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Lesesne","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/13137897/","id":13137897,"attorneys":[],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"name":"Plaintiff","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.542504-08:00","date_modified":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.542518-08:00","name":"pla Bonnie Florentine","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/13137896/","id":13137896,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/8814614/","attorney_id":8814614,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/8814614/","attorney_id":8814614,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"name":"Plaintiff","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.444678-08:00","date_modified":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.444692-08:00","name":"Trois White","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/13137895/","id":13137895,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/8814614/","attorney_id":8814614,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/8814614/","attorney_id":8814614,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"name":"Plaintiff","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.400844-08:00","date_modified":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.400858-08:00","name":"Jaime Duran","extra_info":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/parties/13137894/","id":13137894,"attorneys":[{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/8814614/","attorney_id":8814614,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"role":2},{"attorney":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/attorneys/8814614/","attorney_id":8814614,"date_action":null,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"role":1}],"party_types":[{"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","docket_id":66735659,"name":"Plaintiff","date_terminated":null,"extra_info":"","highest_offense_level_opening":"","highest_offense_level_terminated":"","criminal_counts":[],"criminal_complaints":[]}],"date_created":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.364465-08:00","date_modified":"2023-11-08T07:22:34.364478-08:00","name":"Nelson Yerger","extra_info":""}],"entries":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/484197123/","id":484197123,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/500031655/","id":500031655,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/365/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-11-03T07:36:27.770925-08:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T07:36:28.834689-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"365","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018867573","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":true,"document_type":1,"description":"Transcript","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/500031685/","id":500031685,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/365/1/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-11-03T07:36:31.282438-08:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T07:36:32.255278-08:00","sha1":"","page_count":1,"file_size":96399,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"365","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"055018867574","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Appendix","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-11-03T07:36:27.702555-08:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T07:36:27.725563-08:00","date_filed":"2026-11-03","time_filed":null,"entry_number":365,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-11-03.001","pacer_sequence_number":2022,"description":"TRANSCRIPT of a status conference held on 10/29/2026, before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. Court Reporter/Transcriber Diane Peede, Diane_Peede@gand.uscourts.gov. A full directory of court reporters and their contact information can be found at www.gand.uscourts.gov/court-reporter-directory. Tape Number: n/a. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/24/2026. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/4/2026. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/1/2027. (Attachments: (1) Appendix) (dcp)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/483637169/","id":483637169,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/499457355/","id":499457355,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/364/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-30T07:01:23.236398-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-09T06:34:27.830156-08:00","sha1":"677647b8882a51a4adc3d88edf4360c99778e5ab","page_count":1,"file_size":91360,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.364.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.364.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"         Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT          Document 364        Filed 10/29/26      Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                  NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                         ATLANTA DIVISION\n                               1:22-md-03051-TWT\n               IN RE: ARC Airbag Inflators Products Liability Litigation\n                         Honorable Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\n\n                  Minute Sheet for proceedings held In Open Court on 10/29/2026.\n\n\n    TIME COURT COMMENCED: 10:00 A.M.\n    TIME COURT CONCLUDED: 10:30 A.M.               COURT REPORTER: Diane Peede\n    TIME IN COURT: 00:30                           DEPUTY CLERK: Jordyn Holder\n    OFFICE LOCATION: Atlanta\n\nATTORNEY(S)         David Fernandes representing Anita Victory\nPRESENT:            April Ross representing General Motors LLC\n                    David Stellings representing Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class\nPROCEEDING\n                    Status Conference(Other Proceeding Non-evidentiary);\nCATEGORY:\nMINUTE TEXT:        Status conference held at the request of the Court. The parties advised the\n                    Court of their respective positions regarding the posture of the case. The\n                    Court directed the parties to submit any discovery disputes in the form of\n                    letter briefs not exceeding two pages. The Court discussed upcoming\n                    deadlines and advised the parties that status conferences will be held\n                    monthly going forward. The Court further directed the parties to submit\n                    proposed agendas at least one day before each future status conference.\n                    The parties shall confer with Ms. Holder at the conclusion of the hearing\n                    to discuss dates for the next status conference.\nHEARING STATUS:     Hearing Concluded\nADDL HEARING(S)     Status Conference set for December 7, 2026 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom\nSCHEDULED:          2108;\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-30T07:01:23.526776-07:00","document_number":"364","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018857706","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Status Conference","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-30T07:01:23.189342-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-30T07:01:23.201882-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-29","time_filed":null,"entry_number":364,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-29.001","pacer_sequence_number":2020,"description":"Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.: Status Conference held on 10/29/2026 at the request of the Court. The parties advised the Court of their respective positions regarding the posture of the case. The Court directed the parties to submit any discovery disputes in the form of letter briefs not exceeding two pages. The Court discussed upcoming deadlines and advised the parties that status conferences will be held monthly going forward. The Court further directed the parties to submit proposed agendas at least one day before each future status conference. The parties shall confer with Ms. Holder at the conclusion of the hearing to discuss dates for the next status conference. Status Conference set for December 7, 2026 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 2108. (Court Reporter Diane Peede)(tcc)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/483501166/","id":483501166,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/499318852/","id":499318852,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/363/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-29T12:17:16.221099-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-09T06:07:31.247676-08:00","sha1":"b8e2c76e0cd59ecc51b528809ae4a82339431b81","page_count":1,"file_size":65148,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.363.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.363.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 363   Filed 10/29/26   Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                   NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                         ATLANTA DIVISION\n\nIN RE: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                 MDL No. 3051\nPRODUCT LIABILITY\nLITIGATION                                  Case No. 1:22-md-03051-TWT\n\n                                            District Judge Thomas W. Thrash\n\n    ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO\n    ANSWER PLAINTIFFS\u2019 CORRECTED CONSOLIDATED CLASS\n         ACTION COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 157 AND 157-1]\n\n      Upon consideration of Defendants\u2019 Consent Motion to Extend Time to\n\nAnswer Plaintiffs\u2019 Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint [ECF No. 157\n\nand 157-1], it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. Defendants\u2019\n\nrespective answers to Plaintiffs\u2019 Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint\n\nmust be filed no later than December 2, 2026.\n\n      SO ORDERED this 29th day of October, 2026\n\n\n                                     ____________________________________\n                                     Hon. Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\n                                     United States District Judge\n                                     Northern District of Georgia\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-29T12:17:16.743145-07:00","document_number":"363","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018854910","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion for Extension of Time to Answer","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-29T12:17:16.162977-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-29T12:17:16.187037-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-29","time_filed":null,"entry_number":363,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-29.001","pacer_sequence_number":2017,"description":"ORDER GRANTING [362] Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re [157] Amended Complaint. Defendants' respective answers to Plaintiffs' Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint must be filed no later than December 2, 2026. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 10/29/2026. (tcc)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/483163316/","id":483163316,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498971311/","id":498971311,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/362/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-28T07:37:42.081760-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T07:15:26.866670-08:00","sha1":"65cd81a5ebec0f61c1a9126eb8f16c41ea64e2f6","page_count":13,"file_size":118397,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.362.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.362.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 362    Filed 10/28/26     Page 1 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                   NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                         ATLANTA DIVISION\n\nIN RE: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                  MDL No. 3051\nPRODUCT LIABILITY\nLITIGATION                                   Case No. 1:22-md-03051-TWT\n\n                                             District Judge Thomas W. Thrash\n\n             CONSENT MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO\n         ANSWER PLAINTIFFS\u2019 CORRECTED CONSOLIDATED\n         CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 157 AND 157-1]\n\n      Defendants BMW of North America, LLC; BMW Manufacturing Co. LLC;\n\nFCA US LLC; Ford Motor Company; General Motors LLC; Porsche Cars North\n\nAmerica, Inc.; Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.; Hyundai Motor America; Kia\n\nAmerica, Inc.; Autoliv, Inc.; Autoliv ASP, Inc.; Key Safety Systems, Inc. d/b/a\n\nJoyson Safety Systems; TG Missouri Corporation; ZF Active Safety and Electronics\n\nUS LLC; ZF Passive Safety Systems US Inc.; ZF Automotive US Inc.; ZF TRW\n\nAutomotive    Holdings    Corp.;    and    ARC    Automotive,       Inc.   (collectively,\n\n\u201cDefendants\u201d), by and through their respective undersigned counsel, and pursuant\n\nto Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully move this Court\n\nfor an extension and/or enlargement of time to answer Plaintiffs\u2019 Corrected\n\nConsolidated Class Action Complaint [ECF No. 157 and 157-1] (\u201cSecond Amended\n\nComplaint\u201d). Plaintiffs have informed the undersigned that Plaintiffs do not oppose\n\nthe relief sought in Defendants\u2019 motion.\n\f    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 362     Filed 10/28/26   Page 2 of 13\n\n\n\n\n      In support of this motion, Defendants respectfully state as follows:\n\n      1.    Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on August 28, 2023.\n\nThe Second Amended Complaint is 1,513 pages in length and contains 4,176\n\nnumbered paragraphs of allegations.\n\n      2.    On October 18, 2023, Defendants filed respective motions to dismiss\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 Second Amended Complaint.\n\n      3.    On October 2, 2026, this Court entered an Opinion and Order granting\n\nin part and denying in part Defendants\u2019 respective motions to dismiss.\n\n      4.    Pursuant to a June 15, 2023 Case Management Order entered in this\n\ncase, Defendants must file their respective answers to Plaintiffs\u2019 Second Amended\n\nComplaint by November 2, 2026 (i.e., \u201cWithin thirty (30) days of the Court\u2019s\n\nresolution of any motions to dismiss[.]\u201d). [ECF No. 91]\n\n      5.    Given the length and complexity of the Second Amended Complaint,\n\nDefendants respectfully request additional time to answer.\n\n      6.    Accordingly, on October 19, 2026, counsel for the parties met and\n\nconferred and agreed, subject to the Court\u2019s approval, to extend the deadline for\n\nDefendants to file their respective answers to the Second Amended Complaint to\n\nDecember 2, 2026.\n\n      This request is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. Therefore,\n\nfor good cause shown, Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an order\n\n\n\n                                         2\n\f    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 362       Filed 10/28/26   Page 3 of 13\n\n\n\n\nextending the time for Defendants to answer the Second Amended Complaint until\n\nDecember 2, 2026.\n\n     A proposed order is attached.\n\n     Respectfully submitted this 28th day of October, 2026.\n\n\n\n                                           /s/ Michael B. Shortnacy\n                                           Michael B. Shortnacy\n                                           SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.\n                                           2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400\n                                           Los Angeles, CA 90067\n                                           (424) 324-3494\n                                           Fax: (424) 204-9093\n                                           mshortnacy@shb.com\n\n                                           KING & SPALDING LLP\n\n                                           Livia M. Kiser\n                                           Susan Vargas\n                                           633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1600\n                                           Los Angeles, CA 90071\n                                           (213) 443-4355\n                                           lkiser@kslaw.com\n                                           svargas@kslaw.com\n\n                                           John C. Mitchell\n                                           50 California Street, Suite 330\n                                           San Francisco, CA 94111\n                                           (415) 318-1237\n                                           cmitchell@kslaw.com\n\n                                           COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT\n                                           VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF\n                                           AMERICA, INC.\n\n\n\n\n                                       3\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362     Filed 10/28/26   Page 4 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                   /s/ April N. Ross\n                                   MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP\n                                   April N. Ross\n                                   1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW\n                                   Washington, DC 20004\n                                   Telephone: (202) 739-5590\n                                   april.ross@morganlewis.com\n\n                                   Mohamed Awan\n                                   110 North Wacker Drive\n                                   Chicago, IL 60606\n                                   Telephone: (312) 324-1574\n                                   mohamed.awan@morganlewis.com\n\n                                   BAKER DONELSON,\n                                   BEARMAN, CALDWELL &\n                                   BERKOWITZ, PC\n                                   Linda A. Klein\n                                   (GA Bar No. 425069)\n                                   Monarch Plaza, Suite 1500\n                                   3414 Peachtree Rd., NE\n                                   Atlanta, Georgia 30326\n                                   Telephone: (404) 577-6000\n                                   lklein@bakerdonelson.com\n                                   ktucker@bakerdonelson.com\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT\n                                   GENERAL MOTORS LLC\n\n                                   /s/ Eric Y. Kizirian\n                                   LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD &\n                                   SMITH, LLP\n                                   Eric Y. Kizirian\n                                   Zourik Zarifian\n                                   633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000\n                                   Los Angeles, CA 90071\n                                   (213) 250-1800\n                                   Fax: (213) 250-7900\n                                   eric.kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com\n                                   zourik.zarifian@lewisbrisbois.com\n\n                               4\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362    Filed 10/28/26   Page 5 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS BMW\n                                   OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC AND\n                                   BMW MANUFACTURING CO., LLC.\n\n                                   /s/ Stephen A. D\u2019Aunoy\n                                   KLEIN THOMAS LEE & FRESARD\n                                   Stephen A. D\u2019Aunoy\n                                   Thomas L. Azar, Jr.\n                                   Suite 1600\n                                   100 N Broadway\n                                   St. Louis, MO 63102\n                                   (314) 888-2971\n                                   steve.daunoy@kleinthomaslaw.com\n                                   tom.azar@kleinthomaslaw.com\n\n                                   KLEIN THOMAS LEE & FRESARD\n                                   Fred Fresard\n                                   Ian Edwards\n                                   Lauren Fibel\n                                   101 W. Big Beaver Road, Ste. 1400\n                                   Troy, MI 48084\n                                   (248) 509-9270\n                                   fred.fresard@kleinthomaslaw.com\n                                   ian.edwards@kleinthomaslaw.com\n                                   lauren.fibel@kleinthomaslaw.com\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT FCA\n                                   US LLC\n\n                                   /s/ Perry W. Miles IV\n                                   MCGUIREWOODS LLP\n                                   Perry W. Miles IV\n                                   Brian D. Schmalzbach\n                                   800 East Canal Street\n                                   Richmond, VA 23219\n                                   (804) 775-1000\n                                   Fax: (804) 775-1061\n                                   pmiles@mcguirewoods.com\n                                   bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com\n\n                               5\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362     Filed 10/28/26   Page 6 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                   Lee K. Royster\n                                   201 North Tryon Street\n                                   Suite 3000\n                                   Charlotte, NC 28202\n                                   (704)-343-2000\n                                   Fax: (704) 343-2300\n                                   lroyster@mcguirewoods.com\n\n                                   WATSON SPENCE LLP\n                                   Michael R. Boorman\n                                   Phillip A. Henderson\n                                   600 Peachtree St NE, Suite 1130\n                                   Atlanta, GA 30308\n                                   (678) 433-6586\n                                   Fax: (229) 436-6358\n                                   mboorman@watsonspence.com\n                                   phenderson@watsonspence.com\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT FORD\n                                   MOTOR COMPANY\n\n                                   /s/ Michael L. Kidney\n                                   HOGAN LOVELLS CADWALADER\n                                   US LLP\n                                   Michael L. Kidney\n                                   Trent Sterneck\n                                   555 Thirteenth Street NW\n                                   Washington, DC 20004\n                                   (202) 637-5600\n                                   Fax: (202) 637-5910\n                                   Michael.kidney@hlc.com\n                                   Trent.sterneck@hlc.com\n\n                                   Ellyce R. Cooper\n                                   1999 Avenue of the Stars\n                                   17th Floor\n                                   Los Angeles, CA 90067\n                                   (213) 896-6000\n                                   Fax: (213) 896 6600\n\n                               6\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362    Filed 10/28/26   Page 7 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                   ecooper@sidley.com\n\n                                   BOWMAN AND BROOKE\n                                   Joel H. Smith\n                                   Patrick J. Cleary\n                                   1441 Main St., Suite 1200\n                                   Columbia, SC 29201\n                                   (803) 726-7422\n                                   Fax: (803) 726-7421\n                                   joel.smith@bowmanandbrooke.com\n                                   patrick.cleary@bowmanandbrooke.com\n\n                                   DYKEMA GOSSETT, PLLC-MI\n                                   James P. Feeney\n                                   Suite # 300\n                                   39577 Woodward Avenue\n                                   Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304\n                                   (248) 203-0841\n                                   Fax: (855)243-9885\n                                   jfeeney@dykema.com\n\n                                   NELSON MULLINS RILEY &\n                                   SCARBOROUGH LLP\n                                   Anita Wallace Thomas\n                                   201 17th Street, N.W.\n                                   Suite 1700\n                                   Atlanta, GA 30363\n                                   (404) 322-6000\n                                   Fax: 404-322-6050\n                                   anita.thomas@nelsonmullins.com\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS KIA\n                                   AMERICA, INC. AND HYUNDAI\n                                   MOTOR AMERICA\n\n                                   /s/ David S. Killoran\n                                   DYKEMA GOSSETT LLP\n                                   David S. Killoran\n                                   444 S. Flower, Suite 2200\n                                   Los Angeles, CA 90071\n\n                               7\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362    Filed 10/28/26   Page 8 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                   (213) 457-1800\n                                   dkilloran@dykema.com\n\n                                   DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC\n                                   Eric Tew\n                                   1301 K Street NW\n                                   Suite 1100 West\n                                   Washington, D.C. 20005\n                                   (202) 906-8600\n                                   etew@dykema.com\n\n                                   Andrew T. VanEgmond\n                                   2723 South State Street\n                                   Suite 400\n                                   Ann Arbor, MI 48104\n                                   (734) 214-7603\n                                   avenegmond@dykema.com\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT\n                                   PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA,\n                                   INC.\n\n                                   /s/ Michael D. Leffel\n                                   FOLEY & LARDNER LLP\n                                   Michael D. Leffel\n                                   150 East Gilman Street, Suite 5000\n                                   Madison, WI 53703\n                                   (608) 257-5035\n                                   Fax: (608) 258-4258\n                                   mleffel@foley.com\n\n                                    Jeff Soble\n                                    Lauren Loew\n                                    321 N Clark Street, Suite 3000\n                                    Chicago, IL 60654\n                                    (312) 832-4500\n                                    jsoble@foley.com\n                                    lloew@foley.com\n\n\n\n\n                               8\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362   Filed 10/28/26   Page 9 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ARC\n                                   AUTOMOTIVE, INC.\n\n\n                                   /s/ Joseph G. Petrosinelli\n                                   Joseph G. Petrosinelli\n                                   Charles L. McCloud\n                                   J. Liat Rome\n                                   WILLIAMS AND CONNOLLY LLP\n                                   680 Maine Ave., S.W.\n                                   Washington, DC 20024\n                                   (202) 434-5000\n                                   Fax: (202) 434-5029\n                                   jpetrosinelli@wc.com\n                                   lmccloud@wc.com\n                                   jrome@wc.com\n\n                                   Cari K. Dawson\n                                   Georgia Bar No. 213490\n                                   Kara F. Kennedy\n                                   Georgia Bar No. 926006\n                                   ALSTON & BIRD LLP\n                                   One Atlantic Center\n                                   1201 West Peachtree Street\n                                   Atlanta, GA 30309\n                                   (404) 881-7000\n                                   Fax: (404) 881-7777\n                                   cari.dawson@alston.com kara.kennedy\n                                   @alston.com\n\n                                   COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS\n                                   AUTOLIV, INC. AND AUTOLIV ASP,\n                                   INC.\n\n\n                                   /s/ Benjamin W. Jeffers\n                                   HICKEY HAUCK BISHOFF\n                                   JEFFERS & SEABOLT, PLLC\n                                   Benjamin W. Jeffers\n                                   Benjamin I. Shipper\n\n                               9\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362    Filed 10/28/26   Page 10 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                    706 South Main Street\n                                    Plymouth, MI 48170\n                                    Telephone: (313) 964-8600\n                                    Facsimile: (313) 964-8601\n                                    bjeffers@hhbjs.com\n                                    bshipper@hhbjs.com\n\n                                    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KEY\n                                    SAFETY SYSTEMS, INC. d/b/a/\n                                    JOYSON SAFETY SYSTEMS\n\n                                    /s/ Sean M. Berkowitz\n                                    Sean M. Berkowitz\n                                    Arthur F. Foerster\n                                    Johanna Spellman\n                                    LATHAM & WATKINS LLP\n                                    330 North Wabash Street, Suite 2800\n                                    Chicago, IL 60611\n                                    (312) 876.7700\n                                    Fax: (312) 993-9767\n\n                                    Sean P. McNally\n                                    TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON\n                                    SANDER LLP\n                                    4000 Town Center, Suite 1800\n                                    Southfield, MI 48075\n                                    (248) 359-7317\n                                    Fax: (248) 359-7700\n\n                                    Lindsey B. Mann\n                                    TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON\n                                    SANDER LLP\n                                    600 Peachtree Street, Suite 3000\n                                    Atlanta, GA 30308\n                                    (404) 885-2743\n                                    Fax: (404) 962-6538\n\n                                    COUNSEL FOR ZF ACTIVE SAFETY\n                                    AND ELECTRONICS US LLC, ZF\n                                    PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS US INC.,\n\n                               10\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 362    Filed 10/28/26   Page 11 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                                    ZF AUTOMOTIVE US INC., AND ZF\n                                    TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS\n                                    CORP.\n\n\n                                    /s/ Joseph C. Weinstein\n                                    Joseph C. Weinstein\n                                    Roger M. Gold\n                                    Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP\n                                    1000 Key Tower\n                                    127 Public Square\n                                    Cleveland, OH 44114-1304\n                                    (216) 479-8500\n                                    Fax: (216) 479-8780\n                                    joe.weinstein@squirepb.com\n                                    roger.gold@squirepb.com\n\n                                    Dara D. Mann\n                                    Georgia Bar No. 469065\n                                    Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP\n                                    1230 Peachtree Street NE\n                                    Suite 2200\n                                    Atlanta, GA 30309\n                                    (678) 272-3222\n                                    Fax: (678) 272-3211\n                                    dara.mann@squirepb.com\n\n\n                                    COUNSEL FOR TG MISSOURI\n                                    CORPORATION\n\n\n\n\n                               11\n\f    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 362     Filed 10/28/26   Page 12 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                     CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\n      Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), the undersigned certified that the foregoing\n\ncomplies with the font and point selection permitted by Local Rule 5.1. This brief\n\nwas prepared on a computer using Times New Roman font (14 point).\n\n                                     /s/ Michael B. Shortnacy\n                                     Michael B. Shortnacy\n\n\n\n\n                                       12\n\f    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 362     Filed 10/28/26   Page 13 of 13\n\n\n\n\n                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n      I certify that on October 28, 2026, a copy of the foregoing Consent Motion to\n\nExtend Time to Answer Plaintiffs\u2019 Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint\n\n[ECF No. 157 and 157-1] was served electronically through the Court\u2019s electronic\n\nfiling system upon all parties appearing on the court\u2019s ECF service list.\n\n                                       /s/ Michael B. Shortnacy\n                                       Michael B. Shortnacy\n\n\n\n\n                                         13\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-28T07:37:42.513940-07:00","document_number":"362","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018849488","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498971312/","id":498971312,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/362/1/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-28T07:37:45.062046-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T07:15:30.473551-08:00","sha1":"be9eb2b896113e80297e0aa60132b0ee65d185fe","page_count":1,"file_size":27256,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.362.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.362.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 362-1   Filed 10/28/26   Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                   NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                         ATLANTA DIVISION\n\nIN RE: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                 MDL No. 3051\nPRODUCT LIABILITY\nLITIGATION                                  Case No. 1:22-md-03051-TWT\n\n                                            District Judge Thomas W. Thrash\n\n  [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION TO EXTEND\n   TIME TO ANSWER PLAINTIFFS\u2019 CORRECTED CONSOLIDATED\n       CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 157 AND 157-1]\n\n      Upon consideration of Defendants\u2019 Consent Motion to Extend Time to\n\nAnswer Plaintiffs\u2019 Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint [ECF No. 157\n\nand 157-1], it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. Defendants\u2019\n\nrespective answers to Plaintiffs\u2019 Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint\n\nmust be filed no later than December 2, 2026.\n\n      SO ORDERED this _____ day of ________, 2026\n\n\n                                     ____________________________________\n                                     Hon. Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\n                                     United States District Judge\n                                     Northern District of Georgia\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-28T07:37:47.566013-07:00","document_number":"362","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"055018849489","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Text of Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-28T07:37:41.995712-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-28T07:37:42.029388-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-28","time_filed":null,"entry_number":362,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-28.001","pacer_sequence_number":2015,"description":"Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer to PLAINTIFFS CORRECTED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT by Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.. (Attachments: (1) Text of Proposed Order)(Shortnacy, Michael)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/483062924/","id":483062924,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498863493/","id":498863493,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/361/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-27T12:53:25.405557-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T08:22:51.553542-08:00","sha1":"cc8d8d4e2bb826e7054ec2a98169ccce86aac108","page_count":1,"file_size":266884,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.361.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.361.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"                 Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT              Document 361           Filed 10/27/26        Page 1 of 1\nAO 458 (Rev. 06/09) Appearance of Counsel\n\n\n                                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                                                            for the\n                                                Northern District\n                                             __________  District of\n                                                                  of Georgia\n                                                                     __________\n\n\n In re ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS PROD. LIAB. LITIG                  )\n                             Plaintiff                         )\n                                v.                             )      Case No.     1:22-md-03051-TWT\n                                                               )\n                            Defendant                          )\n\n                                              APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL\n\nTo:       The clerk of court and all parties of record\n\n          I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:\n\n          Defendant FCA US LLC                                                                                         .\n\n\nDate:          10/27/2026                                                               /s/ Sarah K. Molina\n                                                                                         Attorney\u2019s signature\n\n\n                                                                                   Sarah K. Molina (MO/60606)\n                                                                                     Printed name and bar number\n                                                                                   Klein Thomas Lee & Fresard\n                                                                                         100 N. Broadway\n                                                                                            Suite 1600\n                                                                                       St. Louis, MO 63102\n                                                                                               Address\n\n                                                                                 sarah.molina@kleinthomaslaw.com\n                                                                                            E-mail address\n\n                                                                                          (314) 888-2970\n                                                                                          Telephone number\n\n\n\n                                                                                             FAX number\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-27T12:53:25.684505-07:00","document_number":"361","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018846880","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Notice of Appearance","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-27T12:53:25.357706-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-27T12:53:25.374228-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-27","time_filed":null,"entry_number":361,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-27.001","pacer_sequence_number":2012,"description":"NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah Molina on behalf of FCA US LLC (Molina, Sarah)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/483033253/","id":483033253,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498833521/","id":498833521,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/360/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-27T11:26:05.104268-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T04:00:25.653693-08:00","sha1":"6e04ae2a6319e9d2653a98c4190e32368978eeee","page_count":2,"file_size":152850,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.360.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.360.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 360      Filed 10/27/26   Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                            ATLANTA DIVISION\n\n In re: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                     Case No.: 1:22-MD-3051-TWT\n PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION\n                                                 MDL No. 3051\n ALL CASES\n                                                 Judge: Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\n\n           ORDER ALLOWING ELECTRONICS IN COURTROOM\n\n      The Court hereby permits counsel to bring portable computers, cellular\n\ntelephones, pagers and personal communication devices without cameras, electronic\n\ndevices equipped with cameras, including cellular telephones, personal digital\n\nassistants and laptop computers, and paper and demonstrative exhibits into the\n\ncourthouse on October 29, 2026, for attendance at the status conference scheduled\n\nbefore the Court at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2108 of the Richard B. Russell Federal\n\nBuilding, as follows:\n\n      For Plaintiffs:\nAttorney                Firm\nAshley Brown            Caplan Cobb LLC\nElizabeth Castillo      Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP\nSterling Cluff          Baron & Budd, P.C.\nZachary Jacobs          Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Brody & Agnello, P.C.\nLance Oliver            Motley Rice LLC\nMatthew Schultz         Levin, Papantonio, Proctor, Buchanan, O\u2019Brien, Barr, &\n                        Mougey, P.A.\nDavid Stellings         Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP\nTom Willingham          Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.\n\f     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 360     Filed 10/27/26   Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n      For Defendants:\nAttorney            Firm                       Party\nJeffrey Soble       Foley & Lardner LLP        ARC Automotive, Inc.\nLiat Rome           Williams & Connolly LLP Autoliv ASP Inc.\nSabrina You                                 Autoliv Inc.\n\nZourik Zarifian     Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & BMW of North America, LLC\n                    Smith, LLP                BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC\nStephen D\u2019Aunoy     Klein Thomas Lee &         FCA US LLC\n                    Fresard                    FCA US LLC/RAM\nMichael Boorman     Watson Spence LLP          Ford Motor Company\nPhilip Henderson\nApril Ross          Morgan, Lewis & Bockius General Motors LLC\n                    LLP\nMichael Kidney      Hogan Lovells Cadwalader Hyundai Motor America\n                    US LLP                   Kia America, Inc.\nBenjamin Jeffers    Hickey Hauck Bishoff       Key Safety Systems, Inc., d/b/a Joyson\n                    Jeffers & Seabolt, PLLC    Safety Systems\nDavid Killoran      Dykema Gossett LLP         Porsche Cars North America\nJoseph Weinstein    Squire Patton Boggs (US) TG Missouri Corporation\nDara Mann           LLP\nLiv Kiser           Shook, Hardy & Bacon       Volkswagen Group of America\nMichael Shortnacy   L.L.P.\nSean Berkowitz      Latham & Watkins LLP       ZF Active Safety and Electronics US\n                                               LLC\n                                               ZF Passive Safety Systems US Inc.\n                                               ZF Automotive US Inc.\n                                               ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.\n\nIT IS SO ORDERED this 27th\n                      ___ day of October 2026.\n\n\n                                           THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.\n                                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-27T11:26:05.436678-07:00","document_number":"360","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018845722","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion to Bring Audio/Visual/Electronic Equipment in the Courtroom","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-27T11:26:05.043411-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-27T11:26:05.064931-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-27","time_filed":null,"entry_number":360,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-27.001","pacer_sequence_number":2010,"description":"ORDER granting [359] Motion to Bring Audio/Visual/Electronic Equipment in the Courtroom for the status conference on 10/29/2026. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 10/27/2026. (jeh)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/482996938/","id":482996938,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498796663/","id":498796663,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/359/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-27T09:45:47.905537-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-03T07:01:58.957350-08:00","sha1":"f3cd2db7e6c47d4fb53d5e04762f720dd644770e","page_count":4,"file_size":314943,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.359.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.359.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 359      Filed 10/27/26   Page 1 of 4\n\n\n\n\n                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                            ATLANTA DIVISION\n\n In re: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                     Case No.: 1:22-MD-3051-ELR\n PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION\n                                                 MDL No. 3051\n ALL CASES\n                                                 Judge: Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\n\n                                                 JOINT MOTION TO ALLOW\n                                                 ELECTRONICS IN COURTROOM\n\n\n      Pursuant to Local Rule 83.4 for the U.S. District Court for the Northern\n\nDistrict of Georgia, the parties jointly move for permission for counsel to bring\n\nportable computers, cellular telephones, pagers and personal communication devices\n\nwithout cameras, electronic devices equipped with cameras, including cellular\n\ntelephones, personal digital assistants and laptop computers, and paper and\n\ndemonstrative exhibits into the courthouse on October 29, 2026, for attendance at\n\nthe status conference scheduled before the Court at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2108\n\nof the Richard B. Russell Federal Building, as follows:\n\n      For Plaintiffs:\nAttorney                Firm\nAshley Brown            Caplan Cobb LLC\nElizabeth Castillo      Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP\nSterling Cluff          Baron & Budd, P.C.\nZachary Jacobs          Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Brody & Agnello, P.C.\nLance Oliver            Motley Rice LLC\n\f     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 359     Filed 10/27/26   Page 2 of 4\n\n\n\n\nMatthew Schultz         Levin, Papantonio, Proctor, Buchanan, O\u2019Brien, Barr, &\n                        Mougey, P.A.\nDavid Stellings         Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP\nTom Willingham          Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.\n\n      For Defendants:\nAttorney              Firm                       Party\nJeffrey Soble         Foley & Lardner LLP        ARC Automotive, Inc.\nLiat Rome             Williams & Connolly LLP Autoliv ASP Inc.\nSabrina You                                   Autoliv Inc.\nZourik Zarifian       Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & BMW of North America, LLC\n                      Smith, LLP                BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC\nStephen D\u2019Aunoy       Klein Thomas Lee &         FCA US LLC\n                      Fresard                    FCA US LLC/RAM\nMichael Boorman       Watson Spence LLP          Ford Motor Company\nPhilip Henderson\nApril Ross            Morgan, Lewis & Bockius General Motors LLC\n                      LLP\nMichael Kidney        Hogan Lovells Cadwalader Hyundai Motor America\n                      US LLP                   Kia America, Inc.\nBenjamin Jeffers      Hickey Hauck Bishoff       Key Safety Systems, Inc., d/b/a Joyson\n                      Jeffers & Seabolt, PLLC    Safety Systems\nDavid Killoran        Dykema Gossett LLP         Porsche Cars North America\nJoseph Weinstein      Squire Patton Boggs (US) TG Missouri Corporation\nDara Mann             LLP\nLiv Kiser             Shook, Hardy & Bacon       Volkswagen Group of America\nMichael Shortnacy     LLP\nSean Berkowitz        Latham & Watkins LLP       ZF Active Safety and Electronics US\n                                                 LLC\n                                                 ZF Passive Safety Systems US Inc.\n                                                 ZF Automotive US Inc.\n                                                 ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.\n\n\n\nFor the Court\u2019s convenience, a proposed order granting this relief is attached.\n\n                                        -2-\n\f   Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 359    Filed 10/27/26   Page 3 of 4\n\n\n\n\n    Respectfully submitted this 27th day of October 2026.\n\n\n                                    /s/ Dara D. Mann\n                                    Dara D. Mann (Georgia #469065)\n                                    Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP\n                                    1230 Peachtree Street NW,\n                                    Suite 2200\n                                    Atlanta, GA 30309\n                                    Telephone: (678) 272-3221\n                                    Facsimile: (678) 272-3211\n                                    Email: dara.mann@squirepb.com\n\n                                    Joseph C. Weinstein (Ohio #23504)\n                                    Roger M. Gold (Ohio #55905)\n                                    Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP\n                                    1000 Key Tower\n                                    127 Public Square\n                                    Cleveland, OH 44114-1304\n                                    Telephone: (216) 479-8500\n                                    Fax: (216) 479-8780\n                                    joe.weinstein@squirepb.com\n                                    roger.gold@squirepb.com\n\n\nCOUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT TG MISSOURI CORPORATION\n\n\n\n\n                                    -3-\n\f     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 359        Filed 10/27/26   Page 4 of 4\n\n\n\n\n                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n      I hereby certify that on October 27, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing\n\ndocument with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send\n\nnotification of such filing to all counsel of record.\n\n                                         /s/ Dara D. Mann\n                                         Dara D. Mann\n\n\n\n\n                                          -4-\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-27T09:45:48.469335-07:00","document_number":"359","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018844795","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Motion to Bring Audio/Visual/Electronic Equipment in the Courtroom","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498796665/","id":498796665,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/359/1/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-27T09:45:50.311128-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-28T07:04:50.054261-07:00","sha1":"51576e1d8d9ce79c71e2c5e4fc5693192799c71d","page_count":2,"file_size":292648,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.359.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.359.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 359-1      Filed 10/27/26   Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n               IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n              FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                         ATLANTA DIVISION\n\n In re: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                     Case No.: 1:22-MD-3051-ELR\n PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION\n                                                 MDL No. 3051\n ALL CASES\n                                                 Judge: Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\n\n [PROPOSED] ORDER ALLOWING ELECTRONICS IN COURTROOM\n\n      The Court hereby permits counsel to bring portable computers, cellular\n\ntelephones, pagers and personal communication devices without cameras, electronic\n\ndevices equipped with cameras, including cellular telephones, personal digital\n\nassistants and laptop computers, and paper and demonstrative exhibits into the\n\ncourthouse on October 29, 2026, for attendance at the status conference scheduled\n\nbefore the Court at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2108 of the Richard B. Russell Federal\n\nBuilding, as follows:\n\n      For Plaintiffs:\nAttorney                Firm\nAshley Brown            Caplan Cobb LLC\nElizabeth Castillo      Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP\nSterling Cluff          Baron & Budd, P.C.\nZachary Jacobs          Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Brody & Agnello, P.C.\nLance Oliver            Motley Rice LLC\nMatthew Schultz         Levin, Papantonio, Proctor, Buchanan, O\u2019Brien, Barr, &\n                        Mougey, P.A.\nDavid Stellings         Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP\nTom Willingham          Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.\n\f    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 359-1    Filed 10/27/26   Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n      For Defendants:\nAttorney            Firm                      Party\nJeffrey Soble       Foley & Lardner LLP       ARC Automotive, Inc.\nLiat Rome           Williams & Connolly LLP Autoliv ASP Inc.\nSabrina You                                 Autoliv Inc.\n\nZourik Zarifian     Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & BMW of North America, LLC\n                    Smith, LLP                BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC\nStephen D\u2019Aunoy     Klein Thomas Lee &        FCA US LLC\n                    Fresard                   FCA US LLC/RAM\nMichael Boorman     Watson Spence LLP         Ford Motor Company\nPhilip Henderson\nApril Ross          Morgan, Lewis & Bockius General Motors LLC\n                    LLP\nMichael Kidney      Hogan Lovells Cadwalader Hyundai Motor America\n                    US LLP                   Kia America, Inc.\nBenjamin Jeffers    Hickey Hauck Bishoff      Key Safety Systems, Inc., d/b/a Joyson\n                    Jeffers & Seabolt, PLLC   Safety Systems\nDavid Killoran      Dykema Gossett LLP        Porsche Cars North America\nJoseph Weinstein    Squire Patton Boggs (US) TG Missouri Corporation\nDara Mann           LLP\nLiv Kiser           Shook, Hardy & Bacon      Volkswagen Group of America\nMichael Shortnacy   L.L.P.\nSean Berkowitz      Latham & Watkins LLP      ZF Active Safety and Electronics US\n                                              LLC\n                                              ZF Passive Safety Systems US Inc.\n                                              ZF Automotive US Inc.\n                                              ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.\n\nIT IS SO ORDERED this ___ day of October 2026.\n\n\n                                           THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.\n                                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-27T09:45:53.498562-07:00","document_number":"359","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"055018844796","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Text of Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-27T09:45:47.803657-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-27T09:45:47.828846-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-27","time_filed":null,"entry_number":359,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-27.001","pacer_sequence_number":2008,"description":"Joint Motion to Bring Audio/Visual/Electronic Equipment in the Courtroom /Joint Motion to Allow Electronics in Courtroom by TG Missouri Corporation. 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LIAB. LITIG\n\nPlaintiff\nVv.\n\nTo:\n\nDate:\n\nDefendant\n\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase No.  1:22-md-03051\n\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL\n\nThe clerk of court and all parties of record\n\nI am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:\n\nKristen Luiz, Daniel McCarthy, Ryan Charles Clark\n\n10/27/2026\n\n/s/ Zachary Jacobs\n\nAttorney\u2019s signature\n\nZachary Jacobs (Bar #6294345)\n\nPrinted name and bar number\n\nCarella, Byrne, Cecchi, Brody & Agnello, P.C.\n222 S. Riverside Plaza\nChicago, IL 60606\n\nAddress\n\nzjacobs@carellabyrne.com\n\nE-mail address\n\n(973) 994-1700\n\nTelephone number\n\n(973) 994-1744\n\nFAX number\n","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-10-27T08:36:20.842875-07:00","document_number":"358","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018843669","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Notice of Appearance","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-27T08:36:20.472248-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-27T08:36:20.487821-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-27","time_filed":null,"entry_number":358,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-27.001","pacer_sequence_number":2003,"description":"NOTICE of Appearance by Zachary A. Jacobs on behalf of Ryan Charles Clark, Kristen Luiz, Daniel McCarthy (Jacobs, Zachary)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/482592076/","id":482592076,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/498372420/","id":498372420,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/357/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-23T07:25:21.830947-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-26T15:46:07.543348-07:00","sha1":"d3307b89d74215cd581b340f1cab0cdd6cfcf758","page_count":3,"file_size":109989,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.357.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.357.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 357    Filed 10/23/26   Page 1 of 3\n\n\n\n\n                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                   NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                         ATLANTA DIVISION\n\n In re: ARC AIRBAGS INFLATORS                   Case No.: 1:22-MD-3051-ELR\n PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION\n                                                MDL No. 3051\n ALL CASES\n                                                Judge Eleanor L. Ross\n\n\n\n\n               NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FOR\n                DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS LLC\n\n      COMES NOW Kristin S. Tucker, of the law firm Baker, Donelson, Bearman,\n\nCaldwell, & Berkowitz, P.C., and hereby enters her appearance of record as counsel\n\nfor Defendant General Motors LLC (\u201cGM\u201d). All pleadings, notices, and other\n\ncorrespondence for GM should be electronically sent to the undersigned at\n\nktucker@bakerdonelson.com.\n\n      Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of October 2026.\n\n                                       /s/Kristin S. Tucker\n                                       Linda A. Klein (GA Bar No. 425069)\n                                       lklein@bakerdonelson.com\n                                       Kristin S. Tucker (GA Bar No. 805833)\n                                       ktucker@bakerdonelson.com\n                                       BAKER DONELSON, BEARMAN,\n                                       CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC\n                                       Monarch Plaza, Suite 1500\n                                       3414 Peachtree Rd., NE\n                                       Atlanta, Georgia 30326\n\n                                        1\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 357   Filed 10/23/26   Page 2 of 3\n\n\n\n\n                              Telephone: (404) 577-6000\n\n                              Attorneys for General Motors LLC\n                              General Motors LLC\n\n\n\n\n                               2\n\f     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 357    Filed 10/23/26   Page 3 of 3\n\n\n\n\n                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n      I hereby certify that on October 23, 2026, a copy of the foregoing NOTICE\n\nOF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FOR DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS\n\nLLC was served electronically through the Court\u2019s electronic filing system upon all\n\nparties on the court\u2019s ECF service list.\n\n      This 23rd day of October 2026.\n\n                                               BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN\n                                               CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC\n\n                                               /s/ Kristin S. Tucker\n                                               Kristin S. Tucker\n                                               Georgia Bar No. 805833\n                                               ktucker@bakerdonelson.com\n\n\n\n\n                                           3\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-10-23T07:25:22.287269-07:00","document_number":"357","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018834756","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Notice of Appearance","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-23T07:25:21.807375-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-23T07:25:21.814371-07:00","date_filed":"2026-10-23","time_filed":null,"entry_number":357,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-23.001","pacer_sequence_number":2000,"description":"NOTICE of Appearance by Kristin S. 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Thrash Jr. (jeh)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/480352532/","id":480352532,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/496053533/","id":496053533,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/353/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-02T13:34:29.825527-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-02T02:43:19.088287-08:00","sha1":"30bf6d41efa29b48cedfc9a490a1c48a81ee2a81","page_count":246,"file_size":1095044,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.353.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.353.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":" Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 1 of 246\n\n\n\n\n                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                           ATLANTA DIVISION\n\n\n  IN RE: ARC ARIBAG INFLATORS                 MDL DOCKET NO. 3051\n  PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION               1:22-md-3051-TWT\n\n                                              ALL CASES\n\n\n                           OPINION AND ORDER\n\n      This matter is presently before the Court on 24 motions, chiefly\n\nDefendants\u2019 collective and individual motions to dismiss and Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nmotions for jurisdictional discovery. [Docs. 178\u201388, 272, 279, 287, 289, 294,\n\n305, 309, 311, 319, 322, 328]. 1 Also pending are Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Oral\n\nArguments on Motions to Dismiss [Doc. 252] and Motion for Leave to File\n\nSur-Reply In Opposition to Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 256] which are\n\nDENIED. 2 The Parties have fully briefed the pending motions, and the Court\n\naddresses each of them in this omnibus order.\n\n\n\n      1 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations are to the electronic docket,\n\nand any included page number references are to the page numbers imprinted\nby the Court\u2019s docketing software.\n      2 Plaintiffs direct these two motions to the first wave of the motions to\n\ndismiss, that is to the motions filed by those Defendants who were first served\nand appeared before Plaintiffs served a second set of Defendants. The first\nwave of motions mainly focus on the merits of the claims, while the second\nwave of motions, filed by the later-served Defendants, mainly challenge the\nCourt\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Parties have briefed the issues\nraised in those motions in their written submissions, and the Court does not\nrequire oral argument to further assist its deliberation. Thus, the Court denies\nthe motion. The Court also denies the motion for leave to file sur-reply. \u201cAbsent\nextraordinary circumstances, not present here, sur-replies are not allowed.\u201d\nParker v. Selene Fin., LP, 2024 WL 3833853, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 8, 2024), R.\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 2 of 246\n\n\n\n\n                             I.     Background 3\n\n      This is a multidistrict litigation (MDL) with over 20 consolidated cases.\n\n[See Docs. 1, 2, 119]. In their operative pleading\u2014i.e., the Corrected\n\nConsolidated Class     Action Complaint       (\u201cSecond Amended Complaint\u201d\n\n(SAC)) 4\u2014Plaintiffs allege that their vehicles have defective airbag inflators.\n\nSAC Vol. I (\u201cSAC I\u201d) \u00b6 1 [Doc. 157]. They seek to hold three sets of defendants\n\nliable: (1) the manufacturer of the allegedly defective airbag inflators, ARC\n\nAutomotive, Inc. (\u201cARC\u201d; referred to in the automotive industry as a \u201cTier 2\n\nsupplier\u201d); (2) the airbag manufacturers who supplied airbag modules\n\ncomprising the allegedly defective ARC airbag inflators (\u201cAirbag Suppliers\u201d;\n\nreferred to in the industry as \u201cTier 1 suppliers\u201d); and (3) the auto\n\nmanufacturers and distributors who incorporated those airbag modules into\n\n\n\n& R. adopted 2024 WL 4251742 (N.D. Ga. July 26, 2024). To the extent that,\nas Plaintiffs contend, Defendants misrepresent Plaintiffs\u2019 position on a given\nissue, the Court can recognize such a misrepresentation. And to the extent the\nCourt considers a reply brief to have raised a new argument, it will recognize\nand disregard such an argument. See Boring v. Pattillo Indus. Real Est., 426\nF. Supp. 3d 1341, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (refusing to consider new arguments\nraised for the first time in a reply brief); Stevenson v. Great Am. Dream, Inc.,\n2015 WL 3650384, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 2015) (noting that where a party\nraises a new argument in a reply brief, the court has the option to give the\nopposing party an opportunity to address the new argument or to disregard it).\n      3 For purposes of the present motions to dismiss for failure to state a\n\nclaim, the Court accepts \u201cthe factual allegations in the complaint as true and\nconstrue[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s].\u201d Pielage v.\nMcConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).\n      4 For ease of reference, in this order, the Court refers to the Corrected\n\nConsolidated Class Action Complaint as the SAC. The SAC comprises two\nvolumes: SAC Vol. I, [Doc. 157], and SAC Vol. II, [Doc. 157-1].\n\n\n\n                                          2\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 3 of 246\n\n\n\n\n\u201cClass Vehicles\u201d that they manufactured, distributed, marketed, and sold\n\n(\u201cAutomakers\u201d). See SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319, 24, 263. Plaintiffs identify Class Vehicles\n\nas certain models and model years of the following vehicles makes: Audi; Mini\n\nCooper; BMW; Chrysler; Dodge; Jeep; Ford; Lincoln; Mercury; Buick; Cadillac;\n\nChevrolet; GMC; Hummer; Isuzu; Oldsmobile; Pontiac; Saab; Saturn;\n\nHyundai; Kia; Porsche; and Volkswagen. Id. \u00b6 375; SAC, Ex. E [Doc. 157-2 at\n\n55].\n\n       Plaintiffs allege that the airbag inflators that ARC manufactured\n\nbetween 2001 and 2018 for the driver and passenger side airbags of the Class\n\nVehicles (\u201cARC airbag inflator\u201d or \u201cARC inflators\u201d) are defectively designed.\n\nSAC I \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201321, 272, 297\u2013301. Airbag systems use a controlled explosion to\n\nrapidly inflate the airbag cushion when a collision occurs. Id. \u00b6 270. A chemical\n\npropellant creates the explosive charge, and it is housed in a metal canister,\n\nthe airbag inflator, which controls its release. Id. The ARC airbag inflators use\n\nammonium nitrate, a highly explosive and unstable propellant known to be\n\nassociated with airbag ruptures and requiring properly designed and\n\nengineered ventilation measures. Id. \u00b6 272, 279, 282. The ARC airbag inflators\n\nwere assembled using a \u201cfriction welding process [that] allowed for the chance\n\nthat asymmetrical and brittle weld flash [(excess metal that collects at the\n\nseam of two pieces being welded)] could form at the seams of any inflator.\u201d\n\nId. \u00b6 288, 291. When exposed to gas flow during airbag deployment, pieces of\n\nthe asymmetrical weld flash near the gas exit port of the airbag inflator may\n\n\n\n\n                                           3\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 4 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndislodge. Id. 293. If a dislodged weld flash is large enough to block the gas exit\n\nport, it restricts the exit, causing the pressure in the inflator housing to\n\nincrease. Id. The increased pressure ultimately ruptures the airbag inflator\n\nand propels some of its parts towards the vehicle occupant, resulting in injury\n\nor death. Id. \u00b6 294. The rupture may also cause the airbag module itself to\n\nbreak free and strike the occupant, with the same result. Id. \u00b6 295. Plaintiffs\n\nmaintain that all ARC airbag inflators have \u201casymmetrical and unstable weld\n\n\u2018flash\u2019 in the interior of the inflator housing combined with insufficient\n\nventilation using a single exit orifice\u201d (\u201cInflator Defect\u201d or \u201cDefect\u201d), which\n\ncauses the ARC airbag inflators to rupture when the airbags housing them are\n\ndeployed. Id. \u00b6 283.\n\n      At least ten ARC airbag inflators, seven on the driver\u2019s side and 3 on the\n\npassenger side, have ruptured. SAC I \u00b6 335. Two of the ruptures resulted in\n\ndriver fatalities. Id. Two inflators ruptured during Lot Acceptance Testing\n\n(LAT) at ARC\u2019s factory. Id. To date, none of Plaintiffs\u2019 vehicles have had an\n\nairbag inflator rupture, and no Plaintiff claims that he or she had been injured\n\nby an ARC airbag inflator rupture. But after a years-long investigation, on\n\nApril 27, 2023, the National Highway Traffic Administration (NHTSA)\n\n\u201ctentatively concluded that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists in the\n\nfrontal driver and passenger air bag inflators under investigation that were\n\nproduced before . . . January 2018[.]\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 6. The 67 million allegedly\n\ndefective ARC airbag inflators are incorporated into the airbag modules of the\n\n\n\n\n                                           4\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 5 of 246\n\n\n\n\nvehicles of 12 major vehicle manufacturers. Id. \u00b6 1. Although the NHTSA\n\ndemanded that ARC recall its airbag inflators, ARC has not done so. Id. \u00b6 1, 4.\n\nAnd while some Automakers have issued recalls, these recalls, limited to a few\n\nmakes and models, are inadequate in scope. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 6\u20137.\n\n      According to Plaintiffs, \u201cARC, the Airbag [Suppliers], and the\n\nAutomaker[s] . . .shared information and worked together throughout the\n\ndesign, manufacturing, assembly and investigation process\u201d of the ARC\n\ninflators, engaged with each other to ensure that the \u201cinflators were designed,\n\nmanufactured, and tested to meet the Tier 1 and Automaker requirements,\u201d\n\nand, thus, the Airbag Suppliers and the Automakers would have reviewed and\n\napproved before the ARC inflators were produced, purchased, and installed.\n\nSAC I \u00b6\u00b6 264\u2013266.\n\n      Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of members of a putative\n\nplaintiff class of buyers or lessees of Class Vehicles, assert claims for fraud for\n\nthe failure to disclose and for concealing the Defect and violations of state\n\nconsumer protection laws against all three sets of Defendants. SAC II\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 434\u2013770, 789\u20134176. Against the Automakers, they additionally assert a\n\nfalse advertising claim under California law, id. \u00b6\u00b6 771\u2013788, and unjust\n\nenrichment and breach of warranty claims under the laws of all 50 states and\n\nthe District of Columbia, see e.g., id., \u00b6\u00b6 821\u2013854, 1509\u20131545. They also assert\n\nnationwide claims for fraud against all Defendants and for unjust enrichment\n\nagainst the Automakers. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 408\u2013433. Defendants, in groups and\n\n\n\n\n                                            5\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 6 of 246\n\n\n\n\nindividually, challenge Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for various reasons. Chief among the\n\nchallenges are (1) the Court\u2019s lack of personal jurisdiction over certain foreign\n\nAutomakers and a foreign Airbag Supplier; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction\n\nover ARC in transferor courts outside of Tennessee; (3) Plaintiffs\u2019 lack of\n\nstanding to assert claims under laws of states other than the state under which\n\ntheir individual claims arise; (4) improper shotgun pleading; and (5) Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nfailure to state cognizable claims. The Airbag Suppliers and the domestic\n\nAutomakers (\u201cU.S. Automakers\u201d) Audi of America, LLC (\u201cAudi\u201d), BMW of\n\nNorth America, LLC (\u201cBMW America\u201d) and BMW Manufacturing Co. (\u201cBMW\n\nManufacturing\u201d and together with BMW America, \u201cBMW\u201d), FCA US LLC\n\n(\u201cFiat Chrysler\u201d), Ford Motor Company (\u201cFord\u201d), General Motors LLC (GM),\n\nHyundai Motor America (\u201cHyundai\u201d), 5 Kia America, Inc. (\u201cKia\u201d), Porsche Cars\n\nNorth America, Inc. (\u201cPorche\u201d), and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.\n\n(\u201cVolkswagen\u201d) seek dismissal on behalf on their Defendant group. Several\n\nother Defendants, including ARC, the individual U.S. Automakers, and the\n\nforeign Automakers, seek dismissal on an individual basis.\n\n      Below, the Court analyzes these and the other issues raised in the\n\nnumerous motions to dismiss filed by Defendants. The Court first takes up the\n\n\n\n      5 The SAC does not name \u201cHyundai Motor America\u201d as Defendant or\n\notherwise reference this entity. However, the SAC does name as Defendants\n\u201cHyundai America, Inc.\u201d a domestic corporation and \u201cHyundai Motor Group\u201d\nand \u201cHyundai Motor Company,\u201d both foreign corporations. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 110\u2013113.\nIt appears that \u201cHyundai Motor America\u201d is Defendant Hyundai America, Inc.,\nand the Court proceeds under this understanding.\n\n\n\n                                           6\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 7 of 246\n\n\n\n\npersonal jurisdiction challenges, then addresses the standing challenge, and\n\nreserves the remainder of this order for the numerous challenges to the merits\n\nof Plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\n\n       Before turning to the substance of the Parties\u2019 arguments, the Court\n\naddresses the following \u201chousekeeping\u201d matters. First, the Court does not\n\nrecognize arguments incorporated by reference in support of or in opposition\n\nto a motion. Here, many movants and respondents employ this tactic. [See, e.g.,\n\nDocs. 178 at 1\u20135; 179 at 4\u20135; 187 (passim); 188-1 at 8 n.3; 228 at 7; 279 at 1;\n\n289 at 1; 305 at 1]. Arguments incorporated by reference \u201cserve[] only to\n\ncircumvent the [page limitations in the] Local Rules and lead the Court\n\nthrough a paper maze of filings.\u201d Murdock v. Am. Mar. Officers Union Nat\u2019l\n\nExec. Bd., 2022 WL 18024476, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2022); Gov\u2019t Emps. Ins.\n\nCo. v. Path Med., 2018 WL 11487963, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2018) (\u201cThese\n\n\u2018Hey, Judge! What he said!\u2019 cross-references are inappropriate and unduly tax\n\nthe Court\u2019s resources.\u201d); Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio\n\nBarr S.A., 377 F.3d 1164, 1167 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (incorporation of arguments\n\nby reference \u201cmakes a mockery of [court] rules governing page limitations and\n\nlength\u201d). Thus, the Court addresses only those arguments that are fully raised\n\nin each brief and does not address those arguments that a movant or\n\nrespondent \u201cincorporates\u201d or \u201cjoins\u201d by reference to another filing.