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City of Dallas","case_name_full":"","slug":"hayes-v-city-of-dallas","docket_number":"3:23-cv-02271","docket_number_core":"2302271","docket_number_raw":"3:23-cv-02271","docket_number_source":0,"federal_dn_office_code":"3","federal_dn_case_type":"cv","federal_dn_judge_initials_assigned":"S","federal_dn_judge_initials_referred":"","federal_defendant_number":null,"pacer_case_id":"382279","cause":"42:1983 Civil Rights Act","nature_of_suit":"440 Civil Rights: Other Civil Rights","jury_demand":"Plaintiff","jurisdiction_type":"Federal 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Officers","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/14104627/","id":14104627,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9498560/","attorney_id":9498560,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","docket_id":67883583,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9498560/","attorney_id":9498560,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","docket_id":67883583,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","docket_id":67883583,"name":"Defendant","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2024-05-21T08:46:38.041681-07:00","date_modified":"2024-05-21T08:46:38.041691-07:00","name":"Holly Harris","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/14104626/","id":14104626,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9498560/","attorney_id":9498560,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","docket_id":67883583,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/9498560/","attorney_id":9498560,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","docket_id":67883583,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","docket_id":67883583,"name":"Defendant","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2024-05-21T08:46:38.017885-07:00","date_modified":"2024-05-21T08:46:38.017898-07:00","name":"Walter  Paul 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3:23-cv-02271-S            Document 52      Filed 04/25/25         Page 1 of 20             PageID 617\n\n\n\n                             United States District Court\n                                   NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n                                          DALLAS   DIVISION\n\n\n\n S I LV E S T E R H AY E S                         \u00a7\n                                                   \u00a7\n V .                                               \u00a7\n                                                   \u00a7          C I V I L A C T I O N N O . 3 : 2 3 - C V- 2 2 7 1 - S\n CITY OF DALLAS, HOLLY HARRIS,                     \u00a7\n WALTER PAUL GUAB, and DALLAS                      \u00a7\n POLICE OFFICERS DOES 1                            \u00a7\n THROUGH 10                                        \u00a7\n\n                             MEMORANDUM        OPINION     AND      ORDER\n\n\n            This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Defendants Holly Harris, Walter Guab,\n\nand the City of Dallas\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment (\u201cMotion\u201d) [ECF No. 30]. The Court has\n\nreviewed the Motion, Defendants\u2019 Brief in Support of the Motion (\u201cDefendants\u2019 Brief\u2019) [ECF\n\nNo. 31], Plaintiff Silvester Hayes\u2019s Response in Opposition to the Motion (\u201cResponse\u201d) [ECF\n\nNo. 39], Plaintiffs Brief in Support of the Response (\u201cPlaintiffs Brief\u2019) [ECF No. 40],\n\nDefendants\u2019 Reply in Support of the Motion [ECF No. 49], the summary judgment evidence, and\n\nthe applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.\n\n                                         I.   BACKGROUND\n\n\n            This 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 case arises from aconfrontation between Plaintiff Silvester Hayes\n\nand Dallas police of cers. On October 16, 2021, Defendants Walter Guab and Holly Harris ran a\n\nregistration check on avehicle while on patrol. Defs.\u2019 App. in Supp. of the Mot. (\u201cDefendants\u2019\n\nAppendix\u201d) [ECF No. 17] 7. They cross-referenced the owner\u2019s name with another system and\n\n'observed aperson with the name \u2018Sylvester Hayes\u2019 who had afelony warrant for family\n\nviolence.\u201d Id.-, see also PL\u2019s First Am. Compl. (\u201cComplainf\u2019) [ECF No. 27] f21. Subsequently,\n\nPlaintiff, who was driving the car, failed to signal before turning left. Defs.\u2019 App. 7; see also PL\u2019s\n       fi\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S                   Document 52   Filed 04/25/25             Page 2 of 20   PageID 618\n\n\n\n     App. in Supp. of His Resp. (\u201cPlaintiffs Appendix\u201d) [ECF No. 41], Ex. 1[ECF No. 41-1] 3. Guab\n\n     and Harris initiated atraf c stop based on this traf c violation. Defs.\u2019 App. 7.\n\n                  From this point forward, various body-worn cameras and dash cameras captured the\n\n     ensuing events. After pulling Plaintiff over, Guab gets out of the car, walks to the driver\u2019s side\n\n     window of Plaintiff svehicle, and begins speaking with Plaintiff. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 21, at 00:20-46;\n\n     Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 00:14-24. Harris walks up and joins him. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 00:14-20;\n\n     Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 21, at 00:47-01:00. After complaining about being pulled over, Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1,\n\n     at 00:24-36, Plaintiff hands Guab his driver\u2019s license, id. at 00:37-38. Guab hands the license to\n\n     Harris and returns to Plaintiffs window. Id. at 00:39-46. Harris appears to con rm that Plaintiff\n\n     is the person subject to the felony warrant. Id. at 00:44-45. Guab then directs Plaintiff to step out\n\n     of the car and attempts, unsuccessfully, to open Plaintiffs door via the outside handle. Id.\n\n     at 00:46-49. Guab reaches in through the open window, unlocks the car door, and again tells\n\n     Plaintiff to step out. Id. at 00:50-56. Plaintiff does not do so, and Guab opens the now-unlocked\n\n     d o o r. I d . a t 0 0 : 5 6 - 5 8 .\n\n\n                 Through the open door, Guab informs Plaintiff that he is being detained and directs him\n\n     again to step out. Id. at 00:59-01:09. Guab repeats the command to step out several more times\n\n     and warns Plaintiff that he will be tased if he does not comply. Id. at 01:10-26. Plaintiff continues\n\n     to refuse, and Guab reaches into the car to grab him, all the while repeatedly telling Plaintiff to\n\n     step out of the car. Id. at 01:27-33. Other police of cers join Guab and Harris outside the car door\n\n     and assist Guab in attempting to pull Plaintiff out of the car by his left arm. Id. at 01:33-46.\n\n                 As the of cers are trying to remove Plaintiff from the car, non-party Of cer Whitman\n\n     opens the passenger door and orders Plaintiff to get out of the car. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 00:47-52.\n\n     Whitman sees that Plaintiff has agun in his right pocket and alerts the other of cers at the scene.\n\n\n\n\n                                                          2\nfi\n                      fi\n                                                fi\n                                                     fi\n                                                                      fi\n                                                                           fi\n                                                                                fi\n\f                         Case 3:23-cv-02271-S          Document 52        Filed 04/25/25              Page 3 of 20   PageID 619\n\n\n\n                         Id. at 1:01-05; Defs.\u2019 App, Ex. 1, at 01:47-51. Plaintiff yells that it is his gun. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1,\n\n                         at 01:50-53. Whitman takes the gun from Plaintiff, stating that he \u201cgot it.\u201d Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2,\n\n                         at 01:13-15. The of cers on the driver\u2019s side of the car manage to pull Plaintiff out of the car, and\n\n                         he falls to the ground. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 01:54-02:02; PL\u2019s App., Ex. 1, at 4. Ahandcuff dangles\n\n                         from his left wrist, and Harris brie y grabs his left hand. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 01:52-02:00.\n\n                                  Of cers, including Guab, hold Plaintiff down on the ground and tell him to stop resisting.\n\n                         Id. at 02:00-20. Harris and Guab grab Plaintiffs left wrist and try to hold it behind his back, while\n\n                         another of cer does the same with Plaintiffs right wrist. Id. During this time. Plaintiff is\n\n                         squirming, appears to be trying to stand up, and accuses one of the of cers of putting his or her\n\n                         foot on Plaintiffs neck. Id. However, the body camera footage shows that the of cer has his foot\n\n                         on the ground and his knee on the top part of Plaintiff sback. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 01:29-35.\n\n                                  Plaintiff ips over onto his back, and Harris holds down his right leg with both hands.\n\n                         Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 02:46-51. Plaintiff pulls his other leg toward Harris and ips back onto his\n\n                         stomach. Id. at 02:52-55. Harris holds his right leg down with both hands. Id. at 02:55-03:12.\n\n                         Another of cer intermittently holds Plaintiffs head down so that his cheek is against the ground.\n\n                         Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 02:07-28. The same of cer also has his hand on the back or side of Plaintiff s\n\n                         neck twice\u2014once for approximately three seconds and the second time for approximately eight\n\n                         seconds. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 4, at 00:10-13, 00:18-26.\n\n                                  The of cers stand Plaintiff up. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 03:23. He continues to resist them\n\n                         and yell loudly. Id. at 03:23-27. Harris brie y puts her hands on Plaintiffs chest before moving\n\n                         some distance away, and Guab is standing nearby. Id. at 03:26-30. Guab assists the other of cers\n\n                         in facing Plaintiff toward apolice vehicle and holding him against it. Id. at 03:24-35.\n\n\n\n\n                                                                           3\nfi\n     fi\n          fl\n               fi\n                    fi\n                             fi\n                                             fl\n                                                       fi\n                                                            fl\n                                                                                     fi\n                                                                                            fl\n                                                                                                 fi\n                                                                                                              fi\n\f                    Case 3:23-cv-02271-S                    Document 52   Filed 04/25/25       Page 4 of 20       PageID 620\n\n\n\n                              As Harris walks around, talking to someone on the radio, agroup of of cers, including\n\n                    Guab, attempt to walk Plaintiff to apolice vehicle. Id. at 03:41-57. Plaintiff continues to yell and\n\n                    physically resist. Id. As the of cers attempt to push Plaintiff into the police car, one unidenti ed\n\n                    of cer\u2014neither Guab nor Harris\u2014wraps his ngers around Plaintiffs throat. Id. at 03:59-04:03.\n\n                    The same of cer appears to brie y raise his knee to Plaintiffs stomach and then pushes down on\n\n                    the baek of Plaintiff shead in an apparent effort to make him duck and get inside the vehicle. Id.\n\n                    at 04:04-11. Plaintiff continues strenuously resisting. Id.\n\n                              As the of cers are trying to get Plaintiff into the car despite his resistance. Plaintiff falls to\n\n                    the ground. Id. at 04:15-24. Guab calls for leg restraints. Id. at 04:26-27. While waiting on the leg\n\n                    restraints, agroup of of cers not including Guab or Harris holds Plaintiff down on the ground. Id.\n\n                    at 04:34-45. One of cer has his knee on the ground near Plaintiffs neck and intermittently holds\n\n                    Plaintiffs arm and the side of Plaintiff sface down with his hand. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 03:40-\n\n                    04:30; Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 5, at 00:44-01:00, 01:13-41, 2:10-11; Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 7, at 00:43-50.\n\n                    Non-party Of cer Grajeda runs over with zip tie-like restraints. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 04:41-44;\n\n                    Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 6, at 00:42-50. Guab runs off toward Plaintiffs car. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1,\n\n                    at 04:42-51. As the of cers continue struggling to restrain Plaintiffs legs, Guab and Harris are\n\n                    walking around and standing some distance away and not touching Plaintiff. Id. at 04:52-05:53.\n\n                    Plaintiff accuses an of cer of pressing on his pressure points, and the of cer acknowledges that\n\n                    he is doing so. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 04:16-22.\n\n                              Plaintiff asks to get in the car and repeatedly states that he will get in. Id. at 04:29-37. As\n\n                    Grajeda is trying to restrain Plaintiffs legs. Plaintiff kicks one of his legs away from Grajeda.\n\n                    Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 6, at 01:27-29. The of eers then nish restraining Plaintiffs legs by putting\n\n                    restraints around his ankles and stand him up. Id. at 01:45-2:07; Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 05:12-21.\n\n\n\n\n                                                                          4\nfi\n     fi\n          fi\n               fi\n                         fi\n                              fi\n                                   fi\n                                        fi\n                                             fi\n                                                  fl\n                                                       fi\n                                                              fi\n                                                                   fi\n                                                                                     fi\n                                                                                          fi\n                                                                                                            fi\n\f          Case 3:23-cv-02271-S             Document 52           Filed 04/25/25          Page 5 of 20         PageID 621\n\n\n\n          Plaintiff continues to argue with the of cers. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 05:23-28. The of cers nally\n\n          manage to get Plaintiff into the vehicle. Id. at 05:29-40.\n\n                   As of cers were getting Plaintiff into the car, Harris checked Plaintiffs driver\u2019s license\n\n          against the system. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 05:58-06:28. Although the video footage is not entirely\n\n          clear, it appears to be at that point that Harris realized that Plaintiff\u2014Silvester Hayes\u2014was not\n\n          the same as the person with the felony warrant\u2014Sylvester Hayes. See id.', see also Defs.\u2019 App.,\n\n          Ex. 11, at 03:23-33 (Of cer Harris stating that Plaintiff had an outstanding \u201ctickef\u2019); Defs.\u2019 App. 7\n\n          (indicating that Plaintiff only had awarrant for speeding). As aresult of his encounter with the\n\n          of cers. Plaintiff suffered atom rotator cuff, post-traumatic stress disorder, and mild insomnia.\n\n          PL\u2019s App., Ex. 2[EOF No. 41-1] 8-9.\n\n                  Two years after the incident. Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Compl. 1.\n\n          Plaintiff brings causes of action for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment*\n\n          and unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Guab and Harris. Id. 77-126.\n\n          Plaintiff also brings aFourth Amendment claim against Defendant City of Dallas under a\n\n          municipal liability theory. Id. 127-37. Plaintiff names Dallas Police Of cers Does 1Through 10\n\n          (\u201cDoe Defendants\u201d) as defendants in the Complaint, but he does not expressly bring any causes of\n\n          action against them. See id. 6.\n\n                                                   II.   LEGAL        S TA N D A R D\n\n\n                  Courts \u201cshall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute\n\n          as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as amatter of law.\u201d Fed. R. CiV.\n\n          P. 56(a)', Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,247 (1986). In making this determination.\n\n\n\n            If, as here, an excessive force claim \u201carises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of afree citizen,\n          it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment.\u201d Graham v.\n          Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); also Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993)\n          (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs claim under Fourth Amendment standards.\n\n\n                                                                  5\nfi\n     fi\n                    fi\n                                      fi\n                                                                              fi\n                                                                                             fi\n                                                                                                    fi\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S             Document 52        Filed 04/25/25         Page 6 of 20     PageID 622\n\n\n\n     courts must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the\n\n     party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving\n\n     party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its belief that there is no genuine\n\n     issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323 (1986).\n\n             When aparty bears the burden of proof on an issue, he \u201cmust establish beyond peradventure\n\n     all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.\u201d Fontenot v.\n\n     Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190,1194 (5th Cir. 1986). When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof.\n\n     the movant may demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment either hy (1) submitting evidence\n\n     that negates the existence of an essential element of the nonmovant\u2019s claim or af rmative defense.