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(kd) (Entered: 07/01/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/395102738/","id":395102738,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/404210330/","id":404210330,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/32/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2024-06-28T20:34:46.008397-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.839209-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"32","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031042734286","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Answer to Complaint","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-06-28T20:34:45.986471-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.818200-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-28","time_filed":"20:16:53","entry_number":32,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-28.001","pacer_sequence_number":93,"description":"ANSWER to Amended Complaint/Petition,,,, 23 JURY DEMAND. filed by Defendant Twitter, Inc..(Attorney Scott Evan Schlafer added to party Twitter, Inc.(pty:dft))(Schlafer, Scott) (Entered: 06/28/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/395102700/","id":395102700,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/404210292/","id":404210292,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/33/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2024-06-28T20:34:42.500935-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.875196-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"33","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031042734322","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Appearance","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-06-28T20:34:42.475270-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.859363-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-28","time_filed":"20:27:56","entry_number":33,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-28.002","pacer_sequence_number":97,"description":"NOTICE of Appearance filed by attorney Scott Evan Schlafer on behalf of Defendant Twitter, Inc. (Schlafer, Scott) (Entered: 06/28/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/393225818/","id":393225818,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/402287016/","id":402287016,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/31/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2024-06-10T08:31:52.006625-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.798612-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"31","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031042588423","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Dismiss Case","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2024-06-10T08:31:51.993917-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.775358-07:00","date_filed":"2024-06-07","time_filed":null,"entry_number":31,"recap_sequence_number":"2024-06-07.001","pacer_sequence_number":91,"description":"MINUTES IN CHAMBERS - ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 26 by Judge Dolly M. Gee. In light of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Backgrid's claims for direct, contributo1y, and vicarious infringement, and GRANTED with respect to its Declarato1y Judgment Act claim, without prejudice. Corp. shall file its Answer by June 28, 2024. (lom) (Entered: 06/10/2024)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/365283247/","id":365283247,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/372185702/","id":372185702,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/30/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-09-19T12:59:34.174002-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.756884-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"30","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-09-19T12:59:34.159400-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.741681-07:00","date_filed":"2023-07-20","time_filed":null,"entry_number":30,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-07-20.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Judge Dolly M. Gee: The Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 26 set for hearing on July 21, 2023, is appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. L.R. 7-15. Accordingly, the motion is taken UNDER SUBMISSION and the hearing is vacated. IT IS SO ORDERED. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (kti) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 07/20/2023)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/359294440/","id":359294440,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/365882789/","id":365882789,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"","date_created":"2023-07-20T09:04:17.165370-07:00","date_modified":"2023-07-21T08:43:59.323371-07:00","sha1":"","page_count":null,"file_size":null,"filepath_local":null,"filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"","ocr_status":null,"date_upload":null,"document_number":"","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"","is_available":false,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Text Only Scheduling Notice","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-07-20T09:04:17.162265-07:00","date_modified":"2023-07-21T08:43:59.317053-07:00","date_filed":"2023-07-20","time_filed":"08:55:06","entry_number":null,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-07-20.001","pacer_sequence_number":null,"description":"","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/348380746/","id":348380746,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/354817522/","id":354817522,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/29/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-06-30T15:35:07.782506-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.719045-07:00","sha1":"41e198450b31a4201287444ec4a743f4a2f1bdd1","page_count":23,"file_size":464627,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.29.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.29.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:6238\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP\n Daniel C. Posner (Bar No. 232009)\n 2 danposner@quinnemanuel.com\n Justin C. Griffin (Bar No. 234675)\n 3 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com\n Laurenne M. Babayan (Bar No. 348075)\n 4 laurennebabayan@quinnemanuel.com\n 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543\n Telephone: (213) 443-3000\n 6 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100\n 7 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 10\n 11 BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n corporation,\n 12 DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY\n Plaintiff, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO\n 13 DISMISS\n vs.\n 14\n TWITTER, INC., a Delaware Date: July 21, 2023\n 15 corporation and Does 1-10, inclusive, Time: 8:30 a.m.\n Judge: The Honorable Dolly M. Gee\n 16 Defendants. Courtroom: 8C\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 2 of 23 Page ID #:6239\n\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n Page\n 2\n 3 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1\n 4 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 2\n 5 I. BACKGRID FAILS TO SHOW IT STATED A VALID CLAIM FOR\n DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ..................................................... 2\n 6\n A. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Volitional\n 7 Conduct ................................................................................................... 2\n 8 B. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged A Nexus\n Between Twitter\u2019s Alleged Conduct And The Alleged\n 9 Infringements .......................................................................................... 5\n 10 II. BACKGRID FAILS TO SHOW IT STATED VALID CLAIMS FOR\n INDIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ................................................. 7\n 11\n A. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Underlying\n 12 Direct Infringement ................................................................................. 7\n 13 B. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Contributory\n Infringement ............................................................................................ 8\n 14\n C. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Vicarious\n 15 Infringement .......................................................................................... 11\n 16 III. BACKGRID FAILS TO SHOW IT STATED A VALID CLAIM FOR\n DECLARATORY RELIEF............................................................................. 13\n 17\n IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW FURTHER LEAVE TO\n 18 AMEND .......................................................................................................... 16\n 19 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 16\n 20 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE......................................................................... 18\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -i- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 3 of 23 Page ID #:6240\n\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n Page(s)\n 2\n 3 Cases\n\n 4 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,\n 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................ 11\n 5\n American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,\n 6\n 573 U.S. 431 (2014) ......................................................................................... 3, 4\n 7\n Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n 8 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................................................................... 3, 7, 9\n 9\n BMG Rts. Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Joyy Inc.,\n 10 2022 WL 17578247 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5 2022)............................................... 3, 6, 9\n 11 Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,\n 12 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 16\n 13 Cook v. Meta Platforms Inc.,\n 14 No. 4:22-cv-02485-YGR (Dkt. 40) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023) ............................. 11\n\n 15 CoStar Grp., Inv. v. LoopNet, Inc.,\n 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................ 2\n 16\n 17 Divino Grp. LLC v. Google LLC,\n 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) .......................................................... 15\n 18\n Dunham v. Lei,\n 19 2021 WL 4595808 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2021) ........................................................ 9\n 20\n Fayer v. Vaughn,\n 21 649 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 9\n 22 Joycette Goodwin v. Walgreens, Co.,\n 23 2023 WL 4037175 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2023).................................................... 16\n 24 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc.,\n 25 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008)................................................................ 9\n\n 26 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.\n 545 U.S. 913 (2005) ..................................................................................... 10, 11\n 27\n 28\n\n -ii- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 4 of 23 Page ID #:6241\n\n\n\n\n 1 Newman v. Google LLC,\n 2021 WL 2633423 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) ................................................... 15\n 2\n 3 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................ 11, 12, 14\n 4\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,\n 5\n 847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017) ...................................................... 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12\n 6\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass\u2019n,\n 7 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 10\n 8\n Reed v. Nat\u2019l Football League,\n 9 2015 WL 13344625 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015) ................................................. 16\n 10 Rosen v. eBay, Inc.,\n 11 2018 WL 4808513 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018) ........................................................ 5\n 12 Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc.,\n 13 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ................................................................ 8\n\n 14 Stross v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,\n 2022 WL 1843129 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2022) .............................................. 6, 7, 13\n 15\n 16 Stross v. Twitter, Inc.,\n 2022 WL 1843142 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2022) .................................. 4, 5, 6, 12, 13\n 17\n UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mahakkapong,\n 18 2015 WL 12803768 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2015) .................................................... 10\n 19\n UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners,\n 20 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 11\n 21 Vander Music v. Azteca Int\u2019l Corp.,\n 22 2011 WL 13177301 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011)................................................... 12\n 23 Veoh Networks v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,\n 24 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Cal. 2007) .............................................................. 14\n\n 25 VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Group, Inc.,\n 918 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 2, 3, 4\n 26\n 27 Wanxia Liao v. United States,\n 2012 WL 3945772 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).................................................... 16\n 28\n\n -iii- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 5 of 23 Page ID #:6242\n\n\n\n\n 1 Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n 627 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2020)................................................................ 7\n 2\n 3\n Rules/Statutes\n 4\n 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(l) .................................................................................................... 14\n 5\n 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(c)(3)(A) ........................................................................................... 8\n 6\n F.R.C.P. Rule 12 .................................................................................................. 3, 16\n 7\n 8 F.R.C.P. Rule 15(a)(2) ............................................................................................. 16\n 9\n Other Authorities\n 10\n 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,\n 11 Nimmer On Copyright, \u00a7 12B.04[B][2] ............................................................... 8\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -iv- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 6 of 23 Page ID #:6243\n\n\n\n\n 1 INTRODUCTION\n 2 Despite having two attempts to state valid claims against Twitter, Backgrid fails\n 3 to show it has done so in its First Amended Complaint (\u201cFAC\u201d). It is undisputed that\n 4 Twitter itself did not originally select or display any of Backgrid\u2019s alleged\n 5 copyrighted photographs, so that Backgrid has no claim against Twitter for direct\n 6 infringement on that basis. Nevertheless, Backgrid strains to state a claim against\n 7 Twitter for direct infringement based on features Twitter allegedly offers that \u201cselect\u201d\n 8 or \u201cpromote\u201d certain popular content on its site. But Backgrid can point to no\n 9 allegations showing that Twitter employees engaged in any active, \u201cvolitional\u201d\n 10 conduct that resulted in Backgrid\u2019s photographs being selected or promoted in any\n 11 way. There is no indication, nor any allegations, that this ever happened, and\n 12 Backgrid\u2019s claim for direct copyright infringement fails.\n 13 Nor has Backgrid stated valid claims for contributory or vicarious\n 14 infringement. It is Backgrid\u2019s burden to allege facts showing that Twitter had actual\n 15 knowledge of the specific acts of infringement Backgrid alleges, yet the most\n 16 Backgrid has done\u2014and the most it evidently can do\u2014is make the bald, conclusory,\n 17 and legally insufficient allegation that it sent \u201ccompliant\u201d DMCA takedown notices.\n 18 And Backgrid offers no facts showing that Twitter had the ability to detect the alleged\n 19 infringements of Backgrid\u2019s photographs or that it reaped any direct financial benefit\n 20 from them. Both of Backgrid\u2019s claims for indirect infringement fail too.\n 21 Finally, Backgrid admits that its claim for declaratory relief seeks a sweeping\n 22 judgment that would bar Twitter\u2019s anticipated DMCA \u201csafe harbor\u201d defense not\n 23 only as to Backgrid\u2019s infringement claims, but as to any infringement claim by any\n 24 third party now or in the future. This absurd claim falls well outside this Court\u2019s\n 25 limited jurisdiction to resolve actual cases or controversies between the parties. The\n 26 only explanation for Backgrid\u2019s insistence on bringing this claim is that it reflects a\n 27 tactical decision to increase pressure on Twitter to settle. But there is no basis for\n 28 Backgrid to assert such a broad claim, and it too should be dismissed with prejudice.\n\n -1- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 7 of 23 Page ID #:6244\n\n\n\n\n 1 ARGUMENT\n 2 I. BACKGRID FAILS TO SHOW IT STATED A VALID CLAIM FOR\n DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT\n 3\n Nothing in Backgrid\u2019s opposition brief (\u201cOpp.\u201d) shows that Backgrid\n 4\n sufficiently alleged a claim against Twitter for direct copyright infringement.\n 5\n Backgrid does not contend that Twitter uploaded any of the alleged copyrighted\n 6\n photographs at issue\u2014which would be the classic basis for a claim of direct\n 7\n infringement involving photographs on the Internet. Backgrid instead points to its\n 8\n allegations that Twitter \u201cselects, orders, and/or arranges content to display to other\n 9\n Twitter users\u201d (Opp. 7 (quoting FAC \u00b6 11)), and promotes Tweets through\n 10\n subscription models (id. (citing FAC \u00b6 34)). But these allegations are \u201ccast in terms\n 11\n of [Twitter] facilitating or enabling infringement\u201d of photos posted to Twitter by\n 12\n others, and thus present the \u201ctype of claim [that] more properly falls in the category\n 13\n of secondary infringement,\u201d not direct infringement. VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Group, Inc.,\n 14\n 918 F.3d 723, 733 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of direct infringement claim\n 15\n where, \u201c[a]s in cases involving Internet service providers, Zillow \u2018affords its users an\n 16\n Internet-based facility on which to post materials, but the materials posted are of a\n 17\n type and kind selected by the user and at a time initiated by the user\u2019\u201d (quoting CoStar\n 18\n Grp., Inv. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004)). Backgrid simply has\n 19\n no need, nor any proper basis, to assert a claim for direct infringement, and it fails to\n 20\n defend the sufficiency of its pleading.\n 21\n A. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Volitional Conduct\n 22\n Backgrid does not dispute that direct infringement requires \u201cvolitional\u201d\n 23\n conduct by the defendant, yet Backgrid points to no allegations in its FAC of Twitter\u2019s\n 24\n volitional conduct relating to the copyrighted photographs at issue. Backgrid\n 25\n contends (Opp. 7) that its allegations of Twitter\u2019s \u201cvolitional\u201d acts are analogous to\n 26\n those taken by Zillow in the Zillow case that were not reviewed on appeal. Yet the\n 27\n language Backgrid cites from Zillow only highlights why its allegations are deficient.\n 28\n\n -2- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 8 of 23 Page ID #:6245\n\n\n\n\n 1 In Zillow, the Ninth Circuit explained in dicta that the district court found \u201csubstantial\n 2 evidence that Zillow directly infringed VHT\u2019s display rights in 3,921 photos\n 3 displayed on Digs that Zillow moderators selected and tagged for searchable\n 4 functionality.\u201d Zillow, 918 F.3d at 736 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, Backgrid\n 5 identifies no allegations suggesting that a Twitter \u201cmoderator,\u201d or anyone akin to such\n 6 a person, \u201cselects, orders, and/or arranges content to display to other Twitter users.\u201d\n 7 (See Opp. 7 (quoting FAC \u00b6 11)). Nor can Backgrid point to allegations that anything\n 8 but Twitter\u2019s automated, passive functionality links Tweets in email messages to users\n 9 or \u201cpromotes\u201d Tweets based on subscription models. (See FAC \u00b6 34.) Backgrid\u2019s\n 10 allegations merely show that Twitter\u2019s conduct \u201camounts to, at most, passive\n 11 participation in the alleged infringement,\u201d which is \u201cnot sufficient to cross the\n 12 volitional-conduct line.\u201d Zillow, 918 F.3d at 738; see BMG Rts. Mgmt. (US) LLC v.\n 13 Joyy Inc., 2022 WL 17578247, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5 2022) (dismissing claim for\n 14 direct infringement where, \u201c[a]s in Zillow, it is the users themselves \u2018that select and\n 15 upload every\u2019 work\u201d) (quoting id. at 733).\n 16 Lacking any factual basis to allege volitional conduct by Twitter, Backgrid\n 17 argues, without citation (Opp. 7), that \u201c[a]t this early, pre-discovery stage Backgrid\n 18 should not be barred from bringing its direct infringement claim when it does not have\n 19 the benefit of conducting discovery on Twitter\u2019s involvement.\u201d But Backgrid cannot\n 20 simply waive off its obligation under Rule 12 to allege \u201csufficient factual matter\u201d to\n 21 state a plausible claim for relief, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and the\n 22 Court should reject Backgrid\u2019s attempt to avoid its pleading burden.\n 23 To further sidestep the volitional-conduct requirement, Backgrid misplaces\n 24 reliance (Opp. 8) on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in American Broadcasting\n 25 Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 439 (2014), for the proposition that\n 26 automated functionality can constitute volitional conduct. But as the Ninth Circuit\n 27 explained in Giganews, \u201cthe Aereo Court did not expressly address the volitional-\n 28 conduct requirement for direct liability under the Copyright Act.\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v.\n\n -3- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 9 of 23 Page ID #:6246\n\n\n\n\n 1 Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2017). And more fundamentally, the\n 2 infringing activity in Aereo was very different from the conduct Backgrid alleges\n 3 here: Aereo offered \u201cbroadcast television programming over the Internet, virtually as\n 4 the programming is being broadcast.\u201d Aereo, 573 U.S. at 436. \u201cAereo neither\n 5 own[ed] the copyright in those works nor [held] a license from the copyright owners\n 6 to perform those works publicly,\u201d yet nonetheless streamed programs to subscribers\n 7 over the Internet. Id. at 436. Backgrid does not allege, or even argue, that Twitter\n 8 engaged in any sort of direct display of its alleged copyrighted photographs that is\n 9 similar to the allegations in Aereo. Further, in holding that, after Aereo, \u201cthe\n 10 distinction between active and passive participation remains a central part of the\n 11 analysis of an alleged infringement,\u201d the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court\n 12 \u201cdistinguished between an entity that \u2018engages in activities like Aereo\u2019s,\u2019 and one that\n 13 \u2018merely supplies equipment that allows others\u2019 to perform or transmit.\u201d Giganews,\n 14 Inc., 847 F.3d at 667 (quoting Aereo, 573 U.S. at 438-49). Backgrid\u2019s meager\n 15 allegations of Twitter\u2019s supposed direct infringement fall squarely on the side of a\n 16 company that \u201cmerely\u201d allows its users to \u201cperform and transmit\u201d the content the users\n 17 post on Twitter, and Backgrid\u2019s reliance on Aereo is unpersuasive.\n 18 Backgrid also fails to distinguish the holding of Stross v. Twitter, Inc., 2022\n 19 WL 1843142 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2022), the most analogous case to the instant one\n 20 given that Twitter was a defendant in both and much of the same Twitter features and\n 21 functionality were at issue in both. Backgrid does not even address Stross\u2019s holding\n 22 that direct infringement claims should be dismissed when a \u201ccomplaint fails to specify\n 23 whether Twitter\u2019s \u2018conduct\u2019 occurs automatically, akin to Zillow\u2019s \u2018behind-the-\n 24 scenes technical work,\u2019 or whether Twitter is actively involved in the alleged\n 25 infringement.\u201d Id. at *2 (quoting Zillow, 913 F.3d at 738). Confirming that it has no\n 26 basis to distinguish the holding of Stross, Backgrid merely makes the unremarkable\n 27 point (Opp. 8 n. 2) that the complaint in Stross \u201ccontain[s] different factual\n 28 allegations.\u201d But Backgrid does not identify what those \u201cdifferent\u201d factual allegations\n\n -4- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 10 of 23 Page ID #:6247\n\n\n\n\n 1 are or why they are relevant, and it fails to show why the reasoning of Stross does not\n 2 support the dismissal of Backgrid\u2019s claim for direct infringement.\n 3 Backgrid likewise does not address Rosen v. eBay, Inc., where the court\n 4 rejected the plaintiff\u2019s attempt to sustain a direct infringement claim based on\n 5 allegations that the plaintiff failed to \u201cremove the infringing images\u201d after being\n 6 notified of the alleged infringement. 