\n\n       Second, the Parties have abused the Court\u2019s page limit restrictions in\n\ntwo additional ways. The movants and respondents reserve case law citations\n\n\n\n\n                                           7\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 8 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfor footnotes and include single-spaced footnotes that take over substantial\n\nportions of a given brief and bleed from one to the next because no space\n\nseparates them. [See, e.g., Doc. 220 at 34\u201340; 246 at 18\u201328]. While the Court\n\nappreciates the complexities of the briefing involved, 6 going forward, it expects\n\nthe Parties to reserve footnotes in their briefs for supplemental information\n\nrather than serving as a depository for the case law on which they rely. Even\n\nmore problematically, certain briefs reserve citations to, or discussions of, the\n\nauthority in support of a given position to charts appended to the brief. [See,\n\ne.g., Docs. 178-3, 181-3, 181-5, 181-7, 221-1, 249-1, 249-2]. The Court expects\n\nto review the law and the arguments supporting a given position in the brief\n\nitself and will not entertain future briefs that reserve legal citations and\n\nexplanations for appended documents or use appended documents to further\n\nsupplement legal analysis.\n\n      Third, the Court cautions the Parties that a notice of supplemental\n\nauthority is not an opportunity to rehash arguments on a given issue. Here,\n\nthe notices of supplemental authority filed by the Parties summarize the\n\naspects of the supplemental authority that the filing Party considers favorable.\n\n[See Docs. 267, 276, 286, 291, 300]. This then triggers a round of briefing. [See\n\nDocs. 268, 269, 278, 297, 298, 307, 320,]. The Court understands that the Party\n\ndrawing the Court\u2019s attention to supplemental authority is likely doing so\n\n\n\n      6 For this reason, the Court granted page limit extensions to those who\n\nrequested them.\n\n\n\n                                           8\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 9 of 246\n\n\n\n\nbecause it considers the authority to favor its position, and it can analyze an\n\nauthority and determine its weight and relevance. Going forward, the Parties\n\nshould restrict any notices of supplemental authority to a statement\n\nidentifying the authority, with the authority attached as an exhibit. The Court\n\nshall disregard any additional information included in such a notice and will\n\nnot consider any responses or replies.\n\n                      II.   Lack of Personal Jurisdiction\n\n      ARC and several of the foreign Defendants challenge personal\n\njurisdiction. But while the foreign Defendants argue that the Court lacks\n\npersonal jurisdiction over them and, thus, that they should be dismissed as\n\nParties to this litigation, ARC contends that some (but not all) of the transferor\n\ncourts lack personal jurisdiction and, thus, that the Court should dismiss\n\ncertain of the transferred actions against ARC. The Court begins its analysis\n\nby setting out the legal standard applicable to personal jurisdiction challenges\n\ngenerally and then addresses ARC\u2019s personal jurisdiction argument, followed\n\nby the argument of each of the foreign Automakers.\n\n   A. Legal Standard\n\n      In MDL proceedings, \u201cfollowing transfer under [28 U.S.C. \u00a7] 1407, the\n\ntransferee judge has all the jurisdiction and powers over pretrial proceedings\n\nin the actions transferred to him that the transferor judge would have had in\n\nthe absence of transfer.\u201d In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp.\n\n3d 1101, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (\u201cTakata I\u201d). As such, for the cases transferred\n\n\n\n\n                                           9\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353        Filed 10/02/26   Page 10 of 246\n\n\n\n\nto the MDL, \u201cthe Court must determine whether the transferor district courts\n\nhad [personal] jurisdiction over the . . . [challenging] Defendants; and for\n\n[those cases filed directly in this District], the Court must determine whether\n\nit can exercise [personal] jurisdiction over the . . . [challenging] Defendants. Id.\n\n       \u201cPersonal jurisdiction can arise specifically or generally from a\n\ndefendant\u2019s contacts in the state.\u201d Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort &\n\nCrystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006).\n\n       A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state\n       or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims\n       against them when their affiliations with the State are so\n       \u2018continuous and systematic\u2019 as to render them essentially at home\n       in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand,\n       depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying\n       controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place\n       in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State\u2019s\n       regulation.\u201d\n\nGoodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)\n\n(citation modified). \u201cThe paradigm forums in which a corporate defendant is\n\n\u2018at home\u2019 are the corporation\u2019s place of incorporation and its principal place of\n\nbusiness.\u201d BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 403 (2017). General personal\n\njurisdiction over the foreign Defendants and ARC is not at issue; Plaintiffs\n\ncontend that the jurisdiction-challenging Defendants are subject to the Court\u2019s\n\nexercise of specific personal jurisdiction.\n\n       \u201cA federal court sitting in diversity,\u201d as here, \u201cundertakes a two-step\n\ninquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of\n\njurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and (2)\n\nnot violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United\n\n\n                                              10\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 11 of 246\n\n\n\n\nStates Constitution.\u201d See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int\u2019l,\n\nInc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257\u201358 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks\n\nomitted) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir.\n\n2009)). \u201cWhen a federal court uses a state long-arm statute, because the extent\n\nof the statute is governed by state law, the federal court is required to construe\n\nit as would the state\u2019s supreme court.\u201d Id. at 1258 (quoting Lockard v. Equifax,\n\nInc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.1998)).\n\n      \u201cIf a state\u2019s long-arm statute is satisfied, the next step is to assess\n\npersonal jurisdiction under constitutional due process principles,\u201d with the aid\n\nof \u201ca three-part test.\u201d Ekpo v. Playa Mgmt. USA, LLC, 2022 WL 2048665, at\n\n*2 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2022) (first quote); Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901\n\nF.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018) (second quote).\n\n      First, courts consider whether the plaintiffs have established that their\n\nclaims arise out of or relate to at least one of the defendant\u2019s contacts with the\n\nforum. Id. Second, courts ask whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that\n\nthe defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting\n\nactivities within the forum state. Id. Third, courts \u201cconsider whether the\n\ndefendant has made a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would\n\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d Id.\n\n      The \u201cplaintiff . . . bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint\n\nsufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.\u201d Diamond\n\nCrystal, 593 F.3d at 1257 (citation modified); see also United States ex rel.\n\n\n\n\n                                           11\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 12 of 246\n\n\n\n\nBibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2021) (\u201cTo establish\n\npersonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff has the burden\n\nof establishing a prima facie case by presenting enough evidence to withstand\n\na motion for directed verdict.\u201d (citation modified)). In evaluating a plaintiff\u2019s\n\nprima facie case of personal jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss\n\nfor lack of personal jurisdiction, \u201c[t]he district court must construe the\n\nallegations in the complaint as true, to the extent they are uncontroverted by\n\ndefendant\u2019s affidavits or deposition testimony.\u201d Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d\n\n489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). \u201c[I]f the complaint alleged sufficient facts, and the\n\ndefendant challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support\n\nof its position, the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce\n\nevidence supporting jurisdiction.\u201d Diulus v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs.\n\nCo., 823 F. App\u2019x 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation modified); Stubbs v.\n\nWyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th\n\nCir. 2006) (explaining that where the defendant contests the allegations in the\n\ncomplaint through affidavits, \u201cthe burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce\n\nevidence supporting personal jurisdiction, unless the defendant\u2019s affidavits\n\ncontain only conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to\n\njurisdiction\u201d). \u201cAnd where the evidence presented by the parties\u2019 affidavits and\n\ndeposition testimony conflicts, the court must draw all reasonable inferences\n\nin the plaintiff\u2019s favor.\u201d Mortg. Invs., 987 F.3d at 1356 (citation modified).\n\n\n\n\n                                           12\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 13 of 246\n\n\n\n\n   B. Jurisdiction Over ARC\n\n      For the 17 cases filed against ARC across nine states, ARC maintains\n\nthat it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in any of the forums except\n\nTennessee, where it has its principal place of business. 7 [Doc. 179-1 at 16\u201322].\n\nPlaintiffs counter that because ARC is subject to personal jurisdiction in\n\nTennessee and the Tennessee cases, including Anderson v. ARC Auto., Inc.,\n\nNo. 23-CV-00233 (E.D. Tenn. June 30, 2023), were transferred to this MDL as\n\nmember cases, this Court has personal jurisdiction over ARC to adjudicate the\n\nclaims asserted in the SAC. [Doc. 219 at 18\u201319]. ARC, however, does not\n\nchallenge the Court\u2019s pretrial authority to oversee the claims against it in this\n\nMDL; rather, it contests personal jurisdiction in transferor courts outside of\n\nTennessee. [See Doc. 245 at 8].\n\n      \u201cEvery federal court to have considered the issue has affirmed that the\n\ntransferee court can exercise personal jurisdiction to the same extent that the\n\ntransferor court could.\u201d In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litig., 509 F. Supp. 3d\n\n1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2020). Thus, for the cases against ARC filed outside of\n\nTennessee, the question before the Court is whether the transferor courts had\n\npersonal jurisdiction over ARC. ARC says no. It argues, and Plaintiffs do not\n\ncontest, that it is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in any of the\n\nstates, except Tennessee, where it was sued. [Doc. 179-1 at 19]. ARC also\n\n\n\n\n      7 ARC is incorporated in Delaware, but no case was filed against ARC in\n\nthat state. [Doc. 179-1 at 19 & n.4].\n\n\n                                          13\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 14 of 246\n\n\n\n\nargues that the SAC lacks facts to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction\n\nagainst ARC in the non-Tennessee cases because, for example, the SAC fails\n\nto allege facts indicating that ARC purposefully directs its activities at\n\nresidents in those states. [Doc. 179-1 at 20\u201321] Plaintiffs do not dispute this\n\nargument either. Rather, they propose that the Court focus on the merits of\n\nthe claims asserted in the SAC and leave ARC to re-raise its personal\n\njurisdiction challenge \u201c[i]f and when this Court remands those cases to their\n\ntransferor courts.\u201d [See Doc. 219 at 19].\n\n      ARC\u2019s challenge is properly raised under Rule 12(b)(2), and Plaintiffs\n\nneither provide nor does the Court perceive any compelling reason to defer its\n\nadjudication. Plaintiffs have failed to rebut ARC\u2019s argument that it is not\n\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in the non-Tennessee cases. Accordingly, the\n\nCourt GRANTS ARC\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 179], to the extent that it\n\nDISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims against ARC in the following\n\n13 cases: Jophlin v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-02507 (D.S.C. Aug. 1,\n\n2022); Long v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-01098 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 29,\n\n2022); Mann v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-03285 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16,\n\n2022); Underwood v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-01043 (N.D. Ala. Aug.\n\n17, 2022); Tribble v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-03573 (N.D. Ga.\n\nSeptember 2, 2022); Topa v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-00958 (N.D.N.Y.\n\nSept. 13, 2022); Jones v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-00397 (S.D. Iowa\n\nNov. 29, 2022); Thomas v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-05067 (N.D. Ill.\n\n\n\n\n                                            14\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 15 of 246\n\n\n\n\nSept. 16, 2022); Aula v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-12738 (E.D. Mich.\n\nNov. 11, 2022); McCarthy v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-05708 (D.N.J.\n\nSept. 26, 2022); Wilson v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-09432 (S.D.N.Y.\n\nNov. 3, 2022); Hudson-Battie v. ARC Automotive, Inc., No. 22-CV-03809-ELR\n\n(N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2022); and Clark v. BMW Mfg. Co., No. 22-CV-03244 (D.S.C.\n\nSept. 23, 2022). 8\n\n   C. Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Defendants\n\n         Several foreign Automakers and a foreign Airbag Supplier challenge the\n\nCourt\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them, arguing that the SAC fails\n\nto allege a prima facie case justifying the exercise of specific personal\n\njurisdiction against them under the applicable long-arm statutes. Plaintiffs\n\ncounter that the Court has jurisdiction over these foreign Defendants under\n\nthe relevant long-arm statutes based on each Defendant\u2019s own in-state conduct\n\nand, alternatively, based on the in-state conduct of the foreign Defendant\u2019s\n\nU.S. subsidiary. The Court addresses these personal jurisdiction challenges\n\nbelow.\n\n\n\n\n         8 In its opening brief, ARC also argues for the dismissal of nine member\n\ncases because of Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to serve ARC with the Complaint and\nsummons in each of those cases. [Doc. 179-1 at 19\u201324]. But because ARC\u2019s\nagreement to waive service in those nine cases moots its service-based\nchallenge, [Doc. 245 at 12], the Court does not address the merits of ARC\u2019s\nargument.\n\n\n                                           15\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 16 of 246\n\n\n\n\n         1. ZF Germany\n\n      Plaintiffs assert claims for fraud (by omission and concealment) and the\n\nviolation of statutory consumer protection laws against the \u201cZF Defendants,\u201d\n\na related group of five Airbag Suppliers comprised of ZF Active Safety and\n\nElectronics US LLC (\u201cZF Electronics\u201d), ZF Passive Safety Systems US Inc. (\u201cZF\n\nSystems\u201d), ZF Automotive US Inc. (\u201cZF Automotive\u201d), ZF TRW Automotive\n\nHoldings Corp. (\u201cZF-TRW\u201d), and ZF Friedrichshafen AG (\u201cZF Germany\u201d), SAC\n\nI \u00b6 52. Apart from ZF Germany, the other four ZF Defendants are U.S.-based\n\ncompanies headquartered in Michigan. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 53\u201356, 58. The European-\n\nbased ZF Germany is \u201cthe parent owner\u201d of the U.S.-based ZF Defendants. Id.\n\n\u00b6 58. Plaintiffs assert that the Michigan transferor court and, thus, this\n\ntransferee Court, has personal jurisdiction over ZF Germany under the\n\nMichigan long-arm statute. [Doc. 293 at 8 n.2 (citing Takata I, 396 F. Supp. 3d\n\nat 1137)]. Under the Michigan long-arm statute,\n\n      [t]he existence of any of the following relationships between a\n      corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient\n      basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to\n      exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such corporation and\n      to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such\n      corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any of the\n      following relationships:\n\n      (1) The transaction of any business within the state.\n\n      (2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to\n      occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort . . . .\n\n\n\n\n                                          16\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT            Document 353   Filed 10/02/26   Page 17 of 246\n\n\n\n\nMich. Comp. Laws Ann. \u00a7 600.715. According to Plaintiffs, both subsections\n\nsupport the Court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over ZF Germany. [Doc.\n\n293 at 10\u201313].\n\n       The SAC alleges the following regarding the corporate structure of the\n\nZF Defendants: On May 15, 2015, ZF Germany acquired the U.S.-based TRW\n\nAutomotive Holding Corp. and its subsidiaries (collectively, \u201cTRW\u201d), which\n\nnow operate as the Michigan-based ZF-TRW and its subsidiaries. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 61,\n\n66. ZF Electronics (formerly, TRW Automotive U.S. LLC) \u201cdesigned,\n\nmanufactured, and sold some airbag modules that incorporated ARC\u2019s\n\nDefective Inflators.\u201d Id. \u00b6 53. ZF Systems (formerly, TRW Vehicle Safety\n\nSystems, Inc.) \u201cworked closely\u201d with ZF Electronics to design the airbag\n\nmodules that incorporated the ARC inflators. Id. \u00b6 54. ZF Automotive\n\n(formerly, TRW Automotive Inc.) is the parent and 100% owner of ZF\n\nElectronics and ZF Systems and \u201cshared responsibility\u201d with ZF Electronics\n\nfor the design and manufacture of the airbag modules with the ARC inflators.\n\nId. \u00b6 55. ZF-TRW (formerly, TRW Automotive Holding Corp.) is the parent and\n\n100% owner of ZF Automotive, and it entered contracts under which its\n\nsubsidiaries designed, manufactured, and sold the airbag modules with ARC\n\ninflators to several Automakers. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 56 & n.18, 60. According to Plaintiffs,\n\nthe four U.S-based ZF Defendants \u201cshare personnel and frequently operate\n\njointly as one unit.\u201d Id. \u00b6 57.\n\n\n\n\n                                            17\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 18 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      ZF Germany asserts that it was not involved in the design, manufacture,\n\nor sale of airbags with the ARC inflators at issue because those inflators were\n\nused by TRW only for the 2008 through 2012 model year Chevy Malibu and ZF\n\nGermany did not acquire TRW until 2015, three years after the last model year\n\nfor which TRW supplied the ARC inflators. [Doc. 279-1 at 10 (citing Decl. of\n\nKelly Laliberte \u00b6 16 [Doc. 279-2])]. 9 Plaintiffs do not directly rebut this\n\nassertion, arguing instead that they are unable to \u201ctest the veracity of ZF\n\nGermany\u2019s assertions\u201d because discovery has not opened. [Doc. 293 at 15]. But\n\nZF Germany represents that the ZF Defendants have already produced to\n\nPlaintiffs documents substantiating this assertion, [Doc. 301 at 13], and\n\nPlaintiffs do not explain what additional documents they require to test this\n\nassertion. Plaintiffs also contend that even if the last of the ZF-TRW airbag\n\nmodules with ARC inflators were supplied three years before ZF Germany\n\nacquired TRW, this fact is of no moment if ZF Germany acquired TRW\u2019s\n\nliabilities. [Doc. 293 at 15]. This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.\n\nFirst, not only does the SAC not allege that ZF Germany acquired the liabilities\n\nof TRW, but Plaintiffs also provide no support for their speculation. Second,\n\nreferencing the publicly available merger plan for the TRW acquisition, ZF\n\n\n\n      9 The Court appropriately considers the Laliberte Declaration for the\n\npurposes of ZF Germany\u2019s motion to dismiss. See Sierra Equity Grp., Inc. v.\nWhite Oak Equity Partners, LLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2009)\n(\u201cWhile the consideration [of evidentiary] materials ordinarily would convert a\nmotion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, . . . in the context of personal\njurisdiction the motion remains one to dismiss even if evidence outside the\npleadings is considered.\u201d).\n\n\n                                          18\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 19 of 246\n\n\n\n\nGermany shows that following TRW\u2019s acquisition, ZF-TRW retained \u201cthe\n\nclaims, obligations, debts, liabilities and duties of\u201d TRW. [Doc. 301 at 13n.7\n\n(citing Agreement & Plan of Merger (Sep. 15, 2014) at \u00a7 1.1, available at\n\nhttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1267097/000110465914066397/a14-\n\n20989_1ex2d1.htm)]. Thus, to establish the Court\u2019s jurisdiction over ZF\n\nGermany, Plaintiffs must show that their claims arise out of ZF Germany\u2019s\n\nMichigan-directed actions following its acquisition of TRW.\n\n      Under \u00a7 600.715(1) of the Michigan long-arm statue, \u201ceven the slightest\n\nact of business in Michigan\u201d suffices as a \u201ctransaction of business,\u201d but to\n\nsupport the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action must\n\narise out of that act. Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651, 667 (6th Cir.\n\n2023) (citation modified). And to support jurisdiction under \u00a7 600.715(2), either\n\nthe defendant\u2019s tortious conduct or the plaintiff\u2019s injury must occur in\n\nMichigan. Id. at 668. Plaintiffs point to \u201cextensive allegations that ZF Germany\n\ntransacts business in Michigan.\u201d [Doc. 293 at 10]. Indeed, the SAC alleges that\n\nZF Germany \u201cintegrated its physical locations\u201d with ZF-TRW and its\n\nsubsidiaries, has described itself and the U.S-based ZF Defendants as a unified\n\nentity, has voting power over and appoints board members to the boards of the\n\nU.S.-based ZF Defendants. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 65, 67, 70\u201372. It also alleges that, as part\n\nof TRW\u2019s integration, ZF Germany created a new division the \u201cActive &\n\nPassive Safety Technology Division,\u201d which manages TRW\u2019s business\n\nactivities, and has merged ZF Germany\u2019s and ZF-TRW\u2019s product compliance\n\n\n\n\n                                           19\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 20 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfunctions. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 69, 73\u201374. The problem with this alleged business activity by\n\nZF Germany is that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against the Airbag Module Defendants\n\nstem from their sale of airbag modules containing the defective ARC inflators\n\nfor incorporation into the Class Vehicles without disclosing their knowledge of\n\nthe Inflator Defect, and none of ZF Germany\u2019s Michigan-directed business\n\nactivities, which all occurred after it acquired TRW, relate to TRW\u2019s\n\nmanufacture and supply of airbags with the relevant ARC inflators.\n\n      Although the SAC alleges that ZF Germany approves the U.S.-based ZF\n\nDefendants\u2019 statements \u201cto the NHTSA regarding airbag module design and\n\nfailure,\u201d SAC I \u00b6 63, the SAC does not allege that the ZF Defendants made any\n\nmisrepresentations concerning the ARC inflators to the NHTSA. Indeed, it\n\ndoes not even allege whether the statements concern airbags with ARC\n\ninflators. And even assuming that ZF Germany had a duty to disclose the\n\nDefect allegedly present in the airbag modules supplied by TRW, the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations fail to show that ZF Germany, which had not yet acquired TRW\n\nand, thus, had no role in the manufacturing of the ARC inflator-containing\n\nairbag modules, had knowledge of the Defect before the only two named\n\nPlaintiffs who own a 2012 or older Chevy Malibu (Ninotchka Harpey-Bey and\n\nPatricia Mobley, SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 149, 250) bought their vehicles. Plaintiffs also\n\ntheorize that through its role in governing its U.S.-based affiliates, ZF\n\nGermany participated in the fraud alleged. [See Doc. 293 at 12\u201313]. But the\n\nSAC is silent about any action by ZF Germany involving a decision not to\n\n\n\n\n                                         20\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 21 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndisclose the Defect, and (as discussed below) the SAC does not allege active\n\nconcealment by any Airbag Suppliers, much less ZF Germany\u2019s participation\n\nin any such concealment.\n\n      In short, the SAC fails to present a prima facie case for the exercise of\n\nspecific personal jurisdiction under the Michigan long-arm based on ZF\n\nGermany\u2019s transactions of business or its commission of a tortious act.\n\n      Plaintiffs alternatively argue that the Court may exercise jurisdiction\n\nover ZF Germany because the U.S.-based ZF Defendants are its alter ego. [Doc.\n\n293 at 18\u201319]. Under the alter-ego theory of jurisdiction \u201ca non-resident parent\n\ncorporation is amenable to suit in the forum state if the parent company exerts\n\nso much control over the subsidiary that the two do not exist as separate\n\nentities but are one and the same for purposes of jurisdiction.\u201d Indusource, Inc.\n\nv. Sandvik Tooling France S.A.S., 2016 WL 6216003, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25,\n\n2016) (quoting Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 450 (6th Cir.\n\n2012)). However, \u201cMichigan courts will not pierce the corporate veil unless, (1)\n\nthe corporate entity was a mere instrumentality of another entity or\n\nindividual; (2) the corporate entity was used to commit a fraud or wrong; and\n\n(3) the plaintiff suffered an unjust loss.\u201d Indusource, 2016 WL 6216003, at *4\n\n(citation modified). Even where one business entity operates as a \u201cmere\n\ninstrumentality\u201d of another, \u201cMichigan will not impose alter ego liability on a\n\nparent corporation for having a separate corporation as its mere\n\ninstrumentality when that parent corporation has not exercised control over\n\n\n\n\n                                          21\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 22 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe subsidiary in a manner amounting to a fraud or wrong.\u201d In re Flint Water\n\nCases, 584 F. Supp. 3d 383, 408 (E.D. Mich. 2022).\n\n      Here, the SAC alleges facts that, Plaintiffs contend, show that the U.S.-\n\nbased ZF Defendants are mere instrumentalities of ZF Germany, and it also\n\nalleges that the ZF Defendants fraudulently failed to disclose the Inflator\n\nDefect. But it does not allege that ZF Germany exercised control over the U.S.-\n\nbased ZF Defendants in a manner that amounted to fraud. In Green v.\n\nZiegelman, 310 Mich. App. 436, 457\u2013459 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), the Michigan\n\nCourt of Appeals held that there was evidence showing the defendant used the\n\ncorporate form to commit a fraud or wrong where the defendant, for example,\n\nmisled the plaintiffs into believing that the alleged instrumentality entity was\n\na viable business although it had no independent source of income and caused\n\nthe instrumentality entity to breach its agreement with one of the plaintiffs\n\nknowing that the instrumentality entity liability could be rendered\n\nuncollectible. See also EPLET, LLC v. DTE Pontiac N., LLC, 984 F.3d 493, 500\n\n(6th Cir. 2021) (By \u201cdirecting its wholly owned subsidiary to stop maintaining\n\nthe [power plant] and thereby breach its contractual obligations, [the parent]\n\nexercised its control over [subsidiary] in a way that wronged [the plaintiff]\u201d).\n\nAlthough, according to Plaintiffs, ZF Germany exerted significant control over\n\nthe daily operations of the U.S.-based ZF Defendants, they do not allege that\n\nZF Germany misused the corporate form to defraud Plaintiffs. At best, the SAC\n\nalleges that the U.S.-based ZF Defendants\u2019 failure to disclose the Defect should\n\n\n\n\n                                          22\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 23 of 246\n\n\n\n\nalso be attributed to ZF Germany because it exerts a high level of control over\n\ntheir actions. This does not suffice to justify piercing the corporate veil under\n\nMichigan law.\n\n      For the above-discussed reasons, Plaintiffs fail to state a prima facie\n\ncase for the Court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over ZF Germany. And in\n\nview of this failure, jurisdictional discovery is not warranted. See Beckham v.\n\nBaker & Hostetler, LLP, 2023 WL 9957259, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 17, 2023) (\u201cIt\n\nis an abuse of discretion . . . if a court orders jurisdictional discovery when a\n\nplaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.\u201d).\n\nAccordingly, the Court GRANTS ZF Germany\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 279],\n\nDENIES Plaintiffs\u2019 related motion for jurisdictional discovery, [Doc. 294], and\n\nDISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against ZF Germany.\n\n          2. BMW Germany\n\n      Plaintiffs assert claim for fraud (by omission and by concealment), the\n\nviolation of statutory consumer protection laws, breach of warranties, and\n\nunjust enrichment against Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft\n\n(\u201cBMW Germany\u201d), a German-based company. SAC I \u00b6 80. BMW Germany\n\ndesigns and manufactures vehicles in Germany. Decl. of Ronny L\u00f6wa (\u201cL\u00f6wa\n\nDecl.\u201d) \u00b612 [Doc. 299-1]. BMW Germany seeks dismissal from this action,\n\narguing that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to support the Court\u2019s\n\nexercise of personal jurisdiction against it under the long-arm statutes of New\n\nJersey and South Carolina (the forums of the transferor courts). [Doc. 287-1\n\nat 8\u20139]. Plaintiffs contend that the exercise of jurisdiction is proper because\n\n\n                                          23\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 24 of 246\n\n\n\n\nBMW Germany \u201chas purposefully availed itself of doing business in New\n\nJersey and South Carolina, including by establishing [BMW America] and\n\n[BMW Manufacturing] there and conducting critical activities through those\n\nentities.\u201d [Doc. 310 at 7].\n\n       BMW Germany asserts, and Plaintiffs agree, that because the long-arm\n\nstatues of South Carolina and New Jersey permit the exercise of personal\n\njurisdiction consistent with due process, it is appropriate to merge the long-\n\narm and due process inquiries \u201cand determine only whether the exercise of\n\njurisdiction over BMW Germany comports with due process. [Docs. 287-1 at 16\n\n(citing (S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 36-2-802; N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:4-4); 310 at 15]. Thus,\n\nthe Court employs the familiar three-part test to determine (1) whether\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claims relate to BMW Germany\u2019s contact with the transferor forum\n\nstates; (2) whether BMW Germany purposefully availed itself of the privilege\n\nof conducting activities within those states; and (3) whether \u201cthe exercise of\n\njurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial\n\njustice.\u201d Waite, 901 F.3d at 1313. The Court first takes up the question whether\n\nBMW Germany\u2019s purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting\n\nbusiness in either New Jersey or South Carolina. For the reasons discussed\n\nbelow, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing BMW\n\nGermany\u2019s purposeful conduct targeting New Jersey or South Carolina.\n\n       Plaintiffs point to conduct by BMW Germany that they claim establishes\n\nBMW Germany\u2019s purposeful conduct directed at New Jersey and South\n\n\n\n\n                                           24\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 25 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCarolina. First, Plaintiffs assert that BMW Germany targets the U.S.,\n\ngenerally, and the transferor forum states specifically, by designing BMWs for\n\ncompliance with U.S. regulations. [Doc. 310 at 16 (citing L\u00f6wa Decl.\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 12\u201313)]. Second, Plaintiffs contend that BMW Germany established its\n\npresence in the U.S. through BMW America (in New Jersey) and BMW\n\nManufacturing (in South Carolina) and has used those states as \u201cas hubs for\n\nthe marketing, sale, manufacturing, assembly, and distribution of its vehicles,\n\nincluding the Class Vehicles, throughout the United States.\u201d [Id. at 18 (citing\n\nExs. 14, 15, 18 [Docs. 310-15, 310-16, 310-19]). According to Plaintiffs, BMW\n\nGermany operates its global business through an entity called the BMW\n\nGroup, which includes BMW America and BMW Manufacturing. [Doc. 310 at\n\n7\u20138 (citing Exs. 1\u20133 [Docs. 310-2\u2013310-4])]. Third, Plaintiffs also maintain that\n\nBMW Germany ships its vehicles and component parts to New Jersey and\n\nSouth Carolina. [Id. at 19\u201320].\n\n      The Court, however, agrees with BMW Germany that Plaintiffs have\n\nnot established a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.\n\nPlaintiffs must carry \u201cthe initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient\n\nfacts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.\u201d Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d\n\nat 1257 (citation modified). But Plaintiffs stumble. While in opposition to BMW\n\nGermany\u2019s motion, Plaintiffs point to evidence that they contend shows BMW\n\nGermany purposefully directs its business activities to the transferor forum\n\nstates, what they do not (and cannot) do is cite to the SAC\u2019s allegations in\n\n\n\n\n                                          25\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 26 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsupport. This is because the SAC alleges only two facts specific to BMW\n\nGermany: (1) BMW America \u201cimports, promotes, advertises, distributes, and\n\nsells BMW [Germany] and/or BMW brand cars, trucks, and sport utility\n\nvehicles in the United States\u201d and (2) BMW Germany is incorporated and\n\nheadquartered in Germany. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 79\u201380. The SAC goes on to allege that\n\nthe \u201cBMW Defendants\u201d (referring collectively to BMW Germany, BMW\n\nManufacturing, and BMW America) conduct business in South Carolina and\n\nNew Jersey, maintain contractual relationships with ARC or the Airbag\n\nSuppliers for component parts for installation in Class Vehicles, and market\n\nand sell vehicles intrastate. Id. \u00b6 82. But this conclusory recitation of activities\n\nis unsupported by any facts concerning BMW Germany\u2019s actions directed to\n\nSouth Carolina or New Jersey. And \u201c[w]here a complaint lacks jurisdictional\n\nallegations to sufficiently establish a prima facie case, the district court doesn\u2019t\n\ngo to the second and third steps of the burden-shifting process, and the motion\n\n[to dismiss] should be granted.\u201d Andres v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., 2022 WL\n\n1015489, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2022). Because the SAC fails to allege facts\n\nsupporting BMW Germany\u2019s purposeful availment of the privilege of\n\nconducting activities in either transferor forum state, the exercise of personal\n\njurisdiction over BMW Germany is improper. This ends the jurisdictional\n\ninquiry. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS BMW Germany\u2019s motion to dismiss,\n\n[Doc. 287], DENIES Plaintiffs\u2019 related motion for jurisdictional discovery, [Doc.\n\n\n\n\n                                            26\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 27 of 246\n\n\n\n\n311], and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against\n\nBMW Germany.\n\n             3. Porsche Germany\n\n       Dr. Ing. H.C. F. Porsche AG (\u201cPorsche Germany\u201d) seeks dismissal from\n\nthis action, arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. [Doc. 289-2].\n\nPlaintiffs counter that Porsche Germany is subject to the Court\u2019s exercise of\n\njurisdiction under Georgia\u2019s long-arm statute, which applies because the only\n\nmember case naming Porsche Germany as a Defendant is the one filed by\n\nStephen Gearhart in this Court. [Doc. 308 at 12\u201313]. Plaintiffs rely on the\n\nsection of the Georgia long-arm, which \u201cpermits jurisdiction where a plaintiff\u2019s\n\ncause of action \u2018arises out of\u2019 a nonresident defendant\u2019s \u2018transact[ion] of any\n\nbusiness within [Georgia].\u2019\u201d Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1264 (alteration in\n\noriginal) (quoting O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-10-91(1)). The phrase \u201ctransacts any business\u201d\n\nas employed in \u00a7 9-10-91(1), in interpreted literally to mean \u201cthat the\n\nnonresident defendant has purposefully done some act or consummated some\n\ntransaction in Georgia\u201d and does not require that the defendant be present in\n\nstate. Id.\n\n       Plaintiffs argue that Porsche Germany has transacted business in\n\nGeorgia by importing and selling its vehicles in the U.S. through PCNA, its\n\nGeorgia-based subsidiary and co-Defendant. [Doc. 308 at 13\u201314]. But the SAC\n\nfails to allege facts supporting this contention. It simply alleges that the\n\nGeorgia-headquartered PCNA \u201cis the importer and distributor of Porsche\n\nbrand vehicles sold in the United States.\u201d SAC I \u00b6 123. There is no allegation\n\n\n                                          27\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353    Filed 10/02/26   Page 28 of 246\n\n\n\n\nto suggest that Porsche Germany itself imports its vehicles to Georgia or for\n\nsale in Georgia. Plaintiffs fail to rebut Porsche Germany\u2019s showing that PCNA\n\nbuys and takes possession of vehicles from Porsche Germany in Germany and\n\nthen imports those vehicles into the U.S. for distribution through its own\n\ndealership network. Decl. of Michael L\u00f6ffler \u00b6\u00b6 17\u201318 [Doc. 289-5]. Moreover,\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 contention that Porsche Germany transacts business through PCNA\n\nfails. At best, Plaintiffs provide that Porsche Germany and PCNA share a\n\n\u201cclose corporate relationship.\u201d [Doc. 308 at 9\u201310]. But the fact remains that\n\neach is a separate corporate entity, see SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 122\u201323, and the SAC alleges\n\nno facts to indicate that PCNA acts as Porsche Germany\u2019s agent or that it is\n\nappropriate to \u201cpierce the corporate veil.\u201d conduct is attributable to Porsche\n\nGermany. See Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th\n\nCir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org.,\n\n606 U.S. 1 (2025) (\u201cWhere the subsidiary\u2019s presence in the state is primarily\n\nfor the purpose of carrying on its own business and the subsidiary has\n\npreserved some semblance of independence from the parent, jurisdiction over\n\nthe parent may not be acquired on the basis of the local activities of the\n\nsubsidiary.\u201d (citation modified)).\n\n      In sum, because the SAC fails to allege facts showing that Porsche\n\nGermany transacts any business in Georgia, the Georgia long-arm statute does\n\nnot support the Court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Porsche Germany.\n\nSee Gerow v. Newsom, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131275, at *11 (M.D. Fla. June\n\n\n\n\n                                         28\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 29 of 246\n\n\n\n\n25, 2024) (\u201cIf the complaint lacks allegations to show jurisdiction is appropriate\n\nunder either [the statutory or the constitutional] part of the analysis, the\n\nplaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.\u201d).\n\nMoreover, because the SAC fails to present a prima facie case supporting the\n\nexercise of jurisdiction, jurisdictional discovery is not warranted. The Court,\n\ntherefore, GRANTS Porsche Germany\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 289], DENIES\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 related motion for jurisdictional discovery, [Doc. 309], and\n\nDISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Porsche Germany.\n\n          4. Audi Germany and Volkswagen Germany\n\n      Audi     Aktiengesellschaft    (\u201cAudi     Germany\u201d)     and    Volkswagen\n\nAktiengesellschaft (\u201cVolkswagen Germany\u201d) also moves for their dismissal\n\nfrom this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Docs. 305, 319]. According to\n\nthe SAC, Audi Germany is headquartered in Germany and Audi of America,\n\nLLC (\u201cAudi\u201d), a Virginia headquartered company, imports and distributes\n\nAudi brand vehicles in the U.S. SAC I \u00b6 132. Volkswagen AG is also a German-\n\nbased corporation and the parent of the Virginia-headquartered Volkswagen\n\nGroup of America, Inc. (\u201cVolkswagen\u201d), which advertises, markets, and sells\n\nVolkswagens in the U.S. and \u201chouses the U.S. operations of a worldwide family\n\nof distinguished and exciting brands including Audi . . . and Volkswagen.\u201d Id.\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 133\u201334. Volkswagen AG and Volkswagen together operate as the\n\n\u201cVolkswagen Group,\u201d which \u201ccultivates a market for, designs, develops,\n\nmanufactures, and/or sells Volkswagen and Audi automobiles and the\n\nreplacement component parts for these vehicles\u201d in the U.S. Id. \u00b6 133.\n\n\n                                           29\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 30 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Audi Germany and Volkswagen Germany contend that the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations fail to show that they directed their conduct into the forum state.\n\n[Docs. 305-1 at 20\u201324; 319-1 at 19\u201322]. Plaintiffs maintain that the Court has\n\njurisdiction over both Defendants under the long-arm statute of Virginia, the\n\ntransferor forum. [Doc. 321 at 7\u20138; 327 at 16]. Plaintiffs rely on Va. Code Ann.\n\n\u00a7 8.01-328.1(A)(1), which authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over\n\na defendant \u201cas to a cause of action arising from [the defendant\u2019s] transacting\n\nany business in [Virginia].\u201d And as the Parties acknowledge, [Docs. 305-1 at\n\n17; 321 at 17; 327 at 15], because Virginia\u2019s long-arm reach extends to the outer\n\nlimits of the due process clause, \u201cthe statutory inquiry merges with the\n\nconstitutional inquiry.\u201d Consulting Eng\u2019rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F3d\n\n273, 277 (4th Cir. 2009). As discussed above, the constitutional inquiry\n\nnecessitates establishing three elements, one of which is the defendant\u2019s\n\npurposeful availment of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\n\n(here, Virginia). Waite, 901 F.3d at 1313. Below, the Court first addresses Audi\n\nGermany\u2019s challenge to personal jurisdiction and then turns to Volkswagen\n\nGermany\u2019s challenge.\n\n      Plaintiffs maintain that Audi Germany purposefully availed itself of the\n\nprivilege of conducting business in Virginia through \u201cprincipally through its\n\nagreements and other interaction with its exclusive importer and distributor\n\nof Audi-manufactured vehicles in the U.S., [Volkswagen].\u201d [Doc. 321 at 16\u201317].\n\nThe issue with Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion is that it is unsupported by the SAC\u2019s\n\n\n\n\n                                          30\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 31 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfactual allegations. \u201cA party cannot amend a complaint by arguments of\n\ncounsel made in opposition to a motion to dismiss. In the post-Twombly world,\n\nthe complaint is judged as it is and not on whether a set of facts could be\n\nimagined that would support the claim.\u201d In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No.\n\nII), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (citation modified). The SAC\n\nalleges that Volkswagen does business as Audi of America, Inc.\u2014not Audi\n\n(LLC), the alleged U.S. importer and distributor of Audis\u2014and that\n\nVolkswagen engages in the \u201cadvertising, marketing, and sale of VW\n\nautomobiles nationwide\u201d and \u201chouses the U.S. operations of a worldwide family\n\nof distinguished and exciting brands including Audi[.]\u201d SAC I \u00b6 134. It also\n\nalleges that Volkswagen and Volkswagen Germany, as the \u201cVolkswagen\n\nGroup\u201d \u201ccultivate[] a market for, designs, develops, manufactures, and/or sells\n\nVolkswagen and Audi automobiles and the replacement component parts for\n\nthese vehicles\u201d in the U.S. Id. \u00b6 133. Even assuming that the SAC\u2019s reference\n\nto Audi (LLC) as the U.S. importer and distributor of Audis was intended to be\n\na reference to Audi of America Inc. (i.e., Volkswagen) instead, the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations give no hint of Audi Germany\u2019s Virginia-directed activity.\n\n      Audi Germany provides the declaration of Magus Weiss, who explains\n\nthat Volkswagen is the exclusive U.S. importer and distributor of Audi\n\nGermany-manufactured vehicles and uses the trade name Audi of America,\n\nInc. Decl. of Magnus Weiss (\u201cWeiss Decl.\u201d) \u00b6 14 [Doc. 305-3]. Based on this,\n\nPlaintiffs argue that Audi Germany purposely directed its business activity\n\n\n\n\n                                         31\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 32 of 246\n\n\n\n\nand sales into Virginia. [Doc. 321 at 16\u201319]. But there is no circumventing the\n\nfact that the SAC is silent about Audi Germany\u2019s Virginia-targeted activities.\n\nFor example, there is no allegation in the SAC that Audi Germany directs or\n\ncontrols Volkswagen\u2019s activities or that Volkswagen acts on Audi Germany\u2019s\n\nbehalf.\n\n      Indeed, instead of citing to the SAC\u2019s allegations, Plaintiffs refer to the\n\nWeiss Declaration\u2019s assertions regarding Volkswagen\u2019s role in the importation\n\nand distribution of Audi Germany-manufactured vehicles and to court findings\n\nregarding Audi Germany\u2019s actions in other cases. [See e.g., Doc. 321 at 12]. But\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 efforts are unavailing. The SAC does not allege facts showing that\n\nAudi Germany purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in\n\nVirginia and, as such, fails to establish a prima facie case supporting the\n\nexercise of personal jurisdiction over Audi Germany. Thus, the Court lacks\n\npersonal jurisdiction over Audi Germany, and in the absence of a prima facie\n\ncase for jurisdiction, jurisdictional discovery is inappropriate. The Court,\n\ntherefore, GRANTS Audi Germany\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 305], DENIES\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 related motion for jurisdictional discovery, [Doc. 322], and\n\nDISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Audi Germany.\n\n      As they do in response to Audi Germany\u2019s challenge, Plaintiffs respond\n\nto Volkswagen Germany\u2019s jurisdictional challenge by arguing that Volkswagen\n\nGermany\u2019s Virginia contacts through Volkswagen subject it to jurisdiction in\n\nthat state. [Doc. 327 at 9]. They point out that \u201ca corporation can purposefully\n\n\n\n\n                                          32\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 33 of 246\n\n\n\n\navail itself of a forum by directing its agents or distributors to take action\n\nthere\u201d [Doc. 327 at 9 quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 135 n.13\n\n(2014)]. But once again, the SAC\u2019s factual allegations fail to support Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nargument. The SAC alleges that Volkswagen Germany \u201cjointly actively\n\ncultivates a market for, designs, develops, manufactures, and/or sells\n\nVolkswagen and Audi automobiles and the replacement component parts for\n\nthese vehicles\u201d in the U.S. and ships vehicles to the U.S., including through\n\nVirginia. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 133, 136. Not only are these allegations conclusory, but they\n\nsay nothing about Volkswagen Germany\u2019s Virginia targeted activities.\n\n      Plaintiffs   emphasize    that   Volkswagen     is   Virginia   based   and\n\n\u201cjurisdiction results from [Volkswagen Germany\u2019s] substantial conduct\n\ndirected at Virginia through its subsidiary there,\u201d [Doc. 327 at 21], but the SAC\n\ndoes not include any allegations that Volkswagen Germany acts through its\n\nVirginia subsidiary. Plaintiffs point out that a Virginia court has previously\n\nrejected Volkswagen Germany\u2019s argument that \u201cthere is no connection\n\nbetween [the German Defendants, including Volkswagen Germany] and\n\nVirginia because plaintiffs\u2019 claims involve conduct initiated by [Volkswagen],\n\nand not the German Defendants.\u201d [Doc. 327 at 20 (quoting Re Volkswagen\n\n\u201cClean Diesel\u201d Litig., 100 Va. Cir. 134 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2018) (citation modified))].\n\nBut there, the complaint alleged facts showing that \u201c[e]mployees and agents of\n\nthe German Defendants enter[ed] the forum state,\u201d that the German\n\nDefendants allegedly developed \u201cmarketing and advertising schemes . . . in the\n\n\n\n\n                                           33\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 34 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCommonwealth,\u201d and also alleged an agency relationship. Clean Diesel Litig.,\n\n100 Va. Cir. 134. The SAC contains no such allegations. And Plaintiffs\u2019 effort\n\nto augment the SAC\u2019s allegations with additional facts is too little too late. The\n\nSAC fails to make out a prima facie case for jurisdiction against Volkswagen\n\nGermany because it fails to allege facts indicating that Volkswagen Germany\u2019s\n\npurposefully directed its conduct to Virginia.\n\n      The Court, therefore, GRANTS Volkswagen Germany\u2019s motion to\n\ndismiss, [Doc. 319], and, because in the absence of a prima facie case for\n\njurisdiction, jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate, DENIES Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nrelated motion for jurisdictional discovery, [Doc. 322], and DISMISSES\n\nWITHOUT PREJUDICE Volkswagen Germany. 10\n\n                            III.   Shotgun Pleading\n\n      Several Defendants seek dismissal of the SAC as an impermissible\n\nshotgun pleading. Although Plaintiffs take liberty with the pleading form, with\n\none exception, the Court is unpersuaded that their abuse rises to a level that\n\njustifies dismissal.\n\n   A. Legal Standard\n\n      A plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil\n\nProcedure 8 by providing \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing\n\n\n\n\n      10  Because ZF Germany, BMW Germany, Porsche Germany, Audi\nGermany, and Volkswagen Germany are dismissed from this action, the\nCourt\u2019s references to \u201cthe Airbag Suppliers\u201d and to \u201cthe Automakers\u201d from this\npoint forward excludes the respective dismissed Defendants.\n\n\n                                           34\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT           Document 353     Filed 10/02/26     Page 35 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthat the pleader is entitled to relief\u201d as well as a \u201cbrief factual description\u201d of\n\nthe circumstances that surround the acts upon which a plaintiff bases a claim\n\nfor relief. Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (N.D. Ga.\n\n2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A shotgun pleading \u201cfails to satisfy these\n\nbasic requirements.\u201d Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1358\n\n(11th Cir. 2020). Indeed, a shotgun pleading is \u201cnever plain because it is\n\nimpossible to comprehend which specific factual allegations the plaintiff\n\nintends to support which of his causes of action, or how they do so.\u201d Id.; see also\n\nJackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356\u201357 (11th Cir. 2018)\n\n(\u201cShotgun pleadings . . . exact an intolerable toll on the trial court\u2019s docket,\n\nlead to unnecessary and unchanneled discovery, and impose unwarranted\n\nexpense on the litigants, the court and [its] resources. Moreover, justice is\n\ndelayed for the litigants who are \u2018standing in line,\u2019 waiting for their cases to be\n\nheard.\u201d); Chapman v. AI Trans., 229 F.3d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 2000) (\u201cWe\n\nhave frequently railed about the evils of shotgun pleadings and urged district\n\ncourts to take a firm hand.\u201d).\n\n      Broadly speaking, there are four (4) types of shotgun pleadings:\n\n      [t]he most common type\u2014by a long shot\u2014is a complaint\n      containing multiple counts where each count adopts the\n      allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count\n      to carry all that came before and the last count to be a\n      combination of the entire complaint. The next most common\n      type . . . is a complaint that . . . is guilty of the venial sin of being\n      replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not\n      obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third\n      type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not\n      separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for\n      relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of\n\n\n                                            35\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 36 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without\n      specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts\n      or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought\n      against.\n\nWeiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff\u2019s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321\u201323 (11th Cir.\n\n2015) (collecting cases). Put simply, the \u201cunifying characteristic of all types of\n\nshotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or\n\nanother, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and\n\nthe grounds upon which each claim rests.\u201d Id. at 1323.\n\n   B. Discussion\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers argue that in the SAC Plaintiffs commit the first\n\nand the fourth \u201csins\u201d of shotgun pleading, denying them adequate notice of the\n\nclaims Plaintiffs assert against them and the grounds for those claims. [Doc.\n\n178-1 at 23\u201324]. First, Plaintiffs undoubtedly commit the \u201csin\u201d of adopting by\n\nreference into various counts all the allegations of each preceding count such\n\nthat each successive count becomes an amalgam of all the counts before it. See,\n\ne.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 434, 507, 576, 645, 670, 689, 714, 749, 830, 981, 1080, 1151,\n\n1209, 1591, 2073, 2234, 2279, 2237, 3761, 3829, 3897, 3966, 4037, 4106, and\n\n4152. As the Airbag Suppliers correctly point out, this type of loose pleading\n\npractice leads to absurdities. [Doc. 178-1 at 27]. For example, through\n\nincorporation, counts against the Automakers for breaches of warranty\n\ncarryover factual allegations irrelevant to those claims and claims for liability\n\n(from previous counts) on other grounds and against other Defendants. The\n\nCourt does not condone this unfortunately all too common practice of pleading.\n\n\n\n                                           36\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 37 of 246\n\n\n\n\nNevertheless, because each count sufficiently explains the basis for the claim,\n\nwhich can be related back to the SAC\u2019s factual assertions, the Court concludes\n\nthat Plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cincorporat[ion] by reference\u201d of allegations from preceding\n\ncounts warrants the SAC\u2019s dismissal.\n\n      Second, although the Airbag Suppliers argue that the SAC lumps\n\ntogether ARC, the Automakers, and the Airbag Suppliers, without specifying\n\nwhich act or omission each Airbag Module Defendant is allegedly responsible\n\nfor [Doc. 178-1 at 24\u201325], a fair reading of the SAC shows that it sufficiently\n\nalleges the role each set of Defendants played in the ARC airbag inflator supply\n\nchain, how they acquired knowledge of the alleged Inflator Defect, and their\n\nfailure to inform Plaintiffs of the Defect. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 263\u2013269, 325\u2013326,\n\n368, 377\u2013379. Thus, although the SAC alleges numerous claims against \u201cAll\n\nDefendants\u201d and speaks in terms of \u201cDefendants\u201d knowledge of the Defect and\n\nfailure to share that knowledge with Plaintiffs, the Court is unpersuaded that\n\nit fails to give Defendants fair notice of the conduct they are responsible for.\n\nQuality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d\n\n1249, 1275 (11th Cir. 2019) (concluding that allegations against \u201call\n\nDefendants\u201d did not run afoul of Rule 8(a) because the complaint gave \u201cfair\n\nnotice that each and every one of them is alleged to have\u201d engaged in the same\n\nwrongful conduct). This conclusion also holds for the Airbag Suppliers, who\n\ncomplain that the SAC makes no distinction between them but rather forms of\n\nthem a monolith titled \u201cAirbag Module Defendants.\u201d [Doc. 178-1 at 25\u201326]. In\n\n\n\n\n                                          37\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 38 of 246\n\n\n\n\naddition to sufficiently alleging the role of the Airbag Suppliers, the basis for\n\ntheir knowledge of the Inflator Defect, and their inaction, the SAC clarifies\n\nthat each Plaintiff\u2019s claim is limited to the Airbag Supplier who supplied the\n\nairbag module for that Plaintiff\u2019s Class Vehicle. See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6 460\n\n(Alabama Plaintiffs asserting claim for violation of the Alabama Deceptive\n\nTrade Practices Act against the \u201c[Airbag Suppliers] for their respective Class\n\nVehicles[.]\u201d). Accordingly, the Court declines the invitation to dismiss the SAC\n\non these grounds.\n\n                            IV.    Lack of Standing\n\n      The U.S. Automakers seek the dismissal of certain claims for Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nlack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. [Docs. 181-1 at 22\u201324;\n\n184-1 at 9\u201310]. Through a separate motion, the four corporate groups 11 that\n\nPlaintiffs identify as the Airbag Suppliers\u2014AUTOLIV, INC. and a related\n\nentity (\u201cthe Autoliv Defendants\u201d), Joyson Safey Systems (\u201cJoyson\u201d), TG\n\nMissouri Corporation (\u201cTGMO\u201d), 12 and ZF Active Safey and Electronics US\n\n\n\n\n      11The SAC names a fifth Airbag Module Defendant, Mobis Parts\nAmerica, LLC, but Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against this\nDefendant. [Doc. 161].\n      12 The SAC names Toyoda Gosei North America, Inc. (\u201cTGNA\u201d) as a\n\nDefendant. However, after the Airbag Module Defendants filed their motion to\ndismiss, on the Parties\u2019 joint motion, the Court substituted TGMO as\nDefendant for TGNA and adopted the Parties stipulation that the SAC\u2019s\nallegations regarding TGNA (except those as to its principal place of business\nand registered agent) be treated as allegations pleaded against TGMO and that\nTGNA, rather than TGMO, be considered to have joined the Airbag\nDefendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. [Doc. 216]. The Airbag Module Defendants\n\n\n                                          38\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 39 of 246\n\n\n\n\nLLC and related entities (\u201cthe ZF Defendants\u201d)\u2014argue that Plaintiffs lack\n\nstanding to sue them because no Plaintiff has alleged that his or her injury is\n\ntraceable to any particular Airbag Module Defendant. [Doc. 178-1 at 18\u201322,\n\n28\u201329]. The Court addresses both positions, beginning with the U.S.\n\nAutomaker\u2019s arguments.\n\n       \u201cThe standing doctrine stems directly from Article III\u2019s \u2018case or\n\ncontroversy\u2019 requirement and implicates [the court\u2019s] subject matter\n\njurisdiction.\u201d Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir.\n\n2021) (citation modified); Jacobson v. Fla. Sec\u2019y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1270\n\n(11th Cir. 2020) (Pryor, J., dissenting) (\u201cTo satisfy the case-or-controversy\n\nrequirement, a plaintiff must have standing to sue.\u201d). And \u201c[a]ttacks on subject\n\nmatter jurisdiction . . . are governed by Rule 12(b)(1)\u201d of the Federal Rules of\n\nCivil Procedure. Kennedy, 998 F.3d at 1230. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff\n\nsurvives a Rule 12(b)(1) motion if the complaint alleges that the plaintiff has\n\n\u201can injury-in-fact\u201d that is both \u201ccausal[ly] connect[ed]\u201d to the defendant\u2019s\n\nactions and \u201credress[able] by a favorable decision\u201d has standing under Article\n\nIII. Id. at 1229.\n\n   A. U.S. Automakers\u2019 Standing Challenge\n\n       The U.S. Automakers argue that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims under the laws of 14\n\nstates (i.e., Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, New\n\n\n\nrepresent that their arguments to dismiss the SAC apply with equal force to\nTGMO. [Doc. 178-1 at 21].\n\n\n\n                                          39\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 40 of 246\n\n\n\n\nMexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia,\n\nand Wyoming) fail for lack of standing. [Doc. 181-1 at 22\u201324. See also, e.g.,\n\nDocs. 183-1 at 8\u201310; 185-1 at 4\u20135; 187 at 3\u20134]. This is so, the U.S. Automakers\n\nmaintain, because no Plaintiff resides in those states and none alleges that he\n\nor she sustained the injury (i.e., purchased or leased their Class Vehicle) in\n\nthose states. 13 Likewise, the U.S. Automakers argue that Plaintiffs\u2019 nationwide\n\nclaims for fraud and unjust enrichment fail because these claims arise under\n\nstate law, including the law of states where no Plaintiffs live or bought their\n\nvehicle. Separately, Audi contends that Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege facts\n\nto show an injury traceable to its conduct. [Doc. 184-1 at 9\u201310]. The Court first\n\naddresses the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument and then turns to Audi\u2019s challenge.\n\n      \u201cArticle III has two related, but distinct requirements for class\n\nrepresentative standing[:]\u201d (1) the representatives must have Article III\n\nstanding for their own claims and (2) they \u201cmust also be part of the class and\n\npossess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.\u201d In\n\n\n\n      13 Hyundai and Kia separately move to dismiss the claims against them\n\nto the extent that any Plaintiff with only a Hyundai Class Vehicle also asserts\nclaims against Kia and any Plaintiff with only a Kia Class Vehicle also asserts\nclaims against Hyundai. [Doc. 180-1 at 8]. In response, Plaintiffs represent\nthat Plaintiffs with Hyundai Class Vehicles are only pursuing claims against\nHyundai and those with Kia Class Vehicles are only pursuing claims against\nKia. [Doc. 229 at 12]. This clarification moots Hyundai and Kia\u2019s argument.\nThe same holds for Volkswagen\u2019s argument that a named Plaintiff who owns\na Volkswagen Class Vehicle but not an Audi Class Vehicle lacks standing to\nsue Audi and vice versa. [Docs. 182-1 at 7\u20139; 225 at 6 n.4]. See also Doc. 185-1\nat 4 (Ford asserting that Plaintiffs who do not own Ford Class Vehicles lack\nstanding to sue Ford) and Doc. 224 at 6 (Plaintiffs\u2019 concession that those who\ndo not buy or lease a Ford Class Vehicle lack standing to sue Ford)].\n\n\n                                          40\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 41 of 246\n\n\n\n\nre Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litigation, 2022 WL 16729170, at *4 (11th\n\nCir. Nov. 7, 2022) (citation modified). The U.S. Automakers do not take issue\n\nwith either of these requirements as it concerns Plaintiffs. Rather, they\n\nquestion Plaintiffs\u2019 ability to assert causes of action under the law of the 14\n\nstates where they do not reside or did not buy their vehicles. But this \u201cis not a\n\nstanding question at all.\u201d Zantac, 2022 WL 16729170, at *5. \u201c[W]hether a\n\nplaintiff can represent unnamed class members whose claims fall under\n\ndifferent states\u2019 laws . . . is a question that concerns Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 23\u2014\n\nnot Article III.\u201d Id. *6. When faced with this law, the U.S. Automakers pivot to\n\nargue that the Court should dismiss the challenged claims under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\nThe problem, however, is that they did not move for dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6)\n\ngrounds; rather, they premised their argument on standing\u2014a Rule 12(b)(1)\n\nissue. And the Court is not inclined to take up this argument raised, and\n\nsuperficially at that, for the first time in a reply. Because the U.S. Automakers\n\nhave failed to show that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the challenged\n\nclaims, the dismissal .\n\n      The U.S. Automakers also argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their\n\nnationwide fraud and unjust enrichment claims for several other reasons. To\n\nthe extent that Plaintiffs assert those nationwide claims under Georgia law,\n\nthe U.S. Automakers contend that the claims fail because (1) Plaintiffs and\n\nputative class members who did not buy or lease their vehicle in Georgia could\n\nnot have sustained an injury under Georgia law; (2) these individuals do not\n\n\n\n\n                                           41\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 42 of 246\n\n\n\n\nhave the meaningful connection to Georgia that is required to apply Georgia\n\nlaw over the claims of a nationwide class; and (3) in MDL proceedings, the\n\ncourt applies the choice of law rules of each transferor forum and those rules\n\nwill not uniformly point to Georgia common law. [Doc. 181-1 at 24\u201325].\n\n      The U.S. Automakers\u2019 first argument is simply a variant of their lack of\n\nstanding argument, and it is unpersuasive for the same reason. Their next two\n\narguments concern choice of law questions, which are not suited for resolution\n\nat the pleading stage. Georgia \u201cmust have a significant contact or significant\n\naggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff\n\nclass, contacts creating state interests, in order to ensure that the choice of\n\n[Georgia] law is not arbitrary or unfair.\u201d Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472\n\nU.S. 797, 821\u201322 (1985) (citation modified). Answering this question requires\n\nfactual development. See Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th\n\nCir. 1990) (\u201c[T]o determine which sovereign has the most significant\n\nrelationship to a particular issue, a court must instead examine the facts and\n\ncircumstances presented in each particular case.\u201d (citation modified)).\n\nAccordingly, the U.S. Automaker\u2019s challenge to the nationwide fraud and\n\nunjust enrichment claims on standing and choice-of-law grounds is premature.\n\n      Plaintiffs alternatively assert their nationwide fraud claim under \u201cthe\n\ncommon law\u201d of every state. SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 409\u201310, 426, The U.S. Automakers\n\nargue that this claim fails because there is no uniformity within the 50 states\n\nin the common law of fraud. [Doc. 181-1 at 25\u201326]. The Court agrees. Contrary\n\n\n\n\n                                          42\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT          Document 353       Filed 10/02/26      Page 43 of 246\n\n\n\n\nto Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion that \u201cthere are no true conflicts among the states\u2019 laws\n\nof fraudulent concealment,\u201d [SAC I \u00b6 410], state laws on fraud vary materially.\n\n\u201cIn   a     fraud   claim,   some   states   require    justifiable    reliance    on   a\n\nmisrepresentation, while others require reasonable reliance. States impose\n\nvarying standards to determine when there is a duty to disclose facts.\u201d Castano\n\nv. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citations\n\nomitted); see DeArmey v. Hawaiian Isles Kona Coffee Co., Ltd, 2019 WL\n\n6723413, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2019) (noting that the common law of fraud\n\n\u201cvaries materially from state to state\u201d). The undersigned\u2019s experience in\n\napplying fraud-law from various states to the Rule 12(b)(6) challenges raised\n\nby certain Defendants bears out this observation. Because there is no uniform\n\ncommon law of fraud, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a nationwide fraud claim\n\nunder the common law.\n\n          In sum, the U.S. Automakers fail to show that Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims\n\nunder the common law of Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine,\n\nNebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,\n\nUtah, West Virginia, and Wyoming should be dismissed for Plaintiffs\u2019 lack of\n\nstanding or that Plaintiffs\u2019 Georgia-law based nationwide fraud and unjust\n\nenrichment claims should be dismissed on the grounds discussed in this\n\nsection. However, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument for the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019    common-law     based   nationwide       fraud   claim    prevails    and,\n\naccordingly. the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automaker\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, [Doc.\n\n\n\n\n                                             43\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 44 of 246\n\n\n\n\n181], to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nnationwide fraud claim (Nationwide Count 1) premised on the common law of\n\nfraud.\n\n         Next, the Court turns to Audi\u2019s challenge to Plaintiffs\u2019 standing. Audi\n\nraises a factual challenge to the Court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule\n\n12(b)(1). Audi argues that Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations fail to show an injury\n\n(specifically, the injury of Eva Jacinto, the sole named Plaintiff who owns an\n\nAudi Class Vehicle) that is \u201cfairly traceable\u201d to Audi\u2019s actions. Lujan v. Defs.\n\nof Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Audi maintains that the SAC incorrectly\n\nalleges that it \u201cis the importer and distributor of Audi brand vehicles sold in\n\nthe United States,\u201d [Doc. 184-1 at 9 (quoting SAC I \u00b6 132)], and further asserts\n\nthat it does not import, sell, distribute, or service Audis or issue vehicle\n\nwarranties for Audi brand vehicles in the U.S. and has not done so in the past,\n\n[Doc. 184-1 at 9 (citing Decl. of Peter Green (\u201cGreen Decl.\u201d) [Doc. 184-2]).\n\n         Plaintiffs counter that Audi is properly named as Defendant and that\n\nbecause Audi\u2019s challenge raises a dispute of material facts at the pre-discovery\n\nstage, its dismissal on standing grounds would be premature. [Doc. 226 at 7].\n\nPlaintiffs argue that the declaration of Peter Green, a Product Analysis\n\nTechnical Lead with Volkswagen, on which Audi relies, directly contradict the\n\nSAC\u2019s allegations and that because the contradictions \u201cimplicate[] the\n\nelements of the plaintiff\u2019s claim,\u201d Audi\u2019s Motion presents a premature request\n\nfor summary judgment. [Id. at 6\u20137]. They contend that the Green Declaration\u2019s\n\n\n\n\n                                           44\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT          Document 353    Filed 10/02/26    Page 45 of 246\n\n\n\n\nassertion that Audi has not issued vehicle warranties for or designed,\n\nmanufactured, sold, or serviced Audi brand vehicles contradicts the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegation that Audi is the distributor of Audi brand vehicles in the U.S. [Id. at\n\n6]. And they argue that Audi\u2019s dismissal is not appropriate because \u201cdeciding\n\nwhether Audi in fact [warranted or made representation about Audi Class\n\nVehicles and was in the business of selling them] goes to essential elements of\n\nPlaintiff[s\u2019] claims.\u201d [Id. at 6\u20137].\n\n       The Green Declaration does not tee up any dispute going to the merits\n\nof Plaintiffs\u2019 claims. 14 Rather, it highlights the fact that the SAC incorrectly\n\nidentifies Audi as a vehicle importer and distributor, and Audi\u2019s Motion\n\nunderscores the SAC\u2019s lack of allegations that render Plaintiffs\u2019 injury fairly\n\ntraceable to Audi. First, Plaintiffs do not counter Audi\u2019s showing that it does\n\nnot the importer and distributors of Audi vehicles. Second, contrary to\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 argument, the Green Declaration\u2019s assertion that Audi does not\n\nissue vehicle warranties for or design, manufacture, sell, or service Audi brand\n\nvehicles does not contradict the SAC\u2019s allegations regarding Audi. This is\n\nbecause the SAC contains no allegations indicating that Audi had a role in the\n\nmanufacturing, designing, advertising, warrantying, or servicing of Audi Class\n\nVehicles. In fact, according to the SAC, the Volkswagen Group jointly\n\n\n\n\n       14  The Court considers the Green Declaration because Audi\u2019s\njurisdictional challenge is factual, leaving the court \u201cfree to weigh the evidence\nand satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.\u201d Anderson v.\nRaffensperger, 497 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (citation modified).\n\n                                           45\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 46 of 246\n\n\n\n\n\u201ccultivates a market for, designs, develops, manufactures, and/or sells\n\nVolkswagen and Audi automobiles and the replacement component parts for\n\nthese vehicles\u201d in the U.S. SAC I \u00b6 133. And although the SAC generally\n\nalleges that the Automakers \u201cissued an express written warranty for each\n\ndefective Class Vehicle they sold,\u201d see, e.g., SAC II \u00b6 440, it does not allege that\n\nAudi sold Audi brand vehicles or even that it issued the warranty for them.\n\nPlaintiffs also do not rebut Audi\u2019s showing that Volkswagen (referred to as\n\nVWGoA in the Green Declaration) issues and administers the New Vehicle\n\nLimited Warranty for Audi brand vehicles in the U.S. Green Decl. SAC II \u00b6 8.\n\n       As to Plaintiff\u2019s claim that the SAC alleges that Jacinto relied on Audi\u2019s\n\nadvertisements, marketing, and statements regarding vehicle safety and that\n\nAudi had pre-sale knowledge of the Defect, in part, because of its engagement\n\nin the airbag design process with ARC, [Doc. 226 at 5, 8], the SAC alleges no\n\nsuch thing. To be clear, the SAC does allege that the \u201cAutomaker Defendants\u201d\n\nwere aware of the Inflator Defect because of their knowledge of ARC\u2019s airbag\n\ntesting results and their own tests on airbag modules, among other things, and\n\nnonetheless sold the Class Vehicles. See, e.g., SAC \u00b6\u00b6 10, 264, 267\u201368. But the\n\nAutomakers acquired this knowledge through their role in the design and\n\ntesting of the airbag modules, which was connected to their involvement in the\n\ndesign and manufacturing of the Class Vehicles. See, e.g., id. \u00b6\u00b6 263\u201364. The\n\nSAC does not allege that Audi had a role in the design or manufacturing of\n\nAudi Class Vehicles and, thus, fails to plausibly allege that it acquired pre-sale\n\n\n\n\n                                            46\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353    Filed 10/02/26   Page 47 of 246\n\n\n\n\nknowledge of the Defect through involvement in the design and testing of the\n\nARC airbag inflators. Moreover, the SAC does not specify that any marketing\n\nmessages and statements that Jacinto saw or heard were those made by Audi\n\nAmerica (Plaintiffs\u2019 name for Audi).\n\n      Because Audi shows that it is incorrectly identified as the importer and\n\ndistributor of Audi Class Vehicles and the SAC fails to allege that Audi had a\n\nrole in the manufacturing, selling, advertising, warrantying, or servicing of\n\nthose vehicles, Plaintiffs cannot show that their injury is fairly traceable to\n\nAudi. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Audi\u2019s Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nlack of Article III standing and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claims against Audi. 15\n\n   B. The Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Standing Challenge\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers\u2019 overarching argument for lack of standing is that\n\n\u201cevery Plaintiff appears to assert his or her claim against every [Airbag Module\n\nDefendant].\u201d [Doc. 178-1 at 28]. And because all of the Airbag Suppliers \u201ccould\n\nnot have possibly harmed anyone of the named Plaintiffs, let alone all of them,\u201d\n\nDefendants argue, the SAC fails to trace each Plaintiff\u2019s injury to a specific\n\nAirbag Module Defendant\u2019s conduct. [Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)]. The\n\nAirbag Suppliers acknowledge, however, that because each Plaintiff owned or\n\nleased one or (at most) two Class Vehicles, \u201ceach Plaintiff has standing to sue,\n\n\n\n      15 Because Audi is dismissed from this action, the Court\u2019s references to\n\n\u201cthe Automakers\u201d or \u201cthe U.S. Automakers\u201d from this point forward excludes\nAudi.\n\n\n                                          47\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 48 of 246\n\n\n\n\nat most, one or two [Airbag Suppliers.]\u201d [Id. at 29]. This is just what each\n\nPlaintiff does. As noted above, each Plaintiff sues the airbag module supplier\n\nfor his or her \u201crespective Class Vehicles.\u201d See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6 460. While each\n\nPlaintiff does not specify the Airbag Module Defendant who supplied the\n\nairbag module for his or her Class Vehicle, the SAC alleges that each Airbag\n\nModule Defendant make and sell airbag modules to the Automaker, SAC I\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 31\u201332 (Autoliv); 37 (Joyson); 49 (TGNA); and 52\u201356 (ZF Defendants), they\n\nprovide examples of this supply chain, SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 278, 341, 343, 355, 363, and\n\n366, and Plaintiffs identify the year, make, and model of their own vehicles.\n\nSAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142\u2013255. Based on Plaintiffs\u2019 identification of their vehicles, the\n\nAirbag Suppliers are in the best position to determine which one of them\n\nsupplied the airbag module in a given Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle. And, collectively, the\n\nSAC\u2019s allegations suffice to raise an inference that each Plaintiff\u2019s injury is\n\ntraceable to the conduct of a specific Airbag Supplier.\n\n      As to the Autoliv Defendants and Joyson, specifically, the Airbag\n\nSuppliers also extend the following arguments. Regarding the Autoliv\n\nDefendants, they appear to argue that injury traceable to airbag modules of\n\nnon-party Delphi Automotive should not be attributed to the Autoliv\n\nDefendants because the SAC\u2019s allegation that the Autoliv Defendants are\n\nsuccessors-in-interest to the liabilities of Delphi is mere speculation based on\n\n\u201cinformation and belief.\u201d [Doc. 178-1 at 19]. As to Joyson, the Airbag Suppliers\n\n\n\n\n                                          48\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 49 of 246\n\n\n\n\nargue that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to show that Joyson bears responsibility\n\nfor non-party Takata Corporation\u2019s airbag modules. [Id. at 20].