Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 1 of 194 68736 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF LABOR I. Executive Summary Today, such benefits make up The FLSA generally requires covered approximately one-third of total Wage and Hour Division employers to pay nonexempt employees compensation. 5 Many employers, overtime pay of at least one and one-half moreover, now offer various wellness 29 CFR Parts 548 and 778 times their regular rate for hours worked benefits or perks, such as fitness classes, in excess of 40 per workweek. The nutrition classes, weight loss programs, RIN 1235-AA24 FLSA defines the regular rate as "all smoking cessation programs, health risk remuneration for employment paid to, assessments, vaccination clinics, stress Regular Rate Under the Fair Labor or on behalf of, the employee" -subject reduction programs, and training or Standards Act to eight exclusions established in coaching to help employees meet their section 7(e). 1 Part 778 ofCFR title 29 health goals. AGENCY: Wage and Hour Division, Both law and practice concerning contains the regulations addressing the Department of Labor. calculation of the regular rate of pay for more traditional benefits, such as sick ACTION: Final rule. overtime compensation under section 7 leave, have likewise evolved in the of the FLSA. decades since the Department first SUMMARY: The Fair Labor Standards Act The Department promulgated the promulgated part 778. For example, (FLSA or Act) generally requires that majority of part 778 of CFR title 29 more instead of providing separate paid time covered, nonexempt employees receive than 60 years ago, when typical off for illness and vacation, many overtime pay of at least one and one-half compensation often consisted employers now combine these and other times their regular rate of pay for time predominantly of traditional wages, types of leave into paid time off plans. worked in excess of 40 hours per paid time off for holidays and vacations, Moreover, in recent years, a number of workweek. The regular rate includes all and contributions to basic medical, life state and local governments have passed remuneration for employment, subject insurance, and disability benefits laws requiring employers to provide to the exclusions outlined in section plans. 2 Since that time, the workplace paid sick leave. In 2011, for example, 7(e) of the FLSA. In this final rule, the and the law have evolved, but the Connecticut became the first state to Department of Labor (Department) Department has only made minor require private-sector employers to updates a number of regulations on the updates to part 778 since 1950. 3 provide paid sick leave to their calculation of overtime compensation First, employee compensation employees. 6 Today, several states, the both to provide clarity and to better packages, including employer-provided District of Columbia,7 and various cities reflect the 21st-century workplace. benefits and "perks," have expanded and counties 8 require paid sick leave, These changes will promote compliance significantly. The Bureau of Labor and many other states are considering with the FLSA, provide appropriate and Statistics (BLS) estimated that fringe similar requirements. updated guidance in an area of evolving benefits comprised only 5 percent of Recently, several states and cities law and practice, and encourage employees' total compensation in 1950. 4 have also begun considering and employers to provide additional and implementing scheduling laws. In the innovative benefits to workers without 1 See 29 U.S.C. 207(e). last 5 years, for example, New York, San fear of costly litigation. 2 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, An Overview Francisco, Seattle, and other cities have of Employee Benefits. Occupational Outlook enacted laws imposing penalties on DATES: This final rule is effective on Quarterly (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), Summer January 15, 2020. 2005, at 20, available at https://www.bls.gov/ employers who change employees' careeroutlook/2005/summer/arto2.pdf schedules without the requisite notice, FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 3 See, e.g .. 33 FR 986 (Jan. 26, 1968) (codified at and various state governments are Amy DeBisschop, Division of 29 CFR 778.0 through 778.603); 36 FR 4699 (Mar. considering and beginning to pass Regulations, Legislation, and 11, 1971) (updating 29 CFR 778.214 to clarify that advance approval by the Department is not required Interpretation, Wage and Hour Division, for plans providing benefits within the meaning of 95 percent in 1950, to 92.2 percent in 1960, 89.7 U.S. Department of Labor, Room S- 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(4)); 36 FR 4981 (Mar. 16, 1971) percent in 1970, and 84.2 percent in 1980° 0). 5 Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release, 3502, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, (updating 29 CFR 7 78.117 to clarify commission Employer Cost for Employee Compensation-March Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) payments that must be included in the regular rate); 2019, June 18, 2019, ("Wages and salaries cost 46 FR 7308 (Jan. 23, 1981) (updating 29 CFR part 693-0406 (this is not a toll-free 778 to increase the dollar amounts used as employers $25.22 [per hour] while benefit costs number). Copies of this final rule may examples in the regulations, to respond to statutory were $11.55.""), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ be obtained in alternative formats (Large amendments affecting other parts of the FLSA, and pdflecec.pdf 6 See 2011 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 11-52 (West). Print, Braille, Audio Tape or Disc), upon to modify§ 778.320 to clarify that pay for 7 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. secs. 23-364, 23-371 et seq.; nonworking time does not automatically convert request, by calling (202) 693-0675 (this such time into hours worked); 46 FR 33515-2 (June Cal. Lab. Code secs. 245, 2810.5; 2011 Conn. Legis. is not a toll-free number). TTY/TDD 30, 1981) (correcting errors in the January 1981 Serv. P.A. 11-52 (West); D.C. Code sec. 32-131.01 callers may dial toll-free 1-877-889- update in 29 CFR 778.323, 778.327, 778.501, et seq.; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, sec. 636 (2019) 5627 to obtain information or request 778.601); 56 FR 61100 (Nov. 29, 1991) (updating 29 (effective Jan. 1, 2021); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & CFR 778.603 to address statutory amendment Empl. section 3-1301 et seq. (West 2019); Mass. materials in alternative formats. adding section 7(q) regarding maximum-hour Gen. Laws ch. 149, sec. 148C, 148D; Mich. Comp. Questions of interpretation and/or exemption for employees receiving remedial Laws secs. 408.961-974; 2019 Nev. Legis. Serv. 592 enforcement of the agency's regulations education); 76 FR 18832 (Apr. 5, 2011) (updating (West) (to be codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 608 §§ 778.110, 778.111, 778.113, and 778.114 to reflect (2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. may be directed to the nearest WHD statutory changes to the minimum wage; updating 34:11D-1 et seq.; Or. Rev. Stat. sec. 653.601 et seq.; district office. Locate the nearest office § 7 78.200 to reflect amendments made by the 28 R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 28-57-1 et seq.; 21 Vt. Stat. by calling WHD's toll-free help line at Worker Economic Opportunity Act; updating secs. 384, 481-485, 345; Wash. Rev. Code secs. (866) 4US-WAGE ((866) 487-9243) § 778.208 from "seven•• to "eight"" types of 49.46.005, 49.46.020, 49.46.090, 49.46.100. between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. in your local remuneration excluded when computing the regular 8 See, e.g .. Austin, Tex., City Code ch. 4-19 rate). (2018); Chi., Ill., Code ch. 1-24 (2017); Minneapolis, time zone, or visit WHD's website for a 4 Yung-Ping Chen, The Growth of Fringe Benefits Minn., Admin. Code title 2, sec. 40.10 et seq. nationwide listing of WHD district and Implications for Social Security, Monthly Labor (2016); Phila., Pa., Code ch. 9-4100 (2015); N.Y.C., area offices at http://www.dol.gov/whd/ Review Vol. 104 No. 11, November 1981, https:// N.Y., Admin. Code sec. 20-911 (2013); Seattle, america2.htm. www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/11/artl full. pdf (" cash Wash., Mun. Code ch. 14.16 (2011); Westchester payroll as a percentage of total compensation County, N.Y., Laws of Westchester County ch. 585 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: declined steadily over the last 30 years, falling from (2018). DOLAR0910 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 2 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68737 similar scheduling legislation. 9 Some of determine whether a bonus is work in regular rate calculations. 14 It these laws expressly exclude these discretionary or nondiscretionary; also specified that the regular rate must penalties from the regular rate under revising language at§§ 778.202 and be "the rate at which the employee is state law, 10 but questions remain for 778.205 to reflect that excludable actually employed and paid and not employers determining how these and overtime premium payments may be . . . a fictitious rate which the employer other penalties may affect regular rate made pursuant to a "written or adopts solely for bookkeeping calculations under federal law. unwritten employment contract, purposes." 15 The Department published a notice of agreement, understanding, handbook, In 1948, the Supreme Court in Bay proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the policy, or practice"; and referencing Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. Federal Register on March 29, 2019 (84 state or local minimum wage laws as 446, addressed whether specific types of FR 11888 (Mar. 29, 2019)), inviting well as Federal law in the regulations at compensation may be excluded from the comments about proposed updates to its part 548 of title 29 discussing the basic regular rate, or even credited towards an regulations in part 778 to reflect changes rate. employer's overtime payment in the modern workplace and to provide The Department's estimated economic obligations. The Court held that an clarifications that reflect the statutory impact of this final rule follows below. overtime premium payment, which it language and WHD's enforcement The Department qualitatively estimates defined as "[e]xtra pay for work because practices. Additionally, the Department the potential benefits associated with of previous work for a specified number proposed minor clarifications and reduced litigation at $281 million over of hours in the workweek or workday updates to part 548 of title 29, which 10 years, or $28.1 million per year. The whether the hours are specified by implements section 7(g)(3) of the FLSA. Department quantitatively estimates the contract or statute," could be excluded Section 7(g)(3) permits employers, one-time regulatory familiarization cost from the computation of the regular under specific circumstances, to use a of this final rule at $30.5 million, whichrate. 16 Permitting an "overtime basic rate to compute overtime results in a 10-year annualized cost of premium to enter into the computation compensation rather than a regular $3.6 million at a discount rate of 3 of the regular rate would be to allow rate. 11 Comments were initially due on percent or $4.3 million at a discount overtime premium on overtime or before May 28, 2019. In response to rate of 7 percent. premium-a pyramiding that Congress a request for an extension of the time could not have intended." 17 The Court period for filing written comments, the This final rule is considered an Executive Order (E.O.) 13771 also held that "any overtime premium Department extended the deadline to paid, even if for work during the first June 12, 2019 (84 FR 21300 (May 14, deregulatory action. Details on the forty hours of the workweek, may be 2019)). The Department received estimated reduced burdens and cost savings of this final rule can be found credited against any obligation to pay approximately 80 timely comments. statutory excess compensation." 18 By After considering the comments, the in the rule's economic analysis. contrast, the Court noted, "[w]here an Department has decided to adopt the II. Background employee receives a higher wage or rate NPRM's proposed changes with some because of undesirable hours or modifications. The final rule clarifies A. The FLSA and Regular Rate disagreeable work, such wage represents when payments for forgoing unused Regulatory History a shift differential or higher wages paid leave, payments for bona fide meal Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to because of the character of work done or periods, reimbursements, benefit plan remedy "labor conditions detrimental to the time at which he is required to labor contributions, and certain ancillary the maintenance of the minimum rather than an overtime premium. Such benefits may be excluded from the standard ofliving necessary for health, payments enter into the determination regular rate. The final rule also revises efficiency, and general well-being of of the regular rate of pay." 19 certain sections of the existing workers[,]" which burdened commerce Following the Bay Ridge decision, in regulation to more closely align with the and constituted unfair methods of 1948, the Department promulgated 29 Act. Additionally, the final rule competition. 12 In relevant part, section CFR part 778, concerning the regular incorporates, with modification, the 7(a) of the FLSA requires employers to rate. 20 This regulation codified the proposed clarifications and updates to pay their employees overtime at one and principles from Bay Ridge that extra part 548. The final rule incorporates one-half times their "regular rate" of payments for hours worked in excess of numerous suggestions from pay for time worked in excess of 40 a daily or weekly standard established commenters, including adding examples hours per workweek. 13 When enacted, by contract or statute may be excluded of excludable state and local scheduling however, the FLSA did not define the from the regular rate and credited law payments to § 778.222, which term "regular rate." toward overtime compensation due, and addresses "other payments similar to that extra payments for work on call-back pay"; providing additional Later that year, WHD issued an interpretive bulletin addressing the Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or at guidance in the preamble about how to night that are made without regard to meaning of "regular rate," which WHD later revised and updated in 1939, and the number of hours or days previously 9 See Chi., Ill., Fair Workweek Ordinance (July 24, again in 1940. The 1940 version of the worked in the day or workweek must be 2019) (effective July 1, 2020); N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code 20-1222 (2017); Phila., Pa., Code ch. 9-4600 bulletin stated, among other things, that included in the regular rate and may not (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); Seattle, Wash., Mun. an employer did not need to include be credited toward the overtime owed. 21 Code ch. 14.22.050 (2017); SB 828, 79th Leg. Assemb., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017); see also extra compensation paid for overtime 14 See Interpretive Bulletin No. 4 'II 13 (Nov. Emeryville, Cal., Mun. Code 5-39.01 (2017); S.F., 1940). Cal., Police Code art. 33G (2015), 12 29 U.S.C. 202(a); see Fair Labor Standards Act 15 Id. 'II 18. 10 See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 653.412(7)(d) of 1938, Public Law 75-718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 16 334 U.S. at 450 n.3, 465-66. ("Regular rate of pay•• does not include "[a]ny (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 201-219). 17 Id. at 464. additional compensation an employer is required to 13 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The statutory maximum in 1 3 Id. at 464-65. pay an employee under ORS 653.442 [right to rest 1938 was 44 hours per workweek; in 1939, it was between work shifts] or 653.455 [compensation for 19 Id. at 468-69. 42 hours per workweek; and in 1940, it was 40 work schedule changes].""). 20 See 13 FR 4534 (Aug. 6, 1948). hours per workweek. See Public Law 75-718, 52 1 1 See 29 U.S.C. 207(g)(3). Stat. at 1063. 21 See 29 CFR 778.2 (1948). DOLAR0911 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 3 of 194 68738 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations It noted, however, that when extra occasional periods when no work is In 1961 and 1966, Congress made a payments for work on Saturdays, performed such as vacation or sick pay, few minor, non-substantive language Sundays, holidays, or nights are reimbursements for work-related changes and redesignated certain contingent on the employee having expenses, and other similar payments sections. 37 In 1968, the Department previously worked a specified standard that are not compensation for hours of updated part 778, principally to clarify number of hours or days, such payments employment; (3) discretionary bonuses, the statutory references, update the are true overtime premium payments payments to profit-sharing or thrift or amounts used to illustrate pay that may be excluded from the regular savings plans that meet certain computations, and reorganize the rate and credited toward overtime requirements, and certain talent fees; (4) provisions in part 778. 38 Over the next compensation due. 22 The Department contributions to a bona fide plan for several decades, the Department also explained that payments "that are retirement, or life, accident, or health periodically made minor changes and not made for hours worked, such as insurance; (5) extra compensation updates to part 778. 39 payments . . . for idle holidays or for provided by a premium rate for certain In 2000, Congress added another occasional absences due to vacation or hours worked in excess of eight in a category of payments that could be illness or other similar cause" may be day, 40 hours in a workweek, or the excluded from the regular rate, currently excluded from the regular rate, but employee's normal working hours; (6) contained in section 7(e)(8). 40 This could not be credited against statutory extra compensation provided by a amendment permitted an employer to overtime compensation due. 23 premium rate for work on Saturdays, exclude from the regular rate income In 1949, Congress responded to the Sundays, regular days of rest, or the derived from a stock option, stock Bay Ridge decision by amending the sixth or seventh days of the workweek; appreciation right, or employee stock FLSA to identify two categories of and (7) extra compensation provided by purchase plan, provided certain payments that could be both excluded a premium rate pursuant to an restrictions were met. 41 Congress also from the regular rate and credited employment contract or collective amended section 7(h) to state that, toward overtime compensation due. 24 bargaining agreement for work outside except for the types of extra The first category was extra of the hours established therein as the compensation identified in sections compensation for work on Saturdays, normal workday (not exceeding eight 7(e)(5), (6), and (7), sums excluded from Sundays, holidays, or the sixth or hours) or workweek (not exceeding 40 the regular rate are not creditable seventh day of the workweek paid at a hours). 30 The October 1949 toward minimum wage or overtime premium rate of one and one-half times amendments also added a provision compensation due. 42 In 2011, the the rate paid for like work performed in specifying that the last three of these Department updated part 778 to reflect nonovertime hours on other days. The categories are creditable against the 2000 statutory amendments and to second category was extra compensation overtime compensation due. 31 modify the wage rates used as examples paid pursuant to an applicable In 1950, the Department updated part to reflect the current minimum wage. 43 employment contract or collective 778 to account for the 1949 amendments Currently, the FLSA's definition of bargaining agreement for work outside to the FLSA. 32 These regulations "regular rate" and the eight categories of of the hours established therein as the explained general principles regarding 37 1n 1961, Congress made non-substantive normal workday (not exceeding eight overtime compensation and the regular language changes to sections (d)(5) and (7). See Fair hours) or workweek (not exceeding 40 rate, including the principle that each Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Public Law hours) at a premium rate of one and workweek stands on its own for 87-30, sec. 6, 75 Stat. 65, 70. In 1966, Congress purposes of determining the regular rate redesignated section 7(d) as section 7(e). See Fair one-half times the rate paid for like Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Public Law work performed during the workday or and overtime due. 33 The regulations 89-601, Title II, sec. 204(d)(1), 80 Stat. 830, 836. workweek. 25 also provided methods for calculating Additionally, section 7(g), which provided that On October 26, 1949, Congress again the regular rate under different extra compensation paid pursuant to sections 7(d)(5), (6), and (7) could be credited against amended the FLSA. 26 The amendments compensation systems, such as salary overtime compensation due under section 7(a), was added, among other things, a and piecework compensation. 34 They moved to section 7(h). See id. comprehensive definition of the term further elaborated on the seven 38 See 33 FR 986 (Jan. 26, 1968) (29 CFR 778.0 "regular rate." 27 "Regular rate" was categories of payments that are through 778.603). defined to include "all remuneration for excludable from regular rate 39 See 36 FR 4699 (Mar. 11, 1971) (updating calculations, and provided several § 778.214 to clarify that advance approval by the employment paid to, or on behalf of, the Department is not required for plans providing employee[,]" 28 with the exception of an examples. 35 The regulations also benefits within the meaning of section 7(e)(4)); 36 exhaustive list of seven specific addressed special problems and pay FR 4981 (Mar. 16, 1971) (updating§ 778.117 to categories of payments that could be plans designed to circumvent the clarify commission payments that must be included in the regular rate); 46 FR 7308 (Jan. 23, 1981) excluded from the regular rate. 29 Those FLSA.36 (updating part 778 to increase the dollar amounts categories of excludable payments were: used as examples in the regulations, to respond to 30 See id. The excludable categories of payments (1) Gifts and payments on special statutory amendments affecting other parts of the in sections 7(d)(6) and (7) in the October 1949 occasions; (2) payments made for amendments were essentially the same as those that FLSA, and to modify§ 778.320 to clarify that pay for nonworking time does not automatically convert had been added in the July 1949 amendments as such time into hours worked); 46 FR 33515-02 22 See id. sections 7(e)(1) and (2); the October 1949 (June 30, 1981) (correcting errors in the January 23 Id. amendments eliminated them from section 7(e). 1981 update in§§ 778.323, 778.327, 778.501, 24 See Public Law 81-177, ch. 352, 63 Stat. 446 31 See id. Public Law 81-393, 63 Stat. at 915. This 778.601); 56 FR 61100 (Nov. 29, 1991) (updating (July 20, 1949). These provisions are currently provision is currently codified at 29 U.S.C. 207(h) § 778.603 to address statutory amendment adding codified at 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(6)-(7). (payments described in sections 7(e)(5)-(7) are section 7(q) regarding maximum-hour exemption 25 See id. creditable). for employees receiving remedial education). 26 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, 32 See 15 FR 623 (Feb. 4, 1950) (codified at 29 40 See Worker Economic Opportunity Act, Public Public Law 81-393, ch. 736, 63 Stat. 910. CFR 778.0 through 778.27). Law 106-202, sec. 2(a)(3), 114 Stat. 308 (2000). 27 Id. Sec. 7, 63 Stat. at 913-14. This provision is 33 See 29 CFR 778.2 (1950). 41 See id. currently codified at 29 U.S.C. 207(e). 34 See 29 CFR 778.3(b) (1950). 42 See id. 28 Id. 35 See 29 CFR 778.5 through 778.8 (1950). 43 See 76 FR 18832 (Apr. 5, 2011) (updating 29 See id. 63 Stat. at 913-14. These provisions are 36 See 29 CFR 778.9.17, 778.21 through 778.23 §§ 778.110, 778.111, 778.113, 778.114, 778.200, currently codified at 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(1)-(7). (1950). 778.208). DOLAR0912 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 4 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68739 excludable payments are contained in on retail goods and services, and compensation by more than $0.50 per section 7(e) of the Act. 44 The payments for tuition programs, such as week on average for overtime Department's regulations concerning the reimbursement programs or repayment workweeks in the period for which the regular rate requirements are contained of educational debt, may be excluded employer makes the payment. The in 29 CFR part 778. As noted above, the from an employee's regular rate of pay. Department proposed to update this last comprehensive revision to part 778 The Department also proposed to clarify regulation to change the $0.50 limit to was in 1968. 45 that payments for unused paid leave, 40 percent of the Federal minimum While section 7(a) defines the general including paid sick leave, may be wage-currently $2. 90. overtime entitlement in terms of an excluded from an employee's regular In developing this rule, the employee's regular rate, under certain rate of pay; that reimbursed expenses Department was mindful of the circumstances, the FLSA permits need not be incurred "solely" for the Supreme Court's recent guidance that, employers to use a "basic rate," rather employer's benefit for the to determine the scope of an exemption than the regular rate as defined in reimbursements to be excludable from under the FLSA, the statutory text must section 7(e), to calculate overtime an employee's regular rate and that be given a "fair reading" rather than a compensation. 46 Congress added this reimbursed travel expenses that do not narrow reading because the FLSA's provision, currently contained in exceed the maximum travel exemptions are "as much a part of the section 7(g), in 1949-at the same time reimbursement permitted under the FLSA's purpose as the [minimum wage that Congress added the definition of Federal Travel Regulation System and and] overtime-pay requirement[s]." "regular rate" to the FLSA. 47 The meet other regulatory requirements may Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 requirements an employer must meet to be excluded from an employee's regular S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018). As the Third use a basic rate are set forth in that same rate of pay; that employers do not need Circuit recently noted in a regular rate section 7(g). 48 a prior formal contract or agreement case, "that is as should be expected, In 1955, the Department promulgated with the employee(s) to exclude certain because employees' rights are not the 29 CFR part 548 to establish the overtime premiums described in only ones at issue and, in fact, are not requirements for authorized basic rates sections 7(e)(5) and (6) of the FLSA; and always separate from and at odds with under section 7(g)(3). 49 It amended that pay for time that would not their employers' interests." U.S. Dep't of various sections of the part 548 otherwise qualify as "hours worked," Labor v. Bristol Excavating, Inc., 935 regulations several times over the next including bona fide meal periods, may F.3d 122,135 (3d Cir. 2019). 12 years to reflect statutory amendments be excluded from an employee's regular to other parts of the FLSA, including Approximately 80 individuals and rate unless an agreement or established organizations timely commented on the increases to the minimum wage. 50 The practice indicates that the parties have Department has not updated any of the NPRM during the 75-day extended treated the time as hours worked. comment period that ended on June 12, regulations in part 548 since 1967, more Additionally, the Department proposed than a half-century ago. 2019. The Department received to provide examples of discretionary comments from a broad array of B. The Department's Proposal bonuses that may be excluded from an constituencies, including small business On March 29, 2019, the Department employee's regular rate of pay under owners, employer and industry issued its proposal to update and revise section 7(e)(3) of the FLSA and to clarify associations, individual workers, worker a number of regulations in parts 548 and that the label given to a bonus does not advocacy groups, unions, non-profit 778. 51 The Department's proposal determine whether it is discretionary. organizations, law firms, professional focused primarily on clarifying whether The Department also proposed to associations, and other interested certain kinds of "perks," benefits, or provide additional examples of benefit members of the public. The majority of other miscellaneous payments must be plans, including accident, comments supported the Department's included in the regular rate. These unemployment, and legal services, that efforts to clarify the regular rate clarifications included confirming that may be excluded from an employee's regulations. All timely received the cost of providing wellness programs, regular rate of pay under section 7(e)(4) comments may be viewed on onsite specialist treatment, gym access of the FLSA. www.regulations.gov, docket ID WHD- and fitness classes, employee discounts The Department proposed two 2019-0002. substantive changes to the existing Some commenters appear to have 44 See 29 U.S.C. 2O7(e). Additionally, section 7(h) regulations. First, the Department mistakenly filed comments intended for states that only payments excludable from the proposed to eliminate the restriction in this rulemaking into the dockets for the regular rate pursuant to sections 7(e)(5), (6), and (7) may be credited against the employer"s overtime 29 CFR 778.221 and 778.222 that "call- Department's rulemakings concerning obligation and that all other excludable payments back" pay and other payments similar to overtime (docket ID WHD-2019-0001) (i.e .. payments that qualify as excludable under call-back pay must be "infrequent and or joint employer status (docket ID sections 7(e)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (8)) are not sporadic" to be excludable from an WHD-2019-0003) under the FLSA. The creditable). See 29 U.S.C. 2O7(h). 45 See 33 FR 986 (29 CFR 778.O through 778.603). employee's regular rate, while Department did not consider these 46 29 u.s.c. 2O7(g). maintaining that such payments must misfiled comments in this rulemaking. 47 See Public Law 81-393, 63 Stat. at 914-15. In not be so regular that they are The Department has carefully 1966, Congress redesignated section 7(f) as section essentially prearranged. Second, the considered the timely-submitted 7(g), with section numbers (1)-(3) remaining the Department proposed to update its comments on the proposed changes. same; no substantive changes were made. See Public Law 89-601, 80 Stat. at 836. "basic rate" regulations, which are Some of the comments were general 47 29 u.s.c. 2O7(g)(1)-(3). authorized under section 7(g)(3) of the statements of support or opposition. See 48 See id. FLSA, as an alternative to the regular Bloomin' Brands; International 49 See 20 FR 5678 (Aug. 6, 1955). The regulations rate under specific circumstances. Bancshares Corporation (IBC); interpreting sections 7(g)(1)-(2) are at 29 CFR Under the current regulations, Independent Bakers Association (IBA); 778.415 through 778.421. 50 See 21 FR 338 Uan. 18, 1956); 26 FR 7730 (Aug. employers using an authorized basic National Demolition Association (NDA); 18, 1961); 28 FR 11266 (Oct. 22, 1963); 31 FR 6769 rate may exclude from the overtime National Federation oflndependent (May 6, 1966); 32 FR 3293 (Feb. 25, 1967). computation any additional payment Businesses (NFIB); International 5184 FR 11888. that would not increase total overtime Association of Firefighters (Association DOLAR0913 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 5 of 194 68740 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations of Firefighters); and various individual of compensation that is excludable from regular rate. 57 In other words, when an commenters. the regular rate under FLSA section employee works instead of taking a The Department received a number of 7(e)(2). Section 7(e)(2) permits an holiday or using vacation leave, and comments that are beyond the scope of employer to exclude from the regular receives pay for both the hours of work this rulemaking. These include, for rate three distinct categories of payment: performed as well as the holiday or example, a request to address whether First, "payments made for occasional vacation leave that he or she did not restricted stock units are excludable periods when no work is performed due take, the amount paid for the forgone under 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(8) of the Act, to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of holiday or vacation leave may be which permits an employer to exclude the employer to provide sufficient work, excluded from the regular rate. In its from the regular rate income derived or other similar cause"; second, current form,§ 778.219 addresses only from a stock option, stock appreciation "reasonable payments for traveling pay for forgoing holidays and vacation right, or employee stock purchase plan. expenses, or other expenses, incurred by leave but does not address sums paid for See Semiconductor Industry an employee in the furtherance of his forgoing the use of other forms of leave, Association (SIA); National Association employer's interests and properly such as leave for illness. As explained of Manufacturers (NAM); the Chamber reimbursable by the employer"; and in the NPRM, WHD has addressed of Commerce (Chamber); Partnership to third, "other similar payments to an payments for forgoing sick leave in its Protect Workplace Opportunity (PPWO); employee which are not made as Field Operations Handbook (FOH). The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC); compensation for his hours of FOH states that the same rules American Benefits Council. Similarly, employment." 53 In this Preamble, these governing exclusion of payments for some commenters urged the Department clauses are referred to as: The unused vacation leave also apply to to require that any payment that must be "occasional periods when no work is payments for unused sick leave. 58 included in the regular rate must count performed" clause; the "reimbursable Therefore, when "the sum paid for towards the overtime salary threshold expenses" clause; and the "other similar unused sick leave is the approximate under 29 CFR part 541. See American payments" clause. The Department's equivalent of the employee's normal Hotel and Lodging Association (AHLA); regulations interpreting section 7(e)(2) earnings for a similar period of working PPWO; College and University are contained in§§ 778.216 through time," such payments are excludable Professional Association for Human 778.224. from the regular rate. 59 Resources (CUP A-HR). The Department To clarify and modernize the did not raise these issues in its proposal, 1. Pay for Forgoing Holidays or Leave regulations, the Department proposed to and they are therefore out of scope of The initial clause of section 7(e)(2) of update§ 778.219 to address payments this rulemaking. the FLSA permits an employer to for forgoing both holidays and other Some commenters raised issues that exclude "payments made for occasional forms of leave. The Department noted in are the subject of other on-going periods when no work is performed due the NPRM that it is aware that many rulemaking efforts by the Department. to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of employers no longer provide separate For example, commenters raised the employer to provide sufficient work, categories of leave based on an concerns regarding the fluctuating or other similar causes" from the regular employee's reason for taking leave- workweek regulation at 29 CFR 778.114. rate. 54 Section 778.218 addresses this such as sick leave and vacation leave. See Associated Builders and statutory provision and provides that Instead, employers provide one category Contractors; AHLA; Chamber. The of leave, which is commonly called paid payments for such time that "are in time off. The Department explained that Department is currently engaged in amounts approximately equivalent to rulemaking to revise this specific it saw no reason to distinguish between the employee's normal earnings" are not the types of leave when determining regulation. 52 Therefore, the Department compensation for hours of employment does not address these issues in this whether payment for forgoing use of the and are therefore excludable from the leave is excludable from the regular rate. final rule. regular rate. 55 Significant issues raised in the Rather, the central issues are whether Section 778.219 addresses a related the amount paid is approximately comments on the Department's proposal issue: The exclusion of payments for are discussed below, along with the equivalent to the employee's normal working on a holiday or forgoing earnings for a similar period of time, Department's response to those vacation leave, as distinct from the comments. and whether the payment is in addition exclusion of payments for using leave. 56 to the employee's normal compensation III. Final Regulatory Provisions It explains that if an employee who is for hours worked. entitled to "a certain sum as holiday or Accordingly, the Department The Department finalizes its vacation pay, whether he works or not," proposals to update the regulations in proposed to clarify that occasional receives additional pay for each hour payments for forgoing the use of leave parts 778 and 548 to clarify the worked on a holiday or vacation day, Department's interpretation in light of are treated the same regardless of the the sum allocable as the holiday or type of leave. The Department therefore modern compensation and benefits vacation pay is excluded from the practices. The sections below discuss, in proposed to revise the title of§ 778.219, turn, each category of excludable clarify in§ 778.219(a) that payments for compensation that the Department has 53 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). all forms of unused leave are treated the 54 See id. same for purposes of determining addressed in this final rule. 55 29 CFR 778.218; see FOH 32d03g ("Payment for absences charged against leave under a bona fide whether they may be excluded from the A. Excludable Compensation Under plan granting the employee a specified amount of regular rate, and add an example Section 7(e)(2) annual, vacation, or sick leave with pay need not concerning payment for forgoing the use Many of the Department's regulatory be included in the regular rate of pay, if the sum of paid time off. The NPRM noted that paid is the approximate equivalent of the updates in this final rule clarify the type employee"s normal earnings for a similar period of the proposed changes reflected the working time. Payments for such absences may be 52 See Fluctuating Workweek Method of excluded regardless of when or how the leave is 57 29 CFR 778.219(a). Computing Overtime, Notice of Proposed taken.""). 58 See FOH 32d03e(b). Rulemaking, 84 FR 59590 (Nov. 5, 2019), 56 See 29 CFR 778.219. 59 Id. DOLAR0914 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 6 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68741 Department's longstanding practice of basis (e.g., per pay-period), WFCA noted employee to expect such payments[.]" 63 applying the same principles to that many employees accrue leave based An important distinction between an payments of unused holiday, vacation, on the number of hours worked and that excludable leave buy-back payment and and sick leave. 60 The NPRM stated that some states require the calculation of a non-excludable attendance bonus is the proposed changes would ensure the leave to be based on hours worked. In that an excludable buy-back payment consistent application of the same response to this comment, the results in the employee no longer principles across differing leave Department notes that neither WHD in having that leave available to use, i.e., arrangements. 61 The Department also its guidance, nor the courts that have the employee's leave balance is proposed to clarify that payments for addressed this issue, have determined diminished by the amount of leave forgoing the use of leave are excludable that pay for forgoing leave is excludable "bought back." In contrast, where an from the regular rate regardless of or not excludable on the basis of how employee receives an additional whether they are paid during the same the paid leave was accrued. payment that does not affect his or her pay period in which the previously Additionally, the Department recognizes leave balance, or the payment is scheduled leave is forgone or during a that employers may use a variety of otherwise tied to factors that are not subsequent pay period as a lump sum. bases for determining leave amounts, related to the holiday, vacation, or A number of commenters representing such as hours or days worked or length illness period, such payment may be an both employers and employees of service. Therefore, the Department attendance bonus that is not excludable addressed this proposal. See, e.g., has concluded that the proposed from the regular rate. As ewe noted in Center for Workplace Compliance regulatory language need not be its comment, the distinction between an (CWC); International Municipal Lawyers modified as suggested. The method of excludable payment for forgoing leave Association (IMLA); Wood Floor computation or accrual of paid leave is and an attendance bonus is usually very Covering Association (WFCA); National not determinative. Under the language fact specific. 64 Because this issue is Public Labor Employer Relations in the regulation finalized in this rule, more appropriately addressed through Association (NPELRA); Chamber; the fact that paid leave may be accrued subregulatory guidance, the Department National Employment Law Project on an hourly basis would not disqualify declines to amend the regulation as (NELP); Association of Firefighters; the pay for forgoing such leave from being suggested. The Department notes, American Federation of Labor and excludable from the regular rate. however, that§ 778.219(a), as adopted Congress of Industrial Organizations NELP, while generally agreeing with in this final rule, does not affect (AFL----CIO). Many supported the the Department's proposed amendments § 778.211(c), which addresses the changes as proposed. See, e.g., to§ 778.219, requested clarification that exclusion of discretionary bonuses from Associated Builders and Contractors; regardless of the type of leave, it still the regular rate pursuant to FLSA Seyfarth Shaw (Seyfarth); PPWO; must comply with the statutory section 7(e)(3)(a). 65 Society for Human Resource requirements that it be "occasional" and A few commenters addressed the Management (SHRM); National "similar to vacation, holiday or illness" requirement that the pay for forgoing the Automobile Dealers Association in order to be excluded from the regular leave be approximately equivalent to the (NADA); Society of Independent rate. The Department acknowledges employee's normal earnings. See Gasoline Marketers of America NELP's concern but does not believe Chamber; NPELRA; Association of (SIGMA); NDA. SHRM stated that the that any modification to the proposed Firefighters. The Chamber asserted that proposal harmonizes the regulation regulatory text in§ 778.219 is necessary. there was no statutory basis for "with the realities of the modern Given the statutory language in section requiring that the payment for the workplace" by treating all forms ofleave 7(e)(2) that, to be excludable, this form forgone leave be approximately in the same manner. NPELRA of payment must be made "for equivalent to the employee's normal occasional periods when no work is earnings for the amount of time covered commented that the proposal "makes performed due to vacation, holiday, by the forgone leave and therefore common sense." NELP expressed illness, . . . or other similar cause," 62 argued that this requirement be removed general agreement with the proposal. the Department believes that this is entirely. NPELRA requested that the WFCA asked that the regulation already clear and therefore further proposed regulatory language in specify that the payout of unused leave clarification in the regulation is § 778.219 be modified to permit is still excludable from the regular rate unnecessary. exclusion of a payment for an even if the amount of leave accrued is ewe suggested that the Department employee's unused leave where that based on the number of hours worked. add an example illustrating the Rather than accruing leave on a periodic difference between attendance-based 63 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(3); see 29 CFR 778.211(c); see incentive bonuses, which must be also 84 FR 11888, 11892 n. 57. 60 See FOH 32d03e. 64 See WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2009-19, 2009 61 See, e.g .. Balestrieri v. Menlo Park Fire Prat. included in the regular rate, and valid WL 649021 at *4 (Jan. 16, 2009) (concluding that Dist .. 800 F.3d 1094, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2015) payments for forgoing leave, which can vacation buy-back payments were excludable, but (holding that annual leave comprised of both sick be excluded. The Department declines stipends for nonuse of sick leave encouraged and vacation leave need not be included in the to modify the regulatory text as employees not to use or abuse sick leave and regular rate under section 7( e )(2)). The NPRM suggested. As discussed in the NPRM, therefore were a form of attendance bonus that was explained that such payments need not be included not excludable); WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2006- in the regular rate under section 7(e)(2) for the same in some situations, employers may make 18NA, 2006 WL 4512960, at *2 (July 24, 2006) reason that payments for unused vacations or payments to encourage attendance at (holiday payments made to employees when they holidays need not be included; it makes no work rather than compensating forgo holidays need not be included in the regular difference that payments for unused annual leave employees for forgoing the use of leave. rate because the employees continued to receive or paid time off may include unused sick leave. See compensation at their customary rate for hours also WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2006-18NA, 2006 Attendance bonuses are typically non- worked in addition to receiving holiday pay); WHD WL 4512960 (July 24, 2006) (holiday payments discretionary bonuses that must be Opinion Letter FLSA2004-2NA (April 5, 2004) made to employees when they forgo holidays need included in the regular rate because (cashed-out accrued vacation time need not be not be included in the regular rate pursuant to they are made "pursuant to [a] contract, included in the regular rate because such payments section 7(e)(2)); WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2004- were made at employees• applicable hourly rate and 2NA, 2004 WL 5303030 (Apr. 5, 2004) (cashed-out agreement, or promise causing the in addition to receiving their customary payment accrued vacation time need not be included in for hours worked). regular rate pursuant to section 7(e)(2)). 62 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2); see also 29 CFR 778.218. 65 See 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(3)(a); 29 CFR 778.211(c). DOLAR0915 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 7 of 194 68742 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations payment is a percentage of the amount attendance bonuses, which are generally period of an employee's work tenure. 71 that would normally be paid to the considered to be non-discretionary Thus, the court's decision in Acton does employee when using the leave. bonuses that must be included in the not inform the proper interpretation of NPELRA stated that instead of paying regular rate. The example provided by the statutory exclusion of payments for 100 cents on the dollar, employers NPELRA, which results in buying back occasional periods when no work is should be permitted to pay a percentage sick leave in amounts that are not performed due to vacation, holiday, or of accrued leave, which is often based approximately equivalent to the illness contained in section 7(e)(2) and on a calculation negotiated with union employee's normal earnings for a explained in§ 778.219. 72 Contrary to representatives and takes into account similar period of working time, these two cases, the Department agrees time-in-service and the total amount of illustrates why this requirement is with both the conclusion and sick leave that an employee has accrued. necessary. In that example, some of the underlying reasoning in Balestrieri v. NPELRA provided an example in which forgone sick leave is "bought back" at Menlo Park Fire Protection District. 73 an employee with 20 or more years of only 20 percent of the dollar value of There, the court held that buy back service would be paid out for his or her that leave. For these reasons, the payments for annual leave, which unused sick leave at 20 percent if the Department has decided to adopt included both sick and vacation leave, employee had accrued between 1 and § 778.219 as proposed. need not be included in the regular rate. 125 hours of leave, 40 percent for 126 Association of Firefighters and the While acknowledging that some sick- to 255 hours, 60 percent for 256-380 AFL-CIO contended that the leave buy-back programs, such as the hours, and 80 percent for 381-607 Department's proposal to permit the one at issue in the 2009 WHD opinion hours. By contrast, Association of exclusion of pay for forgoing sick leave letter, could function like an attendance Firefighters commented that the is contrary to two appellate cases. 67 bonus and therefore require their Department did not provide any First, the court in Chavez relied on inclusion in the regular rate, the annual definition of what constitutes an § 778.219-and in particular, its explicit leave that was bought back in Balestrieri "approximate equivalent" amount and reference to pay for vacation leave but did not differentiate between sick leave expressed concern that buy-back lack of reference to pay for sick leave- and vacation leave. As a result, any payments at "sub-premium" rates will to conclude that vacation-leave buy- portion of the annual leave that could be now be permitted. back payments were excludable, but attributed to sick leave did not function The Department declines to modify that sick-leave buy-back payments must as an attendance bonus. 74 the language in proposed§ 778.219 to be included in the regular rate. 68 In Lastly, IMLA requested that the either remove the requirement that characterizing the Department's position Department provide an additional payments be made in amounts on this issue, however, the court did not example to§ 778.219(a) concerning the "approximate[ly] equivalent" or to acknowledge WHD's statement in the excludability of "holiday-in-lieu" pay provide a formulaic definition as to FOH that the same rules governing from the regular rate. IMLA notes that what constitutes an "approximate exclusion of payments for unused some employees, particularly public equivalent." As an initial matter, the vacation leave also apply to payments sector emergency response personnel, Department notes that this requirement for unused sick leave. 69 Moreover, in work a set schedule without regard to is currently required under§ 778.218, citing a 2009 WHD opinion letter, 70 the holidays. Due to the nature of their which addresses the statutory provision court did not consider the fact-specific work, such employees may be called providing for exclusion of payments for nature of the buy-back program at issue upon to forgo a recognized holiday if occasional periods when no work is there, which, as discussed above, their schedule requires them to work performed due to vacation, holiday, and functioned as an attendance bonus. that day or if an emergency arises. IMLA illness. Section 778.218 has long Nothing in the current language in states that the current regulations permit provided that payments for such time § 778.219 or the 2009 opinion letter the excludability of such payments, but that "are in amounts approximately state that a sick-leave buy-back payment that several courts have nevertheless equivalent to the employee's normal can never be excluded from the regular held that similar forms of "holiday-in- earnings," are not compensation for rate. In the second case, Acton, the court lieu" payments must be included in the hours of employment and are therefore neither cited nor discussed the language regular rate. 75 excludable from the regular rate. 66 in section 7(e)(2) that permits exclusion Current Department regulations Given that§ 778.219's exclusion of pay of payments for occasional periods support excluding holiday-in-lieu pay for forgoing leave is derived from when no work is performed due to from the regular rate. Under 29 CFR § 778.218, the well-established vacation, holiday, or illness, or 778.219, where an employee forgoes his inclusion of this requirement in the § 778.219, which interprets this 71 See 436 F.3d at 977. latter warrants its inclusion in the statutory provision. Instead, the court 72 See 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2); 29 CFR 778.219. former. Additionally, requiring mistakenly applied§ 778.223 to 73 See 800 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2015). excludable payments for forgoing leave determine whether buy-back payments 74 See 800 F.3d at 1102-04. to be approximately equivalent to the were similar to call-back pay, and 75 See Hart v. City of Alameda, No. C-07- employee's normal earnings helps ultimately concluded that the sick-leave 5845MMC, 2009 WL 1705612, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June ensure that the payments are true leave buy back must be included in the 17, 2009) (holiday pay received by city police officers every pay period must be included in the buy-back payments rather than regular rate as it constitutes regular rate); Lewis v. County of Colusa, No. 2:16- compensation for the general work duty cv-01745-VC, 2018 WL 1605754, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 66 29 CFR 778.218; see FOH 32d03g ("Payment of regular attendance over a significant Apr. 3, 2018) (defendant did not meet burden to for absences charged against leave under a bona fide show that biannual lump-sum holiday in-lieu plan granting the employee a specified amount of 67 See Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 630 F.3d payments to safety officers and dispatchers fall annual, vacation, or sick leave with pay need not squarely within section 7(e)(2)); McKinnon v. City be included in the regular rate of pay, if the sum 1300, 1309 (10th Cir. 2011); Acton v. City of of Merced, No. 118CV01124LJOSAB, 2018 WL paid is the approximate equivalent of the Columbia, 436 F.3d 969, 977-78 (8th Cir. 2006). 6601900, at *5-8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018) (finding 68 See 630 F.3d at 1308-09. employee"s normal earnings for a similar period of that payments are not excludable where it was "not 69 See FOH 32d03e. working time. Payments for such absences may be apparent that Plaintiffs are in fact entitled to paid excluded regardless of when or how the leave is 70 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2009-19, 2009 WL time off at the holidays which they are able to taken.""). 649021 (Jan. 16, 2009). forego""). DOLAR0916 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 8 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68743 or her holiday and works, and is paid Section 778.320 addresses "[h]ours establish that the parties have treated for his or her normal work plus an that would not be hours worked if not the time as hours worked. The additional amount for the holiday, the paid for," and identifies "time spent in Department explained in the NPRM additional amount paid for working the eating meals between working hours" as that, in the Department's enforcement holiday is not included in the regular an example. 80 Section 778.320(b) experience, the treatment of bona fide rate. The Department applied this further states that even when such time meal breaks is frequently not subject to principle in a 2006 opinion letter is compensated, the parties may agree formal agreement and is often concluding that holiday-in-lieu pay that the time will not be counted as established by informal policy or course could be excluded from the regular rate hours worked. of conduct. Payments for such periods where the employer provided nine The Department proposed to remove need only be included in the regular "recognized" holidays and two the reference to "lunch periods" in rate when it appears from all the "floating" holidays paid in a lump sum, § 778.218(b) to eliminate any pertinent facts that the parties have and on occasion when employees forgo uncertainty about its relation to treated compensated bona fide meal a holiday and work they received both § 778.320 concerning the excludability periods as hours worked. The NPRM pay for the hours worked and holiday of payments for bona fide meal periods noted that the proposal would clarify pay. 76 The Department notes that it does from the regular rate. As one court the existing requirements and not not matter whether the employee noted, the existing regulations in substantively change either the voluntarily forgoes the holiday to work §§ 778.218 and 778.320 "appear calculation of the regular rate or the or is required to work the holiday by the somewhat inconsistent" on the determination of hours worked. schedule set for the employee. Nothing excludability from the regular rate of The Department received many in this regulation makes the compensation for bona fide meal comments supporting these changes and excludability of such payments periods. 81 In 1986, WHD acknowledged no comments opposed to the changes. dependent on the employee having the in an opinion letter "that the reference See, e.g., NDA; Associated Builders and option to work or not work on the to meal periods in section 778.218(b) of Contractors; NADA; CWC; SHRM; holiday. All that is required for the Part 778 may not be compatible with the PPWO. Accordingly, the Department holiday-in-lieu pay to be excludable is position which is contained in section adopts the changes to§§ 778.218(b) and that the employee is paid an amount for 778.320(b)," and indicated that the issue 778.320 as proposed. the holiday, in addition to being paid was under review. 82 The Department 3. Additional Examples of "Other for his hours worked on the holiday. 77 subsequently clarified in a 1996 opinion Similar Causes" In response to IMLA's comments, the letter that pay provided for a bona fide Department has added an additional meal period is excludable from the As noted above,§ 778.218 addresses example to§ 778.219(a) involving regular rate under§ 778.320(b). 83 As the clause of FLSA section 7(e)(2) that employees who work a set schedule explained in the NPRM, while the permits employers to exclude certain irrespective of holidays to clarify the Department clarified its position in an payments for occasional periods when regulation. opinion letter more than 20 years ago, no work is performed "due to vacation, it is nonetheless concerned that the holiday, illness, failure of the employer 2. Exclusion of Compensation for Bona to provide sufficient work, or other Fide Meal Periods language in§ 778.218(b) may cause confusion concerning the excludability similar cause." 85 Section 778.218(d) Section 778.218 addresses the clause of pay for bona fide meal periods. Thus, lists examples that qualify as "other of FLSA section 7(e)(2) concerning to remove any ambiguity and to codify similar causes," including "absences payments made for occasional periods its interpretation in regulation, the due to jury service, reporting to a draft when no work is performed and Department proposed to delete the board, attending a funeral of a family provides that when payments for such reference to "lunch periods" from member, [and] inability to reach the time "are in amounts approximately § 778.218(b). workplace because of weather equivalent to the employee's normal Bona fide meal periods are not condition." earnings," they are not compensation considered "hours worked" for The Chamber requested that the for hours of employment and may be purposes of the FLSA's minimum wage Department "add paid family medical excluded from the regular rate. 78 or overtime requirements, and leave as an example in§ 778.218(d), and Section 778.218(b) states that this clause employers are not required to pay for paid leave for military service; voting; "deals with the type of absences which such time. 84 The Department proposed attending child custody or adoption are infrequent or sporadic or changing§ 778.320 to clarify that the hearings; attending school activities; unpredictable" and "has no relation to payment of compensation for bona fide donating organs, bone marrow, or blood; regular 'absences' such as lunch periods meal periods alone does not convert voluntarily serving as a first responder; nor to regularly scheduled days of such time to hours worked unless and any other paid leave required under rest." 79 agreement or actual course of conduct state or local laws." Upon review, the Department believes these are all 76 FLSA2006-18NA, 2006 WL 4512960 (July 24, 80 See 29 CFR 778.320. examples of non-routine absences that 2006). Cf. WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1999 WL fall within the meaning of "other similar 1788163, at *2 (Sept. 30, 1999) (payments received 81 Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 by employees were required to be included in the F.3d 325, 331 n.5 (3d Cir. 2016). causes" in FLSA section 7(e)(2). regular rate where employees were not entitled to 82 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA-937 (July 22, 1986). Accordingly, the Department is adding take leave on holidays and instead received an 83 See WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1996 WL these causes for absences in the list of additional 5 percent of base pay each pay period 1031805 (Dec. 3, 1996); see also Ballaris v. Wacker as "in lieu of holiday pay.""), Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2004) examples of "other similar causes." The 77 Thus, the Department disagrees with the (holding that pay for a bona fide lunch period was Department further believes that McKinnon court"s reliance on the word "forgo•• in "properly excluded from the calculation of the attending any funeral, not just the § 778.219 to mean that the employee must have the regular rate under 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2) as interpreted funeral of a family member, is an "other option of not working on the holiday for the by revised§ 778.320° 0); WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, holiday-in-lieu pay to be excludable. See 1997 WL 998021 (July 21, 1997) (stating that pay similar cause" under FLSA section McKinnon, 2018 WL 6601900 at *5, for bona fide meal periods need not be included in 7(e)(2). Therefore, the Department is 78 29 CFR 778.218; see 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). the regular rate). 79 29 CFR 778.218(b), 84 See 29 CFR 785.19. 85 29 CFR 778.218; see 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). DOLAR0917 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 9 of 194 68744 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations deleting "of a family member" from the traveling to and from work, buying All of the comments regarding this text of§ 778.218(d). lunch, paying rent, and the like," are proposal were supportive and agreed not excluded from the regular rate under that the limitation imposed by the word 4. Reimbursable Expenses the "reimbursable expenses" clause of "solely" in the current regulation could The second clause of section 7(e)(2) section 7(e)(2). 90 be overly restrictive and is not required excludes from the regular rate Similarly, as the NPRM explained, the by the FLSA. See Associated Builders "reasonable payments for traveling Department's opinion letters do not and Contractors; CWC; Chamber; Fisher expenses, or other expenses, incurred by analyze whether an expense is incurred Phillips; NADA; PPWO; Seyfarth; an employee in the furtherance of his solely for the employer's convenience SHRM; SIGMA. Two of these employer's interests and properly when discussing whether it may be commenters also asked that the reimbursable by the employer[.]" 86 excluded from the regular rate. Instead, Department add a new sentence Section 778.217 currently states that the opinion letters analyze simply explicitly stating that "business "[w]here an employee incurs expenses whether expenses benefit the expenses need not be solely or primarily on his employer's behalf or where he is employer. 91 Furthermore, since 1955, incurred for the employer's benefit." required to expend sums solely by the Department's policy in WHD's FOH See Associated Builders and reason of action taken for the has mirrored the statutory requirement Contractors; Chamber. convenience of his employer, section that "expenses incurred by an employee The Department has decided to 7(e)(2) is applicable to reimbursement in furtherance of his/her employer's finalize its proposal to remove the word for such expenses." 87 The Department interests" may be excluded from the "solely" from§ 778.217(a) to better align promulgated this section in February regular rate, regardless of whether they the regulations with the FLSA. As 1950. 88 "solely" benefit one party or the other. 92 explained above, the FLSA does not While§ 778.217, in its current form, In the NPRM, the Department pointed impose a limitation on the proportion of limits reimbursable expenses to those out that, consistent with the benefit to the employer in order for "solely" in the interest of the employer, Department's practice and guidance, reimbursed expenses to be excludable. the statutory language does not include courts have not analyzed whether the The Department does not believe it is this limitation. Instead, the FLSA expenses at issue were incurred solely necessary to further add a sentence simply excludes all expenses incurred for the employer's convenience when stating that business expenses need not "in the furtherance of [the] employer's determining whether they are be "solely or primarily incurred for the interests[,]" 89 and, as explained further excludable from the regular rate. employer's benefit" in order to be below, neither the Department nor the Instead, courts have emphasized the excludable. The removal of the term courts have since restricted excludable statutory requirement that the expenses "solely" adequately aligns the expenses to only those that "solely" need only benefit the employer. 