2018 WL 4808513 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4,\n 7 2018). Backgrid thus concedes that its allegations that Twitter did the same (see FAC\n 8 \u00b6 34) do not support a claim for direct copyright infringement.1 Nor does Backgrid\n 9 attempt to distinguish Rosen\u2019s holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for\n 10 direct infringement because he did \u201cnot allege that Defendant\u2019s systems are not\n 11 automated, or that [a user] did not use Defendant\u2019s automated systems to post the\n 12 infringing images.\u201d 2018 WL 4808513 at *5. Backgrid\u2019s failure to even address\n 13 Rosen further supports dismissal of its claim.\n 14 B. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged A Nexus Between\n Twitter\u2019s Alleged Conduct And The Alleged Infringements\n 15\n Backgrid offers no response to Twitter\u2019s argument (Mot. 10) that Backgrid\n 16\n fails to state a claim for direct infringement because its allegations do not establish\n 17\n any \u201cnexus\u201d between Twitter\u2019s alleged conduct and the claimed infringement. In\n 18\n other words, Backgrid fails to explain how its allegations support a claim for direct\n 19\n infringement when none specifically relates to the Backgrid photographs at issue in\n 20\n the FAC. This \u201cmore fundamental problem\u201d with Backgrid\u2019s allegations is fatal to\n 21\n its claim. See Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *3 (dismissing claim for direct\n 22\n infringement where \u201c[n]ot a single allegation in Plaintiff\u2019s FAC suggests that Twitter\n 23\n actively (or even passively) copied, shared, or reposted Plaintiff\u2019s posts.\u201d) (emphasis\n 24\n in original). Thus, like the plaintiff in Stross, who alleged that Twitter\u2019s curation team\n 25\n 26 1\n Backgrid ignores Twitter\u2019s showing (Mot. 5) that Backgrid\u2019s allegations, which it\n 27 repeats now (Opp. 2, 4), that all the Tweets that it allegedly identified in its\n 28 purported DMCA notices remain live, are demonstrably false.\n\n -5- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 11 of 23 Page ID #:6248\n\n\n\n\n 1 \u201cfinds and highlights \u2018great Tweets,\u2019 including photographs,\u2019\u201d but did \u201cnot allege that\n 2 any of his photographs were ever selected by Twitter\u2019s team for placement in a\n 3 moment,\u201d id. at *3 (emphasis added), Backgrid fails to identify any allegation that\n 4 Twitter \u201cselect[ed], order[ed], and/or arrang[ed]\u201d any Tweets containing Backgrid\u2019s\n 5 photographs (see Opp. 9). Nor has Backgrid alleged that any Tweet containing any\n 6 of its photographs was ever included in emails that Twitter allegedly sent to users or\n 7 promoted \u201cbased on subscription models.\u201d (FAC \u00b6 34.)\n 8 Nowhere in its opposition does Backgrid even attempt to show how it\n 9 adequately alleged a nexus between Twitter\u2019s alleged conduct and the infringements\n 10 at issue. Again, Backgrid declines to address this Court\u2019s dismissal of a direct\n 11 infringement claim against Twitter in Stross for failure to adequately allege a nexus,\n 12 or to explain why the same reasoning does not apply here. Thus, even if the conduct\n 13 Backgrid alleges is \u201cvolitional,\u201d Backgrid\u2019s claim for direct infringement still must\n 14 be dismissed for failure to show that any such volitional conduct led to infringement\n 15 of any of its own works. See BMG Rts. Mgmt., 2022 WL 17578247 at *3 (dismissing\n 16 direct infringement claim because the plaintiff, while alleging \u201cthat [the defendant]\n 17 promotes infringing content, including HouseofBrooklyn\u2019s, . . . is unable to identify\n 18 a single promoted video that infringes Plaintiff\u2019s copyrighted works\u201d). And while\n 19 Backgrid argues it is \u201cthe world\u2019s largest celebrity photograph agency\u201d (Mot. 1), with\n 20 the implication being that its \u201cpaparazzi\u201d photographs are of great value, Backgrid\n 21 does not allege any facts showing that Tweets containing its photos actually generated\n 22 meaningful engagement such that Twitter would have had reason to \u201cpromote\u201d them.\n 23 Finally, Backgrid\u2019s authorities do not support its argument that it adequately\n 24 alleged Twitter\u2019s volitional conduct. Stross v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2022 WL\n 25 1843129 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2022) (cited at Opp. 8), actually supports dismissal of\n 26 Backgrid\u2019s claim. There, this Court dismissed a direct infringement claim supported\n 27 by an allegation that, \u201cupon information and belief[,] . . . Facebook selected, curated,\n 28 suggested, and recommended the copyrighted works to appear on user\u2019s News Feeds.\u201d\n\n -6- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 12 of 23 Page ID #:6249\n\n\n\n\n 1 Id. at *3. The Court rejected this allegation as \u201cmerely a disguised legal conclusion\n 2 that Defendant engaged in volitional conduct.\u201d Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).\n 3 The Court added that, \u201c[b]y failing to allege even a single instance of Plaintiff\u2019s\n 4 photographs appearing in any user\u2019s News Feed or in the Moments or Place Tips\n 5 features, Plaintiff only alleges that his photographs appeared on Facebook\u2019s servers,\u201d\n 6 but a \u201cwebsite that passively hosts an infringing work does not engage in volitional\n 7 conduct.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Backgrid\u2019s conclusory allegations of Twitter\u2019s\n 8 volitional conduct likewise cannot support its direct infringement claim here.\n 9 And in Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that\n 10 \u201cAmazon\u2019s algorithm selected, copied, and publicly displayed [the plaintiff\u2019s]\n 11 Peppermint Bark Photo\u201d on Amazon.com \u201cwhere Amazon shoppers who searched for\n 12 that product saw it.\u201d 627 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The court found\n 13 persuasive the plaintiff\u2019s argument that \u201cAmazon is actually performing the acts of\n 14 reproduction and display that constitute infringement.\u201d Id. at 1082-83. Here,\n 15 Backgrid identifies no allegations that Twitter (or even its \u201calgorithm\u201d) has\n 16 reproduced or displayed any of Backgrid\u2019s photographs, and Backgrid\u2019s reliance on\n 17 this case is unpersuasive too.\n 18 II. BACKGRID FAILS TO SHOW IT STATED VALID CLAIMS FOR\n INDIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT\n 19\n A. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Underlying Direct\n 20 Infringement\n 21 As Twitter showed (Mot. 11), Backgrid failed to state valid claims for indirect\n 22 (contributory and vicarious) copyright infringement because Backgrid did not allege\n 23 any specific underlying acts of direct copyright infringement by any third parties. In\n 24 response, Backgrid points (Opp. 9) to the screenshots of Tweets it submitted in\n 25 Exhibit B to the FAC, but the only thing Backgrid alleged about those screenshots is\n 26 that they depicted works that \u201cTwitter had infringed.\u201d (FAC \u00b6\u00b6 26, 33.) Backgrid\n 27 argues in a footnote (Opp. 10 n.3) that \u201cgeneral allegations that users engaged in\n 28 direct infringement is [sic] enough,\u201d but Backgrid\u2019s references to Exhibit B do not\n\n -7- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 13 of 23 Page ID #:6250\n\n\n\n\n 1 even amount to \u201cgeneral allegations\u201d about specific acts of direct infringement by\n 2 third parties. Backgrid has thus failed to adequately allege this required element of\n 3 its claims for indirect infringement.\n 4 B. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Contributory\n Infringement\n 5\n Backgrid\u2019s attempts to show that it adequately pled contributory infringement\n 6\n misunderstand Twitter\u2019s arguments and ignore key authorities showing that the\n 7\n allegations in Backgrid\u2019s FAC do not support its claim.\n 8\n First, Backgrid fails to show that it adequately alleged Twitter\u2019s \u201cactual\n 9\n knowledge of specific acts of infringement.\u201d (See Mot. 11 (citing Giganews, 2014\n 10\n WL 8628031 at *7).) Backgrid\u2019s sole theory of Twitter\u2019s \u201cactual knowledge\u201d is\n 11\n premised on its submission of thousands of \u201cDMCA notices\u201d to Twitter. Backgrid\n 12\n does not dispute that, for purposes of a claim for contributory infringement against an\n 13\n internet service provider like Twitter, a DMCA notice is \u201ceffective\u201d to provide notice\n 14\n of an act of infringement only if it complies with 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(c)(3)(A), which\n 15\n requires, among other things, that the notice include an \u201c[i]dentification of the\n 16\n copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed.\u201d (See Mot. 11-12.) Yet Backgrid\n 17\n points to no allegations that any (let alone all) of the purported DMCA notices it sent\n 18\n included this information. See Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219,\n 19\n 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (dismissing claim for contributory infringement where the\n 20\n defendant\u2019s alleged \u201cknowledge [was] based on a takedown notice, and that notice\n 21\n [was] ineffective\u201d because it failed to \u201ccontain information identifying the\n 22\n copyrighted work that allegedly has been infringed\u201d) (quoting 3 Melville B. Nimmer\n 23\n & David Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright, \u00a7 12B.04[B][2] at 12B-61).2\n 24\n 25 2\n In fact, as Twitter promptly advised Backgrid in response to each purported\n 26 DMCA notice Backgrid sent (though as Backgrid misleadingly failed to mention in\n its complaint or FAC), none of Backgrid\u2019s purported DMCA notices identified the\n 27 copyrighted photos that Backgrid claims were infringed, which is why Backgrid is\n 28 stridently trying to avoid having to allege this information.\n\n -8- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 14 of 23 Page ID #:6251\n\n\n\n\n 1 Moreover, Backgrid conspicuously did not include copies (or even describe) its\n 2 DMCA notices in its initial complaint or FAC. Instead, Backgrid argues (Opp. 11)\n 3 that all it had to do was allege that its DMCA notices were \u201ccompliant,\u201d and \u201cthe\n 4 discussion should end there.\u201d Not so. Backgrid\u2019s obligation was to plead \u201csufficient\n 5 factual matter\u201d to state a plausible claim that Twitter had actual knowledge of specific\n 6 acts of infringement, and \u201cmere conclusory statements,\u201d see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,\n 7 or \u201clegal conclusions\u201d that are \u201ccast in the form of factual allegations,\u201d Fayer v.\n 8 Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011), are not entitled to an assumption of\n 9 truth. Backgrid\u2019s threadbare, conclusory allegation that all its \u201cDMCA notices\u201d were\n 10 \u201ccompliant\u201d is thus insufficient. See BMG Rts. Mgmt., 2022 WL 17578247 at *4\n 11 (\u201cWhile Plaintiff identifies a handful of specific examples of infringement that it is\n 12 aware of, Plaintiff fails to identify any individual copyrighted song that Defendants\n 13 knew was being infringed. Without more, the allegations support only Bigo\u2019s\n 14 generalized knowledge of the possibility of infringement, and amount to little more\n 15 than a threadbare recital of an element for contributory infringement.\u201d).\n 16 Backgrid also errs in arguing (Opp. 11-12) that it should not have to allege facts\n 17 showing that its DMCA notices were compliant because it did not have to send\n 18 DMCA notices at all to put Twitter on notice of the alleged acts of infringement. But\n 19 even if, theoretically, there are other ways to put a defendant on notice of\n 20 infringement, the only theory of notice that Backgrid alleges here is based on its\n 21 supposed transmission of compliant DMCA notices. Backgrid thus misplaces\n 22 reliance (Opp. 11-12) on cases where the plaintiff alleged facts showing the defendant\n 23 had actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement through means other than (or\n 24 in addition to) a DMCA notice. Cf. Dunham v. Lei, 2021 WL 4595808, at *6 (C.D.\n 25 Cal. June 7, 2021) (plaintiff alleged that defendants took down infringing products in\n 26 response to DMCA notices only to have them again become available on its websites,\n 27 showing that defendants \u201cpermitted identical infringement to continue\u201d); Louis\n 28 Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008)\n\n -9- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 15 of 23 Page ID #:6252\n\n\n\n\n 1 (on summary judgment, plaintiff offered evidence of letters and emails it sent to\n 2 defendant). Here, Backgrid alleges no facts showing Twitter\u2019s knowledge of the\n 3 infringements other than through the purported DMCA notices it sent, so it is\n 4 Backgrid\u2019s burden to plead facts showing that its notices were effective.\n 5 Backgrid\u2019s allegations of \u201cwillful blindness\u201d (Opp. 12) are similarly\n 6 inadequate, as Backgrid merely alleges that Twitter \u201cwillfully\u201d refused to remove the\n 7 infringing Tweets in response to Backgrid\u2019s DMCA notices (see FAC \u00b6 19). Given\n 8 that Backgrid\u2019s theory of \u201cactual knowledge\u201d is still premised on Backgrid having\n 9 sent \u201ccompliant\u201d DMCA notices, it cannot avoid its obligation to plead \u201csufficient\n 10 facts\u201d showing it sent compliant DMCA notices simply by alleging \u201cwillfulness.\u201d3\n 11 Second, Backgrid fails to show that it adequately alleged Twitter\u2019s material\n 12 contribution to the alleged third-party infringement. Backgrid claims (Opp. 13) that\n 13 Twitter \u201cconflates the \u2018knowledge\u2019 requirement with the \u2018material contribution\n 14 prong,\u2019\u201d yet it ignores the established principle that a material contribution theory of\n 15 infringement requires \u201cactual knowledge that specific infringing material is available\n 16 using [a defendant\u2019s] system,\u201d Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d at 671 (emphasis in original).\n 17 Because the sole basis for Twitter\u2019s alleged \u201cactual knowledge\u201d are Backgrid\u2019s\n 18 purported DMCA notices, Backgrid\u2019s failure to show that it adequately alleged that\n 19 those notices were effective is also fatal to its material contribution theory.\n 20 Third, Backgrid likewise fails to show that it adequately alleged Twitter\u2019s\n 21 material inducement. \u201c[T]he standard for inducement liability is providing a service\n 22 with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa\n 23 Intern. Service Ass\u2019n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-\n 24\n 25 3\n Backgrid relies (Opp. 12) on UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mahakkapong, 2015 WL\n 26 12803768 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2015), but that decision did not concern an internet\n service provider or mention the DMCA, and the plaintiff\u2019s theory of the defendant\u2019s\n 27 \u201cactual knowledge\u201d for purposes of contributory infringement was not premised on\n 28 it having sent DMCA notices to the defendant.\n\n -10- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 16 of 23 Page ID #:6253\n\n\n\n\n 1 Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)). Here, Backgrid\n 2 merely alleges that Twitter encourages users to \u201cupload and edit photographs on the\n 3 Internet, fail[s] to advise users that civil and criminal penalties attach to [copyright\n 4 infringement], and . . . created a system and practice of removing metadata from each\n 5 unlawfully posted and displayed Celebrity Photograph.\u201d (FAC \u00b6 35.) These\n 6 practices, even if assumed true, by no means show that Twitter\u2019s object is to promote\n 7 infringement, as there is no reason to believe these practices lead Twitter users to\n 8 believe the Twitter platform is to be used for infringing purposes. See Grokster, 545\n 9 U.S. at 938 (defendant had object of promoting use of product to infringe when it\n 10 communicated a \u201cclear message\u201d that it was to be used for infringing purposes).\n 11 C. Backgrid Fails To Show It Adequately Alleged Vicarious\n Infringement\n 12\n Backgrid fails to show that it adequately alleged either of the requirements of\n 13\n a claim for vicarious copyright infringement.\n 14\n First, Backgrid fails to show that Twitter has the \u201cright and ability to supervise\n 15\n the infringing conduct.\u201d Giganews, 847 F.3d at 673. Even under Napster\u2019s standard\n 16\n that Backgrid argues should apply here (Opp. 15), Backgrid has not shown that\n 17\n Twitter has the \u201cgeneral ability to locate infringing material and terminate users\u2019\n 18\n access,\u201d UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th\n 19\n Cir. 2013) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir.\n 20\n 2001).4 The Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508\n 21\n F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), is instructive. There, the court held that Google did not\n 22\n have the right and ability to control infringement on third-party websites because\n 23\n \u201c[w]ithout image-recognition technology, Google lacks the practical ability to police\n 24\n 25\n 4\n 26 Backgrid also cites to Cook v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 4:22-cv-02485-YGR,\n (Dkt. 40) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023), but in that order, the court explained that, unlike\n 27 here, the \u201cdefendant has provided no argument regarding plaintiff\u2019s ability to meet\n 28 the first prong of her vicarious infringement claim,\u201d id. at 9-10.\n\n -11- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 17 of 23 Page ID #:6254\n\n\n\n\n 1 the infringing activities\u201d on those websites. Id. at 1174. The court affirmed the\n 2 district court\u2019s findings that \u201cGoogle\u2019s supervisory power is limited because\n 3 \u2018Google\u2019s software lacks the ability to analyze every image on the [I]nternet, compare\n 4 each image to all the other copyrighted images that exist in the world \u2026 and determine\n 5 whether a certain image on the web infringes someone\u2019s copyright.\u201d Id. Here, as in\n 6 Amazon, Twitter lacks the practical ability to police all the content on its platform\n 7 which, according to Backgrid, averages 7.1 billion visits per month (FAC \u00b6 9).\n 8 Moreover, Backgrid again offers no response to Twitter\u2019s reliance on Judge\n 9 Wilson\u2019s recent decision in Stross v. Twitter (see Mot. 15), in which the Court\n 10 dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s vicarious infringement claim for failure to plead any \u201cfacts\n 11 to suggest that Twitter had the practical ability to locate and remove his photos\n 12 without any knowledge of them or their location.\u201d 2022 WL 1843142, at *4, n.2; see\n 13 also Vander Music v. Azteca Int\u2019l Corp., 2011 WL 13177301, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan.\n 14 21, 2011) (\u201cIn the SAC, Plaintiff does not proffer any facts to suggest that Defendant\n 15 had the ability to police the content or transmission of TV Azteca\u2019s television\n 16 programming for infringing activity.\u201d). Backgrid has similarly failed to plead any\n 17 such facts, and it cannot even muster an argument to the contrary.\n 18 Second, Backgrid fails to show that it adequately alleged a \u201ccausal relationship\n 19 between the infringing activity and any financial benefit\u201d to Twitter. Giganews, 847\n 20 F.3d at 673. Backgrid concedes (Opp. 16) it has not alleged \u201cspecific examples\u201d\n 21 showing that Twitter derived a financial benefit from its copyrighted photographs in\n 22 particular, but deems this \u201cirrelevant\u201d because it alleged generally that Twitter\n 23 \u201cmonetizes its platform\u201d in various ways\u2014and in particular through features that are\n 24 in no way dependent on copyright infringement, let alone on the infringement of\n 25 Backgrid\u2019s photographs. But far from being \u201cirrelevant,\u201d the controlling Ninth\n 26 Circuit law requires a plaintiff to show more than that a defendant derived a financial\n 27 benefit from providing \u201caccess [to] infringing material generally,\u201d id. at 674, and\n 28 Backgrid here does not allege even that. Thus, as in Stross v. Twitter\u2014which\n\n -12- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 18 of 23 Page ID #:6255\n\n\n\n\n 1 Backgrid again ignores\u2014Backgrid has failed to allege \u201cany sort of plausible link\n 2 between the photographs at issue and any financial benefit to Twitter.\u201d 2022 WL\n 3 1843142, at *4 n.2; see Stross v. Meta, 2022 WL 1843129 at *3 (dismissing vicarious\n 4 infringement claim where plaintiff\u2019s allegation \u201conly shows that copyright\n 5 infringement in general occurs on the Facebook platform, which is not sufficient to\n 6 show that Defendant drew users to Facebook because of Plaintiff's infringed works\u201d).\n 7 III. BACKGRID FAILS TO SHOW IT STATED A VALID CLAIM FOR\n DECLARATORY RELIEF\n 8\n Backgrid concedes that its claim for declaratory relief seeks not only a\n 9\n judgment that Twitter has no valid DMCA \u201csafe harbor\u201d defense to the alleged\n 10\n copyright infringements of Backgrid\u2019s works at issue in the FAC, but also that\n 11\n Twitter\u2019s \u201cDMCA policy\u201d is \u201cinvalid . . . as to all similarly situated plaintiffs, not\n 12\n just as to Backgrid.\u201d (Opp. 19 (emphasis added).) Twitter showed in its motion (p.\n 13\n 19) that to the extent Backgrid seeks to preclude Twitter from ever asserting a\n 14\n DMCA defense against any infringement claim asserted by anyone as to any work,\n 15\n its claim is wildly overbroad and this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate it.\n 16\n Backgrid elides this issue in its opposition brief. It argues (Opp. 17) there is a\n 17\n \u201cdefinite and concrete\u201d dispute between Backgrid and Twitter because Backgrid\n 18\n purportedly sent thousands of DMCA-compliant notices but Twitter allegedly \u201cdid\n 19\n not take down even one infringement nor did it terminate a single user,\u201d but it fails\n 20\n to explain how this dispute between the parties involving specific alleged\n 21\n infringements of Backgrid\u2019s photos would also encompass any current or\n 22\n conceivable copyright dispute between Twitter and any other \u201csimilarly situated\n 23\n plaintiffs\u201d involving copyrighted works not at issue in the complaint (or indeed that\n 24\n may not even exist yet). This case is not a class action, and Backgrid lacks standing\n 25\n to assert claims on behalf of \u201csimilarly situated plaintiffs.\u201d Rather, the Article III\n 26\n case-or-controversy requirement precludes Backgrid from bringing, and this Court\n 27\n from adjudicating, such a claim for declaratory relief that \u201creach[es] far beyond the\n 28\n\n -13- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 19 of 23 Page ID #:6256\n\n\n\n\n 1 particular case.\u201d Veoh Networks v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265,\n 2 1269 (S.D. Cal. 2007).\n 3 Backgrid fails to distinguish Veoh, and misses the point of that case, by\n 4 arguing that in Veoh, the plaintiff (an alleged infringer asserting a claim for\n 5 declaratory relief) was seeking a blanket \u201cvalidation\u201d of its business model, whereas\n 6 here, Backgrid seeks a blanket \u201cinvalidation\u201d of Twitter\u2019s DMCA defense. (Opp.\n 7 18.) This is a distinction without a difference. The Veoh court held that the\n 8 plaintiff\u2019s declaratory relief claim was not justiciable because the blanket finding of\n 9 DMCA safe harbor that it sought was \u201c[d]ivorced from a particular dispute over\n 10 specific rights,\u201d and instead \u201cwould have the Court declare a safe harbor as equally\n 11 applicable against Defendants as to any other copyright holder.\u201d Veoh, 522 F. Supp.\n 12 2d at 1270. The Court noted this was improper even as to the plaintiff\u2019s\n 13 (unspecified) alleged infringements, but particularly as to unspecified potential\n 14 infringements by third parties, \u201cgiven the highly factual and time-sensitive findings\n 15 required to satisfy\u201d the DMCA. Id. at 1270 n.3. The same reasoning applies here to\n 16 render Backgrid\u2019s claim an improper and nonjusticiable request for an advisory\n 17 opinion. Thus, at a minimum, Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief must be\n 18 limited to whether Twitter has a valid DMCA defense to the specific alleged\n 19 infringements Backgrid alleges in its FAC.\n 20 But the Court should dismiss the claim outright for independent reasons.\n 21 Backgrid does not dispute that the Court has broad discretion to dismiss any claim\n 22 for declaratory relief, including where it is premature or redundant. (See Mot. 20-\n 23 21.) And here, it is both. Backgrid argues (Opp. 19) that because it has been\n 24 anticipating a potential DMCA defense from Twitter by sending Twitter purported\n 25 DMCA notices, that somehow converts Twitter\u2019s defense into something else that\n 26 Backgrid can preemptively adjudicate. There is no support for this argument, and it\n 27 is contrary to law. See 17 U.S.C. 512(l) (DMCA safe harbor is a \u201climitation of\n 28 liability\u201d); Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1158 (DMCA is an \u201caffirmative defense\u201d).\n\n -14- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 20 of 23 Page ID #:6257\n\n\n\n\n 1 Indeed, Backgrid cites to no authority that has ever preemptively adjudicated any\n 2 affirmative defense through a nominal claim for declaratory relief, let alone a\n 3 defense under the DMCA.\n 4 Moreover, Backgrid fails (Opp. 19 n.10) to distinguish Divino and Newman,\n 5 which both support the dismissal of Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief. In both\n 6 cases, the plaintiffs\u2019 attempt to anticipate an affirmative defense through a claim for\n 7 declaratory relief formed at least part of the basis for the dismissal of the claim. See\n 8 Divino Grp. LLC v. Google LLC, 2021 WL 51715, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6,\n 9 2021) (\u201cFirst . . . . plaintiffs have failed to state a claim . . . . Second . . . plaintiffs .\n 10 . . included a claim for declaratory relief in anticipation of defendant\u2019s assertion of\n 11 Section 230 immunity . . . .