\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers\u2019 specific challenge to the SAC\u2019s allegations\n\nregarding the Autoliv Defendants\u2019 acquisition of Delphi\u2019s liabilities fails.\n\nAccording to the SAC, in 2009, the Autoliv Defendants acquired Delphi. SAC I\n\n\u00b6 36. The SAC further alleges on \u201cinformation and belief\u201d that the Autoliv\n\nDefendants are the successors-in-interest to Delphi\u2019s liabilities. Id. Delphi not\n\nonly manufactured 11 million of the alleged defective inflators under a license\n\nfrom ARC, id. \u00b6 36, but it also manufactured airbag modules that were\n\ninstalled in Kia automobiles. See SAC I \u00b6 341 (ARC airbag inflator placed in a\n\nDelphi airbag module in a 2004 Kia Optima). And at least two Plaintiffs allege\n\nthat they own early model-year Kia vehicles with defective ARC airbag\n\ninflators. E.g., id. \u00b6\u00b6 163 (Plaintiff Latricia Ford owns a 2008 Kia Sportage),\n\n252 (Plaintiff Richard Topa owns a 2006 Kia Sportage). By alleging that they\n\nare the successors to Delphi\u2019s liabilities, presumably, Plaintiffs seek to hold the\n\nAutoliv Defendants responsible for Delphi\u2019s conduct. The fact that their\n\nsuccessor liability allegation is based on information and belief does not bar\n\nthat door here. This is because \u201cfacts based \u2018upon information and belief\u2019 may\n\nsupport a claim when facts \u2018are not within the knowledge of the plaintiff but\n\nhe has sufficient data to justify\u2019 an allegation on the matter.\u201d Sosa v. Martin\n\nCnty., Fla., 2023 WL 1776253, at *9 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2023) (quoting 5 Charles\n\nA. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1224 (3d ed.\n\n\n\n\n                                           49\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 50 of 246\n\n\n\n\n2012). Plaintiffs reasonably justify their assertion that the Autoliv Defendants\n\nare successors-in-interest of Delphi\u2019s liabilities based on the fact that the\n\nAutoliv Defendants acquired Delphi. They need not affirmatively state the\n\nAutoliv Defendants\u2019 position as successors when that fact, pertaining to the\n\nAutoliv Defendants\u2019 corporate acquisitions, is not reasonably within their\n\nknowledge bank.\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers also contend that they are not in fact the\n\nsuccessors to Delphi\u2019s liabilities and refer the Court to the NHTSA\u2019s September\n\n5, 2023 Initial Decision regarding the ARC airbag inflators, which Plaintiffs\n\nfiled, in support of their contention. [Doc. 178-1 at 19 (citing [Doc. 165-1 at 4\n\nn.1])]. Even assuming that it is appropriate for the Court to consider this\n\ndocument in deciding the instant motion to dismiss, all that Initial Decision\n\nreflects is that Autoliv ASP, Inc. provided the NHTSA \u201csome information\u201d that\n\nindicated that \u201cit may not have legal liability for the Delphi-manufactured\n\ninflators\u201d and that the NHTSA \u201chas not verified the entity that has legal\n\nresponsibility under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 for those inflators.\u201d [Doc. 165-1 at\n\n5 n.1]. This does not carry the day for the Autoliv Defendants. 16\n\n\n      16 The Airbag Module Defendants also argue that the SAC does not\n\nname any vehicle with an airbag module manufactured by the Autoliv\nDefendants and fails to identify any Plaintiff who bought such a vehicle. But\nconsidering their resistance to Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion that the Autoliv Defendants\nare the successors-in-interest to Delphi\u2019s liabilities, it is unclear whether\nDefendants exclude Plaintiffs with early model-year Kia vehicles, which it may\nbe reasonably inferred, based on the SAC\u2019s allegation that a Delphi airbag\nmodule was present in an early model-year Kia Optima, have Delphi airbag\nmodules. Thus, the Court is unpersuaded.\n\n\n\n                                          50\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 51 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The challenge to Joyson\u2019s responsibility for Takata airbag modules also\n\nfails but for a different reason. The Airbag Suppliers argue that Joyson\u2019s\n\naffiliates purchased certain assets of Takata pursuant to a reorganization plan\n\napproved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware\n\nand that, in acquiring Takata\u2019s asserts, it did not assume Takata\u2019s liabilities.\n\n[Doc. 178-1 at 20]. Unlike with the Autoliv Defendants and Delphi, the SAC\n\ndoes not, in fact, allege that Joyson became the successor-in-interest to\n\nTakata\u2019s liabilities. Not does it reference Takata\u2019s relationship to Joyson in the\n\nsection introducing Joyson. [See SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 37\u201340]. The SAC notes Takata\u2019s\n\nincorporation into Joyson (through Takata\u2019s acquisition by Joyson predecessor\n\nKey Safety System) in the context of relating an incident where an ARC\n\ninflator in a Takata-assembled airbag module ruptured during testing. But it\n\ndoes not appear that the SAC asserts liability against Joyson as Takata\u2019s\n\nsuccessor. Thus, to the extent the Airbag Suppliers contend that the SAC seeks\n\nto hold Joyson responsible for Takata\u2019s acts, their argument is moot.\n\n      In sum, the SAC alleges sufficient facts to indicate that Plaintiffs have\n\nstanding to sue the specified Airbag Suppliers. The Court, thus, DENIES the\n\nAirbag Suppliers\u2019 Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 178], to the extent that it seeks\n\ndismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against them for lack of standing.\n\n\n\n\n                                           51\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26     Page 52 of 246\n\n\n\n\n            V.     Mootness of Claims for Recall-Covered Vehicles\n\n      GM contends that the Class Vehicles of 14 Plaintiffs (i.e., Anthony\n\nWayne Brown (California), 17 Marcos Diaz (California), Celeste Felice (Florida),\n\nDwayne Stowe (Georgia), Nicole Senkpeil (Illinois), Melissa Warren (Illinois),\n\nGeorge   Welch (Illinois),   Leaha    Barber (Kentucky),         Manakia   Eiland\n\n(Mississippi),   Julie   Struble   (New    Hampshire),    Matthew       Shephard\n\n(Pennsylvania), Aaron Jophlin (South Carolina), Elisabeth Lovett (Tennessee),\n\nand Kenneth Allan (Wisconsin) (the \u201cRecall Plaintiffs\u201d)) are covered by GM\u2019s\n\n2023 recall, which entitles the Recall Plaintiffs to free replacement of the\n\nairbag modules in their Vehicles and renders their claims moot (in a prudential\n\nsense). [Doc. 186-1 at 15\u201316]. Not so, Plaintiffs assert, arguing that the Recall\n\nPlaintiffs seek money damages, including for overpayment for their Vehicles,\n\nand GM\u2019s recall does not offer any compensation. [Doc. 222 at 12].\n\n      \u201cMootness doctrine is an adjunct to Article III's \u2018cases\u2019 and\n\n\u2018controversies\u2019 requirement.\u201d Solak v. Ford Motor Co., 683 F. Supp. 3d 658, 663\n\n(E.D. Mich. 2023) (citation modified). \u201cPrudential mootness typically occurs\n\nwhen a controversy, not actually moot, is so attenuated that considerations of\n\n\n\n\n      17 Two Plaintiffs named Brown who own GM Class Vehicles\u2014Anthony\n\nWayne Brown (owner of a 2014 Chevrolet Traverse) and Tina Brown (owner of\na 2012 GMC Yukon). SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 169, 215. GM simply identifies Plaintiff \u201cBrown\u201d\nas covered by its recall. Because GM identifies no other Plaintiff who owns a\nGMC Yukon but does identify Chevrolet Traverse owning Plaintiffs (Nicole\nSenkpeil and Melissa Warren) as covered by the recall, the Court assumes that\nGM\u2019s reference to \u201cBrown\u201d is to Anthony Wayne Brown, who owns the same\nmodel year Chevrolet Traverse as Senkpeil. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 169, 193.\n\n\n                                          52\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26     Page 53 of 246\n\n\n\n\nprudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court\n\nto stay its hand, and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.\u201d Id. In view\n\nof GM\u2019s recall, the Court considers the Recall Plaintiffs claims prudentially\n\nmoot.\n\n        The crux of Plaintiffs\u2019 damages theory is that had they known of the\n\nDefect, they would have paid less for their Class Vehicles. In other words, the\n\nInflator Defect allegedly diminished the value of the Recall Plaintiffs\u2019 Class\n\nVehicles such that they overpaid for it at the point of sale. See, e.g., SAC I\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 169, 183, 220, 242. But \u201cthe recall, which remedies the [Inflator Defect],\n\nmoots Plaintiffs\u2019 overpayment claim because it removes the defect upon which\n\nthe [P]laintiffs\u2019 diminished-value injury claim is based.\u201d Pacheco v. Ford Motor\n\nCo., 2023 WL 2603937, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2023) (citation modified).\n\nAnd beyond speculation about whether GM\u2019s recall offers an adequate and\n\ntimely inflator module replacement, they do not contend that the recall is\n\nineffective. And \u201c[n]umerous courts have declined to adjudicate automotive\n\ndefect cases based on the mere prospect that a recall proves ineffective.\u201d Solak,\n\n683 F. Supp. 3d at 664 (dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s claims, including those\n\nseeking overpayment damages, on prudential mootness grounds where the\n\nautomaker initiated a recall to replace the defective airbags).\n\n        Accordingly, the Court GRANTS GM\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 186], to\n\nthe extent that it DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all claims by Plaintiffs\n\nA.W. Brown (California), Diaz (California), Felice (Florida), Stowe (Georgia),\n\n\n\n\n                                          53\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 54 of 246\n\n\n\n\nSenkpeil (Illinois), Warren (Illinois), Welch (Illinois), Barber (Kentucky),\n\nEiland (Mississippi), Struble (New Hampshire), Shephard (Pennsylvania),\n\nJophlin (South Carolina), Lovett (Tennessee), and Allan (Wisconsin) as moot.\n\n                        VI.    Failure to State a Claim\n\n   A. Legal Standard\n\n      Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant\n\nmay move to dismiss the complaint for \u201cfailure to state a claim upon which\n\nrelief can be granted.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a 12(b)(6)\n\nmotion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations set forth in the\n\ncomplaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the\n\nplaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555\u201356 (2007); United\n\nStates v. Stricker, 524 F. App\u2019x 500, 505 (11th Cir. 2013). Even so, a complaint\n\noffering mere \u201clabels and conclusions\u201d or \u201ca formulaic recitation of the elements\n\nof a cause of action\u201d is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)\n\n(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc.,\n\n500 F.3d 1276, 1282\u201383 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, a complaint must satisfy\n\ncertain pleading standards, and \u201cthe pleading standards in the Federal Rules\n\nof Civil Procedure apply to state-law claims litigated in federal court.\u201d Pop v.\n\nLuliFama.com LLC, 145 F.4th 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).\n\n      \u201c[A] pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim\n\nshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief\u201d to satisfy \u201cthe pleading\n\nrequirements of Rule 8.\u201d True v. AbbiVie, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 3d 1361, 1368 (N.D.\n\n\n\n\n                                           54\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 55 of 246\n\n\n\n\nGa. 2025) (citation modified). Additionally, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to\n\ndismiss, the complaint must \u201ccontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as\n\ntrue, to \u2018state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\u2019\u201d Iqbal, 556 U.S. at\n\n678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Put differently, a plaintiff must plead\n\n\u201cfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the\n\ndefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Id. This so-called \u201cplausibility\n\nstandard is not akin to a \u2018probability requirement;\u2019\u201d rather, the plaintiff must\n\nallege sufficient facts such that it is reasonable to expect that discovery will\n\nlead to evidence supporting the claim. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.\n\n       Notably, while \u201cRule 8(a)\u2019s simplified pleading standard applies to\n\n[most] all civil actions,\u201d actions alleging fraud represent an exception.\n\nSwierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). Rule 9(b) requires that\n\n\u201c[i]n alleging fraud or mistake a party must state with particularity the\n\ncircumstances constituting fraud or mistake.\u201d This \u201cheightened pleading\n\nstandard\u201d requires the fraud plaintiff \u201cto allege the who, what, when, where,\n\nand how of the fraudulent conduct.\u201d Pop, 2025 WL 2177719, at *4, 7 (citation\n\nmodified). That is, \u201cthe plaintiff must allege: (1) the precise statements,\n\ndocuments, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person\n\nresponsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these\n\nstatements misled the plaintiff; and (4) what the defendants gained by the\n\nalleged fraud.\u201d Id. at *7 (citation modified).\n\n\n\n\n                                            55\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 56 of 246\n\n\n\n\n   B. Discussion\n\n          1. Sufficiency of Allegations Against Hyundai\u2019s and Kia\u2019s Parent\n             Companies\n\n      Dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against the South Korean companies\n\nHyundai Motor Company (\u201cHyundai Korea\u201d) and Kia Corporation (\u201cKia\n\nKorea\u201d) is warranted for Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to allege sufficient facts to render\n\ntheir claims plausible. The following represents the entirety of the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations concerning Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea: The companies are\n\nSouth Korea\u2019s two largest automobile manufacturers. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 110, 115.\n\nHyundai Motor is Kia Korea\u2019s largest investor, and both companies are part of\n\nthe South Korea-based general partnership Hyundai Motor Group (\u201cHMG\u201d).\n\nId. \u00b6\u00b6 110, 116. Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea are the parent companies of the\n\nU.S. based Hyundai America Inc. (\u201cHyundai\u201d) and Kia America, Inc. (\u201cKia\u201d),\n\nrespectively. Id. \u00b6 116. Hyundai and Kia, both principally based in California,\n\n\u201cmanufacture[], design[], and distribute[] new vehicles under [their respective]\n\nbrand[s]\u201d and \u201calso market[] lease[], warrant[], and oversee[] regulatory\n\ncompliance and warranty servicing of [their respective] brand vehicles\n\nthroughout the United States.\u201d SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 111, 114. Although not clearly stated,\n\nPlaintiffs appear to allege that HMG publicly refers to Hyundai Korea, Kia\n\nCorp, Hyundai, and Kia as the \u201cHyundai Kia Automotive Group,\u201d id. \u00b6 116,\n\nand the four Defendants \u201cfrequently act jointly to advance the interest of all of\n\nselling cars in the United States,\u201d id. \u00b6 110. The SAC refers to the four\n\nDefendants collectively as the \u201cHyundai-Kia Defendants\u201d but includes no\n\n\n\n                                          56\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 57 of 246\n\n\n\n\nallegations specific to Hyundai Korea\u2019s and Kia Korea\u2019s role concerning the\n\nClass Vehicles.\n\n      Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea together move to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nclaims against them, arguing that the SAC fails to allege facts supporting their\n\nrole in any wrongdoing against Plaintiffs. [Doc. 272-1 at 5]. They maintain that\n\nthe SAC commits the \u201crare sin\u201d of group pleading \u201cwithout specifying which of\n\nthe defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions\u201d and fails to allege\n\nfacts sufficient to state a claim against Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea. [Id. at\n\n4\u20136 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323)]. The Court agrees. Although the SAC\n\nalleges that Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea are automakers, it does not allege\n\nthat they manufacture, sell, distribute, market, warranty, or service the Class\n\nVehicles. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Hyundai and Kia perform those acts in\n\nthe United States. And although Plaintiffs claim that Hyundai Korea and Kia\n\nKorea \u201cfrequently\u201d act jointly with Hyundai and Kia to advance their collective\n\ninterest in selling cars in the U.S., they fail to include sufficient facts showing\n\nthat Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea either sell cars in the U.S. or that\n\nHyundai\u2019s and Kia\u2019s sales activities are attributable to them. Plaintiffs\u2019 claim\n\nagainst Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea fail for the SAC\u2019s lack of particularized\n\nallegations showing that Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea play a role in the\n\nmaking, marketing, warrantying, or selling of the Hyundai and Kia Class\n\nVehicles.\n\n\n\n\n                                           57\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 58 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Plaintiffs resist this conclusion, arguing that the SAC does allege facts\n\nindicating Hyundai Korea\u2019s and Kia Korea\u2019s role in the manufacture,\n\ndistribution, and sale of the Class Vehicles. [Doc. 275 at 7\u201311]. They point out\n\nthat HMG refers to Hyundai Korea, Hyundai, Kia Korea, and Kia as the\n\nHyundai Kia Automotive Group and that HMG lists the U.S. facilities as part\n\nof that group. [Id. at 7; SAC I \u00b6 116]. Plaintiffs also cite to Hyundai Korea\u2019s\n\nfinancial statement, which acknowledge that Hyundai Korea and its\n\nsubsidiaries (including, Hyundai) \u201cmanufacture and distribute motor vehicles\n\nand parts.\u201d [Doc. 275 at 7 & n.2 (citation modified)]. They request that the\n\nCourt take judicial notice of the several cited financial statements because they\n\nare \u201cpublicly available financial disclosure documents.\u201d [Doc. 275 at 7 n.2]. To\n\na limited extent, courts in the Eleventh Circuit do take judicial notice of\n\nfinancial statements. Specifically, \u201ca court, when considering a motion to\n\ndismiss in a securities fraud case, may take judicial notice (for the purpose of\n\ndetermining what statements the documents contain and not to prove the truth\n\nof the documents' contents) of relevant public documents required to be filed\n\nwith the SEC, and actually filed.\u201d Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,\n\n1278 (11th Cir. 1999). But this is not a securities case, and Plaintiffs provide\n\nno support for their proposition that the Court may take judicial notice of\n\nfinancial statements presented on a company\u2019s website, as opposed to filed\n\nwith the SEC. Moreover, Plaintiffs appear to rely on the financial statements\n\nto establish as true the fact that Hyundai Korea and Hyundai manufacture\n\n\n\n\n                                          58\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 59 of 246\n\n\n\n\nand distribute motor vehicles. Thus, the Court declines to take judicial notice\n\nof the cited financial statement.\n\n      But even if the Court were to take notice of Hyundai Korea\u2019s financial\n\nstatements, it would not change the outcome. The fact that Hyundai Korea and\n\nHyundai manufacture and distribute automobiles, as stated in the financial\n\nstatements, is apparent from the SAC, which alleges that Hyundai Korea and\n\nHyundai are both automakers. And the fact that Hyundai Korea manufactures\n\nand distributes automobiles says nothing about its role in the manufacturing\n\nand distribution of its, or Kia Korea\u2019s, role in the manufacturing and\n\ndistribution of the Class Vehicles. This is also true of the fact that HMG lists\n\nHyundai\u2019s and Kia\u2019s U.S. facilities as part of the Hyundai Kia Automotive\n\nGroup. While the Hyundai Kia Automotive Group may claim the Hyundai and\n\nKia U.S. manufacturing and research facilities, this fact does not suffice to\n\nindicate that Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea manufacturer their automobiles\n\nthere. Indeed, according to the SAC, Hyundai and Kia use their respective U.S.\n\nfacilities for manufacturing purposes.\n\n      Plaintiffs rely on Ford v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2021 WL 7448507, at *19\n\n(C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2021), where the court found the plaintiffs to have stated\n\n\u201csufficient facts regarding [Hyundai Korea] and [Hyundai\u2019s] corporate\n\nrelationship to plead that [Hyundai] is either an agent or alter ego of Hyundai\n\nKorea.\u201d [Doc. 275 at 13 (quoting Ford, 2021 WL 7448507, at *19 )]. But there,\n\nthe complaint alleged as follows:\n\n\n\n\n                                          59\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 60 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      [Hyundai Korea], through its various entities, designs,\n      manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells Hyundai\n      automobiles . . . in the United States. . . . [O]ver 50% of Hyundai\n      vehicles sold worldwide are sold in the United States. . . .\n      [Hyundai Korea] is a fully owned subsidiary of HMC and . . .\n      [Hyundai] acts as [Hyundai Korea\u2019s] United States sales and\n      marketing division, overseeing sales and other operations across\n      the United States. [Hyundai Korea] communicates with\n      [Hyundai] concerning virtually all aspects of the Hyundai\n      products it distributes within the United States and . . .\n      Defendants jointly designed and manufactured the vehicles,\n      developed the post-purchase owner\u2019s manuals and warranty\n      booklets for the Class Vehicle, and made decisions regarding the\n      alleged Defect. . . . [Hyundai Korea] and [Hyundai] each knew of\n      and ratified the acts and omissions of the other and . . . there\n      existed a unity of ownership between [Hyundai Korea] and\n      [Hyundai] [such] that they were alter egos.\n\nFord, 2021 WL 7448507, at *19 (citation modified). The SAC\u2019s allegations do\n\nnot even come close. The improper grouping of Defendants aside, the SAC fails\n\nto allege sufficient facts regarding Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea\u2019s actions that\n\nrender Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against these two Defendants plausible. Accordingly,\n\nthe Court GRANTS Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, [Doc.\n\n272], and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against them.\n\n          2. Viability of Fraud-Based Claims\n\n      The SAC asserts state-specific common law claims for fraud by omission\n\nand concealment for all 50 states and also advances claims premised on fraud\n\nunder numerous, state-specific consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., SAC\n\nII \u00b6\u00b6 409\u201310, 483\u201386, 552\u201355, 806\u201309, 1494\u201397. Several Defendants argue\n\nthat the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based claims (i.e., Plaintiffs\u2019 common law\n\nfraud claims and statutory consumer protection claims that rest on allegations\n\nof fraud) is necessary because the SAC fails to plead fraud with particularity.\n\n\n                                           60\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 61 of 246\n\n\n\n\n[See, e.g., Docs. 178-1 at 29\u201331; 181-1 at 37\u201338]. Alongside their Rule 9(b)\n\nargument, some Defendants also contend that the fraud-based claims fail\n\nbecause the SAC does not allege facts showing (1) Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on\n\nDefendants\u2019 representations; (2) Defendants\u2019 pre-sale knowledge of the Inflator\n\nDefect; and (3) Defendants\u2019 duty to disclose the Defect. [See, e.g., Docs. 178-1\n\nat 31\u201343; 180-1 at 6\u20137; 188-1 at 13\u201315]. Starting with the Rule 9(b) argument,\n\nthe Court takes up each of Defendants\u2019 arguments in turn.\n\n      At the outset, the Court notes that some arguments are unique to a\n\ngiven Defendant or a set of Defendants, others tend to overlap, and there are\n\nalso those that present alternative bases for dismissal of the challenged claims\n\nas to some or all Defendants. The Court has endeavored to resolve these\n\narguments as efficiently and fulsomely as possible. Thus, at times, the Court\n\ndoes not address a separate ground for dismissal for a claim that has failed for\n\nan alternative reason. However, in instances where the Court considers\n\nalternative arguments and dismisses a given claim under both arguments, the\n\ndismissal is intended to be in the alternative, as supported by each of the\n\narguments addressed.\n\n             a. Particularity of Fraudulent Conduct\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers argue that the SAC fails to allege facts specifying\n\nthe allegedly fraudulent conduct in which each of them engaged. [Doc. 178-1\n\nat 29]. They argue that the SAC lacks facts identifying any instance where any\n\none of the Airbag Suppliers omitted disclosing the alleged Inflator Defect and\n\ndoes not even specify the person or entity responsible for making the\n\n\n                                          61\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 62 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndisclosure. [Id. at 30]. The Airbag Suppliers further contend that not only does\n\nthe SAC not allege that the Airbag Suppliers wrote or disseminated the\n\nadvertising and other informational material to which Plaintiffs were allegedly\n\nexposed, it also does not allege which documents the Airbag Suppliers omitted\n\ndisclosing and which of them did so. [Id. at 31].\n\n      The Court agrees with Plaintiffs, however, that the SAC sufficiently\n\ndiscloses \u201cthe who, what, when, where, and how of the fraudulent conduct.\u201d\n\n[Doc. 220 at 23]; Pop, 2025 WL 2177719, at *4, 7 (citation modified). Generally,\n\n      Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint sets forth (1) precisely what\n      statements were made in what documents or oral representations\n      or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each\n      such statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the\n      case of omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of such\n      statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff,\n      and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the\n      fraud.\n\nMcCabe v. Daimler AG, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (\u201cMcCabe\n\nI\u201d) (quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301,\n\n1310 (11th Cir. 2002)). However, \u201c[t]he Rule 9(b) particularity requirement\n\nfunctions differently in the context of omission-based fraud claims. By the very\n\nnature of fraudulent concealment, plaintiffs cannot be expected to point to the\n\ntime, place, and precise substance of what should have been disclosed.\u201d\n\nMcClure v. Toyota Motor Corp., 759 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2024)\n\n(citation modified). Consequently, \u201cit is enough for a plaintiff to allege that a\n\nfact was material and that it could have, and should have, been disclosed prior\n\nto the time plaintiffs acted upon the omission.\u201d Id. (citation modified).\n\n\n\n                                          62\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 63 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The SAC satisfies Rule 9(b)\u2019s requirement by alleging the who, what,\n\nwhen, where, and how of Defendants\u2019 fraudulent omissions and concealment,\n\nto the extent practicable at this early stage. Specifically, the SAC identifies\n\neach of the Airbag Suppliers (who). SAC I \u00a7 II.A.2. It also alleges that starting\n\nwith their earliest knowledge of the alleged Defect based on their involvement\n\nin the design, manufacturing, assembly, and investigation of the ARC airbag\n\ninflators and through to each Plaintiff\u2019s lease or purchase of a Class Vehicle,\n\nthe Airbag Suppliers chose not to warn about or disclose the Defect (what and\n\nwhen) through means that were \u201creadily available,\u201d including stickers,\n\nplacards, pamphlets, and complete disclosure by way of recalls (where and\n\nhow). Id. \u00b6\u00b6 264, 266, 269, 377\u201378. As to the materiality of the omitted\n\ndisclosure, the SAC alleges that (1) the alleged Defect renders the airbags in\n\nthe Class Vehicles unsafe and dangerous, (2) the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 silence\n\n\u201cdistorted and misrepresented the true value of every Class Vehicle,\u201d (3) had\n\nthe Airbag Suppliers disclosed the Defect, Plaintiffs would not have bought the\n\nClass Vehicles or would have paid less for them, and (4) the Airbag Suppliers\n\nmaintained their silence to continue to profit from the \u201cmanufacture,\n\nmarketing, sale, service, and use\u201d of the allegedly defective airbag inflators and\n\nthe Class Vehicles equipped with them. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 376, 378, 380\u201381. These\n\nallegations are sufficient under Rule 9(b). See McClure, 759 F. Supp. 3d at\n\n1358 (finding similar allegations of fraudulent omission satisfied Rule 9(b)\u2019s\n\nparticularity requirement); McCabe I, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (same). This is\n\n\n\n\n                                           63\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 64 of 246\n\n\n\n\nso even though the SAC directs the above identified to Defendants, collectively,\n\noften without distinguishing between the three sets of Defendants and without\n\nidentifying any specific Airbag Module Defendant entity, because the SAC\n\nexplains (1) the role of each set of Defendants in the airbag supply chain, (2)\n\nhow each Airbag Module Defendant contributes to that chain, and (3) the basis\n\nfor their knowledge of the alleged Inflator Defect, and it accuses each\n\nDefendant of engaging in the same fraudulent conduct.\n\n      Contrary to the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 contention, the fraud-based claims do\n\nnot fail because the SAC does not allege that the Airbag Suppliers wrote or\n\ndisseminated the advertising and other informational material Plaintiffs\n\nobserved or because it does not allege which documents the Airbag Suppliers\n\nomitted disclosing. Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud allegations are premised on \u201can omission\u2014\n\na non-statement\u201d and, thus, Plaintiffs need not identify materials by the\n\nAirbag Suppliers containing the omissions. In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab.\n\nLitig., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (\u201cTakata II\u201d); see also Sowa\n\nv. Mercedes-Benz Grp. AG, 764 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1279 (N.D. Ga. 2024)\n\n(identification of specific fraudulent statements, their time and place, and their\n\ncontent not necessary to allege fraudulent omission-based claims).\n\n      Similarly, the U.S. Automakers argue that the SAC does not identify\n\n\u201cany specific statements or omissions from any Defendant in any specific\n\n\n\n\n                                           64\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 65 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndocument, advertisement, or conversation.\u201d [Doc. 181-1 at 37]. 18 However, as\n\nnoted above, the SAC alleges omission-based fraud claims and, thus, it need\n\nnot identify specific materials with the omissions. As it does for the Airbag\n\nSuppliers, the SAC alleges that (1) the identified Automakers (who), (2) were\n\naware of the Inflator Defect from the time of their involvement in the design,\n\nmanufacturing, assembly, and investigation of the ARC airbag inflators\n\nthrough the time of each Plaintiff\u2019s lease or purchase of their Class Vehicle\n\n(when), (3) but chose not to warn about or disclose the Defect (what) through\n\nmeans that were \u201creadily available,\u201d including stickers, placards, pamphlets,\n\nadvertising, owner manuals, and recalls (where and how). SAC I \u00a7 II.A.3,\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 266, 269, 377\u201378. 19\n\n\n      18 PCNA presents an iteration of this argument, including that the SAC\n\ndoes not provide details of the advertisements that the sole Porche Class\nVehicle owning Plaintiff (Stephen Gearhart (Florida)) encountered or facts\nsupporting the existence of the Defect in a Porche vehicle. [See Doc. 187 at 2\u2013\n3]. This argument fails for the reasons discussed in this and other sections of\nthis order. The Court, however, does not separately address the remainder of\nPCNA\u2019s Motion, which addresses Gearhart\u2019s claims under Florida law and\ncertain requests for relief because it relies on the arguments made by the U.S.\nAutomakers in their joint Motion. Thus, the fate of PCNA\u2019s Motion is tied to\nthe Court\u2019s treatment of the U.S. Automakers\u2019 Motion.\n      19   Although the SAC also alleges that, through unspecified\n\u201cadvertisements, promotional materials and other public statements,\u201d each\nAutomaker \u201cuniform[ly] and pervasive[ly] market[ed] [the] message that its\nvehicles are safe and dependable,\u201d see, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142, 144, 151, 186, 223,\nPlaintiffs restrict their common law fraud claims to Defendants\u2019 concealment\nand failure to disclose the Defect, see, e.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 2625\u20132640 (Count 30(d),\nwhich is representative of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims). Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims do\nrely on the Automakers\u2019 marketing misrepresentations, but that reliance is\nsimply to support the allegation that the \u201cincomplete representations about\nthe safety and reliability of the Class Vehicles\u201d imparted a duty on these\nDefendants to \u201cdisclose the whole truth.\u201d See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6 2630. Thus, the\n\n\n                                          65\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 66 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      BMW specifically argues that the SAC\u2019s \u201clumping\u201d together of BMW\n\nAmerica and BMW Manufacturing is particularly problematic, under both\n\nRules 8 and 9, because \u201ceven Plaintiffs recognize [that they] serve different\n\nroles\u201d\u2014that is, BMW America distributes cars and BMW Manufacturing\n\nassembles cars. [Doc. 183-1 at 11\u201312 (citing SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 78\u201379)]. This argument\n\nis unavailing. True, the SAC alleges that BMW Manufacturing \u201cdesigns,\n\nmanufactures, assembles, and tests BMW brand cars\u201d while BMW America\n\n\u201cimports, promotes, advertises, distributes, and sells . . . BMW brand cars,\n\ntrucks, and sport utility vehicles.\u201d SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 78\u201379. BMW appears to argue that\n\nBMW Manufacturing only \u201cassembles\u201d vehicles and, thus, that Plaintiffs fail\n\nto allege facts showing that it also engages in marketing, promoting,\n\nadvertising, distributing, and selling BMWs. [Doc. 183-1 at 11\u201312]. But, as it\n\ndoes for BMW America, the SAC specifically alleges that BWM Manufacturing\n\nalso \u201cmarkets, promotes, advertises, distributes, and sells BMW brand cars,\n\ntrucks, and sport utility vehicles.\u201d Id. \u00b6 79. At this stage, the Court takes the\n\n\n\nSAC does not seek to assert a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against the\nAutomakers. If, in fact, Plaintiffs seek to also advance a fraudulent\nmisrepresentation claim, the Court agrees with the U.S. Automakers that the\nSAC fails to plead such a claim with the particularity that Rule 9 requires. For\nexample, Plaintiffs \u201cdo not plead the precise statements made in [the\nAutomakers\u2019] advertisements, fail to include examples of advertisements, or\nwhen they saw advertisements. Plaintiffs do not include descriptions of what\nadvertisements they saw\u2014whether it was in a newspaper, on television,\nonline, in a mailing or some other medium.\u201d Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 2015\nWL 11143079, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 2015), aff\u2019d, 836 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.\n2016). But again, it does not appear that Plaintiffs base their fraud claims on\nthe Automakers\u2019 alleged affirmative misrepresentations.\n\n\n\n                                          66\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 67 of 246\n\n\n\n\nSAC\u2019s allegation as true and concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently allege\n\nthat BWM Manufacturing specifically engages in the above-described conduct.\n\n      BMW also urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for fraud and for\n\nviolations of statutory consumer protection laws against BMW Manufacturing,\n\narguing that it is an assembly factory and does not engage in the sale of or\n\nadvertising for the BMW Class Vehicles. [Doc. 183-1 at 13\u201314]. BMW contends\n\nthat it is implausible that two companies promote, advertise, distribute, and\n\nsell BMWs in the United States, especially given that one is named BMW\n\nManufacturing. [Doc. 243 at 7\u20138 (emphasis in original)]. The Court is\n\nunpersuaded. Again, the SAC alleges that BMW Manufacturing engages in\n\nsales and advertising of BMWs. The fact that it is a vehicle manufacturing\n\ncompany does not render this alleged role implausible. In short, the SAC\n\nsufficiently alleges that BMW Manufacturing sells and advertises BMWs and,\n\nthus, the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud and fraud-based statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims against BMW Manufacturing on this basis is not warranted.\n\n      Accordingly, the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 and the U.S. Automakers\u2019 arguments\n\nthat the SAC fails to allege fraud with particularity fails. And the Court\n\nDENIES the motions to dismiss, [Docs. 178, 181, 183], to the extent that they\n\nrequest the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims for lack of compliance with\n\nRule 9.\n\n             b. Economic Loss and Manifestation Rules as a Bar\n\nThe U.S. Automakers argue that the economic-loss rule bars Plaintiffs\u2019\n\ncommon law fraud claims under the laws of over half of the 50 states and that\n\n\n                                         67\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 68 of 246\n\n\n\n\nit also bars Plaintiff\u2019s fraud-based consumer protection claims under the\n\nstatutes of some of these states. 20 According to the U.S. Automakers, some\n\nstates also preclude fraud-based statutory consumer protection claims when\n\nthe defect has not manifested. Below, the Court first addresses the application\n\nof the economic loss rule and then turns to the state-specific requirement for\n\nmanifestation.\n\n               i. Economic Loss Rule\n       \u201cThe economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that sets forth\n\nthe circumstances under which a tort action is prohibited if the only damages\n\nsuffered are economic losses.\u201d In re Grandparents.com, Inc., 614 B.R. 625, 633\n\n(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2020) (citation modified). \u201cThe economic loss rule generally\n\nprovides that a contracting party who suffers purely economic losses must seek\n\nhis remedy in contract, not tort. Under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff can\n\nrecover in tort only those economic losses resulting from injury to his person\n\nor damage to his property[.]\u201d Murray v. ILG Techs., LLC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1227,\n\n1243 (S.D. Ga. 2019), aff\u2019d, 798 F. App\u2019x 486 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, the SAC\n\ndoes not allege personal injury or property damage; rather, alleging\n\noverpayment and diminishment in value, the SAC seeks the return of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 purchase price. 21 See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 23, 143, 255, & \u00a7 IX. Plaintiffs\n\n\n       20 The Court refers to common law fraud claims and claims alleging\n\nfraud-based violations of consumer protection statutes collectively as\n\u201cfraud-based claims.\u201d\n       21 The SAC also requests that the Court award compensatory damages.\n\nSAC II \u00a7 IX(E). However, no Plaintiff alleges that he or she has incurred repair\nor other expenses because of the Defect.\n\n\n\n                                            68\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 69 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndo not dispute that they seek only economic losses. They contend that one or\n\nmore exceptions to the application of the economic loss rule shield their claims.\n\n      Before considering whether the economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud\n\nclaims, it is important to understand the parameters of those claims. The SAC\n\nasserts substantively identical claims for fraud (by omission and concealment)\n\nunder the common law of each of the 50 states. Plaintiffs base these claims on\n\nDefendants\u2019 failure to disclose the Inflator Defect, which, Plaintiffs allege, was\n\nintended to and succeeded in inducing them to buy or lease their Class\n\nVehicles. See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 2637\u201338. In this respect, Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud by\n\nomission and concealment claims are akin to fraud in the inducement claims.\n\nImportantly, as to the Automakers, Plaintiffs allege that although the Inflator\n\nDefect rendered the Class Vehicles dangerous and unreliable, the Automakers\n\npromoted the Class Vehicles as \u201csafe and dependable\u201d and intentionally\n\nconcealed the Defect. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142, 143, 146, 153, 160, 167, 175, 184,\n\n186, 189, 191, 203, 207, 228, 255, 376\u2013379. Thus, the thrust of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud\n\nclaims is that by failing to disclose the Defect, the Automakers misrepresented\n\nthe safety and reliability of the Class Vehicles. This alleged misrepresentation\n\nby the Automakers concerns the Class Vehicles\u2019 quality. Similarly, as pled,\n\nARC\u2019s and the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 fraudulent conduct also concerns the Class\n\nVehicles\u2019 quality because these Defendants allegedly failed to disclose a defect\n\naffecting the Class Vehicles\u2019 safety and dependability. The SAC does not allege\n\nany other fraudulent conduct by any Defendant. In essence, Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud\n\n\n\n\n                                           69\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 70 of 246\n\n\n\n\nclaims duplicate the warranty dispute. For example, Plaintiffs base their\n\nbreach of express warranty claims on the Automakers\u2019 alleged failure to deliver\n\non the warranty that, among other things, the Class Vehicles were \u201csafe and\n\nreliable.\u201d See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 440, 1863, 2312, 2735, 3383, 3903. With this\n\nunderstanding, the Court takes up the Parties\u2019 arguments.\n\n      According to the U.S. Automakers, the economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs\u2019\n\ncommon law fraud claims for the following 27 states: Alabama, Arkansas,\n\nArizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,\n\nMaryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New\n\nJersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,\n\nSouth Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. [Doc. 181-1 at 39 &\n\nn.29]. Plaintiffs respond that the dismissal of their fraud claims under the\n\neconomic loss rule is not warranted for one of three reasons. First, they contend\n\nthat the following 25 states recognize fraud or fraudulent inducement as\n\nexceptions to the economic loss rule: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado,\n\nFlorida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,\n\nNebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,\n\nOklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,\n\nUtah, and Wisconsin. [Doc. 221 at 54 & n.39]. Second, they argue that the\n\nfollowing states recognize an exception to the economic loss rule where a safety\n\ndefect is at issue or there is a risk of injury or death: Kentucky, Maine,\n\n\n\n\n                                          70\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 71 of 246\n\n\n\n\nMaryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. 22 [Id. at 54 & n.40].\n\nThird, they argue that Arkansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey,\n\nNew York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee do not recognize the\n\neconomic loss rule or do not apply it to \u201ccertain claims.\u201d [Id. at 55 & n.41].\n\n      Because     Arizona,   California,   Colorado,    Georgia,   Illinois,   New\n\nHampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas\n\nexempt fraud claims generally or the specific type of fraud claims alleged here\n\nfrom the economic loss rule\u2019s bar, Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims under the laws of\n\nthese states survive the U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge. See Barrett-Jackson\n\nAuction Co. LLC v. Mountain Sports Int\u2019l Inc., 2020 WL 9349176, at *4 (D.\n\nAriz. Sept. 9, 2020) (surveying Arizona law and concluding that \u201cthe economic\n\nloss doctrine does not bar Plaintiff's claims for fraud and negligent\n\nmisrepresentation\u201d); Meneses v. FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 2994998, at *6 (C.D.\n\nCal. Oct. 3, 2025) (applying California law and explaining that \u201c[f]raud is an\n\n\n\n      22 Plaintiffs solely rely on Francis v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 504 F. Supp. 3d\n\n659, 687 (E.D. Mich. 2020), for the argument that Kentucky, Maine, New\nJersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania do not apply the economic loss rule\nto claims alleging safety-related defects or the risk of injury or death. [Doc.\n221-2 at 3]. Francis synthesizes the law of several states and concludes that\nthey limit the economic loss rule to specific causes of actions or decline to apply\nto cases alleging fraudulent inducement or the withholding of information\nabout safety-related defects. 504 F. Supp. at 687. Moreover, the authorities\nthat Francis cites for the application of the economic loss rule in Kentucky,\nMaine, New Jersey, and North Carolina do not recognize an exception in tort\ncases concerning a safety-related defect or risk of injury. Thus, Plaintiffs\u2019\nargument that these states recognize an exception where the tort claim\nconcerns the withholding of information about a safety-related defect is\nunsupported.\n\n\n\n                                           71\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 72 of 246\n\n\n\n\nindependent, intentional tort, for which recovery in tort is not barred by the\n\neconomic loss rule\u201d and this \u201cis just as true for fraud claims involving\n\nconcealment as it is for those involving affirmative deception\u201d); In re Bloom,\n\n2022 WL 2679049, at *4 (10th Cir. July 12, 2022) (considering \u201cthe Colorado\n\nSupreme Court\u2019s comment on the development of Colorado law\u201d and concluding\n\nthat \u201ccommon law fraud and fraudulent concealment claims are both tort\n\nclaims that arise independent of a contract, so they would not be barred by the\n\neconomic loss rule\u201d); McWhinney Centerra Lifestyle Ctr. LLC v. Poag &\n\nMcEwen Lifestyle Centers-Centerra LLC, 486 P.3d 439, 455 (Colo. App. 2021)\n\n(relying on \u201cthe significant developments in the law pertaining to the economic\n\nloss rule\u2019s applicability to intentional torts,\u201d and concluding \u201cthat the district\n\ncourt erred when it applied the economic loss rule to dismiss [the plaintiff\u2019s]\n\nclaims of fraudulent concealment\u201d); Bolling v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,\n\n2024 WL 3972987, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2024) (\u201cBolling I\u201d) (holding that\n\nthe economic loss rule does not bar fraudulent concealment claims under\n\nGeorgia law); Iwaski v. P&G Rare Violins, Inc., 2025 WL 2720408, at *4 (N.D.\n\nIll. Apr. 17, 2025) (allowing fraud claims, including fraud by non-disclosure\n\nclaim, to proceed because \u201cIllinois expressly recognizes fraud claims as an\n\nexception to the economic loss doctrine\u201d); Simpson v. Nissan of N. Am., Inc.,\n\n2023 WL 7308072, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2023) (concluding that\n\nfraudulent omission claim not barred by the economic loss rule in New\n\nHampshire where the \u201comission at issue induced the plaintiff to enter into the\n\n\n\n\n                                           72\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 73 of 246\n\n\n\n\ncontract\u201d and declining to dismiss fraud claim alleging that if the plaintiff had\n\nbeen informed of her vehicle\u2019s defect, she would not have bought the vehicle\n\n(citation modified)); Acquard v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc., 2020 WL 12904361,\n\nat *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2021 WL 6550088 (W.D.N.Y.\n\nJan. 4, 2021) (recognizing that \u201cnumerous courts applying New York law\u201d have\n\ndeclined to bar fraud claims under the economic loss rule); Weisblum v.\n\nProphase Labs, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297\u201398 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting \u201cthe\n\nabsence of any contrary authority from the New York state courts\u201d and\n\ndeclining to \u201cdismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims on the basis of the economic loss\n\ndoctrine); In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 936, 966 (N.D.\n\nCal. 2014) (concluding that North Carolina law does not support the dismissal\n\nof fraudulent concealment claim under the economic loss rule); Cummings v.\n\nCarroll, 270 N.C. App. 204, 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part,\n\n379 N.C. 347 (N.C. 2021) (reiterating that, under North Carolina law, \u201c[t]he\n\neconomic-loss rule does not bar fraud claims, even where the alleged fraud also\n\nbreaches a contractual term between the parties\u201d); City of Sioux Falls v.\n\nAzzuro, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 3d 963, 1002 (D.S.D. 2025) (agreeing with the\n\nprediction \u201cthat the South Dakota Supreme Court would hold that the\n\neconomic loss doctrine does not bar fraud . . . claims which concern\n\nmisrepresentations [of \u201cpast or existing facts\u201d] about the quality or\n\ncharacteristics of goods being sold under contract\u201d and declining to dismiss\n\nfraud claims under the economic loss rule); Stockley v. Nissan of N. Am., Inc.,\n\n\n\n\n                                           73\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 74 of 246\n\n\n\n\n701 F. Supp. 3d 682, 710 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) (recognizing that Tennessee law\n\nsupports an exception to the economic loss rule for fraudulent omission claims\n\nby an \u201cordinary consumer\u201d who alleges that the defendant\u2019s failure to disclose\n\nthe defect induced her into buying the product at issue); SBI Crypto Co. v.\n\nWhinstone US, Inc., 2023 WL 7443202, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2023), R. &\n\nR. adopted, 2023 WL 7429179 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2023) (declining to dismiss\n\nfraud claims because the economic loss rule does not apply \u201cwhen a plaintiff\n\ncan provide a plausible basis for claims of fraud\u201d as Texas recognizes an\n\nindependent duty to refrain from \u201cavoiding fraud of all kinds, including\n\nfraudulent omission\u201d); Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354\n\nS.W.3d 407, 419 (Tex. 2011) (explaining that Texas courts allow recovery of\n\n\u201cpure economic loss\u201d for certain torts, including fraud and fraudulent\n\ninducement) (citation modified).\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claim under Maryland law survives because the state\n\n\u201crecognize[s] an exception [to the economic loss rule] where the plaintiff alleges\n\nthe concealment or failure to warn of a defect giving rise to a \u201cserious risk of\n\nbodily harm.\u201d In re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig., 355 F.\n\nSupp. 3d 582, 590 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (\u201cIn re Gearshift Litig. I\u201d). Under\n\nMaryland law, \u201cin limited circumstances, those in which a product defect\n\npresents a substantial, clear and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury,\n\nit is inappropriate to draw a distinction between mere economic loss and\n\npersonal injury.\u201d Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 123\u201324 (Md. App.\n\n\n\n\n                                           74\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 75 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCt. 2007) (citation modified). Thus, a plaintiff may \u201cassert a cognizable\n\nproducts liability theory of recovery, [in] an action sounding in tort, but one\n\npremised on economic loss alone,\u201d if the plaintiff \u201callege[s] facts that\n\ndemonstrate that the product at issue creates a dangerous condition, one that\n\ngives rise to a clear danger of death or personal injury.\u201d Id. at 124, 129\n\n(emphasis in original) (reversing the grant of summary judgment on\n\nfraudulent concealment claims because \u201cso long as sufficient allegations of a\n\nserious risk of bodily harm or death has been made,\u201d there is no reason \u201cwhy\n\nthe petitioners should be barred from asserting a claim for economic loss\n\nresulting from fraudulent concealment\u201d). Here, the SAC adequately alleges\n\nthat the Inflator Defect presents a serious risk of injury or death. For example,\n\naccording to the SAC, when the airbag is deployed, the ARC airbag inflator\n\nmay rupture due to its defective design, resulting in the forceful propulsion of\n\nmetal fragments towards the vehicle\u2019s occupant(s), and ruptures of ARC\u2019s\n\ninflators have caused fatalities in two instances and serious injuries in other\n\ninstances. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 2, 335, 339, 341, 361.\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims under Arkansas law also survives because the\n\nstate does not recognize the economic loss rule. See Willman v. Riceland Foods,\n\nInc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002\u201303 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (\u201cUnder Arkansas law,\n\neconomic loss without other damage, can be awarded in cases where\n\nnegligence, misrepresentation, and fraud are alleged.\u201d).\n\n\n\n\n                                          75\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 76 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Contrary to Plaintiffs\u2019 argument, however, Alabama, Florida, Kentucky,\n\nMaine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma,\n\nPennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin either do not recognize\n\nfraud as an exception or do not exempt fraud claims from the economic loss\n\nrule\u2019s application where, as here, the alleged fraud concerns the quality or\n\nnature of the product. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, although the Inflator\n\nDefect rendered the Class Vehicles dangerous and unreliable, the Automakers\n\npromoted them as \u201csafe and dependable\u201d and intentionally concealed the\n\nDefect. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142, 143, 146, 153, 160, 167, 175, 184, 186, 189, 191,\n\n203, 207, 228, 255, 376\u2013379. Again, the thrust of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims is that\n\nby failing to disclose the Defect, the Automakers misrepresented the safety and\n\ndependability of the Class Vehicles. This alleged misrepresentation through\n\nnon-disclosure or concealment concerns the Class Vehicles\u2019 quality. The SAC\n\ndoes not allege any other fraudulent conduct that may have affected Plaintiffs\u2019\n\ndecision to buy (or lease) their Class Vehicles. The above-mentioned states\n\napply the economic loss rule to bar the type of fraudulent concealment and\n\nomission claims that Plaintiffs make. See Harris Moran Seed Co. v. Phillips,\n\n949 So. 2d 916, 931 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (affirming dismissal of fraudulent\n\nsuppression claim under Alabama law based on the application of the economic\n\nloss rule); Burt v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1324\n\n(N.D. Ala. 2025) (dismissing Alabama-law based fraudulent misrepresentation\n\nclaim on other grounds but noting that had the plaintiff \u201cproperly alleged\n\n\n\n\n                                           76\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 77 of 246\n\n\n\n\nactionable misrepresentation\u201d the economic loss rule would have barred her\n\nfrom recovering damages for her allegedly defective vehicle); Takata II, 193 F.\n\nSupp. 3d at 1339 (holding that where \u201cthe fraudulent concealment claims\n\nallege precisely what a breach of warranty claim would allege\u2014namely that\n\nthe [class] vehicles did not work as promised[,] . . . Florida\u2019s economic loss rule\n\napplies to such claims); Riley v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 664 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1346\n\n(M.D. Fla. 2023) (\u201cFraudulent concealment claims in the products liability\n\nsphere that seek to recover only economic damages are clearly barred by\n\nFlorida\u2019s economic loss rule.\u201d (citation modified)); New London Tobacco Mkt.,\n\nInc. v. Ky. Fuel Corp., 44 F.4th 393, 414 (6th Cir. 2022) (explaining that\n\nKentucky\u2019s application of \u201cthe economic-loss rule bars recovery for fraud,\u201d\n\nincluding fraudulent inducement); Am. Aerial Servs. v. Terex USA, LLC, 39 F.\n\nSupp. 3d 95, 111 (D. Me. 2014) (\u201cconclud[ing] that Maine would extend the\n\neconomic loss doctrine to claims for fraudulent misrepresentation by a seller to\n\na buyer where the misrepresentation concerns the quality of the goods or\n\nproduct promised in the sales contract\u201d and dismissing fraud claims on\n\nsummary judgment); Murphy v. P&G Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607\u201308, 608\n\nn.5 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (explaining that where, as here, \u201cthe only\n\nmisrepresentation by the dishonest party concerns the quality or character of\n\nthe goods sold\u201d and results in only economic damages, Michigan law precludes\n\nthe fraud claim); Forjas Y Macquinados, S.A. De C.V. v. Mectron Eng\u2019g Co.,\n\n2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21535, at *16\u201317 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2019) (concluding\n\n\n\n\n                                           77\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 78 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthat \u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 fraudulent inducement claim does not satisfy Michigan\u2019s\n\nlimited exception to the economic loss rule\u201d because the \u201crepresentations\n\nidentified by Plaintiffs[] as fraudulent are really alleged misrepresentations\n\nabout the nature, quality, and capabilities of the [product]\u201d and \u201cPlaintiffs do\n\nnot allege any independently fraudulent or otherwise sinister activity\u201d);\n\nMarvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Ppg Indus., 223 F.3d 873, 885 (8th Cir. 2000)\n\n(agreeing that the economic loss rule does not bar fraud claims that are\n\n\u201cindependent of the contract,\u201d but recognizing, under Minnesota law, \u201ca\n\nlimitation on this exception\u201d and affirming dismissal of \u201cfraud claims\n\nconcerning representations about [the product]\u201d because such \u201crepresentations\n\nor descriptions about goods may become express warranties\u201d and \u201care not\n\nindependent of the contract\u201d); Flynn v. CTB, Inc., 2015 WL 5692299, at *12\n\n(E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2015) (recognizing that \u201cwhere the fraudulent\n\nmisrepresentation concerns the quality, character, or safety of the goods sold,\n\nthe economic loss doctrine bars the fraud claim because it is substantially\n\nredundant with warranty claims\u201d and barring fraudulent misrepresentation\n\nand inducement claims under Missouri law where the \u201c[p]laintiffs\u2019 damages\n\nflow[ed] from their frustrated expectations about the quality and performance\n\nof the [product]\u201d); 23 Kuecker Logistics Grp., Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing\n\n\n\n      23 Plaintiffs rely on Browning v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, 539 F. Supp. 3d\n\n965, 974 (W.D. Mo. 2021) (Ketchmark, J.), for the proposition that Missouri\u2019s\neconomic loss rule does not apply to consumers\u2019 fraud claims. [Doc. 221-2 at 4].\nBut, as that court later acknowledged, the Missouri Supreme Court has not\n\u201cspecifically addressed whether the economic loss doctrine applies only to\n\n\n                                          78\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353        Filed 10/02/26   Page 79 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCo., 2023 WL 3198418, at *2 (D. Neb. Apr. 14, 2023) (predicting that although\n\n\u201cthe Nebraska Supreme Court would recognize fraud in the inducement as a\n\nnon-controversial exception to the economic loss doctrine,\u201d it \u201cwould also\n\nrecognize an exception to the exception where the tort claims are substantially\n\nredundant of warranty claims or where the misrepresentations are not\n\nindependent of the contracts\u201d and, consequently, dismissing fraud claim based\n\non misrepresentation that \u201cplainly relates to the quality or character of goods\u201d);\n\nIn re Subaru Battery Drain Prods. Liab. Litig., 2021 WL 1207791, at *29\n\n(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021) (explaining that New Jersey courts \u201crecognize[] an\n\nexception   to   the   economic     loss   rule    for   affirmative   fraudulent\n\nmisrepresentations, but [they] decline[] to apply the exception to claims of\n\nfraudulent concealment or omission\u201d and dismissing fraud claims premised on\n\nallegations that the defendant had knowledge of the vehicle defects but, while\n\nmarketing them as \u201csafe and reliable,\u201d failed to disclose the defect to the\n\nplaintiffs during the sale); McCowan v. Williams Indus. Servs. Grp., Inc., 2019\n\nWL 4884230, at *7 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2019) (applying Oklahoma\u2019s law on the\n\neconomic loss rule and granting summary judgment on the fraudulent\n\n\ncommercial-purchasers or commercial transactions.\u201d Tuter v. Freud Am., Inc.,\n2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178459, at *30 (W.D. Mo. Sep. 30, 2022) (Ketchmark,\nJ.). Unlike Browning, Tuter analyzes Missouri law to conclude that the state\u2019s\nhighest court would extend the economic loss rule to tort claims for consumer\ntransactions. See Holman v. Ali Indus., LLC, 654 F. Supp. 3d 871, 882 (W.D.\nMo. 2023) (agreeing with Tuter that \u201cMissouri courts have not delineated a\ncommercial-consumer distinction in the economic loss doctrine\u201d and dismissing\nconsumer\u2019s claim under the economic loss rule). Thus, here, the Court applies\nMissouri law on the economic loss rule to Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims.\n\n\n\n                                           79\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 80 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndismissal claim where the plaintiff claimed only economic loss); Fields v.\n\nHench\u2019s Country Liv\u2019n Homes of Calera, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1259 (E.D. Okla.\n\n2025) (noting that \u201cOklahoma recognizes the economic loss rule only in the\n\ncontext of manufacturers\u2019 products liability, barring recovery solely for injury\n\nto the product resulting in economic loss\u201d); Hatboro Horsham Sch. Dist. v.\n\nTAMKO Bldg. Prods., LLC, 2025 WL 2935251, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2025)\n\n(concluding, under Pennsylvania law, that although \u201cthe economic loss\n\ndoctrine does not bar fraudulent concealment claims when . . . the defendant\n\ncommitted fraud to induce another to enter into a contract,\u201d a plaintiff \u201ccannot\n\nrely on the inducement exception to overcome the economic loss doctrine\u201d\n\nwhere, as here, the alleged fraud \u201cconcern[s] the quality or characteristics of\n\nthe goods sold\u201d (citation modified)); Carroll v. Isle of Palms Pest Control, Inc.,\n\n446 S.C. 177, 186 (S.C. 2025), reh\u2019g denied (Aug. 11, 2025) (refining South\n\nCarolina\u2019s economic loss rule and holding that \u201cthe rule applies only in the\n\nproduct liability context and when the only injury is to the product itself. In\n\nsuch instances, the loss is economic or commercial, and the remedy is limited\n\nto the laws of contract or warranty.\u201d); Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143,\n\n146 (S.C. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Carroll, 446 S.C. 177 (affirming\n\ndismissal of tort claims, including for \u201cfraud/misrepresentation,\u201d under the\n\neconomic loss rule because \u201c[t]he only damage caused by the defect in the\n\ntrucks was damage to the trucks themselves\u2014purely an economic loss\u201d);\n\nHealthBanc Int\u2019l, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc., 435 P.3d 193, 196 (Utah\n\n\n\n\n                                           80\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 81 of 246\n\n\n\n\n2018) (\u201c[T]he economic loss rule applies to a fraudulent inducement claim that\n\noverlaps completely with a contract claim\u2014in the sense that the alleged\n\nfraudulent inducement is also a breach of a warranty in the contract.\u201d Thus,\n\n\u201cwhere the party\u2019s tort claim is a mere duplication of its breach of contract\n\nclaim, there is no exception to the economic loss rule. The tort claim is\n\nbarred.\u201d); and Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 283 Wis.2d 555, 585, 587\n\n(Wis. 2025) (holding that \u201ca fraud in the inducement claim is not barred by the\n\neconomic loss doctrine where the fraud is extraneous to, rather than\n\ninterwoven with, the contract\u201d but that fraud claims concerning \u201cthe\n\nperformance or the quality or character of the goods sold\u201d are barred because\n\nsuch \u201c[m]atters are expressly or implicitly dealt with in the contract\u201d).\n\n      As to Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer protection claims, the U.S.\n\nAutomakers maintain that the economic loss rule also bars Plaintiffs\u2019 claims\n\nalleging fraud-based violations of the consumer protection statutes in the\n\nfollowing 10 states: Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North\n\nCarolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. [Doc. 181 at 39\n\n& 39 n.30]. The U.S. Automakers neither separately identify the authority that\n\nsupports the dismissal of the statutory consumer protection claims nor explain\n\nwhy authority supporting the dismissal of common law claims fraud claims\n\nequally supports the dismissal of those fraud-based statutory claims that they\n\ntarget. [See Doc. 181-7 at 14\u201315]. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the\n\ncited cases for the relevant states to determine whether they discuss the\n\n\n\n\n                                          81\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 82 of 246\n\n\n\n\napplication of the economic loss doctrine to claims under that state\u2019s statutory\n\nconsumer protection laws. To the extent they do not, the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nargument fails for lack of support. Specifically, the cases that the U.S.\n\nAutomakers cite for the economic loss rule as applied in Florida, Missouri,\n\nOklahoma, 24 Tennessee and Wisconsin do not discuss the rule in the context of\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims. And although in Chambers v. King\n\nBuick GMC, LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 575, 622 (D. Md. 2014), a case the U.S.\n\nAutomakers cite, the Maryland district court dismissed a claim under the\n\nMaryland Consumer Protection Act for the plaintiff\u2019s failure to plead an injury,\n\nit did not apply the economic loss rule. In contrast, Murphy, one of the two\n\ncases that the U.S. Automakers advance for the dismissal of fraud-based\n\nclaims under the Michigan economic loss rule, does consider the rule in the\n\ncontext of claims under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). In a\n\nfootnote, Murphy suggests that \u201c[t]he underlying rationale of the economic loss\n\n\n      24 To be clear, Walls v. Am. Tobacco Co., 11 P.3d 626, 630 (Okla. 2000),\n\nwhich the U.S. Automakers advance in support of the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019\nfraud and statutory consumer protection claims under Oklahoma law notes\nthat the dismissal of a claim alleging the violation of the Oklahoma Consumer\nProtection Act (OCPA) is proper where \u201cthe plaintiffs . . . incurred no monetary\ndamages and . . . received precisely what they had bargained for.\u201d\nCorrespondingly, Walls concluded that \u201cto have a private right of action under\n\u00a7 761.1(A), a consumer must suffer some detriment or loss as a result of a\nviolation of the OCPA.\u201d The Court does not perceive Walls\u2019 analysis as an\napplication of the economic loss rule to the OCPA claim. Moreover, the U.S.\nAutomakers fail to provide any authority indicating that the economic loss\nPlaintiffs allege\u2014for example, the diminished value of their Class Vehicles\u2014\ndoes not qualify as monetary damages. And Plaintiffs maintain that contrary\nto their expectations of the sale, they received defective vehicles\u2014i.e., they did\nnot receive that which they bargained for.\n\n\n\n                                           82\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 83 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndoctrine\u201d applies to MCPA claims. 695 F. Supp. 2d at 606 n.3. However, the\n\nCourt declines to dismiss the MCPA claim based on Murphy\u2019s dictum. Not only\n\ndoes \u201c[a] competing footnote in a Michigan Court of Appeals case suggests\n\notherwise,\u201d the \u201ccase on which [Murphy] relies for the proposition that the\n\neconomic loss doctrine bars MCPA claims does not so hold.\u201d Hall v. Trivest\n\nPartners, L.P., 2023 WL 5941729, at *8\u20139, 9 n.3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2023),\n\nrev\u2019d on other grounds, 178 F. 4th 986 (6th Cir. 2026).\n\n      The U.S. Automakers cite to HSM Holdings, LLC v. Mantu I.M. Mobile\n\nLtd., 2021 WL 918556, *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), and Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., 574\n\nF.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2009), as supporting the dismissal of Plaintiffs fraud-based\n\nclaim under New York General Business Law \u00a7 349 (Count 33(c)). [Doc. 249-2\n\nat 9]. But neither case expressly applies the economic loss rule. Moreover, HSM\n\nHoldings cites Spagnola for the proposition that \u201c[a] Section 349 claim should\n\nalso be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to allege a loss independent of the loss\n\ncaused by the alleged breach of contract.\u201d 2021 WL 918556, at *21 (citation\n\nmodified). The Second Circuit has clarified, however, that Spagnola \u201cdo[es] not\n\nestablish a requirement that a plaintiff allege an injury under \u00a7 349\n\nindependent of their contract damages.\u201d Milligan v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2022\n\nWL 433289, at *6 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (emphasis in original). Rather, under\n\nSpagnola, \u201cno \u00a7 349 claim exists where the plaintiffs allege damages in the\n\namount of the purchase price of their contracts, but fail to allege that\n\ndefendants have denied them the services for which they contracted.\u201d Id., 2022\n\n\n\n\n                                          83\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 84 of 246\n\n\n\n\nWL 433289 at *6 (citation modified). Although, here, Plaintiffs claim the same\n\nloss from the U.S. Automakers\u2019 deceptive practices as they do from their breach\n\nof warranty, this case does not involve the provision of services. The Court,\n\nthus, is not persuaded that the cases the U.S. Automakers cite support the\n\ndismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 \u00a7 349 claim under the economic loss rule. 25\n\n      Similarly, while the U.S. Automakers rely on Buffa v. Cygnature Constr.\n\n& Dev., Inc., 2016 WL 7984216, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec 30, 2016), this case\n\ndoes not support the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 consumer protection claim under\n\nthe North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NC UDTPA),\n\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1, et seq., under the economic loss rule. In Buffa, the\n\ntrial court applied the economic loss rule to grant summary judgment on the\n\nplaintiffs\u2019 NC UDPTA claim. 2016 WL 7984216, at *7. Although the appeals\n\ncourt affirmed that decision, it did so on the basis that although the\n\n      claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices relies on the\n      allegation that [the defendant] was aware of a defect in the design\n      of their windows . . . and failed to notify the [plaintiffs] of the\n      defect with the intent the [plaintiffs] would rely upon [the\n      defendant\u2019s] failure to disclose when purchasing the windows[,]\n      [a] review of the record provides that other than allegations in the\n      complaint, there is no evidence of systematic window failure or a\n      design flaw.\n\nBuffa, 2016 WL 7984216, at *7. Thus, according to the court in Buffa, the\n\nplaintiffs had essentially asserted a breach of warranty claim, which is not\n\n\n\n      25 Plaintiffs also assert a claim for the violation of New York General\n\nBusiness Law \u00a7 350 (Count 33(d)). The U.S. Automakers do not provide\nauthority supporting the dismissal of Count 33(d) under the economic loss rule.\n\n\n\n                                           84\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 85 of 246\n\n\n\n\n\u201csufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain a UDTPA claim.\u201d Id. (quoting Ellis\n\nv. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 699 F.3d 778, 787 (4th Cir. 2012)). The question here\n\nis not whether Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficiently unfair or deceptive act to\n\nsupport their NC UDPTA claim. Rather, the question is whether the fact that\n\nPlaintiffs allege only economic losses forecloses their NC UDTPA claim. Buffa\n\ndoes not answer that question. Moreover, the Court is persuaded that North\n\nCarolina law limits the application of the economic loss rule to negligence\n\nclaims. In re Gearshift Litig. I, 355 F. Supp. 3d 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 2018)\n\n(analyzing North Carolina law and declining to dismiss the fraud and fraud-\n\nbased statutory consumer protection claims).\n\n      For the last statutory consumer protection claim they challenge under\n\nthe economic loss rule\u2014Plaintiffs\u2019 claim under Pennsylvania\u2019s Unfair Trade\n\nPractices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a7 201-1,\n\net seq.\u2014the U.S. Automakers advance Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d\n\n661, 681 (3d Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit, however, has \u201cset aside [its] holding\n\nin Werwinski with respect to the economic loss doctrine\u2019s application to\n\nUTPCPL claims.\u201d Earl v. NVR, Inc., 990 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2021). Instead,\n\naccording to Earl, \u201cthe economic loss doctrine no longer may serve as a bar to\n\nUTPCPL claims.\u201d Id.\n\n      In sum, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 fail to prevail in their argument that the\n\neconomic loss rule bars Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims under the laws of Arizona,\n\nArkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire,\n\n\n\n\n                                          85\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 86 of 246\n\n\n\n\nNew York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas and that the\n\nrule bars Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer protection claims for Florida,\n\nMaryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,\n\nPennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. However, their challenge to\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims under the common law of the remaining 14 states\n\nsucceeds. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019 Motion, [Doc.\n\n181], to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the following\n\nclaims for fraud by omission and concealment: Alabama (Count 1(d)), Florida\n\n(Count 10(d)), Kentucky (Count 18(d)), Maine (Count 20(d)), Michigan (Count\n\n23(d)), Minnesota (Count 24(e)), Missouri (Count 26(d)), Nebraska (Count\n\n28(d)), New Jersey (Count 31(d)), Oklahoma (Count 37(d)), Pennsylvania\n\n(Count 39(d)), South Carolina (Count 41(e)), Utah (Count 45e)), and Wisconsin\n\n(Count 50(d)). 26\n\n               ii.   Manifestation Requirement\n\n       The U.S. Automakers next argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their\n\nfraud-based statutory consumer protection claims under the laws of the\n\nfollowing 16 states because the SAC fails to allege that the Defect manifested\n\nin Plaintiffs\u2019 vehicles: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois,\n\nMassachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North\n\n\n\n       26 Plaintiffs assert their causes of action in section VIII of the SAC. The\n\nCourt refers to Plaintiffs\u2019 asserted Counts by the subsection of section VIII that\nthey appear in. For example, Plaintiffs\u2019 claim for fraud under Alabama law\nappears in Section VIII(1)(d).\n\n\n\n                                           86\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 87 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCarolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Washington. 27 [Doc. 181 at 40 & n.31].\n\nThe chart through which the U.S. Automakers provide supporting authority\n\nfor each of the challenged statutory claims, includes parentheticals quoting the\n\nauthority or summarizing the outcome. Many of the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nparentheticals pertain to the dismissal of fraud claims, but nowhere do these\n\nDefendants explain why a court\u2019s dismissal of a common-law fraud claim under\n\na given state\u2019s law also supports the dismissal of fraud-based statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed all cited\n\nauthority. To the extent that the U.S. Automakers\u2019 authority lacks a discussion\n\nof the manifestation requirement under the relevant state\u2019s consumer\n\nprotection statutes, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument fails for their failure to\n\nproperly support and develop it. Specifically, the U.S. Automakers fail to\n\nsupport their argument that Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims for Alabama, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland,\n\nMichigan, Montana, Oregon, and Washington fail for the lack of the Defect\u2019s\n\nmanifestation in Plaintiffs\u2019 vehicles.\n\n      Some of the cases the U.S. Automakers cite concern whether the\n\nplaintiff alleges a cognizable injury to confer standing under Article III.