93 regulations with the statute. benefit the employer. As explained in The Department also proposed to the NPRM, the Department is concerned 90 29 CFR 778.217(d). The NPRM noted that this clarify section 7(e)(2)'s requirement that is consistent with the illustrative examples in that this single use of the word "solely" § 778.217(b) only "reasonable" and "properly ofreimbursable expenses that may be in§ 778.217 may be interpreted as more excluded from the regular rate, which include reimbursable" expenses may be restrictive than what the FLSA actually "purchasing supplies, tools, materials, or excluded from the regular rate when requires. The Department therefore equipment on behalf of his employer,"" travel reimbursed. Current§ 778.217(b)(3) expenses, including living expenses away from permits employers to exclude from the proposed to remove the word "solely" home, incurred while traveling for work for the from§ 778.217(a) to clarify its employer"s benefit, and the cost of" supper money•• regular rate "[t]he actual or reasonably interpretation of the reimbursable to an employee in a situation where "he or she approximate amount expended by an expenses clause of section 7(e)(2). The would ordinarily leave work in time to have supper employee who is traveling 'over the at home, but instead must remain to work road' on his employer's business, for Department noted that this proposed additional hours for the employer"s benefit."" See 29 clarification was consistent with the CFR 778.217(b)(1), (2), (4). transportation . . . and living expenses other subsections of§ 778.217, as well 91 For example, the cost of food for eating meals away from home, [or] other [such] travel as court rulings and the Department's during travel out of town for work is for the expenses[.]" Section 778.217(c) cautions opinion letters-which have not employer"s benefit; therefore, such reimbursement that "only the actual or reasonably may be excluded from the regular rate. See WHD approximate amount of the expense is required that excludable expenses solely Opinion Letter FLSA2004-3, 2004 WL 2146923 benefit the employer. (May 13, 2004); see also WHD Opinion Letter excludable from the regular rate. If the Section 778. 217( d) also discusses FLSA-828 (July 19, 1976) ("[r]eimbursement to an amount paid as 'reimbursement' is expenses that are excludable from the employee for expenses incurred on behalf of an disproportionately large, the excess employer•• would not become part of the regular regular rate. The Department explained rate); WHD Opinion Letter FLSA-940 (Mar. 9, 1977) amount will be included in the regular in the NPRM that this paragraph (regular rate shall not include "reimbursement for rate." emphasizes only whether such expenses where an employee incurs out of pocket Two commenters asked the payments benefit the employer or the expenses on the employer"s behalf""); WHD Opinion Department to clarify that specific Letter FLSA, 1985 WL 1087356, at *2 (July 12, reimbursable expenses are excludable employee; it does not require them to 1985) (reimbursement must be for "expenses "solely" benefit one party or the other. incurred by the employee on the employer"s behalf from the regular rate. See NADA; AHLA. Thus, payments for expenses that are or convenience''). These requests included "cell phone "incurred by the employee on the 92 FOH 32d05a(a). reimbursement," "non-mandatory employer's behalf or for his benefit or 93 See, e.g., Berryv. Excel Grp., Inc., 288 F.3d 252, credentialing exam fees," "organization 253-54 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that membership dues," and reimbursements convenience" merit exclusion from the reimbursements of travel expenses were primarily regular rate, but reimbursements for for the employer"s benefit; therefore, such expenses for the cost of tools. These are clearly expenses "incurred by the employee for were excluded from the regular rate); see also Sharp not compensation for hours of his own benefit," such as "expenses in v. CGGLand, Inc., 840 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. employment, but instead are expenses 2016) ("[T]he proper focus under§ 778.217(b)(3) is taken on by employees for the whether the $35 payments are for reimbursement of 86 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). travel expenses incurred in furtherance of the employer's convenience or benefit. 8 7 29 CFR 778.217(a). employer"s interests . . . .""); Brennan v. Padre 88 See 15 FR 623. Drilling Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 462, 465 (S.D. Tex. by the employee in the furtherance of his 8 9 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). 1973) (per diem for traveling expenses is "expended employer"s interest""). DOLAR0918 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 10 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68745 Because "[t]he actual amount expended necessarily unreasonable. As the NPRM rates set by the IRS on travel expenses by an employee in purchasing . . . explained, a payment may be more than are per se unreasonable. 99 tools" is already included in the that required "to minimize 5. Other Similar Payments regulation's illustrations of excludable administrative costs" yet still within the reimbursements, the Department realm of reasonable business and Section 7(e) requires "all believes sufficient guidance is available industry norms. remuneration for employment" be regarding tool reimbursements. 94 A number of commenters supported included in the regular rate, subject to However, to provide additional clarity the Department's proposal to state in the that section's eight listed exclusions. regarding cell phone reimbursement, regulatory text that reimbursements for Section 7(e)(2) consists of three clauses, exam fees, and membership dues, the travel expenses are per se reasonable if each of which address a distinct Department has decided to revise the they do not exceed the rates in the category of excludable compensation. language of the illustration provided at Federal Travel Regulation. See, e.g., As discussed above, the first excludes § 778.217(b)(1) to make clear that these NDA; PPWO; SIGMA; SHRM; Chamber. "payments made for occasional periods too are excludable reimbursements. Several commenters noted that the when no work is performed due to The NPRM proposed additional Federal Travel Regulation rates are vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the explanation of what is "reasonable"- below market rate, and that in many employer to provide sufficient work, or and thus not "disproportionately cases expenses exceeding that amount other similar cause." The second large"-by referring to the Federal may still be reasonable. To address this excludes "reasonable payments for Travel Regulation. The Department issue, some commenters recommended traveling expenses, or other expenses, explained that it believes that the that the Department finalize proposed incurred by an employee in the amounts set in the Federal Travel paragraph (c)(3) stating that costs furtherance of his employer's interests Regulation are not excessive and are exceeding the Federal Travel Regulation and properly reimbursable by the easily ascertained, given its "two may still be reasonable, and two employer." The third clause of section principal purposes" of "balanc[ing] the recommended that the Department 7(e)(2) excludes from the regular rate need to assure that official travel is develop additional guidance about the "other similar payments to an employee conducted in a responsible manner with Federal Travel Regulations after which are not made as compensation for the need to minimize administrative issuance of the final rule. See AHLA; his hours of employment." costs" and "communicat[ing] the CWC; Chamber; SIGMA; SHRM. Two As explained in the NPRM, "[o]ther resulting policies in a clear manner to commenters noted that many employers . . . payments" are "similar" to those in Federal agencies and employees." 95 use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the first two clauses of section 7(e)(2) The Department thus proposed to add guidelines for reimbursement of because they are "not made as regulatory text explaining that a employee travel expenses, and compensation for [an employee's] hours payment for an employee traveling on suggested that the final rule also state of employment." The first two clauses his or her employer's business is per se that expenses not exceeding the IRS's share the essential characteristic of reasonable if it is at or beneath the guidelines for reimbursement of having no connection to the quantity or maximum amounts reimbursable or employee travel expenses are per se quality of work performed. The "other allowed for the same type of expense reasonable. See NDA; PPWO. similar payments" clause thus excludes under the Federal Travel Regulation and payments not tied to an employee's The Department has decided to meets§ 778.217's other requirements. hours worked, services rendered, job modify the language in proposed Those other requirements include that § 778.217(c)(2) to state that payments performance, or other criteria linked to the reimbursement be for the "actual or the quality or quantity of the employee's equal to or less than the Federal Travel reasonably approximate amount" 96 of work. 100 Regulation rates or the substantiation the expense, that the expense be amounts for travel expenses permitted The NPRM explained that, in a sense, incurred on the employer's behalf, and every benefit or payment that an by the IRS under 26 CFR 1.274-5(g) and that the expense not vary with hours employer gives an employee is (j) are per se reasonable and not worked. 97 The proposed regulatory text disproportionately large. 98 The also clarified that a reimbursement for See id. Department has also decided to finalize 99 an employee traveling on his or her 100 See Reich v. Interstate Brands Corp., 57 F.3d the regulatory language in proposed employer's business exceeding the § 778.217(c)(3) noting that 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The word 'similar" then Federal Travel Regulation limits is not refers to other payments that do not depend at all § 778.217(c)(2) does not create an on when or how much work is performed.""); 94 See 29 CFR 778.217(b)(1). inference that amounts in excess of the Minizza v. Stone Container Corp., 842 F.2d 1456, Federal Travel Regulation rates or the 1461 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[W]e interpret the phrase 95 41 CFR 300-1.2. Those amounts are published 'other similar payments• by reading each clause of online annually by the General Services section 207(e)(2) separately. The phrase 'other Administration. See Plan and Book, GSA, 98 Under the authority of 26 U.S.C. 274(d), 26 CFR similar payments . . . not made as compensation www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-and-book (last visited 1.274-5(g) and 26 CFR 1.274-5(j), the IRS for hours of employment" does not mean just other Aug. 23, 2019). Commissioner has prescribed special per diem payment for idle hours or reimbursements, the two 96 Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d methods under which a taxpayer may use a types of payments set forth in the two preceding 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 2010), provides a helpful specified amount in lieu of substantiating the actual clauses of the section, but payments not tied to contrast to a properly excludable reimbursement. costs of certain travel while away from home. IRS hours of compensation, of which payments for idle There, multiple facts indicated that the employee"s guidelines regarding special per diem and meals hours and reimbursements are only two purported "per diem•• was simply a scheme to and incidental expenses (M&IE) methods are set examples. 00 But see Flores v. City of San Gabriel, ). avoid paying overtime. Those facts included the per forth in Revenue Procedure 2011-47, 2011-42 I.R.B. 824 F.3d 890, 899 (9th Cir. 2016) ("the 'key point"•• diem's rise over time without any clear connection 520, 2011 WL 4503974 (Oct. 17, 2011). The IRS for exclusion under the third clause "is whether the to travel or other expenses, its variance by the hour, publishes the special per diem rates in an annual payment is 'compensation for work"•• (quoting its cap at 40 hours per week, and its payment in notice. See Notice 2019-55 (2019-42 !RB 937) (or Local 246 Utility Workers Union of Am. v. S. Cal. combination with a well-below-market wage. successor), available at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/ Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1996)); Acton, 97 See, e.g., Baouch v. Werner Enters., Inc., 908 irs-drop/n-19-55.pdf. Revenue Procedure 2011-47 436 F.3d at 976 ("Section 207(e)(2), properly F.3d 1107, 1116 (8th Cir. 2018) ("Per diem provides optional substantiation methods (for understood, operates not as a separate basis for payments that vary with the amount of work example, meal and incidental expenses only per exclusion, but instead clarifies the types of performed are part of the regular rate.""), petition for diem allowance, special rules for the transportation payments that do not constitute remuneration for cert. filed, (U.S. June 13, 2019) (No. 18-1541). industry, and the high-low substantiation method). employment for purposes of section 207.""). DOLAR0919 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 11 of 194 68746 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations "remuneration for employment." 101 similar payments" cannot be simply Second, the Seventh Circuit espoused Certainly benefits like paid vacation or wages in another guise. When a a similar understanding in Reich v. sick leave are seen as such by many payment is a wage supplement, even if Interstate Brands Corp. 110 There, the employers and employees. But the not tied directly to employee court held that regular, planned $12 section 7(e)(2) exclusions make clear performance or hours worked, it is still payments to bakers who worked weeks that whether or not they are compensation for "hours of without two consecutive days off could remuneration, they are "not made as employment." For example, payments not be excluded from the regular rate compensation for [the employee's] such as production bonuses, 103 and the under section 7(e)(2). The court hours of employment" because they cost of furnished board, lodging, or reasoned that the payments were have no relationship to the employee's facilities, 104 which "though not directly materially no different from a higher hours worked or services rendered. This attributable to any particular hours of base rate to compensate the bakers for interpretation gives meaning to the third work are, nevertheless, clearly taking on an unpleasant schedule. 111 clause. It allows employers to provide understood to be compensation for "Other similar payments" are different, benefits unconnected to the quality or services" 105 are not excludable under wrote the court. "The word 'similar' quantity of work, even if those benefits this provision. Similarly, payments that . . . refers to other payments that do not are remuneration of a sort. differ only in form from regular wages depend at all on when or how much The NPRM further explained that by, for instance, being paid in a monthly work is performed." 112 interpreting the third clause as simply a lump sum or as hardship premiums, are Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held restatement of the "remuneration" better characterized as wages or bonuses that pay differentials based on requirement would contravene basic than as "other similar payments" employees' education level, shift principles of statutory interpretation. excludable from the regular rate. The differentials, and hazardous pay are Such an interpretation would equate the other similar payments clause cannot be compensation for services rendered, unique phrases "all remuneration for interpreted so broadly as to "obliterate[] unlike payments that "are unrelated to employment" and "compensation for the qualifications and limitations" [employees'] compensation for services [the employee's] hours of employment," placed on excludable payments and hours of service." 113 Some circuit even though Congress used different specifically addressed in section 7(e)'s courts have interpreted the "other words and thus, presumably, meant various other sections, which could similar payments" not to exclude different things. This is especially so render such limits "superfluous." 106 payments that are "compensation for when considering that one phrase uses The NPRM stated that the work." 114 The Department concurs with the word "employment" when the other Department's interpretation has these courts to the extent that they have uses the term "hours of employment." considerable support in the case law, used these or similar phrases to capture Such an interpretation would also citing multiple decisions. First, the the idea that the regular rate includes render the third clause redundant, Third Circuit held in Minizza v. Stone payments tied to work performance or another disfavored result. And it would Container Corp. that two lump sums that function as a wage supplement. But be difficult to reconcile with the first paid to select employees to induce them insofar as these courts have equated clause of section 7(e)(2), in which the to agree to a collective-bargaining "compensation for work" with payments are clearly remuneration yet agreement were excludable as an "other "remuneration for employment," 115 excludable from the regular rate. similar payment" because they were not that is difficult to reconcile with the text The NPRM also explained that compensation for hours worked or of the FLSA. As explained above, the payments to employees are not services rendered. 107 The court FLSA uses two different phrases, excludable under the "other similar interpreted the clause to exclude "remuneration for employment" and payments" clause merely because the "payments not tied to hours of "compensation for hours of payments are not specifically tied to an compensation, of which payments for employment," each of which should be employee's hours of work. 102 "Other idle hours and reimbursements are only given distinct content. And just as two examples." 108 The court's decision importantly, the first clause of section 101 Cf. Minizza, 842 F.2d at 1460 ("Employers that these payments were not 7(e)(2) excludes vacation and sick leave, have a finite amount to spend for the labor compensation for employment rested in which is clearly remunerative; "other component of their product or service. This sum part on the fact that the "eligibility similar payments" to employees can be can be allocated solely as compensation on an hourly basis (in which event the payment would be requirements were not meant to serve as remunerative too. fully includable in the 'regular rate"), or it can compensation for service, but rather to Accordingly, the NPRM explained, assume any number of other forms . . . (in which reduce the employers' costs," but also in the proposed clarifications would case the payments may or may not be includable ), part on the fact that "the eligibility promote a clear yet flexible standard for in any ratio the parties care to set.""); Sec'y U.S. employers and employees to order their Dep't of Laborv. Bristol Excavating, Inc., No. 17- terms themselves [for the lump sums] 3663, 2019 WL 3926937, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, [did] not require specific service"-it affairs. Payments are "other similar 2019) (clarifying that not all payments relating to did "not matter how many hours an payments" when they do not function employment, regardless of source, qualify as employee worked during that period, as formulaic wage supplements and are remuneration for employment and that, in the not tied to hours worked, services context of third-party payments, a "payment nor how many hours he might work in qualifies as remuneration for employment only the future." 109 when the employer and employee have effectively have been conditioned on a certain number of hours agreed it will."). worked or on an amount of services provided."). possibly exclude every payment that is not 110 57 F.3d 574. 102 See Local 246, 83 F.3d at 295 n.2 ("Even if measured by the number of hours spent at work."). 111 See id. at 578-79. payments to employees are not measured by the 103 See 29 CFR 778.21 l(c). 112 Id. at 578. number of hours spent at work, that fact alone does 104 See 29 CFR 778.116. 113 Featsent, 70 F.3d at 904-06. not qualify them for exclusion under section 105 29 CFR 778.224(a). 207(e)(2)."); Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 114 See, e.g., Flores, 824 F.3d at 899. 106 Reich, 57 F.3d at 578. 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1995) ("7(e)(2) does not exclude 115 See Acton, 436 F.3d at 976 ("the language 'not 107 Minizza, 842 F.2d at 1461-62. every payment not measured by hours of made as compensation for [the employee's] hours 108 Id. at 1461. employment from the regular rate."); Reich, 57 F.3d of employment' posited in§ 207(e)(2) is but a mere at 577 ("We cannot read§ 7(e)(2) in isolation . . . . 109 Id. at 1460-61; see also id. at 1462 ("If the re-articulation of the 'remuneration for It is one among many exemptions, and a glance at payments were made as compensation for hours employment' requirement set forth in the a few of the others shows that § 7( e )(2) cannot worked or services provided, the payments would preambulary language of§ 207(e)"). DOLAR0920 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 12 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68747 rendered, job performance, or other added this set of examples in 1950. rate the cost of providing certain health criteria linked to the quality or quantity Therefore, the Department proposed promotion and disease prevention of the employee's work, but are clarifying in§ 778.224(b) that the activities, often known as wellness conditioned merely on one being an following items may be excluded from programs. The NPRM noted that employee. Conditions not tied to the an employee's regular rate under the examples of some common wellness quality or quantity of work performed, "other similar payments" clause of programs include health risk such as a reasonable waiting period for section 7(e)(2). assessments, biometric screenings, eligibility 116 or the requirement to a. Specialist Treatment Provided Onsite; vaccination clinics (including annual repay benefits as a remedy for employee Gym Access, Gym Memberships, and flu vaccinations), nutrition classes, misconduct, are permitted. This Fitness Classes; Wellness Programs; weight loss programs, smoking cessation standard also clarifies that there is space for a variety of creative benefits Discounts on Retail Goods and Services programs, stress reduction programs, offerings, and encourages their The Department proposed clarifying exercise programs, and coaching to help provision to wide groups of employees in§ 778.224(b)(3) that employers may employees meet health goals. 125 instead of reserving them only for exclude from the regular rate the cost of Wellness programs are often provided to FLSA-exempt employees. providing onsite treatment from employees enrolled in an employer- Section 778.224 addresses specialists such as chiropractors, sponsored health insurance plan, but miscellaneous items that are excludable massage therapists, personal trainers, some employers offer wellness programs from an employee's regular rate under counselors, Employment Assistance to employees regardless of their health the "other similar payments" clause of Programs, or physical therapists. 121 As insurance coverage. The NPRM stated section 7(e)(2) because they are "not explained in the NPRM, such specialist that workplace wellness programs are made as compensation for . . . hours of treatment resembles "on-the-job medical similar to "on-the-job medical care" and employment[.]" 117 Section 778.224(b) care," which§ 778.224(b)(3) already "recreational facilities," conveniences currently provides a brief, identifies as an excludable that the regulations already specify are nonexhaustive set of examples of "other "convenience furnished to the excludable from an employee's regular similar payments" excludable from an employee." 122 Employers that provide rate. 126 Employers may provide such employee's regular rate: "(1) Sums paid onsite specialist treatment do so for a programs to, for example, reduce health to an employee for the rental of his variety of reasons, including to raise care costs, reduce health-related truck or car[;] (2) Loans or advances workplace morale, promote employee health, and reduce healthcare costs. absenteeism, and improve employee made by the employer to the health and morale. employee[;] [and] (3) The cost to the The Department also proposed employer of conveniences furnished to clarifying in§ 778.224(b)(3) that the cost The Department also proposed adding the employee such as parking space, of providing employees with gym an example in§ 778.224(b)(5) to confirm restrooms, lockers, on-the-job medical access, gym memberships, and fitness that discounts on retail goods and care and recreational facilities." 118 The classes, whether onsite or offsite, is services may be excluded from the NPRM noted that the Department added excludable from the regular rate. 123 regular rate of pay as long as they are this set of examples to the part 778 These fitness benefits, the Department not tied to an employee's hours worked regulations in 1950, 119 and has not explained, resemble "recreational or services rendered. The NPRM cited a substantively amended them since. The facilities," which§ 778.224(b)(3) already survey that indicated that many regulation makes clear that "it was not identifies as an excludable convenience employers provide employees with an considered feasible" to provide an provided to employees. According to option to purchase these types of goods exhaustive list of excludable "other one survey, a substantial number of or services at a discounted price relative similar payments" given the "variety of employers provided fitness benefits. 124 to their full retail value. 127 Such miscellaneous payments [that] are paid Employers may provide such discounts are commonly available to by an employer to an employee under conveniences for many reasons, including to raise workplace morale, employees regardless of their quality or peculiar circumstances." 120 quantity of work, and it is solely the The Department explained in the promote employee health, and reduce NPRM that it continues to believe that healthcare costs. employees' choice whether to purchase providing a comprehensive list of all The Department proposed adding an anything under the discount. When "other similar payments" excludable example in§ 778.224(b)(4) to clarify that these discounts are available to under section 7(e)(2)'s third clause is employers may exclude from the regular employees regardless of their hours infeasible. Nonetheless, the Department worked or services rendered, and are recognized that an updated list would 121 This proposal is not intended to affect the not tied to any duties performed, they further help employers understand their circumstances under which receiving medical qualify as "other similar payments" attention at the direction of the employer is legal obligations by addressing some of considered to be hours worked. See 29 CFR 785.43. 125 See, e.g., Soc"y for Human Res. Mgmt., "How the innovative changes in compensation 122 29 CFR 778.224(b)(3). to Establish and Design a Wellness Program,"" practices and workplace environments 123 In circumstances where maintaining a certain h ttps ://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtool s/hr-top ics/ that have occurred since the Department level of physical fitness is a requirement of the pages/howtoestablishanddesignawellness employee"s job, the cost to the employer of program.aspx (last accessed Aug. 26, 2019). providing exercise opportunities is a facility 116 See Minizza, 842 F.2d at 1460 ("A review of 12 5 29 CFR 778.224(b)(3). furnished "primarily for the benefit or convenience 127 See Soc"y for Human Res. Mgmt., "2018 the eligibility terms reflects a requirement only that of the employer,"" as described in § 531.3( d). a payee achieve the status of an active employee for Facilities furnished for the employer"s benefit do Employee Benefits: The Evolution of Benefits,"" at a specified period of time prior to receipt. It does not qualify as wages or remuneration for 31 (June 2018), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/ not matter how many hours an employee worked employment and thus need not be included in the trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys! during that period, nor how many hours he might regular rate. Documents/201 B%20Employee %20Benefits% work in the future.""). 124 See Soc"y for Human Res. Mgmt., 2018 20Report.pdf(from 2014 to 2018, employers 1 17 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). offering an employee discount on company services Employee Benefits: The Evolution of Benefits 23 1 13 29 CFR 778.224(b). ranged from 31 percent to 34 percent, and (2018), available at https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/ 119 See 15 FR 623 (1950) (codified at 29 CFR employers offering employer-sponsored personal trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys! 778.7(g); relocated in 1968 to 29 CFR 778.224(b)). Documents/2018%20Employee%20Benefits% shopping (e.g., retail) discounts ranged from 11 120 29 CFR 778.224(a). 20Report.pdf. percent to 19 percent). DOLAR0921 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 13 of 194 68748 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations under section 7(e)(2). 128 The NPRM § 778.224(a): "Payments are 'similar' § 778.224(a) so as to avoid duplicative pointed out that more than 50 years ago, when the amount of the payment is not text. the Department stated that such dependent on hours worked, To provide additional clarity, the employee discounts are not included in production, or efficiency and when the Department is adding to § 778.224(a) the regular rate of pay. In a 1962 amount of the payment is unaffected by two examples of conditions identified in opinion letter, the Department found the quantity or quality of work the NPRM as being unconnected to the that the value of "concessions granted to performed." The Department agrees that quality or quantity of work performed: employees . . . on charges for telephone such a statement would provide further "reasonable waiting period for service" was "not part of wages clarity and notes that the NPRM defined eligibility" and "the requirement to includible in the regular rate of pay"- "other similar payments" in a repay benefits as a remedy for employee in part because "[s]uch concessions comparable manner as "payments not misconduct." 133 The Department is also appear to be similar to discounts on tied to an employee's hours worked, adding an additional example of a merchandise offered by many retail services rendered, job performance, condition that is unconnected to the establishments to their employees credentials, or other criteria linked to quality or quantity of work to which [the Department] do[es] not the quality or quantity of the employee's § 778.224(a): "limiting eligibility on the regard as wages." 129 The NPRM work." 130 Three items in the NPRM's basis of geographic location or job explained that discounts like these are list of criteria not linked to the quality position." Payments that depends on not fungible cash but merely a lower or quantity of work-"hours worked, location-for instance, offering benefits price on the employer's offerings. They services rendered, [and] job for employees in certain states or appeal only to the employees who want performance"-closely correspond with cities-are not related to work quality or to use them and are limited to the "hours worked, production, or quantity. Nor do payments that depend offered selection of goods or services. efficiency" from the Chamber's on an employee's job position-for Employees must expend their own proposal. The NPRM also listed instance, offering a signing bonus to funds to avail themselves of the "credentials." But upon further engineers but not salespersons. discounts. The discounts are reflection, the Department believes that, Relatedly, in response to NELA's and presumably limited in their value, since unlike the other listed criteria, NELP's comments, the Department employers likely do not offer discounts credentials are not necessarily linked to believes that the addition of the above that would materially harm their the quality or quantity of an employee's language to § 778.224(a) makes clear business. And employers may also place work. that the proposed examples in conditions on the discounts to protect Additional pay for education § 778.224(b) do not change the existing their interests by, for instance, requiring credentials is generally connected with statutory analysis that the Department that discounted restaurant meals be work quality or quantity, and therefore uses for determining whether a payment eaten on the premises to prevent abuse. not excludable under§ 778.224, as is properly excluded, but instead simply The Department received numerous "education advancement . . . enhances add examples of categories of payments comments in support of these the quality of an employee's job that may be excluded as "other similar clarifications, with many commenters performance." 131 However, because the payments." The Department will still noting that the additional clarity connection between an employee's look to see if a benefit plan labeled a provided by the additional examples in education credentials and his or her "wellness plan," for example, meets the § 778.224(b) will allow employers to quality or quantity of work may vary, statutory requirements of section 7(e)(2) provide these types of benefits to the Department declines to include and corresponding regulatory employees more frequently. See, e.g., "credentials" in the regulatory text as an requirements to determine whether the Chamber; National Association of example of a criterion inextricably benefit is tied to hours worked, services Health Underwriters (NAHU); HR Policy linked to the quality or quantity of the rendered, job performance, or other Association (HR Policy); SHRM; employee's work. 132 In contrast, hours criteria linked to the quality or quantity Seyfarth; NFIB. By contrast, a few worked, services rendered, and job of the employee's work. The benefit commenters expressed concerns with performance are necessarily linked to must be conditioned only on being an this proposed clarification. See, e.g., work quality or quantity, and therefore, employee, although conditions National Employment Lawyers these are appropriate examples for the unconnected to the quality or quantity Association (NELA); NELP. NELA regulatory text. Accordingly, the of work, such as a reasonable waiting opposed this proposed clarification, Department has revised§ 778.224(a) period for eligibility, are permissible. suggesting that the Department instead using language adapted from the NPRM Furthermore, as explained in the NPRM, state that such payments "may be to clarify that "other similar payments" the benefit cannot be simply wages in excluded from the regular rate only after are "payments that do not depend on another guise. When a payment is a hours worked, services rendered, job wage supplement, even if not tied a case by case analysis using applicable principles." NELP similarly expressed performance, or other criteria that directly to employee performance or depend on the quality or quantity of the hours, it is still compensation for "hours concern that the added examples employee's work." The Department has of employment." The additional created per se categorical exclusions of types of benefits. also revised§ 778.224(b)(5) to remove examples that the Department has The Chamber asked the Department to language similar to that added in added to§ 778.224(b) do not change add the following language to these requirements or the Department's 130 84 FR 11894. analysis regarding the appropriate 131 See Featsent v. City of Youngstown. 70 F.3d treatment of these benefits. 128 See Reich. 57 F.3d at 578 (payments under 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1995) (additional pay for section 7(e)(2) are those "that do not depend at all education degrees was not excludable under Commenters also identified numerous on when or how much work is performed""); § 778.224). commonly provided employee perks Minizza. 842 F.2d at 1462 (payments under section 132 See, e.g .. Duplesse v. Cty. of Los Angeles. 714 and asked the Department to clarify 7(e)(2) all "share the essential characteristic . . . of F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2010) not being compensation for hours worked or whether these items would be (additional pay for credentials were excludable services rendered""). from the regular rate for firefighters who were not excludable under section 7(e)(2). The 129 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1962 DOLWH regularly assigned to positions involving those LEXIS 217 (Oct. 31, 1962). credentials). 133 84 FR 11895. DOLAR0922 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 14 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68749 Department believes several of the items managing work-life balance . . . and are These benefits might include financial raised would be excludable and are to the mutual benefit of both the assistance, legal services, information consistent with the Department's employer and the employee." The and referral services, and paid or unpaid proposal. These include discounts on NPRM explained that workplace leave. Adoption assistance takes many employer-provided hotel rooms and wellness programs are similar to "on- forms, some of which are excludable travel, and non-mandatory credentialing the-job medical care" and "recreational under other statutory exceptions. Legal classes. See AHLA; NADA. facilities," conveniences that the services are excludable under section AHLA asked the Department to clarify regulations already specify are 7(e)(4) to the extent they meet the that beverage discounts, food discounts, excludable from an employee's regular requirements of§ 778.215, and paid hotel room discounts, and travel rate. The Department finds no leave is excludable under section 7(e)(2) discounts are excludable from the meaningful difference between mental as "occasional periods when no work is regular rate as an "other similar health and financial wellness programs performed." Additionally, the costs of payment." In the NPRM, the and the wellness programs included in providing adoption assistance in the Department proposed that discounts on the NPRM. Accordingly, the Department form of information and referral services employer-provided goods and services clarifies in the final rule that the cost of or financial assistance for non-legal are excludable from the regular rate as providing such mental health and services may be excluded under section "other similar payments." As noted in financial wellness programs are 7(e)(2)'s "other similar payments" the NPRM, such discounts are not excludable from the regular rate as an clause. These benefits are not tied to an fungible cash-they offer a lower price "other similar payment." employee's hours worked, services on certain offerings and are typically AHLA asked the Department to clarify rendered, or other criteria linked to the non-transferable. Further, employees that parking benefits, in addition to the quality or quantity of work performed. have discretion as to whether or not to parking spaces explicitly listed under The Department amends its final rule to purchase anything under a discount, § 778.224(b)(3)(i), are excludable from include this clarification. Unlike thereby receiving the benefit. Provided the regular rate. Parking benefits adoption assistance, surrogacy these beverage discounts, food provide parking spaces for employees assistance tends to consist solely of discounts, hotel room discounts, and near the business premises of their payment of or reimbursement for travel discounts are not tied to an employer. As explained under medical expenses, typically outside of a employee's hours worked, services § 778.224(a), section 7(e)(2) of the FLSA medical plan. Such payments may rendered, or other conditions related to does not "permit the exclusion from the therefore be considered a wage under the quality or quantity of work regular rate of payments such as . . . section 3(m) of the FLSA, which is not performed, they are excludable from the the furnishing of facilities like board excludable from the regular rate. regular rate under the proposed and lodging . . . . " The Department language in§ 778.224(b)(5). NADA interprets facilities to include certain Some commenters asked the asked the Department to clarify that the "transportation furnished employees Department to clarify that the cost of cost to the employer of paying for non- between their home and work." 134 providing "snacks," "office coffee," mandatory credentialing classes for Accordingly, the Department has long "meals," or "pantry services" are employees is excludable from the acknowledged that employer-provided excludable from the regular rate. See HR regular rate under section 7(e)(2). To be parking spaces are excludable from the Policy; National Automatic excludable as an "other similar regular rate but commuter subsidies are Merchandising Association (NAMA); payment" under section 7(e)(2), these not. It is the Department's view that Chamber. While commenters suggested non-mandatory credentialing classes parking benefits are analogous to an these costs are excludable under section may not be compensation for hours employer-provided parking space, and 7(e)(2)'s "other similar payments" worked, services rendered, or other distinguishable from commuter clause, Department practice and case conditions related to the quality or subsidies. Parking benefits are law already supports exclusion of many quantity of work performed. The conveniences provided by an employer of these costs from the regular rate as Department believes the language so that the employee may have a gifts under section 7(e)(1). proposed in the NPRM sufficiently parking spot near the business premises Section 7(e)(1) excludes "sums paid addresses this issue, and as a result does of the employer. The employee still as gifts; payments in the nature of gifts not modify its proposal. As such, no bears the cost of the actual made at Christmas time or on other further changes to § 778.224 have been transportation between their home and special occasions, as a reward for made to address these comments. work-purchasing and maintaining a service, the amounts of which are not However, the Department found that vehicle, insurance, and gasoline, etc. To measured by or dependent on hours modifications would be helpful to add remove ambiguity, the Department worked, production, or efficiency." As clarity with regards to the exclusion of modifies its proposal to clarify in the the Department explained in the NPRM, other items raised by the commenters. final rule that parking benefits, like because the first clause, "sums paid as For example, some commenters asked parking spaces, are excludable from the gifts," is separated from the second the Department to clarify in the final regular rate. clause by a semicolon, the first clause rule that the cost to employers of Some of the items identified by addresses a separate set of excludable providing mental health wellness commenters fit within statutory benefits from that in the second programs and financial wellness exclusions other than section 7(e)(2). clause. 135 There may be some overlap programs are excludable along with the First, a few commenters asked the between "sums paid as gifts" and cost of providing physical wellness Department to clarify whether adoption "payments in the nature of gifts made at programs. See ERIC; HR Policy. As ERIC or surrogacy assistance benefits are Christmas time, on special occasions, or noted in its comment, "many employers excludable from the regular rate. See as a reward for services," but the . . . offer mental health and financial Chamber; SHRM; Seyfarth; PPWO. The categories are not coextensive. wellness plans as an integrated package term "adoption assistance" with physical wellness plans." Further, encompasses a wide variety of benefits. 135 See Harris v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 15-CV- HR Policy's comment stated that such 00657-HSG, 2016 WL 4073327, at *6 (N.D. Cal. benefits "assist the employee in 134 29 CFR 531.32(a). Aug. 1, 2016). DOLAR0923 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 15 of 194 68750 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations Specifically, sums under the first wages. 140 However, when a meal is as a discretionary bonus. Such clause are those "paid as gifts"-that is, provided by an employer to employees comments are addressed in that section paid with the express understanding on a special occasion, such as a of the preamble. ERIC suggested that that they are a gift-as opposed to sums celebratory pizza lunch, the cost to the sign-on bonuses, notwithstanding the under the second clause, which are not employer of providing such food is inclusion of a clawback provision, are expressly given as a gift, but are properly excludable from the regular properly excludable under section nevertheless "in the nature of gifts" rate under the second clause of section 7(e)(2)'s "other similar payments" because of their timing. The second 7(e)(1). The Department adds language clause and following the Third Circuit's clause in 7(e)(1) therefore expands the to§ 778.212(c) to clarify this in the final reasoning in Minizza. 144 See also NADA. universe of excludable gifts from sums rule. 141 In that case, the court found that lump that are obviously "paid as gifts" to Some commenters also requested sum payments to employees to induce include those that are also "in the clarification that prizes, such as coffee ratification of a collective bargaining nature of gifts," but limits the latter cups and t-shirts, provided in agreement were excludable as an "other category to those made at Christmas connection with contests or raffles are similar payment" because such time, on special occasions, or as rewards excludable from the regular rate as payments were unrelated to hours of for service. In either case, however, the "other similar payments" under section employment or service. 145 Since a sign- payments must not be measured by or 7(e)(2). See SHRM; PPWO; Seyfarth. As on bonus with no clawback provision is dependent on hours worked, with snacks and special occasion meals, granted before any work is performed, production, or efficiency. 136 the Department believes that the gift such payment is unrelated to hours The FLSA defines "wage" as "the provision in section 7(e)(1) already worked or services provided and may be reasonable cost . . . [of] board, lodging, provides for their exclusion from the excluded under section 7(e)(2). or other facilities" and thus the cost of regular rate as sums "paid as gifts"- While still labeled a sign-on bonus, a providing meals is included in the that is, paid with the express sign-on bonus with a clawback regular rate. 137 However, if snacks or understanding that they are a gift-the provision is substantively different from other food are provided as a gift, or in amounts of which are not measured by a sign-on bonus that is paid free and the nature of a gift, and are "not or dependent on hours worked, clear. As explained by the Sixth Circuit measured by hours worked, production, production, or efficiency. 142 Because in Featsent v. City of Youngstown, or efficiency," they may be excluded "the subsections of§ 7(e) are not longevity bonuses are dependent on from the regular rate. 138 Courts have mutually exclusive," 143 there may be length of service and therefore do not specifically found the cost to an areas of overlap between payments that fall within the section 7(e)(2) employer of providing food items to are excludable under section 7(e)(1) and exception. 146 Since a sign-on bonus employees, aside from regularly those excludable under section 7(e)(2). with a clawback provision is essentially provided meals, to be excludable from Thus, in addition to being excludable as a longevity bonus, these may not be the regular rate as gifts under section gifts under section 7(e)(1), small items excluded under section 7(e)(2). 7(e)(1).139 such as coffee mugs or t-shirts provided However, case law already supports When an employer provides snacks or to an employee may also be properly exclusion of certain longevity bonuses food to employees as a gift, the cost of excludable as an "other similar under section 7(e)(1) as a gift provided providing such snacks or food is payment" under section 7(e)(2), so long as a reward for future service. The properly excludable from the regular as its provision does not depend on Department's regulations permit rate under the first clause of section hours worked, services rendered, job exclusion of such bonuses provided that 7(e)(1). This commonly arises in performance, or other criteria that the requirements of§ 778.212 are situations where an employer provides depend on the quality or quantity of the satisfied. A sign-on bonus with no employee's work. clawback provision is clearly provided employees with office coffee and Similarly, several commenters asked snacks, the value of which is minimal. on a special occasion as a reward for the Department to provide guidance on future service, and is not measured by These are provided without regard to the excludability of sign-on bonuses, or dependent on hours worked, hours worked, production, or efficiency, suggesting they might be excludable and the cost of such provision is under section 7(e)(2) as an "other 144 Minizza, 842 F.2d at 1458-62. excludable from the regular rate. similar payment" or under 7(e)(3) as a 145 See id. at 1462. Unlike snacks, meals furnished by an discretionary bonus. See ERIC; AHLA; 146 70 F.3d 900, 905 (6th Cir. 1995); see WHD employer are generally considered to be Associated Builders and Contractors; Opinion Letter WH-527, 1986 WL 383427, at *2 (Apr. 21, 1986) ("[W]here an employee must be on 136 29 CFR 778.212. NADA; Seyfarth; SHRM; PPWO. Most of the payroll in order to receive a future bonus 137 29 U.S.C. 203(m); 29 CFR 778.116; 29 CFR these commenters suggested that such payment, . . . such a condition [is] an inducement 531.29 and 531.32. payments are excludable under 7(e)(3) for an employee to continue in employment until the time the payment is to be made" and therefore 138 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1999 WL 1002365 the payment is not an excludable "other similar (Feb. 12, 1999). 140 29 U.S.C. 203(m); 29 CFR 531.29 and 531.32. payment."). But eligibility requirements that are 139 Rau v. Darling's Drug Store, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 141 The provision of meals by an employer using "not meant to serve as compensation for service" 877, 879 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See also Lemus v. Denny's an authorized basic rate under section 7(g)(3) of the and "do not require specific service" do not Inc., No. 1DCV2061-CAB (WVG), 2015 WL FLSA to compute overtime rather than a regular rate preclude payments from being excludable under 13740136, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2015) (finding is discussed infra. section 7(e)(2). Minizza, 842 F.2d at 1460-61. employer-offered food discounts to be gifts since 142 Prizes that are not paid as gifts, but are awards Courts and the Department have also concluded employees are entitled to receive the discount as for activities not normally part of an employee's job, that longevity bonuses are not excludable soon as they begin working and the employer does may be excludable from the regular rate under 29 discretionary bonuses under section 7(e)(3) when not dictate whether or how the employee may use CFR 778.332. made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement the discount); Rodriguez v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 143 Reich, 57 F.3d at 578. The Reich court or city ordinance. See O'Brien v. Town of Agawam, 1:13-CV-01498-SAB, 2013 WL 5877788, at *5-6 cautioned, however, that "we hesitate to read 350 F.3d 279, 295 (1st Cir. 2003) (longevity pay (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) (finding meal provided § 7(e)(2) as a catch-all, one that obliterates the paid pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement through discount meal policy not excludable from qualifications and limitations on the other does not qualify as an excludable discretionary the regular rate, but noting that a similar meal subsections and establishes a principle that all bonus and therefore must be included in the regular policy may qualify as a gift if available to all lump-sum payments fall outside the 'regular rate,' rate); WHD Opinion Letter, 1986 WL 1171142, at *2 employees at any time without restrictions based for then most of the remaining subsections become (Aug. 26, 1986) (same); WHD Opinion Letter (Nov. upon the number of hours worked). superfluous." Id. 8, 1985) (same). DOLAR0924 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 16 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68751 production, or efficiency. A clawback generally unrelated to the quality or repaying educational debt, and the like. provision that makes such a bonus quantity of work performed. However, Unlike wage supplements, the dependent on length of employment in the past, the Department has taken a Department explained, these tuition does not necessarily impact its broad view of what is considered to be programs are not fungible, any-purpose excludability under section 7(e)(1). As a "wage" under 3(m) of the FLSA and cash, but must be directed toward courts have noted, longevity payments as such, some payments for childcare particular educational and training are properly excludable from the regular services or subsidies may be considered opportunities. These programs are also rate under 7(e)(1) when employees a wage. Payments for childcare services optional, appeal only to those receive these payments as a reward for or subsidies are excludable from the employees who want to use them, and tenure, and the payments are not, for regular rate under (e)(2)'s "other similar are directed toward educational and example, made pursuant to a city payments" clause to the extent such training pursuits outside the employer's ordinance or policy, or collective payments are not wages under section workplace. Such tuition programs do bargaining agreement.1 47 The 3(m). 149 For instance, routinely- not meet the basic necessities oflife, Department's existing regulation at provided childcare qualifies as an in- such as food, clothing, or shelter. While § 778.212(c) supports this interpretation, kind reimbursement for "expenses the educational benefit may result in stating that gift payments may "vary normally incurred by the employee for employees better able to accomplish the with the amount of the salary or regular his own benefit," which are wages that employer's objectives, these programs hourly rate of such employees or must be included in the regular rate. 150 are not directly connected to the according to their length of service with However, emergency childcare services employees' day-to-day duties for the the firm so long as the amounts are not provided by employers as an important employer. The NPRM stated that as long measured by or directly dependent component of their work-life support as tuition programs are available to upon hours worked, production, or packages do not meet this test and may employees regardless of their hours efficiency." 148 It follows that "length of be excluded from the regular rate, if worked or services rendered, and are service" is not necessarily "directly such services are not provided as instead contingent merely on one's dependent on hours worked." As such, compensation for hours of employment. being an employee, these programs the Department does not amend its final Emergency care is provided in the case would qualify as "other similar rule because it believes this of unforeseen circumstances, such as payments" under section 7(e)(2). 152 interpretation is already clear. In brief, when schools or daycares are closed for The Department noted in the NPRM sign-on bonuses with no clawback bad weather or when a child is sick. If that this clarification, permitting tuition provision are excludable from the these payments are not tied to the programs to be excluded from the regular rate; sign-on bonuses with a quality or quantity of work performed, regular rate, would not affect the clawback provision pursuant to they are properly excluded from the Department's regulations at§ 531.32 collective bargaining agreement (CBA), regular rate under section 7(e)(2)'s referencing "meals, dormitory rooms, or city ordinance or policy are included "other similar payments" clause. and tuition furnished by a college to its in the regular rate; and sign-on bonuses Finally, some of the items raised by student employees" as an "other with a clawback provision not pursuant commenters were outside the scope of facility." 153 The college environment is to a CBA, city ordinance or policy, or the Department's proposal, and better a unique context in which learning, other similar document that complies addressed in a separate rulemaking. work, and daily living are inextricably with§ 778.212, are excludable from the These include meals, relocation connected, tightly knit, and often all regular rate. stipends, 151 commissions, and programs provided by the same entity, that being Several commenters asked the that issue points redeemable for the college. Department to clarify that childcare merchandise. See PPWO; Hancock The Department received numerous services or subsidies are excludable comments in support of this from the regular rate. See, e.g., Chamber; Estabrook, LLP; SHRM; Seyfarth; Chamber. clarification. See, e.g., PPWO; NPELRA; Associated Builders and Contractors; SHRM; Associated Builders and HR Policy; CWC. Employer-provided b. Tuition Contractors; Chamber; SIGMA. The childcare services and subsidies are The Department proposed adding an Department also received a few example in§ 778.224(b)(5) clarifying comments opposed to this clarification 147 See Moreau v. Klevenhagen. 956 F.2d 516, 521 that certain tuition programs offered by as proposed and that suggested (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd. 508 U.S. 22 (1993); Shiferaw v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt.. Inc .. 2016 WL employers may be excludable from the modifications to the regulatory language 6571270, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2016) (finding regular rate. The NPRM noted that some in this section. See, e.g., NELP; NELA; an employer"s tenure-based "Long Term Service employers today offer discounts for Economic Policy Institute (EPI). Award"" paid every five years to be excludable Several commenters requested under 7(e)(1)); White v. Publix Super Markets. Inc .. online courses, continuing-education 2015 WL 4949837, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2015) programs, modest tuition- additional guidance on the types of (finding a holiday bonus based on length of reimbursement programs, programs for tuition benefits encompassed by the employment to be excludable under 7(e)(1)); Local proposed rule. See ERIC; American 359 Gary Firefighters. AFL-CIO v. City of Gary. 1995 Benefits Council; Chamber; CWC; HR 149 See Opinion Letter FLSA-642 (Jan. 23, 1983) WL 934175, *7 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 17, 1995) (longevity pay was not excludable under section 7(e)(1) (deductions from employees• wages for childcare Policy; PPWO. Payments for an because it was "a fixed amount given pursuant to payments and reimbursement for childcare employee's current coursework, expenses are wages under section 3(m) and must be city policy•• that was "based on the scale included in employees• regular rates); see also payments for an employee's online promulgated by the City""); WHD Opinion Letter WH-332, 1975 WL 40955 (May 1, 1975) ("It would Opinion Letter (Apr. 1, 1992) (employer payments coursework, payment for an employee's appear that an employee who satisfied the that employees may redesignate for child care eligibility requirement for [payments provided for benefits must be included in the regular rate of 152 See Reich. 57 F.3d at 578 (payments under in personnel rules] would have a contractual right pay). section 7(e)(2) are those "that do not depend at all 150 29 CFR 778.217(d); see 29 CFR 531.37(b). on when or how much work is performed""); to [longevity] payments.""); see also 29 CFR 778.212(b) (explaining that if a bonus is 151 Pursuant to guidance in its Field Operations Minizza. 842 F.2d at 1462 (payments under section "consider[ed] . . . a part of the wages•• or if "paid Handbook, the Department generally considers 7(e)(2) all "share the essential characteristic . . . of pursuant to a contract,"" it is not in the nature of sums "paid as an incentive to attract employees to not being compensation for hours worked or a gift). an isolated or otherwise undesirable job site"" to be services rendered""). 14s 29 CFR 778.212(c). includable in the regular rate. FOH 32c00(b)(6). 153 29 CFR 531.32(a). DOLAR0925 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 17 of 194 68752 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations family members' tuition, and student education provider, or a student loan expected amount of work after reporting loan repayment programs each fit program" to its final rule. as scheduled. 158 Payments for hours within the exclusion so long as they are Many commenters asked the actually worked are included in the not tied to hours worked, services Department to clarify that student loan regular rate; amounts beyond what the rendered, or other conditions related to repayment programs are excludable employee would receive for the hours quality or quantity of work performed from the regular rate under section worked are excludable. (except for conditions as stated in the 7(e)(2). See ERIC; Chamber; NADA; Section 778.221 addresses "call-back" rule). Of course, tuition benefits for American Benefits Council; CWC; pay. Call-back pay is additional coursework directly related to the Seyfarth; SHRM; PPWO; HR Policy. As compensation for calling an employee employee's job are excludable under the noted by these commenters, student back to work without prearrangement to reimbursements clause of section loan repayment programs take many perform extra work after the employee's 7(e)(2J.1s4 forms, but the excludability of each plan scheduled hours have ended. It is Some commenters asked the depends on the facts of that particular typically paid for a specified number of Department to clarify what eligibility plan. As with tuition benefits, student hours at the applicable straight-time or limits an employer may place on loan repayment plans may be overtime rate. 159 Call-back pay is treated excludable tuition benefits. See CWC; excludable as an "other similar the same as show-up pay under Seyfarth. For example, Seyfarth payment" to the extent the payments are § 778.220. commented that many of their clients not compensation for hours worked or Section 778.222 addresses "other "employ workers who work for very services rendered, or other conditions payments similar to 'call-back' pay," short periods of time, or very related to the quality or quantity of work which are "extra payments made to infrequently" and they believe that "a performed. employees on infrequent and sporadic minimum employment requirement is a Some commenters asked the occasions, for failure to give the 'basic commonsense condition'" for Department to clarify that tuition employee sufficient notice to report for some benefits. As explained in the programs may only be excluded from work on regular days of rest or during NPRM and proposed regulatory text, the regular rate after a case-by-case hours outside of his regular work while "other similar payments," such as analysis of whether the tuition program schedule," and "extra payments made, tuition benefits, must generally not be is compensation for work. 156 See NELA; on infrequent and sporadic occasions, tied to hours worked, services rendered, NELP; EPI. As discussed above, the solely because the employee has been job performance, or other criteria linked other similar payments clause permits called back to work before the to the quality or quantity of the employers to exclude from the regular expiration of a specified number of employee's work, employers may place rate payments to an employee that are hours between shifts or tours of duty, "conditions, such as a reasonable "not made as compensation for his sometimes referred to as a 'rest waiting period for eligibility" on tuition hours of employment." 157 Accordingly, period.'" 160 Such time is treated the benefits. 155 Minimum employment as proposed in the NPRM, the final same as show-up pay under§ 778.220 requirements would be a permissible regulatory text provides that tuition and call-back pay under§ 778.221. condition that would not affect the programs may only be excluded from Sections 778.220, 778.221, and 778.222 excludability of the tuition benefit from the regular rate provided they are not all currently require that the payments the regular rate. tied to an employee's hours worked, services rendered, or other conditions be "infrequent and sporadic" to be Additionally, several commenters excludable from the regular rate. asked the Department to clarify whether related to the quality or quantity of work Show-up or reporting pay is paid a tuition benefit payment must be made performed. Because the determination when the employee is scheduled to to the employee, directly to the of whether individual tuition programs meet the requirements of section 7(e)(2) work but the employer fails to provide education or training provider, or the expected amount of work. 161 Show- through a bona-fide third party service and§ 778.224 will be based on the up pay is therefore excludable under the provider, in order to be excludable from specific facts and circumstances of each first clause of section 7(e)(2), which the regular rate. See, e.g., CWC; PPWO. program, the Department concludes there is no need to revise the proposed excludes payments made for So long as the employee is receiving a "occasional periods" when no work is tuition benefit that is not based on hours regulatory text. performed due to the "failure of the worked or services rendered, or other 6. Show-Up Pay, Call-Back Pay, and employer to provide sufficient conditions related to the quality or Payments Similar to Call-Back Pay work." 162 Section 778.220 accordingly quantity of work performed, it makes no limits exclusion of such payments to difference whether that benefit is a Section 778.220 excludes from the regular rate "show-up" or "reporting" when they are made "on infrequent and direct payment to the education sporadic occasions." 163 provider, to the employee, or through a pay, which is defined as compensation In contrast, call-back pay and other third-party provider. To make this clear, for a specified minimum number of payments similar to call-back pay are the Department adds the phrase hours at the applicable straight-time or overtime rate on "infrequent or not made for periods when the "whether paid to an employee, an employer fails to provide sufficient sporadic" occasions in which an 154 See 29 CFR 778.217; see also White v. Publix employee is not provided with the 158 See 29 CFR 778.220. Super Markets. Inc .. No. 3:14-CV-1189, 2015 WL 4949837 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2015) (finding tuition 159 See 29 CFR 778.221(a). 156 These commenters also requested that the 160 29 CFR 778.222. reimbursement payments to be excludable from the Department include a discussion of whether tuition 161 Since 1940, the Department"s position has regular rate because they constituted programs primarily benefit the employee or the reimbursements for an expense incurred in employer. The Department typically conducts such been that show-up pay that exceeded pay due for furtherance of the employer"s interest and were not an analysis when evaluating whether a payment is hours worked was meant to compensate the tied to hours worked). a wage under section 3(m) of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. employee for the consumption of his time and 155 84 FR 11911; see also Minizza. 842 F.2d at 203(m); see also 29 CFR 531.32. However, tuition discourage employers from calling in employees for 1461 ("eligibility terms [that] do not require specific programs are only excludable from the regular rate only a fraction of a day. Interpretive Bulletin No. service . . . do not lend support to the conclusion under section 7(e)(2) to the extent they are not a 4 'I] 70(8). that the payments are compensation for wage under section 3(m). 162 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). employment""). 157 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). 