for an order\n 7 dismissing this action in its entirety with prejudice and without leave to amend\n 8 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). This Motion is\n 9 made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place on\n10 December 20, 2024.\n11 BB OpCo LLC moves to dismiss Plaintiff KIEREN KISHNANI\u2019S Class Action\n12 Complaint (\u201cComplaint\u201d) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the\n13 grounds that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Specifically, Plaintiff\u2019s\n14 Complaint fails to allege any injury arising from Plaintiff\u2019s alleged website visit.\n15 In addition, BB OpCo moves to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint under\n16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state\n17 a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the Court should dismiss\n18 Plaintiff\u2019s claim because the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a\n19 cause of action against BB OpCo.\n20 This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the\n21 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, BB OpCo\u2019s Request\n22 for Judicial Notice filed concurrently herewith, and the exhibits attached thereto,\n23 and all pleadings and papers in the Court\u2019s file, the record and files herein, and\n24 upon such oral argument as may be made at the hearing on the Motion and such\n25 other evidence as may be admitted at the time of the hearing on the Motion.\n26 ///\n27 ///\n28 /// 3\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 3 of 31 Page ID\n #:44\n\n\n\n 1 DATED: January 10, 2025 BLANK ROME LLP\n 2\n\n 3\n By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n 4 Ana Tagvoryan\n Victor Sandoval\n 5 Attorneys for Defendant\n BB OpCo LLC\n 6\n\n 7\n\n 8\n\n 9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 4\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 4 of 31 Page ID\n #:45\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n Page\n 2\n I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................10\n 3\n\n 4 II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................12\n\n 5 III. STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................13\n\n 6 IV. LEGAL STANDARDS ...........................................................................................................15\n\n 7 V. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE SHE SUFFERED AN INJURY-IN-FACT. .....................15\n 8 VI. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) ...........................18\n 9 A. The Trap & Trace Laws Are Inapplicable Here. .........................................................18\n10\n 1. The Trap and Trace Laws Are Intended to Apply Only to Devices\n11 Attached to Telephone Lines. ..........................................................................18\n\n12 2. CIPA\u2019s Legislative History Demonstrates that Website Tools are Not\n Trap and Trace Devices. ..................................................................................21\n13\n 3. Other California Legislation Governs the Use of Website Analytics\n14 Tools. ...............................................................................................................22\n15 B. Section 637.2\u2019s Private Right of Action Does not Apply to Section 638.51. ..............23\n16\n C. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting Statutory Standing Under Section\n17 637.2.............................................................................................................................25\n\n18 D. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting the Claim that BB OpCo Installed or\n Used a \u201cTrap and Trace Device\u201d Within the Meaning of CIPA..................................27\n19\n E. Plaintiff Fails to Plead BB OpCo Installed the TikTok Pixel in California.................29\n20\n F. BB OpCo Is Exempt As The Website Operator And/Or Because It Was a\n21 Party to the Communication. .......................................................................................30\n22\n VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................31\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 5\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 5 of 31 Page ID\n #:46\n\n\n\n TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n 1\n Page(s)\n 2\n\n 3 Cases\n\n 4 Animal League Defense Fund v. Mendes,\n 160 Cal.App.4th 136 (2008) ..........................................................................................................25\n 5\n Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n 6 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................................................15\n 7 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n 8 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................................................15\n\n 9 Brown v. Google LLC,\n 2021 WL 6064009 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .............................................................................................30\n10\n Byars v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc.,\n11 2023 WL 2996686 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023) ...........................................................................16, 17\n12 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,\n 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ...........................................................................................15\n13\n\n14 Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc.,\n 2024 WL 4873370 (Cal. Sup. Sep. 09, 2024) ....................................................................21, 22, 30\n15\n Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,\n16 598 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................................15\n17 Coburn v. Sievert,\n 133 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (2005) ......................................................................................................23\n18\n Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell,\n19\n 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal 2007).........................................................................................13, 30\n20\n Daghaly v. Bloomingdales.Com, LLC,\n21 2024 WL 5134350 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024) ......................................................................13, 17, 18\n\n22 Dana Hughes v. Vivint, Inc., et al.,\n 2024 WL 5179916 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2024) (tentative ruling adopted dismissing case\n23 2024 WL 5179917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024)) .........................................................................13, 17\n24\n In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation\n25 154 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)..............................................................................................31\n\n26 In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.,\n 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) .........................................................................................................16\n27\n\n28 6\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 6 of 31 Page ID\n #:47\n\n\n\n Glob. Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-New Jersey, Inc.,\n 1 287 F.Supp. 2d 532 (D.N.J. 2003) .................................................................................................25\n 2\n Heeger v. Facebook, Inc.,\n 3 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .........................................................................................13\n\n 4 Heiting v. F21 OPCO, LLC,\n No. 24STCV20340 (Cal. Sup., Nov. 18, 2024 Minute Order) ......................................................28\n 5\n I.C. v. Zynga, Inc.,\n 6 600 F. Supp. 3d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2022) .........................................................................................26\n 7\n Levings v. Open Text Corporation,\n 8 No. 24STCV05440 ..................................................................................................................30, 31\n\n 9 Lightoller v. Jetblue Airways Corp.,\n 2023 WL 3963823 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023)................................................................................17\n10\n Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.,\n11 84 Cal. App. 5th 671 (2022), review denied (Jan. 25, 2023) .........................................................26\n12 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,\n13 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......................................................................................................................15\n\n14 Mayron v. Google LLC,\n 54 Cal.App.5th 566 (2020) ............................................................................................................25\n15\n Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc.,\n16 2024 WL 3561367 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) ................................................................................24\n17 Moore v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.,\n 58 Cal.App.5th 561 (2020) ............................................................................................................23\n18\n\n19 People v. Giordano,\n 42 Cal. 4th 644, 170 P.3d 623 (2007) ............................................................................................28\n20\n Rodriguez v. Fountain9, Inc.,\n21 2024 WL 3886811 (Cal. Sup. July 09, 2024), 2024 WL 4905217 (Cal. Sup. Nov. 21,\n 2024) ..............................................................................................................................................17\n22\n Rules and Policies Regarding Calling No. Identification Serv.