\n\n     or (2) showing that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant\u2019s claim\n\n     or af rmative defense. Celotex, All U.S. at 322-25. Once the movant has made this showing, the\n\n     burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish that there is agenuine issue of material fact so that a\n\n     reasonable jury might return averdict in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio\n\n     Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). \u201c[Cjonclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated\n\n     assertions\u201d will not suf ce to satisfy the nonmovanf sburden. RSR Corp. v. Int\u2019l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d\n\n     851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party\n\n      only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of\n\n     contradictory facts.\u201d Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521,525 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing\n\n     McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Wash. Cap. Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1995)).\n\n                                                 III.   A N A LY S I S\n\n\n                  Section 1983 provides afederal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of\n\n     acitizen\u2019s \u2018rights, privileges, or immunities secured hy the Constitution and laws\u2019 of the United\n\n     States.\u201d Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (citation omitted). To state aclaim under\n\n     Section 1983, aplaintiff must allege facts showing (1) adeprivation of aright secured by the\n\n\n                                                           6\nfi\n             fi\n                                                                           fi\n\f               Case 3:23-cv-02271-S         Document 52        Filed 04/25/25      Page 7 of 20      PageID 623\n\n\n\n               Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation occurred under color\n\n               of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs.\n\n               Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). \u201cClaims under \u00a71983 may be brought\n\n               against persons in their individual or of cial capacity, or against agovernmental entity.\u201d Goodman\n\n               V. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs of Bryan Cnty.\n\n               V. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).\n\n                      Here, Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims against Guab and Harris in their individual\n\n               capacities and against the City of Dallas under atheory of municipal liability. Guab and Harris\n\n               argue that they are entitled to summary judgment based on quali ed immunity. Defs.\u2019 Br. 16-28.\n\n               The City of Dallas contends that Plaintiff has not pleaded an underlying constitutional violation\n\n               and thus cannot hold it liable under Section 1983. Id. at 28-29.\n\n\n                                                    A. Quali ed Immunity\n\n                       'Quali ed immunity protects of cers from suit unless their conduct violates aclearly\n\n               established statutory or constitutional right.\u201d Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 558 (5th Cir.\n\n               2023) (cleaned up), cert, denied sub nom. Crandel v. Hall, 144 S. Ct. 1002 (2024). When an of cial\n\n               asserts quali ed immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant is not\n\n               entitled to quali ed immunity. Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329-30\n\n               (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must show (1) that the of cial violated astatutory\n\n               or constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged\n\n               conduct. Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).\n\n\n\n\n                                                                7\nfi\n     fi\n          fi\n                fi\n                                 fi\n                                       fi\n                                                                    fi\n                                                                           fi\n                                                                                               fi\n\f          Case 3:23-cv-02271-S          Document 52        Filed 04/25/25         Page 8 of 20     PageID 624\n\n\n\n                                           i. Violation of Constitutional Right\n\n                                                   a. Excessive Force\n\n\n                 Plaintiff contends that Guab and Harris used excessive force in effectuating his arrest. See,\n\n          c.g., PL\u2019s Br. f105. To establish an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must establish (1) an injury,\n\n          (2) that resulted directly and only from ause of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the\n\n          excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable. Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281, 287\n\n          (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). \u201cOur precedents recognize that inquiries regarding whether a\n\n          use of force was \u2018clearly excessive\u2019 or \u2018clearly unreasonable ... are often intertwined,\u2019 and we\n\n          consider those questions together ... .\u201d Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir.\n\n          2018) ( rst alteration in original) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017)).\n\n                 As to the rst element. Plaintiff has demonstrated an injury. He submitted an af davit from\n\n          Dr. Adrienne Grant, D.O., averring that Plaintiff suffered atorn rotator cuff, post-traumatic stress\n\n          disorder, and insomnia. PL\u2019s App., Ex. 2, at 8-9. But Plaintiff has not satis ed the second and third\n\n          elements because his injuries did not result directly and only from an unreasonable, excessive use\n\n          of force by Guab or Harris.\n\n                 The Court\u2019s inquiry into the excessiveness and reasonableness of the use of force depends\n\n          on \u201cthe facts and circumstances of each particular case.\u201d Darden, 880 F.3d at 728 (quoting Deville\n\n          V. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,167 (5th Cir. 2009)). \u201cThe \u2018reasonableness\u2019 of aparticular use of force\n\n          must be judged from the perspective of areasonable of cer on the scene, rather than with the\n\n          20/20 vision of hindsight.\u201d Id. at 729 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This analysis \u201cmust\n\n          embody allowance for the fact that police of cers are often forced to make split-second\n\n          judgments\u2014in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving\u2014about the amount\n\n          of force that is necessary in aparticular situation.\u201d Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159,\n\n\n\n\n                                                            8\nfi\n     fi\n                                              fi\n                                                      fi\n                                                                       fi\n                                                                             fi\n\f          Case 3:23-cv-02271-S                    Document 52   Filed 04/25/25          Page 9 of 20     PageID 625\n\n\n\n          1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). \u201cIn making this determination, acourt\n\n          should consider the totality of the circumstances, \u2018including [the following Graham factors:] the\n\n          severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the\n\n          of cers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by ight.\n\n          Darden, 880 F.3d at 728-29 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Courts also consider \u201cthe\n\n          relationship between the need [for force] and the amount of force used.\u201d Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th\n\n          577, 582 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court rst clari es the use\n\n          of force in this case before examining each of the Graham factors in turn.\n\n                    The Court notes that much of the force identi ed by Plaintiff was used by other of cers,\n\n          not Guab or Harris. Ordinarily, \u201c[t]he plaintiff\u2019s factual assertions are taken as true to determine\n\n          whether they are legally suf cient to defeat the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\u201d Craig\n\n          V.   Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But where\n\n           there is video and audio recording of the event,\u201d the Court is \u201cnot required to accept factual\n                                                                        5 9 ?\n\n          allegations that are \u2018blatantly contradicted by the record.           Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d\n\n          165, 170 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Instead, the Court\n\n           view[s] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.\u201d Id.\n\n                    In the videotape, Guab\u2014after repeatedly asking Plaintiff to step out of the car\u2014^pulled on\n\n          Plaintiffs arm and later his side or back to try to get him out of the car. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1,\n\n          at 01:34-02:00. Once Plaintiff was out of the car on the ground, Guab helped hold Plaintiffs arm\n\n          behind his back. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 4, at 00:06-24. Guab then held onto Plaintiffs arm and shoulder\n\n          while of cers held him up against apolice car and while they attempted to walk him to another\n\n          police car. Id. at 00:38-01:35. Harris brie y grabbed Plaintiffs hand while other of cers were\n\n          pulling him out of the car, helped other of cers attempt to hold Plaintiffs hands behind his back.\n\n\n\n\n                                                                 9\nfi\n     fi\n                         fi\n                                        fi\n                                             fl\n                                                    fi\n                                                                                   fi\n                                                                                         fi\n                                                                                              fi\n                                                                                               fi\n                                                                                                    fl\n\f          Case 3:23-cv-02271-S                Document 52    Filed 04/25/25            Page 10 of 20    PageID 626\n\n\n\n           held Plaintiffs legs down while of cers were attempting to restrain him, and put her hands on\n\n           Plaintiffs chest as of cers tried to get him to turn around and face the police car. See Defs.\u2019 App.,\n\n           Ex. 1, at 01:48-03:28. Harris\u2019s entire involvement in the physical struggle with Plaintiff lasted less\n\n           than two minutes. See id. Neither Guab nor Harris\u2014^nor any of the other police of cers involved-\n\n               Eick[ed], punch[ed], [or]... use[d] their tasers on Plaintiff.\u201d Compl. 39. They also did not \u201chog\n\n           tie[]\u201d Plaintiff Id. ^45. Apparently recognizing the errors in his pleadings, Plaintiff dropped these\n\n           allegations from his Af davit. PL\u2019s App., Ex. 1, at 3-5. In the Af davit, the only speci c assertions\n\n           with respect to Guab and Harris are that they \u201cstarted pulling and pushing [Plaintiff] to the ground.\n\n           Id. at 3.\n\n\n                        The Court will assume arguendo that the rst Graham factor, the severity of the crime at\n\n           issue, weighs against Guab and Harris\u2019s use of force. Guab and Harris rst stopped Plaintiff for a\n\n           minor traf c violation\u2014failing to signal before turning left. After the traf c stop, and after Guab\n\n           informed Plaintiff that he was being detained. Plaintiff resisted arrest by struggling against of cers\n\n           as they attempted to handcuff him and restrain his legs. Defendants concede that \u201cresisting arrest\n\n           is aClass Amisdemeanor under Texas law.\u201d Defs.\u2019 Br. 19 (citing Tex. Penal Code \u00a738.03). Minor\n\n           crimes like traf c violations and misdemeanors generally weigh against the use of force. See, e.g.,\n\n           Deville, 567 F.3d at 167 (concluding that \u201cthe need for force [was] substantially lower\u201d where the\n\n           plaintiff \u201cwas stopped for aminor traf c violation\u201d).\n\n                        However, Guab and Harris thought Plaintiff\u2019 was the subject of awarrant for felony\n\n           domestic violence. The severity of the crime evaluation must be \u201cbased upon the information the\n\n           of cers had when the conduct occurred.\u201d County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428\n\n           (2017) (citation omitted). Felony domestic violence is amore severe crime than atraf c violation\n\n\n\n\n                                                              10\nfi\n     fi\n          fi\n                   fi\n                        fi\n                                   fi\n                                        fi\n                                             fi\n                                                               fi\n                                                                        fi\n                                                                             fi\n                                                                                  fi\n                                                                                         fi\n                                                                                              fi\n                                                                                                   fi\n\fCase 3:23-cv-02271-S             Document 52         Filed 04/25/25    Page 11 of 20       PageID 627\n\n\n\nor misdemeanor. Nevertheless, the Court\u2019s decision on severity would not change the outcome of\n\nthis case. So the Court will assume without deciding that this factor weighs against the use of force.\n\n           As to the second factor, Plaintiff posed some threat to Guab and Harris. As long as Plaintiff\n\nremained in his vehicle, he posed apotential danger to the of cers. \u201cA motor vehicle can be used\n\nas adangerous weapon, even when blocked in by apolice cruiser.\u201d Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513,\n\n519 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Plumhoffv. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,776-77 (2014)). Areasonable of cer\n\ncould have feared that Plaintiff had aweapon in the car; in fact. Of cer Whitman later discovered\n\nagun in Plaintiff\u2019s pocket. See id. (citation omitted). And even when Plaintiff was pulled from the\n\nvehicle, he continued to physically struggle while of cers attempted to restrain him. This factor\n\nweighs in favor of Guab and Harris\u2019s use of force.\n\n           The third Graham factor, whether Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to\n\nevade arrest by ight, also weighs in favor of nding that the force used by Guab and Harris was\n\nnot excessive. Guab attempted to negotiate with Plaintiff, telling him multiple times to step out of\n\nthe car before touching him. Guab did not grab Plaintiff\u2019s arm until after he had failed to comply\n\nwith repeated, clear instructions. \u201cOf cers may consider asuspect\u2019s refusal to comply with\n\ninstructions during atraf c stop in assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the\n\nsuspect\u2019s compliance.\u201d Deville, 567 F.3d at 167 (citation omitted); see also Brothers, 837 F.3d\n\nat 519-20 (concluding that of cers were entitled to quali ed immunity when they used their hands\n\nto pull the plaintiff from his vehicle after he refused to comply with instructions to get out of the\n\nvehicle). And Guab did not take Plaintiff to the ground until his efforts to handcuff Plaintiff and\n\npull Plaintiff from the car failed. Of cers are entitled to take suspects to the ground in response to\n\nnon-compliance. Priest v. Grazier, 860 F. App\u2019x 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted)\n\n(holding that of cers were entitled to quali ed immunity where they pulled the plaintiff out of the\n\n\n\n\n                                                          11\n fi\n      fl\n             fi\n                  fi\n                       fi\n                            fi\n                                 fi\n                                      fi\n                                           fi\n                                                fi\n                                                     fi\n                                                               fi\n                                                                                    fi\n\f          Case 3:23-cv-02271-S        Document 52        Filed 04/25/25       Page 12 of 20      PageID 628\n\n\n\n          car and forced him to the groimd when he \u201cdid not comply with their repeated instructions\u201d to get\n\n          out of the car); see also Hutcheson v. Dallas County, 994 F.3d All, 480 (5th Cir. 2021) (\u201cResisting\n\n          while being handcuffed constitutes active resistance and justi es the use of at least some force.\n\n          (citation omitted)). After that point, Guab and Harris held onto Plaintiff\u2019s limbs in an attempt to\n\n          restrain him. Throughout the encounter, the of cers were \u201c[fjaced with an uncooperative arrestee'\n\n          and \u201cproperly use[d] \u2018measured and ascending actions that correspond[ed] to [Plaintiff\u2019s]\n\n          escalating verbal and physical resistance.\u2019\u201d Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021)\n\n          (citation omitted). In sum. Plaintiff\u2019s active and prolonged resistance justi ed Guab\u2019s and Harris\u2019s\n\n          uses of force.\n\n\n                 Finally, turning to the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used.\n\n          the Court notes that Guab and Harris were presented with an uncooperative arrestee who at rst\n\n          resisted passively by refusing to get out of the car and then resisted actively as of cers attempted\n\n          to restrain him. In response to this rapidly evolving situation, Guab and Harris used relatively\n\n          minor force. They pulled Plaintiff out of his car and occasionally helped hold him down as separate\n\n          of cers were attempting to restrain him, and they later helped move him into apolice vehicle. And\n\n          their use of force only escalated as Plaintiff\u2019s noncompliance and resistance escalated, which, as\n\n          the Court noted above, is appropriate.\n\n                 Having considered the totality of the circumstances, including the Graham factors, the\n\n          Court concludes that the force Guab and Harris employed was neither clearly excessive nor clearly\n\n          unreasonable.\n\n\n                                                    b. False Arrest\n\n\n                 Plaintiff argues that Guab and Harris falsely arrested him because they mistakenly\n\n          identi ed him as the Sylvester Hayes subject to an outstanding felony warrant. PL\u2019s Br. 49-78.