\u201d); Newman v. Google LLC, 2021 WL 2633423, at *14\n 12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (\u201cThe Court dismisses Plaintiffs\u2019 declaratory judgment\n 13 claim for two reasons.\u201d). And Backgrid fails to respond to the reasoning in both\n 14 cases that \u201cusing the Declaratory Judgment Act to anticipate an affirmative defense\n 15 is not ordinarily proper.\u201d Newman, 2021 WL 2633423, at *14 (quoting Divino,\n 16 2021 WL 51715, at *11). Nor does Backgrid dispute (see Mot. 21) that \u201c[d]ismissal\n 17 of a declaratory relief claim intended to anticipate an affirmative defense is\n 18 appropriate, particularly where, as here, the Court need not consider the affirmative\n 19 defense in order to resolve defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 other claims.\u201d\n 20 Divino, 2021 WL 51715 at *11.\n 21 Finally, even if it were appropriate for Backgrid to attempt to preemptively\n 22 adjudicate Twitter\u2019s affirmative defense, it is unnecessary for it to do so through a\n 23 claim for declaratory relief because\u2014as Backgrid does not dispute\u2014the merits of\n 24 that defense can be fully adjudicated through Twitter\u2019s assertion of the defense.\n 25 Backgrid\u2019s claim thus also fails for being redundant. (See Mot. 21.)\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -15- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 21 of 23 Page ID #:6258\n\n\n\n\n 1 IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW FURTHER LEAVE TO\n AMEND\n 2\n To the extent the Court dismisses Backgrid\u2019s claims, there is no basis for the\n 3\n Court to grant leave to amend. A court\u2019s discretion to deny leave to amend is\n 4\n \u201cparticularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.\u201d Cafasso\n 5\n v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Backgrid\n 6\n already amended once after the parties met and conferred regarding the arguments\n 7\n Twitter intended to raise in its motion to dismiss the initial complaint. Although\n 8\n Backgrid asks for further leave to amend, it does not even hint at what more it could\n 9\n allege to address the deficiencies in its pleading that Twitter has identified, showing\n 10\n that further leave to amend would be futile. See, e.g., Joycette Goodwin v.\n 11\n Walgreens, Co., 2023 WL 4037175, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2023) (Gee, J.)\n 12\n (dismissing complaint without leave to amend after plaintiff voluntarily amended\n 13\n once before first motion to dismiss was decided); Reed v. Nat\u2019l Football League,\n 14\n 2015 WL 13344625, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015) (Gee, J.) (citation omitted),\n 15\n aff\u2019d, 683 F. App\u2019x 619 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1610 (2018) (noting\n 16\n that \u201ccourts have the discretion to deny leave to amend for futility of amendment\u201d);\n 17\n Wanxia Liao v. United States, 2012 WL 3945772, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012)\n 18\n (finding leave to amend would be futile because plaintiff already amended and still\n 19\n made insufficient allegations).5\n 20\n CONCLUSION\n 21\n For the foregoing reasons, Twitter respectfully requests that the Court dismiss\n 22\n the FAC without leave to amend.\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26 5\n Backgrid misplaces reliance (Opp. 19) on the liberal standards for granting leave\n 27 to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), which do not apply to whether leave should be\n 28 granted after Rule 12 a motion to dismiss is granted.\n\n -16- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 22 of 23 Page ID #:6259\n\n\n\n\n 1 DATED: June 30, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 2\n 3\n 4 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 5 Daniel C. Posner\n 6 Attorneys for Twitter, Inc.\n\n 7\n 8\n 9\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -17- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 29 Filed 06/30/23 Page 23 of 23 Page ID #:6260\n\n\n\n\n 1 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n 2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Twitter, Inc., certifies that this brief\n 3 contains 5,385 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.\n 4\n DATED: June 30, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n 5\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 6\n 7\n 8 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 9 Daniel C. Posner\n Attorneys for Twitter, Inc.\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -18- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-11-11T13:30:26.967504-08:00","document_number":"29","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031040342092","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Reply (Motion related)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-06-30T15:35:07.773633-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.706164-07:00","date_filed":"2023-06-30","time_filed":"15:05:08","entry_number":29,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-06-30.001","pacer_sequence_number":86,"description":"REPLY In Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case 26 filed by Defendant Twitter, Inc.. (Posner, Daniel) (Entered: 06/30/2023)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/346825201/","id":346825201,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/353223412/","id":353223412,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/28/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-06-16T16:33:15.917257-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.687855-07:00","sha1":"e8344f8256c5d82553a0d86fc6e11bca3cfbcb3b","page_count":26,"file_size":344572,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.28.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.28.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 1 of 26 Page ID #:6212\n\n\n 1 David Quinto (Bar No. 106232)\n Dquinto@onellp.com\n 2\n Peter R. Afrasiabi (Bar No. 193336)\n 3 pafrasiabi@onellp.com\n Joanna Ardalan (Bar No. 285384)\n 4\n jardalan@onellp.com\n 5 ONE LLP\n 23 Corporate Plaza, Suite 150\n 6\n Newport Beach, CA 92660\n 7 Telephone: (949) 502-2870\n 8 Facsimile: (949) 258-5081\n\n 9 Attorneys for Plaintiff,\n 10 Backgrid USA, Inc.\n\n 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 12 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 13 WESTERN DIVISION\n 14 BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No.: 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n corporation Hon. Judge Dolly M. Gee.\n 15\n 16 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION\n 17 v. TO DISMISS\n 18\n TWITTER, INC., a Delaware Complaint served: January 6, 2023\n 19 corporation and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Trial Date: None Yet\n 20\n Defendants.\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 2 of 26 Page ID #:6213\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n 2\n I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1\n 3\n II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................. 2\n 4 A. Plaintiff Backgrid and Its Photographs ..................................................... 2\n B. Twitter and Its Infringement of Backgrid\u2019s Copyrights ............................ 3\n 5\n III. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................... 5\n 6\n IV. BACKGRID HAS ALLEGED VOLITIONAL CONDUCT SUFFICIENT TO\n 7 SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR DIRECT INFRINGEMENT .................................. 6\n 8 V. BACKGRID HAS ALLEGED INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT ........................ 9\n 9 A. Backgrid Has Properly Alleged Underlying Direct Infringement by Third-\n Party Users ................................................................................................ 9\n 10 B. Backgrid Has Properly Alleged Contributory Infringement ................... 10\n 11 1. Twitter had Knowledge of Infringement ...................................... 10\n 2. Twitter Materially Contributed to the Infringement .................... 13\n 12 3. Backgrid Has Adequately Pleaded that Twitter Induced\n 13 Infringement ................................................................................. 13\n C. Backgrid Has Sufficiently Alleged Vicarious ......................................... 14\n 14 Infringement...................................................................................................... 14\n 15 1. Control Over Infringing Conduct ................................................. 14\n 2. Financial Benefit .......................................................................... 15\n 16\n VI. BACKGRID\u2019S CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER ......... 17\n 17 A. The Court has Jurisdiction to Decide Backgrid\u2019s Declaratory Relief Claim\n 18 ................................................................................................................. 17\n B. The Declaratory Relief Claim Is Proper.................................................. 18\n 19\n VII. SHOULD THE COURT GRANT THIS MOTION, BACKGRID\n 20 RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT THE COURT GRANT BACKGRID\n LEAVE TO AMEND ....................................................................................... 19\n 21\n VIII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 20\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n i\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 3 of 26 Page ID #:6214\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n 2 Cases\n 3\n Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Canus Prods. Inc.,\n 4 173 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ..................................................... 13\n 5 Adobe Sys. v. Blue Source Grp.,\n 6 125 F.Supp.3d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ................................................................... 6\n\n 7 American Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo,\n 573 U.S. 431 (2014) ............................................................................................. 8\n 8\n 9 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................. 5\n 10\n Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n 11\n 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ............................................................................................. 5\n 12\n Cook v. Meta Platforms Inc.,\n 13 No. 4:22-cv-02485-YGR (Dkt. 40) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023) ............................ 15\n 14\n Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,\n 15 cv16-04109 AB (plax), 2019 WL 13020442 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2019) ............. 10\n 16 Divino Grp. v. Google LLC,\n 17 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) .......................................................... 19\n 18 Dunham v. Lei,\n No. CV 20-3716-DMG, 2021 WL 4595808 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2021) ........ 10, 11\n 19\n 20 Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon,\n 95 F.Supp.2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ................................................................... 6\n 21\n 22 Ellison v. Robertson,\n 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) ..................................................................... 10, 16\n 23\n Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,\n 24 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................... 6\n 25\n Greg Young Publishing, Inc. v. Zazzle, Inc.,\n 26 2:16-cv-04587-SVW-KS, 2017 WL 2729584 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) ........... 11\n 27\n 28\n ii\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 4 of 26 Page ID #:6215\n\n\n\n 1 Hero Nutritionals, Inc. v. Vitastix, Inc.,\n SACV 09-00927 DMG (mlgx), 2010 WL 11580048, at * 2 (C.D. Cal.\n 2\n Apr. 23, 2010) .............................................................................................. 17, 19\n 3\n Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,\n 4 586 F.Supp.2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ............................................................... 15\n 5\n Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,\n 6 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................. 19\n 7 Keck v. Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd.,\n 8 369 F.Supp.3d 932 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ................................................................. 14\n\n 9 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc.,\n 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ............................................................. 12\n 10\n 11 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,\n 549 U.S. 118, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) ...................................... 17\n 12\n MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd,\n 13\n 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005) ............................. 1, 13\n 14\n Newman v. Google LLC,\n 15 2021 WL 2633423 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) ................................................... 19\n 16\n P.H. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist.,\n 17 No. ED CV 21:219-DMG, 2021 WL 4902198 (C.D. Cal. July 26,\n 2021) .................................................................................................................... 5\n 18\n 19 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,\n 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................... 16\n 20\n 21 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.,\n 167 F.Supp.2d 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ............................................................... 10\n 22\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,\n 23 847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 6, 16\n 24\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n,\n 25 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 10\n 26 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,\n 27 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) ....................................................................... 6, 17\n 28\n iii\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 5 of 26 Page ID #:6216\n\n\n\n 1 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,\n 622 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................. 5\n 2\n 3 Stross v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,\n 2:21-cv-08023-MCS-as, 2022 WL 1843129 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2022) ............... 8\n 4\n Stross v. Twitter,\n 5\n 2022 WL 1843142 ................................................................................... 8, 12, 13\n 6\n Stross v. Twitter, Inc.,\n 7 No. 2:21-cv-8360-SVW, Dkt. 22 ....................................................................... 12\n 8\n Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,\n 9 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).......................................................................... 17\n 10 Tur v. YouTube,\n 11 CV064436 FMC ajwx, 2007 WL 1893635, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2007) .................. 15\n 12 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mahakkapong,\n No. CV 14\u201307229 DMG (JEM), 2015 WL 12803768 (C.D. Cal. Feb.\n 13\n 9, 2015) .............................................................................................................. 12\n 14\n UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners,\n 15 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................... 15\n 16\n United States v. Ritchie,\n 17 342 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................... 5\n 18 Veoh Networks v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,\n 19 522 F.Supp.2d 1265 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ................................................................ 18\n 20 VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp.,\n 21 918 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................... 6, 7\n\n 22 Williams v. Gaye,\n 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................... 14\n 23\n 24 Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n --- F. Supp.3d ----, 2020 WL 13734708 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2020) ................ 7, 8\n 25\n Statutes\n 26\n 27 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 501 ......................................................................................................... 8\n\n 28 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512 ................................................................................................ passim\n iv\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 6 of 26 Page ID #:6217\n\n\n\n 1 Communications Decency Act ................................................................................ 19\n 2 Copyright Act ............................................................................................................ 8\n 3\n Digital Millennium Copyright Act ................................................................... passim\n 4\n Other Authorities\n 5\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ............................................................................................ 5, 6, 17\n 6\n 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 .................................................................................................... 19\n\n 8\n 9\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n v\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 7 of 26 Page ID #:6218\n\n\n 1 I. INTRODUCTION\n 2 Plaintiff Backgrid USA Inc. is the world\u2019s largest celebrity photograph agency.\n 3 It depends for its existence on the licensing or sale of its celebrity photographs to\n 4 major media outlets. Its existence is jeopardized when its photographs are widely\n 5 disseminated without license and without consent.\n 6 Twitter operates a spectacularly profitable platform that generates enormous\n 7 revenue through clicks, views, \u201ctweets,\u201d and shares. The more data a tweet generates,\n 8 the more money Twitter earns as the traffic generated translates into more sponsor\n 9 dollars and even more data to sell. The tweets that incorporate unlawfully obtained\n 10 copyrighted content generate enormous amounts of data Twitter can monetize and\n 11 negotiate great sponsor payments.\n 12 In this regard, Twitter\u2019s service is not unlike the file-sharing service\n 13 condemned in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162\n 14 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005). Although the Grokster service had non-infringing uses,\n 15 Grokster\u2019s business model depended on user infringements for its success. Similarly,\n 16 as a user\u2019s tweet attracts traffic because Twitter audience groups wish to see the\n 17 infringing content associated with it, Twitter assigns the user\u2019s post a higher position\n 18 in the audience groups\u2019 Twitter feed. Where the post falls in an audience group\u2019s\n 19 Twitter feed is controlled by Twitter and Twitter alone. Twitter targets\n 20 advertisements to specific audience groups, thereby generating greater advertising\n 21 revenues and data monetization for itself. Twitter\u2019s profits are attributable in no small\n 22 measure to the infringing content it makes available to the public. For that reason,\n 23 Twitter even sends e-mail messages to user groups apprising them of tweets they\n 24 might not otherwise overlook. See First Amended Complaint (\u201cFAC\u201d), \u00b6 10. Twitter\n 25 is actively involved in the infringements reproduced and displayed on its platform\n 26 directly, contributorily, and vicariously. FAC, \u00b6\u00b6 30-38.\n 27 Twitter seeks unavailingly to portray itself as a passive internet service\n 28 provider (\u201cISP\u201d) whose activities qualify for safe-harbor protection under the Digital\n 1\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 8 of 26 Page ID #:6219\n\n\n\n 1 Millennium Copyright Act (\u201cDMCA\u201d). While Twitter contends that Backgrid has\n 2 \u201canticipated\u201d that it might assert compliance with the DMCA\u2019s safe-harbor provision\n 3 as an affirmative defense, that is of no moment. Backgrid has unsuccessfully relied\n 4 on Twitter\u2019s own terms of service that claim Twitter both has and implements a\n 5 reasonable repeat infringer policy. If that were the case, Twitter might avail itself of\n 6 the safe harbor, but it is not true. After sending over 6,700 DMCA takedown notices\n 7 for Backgrid\u2019s works, Twitter failed to take down even one posting or user account.\n 8 Backgrid has sufficiently pleaded its claim for direct, contributory, and\n 9 vicarious copyright infringement, as well as its declaratory judgment claim. It\n 10 respectfully requests that the Court deny Twitter\u2019s motion to dismiss in full.\n 11 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS\n 12 A. Plaintiff Backgrid and Its Photographs\n 13 Backgrid is the world\u2019s premier celebrity-related photograph agency and\n 14 provides highly sought-after images of celebrities to top news and lifestyle outlets. Its\n 15 photographs increase the sales of its customers\u2019 magazines and newspapers and\n 16 increase their website traffic and website viewer engagement. FAC, \u00b6 6.\n 17 Backgrid\u2019s photographs are regularly licensed by People magazine, the\n 18 Huffington Post, the Daily Mail, TMZ, US Weekly, Harper\u2019s Bazaar, Entertainment\n 19 Tonight, Vogue, Elle magazine, and many other publications. Id. Backgrid owns all\n 20 rights to its Celebrity Photographs, each of which was timely registered with the\n 21 United States Copyright Office. Included in the complaint as an attachment are the\n 22 copyright registrations numbers associated with the works then-identified as infringed\n 23 by Twitter. Id., \u00b6 7, Ex. A. Due to Defendant\u2019s continuing infringements and refusal\n 24 to adopt and reasonably implement a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (\u201cDMCA\u201d)\n 25 repeat infringer policy, the number of timely registered infringements on its Twitter\n 26 platform and the damages for which Defendant is responsible is continually\n 27 increasing.\n 28\n 2\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 9 of 26 Page ID #:6220\n\n\n\n 1 B. Twitter and Its Infringement of Backgrid\u2019s Copyrights\n 2 Twitter is a platform that \u201ctouts itself as a \u2018global platform\u2019 [] that \u2018help[s]\n 3 people discover what\u2019s happening through text, images, on demand and live video.\u201d\n 4 Id., \u00b6 9. It is one of the top ranked websites globally, ranked number five in the world\n 5 and averaging 7.1 billion visits per month. Id.\n 6 Twitter monetizes its platform by enabling advertisers to promote their brands,\n 7 products, and services through the Twitter platform that then permits the targeting of\n 8 specific audience members based on the accounts they follow and the actions they\n 9 have taken on the Twitter platform. Id., \u00b6 10. The more attractive and compelling a\n 10 tweet, the more Twitter can monetize it. Every upload, click, and view yields data that\n 11 can be and is monetized, meaning that Twitter monetizes each photo uploaded on its\n 12 platform, including Backgrid\u2019s Celebrity Photographs. It does so by displaying\n 13 advertisements calculated to interest a given audience. Twitter charges advertisers\n 14 more based on the amount of interaction the advertisement-tweet generates. Id.\n 15 To keep its users engaged while promoting the advertisements on which much\n 16 of its revenue depends, Twitter also sends e-mail messages to its users providing links\n 17 to tweets that they might not otherwise see. Id., \u00b6 10. The links provided are to\n 18 tweets from accounts that the targeted users do not \u201cfollow.\u201d By doing so, Twitter\n 19 increases the number of views those advertisements receive, thereby increasing its\n 20 own advertising revenue. Id.\n 21 Moreover, Twitter promotes tweets based on subscription models, such as the\n 22 Twitter Blue subscription, pursuant to which verified users pay a monthly fee to have\n 23 their tweets promoted on others\u2019 tweet-feeds. When a Twitter user uploads a photo,\n 24 Twitter selects, orders, and/or arranges its content to display that content to other\n 25 Twitter users, including content from Twitter accounts that are not among those\n 26 \u201cfollowed\u201d by the viewing user. Id., \u00b6 11. Further, Twitter stores copies of the photos\n 27 on its servers without Backgrid\u2019s consent. Id., \u00b6 34.\n 28\n 3\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 10 of 26 Page ID #:6221\n\n\n\n 1 Twitter claims to have DMCA compliant take-down policies set forth in its\n 2 website\u2019s Terms of Service. Twitter\u2019s \u201cCopyright Policy\u201d provides that copyright\n 3 owners may send DMCA takedown notices. Its policy represents that \u201cif multiple\n 4 copyright complaints are received about an account, or other evidence suggests a\n 5 pattern of repeat infringement, Twitter may suspend that account in accordance with\n 6 our Repeat Infringer Policy.\u201d Based thereon, it claims that the DMCA\u2019s safe-harbor\n 7 protection for ISPs with DMCA compliant take-down policies shields it from liability\n 8 for the massive number of infringements it contributes to and engages in daily. But\n 9 such lip service compliance with the DMCA is merely a fig leaf to hide its systematic\n 10 abuse of the rights of photograph copyright holders and their enormous profits\n 11 derived from such infringement. Id., \u00b6 13.\n 12 A threshold requirement for DMCA safe harbor protection is that the ISP have\n 13 \u201cadopted and reasonably implemented \u2026 a policy that provides for the termination in\n 14 appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders \u2026 who are repeat\n 15 infringers.