-Caller ID\n23\n 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 1764 (1994) .............................................................................................................31\n24\n S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm,\n25 306 S.C. 70 (1991) .........................................................................................................................31\n\n26 Saracco Tank and Welding Co. v. Platz,\n 65 Cal.App.2d 306 (1944) .............................................................................................................31\n27\n\n28 7\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 7 of 31 Page ID\n #:48\n\n\n\n Smith v. Maryland,\n 1 442 U.S. 735 (1979) .......................................................................................................................28\n 2\n Sparshott v. Feld Ent., Inc.,\n 3 311 F.3d 425 (D.C.Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................31\n\n 4 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,\n 51 Cal. 4th 1191 (2011) ...........................................................................................................29, 30\n 5\n Thomas v. Papa Johns Int\u2019l, Inc.,\n 6 2024 WL 2060140 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2024)..................................................................................27\n 7\n TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,\n 8 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ...................................................................................................................16\n\n 9 United States v. Jean,\n 207 F.Supp.3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016)............................................................................................30\n10\n Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,\n11 570 U.S. 338 (2013) .......................................................................................................................25\n12 Vasquez v. Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc.,\n13 27 Cal. App. 5th 84 (2018) ............................................................................................................23\n\n14 Vicko Ins. Services v. Ohio Indem. Co.,\n 70 Cal.App.4th 55 (1999) ..............................................................................................................24\n15\n In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig.,\n16 238 F.Supp. 3d 1204 (C.D.Cal. 2017) ...........................................................................................20\n17 Waits v. Pacifica Villa Royale, LLC\n (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) 2008 WL 3906679.........................................................................24\n18\n\n19 Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Public Service Commission,\n 205 Wis. 2d 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ............................................................................................31\n20\n Statutes\n21\n Cal. Civ. Code\n22 \u00a7 1798.100......................................................................................................................................22\n \u00a7 1798.140(v)(1) ............................................................................................................................22\n23\n \u00a7 1798.150(a) .................................................................................................................................22\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 8\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 8 of 31 Page ID\n #:49\n\n\n\n Cal. Penal Code\n 1 \u00a7 629.51(a) ...............................................................................................................................28, 29\n 2 \u00a7 629.51(a)(1) ................................................................................................................................29\n \u00a7 629.51(a)(2)(C) ...........................................................................................................................29\n 3 \u00a7 629.51(a)(3) ................................................................................................................................29\n \u00a7 629.51(a)(4) ................................................................................................................................29\n 4 \u00a7 631.........................................................................................................................................20, 31\n \u00a7 631(a) ..........................................................................................................................................31\n 5\n \u00a7 632.........................................................................................................................................20, 31\n 6 \u00a7 632.5............................................................................................................................................25\n \u00a7 632.5(a) .......................................................................................................................................25\n 7 \u00a7 633.........................................................................................................................................20, 31\n \u00a7 633.02....................................................................................................................................20, 31\n 8 \u00a7 637.2.................................................................................................................................... passim\n \u00a7 638.50(a) .....................................................................................................................................29\n 9\n \u00a7 638.50(c) .........................................................................................................................10, 19, 28\n10 \u00a7 638.51.................................................................................................................................. passim\n \u00a7 638.51(a) .....................................................................................................................................10\n11 \u00a7 638.51(b) .....................................................................................................................................30\n \u00a7 638.51(b)(1) ................................................................................................................................30\n12 \u00a7 638.51(b)(5) ..........................................................................................................................30, 31\n \u00a7 638.52(c) ...............................................................................................................................19, 28\n13\n \u00a7 638.52(d)(1) ................................................................................................................................19\n14 \u00a7 638.52(d)(3) ..........................................................................................................................19, 20\n \u00a7 638.55..........................................................................................................................................24\n15\n Other Authorities\n16\n Fed. R. Civ. P.\n17 \u00a7 12(b)(1) .................................................................................................................................15, 18\n18 \u00a7 12(b)(6) .................................................................................................................................15, 18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 9\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 9 of 31 Page ID\n #:50\n\n\n\n 1 I. INTRODUCTION\n\n 2 At its core, this case is an ill-founded attempt to apply a telephone surveillance\n 3 statute in a manner that its text does not support and it was never intended: to\n 4 criminalize commonly used website functionality and analytics tools. Kieren Kishnani\n 5 (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) sues BB OpCo, LLC (\u201cBB OpCo\u201d or \u201cDefendant\u201d), claiming that one\n 6 such website tool\u2014the TikTok pixel\u2014is actually a \u201ctrap and trace\u201d device under\n 7 Penal Code \u00a7 638.51 (\u201cSection 638.51\u201d). Plaintiff\u2019s attempt to apply Section 638.51 to\n 8 commonplace website technology and information that is communicated every day on\n 9 every website should be rejected.\n10 Sections 638.50 to 638.55 (the \u201cTrap & Trace Laws\u201d) were enacted to prohibit\n11 law enforcement surveillance of calling and routing information (phone numbers)\n12 between an individual and a third-party without a court order. See Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7\n13 638.51(a). The legislative history makes clear that the express purpose of the Trap &\n14 Trace Laws is \u201cto authorize state and local law enforcement to seek emergency orders\n15 for pen registers/trap and trace devices used in telephone surveillance, while\n16 requiring as a precondition a standard of evidence higher than under federal law.\u201d RJN\n17 Ex. A, p.4. Website functionality software simply does not fit within the purview of\n18 the statute. Even if it did, Plaintiff fails to identify the various elements necessary for a\n19 Section 638.51 claim to survive\n20 The statute requires three independent allegations of (1) \u201celectronic or other\n21 impulses\u201d that identify, (2) the \u201csignaling information,\u201d and (3) are reasonably likely\n22 to identify the source of the electronic communication. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c).