\n\nAlthough the U.S. Automakers present cherry-picked quotations, these cases\n\n\n      27 The U.S. Automakers also challenge Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer\n\nprotection claim under Florida law. [Doc. 181 at n.31]. However, they include\nno authority in support, [see Doc. 181-7 at 15\u201317], and represent in their Reply,\n[Doc. 249-2 at 12], that they do not contend that the claim fails for lack of defect\nmanifestation.\n\n\n\n                                            87\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 88 of 246\n\n\n\n\nare generally not helpful to their argument. For example, Varner v. Domestic\n\nCorp., 2017 WL 3730618, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2017), on which the U.S.\n\nAutomakers rely for the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claim under the Montana\n\nUnfair Trade Practices Act of 1973 (MUTPA), Mont. Code \u00a7 30-14-101, et seq.,\n\nrecognized that because the plaintiffs asserted \u201cthat the defect is already\n\npresent in all of the Named Plaintiffs\u2019 Defective Refrigerators whether or not\n\nphysical damage from fire has resulted\u201d and that the defect \u201cbasic\n\nfunctionality\u201d of those refrigerators, they \u201cgenerally have Article III standing\n\nto bring this suit.\u201d Varner does not discuss whether defect manifestation is\n\nrequired to sustain a MUTPA claim.\n\n      The same is also holds for Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d\n\n955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2015), from which the U.S. Automakers harvest the\n\nproposition that \u201c[w]hen economic loss is predicated solely on how a product\n\nfunctions, and the product has not malfunctioned, . . . something more is\n\nrequired than simply alleging an overpayment for a \u2018defective\u2019 product.\u201d They\n\ncontend that Cahen supports the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claims under\n\nCalifornia\u2019s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1750, et\n\nseq., and Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code \u00a7 17200, et\n\nseq. [Doc. 249-2 at 11]. However, the issue on hand in Cahen was whether the\n\nplaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an injury to establish standing under Article\n\nIII based on a speculative future risk of their vehicles being hacked. Cahen,\n\n147 F. Supp. at 970. Here, the question is not whether Plaintiffs have\n\n\n\n\n                                          88\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 89 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsufficiently alleged an injury for Article III standing but whether they may\n\nmaintain their CLRA and UCL claims in the absence of allegations of injury\n\nrelated to the Defect\u2019s manifestation in their vehicles. Cahen does not answer\n\nthis question. Moreover, as Cahen observed, even in cases where the alleged\n\ndefect has not manifested, the plaintiffs may establish a cognizable injury\n\nthrough \u201cspecific allegations of diminution in value.\u201d 147 F. Supp. at 970\n\n(quoting In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales\n\nPractices, and Prods. Litig., 790 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1166 n.11 (C.D.Cal.2011) (\u201cIn\n\nre Toyota Acceleration\u201d)). Plaintiffs allege that the safety-related Inflator\n\nDefect has diminished the value of their vehicles, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 23, 142\u201343,\n\n151, 170.\n\n      Also, and specifically as to the statutory consumer protection claims for\n\nIllinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington, the U.S.\n\nAutomakers rely on a single case in support of dismissal. [Doc. 187-7 at 16\u201317\n\n(citing Miller v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2018 WL 2740240, at *14 (E.D. Mich. June\n\n7, 2018))]. However, Miller did not address the manifestation requirement in\n\ndismissing statutory consumer protection claims. Rather, in analyzing the\n\nfraud by omission claim, the Court noted that two of the plaintiffs did not allege\n\nthat the defect manifested in their vehicles and, thus, \u201cfail[ed] to establish that\n\nthey suffered any detriment connected to [the defendant\u2019s] alleged failure to\n\ndisclose\u201d the defect. 2018 WL 2740240, at *12. Ultimately, the court dismissed\n\nthe fraud claim for Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to meet Rule 9\u2019s particularity requirement\n\n\n\n\n                                           89\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 90 of 246\n\n\n\n\nand, correspondingly, dismissed the statutory consumer protection claims\n\nunder the same standard. Because it did so without discussing the significance\n\nof the lack of defect manifestation under each of the relevant statutory claims,\n\nthe Court finds little support in Miller for the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument.\n\n      In their Reply, the U.S. Automakers cite two new cases as additionally\n\nsupporting the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 consumer protection claims for\n\nMassachusetts and Washington. 28 Both cases are inapposite. Analyzing the\n\neconomic injury requirement for a claim under the Massachusetts Consumer\n\nProtection Law (MCPL), Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, \u00a7 1, et seq., the court in Martin\n\nv. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 2010 WL 3928707, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 30,\n\n2010), noted that \u201coverpayment for a product is not a recoverable injury where\n\nthe plaintiff no longer has the product in her possession and did not suffer\n\nphysical injury or property damage because of the product.\u201d But that rule is\n\nnot applicable here as there is no contention that Plaintiffs are not in\n\npossession of their vehicles. Similarly unhelpful, Beaty v. Ford Motor Co., 2021\n\nWL 3109661, at *9 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2021), amended, 2023 WL 1879534\n\n(W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2023), addressed the typicality requirement for class\n\ncertification and observed simply that \u201cdisparate manifestations of the alleged\n\nPSR defect\u201d may make it \u201cless likely\u201d for the plaintiffs to prevail on their claim\n\n\n\n\n      28 Generally, the Court does not consider authority in support of the\n\nmovant\u2019s original argument that is cited for the first time in a reply brief. The\nCourt has considered it here, however, in the interest of a more fulsome\napplication of the relevant state law.\n\n\n                                           90\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 91 of 246\n\n\n\n\nunder the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev. Code\n\n\u00a7 19.86.010, et seq. Beaty did not determine that a plaintiff cannot maintain a\n\nclaim under the WCPA in the absence of defect manifestation.\n\n       Similarly, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 reliance on Cunningham v. Ford Motor\n\nCo., 641 F. Supp. 3d 400, 418 (E.D. Mich. 2022), for the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nclaim under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (GUDTPA),\n\nO.C.G.A. \u00a7 10-1-370, et seq., is to no avail. Although in Cunningham, the court\n\ndismissed the GUDTPA claim, it did not do so for lack of manifestation of the\n\nalleged defect. Rather, it did so, in part, because of the plaintiff\u2019s failure to\n\nallege an on-going harm from the defendant\u2019s deceptive trade practice to\n\nsupport the issuance of injunctive relief under GUDTPA. 641 F. Supp. 3d at\n\n418.\n\n       Plaintiffs\u2019 claim for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act\n\n(NJCFA), N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 56:8-1, et seq., survives the U.S. Automakers\n\nchallenge. The Court finds Tijerina v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 2023 U.S.\n\nDist. LEXIS 187865 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2023), on point. There, the court declined\n\nto dismiss the NJCFA claim by a plaintiff (Upshur) whose vehicle had not\n\nmanifested the defect for failure to \u201cplead ascertainable loss\u201d because\n\n\u201callegations that the class vehicles are worth less because of the . . . defect\n\nsatisfies the ascertainable loss element for stating a claim since such a loss is\n\nquantifiable.\u201d 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187865, at *41, *81\u2013*82.\n\n\n\n\n                                          91\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 92 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The absence of allegations indicating the Defect\u2019s manifestation in\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 vehicles also does not require the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based\n\nconsumer protection claims under New York General Business Law \u00a7\u00a7 349 and\n\n350. The Court is persuaded by Nuwer v. FCA US LLC, 552 F. Supp. 3d 1344,\n\n1358 (S.D. Fla. 2021), which analyzed decisions applying New York law and\n\ndetermined that \u201ca claim for economic damages could be made even in the\n\nabsence of a manifested defect.\u201d The Nuwer court declined to dismiss the\n\nplaintiff\u2019s claims under New York law, including the claim under \u00a7 350\n\n(although the defect had not manifested), because the complaint alleged\n\neconomic injury from, among other things, overpayment and diminished value.\n\n552 F. Supp. 3d at 1358.\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 claim for the violation of the North Carolina Unfair and\n\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act (NCDTPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1, et seq., also\n\nsurvives. The case the U.S. Automakers rely on, Bailey v. LeBeau, 339 S.E.2d\n\n460, 463 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), is not factually on point. See In re ZF-TRW\n\nAirbag Control Units Prods. Liab. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 3d 625, 792\u201393 (C.D.\n\nCal. 2022), (\u201cIn re ZF-TRW Litig.\u201d), opinion clarified sub nom. In re ZF-TRW\n\nAirbag Control Units Prods., 2022 WL 19425927 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022)\n\n(distinguishing Bailey and concluding that the complaint\u2019s allegation that\n\nplaintiffs\u2019 vehicles were worth less than the price plaintiffs paid sufficed \u201cto\n\nestablish an injury under the NCDTPA\u201d).\n\n\n\n\n                                           92\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 93 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The case the U.S. Automakers cite as supporting the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claim under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA), Okla.\n\nStat. Ann. tit. 15, \u00a7 751, et seq., is also distinguishable. In Sisemore v.\n\nDolgencorp, LLC, 212 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1110 (N.D. Okla. 2016), the court\n\ndismissed the OCPA claim because the plaintiff could not establish that he had\n\nsuffered actual damages by \u201csimply purchasing a product whose labeling\n\nviolates the OCPA.\u201d There, the plaintiff alleged nothing more than that he was\n\nharmed because he paid for the product. 212 F. Supp. at 1110. In contrast,\n\nhere, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants\u2019 fraudulent conduct caused them to\n\noverpay for their vehicles and that the Defect diminished the value of their\n\nvehicles. Accordingly, Sisemore does not dictate the dismissal of Plaintiffs\n\nOCPA claim for lack of the Defect\u2019s manifestation.\n\n      This is also true about Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 914 F. Supp. 1449 (S.D.\n\nTex. 1996), the U.S. Automakers\u2019 authority supporting the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim under the Texas Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (TCPA),\n\nTex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. \u00a7 17.41, et seq. There, the plaintiffs\u2019 statutory\n\nconsumer protection claim under Texas law failed to survive summary\n\njudgment because the plaintiffs were unable to present any evidence of injury\n\nfrom the allegedly inadequate warning about lap belt use on their vehicles\u2019\n\nvisors. 914 F. Supp. at 1455. In contrast, Plaintiffs allege injury from\n\noverpayment and diminished value. Martin does not support the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 TCPA claim.\n\n\n\n\n                                         93\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 94 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Plaintiffs do not emerge unscathed from the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nchallenge. The U.S. Automakers prevail in their effort to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nconsumer protection claims under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act\n\n(ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-88-101, et seq., and the Georgia Fair Business\n\nPractices Act (GFBPA), O.C.G.A. \u00a7 10-1-390, et seq. See Motal v. Allstate Prop.\n\n& Cas. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 724564, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2021), aff\u2019d, 2023\n\nWL 3515690 (8th Cir. May 18, 2023) (noting that the 2017 version of the\n\nADTPA continues to require proof of actual damages and that \u201cactual damage\n\n\u2018is sustained when the product has actually malfunctioned or the defect has\n\nmanifested itself but not when the only alleged injury is the diminution in\n\nvalue of the product\u2019\u201d) (quoting Wallis v. Ford Motor Co., 362 Ark. 317, 328\n\n(Ark. 2005))); and Edel v. Southtowne Motors of Newnan II, Inc., 338 Ga. App.\n\n376, 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming dismissal of GFBPA claim where the\n\nplaintiffs had not made a warranty claim that was denied, had not incurred\n\nrepair costs, and had not \u201cotherwise shown an actual injury suffered,\u201d because\n\n\u201ca private right of action [under GFBPA] is available only to a person who\n\nsuffers injury or damages as a result of a violation\u201d and, under GFBPA\u2019s\n\nrequirements, \u201cthe measure of damages . . . is that of actual injury suffered\u201d\n\nand the only damages that the plaintiffs could seek under the circumstances\u2014\n\na \u201crefund of the purchase price and restitution\u201d\u2014could not serve as \u201cactual\n\ndamages\u201d under the GFBPA).\n\n\n\n\n                                         94\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 95 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      In sum, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 fail to prevail in their argument that the\n\nabsence of allegations of the Defect\u2019s manifestation in Plaintiffs\u2019 vehicles\n\nprecludes Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based claims under the consumer protection\n\nstatutes of Alabama, California, Georgia (GUDTPA only), Illinois, Maryland,\n\nMassachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,\n\nOklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. However, they prevail in their\n\nchallenge to Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based claims under the consumer protection\n\nstatutes of Arkansas and Georgia (GFBPA, specifically). Accordingly, the\n\nCourt GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019 Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 181], to the\n\nextent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for the\n\nviolation of ADTPA (Count 4(c)) and GFBPA (Count 11(d)).\n\n             c. Knowledge of the Inflator Defect\n\n      Both the Airbag Suppliers and the U.S. Automakers challenge the\n\nsufficiency of the SAC\u2019s allegations regarding their knowledge of the Inflator\n\nDefect before each Plaintiff bought or leased his or her vehicle. According to\n\nthe Airbag Suppliers, although knowledge of the misrepresentation is an\n\n\u201cessential element of any fraud-based claim,\u201d the SAC fails to allege that the\n\nAirbag Suppliers had knowledge of the alleged Defect in the ARC airbag\n\nmodules. [Doc. 178-1 at 31\u201332, 32 n.8]. Both set of Defendants assert that the\n\nknowledge requirement applies to Plaintiffs\u2019 common-law fraud claims under\n\n\n\n\n                                         95\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 96 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe laws of each of the 50 states and to the majority of Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims. 29\n\n      Characterizing the allegations of the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 knowledge as\n\nscant and speculative, the Airbag Suppliers contend that (1) the SAC fails to\n\nallege that they knew that the inflator testing results showed a design defect;\n\n(2) the 11 in-the-field airbag ruptures across 14 years does not equate to\n\nknowledge of a widespread design defect in all ARC airbag inflators; and\n\n(3) the NHTSA investigation undertaken to determine whether there was a\n\ndefect cannot support the inferential leap that the Airbag Suppliers knew of\n\nthe defect. [Doc. 178-1 at 33\u201334]. The U.S. Automakers\u2019 Motion repackages\n\nthese arguments, maintaining that the SAC\u2019s allegations of lot-specific\n\nruptures during testing, the NHTSA investigation, and the field ruptures fails\n\nto support that Defendants were aware that the Defect affected all ARC airbag\n\ninflators. [Doc. 181 at 40\u201343]. The U.S. Automakers also raise iterations of this\n\nargument in support of their individual Motions. [Docs. 180-1 at 6\u20137; 182-1 at\n\n9\u201310; 188-1 at 13\u201315]. The Court is unpersuaded.\n\n\n\n      29 The Airbag Suppliers identify the following 31 states with consumer\n\nprotection statutes that require a showing of knowledge: Alabama; Arizona;\nArkansas; California; Colorado; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Idaho; Illinois;\nIndiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Michigan; Missouri; Nevada;\nNew Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; Oregon; South\nDakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Virginia; Washington; and Wyoming. [Doc.\n178-1 at 32 n.8]. According to the U.S. Automakers, the consumer protection\nstatues of all states require some degree of knowledge or intent, except for the\nfollowing nine states: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Nebraska, North\nCarolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. [Doc. 181-6].\n\n\n\n                                           96\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 97 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The SAC alleges that \u201cARC, the Airbag [Suppliers], and the\n\nAutomaker[s] . . . shared information and worked together throughout the\n\ndesign, manufacturing, assembly and investigation process using the APQP\n\nprocess, in which the suppliers and customers communicate during every step\n\nof design and testing.\u201d SAC I \u00b6 264. It outlines the Design Failure Mode and\n\nEffects Analysis (DFMEA) process used to identify possible problems that\n\ncould arise with the design of the ARC airbag inflators, and it alleges that a\n\nControl Plan is created once the DFMEA is completed to minimize the chance\n\nof the identified manufacturing errors occurring. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 15, 265. It further\n\nalleges that the Airbag Suppliers and the Automakers reviewed the DFMEA\n\nand the Control Plan and then engaged with ARC on any redesign to lower the\n\nrisk that a failure mode will occur. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 265\u201366. Based on this process, the\n\nSAC alleges that the Airbag Suppliers and the Automakers reviewed and\n\napproved the ARC airbag inflator design and manufacture, including the use\n\nof friction welding without a process for inspecting the center support for weld\n\nflash, before the inflators were produced and installed. Id. \u00b6 266. It also alleges\n\nthat the use of phase stabilized ammonium nitrate (PSAN) is considered\n\n\u201coverly risky and inappropriate by most in the scientific, research, safety,\n\nAutomaker, and supplier manufacturing communities,\u201d that \u201cTakata\u2019s use of\n\nPSAN in its deadly airbag inflators focused the industry\u2019s attention on the\n\npotential for PSAN to be volatile,\u201d and that Defendants knew that \u201cARC\u2019s\n\nairbag inflator housing needed to, at least, incorporate features that mitigate\n\n\n\n\n                                           97\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353         Filed 10/02/26   Page 98 of 246\n\n\n\n\nagainst structural failure due to the risk of excessive pressure\u201d resulting from\n\nPSAN use. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 280\u2013281, 280 n. 39. But according to the SAC, the\n\napproved ARC airbag inflator design did not include a pressure relief\n\nmechanism and used a welding method that produced asymmetrical and\n\nunstable weld flash. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 283, 297\u2013299. The SAC also alleges that\n\nDefendants\u2019   knowledge     of   the   Inflator    Defect   continued   to   grow\n\npost-production because there were multiple ARC inflator ruptures during\n\nARC\u2019s LAT (i.e., during lot testing), of which the Airbag Suppliers and the\n\nAutomakers were notified, and there were several ARC inflator ruptures in the\n\nfield. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 9\u201310. And it further alleges that Defendants gained additional\n\nknowledge about evaluating the propensity of the ARC airbag inflators to fail\n\nonce the NHTSA investigation, launched in 2015, was underway. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 308,\n\n310\u201311, 318, 325\u201326.\n\n      Together, these allegations raise a plausible inference that all three sets\n\nof Defendants knew of the Defect pre-production and that their knowledge base\n\ncontinued to grow as they investigated the LAT ruptures, from the field\n\nruptures, and from the information shared and learned during the NHTSA\n\ninvestigation. Plaintiffs do more than \u201csimply allege that testing was\n\ncompleted and showed a defect.\u201d Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 530 F.\n\nSupp. 3d 1183, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2021). Rather they recount the detailed failure\n\ntesting process in place; they further allege that the Airbag Module and the\n\nAutomakers were integrally involved in that process; and they also allege\n\n\n\n\n                                          98\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 99 of 246\n\n\n\n\nknowledge in the industry of the risk that PSAN use presented. See Sowa, 764\n\nF. Supp. 3d at 1281 (finding that although the plaintiffs did not specify what\n\ntest results showed, detailed allegations of the defendants\u2019 pre-sale testing and\n\nmonitoring of corrosion-related issues plausibly supported knowledge of the\n\ndefect).\n\n             d. Duty to Disclose the Inflator Defect\n\n       Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims are premised on Defendants\u2019 concealment of and\n\nfailure to disclose the Inflator Defect. See e.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 2614\u20132622, 2629\u2013\n\n2640 (alleging, as to the statutory consumer protection and the fraud claims\n\nunder New Hampshire law (Counts 30(c), (d)), that Defendants failed to\n\ndisclose and concealed the Inflator Defect). Both the Airbag Suppliers and the\n\nU.S. Automakers argue that the SAC fails to allege facts supporting their duty\n\nto disclose and that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their fraud claims in the\n\nabsence of that duty. [Docs. 178-1 at 34\u201335; 181-1 at 43\u201346]. Although they\n\nraise the same issue, because the briefs broach the issue from different angles,\n\nthe Court separately takes up the arguments asserted by each set of\n\nDefendants in turn, first addressing the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 arguments and then\n\nturning to the U.S. Automakers\u2019 arguments.\n\n               i.   Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Duty\n\n       The Airbag Suppliers argue that their role was limited to supplying the\n\nAutomaker with airbag modules, that in that role, they did not interact with\n\n\n\n\n                                          99\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 100 of 246\n\n\n\n\n(or even know the identity of) any Plaintiff, and that they had no practical\n\nability to disclose the Defect. 30 [Doc. 178-1 at 36\u201337].\n\n       As to the argument of the lack of ability to disclose, the SAC alleges that\n\nDefendants had the means to convey the Inflator Defect, including through\n\nlabels, stickers, placards, pamphlets, and by full and complete recalls. To the\n\nextent the Airbag Suppliers contend that these means of disclosure were\n\nunavailable to them as a practical matter, this is not the stage to flesh out that\n\nfactual debate.\n\n       Regarding their argument of a lack of duty to disclose, the Airbag\n\nSuppliers contend that Plaintiffs cannot maintain fraud claims against them\n\nin the following 42 jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,\n\nColorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,\n\nHawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,\n\nMaryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New\n\nHampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North\n\nDakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South\n\n\n\n       30 They also argue that to the extent they owed any duty to disclose, that\n\nduty was to the respective Automakers they supplied, but because the SAC\nalleges that the Automakers knew of the Defect, the learned intermediary\ndoctrine precludes claims against the Airbag Module Defendants based on\ntheir failure to disclose. [Doc. 178-1 at 36 n.9]. But the Airbag Module\nDefendants fail to rebut Plaintiffs\u2019 challenge that they offer no law applying\nthe doctrine to the fraud and statutory consumer protection claims at issue\nhere. The Court, thus, considers the Airbag Module Defendants to have\nconceded this point, and in the absence of relevant authority declines to apply\nthe learned intermediary doctrine as the Airbag Module Defendants propose.\n\n\n\n                                           100\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 101 of 246\n\n\n\n\nDakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and\n\nWyoming law. [Doc. 178-1 at 38\u201341]. These jurisdictions, the Airbag\n\nDefendants argue, require conditions that are lacking here\u2014a relationship, a\n\nsales transaction, or other dealings between them and Plaintiffs or an\n\naffirmative, misleading statement by them\u2014to impose a disclosure duty. [Id.]\n\n      \u201cAlthough, generally, a duty to speak arises if there is a confidential\n\nrelationship between the parties, a duty to speak may arise if there are special\n\ncircumstances mandating disclosure.\u201d Takata II, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1337.\n\nPlaintiffs respond that the law of various states recognizes a duty to disclose\n\nbased on the three \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d at play here. [Doc. 220 at 32\u201338].\n\nFirst, Plaintiffs maintain that the exception where a critical safety defect exists\n\napplies here because the Inflator Defect presents a safety concern and that\n\nAlabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,\n\nTexas, and Virginia recognize a duty under this exception. [Id. at 33]. They\n\nalso maintain that their nationwide fraud claim under Georgia law against the\n\nAirbag Suppliers survives for the same reason. [Id.] Second, they assert that\n\nthe Airbag Suppliers\u2019 superior knowledge (as compared to Plaintiffs\n\nknowledge) triggers a duty to disclose in 24 states (i.e., Alabama; Arkansas;\n\nConnecticut;    Florida;   Idaho;   Indiana;     Louisiana;   Maine;   Maryland;\n\nMassachusetts; Michigan; Montana; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey;\n\nNew York; North Carolina; Ohio; Oklahoma; South Carolina; Texas; Vermont;\n\nVirginia; and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia. [Id. at 34\u201335]. Third,\n\n\n\n\n                                           101\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 102 of 246\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiffs contend that the SAC alleges active concealment, which triggers a\n\nduty to disclose under the laws 10 states (i.e., Arkansas; Connecticut;\n\nDelaware; Illinois; New York; North Carolina; Oregon; Pennsylvania;\n\nVermont; and Virginia). [Id. at 36\u201338].\n\n      As a preliminary matter, of the 42 jurisdictions in which the Airbag\n\nSuppliers maintain they had no duty to disclose, Plaintiffs fail to identify any\n\nspecial circumstance supporting a duty (in the absence of some relationship\n\nbetween the parties or the defendant\u2019s misstatement, which are not alleged\n\nhere) recognized in the following 13 states: Alaska; Arizona; Colorado; Hawaii;\n\nKansas; Kentucky; Mississippi; New Mexico; North Dakota; South Dakota;\n\nUtah; West Virginia; and Wyoming. 31 Thus, Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against the\n\nAirbag Suppliers for fraud by omission and by concealment under the laws of\n\nthe above-mentioned states are not viable.\n\n      As to the three exceptions Plaintiffs advance, none of the cases on which\n\nPlaintiffs rely apply the relevant exception in the absence of either a\n\n\n      31  For Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Utah, West Virginia, and\nWyoming, Plaintiffs contend generally that the Airbag Module Defendants\u2019\nargument that these states require a sales transaction is merely a variant of\nthe argument that a fiduciary or special relationship is required to impose a\nduty to disclose. [Doc. 220 at 38]. Plaintiffs maintain that this argument \u201cfails\nfor the same reason.\u201d [Doc. 220 at 38]. That reason, presumably, is that these\nstates recognize one or more of the special circumstances that Plaintiffs\nidentify. However, Plaintiffs provide no authority to show that these states\napply any of the exceptions on which they rely. And furthermore, as discussed\nbelow, none of the state-specific cases Plaintiffs cite support the imposition of\na duty to disclose on the Airbag Module Defendants under the exceptions\nPlaintiffs identify. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by this generalized\nargument.\n\n\n\n                                          102\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 103 of 246\n\n\n\n\nrelationship between the plaintiff and the defendant or a misrepresentation.\n\nThe Court discusses below each of the three exceptions on which Plaintiffs rely\n\nand analyzes the authorities provided in support.\n\n                   (a) Critical Safety Defect\n\n      The cases on which Plaintiffs rely for a duty to disclose a critical safety\n\ndefect fail to support the imposition of this duty on an intermediate auto part\n\nmanufacturer and supplier whose product incorporates an allegedly defective\n\npart manufactured by another party. The case Plaintiffs cite for the Airbag\n\nSuppliers\u2019 duty to disclose under Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, South Carolina, and\n\nTexas law concern the manufactures and sellers of the allegedly defective\n\nvehicles. See In re Volkswagen Timing Chain Prod. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL\n\n1902160, at *3 (D.N.J. May 8, 2017) (\u201cVW Timing Chain\u201d). Indeed, Georgia\n\ncases \u201cfind[ing] a duty to disclose outside of the confidential relationship\n\ncontext have involved at least some relationship between the parties,\u201d but such\n\na relationship is absent where \u201cDefendants had [no] direct knowledge of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 purchases of the vehicles in question and had no apparent\n\nrelationship with Plaintiffs.\u201d McCabe v. Daimler AG, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1337,\n\n1351 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (\u201cMcCabe II\u201d). Here, Plaintiffs point to no allegation that\n\nraises an inference of a relationship between the Airbag Suppliers and\n\nPlaintiffs or even that these Defendants knew of Plaintiffs\u2019 purchase or lease\n\ntransactions.\n\n      Similarly, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 257 F. Supp. 3d\n\n372 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (\u201cGM Ignition Switch\u201d), cabined the duty to disclose under\n\n\n                                         103\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 104 of 246\n\n\n\n\nAlabama and Illinois law to a defendant who made incomplete representations\n\nabout the safety of the allegedly defective vehicles. Here, Plaintiffs do not\n\nallege that the Airbag Suppliers made any representations to them, much less\n\nincomplete representations about the safety of their airbag modules. While In\n\nre Gen. Motors Air Conditioning Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 406 F. Supp.\n\n3d 618, 637\u201339 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (\u201cGM Air Conditioning\u201d) imposed a duty to\n\ndisclose on an auto manufacturer and seller under Florida law, it did so based\n\non the seller\u2019s alleged \u201cexclusive knowledge\u201d in the context of a \u201cbuyer-seller\n\nrelationship[].\u201d 406 F. Supp. 3d at 638 (quoting Majdipour v. Jaguar Land\n\nRover N. Am., LLC, 2015 WL 1270958, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2015). The facts\n\nas alleged in the SAC do not support a buyer-seller relationship between\n\nPlaintiffs and the Airbag Suppliers. Finally, Plaintiffs\u2019 authority for a duty to\n\ndisclose under Pennsylvania and Virginia law concerns the duty of auto\n\nmanufacturers and distributors. See Zwiercan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2003 WL\n\n1848571, at *2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 18, 2003) *2 (acknowledging auto\n\nmanufacture\u2019s duty to disclose a life-threatening defect under Pennsylvania\n\nlaw); McCabe I, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1353, 1368\u201369 (duty to disclose under\n\nVirgina law for an auto manufacturer and a distributor of allegedly defective\n\nvehicles). In short, there is no support for Plaintiffs\u2019 position that the Airbag\n\nSuppliers\u2014the manufacturers and suppliers of the airbag modules housing the\n\nallegedly defective ARC inflators\u2014had a duty to disclose the alleged critical\n\nsafety defect. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their fraud claims against the\n\n\n\n\n                                         104\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT          Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 105 of 246\n\n\n\n\nAirbag     Suppliers    under   Alabama,    Georgia,   Florida,   Illinois,   Ohio,\n\nPennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia law based on the theory\n\nthat these Defendants had a duty to disclose the alleged critical safety defect.\n\nAnd, because Georgia law does not impose a duty to disclose on the Airbag\n\nSuppliers under the circumstances alleged, Plaintiffs\u2019 nationwide fraud claim\n\n(Nationwide Count 1) against these Defendants, premised on Georgia law, also\n\nfails.\n\n                       (b) Superior Knowledge of the Defect\n\n         For a duty to disclose based on the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 superior\n\nknowledge, these Defendants argue that the \u201csuperior knowledge\u201d cases on\n\nwhich Plaintiffs rely impose a duty to disclose only where there is some\n\nrelationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. [Doc. 246 at 21\u201322]. The\n\nAirbag Suppliers are correct. For example, while Alabama law imposes a duty\n\nto disclose on a defendant with superior knowledge, In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep\n\nEcoDiesel Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 295 F. Supp. 3d 927,\n\n1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (\u201cEcoDiesel\u201d), it nonetheless requires a \u201csufficient\n\nrelationship\u201d between the parties. See Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc.,\n\n655 So. 2d 909, 920 (Ala. 1994), overruled on other grounds by State Farm Fire\n\n& Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 1998). The Airbag Suppliers thus\n\ncontend that Plaintiffs cannot maintain fraud claims based on a duty imposed\n\nby their superior knowledge because not only does the SAC fail to allege that\n\n\n\n\n                                           105\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 106 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthey had superior knowledge of the Inflator Defect, the necessary relationship\n\nbetween the parties is also absent here. [Doc. 246 at 21\u201322].\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers\u2019 first argument fails. The SAC sufficiently alleges\n\nthat the Airbag Suppliers had knowledge of the alleged Inflator Defect. Supra\n\n\u00a7 VI.B.2.c. And it further alleges that Plaintiffs had no way to know when they\n\nbought or leased that their Class Vehicles that their vehicles had an airbag\n\nwith the alleged defective ARC inflators. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142\u2013255.\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers\u2019 second argument, however, has merit. The law\n\nrequires some relationship or transaction between the parties, which is\n\nmissing here. Hines, for example, recognized \u201ca sufficient relationship\u201d to\n\nimpose a disclosure duty on the auto manufacturer because the new-car buyer\n\nplaintiffs were \u201cmembers of a group or class of persons who [the auto\n\nmanufacturer] expected or had special reason to expect would be influenced by\n\nits decision not to disclose information about the repainting of damaged\n\nautomobiles.\u201d 655 So. 2d at 920. Like the car buyers and auto manufacturer in\n\nHines, here, Plaintiffs and the Airbag Suppliers had no \u201ccontractual\n\nrelationship or other dealings.\u201d Id. at 919. But unlike in Hines where the\n\nplaintiffs bought the cars that the defendant manufactured, Plaintiffs did not\n\nbuy airbag modules that the Airbag Suppliers manufactured. And while the\n\nSAC alleges that the Airbag Suppliers remained silent about the alleged\n\nInflator Defect so that they could profit from the sales of Class Vehicles and\n\nthe defective ARC inflators, SAC I \u00b6 378, this allegation is too slim a reed to\n\n\n\n\n                                         106\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 107 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsupport an inference that the Airbag Suppliers therefore considered Plaintiffs\n\nin the ambit of those whom they had special reason to expect would be\n\ninfluenced by their failure to disclose.\n\n      The laws of the other states Plaintiffs invoke also fail to support\n\nimposing a duty on the Airbag Suppliers based on their superior knowledge.\n\nFor instance, Plaintiffs rely on EcoDiesel for a duty to disclose in Maine.\n\nHowever, EcoDiesel merely indicates that Maine supports a duty \u201cdepending\n\non the facts of the case.\u201d 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 (quoting Martin v. Ort, 2016\n\nWL 1069907, at *3 n.3 (Me. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2016)). This general statement\n\nfails to establish that, in Maine, a supply chain intermediary\u2019s superior\n\nknowledge imposes a duty to disclose on that party. 32\n\n      The same holds for Roe v. Ford Motor Co., 2021 WL 2529825, at *12\n\n(E.D. Mich. June 21, 2021), which concerns an auto manufacturer and simply\n\nindicates that Arkansas recognizes that \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d may extend\n\nthe duty to disclose to instances beyond those where the parties have a\n\ncontractual or fiduciary relationship. To impose a such a duty, the court\n\nconsiders the \u201ccircumstances surrounding the transaction which give rise to a\n\nrelationship that requires disclosure.\u201d Lambert v. Firstar Bank, N.A., 83 Ark.\n\n\n\n      32 In fact, although Plaintiffs cite to EcoDiesel\u2019s statement on Maine law\n\nin arguing for a duty based on a superior knowledge, the thrust of their\nargument is that a defendant\u2019s active concealment supports a duty to disclose.\n[Doc. 220 at 35 n.11]. The Court therefore additionally considers Plaintiffs\u2019\nargument regarding Maine law in the context of the active concealment\nexception.\n\n\n\n                                           107\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 108 of 246\n\n\n\n\nApp. 259, 265 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). But Plaintiffs point to no Arkansas\n\nauthority that indicates that a defendant\u2019s superior knowledge gives rise to a\n\nrelationship supporting a duty to disclose where the defendant neither\n\nmanufactured the vehicles at issue or the allegedly defective part in those\n\nvehicles.\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 argument for a duty to disclose under the law of the other\n\nstates they identify fares no better. See Rosen v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,\n\n2022 WL 20766104, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2022) (recognizing duty under\n\nConnecticut law for automaker\u2019s superior knowledge); Intelect Corp. v. Cellco\n\nP\u2019ship GP, 160 F. Supp. 3d 157, 187 (D.D.C. 2016) (acknowledging simply that\n\nD.C. law recognizes a duty to disclose where a \u201cmaterial fact is unobservable\n\nor undiscoverable\u201d in a suit by an alleged third-party beneficiary to a contract);\n\nVW Timing Chain, 2017 WL 1902160 at *19 n.9 (extending duty to disclose\n\nvehicle defect to automobile manufactures and sellers under Florida,\n\nMichigan, North Carolina, and New York law); Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho\n\n702, 707 (Idaho 2000) (recognizing disclosure duty under Idaho law specific to\n\nfiduciary or confidential relationships, misstatements, and contracting party);\n\nBledsoe v. FCA US LLC, 2023 WL 2619132, at *24\u201325 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23,\n\n2023) (recognizing duty to disclose under Idaho law in the context of third party\n\nbeneficiaries, fiduciary and confidential relationships, and misstatements);\n\nNorthrop Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 807 N.E.2d 70, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)\n\n(Indiana law recognizes duty to disclose for contracting party with superior\n\n\n\n\n                                          108\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 109 of 246\n\n\n\n\nknowledge); Bunge Corp. v. GATX Corp., 557 So. 2d 1376, 1384 (La. 1990)\n\n(considering \u201cthe relationship of the parties\u201d as a factor in imposing a duty to\n\ndisclose and recognizing a vendor\u2019s duty to share superior knowledge of\n\nmaterial fact with buyer); Rhee v. Highland Dev. Corp., 182 Md. App. 516, 535\u2013\n\n38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (imposing duty on real estate developer who\n\n\u201csuccessfully conceals a defect from his initial purchaser\u201d to disclose actively\n\nconcealed material fact to subsequent purchasers); Morrow v. Bank of Am.,\n\nN.A., 375 Mont. 38, 57 (Mont. 2014) (addressing a lender/borrower relationship\n\nand noting that a party with superior knowledge may have a duty to disclose\n\nto the other party); Ingaharro v. Blanchette, 122 N.H. 54, 57 (N.H. 1982)\n\n(noting, in the context of a real property sale, that some courts impose a duty\n\non the seller to disclose a latent defect to the buyer); Matanky v. Gen. Motors\n\nLLC, 370 F. Supp. 3d 772, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (acknowledging that \u201c[i]n\n\nNevada, a party\u2019s superior knowledge imposes a duty to speak in certain\n\ntransactions\u201d but that \u201cat a minimum, some form of relationship between the\n\nparties\u201d is required (citation modified)); Catalano v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2016\n\nWL 3406125, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016) (finding duty to disclose vehicle\n\ndefect under New York law for auto maker and seller); Citizens State Bank v.\n\nFDIC, 639 F. Supp. 758, 763 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (under Oklahoma law, superior\n\nknowledge and justifiable reliance may raise a duty to disclose in the context\n\nof a loan agreement); Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 403 (S.C. 1972)\n\n(recognizing duty to disclose latent defect under South Carolina law in real\n\n\n\n\n                                         109\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT          Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 110 of 246\n\n\n\n\nestate transaction); McCabe I, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (finding that Texas law\n\nsupports an automaker\u2019s and a distributor\u2019s duty to disclose superior\n\nknowledge of defect); Vinci v. V.F. Corp., 2018 WL 1027429, at *9 (D. Vt. Feb.\n\n21, 2018) (concluding that Vermont law supports vendor\u2019s duty to disclose\n\nsuperior knowledge of a material fact to buyer, based on the parties\u2019 course of\n\ndealing); Chapman v. Gen. Motors LLC, 531 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1291 (E.D. Mich.\n\n2021) (finding automaker has duty to disclose defect under Virginia law); and\n\nOllerman v. O\u2019Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 41\u201342 (Wis. 1980) (duty on real estate\n\nseller to disclose material facts to buyer under Wisconsin law). These cases\n\nshow that some transaction or relationship must undergird a defendant\u2019s duty\n\nto disclose. But the facts alleged fail to satisfy this requirement as to the Airbag\n\nSuppliers. 33\n\n       Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their fraud claims against the\n\nAirbag Suppliers under Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of\n\nColumbia,       Florida,    Idaho,   Indiana,    Louisiana,   Maine,    Maryland,\n\nMassachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,\n\n\n       33 Plaintiffs alsorely on the following cases for the proposition that\ncertain states do not require a fiduciary relationship to impose a duty to\ndisclose: EcoDiesel, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1008\u201312 (Massachusetts, Maryland,\nNew Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina); Schmitz v. Nat\u2019l Collegiate Athletic\nAss\u2019n, 67 N.E.3d 852, 870\u201371 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (Ohio); and Sutton v. David\nStanley Chevrolet, Inc., 475 P.3d 847, 854 (Okla. 2020), as corrected (Oct. 21,\n2020) (Oklahoma). The Court, however, is not prepared to craft a duty to\ndisclose specific to the Airbag Module Defendants based on this general,\nunexceptional statement. And Plaintiffs provide no case law indicating that\nthese states would recognize a duty to disclose based on the Airbag Module\nDefendants\u2019 superior knowledge under the facts at alleged here.\n\n\n\n                                           110\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 111 of 246\n\n\n\n\nNew York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont,\n\nVirginia, and Wisconsin law based on the theory that these Defendants had a\n\nduty to disclose their alleged superior knowledge.\n\n                    (c) Active Concealment of the Defect\n\n      Based on the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 active concealment, Plaintiffs contend\n\nthat \u201cseveral states\u201d (i.e., Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine,\n\nNew York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia)\n\neither impose a duty to disclose or do not require a duty to disclose. [Doc. 220\n\nat 35 n.11, 36\u201338]. Plaintiffs\u2019 state-specific authority indicates that conduct\n\nbeyond mere silence is required to impose or suspend the requirement for a\n\nduty to disclose. That is, to support their fraud claims against the Airbag\n\nSuppliers, Plaintiffs must allege an \u201cactive\u201d or affirmative act of concealment.\n\n[See Doc. 220 at 35 n. 11, 36 n.12]. According to Plaintiffs, the SAC sufficiently\n\ndoes so by alleging that Defendants (which includes the Airbag Suppliers)\n\nknew about and investigated the Inflator Defect over many years but did not\n\ndisclose the Defect to the NHTSA or launch a comprehensive recall. [Id. at\n\n36\u201337]. The Court disagrees.\n\n      At most, the SAC alleges inaction by the Airbag Suppliers; it does not\n\nallege any active steps by them to conceal the alleged Defect. That is, the\n\nallegation that the Airbag Suppliers knew about and investigated the Defect\n\ndoes not suffice to indicate active concealment. Similarly, these Defendants\u2019\n\nfailure to recall the airbag modules with the defective ARC inflators and to\n\ndisclose the Defect to the NHTSA, without more, also does not show active\n\n\n                                          111\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 112 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsteps to conceal the Defect. Although Plaintiffs cite to paragraphs 4\u20135, 7\u20138,\n\n10\u201315, 335\u201374, 376\u201379, and 414\u201321 of the SAC in support, they fail to explain\n\nhow any fact-based allegations in these paragraphs pertain to the Airbag\n\nSuppliers\u2019 active concealment. Indeed, the cited allegations go to Defendants\u2019\n\nknowledge of the Defect, to the Automakers\u2019 recall decisions, to ARC\u2019s and the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 involvement in the NHTSA investigation, or to the materiality of\n\nthe Defect and Defendants\u2019 silence. While the SAC also alleges that \u201cARC\n\nworked with others to conceal\u201d the Defect and had \u201chelp\u201d from the Airbag\n\nSuppliers and the Automakers, SAC I \u00b6 8, this allegation is conclusory, failing\n\nto identify any independent or concerted affirmative conduct by the Airbag\n\nSuppliers.\n\n      Relying on EcoDiesel, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1008, and In re Toyota\n\nAcceleration, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1192, Plaintiffs argue that the Airbag\n\nSuppliers\u2019 failure to disclose the alleged Inflator Defect to the NHTSA\n\nconstitutes an active act of concealment. Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance is misplaced. In\n\nEcoDiesel, the defendants allegedly developed and implemented \u201cdefeat\n\ndevices\u201d that allowed the vehicles at issue to \u201csimulate passing the EPA\n\n[Environmental Protection Agency] and CARB [California Ari Resources\n\nBoard] emission testing\u201d but did not disclose the devices on their EPA and\n\nCARB applications, which lead to the approval of the vehicles for sale. 295 F.\n\nSupp. 3d at 943. There, the installed devices were allegedly purposefully\n\nmanipulated to allow vehicles lacking \u201cproper emissions control under normal\n\n\n\n\n                                        112\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 113 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndriving conditions\u201d to pass emissions tests, i.e., were inherently deceptive, and\n\nthere was a requirement to disclose the presence of these devices to the\n\nregulators during the process to gain sales approval. 295 F. Supp. 3d 927, 943,\n\n977, 1012. The allegations in EcoDiesel thus indicated that the defendants\n\naffirmatively concealed by cheating their way to regulatory approval (or by\n\nfacilitating the applicant\u2019s cheating). But Plaintiffs\u2019 allegation that the Airbag\n\nSuppliers failed to share their knowledge with the NHTSA does not rise to that\n\nlevel. Likewise, in In re Toyota Acceleration, the plaintiffs alleged more than\n\nsimply that the defendant failed to disclose the defect to the NHTSA. Rather,\n\nthere, the complaint alleged that the defendant actively concealed the defect\n\nby withholding relevant customer complaints and misstating evidence. 754 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 1192. The SAC makes no such allegations regarding the Airbag\n\nSuppliers. The Court concludes that the SAC fails to allege that the Airbag\n\nSuppliers actively concealed the Inflator Defect. As such, Plaintiffs cannot\n\nmaintain their fraud claims against the Airbag Suppliers under Arkansas,\n\nConnecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,\n\nPennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia law based on these Defendants\u2019 alleged\n\nactive concealment of the Defect.\n\n      In sum, the Court GRANTS the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Motion, [Doc. 178], to\n\nthe extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims\n\nagainst the Airbag Suppliers under the common law of Alabama (Count (1)(d)),\n\nAlaska (Count 2(d)), Arizona (Count (3)(d)), Arkansas (Count 4(d)), Colorado\n\n\n\n\n                                          113\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 114 of 246\n\n\n\n\n(Count 6(d)), Connecticut (Count 7(d)), Delaware (Count 8(e)), District of\n\nColumbia (Count 9(d)), Florida (Count 10(d)), Georgia (Count 11(e)), Hawaii\n\n(Count 12(d)), Idaho (Count 13(d)), Illinois (Count 14(e)), Indiana (Count\n\n15(d)), Kansas (Count 17(d)), Kentucky (Count 18(d)), Louisiana (Count 19(c)),\n\nMaine (Count 20(d)), Maryland (Count 21(d)), Massachusetts (Count 22(d)),\n\nMichigan (Count 23(d)), Mississippi (Count 25(d)), Montana (Count 27(d)),\n\nNevada (Count 29(d)), New Hampshire (Count 30(d)), New Jersey (Count\n\n31(d)), New Mexico (Count 32(d)), New York (Count 33(e)), North Carolina\n\n(Count 34(d)), North Dakota (Count 35(d)), Ohio (Count 36(e)), Oklahoma\n\n(Count 37(d)), Oregon (Count 38(d)), Pennsylvania (Count 39(d)), South\n\nCarolina (Count 41(e)), South Dakota (Count 42(d)), Texas (Count 44(d)), Utah\n\n(Count 45(e)), Vermont (Count 46(d)), Virginia (Count 47(d)), West Virginia\n\n(Count 49(d)), Wisconsin (Count 50(d)), and Wyoming (Count 51(d)). And,\n\nbecause Georgia law does not impose a duty to disclose on the Airbag Suppliers\n\nunder the circumstances alleged, Plaintiffs\u2019 nationwide fraud claim\n\n(Nationwide Count 1) against these Defendants, premised on Georgia law, also\n\nfails and is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.\n\n              ii.   Automakers\u2019 Duty\n\n      In turn, the U.S. Automakers challenge Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims under\n\nthe laws of the following 22 states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,\n\nFlorida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,\n\nMissouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South\n\n\n\n\n                                        114\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 115 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCarolina, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. 34 [Doc. 181-1 at 43\u201346]. The Court has\n\ndismissed eight of the challenged fraud claims under the economic loss rule,\n\nbut it nevertheless addresses the U.S. Automakers\u2019 alternative argument for\n\nthe dismissal of those claims.\n\n      As they do in their opposition to the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 challenge,\n\nPlaintiffs maintain that the facts alleged support one or more special\n\ncircumstances that either impart or excuse the duty to disclose under the laws\n\nof many states. In addition to the three special circumstances discussed above\n\n(i.e., superior knowledge, critical safety concern, and active concealment),\n\nPlaintiffs additionally identify the Automakers\u2019 incomplete representations of\n\nthe Class Vehicle\u2019s safety and dependability as a fourth applicable special\n\ncircumstance. [Doc. 221 at 49\u201353]. Below, the Court addresses the Parties\u2019\n\narguments as to each basis for the Automakers\u2019 duty to disclose.\n\n      The U.S. Automakers recognize that under the laws of California, Iowa,\n\nMassachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina, and Vermont, the\n\ndefendant\u2019s exclusive or superior knowledge of a material fact triggers the duty\n\nto disclose, but they argue that the SAC does not allege that Defendants had\n\nsuch knowledge. [Doc. 181-1 at 45]. This argument fails. Not only does the SAC\n\n\n\n\n      34 The U.S. Automakers also argue that Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims for Arkansas, California, Georgia, Montana, New\nYork, and North Carolina fail for the SAC\u2019s failure to allege facts to support a\nduty to disclose. [Doc. 181-1 at 43\u201346]. The Court addresses this argument\nlater, in the section discussing the viability of Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer\nprotection claims.\n\n\n                                         115\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 116 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsufficiently allege that the Automakers had knowledge of the alleged Inflator\n\nDefect, supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.c., it also alleges that Plaintiffs did not have that\n\nknowledge at the time of sale or lease. See SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142\u2013255. Thus, the SAC\n\nsufficiently alleges that the Automakers\u2019 knowledge of the Inflator Defect was\n\nsuperior to Plaintiffs, and due to that superior knowledge, the Automakers had\n\nthe duty to disclose the Inflator Defect under the laws of the above-mentioned\n\nstates.\n\n      This leaves unresolved the U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge to Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nfraud claims under Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Illinois,\n\nIndiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina,\n\nTexas, and Virginia law. Thus, the Court next turns to whether Plaintiffs\n\nsuccessfully counter the U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge as to the fraud claims for\n\nthese 16 states under any of the three other special circumstances at issue.\n\n      According to Plaintiffs, defects that pose safety concerns are sufficiently\n\nmaterial to impart a duty to disclose. [Doc. 221 at 51 (citing McCabe I and\n\nLassen v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1286-87 (C.D. Cal. 2016))].\n\nPlaintiffs do not specify the challenged states that recognize a duty to disclose\n\nsuch defects. However, McCabe I, the case Plaintiffs cite, indicates that\n\nGeorgia, 35 Texas, and Virginia recognize that a party has the duty to disclose\n\n\n\n      35 The U.S. Automakers contend that Georgia law will not impose a duty\n\nto disclose under any circumstance absent \u201ca fiduciary or other relationship of\ntrust or confidence\u201d between the parties. [Doc. 181-1 at 27]. It is apparent that\nGeorgia law requires \u201cat least some relationship between the parties\u201d McCabe\nII, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 1351 (emphasis added). At this early stage, the Court\n\n                                         116\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 117 of 246\n\n\n\n\na material fact, such as a safety defect, that the other party is unaware of, and\n\nthat Florida recognizes this duty where the party has superior knowledge. 948\n\nF. Supp. 2d at 1369\u201372. Here, the SAC alleges that the Inflator Defect presents\n\na safety issue, that the Plaintiffs could not and did not know of the Defect at\n\nthe time of sale or lease, that the Automakers had knowledge of the Defect at\n\nor before the time that Plaintiffs purchased or leased their Class Vehicles, and\n\nthat the Automakers were aware that Plaintiffs did not expect their airbags to\n\nbe defective. These alleged facts sufficiently support the Automakers\u2019 duty to\n\ndisclose the Inflator Defect under Georgia (limited to Plaintiffs who bought or\n\nleased vehicles from authorized dealers), Florida, Texas, and Virginia law.\n\n      For active concealment, Plaintiffs rely on EcoDiesel for the proposition\n\nthat \u201can act of affirmative concealment by the defendant effectively negates\n\nthe duty to disclose requirement.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 52 (quoting EcoDiesel, 295 F.\n\nSupp. 3d at 1008)]. Of the remaining 10 challenged states, EcoDiesel discusses\n\n\n\n\ncannot say that there is no relationship between Plaintiffs and the\nAutomakers. The SAC alleges that the Automakers sold their vehicles through\ntheir network of dealers, issued an express written warranty, and that this\nwarranty formed the basis of the bargain for Plaintiffs\u2019 purchase or lease of the\nClass Vehicles. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b627; SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 440-41, 1132\u201333, 1201-02.\nAlthough a slim reed, these allegations support the inference of a relationship\nbetween those Georgia Plaintiffs who bought their vehicles from an\nAutomaker\u2019s authorized dealer (i.e., Plaintiffs Dwayne Stowe, Latasha Tinch,\nand Nelson Yerger) and that Automaker. To be clear, the SAC contains no\nindication of a relationship between the Automakers and Georgia Plaintiffs\nwho bought used vehicles from third-party dealers or other sources unaffiliated\nwith the Automakers; accordingly, those Plaintiffs cannot maintain a fraud\nclaim under Georgia law.\n\n\n                                         117\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 118 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe law of only two\u2014South Carolina and New Jersey. 36 EcoDiesel\u2019s discussion\n\nof New Jersey law is limited to acknowledging that New Jersey generally\n\nrecognizes a duty to disclose based on the parties\u2019 relationship, \u201ccustoms in the\n\ntrade,\u201d or \u201cother objective circumstances.\u201d 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. In short,\n\nEcoDiesel does not establish that New Jersey law triggers the duty to disclose,\n\nor waives its absence, where the plaintiff alleges fraud by active concealment.\n\nBut it indicates that South Carolina does. 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1010. Thus, to\n\nthe extent that the SAC alleges active concealment (as opposed to inaction,\n\nsuch as silence) by the Automakers, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge to\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 fraud claim under South Carolina law fails. 37\n\n      The Parties disagree over whether the SAC alleges facts supporting the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 active concealment of the Inflator Defect. [Docs. 181-1 at 45\u201346;\n\n\n\n      36 The other states that EcoDiesel discusses are either not part of the\n\nU.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge or are those states that impart a duty to disclose\nbased on superior knowledge (e.g., Massachusetts).\n      37 Under South Carolina law, a duty to disclose may arise where \u201cthe\n\ncircumstances of the case, the nature of [the parties\u2019] dealings, or [the parties]\nposition towards each other\u201d imply a relationship of trust or confidence. Harrell\nv. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 517 F. Supp. 3d 527, 539 (D.S.C. 2021) (quoting\nRegions Bank v. Schmauch, 582 S.E.2d 432, 445 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)). In\nHarrell, the court denied an automobile manufacture\u2019s motion to dismiss the\nfraudulent concealment claim because the plaintiff alleged that the\nmanufacturer had pre-existing knowledge of the alleged manufacturing defect\nbut took active steps, including issuing a series of technical service bulletins\nthat cast the defect as \u201ca normal feature,\u201d to conceal the defect and these\n\u201callegations could \u2018constitute circumstances\u2019 or \u2018nature of dealings\u2019 that give\nrise to a duty to speak.\u201d 517 F. Supp. 3d at 529. Here too Plaintiffs allege that\nthe Automakers had preexisting knowledge of the defect at issue and, to the\nextent that they sufficiently allege the Automakers\u2019 active concealment of that\ndefect, their South Carolina-law based fraud claim survives.\n\n\n                                          118\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 119 of 246\n\n\n\n\n221 at 52]. The U.S. Automakers maintain that the SAC does not allege facts\n\nsupporting the Automakers\u2019 pre-existing knowledge much less any affirmative\n\naction by them to conceal that knowledge. [Doc. 181-1 at 45\u201347]. This failure,\n\naccording to the U.S. Automakers, dooms Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims for states,\n\nsuch as Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, and North\n\nCarolina, that require allegations of affirmative acts of concealment. [Id.]\n\nBecause Plaintiffs have shown that one of the other special circumstances\n\ntriggers the Automakers\u2019 duty to disclose under California, Florida,\n\nMassachusetts, and North Carolina law, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs\u2019 active\n\nconcealment allegations remain relevant only as to their fraud claims under\n\nArizona and Indiana law and based on Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on EcoDiesel, under\n\nSouth Carolina law.\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 point to paragraphs 8, 376\u201379, and 414(f) of the SAC to show\n\nthat they plausibly allege the Automakers\u2019 active concealment. [Doc. 221 at\n\n52]. But the referenced, factually supported allegations concern Defendants\u2019\n\nfailure to disclose the Defect, i.e., their inaction or silence. Specifically,\n\nparagraphs 376\u201379 of the SAC allege that the existence of the Inflator Defect\n\nwas a material fact, that each entity in the airbag supply chain\u2014i.e., ARC, the\n\nAirbag Suppliers, and the Automakers\u2014chose not to disclose it through any of\n\nthe available means of disclosure, and that Defendants\u2019 intent was to mislead\n\nconsumers. Similarly, paragraph 414(f) of the SAC goes to Defendants\u2019\n\ninaction; it asserts that although Defendants were aware of the Defect, they\n\n\n\n\n                                        119\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 120 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfailed to inform consumers, disclose the defect to the NHTSA, or launch a\n\ncomprehensive recall. But silence is not active concealment. See United States\n\nv. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 2000) (\u201c[T]he common law clearly\n\ndistinguishes between concealment and nondisclosure. The former is\n\ncharacterized by deceptive acts or contrivances intended to hide information[,]\u201d\n\n\u201c[t]he latter is characterized by mere silence.\u201d). And although Plaintiffs cite\n\nparagraph 8 of the SAC, which asserts that \u201cARC worked with others to\n\nconceal\u201d the Defect and had \u201chelp\u201d from the Automakers in doing so, this is a\n\nconclusory assertion, supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.d.i.c., and Plaintiffs fail to identify any\n\nfactual allegations in the SAC that support it. Indeed, the section of the SAC\n\ntitled \u201cDefendants\u2019 Concealment of the Defect\u201d points exclusively to\n\nDefendants\u2019 silence. See SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 376\u201379. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to show\n\nthat the Automakers had a duty to disclose the Defect under the common law\n\nof fraud in Arizona, Indiana, and South Carolina.\n\n      Last up is Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the Automakers\u2019 incomplete\n\nrepresentations about the safety and reliability of the Class Vehicles (i.e., the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 \u201chalf-truth\u201d) triggered their duty to disclose the Inflator Defect\n\n(i.e., the \u201cwhole truth\u201d). [Doc. 221 at 52]. The two cases Plaintiffs advance in\n\nsupport indicate that under Alabama, California, and Florida law a partial\n\nrepresentation triggers the duty to disclose. See Takata II, 193 F. Supp. 3d at\n\n1337\u201338 (applying Alabama law); In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action\n\nLitig., 2015 WL 12732461, at *18 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2015) (applying California\n\n\n\n\n                                         120\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 121 of 246\n\n\n\n\nand Florida law). The U.S. Automakers further acknowledge that Indiana\n\nrecognizes the duty where partial misrepresentations are made to the plaintiff.\n\n[Doc. 181-1 at 45]. But they maintain that the SAC fails to allege facts\n\nsufficient to show that the Automakers made such misrepresentations. [Id.].\n\nAlthough the SAC does not identify the materials specifically, it alleges that\n\nthrough \u201cadvertisements, promotional materials and other public statements,\u201d\n\neach Automaker \u201cuniform[ly] and pervasive[ly] market[ed] [the] message that\n\nits vehicles are safe and dependable\u201d and that Plaintiffs were exposed to that\n\nmarketing message. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142, 144, 151, 186, 223. These\n\nallegations suffice to support the position that the Automakers made\n\nincomplete representations about the safety and reliability of the Class\n\nVehicles and, thus, that they had a duty to disclose the Inflator Defect under\n\nthe laws of Alabama, California, Florida, and Indiana.\n\n      In sum, of the 22 fraud claims that the U.S. Automakers challenge for\n\nlack of a duty to disclose, Plaintiffs successfully show that one or more special\n\ncircumstance triggered the U.S. Automakers\u2019 duty to disclose the Inflator\n\nDefect under the laws of Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia (limited to\n\nPlaintiffs who bought or leased vehicles from authorized dealers), Indiana,\n\nIowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Vermont,\n\nand Virginia. Thus, while Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims under the laws of one or more\n\nof these states may fail for other reasons, they do not fail for the lack of the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 duty to disclose. However, Plaintiffs fail to identify a condition\n\n\n\n\n                                         121\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 122 of 246\n\n\n\n\ntriggering the Automakers\u2019 duty to disclose to support the remaining\n\nchallenged fraud claims. 38 Thus, the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nMotion, [Doc. 181], to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE\n\nPlaintiffs fraud by omission and concealment claims against the Automakers\n\nunder the law of Arizona (Count 3(d)), Arkansas (Count 4(d)), Georgia (Count\n\n5(e), as to Plaintiffs who acquired used Class Vehicles from sources unaffiliated\n\nwith the Automakers), Illinois (Count 14(e)), Kentucky (Count 18(d)), Michigan\n\n(Count 23(d)), Missouri (Count 26(d)), New Jersey (Count 31(d)), Ohio (Count\n\n36(e)), and South Carolina (Count 41(e)).\n\n             e. Reliance and Causation\n\n      The U.S. Automakers seek the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 common-law fraud\n\nclaims for Arkansas, Georgia, and Montana and their fraud-based claims for\n\nAlabama, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas,\n\nMaryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,\n\nPennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia, arguing that\n\nthese states require reliance and causation, which the SAC fails to allege. [Doc.\n\n\n      38 Plaintiffs repeatedly reference \u201cApp\u2019x B\u201d for state law in support of\n\ntheir arguments. [E.g., Doc. 221 at 52\u201353]. However, Appendix B to Plaintiffs\u2019\nresponse brief, [Doc. 221-2], contains case law regarding the issue of economic\nloss and manifestation only. They also cite to their response brief in opposition\nto the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 220], in support of the\nproposition that \u201care several bases that trigger the Automakers\u2019 duty to\ndisclose the Inflator Defect here.\u201d [Doc. 249 at 50 (citing AMD Opp. \u00a7 II.C.)].\nPlaintiffs make no effort to explain how the arguments and case law in the\ncited section of their opposition to the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Motion apply to the\nU.S. Automakers\u2019 Motion. Thus, to the extent that the citation is intended to\nincorporate the arguments and authority raised in section II.C. of Plaintiffs\u2019\nopposition to the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Motion, the Court rejects this effort.\n\n\n                                         122\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 123 of 246\n\n\n\n\n181-1 at 47]. Moreover, they contend that Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims for Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,\n\nFlorida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota,\n\nMissouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode\n\nIsland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Utah fail\n\nbecause the SAC does not allege causation. [Id.] The explanatory\n\nparentheticals accompanying the cases the U.S. Automakers cite, indicate that\n\nthe cited cases either support the general proposition that reliance, causation,\n\nor both are required under the laws of the specified state or that a plaintiff\n\nalleging fraud must specify the misrepresentations on which he or she relied.\n\n[See Doc. 181-7 at 17\u201321]. Relying on this authority, the U.S. Automakers\n\nclaim that Plaintiffs are required to allege that \u201cthey were aware of, and relied\n\nupon, specific misrepresentations or omissions, and that this reliance caused\n\ntheir damages.\u201d [Doc. 181-1 at 47]. But as Plaintiffs point out, in addition to\n\nalleging misstatements by the Automakers, the SAC alleges fraud based on\n\nomissions. [Doc. 221 at 53]. And the U.S. Automakers identify no authority,\n\nand the Court is aware of none, supporting their contention that Plaintiffs are\n\nrequired to allege that they were aware of Defendants\u2019 omission but,\n\nnevertheless, they relied on that omission to their detriment.\n\n      To the extent the thrust of the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument is that\n\nPlaintiffs fail to allege individualized facts showing reliance and causation,\n\nthis argument fails. Each Plaintiff alleges that he or she would have become\n\n\n\n\n                                         123\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 124 of 246\n\n\n\n\naware of a disclosure by the Automaker of the Inflator Defect in his or her\n\nClass Vehicle but that the relevant Automaker made no such disclosure before\n\nthe time of sale or lease and that he or she had no way to learn of the Defect.\n\nSAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142\u2013255. Each Plaintiff further alleges that he or she would not have\n\nbought the Class Vehicle or, at least, not paid as much for it if he or she had\n\nknown about the Defect. Id. The SAC sufficiently, albeit in a cookie cutter\n\nmanner, indicates each Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Defendants\u2019 omission and the\n\nresulting damages by alleging that Defendants, did not disclose the Defect,\n\neach Plaintiff relied on the non-disclosure, including the non-disclosure by the\n\nrelevant Automaker, in buying or leasing his or her Class Vehicle, and that,\n\nconsequently, each Plaintiff paid for a vehicle he or she would not have\n\notherwise bought or leased or overpaid for it. See, e.g., In re Takata Airbag\n\nProds. Liab. Litig., 462 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1318\u201319 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (\u201cTakata\n\nIII\u201d)   (declining   to   dismiss   nationwide-class   common-law      fraudulent\n\nconcealment and fraud-based statutory consumer protection claims under the\n\nlaws of various states over the sufficiency of the plaintiffs\u2019 reliance allegations\n\nwhere the plaintiffs alleged that they lacked knowledge of the omitted facts,\n\nwould not have acted as they did and would have either paid less for or not\n\nbought or leased their vehicles if they had known of the airbag defect). It is not\n\nimplausible in the context of the non-disclosure of a safety-related airbag defect\n\nfor the reliance and causation scenario alleged to apply to each Plaintiff. And\n\n\n\n\n                                           124\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 125 of 246\n\n\n\n\nbecause each Plaintiffs plausibly allege reliance and causation, the U.S.\n\nAutomakers fail to prevail on their argument.\n\n             f. Omission-Based Claims Not Recognized\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 common law fraud claims for Arkansas, Missouri, Montana,\n\nand Texas should be dismissed, the U.S. Automakers argue, because the\n\napplicable common law does not recognize independent fraudulent omission or\n\nconcealment claims. [Doc. 181-1 at 48\u201349]. While Arkansas, Montana, and\n\nTexas do not recognize fraudulent omission or concealment claims as\n\nindependent causes of action, Missouri does not bar such claims. In Arkansas\n\nand Texas, \u201c[f]raudulent concealment is a [statute of] limitations defense, not\n\na claim.\u201d Riggs-Degraftenreed v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Inc., 2014 WL\n\n12613403, at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 27, 2014), aff\u2019d, 676 F. App\u2019x 613 (8th Cir.\n\n2017); White v. Statebridge Co., LLC, 2023 WL 2472657, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Feb.\n\n6, 2023), R. & R. adopted, No. 22-CV-713, 2023 WL 2465774 (E.D. Tex. Mar.\n\n10, 2023) (\u201c[F]raudulent concealment is not an independent cause of action,\n\nbut is rather a tolling provision to prevent the defendant from relying upon a\n\nstatute of limitations period as an affirmative defense.\u201d (quoting Buraimoh v.\n\nBMW of N. Am., LLC, 2020 WL 7711823, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2020))). And\n\n\u201cMontana caselaw reveals that fraudulent concealment does not operate as a\n\nstandalone claim.\u201d Nelson v. Forest River, Inc., 2023 WL 2610769, at *6 (D.\n\nMont. Mar. 23, 2023).\n\n      However, although the Missouri Supreme Court \u201chas not recognized a\n\nseparate tort of fraudulent nondisclosure, Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank,\n\n\n                                        125\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 126 of 246\n\n\n\n\nUSA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 765 (Mo. 2007), this does not foreclose a\n\nnondisclosure-based    fraud claim.      Missouri does recognize        fraudulent\n\nmisrepresentation and, where a plaintiff alleges fraud by nondisclosure, \u201ca\n\nparty\u2019s silence in the face of a legal duty to speak replaces the first element:\n\nthe existence of a representation.\u201d Hess, 220 S.W.3d 758 at 765. \u201cThus, while\n\na fraudulent concealment or nondisclosure claim is not a separate cause of\n\naction under Missouri law, it falls under the rubric of fraudulent\n\nmisrepresentation\u201d and is \u201cvalid under Missouri law as subsumed by\n\nfraudulent misrepresentation.\u201d Tucker v. Ethicon, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n\n22315, at *21 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2021).\n\n      For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019 Motion to\n\nDismiss, [Doc. 181], to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims for Arkansas (Count 4(d)), Montana (Count 27(d)), and\n\nTexas (Count 44(d)) in their entirety (i.e., against all Defendants).\n\n          3. Viability of Statutory Consumer Protection Claims\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers present several grounds for the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based statutory consumer protection claims. They argue that\n\nseveral of the same reasons dictating the dismissal of the common law fraud\n\nclaims also apply to Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory claims. Specifically, the Airbag\n\nSuppliers argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain consumer protection claims for\n\nstates that require: (1) a duty to disclose; (2) consumer-oriented conduct; or (3)\n\naffirmative statements. The Airbag Suppliers additionally contend that\n\nseveral of the other statutory claims fail for various reasons, including as\n\n\n                                          126\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 127 of 246\n\n\n\n\nbarred because they concern regulated activity and for Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to\n\ncomply with applicable pre-suit notice requirements.\n\n      Likewise, the U.S. Automakers seek the dismissal of certain fraud-based\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims by Plaintiffs for various reasons,\n\nincluding among other reasons, the SAC\u2019s failure to allege a duty to disclose,\n\nits failure to allege active concealment, the insufficiency of omission-based\n\nfraud to support the statutory violation, and the SAC\u2019s failure to plead the\n\nrequired intent to defraud. [Doc. 181-1 at 43\u201347, 49\u201350]. The Court addresses\n\nthese arguments below.