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(i)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Twitter\u2019s policy is not\n 16 reasonably implemented. Although its \u201cCopyright Policy\u201d provides that copyright\n 17 owners may send a DMCA takedown notice and further provides that \u201cIf multiple\n 18 copyright complaints are received about an account, or other evidence suggests a\n 19 pattern of repeat infringement, Twitter may suspend that account in accordance with\n 20 our Repeat Infringer Policy,\u201d it does not do so. Id., \u00b6 15.\n 21 Twitter\u2019s purported policy is honored in the breach. Despite Backgrid sending\n 22 more than 6,700 DMCA takedown notices, not a single work was taken down and not\n 23 a single repeat infringer was suspended. Each notice complied with 17 U.S.C.\n 24 512(c)(3), giving Twitter knowledge of specific infringing material, including by\n 25 providing a link to where the infringement was stored and where it was displayed. Id.,\n 26 \u00b6 18. Despite having such knowledge, however, Twitter refuses to take simple\n 27 measures to prevent further damage, such as disabling the infringement and deleting it\n 28\n 4\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 11 of 26 Page ID #:6222\n\n\n\n 1 from its servers, as well as suspending accounts that have repeatedly infringed\n 2 copyrights belonging to Backgrid. Id.\n 3 Twitter treats Backgrid\u2019s DMCA notices differently than notices from other\n 4 parties, demonstrating that it has not implemented a reasonable DMCA policy. Id.\n 5 Moreover, it feigns ignorance of the contents of Backgrid\u2019s DMCA notices, thus\n 6 demonstrating willful blindness towards the infringements of Backgrid\u2019s works, by\n 7 not taking the work down. Id., \u00b6 19.\n 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD\n 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may seek\n 10 dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\n 11 However, a court may grant dismissal only when the plaintiff has not asserted a\n 12 cognizable legal theory or alleged sufficient facts to support one. Shroyer v. New\n 13 Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro\n 14 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). On a motion to dismiss, a court may\n 15 consider documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference\n 16 in a complaint, and documents subject to judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342\n 17 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).\n 18 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must articulate \u201cenough facts to\n 19 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550\n 20 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). \u201cA claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\n 21 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is\n 22 liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing\n 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must\n 24 accept all factual allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.\n 25 at 555).\n 26 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may seek\n 27 dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. P.H. v. Compton\n 28 Unified Sch. Dist., No. ED CV 21:219-DMG (JEMx), 2021 WL 4902198, at *1 (C.D.\n 5\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 12 of 26 Page ID #:6223\n\n\n\n 1 Cal. July 26, 2021). \u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.\u201d\n 2 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). \u201cIn a facial\n 3 attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are\n 4 insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack,\n 5 the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would\n 6 otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.\u201d Id. Twitter\u2019s arguments constitute a facial\n 7 attack.\n 8 IV. BACKGRID HAS ALLEGED VOLITIONAL CONDUCT SUFFICIENT\n 9 TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR DIRECT INFRINGEMENT\n 10 To state a claim for direct copyright infringement, a copyright owner must\n 11 show \u201cvolitional conduct,\u201d i.e., causation by the defendant. Perfect 10, Inc. v.\n 12 Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017). Although volition is a requirement,\n 13 intent is not. Copyright infringement is a strict liability tort. Educ. Testing Serv. v.\n 14 Simon, 95 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1987 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Therefore, it is not required that a\n 15 plaintiff plead an \u201cact of willing or choosing\u201d or an \u201cact of deciding.\u201d Volition\n 16 \u201csimply stands for the unremarkable proposition that proximate causation historically\n 17 underlines copyright infringement liability.\u201d VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., 918 F.3d 723,\n 18 731 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Giganews, 847 F.3d at 666).1 Courts look at the\n 19 \u201cdistinction between active and passive participation\u201d to determine whether volition\n 20 exists. VHT, 918 F.3d at 732 (volition requires \u201cactive involve[ment]\u201d).\n 21\n 22\n 23 1\n An infringer need not be the sole infringer to be the proximate cause of the\n 24 infringement. Twitter and its users can be simultaneous direct infringers. \u201cwhen a\n copyright is infringed, all infringers are jointly and severally liable for plaintiff['s] actual\n 25 damages.\u201d Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 519 (9th Cir.\n 1985); Adobe Sys. v. Blue Source Grp., 125 F.Supp.3d 945, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2015). To bake\n 26\n a cake, one needs both flour and baking powder, among other ingredients. Flour and\n 27 baking powder are each a \u201cproximate cause\u201d of the cake\u2019s creation; without baking powder\n it will not rise; without flour it will not have volume.\n 28\n 6\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 13 of 26 Page ID #:6224\n\n\n\n 1 Backgrid did not allege that Twitter\u2019s actions \u201cwere akin to \u2018passively storing\n 2 material at the direction of the users in order to make that material available to other\n 3 users upon request,\u201d as Twitter falsely claims. Twitter\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.\n 4 26 (\u201cMotion\u201d) at 9. Rather, Backgrid alleged substantial, active involvement by\n 5 Twitter to promote infringements and monetize them. Among other things, it alleged\n 6 that, \u201c[o]nce a Twitter user uploads a photo, Twitter selects, orders and/or arranges\n 7 content to display to other Twitter users, including content from Twitter accounts that\n 8 are not among those \u2018followed\u2019 by the viewing user.\u201d FAC, \u00b6 11. In other words,\n 9 Twitter \u201cdisplays other tweets in a feed tailored to a particular use\u201d and even supplies\n 10 links to those tweets in e-mail messages sent to users who would not otherwise\n 11 \u201cfollow\u201d or see those tweets. FAC \u00b6 35. Twitter decides where and when to publicly\n 12 display, distribute, and reproduce the infringements and even \u201cpromot[ed] tweets\n 13 based on subscription models\u201d FAC \u00b6 34. Its acts are akin to the acts performed by\n 14 Zillow that were not reviewed on appeal. Those acts were sufficient for Zillow to be\n 15 found liable for the direct infringement of the plaintiff\u2019s works. Zillow, 918 F.3d at\n 16 736 (Zillow did not appeal a finding of direct infringement against it when Zillow\n 17 \u201cmoderators selected and tagged [the photos] for searchable functionality\u201d). See also\n 18 Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., --- F. Supp.3d ---- , 2020 WL 13734708,\n 19 *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2020) (acknowledging that in Zillow, \u201c[t]he Ninth Circuit\n 20 approvingly cited the district court's reasoning \u201cthat Zillow's moderation efforts,\n 21 which rendered those images searchable, proximately caused the\n 22 [infringement].\u201d Id. \u201cPut differently,\u201d the Ninth Circuit explained that the \u201cactive\n 23 conduct by Zillow met the volitional-conduct requirement for direct infringement\u201d).\n 24 Twitter admonishes Backgrid for its purported failure to \u201cspecify whether\n 25 Twitter actively performs these acts, or whether the conduct stems from automated\n 26 functionality.\u201d Motion at 9. At this early, pre-discovery stage Backgrid should not be\n 27 barred from bringing its direct infringement claim when it does not have the benefit of\n 28 conducting discovery on Twitter\u2019s involvement.\n 7\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 14 of 26 Page ID #:6225\n\n\n\n 1 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent does not support the notion that non-\n 2 human acts preclude a finding of volition. Afterall, in American Broadcasting Co. v.\n 3 Aereo, 573 U.S. 431 (2014), the Supreme Court held that Aereo directly infringed\n 4 ABC\u2019s works even though its conduct resulted from automatic functionality. Id. at\n 5 451. Nor does the text of the Copyright Act support the idea that volition can result\n 6 only from direct human activity. See 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 501(a) (\u201cAnyone who violates any of\n 7 the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.\u201d)\n 8 Especially in this age of artificial intelligence it would be catastrophic to copyright\n 9 holders to permit infringement so long as it was caused by a non-human.\n 10 Indeed, using an algorithm that proximately results in infringement does not\n 11 avoid copyright infringement liability. Stross v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2:21-cv-08023-\n 12 MCS-as, 2022 WL 1843129 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2022). In Stross, Facebook argued that\n 13 the process through which items appeared on a user\u2019s news feed resulted from the use\n 14 of an algorithm and was therefore \u201cautomated,\u201d not volitional. The court disagreed.\n 15 \u201cThere is no basis in the law to conclude that active management of a website, which\n 16 would constitute volitional conduct if performed by a human, fails to meet that\n 17 element because an algorithm designed by a human engineer manages the website\n 18 instead.\u201d Id. at *3.2\n 19 In Williams-Sonoma, Amazon disputed the allegations of direct infringement of\n 20 the plaintiff\u2019s photographs. The plaintiff had alleged that Amazon \u201cthrough its\n 21 algorithms, selects which product image, along other elements, is more likely to make\n 22 the sale and displays the image of the public listing page for the product\u201d and that its\n 23 algorithm \u201cus[es] multi-factor criteria that Amazon employs to boost internet traffic\n 24 and promote sales.\u201d 2020 WL 13734708, at *6.\n 25\n 26 2\n Twitter relies on Stross v. Twitter, 2022 WL 1843142, to support its claim that\n 27 direct infringement is not alleged here. The Stross complaint and Backgrid\u2019s complaint\n contain different factual allegations and the Court should make its own independent\n 28 determination if the allegations here are sufficient.\n 8\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 15 of 26 Page ID #:6226\n\n\n\n 1 Similarly, Twitter, without any direction from its users, \u201cselects, orders and/or\n 2 arranges content to display to other Twitter users, including content from Twitter\n 3 accounts that are not among those \u2018followed\u2019 by the viewing user.\u201d FAC, \u00b6 11.\n 4 Without any direction from the users, it, alone decided to link to certain infringing\n 5 tweets in email messages sent to other users who would not otherwise \u201cfollow\u201d or see\n 6 the infringing tweet, and it, and it alone, \u201cpromotes tweets based on subscription\n 7 models\u201d (FAC \u00b6 34), much like Amazon promoted photographs based on what its\n 8 algorithm concluded would be monetized best. Moreover, it, alone, \u201cchoose[s] and\n 9 arrange[s] infringing content, promoting tweets based on subscription models, such as\n 10 the Blue Subscription, in which verified users pay a monthly fee to have their tweets\n 11 promoted on others\u2019 tweet-feeds, and continuing to store copies of the photos on\n 12 Defendant\u2019s servers without Backgrid\u2019s consent.\u201d FAC, \u00b6 34.\n 13 V. BACKGRID HAS ALLEGED INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT\n 14 A. Backgrid Has Properly Alleged Underlying Direct Infringement by\n 15 Third-Party Users\n 16 Twitter contends that Backgrid has not alleged \u201cspecific instances of direct\n 17 infringement by any third party [].\u201d Not so. Exhibit B, attached to the FAC, shows\n 18 thousands of screenshots of the infringements. The screen shots also show the\n 19 Twitter user who uploaded each work. FAC Ex. B, (ECF. 23-2 to 23-31) (Exhibit B\n 20 was so large it required 29 ECF events to upload). The text of the FAC also alleges\n 21 user infringement. See, e.g. FAC \u00b6 28 (\u201cDefendant\u2019s users have reproduced, publicly\n 22 displayed, and publicly distributed, and continue to reproduce, publicly display and\n 23 publicly distribute, Celebrity Photographs by making them available for download,\n 24 copy, and reproduction, together with other photographs that Backgrid either owns or\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n 9\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 16 of 26 Page ID #:6227\n\n\n\n 1 exclusively licenses for distribution, reproduction, public display, and use in creating\n 2 derivative works.\u201d).3\n 3 Moreover, there is no requirement that copyright plaintiffs must specifically\n 4 identify every work at issue in the litigation. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,\n 5 cv16-04109 AB (plax), 2019 WL 13020442 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2019) (deciding that\n 6 all titles revealed through discovery were at issue at trial even though not alleged in\n 7 the complaint or identified in discovery responses); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet\n 8 Ventures, Inc., 167 F.Supp.2d 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The FAC \u201cidentifie[d]\n 9 copyrights involving [plaintiff's] magazines and identifie[d] ownership of the pictures\n 10 within the magazines,\u201d id. at 1121, which the court found sufficient to apprise the\n 11 defendant of the nature of the claims. The court also acknowledged that greater\n 12 specificity makes little sense in cases involving allegations of massive infringement.\n 13 B. Backgrid Has Properly Alleged Contributory Infringement\n 14 The Ninth Circuit defines a contributory infringer as one who, \u201c(1) has\n 15 knowledge of another's infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b)\n 16 induces that infringement.\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788,\n 17 795 (9th Cir. 2007). The knowledge requirement for contributory infringement is\n 18 satisfied if the defendant had \u201cactual knowledge\u201d of or \u201creason to know of direct\n 19 infringement.\u201d Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).\n 20 1. Twitter had Knowledge of Infringement\n 21 Twitter concedes that compliant DMCA Notices are sufficient to give a\n 22 defendant knowledge for purposes of contributory infringement. (Motion 11:26-\n 23\n 24\n 25 3\n Even though Backgrid specifically pleaded the works and attached examples of\n infringements, general allegations that users engaged in direct infringement is enough. See\n 26 Dunham v. Lei, no. cv 20-3716 DMG-MAAx, 2021 WL 4595808, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. June 7,\n 2021) (citing Fonovisa v. Napster, Inc., No. CV 01-02669, 2002 WL 398676, at *4 (N.D.\n 27 Cal. Jan, 28, 2002) for the proposition that it is sufficient to allege third party direct\n infringement based on general allegations that users of the defendant\u2019s software uploaded\n 28 specific protected works to it).\n 10\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 17 of 26 Page ID #:6228\n\n\n\n 1 12:02.) Backgrid alleged that it provided compliant DMCA notices, which is\n 2 sufficient to provide Twitter notice; the discussion should end there. (\u00b6 18.) 4\n 3 The heightened pleading standard championed by Twitter, akin to Rule 9, is not\n 4 supported by law. Twitter has cited to no case requiring a plaintiff to allege the \u201cdates\n 5 of the notices or the locations (urls) of the infringing content it allegedly requested to\n 6 be removed, or even a description of the content\u201d it claims a properly pleaded\n 7 complaint must contain. Motion at 12. Such facts are not required to be pleaded.5 6\n 8 This Court denied a motion to dismiss a contributory copyright infringement\n 9 claim in Dunham v. Lei, No. CV 20-3716-DMG (MAAx), 2021 WL 4595808 (C.D.\n 10 Cal. June 7, 2021), even though the plaintiff did not even allege that his DMCA\n 11 notices were \u201ccompliant\u201d and failed to attach the DMCA notices to the complaint.\n 12 See Dunham v. Lei, No. CV 20-3716-DMG (MAAx) (Apr. 23, 2020) (complaint).\n 13 The Court explained that the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had actual\n 14 knowledge of or reason to know of the direct infringement of third party infringement\n 15 based on conduct \u201cwhich can be equated to a game of \u2018whack-a-mole\u2019\u201d: [the plaintiff]\n 16 sends DMCA notices to [the] Defendants identifying infringing products [], [the]\n 17 defendants take those products down, then the same and new products using [the\n 18 plaintiff\u2019s] Intellectual Property again become available on those websites.\u201d Id. at *\n 19 6.\n 20 Moreover, Twitter materially misrepresents Backgrid\u2019s pleading when it states\n 21 that apart from the representative examples in the complaint, \u201cBackgrid offers no\n 22\n 23 4\n Twitter also relies on Greg Young Publishing, Inc. v. Zazzle, Inc., 2:16-cv-04587-SVW-\n KS, 2017 WL 2729584 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) for its position that the DMCA notice need\n 24 be compliant to provide notice. That case did not involve contributory infringement.\n 5\n Twitter complains that the notices were not attached. Had Backgrid attached 6,700 DMCA\n 25 notices, presumably Twitter would complain that doing that would be insufficient, just as it\n complained about Backgrid\u2019s purported failure to identity the users when they were\n 26 identified in Exhibit B.\n 6\n Imagine if those facts were. In addition to Twitter\u2019s argument that each infringement must\n 27 be identified by attaching thousands of screenshots to the complaint, Twitter appears to be\n asking that each DMCA notice and each infringement be pleaded individually in the\n 28 complaint. That would be a poor use of the Court\u2019s and the parties\u2019 resources.\n 11\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 18 of 26 Page ID #:6229\n\n\n\n 1 facts at all about its notice.\u201d Motion, 12:09. In fact, Backgrid alleges that it sent\n 2 \u201cmore than 6,700 DMCA takedown notices\u201d (\u00b6 18) and that each notice \u201ccomplied\n 3 with 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3), giving Twitter knowledge of specific infringing material,\n 4 including by providing a link to where the infringement was stored and where it was\n 5 displayed.\u201d Id. That is sufficient to allege knowledge, especially inasmuch as sending\n 6 a DMCA notice is not required but is sufficient to find knowledge. For example, a\n 7 cease-and-desist letter, which might not otherwise contain some of the information in\n 8 a proper DMCA notice, could create sufficient knowledge under a contributory\n 9 infringement theory. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc., 591 F. Supp.\n 10 2d 1098, 1106-08 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that letters informing defendants of\n 11 infringing websites, among other evidence, could lead a reasonable jury to find that\n 12 defendants had actual knowledge of direct infringement). Although there is no\n 13 requirement to plead the use of compliant DMCA notices, Backgrid has done so\n 14 anyway.7\n 15 Additionally, Twitter ignores Backgrid\u2019s allegations of willful blindness, which\n 16 are sufficient by themselves to adequately plead \u201cknowledge.\u201d See UMG Recordings,\n 17 Inc. v. Mahakkapong, No. CV 14\u201307229 DMG (JEM), 2015 WL 12803768, at * 3\n 18 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2015) (quoting Ludvarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d\n 19 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201cwillful blindness\u201d can establish the knowledge element\n 20 for contributory liability)). Backgrid alleged that \u201c[Twitter] feign[s] ignorance of the\n 21 content of Backgrid\u2019s DMCA notices, thus acting with willful blindness toward the\n 22 infringement of Backgrid\u2019s works [when they refuse to take the works down].\u201d (FAC\n 23\n 24 7 Twitter cites to Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *5 \u201cfor sake of comparison,\u201d but that order did not\n address and did not decide whether allegations regarding the contents of the DMCA notices were\n 25 necessary. In fact, the First Amended Complaint in that case, cited to by Twitter shows the opposite.\n The allegations did not include factual detail regarding the contents of the DMCA Notices. See\n 26 Stross v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-8360-SVW, Dkt. 22 (\u00b6 55) (stating that the notice included (1) a\n table of each Subject Work matched to screen captures of the corresponding Infringing Use(s) and\n 27 their respective URLS, and (20 an additional list of URLS [] in clickable form.\u201d Stross had not\n alleged each element of the notification.), cf 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3). Apparently, Twitter attached\n 28 some of the correspondence to its motion in that case. Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *4, n.3.\n 12\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 19 of 26 Page ID #:6230\n\n\n\n 1 \u00b619) Further, \u201c[o]ther parties send DMCA notices similar to those sent by Backgrid,\n 2 to which Twitter responds by taking the work down. However, with Backgrid\u2019s\n 3 notices, Twitter requires extrajudicial information beyond that required by the\n 4 DMCA.\u201d Id. \u201cTwitter treats Backgrid differently than smaller content providers\n 5 because Backgrid is a source of a substantial amount of valuable, celebrity content.\u201d\n 6 Id.\n 7 2. Twitter Materially Contributed to the Infringement\n 8 To allege material contribution, Backgrid must allege that Twitter could have\n 9 taken \u201csimple measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works yet continues\n 10 to provide access to infringing works.\u201d Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at * 4. Twitter\n 11 contends that Backgrid has not properly alleged material contribution because\n 12 \u201cBackgrid has not provided sufficient allegations to demonstrate that it adequately\n 13 informed Twitter of the alleged infringement.\u201d Motion at 13. In doing so, Twitter\n 14 conflates the \u201cknowledge\u201d requirement with the \u201cmaterial contribution prong\u201d and\n 15 then fails to show that the existence of a material contribution has not been pleaded.\n 16 See Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *4. In fact, Backgrid has alleged facts sufficient to\n 17 support contributory infringement based on material contribution, but Twitter has\n 18 ignored them. See, e.g. FAC \u00b6 18 (\u201cDespite having such knowledge [from the 6,700\n 19 takedown notices], however, Twitter failed to take simple measures to prevent further\n 20 damage, such as disabling the infringement and deleting it from its servers, as well as\n 21 suspending the infringing accounts which repeatedly infringed the copyrights\n 22 belonging to Backgrid.\u201d).\n 23 3. Backgrid Has Adequately Pleaded that Twitter Induced\n 24 Infringement\n 25 The \u201cinducement\u201d element is satisfied when a defendant intentionally induces\n 26 or encourages direct infringement. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942. Twitter has\n 27 induced infringement by providing a platform that encourages its users to \u201cupload and\n 28 edit photographs found on the Internet, failing to advise users that civil and criminal\n 13\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 20 of 26 Page ID #:6231\n\n\n\n 1 penalties attach to the unauthorized copying, posting, and public display of the\n 2 copyrighted photographs, and by creating a system and practice of removing metadata\n 3 from each unlawfully posted and displayed Celebrity Photograph.\u201d FAC \u00b6 35. This\n 4 system induces and encourages infringement, especially when it automatically strips\n 5 metadata that includes authorship and ownership information. There is no legitimate\n 6 purpose in stripping metadata except to induce infringement.\n 7 C. Backgrid Has Sufficiently Alleged Vicarious\n 8 Infringement\n 9 To allege vicarious copyright infringement liability, a plaintiff must plead: (1)\n 10 the defendant exercised the requisite control over the direct infringer; and (2) the\n 11 defendant derived a direct financial benefit from the direct infringement. Keck v.\n 12 Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd., 369 F.Supp.3d 932, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2019). \u201c[T]o escape\n 13 imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must be exercised to its\n 14 fullest extent. Turning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of\n 15 profit gives rise to liability.\u201d Id. (citing A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004\n 16 at 1023 (9thCir. 2001)). A defendant\u2019s knowledge of the infringement, or lack\n 17 thereof, is irrelevant to a claim for vicarious liability. Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Canus\n 18 Prods., Inc., 173 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Vicarious liability is an\n 19 \u201coutgrowth\u201d of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds the\n 20 employer liable for the acts of its agents without regard to whether the employer knew\n 21 of those acts. Id.\n 22 1. Control Over Infringing Conduct\n 23 \u201cA vicarious infringer \u2018exercises control over a direct infringer when he has\n 24 both a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the\n 25 practical ability to do so.