\n\n\n\n\n                                                               12\nfi\n     fi\n                                         fi\n                                                          fi\n                                                                      fi\n                                                                              fi\n                                                                                           fi\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S         Document 52       Filed 04/25/25            Page 13 of 20   PageID 629\n\n\n\n     The Fourth Amendment protects the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,\n\n     papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. Arrests\n\n     are seizures of persons and, therefore, must be reasonable under the circumstances to comply with\n\n     the Fourth Amendment. See District of Columbia v. fVesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018) (citation\n\n     omitted). To prevail on aFourth Amendment false arrest claim, aplaintiff must prove (1) that he\n\n     was arrested, and (2) that the arrest was not supported by the requisite probable cause. Rhodes v.\n\n     Prince, 360 F. App\u2019x 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\n\n             'Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within apolice\n\n     of cer\u2019s knowledge at the moment of arrest are suf cient for areasonable person to conclude that\n\n     the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.\u201d Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269\n\n     (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Apolice of cer who has probable cause to believe that aperson\n\n     committed even aminor offense may arrest that person without violating the Fourth Amendment.\n\n     Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Plaintiff gave Guab and Harris probable\n\n     cause for his arrest when he failed to use his turn signal before making aleft turn, in violation of\n\n     Texas Transportation Code Sections 545.104(a) and (b). Under Texas law, \u201c[a]ny peace of cer\n\n     may arrest without warrant aperson found committing aviolation of the subtitle.\u201d Tex. Transp.\n\n     Code. \u00a7543.001. Sections 545.104(a) and (b) \u201cfall under Section 543\u2019s purview\u201d; therefore, they\n\n     granted Harris and Guab arrest authority for the violation. United States v. Allam,\n\n     No. U23-CR-00010-MAC, 2023 WL 3398594, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2023) (citation omitted);\n\n     see alsoCurleyv. Gonzalez,lAo. 3;15-CV-1341-L, 2017 WL 4351073, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30,\n\n     2017) (concluding that probable cause for arrest existed where the defendant-of cer observed the\n\n     plaintiff turn right without signaling).\n\n\n\n\n                                                     13\nfi\n                                   fi\n                                           fi\n                                                                         fi\n                                                                                        fi\n\f      Case 3:23-cv-02271-S             Document 52           Filed 04/25/25           Page 14 of 20   PageID 630\n\n\n\n                                                  a. Clearly Established Right\n\n                  Although Plaintiffs case fails because he has not shown aconstitutional violation, the\n\n          Court considers the seeond prong of the quali ed immunity analysis for the sake of eompleteness.\n\n          The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to identify any controlling precedent that would put\n\n          Guab and Harris on notiee that their actions violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See Joseph,\n\n          981 F.3d at 336 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001)). Under this second prong of the\n\n          quali ed immunity analysis, courts \u201cdetermine whether the defendant\u2019s actions violated elearly\n\n          established statutory or constitutional rights of which areasonable person would have known.\n\n          Griggs V. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Mullenix v.\n\n          Luna, 511 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (\u201cA clearly established right is one that is suf eiently clear that every\n\n          reasonable of cial would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.\u201d (cleaned up)).\n\n          And adefendant eannot be said to have violated aclearly established right unless the right\u2019s\n\n          contours were suf ciently de nite that any reasonable of cial in the defendant\u2019s shoes would have\n\n          understood that he was violating it.\u201d Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778-79 (citation omitted). Accordingly,\n\n           [a plaintiff] must identify acase that put [the defendant] on notiee that his speci c conduct was\n\n          unlawful.\u201d Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rivas-Villegas v.\n\n          Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6(2021)).\n\n                  As to Plaintiff\u2019s excessive force claim. Plaintiff does not identify any cases that clearly\n\n          establish the law. This failure is unsurprising given that, as set forth at length above, Guab and\n\n          Harris\u2019s actions did not rise to the level of uneonstitutional excessive foree.\n\n\n                  In support of his false arrest claim, Plaintiff points to several eases. He acknowledges that\n\n          the facts of all of the cases are distinguishable but contends that they stand for the proposition that\n\n           the determinative factor of whether an of cer is entitled to quali ed immunity in amistaken\n\n\n\n\n                                                              14\nfi\n     fi\n             fi\n                        fi\n                                        fi\n                                             fi\n                                                        fi\n                                                                    fi\n                                                                         fi\n                                                                                 fi\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S               Document 52   Filed 04/25/25     Page 15 of 20       PageID 631\n\n\n\n     identity case is whether that of cer made reasonable efforts to ensure that the warrant he is\n\n     executing on aperson or place is the correct person or place.\u201d PL\u2019s Br. 91, 96.\n\n            First, Plaintiff relies on Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987). See PL\u2019s Br. 85-88.\n\n     Garrison, unlike this case, involved of cers misidentifying an apartment that was subject to a\n\n     search warrant. 480 U.S. at 80. Second, Plaintiff cites Rogers v. Hooper, 271 F. App\u2019x 431 (5th Cir.\n\n     2008). See PL\u2019s Br. ]f 89. Rogers is unpublished and thus \u201ccannot be the source of clearly\n\n     established law for quali ed immunity analysis.\u201d Jimerson v. Lewis, 94 F.4th 423,429 n.2 (5th Cir.\n\n     2024) (citation omitted). Further, Rogers involved awarrant to search ahouse, not awarrant for a\n\n     person\u2019s arrest. 271 F. App\u2019x at 431-32. Third, Plaintiff cites Jimerson, 94 F.4th 423. See PL\u2019s Br.\n\n     T| 90. Jimerson was decided after the incident at issue and thus could not clearly establish the law.\n\n     And Jimerson involved police of cers executing asearch warrant at an incorrect house. 94 F.4th\n\n     at 425. Plaintiff also points to an Eleventh Circuit case, Harts eld v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950\n\n     (11th Cir. 1995). PL\u2019s Br.^^ 92-96. This case is nonprecedential in the Fifth Circuit. Moreover,\n\n     like the other cases cited by Plaintiff, Harts eld dealt with awarrant to search aresidence, not a\n\n     warrant to arrest an individual. 50 F.3d at 955-56.\n\n\n            Even setting aside the factual and other issues with the cases cited by Plaintiff, they all\n\n     share one fatal aw. Each case, in Plaintiff\u2019s own words, deals with mistaken identity and the\n\n     question of whether an of cer \u201cmade reasonable efforts to ensure that the warrant he is executing\n\n     on aperson or place is the correct person or place.\u201d PL\u2019s Br. ^91. But here, as set forth above, the\n\n     mistaken identity issue became irrelevant as soon as Guab and Harris witnessed Plaintiff commit\n\n     atraf c violation. That traf c violation\u2014not the of cers\u2019 mistake in searching in the system for\n\n     \u201cSylvester Hayes\u201d instead of \u201cSilvester Hayes\u201d\u2014^provided probable cause for Plaintiff\u2019s arrest.\n\n     See supra \u00a7III.A.i.b. Therefore, whether Guab and Harris made reasonable efforts to ensure that\n\n\n\n                                                       15\nfi\n       fl\n               fi\n                    fi\n                         fi\n                              fi\n                              fi\n                                   fi\n                                         fi\n                                              fi\n                                                            fi\n\f          Case 3:23-cv-02271-S         Document 52         Filed 04/25/25        Page 16 of 20    PageID 632\n\n\n\n          Plaintiff was in fact the subject of the outstanding warrant is legally irrelevant, and none of the\n\n          cases cited by Plaintiff show that Guab and Harris violated Plaintiff\u2019s clearly established rights.\n\n                  For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Guab and Harris are entitled to\n\n          quali ed immunity with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and\n\n          false arrest.\n\n\n                                                B. Municipal Liability\n\n                  The Court turns next to Plaintiffs claim against the City of Dallas. \u201c[IJsolated\n\n          unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger [municipal] liability.\n\n          Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). As such, \u201ca\n\n          local government may not be sued under \u00a71983 for an injury in icted solely by its employees or\n\n          agents. Instead, it is when execution of agovernment\u2019s policy or custom ... in icts the injury that\n\n          the government as an entity is responsible under \u00a71983.\u201d Monell v. Dep\u2019t ofSoc. Servs. of NY,\n\n          436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). \u201cThe Fifth Circuit interprets Monell as requiring aplaintiff to identify\n\n          \u2018(1) an of cial policy (or custom), of which (2) apolicy maker can be charged with actual or\n\n          constructive knowledge, and (3) aconstitutional violation whose \u201cmoving force\u201d is that policy (or\n\n          custom).\u201d\u2019 Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 749 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston,\n\n          291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).\n\n                  Acourt need not consider municipal liability if it does not nd an underlying constitutional\n\n          violation. Carvell ex rel. HA.A.W. v. Gibson, No. 23-30252, 2024 WL 4533312, at *4 (5th Cir.\n\n          Oct. 21, 2024) (citing Hicks-Fields v. Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). That is\n\n          so because every municipal liability claim requires \u201can underlying constitutional violation.\u201d Hicks-\n\n          Fields, 860 F.3d at 808 (quoting Kitchen v. Dallas County, 759 F.3d 468,483 (5th Cir. 2014)). For\n\n          the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that Guab or\n\n\n\n\n                                                            16\nfi\n     fi\n                                                      fi\n                                                             fl\n                                                                            fl\n\f               Case 3:23-cv-02271-S            Document 52        Filed 04/25/25       Page 17 of 20    PageID 633\n\n\n\n               Harris violated his constitutional rights. \u201cThat alone forecloses his claim,\u201d at least with respect to\n\n               Guah and Harris\u2019s conduct. Jackson v. City ofHearne, 959 F.3d 194, 204 (5th Cir. 2020).\n\n                       But Plaintiff premises his municipal liahility claim on the actions of unnamed police\n\n               of cers as well. See, e.g., PL\u2019s Br. 1167(h) (arguing that \u201cnone of the [Doe Defendants] were\n\n               disciplined for the excessive force that they used to arrest Plaintiff ...under an erroneous\n\n               warrant\u201d). Plaintiffs municipal liability claims involving unnamed of cers are predicated on the\n\n               same two purported constitutional violations discussed above\u2014false arrest and excessive force.\n\n               See id. 1167(c) (contending that the City of Dallas failed to train its of cers on verifying aperson\u2019s\n\n               identity, proper arrest and confrontation techniques, excessive force, proper seizure, detention, and\n\n               arrest procedures, use of force against passively resisting individuals, less violent means to seize,\n\n               detain, or arrest aperson, and de-escalation methods). And amunicipality \u201cmay still be liable if\n                                                                                                                   9 9 9\n\n               the alleged injuries are not \u2018solely attributable to the actions of named individual defendants.\n\n               Bustos V. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458,467 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Curley v. Village ofSuffern,\n\n               268F.3d65,71 (2d Cir. 2001)).\n\n                       For the reasons set forth above, the Court determines that Plaintiff has not established a\n\n               false arrest claim against any police of cer. Plaintiffs traf c violation provided probable cause\n\n               for his arrest. See supra \u00a7III.A.i.b.\n\n                      As to excessive force, the Court, considering all the factors set forth previously, concludes\n\n               that no of cer on the scene used force that was clearly excessive and unreasonable. Again, the\n\n               Court nds it helpful to rst de ne the force used. Broadly, the of cers helped Guah pull Plaintiff\n\n               out of his car, assisted in holding Plaintiff down and trying to handcuff him and\u2014later\u2014restrain\n\n               his legs, and struggled to walk Plaintiff to apolice vehicle and to get Plaintiff into the vehicle.\n\n               Though Plaintiff claims that one or more of cers \u201ccan be seen dangerously pressing with his shin\n\n\n\n\n                                                                   17\nfi\n     fi\n          fi\n                        fi\n                                fi\n                                          fi\n                                               fi\n                                                             fi\n                                                                        fi\n                                                                             fi\n                                                                                  fi\n\f               Case 3:23-cv-02271-S                                 Document 52   Filed 04/25/25            Page 18 of 20   PageID 634\n\n\n\n               on the back of [Plaintiff\u2019s] neck\u201d and using a\u201clateral vascular neck restraint\u201d on Plaintiff, PL\u2019s Br.\n\n                      24-25, these assertions are belied by the video evidence. During the rst struggle on the ground.\n\n               an of cer has his foot on the ground and his knee on the top part of Plaintiff sback. Defs.\u2019 App.,\n\n               Ex. 2, at 01:29-35. Later, an of cer holds Plaintiffs head down so that his cheek is against the\n\n               ground. Id. at 02:07-28. The same of cer also intermittently has his hand on the back or side of\n\n               Plaintiffs neck. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 4, at 00:10-26. Later, as the of cers attempt to push Plaintiff into\n\n               the police car, an of cer wraps his ngers around Plaintiffs throat and appears to raise his knee\n\n               to Plaintiffs stomach. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 1, at 03:59-04:03. The same of cer then pushes down on\n\n               the back of Plaintiff shead as he tries to get Plaintiff inside the vehicle. Id. at 04:04-11. Finally,\n\n               during the struggle with Plaintiff outside the police vehicle, one of cer has his knee on the ground\n\n               near Plaintiffs neck and intermittently holds the side of Plaintiff sface down with his hand. Defs.\u2019\n\n               App., Ex. 2, at 03:40-04:30; Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 5, at 00:44-01:00, 01:13-41, 02:10-11; Defs.\u2019 App.,\n\n               Ex. 7, at 00:43-50. Plaintiff accuses an of cer of pressing on his pressure points, and the of cer\n\n               con rms that he is doing so. Defs.\u2019 App., Ex. 2, at 04:16-22. Throughout this time. Plaintiff is\n\n               actively struggling against the of cers as they attempt to restrain him.\n\n                                Having reviewed the evidence, the Court concludes that none of the of cers used excessive\n\n               force. Instead, they \u201cproperly use[d] \u2018measured and ascending actions that correspond[ed] to\n\n               [Plaintiff\u2019s] escalating verbal and physical resistance.\u2019\u201d Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384 (citation omitted).\n\n               Outside of one of cer momentarily grabbing Plaintiff\u2019s throat and possibly hitting Plaintiff in the\n\n               stomach with his knee, the of cers used relatively minor force, even as Plaintiff screamed, resisted\n\n               restraint, and refused to get in the police car. And as soon as Plaintiff\u2019s wrists and ankles were\n\n               restrained, the of cers put Plaintiff in the police car and then ceased their use of force. The Court\n\n                nds the use of force neither clearly excessive nor clearly unreasonable; therefore, the of cers did\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                   18\nfi\n     fi\n          fi\n                 fi\n                      fi\n                           fi\n                                      fi\n                                           fi\n                                                fi\n                                                     fi\n                                                          fi\n                                                               fi\n                                                                                   fi\n                                                                                        fi\n                                                                                             fi\n                                                                                                  fi\n                                                                                                       fi\n                                                                                                                  fi\n                                                                                                                       fi\n\fCase 3:23-cv-02271-S            Document 52       Filed 04/25/25        Page 19 of 20    PageID 635\n\n\n\nnot violate Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights. And without aconstitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot\n\nsustain his municipal liability claim against the City of Dallas.