\n23 Plaintiff\u2019s theory that the TikTok pixel captures electronic impulses to identify the\n24 \u201coriginating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\n25 reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not\n26 the contents of a communication,\u201d is plainly deficient. The information Plaintiff\n27 alleges was collected, \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic information,\n28 10\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 10 of 31 Page ID\n #:51\n\n\n\n 1 referral tracking, and url tracking\u201d do not qualify as either electronic impulses or\n 2 signaling information. And, to the extent Plaintiff claims these pieces of information\n 3 help identify the website user, personally identifying information is not the type of\n 4 source information contemplated by the statute.\n 5 Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint entirely ignores that website analytics tools\n 6 cannot qualify as trap and trace devices or processes because the Trap & Trace Laws\n 7 apply only to devices attached to telephone lines\u2014not internet software. Not only do\n 8 the law\u2019s text and legislative history make clear that only devices connected to\n 9 telephone lines may qualify as a trap and trace device, the California legislature has\n10 already implemented separate legislation, the California Consumer Privacy Act,\n11 governing the collection of \u201cpersonal information\u201d by website analytics software.\n12 Imposing conflicting and inconsistent obligations across these statutes is antithetical\n13 to California\u2019s strong preference to interpret statutes consistently.\n14 Even if a trap and trace device could apply to internet software (it does not),\n15 and even if the TikTok software satisfied its elements (it does not), BB OpCo would\n16 nevertheless be exempt from liability either as the provider of an electronic\n17 communication service, or as a party to the communication itself. As BB OpCo\n18 provides the Website\u2014and allows users to communicate with it\u2014it is the provider of\n19 an electronic communication, which is expressly permitted to use a trap and trace\n20 device. Otherwise, the statute does not and cannot apply to Defendant as a participant\n21 to the communication (i.e., the party that picks up and responds to the electronic\n22 impulses/signals on the other end). In either case, BB OpCo is the wrong party here as\n23 there is no law that states that a website visitor must remain anonymous to a website\n24 operator. The Trap and Trace Laws are no exception.\n25 Finally, notwithstanding all of the above defects, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint fails for\n26 a threshold reason. She does not and cannot allege facts required to allege a concrete\n27 injury and establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.\n28 11\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 11 of 31 Page ID\n #:52\n\n\n\n 1 Plaintiff does not and cannot, assert an expectation of privacy recognized at common\n 2 law, or any other cognizable harm. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint should be dismissed with\n 3 prejudice.\n 4 II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT\n 5 In this case, Plaintiff alleges that BB OpCo purportedly used \u201cTikTok\n 6 Software\u201d on its website, www.brooksbrothers.com (the \u201cWebsite\u201d), and claims in\n 7 wholly conclusory fashion that the software gathers \u201cdevice and browser information,\n 8 geographic information, referral tracking, and url tracking\u2026to send user details to\n 9 TikTok.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 11.) Plaintiff readily admits that the so called TikTok software\n10 operates on the Website\u2014and is not a device attached to a telephone line\u2014thus\n11 falling outside the purview of the Trap & Trace Laws as a matter of law. The\n12 collection of personal information by website analytics tools is governed by other\n13 California statutes, including the Consumer Privacy Act; not the criminal prohibitions\n14 on trap and trace devices.\n15 Even if Plaintiff could get past this threshold defect, there is not a single\n16 specific detail alleged in the Complaint about Plaintiff\u2019s own interactions with the\n17 Website or the TikTok software, and it is unclear as to what, if any, \u201cuser details\u201d\n18 were supposedly collected from Plaintiff herself. Moreover, the general data points\n19 (device, location, and referral information) identified by Plaintiff as part of her vague\n20 narrative of \u201cfingerprinting\u201d do not fall within the purview of the statute. (Compl. \u00b6\n21 10.) And, equally problematic, to the extent Plaintiff claims that the TikTok software\n22 collects geographic information and the contents of Plaintiff\u2019s communications with\n23 the Website, such information falls outside of Section 638.1 on its face.\n24 At bottom, the Penal Code\u2019s prohibition on trap and trace devices does not\n25 apply to standard website-specific advertising or tracking tools used by the website\n26 operator itself. Instead, the statutory language and legislative history make clear that a\n27 \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d is intended to apply to surveillance devices used to track\n28 12\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 12 of 31 Page ID\n #:53\n\n\n\n 1 calling and routing information (phone numbers) between the complainant and others.\n 2 A software tool that collects record information, such as location, referrer\n 3 information,1 and device types used for website-specific interactions does not fall\n 4 within the purview of the statute. This is further supported by the fact that the statute\n 5 specifically exempts communication service providers like BB OpCo, which\n 6 undisputedly is the website operator.\n 7 Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint is also deficient because there is no \u201cinjury\u201d as required to\n 8 establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Courts in this\n 9 district and the Ninth Circuit have dismissed effectively identical complains for lack\n10 of Article III standing. See Dana Hughes v. Vivint, Inc., et al., 2024 WL 5179916\n11 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2024) (tentative ruling adopted dismissing case 2024 WL 5179917\n12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024)); Daghaly v. Bloomingdales.Com, LLC, 2024 WL 5134350,\n13 at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024).\n14 III. STATEMENT OF FACTS\n15 BB OpCo operates the Website, an \u201conline platform that sells clothes for men,\n16 women, and children.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 5, 8.) Plaintiff is a California resident who\n17 allegedly \u201cvisited Defendant\u2019s website within the statute of limitations period,\u201d but\n18 otherwise provides zero detail as to the date, nature or length of her visit to the\n19 Website, whether she made a purchase on the Website, or whether she held an account\n20 with BB OpCo. (See id. \u00b6\u00b6 4, 9.)\n21\n\n22 1\n Plaintiff omits any reference to collection of her \u201cIP address\u201d in her complaint, presumably because\n23 multiple courts have conclusively rejected the theory that collection of an IP address could implicate\n CIPA\u2019s trap and trace provisions. It does not. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 2007 WL\n24 2080419, at *11 (C.D. Cal 2007). Instead, Plaintiff attempts to muddy the waters by referencing\n vague data points such as \u201cdevice and browser information, geographic information, referral\n25 tracking, and url tracking.\u201d (See Compl. \u00b6 11.) Much like an IP address, this is precisely the same\n26 type of general data points required to facilitate website interactions in which a website user simply\n maintains no privacy interest. See Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1189 (N.D. Cal.\n27 2020) (\u201cIP addresses \u2018are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party\u2019s servers,\u2019 ... so no\n reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to them.\u201d).\n28 13\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 13 of 31 Page ID\n #:54\n\n\n\n 1 As to BB OpCo\u2019s purported conduct, Plaintiff alleges in wholly conclusory\n 2 fashion that BB OpCo \u201cinstalled on its Website software created by TikTok in order to\n 3 identify website visitors.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 9.) Plaintiff concludes that the TikTok software \u201cacts\n 4 via a process known as \u2018fingerprinting\u2019\u201d and \u201cgathers device and browser information,\n 5 geographic information, referral tracking, and url tracking by running code or\n 6 \u201cscripts\u201d on the Website to send user details to TikTok.\u201d (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 10-11.) Plaintiff\n 7 claims that the Website \u201cinstantly sends communications to TikTok when a user\n 8 lands, and every time a user clicks on page.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 12.) But the Complaint does not\n 9 identify what \u201ccommunications\u201d, if any, are actually sent to TikTok or how. Tellingly,\n10 Plaintiff does not allege that any of her own information was captured by the TikTok\n11 pixel, or that it otherwise identified her. In sum, the Complaint\u2019s allegations are\n12 hopelessly generic as to how the TikTok software purportedly functions.\n13 Paragraph 12 of the Complaint is even vaguer, and purports to display\n14 unreadable and patently indecipherable screenshots of \u201celectronic impulses\u201d sent to\n15 TikTok. (See id. \u00b6 12). The screenshot shows no such thing. The Complaint never\n16 identifies what specifically the \u201celectronic impulses\u201d are, or how or if they are sent to\n17 TikTok. Importantly, the screenshot does not purport to depict Plaintiff\u2019s own\n18 interactions with the Website.