\u2019\u201d Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018)\n 26 (quoting Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007)). Among\n 27 other things, Backgrid alleges that Twitter has the legal right to stop and limit directly\n 28 infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so, as shown by its\n 14\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 21 of 26 Page ID #:6232\n\n\n\n 1 willingness and ability to take down infringements identified in DMCA notices sent\n 2 by other parties. (FAC \u00b6 35.) In addition, Backgrid pleaded Twitter\u2019s ability to\n 3 republish the infringements, as described by Paragraphs 10-12, and alleged control\n 4 over the Twitter platform which hosts, displays, and republishes the infringed works.\n 5 Twitter contends that the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct\n 6 \u201cpresupposes some antecedent ability to limit or filter copyrighted material,\u201d citing to\n 7 Tur v. YouTube, CV064436 FMC ajwx, 2007 WL 1893635, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2007),\n 8 and Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2008).\n 9 Motion at 15:14-16. But that language came from a district court case addressing\n 10 whether YouTube\u2019s conduct fell under Section 512(c)(1)(B), which also uses \u201cright\n 11 and ability to control\u201d language.\n 12 Since those cases were decided, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that the \u201cright\n 13 and ability to control\u201d language as used in Section 512 does not necessarily have the\n 14 same meaning as when it is used in the context of vicarious infringement. While the\n 15 court \u201c[o]rdinarily presume[s] that similar language in similar statutes should be\n 16 interpreted similarly,\u201d the Ninth Circuit held that Section 512\u2019s \u2018control\u2019 analysis is\n 17 not the same as the vicarious liability \u201cright to supervise\u201d analysis. UMG Recordings,\n 18 Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201cIn light of the\n 19 DMCA\u2019s language, structure, purpose and legislative history, we are compelled to\n 20 reject UMG\u2019s argument that the district court should have employed Napster\u2019s\n 21 vicarious liability standard to evaluate whether Veoh had sufficient \u2018right and ability\n 22 to control\u2019 infringing activity under \u00a7 512(c).\u201d); accord Cook v. Meta Platforms Inc.,\n 23 No. 4:22-cv-02485-YGR, (Dkt. 40) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023) (finding that the plaintiff\n 24 sufficiently alleged Meta\u2019s right and ability to control infringing advertisements on\n 25 the Facebook platform).\n 26 2. Financial Benefit\n 27 \u201cThe essential aspect of the \u2018direct financial benefit\u2019 inquiry is whether there is\n 28 a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a\n 15\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 22 of 26 Page ID #:6233\n\n\n\n 1 defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a\n 2 defendant's overall profits.\u201d Giganews, 847 F.3d at 673 (internal quotation and\n 3 citation omitted). \u201cThere is no requirement that the draw be substantial.\u201d Ellison v.\n 4 Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004). Financial benefit can exist \u201cwhere\n 5 the availability of infringing material acts as a draw for customers.\u201d Id. at 1078; see\n 6 also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007).\n 7 Here, Backgrid pleaded that, \u201c[o]n information and belief, the Celebrity\n 8 Photographs were displayed in tweet-feeds, along with advertisements that targeted\n 9 particular groups of Twitter users. To keep its users engaged while promoting the\n 10 advertisements on which its revenue depends, Twitter also sends emails to its users\n 11 with links to tweets that they might not otherwise see. Twitter thus provides links to\n 12 tweets from accounts that are not \u2018followed\u2019 by the targeted user. By doing so,\n 13 Twitter increases the number of views those advertisements receive, thereby\n 14 increasing its own advertising revenue.\u201d FAC, \u00b6 35.\n 15 It is irrelevant that Backgrid has not included in the FAC specific examples\n 16 showing a \u201ccausal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial\n 17 benefit.\u201d Financial benefit is sufficiently alleged by, among other things, the\n 18 allegations that Twitter monetizes its platform to enable advertisers to promote their\n 19 brands, products and services through the Twitter platform that uses data to target\n 20 specific audience members by the accounts they follow and the actions they have\n 21 taken. The data it collects from its users is sold to their clients for commercial use and\n 22 is monetized, which means each photo is monetized, and \u201cthe Celebrity Photographs\n 23 were displayed in tweet-feeds, along with advertisements that targeted particular\n 24 groups of Twitter users\u201d and the more traffic generated by the Tweet, the more\n 25 Twitter generates income. (FAC, \u00b6 10.) As described herein, Backgrid has pleaded the\n 26 specifics showing the ways in which Twitter monetizes the Celebrity Photographs. It\n 27 need not provide specific examples.\n 28\n 16\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 23 of 26 Page ID #:6234\n\n\n\n 1 VI. BACKGRID\u2019S CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER\n 2 A. The Court has Jurisdiction to Decide Backgrid\u2019s Declaratory Relief\n 3 Claim8\n 4 When determining whether or not a controversy exists, \"[b]asically, the\n 5 question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show\n 6 that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests,\n 7 of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory\n 8 judgment.\" MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 127 S.Ct. 764,\n 9 771, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). \u201cAn 'actual controversy' requires only that a dispute be\n 10 \u2018definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal\n 11 interests.\u2019\" Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339\n 12 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).\n 13 The controversy between Backgrid and Twitter is \u201cdefinite and concrete.\u201d The\n 14 FAC alleges that \u201cTwitter claims to have DMCA compliant take-down policies set\n 15 forth in its Terms of Service. Based thereon, it claims that the DMCA safe harbor\n 16 protection for ISPs with DMCA compliant take down policies shields it from liability\n 17 for the massive number of infringements it contributes to and engages in daily.\u201d\n 18 (FAC, \u00b6 13.) And its own \u201cCopyright Policy\u201d provides that copyright owners may\n 19 send a DMCA takedown notice and that \u2018If multiple copyright complaints are\n 20 received about an account, or other evidence suggests a pattern of repeat\n 21 infringement, Twitter may suspect the account in accordance with out Repeat\n 22 Infringer Policy.\u201d (FAC, \u00b6 15.) It also alleges that it sent 6,700 takedown notices and\n 23\n 24 8\n Twitter noticed this motion under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). \u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional\n attack may be facial or factual.\u201d Hero Nutritionals, Inc. v. Vitastix, Inc., SACV 09-00927\n 25 DMG (mlgx), 2010 WL 11580048, at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010). See also Safe Air for\n Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (\u201cIn a facial attack, the challenger\n 26 asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke\n federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the\n 27 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction\u201d). Twitter has\n not made a factual attack on jurisdiction nor has it attached any evidence allowing the Court\n 28 to look beyond the four corners of the FAC.\n 17\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 24 of 26 Page ID #:6235\n\n\n\n 1 that Twitter failed to take simple measures to take down the photos identified in the\n 2 notices. (FAC, \u00b6 18.) It did not take down even one infringement nor did it terminate a\n 3 single user even though its terms of service purportedly comply with the DMCA. Id.\n 4 A definite and concrete dispute exists as to whether Twitter\u2019s policy complies with\n 5 the DMCA.\n 6 Twitter\u2019s reliance on Veoh Networks v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 522 F.Supp.2d\n 7 1265 (S.D. Cal. 2007), is misplaced. The plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment\n 8 action against content holders seeking a declaration of non-infringement of the\n 9 content holder\u2019s copyrights, \u201cprimarily under Section 512(c).\u201d Id. at 1267. The court\n 10 expressed concern that because the \u201cPlaintiff does not reference any specific\n 11 copyright, even by way of example, the relief requested would necessarily take the\n 12 form of an advisory opinion.\u201d (Emphasis added). Id. at 1269-70. The plaintiff simply\n 13 wanted \u201cblanket validation of the ongoing legality of their business model.\u201d Id. Here,\n 14 Backgrid is not seeking blanket validation, but rather alleges that as a threshold\n 15 matter Twitter is not entitled to the safe harbor: Because Twitter does not satisfy the\n 16 threshold requirements of 512(i), it does not have the safe harbor.\n 17 B. The Declaratory Relief Claim Is Proper\n 18 Twitter\u2019s argument that the declaratory relief claim is anticipatory and\n 19 premature because it has not yet alleged the DMCA as a defense ignores that an actual\n 20 case or controversy already exists with respect to whether a policy that Twitter\n 21 contends it has, that has been relied upon by both parties, is valid or not.9 As alleged\n 22 in the complaint, this claim is based on Twitter\u2019s \u201cfailure and refusal to apply their\n 23 own Copyright Policy to their users.\u201d FAC, \u00b6 36; see also FAC, \u00b6 44. See Section\n 24 VI(a), incorporated herein by reference.\n 25\n 26\n 27 9\n Twitter also argues that the declaratory judgment claims are \u201credundant\u201d of Twitter\u2019s\n anticipated defense (Motion at 21:20), although it does not explain how a claim can be both\n 28 premature and redundant.\n 18\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 25 of 26 Page ID #:6236\n\n\n\n 1 It makes no difference whether the defense has yet been raised. Backgrid has\n 2 been treating Twitter as an ISP, sending compliant DMCA notices to Twitter\u2019s\n 3 purported DMCA agent, with the expectation that the material complained of would\n 4 be taken down as contemplated by Section 512. Whether it is articulated as a defense\n 5 or not, Backgrid has actually been tirelessly going through this process to vindicate its\n 6 rights.\n 7 Twitter contends it has a DMCA policy that it enforces with respect to all\n 8 copyright holders. Should that policy be deemed invalid, the effect would be to\n 9 invalidate it as to all similarly situated plaintiffs, not just as to Backgrid.10 Much like\n 10 a declaratory relief claim for invalidity of a patent, Twitter\u2019s policy is either valid or\n 11 not valid. See Hero Nutritionals, 2010 WL 11580048, at *3. Whether Backgrid\n 12 articulated in its complaint that no safe harbor exists as to the world is immaterial.\n 13 VII. SHOULD THE COURT GRANT THIS MOTION, BACKGRID\n 14 RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT THE COURT GRANT\n 15 BACKGRID LEAVE TO AMEND\n 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may amend a\n 17 pleading with the court's leave, and that \u201c[t]he court should freely give leave when\n 18 justice so requires.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). \u201c[L]eave to amend should be granted\n 19 unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith,\n 20 is futile, or creates undue delay.\u201d Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d 604,\n 21 607 (9th Cir. 1992).\n 22\n 23 10\n Twitter contends that Divino Grp. v. Google LLC, 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) is\n instructive because the plaintiff in that case purportedly \u201csought a declaration that Section 230 of the\n 24 Communications Decency Act was unconstitutional.\u201d Motion at 20. There, the declaratory relief\n claim depended on the alleged violation of plaintiff\u2019s First Amendment rights, for which plaintiff\n 25 failed to state a claim in the first instance. Id. at *10. Twitter also cites to Newman v. Google LLC,\n 2021 WL 2633423, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021). In Newman\u00b8 the court decided that it would not\n 26 hear whether Section 230 was constitutional. Like Divino, that case is distinguishable because the\n court had dismissed plaintiff\u2019s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over\n 27 the plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims, making it \u201cinappropriate to adjudicate the constitutionality of Section\n 230 [] because such adjudication is avoidable and unnecessary to decide Defendants\u2019 motion to\n 28 dismiss.\u201d Newman, 2021 WL 2633423, at * 14.\n 19\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 28 Filed 06/16/23 Page 26 of 26 Page ID #:6237\n\n\n\n 1 Should the Court find dismissal of any of Backgrid\u2019s claims proper, Backgrid\n 2 respectfully requests that it be given leave to amend.\n 3 VIII. CONCLUSION\n 4 Backgrid respectfully requests that the Court deny Twitter\u2019s motion to dismiss\n 5 in full.\n 6\n 7 Dated: June 16, 2023 ONE LLP\n 8\n By: /s/ Joanna Ardalan\n 9 Joanna Ardalan\n 10 Peter R. Afrasiabi\n David W. Quinto\n 11\n 12 Attorneys for Plaintiff,\n Backgrid USA, Inc.\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n 20\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-06-21T04:00:03.827505-07:00","document_number":"28","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031040249264","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Objection/Opposition (Motion related)","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-06-16T16:33:15.908891-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.674365-07:00","date_filed":"2023-06-16","time_filed":"16:17:03","entry_number":28,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-06-16.001","pacer_sequence_number":83,"description":"Opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case 26 filed by Plaintiff BackGrid USA, Inc.. (Ardalan, Joanna) (Entered: 06/16/2023)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/329435018/","id":329435018,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/335700112/","id":335700112,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/27/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-05-16T12:35:05.058613-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.659718-07:00","sha1":"b562a6ea3141ea3cdbeab8693e45e50c0a2662bb","page_count":3,"file_size":184516,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.27.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.27.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 27 Filed 05/16/23 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:6209\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP\n Daniel C. Posner (Bar No. 232009)\n \uf032 danposner@quinnemanuel.com\n Justin C. Griffin (Bar No. 234675)\n \uf033 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com\n Laurenne M. Babayan (Bar No. 348075)\n \uf034 laurennebabayan@quinnemanuel.com\n 865 S. Figueroa Street, 10th Floor\n \uf035 Los Angeles, California 90017\n Telephone: (213) 443-3000\n \uf036 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100\n \uf037 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n\n \uf038\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n \uf039\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n \uf031\uf030\n\n \uf031\uf031\n BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n \uf031\uf032 corporation,\n DEFENDANT\u2019S CERTIFICATION\n \uf031\uf033 OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR\n Plaintiff, PERSONS AND CORPORATE\n \uf031\uf034 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT\n \uf031\uf035 vs.\n The Honorable Dolly M. Gee\n \uf031\uf036 TWITTER, INC. a Delaware Courtroom: 8C\n \uf031\uf037 corporation,\n\n \uf031\uf038 Defendant.\n \uf031\uf039\n\n \uf032\uf030\n\n \uf032\uf031\n\n \uf032\uf032\n\n \uf032\uf033\n\n \uf032\uf034\n\n \uf032\uf035\n\n \uf032\uf036\n \uf032\uf037\n\n \uf032\uf038\n\n Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 27 Filed 05/16/23 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:6210\n\n\n\n\n 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1, the undersigned counsel for\n 2 named Defendant Twitter, Inc. hereby states that Twitter, Inc. has been merged into\n\n 3 X Corp. and no longer exists.\n\n 4 X Corp. is a privately held corporation incorporated under the laws of the\n 5 State of Nevada. Its parent corporation is X Holdings Corp. No publicly traded\n\n 6 corporation owns 10% or more of the stock of X Corp. or X Holdings Corp.\n\n 7 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 and Local Rule 7.1-1, the\n 8 undersigned counsel of record for Defendant X Corp. certifies that the following\n\n 9 listed persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations (including,\n\n 10 but not limited to, parent corporations), or other entities (i) have a financial interest\n\n 11 in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or (ii) have a\n\n 12 non-financial interest in that subject matter or in a party that could be substantially\n\n 13 affected by the outcome of this proceeding:\n\n 14 \u2022 X Corp.\n 15 \u2022 X Holdings Corp.\n 16\n\n 17 DATED: May 16, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 18\n\n 19\n\n 20 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 21 Daniel C. Posner\n Justin C. Griffin\n 22 Laurenne M. Babayan\n 23\n Attorneys for X Corp., sucessor in interest\n 24 to Twitter, Inc.\n 25\n\n 26\n 27\n\n 28\n\n 1 Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 27 Filed 05/16/23 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:6211\n\n\n\n\n 1\n CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n 2\n I hereby certify that the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record\n 3\n electronically or by another manner authorized under FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b) on this\n 4\n the 16th day of May 2023.\n 5\n\n 6 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n 7 SULLIVAN, LLP\n\n 8\n\n 9\n By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 10 Daniel C. Posner\n 11 Justin C. Griffin\n Laurenne M. Babayan\n 12 Attorneys for X Corp., a successor in\n 13 interest to Twitter, Inc..\n\n 14\n\n 15\n\n 16\n\n 17\n\n 18\n\n 19\n\n 20\n\n 21\n\n 22\n\n 23\n\n 24\n\n 25\n\n 26\n 27\n\n 28\n\n 2 Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-05-16T15:26:13.778359-07:00","document_number":"27","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031040037779","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Certificate/Notice of Interested Parties","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-05-16T12:35:04.996769-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.646320-07:00","date_filed":"2023-05-16","time_filed":"12:26:19","entry_number":27,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-05-16.001","pacer_sequence_number":79,"description":"CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties filed by Defendant Twitter, Inc., identifying X Holdings Corp.. (Posner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/16/2023)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/322749355/","id":322749355,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/329009685/","id":329009685,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/26/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-05-12T15:06:05.806135-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.626956-07:00","sha1":"d41a01c4273b3e308b48681a1be5fa80f1ef08b3","page_count":29,"file_size":550431,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.26.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.26.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 1 of 29 Page ID #:6178\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP\n Daniel C. Posner (Bar No. 232009)\n 2 danposner@quinnemanuel.com\n Justin C. Griffin (Bar No. 234675)\n 3 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com\n Laurenne M. Babayan (Bar No. 348075)\n 4 laurennebabayan@quinnemanuel.com\n 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543\n Telephone: (213) 443-3000\n 6 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100\n 7 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 10\n 11 BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n corporation,\n 12 DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S\n Plaintiff, NOTICE OF MOTION AND\n 13 MOTION TO DISMISS;\n vs. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND\n 14 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT\n TWITTER, INC., a Delaware THEREOF\n 15 corporation and Does 1-10, inclusive,\n 16 Defendants. Date: July 21, 2023\n Time: 8:30 a.m.\n 17 Judge: The Honorable Dolly M. Gee\n Courtroom: 8C\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 2 of 29 Page ID #:6179\n\n\n\n\n 1 TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-TITLED COURT, ALL PARTIES AND\n 2 THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:\n 3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, on July 21, 2023, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon\n 4 thereafter as the matter may be heard, Defendant Twitter, Inc. (\u201cTwitter\u201d) will, and\n 5 hereby does, move the Court to grant Twitter\u2019s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules\n 6 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the\n 7 Court should dismiss the First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Backgrid\n 8 U.S.A., Inc. (\u201cBackgrid\u201d) because it fails to state claims for direct, contributory, or\n 9 vicarious copyright infringement, or for declaratory relief.\n 10 This motion is made pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal\n 11 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion to\n 12 Dismiss, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all pleadings\n 13 on file in this action, such other evidence or arguments as may be presented to the\n 14 Court, and such other matters of which this Court may take judicial notice.\n 15 This motion is made following the meet and confer of counsel which took\n 16 place on April 20, 2023.\n 17\n 18 DATED: May 12, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 19\n 20\n 21 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 22 Daniel C. Posner\n Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -2- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 3 of 29 Page ID #:6180\n\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS\n Page\n 2\n 3 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1\n 4 BACKGROUND............................................................................................ 2\n 5 A. Backgrid\u2019s Complaint ................................................................... 2\n 6 B. Backgrid\u2019s First Amended Complaint.............................................. 2\n 7 1. Allegations About Backgrid .................................................. 2\n 8 2. Allegations About Twitter\u2019s Platform ..................................... 2\n 9 3. Allegations About Twitter\u2019s DMCA Compliance..................... 3\n 10 4. Backgrid\u2019s Claims For Relief ................................................ 5\n 11 LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................... 6\n 12 ARGUMENT................................................................................................. 7\n 13 I. BACKGRID FAILS TO STATE VALID CLAIMS FOR COPYRIGHT\n INFRINGEMENT ................................................................................. 7\n 14\n A. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Direct Infringement ................. 7\n 15\n B. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Indirect Infringement ............. 11\n 16\n 1. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Underlying Direct\n 17 Infringement By Any Third Party ........................................ 11\n 18 2. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Contributory\n Infringement ..................................................................... 11\n 19\n 3. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Vicarious\n 20 Infringement ..................................................................... 15\n 21 II. BACKGRID FAILS TO STATE A VALID CLAIM FOR\n DECLARATORY RELIEF................................................................... 17\n 22\n A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Backgrid\u2019s Sweeping Claim\n 23 For Declaratory Relief................................................................. 18\n 24 B. Backgrid\u2019s Declaratory Relief Claim Is Otherwise Improper ............ 20\n 25 CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 22\n 26 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................... 23\n 27\n 28\n\n -i- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 4 of 29 Page ID #:6181\n\n\n\n\n 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n Page(s)\n 2\n 3 Cases\n 4 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,\n 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)...............................................................7, 11\n 5\n Albrecht v. Lund,\n 6\n 845 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................... 6\n 7\n Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n 8 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................6, 13\n 9\n Azoulai v. BMW of N. Am. LLC,\n 10 2017 WL 1354781 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) .............................................. 7\n 11 Balistreri v. Pacific Police Dep\u2019t,\n 12 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................... 6\n 13 CoStar Grp,. Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,\n 14 373 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 2004) ..................................................................... 9\n\n 15 Divino Grp. LLC v. Google LLC,\n 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) ............................................. 