\n\n             a. No Duty to Disclose\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers assert that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims of fraudulent\n\nomission or concealment-based violations of the consumer protection statutes\n\nof Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware (as to Count 8(c)), Michigan,\n\nNevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South\n\nCarolina also fail because these statues are construed to require a duty to\n\ndisclose and (for the same reasons as for the common law fraud claims) the\n\nAirbag Suppliers had no such duty. As to statutory consumer protection claims\n\nunder the laws of six of the challenged states (i.e., Arkansas, Colorado,\n\nDelaware, Michigan, Nevada, and New Jersey), Plaintiffs respond that the\n\nrelevant statutes do not in fact require a duty to disclose. [Doc. 220 at 38 n.13].\n\nFor claims under the consumer protection statutes of Connecticut, North\n\nCarolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, Plaintiffs maintain that\n\nthe duty to disclose required by these statutes is satisfied for the same reasons\n\n\n                                           127\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 128 of 246\n\n\n\n\nas it is satisfied for the common law fraud claims. [Id. at 38]. But, in the context\n\nof the common law fraud claims under the laws of these states, as discussed\n\nabove, Plaintiffs fail to establish that the Airbag Suppliers had a duty to\n\ndisclose. Thus, their statutory consumer protection claims under Connecticut,\n\nNorth Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina law also fail.\n\nBelow, the Court addresses the challenge to the statutory claims for the\n\nremaining six states. 39\n\n       Regarding Arkansas, Plaintiffs simply quote the statutory language 40\n\nwithout providing authority to indicate that Arkansas courts interpret the\n\nstatutory language to excuse a duty to disclose for claims under the Arkansas\n\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-88-101, et seq.,\n\nbased on fraudulent concealment or omission. They do not. See White v.\n\nVolkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 2013 WL 685298, at *9 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 25, 2013)\n\n(dismissing ADTPA claims alleging fraudulent concealment and omission for\n\nlack of a basis to impose a duty to disclose on the defendant).\n\n\n       39 Plaintiffs assert claims under the South Carolina Unfair Trade\nPractices Act (SCUTPA) and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers,\nDistributions, and Dealers Act (Counts 41(c) and 41(d), respectively). Both are\nconsumer protection statutes. The Airbag Module Defendants\u2019 \u201cno duty to\ndisclose\u201d challenge is restricted to Plaintiffs\u2019 SCUTPA claim. [See Doc. 178-1\nat 42 n.11 (referencing SCUTPA)]. Thus, the Court\u2019s reference to South\nCarolina\u2019s consumer protection statute in this Section, \u00a7 VI.B.3.a., is limited to\nSCUTPA.\n       40 Specifically, Plaintiffs rely on the following language, [Doc. 220 at 38\n\nn.13]: \u201cThe deceptive and unconscionable trade practices listed in this section\nare in addition to and do not limit the types of unfair trade practices actionable\nat common law or under other statutes of this state.\u201d Ark. Code \u00a7 4-88-107(b).\n\n\n\n                                           128\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353        Filed 10/02/26   Page 129 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      For Colorado, Plaintiffs point out the court in Martinez v. Lewis, 969\n\nP.2d 213, 221 (Colo. 1998), decided the plaintiff\u2019s claim under the Colorado\n\nConsumer Protection Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 6-1-101, et seq., without\n\ninvoking a duty to disclose as a claim element. But there, the CCPA claim\n\nfailed on other grounds and, thus, the absence of a discussion of a duty to\n\ndisclose is unsurprising. See id. at 221-23. Rather, the Court is persuaded that\n\nfor claims alleging a failure to disclose under the CCPA, \u201c[t]here can be no\n\nfailure to disclose absent a duty to disclose.\u201d Francis v. Mead Johnson & Co.,\n\n2010 WL 5313540, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 17, 2010).\n\n      As to Delaware, Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on Corp. Prop. Assocs. 14 Inc. v. CHR\n\nHolding Corp., 2008 WL 963048, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2008), is unavailing.\n\nNot only does CHR Holding not involve a statutory consumer protection claim,\n\nbut, in the context of \u201cfraud by silence,\u201d the court simply noted that \u201cthere is\n\nno duty to speak absent special circumstances.\u201d Id. at *6. As discussed above,\n\nhowever, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that any of the special\n\ncircumstances they assert imposes a duty to disclose on the Airbag Suppliers.\n\nThis is fatal to their Delaware statutory consumer protection claims against\n\nthese Defendants, because the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, 6 Del. Code\n\n\u00a7 2531, et seq., requires that \u201cdeliberate concealment of a material fact must\n\nbe done \u2018in the face of a duty to speak.\u2019\u201d Arcelik, A.S. v. E.I. Du Pont de\n\nNemours & Co., 619 F. Supp. 3d 473, 485 (D. Del. 2022) (quoting Nicolet, Inc.\n\nv. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1987)).\n\n\n\n\n                                           129\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 130 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      However, Plaintiffs\u2019 claim for the violation of the Michigan Consumer\n\nProtection Act (MCPA), Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 445.901, et seq., against the\n\nAirbag Suppliers fails for the same reasons. Plaintiffs rely upon Flynn v. FCA\n\nUS LLC, 327 F.R.D. 206, 220 (S.D. Ill. 2018), where the court concluded that\n\nan MCPA \u201cclaim premised on a failure to disclose material facts does not\n\nrequire a consumer to prove reliance or a duty to disclose.\u201d Flynn\u2019s reading of\n\nthe MCPA notwithstanding, the Court is persuaded by the Michigan Court of\n\nAppeals\u2019 instruction that \u201cit is proper to construe the provisions of the MCPA\n\n\u2018with reference to the common-law tort of fraud.\u2019\u201d Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 236\n\nMich. App. 261, 283 (1999) (citation omitted). And, in Michigan, the duty to\n\ndisclose is an element of a fraudulent omission claim. Francis v. Gen. Motors,\n\nLLC, 504 F. Supp. 3d 659, 681 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Thus, in line with Zine, courts\n\nin Michigan have held that a duty to disclose is a required element of an MCPA\n\nclaim. See Jones v. Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 3d 569,\n\n613-14 (N.D. Ohio 2021), granting reconsideration in part on other grounds,\n\n2021 WL 4582180 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2021); Shain v. Advanced Techs. Grp.,\n\nLLC, 2017 WL 768929, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2017) (\u201cThe omission of facts\n\ndoes not constitute a violation of Michigan\u2019s consumer protection act absent a\n\nduty to disclose certain information to a consumer.\u201d); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe\n\nWarehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 781 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that a\n\nduty to disclose in an element of an MCPA cause of action).\n\n\n\n\n                                         130\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 131 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Likewise, Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the Nevada Consumer Practices Act,\n\nNev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 598.0903, et seq., does not require a duty to disclose fails to\n\nprevail. Unlike in Smallman v. MGM Resorts Int\u2019l, 638 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1199\n\n(D. Nev. 2022), where the defendant, by relying upon authority for common\n\nlaw fraud, failed to show that statutory \u201cfraud by omission . . . requires an\n\naffirmative duty to disclose,\u201d here, the Airbag Suppliers point to on point\n\nauthority that supports their position. In Cohen v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 2022\n\nWL 714795, at *26 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2022), the court dismissed the Nevada\n\nstatutory consumer protection claim concluding that Nevada law \u201crequires a\n\nduty to disclose to state [that] claim.\u201d Similarly, in MST Mgmt., LLC v. Chicago\n\nDoughnut Franchise Co., LLC, 584 F. Supp. 3d 923, 933 (D. Nev. 2022), the\n\ncourt dismissed factual omission-based Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act\n\nclaims because the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants had a duty to\n\ndisclose under the statute.\n\n      Finally, Plaintiffs\u2019 claim against the Airbag Suppliers under the New\n\nJersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA), N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a756:8-1, et seq., fails\n\nbecause \u201cNew Jersey law requires a duty to disclose for omission-based claims\n\nunder the NJCFA.\u201d Subaru of Am., 2022 WL 714795 at *24. Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance\n\non Harvey v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 2005 WL 1252341, at *14 (N.J. Super.\n\nCt. Apr. 29, 2005), for the proposition that \u201cduty to disclose is not necessary to\n\nhave a knowing omission violate the [NJ]CFA\u201d is unavailing. In fact. Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nquote from Harvey is not a statement of New Jersey law but rather the\n\n\n\n\n                                          131\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 132 of 246\n\n\n\n\nplaintiffs\u2019 argument. Indeed, rejecting that argument, the court applied \u201cthe\n\nstandards set forth in the fraud cases regarding duty [to disclose]\u201d to the\n\nNJCFA claim and concluded that the facts failed to show a special relationship,\n\na fiduciary relationship, or a special trust to support such a duty. Id.\n\n      Because the Airbag Suppliers have successfully shown that Arkansas ,\n\nColorado, Connecticut, Delaware (as to Count 8(c)), Michigan, Nevada, New\n\nJersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina (as to\n\nCount 41(c)) require a duty to disclose to support a claim for the violation of\n\nthe respective states\u2019 consumer protection statutes based on fraudulent\n\nomission or concealment and that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts giving\n\nrise to that duty, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their fraud-based claims under\n\nthe consumer protection statutes of these states.\n\n      The U.S. Automakers also argue that the Court should dismiss\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 statutory fraud-based consumer protection claims under the laws of\n\nArkansas (Count 4(c)), Georgia (Count 11(c)), California (Counts 5(d)\u2013(f)),\n\nMontana (Count 27 (c)), New York (Counts 33(c)\u2013(d)), North Carolina (Count\n\n34(c)), and Ohio (Count 36(c)) for the failure to allege a circumstance giving\n\nrise to the duty to disclose. [Doc. 181-1 at 43\u201347]. They base their arguments\n\nfor dismissal of the fraud-based statutory claims on the same grounds that they\n\nraise for the dismissal of the common law fraud claims. Thus, to the extent\n\nthat Plaintiffs successfully establish a basis for the Automakers\u2019 duty to\n\ndisclose as to a challenged fraud claim, they also succeed in establishing an\n\n\n\n\n                                          132\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 133 of 246\n\n\n\n\nunderlying duty to disclose in support of any corresponding challenged\n\nstatutory consumer protection claim. In short, for the reasons that Plaintiffs\n\nestablish that their fraud claims against the Automakers under the laws of\n\nCalifornia, Georgia (as to the GUDTPA claim by Plaintiffs who bought or\n\nleased from an Automaker-authorized dealer), Montana, New York, and North\n\nCarolina are supported by a duty to disclose, supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.d.ii., they also\n\nestablish that their corresponding challenged fraud-based statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims are supported by the Automakers\u2019 duty to disclose. However,\n\nPlaintiffs fail to show a cognizable duty to disclose under the laws of Arkansas,\n\nGeorgia (as to the GUDTPA claim by Plaintiffs who acquired their Class\n\nVehicles from a source other than an Automaker-authorized dealer), and\n\nOhio. 41 See supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.d.ii. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims against the Automakers for Arkansas\n\n(Count 4(c)), Georgia (Count 11(c), in part), and Ohio (Count 36(c)).\n\n             b. No Consumer-Oriented Conduct\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers seek the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims for ten states (i.e., Arizona, Delaware (Count 8(d)),\n\nIdaho, Kansas, Maryland, New York (Counts 33(c), (d)), Texas, Utah (Count\n\n\n\n      41 Although Plaintiffs argue that the SAC sufficiently alleges the U.S.\n\nAutomakers\u2019 active concealment, which supports a duty to disclose under the\nOhio Consumer Sales Practices Act, (OCSPA), Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 1345.01,\net seq., [Doc. 221 at 52 n.37], they not only fail to provide authority in support,\nbut they also fail to allege active concealment by the Automakers, supra\n\u00a7 VI.B.2.d.ii.\n\n\n\n                                           133\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 134 of 246\n\n\n\n\n45(c)), and Virginia), 42 arguing that they did not transact consumer sales or\n\nengage in consumer-oriented conduct as the applicable statutes require.\n\nPlaintiffs rhetorically question how the Airbag Suppliers concealment of the\n\nDefect is not consumer oriented and argue that the relevant statues do not\n\nrequire that these Defendants have privity with consumers. However,\n\nPlaintiffs fail to rebut the position that the relevant consumer protection\n\nstatutes do not recognize claims against parts manufacturers who do not\n\nengage in any consumer sales or interactions or make an affirmative\n\nmisstatement.\n\n      Arizona\u2019s Consumer Fraud Act (ACFA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 44\u20131522,\n\net seq., \u201c\u2018is designed to root out and eliminate unlawful practices in merchant-\n\nconsumer transactions.\u2019\u201d Powers v. Guar. RV, Inc., 229 Ariz. 555, 561 (App.\n\n2012) (quoting People ex rel. Babbitt v. Green Acres Trust, 127 Ariz. 160, 164\n\n(App. 1980), superseded by statute on other grounds, 1981 Ariz. Sess. Laws,\n\nCh. 295, \u00a7 5). The SAC alleges no such transaction between Plaintiffs and the\n\nAirbag Suppliers.\n\n      In Delaware, \u201c[c]onsumers lack standing to raise deceptive trade\n\npractice claims under the [Deceptive Trade Practices Act], because the Act\n\nprotects competing business interests against unfair trade practices.\u201d Nieves\n\n\n\n      42 The Airbag Module Defendants also argue for dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nIllinois statutory consumer protection claim. The Court does not address it\nhere because, as explained elsewhere in this Order, the Court dismisses the\nclaim on another ground.\n\n\n\n                                         134\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 135 of 246\n\n\n\n\nv. All Star Title, Inc., 2010 WL 2977966, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 27, 2010)\n\n(emphasis in original). No such interests are at play between Plaintiffs and the\n\nAirbag Suppliers.\n\n      To have standing to assert an Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA)\n\nclaim, \u201c\u2018the aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with\n\nthe party alleged to have acted unfairly or deceptively.\u2019\u201d Duspiva v. Fillmore,\n\n154 Idaho 27, 36 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846\n\n(2010)). Again, the SAC does not allege a contractual relationship between\n\nPlaintiffs and the Airbag Suppliers. Plaintiffs point out that it is unclear\n\nwhether Taylor requires a direct contractual relationship between the plaintiff\n\nand the defendant. [Doc. 220 at 40 n.14 (citing In re Insulin Pricing Litig., 2019\n\nWL 643709, at *19 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019))]. But \u201c[t]o interpret [Taylor\u2019s]\n\nholding as requiring a contractual relationship generally but not direct\n\ncontractual privity would render the phrase \u2018with the party alleged\u2019\n\nsuperfluous. That phrase (and the rest of the holding in Taylor) is binding on\n\nthis Court.\u201d In re Duramax Diesel Litig., 2018 WL 3647047, at *9 (E.D. Mich.\n\nAug. 1, 2018).\n\n      The Kansas Consumer Credit and Protection Act prohibits a \u201csupplier\u201d\n\nfrom \u201cengag[ing] in any deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer\n\ntransaction.\u201d Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 50-626(a). The Act is \u201cconstrued liberally to\n\nstreamline the law of consumer transactions and to protect consumers from\n\nunscrupulous suppliers.\u201d Moore v. Bird Eng'g Co., P.A., 273 Kan. 2, 10 (2002).\n\n\n\n\n                                          135\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 136 of 246\n\n\n\n\nAnd it broadly defines \u201cconsumer transaction\u201d as \u201ca sale, lease, assignment or\n\nother disposition for value of property . . . within this state . . to a consumer\u201d\n\nand does not require that the \u201csupplier\u201d have direct dealings with the\n\nconsumer. 43 Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 50-624(c), (i). Even so, to fall within the Act\u2019s\n\nambit, the \u201csupplier\u201d must \u201cin the ordinary course of business, solicit[],\n\nengage[] in, or enforce[] consumer transactions.\u201d Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 50-524(i).\n\nThe SAC\u2019s allegations fail to raise the inference that, by supplying airbag\n\nmodules to automakers, the Airbag Suppliers either directly or indirectly\n\nsolicit, engage in, or enforce the sale or lease of vehicles. See Moore, 273 Kan.\n\nat 10 (determining that the defendant who provided engineering services to\n\nconsumers was a \u201csupplier\u201d within the KCPA\u2019s definition because, in the\n\nordinary course, he \u201cengage[d]\u201d in the \u201csale of his engineering services\u201d to\n\nconsumers).\n\n      Likewise, the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (\u201cMaryland CPA\u201d),\n\nMd. Code, Com. Law, \u00a7 13-101, et seq., requires that \u201cthe deceptive trade\n\npractice must occur in the sale or offer for sale to the consumer.\u201d Morris v.\n\nOsmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 541 (1995) (emphasis added). In the\n\ncase of a \u201cdeceptive trade practice committed by someone who is not the seller,\u201d\n\nthe non-seller\u2019s wrongful practice must \u201cso infect the sale or offer for sale to a\n\n\n\n      43 Under the Act \u201c[s]upplier means a manufacturer, distributor, dealer,\n\nseller, lessor, assignor, or other person who, in the ordinary course of business,\nsolicits, engages in or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not dealing\ndirectly with the consumer.\u201d Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 50-624(i).\n\n\n\n                                          136\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353        Filed 10/02/26   Page 137 of 246\n\n\n\n\nconsumer that the law would deem the practice to have been committed \u2018in\u2019 the\n\nsale or offer for sale.\u201d Id. The defective trade practice of a defendant supplier\n\nor manufacturer of a component part who is not \u201cinvolved in selling, offering,\n\nor advertising the\u201d the end product to consumers or has not \u201cattempted to\n\ninfluence\u201d consumers to buy the end product does not occur \u201cin\u201d the consumer\n\nsale. Id. at 542. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that the Airbag Suppliers engaged\n\nin any of these consumer-oriented acts. In the absence of allegations of the\n\nAirbag Suppliers\u2019 involvement in the sale of vehicles to consumers, Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nMaryland CPA claim against these Defendants fails. White v. Kennedy Krieger\n\nInst., 221 Md. App. 601, 653 (2015) (\u201cLiability has only been extended to third\n\nparties under the CPA in limited instances where the third party\u2019s actions were\n\nso integral that the sale of consumer goods would not have proceeded without\n\ntheir involvement.\u201d (citation omitted)).\n\n      Both sections of New York\u2019s General Business Law under which\n\nPlaintiffs assert claims against the Airbag Suppliers require \u201cconsumer-\n\noriented conduct.\u201d St. Patrick\u2019s Home for the Aged & Infirm v. Laticrete Int\u2019l,\n\n696 N.Y.S.2d 117, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). And a business-to-business\n\nsupplier of materials who has no contact with consumers does not engage in\n\nconsumer-oriented conduct by selling materials to a business that uses them\n\nin the end product. Id. The Airbag Suppliers supplied airbag modules to auto\n\nmanufacturers; the SAC does not allege that they have any consumer contact\n\nin that process to support an inference of consumer-oriented conduct.\n\n\n\n\n                                           137\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 138 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Texas\u2019s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (\u201cTDTPA\u201d),\n\nTex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. \u00a7 17.41, et seq., does not \u201creach upstream\n\nmanufacturers and suppliers when their misrepresentations are not\n\ncommunicated to the consumer.\u201d Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919\n\nS.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996). The thrust of Amstadt is that the upstream\n\nmanufacturer or supplier \u201cmust be connected to the consumer transaction in\n\norder to be held liable for deceptive trade practices.\u201d Church & Dwight Co. v.\n\nHuey, 961 S.W.2d 560, 565 (Tex. App. 1997). Such a connection exits when the\n\nmanufacturer\u2019s \u201cmarketing efforts [are] incorporated into [the seller\u2019s]\n\nmarketing efforts, and they form[] the basis for [the consumer\u2019s] decision to use\n\nthe product.\u201d Id. An automobile distributor\u2019s deceptive omission also becomes\n\n\u201cincorporated into\u201d the consumer sales of the vehicles. In re Porsche Cars N.\n\nAm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 801, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (applying TDTPA). But\n\nthe misstatements by a manufacturer of an automobile component are not\n\nincorporated into the vehicle sales to consumers where the component\n\nmanufacturer \u201cnever communicated directly to consumers.\u201d Bledsoe v. FCA US\n\nLLC, 663 F. Supp. 3d 753, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (same); contrast Chavez v.\n\nFord Motor Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224235, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 26, 2018)\n\n(finding no \u201cupstream manufacturer\u201d liability for deceptive statements where\n\nthe plaintiff did not allege that the manufacturer interacted with her), with\n\nO\u2019Connor v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F. Supp. 3d 915, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (declining\n\nto insulate the defendant as an \u201cupstream manufacturer\u201d and dismiss the\n\n\n\n\n                                         138\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 139 of 246\n\n\n\n\nTDTPA claim where the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer directly\n\ncommunicated its misrepresentations to him before the sale). Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nallegations fail to show that the Airbag Suppliers, who supplied airbag\n\nmodules for incorporation into vehicles, were connected to the consumer sales\n\ntransactions for those vehicles. Specifically, the Airbag Suppliers neither\n\nsupplied nor manufactured the vehicles and Plaintiffs do not allege that the\n\nAirbag Suppliers communicated directly with them.\n\n      The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (\u201cUCSPA\u201d) applies to\n\n\u201csuppliers\u201d (i.e., those \u201cwho regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer\n\ntransactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer\u201d). Copeland\n\nv. Albion Labs., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154757, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov.\n\n16, 2015) (quoting Utah Code. Ann. \u00a7 13-11-3(5)). As with the claim under the\n\nKCPA, which employs the same definition of \u201csupplier,\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 claim under\n\nUCSPA also fails because the SAC does not allege facts to show that the Airbag\n\nSuppliers either directly or indirectly solicit, engage in, or enforce the sale or\n\nlease of vehicles. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs maintain that the Airbag\n\nSuppliers engage in the sale of vehicles because they supply a vehicle\n\ncomponent to automakers, courts interpret the UCSPA to require that the\n\nupstream \u201cseller must directly engage in the deceptive representation to be\n\nheld liable.\u201d Id. at *9 (dismissing UCSPA claim where the plaintiff did not\n\nallege that the upstream seller made representations to consumers or alleged\n\nthat it was responsible for the re-seller\u2019s representations). The SAC does not\n\n\n\n\n                                          139\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 140 of 246\n\n\n\n\nallege that the Airbag Suppliers made direct representations to consumers, nor\n\ndoes it allege that they were involved in the Automakers\u2019 representations.\n\nPlaintiffs point out that the UCSPA \u201cis broad enough to impose liability upon\n\nsuppliers of consumer goods.\u201d [Doc. 220 at 40 n.14 (selectively quoting Utah v.\n\nB & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201, 205 (D. Utah 1988)]. They fail to explain how\n\nthe airbag modules sold by the Airbag Suppliers to the Automaker as a\n\ncomponent for assembly into new vehicles qualifies as a \u201cconsumer good\u201d or\n\nhow the Airbag Suppliers are covered by the scenario B & H Auto envisions\u2014\n\nUCSPA liability reaching an upstream stream supplier of a product (as\n\nopposed to a component supplier) who deceptively sells to an innocent\n\nintermediary and whose deceptive actions \u201csignificantly impact the later\n\nconsumer transaction\u201d for that product. The Court agrees that the UCSPA\n\nwould cover the type of \u201cindirect\u201d dealing with consumers that B & H Auto\n\ncontemplates. But Plaintiffs have failed to show that the UCSPA also reaches\n\nthe actions of the Airbag Suppliers. The Court concludes that it does not.\n\n      Finally, the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) prohibits\n\ndeceptive acts by a \u201csupplier in connection with a consumer transaction.\u201d Va.\n\nCode \u00a7 59.1-200. Virginia courts interpret \u201cconsumer transaction\u201d to \u201cexclude\n\ntransactions in which goods are first sold to an intermediary . . . and used as\n\ncomponents.\u201d In re Atlas Roofing Corp. Chalet Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 2015\n\nWL 3824020, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2015). Such \u201ccommercial transactions\u201d\n\nbetween businesses are outside the VCPA\u2019s scope. Id. But the Airbag Suppliers\u2019\n\n\n\n\n                                         140\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26     Page 141 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsales represent just such transactions. As in In re Atlas, Plaintiffs do not allege\n\nthat they bought the airbag modules with the ARC inflators directly from the\n\nAirbag Suppliers; rather, the SAC alleges that the Airbag Suppliers sold the\n\nmodules to the Automakers who installed them in vehicles during\n\nmanufacturing. This commercial transaction between two businesses for a\n\nproduct\u2019s component for assembly into the product for consumer sale does not\n\ngive rise to a consumer\u2019s claim for deceptive practices under the VCPA.\n\nBenkirane v. City Concrete Corp., 85 Va. App. 460, 475 (2025) (noting that\n\ninterpreting the VCPA\u2019s \u201cconsumer transaction\u201d to include \u201cany transaction\n\nresulting in an end-product that is ultimately used for \u2018personal, family, or\n\nhousehold purposes\u2019 would bring about an \u201cabsurd result\u201d and that \u201cthe\n\nrelevant question is whether the bargained-for \u2018goods . . .\u2019 are \u2018to be used\u2019 for\n\npersonal purposes, not whether any eventual end-product to which the goods .\n\n. . contribute is for personal use\u201d).\n\n       Because the Airbag Suppliers have successfully shown that they did not\n\nconduct consumer sales or otherwise engage in consumer-oriented conduct,\n\nPlaintiffs cannot maintain their consumer protection statutory claims for the\n\nfollowing states: Arizona, Delaware (Count 8(d)), Idaho, Kansas, Maryland,\n\nNew York (Counts 33(c), (d)), Texas, Utah (Count 45(c)), and Virginia.\n\n              c. No Misstatements Specified\n\n       The   Airbag    Suppliers    challenge    Plaintiffs\u2019   statutory   consumer\n\nprotection claim under California\u2019s False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. &\n\nProf. Code \u00a7 17500, et seq., (Count 5(e)), arguing that Plaintiffs allege only\n\n\n                                           141\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 142 of 246\n\n\n\n\nomissions and no affirmative misstatements by the Airbag Suppliers. 44 [Doc.\n\n178-1 at 43 & n.16].The issue with this argument is that the SAC does not\n\nassert a FAL claim against the Airbag Suppliers; it asserts that claim against\n\nonly the Automakers. SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 722\u2013788. So it is irrelevant, for purposes of\n\nthe FAL claim, whether the SAC alleges affirmative misstatements by the\n\nAirbag Suppliers.\n\n      Moreover, according to Plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that\n\n\u201cFAL permits pure omissions claims premised on a duty to disclose.\u201d [Doc. 220\n\nat 40 n.15 (citing Hodson v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2018)]. And,\n\nin the context of a \u201cpure omission\u201d claim, a plaintiff may \u201cplead a safety hazard\n\nto establish that the defendant had a duty to disclose.\u201d Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at\n\n864. The Airbag Suppliers do not rebut this argument; rather, they shift gears\n\nand argue that the FAL claim fails because it does not plausibly allege\n\nDefendants\u2019 knowledge of the Inflator Defect. [Doc. 246 at 25 n.19]. Not so. As\n\ndiscussed above, supra \u00a7\u00a7 III.D; VI.B.2.c., the SAC sufficiently alleges\n\nknowledge. Ultimately, however, the Court need not decide whether the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations sufficiently support a pure omission-based FAL claim against the\n\nAirbag Suppliers because the SAC asserts no such claim against them.\n\n\n\n\n      44 Also up for dismissal are Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory claims under Illinois and\n\nWisconsin law. [Doc. 178-1 at 43]. However, because Plaintiffs concede that\n\u201cthe Illinois and Wisconsin statutes do not extend to pure omissions,\u201d [Doc. 220\nat 41 n.15], the Court does not address those claims here.\n\n\n\n                                          142\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 143 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The U.S. Automakers also challenge Plaintiffs FAL claim, arguing that\n\nthe statute does not extend to omission-based fraud. [Doc. 181-1 at 49]. Not\n\nonly does Hodson indicate otherwise, \u201cCalifornia appellate courts have held\n\nthat a claim may be stated under . . . [FAL] in terms constituting fraudulent\n\nomissions so long as the omission is contrary to a representation actually made\n\nby the defendant or the omission is of a fact the defendant was obliged to\n\ndisclose.\u201d In re Toyota RAV4 Hybrid Fuel Tank Litig., 534 F. Supp. 3d 1067,\n\n1101 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (citation modified). The U.S. Automakers argue that\n\nPlaintiffs do not meet either condition because no California Plaintiff alleges\n\nthat he or she was exposed to any specific representations, nor does the SAC\n\nallege facts supporting the Automakers\u2019 duty to disclose. [Doc. 249 at 34]. This\n\nargument fails. Although the SAC does not name a specific advertisement\n\ncontaining the representation, there is no ambiguity about the representation\n\nthat Plaintiffs attribute to the Automakers. Frank Talavera, a California\n\nresident who bought a Class Vehicle (a 2011 Cadillac SRX) in California,\n\nalleges that he was exposed to GM\u2019s advertising and promotional materials\n\nand, through them, to GM\u2019s representation that its vehicles are \u201csafe and\n\ndependable\u201d and that, at no point before the sale, did GM disclose that\n\nTalaveras\u2019 Class Vehicle had a defective airbag. SAC I \u00b6 244. Other California\n\nPlaintiffs allege the same. See e.g., id. \u00b6\u00b6 181, 182, 186, 220, 222, 240. Although\n\nthe same, this commonality does not render the allegations deficient. It is\n\nplausible, in the vehicle sales context, that each Plaintiff encountered the\n\n\n\n\n                                           143\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 144 of 246\n\n\n\n\nrelevant Automaker\u2019s promotional materials regarding his or her Class Vehicle\n\nand that the promotional material touted the vehicle as safe and dependable.\n\nAnd because the promotional materials allegedly represented the Class\n\nVehicles as safe and dependable, arguably, the Automakers had the duty to\n\ndisclose the Inflator Defect because the Defect renders vehicles unsafe. At this\n\nearly stage, the SAC\u2019s allegations of the Automakers\u2019 partial representations\n\nsuffice to support Plaintiffs\u2019 FAL claim. Thus, the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 and the\n\nU.S. Automakers\u2019 effort to dismiss the FAL claim as impermissibly premised\n\non omissions fails.\n\n             d. No Intent to Defraud\n\n      To state a viable claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act\n\n(IDCSA), Ind. Code \u00a7 24-5-0.5-1, et seq., and the North Carolina Uniform\n\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act (\u201cNCUDTPA\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1, et seq.,\n\nthe U.S. Automakers contend, the SAC must allege that Defendants had the\n\nspecific intent to deceive but that it fails to do so. [Doc. 181-1 at 49\u201350]. This\n\nargument fails.\n\n      The U.S. Automakers maintain that because \u201cPlaintiffs have not even\n\nadequately pled Defendants\u2019 pre-suit knowledge, much less any intent to\n\ndefraud,\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 ICSA claim fails. [Doc. 181-1 at 50]. Although Plaintiffs do\n\nnot rebut the U.S. Automakers\u2019 contention that they must allege an intent to\n\ndefraud in furtherance of their IDCSA claim, they do argue that the SAC\n\nplausibly alleges knowledge and that it raises a \u201cplausible inference of intent.\u201d\n\n[Doc. 221 at 57]. The Court has also determined that the SAC sufficiently\n\n\n                                          144\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 145 of 246\n\n\n\n\nalleges Defendants\u2019 knowledge of the Inflator Defect. Supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.c.\n\nMoreover, the SAC alleges facts supporting Plaintiffs\u2019 allegation that\n\nDefendants intended to mislead consumers. SAC II \u00b6 1559. For example, the\n\nSAC alleges that Defendants remained silent about the Inflator Defect to\n\n\u201ccontinue[] to profit from the manufacture, marketing, sale, service, and use\u201d\n\nof the allegedly defective inflators and the Class Vehicles and that they\n\nintended their silence to mislead Plaintiffs and others so that they could\n\n\u201cgenerate and increase sales of the Class Vehicles, thereby increasing [their]\n\nrelative share of the automotive components and automobile markets.\u201d SAC I\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 378\u201379.\n\n       As to the argument concerning the NCUDTPA, as Plaintiffs\u2019 correctly\n\npoint out, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 authority for the intent requirement under\n\nNorth Carolina law concerns common law fraud rather than statutory fraud.\n\n[Doc. 221 at 57 n.45]. Thus, the U.S. Automakers fail to support their argument\n\nwith applicable law. Moreover, North Carolina courts \u201c\u2018generally rule[] that\n\nthe consumer need only show that an act or practice possessed the tendency or\n\ncapacity to mislead, or created the likelihood of deception, in order to prevail\n\nunder the states\u2019 unfair and deceptive practices act[,] . . . the intent of the actor\n\nis irrelevant.\u2019\u201d Media Network, Inc. v. Long Haymes Carr, Inc., 197 N.C. App.\n\n433, 452 (2009) (citation omitted). Also, rather than directly challenging\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 position, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 reply shifts focus, raising a different\n\nreason why the NCUDTPA claim fails. They assert that Plaintiffs\u2019 claim is\n\n\n\n\n                                            145\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 146 of 246\n\n\n\n\npremised on breach of contract and thus requires \u201callegations of egregious and\n\naggravating circumstance\u201d to state a claim for an NCUDTPA violation, and\n\nthey claim, in a conclusory fashion that such allegations are absent from the\n\nComplaint. [Doc. 249 at 35]. This is not an instance where \u201ca party\n\n[permissibly] responds directly to an opposing party\u2019s new issue[.]\u201d Solito v.\n\nSam\u2019s E. Inc., 2025 WL 4093526, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2025). Instead, this\n\nis an impermissibly raised new argument in a reply, and for the several\n\nreasons that Solito identifies, the Court declines to consider the argument. Id.\n\nat *2\u20133 (declining to consider an issue \u201cimproperly injected\u201d into the reply and\n\nexplaining that the rule against considering such newly raised arguments\n\n\u201cserves important ends, like giving litigants an opportunity to challenge the\n\nargument, preventing the Court from being forced to perform a litigant\u2019s\n\nresearch for it on a key legal issue, and eliminating the tactical advantage\n\ngained by a party saving his best argument for his reply\u201d (citation modified)).\n\nAccordingly, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument in favor of the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claims for the violation of the ICDSA (Count 15(c)) and NCUDTPA\n\n(Count 34(c)) fails.\n\n              e. No Allegations of Previous Violations\n\n       Plaintiffs\u2019 claim pursuant to the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act\n\n(\u201cOhio CSPA\u201d), Ohio Rev. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1345.01 et seq., fails because the SAC does\n\nnot contain allegations satisfying the Ohio CSPA\u2019s notice requirement. A\n\nconsumer may bring a class action under the Ohio CSPA:\n\n\n\n\n                                         146\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 147 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      only if the alleged violation: \u201cwas an act or practice declared to be\n      deceptive or unconscionable by rule adopted under division (B)(2)\n      of section 1345.05 of the Revised Code before the consumer\n      transaction on which the action is based, or an act or practice\n      determined by a court of this state to violate section 1345.02,\n      1345.03, or 1345.031 of the Revised Code and committed after the\n      decision containing the determination has been made available\n      for public inspection under division (A)(3) of section 1345.05 of the\n      Revised Code[.]\u201d\n\nFoster v. Health Recovery Servs., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 622, 636\u201337 (S.D. Ohio\n\n2020) (quoting Ohio Rev. Code \u00a7 1345.09(B)). Thus, to maintain a class action\n\nclaim under the Ohio CSPA claim, \u201c[t]he plaintiff\u2019s complaint must allege that\n\ndefendant\u2019s conduct was substantially similar to conduct that was either: (1)\n\nestablished as deceptive by an Ohio administrative rule; or (2) found to be\n\ndeceptive by an Ohio state Court decision.\u201d Id. at 637; see also Carder v. Graco\n\nChildren\u2019s Prods., 558 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (explaining that\n\n\u201c\u2018R.C. 1345.09(B) provides that a consumer may qualify for class-action status\n\nonly when a supplier acted in the face of prior notice that its conduct was\n\ndeceptive or unconscionable\u2019\u201d and that \u201c\u2018[t]he prior notice may be in the form\n\nof (1) a rule adopted by the Attorney General under R.C. 1345.05(B)(2) or (2) a\n\ncourt decision made available for public inspection by the Attorney General\n\nunder R.C. 1345.05(A)(3).\u2019\u201d (quoting Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 110\n\nOhio St. 3d 5, 7-8 (2006))).\n\n      Although \u201cOhio courts . . . construe the [Ohio CSPA] liberally in favor of\n\nconsumers,\u201d Chapman v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 2016 WL 6216135, at *3 (N.D.\n\nOhio Oct. 25, 2016), the SAC contains no allegations for the Court to liberally\n\nconstrue. Plaintiffs point to paragraph 3052 of the SAC as satisfying the\n\n\n                                          147\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 148 of 246\n\n\n\n\nOCSPA\u2019s \u201cliberal notice requirement.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 58 (quoting id. at *4)].\n\nHowever, the cited paragraph merely alleges that by misrepresenting the\n\nClass Vehicles as safe and reliable or by failing to disclose the Inflator Defect,\n\nDefendants engaged in the unfair or deceptive practice of \u201c[r]epresenting that\n\nthe Class Vehicles have characteristics, uses, benefits, and qualities which\n\nthey do not have\u201d and that they are \u201cof a particular standard, quality, and\n\ngrade when they are not.\u201d There is no allegation that this conduct is\n\nsubstantially similar to an applicable rule or an Ohio court decision \u201cthat\n\nwould put Defendant[s] on notice of the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct.\u201d\n\nFoster, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 637.\n\n      To the extent Plaintiffs now cite cases that they argue provides the\n\nrequired notice, they \u201cmay not amend th[eir] pleading through their opposition\n\nbrief to Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\u201d Park 80 Hotels, LLC v. Holiday Hosp.\n\nFranchising, LLC, 2023 WL 5523617, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2023). And to the\n\nextent Plaintiffs intend their contention that they may amend the SAC to\n\nallege additional facts regarding notice, [Doc. 221 at 58], to serve as a motion\n\nto amend, the request is not properly before the Court. Terry v. Equifax Info.\n\nServs., LLC, 2025 WL 3909977, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2025) (explaining that\n\na request to amend the complaint \u201cembedded within [the plaintiff\u2019s] response\n\nbrief, is procedurally improper\u201d and that \u201ca plaintiff may not simply await the\n\nCourt\u2019s ruling on a motion to dismiss before filing a motion seeking leave to\n\namend\u201d).\n\n\n\n\n                                          148\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 149 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      In sum, the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019 motion, [Doc. 181], to\n\nthe extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 class-wide claim\n\nfor a violation of the Ohio CSPA (Count 36(c)) against all Defendants. In the\n\ninterest of clarity, the Court notes that this ruling does not affect any\n\nindividual claim asserted by an Ohio Plaintiff. Thus, to the extent that such a\n\nclaim survives any alternative challenge by one or more Defendants, that claim\n\nmay proceed.\n\n             f. No Actual and Tangible Financial Loss Allegations\n\n      Next up is the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument that Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims for Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Montana, and New\n\nYork, fail for the absence of allegations showing actual and tangible financial\n\nloss. [Doc. 181-1 at 53]. Because the Court has dismissed the challenged\n\nArkansas and Georgia statutory claims (i.e., Counts 4(c) and 11(d)) on other\n\ngrounds, it does not take up the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument as to those claims.\n\nBut it addresses the other challenged claims below.\n\n      The U.S. Automakers\u2019 effort to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 consumer protection\n\nclaims under Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act\n\n(\u201cIllinois CFA\u201d), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1, et seq., and Illinois Uniform\n\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act (\u201cIllinois UDTPA\u201d), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/1,\n\net seq., fails. The two cases that these Defendants advance do not support their\n\nargument that the SAC fails to allege the type of loss that the Illinois statutes\n\nrequire. The first, Koronthaly v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 2008 WL 2938045, at *2\n\n(D.N.J. July 29, 2008), concerns the New Jersey CFA rather than the Illinois\n\n\n                                         149\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 150 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCFA and, thus, sheds no light on the Illinois CFA\u2019s requirements. The second,\n\nFrye v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 583 F.Supp.2d 954, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2008), favors\n\nPlaintiffs. There, the plaintiff failed to allege a \u201cconcrete and ascertainable\u201d\n\nharm from her purchase of a lead-containing lipstick to satisfy the \u201cactual\n\ndamages\u201d element of the Illinois CFA because she did not allege \u201cthat she\n\nwould not have purchased lipstick, that she would have purchased cheaper\n\nlipstick, or that the lipstick in question had a diminished value because of the\n\nlead.\u201d Id. In contrast, here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants\u2019 deceptive\n\npractices caused Plaintiffs to overpay for their allegedly defective Class\n\nVehicles and that alleged Defect has \u201csignificantly diminished, and will\n\ncontinue to diminish, the value of the Class Vehicles.\u201d See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6 23,\n\n146; SAC II \u00b6 1472. Thus, the SAC\u2019s allegations suffice to show actual damages\n\nunder the Illinois CFA. C.f. Stemm v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d\n\n734, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to allege actual\n\nharm because she did \u201cnot allege that the candy that she did receive was\n\ndefective in some way, or that she would have paid less in the marketplace for\n\ncomparable products, but for the purported deception\u201d).\n\n      Next, the U.S. Automakers fail to sufficiently support their argument\n\nfor the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claim under the Montana Unfair Trade Practices\n\nand Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (\u201cMontana CPA\u201d), Mont. Code \u00a7 30-14-\n\n101, et seq. They quote the Montana Supreme Court for the rule that \u201can\n\n\u2018ascertainable loss\u2019 under the [Montana] CPA does not require a showing of\n\n\n\n\n                                         150\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 151 of 246\n\n\n\n\n\u2018actual damages\u2019 [only] where the plaintiff demonstrates facts \u2018sufficient to\n\nestablish a pecuniary loss.\u2019\u201d [Doc. 181-1 at 21 (second alteration in original)\n\n(quoting Aiking-Taylor v. Serang, 404 Mont. 554 (2011))]. Based on this, they\n\nargue that because \u201c[n]o Plaintiff alleges that he or she has tried and failed to\n\nsell his or her vehicle for the purchase price (minus depreciation),\u201d as Aiking-\n\nTaylor requires, dismissal of the Montana CPA claim is appropriate. The Court\n\nis not persuaded. The very language that the U.S. Automakers\u2019 quote indicates\n\nthat a plaintiff need not allege actual damages to proceed under the Montana\n\nCPA where he or she alleges facts going to pecuniary loss. This proposition is\n\nin line with the Montana Supreme Court\u2019s \u201creject[ion] [of the] . . . argument\n\nthat under the [Montana] CPA \u2018ascertainable loss of money and property\u2019\n\nrequires a showing of \u2018actual damages\u2019[.]\u201d Puryer v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat\u2019l\n\nAss\u2019n, 391 Mont. 361, 375 (2018), Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants\u2019\n\nalleged deception led Plaintiffs to overpay for their Class Vehicles and that the\n\nalleged Defect that Defendants failed to disclose has diminished the value of\n\nthose vehicles. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 23, 154; SAC II \u00b6 2417. And the U.S.\n\nAutomakers fail to show that these allegations are insufficient to support a\n\nMontana CPA claim.\n\n      Last, Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for violations of New York General Business Law\n\n\u00a7 349, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law \u00a7 349, et seq., and New York General Business Law\n\n\u00a7 350, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law \u00a7 350, et seq., are not subject to dismissal for failure\n\nto allege a cognizable injury. To allege an \u201cactual injury claim under \u00a7\u00a7 349\n\n\n\n\n                                          151\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 152 of 246\n\n\n\n\nand 350[,] a plaintiff [must] . . . allege that, on account of a materially\n\nmisleading practice, she purchased a product and did not receive the full value\n\nof her purchase,\u201d and she \u201cshow[s] this injury by alleging an overpayment, or\n\na price premium, whereby [she] pays more than she would have but for the\n\ndeceptive practice.\u201d Hawkins v. Coca-Cola Co., 654 F. Supp. 3d 290, 301\n\n(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citation modified). Similar to the allegations in Hawkins,\n\nPlaintiffs allege that they bought the Class Vehicles because the Defendants\n\nrepresented the Vehicles as safe and reliable and that they would not have\n\nbought the Vehicles or would have paid less for them if they had known that\n\nthe representations and omissions were false or misleading. See, e.g., SAC II\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 2831\u201334, 2836\u201337. \u201cAt this early stage of the case, these allegations suffice\n\nto allege a price premium theory of injury.\u201d Hawkins, 654 F. Supp. 3d 290, 301\n\n(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (concluding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged an injury\n\nthrough her allegations that she bought the product at issue because it was\n\nrepresented as having certain characteristics and that she would not have paid\n\nor would have paid less for the product if she had known that the\n\nrepresentations and omissions were false and misleading).\n\n      In sum, the U.S. Automakers do not prevail in their effort to dismiss\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 Illinois (Count 14(c)), Montana (Count 27(c)), and New York (Count\n\n33(c), (d)) statutory consumer protection claims for the SAC\u2019s failure to allege\n\na cognizable loss under the statutes.\n\n\n\n\n                                         152\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 153 of 246\n\n\n\n\n             g. Non-Compliance With Pre-Suit Notice Requirements\n\n      Both the Airbag Suppliers and the U.S. Automakers move to dismiss\n\nseveral of Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer protection claims citing the\n\ninadequacy of the SAC\u2019s allegations regarding pre-suit notice. Below, the Court\n\nfirst addresses the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 arguments and then the U.S.\n\nAutomakers\u2019 arguments.\n\n      The Airbag Suppliers contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nAlabama, California, 45 Georgia (Count 11(d)), Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts,\n\nTexas, West Virginia, and Wyoming statutory consumer protection claims\n\nbecause Plaintiffs\u2019 pre-suit notices under the relevant statutes were either\n\nuntimely or inadequate. [Doc. 178-1 at 44\u201346]. These Defendants argue that\n\nthe consumer protection statutes of the above-mentioned nine states require a\n\nplaintiff to provide the defendant with a pre-suit notice that reasonably\n\ndescribes the allegedly unfair or deceptive practice and the injury the plaintiff\n\nsuffered within a set period before the plaintiff files his or her claim.\n\n      Citing to their opposition to the U.S. Automaker\u2019s motion, Plaintiffs\n\nmaintain that state procedural provisions do not apply to federal actions. [Doc.\n\n220 at 44]. But as detailed below, see \u00a7 V.B.4.b., this challenge fails. Thus, the\n\n\n      45 Plaintiffs assert claims under several California consumer protection\n\nstatutes. Because the Airbag Module Defendants cite to California Civil Code\n\u00a7 1782 for the applicable notice requirement, [Doc. 178-1 at 44 n.18], the Court\nperceives their challenge to be limited to Plaintiffs\u2019 claim for violations of the\nCLRA (i.e., Count 5(d)). This is because the notice provision of \u00a7 1782 attaches\nonly to actions pursuant to Title 1.5 of the California Civil Code (i.e., the CLRA,\nCal. Civ. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1750\u20131784). See Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1782(a).\n\n\n\n                                           153\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 154 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCourt takes up Plaintiffs\u2019 alternative argument that they satisfied applicable\n\npre-suit notice requirements. Id. With the exception of the notice requirements\n\nof California (as to the CLRA claim), the Airbag Suppliers have failed to show\n\nthat dismissal of the challenged claims is warranted for lack of timely or\n\neffective notice.\n\n       First, as to timing, the Airbag Suppliers contend that Plaintiffs sent\n\nuntimely, post-suit notice letters to the Airbag Suppliers rather than the\n\nrequired pre-suit notice letters and, thus, Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims for the above-listed states should be dismissed. Plaintiffs\n\ncounter that they cured any defect in their notice letters by providing\n\nDefendants with sufficient notice before they filed the SAC on August 28, 2023.\n\nSee Chen v. Wow Rest. TH LLC, 2023 WL 3092618, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26,\n\n2023) (finding that the plaintiffs cured their failure to provide timely pre-suit\n\nnotice \u201cby providing sufficient notice prior to the filing of their amended\n\ncomplaint\u201d). However, Chen, on which Plaintiffs rely, concerned notice under\n\nthe Florida Minimum Wage Act, which is not at issue here. See id. at *3-4.\n\nRather Carder is on point. There, the court rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 argument\n\nthat they complied with the statutory notice requirement of the GFBPA, the\n\nsame statute Plaintiffs invoke here, by giving the required notice more than 30\n\ndays before they amended their complaint. Carder, 558 F. Supp. 3d at 1328.\n\nThe court deemed the post-suit notice insufficient \u201cbecause the Consolidated\n\nAmended Complaint did not constitute a new lawsuit; instead, it was an\n\n\n\n\n                                         154\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 155 of 246\n\n\n\n\namendment of the original complaint[.]\u201d 46 Id. Here, although Plaintiffs\u2019\n\npre-suit notice to the Airbag Defendants is untimely under the GFBPA, this\n\ndoes not warrant the dismissal of the GFBPA claim because, as discussed\n\nbelow, Plaintiffs successfully show that they are excused from providing pre-\n\nsuit notice under Georgia law.\n\n      Not all courts require that a pre-suit notice be filed before suit is\n\ncommenced. For example, under the more recent line of cases applying CLRA\u2019s\n\nnotice requirement, courts dismiss CLRA claims with leave for the plaintiff to\n\namend the complaint after complying with the notice requirement. See, e.g.,\n\nOxina v. Lands\u2019 End, Inc., 2015 WL 4272058, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2015).\n\nThe Airbag Suppliers provide no authority analyzing the notice requirement\n\nunder the relevant consumer protection statutes of Alabama, Indiana, Maine,\n\nMassachusetts, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming to support their argument\n\nfor the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for the lack of pre-suit notice. As such,\n\nconsidering that the result of a failure to provide timely notice for violations of\n\n\n\n      46 On reconsideration, the court concluded that the GFBPA claim did not\n\nfail for lack of notice because, as counsel belatedly discovered, one of the\nGeorgia plaintiffs satisfied the pre-suit notice requirement by providing the\ndefendant notice before she asserted her GFBPA claim for the first time\nthrough the amended complaint. Carder v. Graco Children\u2019s Prods., Inc., 2021\nWL 9721143, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2021). Here, Plaintiffs do not contend\nthat they asserted their statutory consumer protection claims for the above-\nmentioned states for the first time in the SAC. Indeed, Plaintiffs asserted the\nrelevant consumer protection claims in the \u201cConsolidated Class Action\nComplaint,\u201d [Doc. 94], their first amended Complaint, which they filed five\ndays after providing notice to all the Airbag Suppliers, with the exception of\nthe ZF Defendants.\n\n\n\n                                           155\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 156 of 246\n\n\n\n\nconsumer protection laws is not uniform across all states, the Airbag Suppliers\n\nhave failed to carry their burden of establishing that Plaintiffs\u2019 consumer\n\nprotection claims under Alabama, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Texas,\n\nWest Virginia, and Wyoming necessarily fail for lack of timely notice. Thus,\n\ntheir dismissal challenge fails.\n\n       To the extent they seek to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 CLRA claim with prejudice\n\nfor failure to provide timely notice, this challenge also fails in view of Oxina\u2019s\n\napproach. Moreover, although Plaintiffs assert their CLRA claim against all\n\nDefendants, they seek money damages only from ARC, Audi, Ford, and Airbag\n\nSupplier Joyson. SAC II \u00b6 768. As to remaining Defendants, Plaintiffs seek\n\ninjunctive relief only. Id. \u00b6 769. Neither the Airbag Suppliers nor Plaintiffs\n\nbrief whether the relief sought affects CLRA\u2019s pre-suit requirement. However,\n\na plain reading of \u00a7 1782(a) shows that the CLRA requires notice only for \u201can\n\naction for damages,\u201d and allows consumers to sue for injunctive relief without\n\ncomplying with the pre-suit notice requirement, \u00a7 1782(d). Thus, the Airbag\n\nSuppliers\u2019 timeliness challenge fails altogether as to Airbag Suppliers except\n\nJoyson Safety System. And the argument for the dismissal of the CLRA claim\n\nagainst Joyson Safety System falls flat under Oxina\u2019s approach. Plaintiffs sent\n\nJoyson Safety System their notice letter on June 23, 2023, more than 30 days\n\nbefore filing the SAC. [Doc. 178-14 at 7]. This rendered notice timely for CLRA\n\npurposes. Accordingly, dismissal of the challenged claims is not warranted for\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 failure to provide timely notice.\n\n\n\n\n                                           156\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 157 of 246\n\n\n\n\n       Second, as to the adequacy of the notice, the Airbag Suppliers argue that\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 notice letters were deficient in that they contained only \u201ccursory and\n\ncollective allegations regarding purported omissions and concealment\u201d by all\n\nAirbag Suppliers, described injuries in \u201cgeneral terms,\u201d and failed to identify\n\nall members of the class on whose behalf Plaintiffs sent the notice letters.\n\nPlaintiffs have the better argument. They explain that the notice letters\n\n(1) detailed the Inflator Defect; (2) explained that Plaintiffs were deprived of\n\nthe benefit of the bargain in purchasing or leasing their vehicles; (3) specify\n\nthe sources of the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 knowledge; (4) allege that these\n\nDefendants failed to disclose and actively concealed the dangers and risks of\n\nthe Defect; and (5) inform them that they had, thus, violated consumer\n\nprotection laws across all U.S. jurisdictions. 47 [Doc. 220 at 45]. Plaintiffs\u2019 notice\n\nletters reasonably describe the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 allegedly unfair or deceptive\n\npractice and Plaintiffs\u2019 injuries. 48\n\n\n       47 The Airbag Module Defendants assert, and Plaintiffs do not dispute,\n\nthat the Court may consider Plaintiffs\u2019 notice letters [Doc. 178-4] because they\nare central to Plaintiffs\u2019 claims and their content is undisputed. [Doc. 178 at\n45 n.19 (quoting Lockwood v. Beasley, 211 F. App\u2019x 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2006))].\nThe Court agrees.\n       48 The Airbag Suppliers contend that the Texas consumer protection\n\nstatute required Plaintiffs to include the amount of damages. But as Plaintiffs\ncounter\u2014and the Airbag Suppliers fail to rebut, [see Doc. 246 at 28]\u2014the\nfailure to specify the amount of damages does not warrant dismissal of the\nTexas consumer protection claim. Rather, the remedy is \u201cabatement of the\naction for the statutory notice period, but these Defendants have \u201cwaived their\nobjection to the lack of notice by failing to make a timely request for\nabatement.\u201d Dzielak v. Whirlpool Corp., 26 F. Supp. 3d 304, 347 (D.N.J. 2014)\n(citation modified).\n\n\n\n                                            157\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 158 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Like the Airbag Suppliers, the U.S. Automakers also challenge the\n\ntimeliness of Plaintiffs\u2019 pre-suit notice. They argue that the SAC does not\n\nidentify any pre-suit notice and instead alleges, in a conclusory manner, only\n\nthat Plaintiffs provided timely notice. [Doc. 181-1 at 52]. As a result, they\n\nclaim, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 Alabama, California, Georgia, and\n\nMassachusetts 49 statutory consumer protection claims.\n\n      Plaintiffs respond that they are excused from providing pre-suit notice\n\nunder Alabama, Georgia, and Massachusetts law because the SAC does not\n\nallege that any Automaker, except for PCNA maintains a place of business or\n\nholds assets in these states. The U.S. Automakers fail to rebut this argument,\n\nsignaling their lack of opposition. See Kramer v. Gwinnett Cnty., Ga., 306 F.\n\nSupp. 2d 1219, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (explaining that, in accordance with the\n\nCourt\u2019s Local Rule 7.1B, \u201ca party\u2019s failure to respond to any portion or claim in\n\na motion indicates such portion, claim or defense is unopposed.\u201d), aff\u2019d, 116 F.\n\nApp\u2019x 253 (11th Cir. 2004).\n\n      Under Georgia law, the pre-suit notice requirement does \u201cnot apply if\n\nthe prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not\n\n\n\n      49 The U.S. Automakers also argue for the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 Ohio\n\nstatutory consumer protection claim for the failure to adequately allege\npre-suit notice. [Doc. 181-1 at 52]. This time around, the U.S. Automakers\u2019\nchallenge to the OCSPA claim emphasizes the SAC\u2019s failure to allege when\nPlaintiffs gave the required notice. Having dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 class-wide\nclaim for a violation of the OCSPA (Count 36(c)) for the lack of allegations going\nto notice, supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.e., the Court does not address this alternative\nargument.\n\n\n\n                                          158\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 159 of 246\n\n\n\n\nkeep assets within the state.\u201d O.C.G.A. \u00a7 10-1-399. Because the SAC does not\n\nallege that any Defendant, other than PCNA, maintains a place of business in\n\nGeorgia or keeps asserts here, Plaintiffs were not required to provide\n\nDefendants, other than PCNA, with pre-suit notice before asserting their\n\nGFPBA claim. Thus, except as applied to PCNA, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 do not\n\nprevail in their effort to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 GFPBA claim based on the SAC\u2019s\n\nfailure to allege facts showing compliance with Georgia\u2019s pre-suit notice\n\nrequirement fails. For the same reason, the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 challenge to the\n\npre-suit notice for Plaintiffs\u2019 GFPBA claim fails.\n\n       The U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge does succeed as to the GFPBA clams\n\nagainst PCNA. First, because the SAC alleges that PCNA maintains its\n\nprincipal place of business in Georgia, SAC I \u00b6 123, Plaintiffs were required to\n\nprovide pre-suit notice to PCNA. Second, Plaintiffs contention that the SAC\n\nindicates that Plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice \u201cbefore filing the [SAC] on\n\nJune 28, 2023,\u201d [Doc. 221 at 61], is unavailing. But, as discussed above, a post-\n\nsuit notice, albeit provided before an amendment to the complaint, does not\n\nmeet Georgia\u2019s pre-suit notice requirement. See Carder, 558 F. Supp. 3d at\n\n1328. Accordingly, Plaintiffs\u2019 GFPBA claim against PNCA fails for lack of\n\ntimely pre-suit notice. 50\n\n\n\n\n       50 The U.S. Automakers have secured the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 GFBPA\n\nclaim in its entirety. Supra \u00a7 V.B.2.b.ii. Nevertheless, the Court has addressed\nthis additional basis for the dismissal of the GFPBA claim by the U.S.\nAutomakers and the Airbag Suppliers. Although the claim survives this\n\n\n                                          159\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 160 of 246\n\n\n\n\n       The pre-suit notice requirements of Alabama and Massachusetts track\n\nthose of Georgia. See Bolling v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2025 WL 83826, at\n\n*9 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2025) (\u201cBolling II\u201d) (\u201c[T]here is only a pre -suit notification\n\nrequirement [under Alabama law] if [the defendant] maintains a place of\n\nbusiness or keeps assets within the state of Alabama.\u201d (citing Ala. Code\n\n\u00a7 8-19-10(e))); Lima v. Post Consumer Brands, LLC, 2019 WL 3802885, at *8\n\n(D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2019) (\u201cThe Massachusetts requirement that a plaintiff send\n\na pre-suit demand letter does not apply, however, where \u2018the prospective\n\nrespondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within\n\nthe commonwealth.\u2019\u201d (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, \u00a7 9(3))). And because\n\nno Defendant allegedly maintains a place of business in these states or keep\n\nassets there, Plaintiffs were also not required to provide pre-suit notice to\n\nDefendants before asserting statutory consumer protection claims under\n\nAlabama and Massachusetts law.\n\n       That leaves the U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge to the adequacy of the SAC\u2019s\n\npre-suit notice allegations under California law. The U.S. Automakers cite one\n\ncase applying the CLRA and one case applying the UCL to extend the\n\nargument that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 CLRA and UCL claims with\n\nprejudice for lack of pre-suit notice. [Doc. 181-7 at 20]. First, as discussed\n\nabove, Plaintiffs were not required to give pre-suit notice under the CLRA to\n\n\n\nchallenge as to all Defendants except PCNA, it remains subject to dismissal as\nto all Defendants, for the reason discussed in Section V.B.2.b.ii.\n\n\n\n                                            160\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 161 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthose Defendants against whom they seek only injunctive relief. Cal. Civ. Code\n\n\u00a7 1782(d). Second, dismissal of the CLRA claim against Defendants from whom\n\nPlaintiffs seek money damages is not warranted because, as discussed above,\n\nthe more recent line of cases take a more flexible approach to the CLRA\u2019s pre-\n\nsuit notice requirement, considering the requirement satisfied where the\n\nplaintiff provides notice 30 days before filing an amended complaint. See\n\nOxina, 2015 WL 4272058 at *4. Here, the SAC alleges that Plaintiffs gave\n\nARC, Audi, and Ford notice of issues raised in their CLRA claim, indicating\n\nthat they gave notice sometime before filing the SAC. SAC II \u00b6 768. The\n\nConsolidated Class Action Complaint, i.e., Plaintiffs\u2019 First Amended\n\nComplaint, also alleges that Plaintiffs provided ARC, Audi, and Ford notice,\n\nunder \u00a7 1782, of the issues raised in their CLRA claim. FAC II \u00b6 763 [Doc. 94-\n\n1]. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the pleadings show that\n\nPlaintiffs had given notice to ARC, Audi, and Ford at least by the filing of the\n\nFAC, i.e., by June 28, 2023, more than 30 days before they filed the SAC.\n\nAccordingly, dismissal of the CLRA claim for untimely notice is not warranted.\n\n      As to the notice requirement under the UCL, the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nauthority does not address dismissal of UCL claims for failure to allege pre-\n\nsuit notice. See Milman v. FCA U.S., LLC, 2018 WL 5867481, at *14 (C.D. Cal.\n\nAug. 30, 2018) (dismissing UCL claims for failure to allege sufficient facts\n\nsupporting fraudulent, unfair, and unlawful practices). Thus, the U.S.\n\nAutomakers have \u201cnot cited any authority holding that the pre-suit notice\n\n\n\n\n                                         161\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 162 of 246\n\n\n\n\nrequired by section 1782 (which is a specific provision of the CLRA) is\n\nmandated before filing suit under the UCL[.]\u201d In re FCA US LLC Monostable\n\nElec. Gearshift Litig., 280 F. Supp. 3d 975, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (\u201cIn re\n\nGearshift Litig. II\u201d). In sum, the statutory consumer protection claims that the\n\nAirbag Suppliers and the U.S. Automakers challenge do not fail on the pre-suit\n\nnotice grounds addressed in this section.\n\n             h. Activity Governed By a Regulatory Regime\n\n      According to the Airbag Suppliers, Plaintiffs\u2019 consumer protection\n\nclaims under the relevant statutes of Connecticut (Count 7(c)), Massachusetts\n\n(Count 22(c)), Michigan (Count 23(c)), and Tennessee (Count 43(c)) cannot\n\nproceed because these statutes exempt claims that concern activity governed\n\nby a regulatory regime. [Doc. 178-1 at 43]. Relying on the same reason, the\n\nU.S. Automakers place in their crosshairs Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims for Michigan (Count 23(c)) and Oklahoma (Count 37(c)). [Doc.\n\n181-1 at 50\u201351]. Both movants generally maintain that the automotive\n\nindustry, specifically the manufacture and sale of automobiles, is heavily\n\nregulated. [Docs. 178-1 at 43; 181-1 at 51]. But both movants pay only lip\n\nservice to this argument, and the Court declines to dismiss claims at this early\n\nstage based on such an underdeveloped position. \u201cAn analysis of whether\n\nclaims are barred by the exemption requires the identification and careful\n\nconsideration of the specific statute that purports to authorize the transaction\n\nat issue.\u201d GM Air Conditioning, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 642-43. The movants have\n\n\n\n\n                                         162\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 163 of 246\n\n\n\n\nnot provided the Court with the information necessary to it to undertake such\n\nan analysis. Their position may well carry the day; but this is not that day.\n\n              i. Statute Not Applicable to Component Suppliers\n\n       Plaintiffs cannot maintain their claim under the South Carolina\n\nRegulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (\u201cDealers Act\u201d),\n\nS.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 56-15-10, et seq., against the Airbag Suppliers. The Dealers\n\nAct seeks to hold liable \u201cany manufacturer, . . . distributor, . . . or motor vehicle\n\ndealer\u201d whose \u201cunfair or deceptive acts or practices.\u201d S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 56-15-\n\n30(a), 40(B). The Act defines \u201cmanufacturer\u201d as \u201cany person engaged in the\n\nbusiness of manufacturing or assembling new and unused motor vehicles.\u201d Id.\n\n\u00a7 51-15-10(b). Plaintiffs contend, without any explanation or authority, that\n\nthis definition of \u201cmanufacturer\u201d \u201cplausibly extends to [the Airbag Module]\n\nDefendants under the present facts.\u201d [Doc. 220 at 44]. The Airbag Suppliers,\n\naccording to the SAC, are Tier 1 suppliers in the airbag supply chain who\n\n\u201csupplied completed airbag modules to the Automakers, i.e., major auto\n\nmanufacturers and distributors, who incorporated the modules into the\n\ncompleted Class Vehicles.\u201d SAC I \u00b6 263. Under \u201cthe present facts,\u201d the Court\n\nremains unpersuaded that the Airbag Suppliers \u201care in the business of\n\nmanufacturing or assembling new and unused motor vehicles\u201d such that they\n\nqualify as manufacturers to whom the Dealer\u2019s Act applies. Accordingly, the\n\nCourt GRANTS the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 motion, [Doc. 178], to the extent that it\n\nDIMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 claim against the Airbag Suppliers\n\nfor the violation of the Dealers Act (Count 41(d)).\n\n\n                                            163\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 164 of 246\n\n\n\n\n             j. Adequate Legal Remedies Bar Equitable Relief Claims\n\n      According to the U.S. Automakers, the availability of an adequate\n\nremedy at law through their other claims bars Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for equitable\n\nrelief under the consumer protection statutes of California (Counts 5(d)\u2013(f)),\n\nGeorgia (Count 11(d)), and New York (Counts 33(c)\u2013(d)). [Doc. 181-1 at 51].\n\nThey also argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their statutory consumer\n\nprotection claim under Alabama law (Count 1(c)) because the statute prohibits\n\nthe claim when asserted in conjunction with other fraud-based claims.\n\n      Because Plaintiffs cannot assert a private right of action for a violation\n\nof the GFBPA (Count 11(d)) in the absence of allegations indicating actual\n\ndamages, supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.b.i., their claim fails in its entirety. Thus, the Court\n\ndoes not address the alternative argument calling for the dismissal, in part, of\n\nthe GFBPA claim to the extent that it seeks equitable relief.\n\n      Citing Alabama law, Plaintiffs maintain that it is permissible to assert\n\nclaims in the alternative. [Doc. 221 at 59]. They also contend that remedies\n\nunder California\u2019s UCL allows for the coexistence of claims seeking legal and\n\nequitable remedies. [Id. at 60]. And Plaintiffs distinguish the case that the U.S.\n\nAutomakers rely on for New York law, El Toro Grp., LLC v. Bareburger Grp.,\n\nLLC, 141 N.Y.S.3d 3, 4\u20135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2021), as one involving\n\nrecission and not injunctive relief.\n\n      Regarding California\u2019s consumer protection statutes, the Ninth Circuit\n\nhas held that \u201ctraditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal\n\ncourts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a\n\n\n                                          164\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 165 of 246\n\n\n\n\nparty requests [equitable relief] under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity\n\naction.\u201d Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020).\n\nHowever, \u201c[m]any . . . courts post-Sonner . . . have held that money damages\n\nare an inadequate remedy for the future harm only remediable by injunctive\n\nrelief.\u201d Linton v. Axcess Fin. Servs., Inc., 2023 WL 4297568, at *3 (N.D. Cal.\n\nJune 30, 2023) (citation modified) (\u201cBecause retrospective monetary damages\n\nwill not prevent the future harm only remediable by an injunction ordering\n\n[the defendant] to stop issuing loans with unfair interest rates, the Court\n\ndeclines to extend Sonner\u2019s inadequate-remedy-at-law requirement to [the\n\nplaintiff\u2019s] injunctive relief claim.\u201d). Here, as Plaintiffs allude, [Doc. 221 at 60],\n\nthe SAC seeks to enjoin Defendants\u2019 \u201cfrom further deceptive distribution, sales,\n\nand lease practices with respect to the Class Vehicles.\u201d SAC II at \u00a7 IX \u00b6 D. The\n\nU.S. Automakers do not address the adequacy of legal remedies in view of the\n\nrequested injunctive relief aimed at preventing alleged future consumer\n\ndeception. Thus, their effort to dismiss the California statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims for equitable remedies fails.\n\n       For the same reason, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument that New York\n\nlaw requires the dismissal of statutory consumer protection claims to the\n\nextent that they seek equitable remedies also fails. Although El Toro Grp., 141\n\nN.Y.S.3d at 4\u20135, indicates that New York law requires the dismissal of a \u201ccause\n\nof action [that] seeks the equitable remedy of rescission\u201d where \u201cplaintiffs have\n\na complete and adequate remedy at law,\u201d the U.S. Automakers do explain how\n\n\n\n\n                                            165\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 166 of 246\n\n\n\n\nlegal remedies are complete and adequate when Plaintiffs also request an\n\ninjunction prohibiting allegedly deceptive conduct in the future.\n\n       Last, \u201cthere is a split among the district courts sitting within the\n\nEleventh Circuit\u2014and even within the Northern District of Alabama\u2014over\n\nwhether a plaintiff may simultaneously maintain common law fraud claims\n\nand claims under ADTPA.\u201d Morris v. Walmart Inc., 2020 WL 470287, at *6\n\n(N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2020). The Court agrees with Morris that \u201cdecisions\n\npermitting both claims at the pleading stage have the better argument,\n\nbecause although the plain language of the [ADTPA\u2019s] savings clause requires\n\na plaintiff to elect one or the other remedy, it does not specify when in the\n\nproceedings the plaintiff must do so.\u201d Id. at *6 (citation modified) (emphasis in\n\noriginal).\n\n             k. Injunctive Relief Not Available\n\n       The Airbag Suppliers correctly argue that Plaintiffs\u2019 GUDTPA claim\n\n(Count 11(c)) fails because Plaintiffs do not allege that they are likely to suffer\n\nfuture harm from Defendants\u2019 allegedly deceptive practices. [Doc. 178-1 at 44].\n\nGUDTPA \u201coffers only injunctive relief where the plaintiff has established a\n\nlikelihood of future damage, but it does not address past harm.\u201d Collins v.\n\nAthens Orthopedic Clinic, 356 Ga. App. 776, 779 (2020). But the harm from\n\nDefendants\u2019 deceptive practices has already occurred\u2014i.e., Plaintiffs bought\n\nvehicles they would not have otherwise bought or paid more for the vehicles\n\nthan they would have if they had known of the Inflator Defect. See SAC II\n\n\u00b6 1235. Although the SAC alleges that the Class Vehicles remain unsafe, see\n\n\n                                           166\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 167 of 246\n\n\n\n\nSAC II \u00b6 1236, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the injunctive relief they seek\u2014\n\n\u201c[a]n order enjoining Defendants to desist from further deceptive distribution,\n\nsales, and lease practices with respect to the Class Vehicles,\u201d [Doc. 220 at 43\n\n(quoting SAC II \u00a7 IX(D))]\u2014addresses any future harm to them. Plaintiffs do\n\nnot allege that they intend to buy a Class Vehicle in the future. 