\n\n                                           C. Doe Defendants\n\n            Finally, Defendants ask the Court to sua sponte dismiss all claims against Doe Defendants.\n\nDefs.\u2019 Br. 6n.2. Plaintiff does not address this argument. Even if the Court     nds that Plaintiff did\n\nnot abandon his claims against these Defendants by failing to respond to the Motion on this point.\n\nsee Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.l (5th Cir. 2006), the claims are barred by\n\nthe applicable statute of limitations.\n\n            To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against Doe Defendants, such claims would arise\n\nunder 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. See Compl. 77-96 (asserting excessive force claim against Harris and\n\nGuab under Section 1983 and mentioning Doe Defendants\u2019 conduct). \u201cBecause there is no federal\n\nstatute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [\u00a7 1983], federal courts borrow the\n\nforum state\u2019s general personal injury limitations period.              Beckwith v. City of Houston,\n\n790 F. App\u2019x 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Texas\u2019s statute of limitations for personal\n\ninjury claims is two years. Id. at 572 (citation omitted). Federal law, however, governs when a\n\nclaim accrues. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (citation omitted). ASection 1983 claim accrues\n\nwhen the plaintiff knows or has suf cient information to know that he has been injured by the\n\ndefendant\u2019s actions. Id. (citations omitted). In this case. Plaintiffs claims accrued on October 16,\n\n2021, the date of Plaintiff sarrest. Plaintiff brought suit within two years of October 16, 2021, but\n\nhe still has not identi ed Doe Defendants.\n\n\n             [A]n amended complaint to substitute an individual for aJohn Doe defendant does not\n\nrelate back to the date of the original complaint....\u201d Bond v. Nueces County, No. 20-40050,2022\n\nWL 4595000, at *2 n.2 (5th Cir. Sept. 30,2022) (citation omitted); see also Bade v. Nueces County,\n\n952 F.3d 552, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding that an amended complaint does not relate back\n\n\n                                                    19\n       fi\n                          fi\n                                                                  fi\n\fCase 3:23-cv-02271-S       Document 52             Filed 04/25/25      Page 20 of 20       PageID 636\n\n\n\nto the date of the original complaint where the plaintiff substitutes anamed individual for aJohn\n\nDoe). The doctrine of equitable tolling is available to preserve Plaintiffs claims if \u201cstrict\n\napplication of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.\u201d Balle, 952 F.3d at 558 (citation\n\nomitted). But Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion on this point, sought discovery, or\n\notherwise \u201cdiligently pursued [his] rights as required for equitable tolling of the limitations\n\nperiod.\u201d Bond, 2022 WL 4595000, at *2 n.2. Indeed, by ling this case on October 16, 2023, the\n\ndate the statute of limitations ran. Plaintiff all but ensured he would not be able to name Doe\n\nDefendants in time. See Balle, 952 F.3d at 558. As such, the Court nds no basis for equitable\n\ntolling and dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Doe Defendants.\n\n                                      I V.        CONCLUSION\n\n\n       For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary\n\nJudgment [ECF No. 30]. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.\n\n       SO   ORDERED.\n\n\n       SIGNED April 25, 2025.\n\n\n\n                                                         IC\\REN     GREN    SCHOLER\n                                                         UNITED     S TAT E S   DISTRICT   JUDGE\n\n\n\n\n                                                    20\n                                             fi\n                                                          fi\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-04-27T18:36:27.038281-07:00","document_number":"52","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017646294","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Memorandum Opinion and Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-04-25T16:10:38.503835-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-25T01:55:51.333019-07:00","date_filed":"2025-04-25","time_filed":"17:52:59","entry_number":52,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-04-25.001","pacer_sequence_number":151,"description":"MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting  30  Defendants'  Motion for Summary Judgment.  This case is DISMSISSED WITH PREJUDICE.     (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 4/25/2025) (axm)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/423571175/","id":423571175,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/437637124/","id":437637124,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67883583/53/hayes-v-city-of-dallas/","date_created":"2025-04-25T16:10:38.441297-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-10T02:30:30.752932-07:00","sha1":"5c8db03b5150f168d6daaaa7adf76d5d4579673a","page_count":1,"file_size":218121,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.53.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.53.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S          Document 53        Filed 04/25/25        Page 1 of 1            PageID 637\n\n\n\n                                  United States District Court\n                                     NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n                                             DALLAS   DIVISION\n\n\n      S I LV E S T E R H AY E S                       \u00a7\n                                                      \u00a7\n      V .                                             \u00a7\n                                                      \u00a7          C I V I L A C T I O N N O . 3 : 2 3 - C V- 2 2 7 1 - S\n      CITY OF DALLAS, HOLLY HARRIS,                   \u00a7\n      WALTER PAUL GUAB, and DALLAS                    \u00a7\n      POLICE OFFICERS DOES I                          \u00a7\n      THROUGH 10                                      \u00a7\n\n                                           FINAL      JUDGMENT\n\n\n             The Court has granted Defendants Holly Harris, Walter Guab, and the City of Dallas\u2019s\n\n     Motion for Summary Judgment (\u201cMotion\u201d) [ECF No. 30]. See Order [ECF No. 52]. In doing so.\n\n     it has DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE all claims against Defendants.\n\n             It is, therefore, ORDERED that Plaintiff Silvester Hayes take nothing by his claims against\n\n     Defendants. Court costs are taxed against Plaintiff. All relief not expressly granted is DENIED.\n\n     This is a nal judgment.\n\n             SO   ORDERED.\n\n\n             SIGNED April 25, 2025.\n\n\n\n                                                          KAREN      GREN        SCHOLER\n                                                          UNITED      S TAT E S     DISTRICT          JUDGE\nfi\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2025-05-09T10:34:03.154737-07:00","document_number":"53","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017646317","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Judgment","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-04-25T16:10:38.425346-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.497764-07:00","date_filed":"2025-04-25","time_filed":"18:02:39","entry_number":53,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-04-25.002","pacer_sequence_number":153,"description":"FINAL JUDGMENT: It is ORDERED that Plaintiff Silvester Hayes take nothing by his claims against Defendants. Court costs are taxed against Plaintiff. All relief not expressly granted is DENIED. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 4/25/2025) (axm) (Entered: 04/25/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/420451809/","id":420451809,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/434421850/","id":434421850,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67883583/51/hayes-v-city-of-dallas/","date_created":"2025-03-26T10:13:27.203536-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.380492-07:00","sha1":"6ec8c1973ab3e54609be0e91f4c7d41a7ccd38ab","page_count":1,"file_size":255212,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.51.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.51.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":"2025-03-26T14:59:24.020919-07:00","document_number":"51","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017566766","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion for Summary Judgment","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2025-03-26T10:13:27.187152-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.370946-07:00","date_filed":"2025-03-25","time_filed":null,"entry_number":51,"recap_sequence_number":"2025-03-25.001","pacer_sequence_number":149,"description":"ORDER granting 30 Motion for Summary Judgment. The reasoning for the Court's ruling will follow in a separate memorandum opinion and order. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 3/25/2025) (ndt) (Entered: 03/26/2025)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/400329845/","id":400329845,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/409559794/","id":409559794,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67883583/50/hayes-v-city-of-dallas/","date_created":"2024-08-23T15:02:16.953733-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.354977-07:00","sha1":"7549a908c642b3a11b826c14ec12ddc4e8eb9fb5","page_count":14,"file_size":775708,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.50.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.50.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 1 of 14. PagelD: 215\" \u00a2 ees\n| TIED\n|\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | ,,\nFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS | <>\nDALLAS DIVISION |\n\nAUG 23 2024\n\nSPECIAL ORDER NO. 3-354\n\nEffective August 23, 2024, the cases listed on Exhibit A to this order are transferred to\nMagistrate Judge Brian McKay and shall henceforth carry the suffix letters \u201cBW.\u201d Magistrate\nJudge McKay shall seek consent of the parties in these cases to conduct all further proceedings\nand order the entry of final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(c). Ifall parties do not\nconsent, Magistrate Judge McKay shall, unless the assigned district judge otherwise orders,\n\nexercise all powers permitted by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b).\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nAugust 23, 2024\n\nDect (_ wes\n\nDAVID C. GODBEY\nCHIEF JUDGE\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 2of14 PagelD 216\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n1 2:24-CV-0142-BK Hasan v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n2 3:18-CV-1933-N Lexor Manufacturing LLC v. Luraco Ine, et al.\n\n3 3:19-CV-2204-X Retail Ready Career Center inc v. United States of America, et al.\n\n4 3:19-CV-2218-E Southwest Airlines Co v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc\n\n5 3:19-CV-2281-K FTC v. Match Group\n\n6 3:20-CV-0656-K-BK Buzz Photo, et al. v. People's Republic of China, et al.\n\n7 3:20-CV-2935-N Carswell v. Hunt County Texas, et al.\n\n8 3:20-CV-3718-D Samurai Global LLC v. Landmark American Insurance Company\n3:21-CV-0116-B Rainier Arms LLC, et al. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and\n\n9 Explosives, et al.\n\n10 3:21-CV-0840-E TNT Quadrangle Partner, LP, et al. v. SRPF B/Quadrangle Property, LLC, et al.\n\n11 3:21-CV-1764-D Vess v. City of Dallas, et al.\n\n412 3:21-CV-2429-L Raskin, et al. v. Dallas Independent Schoo! District, et al.\n\n13 3:22-CV-0654-N Salt and Light Energy Equipment LLC v. Crigin Bancorp\n\n14 3:22-CV-0663-E United States of America v. All Funds in 199 Bank Accounts Located in India\n\n15 3:22-CV-0780-M State of Texas, et al. v. Biden, et al.\n\n16 3:22-CV-0907-5 Hilltop Holdings Inc v. AlG Specialty Insurance Company\n\n17 3:22-CV-1185-X Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company v. Morgan\n\n18 3:22-CV-1869-E Walsh v. Peterson\n\n19 3:22-CV-2118-X Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton, et al.\n\n20 3:22-CV-2272-S Thomas v. McDonough, et al.\n\n21 3:22-CV-2597-K Pearson, et al. v. Gage\n\n22 3:22-CV-2624-B Iske v. Precision Dynamics International LLC\n\n23 3:22-CV-2763-E Boy Scouts of America v. Touch A Life Foundation Inc\n\n24 3:22-MC-0079-X-BK NiRB v. LM Carpet\n\n25 3:23-CV-0037-5 Young v. Baylor Scott & White Health\n\n26 3:23-CV-0133-B Endurance American Insurance Company v. Lloyd's Syndicate 3624\n\n27 3:23-CV-0313-S G Thomas Air LLC v. Pratt & Whitney Engine Services Inc\n\n28 3:23-CV-0342-M Ariat International Inc v. Khemchand Handicrafts Limited, et ai.\n\n29 3:23-CV-0464-D Alford v. Wonderland Montessori Academy LLC\n\n30 3:23-CV-0584-G Lee Ir v. United States\n3:23-CV-0640-D M Central Residences Condominium Association Inc v. Technology\n\n31 Insurance Company Inc\n\n32 3:23-CV-0641-L Securities and Exchange Commission v. McKnight\n\n33 3:23-CV-0811-E Alawei v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service\n\n34 3:23-CV-0881-X GS Holistic LCC v. Sri Manakamana Inc\n\n35 3:23-CV-0910-B Brandon Architects Inc v. Olerio Home LLC\n\n36 3:23-CV-0954-X Lopez v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.\n\n37 3:23-CV-0965-X Wilcox v. Equifax Information Services LLC\n\n38 3:23-CV-1171-K Modern Vascular of Southaven LLC, et al. v. Qlarant Integrity Solutions LLC\n\n39 3:23-CV-1198-G White v. American Economy Insurance Company\n\n40 3:23-CV-1351-X $2 Brothers LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company\n\n41 3:23-CV-1399-G Dill v. Experian Information Solutions Inc\n\n1\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 3o0f14 PagelD 217\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n42 3:23-CV-1457-5 Denison Glass & Mirror Ine v. EFCO LLC\n\n43 3:23-CV-1559-B Fitton v. Pinnacle Propane LLC\n\n44 3:23-CV-1574-E Johnson, et al. v. Dallas County Hospital District, et al.\n\n45 3:23-CV-1583-E Hernandez v. Brown\n\n46 3:23-CV-1663-D-BK Hill v. Norman, et ai.\n\n47 3:23-CV-1698-L-BK Jaffari v. Garland, et al.\n\n48 3:23-CV-1772-B Uliman v. OBM Miami\n\n49 3:23-CV-1915-B-BK Pinson v. Dallas Cnty. Sherriff\u2019s Office, et al.\n\n50 3:23-CV-1918-N Martinez v. Kroger\n3:23-CV-1945-D-BK Thornton v. Dallas County d/b/a Dallas County District Attorney's Office, et\n\n51 al.\n\n52 3:23-CV-2088-L-BK Gordon v. Kellam\n\n53 3:23-CV-2090-N-BK Tyson v. Commissioner of Social Security\n\n54 3:23-CV-2094-N-BK Humble v. Enge, et al.\n\n55 3:23-CV-2112-D King v. SeaHarbor Insurance Agency LLC\n\n56 3:23-CV-2162-5 Sealed v. Sealed\n\n57 3:23-CV-2195-X-BK Ashley v. DOL\n\n58 3:23-CV-2212-B Hunter v. Procollect Inc\n\n59 3:23-CV-2231-5 82 Glenwood Avenue LLC v. Schutze, et al.\n\n60 3:23-CV-2385-BK Fernandez v. Social Security Administration\n\n61 3:23-CV-2412-D Beasley v. Castle Credit Co Holdings LLC\n\n62 3:23-CV-2438-N-BK Blanks v, Federal Correctional Institution Seagoville, et al.\n\n63 3:23-CV-2493-K-BK Dickerson v. Conduent Commercial! Solutions LLC\n\n64 3:23-CV-2656-K-BK United States of America v. Rehab 4 Work Services LLC, et al.\n\n65 3:23-CV-2728-B Factor Mutual Insurance Company v. Southwest Pumps LLC, et al.\n\n66 3:24-CV-0013-B SW Marine v. Valentine\n\n67 3:24-CV-0072-E Katz v. Gruenberg, et al.\n\n68 3:24-CV-0104-E Tupac v. Asbury Automotive Group Inc, et al.\n\n69 3:24-CV-0112-E-BK Keys v. Connors et al.\n\n70 3:24-CV-0113-K-BK Smith v. Federai Bureau of Prisons, et al.\n\n71 3:24-CV-0148-B Samiappan v. Su\n\n72 3:24-CV-0244-N Sukin v. Experian Information Soiutions Inc, et al.\n\n73 3:24-CV-0298-G Liu v. U.S. Department of State, et ai.\n\n74 3:24-CV-0376-X Colonna, et al. v. LoanDepot.com LLC\n\n75 3:24-CV-0626-S-BK Alfano v. Allred Unit Mailroom\n\n76 3:24-CV-1060-L-BK Butler v. Lee at al\n\n77 3:24-CV-1063-D Rodriguez v. ALDI Inc\n\n78 3:24-CV-1083-K G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Frida's Tacos LLC, et al.\n\n79 3:24-CV-1089-X Feit Electric Company Inc v. Elong international USA Inc, et al.\n\n80 3:24-CV-1117-K Umoru v. Walmart Stores Texas LLC\n\n81 3:24-CV-1149-X-BK Central States Health and Welfare Fund v. Contreras\n3:24-CV-1151-X Dallas Food & Beverage LLC, et al. v. United States Smail Business\n\n82 Administration, et al.\n\n83 3:24-CV-1245-B Sealed v. Sealed\n\n84 3:24-CV-1367-S Jain, et al. v. Jaddou\n\n85 3:24-CV-1416-G-BK Henderson v. Trump\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 4of14 PagelD 218\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE RENEE H. TOLIVER TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n86 3:24-CV-1422-5 Kearney v. Equifax Information Services LLC\n\n87 3:24-CV-1551-B Zachary v. Environmental Protection Agency\n\n88 3:24-CV-1587-S-BK Henderson v. Trump\n\n89 3:24-CV-1621-G Hamilton v. Walmart Inc\n\n90 3:24-CV-1677-X EYM Pizza of Georgia LLC, et al. v. Pizza Hut LLC, et al.\n\n91 3:24-CV-1705-D Ogboru v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company\n92 3:24-MC-0017-E NFinity IP v. Varsity Spirit\n\n93 4:24-CV-0592-BK Johnson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n94 5:23-CV-0259-BK Arguello v. Social Security Administration\n\n95 5:23-CV-0281-BK Murphy v. Social Security Administration\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page5of14 PagelD 219\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n1 3:16-cv-00764-N VidStream LLC v. Twitter Inc\nCapio Funding LLC v. Rural/Metro Operating\n2 3:17-cv-02713-X Company LLC et al\n3 3:19-cv-01067-K Von Colditz v. Woods et af\n4 3:20-cv-00045-D Rodriguez v. Southern Health Partners Inc et al\n5 3:20-cv-00313-N Hamilton et al v. Dallas County\n6 3:20-cv-01358-E Coleman et al v. Brozen et al\n7 3:20-cv-03636-K Blue Yonder Group inc v. Kinaxis inc et al\n8 3:21-cv-01498-B Halperin et al v. Wills et al\n9 3:22-cv-00034-X McClung et al v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC et al\n10 3:22-cv-00141-N-BN Bell v. Moore\nit 3:22-cv-00525-X Fiberco, Inc. v. Acadia Insurance Company\nHighland Capital Management LP et al v. Highland Capital Management Fund\n12 3:22-cv-00789-X Advisors LP\n13 3:22-cv-00794-$ Legacy Exploration LLC v. Optimum Energy Partners LLC et al\n14 3:22-cv-01498-G-BN Timmons v. Director\n45 3:22-cy-01581-G-BN Sharper v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n416 3:22-cv-01600-G-BN Matthews v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n17 3:22-cv-01871-G-BN Turner v. O'Daniel\n18 3:22-cv-02062-X Shuler Drilling Company Inc v. Disiere Partners LLC, et al\n19 3:22-cv-02312-G-BN Mornes v, Director, TDCJ-CID\n20 3:22-cv-02403-N-BN Carey v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n21 3:22-cv-02410-G Castillo v. Walmart Inc et ai\n22 3:22-cv-02589-S-BN Minze v. Director, TOCJ-CID\n23 3:22-cv-02600-X Venzant v. Bigelow Arizona TX-282 LP et al\n24 3:22-cv-02891-N-BN Carcamo v. Director, FDCJ-CID\n25 3:23-cv-00057-K-BN Turner v. Wellpath Med Co\n26 3:23-cv-00066-B-BN Hernandez v. Director, TDCJ-CID\nTrustees of the IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health and Benefit Fund et al v. Rockey\n27 3:23-cv-00224-B Electric Inc\n28 3:23-cv-00280-K Mercury Associates Inc v. Primoris Services Corporation\n29 3:23-cv-00303-N Paige v. State Farm Lloyds\n30 3:23-cv-00337-X-BN Roccaforte v. Transunion\n31 3:23-cv-00338-N-BN Roccaforte v. Experian information Solutions Inc\n32 3:23-cv-00339-E-BN Roccaforte v. Equifax Inc\n33 3:23-cv-00355-X EDN Global Inc et al v. AT&T Mobility Services LUC et al\n34 3:23-cv-G0391-D Walker v. Hoffman et al\n35 3:23-cv-00410-E-BN Lewis v. Equifax\n36 3:23-cv-00435-B-BN Lewis v. Experian\n37 3:23-cv-00508-N Doe v. Backpage.com LLC et al\n38 3:23-cv-00547-K Bilbo v. Central Transport LLC\n39 3:23-cv-00568-B Cunningham v. State Farm Lloyds\n40 3:23-cv-00574-B Martin v. Penske Logistics LLC\n41 3:23-cv-80603-E Bridging Biosciences LLC v, Esch et al\n42 3:23-cv-00668-E-BN Spillman Jr v. Director, TDCI-CID\n43 3:23-cv-00706-E Arka Mesquite Investments LLC et al v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company\n44 3:23-cv-00736-M Powell v. Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana\n45 3:23-cv-00755-M-BN Toliver v. Director, TDCJ-CID\n46 3:23-cv-00772-E-BN Cloninger v. Director, TDC)-CID\n47 3:23-cv-00819-G White v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 6\u00e9of14 PagelD 220\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n4g 3:23-cv-00844-M Bellinger v. CureWave Lasers LLC et al\n49 3:23-cv-00852-G New York inn Inc et al v, Associated Industries Insurance Company Inc\n50 3:23-cv-00882-L GS Holistic LLC v. B Over 21 Inc et al\n51 3:23-cv-00915-B SMA v. Salesforce et al\n52 3:23-cv-00948-K Eder v. City of Burleson\n53 3:23-cv-00977-5 Brown v. Sarn\u2019s East Inc\n54 3:23-cv-01016-D Johnson v. Epsilon Data Management LLC\n55 3:23-cv-01018-X Licht v. Ling et al\n56 3:23-cv-01024-L GS Holistic LLC v. OMS Investment LLC et al\n57 3:23-cv-01039-B Jone Doe AS v. Salesforce Inc et a!\n58 3:23-cv-01089-N-BN Rountree v, FedEx Ground Package System Inc\n59 3:23-cv-01228-G Garcia v. Fiesta Mart LLC et al\n60 3:23-cv-01230-B Horton et al v. Heppner et al\n61 3:23-cv-01286-E Warner v. Equifax information Services LLC et ai\n62 3:23-cv-01301-X Dheera Limited Company v. Johnson Controls Inc et ai\n63 3:23-cv-01320-N-BN Silvers v. Director, TOCJ-CIB\n64 3:23-cv-01339-E Terri E Newkirk IRA v. Kelly e\u00a2 al\n65 3:23-cv-01345-L Russell v. Kroger Texas, LP\n66 3:23-cv-01356-L-BN Perez v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC et al\n6&7 3:23-cv-01366-N Husinger v. Smart Start Real estate Corporation\n68 3:23-cv-01376-X Harris v. Papa Texas LLC\n69 3:23-cv-01468-D Nieves v. Uber Technologies Inc et al\n70 3:23-cv-01484-L Red Barn Candle Company ELC v. Bath & Body Works Brand Management Inc\n7t 3:23-cv-01497-L Rittman v. Amguard Insurance Company\n72 3:23-cv-01502-G-BN Cook v. Costco Wholesale Corporation\n73 3:23-cv-01503-B Charitable DAF Fund LP et al v. Highland Capital Management LP\n74 3:23-cv-01517-N Bahamas Laguna Azure LLC v. City of Royse City, Texas\n75 3:23-cv-01525-X Biovant LLC v. BTEAG LLC et al\n76 3:23-cv-01548-5 Cobbs v. Baylor Scott & White\n77 3:23-cv-01557-D Clark v. Wyndham Worldwide, Inc\n78 3:23-cv-01561-K Erwin et al v. Metalcraft of Mayville Inc\n79 3:23-cv-01565-S-BN Fields v. Kelley\n80 3:23-cv-01617-X Holmes v. Equifax information Services LLC et al\n81 3:23-cv-01621-5 Niter et al v. Brown et al\n82 3:23-cv-01669-B Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n83 3:23-cv-01674-B Brookfield Property Retail Holdings LLC et ai v. Dillard Texas Central LLC\n84 3:23-cv-01675-L Van-Zandt Reiss et al v. The Bank of New York Melon\n&5 3:23-cv-01679-E Harris v. HireRight LLC\n86 3:23-cv-01775-X Palmer v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc\n87 3:23-cv-01791-L SPBL-1119 LLC v. Arciterra Strategic Retail Advisor LLC et al\n8&8 3:23-cv-01793-L LSM Blue Sky LLC v. AT Olathe Outlot 5 LLC et al\n89 3:23-cv-01802-E Megehee v. Pallida LLC\n90 3:23-cv-01805-E McConnell v. Applied Digital Corporation et al\n91 3:23-cv-01832-8 Doe v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit et al\n92 3:23-cv-01870-K GS Holistic LLC v. GNS Sons Inc\n93 3:23-cv-01889-S Velis v. Bangert et al\n94 3:23-cv-01910-E Hagans v. Child Care Group\n95 3:23-cv-01912-S Lessig v. Fiesta Mart LLC\n96 3:23-cv-01937-N Kustom Signals Inc v. Applied Concepts Inc\n97 3:23-cv-01972-L Owens v. Dallas Country Club\n98 3:23-cv-01973-K-BN Bohemond v. City of Dallas TX\n99 3:23-cv-01998-B Harland v. Workforce outsource Services Inc\n\n5\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 7of14 PagelD 221\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n\n100 3:23-cv-02009-G-BN Hunsinger v. Atmos Energy Corporation\n\n101 3:23-cv-02010-B Johnson et al v. Crosby Elementary School et al\n3:23-cv-02011-B\n\n102 Sample v. SLI Enterprises Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02023-B\n\n103 Promed LLC v, Quintairos Prieto Wood & Boyer PA\n3:23-cv-02050-X\n\n104 Taste of Chengdu LLC v. Feng\n3:23-cv-G2070-G6\n\n105 Summers v. Longbrake et al\n3:23-cv-02071-E\n\n106 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:23-cv-02097-X\n\n107 Holcamb v. Monitronics International\n3:23-cv-02110-B\n\n108 Consumer Data Partners, LP et al v. Agentra LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02126-5\n\n109 Mosure et al. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.\n3:23-cv-02143-N\n\n110 Dillard v. Gaines Investment Trust et al\n3:23-cv-02148-K-BN\n\n411 Booth v. US Bank Trust NA\n3:23-ev-02155-L\n\n412 cici Enterprises LP v. HSB Specialty Insurance Company\n3:23-cv-02158-D\n\n113 Wilson v. Korth Direct Mortgage et al\n3:23-cv-02203-E\n\n114 Warehouse Solutions Inc v. Plus Veterans, LLC\n3:23-cv-02214-$\n\n115 Big Games Management LLC v. Bespoke Piush LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02232-B\n\n116 Campbell v. Methodist Hospitais of Dallas et al\n3:23-cv-02238-E\n\n117 Cameron v. QT South LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02243-E\n\n118 Paez v. Childrens Health System of Texas\n3:23-cv-02284-G\n\n119 Stanley v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC\n3:23-cv-02286-X\n\n120 Brandon Wade Photography LLC v. Killian Design LLC\n3:23-cv-02292-L\n\n121 Lloyd v. Athena Condominiums Co-Owners Association\n3:23-cv-02294-B-BN\n\n422 Andrews v. York et af\n3:23-cv-02307-G\n\n123 Lee v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02367-K\n\n124 City of Dallas v. Triple D Gear, LLC\n3:23-cv-02387-L\n\n125 Nasrallah v. Scottsdale Insurance Company\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 8of14 PagelD 222\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:23-cv-02404-L\n126 Lilium GVP LLC v. Transportation Insurance Company et al\n3:23-cv-02421-X\n127 Principal Life Insurance Company v. Roque et al\n3:23-cv-02457-B-BN\n428 Young v. United Parcel Service Inc (Ohio)\n3:23-cv-02494-\u00a7\n4129 Hossain v. The Boeing Company\n3:23-cv-02504-K\n130 DAV Sub Inc v. QligSOFT Inc\n3:23-cv-02531-E\n131 Dawson v. Union Pacific Railroad\n3:23-cv-02532-E-BN\n132 Randle v. Brown et al\n3:23-cv-02539-X\n133 Bowers v. Uplift Education\n3:23-cv-02547-E\n134 Session v. Sanofi US Services Inc. et al\n3:23-cv-02594-E\n135 Verna IP Holdings LLC v. Dais Inc\n\n3:23-cv-02624-N\n\n136 Doe v. International Association of Eating Disorder Professionals Foundation Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02633-S\n137 Motton v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC\n3:23-cv-02670-E\n138 Samadian v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company\n3:23-cv-02671-X\n139 APOD Group ELC v. Glen Lakes Homeowners Association Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02673-G\n140 Elliott v. Gonzalez et al\n3:23-cv-02708-B\n144 Dishmon v. Newkirk Logistics Inc\n3:23-cv-02725-D\n142 Pradia v. The City of Rhome et al\n3:23-cv-02737-N\n143 Rollins-Booker v. Senture LLC\n3:23-cv-02770-S\n144 Camacho v. Sajeda Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02795-E\n145 Coil v. Experian Information Solutions Inc et al\n3:23-cv-02807-K\n146 Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Williams et al\n3:23-cv-02827-G-BN\n447 Moka v. Huntex Properties LLC et al\n3:23-cv-02830-X\n148 Mesa Digital LLC v. One Plus USA Corp\n3:23-cv-02834-E\n149 Canada, Jr. et al v. Sherman\n3:23-cv-02839-E\n150 Accurate Metal Stamping LLC v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company et al\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page9of14 PagelD 223\n\nExhibit A\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:24-cv-00002-L\n\n151 McLaughlin et al v. Family Assets Management LLC\n3:24-cv-00004-N\n\n152 Hill v. Garcia et af\n3:24-cv-00631-L\n\n153 Great American Insurance v, Truckmax Inc\n3:24-cv-00098-L\n\nLeon Capital Group LEC et al v. Princeton Excess & Surplus Lines Insurance Company\n\n154 et al\n3:24-cv-00122-B\n\n455 Slate/Sefect Inc v. Martin Marietta Materials Inc et al\n3:24-cv-00191-E\n\n156 Crum & Forster Insurance Company v. Shreno Limited\n3:24-cv-00255-E\n\n157 Blacknall v. Allata LLC et al\n3:24-cv-00285-G-BN\n\n158 Davis et al v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et ai\n3:24-cv-00331-5\n\n159 Tafolla v. Wacker et al\n3:24-cv-00341-S\n\n160 Forsythe et al v. Equifax Information Services LLC et ai\n3:24-cv-00347-K\n\n161 Homesteaders Life Company v. Williams\n3:24-cv-00361-E\n\n162 Kendrick v. QuickTrip Corporation\n3:24-cv-00382-B\n\n463 US Bank National Association v. Malloy\n3:24-cv-00388-E\n\n164 Elioznde v. Randalls Food and Drug LP\n3:24-cv-00417-X\n\n165 Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe\n3:24-cv-00434-L\n\n166 G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC v. Aguifar\n3:24-cv-00498-K\n\n167 Highland Employee Retention Assets LLC v. Dondero et al\n3:24-cv-00528-B\n\n168 Texas State Board of Dental Examiners v. Doe\n3:24-cv-00544-D-BN\n\n169 Rector v. Director, TDC)-CID\n3:24-cv-00568-N\n\n170 Strong v. Bank of America Corporation et al\n3:24-cv-00569-5\n\ni71 Haag Engineering Co v. Ellis et al\n3:24-cv-00647-L\n\n172 Languasco et al v. Blair Logistics LLC\n3:24-cv-00658-5\n\n173 Gardner v. The Lincoin National Life Insurance Company\n3:24-cv-00691-D\n\n174 Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP\n3:24-ev-00702-L\n\n175 Birrueta v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 10o0f14 PagelD 224\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n# Case No. Case Name\n3:24-cv-00728-X-BN\n\n176 Said v. EAN Holdings LLC et al\n3:24-cv-00791-E\n\n177 Wilson v. British Airways PLC\n3:24-cv-00796-L\n\n178 Sanchez v. Caliber Holdings LLC\n\n179 3:24-cv-00798-E King v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC\n3:24-cv-00809-S\n\n180 Kenney et al v. Dallas County Texas\n3:24-cv-00817-B\n\n181 Children's Health System of Texas v. UnitedHeaithcare Insurance Company\n3:24-cv-00892-B\n\n182 Toombs et al v. Kaufman County, Texas et al\n3:24-cv-00905-E-BN\n\n183 Rass v. Texas Instruments\n3:24-cv-00909-K-BN\n\n184 Bryant v. EverBank NA\n3:24-cv-00971-X\n\n185 Morgan v. Fundamental Clinical And Operational Services LLC\n3:24-cv-01020-X\n\n186 The Shore Firm LLP v. Videoshare LLC\n\n187 3:24-cv-01051-5 Gilliard v. Southwest Airlines Federal Credit Union\n3:24-ev-01075-N\n\n188 Ayangbile et al v. Children's Health Services of Texas\n3:24-cyv-011329-X\n\n189 Ray v. Experian Information Solutions Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01175-S-BN\n\n190 Romero et al v. US Bank National Association\n3:24-cv-01198-L\n\n191 Nautilus Hyosung America Inc v. BMO Bank NA et al\n3:24-cv-01209-D\n\n192 American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Southwest Airlines Co\n3:24-cv-01233-5\n\n193 Smith v. Montez et al\n3:24-cv-01262-D\n\n194 Brandon Wade Photography, LLC v. OTC Bar LLC\n3:24-cv-01288-D-BN\n\n195 Williams v. Richardson Independent School District\n3:24-cv-01319-G\n\n196 Daniels-Mock v. Taxir Logistics Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01326-K-BN\n\n197 Wickman v. Navarro County Jail\n3:24-cv-01339-B\n\n198 Travers v. Allstate Vehicle and Property insurance Company\n3:24-cv-01358-E\n\n199 Joe Hand Promotions inc v. Carbajal et at\n3:24-cv-01370-D-BN\n\n200 Council v. Draftkings et al\n3:24-cv-01397-K\n\n201 PacSec3 LLC v. RSA Federal LLC\n3:24-cv-01413-X\n\n202 Guillen et al v. U-Haul Company of Texas et al\n\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 11of14 PagelD 225\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n203 3:24-cv-01418-L Wilson v. Frontier Communications Parent, Inc.\n3:24-cv-O1447-E\n204 Akhmedov v. TA Operating LLC\n3:24-cv-01461-K\n205 Moreno et al v. Alan Halperin, In his capacity as Trustee of the GFES Liquidation Trust\n3:24-cv-01479-$\n206 NexPoint Real Estate Partners LLC et al v. Highland Capital Management LP\n3:24-cv-01483-G\n207 Amazon.com Inc et al v. Baik et al\n3:24-cv-01519-B-BN\n208 Robinson-Durham v. Navarro County Jail\n3:24-cv-01531-X\n209 Dugaboy Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:24-cv-01541-B\n210 Sanchez et al v. Schneider National Carriers Inc et al\n3:24-cv-01554-D\n211 Hernandez v. Bishop Cider Company LLC et al\n3:24-cv-01563-D\nWLands Limited Partnership LP et al v. Founders Plaza Nursing & Rehabilitation\n212 Partners LLC et al\n213 3:24-cv-01603-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n214 3:24-cv-01610-E Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n215 3:24-cv-01641-D Elizondo v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n2156 3:24-cv-01642-K Aurzada et af v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al\n217 3:24-cv-01646-G-BN Sharman v. H&R Block et al\n218 3:24-cv-01647-N Rodriguez v. Home Depot USA inc\n219 3:24-cv-01684-L Criss v. Grocery Delivery E-Services USA Inc\n220 3:24-cv-01685-G Harris v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n221 3:24-cv-01692-N Ricker v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al\n222 3:24-cv-01711-D Mitchel v, Pitre et al\n223 3:24-cv-01717-K Ayala v. Chedraui USA Inc\n224 3:24-cv-01716-L Hutchinson v. Sunrun Inc\n225 3:24-cv-01720-K Miller v. Xpress Global Systems LLC\ngag \u00ab| 3:44-cv-01743-L Collier v. Carter\n227 3:24-Cv-01768-S Bosman v. Amazon.com inc et al\n3:24-cv-01786-L\n228 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n3:24-cv-01787-L\n229 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust et al v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n230 3:24-cv-01796-8 Larsen v. Apt All Points Transportation LLC et al\n231 3:24-cv-01811-D McAfee v. Lear Corporation\n232 3:24-cv-01821-K Ryan LLC v, Radin\n233 3:24-cv-01839-E Forstey v. Jordan et al\n234 3:24-cv-01873-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n235 3:24-cv-01882-X Strike 3 Holdings LLC v. Doe\n236 3:24-cv-01908-D Hibdon v. Atrium Hospitality LP\n3:24-cv-01912-L\n237 Hunter Mountain Investment Trust v. Highland Capital Management LP et al\n\n10\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 12o0f14 PagelD 226\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE DAVID L. HORAN TO JUDGE MCKAY\n# Case No. Case Name\n238 3:24-cv-01949-X Alentisar Trading Company v. Eyondi et al\n239 3:24-cv-01967-S-BN Willtams v. Richardson ISD\n\n41\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 130f14 PagelD 227\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE REBECCA RUTHERFORD\nTO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n1 3:22-cv-02887-L-BT Murphy v. Director\n\n2 3:23-cv-00316-B-BT Marcus v. Director\n\n3 3:23-cv-00978-D-BT Walton v. USA\n\n4 3:23-cv-02449-D-BT Manzo v. Federal Bureau of Prisons\n\n5 3:23-cv-2677-S-BT Jackson v. Smali Business Administration et al\n\n6 3:24-cv-00175-S-BT Gonzales v. Collier\n\n7 3:24-cv-00661-B-BT Hammons v. Tradeline Motorcars et al\n\n8 3:24-cv-00637-S-BT Humes v. McDonald's Walmart #5416-945\n\n9 3:24-cv-01708-X-BT Traeger v. Jones et al\n\n10 3:23-cv-00315-X-BT Duhon v. Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company et al\n\n11 3:23-cv-02194-8-BT Walters v. Garland\n\n12 3:23-cv-02157-L-BT United States of America v. Morgan et al\n3:24-cv-00277-L National Association of Blind Merchants et al v. The Army & Air Force Exchange\n\n13 Service et al\n\n14 3:24-cv-00273-N-BT De Pute v. United States of America et al\n\n15 3:24-cv-00703-B-BT Freeman v. USA et al\n\n16 3:23-cv-01994-S-BT Davis v. City of Mclendon Chisholm et al\n\n17 3:24-cv-00731-L Crenshaw v. Anderson et al\n\n18 3:24-mc-00034-B-BT Calhoun v. United States\n\n19 3:23-cv-02682-5-BT Phoenix Bulk Carriers LLC v. CAL-IXA Aggregates LLC\n\n20 3:24-cv-01590-N-BT Jackson v. United States Postal Service et al\n\n27 3:24-cv-01759-B-BT Woods v. Delta Air Lines inc\n\n22 2:23-cv-00171-BT Row v. Commissioner\n\n23 1:24-cv-00083-BT Gonzales v. Commissioner\n\n24 5:23-cv-00293-BT Mims v. Commissioner\n\n25 3:14-cv-02970-X Clapper et al v. American Realty Investors Inc et al\n\n26 3:20-cv-01276-N Kunze et al v. Baylor Scott & White Health et al\n\n27 3:20-cv-01364-E Malbrew et al v. A+ Charter Schools\n\n28 3:21-cv-02131-K Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services Inc\n\n29 3:22-cv-00876-N Grimmett et al v. Coleman et al\n\n30 3:22-cv-02116-X Black v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America\n\n31 3:22-cv-02182-M Range! de Oliveira v. Bierman\n\n32 3:22-cv-02184-B Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Vibrant Builders et ai\n\n33 3:23-cv-00271-K Green v. USA\n\n34 3:23-cv-01340-L Perez v. Experian Information Solutions Inc\n\n35 3:23-cv-01412-N Aravamuthan v. US Citizenship & immigration Service et al\n\n36 3:23-cv-01416-B8 Landmark American Insurance Company v. Richland Trace Owners Association Inc\n\n37 3:23-cv-01441-N Thompson v. McGehee et al\n\n38 3:23-cv-01490-S Norwood v. Dallas County Hospital District\n\n39 3:23-cv-01494-N Mathew v. Santander Consumer USA Inc\n\n40 3:23-cv-02051-N Shrestha et al v. USCIS et al\n\n41 3:23-cv-02089-E Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. ACI Payments Inc et al\n\n42 3:22-cv-01529-N Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC et al\n\n12\n\fCase 3:22-cv-01529-N Document 28 Filed 08/23/24 Page 14o0f14 PagelD 228\n\nExhibit A\n\nCASES TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DOCKET OF JUDGE REBECCA RUTHERFORD\nTO JUDGE MCKAY\n\n43 3:23-cv-00045-E Mauricio et al v. US Postal Service\n\n44 3:23-cv-01168-N-BT United States of America v. $39,900 in US Currency\n45 3:23-cv-02146-D Securities and Exchange Commission v. Verges et al\n\n46 3:23-cv-02222-K Heard et al v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n47 3:23-cv-02591-D Oldham v. State Farm Lloyds\n\n48 3:23-cv-02621-8 Sealed v. Sealed\n\n49 3:23-cv-02701-\u00a3 Pertrorock Mineral Holdings, LLC et al v. Minerva Resources, LLC et al\n50 3:23-cv-02271-S Hayes v. City of Dallas et al\n\n51 3:23-cv-02338-K Smith v. USA\n\n52 3:23-cv-02462-D Botone et al v. Unitrin Safeguard Insurance Company\n\n53 3:24-cv-00014-D Hardrick v. Wells Fargo Bank National Association et al\n54 3:24-cv-00201-K Ware et al v. Meridian Security Insurance Company\n\n55 3:24-cv-00204-X United States of America v. $45,000.00 in US Currency\n56 3:24-cv-00220-B Bayazeed v. Robinson et al\n\n57 3:24-cv-00664-X VDPP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC\n\n58 3:24-cv-00700-X-BT Garrison v. John Doe et al\n\n59 3:24-cv-00943-E M&H Metal Specialties Inc v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fd\n60 3:24-cv-00944-5 USA v. Various Amounts of Funds Seized\n\n61 3:24-cv-01169-B Nieto v. USA\n\n62 3:24-cv-01484-S5 Antunez-Martinez v. Mayorkas\n\n63 3:24-cv-01525-K Gonzales Miranda et al v. Jaddou\n\n64 3:24-cv-01674-E-BT Turner v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm et al\n65 3:24-cv-01676-S Bibars v. Jaddou et al\n\n66 3:24-cv-01795-S Valtrus Innovations Ltd et al v. Google LLC\n\n67 3:24-cv-01902-K-BT Allen-Straight v. Director-TBC)\n\n68 3:24-cv-02028-X-BT Lockwood v. Chilcoat et al\n\n69 3:24-cv-02114-K-BT Santana v. Cantu et al\n\n70 3:24-cv-02127-X-BT Stancu v. Equal Employment Cppertunity Commission\n71 3:24-cy-02132-S-BT Damm v. Dallas County Jail\n\n72 3:24-cv-02143-B-BT Jalloul v. USA\n\n73 3:24-cv-02144-5-BT Jeffery v. NLN\n\n74 4:24-cv-00678-B8T Bolden v. Commissioner\n\n13\n","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2024-08-23T15:02:17.201998-07:00","document_number":"50","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177017081985","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order Reassigning Case","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-08-23T15:02:16.933931-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.342480-07:00","date_filed":"2024-08-23","time_filed":"17:00:23","entry_number":50,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-08-23.001","pacer_sequence_number":146,"description":"Special Order No. 3-354: Effective August 23, 2024, the cases listed on Exhibit A to this order are transferred to Magistrate Judge Brian McKay and shall henceforth carry the suffix letters BW. This case has been reassigned pursuant to Special Order No. 3-354. (The clerk has mailed a copy to all non-ECF users.) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Brian W McKay on 8/23/2024) (rekc) (Entered: 08/23/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/396996581/","id":396996581,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/406158052/","id":406158052,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67883583/49/hayes-v-city-of-dallas/","date_created":"2024-07-19T13:35:32.205915-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.329306-07:00","sha1":"1083e82613e70f5b856dd4f557bee1dd89effc59","page_count":23,"file_size":315355,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.49.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279.49.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":"recap-thumbnails/gov.uscourts.txnd.382279/406158052.thumb.1068.png","thumbnail_status":1,"plain_text":"     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24     Page 1 of 23 PageID 579\n\n\n\n                      IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                      FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n                                DALLAS DIVISION\n\nSILVESTER HAYES,                      \u00a7\n                                      \u00a7\n        Plaintiff,                    \u00a7\n                                      \u00a7\nv.                                    \u00a7       CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-cv-2271-S\n                                      \u00a7\nCITY OF DALLAS, et al.,               \u00a7\n                                      \u00a7\n        Defendants.                   \u00a7\n\n\n                       DEFENDANTS\u2019 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF\n                THEIR RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT\n\n\n\n                                      CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n                                      Tammy L. Palomino\n                                      City Attorney\n\n                                      s/ Lindsay Wilson Gowin\n                                      Lindsay Wilson Gowin\n                                      Deputy Chief of Torts\n                                      Texas State Bar No. 24111401\n                                      lindsay.gowin@dallas.gov\n\n                                      Dallas City Hall 7DN\n                                      1500 Marilla Street\n                                      Dallas, Texas 75201\n                                      Telephone:     214-670-3519\n                                      Telecopier: 214-670-0622\n\n                                      Attorneys for Defendants Holly Harris, Walter\n                                      Guab, and the City of Dallas\n\n\n\n\n                                          1\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                                              Page 2 of 23 PageID 580\n\n\n\n                                                      TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nI.        SUMMARY OF REPLY ......................................................................................................... 6\n\nII. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... 7\n\n     A. Irrelevant portions of Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit should be disregarded. ....................................... 8\n\n     B.      Plaintiff\u2019s arrest was constitutional...................................................................................... 9\n\n     C. Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether Defendant Officers\u2019 use of force\n        was excessive. .................................................................................................................... 14\n\n        1.      Plaintiff has misrepresented his noncompliance and resistance against the officers. .... 14\n\n        2.      Plaintiff has misrepresented the types of force the officers used against him. .............. 16\n\n     D. Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. ..................................................... 19\n\n        1.      Plaintiff has failed to point to any analogous cases showing that his arrest violated\n                clearly established law. .................................................................................................. 20\n\n        2.      Plaintiff has failed to point to any analogous cases showing that Defendant Officers\u2019\n                use of force violated clearly established law. ................................................................. 21\n\n     E.      In the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff\u2019s claims against the City\n             fail as a matter of law. ........................................................................................................ 22\n\n\n\n\n                                                                         2\n\f   Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                                           Page 3 of 23 PageID 581\n\n\n\n                                               TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nAlbrechsten v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys.,\n  309 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................... 8\nAlpha v. Hooper,\n  440 F. 3d 670 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................... 22\nAshcroft v. al-Kidd,\n  563 U.S. 731 (2011) .................................................................................................................. 19\nAtwater v. City of Lago Vista,\n  532 U.S. 318 (2001). ............................................................................................................. 9, 10\nBerckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt,\n  455 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................................ 7\nBetts v. Brennan,\n  22 F.4th 577 (5th Cir. 2022) ...................................................................................................... 19\nBurge v. St. Tammany Parish,\n 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999) ....................................................................................................... 9\nCity of Los Angeles v. Heller,\n  475 U.S. 796 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 22\nCraig v. Martin,\n 49 F.4th 404 (5th Cir. 2022) ...................................................................................... 8, 14, 19, 21\nDarden v. City of Fort Worth,\n 880 722 (5th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................................. 20\nDevenpeck v. Alford,\n 543 U.S. 146 (2004) ........................................................................................................ 9, 12, 13\nDeville v. Marcantel,\n 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 14\nDuckett v. City of Cedar Park,\n 950 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1992) ....................................................................................................... 9\nFinley v. State,\n  484 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) .................................................................................. 11\nHarlow v. Fitzgerald,\n 457 U.S. 800 (1982) .................................................................................................................. 19\nHartsfield v. Lemacks,\n 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995) ..................................................................................................... 21\nHudson v. McMillian,\n 503 U.S. 1 (1992) ................................................................................................................ 21, 22\nJimerson v. Lewis,\n  94 F.4th 423 (5th Cir. 2024) ...................................................................................................... 21\n\n                                                                    3\n\f   Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                                           Page 4 of 23 PageID 582\n\n\n\nJoseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett,\n  981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020) ..................................................................................................... 16\nKansas v. Glover,\n 589 U.S. 376 (2020) .............................................................................................................. 9, 10\nKingsley v. Hendrickson,\n  576 U.S. 389 (2015) .................................................................................................................. 22\nLewis v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc.,\n  No. 22-10758, 2023 WL 2810881 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023) .......................................................... 7\nLivingston v. Texas,\n  No. 22-240719, 2023 WL 4931932 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) ..................................................... 19\nMaryland v. Garrison,\n 480 U.S. 79 (1987) .................................................................................................................... 20\nMeadours v. Ermel,\n 483 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................................... 16\nOscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock,\n No. 5:05-CV-029-C, 2008 WL 11429735 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2008) ........................................ 7\nPearson v. Callahan,\n  555 U.S. 223 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 19\nPennsylvania v. Mimms,\n  424 U.S. 106 (1977) .................................................................................................................. 13\nPoole v. City of Shreveport,\n 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................................... 14\nRamirez v. Martin,\n No. 22-10011, 2022 WL 16548053 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2022) .................................................... 19\nRogers v. Hooper,\n 271 F. App\u2019x 431 (5th Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................. 21\nSam v. Richard,\n  887 F.3d 710, (5th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................... 12\nSolis v. Serrett,\n  31 F.4th 975 (5th Cir. 2022) ...................................................................................................... 19\nUnited States v. Martin,\n 68 F.3d 469, 1995 WL 581913 (5th Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 11\nUnited States v. Walker,\n H-20-222, 2021 WL 951665 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2021) ........................................................... 10\nVelazquez v. Baker,\n  No. 5:20-CV-078-BQ, 2021 WL 812505 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2021) ........................................ 22\nWalker v. City of Houston,\n No. 22-20537, 2023 WL 6457926 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023) ........................................................ 19\n\n\n                                                                    4\n\f   Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                                           Page 5 of 23 PageID 583\n\n\n\nWhren v. United States,\n 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ............................................................................................................ 12, 13\nWilkens v. Gaddy,\n 559 U.S. 34 (2010) .................................................................................................................... 21\nStatutes\nTex. Penal Code \u00a7 38.03 ............................................................................................................... 11\nTexas Penal Code \u00a7 38.01 (a)(1)................................................................................................... 11\nTexas Penal Code \u00a7 38.03 (a) ....................................................................................................... 11\nTexas Penal Code \u00a7 38.03 (b) ....................................................................................................... 11\nOther Publications\nWilliam P. Bozeman, et al.,\n Safety of Vascular Neck Restraint Applied by Law Enforcement Officers, 92 J. Forensic &\n Legal Med. 102446 (Nov. 2022) ............................................................................................... 18\n\n\n\n\n                                                                    5\n\f     Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24               Page 6 of 23 PageID 584\n\n\n\n                         IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                         FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n                                   DALLAS DIVISION\n\nSILVESTER HAYES,                    \u00a7\n                                    \u00a7\n      Plaintiff,                    \u00a7\n                                    \u00a7\nv.                                  \u00a7     CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23cv2271-S\n                                    \u00a7\nCITY OF DALLAS, et al.,             \u00a7\n                                    \u00a7\n      Defendants.                   \u00a7\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\n                    DEFENDANTS\u2019 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF\n                 THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nTO THE HONORABLE COURT:\n\n         Defendants Holly Harris, Walter Guab, and the City of Dallas file this reply in support of\n\ntheir joint motion for summary judgment as to all claims alleged against them by Plaintiff Silvester\n\nHayes.\n\nI.       SUMMARY OF REPLY\n\n         Plaintiff\u2019s Response Brief (\u201cResp.\u201d, Dkt. No. 40) and supporting appendix (\u201cPl. App.\u201d,\n\nDkt. No. 41) offer three key concessions that make summary judgment in favor of Defendants\n\ninevitable:\n\n         (1) Plaintiff does not dispute that his interactions with Defendants were entirely captured\n             on video by the officers\u2019 body-worn and dashboard cameras filed as part of Defendants\u2019\n             summary judgment appendix (\u201cApp.\u201d, Dkt. Nos. 17-18 at Ex. 1-21).\n\n         (2) In his unsworn pleadings Plaintiff repeatedly claimed that Officers Guab and Harris\n             joined other unnamed officers in \u201ckicking, punching, and tasing\u201d him, but he declined\n             to make those accusations in his affidavit made under penalty of perjury (compare 1st\n             Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 24) \u00b6\u00b6 87, 88, 94, 125, with Pl. App. at 001-07); and\n\n\n\n\n                                                  6\n\f      Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                Page 7 of 23 PageID 585\n\n\n\n         (3) Plaintiff admits to committing a traffic violation in plain view of the officers (Pl. App.\n             at 003), which indisputably provides probable cause for his arrest from the outset of\n             the incident.\n\nEspecially in light of those concessions, there are no genuine disputes of material fact. The Court\n\ncan adjudicate the excessive force claim based upon the contents of the videos, which show that\n\nOfficers Guab and Harris did not use excessive force or otherwise violate Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional\n\nrights. Because no constitutional violations occurred, Plaintiff\u2019s Monell claims against the City fail\n\nas a matter of law. Accordingly, all the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor\n\non all claims.\n\nII.      ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES\n\n         Summary judgment \u201cis essentially \u2018put up or shut up\u2019 time for the non-moving party: the\n\nnon-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on\n\nassertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.\u201d Oscar Renda Contracting,\n\nInc. v. City of Lubbock, No. 5:05-CV-029-C, 2008 WL 11429735, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18,\n\n2008) (quoting Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff\n\nviolated Local Rule 56.5(c) by failing to provide citations to the record (or any evidence at all) for\n\nmany of the assertions in his Response. Plaintiff\u2019s Response also contains many footnotes directing\n\nthe reader to one or more videos without providing time stamps, thus obfuscating which portions\n\nof the videos Plaintiff contends support his argument. See, e.g., Resp. \u204b 11 n.14 (citing all twenty-\n\none videos with no time stamps). Because \u201c\u2018[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried\n\nin the record,\u2019\u201d the Court is \u201cnot required to review the entire summary-judgment record to search\n\nfor fact disputes supporting [Plaintiff\u2019s] opposition to the defendants\u2019 summary-judgment\n\nmotion.\u201d Lewis v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., No. 22-10758, 2023 WL 2810881, at *2 (5th Cir.\n\nApr. 6, 2023) (quoting Albrechsten v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th\n\n\n\n                                                   7\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                    Page 8 of 23 PageID 586\n\n\n\nCir. 2002)). All assertions lacking an evidentiary basis and/or a citation to the record should\n\ntherefore be disregarded.\n\n        As explained below and in Defendants\u2019 opening brief (Dkt. No. 31), Plaintiff\u2019s admitted\n\ntraffic violation is fatal to his false arrest claim, and the videos from the officers\u2019 body-worn\n\ncameras (\u201cBWC\u201d) and dashboard cameras (\u201cdashcam\u201d) are fatal to his excessive force claim. In\n\nthe absence of an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff\u2019s claims against the City fail as a\n\nmatter of law. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims.\n\n        A.      Irrelevant portions of Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit should be disregarded.\n\n        In addition to referring to the videos Defendants filed in support of their motion for\n\nsummary judgment, Plaintiff also submitted his own affidavit, which has limited evidentiary value\n\nfor two main reasons. First, as discussed more specifically throughout this Reply, Plaintiff\u2019s\n\ndescription of events omits his noncompliance and resistance, and misrepresents the officers\u2019\n\nactions as depicted in the videos of the event. Pl. App. (Dkt. 41-1) at 001-07. The Fifth Circuit has\n\ninstructed \u201cif there is video evidence that blatantly contradicts the plaintiffs' allegations, the court\n\nshould not adopt the plaintiffs\u2019 version of the facts; instead, the court should view those facts in\n\nthe light depicted by the videotape.\u201d Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal\n\nquotations and citations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit should be disregarded to the\n\nextent it contradicts the video evidence.\n\n        Second, his affidavit also contains many irrelevant descriptions of Plaintiff\u2019s opinions and\n\nemotions. Fourth Amendment analyses must be performed not from a plaintiff\u2019s perspective, but\n\nrather \u201cfrom the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene,\u201d id. at 410, based on \u201cthe facts\n\nknown to the arresting officer at the time\u201d of the incident, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152\n\n\n\n\n                                                   8\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                   Page 9 of 23 PageID 587\n\n\n\n(2004). Only Plaintiff\u2019s actions matter in this analysis; the proclaimed reasons for his unlawful\n\nbehavior do not, and they should be disregarded.