163 29 CFR 778.220. DOLAR0926 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 18 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68753 work, but are instead additional proposed rule provided an example of the work was anticipated and therefore payments made to compensate the an employer restaurant calling in an reasonably could have been scheduled. employee when the employer provides employee server for two hours of This is necessarily a fact specific unanticipated work. 164 As such, as supposedly emergency help during the inquiry that must consider a range of explained in the NPRM, these payments busiest part of Saturday evening for 6 circumstantial factors, in addition to do not fall under the first clause of weeks out of 2 months in a row, and regularity. While substantial regularity section 7(e)(2). The Department has explained that those payments would of call-back pay may be a factor stated that call-back pay described in essentially be prearranged and all of the indicating that work was anticipated, § 778.221 and the other payments call-back pay would be included in the regularity does not by itself necessarily described in§ 778.222 instead fall under regular rate. The Department further establish anticipation regardless of the "other similar payments" clause of proposed to clarify that the regulations surrounding facts. For instance, the section 7(e)(2)-which Congress did not apply regardless of whether the NPRM included an example of restrict to "occasional periods" (unlike compensation is pursuant to established prearrangement in which a restaurant the first clause of section 7(e)(2)). 165 The practice, an employment agreement, or employer calls in a server for the busiest NPRM noted that the FLSA does not state or local law. part of Saturday evening for six weeks require that payments under§§ 778.221 Several commenters supported the in a two month period. Upon review, and 778.222 be only "occasional" to be Department's proposal to remove the the Department believes that such excluded from the regular rate. phrase "infrequent and sporadic" from regularity may suggest prearrangement, Accordingly, the Department proposed §§ 778.221 and 778.222. See, e.g., CWC; but consideration of other facts is removing the regulatory restriction that NADA; Chamber. Some of these necessary to draw a conclusion requires the payments discussed in commenters, however, were concerned regarding prearrangement. For instance, §§ 778.221 and 778.222 to be that the proposed regulatory text about if the restaurant called in the employee "infrequent and sporadic." 166 regularity of payments and in response to unanticipated Although the Department proposed prearrangement could create confusion. emergencies-for instance, the removing the words "infrequent and See PPWO; Seyfarth; SHRM; Chamber. unexpected absence of scheduled sporadic" from§§ 778.221 and 778.222, Seyfarth expressed concern that it was servers-on each of the Saturday the Department proposed to include in unclear "how regularly a payment can evenings worked, regularity would not § 778.222 language that has long been in be made before it is 'essentially indicate prearrangement. § 778.221 explaining that payments prearranged.'" Other commenters The NPRM's example also stated that excluded under these provisions must expressed concern that the proposed "all the call-back pay would be still be "without prearrangement" in §§ 778.221 and 778.222 would create included in the regular rate." But order to be excludable from the regular confusion about when call-back pay and regularity over a two month period does rate. 167 The proposed rule provided an similar types of payments are frequent not, by itself, establish that the first or example of payments made without enough to be included in the regular second call backs were because there prearrangement by describing an rate calculation, and they urged the was no regularity in the early portion of employer retailer who called in an Department to retain the "infrequent that period. Again, consideration of employee to help clean up the store for and sporadic" language. See AFL-CIO; other facts is needed. For instance, call 3 hours after an unexpected roof leak, EPI; NELA; NELP. backs in the early portion of the two- and then again 3 weeks later for 2 hours The Department has decided to month period could have been in to cover for a coworker who left work finalize its proposal to remove the term response to the unanticipated surge in for a family emergency. The proposed "infrequent and sporadic" from Saturday evening business, in which rule stated that payments for those §§ 778.221 and 778.222. The cases they would not have been instances would be without Department believes that removing the prearranged. But if the facts show that prearrangement and any call-back pay "infrequent and sporadic" language at some point in time the restaurant that exceeded the amount the employee from these sections better aligns the anticipated that such new business had would receive for the hours worked regulations with the third clause of become the norm, then the subsequent would be excludable. The proposed rule section 7(e)(2) of the FLSA, which does call backs would have been prearranged. also clarified that when payments under not require that these excludable "other The Department is further concerned §§ 778.221 and 778.222 are so regular similar payments" be occasional. The that the NPRM's example could be read that they, in effect, are prearranged, they Department has also decided to finalize to imply that prearrangement depends are compensation for work and should the proposal to add language to on the same employee being regularly be included in the regular rate. The § 778.222 stating that payments similar called back. It does not. The key issue to call-back pay must be made without is whether the work-i.e., need for an 164 29 CFR 778.221 through 778.222. prearrangement in order to be additional server on certain Saturday 165 See WHD Opinion Letter FLSA-574 (Nov. 18, excludable from the regular rate, which evenings-was anticipated. If the 1964) ("turn around"" payments excludable under is consistent with long-standing restaurant had anticipated additional third clause); WHD Opinion Letter FLSA-933 (July language currently in§ 778.221. The work each evening yet scheduled fewer 20, 1964) (payment for failure to provide rest period excludable under third clause); WHD Opinion Department has decided, however, to servers than needed, it would not matter Letter FLSA (Jan. 1, 1964) (stating that extra clarify in§§ 778.221 and 778.222 that if it had called back a different payments "made for recall to work outside of the regularity of payments, alone, does employee on each of the six evenings to regular working hours and for shortened 'rest not necessarily establish that such perform the anticipated work. Call back periods" between shifts . . . may be excludable from the regular rate under the third clause•• of payments are prearranged. pay would have been prearranged for all section 7(e)(2)). Call-back pay compensates the six employees. 166 The Department also proposed to update the employee for unanticipated work. A At bottom, regularity is neither a reference to§ 778.222 that appears in§ 778.203(d). prearranged payment, however, necessary nor sufficient condition for 167 29 CFR 778.221; see also Stewart v. San Luis constitutes compensation for work that prearrangement: Frequent call backs Ambulance Inc., No. CV 13-09458-BRO (SSX), 2015 WL 13684710, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015) was anticipated, and so is not over a period of time are not necessarily (call-back payments must be "without excludable call back pay. The key prearranged, while a single call back prearrangement""). "prearrangement" inquiry is whether could be prearranged. The Department DOLAR0927 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 19 of 194 68754 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations is concerned that the proposed language these recent trends in state and local scheduling laws under§§ 778.220, regarding regularity in the NPRM might scheduling laws, the Department 778.221, and 778.222, but suggested that encourage employers and employees to proposed to clarify the treatment of they be discussed in the regulatory text use regularity as a substitute for these penalty payments under the instead of only in the preamble, or that prearrangement, without adequate regulations. the Department issue subregulatory regard for other relevant circumstances. The preamble of the NPRM explained guidance, such as a Fact Sheet, on this Accordingly, the Department is not that, in the Department's view, reporting topic. including that language in§§ 778.221 pay pursuant to state or local scheduling The Department has accepted the and 778.222. And the example in laws should be analyzed similar to suggestion to add language about certain § 778.221(a) has been revised to make show-up pay under§ 778.220 because it types of state and local scheduling laws clear that the "without prearrangement" is payment for an employer's failure to to the regulatory text in§§ 778.220, inquiry should focus on whether the provide expected work. 173 778.222, and 778.223. Specifically, the call back work was anticipated. Compensation for any hours actually Department has added paragraph (c) to The preamble to the NPRM also noted worked are included in the regular rate; § 778.220 explaining that an employer that certain states and localities regulate compensation beyond that may be may exclude payments mandated by scheduling practices and impose a excluded from the regular rate as state or local scheduling laws for monetary penalty on employers (which payment to compensate the employee occasions when the employee reports to is paid to employees) in situations for time spent reporting to work and to work but is not provided with the analogous to those discussed in prevent loss of pay from the employer's expected amount of work if such §§ 778.220, 778.221, and 778.222. 168 failure to provide expected work during payments are not for hours worked and These state and local laws include regular hours. are paid on an infrequent or sporadic certain penalties that potentially affect "Clopening" or "right to rest" pay basis. As in current paragraph (a), new regular rate calculations. These include: under state or local scheduling laws paragraph (c) makes clear that such (1) "reporting pay" for employees who would, the Department explained, be payments cannot be credited toward are unable to work their scheduled analyzed under§ 778.222 ("other statutory overtime compensation due. hours because the employer subtracted payments similar to 'call-back' pay") The Department is also updating hours from a regular shift before or after and would therefore generally be paragraph (b) of§ 778.220 in a non- the employee reports for duty; 169 (2) excludable from the regular rate as long substantive way by raising the wage of "clopening" or "right to rest" pay for as the payments are not regular. The the employee in the example from $5 an employees who work the end of one Department would also analyze hour-which is below the current day's shift and the start of the next day's "predictability pay" penalties under minimum wage-to $12 an hour. shift with fewer than 10 or 11 hours § 778.222, as they are analogous to Specifically, the Department has between the shifts, or who work during payments for failure to give an further added a sentence to § 778.222 a rest period; 170 (3) "predictability pay" employee sufficient notice to report for generally defining the types of for employees who do not receive the work outside of his or her regular work excludable payments that may be requisite notice of a schedule change; 171 schedule. As with reporting and call- considered "similar to 'call-back' pay," and (4) "on-call pay" for employees back pay, compensation "over and and noted that such similar payments with a scheduled on-call shift but who above the employee's earnings for the may include those made pursuant to are not called in to work. 172 In light of hours actually worked at his applicable state and local scheduling laws. The rate (straight-time or overtime, as the Department also added to § 778.222 168 A number of state and local jurisdictions have case may be), is considered as a examples of "clopening" or "right to introduced laws regulating scheduling practices in payment that is not made for hours rest" pay and "predictability pay" recent legislative sessions. See, e.g., H.B. 2467, 53rd mandated by state or local law as Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018); S.B. 321, 2018 Reg. worked," and is therefore excludable Sess. (Conn. 2018); H.B. 5046, 100th Gen. Assemb. from the regular rate. 174 payments similar to call-back pay. (Ill. 2018); S.B. 1000, 190th Leg. (Mass. 2017-18); Finally, the Department explained Finally, the Department is revising H.B. 1614, S.B. 1116, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); that "on-call pay" scheduling penalties § 778.223 to explain that the principle S109, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018); H.B. 741, 2015 Sess. that "on call" pay is "compensation for (N.C. 2015); H.B. 7515, 7634, Jan. Sess. A.D. 2016 would be analyzed under§ 778.223, (R.1. 2016); Chi., Ill., Mun. Ordinance 02017-4947 which is entitled "[play for non- performing a duty involved in the (introduced June 28, 2017); Employee Scheduling productive hours distinguished." 175 employee's job and is not a type of (Call-in Pay), N.Y. St. Reg. LAB. 47-17-00011-P Under this regulation, the Department excludable pay under section 7(e)(2)," (proposed Nov. 11, 2017); S.B. 828, 79th Leg. applies with respect to "on call" pay Assemb., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017); H.B. 1436 may require payment for "on-call" time (Penn. 2019); L.A., Ca., Fair Work Week LA to be included in the regular rate when mandated by state or local law. (introduced Mar. 1, 2019); Bos., Mass., Docket No. such payments are "compensation for 0137 (2019). B. Discretionary Bonuses Under Section 169 See, e.g., Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code ch. performing a duty involved in the 7(e)(3) 14.22.050 (2017). employee's job." 176 Section 7(e)(3)(a) of the FLSA 170 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code 20-1231 Several commenters agreed with the excludes from the regular rate "sums (2017); Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code 14.22.035 (2017); Department's explanation of the proper paid in recognition of services Emeryville, Cal. Mun. Code 5-39.06 (2017); Chi., treatment of state and local scheduling Ill., Fair Workweek Ordinance (July 24, 2019) performed" if "both the fact that laws under§§ 778.220, 778.222, and (effective July 1, 2020); Phila., Pa., Code ch. 9-4600 payment is to be made and the amount (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020). 778.223. See, e.g., Bloomin' Brands; of the payment are determined at the 171 See, e.g., S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 33G SHRM; NADA; CWC; Seyfarth. ewe sole discretion of the employer at or (2015); Emeryville, Cal., Mun. Code 5-39.01 (2017); agreed with the Department's discussion N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code§ 20-1222 (2017); near the end of the period and not analyzing common state and local pursuant to any prior contract, Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 14.22.050 (2017); Chi., Ill., Fair Workweek Ordinance (July 24, 2019) 173 See, e.g., Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code ch. agreement, or promise causing (effective July 1, 2020); Phila., Pa., Code ch. 9-4600 (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020). 14.22.050 (2017). employees to expect such payments 172 See, e.g., S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 3300G.4(d) 174 29 CFR 778.222. regularly." 177 Section 778.211 ofthe 175 Id. § 778.223. (2015); Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 14.22.050. (2017). 176 Id. 1n 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(3). DOLAR0928 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 20 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68755 regulations implements this exclusion examples of bonuses that may be commented that "the addition of and provides additional details discretionary to supplement the examples that 'may be discretionary' is concerning the types of bonuses that examples of bonuses that commonly are not particularly helpful as it may give a qualify for this exclusion. In the NPRM, non-discretionary discussed in current false impression that the types of the Department proposed to elaborate § 778.211(c). The NPRM explained that bonuses listed are usually excludable." on the types of bonuses that are and that such bonuses may include, for example, ewe added that more guidance is are not discretionary in § 778. 211 to add employee-of-the-month bonuses, needed which describes facts that make clarity for employers and employees. bonuses to employees who made unique a bonus more or less likely to be The Department proposed modifying or extraordinary efforts which are not discretionary. By contrast, several language in§ 778.211(c) and adding a awarded according to pre-established commenters requested that the new paragraph (d) to clarify that, under criteria, severance bonuses, bonuses for Department include additional longstanding principles, neither the overcoming stressful or difficult examples of excludable discretionary label assigned to a bonus nor the reason challenges, and other similar bonuses bonuses, such as referral bonuses, and it was paid conclusively determine for which the fact and amount of sign-on bonuses. See Cavanagh Law whether it is discretionary under section payment is in the sole discretion of the Firm; Chamber; HR Policy; AHLA; 7(e)(3). 178 The Department explained in employer until at or near the end of the Seyfarth, SHRM; Associated Builders the NPRM that, while attendance, periods to which the bonuses and Contractors; PPWO; ERIC; World production, work quality, and longevity correspond and that are not paid Floor Covering Association. bonuses, as those terms are commonly "pursuant to any prior contract, After reviewing the comments, the used, are usually paid pursuant to a agreement, or promise causing the Department adopts the changes to prior contract, agreement, or promise employee to expect such payments paragraph (c) of§ 778.211 and the causing the employee to expect such regularly." 179 The Department proposed addition of paragraph (d), payments regularly, and therefore are explained that it recognized that with the addition ofreferral bonuses for non-discretionary bonuses that must be employers offer many differing types of employees not primarily engaged in included in the regular rate, there may bonuses to their employees, and that recruiting activities as an example of a be instances when a bonus that is compensation practices will continue to bonus that may be discretionary, as labelled as one of these types of bonuses evolve going forward. Finally, the suggested by the commenters. is not in fact promised in advance and Department invited comments from the In reviewing the comments, the instead the employer retains discretion public regarding other common types of Department agrees that there is a need as to the fact and amount of the bonus bonuses that may be discretionary and for more guidance regarding the facts until at or near the end of the period to that should be addressed in§ 778.211. that may make a bonus discretionary or which the bonus corresponds. The The majority of the commenters nondiscretionary. The statute requires proposed rule modified language in supported the proposal's clarification all of the following facts to be present § 778.21 l(c) and added a new paragraph that labels are not determinative. See, for a bonus to be discretionary: (1) The (d) to§ 778.211 to clarify that the label e.g., SIGMA; IBC; NADA; Cavanagh Law employer has the sole discretion, until assigned to a bonus is not Firm; HR Policy. IBC commented that at or near the end of the period that determinative. Instead, the Department the proposal's "focus on the corresponds to the bonus, to determine explained, the terms of the statute and circumstances of the actual payment whether to pay the bonus; (2) the the facts specific to the bonus at issue versus what the payment is called better employer has the sole discretion, until determine whether a bonus is an reflects the reality of business at or near the end of the period that excludable discretionary bonus. Under operations as well as the purpose and corresponds to the bonus, to determine section 7(e)(3), a bonus is discretionary spirit of the FLSA." The PPWO and the amount of the bonus; and (3) the and therefore excludable, regardless of CWC noted that this change is payment is not made pursuant to any what it is labelled or called, if both the consistent with the Department's prior contract, agreement, or promise fact that the bonus is to be paid and the longstanding position. HR Policy causing employees to expect such amount are determined at the sole approved of this proposal because "the payments. In response to comments discretion of the employer at or near the proper analysis" is the statutory regarding referral bonuses, sign-on end of the period to which the bonus requirements, not the label applied to bonuses, and other examples, the corresponds and the bonus is not paid the bonus. Other commenters addressed Department has addressed each of these pursuant to any prior contract, what they perceived as an inconsistency below. agreement, or promise causing the between stating that labels are not Five commenters asked the employee to expect such payments determinative and providing examples Department to include employee referral regularly. of bonuses that are excludable bonuses in the list of bonuses that may Additionally, the Department discretionary bonuses. PPWO be discretionary, finding that such proposed to include in new§ 778.211(d) commented that the proposal to include examples "[provide] some clarity to additional examples of discretionary employers" and "[encourage] employers 178 See 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(3); Minizza, 842 F.2d at, bonuses was inconsistent with the to offer these incentives to their 1462 n.9 (observing that "what the payments are proposal to make clear that labels are workforce." See AHLA; HR Policy; termed is not important""); Wallingv. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427,430 (1945) ("To discover [the not determinative. CWC similarly Associated Builders and Contractors; regular] rate . . . we look not to contract Cavanagh Law Firm; Chamber. nomenclature but to the actual payments.""); 179 See 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(3); see also Alonzo v. Cavanaugh Law Firm noted that Donohue v. Francis Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A.04-170, Maximus, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133 (C.D. payment of a referral bonus is "not 2005 WL 1155860, at *1 (E.D. La. May 11, 2005) Cal. 2011) (holding that bonuses to employees who (denying an employer"s summary judgment motion "made unique or extraordinary efforts and were not related to the hours worked by the over "amounts described as 'discretionary awarded according to pre-established criteria or employee, their productivity, etc." Such bonuses• 00 The NPRM noted that this principle ). pre-established rates•• were excludable) (internal payments are excludable from the comports with longstanding interpretation of other quotation marks omitted); WHD Opinion Letter regular rate where recruiting activities FLSA provisions; see, e.g., 29 CFR 541.2 (cautioning FLSA2008-12, 2008 WL 5483051 (Dec. 1, 2008) that "[a] job title alone is insufficient to establish (bonuses paid without prior promise or agreement are not part of the receiving employees' the exempt status of an employee•• under section to 911 dispatchers in recognition of high stress level job duties and other conditions are met. 13(a)(1) of the Act). of their job are excludable discretionary bonuses). Specifically, the Department does not DOLAR0929 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 21 of 194 68756 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations consider sums "paid to an employee to a bonus must be considered against employees from events that are rare but who recruits another to join his the statutory terms expounded in the statistically predictable and that could employer's work force" to be "part of an final regulation. otherwise cause significant financial employee's remuneration for Lastly, the Department does not hardship, just as is the case with life employment which must be included in address in this final rule comments insurance, accident insurance, and the [the] regular rate" if (1) participation in concerning bonuses that are outside the catastrophic-protection provisions of the activity is strictly voluntary, (2) the scope of this rulemaking, such as a life insurance. Third, benefit plans for employee's efforts in connection with request to modify the regulation on unemployment or legal services offer the activity do not involve significant percentage bonuses at§ 778.110, or financial help when an employee's amounts of time, and (3) the activity is industry-specific bonuses, such as earnings are (unemployment) or may be limited to after-hours solicitation among bonuses given to front-desk associates (legal services) materially affected, as is friends, relatives, neighbors, and for upselling hotel rooms. See Chamber; the case with the other benefit plans. acquaintances as part of the employee's AHLA. Employees who retire, reach an older social affairs. 180 Because it is consistent C. Excludable Benefits Under Section age, or suffer an accident or health issue with the Department's long-standing 7(e)(4) may be unable to work, or have their position, and because it would provide ability to work affected. clarity to employers and encourage Section 7( e)( 4) of the FLSA excludes The Department noted that other employers to offer bonuses of this type from the regular rate "contributions characteristics of the various types of to employees, the Department includes irrevocably made by an employer to a plans excludable under section 7(e)(4) "referral bonuses for employees not trustee or third person pursuant to a may differ, but they still remain primarily engaged in recruiting bona fide plan for providing old-age, "similar" for purposes of the statute. activities" as a type of bonus that may retirement, life, accident, or health Under the plain text of the statute, be discretionary, so long as it satisfies insurance or similar benefits for excludable plans need not be related to the statutory test, in its final rule. employees." 181 Section 778.215(a)(2) physical health. Retirement benefits are Several commenters requested that explains that, among other things, "[t]he excludable, for instance, even though an the Department clarify that sign-on primary purpose of the plan must be to employee may choose to retire for bonuses are excludable as discretionary provide systematically for the payment reasons wholly unrelated to health. And bonuses. See AHLA; Associated of benefits to employees on account of excludable plans also need not be Builders and Contractors; Seyfarth; death, disability, advanced age, limited to benefits for rare or even SHRM; PPWO. ERIC and NADA retirement, illness, medical expenses, uncommon events. Health insurance, for requested the Department recognize that hospitalization, and the like." The instance, often pays for everyday sign-on bonuses are excludable under NPRM proposed to add examples of medical expenses, and retirement is an 7(e)(2) of the FLSA as an "other similar benefits on account of "accident, event typically planned years in payment," which the Department unemployment, and legal services" to advance. Moreover, the benefits listed in addresses separately in this Preamble. § 778.215(a)(2). the statute may be subject to various As emphasized by the Department's The Department noted in the NPRM forms of payment. Retirement benefits addition of§ 778.211(d), labels are not that the addition of "accident" is are often a recurring payment, while dispositive in determining whether a derived directly from section 7(e)(4), accident and health benefits can bonus is discretionary. Therefore, as which expressly uses the term (even fluctuate, and a life insurance death with all bonuses, the discretionary though the current regulations do not). benefit can be paid in a lump sum. nature of a sign-on bonus will be The Department noted that the addition Therefore, insofar as the proposed decided by assessing whether it meets of benefits for unemployment and legal additional examples differ among the statutory test. services reflected the Department's themselves or among other expressly Several commenters requested that conclusion that, although employers listed benefits by not all being related to the Department address whether other may not have commonly offered these physical health, or not all being for rare common types of bonuses are benefits when Congress enacted the events, or not all being paid out the excludable as a discretionary bonus. FLSA in 1938,1 they are "similar 82 same way, those differences do not These include year-end bonuses based benefits" to those expressly listed in make the proposed examples not on company performance where the section 7(e)(4). The Department "similar" under the statute. Indeed, company retains discretion on whether explained that, first, like other such differences are encompassed in the to pay the bonus until at or near the end specifically enumerated types of benefit statutory examples themselves. of the performance period, bonuses to plans under section 7(e)(4), these benefit The Department further explained induce ratification of union agreements, plans typically provide monetary that these proposed examples, like the preannounced bonuses, incentive benefits that are "specified or definitely examples already provided in regulation bonuses, safety bonuses, spot bonuses, determinable on an actuarial basis." 183 and statute, would have to satisfy the and quarterly bonuses. See HR Policy; Second, benefit plans for other various requirements outlined in World Floor Covering Association; unemployment or legal services protect § 778.215. 184 The Department noted that AHLA; Associated Builders and 181 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(4). The Department these additions would simply help Contractors; Cavanagh Law Firm. In acknowledges that contributions to a plan made by clarify that such plans are not each of these cases, the Department an employee through elective salary reduction are categorically barred from qualifying for believes that its finalized regulation generally treated as employer contributions under exclusion under section 7(e)(4). The provides sufficient clarity by the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. Department solicited comments and 402(e)(3). But employees• elective contributions are emphasizing that labels are not not "contributions irrevocably made by an data on the prevalence and nature of determinative. Instead, the facts specific employer•• under section 7( e )( 4) of the FLSA, and these types of programs and on whether so are not excludable from the regular rate as 180See WHD Opinion Letter FLSA (Jan. 27, 1969) employer contributions to a bona fide plan. 184 Section 778.215(a) contains five conditions all 182 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, An Overview of (concluding that an employee referral bonus is of which must be met in order for employer excludable from the regular rate of pay under the Employee Benefits, supra note 2, at 20. contributions to be excluded from the regular rate FLSA). 183 29 CFR 778.215(a)(3)(i). under 7(e)(4). 29 CFR 778.215(a)(1)-(5). DOLAR0930 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 22 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68757 there are other similar benefit plans that to paying for future expenses. 187 To pension benefit plans governed by should be expressly included as provide further clarification on this ERISA[.]" Chamber, see also ERIC. examples. matter, the Department is revising Some commenters who supported the The Department received several § 778.215(a)(2) to codify the future- proposed changes also suggested the comments supporting the proposed expense requirement on "similar Department clarify that certain types of changes to§ 778.215(a)(2) and no benefits." Specifically, the Department ERISA employee benefit plans are comments opposed to the changes. See, is replacing "or the like" with "or other excludable under section 7(e)(4) of the e.g., SHRM; Associated General events that could cause significant Act. For example, WageWorks requested Contractors of America (AGC); PPWO; future financial hardship or expense." that the Department clarify that Seyfarth; NADA. Some of these The NPRM also proposed to revise "amounts that an employer contributes § 778.215(b), which currently provides to an employee's HRA are to be commenters requested that the excluded . . . just like the benefits that where the benefit plan or trust has Department consider including provided under any other employer been approved by the Bureau of Internal additional examples of benefits. NADA, Revenue as satisfying the requirements provided health plan." And the for instance, stated that it "supports an of section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Associated Builders and Contractors expansion of the non-exclusive list but Code in the absence of evidence to the and NAM requested the Department urges the DOL to indicate that cash contrary, the plan or trust will be clarify that employer contributions to payments in lieu of plan participation considered to meet the conditions multiple employer plans, e.g., also may be excluded." The American specified in§ 778.215(a)(1), (4), and (5). Association Retirement Plans or Benefits Council suggested the In particular, the NPRM proposed to Association Health Plans (AHPs), are Department add that employer-provided modernize this provision by replacing excludable. "programs for repaying educational "Bureau of Internal Revenue" -a term After careful consideration, the debt" may be excludable under section that has not been used since 1953-with Department has concluded that it would 7(e)(4). See also ERIC. Upon review, the "Internal Revenue Service." 188 be appropriate to expand the scope of Department does not believe it would be Commenters suggested several § 778.215(b) in three ways. First, the appropriate to further expand the list of additional ways for the Department to Department agrees with commenters example benefits in§ 778.215(a)(2) to modernize§ 778.215(b). Some that§ 778.215(b) should be revised in include repaying an employee's commenters informed the Department light of the IRS's recent decision to accumulated educational debt or cash that the recent elimination of significant change its determination letter payments in lieu of plan participation. aspects of the IRS's determination letter procedures. The IRS maintains a An employee benefit plan satisfies the program results in fewer "approvals" program under which plan sponsors can "primary purpose" requirement under from the IRS. American Benefits obtain a determination letter that § 778.215(a)(2) if it provides a "similar Council; Chamber. The American approves a plan as complying with benefit" to the expressly listed benefits Benefits Council suggested that the requirements under section 401(a) or in FLSA section 7(e)(4)-i.e., "old-age, Department replace "approved by the 403(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. In retirement, life, accident, or health Internal Revenue Service as satisfying addition, the IRS issues approval letters insurance." The expressly listed the requirements of section 401(a)" with for pre-approved plans, which can be benefits are similar to one another in "designed to meet the requirements of relied upon by plan sponsors, that a that they all provide assistance in section 401(a)." plan meets the requirements of section preparation for a future expense. As Commenters also requested that the 401(a) or 403(b) of the Internal Revenue explained in the NPRM, such "similar Department expand the coverage of Code. But, as of 2017, sponsors of benefits" include providing accident, § 778.215(b) to presume that more individually designed plans generally unemployment, and legal services 185 benefit plans meet the requirements of may request a determination letter only that protect employees from rare but § 778.215(a). The American Benefits for initial qualification or upon plan statistically predictable events that Council, for instance, suggested that the termination. 189 This change may could otherwise cause significant Department deem section 401(a) plans prevent some sponsors that amend an financial hardship or expense. 186 to meet all five conditions required existing plan from receiving a "Similar benefits" also include under§ 778.215(a), rather than just the determination letter approving the assistance in preparation for common conditions in paragraphs (a)(1), (4), and amended plan. Thus, under the current and predictable events-e.g., retirement. (5). The American Benefits Council § 778.215(b), some sponsors that amend Or even inevitable events-e.g., old age. further requested that the Department a qualified plan are unable to obtain a But a common thread remains: the "expand . . . § 778.215(b) to other determination letter that the plan, as benefit must help the employee prepare common types of retirement plans, amended, satisfies the requirements of for an event that may result in namely [Internal Revenue] Code section section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue significant future financial hardship or 403(a), 403(b), 408(k), 408(p), and Code. In order to reflect these changes expense. By contrast, accumulated governmental 457(b) plans." Other to the IRS's determination letter educational debt represents an expense commenters requested that the program, the Department is revising the that an employee would have incurred Department "amend 29 CFR 778.215(b) provision to state that, absent evidence in the past. As such, repayment of past to provide an exemption for all . . . to the contrary, a plan "maintained debt is not similar to the future-oriented employee welfare benefit and employee pursuant to a written document that the benefits expressly listed in section plan sponsor reasonably believes 7(e)(4). Nor are cash payments in lieu of 187 Moreover, § 7 78.215(a)(5) specifically restricts satisfies the requirements" of section payments of "cash instead of the benefits under the 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code will plan participation, as cash is not limited plan•• to be "an incidental part . . . and not inconsistent with the general purpose of the plan 189 See Revenue Procedure 2016-37, available at 185 The Department has taken the position that to provide benefits described in section 7(e)(4) of https://www.irs.gov/irb/2016-29_IRB. for approval legal services plans qualify for exclusion under the Act."" By necessary implication, cash in lieu of letters procedures for qualified plans. See also FLSA section 7(e)(4) since at least 1978. See WHD a benefit under a plan must be different from that Revenue Procedure 2013-22, available at https:// Opinion Letter FLSA (Feb. 7, 1978) benefit. www.irs.gov/irb/2013-18_IRB. for approval letters 186 84 FR 11899. 188 84 FR 11909. procedures for section 403(b) plans. DOLAR0931 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 23 of 194 68758 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations be considered to meet certain determinable on an actuarial basis or satisfy the requirements of section requirements of§ 778.215(a). there must be a definite formula to 45 7(b) of the Internal Revenue Code Second, the Department agrees with determine both the employer's (governmental section 457(b) plans). In commenters that plans meeting the contribution amount and the benefits for contrast to section 401(a) plans, section requirements of section 401 (a) of the each employee participating in the plan. 403(a) plans are employer-sponsored Internal Revenue Code should be Although Treasury regulations provide retirement plans that are funded deemed to comply with§ 778.215(a)(2). that benefits under a pension plan must through annuity contracts rather than A section 401(a) plan is an employer- be definitely determinable, 194 Treasury trusts, 200 and section 403(b) plans are sponsored tax-advantaged plan in which regulations require that section 401(a) funded through annuity contracts or the employer, the employee, or both profit-sharing and stock bonus plans custodial accounts. 201 Section 408(k) may contribute funds for use in have "a definite predetermined formula plans-also called Simplified Employee retirement. Treasury regulations state to allocating the contributions made to Pension (SEP) plans-are employer- that a section 401(a) pension plan must the plan among the participants." 195 sponsored retirement plans that allow provide "for the payment of definitely For section 401(a) profit-sharing and employers to make tax-favored determinable benefits to [an employer's] stock bonus plans, there is no contributions to an employee's employees over a period of years, requirement that there be a definite Individual Retirement Account or usually for life, after retirement." 190 In formula to determining the amount to be Annuity (IRA). 202 Section 408(p) addition, a retirement plan that is a contributed by the employer, as plans-also called SIMPLE (Savings profit-sharing plan must provide "for required by§ 778.215(a)(3). 196 Thus, a Incentive Match Plan for Employees) distributing the funds accumulated section 401(a) profit-sharing or stock IRA plans-are plans established and under the plan after a fixed number of bonus plan may grant an employer maintained by a small business on years, the attainment of a stated age, or complete discretion regarding the behalf of its employees. 203 The upon the prior occurrence of some event amount of contributions. The employer generally is required to such as layoff, illness, disability, Department's opinion letter dated contribute to each eligible employee's retirement, death, or severance of August 17, 1970, explained that such a SIMPLE IRA every year, while employment." 191 The Internal Revenue plan would not satisfy employees may also contribute. Finally, Code further generally subjects early § 778.215(a)(3). 197 But contributions to governmental section 457(b) plans are distributions to a 10 percent additional such a plan may still be excludable tax-advantaged retirement saving tax unless the plan participant has under FLSA section 7(e)(3) as accounts available to employees of state reached age 59½, dies, becomes "payments . . . to a bona fide profit- and local governments. 204 disabled, or meets certain other sharing plan or trust." 198 As the Sections 403(a), 403(b), 408(k), and exceptions. 192 The Treasury regulations' Southern District of California recently 408(p) plans and governmental section definition of pension plan, the explained, a plan need only meet the 457(b) plans are all established and conditions on distributions from profit- requirements of a profit-sharing plan maintained by an employer and sharing plans, and the additional 10 under section 7(e)(3) or a bona fide therefore satisfy the "adopted by the percent tax on early distributions ensure employee benefit plan under section employer" requirement of plan assets are used for retirement or 7(e)(4), but not both, in order for § 778.215(a)(1). All five types of plans another permitted benefit under contributions thereto to be are designed to provide retirement and § 778.215(a)(2). The Department is excludable. 199 advanced age benefits by offering tax- therefore revising§ 778.215(b) to state Third, the Department is extending favored treatment of plan contributions. that a section 401(a) plan may be the presumption of satisfaction under Thus, these plans satisfy§ 778.215(a)(2). presumed to satisfy§ 778.215(a)(2), in § 778.215(b) to plans that meet the A section 403(a) plan's assets must be addition to§ 778.215(a)(1), (4), and (5). requirements of section 403(a), 403(b), placed in an annuity contract provided The Department notes that section 408(k) or 408(p) of the Internal Revenue through a third-party insurer, 205 and a 401(k) plans, which came into existence Code and to governmental plans that section 403(b) plan's assets must be in 1978 and have become popular placed in such an annuity contract or in among private employers, are a type of 194 26 CFR 1.401-l(b)(l)(i). a custodial account invested in section 401(a) plan that uses a qualified 195 26 CFR 1.401-l(b)(l)(ii), (iii) (emphasis regulated investment company stock added). (mutual fund). 206 Employer cash or deferred arrangement to provide 196 29 CFR 778.215(a)(3) permits plans to, in the retirement funds. 193 Accordingly, a alternative, have benefits that are specified or section 401(k) plan is a section 401(a) definitively determinable on an actuarial basis or to 200 See 26 U.S.C. 403(a); 26 CFR 1.403(a)-1. plan and therefore enjoys the same have a formula for determining the amount to be 201 See 26 U.S.C. 403(b); 26 CFR 1.403(b)-8. 202 26 U.S.C. 408(k); see also IRS, Establishing a presumptions as a section 401(a) plan. contributed by the employer and a provision for determining the individual benefits by a method SEP, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/ However, the Department does not which is consistent with the purposes of the plan establishing-a-sep. believe section 401(a) profit-sharing or trust under section 7(e)(4) of the Act. 203 26 U.S.C. 408(p); see also IRS, Establishing a plans should be presumed to satisfy the 197 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1970 WL 26444, SIMPLE IRA Plan, https://www.irs.gov/retirement- requirement in§ 778.215(a)(3) that at *1 (Aug. 17, 1970) ("The plan fails to meet the plans/establishing-a-simple-ira-plan. formula requirements of§ 778.215(a)(3) of Part 778, 204 See 26 U.S.C. 457(b); see also IRS, !RC 457(b) either benefits must be definitely in that it does not contain a definite formula for Deferred Compensation Plans, https://www.irs.gov/ determining the amount to be contributed by the retirement-plans/irc-457b-deferred-compensation- 19 o 26 CFR 1.401-l(b)(l)(i). employer.""). However, a profit sharing plan that plans. 191 26 CFR 1.401-l(b)(l)(ii). Section 1.401- permits discretionary contributions but uses a 205 26 U.S.C. 403(a)(1) l(b)(l)(iii) provides that a stock bonus plan is a plan definite formula to determine the amount of such 206 U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits established and maintained by an employer to contributions does satisfy§ 778.215(a)(3). See Security Administration, Field Assistance Bulletin provide benefits similar to those of a profit-sharing Russell v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-672 No. 2007-02, ERISA Coverage Of !RC Section 403(b) plan with certain exceptions. JLS (WVG), 2018 WL 1210763, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. Tax-Sheltered Annuity Programs Uuly 24, 2007) 1 92 See 26 U.S.C. 72(1). 8, 2018). ("Under a 403(b) plan, employers may purchase for 193 See 26 U.S.C. 401(k)(1) (a "plan shall not be 198 The requirements of a bona fide profit sharing their eligible employees annuity contracts or considered as not satisfying the requirements of plan or trust are set forth in part 549 of the establish custodial accounts invested only in subsection (a) merely because the plan includes a Department's regulations. See 29 CFR part 549. mutual funds for the purpose of providing qualified cash or deferred arrangement.""). 199 Russell, 2018 WL 1210763, at *6. retirement income. Annuity contracts must be DOLAR0932 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 24 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68759 contributions made under SEP and distribution is available only where a Department believes the additional 10 SIMPLE IRA plans must be paid into reservist or national guardsman is called percent tax ensures that early each eligible employee's IRA, which is up for at least 180 days of active duty distributions are incidental to maintained by a financial institution military service. 211 The Department retirement benefits, and so these types that serves as the trustee of the believes that financial hardship and of plans should be presumed to satisfy employee's retirement assets. 207 And active duty distributions are consistent the incidental-payment requirement "[g]overnmental 457(b) plans must be with the incidental-payment under§ 778.215(a)(5). 215 funded, with assets held in trust for the requirements of§ 778.215(a)(5). Indeed, Based on the above discussion, the benefit of employees." zos Thus, all five such distributions are also permitted Department believes that a retirement types of plans also satisfy the under certain section 401(a) plans, plan satisfying section 403(a), 403(b), § 778.215(a)(4) requirement that "[t]he which currently are presumed to satisfy 408(k), or 408(p) of the Internal Revenue employer's contributions must be paid § 778.215(a)(5). Accordingly, section Code, or a governmental section 457(b) irrevocably to a trustee or third person 403(a) and section 403(b) plans may be plan, should be presumed to satisfy pursuant to an insurance agreement, presumed to satisfy§ 778.215(a)(5). § 778.215(a)(1), (2), (4), and (5). trust or other funded arrangement." Section 457(d)(1)(A) of the Internal Accordingly, the Department is revising Section 778.215(a)(5) requires that Revenue Code permits early distribution § 778.215(b) to extend that presumption employer contributions to a plan be from a 457(b) plan only if the to any plan "maintained pursuant to a used in furtherance of a benefit under participant "attains age 70½," "has a written document that the plan sponsor FLSA section 7(e)(4), except that severance from employment," or "is reasonably believes satisfies the incidental cash distributions for other faced with an unforeseeable requirements of section 401(a), 403(a), purposes are permitted. Section 403(a) emergency." Thus, the only type of 403(b), 408(k), or 408(p) of the Internal plans are subject to a 10 percent 457(b) distribution that does not serve Revenue Code, or is sponsored by a additional tax on early distributions and as an FLSA section 7(e)(4) benefit is an government employer that reasonably the minimum distribution requirements unforeseeable emergency distribution. believes the plan satisfies the under section 401(a)(9) of the Internal Treasury regulations define requirements of section 45 7(b) of the Revenue Code. A section 403(b) plan unforeseeable emergency as a severe Internal Revenue Code." The generally permits an employee to financial hardship resulting from Department believes this clarifying withdraw funds only if he or she (1) illness, accident, loss of home, or other revision will make it easier for reaches age 59½, (2) separates from similar extraordinary and unforeseeable employers to determine whether employment, (3) becomes disabled, (4) circumstances. 212 An unforeseeable employer contributions to an employee dies, (5) encounters a financial emergency distribution is not permitted retirement plan are excludable from the hardship, or (6) is called up to active unless the participant's other financial regular rate under FLSA section 7(e)(4) duty military service. 209 The first four assets are insufficient, and the amount and would serve "the policy of the conditions correspond to benefits listed of such distribution must be limited to Federal Government to expand access to in§ 778.215(a)(2)-i.e., advanced age, the needs of the emergency (increased workplace retirement plans for retirement, disability, and death-and by the amount of tax reasonably American workers." 216 therefore distributions under these anticipated to result from the The Department is declining to create conditions are consistent with distribution). 213 The Department a new presumption for employee benefit § 778.215(a)(5). The remaining believes these restrictions ensure plans governed by and in compliance conditions permitting distribution- unforeseeable emergency distributions with ERISA, as requested by some financial hardship and active duty are consistent with the incidental- commenters. See ERIC; Chamber. ERISA service-are narrow. A hardship payment requirements of§ 778.215(a)(5) requirements appear to overlap with distribution is permitted only if the and therefore governmental section some of the requirements of a bona fide participant faces an immediate and 457(b) plans may be presumed to satisfy heavy financial need that cannot be met § 778.215(a)(5). See 26 U.S.C. 72(t)(2)(B). Nor does the tax apply to with available financial resources, and early distribution from SEP and SIMPLE IRA plans The funding vehicles for SEP and that pay for certain expenses relating to qualified the distribution amount must be limited SIMPLE IRA plans are IRAs, which do higher education, first-time home ownership, and to that need (increased by the amount of not prohibit employees from receiving being called to active duty military service. See 26 tax reasonably anticipated to result from distributions before reaching retirement U.S.C. 72(t)(2)(E)-(G). For a list of the exceptions to the distribution). 210 And an active duty the 10 percent additional tax under section 72(t] of age. But to discourage the use of plan the Code, see IRS, Retirement Topics-Exceptions funds for purposes other than to Tax on Early Distributions, https://www.irs.gov/ purchased from a state licensed insurance retirement, the Internal Revenue Code retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/ company, and the custodial accounts must be held retirement-topics-tax-on-early-distributions. Early by a custodian bank or IRS approved non-bank generally imposes an additional 10 distributions from a SIMPLE IRA plan "incur a 25% trustee/custodian.00 ). percent tax on SEP and SIMPLE IRA additional tax instead of 10% if made within the 207 IRS, Establishing a SEP, https://www.irs.gov/ distributions before the employee first 2 years of participation."" Id. retirement-plans/establishing-a-sep; IRS, reaches age 59½ unless the employee 215 As the Department articulated in an opinion Establishing a SIMPLE IRA Plan, https:// dies, becomes disabled, or meets certain letter dated July 2, 2003, a plan that distributes over www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/establishing-a- 20 percent of the employer"s total contributions to simple-ira-plan. other specified exceptions. 214 The the plan for purposes other than a FLSA section 208 IRS, Government Retirement Plans Toolkit, 7(e)(4) benefit does not satisfy§ 778.215(a)(5) https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal- 211 IRS Publication 571, Tax-Sheltered Annuity because such distributions would not be incidental. state-local-governments/government-retirement- Plans (403(b) Plans) (January 2019), https:// WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2003-4, 2003 WL plans-toolkit. www.irs.gov/publications/p571. 23374600, at *2 (July 2, 2003). Thus, while the 209 IRS Publication 571, Tax-Sheltered Annuity 212 26 CFR 1.457-6(c)(2); see also Rev. Ru!. 2010- Department believes it is appropriate to presume a Plans (403(b) Plans) (January 2019), https:// 2 7, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2010-45_IRB#RR-2010- SEP and SIMPLE IRA plan satisfies § 778.215(a)(5), www.irs.gov/publications/p571. The plan may, but 27 (providing guidance on what constitutes an the early withdrawal of over 20 percent of total is not required to, permit participants to receive a unforeseeable emergency distribution). employer contributions may constitute "evidence to cash distribution in response to financial hardship. 213 Id. the contrary•• that would rebut such a presumption. 210 See 26 CFR 1.401(k)-1(d)(3). Hardship 214 26 U.S.C. 72(1). For example, the 10 percent 216 Exec. Order No. 13847, Strengthening distributions are generally subject to a 10 percent additional tax does not apply to early distributions Retirement Security in America, 83 FR 45321 (Aug. tax penalty. See 26 U.S.C. 72(1). that are used to pay for certain medical expenses. 31, 2018). DOLAR0933 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 25 of 194 68760 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations plan detailed in§ 778.215(a)(1)-(5). But under the "other similar payments" Some commenters who supported the compliance with ERISA does not clause of section 7(e)(2) if the proposed changes also suggested the address all requirements for availability and amount of benefits do Department clarify that other specific excludability under FLSA section not depend on hours worked, services benefit plans are excludable under 7(e)(4) and§ 778.215(a). For example, rendered, or any other criteria that section 7(e)(4) of the Act. For example, ERISA does not require all covered depend on the quality or quantity of an ERIC requested that the Department employee benefit plans to have benefits employee's work. 220 Because clarify that contributions to Health that are determined on an actuarial basis compliance with ERISA is not a Saving Accounts (HSA) and Individual or by a definite formula that sets the substitute for statutory and regulatory Retirement Accounts (IRA) are employer's contribution amount, as prerequisites for excludability from the excludable, and the American Benefits required under§ 778.215(a)(3); an regular rate under FLSA section 7(e)(4), Council asked the Department to clarify ERISA-covered profit-sharing plan may the Department does not believe it that discretionary contributions to grant the employer complete discretion would be appropriate to create a retirement plans are excludable. Other regarding the amount of presumption that employer commenters asked the same regarding contributions. 217 Such a plan would not contributions to ERISA employee cash payments to employees made in- meet the requirements of benefit plans are excludable. Employers lieu ofreceiving health insurance § 778.215(a)(3). 218 should assess the plan's compliance provided through contributions to a Additionally, contributions to an with the elements set forth in cafeteria plan. See IMLA; NADA; employee benefit plan are excludable § 778.215(a)(1)-(5) to determine Seyfarth; NPELRA. The Department under FLSA section 7(e)(4) only if they excludability, rather than rely on the discusses the excludability of each of are "irrevocably made by an employer plan's compliance with ERISA. these types of benefit plan contributions to a trustee or third person" and The above principle applies equally below. § 778.215(a)(4) accordingly requires with respect to a multiple employer A cafeteria plan is an employer- employer contributions to be "paid plan. 221 One common type of a multiple sponsored plan established under irrevocably to a trustee or third person employer plan is an Association section 125 of the Internal Revenue pursuant to an insurance agreement, Retirement Plan-which provides group Code. A cafeteria plan allows employees trust or other funded arrangement." But retirement benefits. A multiple to choose between using employer ERISA does not uniformly require employer plan is treated the same for contributions to pay for an employer- employers to fund all types of ERISA purposes of this regulation as if it were provided qualified benefit, including plans through a trustee or third party. a single plan: If the plan satisfies the premiums for health coverage or While some ERISA plans are funded conditions set forth in§ 778.215(a)(1)- contributions to an HSA, or to receive through a trust or an insurer, ERISA (5), then employer contributions to the cash payments (or some other taxable permits employers to establish self- plan would be excludable under FLSA benefits). 223 As an employer-sponsored funded plans that pay benefits out of the section 7(e)(4). 222 plan that provides for "payment of employer's general assets, which would benefits to employees on account of. . . not satisfy the requirement of FLSA 220 See Minizza, 842 F.2d 14562 (payments under medical expenses," a cafeteria plan section 7(e)(4) and§ 778.215(a)(4). section 7(e)(2) all "share the essential characteristic . . . of not being compensation for hours worked would generally meet the requirements For example, a Health Reimbursement or services rendered""). The Gilbertson court held of§ 778.215(a)(1) and (2). And Arrangement (HRA) is a group health that HRA reimbursement payments were not § 778.215(a)(3) and (4) likely are plan that enables employers to excludable under section 7(e)(2)"s reimbursement satisfied if employer contributions are reimburse employees' medical expenses clause because such reimbursements benefited the employee, not the employer. 165 F. Supp. 3d. at determinable or based on a formula, and in a tax-favored manner. An HRA may 7 50-51. But the court did not analyze the are irrevocably made to a trust or third be funded through a trust, in which case excludability of HRA reimbursements under the party. 224 The key issue is whether a it would satisfy the irrevocable- "other similar payments•• clause of section 7(e)(2). cafeteria plan satisfies§ 778.215(a)(5)'s contribution requirement of FLSA 221 For general information on ERISA-covered section 7(e)(4) and§ 778.215(a)(4). But multiple employer plans, see generally, the requirement that cash payments to an employer may also structure an HRA Department"s recently promulgated final rule that employees must be incidental to the expands access to affordable quality retirement plan's benefits. using a notional account through which saving options by clarifying the circumstances The Department's opinion letter dated reimbursements are paid out of the under which an employer group or association or July 2, 2003, explained that employer's general assets. In this type of a professional employer organization may sponsor a multiple employer workplace retirement plan § 778.215(a)(5) recognizes that "[a] bona self-funded HRA, there are no under title I of ERISA. Definition of "Employer•• fide plan may allow incidental cash irrevocable contributions to a trust or Under section 3(5) of ERISA-Association payments to employees." 225 Incidental third party, and therefore, Retirement Plans and Other Multiple-Employer reimbursements by such a plan would Plans, 84 FR 37508 (July 31, 2019). payments must be consistent with the not be excludable under FLSA section 222 In a typical Association Retirement Plan, plan's purpose of providing qualifying 7(e)(4). 219 However, the Department multiple employers participate in a single benefits. And cash payments in excess retirement plan-such as a section 401(k) plan- believes that benefits from self-funded and each employer may choose among eligibility, 223 26 U.S.C. 125(d)(1)(B) ("participants may employee benefit plans-including self- contribution, vesting, and distribution options provided by the plan document. Under revised choose among 2 or more benefits consisting of cash funded HRAs-could be excludable § 778.215(b), the section 401(k) plan in the above and qualified benefits""). If an employee chooses to example may be presumed to satisfy§ 778.215(a)(1), use employer contributions for a qualified benefit, 217 See e.g., 26 U.S.C. 412(a) and (e)(2) (requiring (2), (4) and (5). An employer"s contributions to that then the value of that benefit is excluded from minimum funding of certain plans but exempting Association Retirement Plan would be excludable income for tax purposes, notwithstanding the profit sharing plans from this requirement). so long as the contribution and benefits provisions ability of the employee to receive taxable cash in 218 See e.g., WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1970 WL in the plan document and the employer"s lieu of the benefit. 224 Self-insured cafeteria plans, for instance, 26444, at *1. A profit sharing plan that permits participation agreement satisfy the requirements of discretionary contributions but uses a definite § 778.215(a)(3). See Laughlin v. Jim Fischer, Inc., health flexible saving arrangements, are not funded formula to determine the amount of such 2019 WL 1440406, at *7 (E.D. Wisc. March 31, through a trust or a third party. Accordingly, contributions does satisfy 778.215(a)(3). See 2019) (section 401(k) contributions excluded from employer contributions to such plans would not Russell, 2018 WL 1210763, at *8. regular rate where "there is no room for discretion satisfy§ 778.215(a)(4). 219 See Gilbertson v. City of Sheboygan, 165 F. in [employer]"s plan for the amount to be 225 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA2003-4, 2003 WL Supp. 3d 742, 750 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2016). contributed.""). 23374600, at *2. DOLAR0934 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 26 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68761 of 20 percent of plan contributions are remaining subsections become excludable, provided that the retirement not incidental to the plan's purpose, superfluous." 230 plan otherwise satisfies§ 778.215(a)(1), unless such payments are used for IRAs and HSAs are tax-favored (2), (4), and (5). Many retirement plans, benefits that are the same or similar as savings accounts that provide, such as section 401(k) profit-sharing those listed in FLSA section 7(e)(4). 226 respectively, retirement and health plans, grant employers discretion to Notably, this 20 percent limit is not benefits. Employer contributions to an make additional contributions at the applied on an employee-by-employee IRA or HSA may satisfy§ 778.215(a)(1) end of a plan year. The Department's basis, but plan-wide. As the 2003 if they are made pursuant to an opinion letter dated August 17, 1970, opinion letter explained, a plan-wide arrangement where the employer makes explained that§ 778.215(a)(3) requires limit "is more consistent with the contributions for employees that is the amounts of such discretionary regulatory language which allows 'all or communicated to employees. As contributions to be based on a definite a part of the amount' standing to an explained in the above discussion formula. 234 A plan that simply provides employee's credit to be paid in concerning SIMPLE and SEP plans, an that "[t]he Board of Directors of the cash . . . . " 227 Thus, "a cafeteria plan IRA encourages retirement savings. 231 company at its discretion may make a may qualify as a bona fide benefits plan And HSA contributions may be greater or lesser contribution for any for purposes of section 7(e)(4) if: (1) No distributed on a tax-free basis to pay for plan year" would fall short. 235 But a more than 20% of the employer's certain qualified medical expenses. 232 plan that enables employers to make contribution is paid out in cash; and (2) Thus, employer contributions to IRAs discretionary contributions based on a the cash is paid under circumstances and HSAs satisfy§ 778.215(a)(2). If the formula that "quantifies each variable" that are consistent with the plan's plan requires the benefits be specified or and "describes those variables' relation overall primary purpose of providing definitely determinable based on an to each other" would satisfy the definite benefits." 228 actuarial basis, or based on a definite formula requirement. 236 However, the Department disagrees formula for determining the amount to with commenters requesting that cash be contributed by the employer and for D. Overtime Premiums Under Sections 7(e)(5)-(7) payments in-lieu of plan participation determining the benefits for each of the also may be excluded from the regular employees participating in the plan, or FLSA sections 7(e)(5), (6), and (7) rate under section 7(e)(4). See NADA; based on a formula for determining the permit employers to exclude from the Seyfarth; NPELRA; IMLA. This is amount to be contributed by the regular rate certain overtime premium because such cash payments are made employer and the individual benefits payments made for hours of work on directly to the employee, and so fail to which is consistent with the purposes of special days or in excess or outside of satisfy the requirement under FLSA the plan or trust, then§ 778.215(a)(3) is specified daily or weekly standard work section 7(e)(4) that contributions be satisfied as well. IRA and HSA accounts periods. 