51 See Callen v.\n\nDaimler AG, 2021 WL 4523436, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2021) (dismissing\n\nGUDPTA claim for failure to allege future harm where the plaintiff complained\n\nthat the defendant denies the defect but did not allege that she \u201cintends to\n\npurchase a Class Vehicle in the future or that she ever has paid, or intends to\n\npay, to replace\u201d the defective part); Buske v. Owens Corning (Corp.), 2017 WL\n\n1062371, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2017) (\u201cPlaintiffs have not alleged that they\n\nintend to purchase the [defective product] in the future. Thus, they will not\n\nbenefit from an injunction relating to the Defendants\u2019 marketing scheme.\u201d).\n\n\n\n\n      51 In addition, the SAC requests that the Court direct Defendants to\n\n\u201cpermanently, expeditiously, and completely repair the Class Vehicles\u201d and to\nfund a program for payment of out-of-pocked expenses and damages claims\nassociated with the Defect. SAC II at 1222\u201323. To the extent that Plaintiffs\nmay cast this as a request for injunctive relief to address future harm, the\nrequest \u201cis practically indistinguishable from an order that [Defendants] pay\nPlaintiffs money,\u201d but \u201ca plaintiff cannot transform a claim for damages into\nan equitable action by asking for an injunction that orders the payment of\nmoney.\u201d Herskowitz v. Apple, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 460, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2014)\n(citation modified); see Buske, 2017 WL 1062371 at *3 (finding that plaintiffs\ncould not seek injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring the defendant\nto \u201cremove and replace\u201d the defective product because the requested money\ndamages would sufficiently compensate the plaintiffs).\n\n\n\n                                          167\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 168 of 246\n\n\n\n\nBecause Plaintiffs have not alleged \u201ca future harm caused by the unfair\n\npractice,\u201d their GUDTPA claim fails. Collins, 356 Ga. at 779. 52\n\n      On the other hand, Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for violation of the North Dakota\n\nConsumer Fraud Act (NDCFA), N.D. Cent. Code \u00a7 51-15-02, et seq., and the\n\nOklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, \u00a7 751, et\n\nseq., survive the U.S. Automakers\u2019 effort to dismiss based on the argument\n\nthat these statutes do not confer a private right of action for injunctive relief.\n\n[Doc. 181-1 at 50].\n\n      The U.S. Automakers cite to \u00a7 51-15-09 of the NDCPA in support of their\n\nargument. However, that section simply provides that, except for a specified\n\ndeceptive act, which is not relevant here, chapter 51-15 \u201cdoes not bar any claim\n\nfor relief by any person against any person who has acquired any moneys or\n\nproperty by means of any practice declared to be unlawful in this chapter.\u201d\n\nNothing in this section indicates that the statute bars a private action for\n\ninjunctive relief. In their reply the U.S. Automakers cite \u00a7 51-15-07 to argue\n\nthat this section specifies that injunctive relief is available to the attorney\n\ngeneral. [Doc. 249 at 35]. But the fact that the NDCPA specifies that the\n\nattorney general may seek injunctive relief to address an alleged violation of\n\n\n\n      52 Plaintiffs do allege that they would buy a vehicle of their Automaker\u2019s\n\nbrand in the future if Defendants\u2019 representations about the vehicle were\naccurate.\u201d See SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 184\u201386. But they do not specify that they intend to\nbuy a Class Vehicle. In fact, Plaintiff Francine Lewis, who leased a new\nVolkswagen Jetta in 2019, bought the vehicle off the lease in October 2022,\nafter she joined a California member case. Id. \u00b6 189.\n\n\n\n                                          168\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 169 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe statute does not in itself serve to bar a private party from doing so. And\n\nthe lone case on which the U.S. Automakers rely, [Doc. 249 at 35], does not\n\nauthoritatively address whether the NDCFA provides a private cause of action\n\nfor injunctive relief. See Chapman v. GM LLC, 531 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1302\u201303\n\n(E.D. Mich. 2021) (considering the plaintiffs\u2019 failure to respond to the argument\n\nthat the statute does not allow claims for injunctive relief as a concession and\n\ndismissing the North Dakota statutory consumer protection claim, among\n\nothers, based on that concession).\n\n      The U.S. Automakers also fail to support their argument for the\n\ndismissal of the OCPA claim. First, Plaintiffs not only seek injunctive but also\n\nmonetary relief under the OCPA. SAC II \u00b6 3147. The U.S. Automakers do not\n\nacknowledge this fact and appear to seek the dismissal of the claim in its\n\nentirety. Second, the case that the U.S. Automakers rely on, Tibbetts v. Sight\n\n\u2018n Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 77 P.3d 1042 (Okla. 2003), as corrected (Sep.\n\n30, 2003), \u201cdoes not support [the U.S. Automakers\u2019] argument that injunctive\n\nrelief categorically is disallowed by the statute\u201d in private actions. Francis, 504\n\nF. Supp. 3d at 692. Accordingly, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument for the\n\ndismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 OCPA claim on this basis fails.\n\n      In sum, the Airbag Suppliers successfully show that the dismissal of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 GUDTPA claim (Count 11(c)) is warranted for lack of foreseeable\n\nharm, but the U.S. Automakers fail to show that the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019\n\n\n\n\n                                           169\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 170 of 246\n\n\n\n\nNDCPA (Count 35(c)) and OCPA (Count 37(c)) claims is warranted because\n\nthese statutes prohibit injunctive relief claims by private parties.\n\n      Overall, the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019 motion, [Doc. 181], to\n\nthe extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims against the Automakers under the law\n\nof Arkansas (Count 4(d)), Georgia (Count 11(c) as to Plaintiffs who acquired\n\nused Class Vehicles from sources unaffiliated with an Automaker), and Ohio\n\n(Count 36(c)). It also GRANTS the Airbag Suppliers\u2019 Motion, [Doc. 178], to the\n\nextent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims against the Airbag Suppliers for Arizona (Count 3(c)),\n\nArkansas (Count 4(c)), Georgia (Counts 11(c), (d)), Colorado (Count 6(c)),\n\nConnecticut (Count 7(c)), Delaware (Counts 8(c), (d)), Idaho (Count 13(c)),\n\nIllinois (Count 14(c)), Kansas (Count 17(c)), Maryland (Count 21(c)), Michigan\n\n(Count 23(c)), Nevada (Count 29(c)), New Jersey (Count 31(c)), New York\n\n(Counts 33(c), (d)), North Carolina (Count 34(c)), Oregon (Count 38(c)),\n\nPennsylvania (Count 39(c)), South Carolina (Counts 41(c), (d)), Texas (Count\n\n44(c), Utah (Count 45(c)), Virginia (Count 47(c)), and Wisconsin (Count 50(c)). 53\n\n\n\n      53  Plaintiffs seek to withdraw their claims under the consumer\nprotection statutes of Illinois and Wisconsin. [Doc. 220 at 41 n.15]. But the\nproper way to withdraw a claim is through an amended complaint. See Klay v.\nUnited Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004) (\u201cA plaintiff\nwishing to eliminate particular claims or issues from the action should amend\nthe complaint under Rule 15(a)[.]\u201d (quoting 8 Moore\u2019s Federal Practice\n\u00a7 41.21[2], at 41\u201332)). Plaintiffs have not sought to amend their pleading to\neliminate these claims, and because Plaintiffs agree that they cannot maintain\ntheir claims against the Airbag Module Defendants for violations of the Illinois\n\n\n                                          170\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 171 of 246\n\n\n\n\nFor the same reason that Plaintiffs\u2019 GUDTPA claim (Count 11(c)) fails as to\n\nthe Airbag Suppliers, it also fails as to the other Defendants. Accordingly, the\n\nCourt DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019 GUDTPA claim (Count\n\n11(c)) as to all Defendants.\n\n           4. Plausibility of Express Warranty Breach Claims 54\n\n      Plaintiffs allege that the Automakers \u201cissued an express written\n\nwarranty\u201d that \u201c[t]he Class Vehicles would be free of defects in materials and\n\nworkmanship at the time of sale\u201d and that \u201c[t]he Class Vehicles were safe and\n\nreliable, and their airbags would function properly in the event of a crash.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nand Wisconsin consumer protection statutes, the Court grants the Airbag\nModule Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on this issue.\n      54  The U.S. Automakers attach to their motions their Limited\nWarranties from one of more of the relevant years. [See e.g., Docs. 180-2\u201313\n(Hyundai and Kia Limited Warranties); 189-1 (GMC Limited Warranties);\n183-2 (BWM Limited Warranty)]. Both sides agrees that, under the\nincorporation by reference doctrine, the Court may consider a document not\nincluded with Plaintiffs\u2019 pleadings if it is \u201creferred to in the complaint, central\nto the plaintiff\u2019s claim, and of undisputed authenticity.\u201d [E.g., Docs. 223 at 10\n(quoting Hi-Tech Pharms., Inc. v. HBS Int\u2019l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th\nCir. 2018)); 243 at 6]. Plaintiffs do not contest that the SAC refers to the\nLimited Warranties and that the Warranties are central to their express\nwarranty breach claims. They, however, argue that the Court should not\nconsider Limited Warranties because they are incomplete and Plaintiffs have\nnot had the opportunity to test their authenticity. [E.g., Docs. 222 at 19\u201311;\n223 at 10\u201311; 224 at 10; 227 at 10\u201311]. This is not an effective challenge to\nauthenticity. As several U.S. Automakers point out, Plaintiffs have access to\nthe warranty booklets in their Class Vehicles and yet they do not argue that\nthe Warranties that the U.S. Automakers supply say something different or\nare inapplicable. And while the U.S. Automakers attach only the Limited\nWarranties section of the vehicle booklet, the applicable Limited Warranty\nsections are included in their entirety. Nevertheless, because the SAC provides\nthe alleged express warranty terms, the Court perceives no need to consider\nthe Limited Warranties the Automakers supply.\n\n\n                                           171\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 172 of 246\n\n\n\n\nE.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 440, 513, 582, 720, 973, 1201, 1362, 1433, 1738, 2153, 3384,\n\n4112. They assert that the Automakers breached the warranty because the\n\nClass Vehicles have the Inflator Defect. E.g., id. \u00b6\u00b6 442, 515, 722, 975, 1203,\n\n1364, 1435, 1740, 2155, 3386, 4114. The U.S. Automakers advance three\n\nreasons why Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for the breach of express warranty fail. The first\n\nof these reasons is that the express warranty terms that the SAC identifies fail\n\nto cover the alleged Defect. As discussed below, this argument is dispositive.\n\nThus, the Court does not address the U.S. Automakers\u2019 additional reasons for\n\ndismissal.\n\n      The U.S. Automakers contend that the express warranty that a vehicle\n\nis \u201cfree of defects in materials and workmanship\u201d is limited to manufacturing\n\ndefects and does not extend to design defect. [Doc. 181-1 at 27; see also e.g.,\n\nDocs. 182-1 at 10; 182-1 at 10\u201311]. Plaintiffs respond generally that discovery\n\nregarding \u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 actual warranty terms or their validity\u201d is necessary and\n\nthat the Court should not consider any warranty documents the Automakers\n\nsubmit at this stage. [Doc. 221 at 28; see also e.g., Doc. 225 at 9\u201310]. They also\n\nspecifically respond to the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument in three parts. First,\n\nPlaintiffs assert that \u201ccourts have assessed the Automakers\u2019 warranty terms\n\nand concluded they do cover design defects.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 29]. Second, they\n\nargue that even if the warranty was limited to manufacturing defects, their\n\nclaims survive because the Automakers characterize the Defect as a\n\n\u201cmanufacturing issue\u201d and, thus, it would be covered by the express warranty.\n\n\n\n\n                                          172\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 173 of 246\n\n\n\n\n[Id. at 29\u201330 (quoting Doc. 181-1 at 2 n.3)]. Third, Plaintiffs point out that no\n\ndesign defect exclusion applies to the Automakers warranty that \u201cthe Class\n\nVehicles were safe and reliable, and their airbags would function properly.\u201d\n\n[Id. at 29].\n\n       The question before the Court is whether the SAC alleges plausible\n\nclaims for breach of an express warranty. The SAC itself characterizes the\n\nalleged terms of the \u201cexpress written warranty\u201d that the Automakers issued.\n\nIn doing so, the SAC casts the first applicable term as warrantying a vehicle\n\n\u201cfree of defects in material and workmanship.\u201d But courts deem such a\n\nwarranty to encompass manufacturing defects and not design defects because\n\n\u201ca design defect cannot also be a defect in material and workmanship.\u201d Bruce\n\nMartin Const., Inc. v. CTB, Inc., 735 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2013). \u201cWere it\n\notherwise, a warranty for \u2018material and workmanship\u2019 would obviate the need\n\nfor a design warranty entirely.\u201d Id. (concluding that an express warranty that\n\ncovered \u201cdefects in material or workmanship\u201d was \u201cfatal\u201d to a warranty claim\n\nbased on a design defect); see, e.g., Amin v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 301 F.\n\nSupp. 3d 1277, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (Merecedes warranty covering repairs to\n\n\u201ccorrect defects in material or workmanship\u201d excluded coverage for design\n\ndefects); Mack Trucks Inc. v. BorgWarner Turbo Sys., Inc., 508 F. App\u2019x 180,\n\n185 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding, under Pennsylvania law, that the \u201cplain\n\nmeaning of the \u2018material and workmanship\u2019 warranty, among other things, did\n\nnot warranty design defects); Coba v. Ford Motor Co., 932 F.3d 114, 123 (3d\n\n\n\n\n                                         173\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 174 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCir. 2019) (\u201c[U]nder New Jersey law, a warranty that limits its coverage to\n\ndefects in \u2018materials\u2019 and \u2018workmanship\u2019 does not, without more, apply to\n\ndefects in \u2018design.\u2019); Rollolazo v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n\n181157, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017) (dismissing express warranty claims\n\nbrought under the laws of several states because an express warranty that only\n\ncovers \u201cdefects in materials and workmanship\u201d does not support a warranty\n\nbreach claim over a design defect); Flores v. FCA US LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist.\n\nLEXIS 55191, at *21, 25 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2021) (dismissing warranty\n\nbreach claim over a design defect where the express warranty allegedly \u201conly\n\ncovers defects in \u2018material, workmanship or factory preparation\u2019\u201d). As alleged,\n\nthe \u201cmaterial or workmanship\u201d warranty term that the SAC characterizes\n\ncovers material defects but not design defects. 55\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that other courts have concluded that the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 warranties cover design defect is unavailing. There is no\n\ncommonality between the warranty terms construed in the cases Plaintiffs cite\n\nand the \u201cmaterial and workmanship\u201d warranty term as characterized in the\n\nSAC. See Martell v. GM LLC, 537 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1200\u201305 (D. Or. 2021)\n\n(applying canons of construction and concluding that the presence of\n\n\u201cmaterials and workmanship\u201d in GM\u2019s warranty that specified coverage of\n\n\u201crepairs to correct any vehicle defect, not slight noise, vibrations, or other\n\n\n      55 The Court perceives no need to wait for discovery to elucidate the\n\nterms of the express warranty where the SAC identifies the applicable\ngoverning term.\n\n\n\n                                          174\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 175 of 246\n\n\n\n\nnormal characteristics of the vehicle related to materials or workmanship\u201d did\n\nnot serve to exclude design defects, in part, because a plain reading of the text\n\nshowed that \u201cmaterials and workmanship\u201d did not modify \u201cany vehicle defect\u201d\n\nbut rather modified the phrase \u201cother normal characteristics\u201d); McKee v. GM\n\nLLC, 376 F. Supp. 3d 751, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (same); Sanchez-Knutson v.\n\nFord Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1232 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (concluding that a\n\nFord new vehicle warranty specifying that \u201c[d]efects may be unintentionally\n\nintroduced into vehicles during the design and manufacturing processes and\n\nsuch defects could result in the need for repairs. For this reason, Ford provides\n\nthe New Vehicle Limited Warranty in order to remedy any such defects that\n\nresult in vehicle part malfunction or failure during the warranty period\u201d and\n\nnot exempting design defects from the \u201cwhat is not covered\u201d section did not\n\nexclude coverage for design defects); Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217,\n\n1225 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). 56 Thus, the Court is not persuaded that the\n\nwarranty term as alleged in the SAC (i.e., a warranty that the vehicle \u201cwould\n\n\n\n\n      56 Plaintiffs also rely on Patrick v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc.,\n2020 WL 3883275, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2020), for the court\u2019s application of\na Volkswagen warranty. But there, the court allowed the plaintiff\u2019s breach of\nexpress warranty claim to proceed under a warranty provision covering \u201cany\nrepair to correct a defect in manufacturer's material or workmanship (i.e.,\nmechanical defects)\u201d because the plaintiff alleged both a design and a\nmanufacturing defect. Patrick, 2020 WL 3883275 at *6. And in Parrish v.\nVolkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2020), the\ncourt declined to dismiss the breach of express warranty claim, perceiving an\n\u201copen issue\u201d under Pennsylvania law as to whether a \u201cmaterials and\nworkmanship\u201d warranty covered design defects.\n\n\n\n                                         175\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 176 of 246\n\n\n\n\nbe free of defects in material and workmanship at the time of sale\u201d), see, e.g.,\n\nSAC II \u00b6 440, covers a design defect.\n\n      This conclusion dooms Plaintiffs\u2019 express warranty breach claims based\n\non the \u201cmaterial and workmanship\u201d warranty term because the SAC\n\nunambiguously alleges that the Inflator Defect is a design defect. Plaintiffs\n\nseek to escapes this conclusion by arguing that while they \u201cprimarily advance\n\na defective design theory,\u201d they need not \u201c\u2018commit to a single theory\u2019 of origin\n\nbefore discovery.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 30]. While it may be that Plaintiffs need not\n\ncommit to a given theory in their pleading, the problem is that they have\n\nundoubtedly done so. Not only does the SAC fail to indicate that Plaintiffs\n\nclaim a manufacturing defect, but it also shows that they only advance a\n\ndefective design theory. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 7, 11, 283, 297, 471 (alleging that\n\nthe NHTSA found a design defect; that the Automakers refuse to recognize the\n\n\u201cfleet-wide design defect\u201d; that the ARC airbag inflators \u201chad a serious design\n\ndefect or defects\u201d; that the ARC inflators\u2019 \u201cdesign is what causes the ruptures\u201d;\n\nthat \u201c[t]hese facts strongly suggest a systemic design defect in the inflators\n\nrather than a manufacturing defect occurring at one location, for one lot, for a\n\nshort period of time, due to a non-conforming assembly process\u201d and that\n\nDefendants violated consumer protection laws by misrepresenting that\n\n\u201cdefectively designed\u201d vehicles as safe). Having committed to the theory that\n\nthe ARC airbag inflators are defectively designed, Plaintiffs must bear the\n\noutcome. They cannot maintain a claim for breach of the \u201cmaterial and\n\n\n\n\n                                         176\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 177 of 246\n\n\n\n\nworkmanship\u201d warranty term based on the presence of a design defect. Nor can\n\nthey escape this outcome by pointing to the Automakers\u2019 characterization of\n\nthe Inflator Defect as a \u201cmanufacturing issue.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 30]. Regardless of\n\nhow Defendants may choose to perceive it, what matters is that the SAC\n\ncharacterizes the \u201cissue\u201d as a design defect. Thus, as plead, the Inflator Defect\n\nfalls outside the scope of the \u201cmaterial and workmanship\u201d express warranty.\n\n      Plaintiffs correctly point out that the SAC also alleges that the\n\nAutomakers warranted that the vehicles \u201cwere safe and reliable, and their\n\nairbags would function properly in the event of a crash.\u201d Generally, \u201c\u2018[a]ny\n\naffirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to\n\nthe goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express\n\nwarranty.\u2019\u201d Barnes ex el. Gibson v. Medtronic, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n\n159341, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2021) (quoting O.C.G.A. \u00a7 11-2-313). While\n\nthe SAC alleges that the Automakers extended the \u201csafe and reliable\u201d\n\nwarranty in writing, it fails to plead the source of the warranty. [Doc. 249 at\n\n18]. For example, it does not indicate that the warranty was within a new\n\nvehicle warranty booklet, was present on the window sticker of the vehicles, or\n\nwas included in the Automakers\u2019 promotional materials. Not only does this\n\ndeprive the Automakers of notice of the source of the warranty, the SAC\u2019s bald\n\nallegation regarding the \u201csafe and reliable\u201d warranty fails to identify \u201cany\n\nspecific affirmations or promises to support a claim for breach of an express\n\nwarranty.\u201d Stich v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94923, at\n\n\n\n\n                                         177\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 178 of 246\n\n\n\n\n*19 (D.N.J. May 19, 2021). In Stich, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant\n\n\u201cexpressly warranted that their Product was safe and effective and fit for use\n\nby consumers . . . [and] did not create the risk of or produce dangerous side\n\neffects[.]\u201d Id. at *18. The court dismissed the express warranty claim,\n\nconcluding that the plaintiff \u201cfail[ed] to allege the actual language or source of\n\nany alleged warranty.\u201d Id. at 18-19. Similarly, here, the SAC alleges that the\n\nAutomakers warranted that their vehicles were \u201csafe and reliable\u201d and that\n\nthe airbags would work as intended. But as in Stich, these conclusory\n\nassertions are insufficient to support a claim for breach of express warranty.\n\nCf., Cassidy v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20324, at *12-13 (E.D.\n\nLa. Feb. 19, 2016) (concluding that the complaint \u201csufficiently identified an\n\nexpress warranty\u201d because the allegations about coverage pointed to the source\n\nof the express warranty at issue); Richards v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2018\n\nU.S. Dist. LEXIS 210184, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2018) (finding that the\n\ncomplaint sufficiently \u201coutline[d] the terms of the express warranty and\n\nidentif[ied] its sources\u201d by alleging that the defendant warranted that the\n\nproduct had certain specified characteristics in its product inserts, instructions\n\nfor use, and sales pamphlets and advertisements).\n\n      The U.S. Automakers argue that statements of \u201csafety\u201d and \u201creliability\u201d\n\ncannot serve as warranties because they are non-actionable puffery, [Doc. 249\n\nat 18]. They also contend that the express warranty claims fail because the\n\nSAC does not allege that the Inflator Defect manifested during the warranty\n\n\n\n\n                                          178\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 179 of 246\n\n\n\n\nperiod and because Plaintiffs did not present their vehicles for repair within\n\nthe warranty term. [Id. at 19\u201321; see also Doc. 242 at 4]. The Court does not\n\naddress these alternative grounds for the dismissal of the express warranty\n\nbreach claims.\n\n      Overall, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs\u2019 express warranty claims\n\nagainst the Automakers fail and, accordingly, GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nmotion to dismiss, [Doc. 181], and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nexpress warranty breach claims. It does not address the arguments that the\n\nindividual U.S. Automakers present in their separately filed motions.\n\n          5. Plausibility of Implied Warranty Breach Claims\n\n      According to the U.S. Automakers, the Court may dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nclaims for breach of an implied warranty on several independent grounds. They\n\nargue that these claims fail for the lack of privity, the lack of pre-suit notice,\n\nthe SAC\u2019s failure to allege unmerchantability, its failure to allege that the\n\nDefect manifested during the warranty period, and its failure to allege that\n\nPlaintiffs presented their vehicles for repair during the warranty period. [Docs.\n\n181-1 at 14\u201320; 180-1 at 8\u201317; 182-1 at 11\u201314].The Court takes up each of these\n\narguments in turn.\n\n             a. Lack of Privity\n\n      The U.S. Automakers argue that in several states, the requirement for\n\ncontractual privity prevents implied warranties from flowing up the\n\ndistribution chain. These Defendants identify 23 states with laws requiring\n\ncontractual privity as a prerequisite to claims under an implied warranty\n\n\n                                          179\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 180 of 246\n\n\n\n\n(Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,\n\nIowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,\n\nRhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and\n\nWisconsin (\u201cPrivity States\u201d)). According to the U.S. Automakers, Plaintiffs\n\ncannot maintain their implied warranty breach claims under the laws of the\n\nPrivity States because none of them bought or leased their vehicle from the\n\nAutomakers. [Doc. 181-1 at 30]. The U.S. Automakers rely on the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations to argue that Plaintiffs bought their vehicles from \u201cindependent,\n\nthird-party    dealerships,     CarMax      or    Carvana,     other     used    car\n\nsellers, . . . unspecified sellers\u201d or \u201cvia inheritance.\u201d [Id. at 30\u201331, 31 n.16\u201319].\n\n       Plaintiffs do not dispute the absence of privity of contract between the\n\nAutomakers and Plaintiff. Rather, they contend that five of the Privity States\n\n(California, Kansas, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and West Virginia) in fact\n\nrequire no privity. [Doc. 221 at 37 n.19]. And as to the remaining 18 Privity\n\nStates, Plaintiffs maintain that these states recognize exceptions to the privity\n\nrequirement that apply here. [Id. at 37]. Plaintiffs\u2019 successfully show that\n\nKansas, Rhode Island, and West Virginia do not require privity for implied\n\nwarranty claims in consumer transactions, but they fail to rebut the U.S.\n\nAutomakers\u2019 position that privity is required to maintain their claims under\n\nthe challenged California and North Carolina laws. They additionally fail to\n\nshow that the identified exceptions to the privity requirement apply to their\n\nclaims under the laws of the remaining Privity States.\n\n\n\n\n                                            180\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 181 of 246\n\n\n\n\n               i.   Privity Not Required\n\n      Plaintiffs rely on In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d\n\n936 (N.D. Cal. 2014), to argue that California law does not require privity.\n\nIndeed, \u201c[f]or the implied warranty claim under the Song-Beverly Act, there is\n\nno privity requirement.\u201d Id. at 982. But the SAC assert two separate claims for\n\nbreach of implied warranty under California law\u2014one (Count 17(a)) under\n\nCalifornia Commercial Code \u00a7\u00a7 2314 (for the sale of goods) and 10212 (for lease\n\ncontracts) and another (Count 17(b)) under the Song-Beverly Act (Civ. Code\n\n\u00a7 1790, et seq.). While the U.S. Automakers do not specify whether they seek\n\nthe dismissal of both claims for lack of privity, the authority they cite for the\n\nprivity requirement under California law speaks to claims under \u00a7 2314.\n\nPlaintiffs, of course, cite to authority regarding a wholly different statute. The\n\nParties thus talk at cross purposes (and not for the first time here), impeding\n\nprogress. Nevertheless, with regard to the California implied warranty claims,\n\nPlaintiffs fail to rebut the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument that privity is required\n\nto maintain claims under \u00a7\u00a7 2314 and 10212.\n\n      Contrary to the U.S. Automakers\u2019 position, \u201c[s]ection 50-639(b) of the\n\n[Kansas Consumer Protection Act] has abolished any privity requirement in\n\nan action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability involving a\n\nconsumer transaction under Kansas law.\u201d Gonzalez v. PepsiCo, Inc., 489 F.\n\nSupp. 2d 1233, 1246 (D. Kan. 2007). While the U.S. Automakers seek to\n\ndownplay the relevance of Gonzalez, maintaining that the case represents the\n\n\n\n\n                                          181\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 182 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfederal district court\u2019s prediction of how the Kansas Supreme Court would rule,\n\nGonzalez\u2019s well-reasoned \u201cprediction\u201d remains un-assailed.\n\n      Plaintiffs fail to carry the day as to their implied warranty breach claims\n\nunder North Carolina law. They cite to two statutes (North Carolina General\n\nStatutes \u00a7\u00a7 25-2-103(1)(d), 25-2-314), 57 one of which appears to exempt certain\n\nautomobile manufactures from the privity requirement, without any\n\ndiscussion of how they apply here. [Doc. 221 at 37 n.19]. This does not suffice.\n\nAlthough \u00a7 25-2-103(1)(d)\u2019s definition of \u201cseller\u201d appears to encompass auto\n\nmanufacture not in privity with the vehicle buyer, Plaintiffs do not address the\n\nreach of this definition and whether and how it applies to claims of implied\n\nwarranty breach. As the court in Atl. Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty &\n\nMiller of N.C., Inc., noted, \u201cthe North Carolina Products Liability Act 58\n\neliminated the privity requirement against manufacturers, but only for actions\n\nseeking recovery for personal injury or property damage . . . Privity is still\n\nrequired in an action for breach of implied warranties that seeks recovery for\n\neconomic loss.\u201d 175 N.C. App. 339, 345-46 (2006) (citations omitted); see\n\n\n\n      57  Article 2 of North Carolina\u2019s Uniform Commercial Code-Sales\nprovides that \u201c\u201ca warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in\na contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that\nkind.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-314(1). And \u00a7 25-2-103(1)(d) of that Code provides\nthat \u201c[a]ny manufacturer of self-propelled motor vehicles, as defined in G.S.\n20-4.01, is also a \u2018seller\u2019 with respect to buyers of its product to whom it makes\nan express warranty, notwithstanding any lack of privity between them, for\npurposes of all rights and remedies available to buyers under this Article.\u201d\n      58 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 99B-2(b).\n\n\n\n\n                                           182\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 183 of 246\n\n\n\n\nBlackman v. Bos. Whaler, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 3d 142, 150 (E.D.N.C. 2023)\n\n(\u201cAlthough North Carolina has abolished the privity requirement in certain\n\nsituations, when a plaintiff asserts an implied warranty claim seeking only the\n\nrecovery of economic loss, North Carolina requires privity of contract.\u201d).\n\nBecause Plaintiffs seek to recover only economic losses North Carolina\u2019s privity\n\nrequirement bars their implied warranty claims. See City of High Point, N.\n\nCarolina v. Suez Treatment Sols. Inc., 485 F. Supp. 3d 608, 626-27 (M.D.N.C.\n\n2020) (allowing implied warranty claim under \u00a7 25-2-314 to proceed in the\n\nabsence of privity because the plaintiff alleged that it had suffered \u201cmore than\n\npure economic loss\u201d).\n\n      Plaintiffs are equally cavalier in defense of their argument that Rhode\n\nIsland law requires privity. They cite \u201cR.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 6A-2-318\u201d and call it a\n\nday. [Doc. 221 at 37 n.19]. Nevertheless, the Court declines to dismiss their\n\nimplied warranty claims under Rhode Island law because it is debatable, at\n\nthe least, whether \u00a7 6A-2-318 abolishes the privity requirement. The cited\n\nstatutory provision provides: \u201cA seller\u2019s or a manufacturer\u2019s . . . warranty,\n\nwhether express or implied, including but not limited to a warranty of\n\nmerchantability provided for in \u00a7 6A-2-314, extends to any person who may\n\nreasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is\n\ninjured by breach of the warranty.\u201d R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 6A-2-318. But the courts\n\ndo not interpret this provision to have eliminated the privity requirement. See\n\nAce Am. Ins. Co. v. Grand Banks Yachts, Ltd., 587 F. Supp. 2d 697, 705 (D.\n\n\n\n\n                                         183\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353         Filed 10/02/26   Page 184 of 246\n\n\n\n\nMd. 2008) (citing \u00a7 6A-2-318 and noting that, unlike Maryland, Rhode Island\n\nretains the privity requirement); but see Ulrich v. GM, LLC, 2025 U.S. Dist.\n\nLEXIS 34620, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2025) (concluding that \u00a7 6A-2-318\n\nrepresents a \u201cbroad exception to privity\u201d); Sowa, 764 F. Supp. 3d at 1271\n\n(declining to dismiss Rhode Island-law based implied warranty claims against\n\nan auto manufacturer and a distributor despite the lack of privity because,\n\nunder \u00a7 6A-2-318, the plaintiffs, as the vehicle end users, \u201ccould be reasonably\n\nexpected to be affected by the [defect]\u201d).\n\n      The U.S. Automakers cite Kilgore v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 2015 WL 5838513,\n\nat *5 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 5, 2015), to support their identification of West Virginia\n\nas a \u201cPrivity State.\u201d But Kilgore applied Florida law in dismissing the implied\n\nwarranty claim for lack of privity. This puts Plaintiffs ahead from the starting\n\nline. And it seals the deal that West Virginia\u2019s Supreme Court of Appeals has\n\n\u201cheld that the requirement of privity of contract in an action for breach of an\n\nexpress or implied warranty in West Virginia is hereby abolished.\u201d McMahon\n\nv. Advance Stores Co., 227 W.Va. 21 (2010) (citation modified). Nevertheless,\n\nthe U.S. Automakers maintain their challenge, pivoting to assert that no\n\nPlaintiff resides in the state. [Doc. 249 at 21 n.14]. As previously discussed,\n\nhowever, that fact is not a bar at this point.\n\n      Having concluded that Kansas, Rhode Island, and West Virginia are not\n\n\u201cPrivity States,\u201d the Court turns to the implied warranty claims under the 20\n\nremaining Privity States to decide whether the exemptions to the privity\n\n\n\n\n                                             184\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 185 of 246\n\n\n\n\nrequirements that Plaintiffs identify shield these claims from dismissal.\n\nPlaintiffs contend that the Privity States recognize one or more of the following\n\nfive circumstances to excuse the absence of privity: (1) the buyer is a third-\n\nparty beneficiary to the contract between the seller and the manufacturer; (2)\n\nthe seller is the manufacturer\u2019s agent; (3) an express warranty is issued; (4)\n\nthe product is a \u201cdangerous product\u201d; and (5) the buyer alleges fraud. [Doc. 221\n\nat 37\u201338].\n\n      Before addressing the Parties arguments, the Court notes that Plaintiffs\n\ndo not rebut the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument that Idaho, Michigan, North\n\nCarolina, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin require privity to\n\nmaintain a breach of implied warranty claim. While they generally argue that\n\nthe states that require privity \u201cembrace one or more of the [specified]\n\nexceptions,\u201d [Doc. 221 at 37], the appendix containing the authority for this\n\nproposition includes no law for the above-mentioned states. 59 See App. A,\n\nCharts 1\u20133 [Doc. 221 at 2]. Accordingly, the Court deems Plaintiffs to have\n\nconceded that Idaho, Michigan, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin\n\nrequire privity and that they do not recognize an applicable exception.\n\n\n\n\n      59 Citing two exemplar cases (one applying Alabama law and the other\n\nFlorida law), Plaintiffs also broadly assert that the U.S. Automakers \u201ccite\ninapposite cases\u201d because unidentified cases \u201cdid not address third-party\nbeneficiary or agency arguments\u201d while other unidentified cases \u201cshow at\nminimum that privity is a factual question.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 38, n.22]. This does\nnot sufficiently rebut the U.S. Automakers\u2019 showing that Idaho, Michigan,\nOregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin require privity.\n\n\n\n                                          185\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 186 of 246\n\n\n\n\n               ii.   Privity Exception: Third-Party Beneficiary\n\n      Plaintiffs argue that Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and\n\nKentucky do not require contractual privity between the buyer and the product\n\nmanufacturer where the buyer is a beneficiary of the manufacturer\u2019s contracts\n\nwith the seller. [Doc. 221 at 37]. The U.S. Automakers counter that this\n\nexception does not apply because the SAC pleads no facts establishing (1) that\n\nPlaintiffs who bought new vehicles are third-party beneficiaries of contracts\n\nbetween the Automakers and the independent dealerships they bought from\n\nand (2) that any contracts existed between the Automakers and third parties,\n\nsuch as CarMax, Carvana, unspecified sellers, and original vehicle owners,\n\nfrom whom Plaintiffs bought used vehicles. [Doc. 249 at 22].\n\n      Sixty-six Plaintiffs each bought a new or used Class Vehicle or leased a\n\nClass Vehicle from an \u201cauthorized\u201d dealership. 60 Of the remaining forty-nine\n\n\n\n\n      60 Specifically, Plaintiffs Robert Ballero Gonzalez (New York), Deneen\n\nBrown (North Carolina), Dennis Fett (Illinois), Michael Hayes (Sought\nCarolina), Brandy Knapp (Montana), Rene Madueno (California), James\nMcCrory (Mississippi), Vincent Cerrato, Jr. (South Carolina), William Arthur\nGuest, Jr. (Illinois), Doug Phillip Paulson (Idaho), Julie Walling (Illinois), John\nBritton (California), Eniko Gedo (Illinois), Eva Jacinto (Florida), Matthew\nKakol (New York), Shona Thomas (Illinois), Melissa Warren (Illinois), Marie\nHudson (Illinois), Bobby Sims (Mississippi), Brenda Smith-Watson (Virginia),\nMichael Tropea (Massachusetts), Theresa Wolle (Tennessee), Kenneth Allan\n(Wisconsin), Moises Alonso (Alabama), Brian Belanger (Massachusetts), Tina\nBrown (New York), Christopher Carter (Arizona), Gregorio Escobedo\n(California), Stacey Kabir (Alabama), Daniel McCarthy (New Jersey), Tonjua\nSpeck (California), Gilbert Starkey (Nevada), Julie Struble (New Hampshire),\nand Nelson Yerger (Georgia), bought their new vehicles from an authorized\ndealer. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 143, 144, 146, 151, 154, 156\u201357, 170\u201371, 176, 180, 182, 185\u2013\n88, 194\u201396, 200\u201301, 203, 206\u201308, 212, 215\u201316, 222, 228, 231, 240\u201341, 243, 246.\n\n\n                                           186\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 187 of 246\n\n\n\n\nnamed Plaintiffs, four Plaintiffs bought new Class Vehicles from an\n\nunspecified source or a dealership that the SAC does not identify as\n\n\u201cauthorized,\u201d 61 forty-four bought used Class Vehicles from a third-party dealer\n\n\n\n\n      Plaintiff Francine Lewis (New York) leased her Class Vehicle from an\nauthorized dealer. Id. \u00b6 189.\n       And Plaintiffs Clayton Fineout (Michigan), Bonnie Florentine (Illinois),\nBrad Hoschar (Pennsylvania), Tyler Baker (Vermont), Nicole Hearn\n(Alabama), Carla Taylor Long (Alabama), Patricia Taylor (Alabama), Celeste\nFelice (Florida), Stephen Gearhart (Florida), Eva Jacinto (California), Kristen\nLuiz (Massachusetts), Rittie Marshall (Tennessee), Anthony Raspantini (New\nJersey), Nicole Senkpeil (Illinois), Leigh Schultz (Iowa), Billy Sellers (South\nCarolina), Matthew Shephard (Pennsylvania), Latasha Tinch (Georgia),\nGeorge Welch (Illinois), Brandon Barker (New York), Corby Cline (Florida),\nWilliam Demele (Washington), Tiffany Marvin (Washington), Jeffrey Rhoades\n(Michigan), Jeffrey Slusher (Kansas), Dwayne Stowe (Georgia), Frank\nTalavera (California), Jaime Duran (Nevada), Ryan Taylor (Tennessee),\nRichard Topa (New York), and Ronald Wolf (South Carolina) each bought a\nused vehicle from an authorized dealer. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 147\u201348, 152, 168, 172, 174, 177,\n183\u201384, 190\u201393, 197\u201399, 202, 205, 211, 218\u201319, 230, 237\u201338, 242, 244, 247,\n251\u201352, 255.\n      61 Plaintiffs Steven Aula (Michigan), Aaron Jophlin (South Carolina),\n\nAnthony Wayne Brown (California), and Dave Bacon (South Dakota). Id.\n\u00b6\u00b6 161, 167, 169, 209.\n\n\n\n                                         187\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 188 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsuch as CarMax, from the vehicle\u2019s original owner, or from an unspecified\n\nsource, 62 and one inherited his from an unspecified source. 63\n\n      No Plaintiff can maintain a breach of implied warranty claim under\n\nAlabama law based on the third-party beneficiary theory. \u201cGenerally, implied\n\nwarranties apply only to the seller, not the manufacturer.\u201d Horton Homes, Inc.\n\nv. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44, 48 (Ala. 2001). While, under Alabama law,\n\n      an implied warranty may apply to a manufacturer despite the\n      presence of an intermediary between it and the ultimate\n      consumer . . . \u201cwhen \u2026 the product has been specially\n      manufactured for a particular customer and the manufacturer\n      can reasonably expect the customer to be affected by any\n\n      62  Plaintiffs David Anderson (Pennsylvania), Jonathan M. Carano\n(Michigan), Ninotchka Harpey-Bey (Nevada), Mark Hartman (Missouri), Steve\nIsbister (Ohio), Renee Lesesne (South Carolina), Janice McKennon (North\nCarolina), Loretta Mitchell (Connecticut), Bryan Polo (Virginia), Ryan Clark\n(South Carolina), Latricia Ford (South Carolina), Sheila Hall-Hudson\n(Tennessee), Rosalind Hudson-Battie (Georgia), Hannah Jones (Iowa), Jimmy\nHerrera (Florida), Tracy Miles (Alabama), Jordan E. Tribble (Georgia), Anita\nVictory (Arkansas), David Winslow (California), Elizabeth Valenzuela\n(Arizona), Leatha Barber (Kentucky), Rached Belhadj (Florida), Lisamarie\nBlumberg (Delaware), Katrina Chambliss (Virginia), Marcos Diaz (California),\nManakia Eiland (Mississippi), Jamaria Fernandez (Virginia), Harley Graff\n(Missouri), Douglas Hall (Indiana), Westley Hamner (Alabama), Natasha\nHochstetler (Minnesota), Stacey Kabir (Alabama), John Komoroski\n(Connecticut), Latunder Mercadel (Georgia), Felicia Owens (Tennessee), Kara\nPetschen (Minnesota), Anita Reddick (Georgia), Chad Sorenson (Washington),\nMichael Thomas (Georgia), Preshawn Long (Florida), Elisabeth Lovett\n(Tennessee), Patricia Mobley (South Carolina), Bobbie White (Alabama), Trois\nWhite (Alabama), and Earl Wilson (New York), each bought his or her used\nvehicle either from a dealership not associated with the vehicle\u2019s Automaker\u2014\nfor example, Jonathan M. Carano bought his 2010 Kia Rio from Village Ford\u2014\na third-party dealer (e.g., Carmax), the vehicle\u2019s original owner, or an\nunspecified source. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 142, 145, 149\u201350, 153, 155, 158\u201360, 162\u201366, 173,\n175, 178\u201379, 181, 204, 210, 213\u201314, 217, 220\u201321, 223\u201329, 232, 234\u201336, 239,\n245, 248\u201350, 253\u201354.\n      63 Plaintiff Scott Milewski (Michigan). Id. \u00b6 233.\n\n\n\n\n                                          188\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353         Filed 10/02/26   Page 189 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      problems with the product.\u201d . . . Alabama courts have not\n      recognized . . . any [other] form of third-party-beneficiary\n      exception to the privity requirement in implied warranty actions.\n\nMcCabe v. Ford Motor Co., 774 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (D. Mass. 2025) (\u201cMcCabe\n\nIII\u201d) (quoting Horton Homes, 832 So. 2d at 48). As in McCabe III, the SAC \u201cdoes\n\nnot contain any allegations suggesting that [the Automakers] \u2018specially\n\nmanufactured\u2019 any vehicle \u2018for a particular consumer.\u2019 Thus, [each Automaker]\n\nis a \u2018manufacturer\u2019 in the traditional sense under Alabama law, not a seller\u2014\n\nand not, therefore, subject to implied-warranty-of-merchantability liability as\n\nto the ultimate purchasers of its vehicles.\u201d Id.\n\n      Under California law, \u201ca plaintiff asserting breach of warranty claims\n\nmust stand in vertical contractual privity with the defendant . . . A buyer and\n\nseller stand in privity if they are in adjoining links of the distribution chain.\u201d\n\nClemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008)\n\n(citations omitted). But \u201can end consumer . . . who buys from a retailer\u201d is not\n\nin an \u201cadjoining link\u201d to the manufacture. Id. California courts have found\n\n\u201cthat the third-party beneficiary exception excuses the lack of privity\u201d in the\n\ncontext of implied warranty breach claims. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Shimano N.\n\nAm. Bicycle Inc., 729 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1026 (C.D. Cal. 2024). However, this\n\nexception does not rescue Plaintiffs\u2019 claims because the SAC fails to allege facts\n\nindicating that Plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries to the contract between\n\nthe Automakers and their authorized dealerships much less that contracts\n\nconcerning the Class Vehicles exist between the Automakers and any sales\n\nsource apart from their respective authorized dealerships.\n\n\n                                          189\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 190 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      For example, in Hawkins, the implied warranty claims under California\n\nlaw survived because the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were \u201cintended\n\nthird-party beneficiaries of contracts between Defendants and their agents,\u201d\n\nthat they were \u201cthe intended beneficiaries of Defendants\u2019 implied warranties,\u201d\n\nthat the sellers \u201cwere not intended to be the ultimate consumers of the\n\n[product] . . . and have no rights under the warranty agreements provided with\n\nthe [product],\u201d and that \u201cthe warranty agreements were designed for and\n\nintended to benefit the ultimate consumers only.\u201d Id. at 1025; see Rollolazo v.\n\nBMW of N. Am., LLC, 2017 WL 1536456, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017)\n\n(allowing implied warranty breach claims to proceed against the auto\n\nmanufacturer under California law based on third-party beneficiary exception\n\nwhere the complaint alleged \u201cthat Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles from a\n\nnetwork of dealers who are agents of [the manufacturer], and that the dealers\n\nwere not intended to be the ultimate consumers of the Subject Vehicles and\n\nhave no rights under the warranty agreements provided with the Subject\n\nVehicles\u201d (citation modified)). The SAC contains no such allegations. At best,\n\nit alleges that the law of each state conferred an implied warranty of\n\nmerchantability and that the Automakers breached that warranty because the\n\nClass Vehicles are unfit for their ordinary purpose. See, e.g., SAC II 527\u201328,\n\n734\u201335, 987\u201388, 1214, 1216, 1536, 1542, 1951\u201352, 2903\u201304, 3551\u201352, 3986\u201387,\n\n4126\u201327. These allegations say nothing about Plaintiffs\u2019 third-party\n\nbeneficiary status. Nor do the allegations that Plaintiffs identify in support of\n\n\n\n\n                                         190\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 191 of 246\n\n\n\n\ntheir argument of third-party beneficiary status. [Doc. 221 at 37]. 64 Because\n\nthe SAC does not allege facts to indicate Plaintiffs\u2019 third-party beneficiary\n\nstatus, no Plaintiff can maintain a breach of implied warranty claim under\n\nCalifornia law based on the third-party beneficiary theory\n\n      This holds for Plaintiffs\u2019 implied warranty claims under Florida law too.\n\nPlaintiffs rely on Rollolazo for support. But there, the court allowed the implied\n\nwarranty claims under Florida law to proceed because the above-discussed\n\nfacts alleged in the complaint sufficiently supported the plaintiffs\u2019 status as\n\nthird-party beneficiaries to the contracts between the auto dealerships and the\n\nauto manufacturer. 2017 WL 1536456 at *14. The complaint in Sanchez-\n\nKnutson v. Ford Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2014), also alleged\n\nsimilar facts. \u201cWhile the legal theory itself was not spelled out,\u201d the court\n\nallowed the plaintiff\u2019s \u201cclaim of breach of implied warranty through third-party\n\nbeneficiary law\u201d to proceed because the allegations supported the plaintiff\u2019s\n\nstatus as a third-party beneficiary. Id. at 1233-34.\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 Illinois and Kentucky-law based implied warrant claims also\n\ngo the same way. Although Illinois recognizes the third-party beneficiary\n\nexception, its application is limited to instances \u201c\u2018where the manufacturer\n\nknew the identity, purpose and requirements of the dealer\u2019s customer and\n\n\n\n      64  Those allegations state that the Automakers issued an express\nwritten warranty and that this warranty formed the basis of the bargain for\nPlaintiffs\u2019 purchase or lease of the Class Vehicles. SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 440-41, 1132-33,\n1201-02.\n\n\n\n                                          191\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 192 of 246\n\n\n\n\nmanufactured or delivered the goods specifically to meet those requirements.\u2019\u201d\n\nElward v. Electrolux Home Prods., 214 F. Supp. 3d 701, 704\u201305 (N.D. Ill. 2016)\n\n(quoting Frank\u2019s Maint. & Eng\u2019g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980\n\n(1980)). Noting the fact-intensive nature of the privity analysis, the court\n\ndeemed the complaint\u2019s allegations that the defendant \u201cwas aware of remote\n\ncustomers\u2019 requirement\u201d for its product and that it \u201cdelivered [the product] in\n\norder to satisfy that requirement\u201d sufficient to indicate that the plaintiffs were\n\nthird-party beneficiaries to the contract between the seller and the\n\nmanufacturer. Id. at 706. Here, however, the SAC contains no such allegations.\n\nAnd as for Plaintiffs\u2019 Kentucky-law based implied warranty claims, \u201c[w]hile\n\nKentucky law has recognized a limited exception for third-party beneficiaries\n\nto the rule that express warranties require privity,\u201d that exception is not\n\nimplicated in implied warranty breach claims. Raymond v. Thor Motor Coach\n\nInc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134020, at *23\u201324 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2023).\n\n\u201cTherefore, there is no third-party beneficiary exception to Kentucky's\n\nrequirement that the parties be in privity of contract in order to have a breach\n\nof implied warranty.\u201d Id. at *24; see also Simpson v. Champion Petfoods USA,\n\nInc., 397 F. Supp. 3d 952, 969 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (noting that Kentucky law is\n\n\u201cclear that privity is a strict requirement for implied warranty claims\u201d and\n\ndeclining to apply the third-party beneficiary exception to such a claim).\n\n      The result under Georgia law is mixed. Those Plaintiffs who bought used\n\nvehicles from a source other than their Automaker\u2019s authorized dealer cannot\n\n\n\n\n                                          192\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 193 of 246\n\n\n\n\nassert claims for breach of the implied warranty. This is because \u201c[u]sually,\n\nGeorgia\u2019s implied warranties for goods do not pass to a second or subsequent\n\npurchaser, and may be enforced only by the original buyer, who stands in\n\nprivity of contract with the seller-defendant.\u201d McClure, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 1351\n\n(citation modified). Thus, Georgia-based Plaintiffs (i.e., Rosalind Hudson-\n\nBattie, Jordan E. Tribble, Latunder Mercadel, Anita Reddick, and Michael\n\nThomas) cannot maintain implied warranty claims under Georgia law.\n\n\u201cHowever, Georgia courts recognize an exception to privity where an\n\nautomobile manufacturer, through its authorized dealer issues to a purchaser\n\n. . . a warranty by the manufacturer running to the purchaser[.]\u201d 65 Id. This\n\nexception applies to the claims of the three remaining Georgia Plaintiffs (i.e.,\n\nDwayne Stowe, Latasha Tinch, and Nelson Yerger) who bought warrantied\n\nvehicles from authorized dealerships. See SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 202, 242, 246. Although\n\nthe SAC fails to specify the source of these Plaintiffs\u2019 warranties, it generally\n\nalleges that the Automakers sell Class Vehicles through dealership networks\n\nand that they issued express written warranties for each Class Vehicle they\n\nsold. SAC I \u00b6 27; SAC II \u00b6 1201. Viewing the allegations in the light most\n\nfavorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the SAC sufficiently alleges\n\nthat the relevant Automakers issued warranties through their authorized\n\n\n\n\n      65 Plaintiffs incorrectly cast this exception as the third-party beneficiary\n\nexception.\n\n\n\n                                          193\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353        Filed 10/02/26   Page 194 of 246\n\n\n\n\ndealers that ran to Stowe, Tinch, and Yerger. Thus, these Plaintiffs\u2019 Georgia-\n\nlaw based implied warranty claims may proceed.\n\n      Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for breach of implied warranty under Alabama,\n\nCalifornia, Florida, Illinois, and Kentucky are foreclosed. Moreover, with the\n\nexception of the claims of those Plaintiffs who bought their vehicles from\n\nauthorized dealerships, Plaintiffs may not assert implied warranty claims\n\nunder Georgia law.\n\n             iii.    Privity Exception: Agency\n\n      According to Plaintiffs, where the automobile dealers act as the auto\n\nmanufacture\u2019s agent, Alabama, Connecticut, and Iowa excuse the need for\n\nprivity in implied warranty claims. [Docs. 221 at 37; 229 at 7 (arguing in\n\nresponse to Hyundai and Kia\u2019s motion to dismiss that Taylor Long\u2019s implied\n\nwarranty breach claim under Alabama law survives because she bought her\n\nused Kia Class Vehicle from a Kia-authorized dealership and the allegations\n\nof agency \u201csuffice to allege privity\u201d)]. Plaintiffs contend that the SAC\n\nsufficiently alleges an agency relationship between the dealerships and the\n\nAutomakers and that it is premature to consider the agency question at this\n\nstage because determining whether the dealerships are the Automakers\u2019\n\nagents is a fact-dependent inquiry. The Court agrees that whether agency\n\nexists requires a factual inquiry, but a complaint must include sufficient facts\n\nto indicate that such a relationship allegedly exists. Here, the SAC fails to do\n\nso. The portions of the SAC that Plaintiffs rely on say nothing about agency;\n\nthose paragraphs simply allege that the Automakers extended express written\n\n\n                                         194\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 195 of 246\n\n\n\n\nwarranties covering the Class Vehicles. SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 440, 905, 1362. But the cases\n\non which Plaintiffs rely fail to show that, under the laws of the relevant states,\n\na manufacturer\u2019s extension of an express warranty through the seller suffices\n\nto establish an agency relationship between the two.\n\n      For example, Plaintiffs cite to Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So.\n\n2d 1259 (Ala. 1983), where the court held that a jury could reasonably conclude\n\nthat the seller of a combine was the manufacturer\u2019s agent. Id. at 1262. But that\n\nholding did not depend on the fact that the manufacturer had extended an\n\nexpress warranty. Rather, there, evidence that the manufacture\u2019s \u201cliterature\n\nwas about the premises of [the seller\u2019s] business and that [the manufacturer\u2019s]\n\nemployees accompanied [the seller\u2019s] employees when attempting to repair the\n\ncombine is what teed up the jury question as to agency. Id. While only factual\n\nallegations supporting the inference of an agency relationship are required at\n\nthis stage, the SAC contains no such allegations. Specifically, a review of the\n\nSAC reveals no other factual allegations to support an inference that the\n\nAutomaker-authorized dealers, much less unassociated third-party sellers,\n\nacted as their Automaker\u2019s agent. The SAC does allege that the Automakers\n\nsold Class Vehicles \u201cthrough networks of dealerships in each state and [U.S.]\n\nterritory,\u201d and that they received \u201cfinancial benefit and profits\u201d from selling\n\nthe Class Vehicles,\u201d see, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 27, 32, 82\u201383, 96\u201397, 89\u201390, 104\u201305,\n\n114, 117\u201318, 124\u201325, 137, but these allegations are not sufficient to allege an\n\nagency relationship between those in-network dealers and the Automakers.\n\n\n\n\n                                          195\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 196 of 246\n\n\n\n\nFor example, under Alabama law, \u201c[w]hether an express agency relationship\n\nexists depends on whether there is evidence of a retained right of control by\n\nthe principal over the agent.\u201d Chase v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 140 F. Supp.\n\n2d 1280, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (citing McLemore v. Ford Motor Co., 628 So.2d\n\n548, 551 (Ala. 1993)). But, here, the SAC contains no allegations to support an\n\ninference that the Automakers \u201cretained right of control\u201d over the actions of\n\ntheir associated dealers.\n\n      Soo too in Iowa. In Bruce v. ICI Ams., 933 F. Supp. 781, 790 (S.D. Iowa\n\n1996), which Plaintiffs advance, the fact that the buyer-plaintiff purchased the\n\nproduct from the manufacturer\u2019s authorized dealer did not shield the implied\n\nwarranty breach claim against the manufacturer. There, the claim failed at\n\nsummary judgment because the evidence failed to show that the manufacturer\n\ncontrolled the seller\u2019s operations related to the product. Id. Here, Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nimplied warranty breach claims are foreclosed at the pleading stage because\n\nthe SAC fails to allege any facts from which the Automakers\u2019 control of the\n\ndealers may be inferred.\n\n      Similarly, under Connecticut law, while \u201cit may be possible to satisfy\n\nthe privity requirement by pleading facts which establish an agency\n\nrelationship between a vehicle manufacturer and the Dealership,\u201d the\n\nallegation that a manufacturer extended an express warranty does not suffice\n\nto indicate that relationship. Kahn v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 2008 WL\n\n590469, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2008). Indeed, in Kahn, although the\n\n\n\n\n                                         196\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 197 of 246\n\n\n\n\nplaintiff alleged that the manufacturer had extended express warranties, the\n\ncourt declined to \u201cdispense with the privity requirement\u201d and concluded that\n\nthe complaint failed to allege an agency relationship between the automobile\n\ndealer and the manufacturer. 2008 WL 590469, at *9. The following three\n\nelements are necessary to support an agency relationship under Connecticut\n\nlaw: \u201c(1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2)\n\nacceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understanding between\n\nthe parties that the principal will be in control of the undertaking.\u201d Kahn, 2008\n\nWL 590469, at *11. The SAC, however, is silent on factual allegations going to\n\nthese elements that would raise a plausible inference of agency.\n\n              iv.   Privity Exception: Express Warranty:\n\n      As another exception to the privity requirement, Plaintiffs argue that\n\nIllinois, Ohio, Tennessee, and Washington consider the privity requirement\n\nsatisfied where the manufacture issued an express warranty. [Doc. 221 at 38].\n\nHowever, this exception does not rescue their implied warranty claims under\n\nIllinois law. Illinois \u201cstill requires privity even where the manufacturer issues\n\na written warranty, but has held that under [the] Magnuson-Moss [Warranty\n\nAct] privity is deemed to exist where there is a written warranty.\u201d\n\nMekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., L.L.C., 347 Ill. App. 3d 828, 834 (2004);\n\nSee Bakopoulos v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766-67 (N.D.\n\nIll. 2022) (dismissing implied warranty claim in a case also alleging an express\n\nwarranty because Illinois law requires \u201c[p]rivity of contract . . . to recover\n\neconomic damages for breach of implied warranty\u201d and noting that although\n\n\n                                         197\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 198 of 246\n\n\n\n\n\u201c[t]he Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting federal law, found that privity\n\nwasn't required for federal claims for breach of an implied warranty brought\n\nunder the [Magnuson-Moss Warranty] Act[,] . . . under Illinois law, a showing\n\nof privity remains generally required to bring a claim for breach of implied\n\nwarranty\u201d (citation modified)); McCabe I, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1362\u201363 (rejecting\n\nthe plaintiff\u2019s argument that Illinois has relaxed the privity requirement where\n\nthe manufacturer extends an express warranty and dismissing implied\n\nwarranty claim because \u201cthe privity requirement remains for claims brought\n\nunder Illinois law\u201d).\n\n      For Ohio, \u201cPlaintiffs provide no authority allowing them to bootstrap a\n\ncontract-based implied warranty claim onto an express written warranty\n\nunder Ohio law, and the Court is not aware of any.\u201d Browning v. Am. Honda\n\nMotor Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48555, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022).\n\nPlaintiffs also cite the same Michigan district court case\u2014In re Gearshift Litig.\n\nI\u2014that failed to persuade the court in Browning. This was because In re\n\nGearshift I \u201ccite[s] without analysis a single Ohio district court case\u201d that dealt\n\nwith an implied warranty in tort, rather than, as here, in contract. Browning,\n\n2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48555, at *22. See Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v.\n\nHarold Tatman & Son's, Enters., 50 N.E.3d 955, 962 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)\n\n(affirming dismissal of breach of implied warranty claim where the\n\nmanufacturer extended express written warranties for product sold through\n\n\n\n\n                                           198\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 199 of 246\n\n\n\n\nan intermediary because the buyer-plaintiff and the manufacturer were not\n\n\u201cimmediate links in the distribution chain\u201d and thus lacked privity).\n\n      Similarly, for their argument that under Tennessee law the\n\nmanufacturer\u2019s provision of an express warranty satisfies the privity\n\nrequirement for an implied warranty breach claim, Plaintiffs cite to Francis,\n\n504 F. Supp. 3d at 677, which cites a Montana district court case that accepted,\n\nwithout referencing any authority, the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that they\n\nsufficiently stated a breach of implied warranty claim under the applicable\n\nstate laws (including, presumably, Tennessee,) because the \u201c[d]efendants made\n\nbinding express warranties, forming a unilateral contract.\u201d Bishop v. DeLaval\n\nInc., 466 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1024 (W.D. Mo. 2020). The Court remains\n\nunpersuaded. Plaintiffs, as the proponents of the specific exception to\n\nTennessee\u2019s privity requirement, have the burden of showing that Tennessee\n\nlaw recognizes that exception. They have failed to do so, and thus their\n\nTennessee-law based implied warranty breach claims fail for lack of privity.\n\nSee Harrison v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2023 WL 348962, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Jan.\n\n19, 2023) (dismissing the implied warranty claim where the plaintiffs argued\n\nthat the express warranty provided privity for their implied warranty claim\n\nbut \u201ccited no Tennessee law in support\u201d).\n\n      Finally, Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that Washington allows implied warranty\n\nbreach claims to proceed where the manufacturer has supplied an express\n\nwarranty is also unavailing. In Tex Enters., Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc.,\n\n\n\n\n                                         199\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 200 of 246\n\n\n\n\n149 Wash. 2d 204, 212 (2003), on which Plaintiffs rely, the Supreme Court of\n\nWashington recognized that Washington law \u201cdistinguish[es] between express\n\nand implied warranties, restricting recovery for breach of implied warranty\n\nwhere it would have allowed recovery for breach of express warranty.\u201d And it\n\nheld that \u201cin cases where a commercial purchaser seeks to recover economic\n\ndamages from a remote manufacturer, implied warranties do not arise absent\n\nprivity or an underlying contract to which the remote commercial purchaser is\n\na third-party beneficiary.\u201d Id. at 630. Although Plaintiffs cite to Tex Enters.,\n\nthey provide no analysis. The Court does not read Tex Enters. as standing for\n\nthe proposition that a manufacturer-defendant\u2019s extension of an express\n\nwarranty creates the otherwise missing vertical privity with the \u201cbuyer who is\n\nin the distributive chain, but who did not buy the product directly from the\n\ndefendant.\u201d Id. at 628. And, as previously discussed, the SAC fails to allege\n\nthat Plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries to a contract between the\n\nAutomakers and the dealers for the Class Vehicles.\n\n              v.   Privity Exception: Dangerous Product\n\n      Plaintiffs maintain that New York excuses the privity requirement for\n\nan implied warranty breach claim \u201cwhere the product\u2019s defect is dangerous.\u201d\n\n[Doc. 221 at 38 (quoting Doll v. Ford Motor Co., 814 F. Supp. 2d 526, 540-41\n\n(D. Md. 2011))]. However, based on the well-reasoned analysis in Cummings v.\n\nFCA US LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 288, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 2019), the Court is persuaded\n\nthat \u201cno thing-of-danger exception exists under New York law for claims\n\ninvolving purely economic injury.\u201d See In re ZF-TRW Litig., 601 F. Supp. 3d at\n\n\n                                         200\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 201 of 246\n\n\n\n\n834-35 (questioning Doll\u2019s recognition of the dangerous product exception and\n\ndismissing implied warranty claims for failure to allege privity); In re Rock \u2019n\n\nPlay Sleeper Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., 2022 WL 22922234, at\n\n*14 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2022) (\u201cThere is scant support for a conclusion that [a\n\nprivity exception for \u201cthings of danger\u201d] represents New York law.\u201d).\n\n              vi.   Privity Exception: Fraud\n\n      Plaintiffs rely on In re Gearshift I, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 593, to argue that\n\nArizona recognizes an exception to the privity requirement in cases of fraud by\n\nthe manufacturer. But In re Gearshift I addressed Arizona\u2019s privity\n\nrequirement for common law fraudulent concealment claims not for statutory\n\nimplied warranty breach claims, which are at issue here. See id. at 593-94.\n\nPlaintiffs provide no authority to support the proposition that Arizona waives\n\nthe privity requirement in implied warranty breach claims where fraud is\n\nalleged, and the Court has found none. \u201cArizona law provides that, with one\n\nexception, the privity requirement extends to both implied and express\n\nwarranties.\u201d Eppich v. FCA US LLC, 2021 WL 1951925, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan.\n\n21, 2021) (citation modified). \u201cThis exception extends a seller\u2019s express or\n\nimplied warranty only to \u2018any natural person who is in the family or household\n\nof his buyer . . . who is injured in person.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting A.R.S. \u00a7 47-2318).\n\nPlaintiffs do not contend that this exception applies to their claims. Moreover,\n\n\u201cthis exception does not eliminate the necessity of vertical privity, or privity in\n\nthe chain of distribution.\u201d Eppich, 2021 WL 1951925, at *2 (citation modified).\n\n\n\n\n                                           201\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 202 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Accordingly, Plaintiffs\u2019 breach of implied warranty claims against the\n\nAutomakers survive under the laws of Georgia (limited to the claims of\n\nPlaintiffs who bought their vehicles from authorized dealerships), Kansas,\n\nRhode Island, and West Virginia but fail under Alabama, Arizona, California,\n\nConnecticut, Florida, Georgia (limited to the claims of Plaintiffs who did not\n\nbuy from an authorized dealerships), Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,\n\nMichigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee. Vermont,\n\nVirginia, Washington, and Wisconsin law. The Court GRANTS the U.S.\n\nAutomakers\u2019 joint and individual motions to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 implied\n\nwarranty breach claims, [Docs. 180, 181, 182, 187], to the extent that it\n\nDISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the following claims: Alabama (Count 1(b)),\n\nArizona (Count 3(b)), California (Count 5(b)), Connecticut (Count 7(b)), Florida\n\n(Count 10(b)), Georgia (Count 11(b), as to Plaintiffs who did not buy from\n\nauthorized dealerships), Idaho (Count 13(b)), Illinois (Count 14(b)), Iowa\n\n(Count 16(b)), Kentucky (Count 18(b)), Michigan (Count 23(b)), New York\n\n(Count 33(b)), North Carolina (Count 34(b)), Ohio (Count 36(b)), Oregon (Count\n\n38(b)), Tennessee (Count 43(b)). Vermont (Count 46(b)), Virginia (Count 47(b)),\n\nWashington (Count 48(b)), and Wisconsin (Count 50(b)). 66 The Court DENIES\n\nthe U.S. Automakers\u2019 motion as to implied warranty breach claims under the\n\n\n\n      66 In response to Hyundai and Kia\u2019s motion, Miles (an Alabama resident)\nseeks to withdraw her implied warranty breach claim under Alabama law.\n[Doc. 229 at 6 n.4]. Because Miles\u2019s claim is subject to Hyundai\u2019s challenge and\nthe Court dismissed all Alabama-law based implied warranty breach claims,\nMiles\u2019s claim stands dismissed rather than withdrawn.\n\n\n                                         202\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 203 of 246\n\n\n\n\nlaws of Georgia (Count 11(b), as to Plaintiffs who bought their vehicles from\n\nauthorized dealerships), Kansas (Count 17(b)), Rhode Island (Count 40(b)),\n\nand West Virginia (Count 49(b)).\n\n             b. Pre-Suit Notice\n\n      Of the implied warranty breach claims that either remained\n\nunchallenged on privity grounds or survived that challenge, those under the\n\nlaws of the following 29 states are up for dismissal on pre-suit notice grounds:\n\nColorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,\n\nMinnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New\n\nHampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,\n\nPennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,\n\nVermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. 67 [See Doc. 181-4]. Unlike the Airbag\n\nSuppliers, the U.S. Automakers do not challenge the adequacy and timing of\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 pre-suit notices. Rather, they argue that a pre-suit notice is a\n\nprerequisite to any implied warranty breach claim under the laws of the\n\nrelevant states and that, here, these claims fail because the SAC does not\n\nallege that each Plaintiff notified the Automakers. [Doc. 181-1 at 31\u201333].\n\n\n\n\n      67 For claims under Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New\n\nMexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and\nWyoming law, the U.S. Automakers assert that there is no named Plaintiff who\ncould have provided pre-suit notice. [Doc. 181-1 at 32 n.22]. However, as\npreviously discussed, supra \u00a7 IV.A., the absence of plaintiffs at this stage does\nnot render the claims deficient.\n\n\n\n                                         203\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 204 of 246\n\n\n\n\n        Plaintiffs counter that pre-suit notice is only a prerequisite to state court\n\nlawsuits and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 68 displaces the notice\n\nrequirement in suits filed in federal court. [Doc. 221 at 39\u201340]. Alternatively,\n\nthey argue that (1) the SAC sufficiently alleges pre-suit notice under Rule 9(c),\n\n(2) many states only require notice to sellers and not to manufacturers, and (3)\n\nseveral states excuse the requirement or consider it satisfied when a complaint\n\nis filed, the defendants have actual knowledge, or where notice would be futile.\n\n[Id.]\n\n        Although Plaintiffs contend that state-law governed pre-suit notice\n\nrequirements have no place in this federal suit, they do little to develop this\n\nargument beyond citing to some case law. [Doc. 221 at 38\u201339 n.23]. How does\n\nthe outcome in a case parsing a specific state statutory notice provision and\n\nanalyzing how that state\u2019s courts enforce it apply with a broad brush to other\n\nstatutory notice provisions across all states? Plaintiffs do not explain.\n\n        The inquiry that Plaintiffs\u2019 position tees up is an intensive one, not to be\n\nundertaken lightly. To decide whether Rule 3 displaces a given state\u2019s pre-suit\n\nnotice requirement, a court must follow a \u201cmultistep choice-of-law framework,\u201d\n\nasking at the first step \u201cwhether state law conflicts with a valid federal rule of\n\nprocedure on point.\u201d Albright v. Christensen, 24 F.4th 1039, 1044 (6th Cir.\n\n2022) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2022)). If the state law\n\n\n\n        68 Per Rule 3, \u201c[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with\n\nthe court.\u201d\n\n\n\n                                            204\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 205 of 246\n\n\n\n\nand federal rule \u201ccollide[],\u201d the second step is to gauge \u201cwhether the federal\n\nrule is a general rule of practice and procedure that does not abridge, enlarge\n\nor modify any substantive right and is procedural in the ordinary use of the\n\nterm.\u201d Id. at 1044\u201345 (citation modified). If the state law and federal rule do\n\nnot collide, then the next step is to \u201cwade into Erie\u2019s murky waters.\u201d Id. at\n\n1046, 1049 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,\n\n559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010).\n\n      Deciding the first step requires interpretation of the state statutory\n\nprovision with a view to how that state\u2019s courts interpret it. In Albright, the\n\nSixth Circuit concluded that the following Michigan statutory pre-suit notice\n\nrule for medical malpractice actions conflicted with Rule 3: \u201c\u2018a person shall not\n\ncommence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional\n\nor health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health\n\nfacility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the\n\naction is commenced.\u2019\u201d Id. at 1043 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 600.2912b).\n\nThe conflict arose because Rule 3 \u201crequires only the filing of a complaint to\n\ncommence an action\u2014nothing more,\u201d but, as the Michigan Supreme Court has\n\nexplained, under \u00a7 600.2912b(1)\u2019s demands, \u201c\u2018a medical malpractice action can\n\nonly be commenced by filing a timely [notice of intent] and then filing a\n\ncomplaint and an affidavit of merit.\u2019\u201d Id. at 1046 (quoting Tyra v. Organ\n\nProcurement Agency of Mich., 498 Mich. 68, 94 (2015)) (alteration in original).\n\nBecause \u201cthe Michigan statute\u2014like Rule 3\u2014affects how a lawsuit is\n\n\n\n\n                                         205\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 206 of 246\n\n\n\n\ncommenced\u201d\u2014i.e., by \u201cadd[ing] steps to the process of commencing an action,\u201d\n\nthe statutory notice requirement locks horns with Rule 3. Id. at 1047.\n\nUltimately, in view of its conflict with a valid Federal Rule, the Sixth Circuit\n\nconcluded that Michigan\u2019s \u201cpresuit-notice requirements do not apply in\n\ndiversity actions.\u201d Id. at 1049.\n\n      Here, not only does the language of the statutory pre-suit notice\n\nprovisions differ from the language of the provisions considered in the cases\n\nPlaintiffs cite, 69 Plaintiffs extend no basis for the Court to conclude that each\n\nstate\u2019s courts apply the relevant pre-suit notice provision in a way that\n\naugments Rule 3\u2019s procedure. For example, under Georgia\u2019s pre-suit notice\n\nprovision, which reflects that of Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 2-607(3)(a), \u201c[t]he\n\nbuyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have\n\ndiscovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any\n\nremedy.