\n19 Based solely on the above conclusory allegations, Plaintiff concludes that the\n20 TikTok software qualifies as a \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d under Section 638.51, by doing\n21 nothing more than parroting the statutory language. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 14-15.) There is also not a\n22 single allegation in the Complaint claiming that Plaintiff suffered any injury from BB\n23 OpCo\u2019s purported conduct, notwithstanding that an injury is required under Article III\n24 of the United States Constitution and Section 637.2 of CIPA. Nevertheless, Plaintiff\u2019s\n25 Complaint improperly requests \u201cstatutory damages pursuant to CIPA,\u201d Section 637.2\n26 attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, and injunctive relief. What that injunction would look like,\n27 however, is a mystery.\n28 14\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 14 of 31 Page ID\n #:55\n\n\n\n 1 IV. LEGAL STANDARDS\n 2 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal\n 3 of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto.\n 4 Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff bears the burden of\n 5 establishing standing under Article III of the Constitution, which requires an \u201cinjury in\n 6 fact\u201d that is both \u201cconcrete and particularized\u201d as well as \u201cactual or imminent, not\n 7 conjectural or hypothetical.\u201d Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)\n 8 (internal citation omitted). The injury must be \u201cfairly traceable to the challenged\n 9 action of the defendant,\u201d and it must be likely \u201cthat the injury will be redressed by a\n10 favorable decision.\u201d Id. at 560-61.\n11 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to\n12 dismiss for failure to state a claim is proper where a plaintiff fails to allege sufficient\n13 facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule\n14 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must set forth factual allegations sufficient \u201cto raise a\n15 right to relief above the speculative level.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,\n16 555 (2007). \u201c[A] plaintiff\u2019s obligation to provide the \u2018grounds\u2019 of his \u2018entitle[ment] to\n17 relief\u2019 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the\n18 elements of a cause of action will not do.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). \u201cThreadbare recitals\n19 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not\n20 suffice.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a court is not required to\n21 \u201caccept \u2018conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations if those\n22 conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.\u2019\u201d Cairns v. Franklin\n23 Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 1998).\n24 V. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE SHE SUFFERED AN INJURY-IN-\n25 FACT.\n26 Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). To have Article\n27 III standing, Plaintiff is required to show that Plaintiff has suffered an injury that is\n28 15\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 15 of 31 Page ID\n #:56\n\n\n\n 1 \u201c(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or\n 2 hypothetical.\u201d TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2199 (2021). A statute\n 3 that gives the plaintiff a right to sue for violation of the legislation does not\n 4 automatically establish standing. Id. \u201cArticle III standing requires a concrete injury\n 5 even in the context of a statutory violation.\u201d Id. The Supreme Court \u201chas rejected the\n 6 proposition that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement\n 7 whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that\n 8 person to sue to vindicate that right.\u201d Id. The legislature cannot \u201csimply enact an\n 9 injury into existence[.]\u201d Id.\n10 Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing an injury in fact. Notably, Plaintiff\n11 does not plead any facts regarding what information of Plaintiff allegedly was\n12 collected by TikTok on the Website. Plaintiff does not contend that Plaintiff entered\n13 her email address or phone number into any fields on the Website or that the TikTok\n14 pixel captured that personal information, nor does Plaintiff allege that Plaintiff was\n15 referred to the Website from another URL, such that the TikTok pixel would have\n16 captured \u201creferral tracking\u201d or \u201curl tracking\u201d information.2 All Plaintiff pleads is an\n17 abstract and hypothetical injury, which wholly fails to establish standing. TransUnion,\n18 141 S. Ct. at 2199.3\n19\n\n20\n 2\n Plaintiff may argue that Section 638.51 \u201ccodif[ies] a substantive right to privacy, the violation of\n21 which gives rise to a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.\u201d In re Facebook, Inc. Internet\n22 Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). But Plaintiff\u2019s pleading fails to\n identify any harm to a protected privacy interest and thus cannot establish standing. See, e.g., Byars\n23 v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 2023 WL 2996686, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023) (dismissing complaint\n for lack of standing where plaintiff failed to identify any specific personal information disclosed that\n24 implicates a protectible privacy interest).\n 3\n Having otherwise anonymous browsing data be linked to Plaintiff\u2019s identity through\n25 \u201cfingerprinting\u201d is still not enough to find concrete injury. For example, Plaintiff does not even\n26 allege that Plaintiff has a TikTok account that would allow TikTok\u2019s purported collection of\n Plaintiff\u2019s anonymous information from visiting the Website to be associated with Plaintiff. If\n27 Plaintiff does not have a TikTok account, Plaintiff\u2019s identity cannot be connected to Plaintiff\u2019s\n browsing activity.\n28 16\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 16 of 31 Page ID\n #:57\n\n\n\n 1 Indeed, a Court in this district recently dismissed a claim\u2014nearly identical to\n 2 Plaintiff\u2019s\u2014asserting that a defendant violated Section 638.51 by installing the\n 3 TikTok pixel on its website, holding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate an injury-\n 4 in-fact and thus failed to establish standing. Vivint, Inc., 2024 WL 5179916.4 The\n 5 Court found that Plaintiff could not establish standing where, as here, the complaint\n 6 was \u201cvague as to many, if not all, of the details surrounding [plaintiff\u2019s] use of the\n 7 Website and what specific information was captured by the TikTok Software.\u201d See id.\n 8 Here too, Plaintiff has omitted any specific information that BB OpCo or TikTok\n 9 allegedly collected from Plaintiff.\n10 Even more recently, the Ninth Circuit has confirmed that a plaintiff who\n11 complains of third-party website analytics software but alleges only that she visited a\n12 website, does not allege an injury and thus lacks standing. Bloomingdales.Com, LLC,\n13 2024 WL 5134350, at *1. There, the plaintiff made only \u201cgeneral allegations\u201d about\n14 \u201cthe types of information Bloomingdales.com collects and the mechanisms of\n15 collection\u201d but the plaintiff\u2019s \u201callegations about her own interactions with the\n16 Bloomingdales.com website [we]re sparse. She allege[d] only that she \u2018visited\u2019 and\n17 \u2018accessed\u2019 the website\u2026 She d[id] not assert, for example, that she made a purchase,\n18 entered text, or took any actions other than simply opening the webpage and then\n19 closing it.\u201d Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that she had not alleged an injury\n20 sufficient to have standing. Id. at *1-2. The allegations here are indistinguishable. All\n21 that Plaintiff alleges about her own interactions with the Website is that she visited\n22 it\u2014nothing more. The remainder of the \u201cgeneral allegations\u201d about \u201cthe types of\n23\n\n24 4\n See also Lightoller v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 2023 WL 3963823, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023)\n (dismissing for lack of standing because the plaintiff failed to allege she disclosed any personal\n25 information); Byars v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 2023 WL 2996686, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023)\n26 (plaintiff lacked standing where she failed to allege that she disclosed any sensitive information);\n Rodriguez v. Fountain9, Inc., 2024 WL 3886811, at *4 (Cal. Sup. July 09, 2024) (no standing under\n27 638.51 for similar complaint), 2024 WL 4905217, at *4 (Cal. Sup. Nov. 21, 2024) (finding same\n without leave to amend).\n28 17\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 17 of 31 Page ID\n #:58\n\n\n\n 1 information [that the TikTok pixel can] collect[] and the mechanisms of collection\u201d do\n 2 not suffice. Id. at *1-2.\n 3 As a result, the Court should dismiss this case under Rule 12(b)(1) because\n 4 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish an injury as required under\n 5 Article III of the United States Constitution.\n 6 VI. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)\n 7 Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint should also be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). As an\n 8 initial matter, the text, legislative history, and legislative context of the Trap & Trace\n 9 Laws make clear that they do not apply to the website analytics tools at issue here.