237 More specifically, section "made by an employer to a trustee or must be with a trustee or custodian, and 7(e)(5) permits exclusion of premiums third person." 229 Nor are cash-in-lieu of so employer contributions would also for "hours worked in excess of eight in medical benefits generally excludable satisfy§ 778.215(a)(4)'s requirement that a day or in excess of the maximum under the "other similar payments" employer contributions must be "paid workweek applicable to such employee clause of section 7(e)(2), as the irrevocably to a trustee or third person [under section 7(a)] or in excess of the International Municipal Lawyers pursuant to an insurance agreement, employee's normal working hours or Association suggests. As explained trust, or other funded arrangement." regular working hours, as the case may above, "other similar payments" cannot Finally, IRAs and HSAs permit be[.]" 238 Section 7(e)(6) permits be wages in another guise. Cash participants to withdraw cash for exclusion of premiums "for work by the payments in lieu of medical benefits in purposes unrelated to retirement or employee on Saturdays, Sundays, many cases function essentially as wage medical benefits, but participants must holidays, or regular days ofrest, or on supplements. Even though they are not pay an additional tax on those the sixth or seventh day of the directly tied to hours worked or service withdrawals. 233 The additional tax workweek, where such premium rate is rendered, they are typically paid ensures that any cash payments are not less than one and one-half times the frequently, regularly, and as fungible incidental to retirement and/or health rate established in good faith for like cash. And it would make little sense for benefits, and so both types of accounts work performed in nonovertime hours Congress to require employers to satisfy the incidental-payment on other days[.]" 239 Section 7(e)(7) provide a bona fide plan to exclude requirement of§ 778.215(a)(5). permits exclusion of premiums in health care benefits under section Accordingly, the Department believes pursuance of an applicable employment 7(e)(4) if employers could simply pay employer contributions to an IRA or contract or collective-bargaining cash toward the same purpose and HSA under these circumstances would agreement, for work outside of the hours claim exclusion under section 7(e)(2). be excludable from the regular rate. established in good faith by the contract As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "we Discretionary employer contributions or agreement as the basic, normal, or hesitate to read§ 7(e)(2) as a catch-all, to a retirement plan may also be regular workday (not exceeding eight one that obliterates the qualifications hours) or workweek (not exceeding the and limitations on the other subsections 230 Reich, 57 F.3d at 578; see also Flores, 824 F.3d maximum workweek applicable to such and establishes a principle that all at 900-01. 234 WHD Opinion Letter FLSA, 1970 WL 26444, lump-sum payments fall outside the 231 Most employer-funded IRAs are SIMPLE and SEP plans that, as explained above, may be at * 1 ("The plan fails to meet the formula 'regular rate,' for then most of the presumed to satisfy the requirements of requirements of§ 778.215(a)(3) of Part 778, in that § 778.215(a)(1), (2), (4), and (5). Employer it does not contain a definite formula for 226 Id. contributions to other IRAs that are described in determining the amount to be contributed by the 227 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Internal Revenue Code section 219(f)(5) fall outside employer. 00 ). 228 Id. this presumption and those contributions must be 235 Id. 236 Russell, 2018 WL 1210763, at *8; see also 229 See Local 246 Util. Workers Union of Am. v. analyzed in accordance with all five elements of S. California Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 296 (9th Cir. § 778.215(a). Laughlin, 2019 WL 1440406, at *7. 232 26 u.s.c. 223. 23 7 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(5)-(7). 1996) ("Section 207(e)(4) deals with contributions 238 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(5). by the employer [to a trust or third person], not 233 The additional tax is 10 percent for an early payments to the employee.""). withdrawal from an IRA and 20 percent for an HSA. 239 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(6). DOLAR0935 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 27 of 194 68762 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations employee under subsection 7(a), where not be a formal contract or agreement The NPRM further noted that, such premium rate is not less than one under sections 7(e)(5) or (6), there must consistent with the Department's and one-half times the rate established be a discernable schedule of hours and practice, most courts have not required in good faith by the contract or days worked from which the excess or employers using the exclusions in agreement for like work performed nonregular hours for which the overtime sections 7(e)(5) and (6) to establish the during such workday or workweek. 240 premiums are paid are existence of any formal contract or Additionally, section 7(h)(2) provides distinguishable. 248 Relatedly, the agreement with employees. 253 Even that extra compensation of the types Department also proposed to amend apart from sections 7(e)(5) and (6), described in sections 7(e)(5), (6), and (7) § 778.207 to refer to the "premium courts interpreting the FLSA do not is creditable toward overtime payments" instead of "contract generally require that contracts be in compensation owed under section premium rates." The NPRM noted that writing (unless specifically required by 7(a). 241 These are the only types of the proposed change was consistent statute), and they likewise emphasize compensation excludable from the with the description of the overtime the importance of the employer's actual regular rate that are also creditable premiums found in§ 778.201 and practices in determining whether a pay toward overtime compensation. 242 removes any implication that all of the practice complies with the FLSA. 254 Sections 778.202, 778.203, 778.205, overtime premium payments must be A few commenters addressed these and 778.207 explain the requirements paid pursuant to a formal contract. proposals. See Fisher Phillips; CWC; for excluding from the regular rate the The Department noted in the NPRM Seyfarth; SHRM; NELA; NELP; EPI. overtime premiums described in that, while the regulations at§§ 778.202, While employers and their sections 7(e)(5) and (6). 243 Sections 778.205, and 778.207 have, since 1950, representatives were generally 778.202 and 778.202(e) refer to extra referred to employment contracts and supportive of the proposed revisions, premium payments paid pursuant to agreements when describing the types of three employee groups disagreed with contracts. 244 Similarly,§ 778.205 uses overtime premiums excludable under the proposal to remove the word an example of an extra premium sections 7(e)(5) and (6), 249 the "contract" from§§ 778.202 and 778.205. payment paid pursuant to an Department has not interpreted the use NELP and EPI suggested that instead of employment "agreement," 245 and of the words "contract" or "agreement" eliminating the word "contract," the § 778.207(a) refers to "contract premium to limit excludable overtime premium Department should instead consider rates[.]" 246 payments to only those paid pursuant to adding additional terms such as The Department proposed amending a formal contract or collective "contract, handbook, policy, or explicit §§ 778.202 and 778.205 to remove bargaining agreement. 250 The agreement or understanding." Similarly, references to employment agreements Department has historically evaluated NELA suggested that the Department and contracts in those sections to the actual practice of the parties to replace the word "contract" with the eliminate any confusion that the determine if extra payments are true phrase "contract, agreement or overtime premiums described in overtime premiums that are excludable understanding.'' sections 7(e)(5) and (6) may be excluded from the regular rate. 251 In the initial In response to the comments received, only under written contracts or publication of part 778 in 1948, for the Department has adopted the agreements. The NPRM explained that example, the Department emphasized the primacy of "actual practice" over previously worked a specified number of hours or these proposed regulatory clarifications days, according to a bona fide standard."" were consistent with sections 7(e)(5) any contractual terms when assessing 253 See Fulmerv. City of St. Albans, W. Va., 125 and (6) of the FLSA, neither of which whether extra payments were true Fed. App"x 459,461 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2005) (holding requires that the overtime premiums be overtime premiums that could be that city properly excluded overtime premiums paid pursuant to a formal employment excluded from the regular rate. 252 from regular rate under 207(e)(5) even though the premiums were not included in employment contract or collective bargaining contract and were mentioned only during the 248 Section 7(e)(5) allows exclusion of premiums agreement. Those statutory exclusions employment interview); Hesseltine v. Goodyear Tire for hours "in excess of the employee"s normal contrast with section 7(e)(7), which working hours or regular working hours•• and & Rubber Co., 391 F. Supp. 2d 509, 522 (E.D. Tex. explicitly requires "an employment 2005) ("If an employer voluntarily pays an sections 7(e)(6) permits exclusion of premiums for employee a premium rate contingent upon his contract or collective-bargaining work on regular days of rest or on the sixth or working more than eight hours in one day, then agreement" to exclude premiums "for seventh day of the workweek. Thus, exclusion such payment may be excluded from the under these provisions requires a discernable work outside of the hours established in schedule. employee"s regular rate and credited toward unpaid good faith by the contract or work overtime.""); Laboy v. Alex Displays, Inc., No. 02 C 249 See 15 FR 623-02 (the precursor to§§ 778.202, 8721, 2003 WL 21209854, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 21, agreement as the basic, normal, or 778.205, and 778.207 was located in§ 778.5 in the 2003) ("The court need not determine whether the regular workday (not exceeding eight 1950 version of the regulations). parties had an agreement for purposes of [section] 250 The FOH sections discussing sections 7(e)(5) hours) or workweek[.]" 247 Exclusion of 7(e)(7) because the payments must be excluded and (6) overtime premiums make no reference to from the regular rate under [section] 7(e)(5)[.]""). premium payments under sections the need for a contract, and instead instruct 254 See Bay Ridge, 334 U.S. at 464 ("As the 7(e)(5) and (6) turns on deviation from investigators to look to the employee"s normal regular rate cannot be left to a declaration by the the employee's normal work schedule. hours or days of work "as established by agreement parties as to what is to be treated as the regular rate The NPRM further explained that the or practice."" FOH 32e01; see also id. 32e04 for an employee, it must be drawn from what (describing criteria for 207(e)(6) overtime premium happens under the employment contract.""); Singer proposed removal of the word for work on special days without any reference to v. City of Waco, Tex., 324 F.3d 813, 824 (5th Cir. "contract" from the regulations did not a requirement that the compensation be paid 2003) (same); see also 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. change the fact that, while there need pursuant to contract). Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 204 (1947) ("[I]n testing the 251 See 13 FR 4534-01 (Aug. 6, 1948) (codified at validity of a wage agreement under the Act the 240 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(7). 29 CFR 778.2 (1948)). courts are required to look beyond that which the 252 Id. Those regulations stated that "[t]he mere parties have purported to do."") (citing Wallingv. 241 29 U.S.C. 207(h)(2). 242 29 CFR 778.201(c). fact that a contract calls for premium payments for Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 243 See id.§ 778.202, 778.203, 778.205, 778.207. work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or at night 419, 424-25 (1945) ("Once the parties have decided 244 See id.§ 778.202(a), (b), (e). would not necessarily prove that the higher rate is upon the amount of wages and the mode of [a non-excludable shift differential] paid merely payment the determination of the regular rate 245 Id. § 7 78.205. because of undesirable working hours if, as a matter becomes a matter of mathematical computation, the 246 Id.§ 778.207(a). of fact, the actual practice of the parties shows that result of which is unaffected by any designation of 247 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(7). the payments are made because the employees have a contrary 'regular rate" in the wage contracts."")). DOLAR0936 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 28 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68763 suggestion to replace the term Department clarify that employers may using such basic rates to compute "employment contracts" in§ 778.202 pay via any method without changing overtime pay under section 7(g)(3). 258 and "agreement of employment" in the regular rate calculation and asked Section 548.2 provides ten § 778.205 with "written or unwritten the Department to identify alternatives requirements for using a basic rate when employment contract, agreement, to the examples provided in the calculating overtime compensation. 259 understanding, handbook, policy, or regulations. See PPWO; SHRM. The Section 548.3 discusses six different practice." This language achieves the Department believes that the proposed authorized basic rates that may be used original objective of clarifying that language of§ 778.1 accomplishes this, if the criteria in § 548. 2 are met. 260 overtime premiums do not need to be stating specifically that "the FLSA does Section 548.300 explains that these made pursuant to a written contract or not restrict the forms of 'remuneration' basic rates "have been found in use in agreement to be excluded under these that an employer may pay . . . as long industry and the Administrator has sections, while also recognizing that as the regular rate is equal to at least the determined that they are substantially they must still be paid pursuant to some applicable minimum wage and equivalent to the straight-time average form of legitimate agreement or compensation for overtime hours hourly earnings of the employee over a understanding. worked is paid at the rate of at least one representative period of time." 261 As and one-half times the regular rate." relevant to this rulemaking, the current E. Clarification That Examples in Part regulation at§ 548.3 authorizes a basic 778 Are Not Exclusive Furthermore, while the NPRM proposed to update and add examples in part 778, rate that excludes "additional payments As explained in the NPRM, the the proposed language of§ 778. l(b) in cash or in kind which, if included in Department recognizes that makes clear that it is not feasible to the computation of overtime under the compensation practices can vary address all of the various types of Act, would not increase the total significantly and will continue to compensation practices that may exist. compensation of the employee by more evolve. In general, the FLSA does not Proposed § 778.1 (b) accordingly clarifies than 50 cents a week on the average for restrict the forms of "remuneration" that that the examples in part 778 are not an all overtime weeks . . . in the period for an employer may pay-which may exhaustive list of permissible or which such additional payments are include an hourly rate, salary, impermissible compensation practices made." 262 Section 548.305(b) explains commission, piece rate, a combination under section 7(e) of the Act unless that, under§ 548.3(e), upon agreement thereof, or any other method-as long as otherwise clearly indicated. Therefore, or understanding between an employer the regular rate is equal to at least the the Department adopts the changes to and employee, the basic rate may applicable minimum wage and non- § 778.1 as proposed. Additionally, the exclude from the computation of exempt employees are paid any Department changes the title of§ 778.1 overtime "certain incidental payments overtime owed at one and one-half and makes non-substantive edits to which have a trivial effect on the times the regular rate. While the eight modernize the introductory statement. overtime compensation due." 263 This categories of excludable payments section provides a nonexhaustive list of enumerated in section 7(e)(1)-(8) are F. Basic Rate Calculations Under examples of payments that have such a exhaustive, 255 the NPRM proposed to Section 7(g)(3) trivial effect on the overtime confirm in § 778.1 that, unless otherwise Section 7(g) of the FLSA identifies compensation due and therefore may be indicated, part 778 does not contain an three circumstances in which an excluded from the basic rate, including exhaustive list of permissible or employer may calculate overtime "modest housing," "bonuses or prizes of impermissible compensation practices. compensation using a basic rate rather various sorts," and compensation "for Rather, it provides examples of regular than the regular rate, provided that the soliciting or obtaining new rate and overtime calculations that, by basic rate is established by an agreement business." 264 Section 548.305 also their terms, may or may not comply or understanding between the employer provides examples with specific with the FLSA, and the types of and employee, reached before the amounts of additional payments to compensation excludable from regular performance of the work. 256 The third of illustrate the application of rate calculations under section 7(e). these, identified in section 7(g)(3), § 548.3(e). 265 The $0.50 amount is also Because it is impossible to address all allows for the establishment of a basic referenced in§ 548.400(b). The of the various compensation and rate of pay when the rate is "authorized Department last updated these benefits arrangements that may exist by regulation by the Administrator as regulations more than 50 years ago, in between employers and employees, both being substantially equivalent to the 1966. 266 now and in the future, the NPRM The Department proposed to update average hourly earnings of the the $0.50 amount in§§ 548.3, 548.305, proposed to specify in § 778.1 that the employee, exclusive of overtime examples set forth in part 778 of the and 548.400. Rather than provide a premiums, in the particular work over a specific dollar or cent amount, however, types of payments that are excludable representative period of time[.]" 257 Part under section 7(e)(1)-(8) are not the Department proposed to replace the 548 addresses the requirements for $0.50 language in these regulations with exhaustive; there may be other types of payments not discussed or used as "40 percent of the applicable hourly 255 See 29 U.S.C. 207(g). examples in part 778 that nonetheless 257 Id. 207(g)(3). By contrast, section 7(g)(1) minimum wage under section 6(a) of the qualify as excludable payments under allows for a basic rate to be established for Act." The Department explained that section 7(e)(1)-(8). employees employed at piece rates, and section 7(g)(2) allows for a basic rate to be established for 258 See 29 CFR 548.1; see also id.§§ 778.400 The Department received a number of employees performing two or more kinds of work through 7 78.401. comments on this clarification, all in for which different hourly or piece rates apply. Id. 259 See id. § 548.2. support. See, e.g., Associated Builders 207(g)(1)-(2). Only the basic rate provided by 260 See id. § 548.3. and Contractors; AHLA; Chamber. Two section 7(g)(1) is limited to employees paid on a 261 Id. § 548.300. piece rate basis. The Department proposed to clarify of these commenters requested that the the cross reference in § 548.1 to the regulations for 262 Id. § 548.3( e ). 263 Id. § 548.305(b). sections 7(g)(1) and (2), which are at 29 CFR 255 264 Id. § 548.305(b). See, e.g.. Smiley. 839 F.2d at 330; Caraballo 778.415 through 778.421. No comments addressed 265 See id.§ 548.305(c), (d), (f). v. City of Chicago. 969 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1015 (N.D. this proposal. Therefore, the final rule adopts Ill. 2013); see also 29 CFR 778.200(c). § 548.1 as proposed. 266 See 31 FR 6769. DOLAR0937 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 29 of 194 68764 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations this is the same methodology that the state law as well as Federal law, where an employer is paying its Department used in the past to update commenting that "[w]hether payments employees pursuant to an authorized the threshold. In 1955, the Department count as trivial will rise with the basic rate under section 7(g)(3) of the set the threshold for excludable employee's minimum compensation." FLSA and that section's implementing amounts in§ 548.3(e) at $0.30-which, NPELRA appreciated the proposal, but regulations in part 548, the cost of a at the time, was 40 percent of the hourly noted that very few public employers single meal per workday provided by an minimum wage required under the use section 7(g)(3)'s basic rate employer need not be included in the FLSA ($0.75 per hour). 267 Similarly, in calculations and asked that the basic rate. 270 Nonetheless, the 1966, after the minimum wage increased regulations implementing 7(g)(3) be Department recognizes there is an to $1.25 per hour, the Department further amended to take account of the apparent tension between its authorized correspondingly increased the threshold unique work schedules for law basic rate regulations, which allow for amount in§ 548.3(e) to $0.50-which, enforcement and fire protection the exclusion from overtime again, was 40 percent of the hourly personnel and the partial overtime calculations of a customarily furnished minimum wage at the time. 268 The exemption for such personnel in 29 employer-provided single daily meal, 271 current minimum wage is $7.25 per U.S.C. 207(k) of the FLSA. No and section 3(m), which indicates that hour, and 40 percent of $7.25 is $2.90. comments were received that opposed employer-provided meals are wages that To avoid the need for future rulemaking the proposed changes. must be included in overtime in response to any further minimum In response to the comments received, calculations. 272 As stated in the basic wage increases, however, the the Department has finalized the rate regulations published in 1956 after Department proposed to replace the regulations in part 548 as proposed, notice and comment, an employer may, current $0.50 references in§§ 548.3(e), with a modification to the regulatory when calculating overtime 548.305, and 548.400(b) with "40 text to reference the minimum wage compensation due, exclude from the percent of the applicable minimum under either the FLSA or state or local basic rate the cost of providing one free hourly wage under section 6(a) of the law applicable in the jurisdiction in daily meal to employees upon Act." Relatedly, the Department also which the employee is employed, agreement between the employer and proposed to update the examples whichever is higher. The Department said employees. The regulations explain provided in§ 548.305(c), (d), and (f) agrees with the Chamber that the proper this authorization is based on "the with updated dollar amounts, and to fix measure of whether these additional Administrator's experience that the a typographical error in§ 548.305(e) by payments may be excluded from the amount of additional overtime changing the phrase "would not basic rate calculation should be based compensation involved in such cases is exceed" to "would exceed." The on the higher state or local minimum trivial and does not justify the Department specifically invited wage. While the Chamber did not bookkeeping required in computing comment as to (1) whether the specifically reference local minimum it." 273 This remains true today. While additional payments that are excludable wage laws, the rationale for including there may be tension between section if they would not increase total overtime state laws setting a higher minimum 3(m) and the part 548 authorized basic compensation should be tied to a wage is equally applicable to local laws rate regulations with regards to percentage of the applicable minimum setting a minimum wage higher than the exclusion of meals from overtime wage under the FLSA, or a percentage FLSA minimum wage. Therefore, the calculations upon agreement of the of the applicable minimum wage under final rule references the minimum wage employer and employees, part 531 is state or Federal law; and (2) whether 40 under either the FLSA or state or local outside the scope of this rulemaking and percent of the applicable minimum law applicable in the jurisdiction in thus no changes will be made at this wage is an appropriate threshold, or if which the employee is employed, time. this proposed percentage should be whichever is higher. The Department increased or decreased. continues to believe that 40 percent of IV. Paperwork Reduction Act A few commenters addressed these the applicable minimum wage, the ratio The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 basic rate proposals. See Chamber; that the Department has historically (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., and its PPWO; SHRM; NPELRA. The Chamber used for this regulation, is the proper attendant regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, noted with approval that the proposal threshold for exclusion of incidental require the Department to consider the modernized certain aspects of this payments from the basic rate and agency's need for its information regulation while "hewing closely to the therefore declines to adopt the collections and their practical utility, Department's historical approach." It suggestion to raise the amount to ten the impact of paperwork and other also commented that the proposal to use dollars or more per week. The information collection burdens imposed a percentage of the applicable minimum Department also declines to modify wage rather than a fixed dollar amount these regulations to account for the 531.32 (noting examples of meals furnished under "makes sense." While generally certain circumstances are wages under section partial overtime exemption for 3(m)); 29 CFR 778.116 ("Where payments are made supportive of the proposal to update employees engaged in law enforcement to employees in the form of goods or facilities this regulation, PPWO and SHRM and fire protection because such a which are regarded as part of wages, the reasonable commented that the 40 percent amount request is outside of the scope of the cost to the employer or the fair value of such goods was too low and suggested that the Department's proposal. or of furnishing such facilities must be included in the regular rate.""); 29 CFR 778.224 ("It is clear that amount be raised to ten dollars or more Several commenters asked the the [other similar payments] clause was not per week. In response to the Department for clearer guidance intended to permit the exclusion from the regular Department's question regarding tying regarding treatment of furnished meals rate of payments such as . . . the furnishing of the percentage of the applicable under the regular rate. See PPWO; HR facilities like board and lodging which, though not directly attributable to any particular hours of work minimum wage under the FLSA or Policy Association; Chamber. While the are, nevertheless, clearly understood to be under state or Federal law, the Chamber cost of meals provided by an employer compensation for services.""). suggested that the final rule reference must be included in the regular rate, 269 270 See 29 CFR 548.3(d), 548.304. 271 29 CFR 548.3(d); 29 CFR 548.304. 267 See 20 FR 5679. 269 See 29 U.S.C. 203(m) (defining wage to 272 29 CFR 531.32; 29 CFR 778.116. 268 See 31 FR 4149 (Mar. 9, 1966); 31 FR 6769. include, among other things, "board""); 29 CFR 27 3 29 CFR 548.304(b). DOLAR0938 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 30 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68765 on the public, and how to minimize B. Economic Analysis benefits that may be excluded from an those burdens. This final rule does not This economic analysis provides a employee's regular rate of pay as "other require a collection of information quantitative analysis ofregulatory similar payments"; subject to approval by the Office of familiarization costs attributable to the • Clarification in§ 778.215 of the Management and Budget (0MB) under types of benefit plans that are final rule and a qualitative analysis of excludable as "similar benefits for the PRA, or affect any existing other potential benefits, cost savings, collections of information. The employees" under section 7(e)(4) and and transfers. This includes a other additions; Department did not receive any discussion of benefits resulting from • Clarification in§§ 778.202, 778.203, comments on this determination. reduced litigation. As described above, 778.205, and 778.207 that employers do this rule clarifies existing regulations for not need a prior contract or agreement V. Executive Order 12866, Regulatory employees and employers in the 21st- with the employee(s) to exclude certain Planning and Review; and Executive century workplace with modern forms Order 13563, Improved Regulation and overtime premiums described in of compensation and benefits. The sections 7(e)(5) and (6) of the FLSA; Regulatory Review Department believes that these updates • Clarification and examples in A. Introduction will provide clarity and flexibility for § 778.211 of discretionary bonuses that employers interested in providing such are excludable from an employee's Under E.O. 12866, OMB's Office of benefits to their employees. regular rate of pay under section 7(e)(3) Information and Regulatory Affairs of the FLSA; 1. Overview of Changes (OIRA) determines whether a regulatory • Adoption of the interpretation that action is significant and, therefore, This final rule makes several changes some longevity and sign-on bonuses, subject to the requirements of the E.O. to the existing regulatory language in 29 when certain requirements are met, and 0MB review. 274 Section 3(f) ofE.O. CFR part 778 to update and clarify the qualify as gifts under§ 778.212 and may 12866 defines a "significant regulatory FLSA's regular rate requirements, and be excludable from the regular rate; action" as an action that is likely to makes a change to 29 CFR part 548 • Clarification in § 778.1 that the result in a rule that: (1) Has an annual addressing a "basic rate" that can be examples of compensation discussed in effect on the economy of $100 million used to calculate overtime part 778 of the types of excludable or more, or adversely affects in a compensation under section 7(g)(3) of payments under section 7(e)(1)-(8) are material way a sector of the economy, the FLSA when specific conditions are not exhaustive; and met. Specifically, this final rule • An increase from $0.50 to a weekly productivity, competition, jobs, the includes the following: amount equivalent to 40 percent of the environment, public health or safety, or • Clarification in§ 778.219 that applicable hourly minimum wage under state, local, or tribal governments or payments for unused paid leave, the FLSA (currently $2.90, or 40 percent communities (also referred to as including paid sick leave, may be of $7.25) or the state or local law economically significant); (2) creates excluded from an employee's regular applicable in the jurisdiction in which serious inconsistency or otherwise rate of pay; the employee is employed, whichever is interferes with an action taken or • Clarification in§§ 778.218(b) and higher, the amount by which total planned by another agency; (3) 778.320 that pay for time that would not compensation would not be affected by materially alters the budgetary impacts otherwise qualify as "hours worked," the exclusion of certain additional of entitlement grants, user fees, or loan including bona fide meal periods, may payments when using the "basic rate" to programs, or the rights and obligations be excluded from an employee's regular compute overtime provided by of recipients thereof; or (4) raises novel rate unless an agreement or established § 548.3(e). legal or policy issues arising out of legal practice indicates that the parties have To measure potential costs, cost mandates, the President's priorities, or treated the time as hours worked; savings, benefits, and transfers relative the principles set forth in the E.O. OIRA • Clarification in§ 778.217 that to a baseline of current practice, the has determined that this rule is reimbursed expenses need not be Department has attempted to significant under section 3(f) of E.O. incurred "solely" for the employer's distinguish between specific 12866. benefit for the reimbursements to be components that will change existing E.O. 13563 directs agencies to propose excludable from an employee's regular requirements, and those that will merely or adopt a regulation only upon a rate; clarify existing requirements. Here, the reasoned determination that its benefits • Clarification in§ 778.217 that Department believes that only two of the certain reimbursements are per se components listed above constitute justify its costs; that it is tailored to reasonable and excludable from the changes to existing regulatory impose the least burden on society, requirements: (1) Increasing the regular rate; consistent with achieving the regulatory • Elimination of the restriction in threshold for exclusion of certain objectives; and that, in choosing among §§ 778.221 and 778.222 that "call-back" payments when using the "basic rate" to alternative regulatory approaches, the pay and other payments similar to call- compute overtime under§ 548.3(e), agency has selected the approaches that back pay must be "infrequent and from $0.50 to a weekly amount maximize net benefits. E.O. 13563 sporadic" to be excludable from an equivalent to 40 percent of the hourly recognizes that some benefits are employee's regular rate, while minimum wage under the FLSA difficult to quantify and provides that, maintaining that such payments must (currently $2.90, or 40 percent of $7.25) when appropriate and permitted by law, not be prearranged; or the state or local law applicable in agencies may consider and discuss • Addition of regulatory text in the jurisdiction in which the employee qualitatively values that are difficult or §§ 778.220, 778.222, and 778.223 is employed, whichever is higher; and impossible to quantify, including addressing exclusion from the regular (2) eliminating the restriction in equity, human dignity, fairness, and rate of payments to employees pursuant §§ 778.221 and 778.222 that call-back distributive impacts. to state and local scheduling laws; pay and similar payments must be • Inclusion of additional examples in "infrequent and sporadic" to be 274 See 58 FR 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). § 778.224 of employer provided perks or excludable from the regular rate, while DOLAR0939 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 31 of 194 68766 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations maintaining that such payments must specialty treatment, and so forth) and insurance and retirement benefits, as not be prearranged. Both of these are typically exempt from legislation well as overhead costs such as rent, changes are deregulatory in nature. mandating paid sick leave or utilities, and office equipment. The The Department believes that all of scheduling-related premium pay. 279 Department used a fringe benefits rate of the remaining changes clarify existing Thus, the Department believes that 46 percent of the base rate and an requirements. Thus, none of the changes firms with fewer than five employees overhead rate of 17 percent of the base in this final rule will impose any new are unlikely to review this final rule. For rate, resulting in a fully loaded hourly regulatory requirements, or require any the purposes of estimating compensation rate for Compensation, regulated entity (i.e., any employer) to familiarization costs across all firms, the Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists of change its conduct to remain in Department believes that the 2,289,502 $53.22 (= $32.65 + ($32.65 X 46%) + compliance with the law. firms with five or more employees- ($32.65 x 17%)). 281 The Department 2. Potential Costs approximately 38 percent of all 6.0 notes that employers have compliance million firms-represent a reasonable responsibilities under existing regular The only potential costs attributable proxy estimate of the total number of rate standards, and any changes in to this final rule are regulatory interested firms expected to dedicate responsibilities associated with this familiarization costs. Familiarization time learning about the final rule. final rule may, therefore, be absorbed by costs represent direct costs to businesses Next, the Department estimated the existing staff. Consistent with other associated with reviewing any changes time interested firms will likely take to WHD rulemakings, the Department has to regulatory requirements caused by a review the rule. Because the majority of used a 17 percent overhead rate in this final rule. Familiarization costs do not the changes are merely clarifications of calculation. include recurring compliance costs that existing regulatory requirements, the Therefore, regulatory familiarization regulated entities would incur with or Department estimates that it will take an costs in Year 1 for interested firms are without a rulemaking. 275 The average of approximately 15 minutes for estimated to be $30,461,538 (= Department calculated regulatory each interested firm to review and 2,289,502 firms x 0.25 hours of review familiarization costs by multiplying the understand the changes in the rule. time x $53.22 per hour), which amounts estimated number of firms likely to Some firms might spend more than 15 to a 10-year annualized cost of review the final rule by the estimated minutes reviewing the final rule, while $3,571,022 at a discount rate of 3 time to review the rule and the average others might take less time; the percent (which is $1.56 per firm) or hourly compensation of a Department believes that 15 minutes is $4,337,038 at a discount rate of 7 Compensation, Benefits, and Job a reasonable estimated average for all percent (which is $1.89 per firm). Analysis Specialist. interested firms. This final rule will not impose any To calculate the cost associated with Finally, the Department estimated the new requirements on employers or reviewing the rule, the Department first hourly compensation of the employees require any affirmative measures for estimated the number of firms likely to who will likely review the final rule. regulated entities to come into review the final rule. 276 According to The Department assumes that a compliance; therefore, there are no other the data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Compensation, Benefits, and Job costs attributable to this final rule. Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), Analysis Specialist (Standard there are a total of 5,954,684 firms in the Occupation Classification 13-1141), or 3. Potential Cost Savings United States. 277 The SUSB data shows an employee of similar status and The Department believes that this that 3,665,182 firms have four or fewer comparable pay, will review the rule at final rule could lead to potential cost employees. 278 These small-sized firms each firm. The mean hourly wage of a savings. The clarifications and updated are less likely than larger firms to offer Compensation, Benefits, and Job examples included in this final rule may perks or benefits similar to those Analysis Specialist is $32.65. 280 The reduce the amount of time employers addressed in this rulemaking (e.g., Department adjusted this base wage rate spend attempting to understand their wellness programs, on-site medical or to reflect fringe benefits such as health obligations under the law. For example, employers interested in providing an 275 For example, time and resources spent on an 279 For example, none of the predictable employee discount program, a wellness annual basis to train staff on FLSA compliance are scheduling ordinances passed in Chicago, New program, or onsite exercise not familiarization costs attributable to any particular rulemaking, because an employer incurs York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle opportunities will know immediately apply to employers with fewer than 20 employees. these kinds of recurring costs regardless of whether See, e.g .. Chi., Ill., Fair Workweek Ordinance (July from the language included in§ 778.224 specific parts of the regulations have been recently 24, 2019) (effective July 1, 2020); N.Y.C., N.Y., that the cost of providing such programs amended. To the extent that this rule would make Admin. Code 20-1222 (2017) (applying to retail may be excluded from the regular rate, certain regulatory requirements easier to understand, the rule may achieve a reduction in employers with at least 20 employees and fast food thereby avoiding the need for further employers with at least 30 affiliated enterprise or these recurring compliance costs. franchise establishments); Phila., Pa., Code ch. 9- research on the issue. In addition, the 276 The Department assumes that familiarization 4600 (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); S.F., Cal., Police two updates that constitute changes to for this rulemaking will generally occur at the Code art. 33G, 3300G.3 (2015) (applying to retail the regulations will also achieve cost headquarters of each interested firm, rather than at employers with at least 20 employees); Seattle, savings. For example, the Department the establishment level. According to a recent Wash., Mun. Code 14.22.050 (2017) (applying to survey, just eight percent of surveyed employers retail, food service, and full-service restaurant expects that the changes to the basic rate reported that their benefits are administered locally employers with at least 500 employees). Similar regulations will permit employers that at different "locations."" See Soc"y for Human Res. coverage thresholds apply to employers under state use a basic rate plan to give employees Mgmt., 2017 Employee Benefits: Remaining paid sick leave laws in Maryland (15 employees), additional incidental payments without Competitive in a Challenging Talent Marketplace, Oregon (10 employees with smaller employers https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and- required to provide equivalent unpaid sick leave), concern about the impact on their forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/ and Rhode Island (18 employees with smaller overtime obligations. Increasing the 2017%20Employee %20Benefits%20Report.pdf. employers required to provide equivalent unpaid amount by which total compensation 277 U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 Statistics of U.S. sick leave). See Md. Code, Labor & Emp"t sec. 3- would not be affected by the exclusion Businesses (SUSB) Annual Data Tables by 1304 (West 2019); Or. Rev. Stat. sec. 653.606; R.I. Establishment Industry, https://www.census.gov/ Gen. Laws sec. 28-57-4(c). of certain additional payments when data/tables/2016 I econ/su sb/2016-su sb- 280 Estimate based on the BLS"s May 2018 using the "basic rate" to compute ann u al.html. Occupational Employment Statistics, https:// 273 Id. www.bls.gov/oes/current/oesl 31141.htm. 281 Rounded to the nearest whole cent. DOLAR0940 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 32 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68767 overtime will both eliminate avoidable (including annual flu vaccinations), stemming from avoidable workplace litigation and expand the circumstances nutrition classes, weight loss programs, disputes. Due to uncertainty regarding in which employers that meet the smoking cessation programs, stress the costs and prevalence ofFLSA- requirements to use a basic rate may reduction programs, exercise programs, related settlement agreements, exclude "certain incidental payments and coaching to help employees meet arbitration actions, and state court which have a trivial effect on the health goals" to the list of miscellaneous filings, the Department has only overtime compensation due." payments excludable from the regular estimated cost savings attributable to an The Department expects that these rate provided in§ 778.224(b). If expected reduction in Federal FLSA cost savings will outweigh regulatory employers know they can offer wellness regular rate lawsuits-which may familiarization costs. Unlike programs without the threat of represent only a fraction of all regular familiarization costs, the potential cost potentially protracted class or collective rate litigation. savings described in this section will action litigation and without potentially To estimate the number of Federal continue into the future, saving having to track employee participation lawsuits that the final rule may prevent, employers valuable time and resources. in these activities for purposes of the Department first attempted to The Department is unable to provide calculating the regular rate, employers determine the percentage of FLSA quantitative estimates for cost savings might feel more encouraged to offer lawsuits that predominantly or and other potential effects of the final such programs. An increase in the exclusively feature a "regular rate" rule due to a lack of data and provision of wellness programs similar dispute. Here, the Department studied uncertainty regarding employer to those described in this rule (e.g., two sets of data. First, the Department responses to the changes. Employers are smoking cessation programs, vaccine examined a randomly selected sample not generally required to report to the clinics, and so forth) may improve of Federal FLSA court filings from 2014 Department their use of these regulatory worker health and reduce healthcare taken from the U.S. Court's Public provisions, and to the Department's costs. 282 Such improvements benefit Access to Court Electronic Records knowledge, there is no publicly both the worker and the employer with (PACER). After reviewing each of the available data on items such as added value to each. 500 FLSA cases in this sample for employers' use of basic rate calculations The final rule will also provide relevant information, the Department to calculate overtime due. employers greater flexibility and found that 6.8 percent of the cases (34 The Department is unable to provide incentivizes greater creativity in their out of 500) primarily featured a regular quantitative estimates for other potential employee-benefits practices. This room rate dispute. 283 To corroborate the effects of the final rule due to a lack of to innovate may help workers and PACER data, the Department separately data and uncertainty regarding increase retention and productivity by reviewed a sample of 258 Federal court employer responses. The Department allowing employers the chance to decisions from 2017 involving FLSA did not receive any public comments provide unique benefits that their collective action certification claims, 284 providing data or information to employees want and that improve and found that 3.9 percent of these cases quantify cost savings. workers' physical and mental health, primarily centered around a regular rate 4. Potential Benefits work environment, and morale. As dispute (10 out of 258). Considering noted earlier in this final rule, the these two different percentages, the This section analyzes the potential Department cannot feasibly list every Department takes an approximate benefits of the rule. The Department is permissible benefit that employers may average and conservatively assumes that unable to provide quantitative estimates provide employers, and employers may approximately five percent of all FLSA for these potential benefits due to a lack create new and desirable benefits in the cases primarily or exclusively involve a of data and uncertainty regarding future. But the Department believes that regular rate dispute. potential employer responses to the the changes made here will foster that According to the Transactional final rule. The Department does not innovation. Records Access Clearinghouse, 25,605 know, for example, how many In addition, the Department believes Federal FLSA lawsuits were filed in employers will begin offering wellness that clarifying the regulations will Fiscal Years 2015, 2016, and 2017, programs or other benefits to their prevent many avoidable "regular rate" averaging 8,535 lawsuits per year. 285 employees as a result of this rule. The disputes. For example, the omission of Assuming there are approximately 8,535 Department did not receive any public unused sick leave in the current version FLSA lawsuits per year, the Department comments providing data or information of§ 778.219 could be responsible for estimates that about 427 cases, or 5 to quantify benefits. disputes over whether payments for percent of 8,535, primarily or Distinct from the potential cost unused sick leave should be included in exclusively involve a regular rate savings described above, the rule will the regular rate. Although the likely yield benefits. The Department Department's amendment to§ 778.219 283 The Department downloaded data on 521 expects that the added clarity that this simply reflects the Department's current cases; however, 21 of these provided no information rule provides will encourage some guidance, the added clarity provided by because they were administratively closed, employers to start providing benefits voluntarily dismissed, closed due to deficiencies, or changing the text of the regulations a notice of removal was filed. This left a sample of that they may presently refrain from might prevent future expenses 500 usable cases. providing due to apprehension about 284 Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 14th Annual Workplace potential overtime consequences. These 282 According to a recent survey, 88 percent of Class Action Litigation Report 127-270 (2018), newly provided benefits might have a employers with a wellness program rated their https://www.seyfarth.com/dir_ docs/publications/ initiatives as somewhat or very effective in 2018_workplace_ class_ action _report.pdf. positive impact on workplace morale, improving employee health, while 77 percent 285 TRAC at Syracuse University uses the employee health, employee indicated their wellness program was somewhat or Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain data compensation, and employee retention. very effective in reducing health care costs. See Soc. about government enforcement and regulatory For example, the Department has for Human Res. Mgmt., 2017 Employee Benefits: activities. According to TRAC Reports, the added "the cost to the employer of Remaining Competitive in a Challenging Talent following numbers of FLSA lawsuits were filed in Marketplace, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/ Fiscal Years 2015, 2016, and 2017: 8917, 8830, and providing wellness programs, such as trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys! 7858. See TRAC Reports, Fair Labor Standards Act health risk assessments, biometric Documents/ Lawsuits Down from 2015 Peak (2018), http:!I screenings, vaccination clinics 2017%20Employee%20Benefits%20Report.pdf. trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/498/. DOLAR0941 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 33 of 194 68768 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations dispute. Given data limitations, if the court and thus were not captured by a substantial number of small entities. Department assumes for purposes of this PACER; some FLSA regular rate matters The Department believes that this final analysis that this final rule will prevent are resolved before litigation or by rule will achieve long-term cost savings approximately 10 percent of FLSA cases alternative dispute resolution; and some that outweigh initial regulatory primarily or exclusively featuring a attorneys representing FLSA regular rate familiarization costs. 291 For example, regular rate dispute then this rule will plaintiffs may take a contingency fee the Department believes that removing prevent approximately 43 FLSA regular atop their statutorily awarded fees and ambiguous language and adding rate lawsuits per year. 28 6 costs. updated examples to the FLSA's regular To quantify the expected reduction in rate regulations should reduce FLSA lawsuits, the Department must 5. Potential Transfers compliance costs and litigation risks estimate the average cost of an FLSA Transfer payments occur when that small business entities would lawsuit. Here, the Department examined income is redistributed from one party otherwise continue to bear. a selection of 56 FLSA cases concluded to another. The Department has The Department received one between 2012 and 2015 that contained identified two possible transfer comment from a private citizen litigation cost information. 287 To payments between employers and pertaining to the economic analysis. The calculate average litigation costs employees that could occur due to this commenter suggested that the regulation associated with these cases, the final rule, flowing in opposite may negatively impact job growth by Department first examined records of directions. On the one hand, income making it difficult for small or new court filings in the Westlaw Case might transfer from employers to employers to attract and retain talent in Evaluator tool and on PACER to employees if some employers respond a competitive labor market. The ascertain how much plaintiffs in these to the new clarity that particular commenter therefore requested the cases received for attorney fees, benefits are excludable from the regular Department limit the scope of the administrative fees, and/or other costs, rate calculation by newly providing regulation to apply only to certain apart from any monetary damages certain payments or benefits they did businesses. The Department notes that attributable to the alleged FLSA not previously provide. On the other the final rule is intended to provide violations. (The FLSA provides for hand, income might transfer from clarity and promote compliance with successful plaintiffs to be awarded employees to employers if some the Act and encourage employers to reasonable attorney's fees and costs, so employers respond to this rule's new provide additional innovative benefits this data is available in some FLSA clarity that a particular benefit currently without fear of costly litigation. Further, cases.) After determining the plaintiffs provided is excludable from the regular the Act generally requires that covered, total litigation costs for each case, the rate calculation by newly excluding nonexempt employees receive overtime Department then doubled the figures to certain payments from their employees' pay of at least one and one-half times account for litigation costs that the regular rates without changing any other their regular rate of pay for time worked defendant employers incurred. 288 compensation practices. As discussed in excess of 40 hours per week. According to this analysis, the average above, the Department is unable to Coverage criteria of the Act are litigation cost for FLSA cases concluded quantify an estimated net transfer designated by statute, and therefore between 2012 and 2015 was $654,182 amount to employers or employees due outside of the scope of this rulemaking. per case. 289 Applying this figure to to a lack of data on the kinds of In accordance with the Regulatory approximately 43 Federal regular rate payments employers presently provide, Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (as cases that this final rule could prevent, and the inherent uncertainty in amended), WHD examined the the Department estimated that avoided predicting how employers will respond regulatory requirements of the rule to litigation costs resulting from the rule to this rule. determine if they will have a significant will total approximately $28.1 million economic impact on a substantial Summary number of small entities. The final rule per year. Once again, the Department believes this total may underestimate The Department estimates that this is expected to add no regulatory burden total litigation costs because some FLSA rule will result in one-time regulatory for employers, whether large or small. regular rate cases are heard in state familiarization costs of $30.5 million, Accordingly, the Agency certifies that which will result in a 10-year the final rule will not have a significant 286 The Department rounds up to 43 cases for annualized cost of $3,571,022 at a economic impact on a substantial purpose of estimating (10 percent of 427 cases discount rate of 3 percent or $4,337,038 number of small entities. The factual equals 42.7 cases). at a discount rate of 7 percent. basis for this certification is described in 287 The 56 cases used for this analysis were This final rule is an Executive Order the following paragraph. retrieved from Westlaw"s Case Evaluator database As discussed above, the Department using a keyword search for case summaries between (E.O.) 13771 deregulatory action. 2012 and 2015 mentioning the terms "FLSA"" and Although benefits and cost savings used data from the U.S. Census Bureau's "fees."" Although the initial search yielded 64 could not be quantified, they are Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) to responsive cases, the Department excluded one expected to exceed costs. In perpetuity, calculate the number of firms likely to duplicate case, one case resolving litigation costs through a confidential settlement agreement, and the annualized costs are estimated to be review the final rule. The SUSB data six cases where the defendant employer(s) $913,846 using a 3 percent discount rate show that there are 5,954,684 firms in ultimately prevailed. Because the FLSA only and $2,132,308 using a 7 percent the U.S., 3,665,182 of which have four entitles prevailing plaintiffs to litigation cost discount rate. or fewer employees. 292 Also, as awards, information about litigation costs was only available for the remaining 56 FLSA cases that VI. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 291 This rule does not impose any new ended in settlement agreements or court verdicts requirements on employers or require any favoring the plaintiff employees. In accordance with the Regulatory affirmative measures for regulated entities to come 288 This is likely a conservative approach to Flexibility Act, 290 the Department into compliance. Therefore, there are no other costs estimate the total litigation costs for each FLSA examined the regulatory requirements of attributable to this deregulatory rule. lawsuit, as defendant employers tend to incur 292 U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 Statistics of U.S. greater litigation costs than plaintiff employees the rule to determine whether they will Businesses (SUSB) Annual Data Tables by because of, among other things, typically higher have a significant economic impact on Establishment Industry, https://www.census.gov/ discovery costs. data/tables/2016 I econ/su sb/2016-su sb- 289 The median cost was $111,835 per lawsuit. 290 See 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (as amended). ann u al.html. DOLAR0942 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 34 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68769 discussed above, the Department Order 13132 regarding federalism and which, if included in the computation believes that firms with fewer than five determined that it does not have of overtime under the Act, would not employees are unlikely to review this federalism implications. The final rule increase the total compensation of the rule, because these small-sized firms are would not have substantial direct effects employee by more than 40 percent of less likely than larger firms to offer on the States, on the relationship the applicable hourly minimum wage perks or benefits similar to those between the National Government and under either section 6(a) of the Act or addressed in this rulemaking (e.g., the States, or on the distribution of the state or local law applicable in the wellness programs, on-site medical or power and responsibilities among the jurisdiction in which the employee is specialty treatment, and so forth) and various levels of government. employed, whichever is higher, per are typically exempt from legislation week on the average for all overtime mandating paid sick leave or IX. Executive Order 13175, Indian weeks (in excess of the number of hours scheduling-related premium pay. 293 Tribal Governments applicable under section 7(a) of the Act) Familiarization costs will therefore be This final rule would not have in the period for which such additional zero for small businesses with fewer substantial direct effects on one or more payments are made. than five employees. The Department Indian tribes, on the relationship * * * * * estimated familiarization costs across all between the Federal Government and ■ 4. Amend§ 548.305 by revising 2,289,502 firms with five or more Indian tribes, or on the distribution of employees, and found that the estimated paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) to power and responsibilities between the annualized familiarization cost per firm Federal Government and Indian tribes. read as follows: is $1.56 annually over ten years at a § 548.305 Excluding certain additions to discount rate of 3 percent and $1.89 List of Subjects in 29 CFR Parts 548 and wages. annually at a discount rate of 7 percent. 778 (a) See§ 548.3(e) for authorized This comprises less than 0.002 percent Wages. established basic rates. of gross annual revenues for a small Signed at Washington, DC, this 2nd day of * * * * * business earning $100,000 per year. December, 2019. (c) The exclusion of one or more VII. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Cheryl M. Stanton, additional payments under§ 548.3(e) Analysis Administrator, Wage and Hour Division. must not affect the overtime The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act For the reasons set out in the compensation of the employee by more of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. 1532, requires preamble, the Department of Labor than 40 percent of the applicable hourly that agencies prepare a written amends title 29 of the Code of Federal minimum wage under either section 6(a) statement, which includes an Regulations parts 548 and 778 as of the Act or the state or local law assessment of anticipated costs and follows: applicable in the jurisdiction in which benefits, for any Federal mandate that the employee is employed, whichever is may result in excess of $100 million PART 548-AUTHORIZATION OF higher, per week on the average for the (adjusted annually for inflation) in ESTABLISHED BASIC RATES FOR overtime weeks. expenditures in any one year by state, COMPUTING OVERTIME PAY (1) Example. An employee, who local, and tribal governments in the normally would come within the 40- ■ 1. The authority citation for part 548 hour provision of section 7(a) of the Act, aggregate, or by the private sector. While this rulemaking would affect employers continues to read as follows: is paid a cost-of-living bonus of $1300 in the public and private sectors, it is Authority: Sec. 7. 52 Stat. 1063, as each calendar quarter, or $100 per week. not expected to result in expenditures amended; 29 U.S.C. 207, unless otherwise The employee works overtime in only 2 greater than $100 million in any one noted. weeks in the 13-week period, and in year. Please see Section V for an ■ 2. Amend§ 548.1 by revising the first each of these overtime weeks he works assessment of anticipated costs and sentence to read as follows: 50 hours. He is therefore entitled to $10 benefits to the private sector. as overtime compensation on the bonus § 548.1 Scope and effect of regulations. for each week in which overtime was VIII. Executive Order 13132, The regulations for computing worked (i.e., $100 bonus divided by 50 Federalism overtime pay under sections 7(g)(1) and hours equals $2 an hour; 10 overtime The Department has reviewed this 7(g)(2) of the Fair Labor Standards Act hours, times one-half, times $2 an hour, final rule in accordance with Executive of 1938, as amended ("the Act" or equals $10 per week). Forty percent of "FLSA"), for employees paid on the the minimum wage of $7.25 is $2.90 293 For example, none of the predictable basis of a piece rate, or at a variety of (this example assumes the employee scheduling ordinances passed in New York City, hourly rates or piece rates, or a works in a state or locality that does not San Francisco, and Seattle apply to employers with fewer than 20 employees. See, e.g .. S.F., Cal., Police combination thereof, are set forth in have a minimum wage that is higher Code art. 33G, 3300G.3 (2015) (applying to retail §§ 778.415 through 778.421. * * * than the minimum wage under the employers with at least 20 employees); N.Y.C., N.Y., ■ 3. Amend§ 548.3 by revising FLSA). Since the overtime on the bonus Admin. Code 20-1222 (2017) (applying to retail is more than $2.90 on the average for the employers with at least 20 employees and fast food paragraph (e) and removing the employers with at least 30 affiliated enterprise or parenthetical authority citation at the 2 overtime weeks, this cost-of-living franchise establishments); Seattle, Wash., Mun. end of the section to read as follows: bonus would be included in the Code ch. 14.22.050 (2017) (applying to retail, food overtime computation under§ 548.3(e). service, and full-service restaurant employers with § 548.3 Authorized basic rates. (2) [Reserved] at least 500 employees). See also. e.g .. Md. Code, Labor & Emp"t sec. 3-1304 (West 2019) (coverage * * * * * (d) It is not always necessary to make threshold of 15 employees); Or. Rev. Stat. sec. (e) The rate or rates (not less than the elaborate computations to determine 653.606 (coverage threshold of 10 employees with rates required by section 6(a) and (b) of whether the effect of the exclusion of a smaller employers required to provide equivalent the Act) which may be used under the bonus or other incidental payment on unpaid sick leave); R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 28-57-4(c) (coverage threshold of 18 employees with smaller Act to compute overtime compensation the employee's total compensation will employers required to provide equivalent unpaid of the employee but excluding exceed 40 percent of the applicable sick leave). additional payments in cash or in kind hourly minimum wage under either DOLAR0943 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 35 of 194 68770 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations section 6(a) of the Act or the state or employee's total compensation would (b) Prior approval of the local law applicable in the jurisdiction exceed 40 percent of the applicable Administrator is also required if the in which the employee is employed, minimum wage under either section 6(a) employer desires to use a basic rate or whichever is higher, per week on the of the Act or the state or local law basic rates which come within the scope average. Frequently the addition to applicable in the jurisdiction in which of a combination of two or more of the regular wages is so small or the number the employee is employed, whichever is paragraphs in§ 548.3 unless the basic of overtime hours is so limited that higher, per week on the average, then rate or rates sought to be adopted meet under any conceivable circumstances additional overtime compensation must the requirements of a single paragraph exclusion of the additional payments be paid on the bonus. (See § 778.209 of in§ 548.3. For instance, an employee from the rate used to compute the this chapter, for an explanation of how may receive free lunches, the cost of employee's overtime compensation to compute overtime on the bonus). which, by agreement or understanding, would not affect the employee's total (f) In order to determine whether the is not to be included in the rate used to earnings by more than 40 percent of the exclusion of a bonus or other incidental compute overtime compensation. 