20, 21\n 16\n 17 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,\n 545 U.S. 546 (2005) ............................................................................... 18\n 18\n Fayer v. Vaughn,\n 19 649 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2011)...............................................................6, 13\n 20\n Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C.,\n 21 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).................................................................... 7\n 22 Greater Los Angeles Council on Deadness, Inc v. Zolin,\n 23 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987).................................................................. 20\n 24 Greg Young Publishing, Inc. v. Zazzle, Inc.,\n 25 2017 WL 2729584 (C.D. Cal., May 1, 2017) ............................................. 12\n\n 26 Hip Hop Beverage Corp. v. Monster Energy Co.,\n 733 F. App\u2019x 380 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................... 7\n 27\n 28\n\n -ii- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 5 of 29 Page ID #:6182\n\n\n\n\n 1 Ileto v. Glock, Inc.,\n 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).................................................................... 6\n 2\n 3 Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,\n 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ..................................................... 15\n 4\n Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub.,\n 5\n 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................... 20\n 6\n Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,\n 7 494 U.S. 472 (1990) ............................................................................... 18\n 8\n MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,\n 9 549 U.S. 118 (2007) ............................................................................... 18\n 10 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.\n 11 545 U.S. 913 (2005) ............................................................................... 14\n 12 Newman v. Google LLC,\n 13 2021 WL 2633423 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) ....................................... 20, 21\n\n 14 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,\n 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).................................................................. 11\n 15\n 16 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,\n 2014 WL 8628031 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) ............................................ 11\n 17\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,\n 18 847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................... 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17\n 19\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass\u2019n,\n 20 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) .........................................................11, 14, 15\n 21 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V.,\n 22 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ..................................................... 11\n 23 Poppy Tex & Designs, Inc. v. Cont\u2019l Logistic Serv., Inc.,\n 24 2020 WL 7315343 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) ............................................. 17\n\n 25 Pub. Serv. Com. v. Wycoff Co.,\n 344 U.S. 237 (1952) ............................................................................... 19\n 26\n 27 Rosen v. eBay, Inc.,\n 2018 WL 4808513 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018) .............................................. 10\n 28\n\n -iii- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 6 of 29 Page ID #:6183\n\n\n\n\n 1 Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery,\n 829 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1987) ..................................................................... 7\n 2\n 3 Stickrath v. Globalstar, Inc.,\n 2008 WL 2050990 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) ....................................... 20, 21\n 4\n Stross v. Twitter, Inc.,\n 5\n No. 2:21-CV-8360-SVW, Dkt. 22 (First Amended Complaint)\n 6 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2022)................................................9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17\n 7 Tur v. YouTube,\n 8 2007 WL 1893635 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007)............................................. 15\n 9 Veoh Networks, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,\n 10 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Cal. 2007)................................... 7, 18, 19, 20, 21\n\n 11 VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,\n 918 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019) .............................................. 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16\n 12\n 13 Zagorsky-Beaudoin v. Rhino Entertainment Company,\n 2019 WL 4259788 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2019) .......................................... 16, 17\n 14\n 15 Statutes\n 16 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 106............................................................................................ 7\n 17 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(i).............................................................................. 6, 19, 20\n 18\n 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(c)(3).................................................................................. 12\n 19\n 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)......................................................................... 12\n 20\n 21 Communications Decency Act Section 230 .................................................... 20\n 22\n Other Authorities\n 23\n Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 12(f) ............................................................................. 21\n 24\n Rule 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................... 7\n 25\n 26 Rule 12(b)(6) ............................................................................................... 6\n 27\n 28\n\n -iv- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 7 of 29 Page ID #:6184\n\n\n\n\n 1 INTRODUCTION\n 2 Plaintiff Backgrid\u2019s First Amended Complaint (the \u201cFAC\u201d) does not remedy\n 3 the defects in the original complaint that Backgrid voluntarily amended after Twitter\n 4 identified its deficiencies. To the contrary, the FAC confirms that Backgrid is unable\n 5 to state claims for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement, and for\n 6 declaratory relief. The Court should dismiss Backgrid\u2019s FAC without further leave\n 7 to amend.\n 8 Backgrid fails to allege Twitter\u2019s direct infringement because it does not allege\n 9 the requisite \u201cvolitional\u201d conduct by Twitter, or even that any of Backgrid\u2019s\n 10 \u201cCelebrity Photographs\u201d at issue were included as the result of automation by\n 11 Twitter\u2019s systems or otherwise\u2014in any of Twitter\u2019s features that Backgrid identifies\n 12 as the basis for Twitter\u2019s direct infringement.\n 13 Backgrid likewise fails to allege contributory infringement because its vague\n 14 and conclusory allegations that it sent \u201ccompliant\u201d DMCA notices to Twitter are\n 15 inadequate to create a plausible inference that Twitter actually knew which Backgrid\n 16 photos were at issue in any specific Twitter posts that Twitter could have removed.\n 17 And Backgrid does not adequately allege Twitter\u2019s vicarious infringement\n 18 either, because it does not (and cannot) allege that Twitter had the practical ability to\n 19 identify and remove the alleged infringements apart from Backgrid providing notice\n 20 of them, or that Twitter benefitted financially from the alleged infringements.\n 21 Finally, Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief fails as a premature and\n 22 unnecessary attempt to adjudicate Twitter\u2019s anticipated DMCA defense, and because\n 23 it is wildly overbroad\u2014and presents no justiciable case or controversy\u2014to the extent\n 24 it is based on Twitter\u2019s alleged response to claims by third parties relating to\n 25 copyrighted works that have nothing to do with Backgrid and that are not at issue in\n 26 the FAC.\n 27 After Backgrid failed to salvage its claims through its initial amendment, the\n 28 Court should now dismiss Backgrid\u2019s claims with prejudice.\n\n -1- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 8 of 29 Page ID #:6185\n\n\n\n\n 1 BACKGROUND\n 2 A. Backgrid\u2019s Complaint\n 3 Backgrid filed its Complaint on December 30, 2022, asserting claims for (i)\n 4 direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement, and (ii) declaratory relief.\n 5 Dkt. 1. Backgrid failed to state valid claims, so the parties met and conferred\n 6 regarding Twitter\u2019s anticipated motion to dismiss, following which Backgrid agreed\n 7 to amend its Complaint.\n 8 B. Backgrid\u2019s First Amended Complaint\n 9 Backgrid filed the FAC on March 13, 2023. Dkt. 23.\n 10 1. Allegations About Backgrid\n 11 Backgrid alleges it is \u201cthe world\u2019s premier celebrity-related photograph\n 12 agency.\u201d FAC \u00b6 6. Backgrid alleges it owns copyrights in all the \u201cCelebrity\n 13 Photographs known to have been infringed,\u201d and it includes a list of the copyright\n 14 registration numbers for them (albeit without showing images of them or describing\n 15 what the images depict) in Exhibit A to the FAC. Id. \u00b6 7. Backgrid alleges that its\n 16 \u201ctimely registered Celebrity Photographs [are] collectively attached as Exhibit B\u201d to\n 17 the FAC, though Exhibit B contains a compilation of Twitter posts, many or all of\n 18 which depict multiple photographs and other visual content, making it unclear what\n 19 the copyrighted Celebrity Photographs actually are. See Dkts. 23-2 through 23-31.\n 20 2. Allegations About Twitter\u2019s Platform\n 21 Backgrid alleges that Twitter operates a \u201csimple, but spectacularly profitable\u201d\n 22 platform for \u201cpublic self-expression and conversation in real time. FAC \u00b6 9. Backgrid\n 23 alleges that Twitter \u201cmonetizes its platform,\u201d including by \u201cenabling advertisers to\n 24 promote their brands, products, and services through the Twitter platform that then\n 25 permits targeting specific audience members by the accounts they follow and the\n 26 actions they have taken on the Twitter platform\u201d; selling \u201cthe data it collects from its\n 27 users . . . to their clients for commercial use\u201d; and using \u201cthe information it collects\n 28\n\n -2- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 9 of 29 Page ID #:6186\n\n\n\n\n 1 [to] target[] advertisements to specific user audiences . . . by displaying\n 2 advertisements calculated to interest a given audience.\u201d Id. \u00b6 10.\n 3 Backgrid alleges, \u201con information and belief,\u201d that \u201cthe Celebrity Photographs\n 4 were displayed in tweet-feeds, along with advertisements that targeted particular\n 5 groups of Twitter users\u201d (id.), though it offers no facts supporting the basis for this\n 6 \u201cbelief,\u201d and it provides no examples of this occurring. Backgrid also alleges \u201con\n 7 information and belief,\u201d though without reference to the Celebrity Photographs, that\n 8 \u201cTwitter charges advertisers more based on the amount of the interaction the\n 9 advertisement-tweet generates,\u201d so that \u201cit is important to Twitter to have attractive\n 10 and compelling tweets placed around the advertisement tweet to gain more traffic and\n 11 more advertisement interaction.\u201d Id. Backgrid further alleges, again without\n 12 referencing the Celebrity Photographs, that, \u201c[t]o keep its users engaged while\n 13 promoting the advertisements on which its revenue depends, Twitter also sends emails\n 14 to its users with links to tweets that they might not otherwise see,\u201d and that by \u201cdoing\n 15 so, Twitter increases the number of views those advertisements receive, thereby\n 16 increasing its own advertising revenue.\u201d Id. Backgrid alleges that, \u201c[o]nce a Twitter\n 17 user uploads a photo, Twitter selects, orders, and/or arranges content to display to\n 18 other Twitter users, including content from Twitter accounts that are not among those\n 19 \u2018followed\u2019 by the viewing user.\u201d Id. \u00b6 11.\n 20 Backgrid does not allege that any Twitter employees selected any of the\n 21 Celebrity Photographs for inclusion in any of the features it identifies, or state any\n 22 facts showing that the Celebrity Photographs actually were included in any of those\n 23 features, whether as the result of automation or otherwise.\n 24 3. Allegations About Twitter\u2019s DMCA Compliance\n 25 Backgrid alleges that Twitter \u201cclaims to have DMCA compliant take-down\n 26 policies,\u201d but that Twitter\u2019s policies are \u201chonored in the breach.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 13-15.\n 27 Without providing any examples or factual support, Backgrid alleges that Twitter\n 28\n\n -3- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 10 of 29 Page ID #:6187\n\n\n\n\n 1 \u201cregularly fails and refuses to comport with the industry standard\u201d for terminating\n 2 accounts of repeat infringers. Id. \u00b6 16.\n 3 Backgrid alleges that an unspecified number of unidentified Twitter \u201cusers\u201d\n 4 have violated Backgrid\u2019s rights in \u201cat least 1,526\u201d unspecified Celebrity Photographs.\n 5 Id. \u00b6\u00b6 28, 33. Backgrid further alleges that it has sent \u201cmore than 6,700 DMCA\n 6 takedown notices\u201d to Twitter relating to an unspecified number of unidentified\n 7 copyrighted works at unspecified times, but that Twitter did not take down the\n 8 unidentified posts or suspend the accounts of any of the unidentified \u201crepeat\n 9 infringer[s].\u201d Id. \u00b6 18; see also id. \u00b6 29. Backgrid alleges that its purported DMCA\n 10 notices gave \u201cTwitter knowledge of specific infringing material, including by\n 11 providing a link to where the infringement was stored and where it was displayed,\u201d\n 12 but that, \u201c[d]espite having such knowledge, . . . Twitter failed to take simple measures\n 13 to prevent further damage, such as disabling the infringement and deleting it from its\n 14 servers, as well as suspending the infringing accounts which repeatedly infringed the\n 15 copyrights belonging to Backgrid.\u201d Id.\n 16 Without providing any examples or offering any factual support, Backgrid\n 17 alleges that \u201cTwitter treats Backgrid\u2019s DMCA notices differently than notices from\n 18 other parties,\u201d that \u201cit attempts to feign ignorance of what is in Backgrid\u2019s DMCA\n 19 notices, thus acting with willful blindness towards the infringement of Backgrid\u2019s\n 20 works,\u201d and that \u201c[o]ther parties send DMCA notices similar to those sent by\n 21 Backgrid, to which Twitter responds by taking the work down.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19.\n 22 Of the \u201cmore than 6,700\u201d unidentified \u201cDMCA takedown notices\u201d that\n 23 Backgrid alleges it sent to Twitter relating to the Celebrity Photographs, Backgrid\n 24 purports to describe 73 of them (allegedly relating to 49 unspecified \u201ctimely registered\n 25 infringing photographs\u201d) posted by the \u201cBSO\u201d Twitter account, and another 101\n 26 (allegedly relating to 42 unspecified \u201ctimely registered photographs\u201d) posted by the\n 27 \u201cfoochia\u201d account, by identifying the dates when it sent those notices and providing\n 28 the urls where the posts depicting the alleged infringing photographs can be found.\n\n -4- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 11 of 29 Page ID #:6188\n\n\n\n\n 1 Id. \u00b6\u00b6 21-24. Backgrid alleges that \u201c[e]ach infringement remains live.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24. This\n 2 allegation is demonstrably false as to the \u201cBSO\u201d posts, none of which is \u201clive,\u201d as can\n 3 be confirmed by checking the urls Backgrid identifies. See, e.g.,\n 4 https://twitter.com/bso/status/999723833413308416;\n 5 https://twitter.com/bso/status/1041018833249730561.\n 6 4. Backgrid\u2019s Claims For Relief\n 7 Backgrid asserts two claims for relief.\n 8 First, Backgrid asserts a claim for \u201cDirect, Contributory, and Vicarious\n 9 Copyright Infringement.\u201d Backgrid alleges that Twitter \u201cdirectly infringed\u201d by\n 10 \u201ccontinuing to publicly display the photos long after being apprised of infringement,\n 11 using Twitter\u2019s explore feature to choose and arrange infringing content, promoting\n 12 tweets based on subscription models, such as the Blue Subscription, in which verified\n 13 users pay a monthly fee to have their tweets promoted on others\u2019 tweet-feeds, and\n 14 continuing to store copies of the photos on [Twitter\u2019s] servers without Backgrid\u2019s\n 15 consent.\u201d Id. \u00b6 34.\n 16 Backgrid alleges, without any specific factual support or examples, that Twitter\n 17 has \u201ccontributorily infringed the Celebrity Photographs, including without limitation\n 18 by encouraging its users to upload and edit photographs found on the Internet, failing\n 19 to advise users that civil and criminal penalties attach to the unauthorized copying,\n 20 posting, and public display of copyrighted photographs, and by creating a system and\n 21 practice of removing metadata from each unlawfully posted and displayed Celebrity\n 22 Photograph.\u201d Id. \u00b6 35.\n 23 And Backgrid alleges, again without any factual support or examples, that\n 24 Twitter \u201cvicariously infringed the Celebrity Photographs\u201d because it \u201chas both a legal\n 25 right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to\n 26 do so, as shown by its willingness and ability to take down infringement identified in\n 27 DMCA notices sent by other parties,\u201d and it \u201chad a direct financial interest in the\n 28 infringement because it used the information it collects from tweets and user\n\n -5- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 12 of 29 Page ID #:6189\n\n\n\n\n 1 engagement to target advertisements to specific user audiences.\u201d Id. \u00b6 35. Backgrid\n 2 also alleges, \u201con information and belief,\u201d and without providing any factual support\n 3 for the basis of its belief, that \u201cthe Celebrity Photographs were displayed in tweet-\n 4 feeds, along with advertisements that targeted particular groups of Twitter users.\u201d Id.\n 5 Second, Backgrid asserts a claim for \u201cDeclaratory Relief: No Safe Harbor\n 6 Under the DMCA,\u201d in which it alleges that \u201can actual controversy exists over whether\n 7 Twitter has satisfied the requirements of 17 U.S.C. 512(i) by adopting and reasonably\n 8 implementing a Digital Millennium Copyright Act repeat infringer policy, and,\n 9 therefore, whether Twitter is entitled to the safe harbor.\u201d Id. \u00b6 44. Backgrid \u201cseeks a\n 10 declaration that Twitter has neither adopted nor reasonably implemented a repeat\n 11 infringer policy, and, as such, is liable for each of the works infringed on its platform\n 12 and is not entitled to the safe harbor in any circumstances for any work until it\n 13 complies with Section 512(i).\u201d Id. \u00b6 46.\n 14 LEGAL STANDARD\n 15 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Ileto v.\n 16 Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A \u201ccomplaint must contain\n 17 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on\n 18 its face,\u201d but \u201c[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements \u2026 supported by mere conclusory\n 19 statements, do not suffice.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal\n 20 quotation omitted). \u201cAlthough factual allegations are taken as true, [courts] do not\n 21 assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of\n 22 factual allegations.\u201d Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal\n 23 quotation omitted).\n 24 Dismissal is proper where there is a \u201clack of a cognizable legal theory\u201d or \u201cthe\n 25 absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.\u201d Balistreri v.\n 26 Pacific Police Dep\u2019t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). If \u201callegations of other facts\n 27 consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure\u201d deficiencies in the\n 28 complaint, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d\n\n -6- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 13 of 29 Page ID #:6190\n\n\n\n\n 1 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988). Likewise, \u201c[w]here the amended complaint fails to cure the\n 2 pleading deficiencies\u201d in the original, \u201c\u2018[t]he district court could reasonably conclude\n 3 that further amendment would be futile.\u2019\u201d Hip Hop Beverage Corp. v. Monster\n 4 Energy Co., 733 F. App\u2019x 380, 382 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Rutman Wine Co. v. E.\n 5 & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987)) (affirming district court\u2019s\n 6 dismissal with prejudice); see also Azoulai v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 2017 WL\n 7 1354781, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (dismissing claims without leave to amend\n 8 where \u201cPlaintiffs [] already had one opportunity for substantive amendments\u201d).\n 9 Rule 12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a claim for \u201clack of jurisdiction over\n 10 the subject matter.\u201d Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because the plaintiff invoked the\n 11 Court\u2019s jurisdiction, the \u201cplaintiff bears the burden of proof on the necessary\n 12 jurisdictional facts.\u201d Veoh Networks, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d\n 13 1265, 1269 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted).\n 14 ARGUMENT\n 15 I. BACKGRID FAILS TO STATE VALID CLAIMS FOR COPYRIGHT\n INFRINGEMENT\n 16\n A. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Direct Infringement\n 17\n \u201cTo establish a prima facie case of direct infringement, a plaintiff \u2018must show\n 18\n ownership of the allegedly infringed material\u2019 and \u2018demonstrate that the alleged\n 19\n infringers violated at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17\n 20\n U.S.C. \u00a7 106.\u2019\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017)\n 21\n (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)).\n 22\n \u201cIn addition, direct infringement requires the plaintiff to show causation (also referred\n 23\n to as \u2018volitional conduct\u2019) by the defendant.\u201d Id. (citing Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish\n 24\n Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013)).\n 25\n The Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision in VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723\n 26\n (9th Cir. 2019), controls here and compels the dismissal of Backgrid\u2019s direct\n 27\n infringement claim. In Zillow, the Ninth Circuit delineated the boundary between\n 28\n\n -7- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 14 of 29 Page ID #:6191\n\n\n\n\n 1 volitional and non-volitional conduct for website owners. Volitional conduct giving\n 2 rise to direct infringement liability requires \u201cactive[] involve[ment] in the\n 3 infringement.\u201d Id. at 732. In Zillow, for example, Zillow was liable for direct\n 4 infringement where \u201cZillow moderators selected and tagged\u201d infringing photos \u201cfor\n 5 searchable functionality.\u201d Id. at 736. \u201cPut differently, active conduct by Zillow met\n 6 the volitional-conduct requirement for direct infringement.\u201d Id.\n 7 The Zillow court also explained that \u201cactivities that fall on the other side of the\n 8 line, such as \u2018automatic copying, storage, and transmission of copyrighted materials,\n 9 when instigated by others, do not render an Internet service provider strictly liable for\n 10 copyright infringement.\u201d Id. (quoting Giganews, 847 F.3d at 670) (cleaned up).\n 11 Accordingly, the court held that Zillow did not directly infringe through its online\n 12 platform because \u201c[a]ny volitional conduct with respect to [the infringing] photos was\n 13 taken by the users, not Zillow.\u201d Id. at 737. The court reasoned that \u201cZillow\u2019s conduct\n 14 with respect to [the infringing photos] amount[ed] to, at most, passive participation in\n 15 the alleged infringement of reproduction and adaptation rights and is not sufficient to\n 16 cross the volitional-conduct line.\u201d Id. at 738.\n 17 Here, Backgrid\u2019s direct infringement claim should be dismissed because the\n 18 FAC does not allege any conduct by Twitter that could qualify as \u201cvolitional.\u201d1 Like\n 19 the plaintiff in Zillow, and even assuming the truth of its allegations of direct\n 20 infringement (see FAC \u00b6\u00b6 11, 34), Backgrid fails to allege that the features of the\n 21 Twitter platform it identifies are anything more than passive, automated acts that are\n 22 consistent with the general operation of Twitter\u2019s website. For example, although\n 23 Backgrid alleges that \u201cTwitter selects, orders, and/or arranges content to display to\n 24 other Twitter users\u201d (FAC \u00b6 11), it never alleges that Twitter\u2019s employees (human\n 25\n 26\n 1\n Although Backgrid\u2019s FAC asserts a single claim for \u201cDirect, Contributory, and\n Vicarious Copyright Infringement,\u201d these are distinct theories of infringement and\n 27 should be analyzed separately for purposes of determining whether Backgrid has\n 28 stated a valid claim under any theory.\n\n -8- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 15 of 29 Page ID #:6192\n\n\n\n\n 1 actors) take these actions, or that they are not triggered automatically by algorithms\n 2 that control the overall functioning of Twitter\u2019s website. Because Backgrid fails to\n 3 allege that Twitter was actively involved in the infringement beyond the passive\n 4 operation of its website, the FAC fails to state a claim for direct infringement. See\n 5 Giganews, 847 F.3d at 668 (\u201cThe evidence before us shows only that Giganews\u2019s\n 6 actions were akin to \u2018passively storing material at the direction of users in order to\n 7 make that material available to other users upon request,\u2019 or automatically copying,\n 8 storing, and transmitting materials upon instigation by others.