\n10 Even if they did, Plaintiff is incorrect that Section 637.2 provides a private right of\n11 action to sue for violations of Section 638.51. And, even if Plaintiff were correct,\n12 Plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim insofar as Plaintiff fails to allege facts\n13 supporting the allegation that BB OpCo installed a \u201ctrap and trace device or process\u201d\n14 within the meaning of the statute, the requisite scienter, and that BB OpCo installed\n15 the TikTok pixel in California. Finally, even if Plaintiff had made these essential\n16 allegations, BB OpCo is nevertheless exempt from the Trap and Trace Laws as a\n17 provider of electronic or wire communication service and because BB OpCo is a party\n18 participant who consented to the TikTok pixel.\n19 A. The Trap & Trace Laws Are Inapplicable Here.\n20 1. The Trap and Trace Laws Are Intended to Apply Only to\n21 Devices Attached to Telephone Lines.\n22 Plaintiff\u2019s novel theory fails because the plain language and legislative history\n23 of the Trap & Trace Laws make clear that a trap and trace device or process must be\n24 attached to a telephone line. A \u201ctrap and trace device\u201d is defined as a \u201cdevice or\n25 process that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the\n26 originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\n27 reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not\n28 18\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 18 of 31 Page ID\n #:59\n\n\n\n 1 the contents of a communication.\u201d Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c). Section 638.51\n 2 provides that \u201ca person may not install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device\n 3 without first obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.52 or 638.53.\u201d Id. \u00a7\n 4 638.51 (emphasis added). Considering the statute in context, Sections 638.52 and\n 5 638.53 confirm unequivocally that the TikTok software, and other web-based software\n 6 like it, simply are not covered as a trap and trace device or process.\n 7 Section 638.52\u2014invoked directly in Section 638.51\u2014makes clear that the\n 8 legislature intended only processes and devices attached to telephone lines to qualify\n 9 under its trap and trace provisions. For example, Section 638.53 requires that the court\n10 order authorizing a trap and trace device shall specify a specific telephone line:\n11 (1) The identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose\n12 name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and\n13 trace device is to be attached. . . .\n14 (3) The number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line\n15 to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in\n16 the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and\n17 trace order.\n18 Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.52(d)(1), (3) (emphases added). Section 638.52(c) likewise\n19 limits disclosure of information acquired in the context of a telephone line: \u201cthe\n20 authority for a pen register or a trap and trace device shall not include any information\n21 that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber, except to the extent that the\n22 location may be determined from the telephone number.\u201d Id. \u00a7 638.52(c) (emphasis\n23 added). The repeated references to telephone lines and telephones in the implementing\n24 provisions of the Trap & Trace Laws make explicit the statute\u2019s plain intent to\n25 encompass telephone communications only. If the legislature intended trap and trace\n26 devices to apply to website software, it would not have continued to mandate a court\n27\n\n28 19\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 19 of 31 Page ID\n #:60\n\n\n\n 1 order authorizing its use to require the \u201cnumber\u201d and \u201cphysical location of a telephone\n 2 line.\u201d See id. \u00a7 638.52(d)(3).\n 3 Application of U.S. of Am. For an Ord. Authorizing Use of a Cellular Tel.\n 4 Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 199\u2013200 (C.D. Cal. 1995) is instructive. There,\n 5 the court interpreted a similar definition of \u201ctrap and trace\u201d device, which was then in\n 6 effect under the federal Pen Register Act. The court held unequivocally that \u201conly\n 7 devices that are attached to a telephone line\u201d were covered by the statute. Id. The\n 8 court looked to related sections of the Pen Register Act\u2014the analogous Federal law\u2014\n 9 and found they evidenced clear legislative intent that a telephone line was\n10 unequivocally required to qualify as a trap and trace device in the first instance. Id.\n11 The same reading is compelled here.\n12 Tellingly, while the federal Pen Register Act was later amended in 2001 to\n13 apply to a wider range of technology by expressly expanding the definition of a trap\n14 and trace device to permit the use of technology on a \u201ctelephone line or other\n15 facility,\u201d to which it could be \u201cattached or applied,\u201d there has been no corresponding\n16 amendment to the Trap & Trace Laws.5 The logical conclusion is that unlike its\n17 federal counterpart, the California legislature intended a narrower application in its\n18 authorization of trap and trace devices in the context of telephone lines. As a result,\n19 the TikTok pixel simply has no application here.\n20 ///\n21\n 5\n22 The Trap & Trace Laws were enacted in 2015\u2014at a time when the internet and website tracking\n software were both known and omnipresent\u2014thus, there is no need for the Court to evaluate whether\n23 they were intended to evolve and apply to future (unimaginable) technologies. See, e.g., In re Vizio,\n Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F.Supp. 3d 1204, 1227 (C.D.Cal. 2017) (discussing decisions\n24 interpreting California\u2019s wiretap laws from the 1960s to potentially apply to modern forms of\n communications such as the internet and session replay software). The Legislature was aware of the\n25 internet and, if it wanted internet software to fall within the purview of Trap & Trace Laws it would\n26 have explicitly said so. Similarly, the legislature has regularly amended other sections of the Penal\n Code and has declined to amend Trap & Trace Laws to bring internet technologies into its purview.\n27 See Pen. Code \u00a7\u00a7 631 (amended 2022, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), 632 (amended 2016), 633 (amended 2018),\n 633.02 (added 2015), and 633.05 (added 2011).\n28 20\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 20 of 31 Page ID\n #:61\n\n\n\n 1 2. CIPA\u2019s Legislative History Demonstrates that Website Tools\n 2 are Not Trap and Trace Devices.\n 3 Even if the Court found the Trap & Trace Laws ambiguous, their legislative\n 4 history also compels a finding that the TikTok software is not a trap and trace device,\n 5 because as explained above, the statute applies only to telephonic communications.\n 6 Indeed, the legislative history of sections 638.50-638.53 shows that the statute was\n 7 intended to authorize state and local law enforcement to use trap and trace devices for\n 8 telephone surveillance. The California legislature enacted Sections 638.50-638.53 to\n 9 resolve a conflict with state and federal law. The federal pen register act only\n10 authorized state law enforcement to obtain an emergency pen register order if\n11 authorized by a state statute, but none existed in California. See RJN at Ex. B, p. 10.\n12 the Trap & Trace Laws were enacted to remedy this conflict and \u201cexplicitly authorize\n13 state and local law enforcement officers to use pen register and trap and trace devices,\n14 including during emergency situations.\u201d RJN at Ex. A, p. 6. As one Court recently put\n15 it when dismissing a claim brought under the Trap & Trace Laws, \u201c[t]he legislative\n16 purpose of the [Trap & Trace Laws] was to authorize law enforcement to seek orders\n17 for telephone surveillance. [The law] does not address the privacy rights of Internet\n18 users.\u201d Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc., 2024 WL 4873370, at *2 (Cal. Sup. Sep.\n19 09, 2024).\n20 Significantly, the legislative history repeatedly refers to pen registers and trap\n21 and trace devices as tools for collecting telephone numbers, not for an operator\u2019s\n22 collection of data from website visitors. Tellingly, the legislative history expressly and\n23 repeatedly contemplates telephone surveillance, and makes no mention of website\n24 analytics tools. See RJN at Ex. A, p. 1 (explaining that the enactment of CIPA\u2019s trap\n25 and trace provisions \u201c[a]uthorizes state and local law enforcement agencies to seek an\n26 emergency order to use pen registers and trap and trace devices in telephone\n27 surveillance\u201d (emphasis added)); RJN at Ex. B, p. 10 (\u201c[A]nother tool law\n28 21\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 21 of 31 Page ID\n #:62\n\n\n\n 1 enforcement uses is called a \u2018trap and trace device\u2019 which allows them to record\n 2 what numbers have called a specific telephone line, i.e. all incoming phone\n 3 numbers.\u201d) (emphasis added).6 This context supports a narrow interpretation of the\n 4 statute, limiting it to telephonic communications only.\n 5 3. Other California Legislation Governs the Use of Website\n 6 Analytics Tools.\n 7 Not only is the application of the Trap & Trace Laws to website analytics tools\n 8 entirely omitted from the statute, and contradicted by the legislative history, it is also\n 9 at odds with California Consumer Privacy Act (\u201cCCPA\u201d), a separate statute that\n10 directly governs the sharing of \u201cpersonal information\u201d by businesses, including\n11 through online analytics tools. See Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.100 et seq. The CCPA,\n12 initially enacted three years after the enactment of Section 638.51, governs personal\n13 information that \u201cidentifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being\n14 associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly with a particular\n15 consumer.\u201d Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1798.140(v)(1). It provides a private right of action only\n16 for those \u201cconsumer[s] whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information ...