\u201d O.C.G.A. \u00a7 11\u20132\u2013607(3)(a). On its face, the language of this and other\n\nsimilar UCC-derived notice provisions differs markedly from that of the\n\nprovision at issue in Albright. Do Georgia courts and others applying similar,\n\nUCC-derived notice provisions consider them to \u201caffect[] how a lawsuit is\n\ncommenced\u201d? What about state pre-suit notice provisions that differ from the\n\n\n      69 Although Plaintiffs ask the Court to apply Albright, they fail to even\n\nidentify the relevant pre-suit provisions for comparison with the provision at\nissue in Albright. The U.S. Automakers do no better; in a one sentence footnote,\nthey simply argue that Plaintiffs \u201crely on irrelevant medical malpractice cases\u201d\nand incorrectly portray Albright and Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511 (2d Cir.\n2021), as addressing only \u201cwhether an affidavit of merit from a medical\nprovider is required for a complaint in federal court.\u201d [Doc. 249 at 24].\n\n\n\n                                          206\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 207 of 246\n\n\n\n\nUCC\u2019s? Plaintiffs do not say. And this silence cannot carry the day. The Court\n\ndeclines Plaintiffs\u2019 invitation to hold that Rule 3 displaces state-specific\n\npre-suit notice requirements in diversity actions alleging breach of warranty.\n\n      However, Plaintiffs\u2019 alternative argument that, in accordance with Rule\n\n9(c), the SAC sufficiently alleges that Plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice defeats\n\nthe U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge. Again, the U.S. Automakers do not question\n\nthe timing or adequacy of the notice, they contend instead that the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegation of notice is too generalized to suffice. [Doc. 181-1 at 31\u201333]. As to the\n\nbreach of implied warranty claims, the SAC alleges that \u201cPlaintiffs and Class\n\nMembers timely provided the Automakers notice of the issues raised in this\n\ncount and this Complaint and an opportunity to cure[.]\u201d 70 E.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 852,\n\n989, 1217. This allegation, albeit not particularized to any named Plaintiff,\n\nsuffices under Rule 9(c), which allows a complaint to \u201callege generally that all\n\nconditions precedent have occurred or been performed.\u201d Courts recognize that,\n\nas to a condition precedent, a \u201cgeneral statement is an adequate averment\n\nunder the loose guidelines of Rule 9(c).\u201d Kiernan v. Zurich Cos., 150 F.3d 1120,\n\n1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the general allegation that the insurance\n\npolicy at issue was \u201cin full force and effect\u201d served to indicate that all the\n\nconditions precedent for the policy to be in \u201cfully force and effect\u201d were met).\n\n\n      70In full, the allegation reads: \u201cPlaintiffs and Class Members timely\nprovided the Automakers notice of the issues raised in this count and this\nComplaint and an opportunity to cure, as alleged in the paragraphs addressing\nDefendants\u2019 notice, above.\u201d However, it is unclear what \u201cparagraphs\naddressing Defendants\u2019 notice\u201d the SAC refers to.\n\n\n\n                                           207\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 208 of 246\n\n\n\n\nAlthough, typically, \u201cbare assertions are not sufficient to satisfy pleading\n\nrequirements,\u201d under Rule 9(c), even an allegation \u201cthat the plaintiffs have\n\ngiven notice to the extent required,\u201d with \u201cno facts supporting this conclusion\u201d\n\nsuffices. In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal.\n\n2012) (citation modified); see Emp\u2019rs Ins. Co. of WaUSAu v. BL Co. Conn., Inc.,\n\n2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16600, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2024) (general\n\nallegation of notice sufficient). Cf., Ganahl v. Stryker Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist.\n\nLEXIS 15219, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 15, 2011) (noting Rule 9(c)\u2019s lenient\n\nrequirement but dismissing warranty breach claims because the \u201ccomplaint\n\ndoes not allege that [the plaintiff] provided Defendant notice of any kind\u2014\n\nspecific or general\u2014or that [the plaintiff] performed any conditions\n\nprecedent\u201d). Under Rule 9(c)\u2019s \u201cloose guidelines,\u201d the SAC adequately pleads\n\nthat the preconditions of notifying the Automakers of the alleged warranty\n\nbreach and providing an opportunity to cure were met for each Plaintiff.\n\nAccordingly, the U.S. Automakers\u2019 motion to dismiss certain of the implied\n\nwarranty breach claims for failure to allege pre-suit notice fails.\n\n             c. Merchantability\n\n      For each of the implied warranty breach claims, the SAC alleges that\n\nthe applicable state law \u201cconferred an implied warranty that the Class Vehicles\n\nwere in merchantable condition and fit for the ordinary purpose for which they\n\nwere to be used\u201d but that they are \u201cunsafe to drive and unfit for ordinary\n\npurpose\u201d due to the Inflator Defect, which renders them unmerchantable. E.g.,\n\nSAC II \u00b6\u00b6 454\u201355, 527\u201328, 734\u201335, 1305\u201306, 1376\u201377, 1807\u201308, 2602\u201303,\n\n\n                                          208\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 209 of 246\n\n\n\n\n3261\u201362, 3917\u201318, 4126\u201327. The U.S. Automakers argue that the implied\n\nwarranty claims fail because Plaintiffs fail to factually support their\n\n\u201cconclusory claim\u201d that the Class Vehicles are \u201cunsafe to drive.\u201d [Doc. 181-1 at\n\n34\u201335]. They contend that claims for breach of the implied warranty of\n\nmerchantability fail unless the defect renders vehicles unfit for their \u201cordinary\n\npurpose of providing transportation.\u201d [Doc. 181-1 at 34 (quoting In re Gen.\n\nMotors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Prods. Liab. Litig., 966 F. Supp. 1525, 1533\n\n(E.D. Mo. 1997))]. These Defendants point to the SAC as showing that\n\nPlaintiffs (and prior owners) have driven their vehicles without incident for\n\nyears and, thus, that they are not unfit for their ordinary purpose. [Doc. 181-1\n\nat 34\u201335].\n\n      \u201cCars are fit for their ordinary purpose of transportation . . . so long as\n\ntheir drivability or usefulness is not affected by the defect alleged.\u201d Amin, 301\n\nF. Supp. 3d at 1287 (citation modified); In re MyFord Touch, 46 F. Supp. 3d at\n\n980 (\u201c[T]he ordinary purpose of a car is not just to provide transportation but\n\nrather safe, reliable transportation.\u201d). Here, the SAC sufficiently alleges that\n\nthe Defect affects the Class Vehicles\u2019 safety and reliability, and thus the\n\nvehicles\u2019 usefulness, rendering them unfit for their ordinary purpose. For\n\nexample, as pled, \u201c[a]irbags are a critical safety feature in every car,\u201d that all\n\nClass Vehicles have ARC airbag inflators with the Defect, which causes the\n\ninflators to explode when the airbags are deployed during an accident. SAC I\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 283, 297, 375. In In re ZF-TRW Litig., the plaintiffs also alleged a defect\n\n\n\n\n                                          209\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 210 of 246\n\n\n\n\naffecting airbags and the defendants sought to dismiss the implied warranty\n\nclaims for failure to allege vehicle unmerchantability. 601 F. Supp. 3d at 809.\n\nInstead of a defect causing airbags to explode when deployed during an\n\naccident, the In re ZF-TRW plaintiffs alleged that the defect in their vehicles\n\nwould prevent airbags from deploying during an accident. Id. Although the\n\nplaintiffs \u201ccontinued to drive their Class Vehicles[] and have not suffered\n\nserious bodily harm as a result of the Alleged Defect,\u201d the court concluded that\n\nthe complaint plausibly alleged that the vehicles could not provide safe and\n\nreliable transportation and thus were not fit for their ordinary purpose. Id. at\n\n810; see Takata III, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1336 (rejecting, in a case where the\n\nalleged defect caused airbags to explode under certain conditions, the\n\nargument that implied warranty claims failed because the facts alleged did not\n\nindicate that the defect manifested in the vehicles). The SAC supports the\n\nsame conclusion here. By alleging that the Defect in the Class Vehicles\n\nprevents airbags (a \u201ccritical safety feature\u201d) from performing as intended, the\n\nSAC plausibly states that the Class Vehicles are not merchantable. The U.S.\n\nAutomakers correctly note that it can be inferred from the SAC that Plaintiffs\n\nhave driven and continue to drive their vehicles without incident, but in this\n\ncase, that fact is not dispositive. Because the Defect does not affect a vehicle\u2019s\n\ndriving mechanism, an allegedly defective vehicle is able to provide\n\ntransportation; the question is whether it can provide safe and reliable\n\ntransportation. The answer, viewing the SAC\u2019s facts in the light most favorable\n\n\n\n\n                                          210\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353     Filed 10/02/26   Page 211 of 246\n\n\n\n\nto Plaintiffs, is no. The U.S. Automakers\u2019 challenge to the SAC\u2019s vehicle\n\nmerchantability allegations fails.\n\n             d. Defect Manifestation and Presentment for Repair\n\n      In a final effort to dismiss all the implied warranty breach claims, the\n\nU.S. Automakers argue that defect manifestation and presentment of the\n\nvehicle for repair during the applicable warranty period are preconditions for\n\nbreach of warranty claims and that the SAC fails to allege that Plaintiffs met\n\neither precondition for their vehicles. [Doc. 181-1 at 36; see also Doc. 242 at 4\n\n(Hyundai and Kia relying on the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument regarding\n\nmanifestation to argue that Plaintiffs\u2019 warranty claims have expired) and Docs.\n\n186-1 at 14\u201315; 187 at 4\u20135]. They maintain that the time and mileage limits of\n\nthe express warranties for Plaintiffs\u2019 vehicles extend to the implied warranties.\n\n[Id. at 36]. Regarding manifestation, the U.S. Automakers contend that the\n\nvehicle warranties have expired for \u201cmany Plaintiffs,\u201d that Plaintiffs do not\n\nallege that they have encountered issues with their airbags, and that absent\n\nan airbag malfunction during the warranty term, there is no warrantable\n\nrepair. [Id. at 28; see also Doc. 182-1 at 13]. Regarding presentment for repairs,\n\nthey contend that where a warranty provides for repair or replacement, a\n\nplaintiff must give the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to repair but that\n\nthe SAC does not allege that Plaintiffs took their vehicles to a dealership for\n\nrepairs. [Doc. 181-1 at 29].\n\n      Plaintiffs counter that any durational limits applicable to their implied\n\nwarranties are unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. [Doc. 221 at 42]. They\n\n\n                                          211\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 212 of 246\n\n\n\n\nargue alternatively that their implied warranty claims survive because the\n\nDefect was present in the Class Vehicles at the time of sale and, thus, the\n\nAutomakers breached the implied warranty of merchantability at the point of\n\nsale. [Id. at 42 n.29].\n\n       Discounting the implied warranty breach claims that the Court has thus\n\nfar dismissed, claims under the following 33 jurisdictions remain standing:\n\nAlaska, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,\n\nKansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,\n\nMontana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,\n\nNorth Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South\n\nCarolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and\n\nWyoming.\n\n       Of these, Plaintiffs identify the following 17 jurisdictions that recognize\n\nunconscionability as a bar to the enforcement of durational limits on implied\n\nwarranties: Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,\n\nMississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,\n\nPennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. [Doc.\n\n221-1 at 6\u20138]. The U.S. Automakers extend a two-part argument. First, they\n\ncontend that the SAC does not allege unconscionability. Second, they argue\n\nthat because the SAC alleges that Plaintiffs read and relied on the express\n\nwarranties and viewed their terms as part of the benefit of the bargain,\n\n\n\n\n                                          212\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 213 of 246\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiffs are foreclosed from asserting unconscionability of the warranties\u2019\n\nterms. [Doc. 249 at 26].\n\n      The U.S. Automakers\u2019 second argument misses the mark. The SAC does\n\nnot allege that Plaintiffs read all the terms of the express warranties ahead of\n\ntheir purchase. Rather, it contends that Plaintiffs were exposed to the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 misrepresentations and that, in buying or leasing their vehicles,\n\nthey relied on the express warranties that the vehicles were defect free, safe,\n\nand reliable and had properly functioning airbags. See, e.g., SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 440\u201341,\n\n444. 513\u201314, 517. The SAC says nothing about Plaintiffs\u2019 pre-sale knowledge\n\nof the duration limits of any warranty\u2014express or implied.\n\n      Nevertheless, the U.S. Automakers are correct in that the SAC fails to\n\nplead sufficient facts to raise an inference of unconscionability. Plaintiffs\n\ngenerally contend that they have alleged unconscionability by pleading that\n\n\u201cthe Class Vehicles contain a defect that consumers could not discover, which\n\nDefendants knew about but did not disclose at the time of purchase, and\n\nbecause of the non-disclosure, Plaintiffs lacked the meaningful opportunity to\n\nnegotiate the warranty.\u201d 71 [Doc. 221 at 33 n.15 (citing SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 \u00b6\u00b6 652\u201355,\n\n721\u201324, 906\u201309, 974\u201377, 1133\u201336, 1202\u201305, 1598\u20131601, 1639\u20131742, 2082\u201385,\n\n\n\n      71  The latter statement, regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 lack of meaningful\nopportunity to negotiate the warranty, is Plaintiffs\u2019 argument. The statement\nis not present in the SAC, which alleges that the Inflator Defect is latent in the\nClass Vehicle, that the Automakers were aware of but failed to disclose the\nDefect, and that Plaintiffs were unaware of the Defect. See, e.g., SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 246,\n376, 378, 380, 385\u201386; SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 653\u201355, 679(d).\n\n\n\n                                          213\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353     Filed 10/02/26    Page 214 of 246\n\n\n\n\n2154\u201357, 2313\u201316, 2523\u201326, 2804\u201307, 3025\u201328, 3248\u201351, 3385\u201388, 3538\u201341,\n\n3768\u201371, 3836\u201339, 3904\u201307)]. But they fail to establish that these allegations\n\nsuffice to allege unconscionability under the laws of each state that recognizes\n\nthe concept.\n\n      \u201cA    plaintiff   must    allege   both   substantive      and   procedural\n\nunconscionability when claiming a breach of warranty based on the theory of\n\nunconscionability.\u201d Rivera v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3485815, at *3 (E.D.\n\nMich. Aug. 15, 2017) (citing Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119,\n\n1134 (11th Cir. 2010)). \u201c\u2018A contract is substantively unconscionable if its\n\nprovisions are so outrageously unfair as to shock the judicial conscious.\u2019\u201d Id. at\n\n*4 (citation omitted). And in assessing procedural unconscionability, a court\n\nasks: \u201c\u2018[W]hat is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their relative\n\neconomic strength, the alternative sources of supply, in a word, what are their\n\noptions?\u2019\u201d GM Air Conditioning, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 628 (citation omitted).\n\nPlaintiffs rely on In re Porsche, where the court determined that the plaintiffs\n\nraised a prima facie case of unconscionability of the implied warranty\u2019s\n\ndurational limits under New Jersey law by alleging, among other things, that\n\nthe manufacturer knew that its product was inherently defective and that the\n\nbuyer could not detect the defect. 880 F. Supp. 2d at 822\u201323. The court\n\nconsidered that such allegations indicate a \u201c\u2018substantial disparity in the\n\nparties\u2019 relative bargaining power.\u2019\u201d Id. at 822 (quoting Carlson v. Gen. Motors\n\nCorp., 883 F.2d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 1989)). But\u2014\n\n\n\n\n                                          214\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 215 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      In re Porsche conflates a difference in knowledge with a difference\n      in bargaining power. Bargaining power comes primarily from\n      having viable alternatives in the marketplace and a vehicle\n      consumer with many options . . . has real and substantial\n      bargaining power even where a seller. . . knowingly fails to\n      disclose a defect.\n\nGM Air Conditioning, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 630 (joining \u201cthe majority of courts\n\n[that] have ruled that a seller\u2019s presale knowledge of an alleged defect,\n\nstanding alone, is insufficient to establish procedural unconscionability\u201d)\n\n(citation modified). More recently, in Ponzio v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 447\n\nF. Supp. 3d 194, 257 (D.N.J. 2020), the New Jersey district court concluded\n\nthat \u201callegations of substantive unconscionability based on a defendant\u2019s\n\nknowledge of a latent defect are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.\u201d\n\nSee also Amato v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 2019 WL 6607148, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 5,\n\n2019) (finding that the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that the car manufacturer knew\n\nof the latent defect before the sale of the relevant vehicles and acted to conceal\n\nthe defect were insufficient to plead unconscionability of the warranty\u2019s\n\ndurational limits). Similarly, in McCabe I, the court concluded that in Georgia,\n\nand in other jurisdictions relevant there, \u201cDefendants\u2019 knowledge of the alleged\n\ndefect at the time of sale, standing alone, is insufficient to render the\n\n[warranty\u2019s] time and mileage limitations unconscionable.\u201d 948 F. Supp. at\n\n1359. Here too Plaintiffs\u2019 claim of unconscionability rests on the allegation of\n\nthe Automakers\u2019 knowledge of the Inflator Defect, which courts tend to find\n\ninsufficient. In the absence of authority that such an allegation suffices to raise\n\nan inference of unconscionability in each of the 17 relevant jurisdictions, the\n\n\n\n                                           215\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 216 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCourt concludes that the SAC fails to allege unconscionability of the implied\n\nwarranty\u2019s durational limitations. 72\n\n      Although Plaintiffs\u2019 unconscionability argument fails, the 33 implied\n\nwarranty breach claims that remain standing nevertheless survive the U.S.\n\nAutomakers\u2019 challenge. Here, as discussed above, Plaintiffs allege that the\n\nClass Vehicles are not fit for their ordinary purpose and, because the Class\n\nVehicles came equipped with the defective ARC airbag inflators, that this lack\n\nof fitness was inherent at the point of sale. Thus, \u201cthe breach of [implied]\n\nwarranty occurred at the point of sale.\u201d Chapman v. Gen. Motors LLC, 531 F.\n\nSupp. 3d 1257, 1278 (E.D. Mich. 2021); see Stanley v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 719\n\nF. Supp. 3d 786, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (concluding that the expiration of the\n\nexpress warranties had \u201cno effect\u201d on the implied warranty claims where the\n\nplaintiffs alleged that their vehicles were inherently defective); In re Gen.\n\nMotors LLC CP4 Fuel Pump Litig., 393 F. Supp. 3d 871, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019)\n\n\n\n      72  In addition to In re Porsche, addressed above, Plaintiffs rely on\nauthority applying Alabama, California, Florida, Minnesota, New York, North\nCarolina, and Texas law. [Doc. 221 at 42\u201343, 43 n.30]. However, Plaintiffs\u2019\nimplied warranty claims under Alabama, California, Florida, New York, and\nNorth Carolina law no longer remain standing. As to Plaintiffs\u2019 implied\nwarranty claim under Texas law, Plaintiffs do not identify Texas as a\njurisdiction that recognizes unconscionability. [See Doc. 221-1 at 6\u20138]. But\neven assuming Texas recognizes unconscionability, Plaintiffs\u2019 authority in\nsupport fails to persuade the Court. Plaintiffs cite to In re Takata Airbag Prods.\nLiab. Litig., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (\u201cTakata IV\u201d), for the\nproposition that they have sufficiently alleged unconscionability under\nMinnesota and Texas law. However, Takata IV contains no relevant analysis.\nAccordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to persuade the Court that the SAC\nsufficiently alleges unconscionability under Minnesota and Texas law.\n\n\n\n                                          216\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 217 of 246\n\n\n\n\n(\u201cWhere, as here, Plaintiffs allege that their vehicles were unmerchantable due\n\nto an alleged latent safety defect that was present at the time of sale and that\n\nthey could not reasonably have discovered sooner . . . they have set forth\n\nsufficient facts to defeat a motion to dismiss.\u201d). The U.S. Automakers maintain\n\nthat   because    \u201cimplied   warranty    claims   accrue   on    the   date   of\n\ndeliver[y,] . . . [c]claims brought outside the warranty period are untimely.\u201d\n\n[Doc. 249 at 27]. They not only fail to cite any authority in support, the U.S.\n\nAutomakers also fail to identify those Plaintiffs whose claims are arguably\n\nuntimely. Thus, the Court remains unpersuaded that the dismissal of the\n\nremaining 33 implied warranty breach claims is warranted for lack of\n\nmanifestation and presentment within the time and mileage limits of the\n\nexpress warranties.\n\n          6. Viability of unjust enrichment claim\n\n       Plaintiffs assert state-law specific unjust enrichment claims against the\n\nAutomakers for all 50 states and the District of Columbia as well as for the\n\nnationwide class under Georgia law. Arguing that Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust\n\nenrichment claims are \u201cgrounded in fraud\u201d but are not plead with the\n\nparticularity that Rule 9(b) requires, the U.S. Automakers move to dismiss\n\nthese claims. [Doc. 181-1 at 57]. They also muster many state-law specific\n\nreasons for dismissal. [Id. at 58\u201360]. The Court begins its analysis with the\n\nRule 9(b) argument. It then takes up the state-law specific arguments. It does\n\nso with the caveat that where the U.S. Automakers successfully argue for the\n\ndismissal of an unjust enrichment claim for a particular state, the Court does\n\n\n                                         217\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 218 of 246\n\n\n\n\nnot address their alternative, state-law specific arguments for the dismissal of\n\nthat claim.\n\n      First, although they argue that Rule 9(b) applies to Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust\n\nenrichment claims, the U.S. Automakers make no effort to support their\n\nunderlying premise that these claims are \u201cgrounded in fraud.\u201d To be sure,\n\nunjust enrichment claims \u201cemerg[ing] out of a pattern of fraudulent conduct\u201d\n\nby the defendant, fall under Rule 9(b)\u2019s heightened pleading requirement for\n\nfraud claims, Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 950 (7th Cir.\n\n2013), but the U.S. Automakers\u2019 barebones assertion that Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust\n\nenrichment claims are fraud-based does not suffice to make the case that the\n\nCourt should view them under the Rule 9(b) lens. Nevertheless, assuming Rule\n\n9(b) applies to the unjust enrichment claims, 73 the SAC sufficiently alleges the\n\nAutomakers\u2019 fraudulent conduct with particularity. Supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.a.\n\nMoreover, contrary to the U.S. Automakers\u2019 argument, the SAC sufficiently\n\nalleges that Plaintiffs conferred a material economic benefit, in terms of profit,\n\non the Automakers by buying or leasing their Class Vehicles. See, e.g., SAC\n\n\n\n      73 For example, Plaintiffs support their unjust enrichment claims with\n\nthe allegation that the Automakers did not disclose the Inflator Defect to\nPlaintiffs and misled them about the Class Vehicles\u2019 quality and nature and\nprofited from their deception. E.g., SAC II \u00b6 2645\u201346. These allegations go to\nfraud. However, the U.S. Automakers make no distinction between the\nparticularity required for fraud-based allegations and any non-fraud-based\nelements of an unjust enrichment claim. The Court does not parse the issue,\nwhich neither side raises, and assumes for the purpose of this Motion that all\nelements of an unjust enrichment claim based on fraud must be pled with\nparticularity.\n\n\n\n                                          218\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 219 of 246\n\n\n\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 428\u201329, 2644\u201345. The U.S. Automakers fail to show that Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust\n\nenrichment claims fail under Rule 9(b).\n\n       Second, according to the U.S. Automakers, Plaintiffs cannot maintain\n\ntheir unjust enrichment claims under the law of 38 states74 because courts\n\n\u201cregularly dismiss[] unjust enrichment claims filed against automobile\n\nmanufacturers where a valid, enforceable express warranty covers the same\n\nsubject matter as plaintiffs\u2019 unjust enrichment claims.\u201d [Doc. 181-1 at 58\u201359\n\n(quoting GM Air Conditioning, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 634)]. \u201cA party may plead\n\nequitable claims in the alternative . . . if one or more of the parties contests the\n\nexistence of an express contract governing the subject of the dispute.\u201d\n\nGoldstein v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1347 (N.D. Ga.\n\n2009). Plaintiffs do not rebut the state-specific law that the U.S. Automakers\n\ncite. Rather, they maintain that because the Parties\u2019 dispute whether the\n\nexpress warranties cover the Defect, the dismissal of the unjust enrichment is\n\ninappropriate. [Doc. 221 at 65].\n\n\n\n\n       74 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,\nConnecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,\nKentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,\nMissouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,\nNorth Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode\nIsland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West\nVirginia, and Wisconsin. [Doc. 181-1 at 58\u201359]. In addition, the U.S.\nAutomakers cite Louisiana law in their legal citations table, [Doc. 181-9 at 2].\nHowever, the Louisiana case they rely concerns the U.S. Automakers\u2019\nargument regarding the effect of available legal remedies on unjust enrichment\nclaims.\n\n\n\n                                           219\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 220 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      Contrary to Plaintiffs\u2019 argument, the Parties\u2019 dispute about warranty\n\ncoverage does not preclude dismissal. That dispute does not concern the\n\nexistence of an express contract\u2014e.g., the express written warranty. And that\n\ncontract governs the subject matter of the unjust enrichment claim. That is,\n\nthe express written warranty governs the Automakers\u2019 obligations regarding\n\nvehicle defects, and Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust enrichment claims concern their\n\nallegedly defective vehicles. Although the U.S. Automakers successfully\n\ndispute that the express written warrant covers a design defect, [see supra\n\n\u00a7 VI.B.3.], that dispute concerns the scope of the contract and not its validity\n\nor enforceability. See Takata II, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (acknowledging that\n\n\u201can unjust enrichment claim can exist only if the subject matter of that claim\n\nis not covered by a valid and enforceable contract\u201d and declining to dismiss the\n\nclaim because the plaintiffs disputed the contract\u2019s enforceability (citation\n\nmodified)). As in Gregorio v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F. Supp. 3d 264, 288 (E.D.\n\nMich. 2021), at its core, the dispute is about \u201cwhat types of defect[s]\u201d are\n\ncovered under the warranty. But where, as here, \u201cthe parties have an\n\nenforceable contract and merely dispute its terms, scope, or effect, one party\n\ncannot recover for . . . unjust enrichment.\u201d Id. at 294 (citation modified). In\n\nshort, \u201c[w]hen a consumer seeks compensation for a defective product . . . the\n\nwarranty covers the subject matter in dispute and an unjust enrichment claim\n\ndoes not lie.\u201d In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 846. \u201cA\n\nplaintiff cannot use an unjust enrichment claim to alter or expand the terms\n\n\n\n\n                                         220\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 221 of 246\n\n\n\n\nof an express warranty that covers the product that is the subject of his or her\n\nclaim.\u201d Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust enrichment claims under the laws of\n\nthe 32 states that the U.S. Automakers identify fail.\n\n      Third, as to the remaining challenged claims, those under Hawaii,\n\nLouisiana, and Utah law, the U.S. Automakers argue that these claims fail\n\nbecause Plaintiffs have adequate legal remedies based on the same alleged\n\nconduct and, thus, cannot satisfy the unjust enrichment claim precondition\n\nrequiring a lack of an adequate remedy at law. [Doc. 181-1 at 58]. Plaintiffs do\n\nnot rebut the state-specific law the U.S. Automakers cite; instead they counter\n\nthat the SAC pleads the unjust enrichment claim in the alternative and that\n\nthis pleading comports with Rule 8(d)(3), which allows the pleading of\n\ninconsistent claims. [Doc. 221 at 64]. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs\n\nrely on In re Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco Co. Mktg. & Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.\n\nLitig., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1258 (D.N.M. 2017). There, the court concluded\n\nthat because an unjust enrichment claim presents a different damages theory\n\nfrom, for example, the consumer protection and torts claims, that \u201cdivergence\n\nis enough to amount to an alternative theory under Rule 8(d).\u201d Id. at 1257.\n\nThus, it allowed the plaintiffs to \u201cplead both equitable and legal relief,\n\nalthough they may not, under state law, ultimately recover under both\n\ntheories.\u201d Id. at 1259. The Court is not convinced that an unjust enrichment\n\nclaim based on the same facts presents a \u201ctrue alternative theory.\u201d In re Ford\n\nTailgate Litig., 2014 WL 1007066, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014), order\n\n\n\n\n                                         221\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 222 of 246\n\n\n\n\ncorrected on denial of reconsideration, No. 2014 WL 12649204 (N.D. Cal. Apr.\n\n15, 2014). \u201c[The] Plaintiffs are, of course, entitled to plead alternative claims.\u201d\n\nId. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)). \u201cHowever, \u2018where the unjust enrichment claim\n\nrelies upon the same factual predicates as a plaintiff\u2019s legal causes of action, it\n\nis not a true alternative theory of relief but rather is duplicative of those legal\n\ncauses of action.\u2019\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Here, the acts and omissions that\n\nungird, for example, Plaintiffs fraud claims also serve as the premise of their\n\nunjust enrichment claims. Compare SAC II \u00b6\u00b6 1336(g)\u2013(h), 1837(g)\u2013(h), and\n\n3741(g)\u2013(h) to 1352, 1853, and 3757. \u201cShould [the] [P]laintiffs ultimately be\n\nunable to recover under a contract or tort theory, it does not mean a legal\n\nremedy was unavailable (thereby justifying an equitable remedy of unjust\n\nenrichment), but only that their claim lacks merit.\u201d In re Ford Tailgate Litig.,\n\n2014 WL 1007066 at *5. Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust enrichment claims under Hawaii,\n\nLouisiana, and Utah law are barred.\n\n      Last, the U.S. Automakers maintain that Plaintiffs who did not buy or\n\nlease their vehicles from an Automaker-affiliated dealership cannot state an\n\nunjust enrichment claim because they cannot allege that their transactions\n\nunjustly enriched the Automakers. 75 The Court agrees. Plaintiffs\u2019 authority for\n\n\n\n      75 Plaintiffs assert that the U.S. Automakers\u2019 over-inclusively identify\n\n44 Plaintiffs as having their vehicles from unaffiliated dealerships. [Compare\nDocs. 181-1 at 60 n.73 and 221 at 66 n.57]. They argue that the U.S.\nAutomakers\u2019 list includes 12 Plaintiffs who, in fact, bought their vehicles from\nAutomaker-affiliated dealerships. [Doc. 221 at 66 n.57]. However, although the\n12 Plaintiffs allege that they bought their used vehicles from a dealership\naffiliated with an Automaker, apart from Plaintiffs Fett\u2019s, Jacinto\u2019s, and\n\n\n                                           222\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 223 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe argument that \u201cnon-direct purchasers can plead unjust enrichment against\n\nupstream defendants,\u201d [Doc. 221 at 65], does not address the purchase of\n\nvehicles from third-party sources not alleged to be affiliated with the vehicle\n\nmanufacturer.\n\n      Overall, Plaintiffs\u2019 unjust enrichment claims against the Automakers\n\nfail under the laws of above-discussed states and the unjust enrichment claims\n\nof Plaintiffs Anderson (Pennsylvania), 76 Belhadj (Florida and Texas),\n\nBlumberg (Delaware), Chambliss (Virginia), Clark (South Carolina), Diaz\n\n(California), Duran (Nevada), Eiland (Mississippi), Felice (Florida), Fernandez\n\n(Virginia and Maryland), Ford (South Carolina), Graff (Missouri), Hall\n\n(Indiana and Illinois), Hall-Hudson (Tennessee), Hamner (Alabama),\n\n\nSchultz\u2019s dealerships, those dealerships are not alleged to be affiliated with\ntheir Automaker. For example, Plaintiff Hartman bought his used 2016 Ford\nF-150 from Kunes Chevrolet in Morrison, Illinois, and he does not allege that\nKunes Chevrolet is affiliated with Ford. SAC I \u00b6 150. According to the SAC,\nHartman bought his vehicle from a Chevrolet dealership\u2014i.e., a dealership\naffiliated with Defendant GMC, and not one affiliated with Defendant Ford,\nthe Automaker that manufactured Hartman\u2019s vehicle. Thus, with the\nexception of the three Plaintiffs misidentified by the U.S. Automakers, the\nunjust enrichment claims of the following Plaintiffs are properly at issue:\nAnderson, Harpey-Bey, Hartman, Isbister, Lesesne, McKennon, Mitchell, Polo,\nClark, Ford, Hall-Hudson, Hudson-Battie, Jones, Herrera, Miles, Victory,\nWinslow, Felice, Valenzuela, Belhadj, Blumberg, Chambliss, Diaz, Eiland,\nFernandez, Graff, Hall, Hamner, Hochstetler, Komoroski, Owens, Petschen,\nReddick, Sorenson, Thomas, Duran, Long, Lovett, Mobley, White, and Wilson\nare properly at issue. See SAC II 142, 149, 150, 153, 155, 158-160, 162-166,\n173, 175, 179, 181, 183, 186, 204, 213\u201314, 217, 220, 221, 223\u2013227, 229, 234-\n236, 239, 245, 247-250, 253, 254.\n      76  Included with each Plaintiff\u2019s name is that Plaintiff\u2019s state of\nresidence and, to the extent different, the state from which Plaintiff bought or\nleased his or her vehicle.\n\n\n\n                                         223\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 224 of 246\n\n\n\n\nHarpey-Bey (Nevada), Hartman (Missouri), Herrera (Florida), Hochstetler\n\n(Minnesota), Hudson-Battie (Georgia), Isbister (Ohio), Jones (Florida),\n\nKomoroski (Connecticut), Lesesne (South Carolina), Long (Alabama), Lovett\n\n(Tennessee),   McKennon     (North   Carolina),   Miles   (Alabama),    Mitchell\n\n(Connecticut), Mobley (South Carolina), Owens (Tennessee), Petschen\n\n(Minnesota), Polo (Virginia), Reddick (Georgia), Sorenson (Washington and\n\nIdaho), Thomas (Georgia), Valenzuela (Arizona), Victory (Arkansas), B. and T.\n\nWhite (Alabama), Wilson (New York), and Winslow (California) are foreclosed.\n\nAccordingly, the Court GRANTS the U.S. Automakers\u2019 motion to dismiss\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 unjust enrichment claims to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH\n\nPREJUDICE the state-specific claims for Alabama (Count 1(e)), Arkansas\n\n(Count 4(e)), California (Count 5(h)), Colorado (Count 6(e)), Connecticut (Count\n\n7(e)), Florida (Count 10(e)), Georgia (Count 11(f)), Hawaii (Count 12(e)), Idaho\n\n(Count 13(e)), Illinois (Count 14(e)), Indiana (Count 15(e)), Iowa (Count 16(e)),\n\nKansas (Count 17(e)), Kentucky (Count 18(e)), Louisiana (Count 19(d)),\n\nMaryland (Count 21(e)), Massachusetts (Count 22(e)), Michigan (Count 23(e)),\n\nMinnesota (Count 24(f)), Mississippi (Count 25(e)), Missouri (Count 26(e)),\n\nNebraska (Count 28(e)), New Hampshire (Count 30(e)), New Jersey (Count\n\n31(e)), New Mexico (Count 32(e)), New York (Count 33(f)), North Carolina\n\n(Count 34(e)), North Dakota (Count 35(e)), Ohio (Count 36(f)), Oklahoma\n\n(Count 37(e)), Oregon (Count 38(e)), Pennsylvania (Count 39(e)), Rhode Island\n\n(Count 40(e)), South Carolina (Count 41(f)), Tennessee (Count 43(e)), Texas\n\n\n\n\n                                         224\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 225 of 246\n\n\n\n\n(Count 44(e)), Utah (Count 45(f)), Virginia (Count 47(e)), Washington (Count\n\n48(e)), West Virginia (Count 49(e)), and Wisconsin (Count 50(e)) and also\n\nDISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the unjust enrichment claims asserted by\n\nPlaintiffs Anderson, Belhadj, Blumberg, Chambliss, Clark, Diaz, Duran,\n\nEiland, Felice, Fernandez, Ford, Graff, Hall, Hall-Hudson, Hamner,\n\nHarpey-Bey, Hartman, Herrera, Hochstetler, Hudson-Battie, Isbister, Jones,\n\nKomoroski, Lesesne, Long, Lovett, McKennon, Miles, Mitchell, Mobley, Owens,\n\nPetschen, Polo, Reddick, Sorenson, Thomas, Valenzuela, Victory, B. and T.\n\nWhite, Wilson, and Winslow.\n\n          7. Viability of restitution as a remedy for violation of statutory\n             consumer protection laws\n\n      For several of their state-law specific statutory consumer protection\n\nclaims, Plaintiffs request that the Court award restitution, among other\n\nthings, as a remedy for Defendants\u2019 unfair or deceptive practices. SAC II\n\n\u00b6\u00b6 481, 550, 619, 688, 770, 787, 803, 873, 941, 1012, 1029, 1100, 1169, 1237,\n\n1259, 1330, 1399, 1476, 1565, 1635, 1706, 1774, 1831, 1901, 1974, 2047, 2119,\n\n2207, 2278, 2351. The U.S. Automakers contend that because Plaintiffs allege\n\nthat they have an adequate remedy at law, i.e., money damages based on the\n\nalleged diminution in value of their vehicles, the Court may not award them\n\nequitable restitution. [Doc. 181-1 at 60]. In support, the U.S. Automakers cite\n\nSonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). [Doc.\n\n181-1 at 60]. In Sonner, the Ninth Circuit \u201ch[e]ld that the traditional principles\n\ngoverning equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite\n\n\n\n                                          225\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 226 of 246\n\n\n\n\ninadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under\n\nthe UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.\u201d 971 F.3d at 844. Plaintiffs contend\n\nthat not only are district courts within the Ninth Circuit divided on Sonner\u2019s\n\napplication at the pleading stage but that the Court should allow Plaintiffs to\n\nmaintain their restitution request at this stage because, according to the SAC,\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 \u201clegal remedies may prove inadequate.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 67 (quoting SAC\n\nII \u00b6\u00b6 433, 459)]. To be sure, Sonner concerned the securing rather than the\n\npleading of equitable remedies, but \u201c[t]he unique procedural history in\n\n[Sonner] did not play a role in [the Ninth Circuit\u2019s] analysis of the traditional\n\ndivision between law and equity.\u201d Teresa Adams v. Cole Haan, LLC, 2020 WL\n\n5648605, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2020). 77 The Court is persuaded by Sonner\u2019s\n\nanalysis and considers that analysis applicable to Plaintiffs\u2019 request for\n\nrestitution under the several statutory consumer protection claims at issue\n\nhere. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs\u2019 request for restitution\n\nmust be supported by an allegation of inadequate legal remedies. Shay v. Apple\n\nInc., 2021 WL 1733385, at *4\u20135 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2021) (relying on Sonner and\n\nrequiring the plaintiff to \u201cplead inadequate legal remedies in the operative\n\npleading to allege claims for equitable relief\u201d); Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp., 2023\n\n\n\n\n      77 Although the court in Teresa Adams cited a prior version of the Sonner\n\nopinion, the substance of the opinion remained unchanged in the amended\nversion issued later the same day. Compare Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.,\n971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) with Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 962 F.3d\n1072 (9th Cir. 2020).\n\n\n                                          226\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 227 of 246\n\n\n\n\nWL 2876109, at *4\u20136 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2023) (dismissing claim for equitable\n\nrelief for failure to allege an inadequacy of legal remedies).\n\n      The SAC, however, fails to allege that Plaintiffs\u2019 legal remedies are\n\ninadequate. According to the SAC, Plaintiffs\u2019 will have no adequate legal\n\nremedies if the Court enters judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nclaim for damages. E.g., SAC II \u00b6 433. But \u201ca contingent event does not support\n\nan allegation that [the] Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] an inadequate remedy at law.\u201d Shay,\n\n2021 WL 1733385 at *5; Johnson v. Trumpet Behav. Health, LLC, 2022 WL\n\n74163, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2022) (noting that \u201cconditional pleading [of\n\ninadequate remedies] does not satisfy Sonner\u2019s rule\u201d and concluding that an\n\nallegation seeking equitable relief \u201cto the extent legal remedies are inadequate\n\nor if legal remedies are inadequate\u201d is \u201cnot an allegation that [the plaintiffs]\n\nactually lack adequate remedies at law\u201d). And any failure by Plaintiffs to\n\nprevail on their damages claim does not render the remedy inadequate. See In\n\nre Ford Tailgate Litig., 2014 WL 1007066, at *5; Roffman v. Rebbl, Inc., 653 F.\n\nSupp. 3d 723, 731 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (noting that the plaintiff\u2019s \u201cinability to\n\nobtain damages\u201d would reflect her statutory and common law claims\u2019 \u201cfailure\n\non the merits\u201d and would not represent \u201can inherent limitation of the legal\n\nremedy that renders it inadequate\u201d (citation modified)).\n\n      Overall, because Plaintiffs fail to allege that they lack an adequate legal\n\nremedy, they cannot maintain their request for restitution as a remedy under\n\ntheir statutory consumer protection claims. The Court GRANTS the U.S.\n\n\n\n\n                                          227\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 228 of 246\n\n\n\n\nAutomakers\u2019 motion to dismiss, [Doc. 181], to the extent that it STRIKES\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 request for restitution as a remedy under their statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims.\n\n          8. Recall-related injunctive relief claim\n\nThe SAC purports to seek relief in the form of injunctive relief requiring, for\n\nexample, Defendants to remove the defective inflators from and to install safe\n\ninflators in the Class Vehicles. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 19, 24. The U.S. Automakers argue\n\nthat to the extent that Plaintiffs seek an order requiring a nationwide safety\n\nrecall, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 request as recalls are the province\n\nof the NHTSA. [Doc. 181-1 at 61\u201366]. Plaintiffs\u2019 respond that their \u201crequested\n\ninjunctive relief does not interfere with NHTSA\u2019s investigatory and regulatory\n\nfunctions\u201d and that, \u201c[t]o the extent allegations in the [SAC] could be construed\n\notherwise, Plaintiffs agree to strike any requests for recall-related injunctive\n\nrelief, including paragraphs 24, 395, 458, 531, and 600.\u201d [Doc. 221 at 68]. The\n\nU.S. Automakers do not challenge Plaintiffs\u2019 claim that their requested relief\n\ndoes not interfere with NHTSA\u2019s investigatory and regulatory functions or\n\ntheir agreement to strike any requests for recall-related injunctive relief.\n\nAccordingly, in view of Plaintiffs\u2019 representation, the Court DENIES AS\n\nMOOT the U.S. Automakers\u2019 motion, [Doc. 181], to the extent that it seeks the\n\ndismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 recall-related injunctive relief.\n\n          9. Viability of Claims for \u201cOld GM\u201d-Made Class Vehicles\n\n       Thirteen Plaintiffs own GM Class Vehicles dating back to model years\n\n2002 through 2009. They are Plaintiffs B. and T. White (Alabama);\n\n\n                                            228\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 229 of 246\n\n\n\n\nHudson-Battie (Georgia), Schultz (Iowa), Sorenson (Washington and Idaho),\n\nPetschen (Minnesota), Wilson (New York), Milewski (Michigan and Ohio),\n\nLesesne (South Carolina), Hall-Hudson (Tennessee), Marshall (Tennessee),\n\nOwens (Tennessee), and Polo (Virginia). SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 253, 165, 197, 239, 235, 254,\n\n233, 155, 164, 191, 234, 160. As Plaintiffs acknowledge \u201c[t]hrough 2009, GM\n\nClass Vehicles were made by a now bankrupt entity, General Motors Corp.\n\n(Old GM), the predecessor to Defendant GM LLC (GM).\u201d [Doc. 222 at 9]. Under\n\nthe bankruptcy \u201cSale Agreement and Sale Order,\u201d which \u201cset out Old GM\n\nliabilities that [GM] would assume and not assume,\u201d GM \u201cdid not assume\n\nresponsibility for [Old GM\u2019s] . . . implied warranties and statements in\n\nmaterials such as individual customer communications, owner\u2019s manuals,\n\nadvertisements, and other promotional materials\u201d In re Motors Liquidation\n\nCo., 513 B.R. 467, 472\u201373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). Pointing to this language,\n\nGM argues that the Sale Order forecloses the implied warranty breach and\n\nfraud-based claims of Plaintiffs with 2009 and earlier model-year GM Class\n\nVehicles. [Doc. 186-1 at 10]. Plaintiffs concede that the above-named Plaintiffs\n\ncannot maintain their implied warranty breach claims, but they argue that\n\nthese Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud-based claim may proceed because they bought their Old\n\nGM Class Vehicles after the bankruptcy and at a time that GM had knowledge\n\nof the Defect and failed to disclose it. 78 However, although Plaintiffs\n\n\n\n      78 The earliest alleged purchases of Old GM Class Vehicles occurred in\n\n2011. SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 254, 164.\n\n\n\n                                         229\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 230 of 246\n\n\n\n\nsufficiently allege GM\u2019s knowledge as to the Defect in the GM Class Vehicles,\n\nmanufactured from 2010 onward, through its involvement in pre-sale testing,\n\netc., [see supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.c.], they fail to allege facts indicating that GM had\n\nknowledge of the Defect in Old GM Class Vehicles or that they made any\n\nrepresentations regarding those Vehicles.\n\n      The Court agrees with GM that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for implied warranty\n\nbreach, fraud, violations of consumer protection statues, and unjust\n\nenrichment based on the alleged Defect in Old GM Class Vehicles fail. Thus,\n\nthe Court GRANTS GM\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 186-1], to the extent that it\n\nDISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all claims asserted against GM by Plaintiffs\n\nB. and T. White (Alabama); Hudson-Battie (Georgia), Schultz (Iowa), Sorenson\n\n(Washington and Idaho), Petschen (Minnesota), Wilson (New York), Milewski\n\n(Michigan and Ohio), Lesesne (South Carolina), Hall-Hudson (Tennessee),\n\nMarshall (Tennessee), Owens (Tennessee), and Polo (Virginia).\n\n          10. Timeliness\n\n      According to the U.S. Automakers (collectively and individually) and\n\nARC, most of Plaintiffs\u2019 claims run afoul of the respective statutes of\n\nlimitations. [See e.g., Docs. 181-1 at 54\u201355; 179-1 at 24\u201327; 180-1 at 10\u201313;\n\n186-1 at 10\u201313]. The U.S. Automakers do not develop the factual and legal\n\nbasis for their arguments in their collective opening brief; they rely instead of\n\nthe arguments by the individual Automakers. Thus, below the Court first\n\naddresses ARC\u2019s timeliness challenge and then takes up the U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nchallenge, as presented in their collective and individual motions.\n\n\n                                         230\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 231 of 246\n\n\n\n\n               a. Claims against ARC\n\n       ARC moves to dismiss the statutory consumer protection claims of 16\n\nPlaintiffs as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and of repose, and\n\nas to six of these Plaintiffs, ARC also seeks to dismiss their fraud claims for\n\nthe same reason. [Doc. 179-1 at 24\u201327]. The challenged claims are as follows:\n\nConnecticut Unlawful Trade Practices Act claim (Count 7(c)) as to John\n\nKomoroski; Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act claim (Count\n\n10(c)) as to Vincent Cerrato, Jr.; Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim (Count\n\n13(c)) as to Chad Sorenson; Kentucky Consumer Protection Act claim (Count\n\n18(c)) as to Leatha Barber; Michigan Consumer Protection Act and Michigan-\n\nlaw based fraud claims (Count 23(c), (d), respectively) as to Jeffery Rhoades\n\nand Jonathon Carano; Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim\n\n(Count 24(d)) as to Natasha Hochstetler; Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act\n\nclaim (Count 27(c)) as to Brandy Knapp; New Hampshire Consumer Practices\n\nAct claim (Count 30(c)) as to Julie Struble; New York General Business Law\n\nclaims (Counts 33(c), (d)) as to Brandon Barker, Earl Wilson, Rochard Topa,\n\nRobert Ballero Gonzalez, and Tina Brown and New York-law based fraud claim\n\n(Count 33(e)) as to Wilson, Topa, Ballero Gonzalez, and Brown; Ohio Consumer\n\nSales Practices Act claim (Count 36(c)) as to Scott Milewski and Steve Isbister;\n\nand Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim (Count 50(c)) as to Kenneth\n\nAllan. [Id.]\n\n       According to ARC, the claims of each of the above-listed Plaintiffs\n\naccrued at the time they each bought their Class Vehicle and, by the time they\n\n\n                                         231\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 232 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfiled suit, the relevant statutes of limitations had run. 79 Thus, according to\n\nARC, the applicable statutes of limitation bar the statutory consumer\n\nprotection claims of the 16 identified Plaintiffs and also bar the fraud claims\n\nof six of them. Plaintiffs respond that the Court should defer ruling on the\n\nstatute of limitations issue to allow for factual development and, alternatively,\n\nthat ARC\u2019s argument fails because Plaintiffs\u2019 claims did not accrue until they\n\ndiscovered the Defect and that ARC\u2019s fraudulent concealment tolled the statute\n\nof limitations. [Doc. 219 at 23\u201329]. The Court begins its analysis with the issue\n\nof fraudulent concealment and, concluding that the doctrine does not apply to\n\ntoll the statute of limitations here, turns to Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the\n\n\u201cdiscovery rule\u201d applies to the accrual of their claims.\n\n               i.   Fraudulent concealment:\n\n      \u201cThe doctrine of fraudulent concealment will operate to toll the statute\n\nof limitations when it can be shown that fraud has been perpetrated on the\n\ninjured party sufficient to place him in ignorance of his right to a cause of\n\naction or to prevent him from discovering his injury.\u201d Am. Home Assur. Co. v.\n\nWeaver Aggregate Transp., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2013)\n\n(citation modified); see Grover v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 434 F. Supp. 3d 617,\n\n\n      79 Where different from a given Plaintiff\u2019s state of residence, ARC argues\n\nthat, under Georgia\u2019s lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule, the Court should apply\nthe law of the state where Plaintiff bought his or her Class Vehicle because\nPlaintiffs were allegedly defrauded at the time of sale and, thus, at the place\nof sale. [Doc. 179-1 at 25]. Plaintiffs do not challenge ARC\u2019s argument. Thus,\nthe Court applies the law of the state of the Vehicle sale in analyzing ARC\u2019s\narguments in this section.\n\n\n\n                                          232\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353         Filed 10/02/26   Page 233 of 246\n\n\n\n\n632 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (noting that Ohio law tolls the statute of limitation based\n\non fraudulent concealment upon a showing of defendants\u2019 \u201cwrongful\n\nconcealment of their actions,\u201d the plaintiff\u2019s failure to \u201cdiscover the operative\n\nfacts that are the basis of his cause of action within the limitations period,\u201d\n\nand \u201cplaintiff's due diligence until discovery of the facts.\u201d (citation modified)).\n\nPlaintiffs argue that each of the relevant states recognize that fraudulent\n\nconcealment tolls the statute of limitations.\n\n      Generally, for fraudulent concealment tolling to apply, there must either\n\nbe \u201can affirmative act of concealment beyond mere silence\u201d or non-disclosure\n\nin the face of a duty to disclose. Fenn v. Yale Univ., 283 F. Supp. 2d 615, 636\n\n(D. Conn. 2003). ARC asserts that Plaintiffs do not have the benefit of\n\nfraudulent concealment tolling because Plaintiffs fail to allege the\n\ncircumstances of the fraud with particularity and they do not allege an\n\naffirmative act of concealment by ARC or, alternatively, that ARC remained\n\nsilent while under a duty to disclose. [Doc. 179-1 at 27\u201328, 30\u201331].\n\n      ARC\u2019s first argument fails. For the reasons discussed above, the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations meet Rule 9\u2019s particularity requirement. See supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.a.\n\nHowever,    ARC\u2019s    second   and    third    arguments     regarding   fraudulent\n\nconcealment have merit.\n\n      While the SAC alleges that \u201cARC worked with others to conceal\u201d the\n\nDefect and had \u201chelp\u201d from the Airbag Suppliers and the Automakers, SAC I\n\n\u00b6 8, this allegation is conclusory, failing to identify any independent or\n\n\n\n\n                                             233\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26    Page 234 of 246\n\n\n\n\nconcerted affirmative conduct by the Airbag Suppliers. As in case of the Airbag\n\nSuppliers, supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.d.i.c., the SAC also fails to allege an affirmative act\n\nof concealment by ARC.\n\n      Plaintiffs resist this conclusion, arguing that, as in Takata II, they allege\n\nthat ARC \u201cfailed to disclose its knowledge of a life threatening inflator defect\n\nprior to Plaintiffs\u2019 purchases through any mode of communication.\u201d [Doc. 219\n\nat 27\u201328 (quoting Takata II, 193 F. Supp. at 1337)]. But in Takata II, the court\n\ndid not hold that allegations of the defendant\u2019s failure to disclose a life-\n\nthreatening defect equated to allegations of active concealment. Rather, the\n\ncourt held that the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of the defendant\u2019s failure to disclose\n\nmet Rule 9\u2019s heightened pleading standard. Takata II, 193 F. Supp. at 1336\u2013\n\n37. Plaintiffs contend that like in In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017\n\nWL 2406711 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2017) (\u201cTakata V\u201d), they also allege that ARC\n\n\u201cknowingly and actively concealed the defect from Plaintiffs for many years.\u201d\n\n[Doc. 219 at 28 (quoting Takata V, 2017 WL 2406711 at *11)]. As ARC correctly\n\npoints out, however, in Takata V, as well as in Takata II, the court found that\n\nthe plaintiffs had stated fraudulent concealment based on allegations that the\n\ndefendant made incomplete representations, giving rise to a duty to disclose.\n\nSee Takata V, 2017 WL 2406711 at *5; Takata II, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1337. And\n\nPlaintiffs allege no such incomplete representations by ARC. To be sure, the\n\nSAC also alleges that \u201cARC worked with others to conceal\u201d the Defect, SAC I\n\n\u00b6 8, but this allegation is unsupported by facts indicating active concealment.\n\n\n\n\n                                          234\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT           Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 235 of 246\n\n\n\n\nMoreover, the SAC alleges that ARC has \u201cquestioned the necessity\u201d of\n\nproviding the NHTSA with certain information, failed to provide documents in\n\nreadable format, and, among other things, \u201cadvocated for the closure of the\n\n[NHTSA] investigation without possessing or providing a full understanding\n\nof the root cause for at least one of the underlying inflator ruptures,\u201d SAC I \u00b6\n\n320, but Plaintiffs fail to explain how these actions constitute active\n\nconcealment and provide law in support.\n\n      In the absence of allegations supporting active concealment, fraudulent\n\nconcealment tolling may still apply if Plaintiffs establish that ARC had a duty\n\nto disclose the Defect. But Plaintiffs fail to establish that ARC owed them this\n\nduty. Again, they rely on Takata V, to argue that ARC had a duty to disclose.\n\nBut in Takata V, the court found that the airbag manufacturer had a \u201cduty to\n\ndisclose additional facts about the safety of the airbags\u201d because the plaintiffs\n\nalleged   that         the   defendant    manufacture   had    made    \u201cincomplete\n\nrepresentations.\u201d Takata V, 2017 WL 2406711 at *5. Here, Plaintiffs fail to\n\nidentify an allegation of ARC\u2019s incomplete representations in the SAC.\n\nAccordingly, the Court is unpersuaded that fraudulent concealment tolling\n\napplies to the 16 identified Plaintiffs\u2019 statutory consumer protection and,\n\nwhere challenged, their fraud claims against ARC.\n\n                 ii.     Discovery Rule\n\n      Fraudulent concealment tolling aside, Plaintiffs contend that the\n\nchallenged claim under Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, New\n\nHampshire, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin law survive because, in those\n\n\n                                             235\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 236 of 246\n\n\n\n\nstates, the \u201cdiscovery rule\u201d applies to the accrual of fraud and fraud-based\n\nconsumer protection claims. [Doc. 219 at 25 n.8]. Under the discovery rule,\n\n\u201cclaims accrue when the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered\n\nor should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.\u201d City of\n\nMiami v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2022 WL 198028, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2022)\n\n(citation modified); see also e.g., Kimbrough v. Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 515-16\n\n(1997); Grayiel v. AIO Holdings, LLC, 648 F. Supp. 3d 812, 847 (W.D. Ky.\n\n2022), aff\u2019d, 2024 WL 2992676 (6th Cir. June 14, 2024).\n\n      In Plaintiffs\u2019 view, the facts giving rise to their challenged claims could\n\nnot have accrued any earlier than August 2020, when the NHTSA announced\n\nthat \u201cit was investigating \u2018toroidal shaped hybrid air bag inflators, both\n\npassenger and driver side,\u2019 and requested additional information from ARC \u2018to\n\nfacilitate its investigation of the potential risk of deployment-related field\n\nrupture\u2019\u201d because, before then, there was nothing publicly available \u201cto suggest\n\nthat Defendants were involved in the misconduct or concealment\u201d that\n\nPlaintiffs allege. [Doc. 219 at 25 (quoting SAC I \u00b6\u00b6 383\u201384)]. Thus, according\n\nto Plaintiffs, the challenged claims under Florida, Minnesota, New York, and\n\nWisconsin law are timely because a limitations period of at least three years\n\napplies and Cerrato (Florida), Hochstetler (Minnesota); Barker, Wilson, Topa,\n\nand Ballero Gonzalez (New York); and Allan (Wisconsin) filed suit within three\n\nyears of the August 2020 announcement. [Doc. 219 at 25].\n\n\n\n\n                                         236\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 237 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      As an initial matter, although Plaintiffs maintain that the challenged\n\nclaims could not have accrued before August 2020 and generally argue that the\n\nCourt should not determine the statute-of-limitations trigger date at this\n\nstage, [Doc. 219 at 25], they provide nothing to indicate that their claims\n\naccrued at a point after August 2020. Thus, there is no indication that the\n\nchallenged claims of Sorenson (Idaho), Barber (Kentucky), Knapp (Montana),\n\nStruble (New Hampshire), and Milewski and Isbister (Ohio), which are all\n\nsubject to a two-year limitations period, accrued later than August 2020 and\n\nwithin two years of their late-June/early-July 2023-filed Complaints. In sum,\n\nthe Court is persuaded that the discovery rule does not rescue the challenged\n\nIdaho, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, and Ohio claims.\n\n      For Allan\u2019s Wisconsin claim, ARC argues that neither the discovery rule\n\nnor tolling resuscitates the claim because Allan bought his Class Vehicle more\n\nthan three years before filing suit and the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices\n\nAct has a three-year statute of repose. [Doc. 179-1 at 27]. \u201cA statute of\n\nlimitations bars an action not commenced within a specified amount of time\n\nafter the cause of action \u2018accrues.\u2019 In a statute of repose, the legislature has\n\nalready determined when the claim \u2018accrues\u2019\u2014at the time of the defendant\u2019s\n\naction.\u201d Kain v. Bluemound E. Indus. Park, Inc., 248 Wis. 2d 172, 182 (Wis. Ct.\n\nApp. 2001) (citation modified). Because \u201cstatutes of repose are unaffected by\n\nwhat the plaintiff knows,\u201d equitable tolling doctrines and the discovery rule\n\n\n\n\n                                         237\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 238 of 246\n\n\n\n\nare \u201cincompatible with a period of repose.\u201d Neuser v. Carrier Corp., 2007 WL\n\n484779, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 9, 2007) (citations omitted).\n\n       Plaintiffs claim a violation of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices\n\nAct, Wis. Stat. \u00a7 100.18(1), based on Defendants\u2019 untrue representations. SAC\n\nII \u00b6 4072. However, because \u201cWisconsin Stat. \u00a7 100.18(11)(b)3 bars suit for\n\nfraudulent representation brought \u2018more than 3 years after the occurrence of\n\nthe unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action\u2019 . . . the fraudulent\n\nrepresentation statute is a statute of repose.\u201d Kain, 248 Wis. 2d at 182. And\n\nbecause Allan bought his Class Vehicle in 2015, SAC I \u00b6 207, more than three\n\nyears before he filed suit, the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim\u2019s\n\nstatute of repose bars his claim.\n\n       As to the remaining challenged claims, each of which has a limitations\n\nperiod of three or more years, ARC does not dispute that the discovery rule\n\napplies. Rather, ARC rebuts Plaintiffs\u2019 contention that they could not have\n\nreasonably discovered ARC\u2019s alleged concealment of the Defect until (at least)\n\nthe NHTSA\u2019s August 2020 announcement. According to ARC, the NHTSA\n\nmade several public statements, starting as early as 2015, that put Plaintiffs\n\non notice regarding the NHTSA\u2019s investigation of ARC inflators. [Doc. 245 at\n\n14\u201315 (citing seven NHTSA communications, including information requests\n\nto ARC)]. ARC characterizes the pre-August 2020 NTSA statements as \u201cof the\n\nsame type\u201d as the August 2020 statement and as \u201cclearly identif[ying] ARC\n\nairbag inflators as the subject of NHTSA\u2019s investigations.\u201d [Id. at 17]. Whether\n\n\n\n\n                                            238\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 239 of 246\n\n\n\n\nPlaintiffs knew or should have known of any of the pre-August 2020 NHTSA\n\nstatements and whether those statements sufficed to notify Plaintiffs of the\n\nfacts giving rise to the challenged claims entail a fact intensive inquiry not\n\nappropriate at this pre-discovery stage. See In re 3M Combat Arms Earplug\n\nProds. Liab. Litig., 2023 WL 5670825, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2023) (\u201cStatute\n\nof limitations defenses under the discovery rule require fact intensive\n\ninquiries, normally presenting questions of fact for the jury.\u201d (citation\n\nomitted)). Accordingly, ARC\u2019s argument that the statute of limitations bars the\n\nchallenged claims of Cerrato (Florida), Hochstetler (Minnesota); and Barker,\n\nWilson, Topa, Ballero Gonzalez, and Brown (New York), which were all\n\nasserted within three years of August 2020, is premature.\n\n      Overall, the Court GRANTS ARC\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 179],\n\nchallenging on statute of limitations grounds the claims of Komoroski\n\n(Connecticut); Sorrenson (Idaho); Barber (Kentucky); Rhoades and Carano\n\n(Michigan); Knapp (Montana); Struble (New Hampshire); Milewski and Ibister\n\n(Ohio); and Wisconsin (Allan) and DENIES the motion as to the challenged\n\nclaims of Cerrato (Florida); Hochstetler (Minnesota); and Barker, Wilson,\n\nTopa, Ballero Gonzalez, and Brown (New York). Accordingly, the Court\n\nDISMISSES      WITH    PREJUDICE       the    following   claims:   Komoroski\u2019s\n\nConnecticut Unlawful Trade Practices Act claim (Count 7(c)); Sorenson\u2019s Idaho\n\nConsumer Protection Act claim (Count 13(c)); Barber\u2019s Kentucky Consumer\n\nProtection Act claim (Count 18(c)); Michigan Consumer Protection Act and\n\n\n\n\n                                        239\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 240 of 246\n\n\n\n\nfraud claims (Counts 23(c), (d), respectively) as to Rhoades and Carano;\n\nMontana Unfair Trade Practices Act claim (Count 27(c)) as to Knapp; New\n\nHampshire Consumer Practices Act claim (Count 30(c)) as to Struble; Ohio\n\nConsumer Sales Practices Act claim (Count 36(c)) as to Milewski and Isbister;\n\nand Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim (Count 50(c)) as to Allan.\n\n             b. Claims Against the Automakers\n\n      The U.S. Automakers argue that no tolling doctrine rescues Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nwarranty claims and that fraudulent concealment does not rescue the tort and\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims of those Plaintiffs who did not file suit\n\nwithin the original statute of limitations because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts\n\nshowing concealment by the Automakers. [Docs. 180-1 at 11; 181-1 at 55\u201357;\n\n186-1 at 13; 241 at 2\u20133; 188-1 at 11\u201312]. Unlike with the claims against ARC,\n\nfraudulent concealment does toll the statute of limitations for the tort and\n\nstatutory consumer protection claims against the Automakers. First, the SAC\u2019s\n\nallegations meet Rule 9\u2019s particularity requirement. See supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.a.\n\nSecond, while the SAC does not allege an affirmative act of concealment by any\n\nAutomaker, see supra \u00a7 VI.B.2.d.ii. at 94\u201397, fraudulent concealment tolling\n\napplies, nevertheless, because Plaintiffs show that the Automakers had a duty\n\nto disclose the Defect but failed to do so. See Fenn, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 636-37.\n\nThus, fraudulent concealment tolling applies to Plaintiffs\u2019 tort and statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims under the laws of the above-discussed states, supra\n\n\u00a7 VI.B.2.d.ii., where the Automakers had a duty to disclose. Moreover, like\n\nARC, the U.S. Automakers do not dispute that a given state does not recognize\n\n\n                                          240\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 241 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe discovery rule. Rather, they contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts\n\nsufficient to invoke the rule. [See e.g., Doc. 182-1 at 14]. This argument fails\n\nfor the same reason as ARC\u2019s argument. See supra \u00a7 VI.B.10.a.ii.\n\n      The U.S. Automakers also argue that the warranty breach claims of\n\nseveral Plaintiffs fail because those claims accrued at delivery, regardless of\n\nPlaintiff\u2019s lack of knowledge, and those Plaintiffs did not file suit within their\n\napplicable statutes of limitations. [Docs. 185-1 at 5; 242 at 6; 249 at 40; 188-1\n\nat 9\u201310]. Because all express warranty breach claims stand dismissed and\n\nseveral of the implied warranty breach claims fail on other grounds, the only\n\nsurviving warranty breach claims challenged on timeliness grounds belong to\n\nthe following: (1) Hyundai or Kia Class Vehicle-owning Plaintiffs Ford (South\n\nCarolina), Hoschar (Pennsylvania), and Victory (Arkansas), collectively\n\n\u201cHyundai-Kia Plaintiffs\u201d; (2) Ford Class Vehicle-owning Plaintiffs Britton\n\n(California, Song-Beverly Act Claim only), Sellers (South Carolina), and\n\nRaspantini (New Jersey), collectively \u201cFord Plaintiffs\u201d; (3) GM Class\n\nVehicle-owing Plaintiffs Bacon (South Dakota), Belanger (Massachusetts),\n\nDuran (Nevada), Escobedo (California, Song-Beverly Act claim only), Hall\n\n(Indiana), Harpey-Bey (Nevada), Hayes (South Carolina), Hochstetler\n\n(Minnesota), McCarthy (New Jersey), Sims (Mississippi), Slusher (Kansas),\n\nSpeck (California, Song-Beverly Act Claim only), Starkey (Nevada), Tropea\n\n(Massachusetts), and Yerger (Georgia), collectively, \u201cGM Plaintiffs\u201d; and\n\n\n\n\n                                          241\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 242 of 246\n\n\n\n\n(4) Fiat Chrysler Class Vehicle-owning Plaintiff Rene Madueno (California,\n\nSong-Beverly Act claim only). [Docs. 185-1 at 5; 186-1 at 11 & n.9; 242 at 6].\n\n      Under Arkansas law, \u201c\u2018[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of\n\ndelivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future\n\nperformance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of\n\nsuch performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have\n\nbeen discovered.\u2019\u201d Burns v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL\n\n11117157, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 23, 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ark.\n\nCode Ann. \u00a7 4-2-725(1)). However, Arkansas courts have held that \u201cimplied\n\nwarranties cannot explicitly extend to future performance.\u201d Id. at *3 (citation\n\nomitted) (dismissing breach of implied warranty claim as time-barred).\n\nAccordingly, there is support for Hyundai and Kia\u2019s argument that the\n\ndiscovery rule does not toll Victory\u2019s Arkansas implied warranty breach claim.\n\n[See Doc. 229 at 6 (citing id. at *2\u20133)]. Thus, while Victory\u2019s implied warranty\n\nbreach claim fails, because Hyundai and Kia fail to offer authority in support\n\nof the untimeliness of Ford\u2019s and Hoschar\u2019s claims, those claims do not fail on\n\ntimeliness grounds.\n\n      The Ford Plaintiffs\u2019 implied warranty breach claims under California\u2019s\n\nSong-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1790, et seq., and South Carolina law also\n\ndo not fail as untimely. Plaintiffs provide authority indicating that the\n\ndiscovery rule applies to Song-Beverly Act claims and to South Carolina\n\nwarranty breach claims. [See Doc. 224 at 9 & 6 (citing Foulkrod v. Ford Motor\n\n\n\n\n                                         242\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353       Filed 10/02/26   Page 243 of 246\n\n\n\n\nCo., 2019 WL 3064478, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2019), then citing S.C. Code\n\nAnn. \u00a7 36-2-725(2) (\u201cA cause of action accrues for breach of warranty when the\n\nbreach is or should have been discovered\u201d)]. And Ford offers no direct rebuttal\n\nto this argument. As for Raspantini\u2019s implied warranty breach claim under\n\nNew Jersey law, Plaintiffs argue that fraudulent concealment tolls all their\n\nclaims, [Doc. 224 at 8]. But, as Ford correctly notes, Plaintiffs do not\n\nsufficiently allege fraudulent concealment by Ford, [Doc. 241 at 2\u20132], and\n\nPlaintiffs fail to show that New Jersey recognizes a duty to disclose. See supra\n\n\u00a7 VI.d.ii.\n\n       Plaintiffs also argue that the discovery rule and, alternatively, GM\u2019s and\n\nFiat Chrysler\u2019s fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period for the GM\n\nPlaintiffs\u2019 and Madueno\u2019s implied warranty breach claims. [Docs. 222 at 7 &\n\nn.5; 228 at 6\u20137]. Although they maintain that the discovery rule does not apply\n\nto implied warranty breach claims under the Song-Beverly Act, [see Doc. 250\n\nat 3; 188-1 at 11 & n.8], GM and Fiat Chrysler do not dispute that fraudulent\n\nconcealment tolls the limitations period for warranty claims in the relevant\n\nstates. Rather, like the other U.S. Automakers, they also argue that Plaintiffs\n\nfail to allege fraudulent concealment by them. [Docs. 250 at 3\u20134; 188-1 at 10\u2013\n\n11]. As discussed above, however, this argument fails to the extent that the\n\nstates under which the GM Plaintiffs and Madueno assert their claims\u2014i.e.,\n\nCalifornia, Indiana, Massachusetts and Georgia\u2014recognize a duty to disclose.\n\nHayes\u2019s claim under South Carolina law also survives GM\u2019s timeliness\n\n\n\n\n                                          243\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 244 of 246\n\n\n\n\nchallenge, because South Carolina applies the discovery rule. S.C. Code Ann.\n\n\u00a7 36-2-725(2). However, McCarthy\u2019s New Jersey-law based claim against GM\n\nfails because New Jersey does not recognize a duty to disclose, see supra\n\n\u00a7 VI.d.ii., and Bacon\u2019s, Duran\u2019s, Harpey-Bey\u2019s, Hochstetler\u2019s, Sims\u2019s, Slusher\u2019s,\n\nand Starkey\u2019s claims fail because Plaintiffs fails to show that Kansas,\n\nMinnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, and South Dakota, impart a duty to disclose\n\non the Automakers.\n\n      In sum, the Court GRANTS Hyundai and Kia\u2019s, Ford\u2019s, and GM\u2019s Motion\n\nto Dismiss, [Doc. 180, 185, 186], to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH\n\nPREJUDICE the implied warranty breach claims of Plaintiff Victory\n\n(Arkansas; Count 4(b)), Raspintini (New Jersey, Count 31(b)), Bacon (South\n\nDakota, Count 42(b)), Duran and Harpey-Bey and Starkey (Nevada, Count\n\n29(b)), Hochstetler (Minnesota, Count 24(b)), Sims (Mississippi, Count ), and\n\nSlusher (Kansas, Count17(b)). The Court DENIES the other U.S. Automakers\u2019\n\nmotions, [Docs. 181, 188], to the extent that they seek dismissal on statute of\n\nlimitations grounds.\n\n                               VII.   Conclusion\n\n      For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND\n\nDENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss by the Airbag Suppliers, [Doc. 178],\n\nARC, [Doc. 179], the U.S. Automakers (collectively), [Doc. 181], Hyundai and\n\nKia, [Doc. 180], Volkswagen, [Doc. 182], BMW, [Doc. 183], Ford, [Doc. 185],\n\nGM, [Doc. 186], PCNA, [Doc. 187], and Fiat Chrysler, [Doc. 188]. Specifically,\n\n\n\n\n                                         244\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353      Filed 10/02/26   Page 245 of 246\n\n\n\n\nthe Court GRANTS the above-identified motions for Plaintiffs\u2019 failure to state\n\na claim to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE those claims\n\nasserted in the SAC, [Docs. 157, 157-1], that are identified in the discussion\n\nabove (and duplicated for ease of reference in the chart appended to this order),\n\nSTRIKES Plaintiffs\u2019 request for restitution as a remedy under their statutory\n\nconsumer protection claims, DISMISSES AS MOOT the claims against GM by\n\nPlaintiffs Allan, Barber, A.W. Brown, Diaz, Eiland, Felice, Jophlin, Lovett,\n\nSenkpeil, Shephard, Stowe, Struble, Warren, and Welch, and DENIES the\n\nmotions in all other respects, unless indicated otherwise below.\n\n      Further, the Court GRANTS Audi\u2019s Motion to Dismiss for lack of\n\nstanding, [Doc. 184], and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs\u2019\n\nclaims against it.\n\n      The Court also GRANTS Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea\u2019s motion to\n\ndismiss, [Doc. 272], for failure to state a claim and DISMISSES WITH\n\nPREJUDICE all claims by Plaintiffs against these two Defendants.\n\n      The Court further GRANTS ARC\u2019s motion to dismiss, [Doc. 179], for lack\n\nof personal jurisdiction and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the cases\n\nidentified in the discussion above (and duplicated for ease of reference in the\n\nchart appended to this order). 80\n\n\n\n      80 To the extent that ARC is the sole Defendant in a given case, the case\n\nstands dismissed in its entirety, and to the extent that ARC is a co-Defendant,\nARC stands dismissed from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction but the\ncase proceeds against any other Defendant.\n\n\n\n                                         245\n\fCase 1:22-md-03051-TWT         Document 353      Filed 10/02/26    Page 246 of 246\n\n\n\n\n      The Court GRANTS the Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss by Defendants\n\nZF   Friedrichshafen     AG,    [Docs.   279],    Bayerische      Motoren   Werke\n\nAktiengesellschaft, [Doc. 287], Dr. Ing. H.C. F. Porsche AG, [Doc. 289], Audi\n\nAktiengesellschaft, [Doc. 305], and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, [Doc. 319],\n\nDENIES Plaintiffs\u2019 related motions for jurisdictional discovery, [Docs. 294,\n\n309, 311, 322, 328], and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all claims by\n\nPlaintiffs against these Defendants.\n\n      Finally, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for oral arguments, [Doc.\n\n252], and motion for leave to file a sur-reply, [Doc. 256].\n\n      SO ORDERED, this 2nd          day of October, 2026.\n\n\n\n                                                 ______________________________\n                                                 THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.\n                                                 United States District Judge\n\n\n\n\n                                          246\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-02T13:34:30.367581-07:00","document_number":"353","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018768463","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":true,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Order on Motion to Dismiss","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/496053534/","id":496053534,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/353/1/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-10-02T13:34:32.044484-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-05T16:09:18.599853-07:00","sha1":"70058231b5e01ab7ee02d30499303382b1544514","page_count":22,"file_size":329761,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.353.