\n\n       B.      Plaintiff\u2019s arrest was constitutional.\n\n       To state a \u00a7 1983 false arrest claim, Plaintiff must show that he was arrested without\n\nprobable cause. Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 187 F.3d 452, 480 (5th Cir. 1999). \u201cA police officer\n\nhas probable cause to arrest if, at the time of the arrest, he had knowledge that would warrant a\n\nprudent person\u2019s belief that the person arrested had already committed or was committing a crime.\u201d\n\nDuckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1992). It is well-established that an\n\nofficer \u201cmay arrest an individual without violating the Fourth Amendment if there is probable\n\ncause to believe that the offender has committed even a very minor criminal offense in the officer\u2019s\n\npresence.\u201d Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322 (2001).\n\n       Plaintiff\u2019s Response focuses heavily on his \u201cmistaken identity\u201d theory regarding Defendant\n\nOfficers\u2019 investigation of an active domestic violence arrest warrant. See, e.g., Resp. at 5-7, 10-\n\n12, 17-27. However, this theory fundamentally misunderstands decades of Fourth Amendment\n\njurisprudence governing investigative stops. According to the Supreme Court,\n\n        the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic\n       stop when he has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular\n       person stopped of criminal activity. Although a mere \u2018hunch\u2019 does not create\n       reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably\n       less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously\n       less than is necessary for probable cause.\n\nKansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020). Plaintiff admits that Defendant Officers\u2019 law\n\nenforcement databases indicated that (1) active domestic violence arrest warrants existed for an\n\nindividual named \u201cSylvester Hayes,\u201d and (2) Plaintiff\u2019s car was registered to \u201cSylvester Hayes\u201d\n\n(spelled the same way as the subject of the active warrants). Resp. \u204b 7. \u201cTexas courts have\n\nconsistently held that officers may justifiably initiate a traffic stop based on information they find\n\n\n                                                  9\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                  Page 10 of 23 PageID 588\n\n\n\nin their squad-car computers.\u201d United States v. Walker, H-20-222, 2021 WL 951665, at *9 (S.D.\n\nTex. Mar. 12, 2021) (collecting cases). Officers Guab and Harris reasonably and correctly drew\n\nthe \u201ccommonsense inference\u201d that the driver of Plaintiff\u2019s car was the registered owner. Glover,\n\n589 U.S. at 381. The officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Plaintiff could be the subject of\n\nthe active warrants, which provided them with a lawful basis to pull him over to investigate. Their\n\ndecision to briefly detain Plaintiff to determine if he was the subject identified in the domestic\n\nviolence warrants was also reasonable. The subsequent revelation that Plaintiff was not the\n\n\u201cSylvester Hayes\u201d identified in the domestic violence warrants does not render the traffic stop or\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s arrest unlawful, and Plaintiff offers no case law holding otherwise.\n\n       For purposes of this probable cause analysis, however, the domestic violence warrants\n\nbecame legally irrelevant when Defendant Officers saw Plaintiff commit a traffic violation.\n\nPlaintiff admits in his affidavit that he committed a traffic violation in plain view of the officers:\n\n\u201c[W]hen Police Officers Guab and Harris started aggressively following me . . . I failed to indicate\n\nwhen I turned, and Officers Guab and Harris turned on their police lights and I stopped my\n\nvehicle.\u201d Pl. App. at 003; see also Resp. \u00b6 53. Failing to use a turn signal before turning violates\n\nSection 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code. An officer \u201cmay arrest an individual without\n\nviolating the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe that the offender has\n\ncommitted even a very minor criminal offense in the officer\u2019s presence.\u201d Atwater, 532 U.S. at 322.\n\nTherefore, based on having personally observed Plaintiff commit a traffic violation, Defendant\n\nOfficers had probable cause to arrest him from the very outset of the traffic stop. Plaintiff offered\n\nno response to this argument.\n\n       As discussed in Defendants\u2019 opening brief, Plaintiff also created probable cause for his\n\narrest when he refused to get out of the car, and then physically resisted the officers\u2019 efforts to\n\n\n\n                                                 10\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                   Page 11 of 23 PageID 589\n\n\n\nremove him from the vehicle, search him, and place him in the back seat of the squad car. App.\n\nEx. 1 (Harris BWC) at 0:46-6:07; Ex. 2 (Whitman BWC) at 0:40-1:13; Ex. 4 (Guab BWC) 0:00-\n\n3:38; Ex. 5 (Luciano BWC) at 0:33-2:42; Ex. 21 (Dashcam) 0:00-4:10. In doing so, Plaintiff\n\nviolated both Texas Penal Code \u00a7 38.01 (a)(1) (interfering with public duties) and Texas Penal\n\nCode \u00a7 38.03 (a) (resisting arrest, search or transportation). See also Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d\n\n926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (defendant \u201cused force against the officers by pulling against the\n\nofficers' force. In this case, pulling away from the officers satisfies the \u2018in opposition or hostility\n\n[toward the police officers]\u2019 requirement\u201d of Tex. Penal Code \u00a7 38.03). Plaintiff\u2019s bald assertions\n\nabout racial profiling and misapprehension about whether Officer Guab could order him out of the\n\ncar are irrelevant: Texas Penal Code \u00a7 38.03 (b) states that \u201c[i]t is no defense to prosecution under\n\nthis section that the arrest or search was unlawful.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s only response to this argument is\n\ndenial: he claims he was \u201cat most offering passive non-violent resistance and posed absolutely no\n\nthreat and was quickly in full surrender to Defendant Officers Guab and Harris.\u201d Resp. \u204b 132\n\n(citing Plaintiff\u2019s entire affidavit and all twenty-one videos of the incident without time stamps).\n\nVideos of the incident show that Plaintiff fought against the officers throughout their encounter.\n\nSee App. Ex. 1 (Harris BWC) at 0:46-6:07; Ex. 2 (Whitman BWC) at 0:40-1:13; Ex. 4 (Guab\n\nBWC) 0:00-3:38; Ex. 5 (Luciano BWC) at 0:33-2:42; Ex. 21 (Dashcam) 0:00-4:10.\n\n       Finally, Plaintiff also was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant for a prior traffic\n\nviolation, making his arrest not only lawful, but mandatory. App. at 007. \u201c[O]utstanding warrants\n\nconstitute[] probable cause to arrest.\u201d United States v. Martin, 68 F.3d 469, 1995 WL 581913, at\n\n*2 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Plaintiff\u2019s Response does not address this point at all.\n\n       Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Officers used his admitted traffic violation as a\n\npretext, and that their true motivations were (1) investigation of the suspected domestic violence\n\n\n\n                                                  11\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                   Page 12 of 23 PageID 590\n\n\n\nwarrant, and (2) racial profiling. Resp. \u204b\u204b 6-10. Both claims are red herrings. The Supreme Court\n\nhas long held that its \u201ccases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic\n\nstops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.\u201d Whren v. United\n\nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). \u201cNot only have we never held, outside the context of inventory\n\nsearch or administrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer\u2019s motive invalidates\n\nobjectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and\n\nasserted the contrary.\u201d Id. at 812. \u201cThe test is objective, not subjective. Accordingly, the officer\u2019s\n\n\u2018subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known\n\nfacts provide probable cause.\u2019\u201d Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710, (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Devenpeck,\n\n543 U.S. at 153).\n\n       Regarding Plaintiff\u2019s repeated (but unsupported) allegations of racial profiling, the\n\nSupreme Court noted in Whren that it \u201cof course agree[d] that the Constitution prohibits selective\n\nenforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for\n\nobjecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not\n\nthe Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth\n\nAmendment analysis.\u201d 517 U.S. at 813. Plaintiff has neither asserted an equal protection claim nor\n\nproduced any evidence of racial profiling; his accusations of racism against Defendant Officers\n\nare unsupported, conclusory, and baseless.\n\n       Although Plaintiff complains that Officer Guab did not explain the situation to him and\n\nthat Defendant Officers did not have probable cause to remove Plaintiff from his vehicle, he offers\n\nno case law to suggest that either of those actions were constitutionally required. Indeed, Plaintiff\u2019s\n\nresponse ignores Pennsylvania v. Mimms, in which the Supreme Court held that an officer could\n\n\n\n\n                                                  12\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                    Page 13 of 23 PageID 591\n\n\n\norder a driver out of the car \u201cas a matter of course\u201d during a traffic stop \u2013 no separate probable\n\ncause (or any other justification) is required. 424 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977).\n\n        Plaintiff\u2019s Response also makes much of a conversation between Guab, Harris, and a DPD\n\nsergeant who arrived at the scene after Plaintiff was in custody, calling it an \u201can effort to find some\n\nway to arrest the Plaintiff Hayes and justify their actions,\u201d and arguing it is evidence that Plaintiff\u2019s\n\narrest was a \u201cmistake.\u201d Resp. \u00b6 122-23. However, Plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the exchange is both\n\nmischaracterization of the conversation and another misunderstanding of the Fourth Amendment\u2019s\n\nobjective standard. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Guab and Harris corrected the\n\nsergeant\u2019s misunderstanding of the events preceding his arrival: they explained that Plaintiff\n\ncommitted a traffic violation that prompted their initial contact with him, and that during their\n\nencounter Plaintiff resisted arrest by fighting them. Resp. \u00b6 123. The sergeant agreed with the\n\nofficers\u2019 assessment and instructed them to check with the jail sergeant about the particulars of the\n\ngun possession law. Id. Contrary to Plaintiff\u2019s assertion, there was no need for the officers to \u201cfind\n\nsome way to arrest the Plaintiff Hayes\u201d; he was already arrested and sitting in the back of their\n\nsquad car. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an arresting officer\u2019s statement\n\nof his reasons for an arrest is irrelevant:\n\n        We rejected the argument [in Whren], and we reject it again here. Subjective intent\n        of the arresting officer, however it is determined (and of course subjective intent\n        is always determined by objective means), is simply no basis for invalidating an\n        arrest. Those are lawfully arrested whom the facts known to the arresting officers\n        give probable cause to arrest.\n\nDevenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154-55 (emphasis in original); see Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13.\n\n        In summary, Plaintiff has failed to meet his summary judgment burden, and devotes\n\nhis Response to irrelevant arguments and misstatements of the record. The undisputed\n\nsummary judgment evidence unequivocally shows that Officers Guab and Harris had\n\n\n\n                                                   13\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                Page 14 of 23 PageID 592\n\n\n\nprobable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on the facts and information known to them at the\n\ntime. Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence raising a genuine issue as to whether\n\nDefendant Officers lawfully arrested him. Therefore, Plaintiff\u2019s Fourth Amendment\n\nunlawful seizure claim fails as a matter of law and Defendant Officers are entitled to\n\nsummary judgment on this claim.\n\n       C.      Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether Defendant Officers\u2019\n               use of force was excessive.\n\n       To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show \u201c(1) an\n\ninjury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3)\n\nthe excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.\u201d Craig, 49 F.4th at 409. \u201cPhysical force may\n\nbe necessary to ensure compliance when a suspect \u2018refus[es] to comply with instructions.\u2019\u201d Id. at\n\n412 (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009)). \u201cA use of force is\n\nreasonable if an officer uses \u2018measured and ascending actions that correspond[ ] to [a suspect\u2019s]\n\nescalating verbal and physical resistance.\u2019\u201d Craig, 49 F.4th at 412 (quoting Poole v. City of\n\nShreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2012)). Videos of the incident indisputably show that\n\nPlaintiff refused to comply with officers\u2019 commands and that he verbally and physically resisted\n\narrest. The undisputed evidence further shows that despite Plaintiff\u2019s noncompliance and physical\n\nresistance, Defendant Officers and their colleagues managed to gain control of Plaintiff, using\n\nreasonable and far less force than was constitutionally permissible, and take him into custody.\n\n               1. Plaintiff has misrepresented his noncompliance and resistance against the\n                  officers.\n\n       Plaintiff describes his behavior toward the police as \u201cat most offering passive non-violent\n\nresistance and posed absolutely no threat and was quickly in full surrender to Defendant Officers\n\nGuab and Harris.\u201d Resp. \u204b 132. The video evidence, however, belie Plaintiff\u2019s version, and show\n\n\n\n                                                14\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                 Page 15 of 23 PageID 593\n\n\n\nwhat transpired during the incident from multiple angles. 1 See App. Ex. 1 (Harris BWC) at 0:46-\n\n6:07; Ex. 2 (Whitman BWC) at 0:40-1:13; Ex. 4 (Guab BWC) 0:00-3:38; Ex. 5 (Luciano BWC)\n\nat 0:33-2:42; Ex. 21 (Dashcam) 0:00-4:10.\n\n        Plaintiff has also abandoned some of the allegations about his own actions that he made in\n\nhis unsworn complaints. For example, Plaintiff claimed in his pleadings that \u201c[a]s he was\n\ncompliantly handing Defendant Officer Guab his driver\u2019s license, Plaintiff Hayes disclosed to\n\nDefendant Officer Guab that he had a handgun in the vehicle and that the gun was lawfully\n\nregistered in his name.\u201d Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) \u00b6 20; 1st Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 27) \u00b6 26. However,\n\nneither his Response nor his sworn affidavit repeat these claims that he disclosed the gun to Officer\n\nGuab prior to its discovery. In fact, the videos show that Plaintiff did not mention the existence of\n\nthe gun until after Officer Whitman spotted it in Plaintiff\u2019s right front pants pocket, at which time\n\nPlaintiff yelled \u201cOh! Oh! No, this is my gun! This is my gun! This is my gun!\u201d while trying to rip\n\nhis right hand out of Officer Whitman\u2019s grasp. App. Ex. 1 (Harris BWC) at 1:45-1:56; Ex. 2\n\n(Whitman BWC) at 0:56-1:14; Resp. \u00b6 20. The videos also show that Plaintiff did not tell the\n\nofficers at that time that the handgun was legally registered in his name. Id.\n\n        Plaintiff also argues that \u201c[b]ased on the fact that Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 gun was in fact a lawfully\n\nregistered weapon and did not pose a threat to anyone at the scene of the incident, Defendant\n\nOfficers Guab and Harris did not have an objective reason to believe that the gun posed a risk [sic]\n\ntheir safety.\u201d Resp. \u204b 21. A handgun concealed in the pocket of an irate, irrational, noncompliant,\n\nand physically resisting suspect poses a very serious threat to the safety of everyone present,\n\nregardless of whether the gun was \u201clegally registered in [Plaintiff\u2019s] name.\u201d Pl. App. at 004.\n\n\n\n\n1\n  The Statement of Undisputed Facts section of Defendants\u2019 opening brief contains a play-by-play\ndescription of the videos with precise time stamps for easy reference. See Dkt. No. 31 at 6-12.\n\n                                                  15\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                    Page 16 of 23 PageID 594\n\n\n\n                2. Plaintiff has misrepresented the types of force the officers used against\n                   him.\n\n        In his unsworn First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff repeatedly claimed that Officers Guab\n\nand Harris joined other unnamed officers 2 in \u201ckicking, punching, and tasing Plaintiff Hayes.\u201d 1st\n\nAm. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 87, 88, 94, 125. However, in his affidavit (which, unlike his pleadings, must be\n\ngiven under penalty of perjury), Plaintiff does not claim that any of the officers punched, kicked\n\nor tased him. As discussed in Defendants\u2019 opening brief at 8-11, the officers\u2019 BWC and dashboard\n\ncamera videos definitively prove that these allegations are false, and Plaintiff has now quietly\n\nabandoned them.\n\n        Plaintiff also claimed that \u201cthe Officers hog tied Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 feet and they violently\n\nplaced him in the back of one of [sic] a Dallas Police Department cruiser.\u201d Resp. \u204b 29; see also 1st\n\nAm. Compl. \u00b6 45. A \u201chog-tie\u201d is a restraint in which the detainee is positioned \u201con his stomach,\n\n[and] the handcuffs around his wrists were connected to the handcuffs around his ankles.\u201d Joseph\n\nex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 341 (5th Cir. 2020). The videos show that Plaintiff\n\nwas never hog-tied. See App. Ex. 6 (Grajeda BWC) 0:40-2:07 (Officer Grajeda fastened a plastic\n\nziptie around Plaintiff\u2019s ankles while Plaintiff yelled, kicked and pulled his feet away, and then\n\nthe officers lift Plaintiff into a standing position).\n\n        Plaintiff also pleaded that the officers \u201cpull[ed] Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 arm out of his shoulder\n\nsocket.\u201d 1st Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 87, 88, 94, 125; see also Resp. \u00b6 26 (\u201cone of the Officers at the scene\n\npulled Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 arm out of his shoulder socket\u201d). 3 Plaintiff does not identify which officer\n\n\n2\n Throughout his pleadings, Response, and affidavit, Plaintiff frequently makes claims about what \u201cofficers\u201d\npurportedly did without specifying which officer(s) took which actions. The Fifth Circuit has clearly stated\nthat each defendant\u2019s conduct must be examined individually. See Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-\n22 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversible error to consider defendants\u2019 actions collectively).