\n17 is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of\n18 the business's violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security\n19 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information.\u201d Cal. Civ. Code\n20 \u00a7 1798.150(a). If Plaintiff\u2019s novel theory were to be accepted, it would impose a\n21 conflicting obligation on website operators, insofar as the two laws would impose\n22 differing requirements for when the disclosure of information that identifies an\n23 individual is actionable.\n24\n 6\n See also RJN at Ex. B, p. 10 (\u201cPen registers and track [sic] and trace devices track incoming and\n25 outgoing telephone calls.\u201d) (emphasis added)); id., p. 11 (\u201cany location information obtained by a\n26 pen register or a track [sic] and trace device is limited to the information that is contained in the\n telephone number\u201d (emphasis added); RJN at Ex. A, p. 5 (\u201cAs noted above, pen registers/trap and\n27 trace devices are used by law enforcement for telephone surveillance to record incoming and\n outgoing phone numbers from a tapped line.\u201d (emphasis added)).\n28 22\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 22 of 31 Page ID\n #:63\n\n\n\n 1 California courts instruct that when interpreting two statutes that would impose\n 2 conflicting obligations, \u201c[a] court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize [the]\n 3 statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force\n 4 and effect to all of their provisions.\u201d Moore v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 58\n 5 Cal.App.5th 561, 574 (2020). The inconsistencies in applying the Trap & Trace Laws\n 6 to website analytics tools\u2014which would require a court order for their use\u2014and the\n 7 CCPA, which contains no such requirement, is easily reconciled. The plain language,\n 8 supported by its legislative history, demonstrates that the Trap & Trace Laws apply to\n 9 telephone surveillance only. See, e.g., Hickory Farms, 2024 WL 1698147, at *3\n10 (Cal.Sup. Mar. 13, 2024) (granting dismissal of Section 638.51 claim where complaint\n11 did not allege use of \u201ca mobile phone or other potential form of communication device\n12 potentially qualifying as a cellular device\u201d that would fit within the purview of the\n13 statute).\n14 B. Section 637.2\u2019s Private Right of Action Does not Apply to Section\n15 638.51.\n16 Not only are the Trap and Trace Laws inapplicable to the conduct at issue, but\n17 Plaintiff is incorrect that Section 637.2 provides a private right of action to sue for\n18 violations of Section 638.51. \u201cThe Legislature\u2019s intention to create a private cause of\n19 action must be expressly stated or strongly implied in the statutory language or\n20 legislative history.\u201d Vasquez v. Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 5th 84, 91 (2018).\n21 Even where statutory language appears clear, the court must assess whether the statute\n22 contains a latent ambiguity, or \u201csome extrinsic evidence creates a necessity for\n23 interpretation for a choice among two or more possible meanings.\u201d Coburn v. Sievert,\n24 133 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495 (2005). \u201cSuch a necessity is also present\u201d where, as\n25 here, \u201ca literal construction would produce absurd consequences.\u201d Id.\n26 In 1967, the California Legislature enacted Chapter 1509, which added to the\n27 Penal Code, sections 630 through 637.2 (the \u201cCalifornia Invasion of Privacy Act\u201d or\n28 23\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 23 of 31 Page ID\n #:64\n\n\n\n 1 \u201cCIPA\u201d). See RJN, Ex. C. In 2015 and 2016, forty-eight years after passage of CIPA,\n 2 the Trap & Trace Laws were added to the Penal Code to provide law enforcement a\n 3 path to use surveillance devices. RJN, Exs. D, E.7 The Trap & Trace Laws do not\n 4 include language supporting incorporation or applicability of Section 637.2 into the\n 5 Trap & Trace Laws. As such, the plain language does not support Plaintiff\u2019s position.8\n 6 Additionally, Plaintiff\u2019s proposed interpretation would create a conflict with the\n 7 remedies expressly provided. Specifically, Section 638.55 provides remedies for\n 8 violations of the Trap & Trace Laws but does not reference a private right of action\n 9 for statutory damages. Pen. Code \u00a7 638.55. Instead, Section 638.55 confirms that only\n10 the Attorney General is permitted to commence a civil action. This evidences an\n11 intentional decision to treat the Trap & Trace Laws as separate and apart from the\n12 statutory framework for Sections 630 to 637. Vicko Ins. Services v. Ohio Indem. Co.,\n13 70 Cal.App.4th 55, 66 (1999) (finding existing remedies \u201ctogether with the absence of\n14 any reference to a private right of action\u201d to be \u201cstrong evidence the Legislature did\n15 not intend to create such a private right to sue for damages\u201d).9 Moreover, the fact that\n16 the Legislature chose to nest the relevant provision outside of Sections 630 to 637,\n17 further evidences an intent that the Trap & Trace Laws be construed separately from\n18 Sections 630 to 637, such that Section 637.2\u2019s civil damages provision should not\n19\n\n20 7\n In enacting Trap & Trace Laws, the Legislature stated only that they were added \u201cto the Penal\n Code\u201d and unlike past CIPA enactments, did not include a reference to 637.2, the California\n21 Invasion of Privacy Act or any particular legislative Part, Title, or Chapter. Id.\n 8\n22 Plaintiff\u2019s complaint cites Moody v. C2 Educ. Sys. Inc., 2024 WL 3561367, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July\n 25, 2024) which incorrectly found that \u201c637.2 expressly states that all CIPA violations, including \u00a7\n23 638.51, confer a private right of action.\u201d It does not. In fact, 637.2 only provides a private right of\n action for violations of \u201cthis chapter.\u201d \u201cThis chapter\u201d is ambiguous and could be referring to Chapter\n24 1509 which added Sections 630 to 637.2 to the Penal Code or could be referring to only those\n sections enacted with 637.2. Moreover, in enacting the Trap & Trace Laws, the Legislature did not\n25 state that the provisions should be part of the same legislative chapter as Section 637.2. Indeed, the\n26 structural choice to nest it outside indicates otherwise. Moody did not address these contentions.\n 9\n See also Waits v. Pacifica Villa Royale, LLC (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) 2008 WL 3906679, at\n27 *10 (noting that \u201c[b]ecause the Legislature provided for these specific remedies, and did not include\n a private damages remedy, we necessarily presume that this remedy is not available\u201d).\n28 24\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 24 of 31 Page ID\n #:65\n\n\n\n 1 apply to the Trap & Trace Laws. See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.\n 2 338, 353 (2013) (finding that a provision added to a particular statutory section, did\n 3 not apply to a subsequent statutory section because in the same way that a legislature\u2019s\n 4 \u201cchoice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices.\u201d).10\n 5 Indeed, on other occasions, the California Legislature nested new provisions within\n 6 sections 630 to 637. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 632.5 (enacted in 1985). In fact, when\n 7 the Legislature enacted Section 632.5, it made express reference to the civil penalties\n 8 available under Section 632.7. Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 632.5(a). That the Legislature placed\n 9 the Trap & Trace Laws outside of the existing framework (without any such cross-\n10 reference) must be interpreted as an intentional structural decision.\n11 Similarly, the legislative history confirms that the private right of action should\n12 not be extended to the Trap & Trace Laws. \u201c[L]egislative history can reveal the\n13 Legislature\u2019s intent to create a private right of action . . . though it must be \u2018clear\u2019 that\n14 was the intent.\u201d Mayron v. Google LLC, 54 Cal.App.5th 566, 573 (2020). Nothing in\n15 the legislative history of the Trap & Trace Laws evidences an intent to invoke Section\n16 637.2\u2019s civil liability provision\u2014let alone a clear intent. Where \u201cLegislation\n17 expresse[s] no intent on the matter either way, directly or impliedly, there is no private\n18 right of action.\u201d Animal League Defense Fund v. Mendes, 160 Cal.App.4th 136, 142\n19 (2008).\n20 C. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting Statutory Standing Under\n21 Section 637.2.\n22 Even if Section 637.2 did provide a private right of action to sue for violations\n23 of Section 638.51 (it does not), the Complaint would still fail because Plaintiff lacks\n24 statutory standing to sue under Section 637.2.\n25\n 10\n26 Faced with similar questions, courts generally refuse to apply old private rights of action to new\n provisions enacted thereafter for other purposes. See, e.g., Glob. Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-New Jersey,\n27 Inc., 287 F.Supp. 2d 532, 545 (D.N.J. 2003) (refusing to apply private right of action in statute\n enacted long before substantive statute allegedly violated).\n28 25\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 25 of 31 Page ID\n #:66\n\n\n\n 1 Section 637.2 provides a private right of action only for a person \u201cwho has been\n 2 injured by\u201d a violation of one of its provisions. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 637.2. The\n 3 Complaint does not even try to assert that Plaintiff was harmed by BB OpCo\u2019s use of\n 4 the TikTok software, and thus, Plaintiff effectively concedes that she suffered no\n 5 injury. There are no facts that could even possibly imply an injury because Plaintiff\u2019s\n 6 Complaint fails to allege what, if any, of her own information may have been\n 7 collected by the TikTok software or how it could constitute an invasion of privacy.