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.353.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"   Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353-1      Filed 10/02/26     Page 1 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                Summary of Ruling 1\n\n                                 Claims by State\n   State       SAC \u00a7         Claim/Cause of Action 2        Defendant     Disposition 3\n                                                           Automakers\n                             Fraud (Georgia Law):\n                                                           Ab Supplier     Dismissed\n                             Omission/Concealment\n                VII.1                                         ARC\nNationwide                  Fraud (Common Law):\n                                                      All Defs.            Dismissed\n                            Omission/Concealment\n                          Unjust Enrichment (Georgia\n                VII.2                                Automakers\n                                     Law)\n\n                            Express Warranty Breach\n              VIII.1(a)    (Ala. Code \u00a7\u00a7 7-2-313, 7-2A-    Automakers      Dismissed\n                                       210)\n                            Implied Warranty Breach\n                 1(b)      (Ala. Code \u00a7\u00a7 7-2-314, 7-2A-    Automakers      Dismissed\n                                       212)\n Alabama\n                                 Alabama DTPA\n                 1(c)                                       All Defs.      Dismissed\n                           (Ala. Code \u00a7 8-19-1, et seq.)\n                                                      Automakers           Dismissed\n                 1(d)     Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier          Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n                 1(e)         Unjust Enrichment       Automakers           Dismissed\n\n                           Express Warranty Breach\n  Alaska      VIII.2(a)      (Alaska Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7         Automakers      Dismissed\n                             45.02.313, 45.12.210)\n\n      1  These charts encapsulate the Court\u2019s rulings on the numerous pending\nmotions to dismiss and is provided to streamline review of the numerous Court\nrulings: These charts are intended to restate the rulings made in the Court\u2019s order.\nTo the extent that a ruling reflected in this chart is inconsistent with the ruling\ncontained in the order, the chart\u2019s entry should be viewed as an unintended\nscrivener\u2019s error. Further, unless specified otherwise, the dismissals noted here are\nwith prejudice.\n      2 The Court employs the following abbreviations: Consumer Fraud Act (CFA);\n\nConsumer Protection Act (CPA); Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA); Unfair Trade\nPractices Act (UTPA).\n\n      3 A blank space in the \u201cDisposition\u201d column indicates that the claim is still live\n\nas to that particular Defendant; either the relevant Defendant did not move for\ndismissal of such a claim, or its motion was denied.\n\n\n                                              1\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1      Filed 10/02/26     Page 2 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                  Claims by State\n  State       SAC \u00a7         Claim/Cause of Action 2      Defendant      Disposition 3\n                           Implied Warranty Breach\n               2(b)          (Alaska Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7       Automakers\n                            455.02.314, 44.12.212)\n                           Unfair Trade Practices &\n                           Consumer Protection Act\n               2(c)                                       All Defs.\n                               (Alaska Stat. Ann.\n                              \u00a7 45.503471, et seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n               2(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier          Dismiss\n                                                        ARC\n               2(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers\n\n                           Express Warranty Breach\n             VIII.3(a)      (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7    Automakers      Dismissed\n                              47.2313, 47-2A210)\n                           Implied Warranty Breach\n               3(b)       (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 44-   Automakers      Dismissed\n                                  1521, et seq.)\n Arizona                                               Automakers\n                         Arizona CFA (Ariz. Rev. Stat.\n               3(c)                                    Ab Supplier       Dismissed\n                            Ann. \u00a7 44-1521, et seq.)\n                                                          ARC\n                                                       Automakers        Dismissed\n               3(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier         Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n               3(e)           Unjust Enrichment        Automakers\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n             VIII.4(a) (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 4-2-313, 4- Automakers         Dismissed\n                                  2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n               4(b)    (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 4-2-314, 4- Automakers\n                                  2A-212)\nArkansas                      Arkansas DTPA           Automakers         Dismissed\n               4(c)    (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-88-101, et Ab Supplier        Dismissed\n                                   seq.)                 ARC\n                                                      Automakers         Dismissed\n               4(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier           Dismissed\n                                                         ARC             Dismissed\n               4(e)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers         Dismissed\n\nCalifornia   VIII.5(a)     Express Warranty Breach       Automakers      Dismissed\n\n\n\n                                            2\n\f   Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353-1      Filed 10/02/26     Page 3 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                     Claims by State\n   State       SAC \u00a7           Claim/Cause of Action 2      Defendant     Disposition 3\n                              (Cal. Com. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2313,\n                                       10210)\n                             Implied Warranty Breach\n                5(b)        (Cal. Com. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2314 &       Automakers     Dismissed\n                                       10212)\n                             Implied Warranty Breach\n                5(c)       (Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ.     Automakers\n                                Code \u00a7 1790, et seq.)\n                          Consumer Legal Remedies Act Automakers\n                5(d)        (Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1750, et Ab Supplier\n                                        seq.)              ARC\n                           California False Advertising\n                5(e)       Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Automakers\n                                 \u00a7 17500, et seq.)\n                          Unfair Competition Law (Cal.\n                5(f)      Bus. & Prof. Code \u00a7 17200, et\n                                       seq.)\n                                                        Automakers         Dismissed\n                5(g)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier\n                                                           ARC\n                5(h)           Unjust Enrichment        Automakers         Dismissed\n\n                            Express Warranty Breach\n              VIII.6(a)   (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 4-2-313 &    Automakers     Dismissed\n                                    4-2.5-210)\n                            Implied Warranty Breach\n                6(b)      (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 4-2-314 &    Automakers\n                                    4-2.5-212)\n Colorado                         Colorado CPA        Automakers\n                6(c)      (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 6-1-101, et\n                                                      Ab Supplier          Dismissed\n                                       seq.)             ARC\n                                                      Automakers\n                6(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier          Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n                6(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers           Dismissed\n\n                          Express Warranty Breach\nConnecticut   VIII.7(a) (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 42A- Automakers          Dismissed\n                            2-313 and 42a-2A-503)\n\n\n\n\n                                              3\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 4 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n  State        SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2     Defendant     Disposition 3\n                              Implied Warranty\n                          (Merchantability) Breach\n                7(b)                                   Automakers      Dismissed\n                        (Conn. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 42a-2-314\n                                & 42a-2a-504)\n                                                       Automakers\n                          Connecticut UTPA (Conn.\n                                                       Ab Supplier    Dismissed\n                7(c)     Gen. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 42-110a, et\n                                                                       Partially\n                                     seq.)                ARC\n                                                                      Dismissed 4\n                                                    Automakers\n                7(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier        Dismissed\n                                                       ARC\n                7(e)        Unjust Enrichment       Automakers         Dismissed\n\n                           Express Warranty Breach\n              VIII.8(a)   (6 Del. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2-313 & 2A- Automakers       Dismissed\n                                      210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach (6\n                8(b)                                    Automakers\n                        Del. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2-314 & 2A-212)\n                                                        Automakers\n                                 Delaware CFA\n                8(c)                                    Ab Supplier    Dismissed\n                         (6 Del. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2511, et seq.)\nDelaware                                                   ARC\n                                                        Automakers\n                               Delaware DTPA\n                8(d)                                    Ab Supplier    Dismissed\n                          (6 Del. Code \u00a7 2531, et seq.)\n                                                           ARC\n                                                        Automakers\n                8(e)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier        Dismissed\n                                                           ARC\n                8(f)          Unjust Enrichment         Automakers\n\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n              VIII.9(a) (DC Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 28:2-313 & 28:2A- Automakers      Dismissed\n                                     210)\n                           Implied Warranty Breach\nDistrict of     9(b)    (DC Stat \u00a7\u00a7 28:2-314 & 28:2A- Automakers\nColumbia                             212)\n                          D.C. Consumer Protection\n                9(c)      Procedures Act (DC Stat \u00a7\u00a7    All Defs.\n                               28-3901, et seq.)\n                9(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Automakers\n\n\n     4 As to the claim of Komoroski.\n\n\n\n                                           4\n\f   Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353-1      Filed 10/02/26      Page 5 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n   State       SAC \u00a7         Claim/Cause of Action 2         Defendant     Disposition 3\n                                                            Ab Supplier     Dismissed\n                                                               ARC\n                9(e)           Unjust Enrichment            Automakers\n\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n             VIII.10(a)    (Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 672.313 &    Automakers           Dismissed\n                                    680.21)\n                              Implied Warranty\n               10(b)    (Merchantability) Breach (Fla. Automakers           Dismissed\n                         Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 672.314 & 680.212)\n  Florida                Florida Deceptive & Unfair\n               10(c)    Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. All Defs.\n                              \u00a7 501.201, et seq.)\n                                                       Automakers           Dismissed\n               10(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab Supplier             Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n               10(e)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers           Dismissed\n\n                            Express Warranty Breach\n             VIII.11(a)    (O.C.G.A. \u00a7\u00a7 11-2-313 & 11-      Automakers      Dismissed\n                                     2A-210)\n                            Implied Warranty Breach\n                                                                             Partially\n                11(b)        (O.C.G.A. \u00a7\u00a7 11-2-314 &        Automakers\n                                                                            Dismissed 5\n                                   11-2A-212)\n\n                             Georgia Uniform DTPA\n                11(c)                                         All Defs      Dismissed\n                          (O.C.G.A. \u00a7\u00a7 10-1-370, et seq.)\n  Georgia\n                             Georgia Fair Business\n                11(d)            Practices Act               All Defs.      Dismissed\n                          (O.C.G.A. \u00a7 10-1-390, et seq.)\n                                                                             Partially\n                                                            Automaker\n                                                                            Dismissed 6\n                11(e)     Fraud: Omission/Concealment\n                                                            Ab. Supplier    Dismissed\n                                                                ARC\n                11(f)          Unjust Enrichment            Automakers      Dismissed\n\n      5 This claim is dismissed to the extent asserted by Plaintiffs who did not buy\n\nor lease their Class Vehicles from an Automaker-authorized dealer.\n      6 As to Plaintiffs who acquired used Class Vehicles from a source unaffiliated\n\nwith the Automakers.\n\n\n                                              5\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1    Filed 10/02/26    Page 6 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                              Claims by State\n State       SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2     Defendant      Disposition 3\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.12(a) (Haw. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 490:2-313 Automakers        Dismissed\n                             & 490:2A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             12(b)    (Haw. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 490:2-314 Automakers\n                             & 490:2A-212)\nHawaii                   Unfair & Deceptive Acts\n             12(c)     ((Haw. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 480, et  All Defs.\n                                  seq.)\n                                                    Automaker\n             12(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier        Dismissed\n                                                       ARC\n             12(e)         Unjust Enrichment        Automakers        Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.13(a) (Idaho Code \u00a7\u00a7 28-2-314 & 28- Automakers        Dismissed\n                                  12-212)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n             13(b)       (Idaho Code \u00a7\u00a7 28-2-314 & Automakers         Dismissed\n                                 28-12-212)\n                                                      Automaker\nIdaho\n                                Idaho CPA             Ab. Supplier   Dismissed\n             13(c)\n                       (Idaho Code \u00a7 48-601, et seq.)                 Partially\n                                                          ARC\n                                                                     Dismissed 7\n                                                  Automaker\n             13(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier        Dismissed\n                                                      ARC\n              13(e)       Unjust Enrichment       Automakers          Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.14(a) (810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-313 & Automakers      Dismissed\n                                 5/2A-210)\n                      Implied Warranty Breach (810\nIllinois     14(b)       Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-314 &   Automakers      Dismissed\n                                 5/2A-212)\n                                                      Automaker\n                       Illinois Consumer Fraud and\n             14(c)                                    Ab. Supplier    Dismissed\n                       Deceptive Business Practices\n                                                          ARC\n\n    7 As to the Sorenson claim.\n\n\n\n\n                                         6\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1    Filed 10/02/26   Page 7 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n State     SAC \u00a7           Claim/Cause of Action 2       Defendant Disposition 3\n                       Act (815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1,\n                                    et seq.)\n                           Illinois Uniform DTPA        Automaker\n            14(d)      (815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/1, et Ab. Supplier\n                                     seq.)                 ARC\n                                                        Automakers Dismissed\n            14(e)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                           ARC\n            14(f)            Unjust Enrichment          Automakers Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n          VIII.15(a) (Ind. Code \u00a7\u00a7 26-1-2-313, 26-1- Automakers      Dismissed\n                                 2.1-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\nIndiana     15(b)    (Ind. Code \u00a7\u00a7 26-1-2-314, 26-1- Automakers\n                                 2.1-212)\n                      Indiana Deceptive Consumer\n            15(c)      Sales Act (Ind. Code \u00a7 24-5-   All Defs.\n                              0.5-1, et seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n            15(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier        Dismissed\n                                                        ARC\n            15(e)          Unjust Enrichment         Automakers      Dismissed\n\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n          VIII.16(a)      (Iowa Code \u00a7\u00a7 554.2313 &    Automakers     Dismissed\n                                 554.13210)\n                          Implied Warranty Breach\n            16(b)         (Iowa Code \u00a7\u00a7 554.2314 &    Automakers     Dismissed\n                                 554.13212)\n Iowa\n                                 Iowa CFA\n            16(c)                                      All Defs.\n                        (Iowa Code \u00a7 714h.1, et seq.)\n                                                      Automakers    Dismissed\n            16(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier\n                                                         ARC\n            16(e)            Unjust Enrichment        Automakers     Dismissed\n\n                       Express Warranty Breach\nKansas    VIII.17(a) (Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 84-2-313 & Automakers       Dismissed\n                              84-2A-210)\n\n\n\n\n                                          7\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1    Filed 10/02/26   Page 8 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n  State      SAC \u00a7          Claim/Cause of Action 2     Defendant Disposition 3\n                           Implied Warranty Breach\n              17(b)      (Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 84-2-314, Automakers\n                                  84-2A-212)\n                                                       Automaker\n                         Kansas Consumer Credit and\n                                                           Ab.\n              17(c)        Protection Act (Kan. Stat.              Dismissed\n                                                         Supplier\n                            Ann. \u00a7 50-623, et seq.)\n                                                           ARC\n                                                       Automaker\n              17(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n              17(e)           Unjust Enrichment        Automakers Dismissed\n\n                       Express Warranty Breach (Ky.\n            VIII.18(a)   Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 335.2-313 &    Automakers     Dismissed\n                                355.2A-210)\n                       Implied Warranty Breach (Ky.\n              18(b)       Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 335.2-314,    Automakers     Dismissed\n                                355.2A-212)\n                                                      Automakers\nKentucky                      Kentucky CPA\n                                                      Ab. Supplier\n              18(c)     (Ky. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 367.110, et\n                                                                      Partially\n                                    seq.)                 ARC\n                                                                     Dismissed 8\n                                                     Automakers      Dismissed\n              18(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier    Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n              18(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers      Dismissed\n\n                         Implied Warranty Breach (La.\n            VIII.19(a)                                  Automakers\n                           Civ. Code Art. 2520, 2524)\n                            Louisiana Unfair Trade\n                             Practices & Consumer\n              19(b)                                      All Defs.\n                         Protection Law (La. Rev. Stat.\nLouisiana\n                               \u00a7 51:1401, et seq.)\n                                                        Automakers\n              19(c)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier    Dismissed\n                                                           ARC\n              19(d)           Unjust Enrichment         Automakers   Dismissed\n\n\n\n\n    8 As to Barber\u2019s claim.\n\n\n\n                                           8\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26     Page 9 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                              Claims by State\n State      SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2       Defendant Disposition 3\n                       Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.20(a) (Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 11 \u00a7\u00a7 2- Automakers Dismissed\n                             313 & 2-1210)\n                     Implied Warranty Breach (Me.\n             20(b)   Rev. Stat. Tit. 11 \u00a7\u00a7 2-314 & 2- Automakers\n                                  1212)\n Maine\n                      Maine UTPA (Me. Rev. Stat.\n             20(c)                                      All Defs.\n                       Ann. Tit. 5 \u00a7 205-a, et seq.)\n                                                      Automakers Dismissed\n             20(d)   Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n             20(e)        Unjust Enrichment           Automakers\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.21(a) ((Md. Code Com. Law \u00a7\u00a7 2-313 Automakers          Dismissed\n                                & 2A-210))\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n             21(b)     (Md. Code Com. Law \u00a7\u00a7 2-314 Automakers\n                                & 2A-212)\nMaryland                                             Automakers\n                         Maryland CPA (Md. Code,\n             21(c)                                   Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                        Com. Law, \u00a7 13-101, et seq.)\n                                                         ARC\n                                                     Automakers\n             21(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier         Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n             21(e)          Unjust Enrichment        Automakers        Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.22(a)    (Mass. Gen Laws ch. 106,      Automakers      Dismissed\n                            \u00a7\u00a7 2-313 & 2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n             22(b)       (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106,     Automakers\n                            \u00a7\u00a7 2-314 & 2A-212)\n Mass.                    Mass. Deceptive Acts or\n             22(c)       Practices Law (Mass. Gen.      All Defs.\n                         Laws ch. 93a, \u00a7 1, et seq.)\n                                                    Automakers\n             22(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier       Dismissed\n                                                        ARC\n             22(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers         Dismissed\n\n\n\n\n                                           9\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1    Filed 10/02/26   Page 10 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                Claims by State\n  State       SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2     Defendant     Disposition 3\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.23(a)      (Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7\u00a7      Automakers      Dismissed\n                            440.2313 & 440.2860)\n                          Implied Warranty Breach\n              23(b)         (Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7\u00a7      Automakers      Dismissed\n                             440.2314, 440.2862)\n                                                      Automakers\nMichigan                         Michigan CPA\n                                                      Ab. Supplier   Dismissed\n              23(c)      (Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 445.901,\n                                                                      Partially\n                                    et seq.)              ARC\n                                                                     Dismissed 9\n                                                     Automakers      Dismissed\n              23(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier    Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n              23(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers       Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.24(a) (Minn. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 336.2-313 & Automakers         Dismissed\n                                336.2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n              24(b)    (Miss. Code \u00a7\u00a7 75-2-314 & 75- Automakers\n                                  2A-212)\n                      Minn. Prevention of Consumer\n                         Fraud Act (Minn. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7\n              24(c)                                   Automakers\nMinnesota               325F.68, et seq., 8.31, subd.\n                                     3a)\n                         Minnesota Uniform DTPA\n              24(d)    (Minn. Stat. \u00a7 325D.44, Subd.   All Defs.\n                                 1, et seq.)\n                                                      Automakers      Dismissed\n              24(e)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier\n                                                         ARC\n              24(f)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers      Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.25(a) (Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 400.2-313 & Automakers      Dismissed\n                                400.2A-210)\nMississippi\n                       Implied Warranty Breach (Mo.\n              25(b)      Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 400.2-314 &    Automakers\n                                400.2A-212)\n\n\n     9 As to the Rhoades and Carano claims.\n\n\n\n                                          10\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1   Filed 10/02/26   Page 11 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                               Claims by State\n State       SAC \u00a7       Claim/Cause of Action 2      Defendant Disposition 3\n                         Missouri Merchandising\n              25(c)   Practices Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 All Defs.\n                             407.010, et seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n             25(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                        ARC\n              25(e)        Unjust Enrichment         Automakers Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.26(a) (Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 400.2-313 & Automakers     Dismissed\n                               400.2A-210)\n                      Implied Warranty Breach (Mo.\n             26(b)      Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 400.2-314 &    Automakers\n                               400.2A-212)\nMissouri                 Missouri Merchandising\n             26(c)    Practices Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 All Defs.\n                             407.010, et seq.)\n                                                     Automakers     Dismissed\n             26(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier\n                                                        ARC\n             26(e)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers     Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.27(a) (Mont. Code \u00a7\u00a7 30-2-313 & 30- Automakers      Dismissed\n                                2A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             27(b)    (Mont. Code \u00a7\u00a7 30-2-314 & 30- Automakers\n                                2A-212)\n                                                    Automakers\nMontana                  Montana UTPA of 1973           Ab.\n             27(c)     (Mont. Code \u00a7 30-14-101, et   Suppliers\n                                  seq.)                             Partially\n                                                       ARC\n                                                                   Dismissed 10\n                                                  Automakers        Dismissed\n             27(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                      ARC           Dismissed\n              27(e)       Unjust Enrichment       Automakers\n\n\n\n\n    10 As to Knapp\u2019s claim.\n\n\n\n                                        11\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 12 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                Claims by State\n  State      SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2      Defendant Disposition 3\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.28(a) (Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2- Automakers Dismissed\n                               313 & 2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n              28(b)    (Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. \u00a7\u00a7 30- Automakers\n                            2-314 & 30-2A-212)\nNebraska                      Nebraska CPA\n              28(c)    (Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 59-1601, et   All Defs.\n                                    seq.)\n                                                      Automakers Dismissed\n              28(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier\n                                                          ARC\n              28(e)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.29(a) (Nev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 104.2313 & Automakers        Dismissed\n                                104A.2210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n              29(b)    (Nev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 104.2314 & Automakers\n                                104A.2212)\n Nevada                 Nevada Consumer Practices Automakers\n              29(c)        Act (Nev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7     Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                             598.0903, et seq.)           ARC\n                                                      Automakers\n              29(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier         Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n              29(e)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers\n\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.30(a)   (N.H. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 382-A:2-     Automakers    Dismissed\n                            313 & 382-A:2A-210)\n                          Implied Warranty Breach\n              30(b)      (N.H. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 382-A:2-     Automakers\n  New\n                            314 & 382-A:2A-212)\nHampshire\n                                                          Automakers\n                                                              Ab.\n                         New Hampshire CPA (N.H.\n              30(c)                                        Suppliers\n                         Rev. Stat. \u00a7 358-A:1, et seq.)\n                                                                        Partially\n                                                             ARC\n                                                                       Dismissed 11\n\n\n    11 As to Struble\u2019s claim.\n\n\n\n                                            12\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353-1    Filed 10/02/26   Page 13 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n   State      SAC \u00a7          Claim/Cause of Action 2   Defendant Disposition 3\n                                                      Automakers\n               30(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n               30(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.31(a) (N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 12A:2-313      Automakers     Dismissed\n                              & 12A:2A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             31(b)    (N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 12A:2-314      Automakers\n                              & 12A:2A-212)\nNew Jersey                   New Jersey CFA           Automakers\n             31(c)     (N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a756:8-1, et   Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                   seq.)                  ARC\n                                                      Automakers        Dismissed\n               31(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n               31(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers        Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.32(a) (N.M. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 55-2-313 & 55- Automakers          Dismissed\n                                2A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             32(b)    (N.M. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 55-2-314 & 55- Automakers\n                                2A-212)\nNew Mexico                                            Automakers\n                           New Mexico UTPA\n             32(c)                                    Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                      (N.M. Stat. \u00a7 57-12-1, et seq.)\n                                                          ARC\n                                                      Automakers\n             32(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier          Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n             32(e)        Unjust Enrichment           Automakers        Dismissed\n\n                            Express Warranty Breach\n             VIII.33(a)    (N.Y. U.C.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2-313 & 2A-   Automakers     Dismissed\n                                      210)\n                            Implied Warranty Breach\n New York\n               33(b)       (N.Y. U.C.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2-314 & 2A-   Automakers     Dismissed\n                                      212)\n                                                         Automakers\n               33(c)\n                                                         Ab. Supplier   Dismissed\n\n\n\n                                            13\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 14 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                              Claims by State\n State      SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2   Defendant Disposition 3\n                       New York General Business\n                      Law     (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law     ARC\n                                 \u00a7 349)\n                       New York General Business Automakers\n             33(d)     Law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law \u00a7 Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                  350)                ARC\n                                                  Automakers\n             33(e)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                      ARC\n             33(f)        Unjust Enrichment       Automakers Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.34(a) (N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 25-2-313 & Automakers     Dismissed\n                                25-2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n             34(b)    (N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 25-2-314 & Automakers     Dismissed\n                                25-2A-212)\n North                    North Carolina Uniform     Automakers\nCarolina                          DTPA               Ab. Supplier   Dismissed\n             34(c)\n                        (N.C. Gen. Stat.\u00a7 75-1.1, et\n                                                         ARC\n                                   seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n             34(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n             34(e)          Unjust Enrichment        Automakers     Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.35(a) (N.D. Cent. Code \u00a7\u00a7 41-02-30 Automakers       Dismissed\n                              & 41-02.1-19)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             35(b)    (N.D. Cent. Code \u00a7\u00a7 41-02-31 Automakers\n                              & 41-02.1-21)\nNorth\n                           North Dakota CFA\nDakota\n             35(c)     (N.D. Cent. Code \u00a7 51-15-02,  All Defs.\n                                 et seq.)\n                                                    Automakers\n             35(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                       ARC\n             35(e)         Unjust Enrichment        Automakers      Dismissed\n\n\n\n\n                                        14\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26      Page 15 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n  State      SAC \u00a7          Claim/Cause of Action 2     Defendant       Disposition 3\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.36(a)      (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7     Automakers        Dismissed\n                             1302.26 & 1310.17)\n                          Implied Warranty Breach\n              36(b)        (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7     Automakers        Dismissed\n                              1302.27, 1310.19)\n                                                       Automakers        Dismissed\n                            Ohio Consumer Sales                          Partially\n                                                      Ab. Supplier\n  Ohio        36(c)     Practices Act (Ohio Rev. Code                   Dismissed 12\n                           Ann. \u00a7 1345.01, et seq.)                      Partially\n                                                          ARC\n                                                                        Dismissed 13\n                         Ohio DTPA (Ohio Rev. Code\n              36(d)                                      All Defs.\n                           Ann. \u00a7 4165.01, et seq.)\n                                                    Automakers           Dismissed\n              36(e)     Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier         Dismissed\n                                                        ARC\n              36(f)         Unjust Enrichment       Automakers           Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.37(a) (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, \u00a7\u00a7 Automakers          Dismissed\n                             2-313 & 2A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             37(b)     (Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 12A \u00a7\u00a7 Automakers\n                             2-314 & 2A-212)\n                              Oklahoma CPA\nOklahoma\n             37(c)    (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, \u00a7 751, All Defs.\n                                  et seq.)\n                                                       Automakers        Dismissed\n             37(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier           Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n             37(e)         Unjust Enrichment           Automakers        Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach (Or.\n           VIII.38(a)      Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 72.3130 &   Automakers          Dismissed\n                                  72A.2100)\n Oregon\n                        Implied Warranty Breach (Or.\n              38(b)         Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 72.3140,   Automakers          Dismissed\n                                  72A.2120)\n\n    12 As to the class-wide claim.\n\n\n    13 As to the class-wide claim as well as the claims of Milewski and Isbister.\n\n\n\n                                          15\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 16 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                              Claims by State\n State      SAC \u00a7       Claim/Cause of Action 2   Defendant Disposition 3\n                             Oregon UTPA         Automakers\n             38(c)    (Or. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 646.605, et\n                                                 Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                  seq.)              ARC\n                                                 Automakers\n             38(d)   Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                     ARC\n             38(e)       Unjust Enrichment       Automakers Dismissed\n\n                      Express Warranty Breach (13\n           VIII.39(a)   Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 2313 &   Automakers      Dismissed\n                                 2A210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             39(b)    (13 Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 2314 & Automakers\n                                 2A212)\n Penn.                Penn. Unfair Trade Practices Automakers\n             39(c)     & CPA (73 Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a7 Ab. Supplier     Dismissed\n                              201-1, et seq.)          ARC\n                                                    Automakers      Dismissed\n             39(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                       ARC\n             39(e)         Unjust Enrichment        Automakers      Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.40(a) (R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7\u00a7 6A-2-313 & Automakers      Dismissed\n                                6A-2.1-210)\n                      Implied Warranty Breach (R.I.\n             40(b)     Gen. Laws \u00a7\u00a7 6A-2-314, 6A- Automakers\n Rhode\n                                  2.1-212)\n Island\n                            Rhode Island DTPA\n             40(c)      (R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 6-13.1, et  All Defs.\n                                    seq.)\n             40(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment All Defs.\n             40(e)          Unjust Enrichment        Automakers     Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.41(a) (S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 36-2-313 & Automakers      Dismissed\n                               36-2A-210)\n South\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\nCarolina\n             41(b)    (S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 36-2-314 & Automakers\n                               36-2A-212)\n             41(c)                                  Automakers\n\n\n\n                                        16\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 17 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                Claims by State\n  State      SAC \u00a7         Claim/Cause of Action 2     Defendant Disposition 3\n                        South Carolina UTPA (S.C. Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                        Code Ann. \u00a7 39-5-10, et seq.)    ARC\n                             S.C. Regulation of       Automakers\n                       Manufacturers, Distributors, Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n              41(d)\n                        and Dealers Act (S.C. Code\n                                                         ARC\n                          Ann. \u00a7 56-15-10, et seq.)\n                                                      Automakers Dismissed\n              41(e)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n              41(f)         Unjust Enrichment         Automakers Dismissed\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.42(a) (S.D. Codified Laws \u00a7\u00a7 57A-2- Automakers      Dismissed\n                             313 & 57A-2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n              42(b)    (S.D. Codified Laws \u00a7\u00a7 57A-2- Automakers\n                             314 & 57A-2A-212)\n                       South Dakota Deceptive Trade Automakers\n South\n                          Practices and Consumer      Ab. Supplier   Dismissed\n Dakota\n              42(c)            Protection Law\n                       (S.D. Codified Laws \u00a7 37-24-1,     ARC\n                                   et seq.)\n                                                      Automakers\n              42(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n              42(e)          Unjust Enrichment        Automakers\n\n                         Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.43(a) (Tenn. Code \u00a7\u00a7 47-2-313 and Automakers        Dismissed\n                                47-2A-210)\n                         Implied Warranty Breach\n              43(b)    (Tenn. Code \u00a7\u00a7 47-2-314 & 47- Automakers      Dismissed\n                                 2A-212)\nTennessee\n                       Tennessee CPA of 1977 (Tenn.\n              43(c)                                   All Defs.\n                         Code \u00a7 47-18-101, et seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n              43(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier\n                                                        ARC\n              43(e)         Unjust Enrichment        Automakers      Dismissed\n\n\n\n\n                                         17\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353-1    Filed 10/02/26   Page 18 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                              Claims by State\n State     SAC \u00a7        Claim/Cause of Action 2    Defendant Disposition 3\n                       Express Warranty Breach\n                              (Tex. Bus. &\n          VIII.44(a)                              Automakers Dismissed\n                      Com. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 2.313 &\n                                 2A.210)\n                       Implied Warranty Breach\n            44(b)    (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. Automakers\n                           \u00a7\u00a7 2.314 & 2A.212\n Texas\n                     Texas CPA of 1977 (Tex. Bus. Automakers\n            44(c)    & Com. Code Ann. \u00a7 17.41, et Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                  seq.)               ARC\n                                                  Automakers Dismissed\n            44(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                      ARC      Dismissed\n            44(e)         Unjust Enrichment       Automakers Dismissed\n\n                       Express Warranty Breach\n          VIII.45(a) (Utah Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 70A-2-313 Automakers        Dismissed\n                             & 70A-2A-210)\n                       Implied Warranty Breach\n            45(b)    (Utah Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 70A-2-314 Automakers\n                             & 70A-2A-212)\n                          Utah Consumer Sales      Automakers\n                               Practices           Ab. Supplier     Dismissed\n            45(c)\n Utah                 Act (Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 13-11-\n                                                       ARC\n                               1, et seq.)\n                       Utah Truth in Advertising Automakers\n            45(d)      Law (Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 13- Ab. Supplier       Dismissed\n                             11a-1, et seq.)           ARC\n                                                   Automakers       Dismissed\n            45(e)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier       Dismissed\n                                                       ARC\n            45(f)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers       Dismissed\n\n                       Express Warranty Breach (Vt.\n          VIII.46(a)     Stat. Ann. Tit. 9A, \u00a7\u00a7 2-313 Automakers    Dismissed\n                                 and 2A-210)\n                       Implied Warranty Breach (Vt.\nVermont\n            46(b)       Stat. Ann. Tit. 9A, \u00a7\u00a7 2-314, Automakers    Dismissed\n                                    2A-212)\n                        Vermont CPA (Vt. Stat. Ann.\n            46(c)                                      All Defs.\n                           Tit. 9, \u00a713-11-1, et seq.)\n\n\n\n                                        18\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 19 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                               Claims by State\n   State     SAC \u00a7         Claim/Cause of Action 2  Defendant Disposition 3\n                                                   Automakers\n              46(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier Dismissed\n                                                       ARC\n              46(e)        Unjust Enrichment       Automakers\n\n                       Express Warranty Breach (Va.\n            VIII.47(a) Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 8.2-313 & 8.2A- Automakers       Dismissed\n                                    210)\n                       Implied Warranty Breach (Va.\n              47(b)     Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 8.2-314 & 8.2A- Automakers      Dismissed\n                                    212)\n Virginia                      Virginia CPA           Automakers\n              47(c)     (Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 59.1-196, et Ab. Supplier   Dismissed\n                                    seq.)                 ARC\n                                                      Automakers\n              47(d)    Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier      Dismissed\n                                                          ARC\n              47(e)          Unjust Enrichment        Automakers     Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n           VIII.48(a) (Wash. Rev. Code \u00a7\u00a7 62A.2- Automakers          Dismissed\n                           313 & 62A.2A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n             48(b)     (Wash. Rev. Code \u00a7\u00a7 62A.2- Automakers         Dismissed\n                            314 & 2A.2A-212)\nWashington                  Washington CPA\n             48(c)    (Wash. Rev. Code \u00a7 19.86.010, All Defs.\n                                 et seq.)\n                                                   Automakers\n             48(d)   Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier\n                                                      ARC\n             48(e)        Unjust Enrichment        Automakers        Dismissed\n\n                       Express Warranty Breach (W.\n            VIII.49(a) Va. Code \u00a7\u00a7 46-2-313 & 46-2A- Automakers      Dismissed\n                                    210)\n  West                   Implied Warranty Breach\n Virginia     49(b)    (W. Va. Code \u00a7\u00a7 46-2-314, 46- Automakers\n                                  2A-212)\n                          West Virginia Consumer\n              49(c)                                   All Defs.\n                          Credit & Protection Act\n\n\n\n                                         19\n\f Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT        Document 353-1       Filed 10/02/26   Page 20 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                 Claims by State\n  State      SAC \u00a7         Claim/Cause of Action 2         Defendant      Disposition 3\n                         (W. Va. Code \u00a7 46A-1-101, et\n                                     seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n              49(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier          Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n              49(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers            Dismissed\n\n                          Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.50(a)     (Wis. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 402.313 &        Automakers      Dismissed\n                                   411.210)\n                          Implied Warranty Breach\n              50(b)         (Wis. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 402.314,        Automakers      Dismissed\n                                   411.212)\n                                                           Automakers\nWisconsin\n                                Wisconsin DTPA             Ab. Supplier    Dismissed\n              50(c)\n                          (Wis. Stat. \u00a7 100.18, et seq.)                   Partially\n                                                              ARC\n                                                                          Dismissed 14\n                                                     Automakers             Dismiss\n              50(d)      Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier          Dismissed\n                                                         ARC\n              50(e)          Unjust Enrichment       Automakers            Dismissed\n\n                        Express Warranty Breach\n            VIII.51(a) (Wyo. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 34.1-2-313 & Automakers              Dismissed\n                              34.1-2.A-210)\n                        Implied Warranty Breach\n              51(b)    (Wyo. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 34.1-2-314 and Automakers\n                              34.1-2.A-212)\nWyoming                       Wyoming CPA\n              51(c)     (Wyo. Stat. \u00a7 40-12-101, et   All Defs.\n                                    seq.)\n                                                     Automakers\n              51(d)   Fraud: Omission/Concealment Ab. Supplier             Dismissed\n                                                        ARC\n              51(e)        Unjust Enrichment         Automakers\n\n\n                    Dismissed Claims of Named Plaintiffs\nClaim/Requested Relief  Defendant                   Plaintiffs\n\n\n    14 As to Allan\u2019s claim.\n\n\n\n                                             20\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 353-1      Filed 10/02/26   Page 21 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                                       B. and T. White, Hudson-Battie,\n                                       Schultz, Sorenson, Petschen, Wilson,\n      All Claims          Automakers\n                                       Milewski, Lesesne, Hall-Hudson,\n                                       Marshall, Owens, and Polo\n                                       Anderson; Belhadj; Blumberg;\n                                       Chambliss; Clark; Diaz; Duran; Eiland;\n                                       Felice; Fernandez; Ford; Graff; Hall;\n                                       Hall-Hudson; Hamner; Harpey-Bey;\n                                       Hartman; Herrera; Hochstetler;\n  Unjust Enrichment       Automakers   Hudson-Battie; Isbister; Jones;\n                                       Komoroski; Lesesne; Long; Lovett;\n                                       McKennon; Miles; Mitchell; Mobley;\n                                       Owens; Petschen; Polo; Reddick;\n                                       Sorenson; Thomas; Valenzuela; Victory;\n                                       B. and T. White; Wilson; and Winslow\n   Arkansas Implied\n                             Kia       Victory\n   Warranty Breach\nImplied Warranty Breach      Ford      Raspintini\n                                       Bacon, Duran, Harpey-Bey, Hochstetler,\nImplied Warranty Breach      GM\n                                       Sims, Slusher, and Starkey\n Connecticut Unlawful\n                             ARC       Komoroski\n  Trade Practices Act\n   Idaho Consumer\n                             ARC       Sorenson\n    Protection Act\n  Kentucky Consumer\n                             ARC       Barber\n    Protection Act\n    Michigan CPA             ARC       Rhoades and Carano\n   Michigan Fraud            ARC       Rhoades and Carano\n Montana Unfair Trade\n                             ARC       Knapp\n     Practices Act\n New Hampshire CPA           ARC       Struble\n Ohio Consumer Sales\n                             ARC       Milewski and Isbister\n     Practices Act\n  Wisconsin Deceptive\n                             ARC       Allan\n  Trade Practices Act\n\n  Restitution request      All Defs.   All Plaintiffs\n\n                           Dismissed Defendants\n                  Audi of America LLC (without prejudice)\n       Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (without prejudice)\n               Dr. Ing. H.C. F. Porsche AG (without prejudice)\n                          Hyundai Motor Company\n                               Kia Corporation\n\n\n                                         21\n\f  Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 353-1     Filed 10/02/26   Page 22 of 22\n\n\n\n\n                  ZF Friedrichshafen AG (without prejudice)\n                        Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft\n        ARC (without prejudice and as to the following member cases only)\n           Case Name                     Case No.                 Court\nAula v. ARC Automotive, Inc.        22-CV-12738        Eastern Dist. of. Michigan\nClark v. BMW Mfg. Co.               22-CV-03244        District of South Carolina\nHudson-Battie v. ARC Automotive,\n                                     22-CV-03244       District of South Carolina\nInc.\nJones v. ARC Automotive, Inc.        22-CV-00397       Southern District of Iowa\nJophlin v. ARC Automotive, Inc.      22-CV-02507       District of South Carolina\nLong v. ARC Automotive, Inc.         22-CV-01098       N. Dist. of Alabama\nMann v. ARC Automotive, Inc.         22-CV-03285       Northern Dist. of Georgia\nMcCarthy v. ARC Automotive, Inc.     22-CV-05708       District of New Jersey\nThomas v. ARC Automotive, Inc.       22-CV-05067       Northern Dist. of Illinois\nTopa v. ARC Automotive, Inc.         22-CV-00958       N. Dist. of New York\nTribble v. ARC Automotive, Inc.      22-CV-03573       Northern Dist. of Georgia\nUnderwood v. ARC Automotive, Inc.    22-CV-01043       N. Dist. of Alabama\nWilson v. ARC Automotive, Inc.       22-CV-09432       S. Dist. of New York\n\n\n\n\n                                          22\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-10-02T13:34:34.886514-07:00","document_number":"353","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"055018768464","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":2,"description":"Disposition Chart","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-10-02T13:34:29.783301-07:00","date_modified":"2026-11-02T02:43:18.978850-08:00","date_filed":"2026-10-02","time_filed":null,"entry_number":353,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-10-02.001","pacer_sequence_number":1932,"description":" OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons set forth above (SEE ORDER), the Court GRANTS  IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss by the Airbag Suppliers, [Doc.   178 ], ARC, [Doc.  179 ], the U.S. Automakers (collectively), [Doc.  181 ], Hyundai  a nd Kia, [Doc.  180 ], Volkswagen, [Doc.  182 ], BMW, [Doc.  183 ], Ford, [Doc.  185 ], GM, [Doc.  186 ], PCNA, [Doc.  187 ], and Fiat Chrysler,  [Doc.  188 ].  Specifically, the Court GRANTS the above-identified motions for  Plaintiffs' failure  to state a claim to the extent that it DISMISSES WITH  PREJUDICE those claims asserted in the SAC, [Docs.  157 , 157-1], that are  identified in the discussion above (and  duplicated for ease of reference in the  chart appended to this order), STRIKE S Plaintiffs' request for restitution as a  remedy under their statutory consumer protection claims, DISMISSES AS MOOT the  claims against GM by Plaintiffs Allan, Barber, A.W. Brown, Diaz, Eiland,  Felice, Jophlin, Lovett, Senkpeil, Shephard, St owe, Struble, Warren, and Welch,  and DENIES the motions in all other respects, unless indicated otherwise below. Further, the Court GRANTS Audi's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing, [Doc.  184 ], and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs&# 039; claims against it. The Court  also GRANTS Hyundai Korea and Kia Korea's motion to dismiss, [Doc.  272 ], for failure to state a claim and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all claims by Plaintiffs  against these two Defendants. The Court further GRA NTS ARC's motion to dismiss,  [Doc.  179 ], for lack of personal jurisdiction and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE  the cases identified in the discussion above (and duplicated for ease of  reference in the chart appended to this order). To the exten t that ARC is the  sole Defendant in a given case, the case stands dismissed in its entirety, and  to the extent that ARC is a co-Defendant, ARC stands dismissed from the case for  lack of personal jurisdiction but the case proceeds against any other Defendant. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 10/2/2026. (Attachments:  # 1 Disposition Chart) (tcc)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/479050867/","id":479050867,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/494691627/","id":494691627,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/352/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-09-23T06:28:51.229787-07:00","date_modified":"2026-10-01T01:44:55.622638-07:00","sha1":"bfed2ca9ffa392acef85b1a31b10cf0d1c2f2a1a","page_count":1,"file_size":311678,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.352.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.352.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"                 Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT              Document 352           Filed 09/23/26        Page 1 of 1\nAO 458 (Rev. 06/09) Appearance of Counsel\n\n\n                                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                                                            for the\n                                               Northern District\n                                             __________ District of\n                                                                 ofGeorgia\n                                                                    __________\n\n\nIn re ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS PROD. LIAB. LITIG.                  )\n                             Plaintiff                         )\n                                v.                             )      Case No. 1:22-md-03051-TWT\n                                                               )\n                            Defendant                          )\n\n                                              APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL\n\nTo:       The clerk of court and all parties of record\n\n          I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:\n\n         Hyundai Motor Company; Hyundai Motor America; Kia Corporation; Kia America, Inc.                              .\n\n\nDate:          09/23/2026                                                                /s/ Trent Sterneck\n                                                                                         Attorney\u2019s signature\n\n\n                                                                                   Trent Sterneck (DC 1742021)\n                                                                                     Printed name and bar number\n\n                                                                                Hogan Lovells Cadwalader US LLP\n                                                                                    555 Thirteenth Street NW\n                                                                                     Washington, DC 20004\n                                                                                               Address\n\n                                                                                      trent.sterneck@hlc.com\n                                                                                            E-mail address\n\n                                                                                          (202) 637-4855\n                                                                                          Telephone number\n\n                                                                                          (202) 637-5910\n                                                                                             FAX number\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-09-23T06:28:51.493340-07:00","document_number":"352","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018731716","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Notice of Appearance","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-09-23T06:28:51.191329-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-23T06:28:51.201979-07:00","date_filed":"2026-09-23","time_filed":null,"entry_number":352,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-09-23.001","pacer_sequence_number":1926,"description":"NOTICE of Appearance by Trent Sterneck on behalf of Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Company, Kia America, Inc., Kia Corporation (Sterneck, Trent)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/478996870/","id":478996870,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/494634721/","id":494634721,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/351/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-09-22T14:11:00.070482-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-30T22:26:37.495918-07:00","sha1":"b5ebcff422b9375112b5a0e7b8fdae20122f7830","page_count":4,"file_size":137800,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.351.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.351.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"   Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT   Document 351    Filed 09/22/26   Page 1 of 4\n\n\n\n\n               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n               NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n                     ATLANTA DIVISION\n\nIN RE: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                MDL No. 3051\nPRODUCT LIABILITY                          Case No. 1:22-md-3051-TWT\nLITIGATION\n                                           Hon. Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.\nALL CASES\n                                     NOTICE OF FIRM NAME\n                                     CHANGE AND UPDATED\n                                     CONTACT INFORMATION\n\f    Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT     Document 351     Filed 09/22/26   Page 2 of 4\n\n\n\n\n                  NOTICE OF FIRM NAME CHANGE\n               AND UPDATED CONTACT INFORMATION\n\n     PLEASE TAKE NOTICE of a law firm name change and updated contact\n\ninformation for the following counsel for Defendants Hyundai Motor America,\n\nHyundai Motor Company, Kia America, Inc., and Kia Corporation:\n\n           Michael L. Kidney (DC 429093)\n           Hogan Lovells Cadwalader US LLP\n           555 Thirteenth Street NW\n           Washington, DC 20004\n           Telephone: (202) 637-5600\n           Facsimile: (202) 637-5910\n           Email: michael.kidney@hlc.com\n\n\nDated: September 22, 2026             Respectfully submitted,\n\n                                         /s/ Michael L. Kidney\n\n                                         Michael L. Kidney (DC 429093)\n                                         Hogan Lovells Cadwalader US LLP\n                                         555 Thirteenth Street NW\n                                         Washington, DC 20004\n                                         Telephone: (202) 637-5600\n                                         Facsimile: (202) 637-5910\n                                         Email: michael.kidney@hlc.com\n\n\n\n\n                                     1\n\f     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT      Document 351     Filed 09/22/26     Page 3 of 4\n\n\n\n\n                        CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\n      I certify that the foregoing document has been prepared with Times New\n\nRoman font and 14-point font size, one of the font and point selections approved\n\nby Local Rule 5.1(C).\n\n\n                                             /s/ Michael L. Kidney\n\n\n\n\n                                        2\n\f     Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT       Document 351      Filed 09/22/26     Page 4 of 4\n\n\n\n\n                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n      I certify that on September 22, 2026, a copy of the foregoing document was\n\nserved electronically through the Court\u2019s electronic filing system on all parties\n\nappearing on the Court\u2019s ECF service list.\n\n\n                                               /s/ Michael L. Kidney\n\n\n\n\n                                          3\n\f","ocr_status":1,"date_upload":"2026-09-22T14:11:00.353639-07:00","document_number":"351","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018730490","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Notice (Other)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-09-22T14:11:00.015425-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-22T14:11:00.031953-07:00","date_filed":"2026-09-22","time_filed":null,"entry_number":351,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-09-22.001","pacer_sequence_number":1924,"description":"NOTICE by Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Company, Kia America, Inc., Kia Corporation - Notice Of Firm Name Change And Updated Contact Information (Kidney, Michael)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/469814785/","id":469814785,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/485167347/","id":485167347,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66735659/350/in-re-arc-airbag-inflators-products-liability-litigation/","date_created":"2026-07-06T09:49:12.052535-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-16T18:08:28.342706-07:00","sha1":"07a89d2e1ae0515dd2d55c23569a668e23c73e42","page_count":2,"file_size":126288,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.350.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.gand.310505/gov.uscourts.gand.310505.350.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"        Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT               Document 350         Filed 07/06/26        Page 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n                                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                                 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA\n\n\n\nIN RE: ARC AIRBAG INFLATORS                             MDL No. 3051\nPRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION                           Case No. 1:22-MD-03051-TWT\n\n\n                                                        Hon. Thomas W. Thrash Jr.\nALL CASES\n\n\n\n                                NOTICE OF CHANGE OF FIRM NAME\n\nTO THE COURT AND ALL ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:\n\n        NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that effective immediately the law firm of Spector Roseman &\n\nKodroff, P.C. has changed its name to Spector Caldes & Corrigan, PC. The firm's address, telephone\n\nnumber, and fax number remain unchanged. The firm's email domain has changed from @srkattorneys.com\n\nto @scc.law. Counsel respectfully requests that the Court and all parties update their records accordingly.\n\n\nDATED: July 6, 2026                                       /s/ William G. Caldes\n                                                          William G. Caldes\n                                                          Jeffrey L. Spector\n                                                          SPECTOR CALDES & CORRIGAN, PC\n                                                          Two Commerce Square\n                                                          2001 Market Street, Suite 3420\n                                                          Philadelphia, PA 19103\n                                                          Tel: (215) 496-0300\n                                                          Fax: (215) 496-6611\n                                                          bcaldes@scc.law\n                                                          jspector@scc.law\n\n\n                                                          Attorneys for Plaintiff Earl Wilson\n\f        Case 1:22-md-03051-TWT               Document 350          Filed 07/06/26       Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n                                      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n        The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 6th day of July 2026, a true and correct\n\ncopy of NOTICE OF CHANGE OF FIRM NAME was filed with the Court and served on all\n\nparties to this action via the CM/ECF.\n\n\n\nDATED: July 6, 2026                               /s/     William G. Caldes\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2026-07-06T09:49:12.502999-07:00","document_number":"350","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"055018476624","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":false,"document_type":1,"description":"Notice (Other)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-07-06T09:49:11.993688-07:00","date_modified":"2026-07-06T09:49:12.019021-07:00","date_filed":"2026-07-06","time_filed":null,"entry_number":350,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-07-06.001","pacer_sequence_number":1922,"description":"NOTICE by Earl Wilson of Change of Firm Name (Caldes, William)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/467661985/","id":467661985,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66735659/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/482930050/","id":482930050,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2026-06-16T08:40:38.972836-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-16T08:40:38.995193-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Submission to District Judge","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2026-06-16T08:40:38.956752-07:00","date_modified":"2026-06-16T08:40:38.956766-07:00","date_filed":"2026-06-16","time_filed":null,"entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2026-06-16.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"Submission of 178 Motion to Dismiss, 179 Motion to Dismiss, 180 Motion to Dismiss, 181 Motion to Dismiss, 182 Motion to Dismiss, 183 Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, 184 Motion to Dismiss, 186 Motion to Dismiss, 187 Motion to Dismiss, 188 Motion to Dismiss, 252 Motion for Oral Arguments, 256 Motion for Leave to File Surreply, 279 Motion to Dismiss, 287 Motion to Dismiss, 289 Motion to Dismiss, 294 Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, 305 Motion to Dismiss, 309 Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, 311 Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, 319 Motion to Dismiss, 322 Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, and 328 Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, to District Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr. (bgt)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=66735659&page_size=40"}