\u201d) (citing CoStar Grp,.\n 9 Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (9th Cir. 2004)).\n 10 Indeed, this Court has previously dismissed the same claim for direct\n 11 infringement against Twitter supported by nearly identical allegations. In Stross v.\n 12 Twitter, the plaintiff (a photographer) alleged that Twitter (1) \u201cdesigned its website to\n 13 algorithmically select content\u201d and (2) \u201cdirectly and affirmatively\u201d decided what\n 14 content to display \u201cthrough both human employees and automated processes designed\n 15 and controlled by human employees.\u201d 2022 WL 1843142, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28,\n 16 2022) (internal quotes and citations omitted). The plaintiff further alleged that\n 17 \u201cTwitter decides what content (including photographs) is suggested, recommended,\n 18 and/or displayed to users\u201d through Twitter\u2019s \u201ccuration of the \u2018trends,\u2019 \u2018moments,\u2019\n 19 searches, and advertisements on Twitter\u2019s Platform, displays photographs to non-\n 20 posting users that would otherwise only be seen on the posting user(s)\u2019s profile\n 21 page(s).\u201d Id. The Court found those allegations lacking for failure to specify\n 22 \u201cwhether Twitter\u2019s \u2018conduct\u2019 occurs automatically, akin to Zillow\u2019s \u2018behind-the-\n 23 scenes technical work,\u2019 or whether Twitter is actively involved in the alleged\n 24 infringement.\u201d Id. (citing Zillow, 913 F.3d at 738).\n 25 Here, as in Stross, Backgrid alleges that Twitter displays, chooses, arranges,\n 26 promotes, and stores the Celebrity Photographs (Dkt. 23 at \u00b6 34), but fails to specify\n 27 whether Twitter actively performs these acts, or whether the conduct stems from\n 28 automated functionality on Twitter\u2019s website. That failure is fatal to Backgrid\u2019s\n\n -9- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 16 of 29 Page ID #:6193\n\n\n\n\n 1 allegations of direct infringement. See Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *2; see also\n 2 Rosen v. eBay, Inc., 2018 WL 4808513, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018) (dismissing\n 3 direct infringement claim where plaintiff did not allege that \u201cDefendant\u2019s systems are\n 4 not automated, or that [a user] did not use Defendant\u2019s automated systems to post the\n 5 infringing images\u201d).\n 6 Nor can Backgrid sustain a claim for direct infringement based on its\n 7 allegations that Twitter \u201ccontinued\u201d to \u201cpublicly display the photos long after being\n 8 apprised of infringement\u201d and \u201cstore copies of the photos on [its] servers without\n 9 Backgrid\u2019s consent.\u201d Dkt. 23 at \u00b6 34. This Court has \u201calready conclusively\n 10 determined\u201d that the \u201cfailure to remove the infringing images from [the defendant\u2019s]\n 11 servers after it received Plaintiff\u2019s [notices of infringement] does not constitute the\n 12 volitional conduct necessary for direct copyright infringement.\u201d Rosen, 2018 WL\n 13 4808513, at *5.\n 14 Backgrid also fails to establish any \u201cnexus\u201d between Twitter\u2019s conduct that is\n 15 \u201csufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying.\u201d Zillow, 918 F.3d at 732. Apart\n 16 from its allegations that Twitter continued to publicly display and store the Celebrity\n 17 Photographs, Backgrid merely alleges generally that Twitter uses its \u201cexplore\u201d feature\n 18 to \u201cchoose and arrange infringing content\u201d and \u201cpromot[e] tweets based on\n 19 subscription models.\u201d FAC \u00b6 34. Such allegations lack any nexus between Twitter\u2019s\n 20 conduct and the infringement of the Celebrity Photographs specifically. See Stross,\n 21 2022 WL 1843142, at *3 (\u201cNot a single allegation in Plaintiff\u2019s FAC suggests that\n 22 Twitter actively (or even passively) copied, shared, or reposted Plaintiff\u2019s posts.\u201d)\n 23 (emphasis in original). Like the plaintiff in Stross, Backgrid \u201cwould have the Court\n 24 infer that Twitter displayed [its] photographs \u2018in the same way\u2019 that it displays other\n 25 photographs on its platform,\u201d which is insufficient to state a claim for direct\n 26 infringement. Id.\n 27\n 28\n\n -10- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 17 of 29 Page ID #:6194\n\n\n\n\n 1 B. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Indirect Infringement\n 2 1. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Underlying Direct\n Infringement By Any Third Party\n 3\n A plaintiff seeking to show secondary copyright infringement (including\n 4\n contributory and vicarious infringement) must establish, as a threshold matter, \u201cthat\n 5\n there has been direct infringement by third parties.\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,\n 6\n Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,\n 7\n 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V.,\n 8\n 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (\u201cLike contributory liability, vicarious\n 9\n liability requires an underlying act of direct infringement.\u201d).\n 10\n Here, Backgrid fails to allege that third-party Twitter users\u2014or any third party,\n 11\n for that matter\u2014directly infringed Backgrid\u2019s asserted copyrights. The FAC contains\n 12\n numerous allegations regarding, among other things, Twitter\u2019s alleged failures to stop\n 13\n vaguely identified infringement on its platform. See, e.g., Dkt. 23 at \u00b6 35. Yet the\n 14\n FAC falls short of alleging any specific instances of direct infringement by any third\n 15\n party through whom Twitter might become secondarily liable. For that reason alone,\n 16\n the Court should dismiss Backgrid\u2019s contributory and vicarious infringement claims.\n 17\n 2. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Contributory Infringement\n 18\n In the Ninth Circuit, \u201cone contributorily infringes when he (1) has knowledge\n 19\n of another\u2019s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces\n 20\n that infringement.\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass\u2019n, 494 F.3d 788, 795\n 21\n (9th Cir. 2007). Backgrid fails to adequately allege these elements.\n 22\n First, to allege Backgrid\u2019s \u201cknowledge of another\u2019s infringement,\u201d Backgrid\n 23\n must allege that Twitter had \u201cactual knowledge of specific acts of infringement.\u201d\n 24\n Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 2014 WL 8628031, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014).\n 25\n Backgrid tries to meet this standard by relying on its alleged transmission of \u201cDMCA\n 26\n takedown notices.\u201d See FAC \u00b6 18. As a matter of law, however, a DMCA notice is\n 27\n \u201ceffective\u201d to put a service provider on notice of a claimed infringement only if it\n 28\n\n -11- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 18 of 29 Page ID #:6195\n\n\n\n\n 1 includes a specified set of information concerning the copyrighted work and the\n 2 infringing content at issue. See 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3); see also Greg Young Publishing,\n 3 Inc. v. Zazzle, Inc., 2017 WL 2729584, at *7 (C.D. Cal., May 1, 2017) (\u201ca deficient\n 4 notice cannot be used to establish knowledge\u201d).\n 5 Here, Backgrid alleges in conclusory fashion that \u201ceach\u201d of the \u201cmore than\n 6 6,700 DMCA takedown notices\u201d it sent to Twitter \u201ccomplied with\u201d 17 U.S.C.\n 7 512(c)(3). FAC \u00b6 18. But apart from providing the dates when it sent a tiny portion\n 8 of those notices and the locations (urls) of the Twitter posts supposedly at issue in that\n 9 subset, Backgrid offers no facts at all about its notices\u2014and nothing that could\n 10 substantiate its claim that they actually were \u201ccompliant with\u201d the DMCA, and thus\n 11 \u201ceffective\u201d to put Twitter on notice of the alleged infringements. Backgrid notably\n 12 does not include copies of any of its purported DMCA notices, or even describe the\n 13 contents or format of them. Nor does it allege that its notices identified the\n 14 copyrighted photographs at issue in them, which is required under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7\n 15 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). And other than the small sample of its notices relating to two alleged\n 16 Twitter users (\u201cBSO\u201d and \u201cfoochia\u201d), Backgrid does not provide the dates of the\n 17 notices or the locations (urls) of the infringing content it allegedly requested to be\n 18 removed, or even a description of that content. Backgrid also does not allege any\n 19 facts about Twitter\u2019s responses to its purported DMCA notices, including whether\n 20 Twitter requested additional information to help it identify the alleged infringing\n 21 content, and whether Backgrid provided that information.\n 22 For sake of comparison, in Stross v. Twitter, Judge Wilson concluded that the\n 23 plaintiff had adequately alleged Twitter\u2019s knowledge of the alleged infringement for\n 24 purposes of its claim for contributory infringement based on the plaintiff\u2019s purported\n 25 DMCA notices, but the plaintiff there provided far more information regarding its\n 26 notices than Backgrid does here. In particular, the plaintiff provided the dates of each\n 27 notice it sent, and attached as exhibits to its complaint copies of its email\n 28 correspondence with Twitter relating to them. See Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *5.\n\n -12- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 19 of 29 Page ID #:6196\n\n\n\n\n 1 The plaintiff also described its DMCA notices in detail, explaining that each included\n 2 \u201c(1) a table of each Subject Work matched to screen captures of the corresponding\n 3 Infringing Use(s) and their respective URLs, and (2) an additional list of those URLs\n 4 (i.e., URLs for the tweets displaying unauthorized copies of the Subject Works paired\n 5 with URLs specifically for the images included in/with those tweets) in clickable\n 6 form,\u201d and provided a representative sample of the format and content of its notices.\n 7 See Stross v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:21-CV-8360-SVW, Dkt. 22 (First Amended\n 8 Complaint) (C.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2022).\n 9 In contrast, Backgrid has provided no information at all as to the vast majority\n 10 of its purported DMCA notices, other than a conclusory statement that they are\n 11 \u201ccompliant.\u201d Backgrid\u2019s conclusory allegation about the purported legal sufficiency\n 12 of its DMCA notices is insufficient to allege Twitter\u2019s \u201cactual knowledge of specific\n 13 acts of infringement.\u201d See, e.g., Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009); Fayer, 649 F.3d at\n 14 1064. Backgrid has thus failed to allege the first required element of its claim for\n 15 contributory infringement.\n 16 Second, and for the same reasons, Backgrid fails to adequately allege that\n 17 Twitter \u201cmaterially contributed\u201d to the alleged infringement. \u201cIn the online context,\n 18 [the Ninth Circuit has] held that a computer system operator is liable under a material\n 19 contribution theory of infringement if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing\n 20 material is available using its system, and can take simple measures to prevent further\n 21 damage to copyrighted works, yet continues to provide access to infringing works.\u201d\n 22 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 671 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotes\n 23 and citations omitted). As discussed above, Backgrid has not provided sufficient\n 24 allegations to demonstrate that it adequately informed Twitter of the alleged\n 25 infringements through its purported DMCA notices. Backgrid\u2019s failure to allege that\n 26 Twitter had actual knowledge of the specific infringing material available on its\n 27 systems is fatal to Backgrid\u2019s claim of \u201cmaterial contribution,\u201d and is an independent\n 28 basis to dismiss Backgrid\u2019s claim for contributory infringement.\n\n -13- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 20 of 29 Page ID #:6197\n\n\n\n\n 1 Third, Backgrid likewise fails to allege inducement\u2014and it does not appear to\n 2 even attempt to do so. \u201c[T]he standard for inducement liability is providing a service\n 3 with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.\u201d Visa, 494 F.3d at 801\n 4 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 937\n 5 (2005)). \u201c[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or actual infringing uses would\n 6 not be enough here to subject [a defendant] to liability. Nor would ordinary acts\n 7 incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or\n 8 product updates, support liability in themselves.\u201d Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.\n 9 \u201cInstead, inducement premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and\n 10 conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage\n 11 innovation having a lawful promise.\u201d Visa, 494 F.3d at 801 (quoting id. at 937).\n 12 According to the FAC, \u201c[t]o keep its users engaged while promoting the\n 13 advertisements on which its revenue depends, Twitter also sends emails to its users\n 14 with links to tweets that they might not otherwise see. Twitter thus provides links to\n 15 tweets from accounts that are not \u2018followed\u2019 by the targeted user.\u201d FAC \u00b6 10.\n 16 Backgrid seems to suggest that these emails from Twitter were inducement, but it fails\n 17 to allege that Twitter included the Celebrity Photographs in any such emails.\n 18 Backgrid also alleges that \u201cit is important to Twitter to have attractive and compelling\n 19 tweets placed around the advertisement tweet to gain more traffic and more\n 20 advertisement interaction,\u201d but again, it does not allege that any of its copyrighted\n 21 works were placed around any advertisements on Twitter\u2019s websites. Id. In fact,\n 22 nowhere in the FAC does Backgrid allege that its Celebrity Photographs were emailed\n 23 or promoted to users in any way. Backgrid merely describes a business model that\n 24 Twitter utilizes to promote tweets, which does not constitute an accusation that\n 25 Twitter is \u201cproviding a service with the object of promoting its use to infringe\n 26 copyright.\u201d Visa, 494 F.3d at 801. At best, the FAC possibly alleges that Twitter has\n 27 \u201cmere knowledge of infringing potential,\u201d but that is insufficient to subject Twitter to\n 28 liability for contributory infringement. Id.\n\n -14- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 21 of 29 Page ID #:6198\n\n\n\n\n 1 3. Backgrid Fails To Adequately Allege Vicarious Infringement\n 2 \u201cTo prevail on a claim for vicarious infringement, a plaintiff must prove \u2018the\n 3 defendant has (1) the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a\n 4 direct financial interest in the infringing activity.\u2019\u201d Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,\n 5 847 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Visa, 494 F.3d at 802 (9th Cir. 2007)).\n 6 The allegations in the FAC fail to satisfy either element.\n 7 First, the Ninth Circuit has held that \u201cthe right and ability to supervise the\n 8 infringing conduct\u201d \u201crequires both a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing\n 9 conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so.\u201d VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Group, Inc.,\n 10 918 F.3d 723, 746 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotes and citations omitted). The\n 11 \u201cpertinent inquiry is not whether [the defendant] has the right and ability to control\n 12 its system, but rather, whether it has the right and ability to control the infringing\n 13 activity.\u201d Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal.\n 14 2008) (emphasis in original). This element further \u201cpresupposes some antecedent\n 15 ability to limit or filter copyrighted material.\u201d Tur v. YouTube, 2007 WL 1893635, at\n 16 *3 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007) (emphasis added).\n 17 In Stross, the Court summarily dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s vicarious infringement\n 18 claim against Twitter on the grounds it was \u201cpremised entirely on conclusory\n 19 allegations and fails to state a claim.\u201d 2022 WL 1843142, at *4. In particular, the\n 20 Court noted that the plaintiff had pleaded \u201cno facts to suggest that Twitter had the\n 21 practical ability to locate and remove his photos without any knowledge of them or\n 22 their location.\u201d Id. at *4 n.2.\n 23 Backgrid\u2019s allegations fare no better. It simply alleges in conclusory fashion\n 24 that \u201cTwitter has the right and ability to supervise the infringement because it has both\n 25 a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical\n 26 ability to do so, as shown by its willingness and ability to take down infringement\n 27 identified in DMCA notices sent by other parties.\u201d FAC \u00b6 35. But Backgrid fails to\n 28 allege that Twitter has the ability to identify and ferret out any infringing content\u2014\n\n -15- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 22 of 29 Page ID #:6199\n\n\n\n\n 1 let alone the Celebrity Photographs in particular\u2014without being told where to locate\n 2 them. Backgrid\u2019s allegations are insufficient. See Zillow, 918 F.3d at 746 (affirming\n 3 district court grant of Zillow\u2019s motion for JNOV on vicarious infringement where\n 4 \u201cthere was insufficient evidence that Zillow had the technical ability to screen out or\n 5 identify infringing VHT photos among the many photos that users saved or uploaded\n 6 daily to [Zillow\u2019s platform]\u201d).\n 7 Second, the \u201cessential aspect\u201d of the inquiry as to whether Twitter has a direct\n 8 financial interest in the infringing activity \u201cis whether there is a causal relationship\n 9 between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless\n 10 of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a defendant\u2019s overall profits.\u201d\n 11 Giganews, 847 F.3d at 673. In the context of a website, financial benefit can be shown\n 12 when consumers were drawn to defendant\u2019s services because of the infringing\n 13 materials at issue. Id. However, a plaintiff must show more than that consumers were\n 14 simply drawn to the defendant\u2019s services because infringing materials more generally\n 15 were available on the defendant\u2019s website. See, e.g., id. at 674 (affirming dismissal\n 16 where plaintiff \u201cprovides evidence that suggests only that some subscribers joined\n 17 [defendant\u2019s website] to access infringing material generally; [plaintiff] does not\n 18 proffer evidence showing that [defendant] attracted subscriptions because of the\n 19 infringing [plaintiff] material\u201d); Zagorsky-Beaudoin v. Rhino Entertainment\n 20 Company, 2019 WL 4259788, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2019) (\u201cThe Complaint includes\n 21 no factual allegations that the listing of the [at issue] track on Defendant eBay\u2019s site\n 22 affected Defendant eBay\u2019s user base in any way, and thus, Plaintiff has not alleged\n 23 facts that Defendant eBay had a direct financial interest in others\u2019 alleged direct\n 24 infringement of her copyright.\u201d).\n 25 Here, Backgrid alleges that Twitter is liable for vicarious infringement because\n 26 it had a direct financial interest in using information gathered from tweets to target\n 27 advertisements to specific user audiences and that, \u201con information and belief,\u201d the\n 28 Celebrity Photographs \u201cwere displayed in tweet-feeds, along with advertisements that\n\n -16- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 23 of 29 Page ID #:6200\n\n\n\n\n 1 targeted the particular groups of Twitter users.\u201d FAC \u00b6 35. But again, the FAC fails\n 2 to allege that any of the Celebrity Photographs were specifically utilized or promoted\n 3 to target advertisements to specific user audiences. Backgrid merely \u201csuggests only\n 4 that some subscribers joined [Twitter] to access infringing material generally.\u201d\n 5 Giganews, 847 F.3d at 674 (emphasis added). Backgrid also does not proffer any\n 6 facts \u201cshowing that [Twitter] attracted subscriptions because of the infringing []\n 7 material,\u201d but instead suggests that its Celebrity Photographs were posted alongside\n 8 advertisements, like every other post on Twitter\u2019s website. Id. Nor does Backgrid\n 9 show that the Celebrity Photographs \u201caffected [Twitter\u2019s] user base in any way,\u201d as\n 10 is required to show direct financial interest. Zagorsky-Beaudoin, 2019 WL 4259788,\n 11 at *9. And Backgrid fails to offer any factual basis for its supposed \u201cinformation and\n 12 belief\u201d regarding Twitter\u2019s \u201cdisplay\u201d of the Celebrity Photographs, rendering these\n 13 allegations deficient for this reason too. See, e.g., Poppy Tex & Designs, Inc. v. Cont\u2019l\n 14 Logistic Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 7315343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) (allegations\n 15 made \u201con information and belief\u201d must be \u201caccompanied by a statement of facts upon\n 16 which the belief is founded\u201d).\n 17 Thus, as the Court concluded in Stross, the FAC here \u201cdoes not establish any\n 18 sort of plausible link between the photographs at issue and any financial benefit to\n 19 Twitter.\u201d Stross, 2022 WL 1843142, at *4, n.2. As a result, Backgrid\u2019s claim for\n 20 vicarious infringement fails.\n 21 II. BACKGRID FAILS TO STATE A VALID CLAIM FOR\n DECLARATORY RELIEF\n 22\n To the extent Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief seeks a sweeping\n 23\n declaration that would adjudicate Twitter\u2019s rights to assert a DMCA defense to claims\n 24\n for infringement by parties other than Backgrid involving works that are not at issue\n 25\n in the FAC, it is wildly overbroad, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over it. And even\n 26\n if construed more narrowly to apply only to Backgrid\u2019s asserted copyrighted works,\n 27\n 28\n\n -17- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 24 of 29 Page ID #:6201\n\n\n\n\n 1 the claim still fails as a premature, duplicative, and unnecessary attempt to adjudicate\n 2 an affirmative defense through declaratory relief.\n 3 A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Backgrid\u2019s Sweeping Claim\n For Declaratory Relief\n 4\n Federal courts are \u201ccourts of limited jurisdiction,\u201d possessing \u201conly that power\n 5\n authorized by the Constitution and statute.\u201d Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,\n 6\n Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). \u201cUnder Article III of the Constitution, federal courts\n 7\n may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.\u201d Lewis v. Continental\n 8\n Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations omitted). \u201cArticle III denies federal\n 9\n courts the power \u2018to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the\n 10\n case before them, and confines them to resolving \u2018real and substantial controversies\n 11\n admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished\n 12\n from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.\u2019\u201d\n 13\n Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).\n 14\n To satisfy Article III\u2019s case-or-controversy requirement, the dispute underlying\n 15\n a declaratory judgment action must \u201cbe \u2018definite and concrete, touching the legal\n 16\n relations of the parties having adverse legal interests,\u201d \u201cbe \u2018real and substantial,\u2019\u201d and\n 17\n \u201cadmi[t] of a specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as\n 18\n distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical\n 19\n state of facts.\u201d MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).\n 20\n \u201cBasically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the\n 21\n circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between the parties having\n 22\n adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of\n 23\n a declaratory judgment.\u201d Veoh Networks, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (citing\n 24\n MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127). Because of the limitations on a Court\u2019s jurisdiction\n 25\n over claims for declaratory relief, \u201c[c]ourts must exercise caution in entertaining\n 26\n declaratory relief actions where rulings are sought that would reach far beyond the\n 27\n 28\n\n -18- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 25 of 29 Page ID #:6202\n\n\n\n\n 1 particular case.\u201d Id. at 1271 (citing Pub. Serv. Com. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243\n 2 (1952)).\n 3 Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief fails to meet these basic requirements\n 4 for Article III jurisdiction. Backgrid\u2019s claim seeks a declaration \u201cthat Twitter has\n 5 neither adopted nor reasonably implemented a repeat infringer policy, and, as such, is\n 6 liable for each of the works infringed on its platform and is not entitled to the safe\n 7 harbor in any circumstances for any work until it complies with Section 512(i).\u201d\n 8 FAC \u00b6 46 (emphasis added). In effect, Backgrid asks the Court to issue a sweeping\n 9 judgment of Twitter\u2019s repeat infringer policies as to infringement of any and all works\n 10 that users have displayed on its platform, apparently in the past, present, and future,\n 11 and regardless of whether Backgrid holds copyrights in those works and asserts in the\n 12 FAC that Twitter infringed them.\n 13 Article III confers no jurisdiction on this Court to grant such relief. To the\n 14 extent Backgrid\u2019s claim would encompass potential infringement on Twitter\u2019s\n 15 platform of copyrights owned by third parties, or that Backgrid otherwise does not\n 16 assert in the FAC, the relief Backgrid seeks \u201cwould necessarily take the form of an\n 17 advisory opinion.