\n 8 Plaintiff\u2019s abject failure to plead any such facts leaves both BB OpCo and this Court\n 9 guessing as to the basis of the claim for damages. This is plainly deficient.\n10 As the court made clear in Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc., 84 Cal. App. 5th 671\n11 (2022), review denied (Jan. 25, 2023), the purported availability of statutory damages\n12 does not negate the requirement to establish an actual injury to recover under a\n13 statutory violation, particularly where, as here, an injury requirement is expressly\n14 written into the statute. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 637.2. There, the court reiterated that\n15 statutory damages, as opposed to statutory penalties, \u201cwere intended to compensate a\n16 plaintiff for injury\u201d and designed to provide redress where damages are \u201cdifficult or\n17 impossible to quantify or prove.\u201d Id. at 703. But a mere statutory violation is not itself\n18 sufficient. Id. at 706 (no standing where no \u201cconcrete or particularized injury to\n19 privacy interests\u201d).\n20 Here, Plaintiff has omitted any specific information that BB OpCo allegedly\n21 collected from Plaintiff herself. But even if Plaintiff had alleged her information was\n22 collected, the information she alleges can be collected by the TikTok pixel falls\n23 outside of a recognized privacy interest. See I.C. v. Zynga, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 3d 1034,\n24 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (no standing based on disclosure of \u201cemail address, phone\n25 number, or Facebook or Zynga username\u201d). As aptly stated by a district court recently,\n26 \u201c[g]iven the inherent nature of the internet, a number of courts have found that\n27 consumers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over their activity in that\n28 26\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 26 of 31 Page ID\n #:67\n\n\n\n 1 space.\u201d Thomas v. Papa Johns Int\u2019l, Inc., 2024 WL 2060140, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 8,\n 2 2024). As a result, the Court should dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff has failed\n 3 to allege facts sufficient to establish an injury as is required to sue under Section\n 4 637.2.\n 5 D. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Supporting the Claim that BB OpCo\n 6 Installed or Used a \u201cTrap and Trace Device\u201d Within the Meaning of\n 7 CIPA.\n 8 Even if all of these threshold defects did not exist, Plaintiff\u2019s claim would still\n 9 fail because she fails to allege the essential elements of her claim. To state a claim\n10 Plaintiff must put forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that BB OpCo installed a trap\n11 and trace device in violation of Section 638.51. But Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint only pays\n12 lip service to Section 638.51\u2019s specific requirements that a trap and trace device (1)\n13 captures incoming electronic or other impulses, (2) that identify the originating\n14 number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information, (3) that is\n15 reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not\n16 the contents of a communication. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.51. There are simply no facts\n17 alleged in the Complaint that identify any \u201cincoming electronic impulses\u201d captured by\n18 the TikTok software whatsoever, nor whether or how the vague information that\n19 Plaintiff identifies qualifies as \u201cdialing, routing, addressing, or signaling\n20 information\u201d\u2014it plainly does not.\n21 Although Plaintiff lists examples of record data points that the TikTok software\n22 could hypothetically collect from a website user (such as device, browser, geographic,\n23 and referrer information), Plaintiff fails to allege any fact identifying what information\n24 of hers BB OpCo collected, so that the Court may assess whether any such\n25 information is covered by the Penal Code. See e.g., RJN Ex. F, Heiting v. F21 OPCO,\n26 LLC, No. 24STCV20340 (Cal. Sup., Nov. 18, 2024 Minute Order) (sustaining\n27 demurrer and dismissing complaint alleging trap and trace claims based on the TikTok\n28 27\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 27 of 31 Page ID\n #:68\n\n\n\n 1 pixel where the complaint alleged no specific facts supporting that the plaintiff was\n 2 actually identified, or how the TikTok pixel functioned to collect \u201celectronic\n 3 impulses\u201d).\n 4 Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s reference to device and browser information, referral and\n 5 url tracking, and geographic information, are so vague that neither BB OpCo nor the\n 6 Court can discern whether any of these categories falls within the purview of \u201cdialing,\n 7 routing, addressing, or signaling information\u201d of a communication instrument covered\n 8 under Section 638.51. On their face, device and browser information, geographic\n 9 information, and referral tracking are not signaling information as they do not fit\n10 within the same category as dialing, routing or addressing. See People v. Giordano, 42\n11 Cal. 4th 644, 660, 170 P.3d 623, 633 (2007) (\u201cEjusdem generis applies whether\n12 specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa\u2026[T]he general term or\n13 category is restricted to those things that are similar to those which are enumerated\n14 specifically.\u201d). Location data, another category of information Plaintiff claims the\n15 TikTok pixel may collect, is expressly excluded from the statute. See Cal. Penal Code\n16 \u00a7 638.52(c) (location data from telephone numbers are okay). As are \u201ccontents of\n17 communications\u201d. See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442\n18 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (stating that trap and trace devices do not overhear\n19 conversations or confirm whether a call was completed).\n20 Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint not only fails to identify the required \u201cdialing, routing,\n21 addressing or signaling information,\u201d it also does not allege that such information is\n22 \u201creasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication\u2026\u201d to\n23 fit within the statutory requirements. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(c) (emphasis added).\n24 \u201cWire communication\u201d and \u201celectronic communication\u201d are defined in Penal Code\n25 section 629.51(a). Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 638.50(a) (stating that definition contained in\n26 section 629.51(a) applies). \u201cWire communication\u201d is an \u201caural transfer,\u201d meaning a\n27 transfer \u201ccontaining the human voice.\u201d Thus, a \u201cwire transfer\u201d is not applicable here\n28 28\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 28 of 31 Page ID\n #:69\n\n\n\n 1 on its face. Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(1), (4). \u201cElectronic communication\u201d is\n 2 defined to expressly exclude \u201cany communication from a tracking device.\u201d Cal. Penal\n 3 Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(2)(C). \u201cTracking device\u201d is defined, in relevant part, as \u201can\n 4 electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person\n 5 or object.\u201d Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 629.51(a)(3). The TikTok software, alleged by Plaintiff\n 6 to operate as a \u201ctracing process\u201d that purportedly tracks the location and identity of\n 7 users, falls far outside these statutory definitions.\n 8 E. Plaintiff Fails to Plead BB OpCo Installed the TikTok Pixel in\n 9 California.\n10 Under California law, a presumption exists against the extraterritorial\n11 application of state law unless the Legislature\u2019s intention to have the law apply\n12 extraterritorially \u201cis clearly expressed or reasonably to be inferred from the language\n13 of the act or from its purpose, subject matter or history.\u201d Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51\n14 Cal. 4th 1191, 1207 (2011). Section 638.51 does not \u201cclearly express,\u201d nor can it be\n15 \u201creasonably\u2026inferred\u201d from its language that the Legislature intended it to apply\n16 beyond California\u2019s borders. Therefore, under binding precedent, Section 638.51\n17 should apply only to trap and trace devices installed or used in California.\n18 Plaintiff fails to state a claim because Plaintiff does not plead that the alleged\n19 trap and trace activity took place in California. Plaintiff alleges that BB OpCo\n20 installed the TikTok pixel on the Website and collected information about the\n21 Plaintiff\u2019s Website visit. (Compl. \u00b6 1.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that BB OpCo is\n22 a Connecticut limited liability company (see id. \u00b6 8) and does not plead any facts\n23 showing that the TikTok pixel was installed, or that TikTok collected Plaintiff\u2019s\n24 information, in California. Because Plaintiff fails to allege that the challenged conduct\n25 occurred in California, Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint should be dismissed. Sullivan, 51 Cal.\n26 4th at 1207.\n27 ///\n28 29\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 29 of 31 Page ID\n #:70\n\n\n\n 1 F. BB OpCo Is Exempt As The Website Operator And/Or Because It\n 2 Was a Party to the Communication.\n 3 Even if Plaintiff otherwise states a claim\u2014Plaintiff has not for all the reasons\n 4 explained herein\u2014BB OpCo is nevertheless exempt.\n 5 Section 638.51(b) allows a provider of electronic or wire communication\n 6 service11 to use a trap and trace device to \u201coperate\u2026a wire or electronic\n 7 communication service.