17 In applicable hourly minimum wage under payment would affect the total addition, the employee may receive an either section 6(a) of the Act or the state compensation of the employee by not attendance bonus which, by agreement or local law applicable in the more than 40 percent of the applicable or understanding, is to be excluded from jurisdiction in which the employee is hourly minimum wage under either the rate used to compute overtime employed, whichever is higher, per section 6(a) of the Act or the state or compensation. 18 Since these exclusions week. The determination that this is so local law applicable in the jurisdiction involve two paragraphs of§ 548.3, prior may be made by inspection of the in which the employee is employed, approval of the Administrator would be payroll records or knowledge of the whichever is higher, per week on the necessary unless the exclusion of the normal working hours. average, a comparison is made between cost of the free lunches together with (1) Example. An employer has a his total compensation computed under the attendance bonus do not affect the policy of giving employees who have a the employment agreement and his total employee's overtime compensation by perfect attendance record during a 4- compensation computed in accordance more than 40 percent of the applicable week period a bonus of $50. The with the applicable overtime provisions hourly minimum wage under either employee never works more than 50 of the Act. section 6(a) of the Act or the state or hours a week. Exclusion of this (1) Example. An employee, who local law applicable in the jurisdiction attendance bonus from the rate of pay normally would come within the 40- in which the employee is employed, used to compute overtime compensation hour provision of section 7(a) of the Act, whichever is higher, per week on the could not affect the employee's total is paid at piece rates and at one and one- average, in which case the employer and earnings by more than $2.90 per week half times the applicable piece rates for the employee may treat the situation as (i.e., 40 percent of the minimum wage work performed during hours in excess one falling within§ 548.3(e). of $7.25, assuming the employee works of 40 in the workweek. The employee is 17 See§ 548.304. in a state or locality that does not have also paid a bonus, which when 10 See § 548.305. a minimum wage that is higher than the apportioned over the bonus period, minimum wage under the FLSA). 14 PART 778-OVERTIME amounts to $10 a week. He never works COMPENSATION 14 For a 50-hour week, an employee's more than 50 hours a week. The piece bonus would have to exceed $29 a week to rates could be established as basic rates ■ 6. The authority citation for part 778 affect his overtime compensation by more under the employment agreement and continues to read as follows: than $2.90 (i.e., 40 percent of the minimum no additional overtime compensation wage of $7.25). ($30 + 50 hours worked x 10 Authority: 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 paid on the bonus. The employee's total U.S.C. 201 et seq. Section 778.200 also issued overtime hours x 0.5). compensation computed in accordance under Pub. L. 106-202, 114 Stat. 308 (29 (2) [Reserved] with the applicable overtime provision U.S.C. 207(e) and (h)). (e) There are many situations in of the Act, section 7(g)(1) 15 would be ■ 7. Revise§ 778.1 to read as follows: which the employer and employee affected by not more than $1 in any cannot predict with any degree of week by not paying overtime § 778.1 Introductory statement. certainty the amount of bonus to be paid compensation on the bonus. 16 (a) This part contains the Department at the end of the bonus period. They 15 Section 7(g)(1) of the Act provides that of Labor's general interpretations with may not be able to anticipate with any overtime compensation may be paid at one respect to the meaning and application degree of certainty the number of hours and one-half times the applicable piece rate of the maximum hours and overtime an employee might work each week but extra overtime compensation must be pay requirements contained in section 7 during the bonus period. In such properly computed and paid on additional of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, situations, the employer and employee pay required to be included in computing the as amended ("the Act" or "FLSA"). The may agree prior to the performance of regular rate. Administrator of the Wage and Hour 16 Bonus of $10 divided by fifty hours the work that a bonus will be equals 20 cents an hour. Half of this hourly Division will use these interpretations disregarded in the computation of rate multiplied by ten overtime hours equals to guide the performance of his or her overtime pay if the employee's total $1. duties under the Act, and intends the earnings are not affected by more than interpretations to be used by employers, 40 percent of the applicable hourly (2) [Reserved] employees, and courts to understand minimum wage under either section 6(a) * * * * * employers' obligations and employees' of the Act or the state or local law ■ 5. Amend§ 548.400 by revising rights under the Act. These official applicable in the jurisdiction in which paragraph (b) and removing the interpretations are issued by the the employee is employed, whichever is parenthetical authority citation at the Administrator on the advice of the higher, per week on the average for all end of the section to read as follows: Solicitor of Labor, as authorized by the overtime weeks during the bonus Secretary (Reorg. Pl. 6 of 1950, 64 Stat. period. Ifit turns out at the end of the §548.400 Procedures. 1263; Gen. Ord. 45A, published in the bonus period that the effect on the * * * * * Federal Register on May 24, 1950). DOLAR0944 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 36 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68771 (b) The Department recognizes that permissible (but not required) to count 7(h), extra premium compensation paid compensation practices can vary these hours as hours worked in for work on the sixth or seventh day significantly and will continue to evolve determining the amount of overtime worked in the workweek (where the in the future. The Department also premium pay, due for hours in excess of workweek schedule is reflected in an recognizes that it is not feasible to 8 per day or the applicable maximum agreement or by established practice) is address all of the various compensation hours standard, which may be excluded regarded in the same light as premiums and benefits arrangements that may from the regular rate and credited paid for work in excess of the applicable exist between employers and toward the statutory overtime maximum hours standard or the employees, both currently and in the compensation. employee's normal or regular future. In general, the FLSA does not (b) Hours in excess of normal or workweek. restrict the forms of "remuneration" that regular working hours. Similarly, where ■ 9. Amend§ 778.203 by revising an employer may pay-which may the employee's normal or regular daily paragraph (d) to read as follows: include an hourly rate, salary, or weekly working hours are greater or commission, piece rate, a combination fewer than 8 hours and 40 hours § 778.203 Premium pay for work on thereof, or any other method-as long as Saturdays, Sundays, and other "special respectively and such hours are days". the regular rate is equal to at least the reflected in an agreement or by applicable minimum wage and established practice, and the employee * * * * * compensation for overtime hours (d) Payment of premiums for work receives payment of premium rates for performed on the "special day": To worked is paid at the rate of at least one work in excess of such normal or regular and one-half times the regular rate. qualify as an overtime premium under hours of work for the day or week (such section 7(e)(6), the premium must be While the eight categories of payments as 7 in a day or 35 in a week), the extra in section 7(e)(1)-(8) are the exhaustive paid because work is performed on the compensation provided by such days specified and not for some other list of payments excludable from the premium rates, paid for excessive hours, regular rate, this part does not contain reason which would not qualify the is a true overtime premium to be premium as an overtime premium under an exhaustive list of permissible or excluded from the regular rate and it impermissible compensation practices sections 7(e)(5), (6), or (7) of the Act. may be credited toward overtime (For examples distinguishing pay for under section 7(e), unless otherwise compensation due under the Act. indicated. Rather, it provides examples work on a holiday from idle holiday (c) Premiums for excessive daily of regular rate and overtime calculations pay, see§ 778.219.) Thus a premium hours. If an employee whose maximum rate paid to an employee only when he under the FLSA and the types of hours standard is 40 hours is hired at compensation that may be excluded received less than 24 hours' notice that the rate of $12 an hour and receives, as from regular rate calculations under he is required to report for work on his overtime compensation under his regular day of rest is not a premium section 7(e) of the FLSA. contract, $12.50 per hour for each hour ■ 8. Amend§ 778.202 by revising paid for work on one of the specified actually worked in excess of 8 per day days; it is a premium imposed as a paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (e) to read as (or in excess of his normal or regular follows: penalty upon the employer for failure to daily working hours), his employer may give adequate notice to compensate the § 778.202 Premium pay for hours in exclude the premium portion of the employee for the inconvenience of excess of a daily or weekly standard. overtime rate from the employee's disarranging his private life. The extra (a) Hours in excess of 8 per day or regular rate and credit the total of the compensation is not an overtime statutory weekly standard. A written or extra 50-cent payments thus made for premium. It is part of his regular rate of unwritten employment contract, daily overtime hours against the pay unless such extra compensation is agreement, understanding, handbook, overtime compensation which is due paid the employee so as to qualify for policy, or practice may provide for the under the statute for hours in excess of exclusion under section 7(e)(2) of the payment of overtime compensation for 40 in that workweek. If the same Act in which event it need not be hours worked in excess of 8 per day or contract further provided for the included in computing his regular rate 40 per week. If the payment of such payment of $13 for hours in excess of of pay, as explained in§ 778.222. overtime compensation is in fact 12 per day, the extra $1 payments could ■ 10. Revise§ 778.205 to read as contingent upon the employee's having likewise be credited toward overtime compensation due under the Act. To follows: worked in excess of 8 hours in a day or in excess of the number of hours in the qualify as overtime premiums under § 778.205 Premiums for weekend and workweek specified in section 7(a) of section 7(e)(5) of the Act, the daily holiday work-example. the Act as the weekly maximum and overtime premium payments must be The application of section 7(e)(6) of such hours are reflected in an agreement made for hours in excess of 8 hours per the Act may be illustrated by the or by established practice, the extra day or the employee's normal or regular following example: Suppose, based on a premium compensation paid for the working hours. If the normal workday is written or unwritten employment excess hours is excludable from the artificially divided into a "straight time" contract, agreement, understanding, regular rate under section 7(e)(5) of the period to which one rate is assigned, handbook, policy, or practice, an Act and may be credited toward followed by a so-called "overtime" employee earns $18 an hour for all statutory overtime payments pursuant to period for which a higher "rate" is hours worked on a holiday or on section 7(h) of the Act. In applying the specified, the arrangement will be Sunday in the operation of machines by rules in this paragraph (a) to situations regarded as a device to contravene the operators whose maximum hours where it is the custom to pay employees statutory purposes and the premiums standard is 40 hours and who are paid for hours during which no work is will be considered part of the regular a bona fide hourly rate of $12 for like performed due to vacation, holiday, rate. For a fuller discussion of this work performed during nonovertime illness, failure of the employer to problem, see§ 778.501. hours on other days. Suppose further provide sufficient work, or other similar * * * * * that the workweek of such an employee cause, as these terms are explained in (e) Premium pay for sixth or seventh begins at 12:01 a.m. Sunday, and in a §§ 778.216 through 778.224, it is day worked. Under sections 7(e)(6) and particular week he works a schedule of DOLAR0945 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 37 of 194 68772 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 8 hours on Sunday and on each day circumstances they must be included in provided with the understanding that from Monday through Saturday, making the regular rate of pay. they are gifts. Office coffee and snacks a total of 56 hours worked in the (d) Labels are not determinative. The provided to employees, for example, workweek. Tuesday is a holiday. The label assigned to a bonus does not would also be excludable from the payment of $768 to which the employee conclusively determine whether a bonus regular rate under this category. is entitled will satisfy the requirements is discretionary under section 7(e)(3). ■ 14. Amend§ 778.215 by revising of the Act since the employer may Instead, the terms of the statute and the paragraphs (a)(2) and (b) to read as properly exclude from the regular rate facts specific to the bonus at issue follows: the extra $48 paid for work on Sunday determine whether bonuses are and the extra $48 paid for holiday work excludable discretionary bonuses. Thus, § 778.215 Conditions for exclusion of regardless of the label or name assigned benefit-plan contributions under section and credit himself with such amount 7(e)(4). against the statutory overtime premium to bonuses, bonuses are discretionary and excludable if both the fact that the (a) * * * required to be paid for the 16 hours (2) The primary purpose of the plan worked over 40. bonuses are to be paid and the amounts are determined at the sole discretion of must be to provide systematically for ■ 11. Amend§ 778.207 by revising the payment of benefits to employees on paragraph (a) to read as follows: the employer at or near the end of the periods to which the bonuses account of death, disability, advanced § 778.207 Other types of contract premium correspond and they are not paid age, retirement, illness, medical pay distinguished. pursuant to any prior contract, expenses, hospitalization, accident, agreement, or promise causing the unemployment, legal services, or other (a) Overtime premiums are those events that could cause significant defined by the statute. The various types employee to expect such payments future financial hardship or expense. of premium payments which provide regularly. Examples of bonuses that may extra compensation qualifying as be discretionary include bonuses to * * * * * overtime premiums to be excluded from employees who made unique or (b) Plans under sections of the the regular rate (under sections 7(e)(5), extraordinary efforts which are not Internal Revenue Code. In the absence (6), and (7) and credited toward awarded according to pre-established of evidence to the contrary, where the statutory overtime pay requirements criteria, severance bonuses, referral benefit plan or trust has been approved (under section 7(h)) have been described bonuses for employees not primarily by the Internal Revenue Service as in§§ 778.201 through 778.206. The engaged in recruiting activities, bonuses satisfying the requirements of section plain wording of the statute makes it for overcoming challenging or stressful 401(a), 403(a), or 403(b) of the Internal clear that extra compensation provided situations, employee-of-the-month Revenue Code, is otherwise maintained by premium rates other than those bonuses, and other similar pursuant to a written document that the described in the statute cannot be compensation. Such bonuses are usually plan sponsor reasonably believes treated as overtime premiums. When not promised in advance and the fact satisfies the requirements of section such other premiums are paid, they and amount of payment is in the sole 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408(k) or 408(p) must be included in the employee's discretion of the employer until at or of the Internal Revenue Code, or is regular rate before statutory overtime near the end of the period to which the sponsored by a government employer compensation is computed; no part of bonus corresponds. that reasonably believes the plan such premiums may be credited toward ■ 13. Amend§ 778.212 by revising satisfies the requirements of section statutory overtime pay. paragraph (c) to read as follows: 457(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, the plan or trust will be considered to meet * * * * * §778.212 Gifts, Christmas and special the conditions specified in paragraphs ■ 12. Amend§ 778.211 by revising occasion bonuses. (a)(1), (2), (4), and (5) of this section. paragraph (c) and adding paragraph (d) * * * * * ■ 15. Amend§ 778.217 by revising to read as follows: (c) Application of exclusion. If the paragraphs (a), (b)(1), and (c) to read as bonus paid at Christmas or on other follows: § 778.211 Discretionary bonuses. special occasion is a gift or in the nature * * * * * of a gift, it may be excluded from the § 778.217 Reimbursement for expenses. (c) Promised bonuses not excluded. regular rate under section 7(e)(1) even (a) General rule. Where an employee The bonus, to be excluded under section though it is paid with regularity so that incurs expenses on his employer's 7(e)(3)(a), must not be paid pursuant to the employees are led to expect it and behalf or where he is required to expend any prior contract, agreement, or even though the amounts paid to sums by reason of action taken for the promise. For example, any bonus which different employees or groups of convenience of his employer, section is promised to employees upon hiring or employees vary with the amount of the 7(e)(2) is applicable to reimbursement which is the result of collective salary or regular hourly rate of such for such expenses. Payments made by bargaining would not be excluded from employees or according to their length the employer to cover such expenses are the regular rate under this provision of of service with the firm so long as the not included in the employee's regular the Act. Bonuses which are announced amounts are not measured by or directly rate (if the amount of the reimbursement to employees to induce them to work dependent upon hours worked, reasonably approximates the expense more steadily or more rapidly or more production, or efficiency. A Christmas incurred). Such payment is not efficiently or to remain with the firm are bonus paid (not pursuant to contract) in compensation for services rendered by regarded as part of the regular rate of the amount of two weeks' salary to all the employees during any hours worked pay. Most attendance bonuses, employees and an equal additional in the workweek. individual or group production bonuses, amount for each 5 years of service with (b) * * * bonuses for quality and accuracy of the firm, for example, would be (1) The actual amount expended by an work, bonuses contingent upon the excludable from the regular rate under employee in purchasing supplies, tools, employee's continuing in employment this category. Employers may also materials, cell phone plans, or until the time the payment is to be made provide gifts with more regularity equipment on behalf of his employer or and the like are in this category; in such throughout the year, as long as they are in paying organization membership DOLAR0946 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 38 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68773 dues or credentialing exam fees where sickness, and failure of the employer to may be offset against the statutory relevant to the employer's business. provide work. Examples of "similar overtime compensation which is due. * * * * * causes" are absences due to jury service, (Nothing in this example is intended to (c) Payments excluding expenses. (1) reporting to a draft board, attending a imply that the employee has a statutory It should be noted that only the actual funeral, inability to reach the workplace right to $576 or any other sum as or reasonably approximate amount of because of weather conditions, vacation pay. This is a matter of private the expense is excludable from the attending adoption or child custody contract between the parties who may regular rate. If the amount paid as hearings, attending school activities, agree that vacation pay will be "reimbursement" is disproportionately donating organs or blood, voting, measured by straight-time earnings for large, the excess amount will be volunteering as a first responder, any agreed number of hours or days, or included in the regular rate. military leave, family medical leave, by total normal or expected take-home (2) A reimbursement amount for an and nonroutine paid leave required pay for the period, or that no vacation employee traveling on his or her under state or local laws. Only absences pay at all will be paid. The example employer's business is per se of a non-routine character which are merely illustrates the proper method of reasonable, and not disproportionately infrequent or sporadic or unpredictable computing overtime for an employee large, if it: are included in the "other similar whose employment contract provides (i) Is the same or less than the cause" category. $576 vacation pay.) maximum reimbursement payment or ■ 17. Revise§ 778.219 to read as (2) An employee who is entitled per diem allowance permitted for the follows: under his employment contract to 8 same type of expense under 41 CFR hours' pay at his rate of $12 an hour for § 778.219 Pay for forgoing holidays and the Christmas holiday, forgoes his subtitle F (the Federal Travel Regulation unused leave. System) or IRS guidance issued under holiday and works 9 hours on that day. (a) Sums payable whether employee During the entire week, he works a total 26 CFR 1.274-5(g) or (j); and works or not. As explained in§ 778.218, (ii) Otherwise meets the requirements of 50 hours. He is paid under his of this section. certain payments made to an employee contract $600 as straight-time (3) Paragraph (c)(2) of this section for periods during which he performs compensation for 50 hours plus $96 as creates no inference that a no work because of a holiday, vacation, idle holiday pay. He is owed, under the reimbursement for an employee or illness are not required to be statute, an additional $60 as overtime traveling on his or her employer's included in the regular rate because premium (additional half-time) for the business exceeding the amount they are not regarded as compensation 10 hours in excess of 40. His regular rate for working. When an employee who is of $12 per hour has not been increased permitted under 41 CFR subtitle F (the entitled to such paid leave forgoes the Federal Travel Regulation System) or by virtue of the holiday pay but no part use of leave and instead receives a of the $96 holiday pay may be credited IRS guidance issued under 26 CFR payment that is the approximate 1.274-5(g) or (j) is unreasonable for toward statutory overtime compensation equivalent to the employees' normal due. purposes of this section. earnings for a similar period of working (3) An employee whose rate of pay is * * * * * time, and is in addition to the $12 an hour and who usually works a ■ 16. Amend§ 778.218 by revising employee's normal compensation for 40-hour week is entitled to two weeks paragraphs (b) and (d) to read as hours worked, the sum allocable to the of paid time off per year per his or her follows: forgone leave may be excluded from the employer's policies. The employee takes regular rate. Such payments may be one week of paid time off during the § 778.218 Pay for certain idle hours. excluded whether paid out during the year and is paid $480 pursuant to * * * * * pay period in which the holiday or employer policy for the one week of (b) Limitations on exclusion. The prescheduled leave is forgone or as a unused paid time off at the end of the provision of section 7(e)(2) of the Act lump sum at a later point in time. Since year. The leave payout may be excluded deals with the type of absences which it is not compensation for work, pay for from the employee's regular rate of pay, are infrequent or sporadic or unused leave may not be credited but no part of the payout may be unpredictable. It has no relation to toward overtime compensation due credited toward statutory overtime regular "absences" such as regularly under the Act. Four examples in which comf ensation due. scheduled days of rest. Sundays may the maximum hours standard is 40 (4 An employee is scheduled to work not be workdays in a particular hours may serve to illustrate this a set schedule of two 24-hour shifts on establishment, but this does not make principle: duty, followed by four 24-hour shifts off them either "holidays" or "vacations," (1) An employee whose rate of pay is duty. This cycle repeats every six days. or days on which the employee is absent $12 an hour and who usually works a The employer recognizes ten holidays because of the failure of the employer to 6-day, 48-hour week is entitled, under per year and provides employees with provide sufficient work. The term his employment contract, to a week's holiday pay for these days at amounts holiday is read in its ordinary usage to paid vacation in the amount of his usual approximately equivalent to their refer to those days customarily observed straight-time earnings-$576. He forgoes normal earnings for a similar period of in the community in celebration of some his vacation and works 50 hours in the working time. Due to the cycle of the historical or religious occasion; it does week in question. He is owed $600 as schedule, employees may be on duty not refer to days of rest given to his total straight-time earnings for the during some recognized holidays and employees in lieu of or as an addition week, and $576 in addition as his off duty during others, and due to the to compensation for working on other vacation pay. Under the statute he is nature of their work, employees may be days. owed an additional $60 as overtime required to forgo a holiday if an * * * * * premium (additional half-time) for the emergency arises. In recognition of this (d) Other similar cause. The term 10 hours in excess of 40. His regular rate fact, the employer provides the "other similar cause" refers to payments of $12 per hour has not been increased employees holiday pay regardless of made for periods of absence due to by virtue of the payment of $576 whether the employee works on the factors like holidays, vacations, vacation pay, but no part of the $576 holiday. If the employee works on the DOLAR0947 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 39 of 194 68774 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations holiday, the employee will receive his employee received a total of $204 ■ 19. Revise§ 778.221 to read as or her regular salary in addition to the attributable to the holiday: 8 hours' idle follows: holiday pay. In these circumstances, the holiday pay at $12 an hour (8 x $12), § 778.221 "Call-back" pay. sum allocable to the holiday pay may be due him whether he worked or not, and excluded from the regular rate. $108 pay at the nonholiday rate for 9 (a) General. Typically, "call-back" or (b) Premiums for holiday work hours' work on the holiday. In the "call-out" payments are made pursuant distinguished. The example in situation discussed in this paragraph to agreement or established practice and paragraph (a)(2) of this section should (b)(2), the employee received $216 pay consist of a specified number of hours' be distinguished from a situation in for working on the holiday-double pay at the applicable straight time or which an employee is entitled to idle time for 9 hours of work. All of the pay overtime rates received by an employee holiday pay under the employment in this situation is paid for and directlyon occasions when, after his scheduled agreement only when he is actually idle related to the number of hours worked hours of work have ended and without on the holiday, and who, if he forgoes on the holiday. prearrangement, he responds to a call his holiday also, under his contract, from his employer to perform extra forgoes his idle holiday pay. ■ 18. Amend§ 778.220 by revising work. The amount by which the (1) The typical situation is one in paragraph (b) and adding paragraph (c) specified number of hours' pay exceeds which an employee is entitled by to read as follows: the compensation for hours actually contract to 8 hours' pay at his rate of worked is considered as a payment that § 778.220 "Show-up" or "reporting" pay. is not made for hours worked. As such, $12 an hour for certain named holidays when no work is performed. If, * * * * * it may be excluded from the however, he is required to work on such (b) Application illustrated. To computation of the employee's regular days, he does not receive his idle illustrate, assume that an employee rate and cannot be credited toward holiday pay. Instead he receives a entitled to overtime pay after 40 hours statutory overtime compensation due premium rate of $18 (time and one-half) a week whose workweek begins on the employee. Payments that are for each hour worked on the holiday. If Monday and who is paid $12 an hour prearranged, however, may not be he worked 9 hours on the holiday and reports for work on Monday according excluded from the regular rate. For a total of 50 hours for the week, he to schedule and is sent home after being example, if an employer retailer called would be owed, under his contract, given only 2 hours of work. He then in an employee to help clean up the $162 (9 x $18) for the holiday work and works 8 hours each day on Tuesday store for 3 hours after an unexpected $492 for the other 41 hours worked in through Saturday, inclusive, making a roof leak, and then again 3 weeks later the week, a total of $654. Under the total of 42 hours for the week. The for 2 hours to cover for a coworker who statute (which does not require employment agreement covering the left work for a family emergency, premium pay for a holiday) he is owed employees in the plant, who normally payments for those instances would be $660 for a workweek of 50 hours at a work 8 hours a day, Monday through without prearrangement and any call- rate of $12 an hour. Since the holiday Friday, provides that an employee back pay that exceeded the amount the premium is one and one-halftimes the employee would receive for the hours reporting for scheduled work on any worked would be excludable. However, established rate for nonholiday work, it day will receive a minimum of 4 hours' does not increase the regular rate when payments under§§ 778.221 and work or pay. The employee thus 778.222 are prearranged, they are because it qualifies as an overtime receives not only the $24 earned in the premium under section 7(e)(6), and the compensation for work. The key inquiry 2 hours of work on Monday but an extra for determining prearrangement is employer may credit it toward statutory 2 hours' "show-up" pay, or $24 by overtime compensation due and need whether the extra work was anticipated reason of this agreement. However, and therefore reasonably could have pay the employee only the additional since this $24 in "show-up" pay is not sum of $6 to meet the statutory been scheduled. For example, if an regarded as compensation for hours employer restaurant anticipates needing requirements. (For a discussion of worked, the employee's regular rate holidal premiums see § 778.203.) extra servers for two hours during the (2) I a11 other conditions remained remains $12 and the overtime busiest part of each Saturday evening the same but the contract called for the requirements of the Act are satisfied if and calls in employees to meet that payment of $24 (double time) for each he receives, in addition to the $504 need instead of scheduling additional hour worked on the holiday, the straight-time pay for 42 hours and the servers, that would be prearrangement employee would receive, under his $24 "show-up" payment, the sum of $12 and any call-back pay would be contract $216 (9 x $24) for the holiday as extra compensation for the 2 hours of included in the regular rate. work in addition to $492 for the other overtime work on Saturday. (b) Application illustrated. The 41 hours worked, a total of $708. Since (c) Show-up or reporting pay application of the principles in this holiday premium is also an mandated by law. State and local laws paragraph (a) of this section to call-back overtime premium under section 7(e)(6), may mandate payments or penalties payments may be illustrated as follows: it is excludable from the regular rate and paid to an employee when, before or An employment agreement provides a the employer may credit it toward after reporting to work as scheduled, the minimum of 3 hours' pay at time and statutory overtime compensation due. employee is not provided with the one-half for any employee called back to Because the total thus paid exceeds the expected amount of work. All such work outside his scheduled hours. The statutory requirements, no additional payments or penalties paid to employees covered by the agreement, compensation is due under the Act. In employees that are mandated by such who are entitled to overtime pay after 40 distinguishing this situation from that in laws and that are not payments for hours a week, normally work 8 hours the example in paragraph (a)(2) of this hours worked by the employee are each day, Monday through Friday, section, it should be noted that the excludable from the regular rate if such inclusive, in a workweek beginning on contract provisions in the two situations penalties are paid or payments made on Monday, and are paid overtime are different and result in the payment an infrequent or sporadic basis. They compensation at time and one-half for of different amounts. In the example in cannot be credited toward statutory all hours worked in excess of 8 in any paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the overtime compensation due. day or 40 in any workweek. Assume DOLAR0948 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 40 of 194 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations 68775 that an employee covered by this at his applicable rate (straight time or compensation is treated in the same agreement and paid at the rate of $12 an overtime, as the case may be), is manner as compensation for any other hour works 1 hour overtime or a total considered as a payment that is not working time and is, of course, included of 9 hours on Monday, and works 8 made for hours worked. Payments that in the regular rate of pay. Where hours each on Tuesday through Friday, are prearranged, however, may not be payment is ostensibly made as inclusive. After he has gone home on excluded from the regular rate. compensation for such of these hours as Friday evening, he is called back to Examples of payments similar to are not regarded as working time under perform an emergency job. His hours excludable call-back pay include: the Act, the payment is nevertheless worked on the call total 2 hours and he (a) Extra payments made to employees included in the regular rate of pay receives 3 hours' pay at time and one- for failure to give the employee unless it qualifies for exclusion from the half, or $54, under the call-back sufficient notice to report for work on regular rate as one of a type of provision, in addition to $480 for regular days of rest or during hours "payments made for occasional periods working his regular schedule and $18 outside of his regular work schedule; when no work is performed due to for overtime worked on Monday (b) Extra payments made solely failure of the employer to provide evening. In computing overtime because the employee has been called sufficient work, or other similar cause" compensation due this employee under back to work before the expiration of a as discussed in§ 778.218 or is the Act, the 43 actual hours (not 44) are specified number of hours between excludable on some other basis under counted as working time during the shifts or tours of duty, sometimes section 7(e)(2). For example, an week. In addition to $516 pay at the $12 referred to as a "rest period;" employment contract may provide that rate for all these hours, he has received (c) Pay mandated by state or local law employees who are assigned to take under the agreement a premium of $6 for employees who are scheduled to calls for specific periods will receive a for the 1 overtime hour on Monday and work the end of one day's shift and the payment of $5 for each 8-hour period of $12 for the 2 hours of overtime work start of the next day's shift with fewer during which they are "on call" in on the call, plus an extra sum of $18 than the legally required number of addition to pay at their regular (or paid by reason of the provision for hours between the shifts; and overtime) rate for hours actually spent minimum call-back pay. For purposes of (d) "Predictability pay" mandated by in making calls. If the employees who the Act, the extra premiums paid for state or local law for employees who do are thus on call are not confined to their actual hours of overtime work on not receive requisite notice of a homes or to any particular place, but Monday and on the Friday call (a total schedule change. may come and go as they please, of $18) may be excluded as true ■ 21. Revise§ 778.223 to read as provided that they leave word where overtime premiums in computing his follows: they may be reached, the hours spent regular rate for the week and may be "on call" are not considered as hours credited toward compensation due § 778.223 Pay for non-productive hours worked. Although the payment received under the Act, but the extra $18 distinguished. by such employees for such "on call" received under the call-back provision (a) Under the Act an employee must time is, therefore, not allocable to any is not regarded as paid for hours be compensated for all hours worked. specific hours of work, it is clearly paid worked; thus, it may be excluded from As a general rule the term "hours as compensation for performing a duty the regular rate, but it cannot be worked" will include: involved in the employee's job and is credited toward overtime compensation (1) All time during which an not of a type excludable under section due under the Act. The regular rate of employee is required to be on duty or 7(e)(2). The payment must therefore be the employee, therefore, remains $12, to be on the employer's premises or at included in the employee's regular rate and he has received an overtime a prescribed workplace; and in the same manner as any payment for premium of $6 an hour for 3 overtime (2) All time during which an services, such as an attendance bonus, hours of work. This satisfies the employee is suffered or permitted to which is not related to any specific requirements of section 7 of the Act. work whether or not he is required to hours of work. The principle in this The same would be true, of course, if in do so. paragraph (b) also applies when such the foregoing example, the employee (b) Thus, working time is not limited "on call" pay is mandated by state or was called back outside his scheduled to the hours spent in active productive local law. hours for the 2-hour emergency job on labor, but includes time given by the ■ 21. Revise§ 778.224 to read as another night of the week or on employee to the employer even though follows: Saturday or Sunday, instead of on part of the time may be spent in Friday night. idleness. Some of the hours spent by §778.224 "Other similar payments". ■ 20. Revise§ 778.222 to read as employees, under certain (a) General. Sections 778.216 through follows: circumstances, in such activities as 778.223 have enumerated and discussed waiting for work, remaining "on call", the basic types of payments for which § 778.222 Other payments similar to "call- traveling on the employer's business or exclusion from the regular rate is back" pay. to and from workplaces, and in meal specifically provided under section The principles discussed in§ 778.221 periods and rest periods are regarded as 7(e)(2) because they are not made as are also applied with respect to certain working time and some are not. The compensation for hours of work. Section types of extra payments which are governing principles are discussed in 7(e)(2) also authorizes exclusion from similar to call-back pay. Payments are part 785 of this chapter (interpretative the regular rate of other similar similar to call-back pay if they are extra bulletin on "hours worked") and part payments to an employee which are not payments, including payments made 790 of this chapter (statement of effect made as compensation for his hours of pursuant to state or local scheduling of Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947). To the employment. Such payments do not laws, to compensate an employee for extent that these hours are regarded as depend on hours worked, services working unanticipated or insufficiently working time, payment made as rendered, job performance, or other scheduled hours or shifts. The extra compensation for these hours obviously criteria that depend on the quality or payment, over and above the employee's cannot be characterized as "payments quantity of the employee's work. earnings for the hours actually worked not for hours worked." Such Conditions not dependent on the quality DOLAR0949 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 41 of 194 68776 Federal Register/Vol. 84, No. 241/Monday, December 16, 2019/Rules and Regulations or quality of work include a reasonable screenings, vaccination clinics of an employee if the hours are waiting period for eligibility, the (including annual flu vaccinations), compensated at the same rate as other requirement to repay benefits as a nutrition classes, weight loss programs, working hours. The requirements of remedy for employee misconduct, and smoking cessation programs, stress section 7(a) of the Act will be limiting eligibility on the basis of reduction programs, exercise programs, considered to be met where overtime geographic location or job position. coaching to help employees meet health compensation at one and one-half times Since a variety of miscellaneous goals, financial wellness programs or such rate is paid for the hours so payments are paid by an employer to an financial counseling, and mental health compensated in the workweek which employee under peculiar circumstances, wellness programs. are in excess of the statutory maximum. it was not considered feasible to attempt (5) Discounts on employer-provided (b) Time not treated as hours worked. to list them. They must, however, be retail goods and services, and tuition Under the principles set forth in "similar" in character to the payments benefits (whether paid to an employee, § 778.319, where the payments are made specifically described in section 7(e)(2). an education provider, or a student loan for time spent in an activity which, if It is clear that the clause was not program). compensable under contract, custom, or intended to permit the exclusion from (6) Adoption assistance (including practice, is required to be counted as the regular rate of payments such as financial assistance, legal services, or hours worked under the Act by virtue of most bonuses or the furnishing of information and referral services). section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of facilities like board and lodging which, ■ 22. Revise§ 778.320 to read as 1947 (see parts 785 and 790 of this though not directly attributable to any follows: chapter), no agreement by the parties to particular hours of work are, exclude such compensable time from § 778.320 Hours that would not be hours nevertheless, clearly understood to be worked if not paid for. hours worked would be valid. On the compensation for services. other hand, in the case of time spent in (b) Examples of other excludable In some cases an agreement or established practice provides for an activity which would not be hours payments. A few examples may serve to worked under the Act if not illustrate some of the types of payments compensation for hours spent in certain types of activities which would not be compensated and would not become intended to be excluded as "other hours worked under the Portal-to-Portal similar payments". regarded as working time under the Act if no compensation were provided. Act even if made compensable by (1) Sums paid to an employee for the contract, custom, or practice, such time rental of his truck or car. Preliminary and postliminary activities and time spent in eating meals between will not be counted as hours worked (2) Loans or advances made by the unless agreement or established practice employer to the employee. working hours fall in this category. Compensation for such hours does not indicates that the parties have treated (3) The cost to the employer of the time as hours worked. Such time conveniences furnished to the employee convert them into hours worked unless it appears from all the pertinent facts includes bona fide meal periods, see such as: § 785.19. Unless it appears from all the (i) Parking spaces and parking that the parties have treated such time as hours worked. Except for certain pertinent facts that the parties have benefits; treated such activities as hours worked, (ii) Restrooms and lockers; activity governed by the Portal-to-Portal (iii) On-the-job medical care; Act (see paragraph (b) of this section), payments for such time will be regarded (iv) Treatment provided on-site from the agreement or established practice of as qualifying for exclusion from the specialists such as chiropractors, the parties will be respected, if regular rate under the provisions of massage therapists, physical therapists, reasonable. section 7(e)(2), as explained in personal trainers, counselors, or (a) Time treated as hours worked. §§ 778.216 through 778.224. The Employee Assistance Programs; or Where the parties have reasonably payments for such hours cannot, of (v) Gym access, gym memberships, agreed to include as hours worked time course, qualify as overtime premiums fitness classes, and recreational devoted to activities of the type creditable toward overtime facilities. described in the introductory text of this compensation under section 7(h) of the (4) The cost to the employer of section, payments for such hours will Act. providing wellness programs, such as not have the mathematical effect of [FR Doc. 2019-26447 Filed 12-12-19; 8:45 am] health risk assessments, biometric increasing or decreasing the regular rate BILLING CODE 4510-27-P DOLAR0950 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 1 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 42 of 194 ■ , 24-32711XAPl Nnitth ~tatts illnurt nf Appeals for the ~tcnnh illircuit MATTHEW T. SHAFER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, MACE TAMSE, STEVE SHERESKY, GEORGE LIVANOS, JEFFREY SHOVER, MARK LOFTUS, SANDY JUKEL, STEVE NADLER, SHERI HAUGABOOK, JEFFREY SHERESKY, PETER HEIDT, JEFFREY SAMSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, -v.- MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC, MORGAN STANLEY COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESSION COMMITTEE, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, JOHN/JANE DOES, 1-20, Defendant. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRIEF AND SPECIAL APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-APPELLEES ANTON METLITSKY MEAGHAN VERGOW O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP BRIAND. BOYLE 1301 Avenue of the Americas O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 17th Floor 1625 Eye Street NW New York, New York 10019 Washington, DC 20006 (212) 326-2000 (202) 383-5300 Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees (800) 4-APPEAL • (335786) DOLAR0951 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 2 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 43 of 194 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, counsel for the undersigned certifies as follows: Defendant-Appellant Morgan Stanley is a publicly held corporation that has no parent corporation. Based on Securities and Exchange Commission Rules regarding beneficial ownership, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc., 4-5 Marunouchi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8330, beneficially owns greater than 10% of Morgan Stanley's outstanding common stock. Defendant-Appellant Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC is a limited liability company whose sole member is Morgan Stanley Capital Management, LLC, a limited liability company whose sole member is Morgan Stanley. Defendant-Appellant Morgan Stanley Compensation Management Development and Succession Committee is an unincorporated association and a committee of Morgan Stanley's Board of Directors. DOLAR0952 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 3 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 44 of 194 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ......................................................................... 5 ISSUES PRESENTED .............................................................................................. 7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 7 A. Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards ..................... 7 B. Plaintiffs' claims ...................................................................... 10 C. Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration ...................... 11 D. The district court's November 2023 order. .............................. 13 E. Morgan Stanley's motion for reconsideration or clarification .............................................................................. 15 F. The district court's November 2024 order. .............................. 16 G. Morgan Stanley's appeal.. ........................................................ 19 H. Parallel arbitrations .................................................................. 20 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 21 STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................... 25 ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 26 I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY PURPORTED TO RE SOLVE THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS, EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVING MORGAN STANLEY OF ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION ........................................................... 266 A. The district court should have granted Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration without addressing whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards qualify as BRISA pension plans ........................................................... 27 B. The district court's improper merits finding has caused Morgan Stanley the very harm the FAA is designed to avoid ......................................................................................... 33 -1- DOLAR0953 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 4 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 45 of 194 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page C. If the Court determines it lacks appellate jurisdiction over Morgan Stanley's appeal, it should issue a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court's improper ERISA finding ...................................................................................... 36 II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S MERITS COMMENTARY IS WRONG ............................................................................................. 38 A. Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards are not a pension benefit plan .............................................................. 39 1. The awards do not qualify as a "pension plan" under the statutory test.. ................................................ .40 a. The district incorrectly concluded that exceptional payments to former employees transform the awards into an ERISA "pension plan." .................................................... 40 b. The district court incorrectly concluded that the deferred compensation awards are "earned" at the point of grant ............................. .45 c. The district court incorrectly declined to consider the awards' purposes in analyzing ERISA coverage ................................................. .4 7 2. The DOL's bonus plan exemption applies to the awards ............................................................................ 49 a. The awards are ERISA-exempt "bonuses" under DOL regulation ......................................... 49 b. The bonus regulation applies because payment is not "systematically deferred" until after employment.. ...................................... 53 B. Evidence developed in parallel arbitrations reinforces that the awards are not ERISA-govemed ................................ 57 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 58 -11- DOLAR0954 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 5 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 46 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Albers v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 1999 WL 228367 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999) ...................................................... .41 Allen V. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ............................................................................................... 35 Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) ............................................................................................. 26 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) ............................................................................................. 34 AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986) .................................................................................. 2, 26, 31 Berenson v. National Financial Services LLC, 485 (1st Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................. 6 Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009) ............................................................................................. 34 Boos v. AT&T, Inc., 643 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................... .44 Callan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 2010 WL 3452371 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2010) ..................................................... 51 Cashman v. GreyOrange, Inc., 2023 WL 2652789 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2023) ..................................................... 52 Credit Managers Ass 'n of S. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................ 56 Deibler v. United Food & Com. Workers' Loe. Union 23, 973 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1992) ................................................................................. 56 Depew v. MNC Fin., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 492 (D. Md. 1993) ......................................................................... .42 Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) ........................................................................... 56 Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 197 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................ 51 - 111 - DOLAR0955 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 6 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 47 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Faris v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 2023 WL 7386870 (D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2023) ................................................. 41, 52 Finlay v. King's Lessee, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 346 (1830) ................................................................................. .46 Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) ................................................................................... 35 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) ............................................................................................. 27 Henry on behalf of BSC Ventures Holdings, Inc. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan v. Wilmington Tr. NA, 72 F.4th 499 (3d Cir. 2023) .................................................................................... 5 Hester v. Whatever It Takes, 2022 WL 89176 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2022) ............................................................ 52 Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) I (1805) .................................................................................. .46 In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993) ......................................................................................... 7 Int'l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 978 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ....................................................................... 56 Killian v. McCulloch, 850 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ............................................................... 41, 52 Langley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................ 56 Leister v. Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... .44 Lora v. O'Heaney, 602 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2010) ................................................................................. 19 Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili, 704 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................... 26 McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1993) ...................................................................... 51, 52 - lV - DOLAR0956 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 7 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 48 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................... 39, 40 Oatway, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2003) .............................................................. 41, 48, 50, 51 Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2017) ................................................................................. 39 Picard v. Credit Sols., Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................... 35 Pilkington v. CGU Ins. Co., 2000 WL 33159253 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2001) ....................................................... 52 Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ .47 Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loe. 1776, 595 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2010) ................................................................................. 31 S.E. C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 6, 36 Seguros Banvenez S.A. v. SIS Oliver Drescher, 715 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1983) ..................................................................................... 6 Soliman v. Subway Franchisee Advert. Fund Tr., Ltd., 999 F.3d 828 (2d Cir. 2021) ................................................................................. 25 Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 36, 37 Tolbert v. RBC Cap. Mkts. Corp., 758 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2014) ................................................................... 41, 43, 44 Transit Mix Concrete Corp. v. Loe. Union No. 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 809 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1987) ................................................................................. 26 United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020) ............................................................................................. 27 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ............................................................................................. 26 - V - DOLAR0957 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 8 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 49 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Volt Inf0. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) ............................................................................................. 33 WasteCare Corp. v. Harmony Enters., Inc., 822 F. App'x 892 (11th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................... 25 Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990) .............................................................................. 56 Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019) ............................................................. 41, 44, 47, 50 Young v. Verizon' s Bell Atl. Cash Balance Plan, 615 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 28 Statutes 9 U.S.C. § 16 ....................................................................................................... 6, 36 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) ......................................................................................................... 5 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(l)(B) ............................................................................................. 19 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(l )(C) ............................................................................................... 5 9 U.S.C. § 206 ............................................................................................................ 5 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................ 5 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) ................................................................................................. 56 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) ............................................................................... 39, 48, 55 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) ............................................................................... passim 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)(ii) .................................................................................. 28 29 U.S.C. § l 132(e)(l) ............................................................................................... 5 Rules Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(A) ....................................................................................... 19 FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, Rule 13904 ............ 37 Regulations 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) ................................................................................... passim Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395 (June 25, 2010) ................................................................... 10 - Vl - DOLAR0958 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 9 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 50 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (July 12, 2019) .................................................................... 10 Other Authorities 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4421 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 update) ........................................................................ 35 FINRA Award, Rude et al. v. Morgan Stanley (June 17, 2024) .............................. 21 FINRA, 2024 FINRA Annual Regulatory Oversight Report (Jan. 2024) ............... 10 Miriam Rozen, Ex-Morgan Stanley Brokers Must Arbitrate Class Claim Over Deferred Comp, Judge Rules, AdvisorHub (Nov. 22, 2023) ...................... 14 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (May 6, 2024) ........ 10 Op. 79-20A, 1979 WL 6959 (Mar. 19, 1979) ......................................................... .42 Op. 79-15A, 1979 WL 6953 (Mar. 12, 1979) ......................................................... .42 Op. 82-29A, 1982 WL 21212 (July 2, 1982) .................................................... 42, 52 Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654 (Mar. 6, 1998) ..................................... 42, 51, 52, 54 Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 31846478 (Dec. 6, 2002) ............................. 42, 48, 52, 54 -vu- DOLAR0959 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 10 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 51 of 194 INTRODUCTION The district court improperly adjudicated the merits of a dispute it simultaneously (and correctly) held the parties had agreed to arbitrate. The district court nominally compelled arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims, but in that very same order, the court, in its own words, "resolved the parties' dispute" over whether plaintiffs' deferred compensation awards are really BRISA plans. That question is the core dispute in plaintiffs' claims against Morgan Stanley, and the court's ruling has effectively deprived Morgan Stanley of its bargained-for right to have an arbitrator adjudicate it. 1 The underlying dispute is about whether Morgan Stanley is required to pay deferred compensation awards that the plaintiffs failed to earn. Morgan Stanley issues the awards to financial advisors to motivate retention and good conduct. Under the express terms of the awards, an advisor must be employed and in good standing on the award' s vesting date to earn the award. Plaintiffs resigned from Morgan Stanley before the awards at issue vested, and the awards were therefore cancelled according to their terms. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action claiming that the awards should still be paid because they are actually "employee 1 In this brief, "BRISA" refers to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and "Morgan Stanley" refers to the Defendants-Appellants Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, and the Morgan Stanley Compensation Management and Development Committee collectively. - 1- DOLAR0960 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 11 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 52 of 194 pension benefit plans" under ERISA and therefore protected from cancellation by ERISA's anti-forfeiture rules. Because the parties had entered into valid, controlling arbitration agreements, Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). The district court purported to grant the motion, but not before finding that the deferred compensation awards are governed by ERISA, in the mistaken belief that it was necessary to answer that central merits question before deciding whether the matter should be arbitrated. But the court's merits finding was not in fact necessary to its order compelling arbitration, because as the district court itself correctly concluded, arbitration was appropriate even if the awards were ERISA plans. And because the merits finding was unnecessary, it was improper: When "deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims." AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (emphasis added). The district court justified its approach by suggesting that Morgan Stanley invited the court to reach the merits, and was merely the victim of its own gamble. That is demonstrably incorrect. In briefing Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration, neither party asked the court to resolve the ERISA coverage question: the central dispute in that motion was whether plaintiffs could obtain complete -2- DOLAR0961 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 12 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 53 of 194 relief in arbitration if their ERISA claims succeeded. (Morgan Stanley argued, and the district court ultimately agreed, that plaintiffs could obtain full payment of their benefits claims in arbitration.) More than a year after briefing on the motion to compel concluded, the district court sua sponte issued an order directing the parties to address the ERISA coverage question because it wasn't addressed in the parties' briefing. To state the obvious, the question wasn't addressed because both parties agreed that it didn't need to be decided. But Morgan Stanley responded as ordered, stating its underlying merits position in the five-page letter brief permitted by the district judge's rules, while reiterating that the court should send the matter to arbitration-the entire reason Morgan Stanley had filed the motion to compel in the first place. The decision below has effectively denied Morgan Stanley's right to arbitration of the merits of this dispute. The district court's order is Exhibit A to the statements of claim that plaintiffs have filed in arbitration. Plaintiffs' counsel has publicly declared that the order conclusively resolves the merits of the parties' dispute. And the order has prompted a flurry of copycat claims-more than 80 and counting-in which other claimants are arguing the district court's ERISA- coverage finding on this central question is "binding" law that definitively resolves the dispute in their favor. By purporting to resolve the merits of this dispute, the -3- DOLAR0962 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 13 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 54 of 194 district court's order violates the FAA, which protects Morgan Stanley's contractual right to arbitration free from undue judicial influence. The district court's unnecessary merits finding is also just plain wrong-the awards indisputably are not ERISA plans. This Court should not reach that ultimate question, which is reserved for arbitration. But the serious errors in the district court's merits analysis reinforce the importance of vacating, whether through appellate or mandamus review, the court's erroneous decision to reach the merits at all. 2 The district court found that ERISA applies because the awards permit some payments after the end of employment for humanitarian reasons such as death and disability, even though the awards lack the features that courts and the Department of Labor (DOL) have deemed essential to pension plan status. That ERISA theory is unprecedented and truly radical. The district court's errors can perhaps be explained by the peculiar procedure in which this issue was purportedly decided-on a motion to compel arbitration, where no party presented the issue, without the briefing, discovery, testimony, or evidentiary record that is needed to support a decision on the merits. But Morgan Stanley now faces arbitrations in which it must overcome plaintiffs' 2 If the Court were to conclude that it was necessary to reach the merits to decide arbitrability, it should reverse the district court's merits analysis on mandamus review-but as explained within, it cannot seriously be disputed that the ERISA finding was unnecessary to the arbitrability question. -4- DOLAR0963 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 14 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 55 of 194 contention that the only disputed legal issue has already been decided by a federal district court-and decided against Morgan Stanley. The FAA permits this Court to address the district court's effective denial of Morgan Stanley's right to arbitrate. The Court should vacate the orders below so that the district court may compel arbitration without the unnecessary commentary on the merits. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) because plaintiffs assert claims under BRISA. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(l)(C) because the district court constructively denied Morgan Stanley's application to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206 when it purported to resolve the merits of the dispute that the parties had agreed to arbitrate. ECF No. 32 at 9-17 3 ; see, e.g., Henry on behalf of BSC Ventures Holdings, Inc. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan v. Wilmington Tr. NA, 72 F.4th 499, 505 (3d Cir. 2023) ("We have consistently held that under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a), all orders that have the effect of declining to compel arbitration [are] reviewable." (quotation omitted)). The court's finding on the merits in its order nominally compelling arbitration has, in effect, deprived Morgan Stanley of its contractual right to an arbitral resolution of the merits. To the extent 3 "ECF" refers to the docket in this appeal, No. 24-3141. -5- DOLAR0964 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 15 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 56 of 194 the district court's merits "finding" could be given preclusive effect in future proceedings, defendants must be afforded the opportunity for appellate review. 4 To that end, if the Court concludes that it lacks appellate jurisdiction, it may treat the instant appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. ECF No. 32 at 17-18; see S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Even though we lack interlocutory jurisdiction to review the district court's order, a writ of mandamus may still be appropriate."); Seguros Banvenez S.A. v. SIS Oliver Drescher, 715 F.2d 54, 56 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In an appropriate case, we may treat an appeal from an unappealable interlocutory order as a motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus."); infra at 36-38. Finally, Morgan Stanley has Article III standing to appeal the district court's order because Morgan Stanley is "aggrieved" by the portion of the district court's 4 Berenson v. National Financial Services LLC, 485 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2007), relied upon by plaintiffs in opposing jurisdiction, ECF No. 39 at 6, is inapposite. In Berenson, the party seeking to appeal had previously "invited the court to consider broadly the merits" of the dispute at summary judgment, moving to compel arbitration only after obtaining a favorable summary judgment ruling. Berenson, 485 F.3d at 36, 42. The moving party had thus affirmatively waived its right to arbitrate the merits by inviting the court to decide the merits, see id. at 43, unlike here, see infra at 27-33. Multiple other courts of appeals have recognized that appellate jurisdiction over effective denials of arbitration may lie under 9 U.S.C. § 16, ECF No. 32 at 13-14 (collecting cases), and this Court may exercise mandamus jurisdiction in any event. -6- DOLAR0965 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 16 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 57 of 194 order that purports to resolve the merits of the dispute in plaintiffs' favor. See In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1993). ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Did the district court legally err in resolving the parties' core dispute on the merits-i.e., whether ERISA applies to Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards-when the parties agreed that those claims should be resolved not in court but in arbitration? 2. If the Court concludes that it was necessary to determine ERISA's application in order to determine arbitrability, did the district court err in concluding that Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards are governed by ERISA? STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards Morgan Stanley financial advisors generally receive two forms of incentive compensation. A25127. Their incentive compensation includes both ongoing cash incentive compensation that is paid on a monthly basis, which makes up the vast majority of advisors' pay; and deferred cash and stock awards that are granted annually and subject to multi-year vesting periods. A27-281131-34. The deferred cash awards issued under the Morgan Stanley Incentive Compensation Plan ("MSCIP") vest in six years (eight years, before 2015), and the deferred stock awards issued under the Equity Incentive Compensation Plan ("EICP") vest in four -7- DOLAR0966 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 17 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 58 of 194 years. A27131. The terms of financial advisors' compensation-including deferred incentive compensation-are disclosed by Morgan Stanley ahead of time in a compensation plan published annually (the "Compensation Plan"). The Compensation Plan explains that financial advisors will receive a guaranteed monthly base salary (Section 1.1 ), and then are allocated "Total Credits" based on their tenure and production (Section 1.2.1 ), from which the values of their deferred incentive compensation (Section 1.2.2) and monthly incentive compensation (Section 1.2.3) are calculated. Al 73-77. The Compensation Plan discloses the vesting schedule for the cash- and equity-based awards, and states: Deferred compensation awards are contingent upon the [advisor] remaining employed through the grant and vesting dates of the award. A176. The full terms of the deferred awards are set forth in Award Certificates that are issued to financial advisors annually. A28136. The Award Certificates disclose the purpose of the deferred awards-"to reward you for your continued Employment and service to the Firm in the future and your compliance with the Firm's policies (including the Code of Conduct)"-and explain that: In view of these purposes, you will earn your ... award only if you (1) remain in continuous Employment through the Scheduled Vesting Date (subject to limited exceptions set forth below), [and] (2) do not engage in any Prohibited Activity[.] -8- DOLAR0967 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 18 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 59 of 194 A216. Each Award Certificate is supplemented by a Summary Description, or "Term Sheet," that provides an abbreviated, general description of the key award terms and conditions. See A302. The first paragraph of the Term Sheet includes a disclosure nearly identical to that in the Award Certificate: You have no right to your ... award until it is "earned." Generally, to earn your award, you must (1) remain in continuous Employment through the Scheduled Vesting Date, [and] (2) even if your award is vested, not engage in any activity that constitutes Prohibited Activity[.] Id. The award documents provide that as a general rule any unvested awards are cancelled if a financial advisor leaves Morgan Stanley. See A220-21, § 7; A303. Morgan Stanley has subjected that general rule to a handful of narrow exceptions that do not frustrate the retention and guardianship purposes of the awards. If a financial advisor is unable to remain employed through the awards' vesting dates because of death, disability, retirement, involuntary not-for-cause termination (i.e., layoff), or government service, Morgan Stanley will still pay the compensation to the financial advisor (or his or her beneficiaries). See A218-20, §§ 3-5; A303-04. Under these exceptions, and only under these exceptions, some payments may be made to former Morgan Stanley employees. Otherwise, all payments by definition go to current employees. The awards are structured in part to meet the expectations of Morgan Stanley's financial regulators. Regulators including the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the -9- DOLAR0968 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 19 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 60 of 194 Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have issued and proposed guidance to financial firms advising them to defer portions of employee incentive compensation-and to make that compensation contingent and cancellable-to address risk-taking and other behaviors that may be harmful to customers and the public markets. 5 B. Plaintiffs' claims Plaintiffs are former Morgan Stanley financial advisors who voluntarily left the firm to join competitors, resulting in the cancellation of their unvested deferred compensation awards. A23-24 11 11-22. In their complaint, plaintiffs do not dispute that Morgan Stanley correctly applied the terms of the deferred compensation awards by cancelling the awards when they resigned. Instead, plaintiffs argue that the deferred compensation awards are "employee benefit 5 See, e.g., Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395, 36,396, 36,408-10 (June 25, 2010) (commending the use of awards that are deferred for multi-year periods and subject to cancellation); Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,392 (July 12, 2019) (addressing compensation-related best practices for compliance); FINRA, 2024 FINRA Annual Regulatory Oversight Report 45 (Jan. 2024), https://bit.ly/3PDRxBO (describing expectation that FIN RA member firms will "adjust[] compensation for financial professionals who fail to adequately manage conflicts of interest associated with account recommendations"); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 180-81, 192 (May 6, 2024 ), https://bit.ly/40CKEqA (proposing regulation requiring the multi-year deferral and potential cancellation of incentive compensation awarded to "significant risk- takers"). - 10 - DOLAR0969 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 20 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 61 of 194 pension plans" under BRISA-meaning plaintiffs' unvested awards could not lawfully be "forfeited" and the awards' vesting requirements cannot be enforced- because the awards permit some payments after the end of employment. Plaintiffs assert three claims: ( 1) a claim for declaratory and equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3), A43-441198-101; (2) a claim for benefits and for reformation of the deferred compensation awards under ERISA § 502(a)(l) and§ 502(a)(3), A44-45 11102-107; and (3) a claim of fiduciary breach under ERISA § 502(a)(2) on behalf of the putative ERISA plan against the Morgan Stanley Compensation Management Development and Succession Committee, A45-4711108-117. The complaint explicitly requests "an Order from the Court ... declaring that the FA Deferred Compensation Program is subject to ERISA[.]" A2216. C. Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration In May 2022, Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act. A51. Morgan Stanley argued that all plaintiffs had entered valid arbitration agreements that encompassed their claims, A65-72, and that those agreements delegated questions concerning arbitrability to the arbitrator, A 72-73. Morgan Stanley also explained that the arbitration agreements lawfully extended to the claims that plaintiffs styled as "representative" claims because however styled, plaintiffs' claims were quintessential individual benefits claims which are unquestionably arbitrable- - 11 - DOLAR0970 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 21 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 62 of 194 plaintiffs were seeking to recover benefits they claim are due to themfrom the alleged plans. A70-72. In its briefing on the motion to compel arbitration, including its reply brief and responses to plaintiffs' notices of supplemental authority, Morgan Stanley structured its arguments to show that the claims were arbitrable even if plaintiffs were entitled to relief under ERISA. At no point in its briefing did Morgan Stanley argue that plaintiffs' claims are not arbitrable because the deferred compensation awards are not subject to ERIS A, or argue that the district court needed to reach that question in order to resolve the motion to compel. Instead, Morgan Stanley repeatedly emphasized that plaintiffs could obtain complete relief on their ERISA claims in arbitration, as agreed, if the arbitrators determined they were entitled to any relief at all. See A53, 104, 124, 131. Plaintiffs similarly did not seek a resolution of the merits in opposing Morgan Stanley's motion to compel. See A76, 120, 127. On Friday, September 15, 2023, the district court issued an order stating that the "parties' briefing does not adequately address whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation program is an ERISA plan." A136. The Court directed: [B]y Wednesday, September 20, 2023, the parties will submit letters addressing whether Plaintiffs' allegations that, in certain scenarios, some financial analysts receive their scheduled payouts after their employment with Morgan Stanley ends demonstrates that the deferred compensation program is an ERISA plan. - 12 - DOLAR0971 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 22 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 63 of 194 Id. (emphasis in original). The court did not explain the purpose of its request. On the same day, plaintiffs filed a letter in response to an apparent ex parte "request received" from chambers-the specifics of which have never been disclosed to Morgan Stanley-attaching the documents cited in the complaint. Al38. Five days later, the parties submitted five-page letters, consistent with the district court's rules (SPA91 §I(A)), stating their positions on plaintiffs' BRISA-coverage allegations. See A309, 314. Morgan Stanley addressed, as ordered, why plaintiffs' allegations did not demonstrate that BRISA governs the at-issue deferred compensation awards. But it concluded its letter by reiterating that the issue should be decided by an arbitrator, reminding the court that "plaintiffs may-and must-obtain any relief on their BRISA claims in arbitration." A3 l 8 (emphasis added; capitalization altered). D. The district court's November 2023 order On November 21, 2023, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order purporting to grant Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration. SPAl. The district court explained that the parties entered valid arbitration agreements with paradigmatically broad language. SP Al 5-27. The district court then considered plaintiffs' argument that "their claims are not arbitrable" because "they have brought their claims in a representative capacity on behalf of BRISA plans." SPA28. The district court concluded that plaintiffs do not assert any genuinely - 13 - DOLAR0972 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 23 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 64 of 194 representative claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2) but rather raise individual benefits claims that are indisputably arbitrable, SPA41-51; that plaintiffs failed to show that their§ 502(a)(3) claims are not arbitrable, SPA5 l-53; and that compelling arbitration would not result in an impermissible prospective waiver of any statutory rights under ERISA, since plaintiffs could obtain full payment of their benefits through arbitration, SPA5 3-5 5. Before concluding that arbitration was appropriate regardless whether ER/SA applied, the district court took the extra-and remarkable-step of analyzing whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards qualify as pension plans. SP A29-39. Based on the complaint and incorporated documents, the district court concluded that the awards are ERISA plans, SPA39, thereby purporting to resolve the key question on the merits and granting relief the complaint explicitly seeks, A2216. Within 24 hours of the court's decision, plaintiffs' counsel publicly characterized the finding as conclusively resolving the merits of the parties' dispute. 6 6 See Miriam Rozen, Ex-Morgan Stanley Brokers Must Arbitrate Class Claim Over Deferred Comp, Judge Rules, AdvisorHub (Nov. 22, 2023), https://bit.ly/4hkP A9e ("Judge Gardephe concluded that the Morgan Stanley deferred compensation plan is an ERISA pension plan .... This means that our clients' deferred compensation is vested and non-forfeitable."). - 14 - DOLAR0973 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 24 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 65 of 194 E. Morgan Stanley's motion for reconsideration or clarification On December 5, 2023, Morgan Stanley timely moved for reconsideration or clarification of the district court's November 2023 order. A319. The motion asked the court to clarify that it did not intend to rule on the merits of plaintiffs' claims in deciding the motion to compel arbitration or, if that was the court's intention, to reconsider that decision, since arbitrability was not dependent on the merits and the court did not have the evidentiary foundation to decide the merits. A319-50. On April 2, 2024, Morgan Stanley filed an emergency motion for leave to submit a declaration and certain arbitration-related documents demonstrating the exigency of the motion for reconsideration in view of arguments by claimants in arbitration that the district court's BRISA-governance finding "bound" the panel. A393-95. Morgan Stanley explained that it was facing an "imminent threat of recurring irreparable harm" given the order's outsized influence in ongoing arbitrations where final awards premised on the court's order are not generally appealable. A395. On May 24, 2024, with multiple arbitrations proceeding under the cloud of the district court's opinion, Morgan Stanley petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court ( 1) to compel arbitration without purporting to resolve whether the deferred compensation awards are BRISA-governed, or alternatively (2) to rule promptly on the motion for reconsideration so that Morgan - 15 - DOLAR0974 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 25 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 66 of 194 Stanley could appeal to this Court in the ordinary course. A533. On August 27, 2024, the Court denied the petition "without prejudice to renewal if the district court fails to act on the reconsideration motion within a reasonable time." A576. F. The district court's November 2024 order On November 5, 2024, the district court denied Morgan Stanley's motion for reconsideration or clarification. SPA57. Describing its November 2023 order, the district court stated the order had "addressed and resolved the parties' dispute as to whether the deferred compensation programs at issue are covered by BRISA." SPA58 (emphasis added). The district court thus rejected Morgan Stanley's primary request to clarify that it did not intend to resolve the merits of the dispute it ostensibly agreed was reserved for arbitration, stating that it had unambiguously "concluded that Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation programs are BRISA plans." SPA72 (quotation omitted). The district court then rejected Morgan Stanley's request to reconsider its BRISA finding. SPA 72-89. 1. The district court reasoned that it needed to resolve the BRISA- coverage question because if BRISA did not apply, then plaintiffs' arguments to avoid arbitration would fail and there would be no need to consider whether arbitrating their claims would be contrary to BRISA. SP A 75. But as the district court's own opinion demonstrates, plaintiffs' arguments to avoid arbitration also - 16 - DOLAR0975 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 26 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 67 of 194 fail if ERISA does apply-that is how the court purported to compel arbitration despite concluding that ERISA applies. The district court therefore did not need to reach the ERISA issue to decide arbitrability. Contra SPA77-78. 2. The court also faulted Morgan Stanley for "never suggest[ing] that [the court] should assume-for purposes of their motion to compel arbitration- that ERISA applied." SPA74. But arguing-as Morgan Stanley did-that arbitration was appropriate regardless whether ERISA applies is just another way of saying precisely that: the court could assume the question away. See, e.g., Al 14 ("Plaintiffs do not and could not dispute that individual claims for benefits may be arbitrated ... [and] can obtain complete relief, if any, through their individual claims for benefits."). The irrelevance of the underlying merits was plain from the parties' briefing, where neither party briefed the merits question-a void that the district court confirmed when it issued its September 2023 order observing that the parties had neglected that subject. Al36. 3. In its reconsideration order, the court mischaracterized Morgan Stanley's five-page letter response to that September 2023 order as evidence that Morgan Stanley somehow "chose[] to litigate ERISA coverage on the merits," SP A 76 (emphasis added). Morgan Stanley had no choice in the matter. When the court directed the parties to present their views on plaintiffs' allegations that "Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation program is an ERISA plan," Al36, - 17 - DOLAR0976 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 27 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 68 of 194 Morgan Stanley responded as ordered. But in the very same response, Morgan Stanley reminded the court that plaintiffs could and must obtain any relief on their BRISA claims in arbitration. A318. Morgan Stanley's request to send the merits to arbitration could not have been clearer. 7 4. Even as it suggested that Morgan Stanley had willfully sought to litigate the merits, the district court also faulted Morgan Stanley for failing to do so-saying Morgan Stanley had been "on notice of the BRISA coverage issue from the outset of this action and chose not to properly brief it," or to develop a record with the evidence it considered necessary to the decision of the merits, SPA 76-77 n.4. But of course, Morgan Stanley was asking the court to send the merits to arbitration. Asking the district court to decide the merits would have jeopardized that right. And as explained, it was not necessary to reach the BRISA-coverage question to decide arbitrability-the court's belief that Morgan Stanley could have and should have developed a record on the merits follows only from its threshold analytical error in believing the merits were relevant to arbitrability at all. 7 The purpose of the court's September 2023 order was not clear at the time- given the nature of the parties' dispute over whether plaintiffs could obtain complete relief in arbitration, Morgan Stanley understood the judge to be considering that question. That is why Morgan Stanley framed its reminder that the merits had to be arbitrated in those terms: plaintiffs could obtain the benefits they were seeking in arbitration, and therefore were obliged to arbitrate their claims. - 18 - DOLAR0977 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 28 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 69 of 194 5. Finally, the district court rejected Morgan Stanley's argument that the court's substantive analysis of the BRISA-coverage issue constituted "clear error." SP A82-89. The court doubled down on its prior findings and concluded that the evidence Morgan Stanley had suggested would be important to a proper analysis would not change the court's mind. Id. G. Morgan Stanley's appeal On November 29, 2024, Morgan Stanley timely appealed the district court's November 2024 order denying reconsideration and the underlying November 2023 order it addresses, both of which purport to resolve the merits of the dispute reserved for the arbitrators and therefore amount to an effective denial of Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration. A53 l; see 9 U.S.C. § l 6(a)(l )(B); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(A); see also Lora v. O'Heaney, 602 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (timely filed motion for reconsideration "toll[s] the time to file a notice of appeal regarding the underlying order until decision of the motion for reconsideration."). On December 20, 2024, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 26. On January 6, 2025, Morgan Stanley filed its opposition to that motion, explaining the jurisdictional bases for its appeal. ECF No. 32. On January 8, 2025, Morgan Stanley moved to expedite briefing on its appeal. ECF No. 34. - 19 - DOLAR0978 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 29 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 70 of 194 H. Parallel arbitrations Morgan Stanley is currently defending over 80 arbitrations brought by hundreds of former financial advisors before FINRA. See A395-96, 549-50. The first such claim was filed on September 2, 2021, roughly nine months after plaintiffs initiated this action. A549. The claims have proliferated since the district court's November 2023 order, with statements of claim closely hewing to the complaint's allegations and citing the order as resolving the key issue: Whether the deferred compensation awards are subject to ERISA. Id. A handful of the arbitrations have already gone to hearing. Since the district court's November 2023 order, claimants in these hearings have maintained that the district court's opinion "is the law"; that "it holds in no uncertain terms that Morgan Stanley's plans are governed by the broad law ERISA"; that "the panel's duty is to apply the law," and that "it is not within the province of a panel in arbitration to overrule a federal court decision." A418-19 at 23:9-24:1 (claimants' opening statement), A5 l 7-l 8 at 43 :22-44: 14 (claimants' closing argument). The claimants have objected to the presentation of evidence to the panels, arguing that the key merits issue in the case "has already been decided," A410 at 15:21-23, leaving only the calculation and award of damages to the arbitrators. Morgan - 20 - DOLAR0979 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 30 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 71 of 194 Stanley lost an arbitration on this issue for the first time after the district court's order. A550. 8 Several of the plaintiffs in this case have initiated arbitrations. They attached the district court's November 2023 order to their statements of claim, consistent with their counsel's public statements that the order has decided the merits of the claims in their favor. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. The district court improperly adjudicated the merits of a dispute it held the parties agreed to arbitrate, effectively depriving Morgan Stanley of its FAA-protected right to arbitration. The court's merits analysis was unnecessary, and violated the FAA' s mandate to refrain from ruling on the merits of claims that parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. A. Plaintiffs' claims against Morgan Stanley hinge on whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards are governed by ERISA. The district court should have resolved Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration without reaching that key question. The court correctly recognized that plaintiffs' benefits 8 While Morgan Stanley has also prevailed in arbitrations since the district court's November 2023 order, even those decisions illustrate the extent of the prejudice Morgan Stanley now faces due to the order: Morgan Stanley not only must establish that plaintiffs' claims lack merit, but also must convince lay arbitrators to reject a federal judge's finding on the key issue before them. See, e.g., FINRA Award, Rude et al. v. Morgan Stanley (June 17, 2024), https://bit.ly/4ao1Whi. - 21 - DOLAR0980 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 31 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 72 of 194 claims were unquestionably arbitrable because plaintiffs could obtain complete relief in arbitration even if ERISA applied. That holding did not require the court to resolve whether ERISA actually applies to plaintiffs' awards, as demonstrated by the fact that the court found arbitration appropriate whether or not plaintiffs' ERISA claims had any merit. The court has since suggested that Morgan Stanley invited the district court to reach the merits, but that is wrong. Morgan Stanley sought to have an arbitrator decide plaintiffs' claims. Neither Morgan Stanley's nor plaintiffs' arguments at the motion-to-compel stage addressed ERISA's application to the at-issue awards. The district court sua sponte ordered the parties to brief the merits precisely because neither party had addressed the merits (because they were irrelevant to the motion to compel). Morgan Stanley responded as ordered, but reiterated that the plaintiffs' claims had to be decided in arbitration. B. The district court's improper merits finding has frustrated Morgan Stanley's right to arbitrate the merits of the dispute, and has prompted dozens of copycat claims. Morgan Stanley now faces arbitrations against plaintiffs and hundreds of other former financial advisors in which it must contend with a federal court "ruling" that claimants argue binds the arbitrators to rule against Morgan Stanley. While that is wrong as a matter of law, the influence that a federal judge's finding has on lay arbitrators has effectively deprived Morgan Stanley of the - 22 - DOLAR0981 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 32 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 73 of 194 bargained-for arbitration process the FAA is designed to protect. C. If the Court determines that the FAA does not permit Morgan Stanley to appeal the district court's improper BRISA finding, then it still can and should issue a writ of mandamus to vacate the finding. The district court's decision to resolve the merits was clearly and indisputably incorrect, and absent this Court's intervention Morgan Stanley has no other way to obtain relief from the district court's errors that are irreparably harming its arbitration rights. II. The district court's merits commentary is also wrong, which amplifies the prejudice it is causing and reinforces the importance of this Court's review. A. A compensation program is not subject to BRISA either if it is not a "pension plan" under the BRISA statute or if it is an exempt "bonus" plan under Department of Labor regulation. Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards fall outside BRISA's scope under both tests. 1. Contrary to the district court's finding, the awards are not a "pension plan" simply because they permit payment to certain former employees under certain humanitarian exceptions. Courts and the DOL have recognized that incidental payments to former employees do not transform a contingent incentive compensation program into a pension plan. The at-issue subsection of the statute applies to voluntary deferral plans, where employees choose to defer their own earned income to post-employment periods. These awards do not permit any - 23 - DOLAR0982 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 33 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 74 of 194 deferral of earnings by employees-they are earned and paid upon vesting. The district court misapprehended the contingent nature of the awards by declaring that the awards are earned upon grant. The governing award documents say otherwise: to earn an award, a financial advisor must remain at Morgan Stanley in good standing through the vesting date. That means that financial advisors do not choose to defer any earned income under the statute. The district court also incorrectly ignored the awards' express purposes-the "paramount" consideration in determining pension plan status. The purposes of these awards are to reward current employees for their continued service to the firm and good conduct, not to provide retirement or pension income. 2. The awards are also exempt from ERISA under the DOL's "bonus" regulation, which applies as long as bonuses are not "systematically deferred" until employees' post-employment years. The district court erred when it concluded the regulation does not apply because the awards are supposedly "commissions," not bonuses. There is no foundation for the district court's views that bonuses cannot be calculated based on revenue generation or that companies can only issue one type of bonus. To the contrary, courts and the DOL have consistently recognized that contingent awards just like Morgan Stanley's are ERISA-exempt retention bonuses. The bonus regulation applies to bonuses as long as payment is not - 24 - DOLAR0983 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 34 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 75 of 194 "systematically deferred" until after employment. The district court inverted that standard, declaring that the bonus regulation cannot apply unless payments to former employees are "rare." Compounding matters, the district court assumed that fact against Morgan Stanley at the motion to compel stage, where no record had been developed on this point (because the merits of plaintiffs' claims were not at issue); and then relied on its manufactured legal standard to cast aside evidence at the reconsideration stage that over 85% of award distributions go to current Morgan Stanley employees. B. The district court erred in declaring it had everything it needed to decide the BRISA issue. While the court felt equipped to rule on the issue at the motion to compel stage without a complete record or dedicated legal briefing, its BRISA finding-a radical departure from 50 years of caselaw and DOL guidance-demonstrates otherwise. STANDARD OF REVIEW The question whether the district court properly ruled on the merits of the dispute when considering a motion to compel arbitration is a legal one, and the Court reviews questions of law de novo. See WasteCare Corp. v. Harmony Enters., Inc., 822 F. App'x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying de novo review to decision "effectively" denying motion to compel arbitration); Soliman v. Subway Franchisee Advert. Fund Tr., Ltd., 999 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 2021) (denial of - 25 - DOLAR0984 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 35 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 76 of 194 arbitration is reviewed de novo ). The Court likewise reviews de novo the mixed questions of law and fact implicated in the district court's BRISA-coverage finding. Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili, 704 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2012). If the Court concludes that it lacks appellate jurisdiction, or that it was necessary for the district court to reach the merits, then it can in the alternative treat this appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. See supra at 6; infra at 36- 38. ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY PURPORTED TO RESOLVE THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS, EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVING MORGAN STANLEY OF ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION The FAA requires courts to "rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms." Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (quotation omitted). "[I]n deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims." AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649; see Transit Mix Concrete Corp. v. Loe. Union No. 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 809 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating the same); United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (noting that courts "have no business weighing the merits of the grievance" reserved for arbitration). Adherence to this general prohibition is even more important when the parties have not presented the merits for resolution - 26 - DOLAR0985 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 36 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 77 of 194 in the first place. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (explaining that courts are "essentially passive instruments of government" that should "decide only questions presented by the parties" (quotations omitted)); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) ("[W]e rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present."). Here, the district court failed to respect the terms of the parties' arbitration agreements, which reserve for the arbitrators the question whether plaintiffs' claims have any merit-i.e., whether ERISA governs Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards. The district court purported to resolve that question, even though it was not necessary to decide that question to decide whether plaintiffs' claims were arbitrable and the parties never argued otherwise. The district court's decision to reach the merits conflicts with the FAA's mandate and should therefore be abrogated. A. The district court should have granted Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration without addressing whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards qualify as ERISA pension plans. The key question in the parties' underlying dispute is whether the deferred compensation awards at issue are subject to ERISA. If the awards are not, then plaintiffs' claims-all of which are brought under ERISA-fail. But if the awards are subject to ERISA, then there would be no dispute that the cancellation of - 27 - DOLAR0986 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 37 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 78 of 194 plaintiffs' unvested awards when they resigned from Morgan Stanley conflicted with the statute's anti-forfeiture provisions. Under ERISA's vesting provisions, an employee with "at least 3 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the employee's accrued benefit derived from employer contributions." 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)(ii). Each of the plaintiffs worked at Morgan Stanley for at least three years, and the awards at issue were cancelled thereafter. A23-24 ,r,r 11- 22. As a practical matter, then, resolution of the BRISA-coverage issue in either direction is dispositive of the ERISA violation plaintiffs allege. 9 Morgan Stanley's motion to compel presented a much narrower question, independent of the merits: Whether plaintiffs' ERISA claims must be directed to arbitration. The district court correctly answered yes, and none of its reasoning rejecting plaintiffs' contrary arguments required addressing, much less resolving, the BRISA-coverage issue. First, plaintiffs argued (i) that the "parties did not agree to arbitrate claims brought in Plaintiffs' representative capacity"; and (ii) that the alleged ERISA plan (i.e., the deferred compensation awards) "never agreed to arbitrate any claims," and that this precluded arbitration "because Plaintiffs' § 502(a)(2) claims belong 9 If the awards were determined to be ERISA pension plans, Morgan Stanley would be limited to asserting equitable defenses to plaintiffs' entitlement to relief. See, e.g., Young v. Verizon's Bell Atl. Cash Balance Plan, 615 F.3d 808, 822 (7th Cir. 2010). - 28 - DOLAR0987 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 38 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 79 of 194 to" the alleged plan. A90, 93 (quotation omitted). The district court correctly rejected these arguments "because Plaintiffs have not alleged losses to the plan" and thus "are not, in fact, proceeding in a representative capacity." SPA48 (quotation omitted). The district court's reasoning holds even if ERISA actually governs the deferred compensation awards: As the district court explained, because plaintiffs "failed to allege a true § 502(a)(2) claim," their complaint did not require the district court to decide whether "claims under§ 502(a)(2) are non- arbitrable." SPA51. 10 Next, plaintiffs similarly argued they were not bound to arbitrate because they "assert claims in a representative capacity under ERISA § 502(a)(3)." A91. The district court correctly rejected this argument, too, because § 502(a)(3) claims may seek individual relief and be arbitrated individually, and plaintiffs had "not demonstrated that their§ 502(a)(3) claims are non-arbitrable." SPA53. Again, that logic holds whether or not ERISA governs the deferred compensation awards. Finally, plaintiffs objected to arbitration under the prospective waiver doctrine, arguing that "the arbitration provisions would eliminate Plaintiffs' right to pursue statutory remedies provided for under sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3)." 10 Morgan Stanley also argued that plaintiffs' benefits claims were subject to arbitration regardless whether plaintiffs also asserted bona fide representative claims, such that the benefits claims had to proceed to arbitration even if plaintiffs also asserted litigable claims. A 71-72. - 29 - DOLAR0988 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 39 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 80 of 194 A96. The district court correctly rejected this argument because plaintiffs had "not identified any limitation on remedies that would apply in an arbitration, ... other than the class waiver" contained in their arbitration agreements, and the class waiver did not preclude the recovery of the benefits plaintiffs were seeking. SPA54-55. Once again, that reasoning remains valid whether or not ERISA governs plaintiffs' deferred compensation awards. Simply put, the district court concluded that arbitration was appropriate even if plaintiffs' ERISA claims had merit. The disputed issue in the motion to compel was only whether plaintiffs could obtain complete relief on their claims in arbitration, and because they could, the claims were arbitrable. Morgan Stanley raised these points in its motion for reconsideration or clarification, A334-36, but the district court denied the motion based on its belief that it was necessary to reach the ERISA issue: [I]n order to rule on the enforceability of the arbitration provision on which Defendants rely, this Court had to determine ( 1) whether ERISA applies to Plaintiffs' claims - i.e., whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation [awards] are indeed ERISA plans; and (2) if so, whether arbitration of Plaintiffs' claims would be contrary to ERISA. Ruling on the first of those questions - whether the deferred compensation [awards] are covered by ERIS A - was necessary because, if Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation [awards] are not covered by ERISA, Plaintiffs' arguments to avoid arbitration fail, and there would be no need to reach the second issue -whether arbitration of Plaintiffs' claims would be contrary to ERISA. SPA 75 (citation omitted). - 30 - DOLAR0989 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 40 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 81 of 194 That analysis rests on a logical fallacy. True enough, if the district court had determined that the deferred compensation awards were not covered by ERISA, then plaintiffs' arguments to avoid arbitration would have failed. But that does not mean such a determination was necessary to conclude that plaintiffs' claims should be directed to arbitration-after all, the district court infact concluded that ERIS A applied and that plaintiffs' claims were nevertheless arbitrable. Because the court's analysis established that arbitration was compulsory even if plaintiffs were right on the merits that ERISA applied, the court could have and should have resolved Morgan Stanley's motion to compel without reaching the merits question, as it would have avoided violating the well-established rule against courts opining "on the potential merits of the underlying claims" subject to arbitration. See AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649. The district court therefore erred in justifying its decision with reference to caselaw noting that where the question of arbitrability and the merits are "inextricably intertwined, a court's arbitrability decision may, of necessity, touch incidentally on the merits." SPA77 (quoting Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loe. 1776, 595 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2010)). As just explained, the questions of arbitrability and the merits are not intertwined here- they are entirely independent. The district court concluded (correctly) that - 31 - DOLAR0990 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 41 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 82 of 194 plaintiffs' claims are arbitrable whether or not the awards are ERISA pensions, so the court could have resolved the arbitrability question without reaching the merits. The district court also insisted that Morgan Stanley "never suggested that [the district court] should assume - for purposes of [its] motion to compel arbitration-that ERISA applied to the[] deferred compensation [awards]." SPA74. That is incorrect. Both parties operated on that assumption, as the court itself recognized when it issued an order charging the parties with having ignored the issue. Al 36. Morgan Stanley maintained throughout its motion to compel briefing that plaintiffs' claims could be arbitrated even if they were subject to ERISA. See A 70-72, 111-14. Its arguments necessarily assumed that ERISA covered plaintiffs' claims and explained why those claims were arbitrable anyway. The same assumption also governed Morgan Stanley's arguments in response to plaintiffs' notices of supplemental authority. See Al25 ("[I]f [Plaintiffs] succeed in showing that Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation program is an ERISA plan at all, they may obtain the claimed benefits in full in an arbitration proceeding."); A132 (stating the same). Last, the district court stated that Morgan Stanley "asked [it] to rule that the[] deferred compensation [awards] were not covered by ERISA." SPA74. That, too, is incorrect. Morgan Stanley did not ask for a merits ruling when it asked the court to compel arbitration of the merits. A word-by-word review of Morgan - 32 - DOLAR0991 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 42 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 83 of 194 Stanley's briefs in support of its motion to enforce its arbitration agreements confirms that, as should be obvious, Morgan Stanley did not ask the court to substitute its judgment for the arbitrators. See A5 3-75, 104-19. Morgan Stanley addressed the merits only in response to the district court's September 2023 order that it do so. Even in that letter, Morgan Stanley did not ask the district court to rule on the merits (and the district court never indicated that it intended to do so)- Morgan Stanley instead reiterated again that plaintiffs could obtain complete relief in arbitration, and that they therefore had to arbitrate their claims: "plaintiffs may-and must-obtain any relief on their claims in arbitration." A318 (emphasis added; capitalization altered). The district court's unprompted foray into the merits was a mistake. The district court should have granted Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration without addressing the merits of the parties' underlying dispute. This Court should correct that error. B. The district court's improper merits finding has caused Morgan Stanley the very harm the FAA is designed to avoid. Congress's "principal purpose" in enacting the FAA was to "ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms." Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,478 (1989). The district court's improper BRISA-coverage finding has compromised Morgan Stanley's FAA-protected contractual right to resolve the merits of the dispute with - 33 - DOLAR0992 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 43 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 84 of 194 plaintiffs in arbitration. Plaintiffs' counsel has publicly stated that the district court resolved the merits of their claims in plaintiffs' favor. Supra at 14 & n.6. The November 2023 order is Exhibit A to plaintiffs' arbitral statements of claim. The court's finding has likewise undermined the arbitral resolution of claims surrounding Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards more broadly. Morgan Stanley is currently defending over 80 other arbitrations brought by former financial advisors asserting identical BRISA claims to recover unvested deferred compensation. See A395-96, 549-50. Most of these claims were filed in the wake of the district court's November 2023 order and expressly cite the order as judicial precedent confirming ERISA's application to the claimants' deferred compensation awards. A549. In the arbitrations that have proceeding to hearing, the claimants have uniformly argued that the district court's finding is "binding law" that arbitration panels are prohibited from manifestly disregarding, leaving nothing but damages for the arbitrators to decide. This posturing has prompted hearings centered as much on disputes over the effect of the district court's order as on the actual evidence and the merits of the claims. See A394-95, 550. Of course, the district court's BRISA governance finding does not actually "bind" the arbitration panels in other cases. The district court's finding cannot have preclusive effect when it was not necessary to the decision, see Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 835 (2009); when it is not a "valid and final judgment," see Ashe v. - 34 - DOLAR0993 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 44 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 85 of 194 Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); when it has not been affirmed on appeal, see Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1986) (no preclusive effect absent appellate review of finding); 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 4421 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 update); and when Morgan Stanley did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the merits, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); see also, e.g., Picard v. Credit Sols., Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding the "portion of the district court's decision" addressing a merits issue was "dicta that is unnecessary to support the district court's arbitration ruling," and therefore had no preclusive effect). Nevertheless, to a panel of FINRA arbitrators, some with little or no legal background, a federal judge's determination of the merits has incalculable influence, especially when the district court's own opinion incorrectly but quite emphatically states that it resolved the ERISA question because it was required to do so as a matter of law. The result is that the district court's order is effectively depriving Morgan Stanley of the arbitration process that it bargained for with plaintiffs and that the FAA protects. Consistent with the FAA's directive that courts should enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms without reaching the merits themselves, supra at 26, this Court should hold that the district court did not have to reach the merits when deciding arbitrability, and therefore - 35 - DOLAR0994 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 45 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 86 of 194 should not have done so. C. If the Court determines it lacks appellate jurisdiction over Morgan Stanley's appeal, it should issue a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court's improper ERISA finding. The Court has jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16 to reverse the district court's effective denial of Morgan Stanley's contractual right to arbitrate the merits. Supra at 5-6. But the Court may also treat Morgan Stanley's appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus in the alternative, see Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 169, and direct the same corrective steps on that basis. Mandamus is warranted where the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, there are no other adequate means to obtain relief, and issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 759-60 (2d Cir. 2007). Those factors are satisfied here. Morgan Stanley's right to the writ is clear and indisputable: the district court plainly erred under the FAA in unnecessarily resolving the merits of a dispute the parties agreed to arbitrate (and did not ask the court to resolve). Supra§ I.A; see also A533. The district court's decision is causing Morgan Stanley irreparable harm, and absent review, Morgan Stanley will have no other adequate means to obtain relief. Morgan Stanley generally will not have the ability to seek review of the arbitration awards that follow, as FINRA awards do not require any explanation of the arbitration panel's decision and are not ordinarily subject to appellate review. See FINRA Code of - 36 - DOLAR0995 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 46 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 87 of 194 Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, Rule 13904. Finally, the writ is appropriate under the extraordinary circumstances here: the district court's unsolicited ERISA finding is wreaking havoc in countless arbitrations, including those brought by plaintiffs, supra § LB, and is based on critical misstatements of fact and law, infra § II. As this Court explained in Stein, "mandamus is available to confine courts to their designated jurisdiction"; the "touchstones of mandamus review are usurpation of power, clear abuse of discretion and the presence of an issue of first impression." 486 F.3d at 759 (quotation omitted). All of those considerations favor review here, where the district court reached an issue it lacked the power to decide and got it badly wrong. The order is not just wreaking havoc in arbitrations pending against Morgan Stanley which will not be reparable on appeal-the court's novel and unprecedented ruling is creating confusion and uncertainty among regulated entities about their ability to continue to offer a longstanding compensation structure that serves important purposes and is designed to satisfy requirements imposed by their financial regulators. Supra at 7-10 & n.5. And Morgan Stanley will have no opportunity to ameliorate these harms through the ordinary appellate process. If any case is suitable for mandamus review, it's this one. - 37 - DOLAR0996 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 47 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 88 of 194 II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S MERITS COMMENTARY IS WRONG The district court made a series of errors in concluding that Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards are subject to ERISA. The errors can perhaps be explained by the absence of party presentation, meaning the district court lacked a responsive pleading, full briefing, an evidentiary record, or the other procedural accoutrements ordinarily associated with a finding on the merits, but whatever the reason, the district court misunderstood the materials before it and misunderstood the law when it concluded that the deferred compensation awards at issue here are ERISA pension plans. While this Court should not reach the merits for the same reasons the district court should not have, the errors in the district court's decision-and the confusion it is causing about the state of the law- reinforce why the Court's review is needed and appropriate. If and only if the Court were to determine that a merits finding was necessary to decide arbitrability, the Court should reverse that finding on mandamus review. But because the two issues are clearly independent, as discussed above, the district court's errors on the merits are principally relevant to demonstrating the importance of this Court's review. 11 11 The district court's merits finding is clearly wrong based on the law and the very limited materials the court reviewed, and could be reversed on that basis. But the district court's finding could not be affirmed without affording Morgan Stanley the opportunity to present a complete evidentiary record and briefing, see infra at 55-58, and the district court erred in suggesting that Morgan Stanley had such an - 38 - DOLAR0997 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 48 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 89 of 194 A. Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards are not a pension benefit plan. ERISA defines an "employee pension benefit plan" as a plan or program that "by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances ... (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). The DOL, the federal agency charged with enforcing ERISA, has also promulgated a regulation that exempts from ERISA's scope "payments made by an employer to some or all of its employees as bonuses for work performed, unless such payments are systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 C.F .R. § 2510.3-2(c). Taken together, a compensation program is not subject to ERISA either if it is not a "pension plan" under the statute or if it is a "bonus" plan under the DOL regulation. As this Court has observed, the "pension plan" definition is "not to be read as an elastic girdle that can be stretched to cover any content that can conceivably fit within its reach." Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 574-75 (5th Cir. 1980)). opportunity below, supra at 32-33. To reiterate, the merits of this case should be arbitrated-but if liability is to be found in litigation, it cannot be on a one-sided record formulated by plaintiffs alone. - 39 - DOLAR0998 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 49 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 90 of 194 Neither plan sponsors nor employees benefit when a compensation program is retrospectively recast as a pension plan, limiting how much can be paid to current employees and when. In this case, both the statutory definition and the bonus plan regulation lead to a single conclusion: Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards to financial advisors are not a pension plan. I. The awards do not qualify as a "pension plan" under the statutory test. a. The district incorrectly concluded that exceptional payments to former employees transform the awards into an ERISA "pension plan." The district court's ERISA finding was premised on Morgan Stanley's humanitarian exceptions to cancellation for advisors who cannot remain at Morgan Stanley through the vesting period due to death, disability, layoff, ordinary course retirement, and transition to government service. The court reasoned that, because the awards permit payment to former financial advisors under those narrow circumstances, the payments "sometimes occur at the end of employment or beyond" and are therefore within the scope of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii). SP A38. The district court's reasoning that the existence of "some" post-employment payments triggers ERISA coverage under § 1002(2)(A)(ii) has been directly rejected by numerous courts. The Fifth Circuit put it bluntly: [ERISA] does not embrace all plans that may incidentally result in the payment of benefits after death or disability but only plans established for the purpose of providing those benefits .... Under the statutory - 40 - DOLAR0999 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 50 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 91 of 194 definition, the mere fact that some payments under a plan may be made after an employee has retired or left the company does not result in ER/SA coverage. Murphy, 611 F.2d at 574-75 (emphases added). The district court's contrary decision stands alone: No court has previously interpreted§ 1002(2)(A)(ii) to mean that any payment to a former employee, even on an exception basis, brings a plan within ERISA's reach. See Wilson v. Sa/elite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429,436 (6th Cir. 2019) (deferral of payment to termination of employment or retirement must be the plan's frequent and intended result for ERISA to apply, not merely "incidental"); Tolbert v. REC Cap. Mkts. Corp., 758 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 2014) ("The mere fact that some payments under a plan may be made after an employee has retired or left the company does not result in ERISA coverage."); Oatway, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting ERISA coverage because purpose of plan was to encourage employee retention, where "post-retirement payments" were "only incidental" to that goal); Faris v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 2023 WL 7386870, at *5, *8-9 (D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2023) (incentive plan that paid current employees, with "limited number of exceptions" to cancellation that resulted in payments to former employees, was not subject to ERISA); Albers v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 1999 WL 228367, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999) (plan that generally made payments during employment, but paid immediately upon death, retirement, or disability was not subject to - 41 - DOLARI000 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 51 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 92 of 194 ERISA because post-employment payments were "merely incidental to the goal of providing current compensation"); Killian v. McCulloch, 850 F. Supp. 1239, 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (plan with purpose of incentivizing employee retention that contemplated post-termination payments after retirement, death, or disability was not subject to ERISA); Depew v. MNC Fin., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 492,494 (D. Md. 1993) (rejecting contention that any payment after death, disability, and other termination resulted in ERISA coverage). Guidance from the DOL further underscores the district court's error. Assessing an incentive program in which departing employees' awards were generally cancelled, except in the event of the employee's death or retirement, the DOL advised that the "mere fact that many of the [p]lans' participants may have separated from the Company ... prior to the time they will be eligible ... does not, in [DOL's] view, implicate a deferral of income of the kind contemplated by section 3(2)(A)." Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 31846478, at *3 (Dec. 6, 2002). That advice is consistent with the DOL's prior pronouncements on the issue, advising the public that payments that are merely "incidental" to the employer's goal of compensating current employees do not trigger ERISA's pension provisions. Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *1-2 (Mar. 6, 1998); see also Op. 82-29A, 1982 WL 21212, at *1-2 (July 2, 1982); Op. 79-20A, 1979 WL 6959, at *1-2 (Mar. 19, 1979); Op. 79-15A, 1979 WL 6953, at *1-2 (Mar. 12, 1979). - 42 - DOLARI00I Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 52 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 93 of 194 The district court misread the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tolbert to embrace its "one penny" rule. In fact, just like all the other courts to have considered the issue and the Department of Labor, the Fifth Circuit required more than mere payment after the termination of employment to find BRISA coverage. As relevant here, the statute applies to a plan that by its express terms "results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The plan in Tolbert allowed just that-employees could themselves voluntarily defer distribution of their mandatory deferred compensation amounts-even after the amounts became earned through vesting-to the end of their employment. Tolbert, 758 F.3d at 622. The critical feature of the plan that led to the application of BRISA was that the "employees ha[ d] the option to defer receipt of a portion of their compensation"-the employees "forewent [a present right to] income ... in exchange for receiving income ... at a later date." Id. at 625-26. The deferrals in the Tolbert plan are thus distinguishable from Morgan Stanley's deferred awards, where employees lack any ability to voluntarily defer distribution of vested awards-the awards are paid as soon as they are earned, and their payment cannot be deferred by employees until after the end of employment. See A234 § 2(b) (awards "will, to the extent vested, be paid in cash (minus applicable tax and other withholding liabilities) on the Scheduled Distribution - 43 - DOLAR1002 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 53 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 94 of 194 Date"). Indeed, Morgan Stanley's awards are like another non-ERISA plan the Fifth Circuit distinguished in Tolbert, under which the plaintiff-retirees "had no right to income" before certain conditions were met and therefore "had not foregone any income in exchange for receiving income at a later date." Tolbert, 758 F.3d at 265 (citing Boos v. AT&T, Inc., 643 F.3d 127, 134-35 (5th Cir. 2011)). The awards here, like the plan in Boos, are contingent on the advisor meeting specific conditions for payment-meaning advisors have no right to the awards, and thus do not forgo or defer any income, at the point of grant. In its reconsideration order, the district court chastised Morgan Stanley for supposedly misreading Tolbert to tum on this additional feature, SPA87-but it was the district court that overlooked this critical part of the Tolbert decision. 