\n3\n  In his affidavit, Plaintiff does not claim that his shoulder was pulled out of its socket or otherwise\ndislocated. Pl. App. at 001-07. He claims \u201c[a]nother Police Officer was pulling on my arm and almost broke\n\n\n                                                    16\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                       Page 17 of 23 PageID 595\n\n\n\npurportedly did this in either his Response or his affidavit, nor does he point to any video footage\n\npurportedly showing his arm being pulled from his shoulder socket. Thus, he has no evidence that\n\neither Guab or Harris inflicted this purported injury upon him, particularly as none of the videos\n\nshow the officers handling Plaintiff\u2019s arms inappropriately.\n\n        Plaintiff also repeatedly accused the officers of \u201cpinning Plaintiff Hayes with their shins\n\non his skull, neck and back\u201d and falsely claimed that \u201cone or more of the Officers can be seen\n\ndangerously pressing with his shin on the back of Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 neck and applying downward\n\nforce pinning Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 skull, neck and back to the concrete.\u201d Resp. \u00b6 24; see also 1st Am.\n\nCompl. \u00b6\u00b6 87, 88, 94, 125. Guab\u2019s and Harris\u2019s BWC videos show that neither of them placed\n\ntheir shins on Plaintiff\u2019s skull, neck or back. See App. Ex. 1 (Harris BWC) at 1:40-6:26; Ex. 4\n\n(Guab BWC) at 0:00-3:38. The screenshot embedded in Resp. \u00b6 24 is taken from Officer Luciano\u2019s\n\nBWC video at 10:52:50 a.m.; the officer on the left in the screenshot is Officer Nonnenmacher.\n\nApp. Ex. 5 at 2:12. A four-second segment of video from which Plaintiff\u2019s screenshot is taken (Ex.\n\n5 at 2:10-2:13) shows more clearly that Officer Nonnenmacher is not \u201cdangerously pressing with\n\nhis shin on the back of Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 neck\u201d or back. Resp. \u00b6 24. Instead, he is positioned with\n\nhis left knee and upper shin on the ground near the juncture of Plaintiff\u2019s neck and right shoulder,\n\nhis right leg angled out to the side, his right foot in road, and his right hand periodically on the side\n\nof Plaintiff\u2019s head holding it to the pavement. 4 Officer Nonnemacher remained in that same\n\n\nit\u201d and \u201cI have limited range in my right shoulder and pain when I try to use it even for minimal things like\nplaying with my children.\u201d Id. at 004-05. An affidavit from a doctor of osteopathic medicine who\n\u201cpractice[s] general medicine\u201d claims that \u201cthe Dallas Police Officer\u2019s restraint holds, body weight and\npulling of Mr. Hayes\u2019 arms caused him to suffer physical injuries to his right shoulder\u201d \u201cindicative of a\nrotator cuff injury,\u201d with no mention of dislocation. Id. at 009.\n4\n  The best view of the position of Officer Nonnenmacher\u2019s left knee and shin is found at App. Ex. 2\n(Whitman BWC) at 3:40-5:15. This segment also provides a close-up view of how Plaintiff continued to\nresist arrest by yelling and thrashing against the officers\u2019 restraint. The officers held onto Plaintiff\u2019s upper\narm and shoulder area instead of putting pressure on his back. Despite being restrained by at least three\n\n\n                                                      17\n\f    Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                    Page 18 of 23 PageID 596\n\n\n\nposition from 10:51:19 until the officers lifted Plaintiff to his feet at 10:52:53 a.m. See App. Ex. 2\n\n(Whitman BWC) at 3:40-5:15 Ex. 5 (Luciano BWC) at 0:43-2:16; Ex. 7 (Greene BWC) at 0:27-\n\n0:51.\n\n        Plaintiff\u2019s Response also made the following accusation without any citation to the record:\n\n        The Officers then proceeded to press on Plaintiff Hayes\u2019 neck even though the same\n        law enforcement restraint technique has resulted in the death of detainees in cities\n        across the United States \u2013 the most glaring examples being the tragic deaths of\n        George Floyd and Tony Timpa 5 \u2013 and is apparently the same \u201clateral vascular neck\n        restraint\u201d that the Defendant City of Dallas has represented that it disfavors but,\n        based on their failure to discipline any of the Defendant Officers in this case, does\n        not forbid and in fact can be said to defacto [sic] endorse.\n\nResp. \u00b6 25. Plaintiff also claimed in his affidavit that \u201c[a]fter the Police Officers pulled me out, I\n\nfelt one Police Officer put his foot on my neck.\u201d Pl. App. at 004. A vascular neck restraint (also\n\nknown as the carotid restraint technique) applies pressure to blood vessels on the sides of the neck\n\nin order to reduce blood flow to the brain, which quickly leads to voluntary compliance or\n\ntemporary unconsciousness. William P. Bozeman, et al., Safety of Vascular Neck Restraint Applied\n\nby Law Enforcement Officers, 92 J. Forensic & Legal Med. 102446 (Nov. 2022). As shown by the\n\nvideo segments referenced in the preceding paragraph and the screenshots on page 9 of\n\nDefendants\u2019 opening brief plainly show, no one pressed or used a lateral vascular neck restraint on\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s neck, least of all Officers Guab or Harris.\n\n        In light of Plaintiff\u2019s constant noncompliance and resistance, the type and amount of force\n\nDefendant Officers used to remove Plaintiff from his car and take him into custody was eminently\n\n\n\nofficers, Plaintiff nonetheless managed to roll from a prone position onto his right side. Id. at 4:11-4:35.\nAnother helpful clip depicting Officer Nonnenmacher\u2019s position is found at App. Ex. 5 (Luciano BWC) at\n0:48-0:51; it shows Plaintiff briefly lift his head and neck off the ground in front of Nonnenmacher\u2019s left\nknee.\n5\n None of the officers used a lateral vascular neck restraint or made any contact whatsoever with Tony\nTimpa\u2019s neck, nor did anyone except Plaintiff Hayes ever allege that they did. See generally Timpa v.\nDillard, 20 F.4th 1020 (5th Cir. 2021).\n\n                                                    18\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                   Page 19 of 23 PageID 597\n\n\n\nreasonable. The Fifth Circuit has frequently found the use of far more force to be reasonable in\n\nsimilar factual situations. See, e.g., Craig, 49 F.4th at 409; Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975, 983 (5th\n\nCir. 2022); Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 583 (5th Cir. 2022) (use of taser not unreasonable);\n\nLivingston v. Texas, No. 22-240719, 2023 WL 4931932 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023); Ramirez v. Martin,\n\nNo. 22-10011, 2022 WL 16548053, at *2-*4 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2022); Walker v. City of Houston,\n\nNo. 22-20537, 2023 WL 6457926, at *3-*5 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023) (tackle and \u201cthree to four body\n\nshots\u201d not unreasonable). Defendant Officers\u2019 actions did not violate Plaintiff\u2019s constitutional\n\nrights, and they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.\n\n        D.      Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.\n\n        Additionally, Officers Guab and Harris have asserted the defense of qualified immunity.\n\nIn determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-part\n\nanalysis that can be performed in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). One\n\npart of the analysis entails \u201cassess[ing] whether a statutory or constitutional right [were] violated\n\non the facts alleged.\u201d Id. The plaintiff must show \u201cthat the official violated [his or her] statutory\n\nor constitutional right.\u201d Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011). As discussed above in Sections\n\nB and C, the evidentiary record indisputably shows that Defendant Officers did not violate\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights.\n\n        In the second part of the analysis, a plaintiff must show that the right was \u201cclearly\n\nestablished\u201d at the time of the challenged conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818\n\n(1982). Because \u201c\u2018police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent\n\nsquarely governs the specific facts at issue,\u2019\u201d to defeat Defendant Officers\u2019 assertion of qualified\n\nimmunity, Plaintiff must point to factually analogous, precedential cases decided prior to the\n\nincident. Craig, 49 F.4th at 417 (quoting Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 722, 727 (5th Cir.\n\n\n\n                                                  19\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                  Page 20 of 23 PageID 598\n\n\n\n2018)). As Defendants predicted in their opening brief, Plaintiff has failed to point to factually\n\nanalogous cases for either of his claims.\n\n               1. Plaintiff has failed to point to any analogous cases showing that his arrest\n                  violated clearly established law.\n\n       With regard to his false arrest claim, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any Fifth Circuit or\n\nSupreme Court cases in which a court found that an arrest under these circumstances lacked\n\nprobable cause and was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff\u2019s Response cited four cases, but only\n\none case is binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit: Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).\n\n       In Garrison, officers obtained and executed a search warrant of the entire third floor of a\n\nstructure under the mistaken belief that the entire floor was one dwelling unit occupied by the\n\ntarget of the warrant; in fact, the third floor contained a second apartment occupied by an individual\n\nunrelated to the investigation. Id. at 81. \u201cBefore the officers executing the warrant became aware\n\nthat they were in a separate apartment\u201d occupied by Garrison, they discovered drug contraband for\n\nwhich Garrison was convicted. Id. at 80. In holding that the contraband should not be suppressed,\n\nthe majority reasoned that \u201c[w]hile the purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the\n\npermissible extent of the search, the Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for\n\nhonest mistakes.\u201d As an illustration, the Court discussed a prior case in which officers arrested the\n\nwrong person due to an \u201cobjectively understandable and reasonable\u201d misidentification. Id. at 87-\n\n88. This case should be disregarded because its facts are completely different from this case.\n\nGarrison\u2019s emphasis on reasonable mistakes also contradicts Plaintiff\u2019s already-irrelevant\n\nargument that it was unreasonable for the officers to stop him when his name is spelled \u201cSilvester\u201d\n\non his driver\u2019s license while the name on his car registration and the domestic violence warrants\n\nwas spelled \u201cSylvester.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n                                                 20\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                  Page 21 of 23 PageID 599\n\n\n\n       Plaintiff cites three other cases that cannot constitute binding precedent for purposes of\n\nqualified immunity: Jimerson v. Lewis, 94 F.4th 423 (5th Cir. 2024); Rogers v. Hooper, 271 F.\n\nApp\u2019x 431 (5th Cir. 2008); and Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995). Like\n\nGarrison, all three cases examine factually inapposite situations in which officers executed a\n\nsearch warrant on the wrong house. Jimerson cannot represent clearly established law at the time\n\nof the incident because it was decided three years after the 2021 incident at issue in this case. See\n\nCraig, 49 F.4th at 419 (decisions issued after the incident cannot provide fair notice). Helpfully,\n\nthe plaintiff in Jimerson cited Rogers and Hartsfield in asking the Fifth Circuit to deny qualified\n\nimmunity, and the Court explained why those cases are nonprecedential: the unpublished Rogers\n\nruling is \u201ca nonprecedential opinion of this court\u201d pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, and\n\nHartsfield is \u201cnonprecedential in the Fifth Circuit because it was issued by a different circuit court\n\nof appeals.\u201d Jimerson, 94 F.4th at 430. Plaintiff has failed to identify even a single analogous case,\n\nand therefore Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.\n\n               2. Plaintiff has failed to point to any analogous cases showing that Defendant\n                  Officers\u2019 use of force violated clearly established law.\n\n       Plaintiff\u2019s Response failed to point to any Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court cases in which a\n\ncourt examined a factual situation similar to the events depicted in the officers\u2019 body- and dash-\n\ncamera videos and concluded that the force the officers used was clearly excessive and objectively\n\nunreasonable. Instead, Plaintiff \u201cpointed to several cases that discuss the excessive force issue at\n\na \u2018high level of generality\u2019\u2014precisely what the Supreme Court has repeatedly advised courts they\n\ncannot do in analyzing qualified immunity claims.\u201d Craig, 49 F.4th at 419. Plaintiff performs at\n\nleast some analysis on two cases: Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and Wilkens v. Gaddy,\n\n559 U.S. 34 (2010). However, both of these cases address cruel and unusual punishment claims\n\nmade by prison inmates under the Eighth Amendment, and thus are inapplicable to excessive force\n\n\n                                                 21\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                   Page 22 of 23 PageID 600\n\n\n\nclaims brought by pretrial detainees such as Plaintiff. See Velazquez v. Baker, No. 5:20-CV-078-\n\nBQ, 2021 WL 812505, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2021). (noting the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in\n\nKingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015), which abrogated \u201clower courts\u2019 application\n\nof Eighth Amendment excessive force standards from Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) to\n\npretrial detainees\u201d). These cases are also factually inapposite because their underlying incidents\n\ntook place in prisons rather than during traffic stops or other arrests. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy\n\nhis burden, and thus Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment\n\non his excessive force claim as well.\n\n       E.      In the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff\u2019s claims\n               against the City fail as a matter of law.\n\n       There can be no basis for municipal liability in the absence of an underlying constitutional\n\nviolation. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798-99 (1986); see also Alpha v. Hooper,\n\n440 F. 3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2006) (same). If the Court determines that the officers did not deprive\n\nPlaintiff of his constitutional rights, then Plaintiff\u2019s municipal liability claims against the City\n\nnecessarily fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed. Heller, 475 U.S. at 798-799.\n\n\n\n\n                                                  22\n\f  Case 3:23-cv-02271-S Document 49 Filed 07/05/24                  Page 23 of 23 PageID 601\n\n\n\n                                               Respectfully submitted,\n\n                                               CITY ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n                                               Tammy L. Palomino\n                                               City Attorney\n\n                                               /s/ Lindsay Wilson Gowin\n                                               Senior Assistant City Attorney\n                                               Texas State Bar No. 24111401\n                                               lindsay.gowin@dallas.gov\n\n                                               7DN Dallas City Hall\n                                               1500 Marilla Street\n                                               Dallas, Texas 75201\n                                               Telephone:     214-670-3519\n                                               Telecopier: 214-670-0622\n\n                                               ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS HOLLY HARRIS,\n                                               WALTER GUAB, AND THE CITY OF DALLAS\n\n\n\n\n                                     CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n         I hereby certify that on July 5, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the\nclerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF system\nwhich will send notification to case participants registered for electronic notice. I further certify\nthat to the extent applicable I have served all case participants not registered for electronic notice\nby another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).\n\n                                                      s/ Lindsay Wilson Gowin\n                                                      Senior Assistant City Attorney\n\n\n\n\n                                                 23\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2024-08-01T18:48:55.643551-07:00","document_number":"49","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"177016963985","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-07-19T13:35:32.194339-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.313592-07:00","date_filed":"2024-07-05","time_filed":null,"entry_number":49,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-07-05.001","pacer_sequence_number":143,"description":"REPLY filed by City of Dallas, Walter Paul Guab, Holly Harris re: 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Wilson Gowin, Lindsay) (Entered: 07/05/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/396996580/","id":396996580,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/67883583/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/424497406/","id":424497406,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/67883583/48/hayes-v-city-of-dallas/","date_created":"2024-12-18T11:46:45.333500-08:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.303808-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"48","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-07-19T13:35:32.168826-07:00","date_modified":"2025-05-09T10:33:33.295186-07:00","date_filed":"2024-07-01","time_filed":null,"entry_number":48,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-07-01.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"ELECTRONIC ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that 47 Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Extend Time to File Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, to and including July 5, 2024, is GRANTED. 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ORDER: Local Rule 3.1 requires that a complaint be accompanied by \"a separately signed certificate of interested persons.\" Local Rule 7.4 requires that the \"initial responsive pleading or motion filed in lieu of a responsive pleading that a defendant files in a civil action must be accompanied by a separately signed certificate of interested persons that complies with LR 3.1(c) or 3.2(e).\" To date, no party has done so. Accordingly, the parties are ordered to file the signed certificates by July 1, 2024. 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