\u201d Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 638.51 (b). Much like in Columbia\n 8 Pictures, BB OpCo\u2019s alleged collection of incoming user information like the device,\n 9 browser, geographic, and referrer information as alleged by Plaintiff is necessary to\n10 operate the website. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419, at\n11 *11 (C.D. Cal 2007) (interpreting analogous federal exemption). Critically, BB OpCo\n12 necessarily captures such data when a user accesses their website, which is related to\n13 the functioning of the internet and connectivity between a user\u2019s browser and the\n14 website. See United States v. Jean, 207 F.Supp.3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016); Brown v.\n15 Google LLC, 2021 WL 6064009 (N.D. Cal. 2021).\n16 Moreover, and significantly, in addition to exempting a communication\n17 provider from using a trap and trace device to operate, maintain, and test a wire or\n18 electronic communication service, Section 638.51 also allows a communication\n19 provider to use a trap and trace device when the \u201cconsent of the user of that service\n20 has been obtained.\u201d Cal. Pen. Code 638.51(b)(5). It is BB OpCo\u2019s\u2014not Plaintiff\u2019s\u2014\n21 consent required to employ the TikTok software on its own website.12 Id.; see Rules\n22 11\n Plaintiff cannot dispute that BB OpCo is a provider of a communication service as contemplated\n23 by Section 638.51(b), as multiple courts have recognized. See Open Text Corporation, No.\n 24STCV05440 at 6 (addressing pen register claim against website operator and finding that\n24 \u201cDefendant\u2019s website is an electronic communication service\u201d within the meaning of Section\n 638.51(b)(1) (emphasis added)); Transitions Optical II, No. 23STCV30742 at 5 (considering\n25 exemption provisions under Section 638.51(b) in context of trap and trace and pen register claims\n26 brought against website operator and concluding that \u201cDefendant\u2019s website is an electronic\n communication service\u201d).\n 12\n27 The legislature\u2019s use of the singular \u201cuser\u201d for Section 638.51\u2019s consent requirement is a notable\n and intentional departure from Section 631\u2019s prohibition on wiretapping, which requires the consent\n28 30\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 30 of 31 Page ID\n #:71\n\n\n\n 1 and Policies Regarding Calling No. Identification Serv.-Caller ID 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 1764\n 2 (1994) (addressing caller ID feature as trap and trace device under federal statute and\n 3 holding that telephone company need only obtain the telephone subscriber\u2019s, rather\n 4 than the third-party caller\u2019s, consent to fit within the analogous federal exception);\n 5 Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Public Service Commission, 205 Wis. 2d 60,\n 6 80 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases finding same). Because BB OpCo provided\n 7 its consent to the installation of the TikTok software, it is covered under the separate\n 8 statutory consent exception. See, e.g., Hickory Farms, 2024 WL 1698147, at *4\n 9 (granting dismissal of Section 638.51 on the basis of consent).13\n10 VII. CONCLUSION\n11 For the foregoing reasons, BB OpCo respectfully requests that this Court\n12 dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of\n13 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n14 ///\n15 ///\n16 ///\n17\n of \u201call parties.\u201d See Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 631(a) (forbidding wiretapping \u201cwithout the consent of all\n18\n parties to the communication\u201d). Indeed, if 638.51 required the consent of all parties, then \u201cit is hard\n19 to see how any caller ID system, even that used for emergency services, would be legal.\u201d Sparshott\n v. Feld Ent., Inc., 311 F.3d 425, 432 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (interpreting federal law identical to Section\n20 638.51). After all, caller ID allows the recipient of a call to learn the identity of the caller. See id.\n Accordingly, if Section 638.51 is interpreted to require all-party consent, then caller ID is a crime.\n21 See id. Section 638.51 avoids that absurd result by requiring only the consent of one party (the\n22 \u201cuser,\u201d singular). See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 306 S.C. 70, 73 (1991) (interpreting\n materially identical law); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation 154 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.\n23 2001) (\u201cuser\u201d of web service was website operator; not website visitor).\n 13\n If the exceptions did not apply, and liability could extend to a website provider in these\n24 circumstances, it would lead to absurd results. A website operator would be forced to obtain a court\n order to use technology to operate its website. Nothing in the statute suggests that the legislature\n25 intended to criminalize website analytics tools used in the ordinary course. See Levings v. Open Text\n26 Corporation, No. 24STCV05440 at 4 (sustaining demurrer on analogous Section 638.51 claim and\n explaining that the statute \u201cdid not criminalize the process by which all websites communicate with\n27 all users who choose to access them.\u201d); see also Saracco Tank and Welding Co. v. Platz, 65\n Cal.App.2d 306, 315 (1944) (instructing that penal statutes should be interpreted narrowly).\n28 31\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:24-cv-09629-ODW-JC Document 17 Filed 01/10/25 Page 31 of 31 Page ID\n #:72\n\n\n DATED: January 10, 2025 BLANK ROME LLP\n 1\n\n 2\n\n 3 By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n Ana Tagvoryan\n 4 Victor Sandoval\n Attorneys for Defendant\n 5 BB OpCo LLC\n 6\n\n 7 The undersigned, counsel of record for BB OpCo, certifies that this brief\n 8 contains 6,881 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.\n 9\n\n10 By: /s/ Ana Tagvoryan\n Ana Tagvoryan\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28 32\n DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-09-24T17:24:14.482073-07:00","document_number":"17","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031044011698","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss (cause or other)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-01-10T18:32:04.181770-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:20.889629-08:00","date_filed":"2025-01-10","time_filed":"18:28:23","entry_number":17,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-01-10.001","pacer_sequence_number":57,"description":"NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by Defendant BB OpCo, LLC. Motion set for hearing on 2/10/2025 at 09:30 AM before Judge Otis D. Wright II. (Attachments: # 1 Request for Judicial Notice, # 2 Exhibit A in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, # 3 Exhibit B in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, # 4 Exhibit C in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, # 5 Exhibit D in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, # 6 Exhibit E in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, # 7 Exhibit F in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, # 8 Proposed Order) (Tagvoryan, Anahit) (Entered: 01/10/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/412046498/","id":412046498,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/425296476/","id":425296476,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/16/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2024-12-26T15:34:57.776361-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:20.871064-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"16","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031043926507","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Extending Answer Due Deadline","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-12-26T15:34:57.688202-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:20.846587-08:00","date_filed":"2024-12-26","time_filed":"15:19:10","entry_number":16,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-12-26.001","pacer_sequence_number":54,"description":"ORDER GRANTING JOINT STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME FOR DEFENDANT BB OPCO LLC TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT TO JANUARY 10, 2025 15 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lc) (Entered: 12/26/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/411934223/","id":411934223,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/69352813/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/425144684/","id":425144684,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/69352813/15/kieren-kishnani-v-bb-opco-llc/","date_created":"2024-12-23T17:34:38.558479-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:20.822673-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"15","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031043918075","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Extending Time to Answer (30 days or less)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-12-23T17:34:38.546223-08:00","date_modified":"2025-12-27T15:09:20.798694-08:00","date_filed":"2024-12-23","time_filed":"17:18:02","entry_number":15,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-12-23.001","pacer_sequence_number":51,"description":"Joint STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint as to BB OpCo, LLC answer now due 1/10/2025, re Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening) 1 filed by Defendant BB OpCo, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Victor J. Sandoval in Support of Joint Stipulation to Extend Time For Defendant BB OPCO LLC to Respond to Plaintiffs Complaint, # 2 Proposed Order)(Sandoval, Victor) (Entered: 12/23/2024)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=69352813&page_size=40"}