12 The otherwise-universal recognition that compensation plans can include some post-employment payments without implicating ERISA makes sense. ERISA is not intended to reach programs designed to compensate current employees-other legal regimes govern that. See Leister v. Dovetail, Inc., 546 12 The Sixth Circuit's Wilson decision similarly helps illustrate the point. In Wilson, the Sixth Circuit found that ERISA applied because the plan allowed participants to "choose to defer each upcoming year's compensation" and "authorize[d] options for payment of deferred income ... after termination." 930 F.3d at 432,437. No such voluntary deferral mechanism exists with respect to the Morgan Stanley awards at issues here, where financial advisors have no right to the compensation at all until the vesting date and cannot defer a fully vested award. - 44 - DOLAR1003 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 54 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 95 of 194 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[R]egular compensation is not an ERISA benefit."). These awards could not function if they were ERISA plans-under the pension rules they could not be used to reward current employees for retention and good guardianship, their very purposes for existing in the first place. Morgan Stanley would therefore have to either eliminate the awards altogether, or eliminate payments to advisors in cases of death, disability, layoff, retirement, or transition to government service-the only award term that purportedly "results in" post- employment payments under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii), see SPA38. In fact, ERISA does not preclude the use of deferred compensation with humanitarian exceptions, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. b. The district court incorrectly concluded that the deferred compensation awards are "earned" at the point of grant. The district court also misapprehended the contingent nature of the awards, prompting its erroneous finding that financial advisors earn the awards-and thus have their own "income" forcibly deferred-at the point of grant. SPA37-39. Not so. The governing documents before the district court reflect that financial advisors only earn the right to payment once they satisfy the award conditions, viz., remaining employed and in good standing through the vesting date. Supra at 8-9 (award documentation); see A209 ("[N]or shall a Participant or any Beneficiary or any other person have any right to receive any distribution under the Plan except as, and to the extent, expressly provided in this plan document or the A ward - 45 - DOLAR1004 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 55 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 96 of 194 Certificate."). Because advisors do not earn the deferred compensation until they satisfy the award conditions and the compensation is paid immediately once it is earned, there is no deferral of any earned income at all, by employees or otherwise. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii). The district court nevertheless described a financial advisor's failure to fulfill the conditions for payment as the "forfeiture of a contractual right," reasoning that Morgan Stanley could not undo advisors' supposed entitlement to the awards by making them contingent. SPA39. That illogicism cannot be squared with the express terms of the awards, nor with basic, longstanding tenets of contract law. See Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 29 (1805) ("What is a condition precedent? It is a condition to be performed before the estate can vest."); Finlay v. King's Lessee, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 346, 347 (1830) (where a contract has a "condition precedent, without performance ... no right could vest"). The district court based this analysis on its belief that advisors really "earn" the deferred compensation at an earlier point in time because the awards are computed based on the revenues financial advisors generate for the firm. SPA38 (citing Al43-45 §§ 1.2.1, 1.2.2). But the district court cited nothing to support the conclusion that how the awards are computed overrides the express terms of the awards, and a uniform body of precedent recognizes that contingent incentive awards absolutely can be calculated based on the employee's performance. See - 46 - DOLAR1005 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 56 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 97 of 194 infra at 51. At the end of the day, the terms of the awards define what they are-a reward for doing something specific, which is earned if and only if the employee does that specific thing. c. The district court incorrectly declined to consider the awards' purposes in analyzing ERISA coverage. The primary purposes of the awards are the "paramount consideration" in determining whether the deferred compensation program "falls under § 1002(2)(A)(i) or (ii)." Wilson, 930 F.3d at 436 (quoting Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016)). Here, those purposes are expressly disclosed in the Award Certificates issued to financial advisors every year. For example: The purposes of the 2015 award are . . . to reward you for your continued Employment and service to the Firm in the future and your compliance with the Firm's policies (including the Code of Conduct). A233 (2015 Award Certificate); accord A250, 216 (2016 and 2017 Award Certificates). The award Term Sheets issued to advisors each year include a similar disclosure-with an additional disclaimer that the awards are not intended for retirement or otherwise subject to ERISA: This program is not a retirement plan. Its purposes are to reward and retain key employees of the Firm and to align their interests with those of the shareholders. Participants should not look to this program as a source of retirement income. This program is not subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. A308 (2015 Term Sheet) (emphasis removed). And the plan documents for the MSCIP and EICP likewise state that the plans' primary purposes are "to attract, - 47 - DOLAR1006 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 57 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 98 of 194 retain, and motivate employees" and "to compensate them for their contributions" to Morgan Stanley. A202 (MSCIP Plan Document); A265 (EICP Plan Document). The district court incorrectly dismissed the purposes of the awards in analyzing whether they qualify as a "pension plan" under the statute. Citing nothing, the court declared that the test for determining ERISA coverage is "whether the deferred compensation program at issue is a bonus plan"-if it is, only then would the court "consider the plan's purpose and whether the deferral of income is systematic"; if it is not a bonus plan, the court would "consider only whether the deferred compensation program 'results in' deferred income." SPA35. No other court has ever assessed ERISA coverage using this type of decision tree. That is because whether something qualifies as an ERISA "pension" plan under the statute is one test, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A), and whether it is nevertheless exempt from ERISA under DOL's bonus regulation is another test, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3- 2(c). See, e.g., Oatway, 325 F.3d at 188-89 (first determining incentive plan was an BRISA-exempt bonus, and separately concluding "plan was also not an employee pension benefit plan under ERISA"); Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 31846478, at *3 (advising that plans did not "implicate a deferral of income of the kind contemplated by section 3(2)(A) of ERISA or a systemic deferral of payments ... that would preclude the [plans] from being bonus programs" (emphasis added)). - 48 - DOLAR1007 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 58 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 99 of 194 The district court's decision to bypass the purposes of the awards, and consider only the binary question of whether Morgan Stanley's program "results in" a deferral under the statute, was wrong as a matter of law. The awards' purposes here are part of their express terms-and the expressly stated purposes only reinforce that the awards really are not, as their other terms equally provide, ERISA plans. 2. The DOL's bonus plan exemption applies to the awards. a. The awards are BRISA-exempt "bonuses" under DOL regulation. The district court incorrectly determined that the bonus regulation does not apply to the deferred compensation awards. The district court erred in concluding that the awards are not "bonuses" but rather are "commissions" because the awards are calculated based on the revenue financial advisors generate and because financial advisors are also eligible to receive other year-end bonuses. SPA37; see SPA84-85 (affirming prior analysis). The district court's analysis is wrong for multiple reasons. First, the district court's finding that the awards are earned "commissions" rather than contingent "bonuses" is contradicted by the documents that govern the awards. The Compensation Plan that is published to financial advisors ahead of each compensation year does not refer to the awards as "commissions" at all, much less "earned commissions," but rather discloses that the "awards are contingent upon - 49 - DOLAR1008 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 59 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 100 of 194 the [advisor] remaining employed through the grant and vesting dates of the award." Al 76 (emphasis added). The Award Certificates and Term Sheets provided to advisors when the awards are granted similarly include explicit disclosures regarding the contingent nature of the awards. See A216, 233, 250, 279 (Award Certificates); A302 (Term Sheet). In effect, the district court gave the awards a label ("commission") that the governing documents do not use, and then used that label to rewrite the terms of those documents (to say the awards are earned at grant, not at vesting). Needless to say, that analysis cannot be squared with the express terms of the awards-and yet the express terms of the awards are what supposedly drove the district court's BRISA-coverage finding. Second, neither the courts nor the DOL have ever suggested, as the district court concluded here, that a qualifying "bonus[] for work performed" under the regulation cannot be calculated based on an employee's productivity. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c). The regulation's reference to "bonus for work performed" in fact implies that the payment can be based on performance. The word "bonus" does not in any event support the limitation the district court imposed on it. As the Sixth Circuit has observed, "[g]enerally, a bonus plan's express purpose is to pay a financial 'bonus' or 'additional incentive' to employees to encourage performance or retention." Wilson, 930 F.3d at 435-36. Every other Circuit that has analyzed the regulation takes the same approach. See Oatway, 325 F.3d at 186-89 - 50 - DOLAR1009 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 60 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 101 of 194 ("incentive plan designed to provide a financial incentive for employees to remain with [the firm] and improve their performance there" was ERISA-exempt bonus plan); Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 197 F.3d 929, 931-34 (8th Cir. 1999) (incentive plan with objective of encouraging "selected managers" to stay at the company was ERISA-exempt bonus program); McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401, 406 (10th Cir. 1993) (plan with the "purpose of promoting ... loyalty to the organization[,]" with cancellation of unvested awards upon termination, qualified as ERISA-exempt bonus plan). Applying those general principles, courts and the DOL have recognized that similar contingent incentive programs tied to employee revenue generation are covered by the bonus regulation. See, e.g., McKinsey, 986 F.2d at 405-06 (finding a "bonus plan" for sales representatives who received awards "based on their sales of insurance" and "the amount of Sales Credits they produce"); Callan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 2010 WL 3452371, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2010) (finding Merrill incentive awards based on financial advisors' production were "bonus" payments); Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *1-2 (finding a bonus plan where awards were calculated based on "the percentage of revenue that [the employee's] efforts have gained during a fiscal year"). The caselaw is unambiguous: incentive payments designed to encourage employees to remain at the company are retention bonuses, regardless of the form they take. See, e.g., Oatway, 325 F.3d at 188-89 - 51 - DOLARI0I0 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 61 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 102 of 194 (incentive plan designed to retain and motivate "key employees" was a bonus plan); McKinsey, 986 F.2d at 406 (incentive plan designed to promote "loyalty" to the organization was a bonus plan); Faris, 2023 WL 7386870, at *5-6 (long-term incentive plan with "express purpose" of "reward[ing] and retain[ing] eligible employees" was a bonus plan); Cashman v. GreyOrange, Inc., 2023 WL 2652789, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2023) (plans intended to encourage retention and good conduct were bonus plans); Hester v. Whatever It Takes, 2022 WL 89176, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2022) (retention programs were bonus plans); Pilkington v. CGU Ins. Co., 2000 WL 33159253, at *I, *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2001) (plan with purpose to "encourage ... associates to remain with the company" qualified as bonus plan); Killian, 850 F. Supp. at 1246 (plan whose "express purpose" was "to provide employees with an incentive to remain with the Company" was bonus plan). Agency opinions dating back to ERISA's enactment in the 1970s likewise recognize that similar retention incentives are qualifying bonuses under the bonus plan regulation. See, e.g., Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 31846478, at *3 (applying bonus regulation to incentive payments for "motivating and retaining skilled employees"); Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL I 03654, at * 1-2 (plan designed "to motivate [employees] to increase revenues and to continue in employment" is a bonus program); Op. 82-29A, 1982 WL 21212, at *1-2 (plan designed to "attract and retain" employees is a bonus program). - 52 - DOLARI0ll Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 62 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 103 of 194 Nevertheless, in its two-page analysis of whether Morgan Stanley's deferred awards qualify as ERISA-exempt bonuses under the DOL regulation, the district court did not cite a single authority interpreting or applying the regulation-relying instead solely on two dictionaries and three cases involving other issues. SPA35- 37. The district court's limitation on what qualifies as a bonus was a drastic departure from decades of otherwise uniform precedent. Last, there is no legal or logical basis for the district court's suggestion that an employer can only issue one form of "bonus" (in this case, a "year-end" bonus) to employees. SPA3 7. Employers, including Morgan Stanley, can and do commonly issue a variety of bonuses that can serve different purposes. See, e.g., Al 76, 188, 194 (describing year-end awards, Growth Awards, and Capital Accumulation Program awards). In this case, the deferred compensation awards are bonuses that reward very specific things: retention and good conduct. b. The bonus regulation applies because payment is not "systematically deferred" until after employment. Because the deferred compensation awards qualify as a "bonus for work performed" and their payment is not "systematically deferred" until after the end of employment, the awards are not a pension plan. By their terms, the awards are generally paid only if the employee is still employed on the date of vesting, and payments under the limited humanitarian exceptions do not predominate over payments to current employees. The district court's conclusion that the awards are - 53 - DOLAR1012 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 63 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 104 of 194 not a bonus plan within the meaning of the regulation was therefore error. In its November 2023 order, the district court inverted the standard for evaluating payments to former employees under the regulation, asserting without support that "nothing in the record suggest[ ed] that post-employment deferred compensation payments are rare." SPA39. Of course, there was nothing in "the record" on the prevalence of post-employment payments because there was no record on the merits-Morgan Stanley's motion to compel did not implicate whether the awards are BRISA-governed or not, supra at 27-33. But the standard the district court applied was legally erroneous in any case-payment does not have to be "rare" in order to meet the regulatory standard, and the court cited nothing to the contrary. The DOL's advisory opinions reinforce that the payment of a minority of awards to former employees under humanitarian exceptions does not qualify as a systematic deferral under the regulation: for payments to be "systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or beyond" and therefore fall outside the regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c), an "inordinate percentage" must be paid after employment such that the economic benefits of the program are allocated "disproportionately to retirees." Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *2; Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 31846478, at *3 n.3. Plaintiffs did not and could not allege that the awards are systematically deferred under the regulatory standard. - 54 - DOLAR1013 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 64 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 105 of 194 In its motion for reconsideration, Morgan Stanley alerted the district court to evidence in conflict with its decision, including the fact that in parallel arbitrations Morgan Stanley has produced data reflecting that 85% to 92% of award payments historically have been made to current employees. SPA89 (citing A452). But the district court held fast to its original conclusion, declaring that "payments made at a rate of 8 to 15 percent [to former employees] are not rare -they are commonplace." That observation applies the wrong legal standard. A distribution rate of 8% to 15% is not an "inordinate percentage" that is "disproportionately" allocated to former employees, and is not a "systematic deferral" as a matter of law. *** The district court made its finding regarding ERISA coverage on a record comprising just the plaintiffs' complaint and the documents cited therein, without the benefit of full legal briefing, discovery, testimony, or an actual evidentiary record on the issue. Determining whether the deferred compensation awards qualify as an ERISA pension plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A), and whether they are nevertheless exempt from ERISA under the DOL's "bonus" regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2( c), is a fact-intensive, context-dependent inquiry-requiring analysis of the awards' purposes and structure and understanding how they work in practice. The "existence of an ERISA plan is a question of fact, to be answered in the light - 55 - DOLAR1014 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 65 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 106 of 194 of all the surrounding circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable person." 13 Credit Managers Ass 'n of S. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 625 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (en bane)); accord Langley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475,479 (6th Cir. 2007); Deibler v. United Food & Com. Workers' Loe. Union 23, 973 F.2d 206, 209-10 (3d Cir. 1992); Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1082 (1st Cir. 1990); see also, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 978 F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[I]n addition to the express terms of the benefits plans in question, a number of key factors are pertinent" to the pension plan inquiry). Even when evaluating just the express terms of a program, testimony and other evidence can be critical to understanding what a program's express terms mean, and how they operate in practice. The district court rendered its finding in a highly irregular procedural posture, without the benefit of the tools a court-or an arbitration panel-would ordinarily have to render a merits finding. The result was an analysis rife with error. The Court can address those errors by simply ordering the defective analysis 13 Indeed, this Court has vacated and remanded a district court's finding that a plan was an ERISA "welfare benefit plan" (29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)) because the "sparse factual record" was insufficient to definitively answer the question one way or another. Grimo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Vt., 34 F.3d 148, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1994). - 56 - DOLAR1015 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 66 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 107 of 194 struck, leaving the merits for the arbitrators. But if it concludes the merits need to be reached to resolve arbitrability, it should reverse the district court's finding. B. Evidence developed in parallel arbitrations reinforces that the awards are not ERISA-governed. The district court further erred in rejecting Morgan Stanley's argument, on reconsideration, that a factfinder could not reach a reliable decision on the merits without a fully developed factual record and comprehensive legal submissions. A339-43; see A393. The record developed in parallel arbitrations reinforces that the awards are ERISA-exempt retention bonuses that do not qualify as an ERISA "pension plan": • The awards are designed to meet the demands of Morgan Stanley's financial regulators that contingent deferred compensation be used to reward good conduct (and penalize misconduct). • As with any bonus, financial advisors have to do something "additional"-stay at Morgan Stanley in good standing for a certain number of years-to earn their awards. • Financial advisors do not have to wait until they are retirement age to receive payment on a vested award, and in fact between 85% and 92% of award distributions go to current employees, not retirees. • Vested awards are immediately deposited into financial advisors' payroll or brokerage accounts, not 40l(k) or other retirement accounts. • A ward distributions are taxed as ordinary bonus income, not retirement income, on the date of distribution. • The awards make up betweenjust 1.5% and 15.5% of financial advisors' overall incentive compensation, reinforcing that they function as an "additional" incentive for doing something specific. - 57 - DOLAR1016 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 67 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 108 of 194 The district court erroneously concluded that it was equipped to render a conclusive finding on the merits without any of the critical context that arbitration panels will have the opportunity to consider. The district court's characterization of the awards as pension plans under ERISA contravenes the text of the statute and applicable regulation as well as fifty years of interpretation by courts and the DOL. The court's order is incompatible with the directives of financial regulators that institutions like Morgan Stanley use cancellable deferred compensation to deter and penalize behaviors that harm consumers. The court's orders are interfering with the arbitrators' independent assessment of the law and the evidence, and they are creating uncertainty for the many institutions that offer this type of compensation to comply with the expectations of their financial regulators. This Court should ensure that the merits of these claims can be decided in arbitration, based on the evidence and the law. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the district court's orders and require the court to reissue its order compelling arbitration without any analysis of the merits. Alternatively, if the Court determines that it was necessary for the district court to resolve the BRISA-coverage question, then the Court should reverse the district court's ERISA finding. - 58 - DOLAR1017 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 68 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 109 of 194 Dated: January 22, 2025 Respectfully submitted, Isl Meaghan VerGow ANTON METLITSKY MEAGHAN VERGOW O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP BRIAND. BOYLE 1301 Avenue of the Americas O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 17th Floor 1625 Eye Street, N.W. New York, NY 10019 Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (212) 326-2000 Tel: (202) 383-5300 Fax: (212) 326-2061 Fax: (202) 383-5414 ametlitsky@omm.com mvergow@omm.com bboyle@omm.com Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, and Morgan Stanley Compensation Management Development and Succession Committee - 59 - DOLAR1018 Case: 24-3141, 01/23/2025, DktEntry: 48.1, Page 69 of 172 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 110 of 194 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the foregoing brief is in 14-Point Times New Roman proportional font and contains 13,863 words and thus is in compliance with the type-volume limitation set forth in Rule 32(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Dated: January 22, 2025 Washington, D.C. Isl Meaghan VerGow MEAGHAN VERGOW - 60 - DOLAR1019 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 1 of35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 111 of 194 No. 24-3141 L ' 24-3271(XAP) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Matthew T. Shafer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Mace Tamse, Steve Sheresky, George Livanos, Jeffrey Shover, Mark Loftus, Sandy Jukel, Steve Nadler, Sheri Haugabook, Jeffrey Sheresky, Peter Heidt, Jeffrey Samsen, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants V. Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Morgan Stanley Compensation Management Development and Succession Committee, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, John/Jane Does, 1-20, Defendant. On Appeal From The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 1:20-cv-11047, the Hon. Paul G. Gardephe BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE Society for Human Resource Management In support of Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees & Reversal Ian H. Morrison imorrison@seyfarth.com Sam Schwartz-Fenwick sschwartz-fenwick@seyfarth.com Jules A. Levenson jlevenson@seyfarth.com SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Attorneys for Amicus Curae 233 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 8000 SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE Chicago, Illinois 60606 MANAGEMENT Telephone: (312) 460-5000 January 29, 2025 DOLAR1020 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 2 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 112 of 194 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4) and 29(b)(4), the undersigned counsel state that the amicus curiae is not a corporation, and thus no disclosure statement is required by Rule 26.1. 11 DOLAR1021 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 3 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 113 of 194 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......................................... .ii IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .............................. 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 3 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 6 I. The District Court's decision, rendered on an undeveloped record with limited briefing, vastly expanded the scope of ERISA coverage in the absence of statutory authority and despite contrary regulatory guidance ................................................................................... 6 A. The District Court erred in finding ERISA coverage .......................................................................... 6 B. The District Court's erroneous conclusion threatens to greatly expand ERISA coverage ............. 15 II. Expanding the scope of ERISA coverage would have deleterious effects on SHRM members and other employers nationwide ........................................................... 19 A. ERISA imposes extensive obligations on retirement plan sponsors ............................................. 19 B. Employers could be subject to significant costs and penalties under the District Court's interpretation of ERISA ............................................... 23 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 26 111 DOLAR1022 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 4 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 114 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases City of Roseville Emps. 'Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., F. 713 Supp. 2d 378 (D. Del. 2010) ......................................................... 17 Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 86 F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023) ................................................................. 21 Halo v. Yale Health Plan, 819 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2016) .................................................................. 20 McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1993) ............................................................. 12 Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1980) ............................................. 8, 10, 15 O'Grady v. BlueCrest Cap. Mgmt. LLP, 111 F. Supp. 3d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) .................................................. 18 Oat way v. Am. Int 'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2003) ................................................................ 15 Osberg v. Rajaratnam, 95 A.D.3d 649, 946 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dept. 2012) .............................. 18 Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 201 7) .................................................................. 8 Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D. Del. 2010) ..................................................... 17 Tolbert v. REC Cap. Mkts. Corp., 758 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2014) ................................................... 10, 13, 14 Wilson v. Sa/elite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019) ......................................................... 13, 14 IV DOLAR1023 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 5 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 115 of 194 Statutes 29 U.S.C. § 1002 .............................................................................. 8, 9, 13 29 U.S.C. § 1021 ................................................................................ 20, 21 29 U.S.C. § 1024 ...................................................................................... 20 29 U.S.C. § 1030 ........................................................................................ 9 29 U.S.C. § 1052 ...................................................................................... 21 29 U.S.C. § 1053 ................................................................................ 21, 24 29 U.S.C. § 1055 ...................................................................................... 21 29 U.S.C. § 1081 ...................................................................................... 21 29 U.S.C. § 1083 ...................................................................................... 21 29 U.S.C. § 1103 ...................................................................................... 22 29 U.S.C. § 1104 ...................................................................................... 21 29 U.S.C. § 1106 ...................................................................................... 21 29 U.S.C. § 1132 ................................................................................ 24, 25 29 U.S.C. § 1135 ........................................................................................ 8 29 U.S.C. § 1306 ...................................................................................... 23 29 U.S.C. § 1321 ...................................................................................... 22 Regulations 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2 ...................................................................... 9, 12, 13 29 C.F.R. § 2575.2 ................................................................................... 24 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1 ........................................................................... 25 29 CFR § 2560.503-1 ............................................................................... 22 V DOLAR1024 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 6 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 116 of 194 40 FR 34526 (Aug. 15, 1975) ..................................................................... 9 Other Authorities 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 66 ...................................... 18 DOL Op. No. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654 (Mar. 6, 1998) ........ 10, 12, 15, 17 DOL Op. No. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 318464 78 (Dec. 6, 2002) ............... 9, 17 ERISA Practice and Procedure (2024) ......................................................................................... 7, 21, 23 Fed. R. App. P. 29 ...................................................................................... 2 Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, 1 Employee Benefits Handbook § 24:2 (2024) ................................................................................................... 22 Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, 1 Employee Benefits Handbook § 24:4 (2024) ................................................................................................... 23 Vl DOLAR1025 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 7 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 117 of 194 IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1 The Society for Human Resource Management ("SHRM") is a member-driven organization dedicated to creating better workplaces where people and businesses thrive together. As the trusted authority on all things work, SHRM is the foremost expert, researcher, advocate, and thought leader on issues and innovations impacting today's evolving workplaces. With nearly 340,000 members in 180 countries, SHRM touches the lives of more than 362 million workers and their families globally. In New York alone, SHRM has over 15,000 members who represent a diverse cross-section of employers across industries. Over 31 % of members work for smaller companies with less than 500 employees, while the top five sectors-services, healthcare, nonprofit, manufacturing, and others-comprise 53% of New York SHRM members. Moreover, a majority (51%) of New York SHRM members hold Director or Manager titles within their organizations. 1 This brief was principally authored by Amicus along with Seyfarth Shaw LLP, counsel for Amicus. No party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. Neither any party nor any party's counsel contributed money related to the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than Amicus, its members, and their counsel contributed money related to the preparation or submission of this brief. DOLAR1026 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 8 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 118 of 194 Given the prevalence of bonus and incentive plans (in SHRM's 2024 employee benefits survey, over half of respondents reported offering an incentive bonus plan), SHRM anticipates that expanded ERISA coverage under the novel theory set forth in the District Court's opinion will have a significant impact on its members and employers throughout the country. The impacts include restricting usage of incentive plans to motivate retention, placing potentially onerous administrative burdens on programs funded from general assets, and raising the specter of penalties and legal exposure for past noncompliance. SHRM offers this amicus brief because the issues raised in this matter are of immense importance to both SHRM's members and the business community at large. SHRM submits this brief in support of Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees' appeal. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief, so no further leave to file is required. Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2). 2 DOLAR1027 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 9 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 119 of 194 INTRODUCTION For decades, employers nationwide have utilized incentive programs to reward employees for productivity and motivate them to remain employed by providing additional compensation beyond the employees' base pay. These programs, even when they include deferred receipt of incentive payments, are not designed to offer retirement income, but to provide additional compensation to current employees. Accordingly, these programs have long been understood to be outside the scope of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197 4 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., which governs retirement plans and imposes extensive regulatory requirements and potential liability for failure to comply. The District Court's decision below-both erroneous and unnecessary-threatens to upend this status quo. In granting Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration, the District Court improperly prejudged the merits in holding that the Morgan Stanley Incentive Compensation Plan and the Equity Incentive Compensation Plan are subject to ERISA because they pay incentive awards based on the revenue generated by the employees receiving the awards (thus making 3 DOLAR1028 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 10 of35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 120 of 194 the payments "commissions" that are not subject to regulations limiting ERISA coverage of bonus plans) and because the Incentive Plans allow certain employees to be paid their awards after separating employment. The District Court relied on inapposite authority to conclude that revenue-based incentive pay cannot be a bonus and compounded this error by misinterpreting ERISA to cover any program where any participant can be paid after leaving employment. These conclusions run counter to significant contrary case law and regulatory guidance and upend employers' longstanding understanding of the rules applicable to incentive plans. The District Court's unforced error, 2 if followed by other courts, would have significant deleterious effects on employer incentive plans. ERISA imposes extensive regulatory requirements, fiduciary responsibility, and costs with respect to plan maintenance. ERISA also has mandatory vesting provisions that would prevent employers from 2 Not only did the District Court err in holding that the Incentive Plans were governed by ERISA, it erred in making this ruling when that issue was not even before the Court. The District Court did not need to reach the ERISA question to rule on Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration, as it concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were arbitrable regardless of whether ERISA governs the Incentive Plans. 4 DOLAR1029 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 11 of35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 121 of 194 even offering many of the incentive plans that are currently available. Moreover, ERISA imposes significant penalties for failure to comply with its reticulated regulations. Thus, if incentive plans are suddenly covered, every employer offering a newly covered plan might be exposed to hundreds of thousands of dollars, and potentially millions of dollars, in penalties. This is both incompatible with the governing statutes and regulations, as well as an untenable conclusion in the procedural posture of Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, the Court should vacate or reverse the District Court's ERISA coverage decision. 5 DOLAR1030 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 12 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 122 of 194 ARGUMENT I. The District Court's decision, rendered on an undeveloped record with limited briefing, vastly expanded the scope of ERISA coverage in the absence of statutory authority and despite contrary regulatory guidance. A. The District Court erred in finding ERISA coverage. The Court should vacate or reverse the District Court's decision that Morgan Stanley's incentive programs at issue in this case (the Morgan Stanley Incentive Compensation Plan and the Equity Incentive Compensation Plan ("Incentive Plans")) are governed by ERISA. 3 The District Court held (SPA.35-39 4), while granting Morgan Stanley's motion to compel arbitration, that the incentive programs are governed by ERISA because they are not bonus programs and because the programs allowed for certain employees to receive payments after separation from employment. The District Court's ruling on this issue was unnecessary to the outcome of the motion to compel arbitration and 3 This brief focuses on the merits and consequences of the District Court's ERISA-coverage determination-the issue that is acutely important for SHRM members. 4 SPA._ refers to the documents in Defendants-Appellants-Cross- Appellees' special appendix (ECF No. 48.1). A._ refers to the documents in Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees' appendix (ECF No. 49.1, 50.1). ECF No._ refers to documents filed in this Court. R._ refers to documents filed in the District Court. 6 DOLAR1031 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 13 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 123 of 194 defeated the purpose of compelling arbitration because it prejudged the merits of the case. Additionally, it was wrong as a matter of law. ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) was adopted by Congress to in the wake of catastrophic failures of private employer pension plans to secure employees' entitlement to receive promised benefits. See Ronald J. Cooke, "Congressional policy, basic concepts, and coverage," 2 ERISA Practice and Procedure§ 4:1 (2024) (Congress enacted ERISA seeking "to remedy the predicament of thousands of employees whose expectations of adequate retirement income were destroyed by stingy pension plan provisions, bad management, or inadequate funding"). ERISA imposes a wide range of reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary obligations on the employers that sponsor covered plans. These range from annual government filings (with severe penalties for noncompliance), detailed disclosure duties requiring periodic publication of plan summaries, and the obligation to maintain assets to secure pension obligations in separately custodied trust. If upheld by this Court, the District Court's conclusion that Morgan Stanley's compensation programs was really an ERISA-governed pension plan, 7 DOLAR1032 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 14 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 124 of 194 would subject Morgan Stanley to all of the statute's requirements and obligations. As relevant here, ERISA governs an employer sponsored benefit plan, fund, or program that "to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program .. . results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii). To be sure, on its face, this is a broad definition. However, this Court (and others) have held that not every plan that can be squeezed into the literal language of§ 1002(2)(A)(ii) is an ERISA plan. Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 201 7) (quoting Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1980) for the proposition that "this statutory provision is 'not to be read as an elastic girdle that can be stretched to cover any content that can conceivably fit within its reach"'). Additionally, Congress authorized the Department of Labor to issue regulations refining the extent of ERISA coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1135 ("Subject to subchapter II and section 1029 of this title, the Secretary may prescribe such regulations as he finds necessary or 8 DOLAR1033 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 15 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 125 of 194 appropriate to carry out the provisions of this subchapter [29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003, 1021-1193c]," including "defin[ing] accounting, technical and trade terms"); see also, e.g. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (authorizing certain specific regulations); 29 U.S.C. § 1030 (authorizing alternate methods of compliance with reporting and disclosure requirements). In August 1975, less than one year after ERISA came into force, the Department of Labor promulgated regulations excluding from ERISA coverage "payments made by an employer ... as bonuses for work performed, unless such payments are systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c); 40 FR 34526, 34532 (Aug. 15, 1975). 5 This longstanding view has been supplemented with Department guidance explaining the mere fact certain employees receive payments after separation from employment is insufficient to bring the payment in question into the category of deferral covered by§ 1002(2)(A)(ii). E.g., DOL Op. No. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 318464 78, at *3 (Dec. 6, 2002) ("the mere fact that many of the Plans' participants may have separated from 5 This portion of the regulation has remained unchanged for the last 50 years. 9 DOLAR1034 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 16 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 126 of 194 the Company ... prior to the time they will be eligible to convert SAFE Units to cash, does not, in the Department's view, implicate a deferral of income of the kind contemplated by section 3(2)(A) of ERISA"); DOL Op. No. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *2 (Mar. 6, 1998) ("Because the Plan [did] not expressly condition distribution of the bonus payments upon termination of employment or retirement, the Plan [wa]s not by its express terms a pension plan within the meaning of section 3(2)(A) of ERISA," even though certain employees were entitled to receive payments following separation of employment.); accord Tolbert v. REC Cap. Mkts. Corp., 758 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 2014) ("the mere fact that some payments under a plan may be made after an employee has retired or left the company does not result in ERISA coverage") (quoting Murphy, 611 F.2d at 575). Despite this authority, the District Court held that the Incentive Plans at issue here are governed by ERISA. (SPA.35-39). The District Court first held that the payments under the Incentive Plans are not bonuses because the incentive payments were calculated as a percentage of revenue generated and were thus by definition "not 'over and above normal compensation."' (SPA.36-37). It further held that 10 DOLAR1035 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 17 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 127 of 194 because incentive plans were not "bonuses," the plans were covered by ERISA so long as some employees received payments after separation, without respect to the purpose of the Plan or the frequency of post- separation payments. Id. These holdings were erroneous, as Morgan Stanley explains at length in its principal brief. (See ECF No. 48.1 at 4 7-67). However, two points that would result in significant expansion of ERISA coverage are particularly salient here. First, the District Court announced a categorical rule that any payment to an employee based on a percentage of revenue generated is a commission, not a bonus. (SPA.37 ("Because Morgan Stanley financial advisors' deferred compensation is premised on the revenue they generate, deferred compensation payments are not 'over and above normal compensation."')). The District Court cited no authority for this sweeping proposition. Though the District Court cited case authority and dictionary definitions that hold that commissions are a type of payment based on revenue generated (e.g., SPA.36-37 (citing Commission, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Commission, Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 11 DOLAR1036 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 18 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 128 of 194 - Unabridged (1993 ed.); Israel v. Voya Institutional Plan Servs., LLC, No. 15-cv-11914-ADB, 2017 WL 1026416, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2017))), none of the District Court's authority holds that any payment based on revenue generated is perforce a commission and thus outside the scope of the Department of Labor's bonus regulation. Moreover, such a proposition is contrary to both case law and Department of Labor guidance. McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401, 405-06 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying DOL bonus regulation (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c)) to plan where payments were "based upon the amount of Sales Credits [sales representatives] produce[d]"); DOL Op. No. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *1-2 (Mar. 6, 1998) (noting plan potentially qualified for treatment as a bonus plan where it provided for physicians to receive "individual bonus award amount[s] equal to the percentage of revenue that his or her efforts have gained during a fiscal year in excess of ... individual [g]oals"). Moreover, nowhere do the Incentive Plans themselves refer to payments as commissions. To the contrary, the Incentive Plans repeatedly emphasize the contingent nature of the payments. See ECF No. 48.1 at 58-62. 12 DOLAR1037 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 19 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 129 of 194 Second, the District Court held that any non-bonus plan (i.e., a plan outside the scope of 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c)) that permits payments to be made after an employee's separation falls within 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) regardless of the plan's purpose. (SPA.38-39 (holding that Incentive Plans "programs result in the deferral of income to the post-employment period within the meaning of ERISA § 3(2)(A)(ii)" because "[a]lthough Plaintiffs in the instant case ... cannot elect post-employment vesting, disability, retirement, layoff, and government service are not unusual means by which workers leave their employment")). However, the cases that the District Court relies on do not support such a conclusion. For example, in Tolbert, not only did the plan in question permit employees to elect post-termination payment distribution, it also expressly authorized immediate vesting of certain benefits even for voluntary separation. 758 F.3d at 622 (noting that under the plan "Mandatory Deferred Compensation and Company Contributions vest immediately upon either the death of the employee or the separation of the employee" provided requisite conditions were met). Similarly, in Wilson v. Sa/elite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 437 (6th 13 DOLAR1038 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 20 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 130 of 194 Cir. 2019), the plan "expressly provide[d] for employees to defer income from several sources to the future[,] authorize[d] options for payment of deferred income both before and after termination[,] ... [and its] default provision provide[d] for distributions to occur after termination of employment." Thus, both the Tolbert and Wilson plans made offering a choice to participants as to the timing of the deferred income (pre or post separation) a key feature of the respective plans. Conversely, the Incentive Plans at issue here provide incentive income on a fixed schedule. This is no accident, as the purpose of this program is to enhance retention by providing extra compensation to employees who generated more business for the firm. The Incentive Plans were undisputedly designed to pay employees while they remained employed, with limited exceptions. (See SPA.5-6). Hence, the Incentive Plans at issue here are not comparable to the cases the District Court relied on. Rather, they are analogous to the authority rejected by the District Court, which holds that incidental post- termination payments does not transform a plan into one covered by ERISA. E.g., Tolbert, 758 F.3d at 625 ("[T]he mere fact that some payments under a plan may be made after an employee has retired or 14 DOLAR1039 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 21 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 131 of 194 left the company does not result in ERISA coverage.") (quoting Murphy, 611 F.2d at 575); Oatway v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) ("post-retirement payments [that] were only incidental to the goal of providing current compensation" did not trigger ERISA coverage); DOL Op. No. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *2 (Mar. 6, 1998) ("Because the Plan [did] not expressly condition distribution of the bonus payments upon termination of employment or retirement, the Plan [wa]s not by its express terms a pension plan within the meaning of section 3(2)(A) of ERISA," even though certain employees were entitled to receive payments following separation of employment.); see also ECF No. 48.1 at 50-54. Accordingly, the District Court erred in its statutory analysis. B. The District Court's erroneous conclusion threatens to greatly expand ERISA coverage. Given the extensive ERISA obligations that fall on an employer sponsoring a pension plan, it is essential that employers know at the outset whether they are setting up a bonus plan or a pension plan. The District Court's sweeping re-write of the statute and regulations was legal error as set forth above. Equally important, it was an improper exercise of judicial authority because the decision was unnecessary to 15 DOLAR1040 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 22 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 132 of 194 the outcome of the case and was rendered on no factual record with limited opportunity for legal argument. In light of the grave consequences, not just for Morgan Stanley but for all employers, the District Court should have exercised restraint and not reached this question. Because it did decide the issue, however, the District Court triggered vast ramifications for employers by dramatically expanding ERISA coverage to numerous types of incentive plans that have never heretofore been thought of as pension plans. The incredible overreach of this decision and its clearly erroneous holding, mandate reversal. If left to stand, under the District Court's statutory interpretation, any employer incentive plan tied to revenue generated by an employee (and in fact any non-bonus deferred payment structure) is governed by ERISA so long as the plan allows any payments following the separation of employment, regardless of the plan's goals and even if the vast majority of participants are paid while still employed. Not only is this contrary to statute, governing regulations, and case authority, it would greatly expand ERISA coverage to incentive programs administered by SHRM members throughout the country. 16 DOLAR1041 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 23 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 133 of 194 "[A]ccess to stock options and [compensation] according to [company] performance ... are ubiquitous in corporate America," City of Roseville Emps. 'Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 378, 396 (D. Del. 2010), aff'd, 442 F. App'x 672 (3d Cir. 2011), a fact further underscored by the opinion letters issued by the Department of Labor concerning a variety of incentive plans. E.g., DOL Op. No. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 318464 78, at *3 (Dec. 6, 2002); DOL Op. No. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *2 (Mar. 6, 1998). In fact, over 50% of respondents in SHRM's 2024 employee benefit survey reported offering an incentive bonus plan. 6 In light of the broad prevalence of incentive programs, the District Court's holding (if allowed to remain in force) would represent a potential sea change in ERISA coverage requirements for such programs. Under the District Court's logic, any entity that provides incentives to employees based on the revenue generated by the employees would be forced to comply with ERISA if any portion of the incentive were payable to separated employees. For example, under this erroneous approach, a law firm bonus plan based on billable hours or 6The SHRM 2024 Employee Benefits Survey is available at, https://www.shrm.org/topics-tools/research/employee-benefits- survey/other. 17 DOLAR1042 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 24 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 134 of 194 value of time (both close proxies for revenue generation) would be required to comply with ERISA so long as bonuses were not paid immediately when earned and any set of individuals might be paid the bonus after termination. This is problematic because most employers condition bonus payments in incentive plans so that the employees must remain actively employed on the bonus payment date to get their bonus, as shown by many cases across the country about who is entitled to bonuses. E.g., O'Grady v. BlueCrest Cap. Mgmt. LLP, 111 F. Supp. 3d 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (bonus plan provided that employee "will not be eligible to be paid any bonus if at any time prior to the date of any payment ... [his] employment has been terminated"), aff'd, 646 F. App'x 2 (2d Cir. 2016); Osberg v. Rajaratnam, 95 A.D.3d 649, 946 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dept. 2012) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to bonus where his "employment was terminated prior to the end of the year" and "bonus .. . was expressly and unambiguously conditioned upon his working through the end of the relevant calendar year"); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship§ 66 (surveying case law since 1980 on effect of termination on bonus payment and noting that certain "courts find 18 DOLAR1043 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 25 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 135 of 194 that if an employee is terminated prior to the date when he or she was to become eligible for a bonus payment, then the employer is not obligated to pay his or her bonus"). Under the District Court's view of ERISA, however, if these employers so much as allow humanitarian exemptions to the rule requiring incentives be paid to only current employees, they now subject themselves to ERISA. The only alternative to complying with ERISA's vast and complex regulatory scheme (discussed infra) would be to terminate the incentive plans entirely or prohibit any post-termination payments, even when the termination was for disability or death. 7 (See also ECF No. 48.1 at 53-54). II. Expanding the scope of ERISA coverage would have deleterious effects on SHRM members and other employers nationwide. A. ERISA imposes extensive obligations on retirement plan sponsors. The importance of the District Court's error in expanding ERISA coverage can be seen by a brief overview of the extensive regulatory burdens placed on pension plans. "Employee benefit plans governed by 7And certain incentive structures might not be permissible at all within the ERISA framework. 19 DOLAR1044 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 26 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 136 of 194 ERISA are highly regulated by the federal government." Lee T. Polk, 1 ERISA Practice and Litigation§ 1:7 (2023). As this Court has recognized, "ERISA is a comprehensive reticulated statute, and is enormously complex and detailed." Halo v. Yale Health Plan, 819 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 4 77 (1999)). This complexity and high level of regulation are evident from even a brief perusal of ERISA's statutory structure. For example, ERISA contains extensive disclosure and reporting requirements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1032. Some of these obligations include: • Publishing and furnishing participants with summary plan descriptions, 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a)(l); • Filing annual reports with the Department of Labor, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(b), 1024(a); • Furnishing participants with summary annual reports, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3); • Providing governing plan documents to participants upon written request, 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4); and 20 DOLAR1045 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 27 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 137 of 194 • Providing plan funding notices to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (for defined benefit plans 8 subject to ERISA's funding requirements), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(£). 9 ERISA also imposes vesting and participation standards, which place limits on the extent to which employers can restrict participation and require that covered plan benefits be nonforfeitable within a specified range of years of service. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1053. And defined benefit plans must offer survivorship annuities. 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Furthermore, many defined benefit plans are subject to comprehensive minimum funding requirements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081, 1083 (funding standards for single-employer defined benefit plans). Additionally, with the exception of certain exempt plans, ERISA governed benefit plans must be run by fiduciaries adhering to standards of prudence and loyalty, 29 U.S.C. § 1104, and are heavily restricted as to permissible transactions, 29 U.S.C. § 1106. See also Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 86 F.4th 961, 973, 981 (2d Cir. 2023) (analyzing claims 8 The Incentive Plans and similar incentive programs would likely be classified as defined benefit plans because they pay a specific benefit as outlined by the incentive program. 9 See also Ronald J. Cooke, 1 ERISA Practice and Procedure § 3:2 (2024) (surveying the vast requirements, penalties for failure to comply, and "substantial record keeping requirements"). 21 DOLAR1046 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 28 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 138 of 194 asserting prohibited transactions and breaches of fiduciary duty), cert. granted, No. 23-1007, 2024 WL 4394127 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2024). ERISA plans must also establish formal claims procedures to adjudicate benefit claims submitted by participants. 29 CFR § 2560.503-l(b) ("Every employee benefit plan shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures governing the filing of benefit claims, notification of benefit determinations, and appeal of adverse benefit determinations[.]"). Beyond this, ERISA plans (unless exempt) must hold all assets in a trust, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (subject to exceptions, "assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees") and plans that are insured by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation must pay per-participant premium rates of up to $717 annually for variable rate premiums and $106 annually for flat-rate premiums. 10 Premium Rates, PBGC (Oct. 11, 2024), available at, 10"The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) insurance provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197 4 (ERISA) apply to most defined benefit pension plans established or maintained by an employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce. The PBGC insures qualified or nonqualified plans that have met the qualifications requirement in practice for the preceding five years." Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, 1 Employee Benefits Handbook § 24:2 (2024); 29 U.S.C. § 1321. 22 DOLAR1047 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 29 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 139 of 194 https://www.pbgc.gov/prac/prem/premium-rates (last accessed Jan. 28, 2025); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1306; Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, 1 Employee Benefits Handbook § 24:4 (2024) (explaining forms of PBGC premiums); 29 U.S.C. § 1306. In short, treating an incentive program as an ERISA governed pension plan subjects it to compliance with myriad rules, regulations, and restrictions, and has significantly broader consequences than simply fixing obligations of benefit payments between employees and employers. See Preliminary Materials, Ronald J. Cooke, ERISA Practice and Procedure (2024) ("it cannot be disputed that [ERISA] is massive in its complexity, detail and scope"). B. Employers could be subject to significant costs and penalties under the District Court's interpretation of ERISA. ERISA's extensive regulatory requirements also impose significant costs on employers-both in the form of complying with applicable regulations and penalties for failure to do so. For example, the Incentive Plans in this case are operated to provide supplemental compensation beyond employees' base salary and their rules are defined in the applicable program description. (See, e.g., A.143-44). But if the 23 DOLAR1048 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 30 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 140 of 194 Incentive Plans were to be governed by ERISA, a single document laying out the incentive plans would be insufficient. Morgan Stanley would have been obligated to create a summary plan document; submit annual reports; respond to document requests; comply with participation, vesting, and funding requirements; comply with fiduciary duties; and avoid prohibited transactions. Supra§ II.A. Not only would this add significant compliance costs, but it would also frustrate the stated goal of the Incentive Plans-motivating employee retention-and undermine their rationale, because ERISA restricts Morgan Stanley's ability to limit payments to current employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (vesting requirements). In addition to the prospective compliance costs, expanding ERISA coverage could expose employers that offer incentive plans to retrospective liability (and the attendant litigation costs). For example, an ERISA-covered plan administrator who fails to file an annual report with the Secretary of Labor is subject to fines of over $2,000 per day. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2575.2(b). Similarly, plan administrators can be fined up to $110 per day for failing to furnish ERISA plan participants with certain disclosures and requested 24 DOLAR1049 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 31 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 141 of 194 documents. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(l); 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1. Under the District Court's erroneous reading of ERISA coverage, an incentive program that has been operating as a non-ERISA plan could be subject to hundreds of thousands of dollars in penalty liability. And this is even before a participant may attempt to claim that the employer was not appropriately complying with its fiduciary duties (as required under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (allowing a "a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary" to assert a claim "for appropriate relief' for alleged fiduciary breaches or otherwise not administering plan in accordance with ERISA's strictures). Moreover, these costs would not be borne by a single employer in a single case. Rather, every single employer with an incentive plan based on revenue generated by employees would be faced with these costs unless no payments were made after separation. Given the ubiquity of these incentive plans, SHRM anticipates that its members could be facing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in further liability both for transforming how they run incentive programs, as well as in potential exposure for past plan administration outside the scope of ERISA. This Court should not countenance such a massive expansion of liability, 25 DOLAR1050 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 32 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 142 of 194 particularly when the District Court reached its erroneous conclusion on a limited record in a posture that did not require deciding the question of ERISA coverage. * * * The District Court erred in finding ERISA coverage in a way that would greatly expand the number of regulated plans beyond the scope set forth by Congress and the DOL regulations, while imposing vast costs that are not permitted or required by governing law. Accordingly, the decision should be vacated or reversed. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate or reverse the District Court's holding on ERISA coverage. Respectfully submitted, DATED: January 29, 2025 SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Is I Ian H. Morrison Ian H. Morrison Samuel Schwartz-Fenwick Jules A. Levenson SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 233 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 8000 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Telephone: (312) 460-5000 imorrison@seyfarth.com 26 DOLAR1051 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 33 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 143 of 194 sschwartz-fenwick@seyfarth.com jlevenson@seyfarth.com Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management 27 DOLAR1052 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 34 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 144 of 194 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENTS 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)(4), 29(a)(5), and 32(a)(7)(B) and Circuit Rules 29.l(c) and 32.l(a)(4) because the brief contains 4,785 words (according to the word-processing software, Microsoft Word, which was used to prepare the brief), excluding the parts of the brief exempted by FED. R. APP. P. 32(£). 2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(5) and Circuit Rule 32.1, as well as the type style requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(6) because the brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 in plain, 14-point Century Schoolbook typeface; footnotes appear in plain, 14-point Century Schoolbook typeface. s/ Ian H. Morrison Ian H. Morrison Dated: January 29, 2025 28 DOLAR1053 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 64.1, Page 35 of 35 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 145 of 194 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, certify that on January 29, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing Brief with the Clerk of Courts using the ACMS filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record. s/ Ian H. Morrison 29 DOLAR1054 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 1 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 146 of 194 - '24-3271(XAP) Wntteb ~tateg q[ourt of ~ppealg .... for tbe ~econb q[f rcutt ---- MATTHEW T. SHAFER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, MACE TAMSE, STEVE SHERESKY, GEORGE LIVANOS, JEFFREY SHOVER, MARK LOFTUS, SANDY JUKEL, STEVE NADLER, SHERI HAUGABOOK, JEFFREY SHERESKY, PETER HEIDT, JEFFREY SAMSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, V. MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC, MORGAN STANLEY COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESSION COMMITTEE, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, JOHN/JANE DOES, 1-20, Defendant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 20-cv-11047 (Hon. Paul G. Gardephe) BRIEF OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEE AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS APPELLANTS-CROSS-APPELLEES ANDREW J. PINCUS ARCHIS A. P ARASHARAMI DANIELE. JONES Mayer Brown LLP 1999 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 263-3000 Counsel for Amici Curiae DOLAR1055 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 2 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 147 of 194 RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America states that it is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization incorporated in the District of Columbia. The Chamber has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company has 10% or greater ownership in the Chamber. The ERISA Industry Committee states that it is a non-profit, tax- exempt organization incorporated in the District of Columbia. ERIC has no parent corporation and no publicly held company has 10% or greater ownership. 1 DOLAR1056 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 3 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 148 of 194 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................... .iii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................... 4 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................ 6 The District Court's Erroneous Expansion Of ERISA' s Coverage Threatens Adverse Consequences For Both Employers And Employees ............................................................................................ 6 A. The Deferred Compensation Arrangements In This Case Are Not ERISA Pension Plans ...................................... 6 B. Employers Routinely Use Deferred Incentive Compensation Arrangements Like Those In This Case To Encourage Employee Retention And Reward Loyalty, Not To Provide Retirement Benefits ..................... 12 C. Adopting The District Court's Overbroad Reading Of ERISA Would Harm Employers And Employees Alike ...... 18 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 22 11 DOLAR1057 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 4 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 149 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 197 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1999) ............................................................... 11 McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1993) ............................................................. ll Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fermer &. Smith, Inc. v. Brennan, 2007 WL 632904 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2007) ....................................... 14 Milligan v. Merrill Lynch, No. 24-cv-440 (W.D.N.C. filed Apr. 30, 2024) ..................................... 19 Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1980) ......................................................... 10, 11 Oatway v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2003) .......................................................... 10, 11 Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2017) ................................................................ 10 PBGC ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 712 F.3d 705 (2d Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 20 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) ................................................................................. 6 Tolbert v. REC Cap. Mkts. Corp., 758 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2014) ............................................................... 10 Statutes and Regulations 12 U.S.C. § 5641 ...................................................................................... 17 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) ............................................................................... 7 111 DOLAR1058 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 5 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 150 of 194 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) .................................................................... 9, 10 29 U.S.C. § 1053 ........................................................................................ 6 29 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(l) .............................................................................. 17 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) ........................................................................ 7, 12 29 C.F.R. § 2530 ........................................................................................ 6 Other Authorities Andreas Stuermann, Employers, Are You Ready For The Great Resignation? Actionable Ideas To Recruit, Retain, And Reward Key Talent, Stuermann Consulting (Feb. 2022) .................................................................................................... 15 Bartek Podolski, Ask an Advisor: What is a long-term incentive plan and how can it help us?, EBN (July 15, 2022) .................................................................................................... 16 Deborah S. Davidson et al., A Chubb Special Report: A Primer on 401(k) Forfeiture Litigation, Chubb (Oct. 2024) ............... 18 DOL Advisory Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654 ................................... 10, 12 DOL Advisory Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 318464 78 ................................. 12 Eduardo Rivera Greenwood, Workers are leaving. What can you do about it?, Deloitte (Oct. 5, 2022) ............................................. 13 J.P. Morgan, A Quick Guide to Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) (Mar. 13, 2024) ................................................................ 15, 16 Long-term incentive plans: A comprehensive guide for HR, Rippling (Dec. 12, 2024) ...................................................................... 15 Mason Braswell, Recruiting Bonuses for Top Producers Flirt with 400%, Hitting Fresh Highs, AdvisorHub (Sept. 21, 2022) .................................................................................................... 14 IV DOLAR1059 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 6 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 151 of 194 Pearl Meyer, Looking Ahead to Executive Pay Practices in 2024 ..................................................................................................... 16 Sam Cook, The Professional Services Industry Is Leading The Office Worker Revolt, MentorcliQ (Dec. 1, 2021) ......................... 13 Shane McFeely & Ben Wigert, This Fixable Problem Costs U.S. Businesses $1 Trillion, Gallup (Mar. 13, 2019) .......................... 14 Vincent Amanor-Boadu, Empirical evidence for the "Great Resignation", Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Nov. 2022) ............................................................... 13 V DOLAR1060 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 7 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 152 of 194 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1 The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (Chamber) is the world's largest business federation. It represents approximately 300,000 direct members and indirectly represents the interests of more than three million companies and professional organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from every region of the country. An important function of the Chamber is to represent the interests of its members in matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts. To that end, the Chamber regularly files amicus curiae briefs in cases, like this one, that raise issues of concern to the nation's business community. The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC) 1s a national non-profit business trade association representing approximately 100 of the nation's largest employers in their capacity as sponsors of employee benefit plans for their workers, retirees, and families. ERIC routinely 1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity, aside from amici curiae, their members, or their counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E). All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 1 DOLAR1061 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 8 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 153 of 194 participates as amicus curiae in cases implicating the scope and content of the regulation of employee benefits. Amici's members include many employers that, in addition to maintaining retirement plans, offer a variety of deferred incentive compensation or long-term incentive arrangements to their employees. These arrangements play a vital role-both in the financial services industry and beyond-in efforts to retain valuable employees, reward their loyalty, and discourage misconduct. The orders below threaten the continued utility of these arrangements. The district court never should have addressed whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation awards are employee pension benefit plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA): that merits question was for arbitrators to resolve. That is reason enough to vacate the orders below. But if this Court reaches the substantive ERISA issue, amici have a strong interest in this Court's rejection of the district court's improper extension of ERISA to deferred compensation arrangements like the ones in this case. Allowing the district court's interpretation to stand would harm employers and 2 DOLAR1062 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 9 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 154 of 194 employees alike by threatening to eliminate or curtail these beneficial compensation arrangements. 3 DOLAR1063 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 10 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 155 of 194 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The principal underlying merits issue in this case is whether the deferred compensation award programs offered by Morgan Stanley are "employee benefit pension plans" (pension plans) under ERISA. In the course of compelling arbitration, the district court determined that they are. For all of the reasons explained by Morgan Stanley, the district court should never have reached the ERISA-coverage issue, which the parties agreed to resolve in arbitration. This Court should accordingly vacate the orders below and allow the arbitrators to decide the issue in the first instance. If this Court reaches the parties' dispute over whether Morgan Stanley's programs are ERISA pension plans, amici write separately to explain why the district court's interpretation of the statute is both incorrect and detrimental to employers and employees alike. The court below extended ERISA's reach far beyond what the statute and its implementing regulations allow. Both the express terms and the surrounding circumstances of Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation arrangements (which are similar to incentive award arrangements used across employers) demonstrate that they are not 4 DOLAR1064 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 11 of 29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 156 of 194 pension plans, but rather reward current employees for their continued service and good conduct. The text of the statute, the Department of Labor's regulatory exemption for ''bonus" incentive programs, and the overwhelming consensus among judicial and Department of Labor decisions all point to the same result: the arrangements are not ERISA pension plans. Broader workplace dynamics-both in and beyond the securities and financial services industries-further confirm that arrangements like Morgan Stanley's are not ERISA plans. Deferred incentive compensation and long-term incentive programs are in widespread use, and employers offer them for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with providing income after retirement. Those programs play a critical role in promoting retention of productive employees, rewarding good conduct, and deterring or penalizing misconduct. The district court's interpretation of ERISA, if upheld, would harm employers and employees alike. It would encourage a wave of litigation in which the ERISA plaintiffs' bar seizes on ERISA's strict vesting and anti-forfeiture rules to expose employers to potentially astronomical liability for legitimate cancellations of incentive awards that have not 5 DOLAR1065 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 12 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 157 of 194 vested. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053; 29 C.F.R. § 2530. It would undermine employers' justifiable reliance on nearly fifty years of case law and regulatory guidance and deprive employers of their ability to offer attractive and flexible compensation programs. It also would pressure some employers into eliminating their deferred incentive compensation programs altogether, stripping them of a valuable tool in their efforts to retain talented employees and depriving employees of a beneficial compensation arrangement. ARGUMENT The District Court's Erroneous Expansion Of ERISA's Coverage Threatens Adverse Consequences For Both Employers And Employees. A. The Deferred Compensation Arrangements In This Case Are Not ERISA Pension Plans. Congress passed ERISA in 197 4 to "promote the interest of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). Congress defined the term "employee benefit plan" to include "both pension plans and welfare plans." Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added). Welfare plans (such as plans providing health or disability benefits) are not at issue here. And a pension plan, as the term suggests, refers to a program that provides for 6 DOLAR1066 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 13 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 158 of 194 retirement or other post-employment income, not a program designed to compensate current employees. That is clear from the statutory text. To qualify as an "employee benefit pension plan" under ERISA, a program must, "by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances," either "(i) provide[] retirement income to employees" or "(ii) result[] in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (emphasis added). The Department of Labor has by regulation further exempted from ERISA's coverage a program providing "payments made by an employer to some or all of its employees as bonuses for work performed, unless such payments are systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) (emphasis added). As Morgan Stanley's brief explains, its deferred compensation arrangements do not meet the statutory definition of a "pension plan" and are independently exempt from ERISA's coverage under the DOL's definition of a "bonus" plan. Opening Br. 38-58. The district court's contrary determinations also conflict with the overwhelming weight of 7 DOLAR1067 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 14 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 159 of 194 case law and DOL guidance concluding that arrangements that share many features with Morgan Stanley's are not covered by ERISA. Numerous characteristics of Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation arrangements confirm that they fall outside ERISA's scope. Among other things, Morgan Stanley's deferred cash or stock awards are: • Unvested-i.e., unearned-unless and until an advisor stays at Morgan Stanley in good standing for the specified vesting period; • Automatically distributed directly to the advisor once vested, and are not eligible to be deferred by either the advisor or Morgan Stanley; • As a result, distributed to current employees except when one of the narrow enumerated exceptions to the vesting rules applies, which may result in payment being made to a former employee; • Overwhelmingly distributed to current employees (in fact between 85-92% of the time); 8 DOLAR1068 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 15 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 160 of 194 • Expressly described in the program terms as a "reward" for "your continued Employment and service to the Firm in the future and your compliance with the Firm's policies (including the Code of Conduct)" and not "as a source of retirement income"; and • Taxed as ordinary bonus income, not retirement income. Opening Br. 7-11, 57-58. The district court acknowledged that these awards do not provide retirement income. SPA30. Instead, the district court seized on the exceptions permitting distribution of an award to former advisors who leave Morgan Stanley before the vesting period ends due to death, disability, not-for-cause layoff, ordinary course retirement, or transition to government service. According to the district court, those exceptions mean that payments "sometimes occur at the end of employment or beyond" and therefore bring the programs within the scope of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii). SPA37-39. That outlier result departs from an otherwise uniform consensus among courts and the Department of Labor that "incidental" payments to former employees under plans generally designed to compensate 9 DOLAR1069 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 16 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 161 of 194 current employees are insufficient to trigger ERISA's coverage. Oatway v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (following Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1980) and "the unbroken line of cases that have followed Murphy's reasoning"); Murphy, 611 F.2d at 574- 75; DOL Advisory Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *1-2; see also Opening Br. 41-42 (collecting additional cases and DOL opinions). 2 That consensus is for good reason: this Court and others have admonished that ERISA's definition of "pension plan" is "not to be read as an elastic girdle that can be stretched to cover any content that can conceivably fit within its reach." Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162, 2 The district court relied onTolbert v. REC Cap. Mkts. Corp., 758 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2014), but Tolbert is readily distinguishable. Unlike the programs here, under which awards automatically distribute when vested and cannot be deferred by employees, the plan in Tolbert expressly allowed employees to voluntarily defer their earned compensation awards until the end of their employment. Id. at 622, 625-26. That characteristic made termination or post-termination payments entirely within the control of the employee rather than incidental, and placed the plan squarely within the statutory definition for plans that "result[] in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). If anything, Tolbert further supports the consensus view in favor of Morgan Stanley's position, reaffirming the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision in Murphy and explaining that the "'mere fact' of post- termination payments" is not enough to transform a deferred compensation program into an ERISA pension plan. 758 F.3d at 625 (quoting Murphy, 611 F.2d at 575). 10 DOLAR1070 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 17 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 162 of 194 168 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Murphy, 611 F.2d at 574-75). Like many forms of long-term incentive or deferred compensation programs, the awards here are designed to, and do, provide additional compensation to current employees to reward them for continued service and good conduct. That is a far cry from a program aimed at providing retirement or post-termination income; and it explains why these plans cannot be shoehorned into the category of an ERISA pension plan. Finally, the district court also erred by determining that the DOL's exemption for bonuses does not apply. Other courts of appeals analyzing the regulation, and the DOL, have uniformly taken the view that an "incentive plan designed to provide a financial incentive for employees to remain" with their employer "and improve their performance there" falls within ERISA's exemption for bonus plans. Oatway, 325 F.3d at 186-89; see also, e.g., Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 197 F.3d 929, 931-34 (8th Cir. 1999); McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401, 406 (10th Cir. 1993); Opening Br. 51-52 (collecting additional cases and DOL opinions). That is exactly the purpose of the a wards here, both under the express terms of Morgan Stanley's programs and in practice. The district court took the view that the awards cannot be bonuses because they are 11 DOLAR1071 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 18 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 163 of 194 calculated based on past revenue generated by the advisor. SPA37. But that approach ignores the reality that bonuses are frequently tied to past revenue generation, as courts and the DOL have repeatedly recognized. Opening Br. 51-52. In sum, the awards here are ERISA-exempt bonuses. That should end the inquiry, because there is no reasonable dispute that the payments are not "systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c). The DOL has made clear that the "systemically deferred" standard is a high one, under which an "inordinate percentage" of payments under the program must be made after employment and the economic benefits of the program allocated "disproportionately to retirees." DOL Advisory Op. 98-02A, 1998 WL 103654, at *2; accord DOL Advisory Op. 2002-13A, 2002 WL 318464 78, at *3 n.3. The incidental payments to former advisors here come nowhere close to meeting that stringent regulatory standard. B. Employers Routinely Use Deferred Incentive Compensation Arrangements Like Those In This Case To Encourage Employee Retention And Reward Loyalty, Not To Provide Retirement Benefits. Broader workplace dynamics, both in the securities and financial services industries and beyond, confirm that employers offer 12 DOLAR1072 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 19 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 164 of 194 arrangements like Morgan Stanley's to retain and reward current employees, not to provide retirement or post-termination income. Employers face significant challenges in retaining productive employees. Those challenges have been particularly acute during the past few years, with workers voluntarily leaving their jobs at historically high rates-a phenomenon known as the "Great Resignation." See, e.g., Vincent Amanor-Boadu, Empirical evidence for the "Great Resignation", Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Nov. 2022), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2022/article/empirical-evidence-for-the- great-resignation.htm; Eduardo Rivera Greenwood, Workers are leaving. What can you do about it?, Deloitte (Oct. 5, 2022), https://action.deloitte. com/insight/2737/workers-are-leaving.-what-can-you-do-about-it. Professional and business services firm resignations spiked during the Great Resignation. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that approximately 3.4 million workers in that industry quit their jobs in just the five months between May and September of 2021-representing 17% of the 20 million Americans who resigned during that time period. See Sam Cook, The Professional Services Industry Is Leading The Office Worker Revolt, MentorcliQ (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.mentorcliq.com/ 13 DOLAR1073 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 20 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 165 of 194 blog/the-professional-services-industry-is-leading-the-office-warker- revolt-2. This turnover is tremendously costly to businesses. Generally, a "conservative estimate" of the cost to replace a departing worker is "one- half to two times the employee's annual salary." Shane McFeely & Ben Wigert, This Fixable Problem Costs U.S. Businesses $1 Trillion, Gallup (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.gallup.com/workplace/247391/fixable- problem-costs-businesses-trillion.aspx. These costs can be even greater for client-focused professional services firms, where financial advisors and similar workers maintain and cultivate client relationships, and those clients may follow their advisors to a new firm. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fermer &. Smith, Inc. v. Brennan, 2007 WL 632904, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2007) (noting the "fluid nature" of the financial services industry, where "brokers routinely switch firms and take their client lists with them"). Indeed, the employees who are most successful at developing extensive client networks are often the target of competition among firms, with firms offering "eye-popping bonuses to woo talent." Mason Braswell, Recruiting Bonuses for Top Producers Flirt with 400%, Hitting 14 DOLAR1074 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 21 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 166 of 194 Fresh Highs, AdvisorHub (Sept. 21, 2022), https://www.advisorhub.com/ recruiting-bonuses-for-top-producers-flirt-with-400-hitting-fresh-highs/ (reporting that signing bonuses for brokers can reach up to four times the broker's prior 12-month revenue). To address this problem, employers have adopted a variety of deferred incentive compensation arrangements designed to promote employee loyalty and longevity. See, e.g., Andreas Stuermann, Employers, Are You Ready For The Great Resignation? Actionable Ideas To Recruit, Retain, And Reward Key Talent, Stuermann Consulting (Feb. 2022), https://www.stuermannconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/ 02/SCigreatresignationblogfinal.pdf. Among the most common and effective features of such arrangements is the use of mandatory vesting periods-like those in Morgan Stanley's programs-requiring employees to remain at the firm for a certain period of time in good standing prior to receiving an award of additional cash or equity. See generally J.P. Morgan, A Quick Guide to Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) (Mar. 13, 2024), https://www.globalshares.com/insights/long-term-incentive-plan- design-what-you-need-to-know/; Long-term incentive plans: A 15 DOLAR1075 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 22 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 167 of 194 comprehensive guide for HR, Rippling (Dec. 12, 2024), https://www. rippling.com/blog/long-term-incentive-plan. Employers across a variety of industries use these arrangements "to further enhance retention." Pearl Meyer, Looking Ahead to Executive Pay Practices in 2024, at 7, https://pearlmeyer.com/sites/default/files/ knowledge-share/research-report/looking-ahead-to-executive-pay- practices-in-2024-executive-summary.pdf (reporting that nearly 20% of responding employers that offer long-term incentive arrangements increased participation levels in those arrangements in 2023). And employers are increasingly starting to offer long-term incentive awards to employees below the executive level. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan, supra (53% of publicly traded companies reported granting long-term incentives to employees below the vice president level) (citing Pearl Meyer, supra); see also Bartek Podolski, Ask an Advisor: What is a long-term incentive plan and how can it help us?, EBN (July 15, 2022), https://www.benefitnews. com/advisers/news/can-long-term-incentive-plans-help-employers- 16 DOLAR1076 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 23 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 168 of 194 attract-talent (similarly noting that "[m]any companies are starting to offer [LTIPs] to employees below the executive level"). 3 Finally, deferred incentive compensation arrangements not only reward loyalty and good conduct, but also discourage misconduct by providing real consequences in the form of cancelled incentive awards. Indeed, financial regulators have exercised their statutory mandate under Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act to direct regulated firms to use multi-year vesting periods and subject incentive awards to cancellation to deter and penalize excessive risk-taking and other harmful behaviors. See 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (requiring federal regulators to "prescribe regulations or guidelines" prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements "that the regulators determine encourage[] inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions"); Opening Br. 9-10 & n.5 3 Because employers are increasingly offering deferred compensation arrangements to employees other than executives and senior management, ERISA's separate exclusion of "top hat" plans from the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(l), is no solution to the district court's overbroad reading of the statute. Top hat plans must be maintained "primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees" (id.), rather than a broader set of the employer's workforce. 17 DOLAR1077 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 24 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 169 of 194 (discussing directives from FINRA, the SEC, and other financial regulators). C. Adopting The District Court's Overbroad Reading Of ERISA Would Harm Employers And Employees Alike. Upholding the district court's outlier interpretation of ERISA's reach would harm employers and employees. To begin with, the district court's construction would encourage a wave of litigation threatening employers in a variety of sectors who use deferred compensation with potentially enormous liability for past cancellation of unvested deferred compensation. It is no secret that the ERISA plaintiffs' bar is dominated by a small number of specialized firms that sometimes target businesses with theories of liability that challenge well-established legal understandings and seek to push the boundaries of liability under the statute. 4 4 For example, since the fall of 2023 the ERISA plaintiffs' bar has filed a wave of lawsuits asserting the "novel theory" that employers are violating ERISA when they use 40l(k) plan forfeitures-employer contributions that participants forfeit when they leave the plan before those contributions vest-to offset future employer contributions. Deborah S. Davidson et al., A Chubb Special Report: A Primer on 401(k) Forfeiture Litigation, Chubb (Oct. 2024). So far, "courts' reactions to plaintiffs' theories have been mixed," with some courts granting motions to dismiss and others allowing the claims to proceed past the pleadings stage. Id. 18 DOLAR1078 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 25 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 170 of 194 This case embodies that trend: Recognizing that ERISA's strict vesting and anti-forfeiture rules, if they apply, could require employers to pay unearned or cancelled deferred compensation, the ERISA plaintiffs' bar is trying to push for the expansion of the statute beyond bona fide retirement plans to reach deferred incentive compensation and long-term incentive arrangements that have long been understood not to be covered by ERISA. Indeed, the plaintiffs' firms leading the series of cases and arbitrations against Morgan Stanley (see Opening Br. 20-21) have also advanced a similar theory in a suit against Merrill Lynch. See, e.g., Milligan v. Merrill Lynch, No. 24-cv-440 (W.D.N.C. filed Apr. 30, 2024). And if their theory succeeds, these plaintiffs' firms will have no reason to stop with the financial services industry. It is not difficult for a single firm or set of firms to bring dozens of cookie-cutter lawsuits- that is already par for the course in ERISA litigation. An attorney need only identify a theory that applies to a large number of employers before blanketing the country with a series of similar complaints to see which ones gain traction. See note 4, supra. 19 DOLAR1079 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 26 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 171 of 194 Defending lawsuits designed to extract lucrative settlements from commonplace and useful compensation arrangements would force employers to expend enormous resources. As this Court has recognized, the prospect of "asymmetric" discovery for defendants in ERISA actions comes at an "ominous" price, entailing "probing and costly inquiries." PBGC ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 719 (2d Cir. 2013). But the harmful consequences of this increase in costs would not be limited to employers. Market forces will pass the uptick in litigation costs to customers in the form of higher prices or less attractive service offerings, and to employees in the form of reduced compensation. Relatedly, if this Court were to uphold the district court's departure from nearly fifty years of case law and regulatory guidance on the meaning of an ERISA pension plan, that change in the law would undermine employers' settled expectations and introduce substantial uncertainty. Consistent application of the statutory text and regulatory exemptions is critical to give employers clear guidance about what legal regimes apply to their compensation arrangements and to allow them to structure their arrangements accordingly. 20 DOLAR1080 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 27 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 172 of 194 That uncertainty, and the prospect of burdensome and costly ERISA litigation, may cause employers to stop offering deferred incentive compensation arrangements altogether. That would injure employers because they would lose a valuable tool for retaining employees and discouraging misconduct. And it would harm employees who would otherwise reap the rewards for their long-term contributions to their employer. In the securities and financial services context in particular, firms must satisfy the expectations of financial regulators that firms will use cancellable deferred compensation subject to multi-year vesting periods as a tool for policing misconduct. But adopting such plans would run headlong into ERISA's requirements-if, as the district court mistakenly held, ERISA applied to deferred compensation arrangements like Morgan Stanley's. At minimum, employers in all industries would be forced to offer deferred incentive compensation on much less attractive and flexible terms. For example, to avoid even incidentally paying awards to former employees, employers would be forced to jettison humanitarian and common-sense exceptions and impose a strict rule cancelling all deferred 21 DOLAR1081 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 28 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 173 of 194 incentive compensation awards the moment an employee no longer works for the employer, even due to death, disability, or layoff. That harsh and inequitable result is not what ERISA's text requires. CONCLUSION The Court should vacate the orders below, and, if it reaches the ERISA-coverage issue, reverse the district court's determination on that issue. Dated: January 29, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Andrew J. Pincus ANDREW J. PINCUS ARCHIS A. PARASHARAMI DANIELE. JONES Mayer Brown LLP 1999 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 263-3000 Counsel for Amici Curiae 22 DOLAR1082 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 66.1, Page 29 of29 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 174 of 194 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Cir. R. 29. l(c) because it contains 3,686 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(£). This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it was prepared in a proportionately spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Century Schoolbook 14-point type for text and footnotes. Dated: January 29, 2025 /s/ Andrew J. Pincus Andrew J. Pincus DOLAR1083 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 1 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 175 of 194 24-3141 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT MATTHEW T. SHAFER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, MACE TAMSE, STEVE SHERESKY, GEORGE LIVANOS, JEFFREY SHOVER, MARK LOFTUS, SANDY JUKEL, STEVE NADLER, SHERI HAUGABOOK, JEFFREY SHERESKY, PETER HEIDT, JEFFREY SAMSEN, Plaintijfs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, - V. - MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC, AND MORGAN STANLEY COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESSION COMMITTEE, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, JOHN/JANE DOES, 1-20, Defendant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 20-cv-11047, Hon. Paul G. Gardephe BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN BENEFITS COUNCIL AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-CROSS APPELLEES Alexander C.B. Barnard Scott J. Splittgerber Kristi E. Jacques EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C. 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: 212.351.4500 Counsel for Amicus Curiae DOLAR1084 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 2 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 176 of 194 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1, The American Benefits Council states that it is a non-profit organization that does not have a parent corporation and it does not issue stock. DOLAR1085 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 3 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 177 of 194 TABLE OF CONTENTS STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .......................................... 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................... 1 ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4 I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION ........................... 4 II. THE IMPROPER ERISA DETERMINATION CONFUSES THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ERISA PLANS AND CONTINGENT DEFERRED INCENTIVE PLANS ............................................................. 5 A. The district court's opinion erred in finding that the incentive compensation plan documents unambiguously demonstrate that the awards qualify as "commissions" or earned wages ............................ 6 B. The unintended consequences of the opinion's improper merits finding has caused unwarranted uncertainty and threatens other regulatory goals ................................................................................ 10 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 14 -1- DOLAR1086 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 4 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 178 of 194 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc 'ns Workers ofAm., 475 U.S. 643 (1986) ........................................................................................... 4 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010) ......................................................................................... 13 Harvey v. Joyce, 199 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. .4 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63 (2019) ............................................................................................. 5 Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd, 486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973) .................. .4 Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2002) ............................................................................... 6 Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supplemental Mgmt. Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................................. 5 Statutes 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) ................................................................................................ 6 26 U.S.C. § 409A .................................................................................................... 3 Rules Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(2) ........................................................ 1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E) ................................................... 2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 ................................ Corporate Statement Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) ...................................................... 15 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) ................................................. 15 Local Rule 29. l(b) .................................................................................................. 1 -11- DOLAR1087 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 5 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 179 of 194 Other Authorities Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Incentive Compensation Practices: A Report on the Horizontal Review of Practices at Large Banking Organizations (2011) .............................................................................. 11 Compensation Clawbacks Report, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, July 24, 2024 ................................................................... 12 DOJ, The Criminal Division's Pilot Program Regarding Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks, March 3, 2023 ..................................... 12 Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) ....................................passim Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 62 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 11 N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs., Guidance on Incentive Compensation Agreements 2 (2016) ............................................................................................. 11 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., FAQs about Retirement Plans and ERISA ........................................................................... 12-13 -111- DOLAR1088 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 6 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 180 of 194 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAN The American Benefits Council ("The Council") is a Washington D.C.-based employee benefits public policy organization with more than 430 members that advocates for employers that are dedicated to the achievement of best-in-class solutions that protect and encourage the health and financial well-being of their workers, retirees, and families. The Council works closely with Congress, the White House, executive branch agencies and the courts to champion legislation, regulation, and legal rulings favorable to its members' needs, and to defend the employer-sponsored benefits system from proposals that would add burdens, liabilities, and costs. The Council also serves as a technical resource on benefits issues for lawmakers, the media and other industry trade associations. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The district court's decision is legally erroneous. The consequences of this decision would cause disruption and litigation by upending the settled expectations 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E) and Local Rule 29.l(b), amicus states that no party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party, party's counsel, or person other than amicus or its members of counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(2), all parties have consented to this filing. -1- DOLAR1089 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 7 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 181 of 194 of employers and employees across the United States, particularly in the financial services industry. In short, the district court's decision unnecessarily transformed standard contingent deferred incentive compensation that is designed as a reward for good conduct and loyalty into a guaranteed pension that cannot serve the purposes for which the compensation was awarded. These incentive awards, by design, are not earned if an employee triggers any of the identified prohibitions. By wrongfully applying ERISA, the district court's decision suggests that such prohibitions should be written out of the governing documents. In so doing, the decision not only undermines the reason for offering such an incentive, it puts Defendants-Appellants and countless similarly situated employers across the country at risk of enforcement from regulators who expect those provisions to be applied, not to mention the increased potential for litigation. ERISA does not govern most compensation agreements, including deferred compensation. Companies offer employees compensation in myriad forms, from salary to contingent incentive awards, as here, to pensions, 401 (k) plans, insurance plans, etc. These plans and programs are carefully drafted and implemented by a host of subject matter experts. It is well understood that pension plans are governed by ERISA 2 with its fiduciary obligations, which is why special committees are typically formed and carefully managed to ensure compliance. The district court's 2 "ERISA" refers to the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974. -2- DOLAR1090 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 8 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 182 of 194 decision purports to extend these stringent obligations to those involved in crafting and overseeing contingent deferred incentive compensation. There are also other unintended consequences that could arise from the district court's decision, which impact the maximum value of awards, tax treatment of awards, 3 and accounting for awards on the books and records of firms, among others. Such unanticipated consequences are just one of the reasons why there is a prohibition on district courts unnecessarily weighing in on the merits of an underlying dispute at the preliminary stage of a motion to compel arbitration. Necessarily, the record is very limited, without consideration of the broader context. However, the district court's opinion inappropriately ruled on the core issue in the case, the applicability ofERISA, even though that was not necessary. The court held that the matter was arbitrable whether ERISA applies or not, which means it should have simply said that, rather than deciding the core issue underlying every claim that Plaintiffs-Appellees assert in this case. By doing so, the opinion undermined a core purpose of arbitration agreements as protected by the Federal Arbitration Act. Most importantly, for amicus, the opinion errs in its legal analysis of the incentive 3 For instance, deferred compensation awards like these are subject to section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 409A, which requires, among other things, that deferred compensation schedules are adhered to, failing which the employee is subject to substantial penalties. -3- DOLAR1091 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 9 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 183 of 194 compensation plans at issue such that its ruling that the plans are subject to ERISA has created potentially major adverse consequences for employers generally. ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION It was improper for the opinion to weigh in on the merits of the underlying dispute because that was a task that was delegated to arbitration. Courts recognize that parties to an arbitration agreement have the right to a meaningful arbitration. Cf Harvey v. Joyce, 199 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 2000) (granting stay and observing that permitting parallel litigation to determine issues common to, or inextricably intertwined with, the arbitration would render the arbitration proceedings "both redundant and meaningless; in effect, thwarting the federal policy in favor of arbitration"); Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd, 486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973) (same). While amicus will not repeat Defendants-Appellants' arguments on this point, we urge that this Court reverse on the basis of the Supreme Court's directive in AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc 'ns Workers -4- DOLAR1092 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 10 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 184 of 194 ofAm., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986), that "a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims" subject to arbitration. 4 II. THE IMPROPER ERISA DETERMINATION CONFUSES THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ERISA PLANS AND CONTINGENT DEFERRED INCENTIVE PLANS Regardless of the propriety of the opm10n reaching the merits, the determination is erroneous. First, the opinion improperly substituted dictionary definitions of terms for the actual contract terms. Second, the opinion erroneously found that the incentive plans, which unambiguously state that the awards are not vested nor wages when they are awarded, nevertheless qualified as earned commissions that are protected ERISA plans. 5 SPA 72, 79. The opinion erroneously determined that the awards are effectively "commissions" that are deferred income subject to ERISA, regardless of plan vesting provisions, SPA88-89, and that the awards are thereby shielded from forfeiture for any reason. This disregarded the plain meaning of the express terms and definitions in the incentive compensation 4 The Supreme Court has stated that this rule applies to all merit determinations underlying the claims assigned by the contract to arbitration, even the threshold issue of arbitrability. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2019). 5 "Contract language is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business." Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supplemental Mgmt. Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). -5- DOLAR1093 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 11 of 20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 185 of 194 plans and how they are earned under the governing plans, for instance, in the case of the Morgan Stanley Compensation Incentive Program ("MSCIP") and applicable New York labor and other laws (A211 ~ 17). A. The district court's opinion erred in finding that the incentive compensation plan documents unambiguously demonstrate that the awards qualify as "commissions" or earned wages A brief analysis of the compensation plan documents at issue illustrates why the various aspects of the opinion's findings are wrong. First, the awards at issue are defined as "notional" and/or "unfunded," meaning there is no account or money (or anything else) set aside or allocated for any award prior to vesting. 6 See A209 ~ 9 (MSCIP Plan Document). Rather, the awards have certain characteristics and are "earned" once an Advisor remains employed through vesting and refrains from behaviors that could harm Morgan Stanley, its clients and its shareholders. See, e.g., A227-228 ~ 16(p) (2017 Award Certificate). Once "earned," according to these requirements, Morgan Stanley delivers cash or shares to the recipient, thus paying for performance of the contractual requirements. See, e.g., A217 ~ 2 (2017 Award Certificate). The opinion turns this analysis on its head, treating an award as "earned" commission up front. This analysis is misplaced and certainly should not apply in 6 The Court observed in Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243,256 (2d Cir. 2002) that ERISA exempts certain plans from its non-forfeitability provisions such as those that are unfunded and designed to provide deferred compensation to certain employees) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2)). -6- DOLAR1094 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 12 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 186 of 194 the regulated context of executive compensation in financial services, which 1s governed by regulatory expectations that the opinion does not address. As can be seen from the record, the governing incentive compensation documentation spells out that a financial advisor whose firm clients generate adequate revenue potentially receive "a deferred compensation award shortly following year-end (provided the Advisor is employed on the grant date)." A145 (2018 FA Compensation Plan). Accordingly, the deferred awards at issue here are not even granted if the Advisor leaves before year-end. And even after granting, awards remain subject to restrictions including provisions under which an Advisor does not earn them7 where the Advisor: Resigns before vesting and delivery of awards. See AI45 (2018 FA Compensation Plan). Fails to demonstrate "excellent guardianship at all times," etc., giving Morgan Stanley the right to make downward adjustments. See AI 77 (2015 FA Compensation Plan). Engages in any one of the "Prohibited Activit[ies]" defined to include disclosing confidential information, soliciting clients, competition, or other requirements. See A216, 227-228 ~ 16(p) (2017 Award Certificate). Thus, these compensation documents demonstrate that no amounts are "earned" until each of the above requirements is satisfied, something that cannot be 7 "[Y]our Applicable Account Value, even if vested, is not earned until the Scheduled Distribution Date (and until you satisfy all obligations you owe to the Firm as set forth in Section 9 below .... )." A221 ~ 7 (2017 Award Certificate). -7- DOLAR1095 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 13 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 187 of 194 evaluated until years after the underlying revenue event. Accordingly, a conclusion that deems amounts to be "earned" each month ignores the entire compensation framework in addition to industry-wide, long-settled understanding. The district court's opinion fails to account for this language, instead finding that if anything of value is received by an Advisor after employment ends, that must be governed by a law more commonly understood to refer to actual pensions and 401(k) plans that are funded. If the opinion were right, the above restrictions would be unenforceable across the entire country, despite the damage that it may cause to the regulatory framework. Central to the opinion is the assumption that the awards at issue are in fact "earned" monthly and, meaning that they cause advisors to have their "income" forcibly deferred to the post-employment period. See SPA37-39. The plan documents are clear, however: the award is not "earned" until the conditions are satisfied. See, e.g., AI46 (2018 FA Compensation Plan) ("Under no circumstances shall an Advisor be eligible to receive any Incentive Compensation ... unless and until the Incentive Compensation calculation is made and the Advisor meets all other conditions .... "). Accordingly, the awards require that the Advisor perform their -8- DOLAR1096 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 14 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 188 of 194 obligations (including by remaining loyal and responsibly caring for clients) then "earns" and receives awards. That is clear under the documents. The district court opinion erred in holding that ERISA could apply here. The district court's opinion depends on finding that the Morgan Stanley compensation plans are "pension plans" and not defined "bonuses." But as explained in the Morgan Stanley brief, an employee compensation plan is not subject to ERISA if it is not a "pension plan"- that is either intended to or as a practical matter does-provide retirement income. The Morgan Stanley compensation plans do neither, and are rather designed to motivate employees to stay employed and comply with their legal and regulatory obligations, failing which nothing is granted, vested or earned. Just because some of the payments may incidentally occur "at the end of employment or beyond" under certain circumstances does not transform this compensation program into a pension and thereby invalidate the award documentation. The compensation plans are explicitly incentive plans and not retirement plans and these are two very different creatures. For instance, the Financial Advisor Compensation Plan states that: "[ d]eferred compensation awards are not intended to provide for retirement income," Al 45 (2018 FA Compensation Plan), and that "neither MSCIP nor any program under MSCIP is treated as an 'employee benefit plan' under ERISA." A208 (MSCIP Plan Document); see also A308 (2017 MSCIP Award Summary Description) ("This program is not a retirement plan.... and is not subject to the -9- DOLAR1097 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 15 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 189 of 194 [ERISA]."). Instead, the compensation plans are "long-term incentive plan[s]" whose goals are designed "to attract, retain and motivate employees and to compensate them for their contributions to the Firm ... " and to "[align] the interests of ... employees ... with the interests of the Firm's clients and shareholders .... " A202 (MSCIP Plan Document); see also A265 (Equity Incentive Compensation Plan) ("The primary purposes of the Morgan Stanley Equity Incentive Compensation Plan are to attract, retain and motivate employees, to compensate them for their contributions to the growth and profits of the Company and to encourage them to own Morgan Stanley stock"). B. The unintended consequences of the opinion's improper merits finding has caused unwarranted uncertainty and threatens other regulatory goals Employee compensation packages at large financial firms have been the focus of regulators for several years, especially because of their perceived role in the 2008 financial crisis in rewarding employees' risk-taking behavior without proper risk management. These packages offered payments to produce increases in short-term profit without regard to long-term risks. Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 62 (2011), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. It was therefore necessary to implement a compensation program which balanced risks and rewards and had effective risk management. N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs., -10- DOLAR1098 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 16 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 190 of 194 Guidance on Incentive Compensation Agreements 2 (2016), available at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry- guidance/industry- letters/il20161011 - guidance- i ncentive _compensation_arrangements. To that end, in late 2009, the Federal Reserve engaged in a "Horizontal Review" of global financial institutions' incentive-based practices. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Incentive Compensation Practices: A Report on the Horizontal Review of Practices at Large Banking Organizations (2011), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/incentive- compensation-practices-report-201110. pdf. The Horizontal Review found that the two pillars of effective incentive compensation were risk adjustments and deferral of payments. Id. at 2. Compensation packages featuring mandatory deferred compensation with vesting conditions align with these expectations because they allow a firm to cancel outstanding awards if employees engage in behaviors that may result in material harm (financial, reputational, or other) to the firm. Contrary to what Plaintiffs- Appellees allege, the vesting restrictions are not designed to punish Advisors who leave for other firms, but rather serve to minimize risk and to align employee interests with that of investors. The vesting period and the conditions that need to be met before payment strike a balance between providing effective incentives and -11- DOLAR1099 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 17 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 191 of 194 allowing for a sufficient period of time for the validation of the performance measures that gave rise to the original awards. Furthermore, after the financial crisis, many regulations and laws were implemented relating to executive compensation, including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The employee compensation packages are also heavily regulated by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other agencies. Most financial institutions are required to submit an annual report to their federal regulator, in this case, the SEC. 8 The objective of ERISA, on the other hand, is wholly different: "ERISA is a federal law that sets minimum standards for retirement plans in private industry," thereby "protect[ing] the assets of millions of Americans" for retirement. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., FAQs about Retirement Plans and ERISA at 8 The regulatory and federal guidance is not limited to financial industry firms. The DOJ has encouraged, and incentivized, all companies to adopt clawbacks as part of their compensation system to promote compliance and good conduct. See DOJ, The Criminal Division's Pilot Program Regarding Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks, March 3, 2023, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal- fraud/file/1571941/dl. Not surprisingly, seventy percent of the 401 of S&P 500 companies that filed disclosures have exceeded the SEC's clawback requirements, "indicating a strong inclination towards mitigating risks associated with executive compensation and ensuring accountability." N. McCarthy, et al., Compensation Clawbacks Report, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, July 24, 2024, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/07 /24/compensation- clawbacks-report/. -12- DOLARII00 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 18 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 192 of 194 1, available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our- activities/resource-center/faqs/faqs-retirement-plans-erisa. pdf. Different federal regulations apply to the administration of an ERISA plan. The opinion fails to take account of these key differences and conflates the two different types of compensation instruments. The opinion risks upending settled expectations of companies and employees and may cause regulatory issues and litigation. As Plaintiffs-Appellees note in their brief, one of the goals of ERISA is to "promote uniformity in benefits administration." A98. The Supreme Court has observed that in addition to uniformity, ERISA is supposed to encourage other goals such as predictability for plan administrators that decreases costs of litigation. See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010). Classifying a plan as an ERISA plan when it is not intended as such a plan does not promote uniformity or predictability - it does the opposite. -13- DOLARII0I Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 19 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 193 of 194 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate and/or reverse the opinion. Dated: January 29, 2025 Respectfully submitted, Isl Alexander CB. Barnard ALEXANDER C.B. BARNARD SCOTT J. SPLITTGERBER KRISTIE. JACQUES EPSTEIN BECKER& GREEN, P.C. 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: 212.351.4500 Facsimile: 212.878.8600 Counsel for Amicus Curiae American Benefits Council -14- DOLAR1102 Case: 24-3141, 01/29/2025, DktEntry: 67.1, Page 20 of20 Case 1:25-cv-08935-PGG Document 80-15 Filed 09/18/26 Page 194 of 194 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i) and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1 (a)(4) because this brief contains 2,870 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f). This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times New Roman 14-point font. Dated: January 29, 2025 New York, NY Isl Alexander CB. Barnard ALEXANDER C.B. BARNARD -15- DOLAR1103