\u201d Veoh, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. In Veoh, the plaintiff sought a\n 18 declaration that it was \u201cnot liable for infringing any of Defendant\u2019s rights and is\n 19 entitled to the Section 512(c) safe harbor.\u201d Id. The Court concluded it lacked\n 20 jurisdiction to decide the claim because the plaintiff sought \u201ca blanket validation of\n 21 the ongoing legality of [its] business model\u201d through a declaration of its entitlement\n 22 to a safe harbor \u201cas equally applicable against Defendant as to any other copyright\n 23 holder.\u201d Id. As in Veoh, \u201cthe Court cannot determine whether a safe harbor for\n 24 copyright infringement exists without knowing which rights are at stake.\u201d Id.; see\n 25 also id. at 1270 (\u201cSuch a declaration\u2019s effect on each one of Defendant UMG\u2019s\n 26 copyrights would be uncertain enough; the effect on all other copyright holders not\n 27 before the Court would be even more nebulous.\u201d). Backgrid\u2019s claim must be\n 28\n\n -19- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 26 of 29 Page ID #:6203\n\n\n\n\n 1 dismissed because it asks the Court to adjudge rights of individuals and entities that\n 2 are not parties to this action.\n 3 B. Backgrid\u2019s Declaratory Relief Claim Is Otherwise Improper\n 4 Even if the Court had jurisdiction over Backgrid\u2019s sweeping and overbroad\n 5 claim for declaratory relief\u2014which it does not\u2014the Court should exercise its\n 6 discretion to dismiss the claim as either premature or redundant. \u201cThe Declaratory\n 7 Judgment Act gives the Court the authority to declare the rights and legal relations of\n 8 interested parties, but not a duty to do so.\u201d Id. (citing Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music\n 9 Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 533 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Newman v. Google LLC, 2021 WL\n 10 2633423, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (\u201cThe Court\u2019s jurisdiction under the\n 11 Declaratory Judgment Act is discretionary, and the Court has an obligation to exercise\n 12 caution in deciding whether to exercise that discretion.\u201d). And \u201c[a]s a general rule,\n 13 the Court should deny declaratory relief \u2018when it will neither aid in clarifying and\n 14 settling legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford the parties\n 15 relief from the uncertainty and controversy they faced.\u2019\u201d Stickrath v. Globalstar, Inc.,\n 16 2008 WL 2050990, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (quoting Greater Los Angeles\n 17 Council on Deadness, Inc v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 1987)).\n 18 Here, Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief should be dismissed because it is\n 19 entirely anticipatory and therefore premature: Twitter\u2019s defense under Section\n 20 512(i)\u2019s safe harbor is not presently before the Court, yet Backgrid nonetheless asks\n 21 the Court to preemptively decide its validity. The court\u2019s decision in Divino Grp.\n 22 LLC v. Google LLC, 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021), is instructive. There,\n 23 the plaintiffs sought a declaration that Section 230 of the Communications Decency\n 24 Act was unconstitutional. 2021 WL 51715, at *10. The Divino court dismissed the\n 25 claim for declaratory relief, reasoning that the plaintiffs appeared to have \u201cincluded\n 26 [that claim] in anticipation of defendants\u2019 assertion of Section 230 immunity as an\n 27 affirmative defense to plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\u201d Id. at *11. The court explained that \u201cusing\n 28 the Declaratory Judgment Act to anticipate an affirmative defense is not ordinarily\n\n -20- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 27 of 29 Page ID #:6204\n\n\n\n\n 1 proper,\u201d noting that \u201cnumerous courts have refused to grant declaratory relief to a\n 2 party who has come to court only to assert an anticipatory defen se.\u201d Id. (quoting\n 3 Veoh, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1271). The court further reasoned that \u201c[d]ismissal of a\n 4 declaratory relief claim intended to anticipate an affirmative defense is appropriate,\n 5 particularly where, as here, the Court need not consider the affirmative defense in\n 6 order to resolve defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 other claims.\u201d Id. at *11.\n 7 Similarly, Backgrid\u2019s attempt to adjudicate Twitter\u2019s anticipated DMCA\n 8 defense is an improper use of the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Newman v. Google\n 9 LLC, 2021 WL 2633423, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (\u201c[D]ismissal of a claim\n 10 under the Declaratory Judgment Act is appropriate where a claim is intended to\n 11 anticipate an affirmative defense.\u201d). Moreover, dismissal of Backgrid\u2019s claim is\n 12 particularly appropriate because, as in Divino, the Court need not consider Backgrid\u2019s\n 13 declaratory relief claim to resolve this Motion with respect to Backgrid\u2019s other claims.\n 14 See Divino, 2021 WL 51715, at *11; see also Newman, 2021 WL 2633423, at *14\n 15 (\u201cThis principle is particularly relevant where, as is the case here, the Court does not\n 16 consider Defendants\u2019 affirmative defense in granting Defendants\u2019 motion to\n 17 dismiss.\u201d) (citing Divino, 2021 WL 51715, at *11).\n 18 Finally, even if it were otherwise permissible for Backgrid to anticipate\n 19 Twitter\u2019s potential DMCA defense, and the Court otherwise had jurisdiction over\n 20 Backgrid\u2019s claim for declaratory relief, the claim would still fail for being redundant\n 21 of Twitter\u2019s defense, and thus unnecessary. Courts routinely dismiss such redundant\n 22 claims. See Stickrath, 2008 WL 2050990, at *3 (\u201cNumerous courts have used that\n 23 discretion to dismiss counterclaims under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 12(f) where they are\n 24 either the \u2018mirror image\u2019 of claims in the complaint or redundant of affirmative\n 25 defenses.\u201d). There is no aspect of Twitter\u2019s potential DMCA defense that could not\n 26 be adjudicated through Twitter\u2019s assertion of that defense. There is thus no need for\n 27 a duplicative claim for declaratory relief that seeks to do the same thing.\n 28\n\n -21- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 28 of 29 Page ID #:6205\n\n\n\n\n 1 CONCLUSION\n 2 For the foregoing reasons, Twitter respectfully requests that the Court dismiss\n 3 the FAC without further leave to amend.\n 4\n DATED: May 12, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n 5\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 6\n 7\n 8 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 9 Daniel C. Posner\n Attorneys for Twitter, Inc.\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -22- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26 Filed 05/12/23 Page 29 of 29 Page ID #:6206\n\n\n\n\n 1 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n 2 The undersigned, counsel of record for Twitter, Inc., certifies that this brief\n 3 contains 6,985 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.\n 4\n DATED: May 12, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n 5\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 6\n 7\n 8 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 9 Daniel C. Posner\n Justin C. Griffin\n 10 Attorneys for Twitter, Inc.\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -23- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-05-12T15:22:05.676224-07:00","document_number":"26","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031040020675","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Motion to Dismiss Case","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/329406007/","id":329406007,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/26/1/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-05-12T20:35:00.547519-07:00","date_modified":"2023-11-17T01:15:13.401498-08:00","sha1":"a2e74b4bea157c66da372b4f7b39fea1cb7b3ddf","page_count":2,"file_size":145637,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.26.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.26.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:6207\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP\n Daniel C. Posner (Bar No. 232009)\n 2 danposner@quinnemanuel.com\n Justin C. Griffin (Bar No. 234675)\n 3 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com\n Laurenne M. Babayan (Bar No. 348075)\n 4 laurennebabayan@quinnemanuel.com\n 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543\n Telephone: (213) 443-3000\n 6 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100\n 7 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 10\n 11 BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n corporation,\n 12 [PROPOSED] ORDER\n Plaintiff, GRANTING DEFENDANT\n 13 TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO\n vs. DISMISS\n 14\n TWITTER, INC., a Delaware\n 15 corporation and Does 1-10, inclusive, Date: July 21, 2023\n Time: 8:30 a.m.\n 16 Defendants. Judge: The Honorable Dolly M. Gee\n Courtroom: 8C\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 26-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:6208\n\n\n\n\n 1 [PROPOSED] ORDER\n 2 The Court, having considered Defendant Twitter\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, and\n 3 finding good cause, HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant\u2019s motion is GRANTED.\n 4 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff\u2019s First Amended Complaint is hereby\n 5 DISMISSED with prejudice.\n 6 IT IS SO ORDERED.\n 7\n 8\n 9 DATED: ________, 2023\n 10\n 11\n 12\n Hon. Dolly M. Gee\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -2- Case No. 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS\n [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT TWITTER\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-06-21T20:01:41.062959-07:00","document_number":"26","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"031040020676","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-05-12T15:06:05.799802-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.612412-07:00","date_filed":"2023-05-12","time_filed":"14:32:40","entry_number":26,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-05-12.001","pacer_sequence_number":77,"description":"NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant Twitter, Inc.. Motion set for hearing on 7/21/2023 at 08:30 AM before Judge Dolly M. Gee. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Posner, Daniel) (Entered: 05/12/2023)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/267365542/","id":267365542,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/273561962/","id":273561962,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/25/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-04-07T16:04:45.533202-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.598073-07:00","sha1":"2d82d856a934d786fdc77d188c9b3aff5d4511ed","page_count":2,"file_size":104710,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.25.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.25.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 25 Filed 04/07/23 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:6176\n\n\n\n\n 1\n 2\n 3\n 4\n 5\n 6\n 7\n 8\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 9\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 10\n WESTERN DIVISION\n 11\n 12\n BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. CV 22-9462-DMG (ADSx)\n 13 corporation,\n ORDER APPROVING\n 14 Plaintiff, STIPULATION TO EXTEND\n DEFENDANT\u2019S DEADLINE TO\n 15 vs. RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF\u2019S FIRST\n AMENDED COMPLAINT [24]\n 16 TWITTER, Inc., a Delaware\n corporation and DOES 1-10, inclusive,\n 17\n Defendant.\n 18\n 19\n 20 The parties in the above-captioned action have filed a Stipulation to Extend\n 21 Defendant Twitter, Inc.\u2019s Deadline to Respond to Plaintiff BackGrid USA, Inc.\u2019s\n 22 First Amended Complaint (hereafter \u201cFAC\u201d). Having considered the Stipulation,\n 23 and good cause appearing, it is APPROVED.\n 24 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:\n 25 1. The deadline for the Parties to complete a meet and confer pursuant to\n 26 Rule 7-3 on any Rule 12 motion Defendant may file in response to the\n 27 FAC shall be April 21, 2023.\n 28 2. The deadline for Defendant to respond to the FAC shall be May 12, 2023.\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 25 Filed 04/07/23 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:6177\n\n\n\n\n 1 3. The deadline for Plaintiff to oppose any Rule 12 motion filed by\n 2 Defendant in response to the FAC shall be June 16, 2023.\n 3 4. the deadline for Defendant to submit its reply in support of any Rule 12\n 4 motion filed by Defendant in response to the FAC shall be June 30, 2023.\n 5 5. The hearing on any Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in response to the\n 6 FAC shall be July 21, 2023 at 9:30 a.m.\n 7 IT IS SO ORDERED.\n 8\n DATED: April 7, 2023\n 9 DOLLY M. GEE\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n -1-\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-06-21T22:01:37.741202-07:00","document_number":"25","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031039803410","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-04-07T16:04:45.524006-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.584479-07:00","date_filed":"2023-04-07","time_filed":"15:49:48","entry_number":25,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-04-07.001","pacer_sequence_number":71,"description":"ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO EXTEND DEFENDANT'S DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT by Judge Dolly M. Gee: The Stipulation 24 is APPROVED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) The deadline for the parties to complete a meet and confer pursuant to Rule 7-3 on any Rule 12 motion Defendant Twitter, Inc. may file in response to the First Amended Complaint (\"FAC\") 23 shall be 4/21/2023. (2) The deadline for Defendant to respond to the FAC shall be 5/12/2023. (3) The deadline for Plaintiff to oppose any Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in response to the FAC shall be 6/16/2023. (4) The deadline for Defendant to submit its reply in support of any Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in response to the FAC shall be 6/30/2023. (5) The hearing on any Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in response to the FAC shall be 7/21/2023 at 9:30 AM. (gk) (Entered: 04/07/2023)","tags":[]},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/263550379/","id":263550379,"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/66693889/","recap_documents":[{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/269742601/","id":269742601,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/24/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-04-04T20:31:22.960079-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.567756-07:00","sha1":"5f5ed2058ebc304d3612b750855d1a0a3ac7f32c","page_count":5,"file_size":146633,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.24.0.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.24.0.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24 Filed 04/04/23 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:6169\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP\n Daniel C. Posner (Bar No. 232009)\n 2 danposner@quinnemanuel.com\n Justin C. Griffin (Bar No. 234675)\n 3 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com\n Laurenne M. Babayan (Bar No. 348075)\n 4 laurennebabayan@quinnemanuel.com\n 865 South Figueroa Street, 10 th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543\n Telephone: (213) 443-3000\n 6 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100\n 7 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 8\n UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 9\n CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA\n 10\n 11\n BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. CV 22-9462-DMG (ADSx)\n 12 corporation,\n STIPULATION TO EXTEND\n 13 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT\u2019S DEADLINE TO\n RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF\u2019S FIRST\n 14 vs. AMENDED COMPLAINT\n 15 TWITTER, INC., a Delaware\n corporation and DOES 1-10, inclusive, The Honorable Dolly M. Gee\n 16\n Defendants. Courtroom 8C\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n Case No. CV 22-9462-DMG (ADSx)\n STIPULATION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF\u2019S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24 Filed 04/04/23 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:6170\n\n\n\n\n 1 STIPULATION\n 2 Plaintiff BackGrid USA, Inc. and Defendant Twitter, Inc. (the \u201cParties\u201d), by\n 3 and through their undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:\n 4 WHEREAS, Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint in this matter on December\n 5 30, 2022 (Dkt. 1);\n 6 WHEREAS, on January 26, 2023, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation to\n 7 Extend Time to Respond to Initial Complaint pursuant to Rule 8-3 of the Local\n 8 Rules, which extended Defendant\u2019s response deadline to February 27, 2023 (Dkt.\n 9 11);\n 10 WHEREAS, on February 23, 2023, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation\n 11 Regarding First Amended Complaint and Deadline to Respond to Same, in which\n 12 Plaintiff agreed to file a First Amended Complaint by March 13, 2023, and\n 13 Defendant agreed to respond to it by April 14, 2023 (Dkt. 21);\n 14 WHEREAS, on February 28, 2023, the Court approved the Parties\u2019\n 15 Stipulation Regarding First Amended Complaint and Deadline to Respond to Same\n 16 (Dkt. 22);\n 17 WHEREAS, on March 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint\n 18 (\u201cFAC\u201d) (Dkt. 23);\n 19 WHEREAS, Daniel Posner, lead counsel for Defendant, has been co-lead\n 20 counsel in a trial in the Northern District of California since March 27, 2023, which\n 21 ended on April 3, 2023;\n 22 WHEREAS, Joanna Ardalan and David Quinto, lead counsel for Plaintiff,\n 23 have a trial scheduled for May 15 in Los Angeles Superior Court, which is expected\n 24 to last two weeks, but may go longer;\n 25 WHEREAS, on April 3, 2023, Defendant has requested to initiate a meet and\n 26 confer conference with Plaintiff regarding a potential motion to dismiss the FAC;\n 27 WHEREAS, in consideration of the Parties\u2019 counsel\u2019s availability relating to\n 28 their other work commitments and personal commitments in the beginning of\n\n 2\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24 Filed 04/04/23 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:6171\n\n\n\n\n 1 summer, the Parties desire to set a schedule for meeting and conferring on a\n 2 potential motion to dismiss the FAC, and for briefing and the hearing on any such\n 3 motion, that would accommodate the Parties\u2019 schedules;\n 4 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by the Parties, by and\n 5 through their respective counsel, and subject to the Court\u2019s approval, that the\n 6 following deadlines shall apply to Defendant\u2019s response to the FAC:\n 7 1. April 21, 2023: Deadline to complete meet and confer pursuant to Rule 7-\n 8 3 on any Rule 12 motion Defendant may file in response to FAC;\n 9 2. May 12, 2023: Deadline for Defendant to respond to FAC;\n 10 3. June 16, 2023: Deadline for Plaintiff to oppose any Rule 12 motion filed\n 11 by Defendant in response to FAC;\n 12 4. June 30, 2023: Deadline for Defendant to submit reply in support of any\n 13 Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in response to FAC; and\n 14 5. July 21, 2023: Hearing on any Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in\n 15 response to the FAC.\n 16\n 17 DATED: April 4, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 18\n 19\n 20 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 21 Daniel C. Posner\n 22 Justin C. Griffin\n Laurenne M. Babayan\n 23 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n 3\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24 Filed 04/04/23 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:6172\n\n\n\n\n 1 DATED: April 4, 2023 ONE LLP\n 2\n 3\n By /s/ Jo Ardalan\n 4\n Jo Ardalan\n 5 Attorney for Plaintiff BackGrid USA, Inc.\n 6\n 7\n 8\n 9\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n 4\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24 Filed 04/04/23 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:6173\n\n\n\n\n 1 ATTESTATION STATEMENT\n 2 I, Daniel C. Posner, the filer of this Joint Stipulation, attest pursuant to Rule\n 3 5-4.3.4(a)(2) of the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Central\n 4 District of California that all other signatories listed, and on whose behalf the filing\n 5 is submitted, concur in the filing\u2019s content and have authorized the filing.\n 6\n 7 DATED: April 4, 2023 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &\n SULLIVAN, LLP\n 8\n 9\n 10 By /s/ Daniel C. Posner\n 11 Daniel C. Posner\n 12 Justin C. Griffin\n Laurenne M. Babayan\n 13 Attorneys for Defendant Twitter, Inc.\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n\n 5\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-06-21T22:15:04.553326-07:00","document_number":"24","attachment_number":null,"pacer_doc_id":"031039779124","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":1,"description":"Stipulation to Extend Time to Answer (More than 30 days)","acms_document_guid":""},{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/recap-documents/353572629/","id":353572629,"tags":[],"absolute_url":"/docket/66693889/24/1/backgrid-usa-inc-v-twitter-inc/","date_created":"2023-06-21T22:11:00.473288-07:00","date_modified":"2023-11-17T01:15:13.268061-08:00","sha1":"292231bf31c51c4cb45c08d917ce253d4fceda17","page_count":2,"file_size":107394,"filepath_local":"recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.24.1.pdf","filepath_ia":"https://archive.org/download/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703/gov.uscourts.cacd.871703.24.1.pdf","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"thumbnail":null,"thumbnail_status":0,"plain_text":"Case 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24-1 Filed 04/04/23 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:6174\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP\n Daniel C. Posner (Bar No. 232009)\n 2 danposner@quinnemanuel.com\n Justin C. Griffin (Bar No. 234675)\n 3 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com\n Laurenne M. Babayan (Bar No. 348075)\n 4 laurennebabayan@quinnemanuel.com\n 865 South Figueroa Street, 10 th Floor\n 5 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543\n Telephone: (213) 443-3000\n 6 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100\n 7 Attorneys for Defendant, Twitter, inc.\n 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION\n 10\n 11 BACKGRID USA, INC., a California Case No. CV 22-9462-DMG (ADSx)\n corporation,\n 12 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING\n Plaintiff, STIPULATION TO EXTEND\n 13 DEFENDANT\u2019S DEADLINE TO\n vs. RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF\u2019S FIRST\n 14 AMENDED COMPLAINT\n TWITTER, Inc., a Delaware\n 15 corporation and DOES 1-10, inclusive,\n 16 Defendants. The Honorable Dolly M. Gee\n 17 Courtroom 8C\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n Case No. CV 22-9462-DMG (ADSx)\n [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO EXTEND DEFENDANT\u2019S DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\fCase 2:22-cv-09462-DMG-ADS Document 24-1 Filed 04/04/23 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:6175\n\n\n\n\n 1 The parties in the above-captioned action have filed a Stipulation to Extend\n 2 Defendant Twitter, Inc.\u2019s Deadline to Respond to Plaintiff BackGrid USA, Inc.\u2019s\n 3 First Amended Complaint (hereafter \u201cFAC\u201d). Having considered the Stipulation,\n 4 and good cause appearing, it is hereby GRANTED.\n 5 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:\n 6 1. The deadline for the Parties to complete a meet and confer pursuant to\n 7 Rule 7-3 on any Rule 12 motion Defendant may file in response to the\n 8 FAC shall be April 21, 2023.\n 9 2. The deadline for Defendant to respond to the FAC shall be May 12, 2023.\n 10 3. The deadline for Plaintiff to oppose any Rule 12 motion filed by\n 11 Defendant in response to the FAC shall be June 16, 2023.\n 12 4. the deadline for Defendant to submit reply in support of any Rule 12\n 13 motion filed by Defendant in response to the FAC shall be June 30, 2023.\n 14 5. The hearing on any Rule 12 motion filed by Defendant in response to the\n 15 FAC shall be July 21, 2023.\n 16\n 17 IT IS SO ORDERED.\n 18\n DATED:\n 19 Hon. Dolly M. Gee\n United States District Judge\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n 26\n 27\n 28\n -1- Case No. CV 22-9462-DMG (ADSx)\n [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO EXTEND DEFENDANT\u2019S DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO\n PLAINTIFF\u2019S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT\n\f","ocr_status":2,"date_upload":"2023-06-21T22:11:00.473068-07:00","document_number":"24","attachment_number":1,"pacer_doc_id":"031039779125","is_available":true,"is_free_on_pacer":null,"is_sealed":null,"document_type":2,"description":"Proposed Order","acms_document_guid":""}],"date_created":"2023-04-04T20:31:22.951056-07:00","date_modified":"2025-07-18T14:32:56.553568-07:00","date_filed":"2023-04-04","time_filed":"20:06:01","entry_number":24,"recap_sequence_number":"2023-04-04.001","pacer_sequence_number":68,"description":"Joint STIPULATION for Extension of Time to File Answer to May 12, 2023 re Amended Complaint/Petition,,,, 23 filed by Defendant Twitter, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Posner, Daniel) (Entered: 04/04/2023)","tags":[]}],"entries_total":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/docket-entries/?count=on&docket=66693889&page_size=40"}